Introduction

Journal of Peace Research

2020, Vol. 57(1) 3–14
Electoral violence: An introduction ª The Author(s) 2020

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DOI: 10.1177/0022343319889657
Sarah Birch journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr
Department of Political Economy, King’s College London
Ursula Daxecker
Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam
Kristine Höglund
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University

Abstract
Elections are held in nearly all countries in the contemporary world. Yet despite their aim of allowing for peaceful
transfers of power, elections held outside of consolidated democracies are often accompanied by substantial violence.
This special issue introduction article establishes electoral violence as a subtype of political violence with distinct
analytical and empirical dynamics. We highlight how electoral violence is distinct from other types of organized
violence, but also how it is qualitatively different from nonviolent electoral manipulation. The article then surveys
what we have learned about the causes and consequences of electoral violence, identifies important research gaps in
the literature, and proceeds to discuss the articles included in the special issue. The contributions advance research in
four domains: the micro-level targeting and consequences of electoral violence, the institutional foundations of
electoral violence, the conditions leading to high-stakes elections, and electoral violence in the context of other forms
of organized violence. The individual articles are methodologically and geographically diverse, encompassing ethno-
graphy, survey vignette and list experiments and survey data, quantitative analyses of subnational and crossnational
event data, and spanning Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

Keywords
conflict, democracy, elections, violence

Introduction especially those in democracies not yet fully consoli-

dated, are fraught with significant levels of violence dur-
The institution of elections is virtually ubiquitous in the
ing the campaign period, on polling day or in the
contemporary world. With the exception of a handful of
aftermath of voting. Electoral violence can result in casu-
states, including Brunei, China, Eritrea, Qatar, Saudi
alty tolls that meet the threshold of civil war within days
Arabia, and South Sudan, citizens today have the oppor-
or weeks; when this occurs, it can undo years of peace
tunity to elect their leaders in national elections. Elec-
building and development work, it can undermine dem-
tions are held even during periods of armed conflict; for
ocratic institutions, and it can even trigger civil war.
example, since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan
Post-election violence after the 2010 polls in Côte
in 2001, voters have gone to the polls eight times. In
d’Ivoire led to more than 1,000 civilian deaths, one
theory, the employment of elections to select leaders
million internally displaced people and 100,000 refugees
ought to provide a nonviolent alternative to the use of
in neighboring countries. Recent elections in
force to adjudicate between rival claims to rule, and it
ought to be a mechanism that allows citizens greater say
over how they are governed. Yet in practice, these expec- Corresponding author:
tations often fail to conform to reality. Many elections, u.daxecker@uva.nl
4 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 57(1)

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Iraq, Kenya, Nigeria, The aim of this special issue is twofold: first, we
Pakistan, and Zimbabwe were similarly accompanied establish electoral violence as a strategy used by political
by high levels of conflict. Violence, even at levels below actors to influence the course and outcome of electoral
that witnessed in the most egregious cases, undermines contests, and provide a conceptual approach for under-
the democratic character of elections by substituting free standing the distinctiveness of electoral violence. Sec-
choice with coercion and by deterring participation. ond, we address noteworthy gaps in scholarly
When force intrudes into electoral processes, something understanding of this topic. Whereas previous research
is seriously amiss with democratic institutions. has advanced knowledge pertaining to the institutional,
Given the substantive relevance of electoral violence social, and international underpinnings of electoral vio-
as a problem, it is important for academic researchers to lence, as well as having identified important conse-
have a clear understanding of its prevalence, causes, and quences for political behavior and attitudes,
dynamics, as well as what can be done to prevent it.1 The important gaps remain. The special issue contributes
study of electoral violence has grown out of two largely novel insights in four domains: the micro-level target-
independent streams in political science – the literature ing and consequences of electoral violence, the formal
on conflict and political violence, on the one hand, and and informal institutional determinants of electoral vio-
the literature on electoral misconduct, on the other. lence, how the stakes of elections are formed and influ-
Scholars of security and conflict first became inter- ence the prospects of electoral violence, and how
ested in elections following work on democratization and electoral violence is shaped by other forms of organized
its conflict-inducing risks that implied a potential rela- violence.
tionship between elections and violence (Snyder, 2000;
Mansfield & Snyder, 2005). Subsequent research further The distinctiveness of electoral violence
examined elections as a trigger for civil war and the
Electoral violence is levied by political actors to purpose-
potentially destabilizing consequences of elections after fully influence the process and outcome of elections, and
the end of civil war (Brancati & Snyder, 2013; Ceder- it involves coercive acts against humans, property, and
man, Gleditsch & Hug, 2012; Chacón, Robinson & infrastructure (Bekoe, 2012; Harish & Toha, 2019;
Torvik, 2011; Cheibub & Hayes, 2017; Flores & Noor- Höglund, 2009). It can happen in all parts of the elec-
uddin, 2012, 2016; Matanock, 2017), the short- and toral cycle, including at the announcement of elections,
long-term electoral implications of civil war (Balcells, party primaries, and voter registration (Seeberg, Wah-
2012; Costalli & Ruggeri, 2015), and the relationship man & Skaaning, 2018; Söderberg Kovacs, 2018), and
between patterns of political violence and the electoral it can be promoted by both state and non-state actors
cycle (Davenport, 1997; Goldsmith, 2015; Harish & (Taylor, Pevehouse & Straus, 2017; Staniland, 2014).
Little, 2017). This conceptualization has the strategic use of violence at
Working largely separately, scholars of elections out- its core, but alternative and complementary perspectives
side the Western world have long been interested in the exist, as developed below.
subversion of electoral processes through practices such Electoral violence covers a range of different manifes-
as clientelism, vote-buying, and intimidation (Birch, tations and outcomes, but the concept is unified by its
2007, 2011; Mares & Young, 2016; Norris, 2014; Sche- coercive component. Research from the African context
dler, 2013). Electoral violence is conceptualized as one of suggests that harassment and intimidation are more
several tools elites can use to influence election outcomes common than lethal violence (Straus & Taylor, 2012:
(Birch, 2011, 2020; Daxecker, Di Salvatore & Ruggeri, 17–18, 24), despite the fact that lethal violence is gen-
2019; van Ham & Lindberg, 2015; Mares & Young, erally better covered and less subject to underreporting in
2016; Norris, Frank & Martı́nez i Coma, 2015; Sche- the media-based sources that underlie many of the
dler, 2002). Yet this literature has until recently focused cross-country sources capturing electoral violence (von
more on particularistic rewards, neglecting the possibility Borzyskowski & Wahman, 2019).2 However, violence
that the determinants and implications of coercive stra- associated with elections can generate significant casual-
tegies could be quite distinct (Mares & Young, 2016). ties and form part of an escalatory process toward civil

2
Threats and intimidation can be made publicly and privately,
1
For recent surveys, see Daxecker & Jung (2018), Laakso (2019), incurring different reporting biases and leaving some forms of
and von Borzyskowski (2019a). violence more difficult to detect.
Birch et al. 5

war (Christensen & Utas, 2008; Ron, 2001). A survey of being public in its nature, electoral violence can be
relevant datasets indicates that a substantial proportion effected in private to avoid detection (Toros & Birch,
of elections across the globe witness at least some vio- 2019). Second, even when the overall objective is to
lence. The Countries at Risk of Election Violence influence the electoral process, the motivations for the
(CREV) data estimate that over three quarters (78%) individuals involved as instigators and perpetrators of
of elections in countries deemed to be at risk of violence electoral violence can be different from group and
experience at least ten violent events (Birch & leadership goals. This makes electoral violence – like
Muchlinski, 2017), while the Electoral Contention and all forms of political violence – multilayered and
Violence (ECAV) data report more than three violent diverse (Söderberg Kovacs, 2018: 9). Acts of violence
events in over 50% of elections, and deadly violence in may be driven by private motives, such as revenge
approximately 30% of elections (Daxecker, Amicarelli & dynamics unrelated to the electoral process, or tie in
Jung, 2019). with local power struggles, disconnected from the
In order to bring the key features of electoral violence national-level electoral dynamics. The outsourcing of
into clearer focus, we first discuss electoral violence as coercion to violence specialists – militia groups or
strategy, and proceed to distinguishing it from other criminal gangs – adds another layer of motives. While
cognate practices, namely non-electoral violence and such groups may have their own goals in relation to
nonviolent forms of electoral manipulation. the election, violent practices may also be a socializa-
tion tool to maintain internal cohesion, yielding a
situation where motives related to the election out-
Electoral violence as strategy come and socialization are intertwined (Christensen
The strategic perspective dominates existing literature & Utas, 2008; Laakso, 2007; Rasmussen, 2018).
on electoral violence, with scholars seeking to uncover
the incentives and strategic settings that make violence
an attractive tactic for political leaders (e.g. Birch, Electoral and non-electoral violence
2020; Daxecker, 2012, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde Electoral violence is distinct from other forms of orga-
& Jablonski, 2014; Smidt, 2016; Wilkinson, 2004). nized violence in that the institutional frameworks
Electoral violence is typically selected from among surrounding elections shape the ways in which vio-
available tools to achieve electoral ends, even if the use lence intervenes in the electoral process. The actors,
of force may simultaneously deliver on other goals, as practices, and institutions provided by the electoral
when land is forcibly taken from a political opponent framework affect how and why electoral violence
to reward a political ally. The goals of violence gener- arises, and influence both its timing and targets.
ally include political exclusion, be it exclusion from Thus, electoral violence ‘would not have occurred or
candidacy (via attacks on candidates); from campaign- would at least have manifested itself differently in the
ing (via attacks on or obstruction of campaign events); absence of an electoral contest’ (Fjelde & Höglund,
from the provision of electoral information (via attacks 2016b: 8).
on media outlets, election observers, and NGOs A main challenge for the study of electoral violence is
involved in voter education); from electoral participa- that it often takes place in contexts where other forms of
tion and free electoral choice (via the intimidation, organized violence are already pervasive, and where coer-
coercion, and/or the displacement of voters); from elec- cion, violent actors, and weapons abound. Armed con-
toral victory (via attacks on polling stations and poll flict constitutes one such context. When governments
workers or the destruction of polling materials); or face an insurgency, they have the choice of allowing the
from power (via post-electoral protests contesting the political wings of armed opposition actors to compete in
outcome of the election). elections, or barring them from competition. Insurgents
Admittedly, there are challenges to gauge the stra- or rebel groups, for their part, engage with electoral pol-
tegic intent of violence. There are several reasons for itics in different ways and face the choice of whether to
this. First, political actors have incentives to hide their boycott or to abandon (sometimes temporarily) armed
(illegal) involvement (Burchard, 2015: 12–13). For resistance and stand in elections (Dunning, 2011). In
this reason, political leaders often rely on violence some instances, armed opposition actors continue to
specialists (such as militia groups or criminal gangs) wage a military campaign, while simultaneously fielding
for security and outsource coercion to such groups political candidates in the election (Coburn & Larson,
(Raleigh, 2016; Staniland, 2015). In addition, while 2014; Heger, 2015; Matanock & Staniland, 2018; Steele
6 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 57(1)

& Schubiger, 2018).3 When violence is leveraged to overthrowing the existing political system or establishing
influence elections by actors that concurrently seek to territorial control, elections introduce an additional ele-
overthrow the government or establish territorial control, ment of competition that violent actors usually cannot
it can have spillover effects on broader conflict dynamics. afford to ignore; instead they often seek to influence the
For instance, violence against voters and candidates can electoral process with violent tactics.
depress voter turnout and demonstrate the government’s
failure to run secure elections, thereby undermining the Electoral violence and electoral manipulation
government’s overall legitimacy and ability to win the Electoral violence also constitutes a distinct form of elec-
war (Birnir & Ghodes, 2018; Condra et al., 2018). Con- toral manipulation. Just like other forms of electoral
versely, the intensity and form of conflict can shape malpractice, such as tampering with the registration pro-
spatial patterns of electoral violence, not only during the cess, vote buying or electoral fraud, electoral violence
course of armed conflict, but also years after (Harish & aims to manipulate the electoral process (Birch, 2011;
Toha, 2019). Lehoucq, 2003). Yet there are qualitative considerations
Electoral violence can also unfold in the context of that distinguish electoral violence. First, violence induces
violent communal conflict. Communal conflicts pit non- fear of physical injury and actual loss of life, resulting in
state groups organized along communal identities (often psychological effects on individuals and society which are
ethnicity or religion) against each other. These can be different from the impacts expected from fraud, vote-
localized and disconnected from electoral dynamics, buying, and other varieties of electoral manipulation.
spanning issues such as resource scarcity, land-use or Second, there are costs associated with the instigation
local authority (von Uexkull & Pettersson, 2018). How- of violence that are less relevant for other forms of
ever, the introduction of electoral processes often creates manipulation strategy. Electoral violence is unlikely to
incentives for elites to manipulate ethnic or religious go undetected by international observers, who are more
cleavages for electoral benefits (Wilkinson, 2004). Such prone to condemn violence than, for example, vote-buy-
manipulation can trigger communal violence that serves ing, and observer condemnation can lead to loss of inter-
electoral ends, but with long-lasting effects on intercom- national legitimacy and donor support (Daxecker, 2012,
munal relations and the potential for renewed violence 2014; Hyde & Marinov, 2014; Smidt, 2016; see also
outside of the electoral arena. González-Ocantos et al., 2020). While research shows
Finally, electoral violence often intersects with crimi- contradictory effects of violence on support for the party
nal violence. On the one hand, electoral violence is carrying out violence (Collier & Vicente, 2012; Bekoe &
sometimes pursued by criminal gangs on behalf of polit- Burchard, 2017; Birnir & Ghodes, 2018; see also
ical actors that seek to avoid detection (Barnes, 2017). Gutiérrez-Romero & LeBas, 2020), violence is without
On the other hand, criminal actors often rely on protec- a doubt a strategy associated with risk for political lead-
tion agreements with political elites; the holding of elec- ers: once unleashed it is a difficult instrument for politi-
tions can threaten these agreements and lead to violent cians to regulate, and revenge and counter-attacks can
electoral competition among criminal actors (Trejo & cause violence dynamics that spiral out of control. As
Ley, 2018). discussed below, the contributions of this special issue
Elections held in countries where one or several of the uncover some of the strategic conditions that make elec-
above forms of organized violence is present are likely to toral violence more or less costly.
see different manifestations of electoral violence. How-
ever, a common theme across these contexts is that the
What we know about electoral violence
introduction of electoral processes changes the incentive
structures of the state and non-state actors involved in What do we know about the causes and consequences of
ongoing organized violence (Harish & Little, 2017). electoral violence? Work on the causes of electoral vio-
While most organized violence is pursued outside the lence has emphasized institutional, societal, and interna-
electoral arena and with non-electoral goals, such as tional determinants.
In terms of institutions, research has established the
3
importance of level of democracy and strength of insti-
These choices are related to Staniland’s (2014) distinction between
tutions (Birch, 2020; Burchard, 2015; Hafner-Burton,
actors with intrasystemic goals, where actors operate within the
existing system to take over power, and antisystemic goals, where Hyde & Jablonski, 2014). Previous research also demon-
actors set out to challenge the status quo and fundamentally alter strates how the risk of violent elections is affected by
the political order. variations in the electoral process and type of election
Birch et al. 7

(Bhasin & Gandhi, 2013; Burchard, 2015; Claes, 2016; In scholarship on the consequences of electoral vio-
Collier & Vicente, 2012, 2014; Fielding, 2018; Hafner- lence, research has primarily focused on individual-level
Burton, Hyde & Jablonski, 2014; Robinson & Torvik, effects on political behavior and attitudes. This micro-
2009; Salehyan & Linebarger, 2015; Taylor, Pevehouse level emphasis stands in contrast to work on causes,
& Straus, 2017; Wilkinson, 2004). Several accounts which has privileged more aggregate and structural expla-
suggest that violence is more prevalent in competitive nations. The largest body of work focuses on effects on
electoral contests (Asunka et al., 2019; Collier & Vice- behavior, in particular turnout (Bekoe & Burchard,
nte, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski, 2014; 2017; Bratton, 2008; Burchard, 2015; Höglund &
Taylor, Pevehouse & Straus, 2017; Salehyan & Line- Piyaranthne, 2009). More recently, research has exam-
barger, 2015; Wilkinson, 2004), although evidence ined the effects of violence on political attitudes, includ-
remains mixed (Birch, 2020). Relatedly, while some ing satisfaction with democracy (Burchard, 2015), trust
studies confirm that competitive voters and areas are and social capital (Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012;
targeted more (Wilkinson, 2004; Evéquoz, 2019), others Höglund & Piyarathne, 2009), and political knowledge
have found that voters in opposition strongholds experi- (Söderström, 2018). Some studies have examined more
ence higher levels of violence (Rauschenbach & Paula, aggregate-level consequences of violence, including for
2019; Gutiérrez-Romero, 2014). Research also explores incumbent victory (Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski,
the consequences of electoral institution design (Alesina, 2018), for vote shares (Alesina, Piccolo & Pinotti, 2018;
Piccolo & Pinotti, 2018; Burchard, 2015; Claes, 2016; Condra et al., 2018), and for political speech (Alesina,
Fjelde & Höglund, 2016a). Majoritarian elections have Piccolo & Pinotti, 2018). This literature finds that vio-
been shown to produce high-stakes electoral contests lence can depress participation and (thereby) help perpe-
associated with greater levels of electoral violence (Fjelde trators win certain elections (Bratton, 2008; Condra
& Höglund, 2016a). Recent work has drawn attention et al., 2018), despite the fact that it is widely condemned
to earlier parts of the electoral process, highlighting how by voters (Gutiérrez-Romero & LeBas, 2020; Rosenz-
intraparty competition can lead to violence in the nomi- weig, 2016); at the same time, it can also have numerous
nation process (Seeberg, Wahman & Skaaning, 2018). negative side-effects, including the stifling of free speech
Regarding societal factors, scholars have linked eth- and the erosion of trust.
nic polarization, the exclusion of ethnic groups from Despite what we have learned, several gaps in knowl-
power, and parties representing particular ethnic or edge remain. First, with some notable exceptions (such
religious identities to greater incentives for electoral as Wilkinson’s 2004 seminal book and the 2018 edited
violence (Fjelde & Höglund, 2016a; Kuhn, 2015; Nel- volume by Söderberg Kovacs and Bjarnesen), research on
lis, Weaver & Rosenzweig, 2016; Nellis & Siddiqui, the causes of violence has prioritized the national level.
2018; Wilkinson, 2004). Furthermore, land patronage This means that we understand how aggregate societal or
can provide elites with powerful tools for violent elec- institutional factors create the conditions for electoral
toral mobilization (Boone, 2011; Boone & Kriger, violence, but not how these same factors play out within
2012; Klaus & Mitchell, 2015). Research has also countries. For this a more disaggregated approach is
begun to uncover the gendered patterns of electoral required. A second consequence of the aggregate-level
violence. For instance, research suggests that men and focus of most existing literature is that it has not yet
women confront different risks, with men more com- sufficiently developed theories that explain the various
monly subject to physical violence, and women more perpetrators and targets of electoral violence. While elites
often facing acts of intimidation and psychological may be the ones orchestrating violence, empirical work
abuse (Bardall, 2011; Bjarnegård, 2018). highlights a range of perpetrators, such as agents of the
International factors also matter. Examining the state, political candidates, local partisan ethnic groups,
effects of international election monitoring, scholarship militias, gangs, and youth groups (e.g. Agbiboa, 2018;
has shown that the presence of observers can displace Angerbrandt, 2018; Berenschot, 2011; Mutongwizo,
violence as strategy (Daxecker, 2014), and that monitors 2018). In terms of targets, much theorizing has focused
can facilitate post-electoral mobilization (Daxecker, on the ethnicity and competitiveness of voters, neglect-
2012; Smidt, 2016; von Borzyskowski, 2019b). ing other dimensions, including the micro-dynamics that
Research has also examined the consequences of inter- shape perceptions of the stakes involved in elections.
national interventions such as the provision of democ- Finally, data and methods gaps have restricted our
racy aid or violence prevention strategies (Birch & understanding of electoral violence. There certainly has
Muchlinski, 2018; von Borzyskowski, 2019a). been progress compared to ten or 15 years ago, when
8 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 57(1)

most work consisted of case studies or cross-national of the findings in this special issue suggest potentially
statistical analyses. For example, several disaggregated troubling implications for voter information campaigns,
datasets on electoral violence are now available and allow showing that violence is likely to be targeted at groups
scholars to analyze the subnational implications of the- who then anticipate threats and adapt their behavior
oretical arguments (Birch & Muchlinski, 2019; Dax- accordingly (González-Ocantos et al., 2020; von Borzys-
ecker, Amicarelli & Jung, 2019). 4 Systematic kowski & Kuhn, 2020; Klaus, 2020; Gutiérrez-Romero
individual-level data on citizens’ perceptions of the elec- & LeBas, 2020; Young, 2020). In the context of Gua-
toral process provided by the Afrobarometer, including temala, González-Ocantos et al. (2020) use list experi-
fear of electoral violence, are another important public ments to uncover the varying strategic considerations
good for scholars of electoral violence. Yet more innova- underpinning intimidation versus vote-buying. They
tion is needed. For example, ethnographic accounts can establish intimidation as a strategy primarily used to
push forward theorizing on perpetrators, and experimen- demobilize voters who are unresponsive to vote-buying
tal designs allow for more solid causal inferences. and where the risk of intimidation being reported is low.
These considerations make poor and rural voters more
vulnerable. von Borzyskowski & Kuhn (2020) find that
Contributions of the special issue among African citizens, informed voters are more often
The articles in this special issue are methodologically and targeted with violence because they are harder to sway
geographically diverse, encompassing ethnography, through alternative tactics. Based on an original survey
cutting-edge survey vignette and list experiments, quanti- fielded in Kenya, Klaus (2020) shows that despite
tative analyses of subnational and crossnational survey and increasing their trust in the state, citizens receiving land
event data, and spanning Africa, Latin America, and Asia. titles are more fearful of the electoral process. This means
The articles jointly contribute to fill the gaps identified in that the experience of electoral violence will in most
the preceding section and advance research on electoral contexts be highly differentiated, with some citizens hav-
violence in four main areas: (1) the disaggregation of ing very little cause to fear it and others perceiving elec-
actors: the incentives faced by individual-level perpetrators tions to be extremely dangerous events. Moreover,
and targets of electoral violence, as well as the conse- Wahman & Goldring (2020) show that the fact that
quences of violence for these actors; (2) the disaggregation competitive elections are more violent in the aggregate
of institutions: the formal and informal institutional foun- does not imply that perpetrators target voters in the most
dations of electoral violence, including subnational insti- competitive areas.
tutions, and the ways in which formal and informal The fear of being targeted and expectations of
institutions interact at different levels to condition elec- violence also have consequences for behavioral and emo-
toral violence; (3) the determinants of the stakes at play in tional responses. Focusing on Kenya, Gutiérrez-Romero
elections and their effect on violence; and (4) how elec- & LeBas (2020) use a vignette experiment to show that
toral violence is shaped by other forms of violent conflict. voters are less likely to vote for candidates rumored to
have used violence, but that this sanctioning effect is
Perpetrators and targets weaker for the poor and those who had been exposed
A first theme advances knowledge of perpetrators and to violence. Young (2020) examines the consequences of
targets, including incentives for and consequences of violence for the propensity to dissent and negative emo-
electoral violence at the individual level. These contribu- tional responses in repressive environments. She demon-
tions show that violence can be an expensive resource for strates that opposition supporters with a greater sense of
perpetrators, and one they will use selectively against self-efficacy respond with anger rather than fear when
targets that are most likely to respond, least likely to presented with state violence. Offering a more positive
protest, and most likely to be of use in delivering the picture, Smidt (2020) finds that election education cam-
ends envisaged. As articles by von Borzyskowski & Kuhn paigns by the United Nations in Côte d’Ivoire can make
(2020) and González-Ocantos et al. (2020) show, pov- citizens less fearful of electoral violence and increase their
erty, urban–rural status, and political knowledge are sense of efficacy.
important characteristics that influence targeting. Some
The institutional foundations of electoral violence
4
Subnational data on election results and the boundaries of electoral A second theme concerns the formal and informal insti-
districts are also increasingly available (Kollman et al., 2011, 2017). tutional foundations of electoral violence. The
Birch et al. 9

contributions explore the effect of authoritarian legacies a subnational analysis of malapportionment and violence
(Brosché, Fjelde & Höglund, 2020), alternations in in India, Daxecker shows that overrepresented districts
power (Ruiz-Rufino & Birch, 2020), party institutiona- are less likely to experience violence because they are
lization (Fjelde, 2020), institutional biases (Daxecker, more homogenous and biased in favor of incumbents.
2020), and informal networks of patronage (Berenschot, The alignment of strong institutions with peace and
2020). The strength and political inclusiveness of insti- weak institutions with violence further suggests that it
tutions are important mediators of the relationship is the strength of democratic structures rather than their
between the instrumental aims of actors and their choice degree of democratic inclusiveness that really matters for
of political weapon. Strong and inclusive institutions can conditioning the use of violence. Thus, even where insti-
deter the use of force by promoting informed participa- tutions are in some respects exclusionary, they can help
tion, representation, and transparency by means of cred- keep the peace if they are sufficiently strong. This is a
ible democratic channels (Ruiz-Rufino & Birch, 2020; perplexing and possibly worrying observation that merits
Fjelde, 2020; Smidt, 2020). Focusing on political par- further research.
ties, Fjelde (2020) demonstrates that more institutiona-
lized parties reduce the risk of violence by facilitating
High-stakes elections
nonviolent mobilization and constraining the use of
A third theme pertains to the stakes in elections and their
force. Her contribution highlights parties as actors that
effect on violence. Articles examine the underlying con-
can help us link elite preferences with the interests of
ditions contributing to high-stake elections (Klaus,
local actors, something that is poorly explained by
2020) and question the conventional wisdom linking
research prioritizing elites. In a cross-national study,
competitiveness to greater risk of violence (Wahman &
Ruiz-Rufino & Birch (2020) show how alternation in
Goldring, 2020; Daxecker, 2020). Klaus (2020) exam-
power reduces electoral violence by serving as a mechan-
ines how the distribution of land rights in Kenya shapes
ism to decrease the tensions between electoral winners
people’s trust in state institutions and perceptions of the
and losers. Alternation in power is also endogenous to
electoral process. She finds that while land title recipients
electoral management body performance, which points
are more likely to trust the state, they also become more
to the significance of conflict management and violence
fearful of the electoral process and changes it might
reducing efforts. Smidt (2020) confirms that these pos-
bring. Land reform might thus inadvertently raise the
itive effects of conflict management can hold at the local
stakes of elections, and increase the potential for vio-
level, indicating that aggregate and subnational expecta-
lence. Challenging the view that competitive elections
tions do at times converge.
experience more violence, which rests on macro-level
By contrast, pervasive informal institutions, where
assessments, Wahman & Goldring (2020) argue that
patronage politics and lack of rule of law become means
parties use violence against minorities and core opponent
of de facto exclusion of certain groups from state
voters in their own strongholds as a means of maintain-
resources, encourage actors to resort to violent means
ing dominance. Their analysis of Zambia finds that
(Berenschot, 2020; Brosché, Fjelde & Höglund,
incumbent and opposition strongholds experience more
2020). Berenschot (2020), drawing on ethnographic evi-
violence, especially in constituencies with good connec-
dence and within-country variation in India and Indo-
tivity. Finally, Daxecker (2020) shows that the greater
nesia, demonstrates the significance of the type of
electoral influence of overrepresented constituencies
patronage network, where ethnicized networks serve to
reduces the demand for electoral violence in these areas.
sustain divisive politics. Patronage networks are thus
These contributions highlight the importance of
important mid-level structures whose characteristics
establishing the microfoundations of arguments on
matter for elites considering the use of violence. Brosché,
high-stakes elections and violence that we noted in the
Fjelde & Höglund (2020), in a comparison of Kenya and
previous section.
Zambia, show how authoritarian regimes using more
inclusionary governance strategies to maintain power,
nurture dynamics that in multiparty elections reduce the Electoral violence in the context of other forms of
risk of violence, while exclusionary regime strategies have violent conflict
the opposite effect. However, strong and exclusive insti- Finally, articles provide insight into how electoral vio-
tutions that deliver desired electoral results to incum- lence is linked to and shaped by the presence of other
bents without the need for them to resort to force may forms of organized violence (Krause, 2020; González-
also be associated with less violence (Daxecker, 2020). In Ocantos et al., 2020; Smidt, 2020). Krause (2020)
10 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 57(1)

focuses on communal violence triggered by elections in manifests itself and the means through which electoral
Nigeria and Kenya, and shows how the nature of com- ends are achieved.
munal conflict explains divergent patterns of sexual vio- Second, the special issue underlines that the conse-
lence. Post-election violence in Nigeria involved short, quences of electoral violence go beyond vote choice,
intense battles between similarly strong groups, leading demonstrating effects on trust, threat perceptions, dis-
to more intense violence overall, while constraining the sent, and emotions. Recent advances in data collection
use of sexual violence. By contrast, the one-sided nature and innovative research designs have made it possible to
of electoral violence in Kenya played out in the form of examine patterns of targeting and its consequences in
attacks and massacres against minorities, including wide- greater depth. However, the emphasis on short-term,
spread rape and sexual violence. González-Ocantos individual-level consequences means that we have only
et al.’s (2020) study of voter intimidation in Guatemala a rudimentary understanding of the long-term implica-
suggests that the legacies of a civil war with high levels of tions. One reason for the neglect of lasting effects on
civilian victimization and lingering violence by non-state individuals is the lack of panel survey data; another is
actors creates an environment where intimidation can the fairly recent introduction of elections in some parts
easily be disguised. The article by Smidt (2020) on of the developing world. But since most research accepts
UN intervention in Côte d’Ivoire informs the larger that election violence has structural causes, we would
debate on postwar peacebuilding and the role that peace- expect lasting consequences. Examining patterns in his-
keeping has in building peace versus promoting democ- torical cases, such as election-related violence in the
racy. Her findings suggest that peacekeeping may assist Southern United States (Epperly et al., forthcoming)
both democracy and peace by making elections more or ongoing work on electoral violence in Victorian Eng-
secure with investments in election education. These land, could be a promising avenue.5
articles showcase the heterogeneity of electoral violence One overarching policy implication emerges from the
when it occurs in the context of other violence. contributions of the special issue, in addition to the
specific policy consequences highlighted by the individ-
ual articles. Elections are regular and cyclical in nature,
Looking forward making the timing of electoral violence more predictable
than other forms of political violence and thus amenable
This special issue identifies a range of institutional and to electoral assistance programming. But the causes of
contextual factors that distinguish electoral violence from electoral violence commonly encompass a combination
cognate political practices, and demonstrates that elec- of immediate factors tied to elections, such as the pros-
toral violence is linked to the core aims of political com- pect of alternation in power, and conditions that trans-
petition: contestation, participation, and the quest for form slowly, such as perceived historical injustices, or the
power. Episodes of electoral violence are thus integral institutionalization of party structures. For this reason,
components of political strategies. The special issue con- the prevention and mitigation of electoral violence
tributions point to several new promising areas of require both short-term and long-term efforts, as well
research. as a focus that moves beyond election-level factors and
First, in uncovering the dynamics of electoral vio- takes into consideration the broader social, economic
lence, the special issue foregrounds spatial dimensions and political issues. Targeted electoral violence preven-
as being important for patterns of electoral violence, tion measures can help prevent the worst forms of vio-
distinguishing for example urban and rural areas, or lence, but eliminating violence from the range of
underrepresented and overrepresented electoral districts. strategies considered by electoral actors requires deeper
However, we need to expand inquiry into other arenas of changes in sociopolitical structures of inclusion and
violence. For example, social media forms a space for exclusion.
threats and intimidation during election periods
(Muchlinski et al., 2019). Additionally, studies on the Acknowledgements
gendered impacts of electoral violence show how female
We thank the JPR office and the JPR editorial team for
voters and candidates often face violence in the private
outstanding support in producing this special issue. We
space of their home, away from the public limelight
are grateful to all authors for their contributions, and to
(Bardall, 2011; Bjarnegård, 2018). Furthering insights
into these dimensions would serve to question conven-
5
tional assumptions about where electoral violence See http://victorianelectionviolence.uk/? page_id¼109.
Birch et al. 11

the reviewers whose work is indispensable for maintain- Barnes, Nicholas (2017) Criminal politics: An integrated
ing the quality of the journal. We also thank Gudrun approach to the study of organized crime, politics, and
Østby, Marianne Dahl, Patrick Kuhn, Andrea Ruggeri, violence. Perspectives on Politics 15(4): 967–987.
and Austin Wright for comments on earlier versions of Bekoe, Dorine A, ed. (2012) Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence
this introduction. Final thanks are due to participants in in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: United States
Institute of Peace Press.
the Workshop on Electoral Violence held at the Univer-
Bekoe, Dorine A & Stephanie Burchard (2017) The contra-
sity of Amsterdam in February 2018, which provided the
dictions of pre-election violence: The effects of violence on
main impetus for this special issue. voter turnout in sub-Saharan Africa. African Studies Review
60(2): 73–92.
Berenschot, Ward (2011) Riot Politics: Hindu–Muslim Vio-
Funding
lence and the Indian State. New York: Columbia University
Birch is grateful to the Economic and Social Research Press.
Council for Research Grant ES/L016435. Daxecker Berenschot, Ward (2020) Patterned pogroms: Patronage net-
thanks the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and works as infrastructure for electoral violence in India and
Sciences, the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Indonesia. Journal of Peace Research 57(1): 171–184.
Research (NWO), Innovational Research Incentives Bhasin, Tavishi & Jennifer Ghandi (2013) Timing and target-
Scheme Veni no. 451-13-030, and the European Com- ing of state repression in authoritarian elections. Electoral
mission, Marie Curie Career Integration Grant (CIG) Studies 32(4): 620–631.
no. 618422 for funding. Höglund acknowledges Birch, Sarah (2007) Electoral systems and electoral miscon-
funding from Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (grant duct. Comparative Political Studies 40(12): 1533–1556.
Birch, Sarah (2011) Electoral Malpractice. Oxford: Oxford
P16-0124:1).
University Press.
Birch, Sarah (2020) Electoral Violence, Corruption and Political
ORCID iD Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
forthcoming.
Sarah Birch https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6457-1310 Birch, Sarah & David Muchlinski (2017) Electoral violence:
Ursula Daxecker https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2372- Patterns and trends. In: Holly Garnett & Margarita
7192 Zavadskaya (eds) Electoral Integrity and Political Regimes:
Kristine Höglund https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7167- Actors, Strategies and Consequences. New York & London:
609X Routledge, 100–112.
Birch, Sarah & David Muchlinski (2018) Electoral violence
prevention: What works? Democratization 25(3): 385–403.
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Staniland, Paul (2014) Violence and democracy. Comparative Essex, 1998); Professor of Political Science, King’s College
Politics 47(1): 99–118. London; research interests in the empirical study of political
Staniland, Paul (2015) Armed groups and militarized elec- ethics.
tions. International Studies Quarterly 59(4): 694–705.
Steele, Abbey & Livia Schubiger (2018) Democracy and civil URSULA DAXECKER, b. 1976, PhD in Political Science
war: The case of Colombia. Conflict Management and Peace (University of New Orleans, 2008); Associate Professor,
Science 35(6): 587–600. University of Amsterdam; research interests in political
Straus, Scott & Charles Taylor (2012) Democratization and violence and crime and politics.
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Dorine A Bekoe (ed.) Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in KRISTINE HÖGLUND, b. 1974, PhD in Peace and
Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: USIP Press, 15–38. Conflict Research (Uppsala University, 2004); Professor,
Taylor, Charles F; Jon C W Pevehouse & Scott Straus (2017) Uppsala University; current research interests: electoral
Perils of pluralism: Electoral violence and incumbency in violence, causes of peace, urban dynamics of conflict and
sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Peace Research 54(3): 397–411. peace.