Miranda Vistil v IAC GR NO 74431

Summary
Theness due to being bitten by the Vestil’s dog. The Vestil are liable for damages as possessors of
the dog under Article 2183.

FACTS
Theness was bitten by the Vestil’s dog at the house of Vicente Miranda, Purita Vestil’s late father
while playing with Purita’s daughter. She was treated for multiple lacerated wounds on the
forehead and was administered with anti-rabies vaccine. She was later re-admitted due to
vomiting of saliva. She died due to broncho-pnuemonia. Her parents, the Uys, sued Vestil’s for
damages, holding them liable as possessor of the dog, Andoy.

ISSUE
WON Vestil is liable for damages

RULING
The cause of the Theness death was the dog bite. She developed hydrophobia, a symptom of
rabies, and had died due to broncho-pnuemonia, a complication of rabies.
The Vestil’s are the possessors of the property and Purita is the only heir residing in Cebu City.
They use it as a second home and visited weekly – renting it out to the boarders, paying for the
utilities and hiring the maid who cleaned and cooked for the house occupants. An occupant of
the household (Marcial Lao) testified that they maintain the house for business purposes and
that he is one of the boarder of the said property.
Liability is due to the possession of the dog, regardless of the ownership of the dog or the
property. Under Art 2183, regardless if the animal was tame or vicious or if had been lost and
removed from the controlof the Vestils, liability still attached because one who possesses an
animal for utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which the animal may had
caused.

Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for
the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. The responsibility shall cease
only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage.

CAEDO et al vs. YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO

G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968

FACTS:

Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 along
E. de los Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San LorenzoVillage bound for the airport. Several
members of his family were in the car. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac car
of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his driver Rafael Bernardo. The two cars were traveling at a
moderate speed with their headlights on. Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela. Defendant’s
driver did not notice it until he was about eight (8) meters away. Instead of slowing down
behind the caretela defendant’s driver veered to the left with the intention of passing by the
caretela but in doing so its rear bumper caught the ream of thecaretela’s left wheel wrenching it
off. Defendant’s car skidded obliquely to the other end and collided with the on-coming vehicle
of the plaintiff. The plaintiff on his part, slackened his speed and tried to avoid the collision by
veering to the right but the collision occurred just the same injuring the plaintiff and members of
his family. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the driver and owner of
the Cadillac car. There was no question that defendant’s driver was negligent and liable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant Yu Khe Thai, owner of the car, who was in the car, was solidarily
liable with the driver under Art. 2184, of the Civil Code.

RULING:

The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code. Under the said provision, if the

causative factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is
likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The
basis of the master’s liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master
and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in
order to prevent injury or damage.

Negligence on the part of the owner, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and
circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course
which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do
not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at an
unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning.
There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on
the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his
car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute
negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he
could not have anticipated his driver’s sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in
spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time element
was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved
and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he
sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation
worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required
by law to prevent the misfortune. Under the facts the owner of the car was not liable.

Anonuevo v CA
FACTS
Villagracia was travelling along Boni Ave on his bicycle while Anonuevo traversing the opposite
lane was driving a Lancer car owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of the
Annonuevo’s brother. Annonuevo was in the course of making a lefturn towards Libertad St
when the collision occurred.

Di ko na idigest, discussed na to noon.

CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, vs. GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS,

respondents. G.R. No. L-23052, EN BANC, January 29, 1968, CONCEPCION, C.J.

FACTS

On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta
and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to
take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that
came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few
steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.
Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken
pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several
persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico
to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken
home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on
the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the
right infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus
injections administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a private
practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00. As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence,
Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint — which was, subsequently,
amended — for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer,
city treasurer and chief of police.

ISSUE

Whether Art. 2189 should apply

RULING

Yes. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) provides: The city shall not
be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the
Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or
any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.

Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides: Provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by
reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works
under their control or supervision. Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail
over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of
Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines. The Court
of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its
territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a
general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of
Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for:
"damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the
provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor,
Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions."
Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making
"provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by
any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision." In other words,
said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object
thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the
present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is
decisive thereon.

FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO, petitioner, vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN, and the HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. 61516, SECOND DIVISION, March 21, 1989,
SARMIENTO, J.

Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. It is not even
necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for
liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street.

FACTS

It would appear from the evidences that on July 25, 1978, herein plaintiff, a Court Interpreter of
Branch III, CFI--Dagupan City, while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk
located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control and supervision of the City of
Dagupan) accidentally fell into a manhole located on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg
to be fractured. As a result thereof, she had to be hospitalized, operated on, confined, at first at
the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, from July 25 to August 3, 1978 (or for a period of 16 days).
She also incurred hospitalization, medication and other expenses to the tune of P 8,053.65 or a
total of P 10,000.00 in all, as other receipts were either lost or misplaced; during the period of her
confinement in said two hospitals, plaintiff suffered severe or excruciating pain not only on her
right leg which was fractured but also on all parts of her body; the pain has persisted even after
her discharge from the Medical City General Hospital on October 9, 1978, to the present. Despite
her discharge from the Hospital plaintiff is presently still wearing crutches and the Court has
actually observed that she has difficulty in locomotion. From the time of the mishap on July 25,
1978 up to the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter, as she has
difficulty of locomotion in going up the stairs of her office, located near the city hall in Dagupan
City. She earns at least P 720.00 a month consisting of her monthly salary and other means of
income, but since July 25, 1978 up to the present she has been deprived of said income as she has
already consumed her accrued leaves in the government service. She has lost several pounds as a
result of the accident and she is no longer her former jovial self, she has been unable to perform
her religious, social, and other activities which she used to do prior to the incident. Dr. Norberto
Felix and Dr. Dominado Manzano of the Provincial Hospital, as well as Dr. Antonio Sison of the
Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong Rizal have confirmed beyond shadow of any
doubt the extent of the fracture and injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the mishap.
Defendant Alfredo Tangco, City Engineer of Dagupan City and admittedly ex-officio Highway
Engineer, City Engineer of the Public Works and Building Official for Dagupan City, admitted
the existence of said manhole along the sidewalk in Perez Blvd., admittedly a National Road in
front of the Luzon Colleges. He also admitted that said manhole (there are at least 11 in all in
Perez Blvd.) is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are found
along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National Government.

ISSUE

Whether control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in effect
binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code.

RULING

Yes. The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by
pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. It is not even
necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for
liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street.

In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is
exercised through the City Engineer. The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying
out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation
of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board . Thus the charter clearly indicates
that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole
is located.

De Roy v CA
G.R. No. L-80718. January 29, 1988
Art. 2, CC - Effectivity of the law
Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioner, Felisa Perdosa De Roy, collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop of private respondents, Luis Bernal,Sr., et al., resulting in injuries
to their family and death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop but the former failed to do so. 
Given the facts, the First Judicial Region rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross
negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. This decision was affirmed into by the
Court of Appeals. 
On the last day of the 15-dayperiod to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of
tie to file a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate court. They again filed
for a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied. Petitioner filed for a special civic
action for certiorari to declare null and void the previous decision and claimed that the appellate
court committed grave abuse of discretion. 
They contended that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the
case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette. Also
they argued that the petitioners had the “last clear chance” to avoid the accident if only they
heeded the warning to vacate the shop.

Issue:
WoN the rule in the Habaluyas decision, stating that the 15-day period for appealing or filing a
motion for reconsideration cannot be extended, could be applied to the case at bar.

Held:
The ruling in the Habaluyas case should be made to apply to the case at bar, notwithstanding
the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette.
        There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the duty of the
counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court, which
are published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.’s) and in publications as
the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
           The ruling in the Habaluyas case was that the 15-day period for appealing or filing a
motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. Such motion may be filed only in cases pending
in the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which in its discretion may grant or deny the
extension requested. Such decision was given prospective application to subsequent cases like
Lacsamana vs Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court and Bacaya vs
Intermediate Appellate Court.

RUKS KONSULT AND CONSTRUCTION, Petitioner, vs. ADWORLD SIGN AND

ADVERTISING CORPORATION* and TRANSWORLD MEDIA ADS, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 204866, FIRST DIVISION, January 21, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without
which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the
causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty
owed by them to the injured person was not same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a
proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each
wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause
of the injury.

FACTS

The instant case arose from a complaint for damages filed by Adworld against Transworld and
Comark International Corporation (Comark) before the RTC.5 In the complaint, Adworld
alleged that it is the owner of a 75 ft. x 60 ft. billboard structure located at EDSA Tulay,
Guadalupe, Barangka Mandaluyong, which was misaligned and its foundation impaired when,
on August 11, 2003, the adjacent billboard structure owned by Transworld and used by Comark
collapsed and crashed against it. Resultantly, on August 19, 2003, Adworld sent Transworld and
Comark a letter demanding payment for the repairs of its billboard as well asloss of rental
income. On August 29, 2003, Transworld sent its reply, admitting the damage caused by its
billboard structure on Adworld’s billboard, but nevertheless, refused and failed to pay the
amounts demanded by Adworld. As Adworld’s final demand letter also went unheeded, it was
constrained to file the instant complaint, praying for damages in the aggregate amount of
₱474,204.00, comprised of ₱281,204.00 for materials, ₱72,000.00 for labor, and ₱121,000.00 for
indemnity for loss of income.6 In its Answer with Counterclaim, Transworld averred that the
collapse of its billboard structure was due to extraordinarily strong winds that occurred instantly
and unexpectedly, and maintained that the damage caused to Adworld’s billboard structure was
hardly noticeable. Transworld likewise filed a Third-Party Complaint against Ruks, the company
which built the collapsed billboard structure in the former’s favor.1âwphi1 It was alleged therein
that the structure constructed by Ruks had a weak and poor foundation not suited for billboards,
thus, prone to collapse, and as such, Ruks should ultimately be held liable for the damages
caused to Adworld’s billboard structure

ISSUE

Whether the CA correctly affirmed the ruling of the RTC declaring Ruks jointly and severally
liable with Transworld for damages sustained by Adworld.

RULING

Yes. Jurisprudence defines negligence as the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is the
failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury.

In this case, the CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s finding that Transworld’s initial construction of
its billboard’s lower structure without the proper foundation, and that of Ruks’s finishing its
upper structure and just merely assuming that Transworld would reinforce the weak foundation
are the two (2) successive acts which were the direct and proximate cause of the damages
sustained by Adworld. Worse, both Transworld and Ruks were fully aware that the foundation
for the former’s billboard was weak; yet, neither of them took any positive step to reinforce the
same. They merely relied on each other’s word that repairs would be done to such foundation,
but none was done at all. Clearly, the foregoing circumstances show that both Transworld and
Ruks are guilty of negligence in the construction of the former’s billboard, and perforce, should
be held liable for its collapse and the resulting damage to Adworld’s billboard structure. As joint
tortfeasors, therefore, they are solidarily liable to Adworld. Verily, "[j]oint tortfeasors are those
who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a tort, or approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are also
referred to as those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if independent of each
other, unite in causing a single injury. Under Article 219429 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors
are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words, joint tortfeasors are each liable as
principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act
themselves. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or
any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although
under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that
the duty owed by them to the injured person was not same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a
proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each
wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause
of the injury.

California Clothing v. Quinones

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. v. QUINONES

G.R. No. 175822  October 23, 2013
Ponente: Peralta, J.

FACTS:

Respondent went inside the Guess USA Boutique in Robinson’s Department Store in Cebu City
and decided to purchase the black jeans worth P2098. While she was walking, she was
confronted by a Guess employee and told her that she failed to pay for the item she got to which
respondent replied that she did and showed the receipt.  Respondent then suggested they talk
about it in the Cebu Pacific office in the mall. While there, she was allegedly embarrassed and
humiliated by the Guess employees in front of their clients. The next day, Guess employees
event sent a demand letter to respondents employers.  While the RTC ruled for them, CA
reversed the decision saying that the acts done by the employees were not in good faith.
Petitioners pray for the reversal of the decision of CA.

ISSUE:

Did the Guess employees violate Articles 20 and 21 of Civil Code of the Philippines?

HELD:

The Court affirmed CA’s decision and held that the employees abused their rights and did not
have good faith in their actions against respondent where there was no clear evidence that she
was evading to pay for the merchandise. The petition is thus denied for lack of merit.

GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU
T. GONZALES, respondents
G. R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan City. He was

an Iranian exchange student and was 29 years old. Respondent was a former waitress on a
luncheonette, and was 22 years old. Petitioner was allegedly the lover of the respondent, and
was said to promise marriage to the latter, which convinced her to live with him in his
apartment. It was even alleged that the petitioner went to the house of the respondent
to inform her family about the marriage on the end of the semester. However, the marriage did
not materialize, with several beatings and maltreatment experienced by the respondent from the
petitioner.

The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision was held in favor of the
respondent. However, the petitioner claimed that the judgment of the RTC was an error, for the
claims of the respondent are not true, and that he did not know about the custom of the
Filipinos; his acts were in accordance of his custom. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto
by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for the damages incurred by the petitioner.

RULING:

Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since the respondent was proved to
have a good moral character, and that she had just let her virginity be taken away by the
petitioner since the latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment for
damages. Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner, “deflowered” her since
she believed that his promise to marry was true, and not due to her carnal desire, then she could
have her claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of the respondent had already
looked for pigs and chicken for the marriage reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and
then damages were caused by the petitioner against the respondents, which qualified the claims
of the respondent against the petitioner.

PANTALEON VS AMERICAN EXPRESS

Posted by kaye lee on 11:30 PM

G.R. No. 174269, May 8 2009 [Credit Transaction]

FACTS:

After the Amsterdam incident that happened involving the delay of American Express Card to
approve his credit card purchases worth US$13,826.00 at the Coster store, Pantaleon commenced
a complaint for moral and exemplary damages before the RTC against American Express. He
said that he and his family experienced inconvenience and humiliation due to the delays in
credit authorization. RTC rendered a decision in favor of Pantaleon. CA reversed the award of
damages in favor of Pantaleon, holding that AmEx had not breached its obligations to Pantaleon,
as the purchase at Coster deviated from Pantaleon's established charge purchase pattern.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not AmEx had committed a breach of its obligations to Pantaleon.

2. Whether or not AmEx is liable for damages.

RULING:

1. Yes. The popular notion that credit card purchases are approved “within seconds,” there really
is no strict, legally determinative point of demarcation on how long must it take for a credit card
company to approve or disapprove a customer’s purchase, much less one specifically contracted
upon by the parties. One hour appears to be patently unreasonable length of time to approve or
disapprove a credit card purchase.
The culpable failure of AmEx herein is not the failure to timely approve petitioner’s purchase,
but the more elemental failure to timely act on the same, whether favorably or unfavorably. Even
assuming that AmEx’s credit authorizers did not have sufficient basis on hand to make a
judgment, we see no reason why it could not have promptly informed Pantaleon the reason for
the delay, and duly advised him that resolving the same could take some time.

2. Yes. The reason why Pantaleon is entitled to damages is not simply because AmEx incurred
delay, but because the delay, for which culpability lies under Article 1170, led to the particular
injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are remunerative. The
somewhat unusual attending circumstances to the purchase at Coster – that there was a deadline
for the completion of that purchase by petitioner before any delay would redound to the injury
of his several traveling companions – gave rise to the moral shock, mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation sustained by Pantaleon, as concluded by the
RTC. 

Manaloto vs. Veloso III, G.R. No. 171365, October 06, 2010, 632 SCRA 347. Ponente:
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Topic: APPEAL

Facts: This case is an off-shoot of an unlawful detainer case filed by herein petitioners, Ermelinda
C. Manaloto, Aurora J. Cifra, Flordeliza J. Arcilla, Lourdes J. Catalan, Ethelinda J. Holt,
Bienvenido R. Jongco, Artemio R. Jongco, Jr. and Joel Jongco against herein respondent. The
action was instituted on the ground of respondent's failure to pay rentals from May 23, 1997 to
December 22, 1998 despite repeated demands. Respondent denied the non-payment of rentals
and alleged that he made an advance payment of P825,000.00 when he paid for the repairs done
on the leased property. After trial, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) decided in favor of
petitioners by ordering respondent to (a) vacate the premises. On appeal to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) [Branch 88, Quezon City], the MeTC decision was reversed. Respondent was
ordered to pay arrearages from May 23, 1997 up to the date of the decision but he was also given
an option to choose between staying in the leased property or vacating the same, subject to the
reimbursement by [petitioners] of one-half of the value of the improvements. Respondent was
also given the right to remove said improvements pursuant to Article 1678 of the Civil Code,
should [petitioners] refuse to pay. When both parties moved for the reconsideration of the RTC
decision, the RTC issued an Order modifying its previous ruling by increasing the value of the
improvements. Whilst respondent's appeal of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) judgment in
the unlawful detainer case was pending before the RTC-Branch 88, respondent filed before the
RTC-Branch 227 on November 26, 2002 a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against
the petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-48341. The petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion
on February 18, 2003 praying for, among other reliefs, the dismissal of respondent's complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-02-48341. Petitioners argued that respondent had no cause of action against
them because the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case was a matter of public record and
its disclosure to the public violated no law or any legal right of the respondent. Moreover,
petitioners averred that the respondent's present Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages
was barred by prior judgment since it was a mere replication of respondent's Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim in the unlawful detainer case before the MeTC. The said unlawful
detainer case was already judicially decided with finality. On September 2, 2003, the RTC-Branch
227 issued a Resolution dismissing respondent's complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 for
violating the rule against splitting of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to disclose
the pendency of a related case. The RTC-Branch 227 adjudged that Civil Case No. Q02-48341
involved the same facts, parties, and causes of action as those in the unlawful detainer case, and
the MeTC had already properly taken cognizance of the latter case. Respondent filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the said decision which was thereafter denied. He filed his Notice of
Appeal. However, the RTC-Branch 227, in an Order 10 dated March 23, 2004, dismissed
respondent's appeal for being filed out of time. Remedial Law Manaloto vs. Veloso III 2 He filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the same. The RTC-Branch 227 granted respondent's latest
motion because it was "convinced that it is but appropriate and fair to both parties that this
matter of whether or not the Appeal was filed on time, be resolved by the appellate court rather
than by this Court." The RTC-Branch 227 then ordered that the records of the case be forwarded
as soon as possible to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals
resolved to give due course to respondent's appeal. The Court of Appeals fully agreed with the
RTC-Branch 227 in dismissing respondent's second cause of action (i.e., breach of contract) in
Civil Case No. Q-02-48341. The appellate court, however, held that RTCBranch 227 should have
proceeded with the trial on the merits of the first cause of action (i.e., damages) in Civil Case No.
Q-02-48341, because although herein respondent may have stated the same factual antecedents
that transpired in the unlawful detainer case, such allegations were necessary to give an
overview of the facts leading to the institution of another case between the parties before the
RTC acting in its original jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals then went on to find that petitioners
were indeed liable to respondent for damages. Hence, the instant Petition for Review. Petitioners
assert that respondent's appeal of the RTC-Branch 227 Resolution dated September 2, 2003,
which dismissed the latter's complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341, was filed out of time.
Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on September 26, 2003, and he only had 15
days from such date to file his appeal, or until October 11, 2003. Respondent, instead, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution on October 10, 2003, which left him with only one
more day to file his appeal. The RTC-Branch 227 subsequently denied respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which the respondent received on
February 20, 2004. Respondent only had until the following day, February 21, 2004, to file the
appeal. However, respondent filed his Notice of Appeal only on March 1, 2004. Hence,
petitioners conclude that the dismissal of respondent's complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02- 48341
already attained finality.

Issue: Whether respondent timely filed his appeal of the Resolution dated September 2, 2003 of
the RTC Branch 227 before the Court of Appeals.

Held: Affirmative. Jurisprudence has settled the "fresh period rule," according to which, an
ordinary appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of the
trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or denying the motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In the case before us, respondent received a copy of
the Resolution dated September 2, 2003 of the RTC Branch 227 dismissing his complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-02-48341 on September 26, 2003. Fourteen days thereafter, on October 10, 2003,
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution. The RTC-Branch 227 denied
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which the
respondent received on February 20, 2004. On March 1, 2004, just after nine days from receipt of
the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration, respondent already filed his Notice oof
Appeal. Clearly, under the fresh period rule, respondent was able to file his appeal well-within
the prescriptive period of 15 days, and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving due course to
said appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 82610

Titus Villanueva vs. Emma Rosqueta

G.R. No. 180764, January 19, 2010
FACTS:

Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue

Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy
resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation,
claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders
of her superior.

Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent

Rosqueta’s position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition,
quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then
Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila in Civil Case 01-101539. On August 27, 2001 the RTC issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO), enjoining Villanueva and the Finance Secretary from implementing
Valera’s appointment. On August 28, 2001 the trial court superseded the TRO with a writ of
preliminary injunction.

On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case was again in
force, petitioner Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order 40-2001, authorizing Valera
to exercise the powers and functions of the Deputy Commissioner.

During the Bureau’s celebration of its centennial anniversary in February 2002, its special
Panorama magazine edition featured all the customs deputy commissioners, except respondent
Rosqueta. The souvenir program, authorized by the Bureau’s Steering Committee headed by
petitioner Villanueva to be issued on the occasion, had a space where Rosqueta’s picture was
supposed to be but it instead stated that her position was “under litigation.” Meanwhile, the
commemorative billboard displayed at the Bureau’s main gate included Valera’s picture but not
Rosqueta’s.

On February 28, 2002 respondent Rosqueta filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of
Quezon City against petitioner Villanueva in Civil Case Q-02-46256, alleging that the latter
maliciously excluded her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Further, she claimed that
he prevented her from performing her duties as Deputy Commissioner, withheld her salaries,
and refused to act on her leave applications. Thus, she asked the RTC to award her P1,000,000.00
in moral damages, P500,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P300,000.00 in attorney’s fees and
costs of suit.

RTC dismissed the case. CA reversed granting Villanueva to pay P500,000.00 in moral damages,

P200,000.00 in exemplary damages and P100,000.00 in attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to respondent
Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto
case, thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau and to be
officially recognized as such public officer.

RULING:

Petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him. Surely, a
government official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by a court
of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valera’s right to replace respondent
Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved.

That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta
who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the
centennial anniversary memorabilia was not an honest mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he
withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties of the position.

The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta.

Here, respondent Rosqueta’s colleagues and friends testified that she suffered severe anxiety on
account of the speculation over her employment status. She had to endure being referred to as a
“squatter” in her workplace. She had to face inquiries from family and friends about her
exclusion from the Bureau’s centennial anniversary memorabilia. She did not have to endure all
these affronts and the angst and depression they produced had Villanueva abided in good faith
by the court’s order in her favor. Clearly, she is entitled to moral damages.

The Court, however, finds the award of P500,000.00 excessive. As it held in Philippine
Commercial International Bank v. Alejandro,[18] moral damages are not a bonanza. They are
given to ease the defendant’s grief and suffering. Moral damages should reasonably approximate
the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. Here, that would be P200,000.00.

The Court affirms the grant of exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the
public good but, in line with the same reasoning, reduces it to P50,000.00. Finally, the Court
affirms the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses but reduces it to P50,000.00.

ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., and EMMA J. DATUIN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 179799
September 11, 2009

FACTS:
A complaint for violation of B.P. Blg.22 was filed against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio as
proprietor of Alvi Marketing, allegedly for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as
payment for the numerous appliances bought by Alvi Marketing from Sansio. As the address in
the complaint was wrong, she was indicted for 3 counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for failure to
controvert the charges against her. Gregorio filed a Motion for Deferment of Arraignment and
Reinvestigation, alleging that she could not have issued the bounced checks, since she did not
even have a checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn. In the course of
the reinvestigation, Datuin submitted an Affidavit of Desistance stating that Gregorio was not
one of the signatories of the bounced checks subject of prosecution. Subsequently, the court
ordered the B.P. Blg. 22 cases dismissed.

Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio Philippines, Inc. and Emma J. Datuin.

Gregorio in her complaint for damages stated that incalculable damage has been inflicted upon
him due to the defendants reckless disregard of the fundamental legal precept that every person
shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. Sansio and Datuin filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint, being one for
damages arising from malicious prosecution, failed to state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts
constituting the elements thereof were not alleged in the complaint.

The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered
the dismissal of Gregorio’s complaint for damages.

ISSUE:
Whether the complaint for damages filed by Gregorio is based on quasi-delict or malicious
prosecution.
HELD:
It is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil
Code, rather than on malicious prosecution.

Quasi-delict exist under Article 2176 when the plaintiff suffers damage due to the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond provided that
there must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. On the other hand, Article
26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of
breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right to
personal dignity;; (2) right to personal security;; (3) right to family relations;; (4) right to social
intercourse;; (5) right to privacy;; and (6) right to peace of mind.

Gregorio’s rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were
infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in
determining the identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently
funded checks. This fault was compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of
petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not
given proper notice.

Therefore, Sansio and Datuin are liable for damages.

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp.

 on 6:55 AM  in Case Digests, Civil Law 
 0

G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007

FACTS:

This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway
as CIR.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured
cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of
“55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to
effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More”
(all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject
to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already
covered.

In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule
violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and
the right to equal protection of the laws.

For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of
action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and
within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic
and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint
states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.

The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the
ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or
bad faith.
Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

o Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for
acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office
o Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I,
Administrative Code

HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person
may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office
which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would
virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary
claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in
his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his
authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is
bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39
of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is
characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly
or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said
public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer
violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law,
which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which
has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another
receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in
which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the
mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the
defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine
whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive,
does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is,
liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.

Dreamwork v Janiola (DIGEST)

Dreamwork v Janiola (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 184861; 30 June 2009

FACTS:

This case is a petition for the reversal of the decision on the suspension of the criminal
proceeding filed by the petitioner in the MTC for the ground that there is a presence of
prejudicial question with respect to the civil case belatedly filed by the respondent.

The petitioner appealed to RTC but denied Dreamwork, through its President, and Vice-
President, filed a Complaint Affidavit against Janiola for violation of BP 22 at the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City.

Correspondingly, the former also filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against
private respondent with the MTC, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola. On
September 20, 2006, Janiola instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an
alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages.

Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the Criminal Case for the
ground that private respondent claim that the civil case posed a prejudicial question against the
criminal case. Petitioner opposed the Respondent’s Motion to Suspend criminal proceeding
based on juridical question for the following grounds:

(1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the
bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private
respondent violated BP 22; and

(2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial
question is that “the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action”; thus, this element is missing in this
case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.

The MTC granted the Respondents Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Petitioner appealed the
Orders to the RTC but denied the petition. Hence, this petition raised.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in its discretion to suspend proceedings in Criminal
Case on the basis of “Prejudicial Question “, with respect to the Civil Case belatedly filed.

HELD:

This petition must be granted, pursuant to SEC. 7.Elements of prejudicial question.

The elements of a prejudicial question are:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede
the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the
criminal action. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.

In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil
Case filed by the State with the RTC. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. The Resolution of the
Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action. Even if the trial court
in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of
consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal
case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent issued checks that were subsequently
dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP
22.Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial
question, is absent. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.

Republic Vs. Lacap

Facts
The District Engineer of Pampanga, issued and duly published an “invitation to bid”, where
Lacap was awarded as the lowest bidder. Accordingly, the latter undertook the works, made
advances for the purchase of materials and payment for labor costs.
On October 29, 1992 the office of the DE issued Certification of Final Inspection and Acceptance
for 100% completion of project in accordance with specifications. The respondent sought to
collect payment but Department of Public Works and Highways withheld payment after the
District Auditor of Commission on Audit disapproved final release of funds on the ground that
contractor’s license had expired. Opinion of the DPWH Legal Department was sought by the
District Engineer. The former then responded that RA No. 4566 does not provide that a contract
entered into after the license has expired is void and that there is no law which expressly
prohibits such a contract void. Furthermore, Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the Legal Department
in a First Indorsement, recommended the payment should be made to Carwin Construction.
However, no payment was made. On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint through Office
of the Solicitor General for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on September 14, 1995 on the grounds that
complaint states no cause of action and RTC had no jurisdiction since respondent did not appeal
to COA. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was
likewise denied by RTC, in its order on May 23, 1996. On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its
Answer invoking defense of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and doctrine of non-
suability of the State.
Following the trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 its decision ordering the DPWH to
pay the contract price plus interest at 12% from demand until fully paid and the costs of the suit.

Issue: Whether or not a contractor with an expired license at the time of execution of its contract
is entitled to be paid for completed projects?

Held:
Yes. The petitioner must be required to pay the contract price since it has accepted the completed
project and enjoyed the benefits thereof. To allow petitioner to acquire the finished project at no
cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of
respondent. Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by law.

G.R. No. 195670: December 3, 2012

WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner, v. AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Willem Beumer (Beumer), a Dutch National, and respondent
Avelina Amores (Amores), a Filipina, were married. After several years,
the RTC declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis of the formers
psychological incapacity. Consequently, Beumer filed a Petition for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership praying for the distribution of the six
lots claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of their
marriage.
Amores averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential
houses, she and Beumer did not acquire any conjugal properties during
their marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal money to
purchase the four lots and the other two by way of inheritance. She
submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner attesting to the
fact that she purchased one of the lots and the improvements thereon
using her own money. On the other hand, Beumer testified that while the
four lots, excluding the two lots allegedly acquired by Amores by way of
inheritance, were registered in the name of Amores, these properties
were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as
his disability benefit since Amores did not have sufficient income to pay
for their acquisition. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted
before the Register of Deeds was contrary to Article 89 of the Family
Code, hence, invalid.
ISSUE: Whether or not Beumer is entitled for reimbursement of the value
of the lots based on equity.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: National Patrimony
In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v.
Helmut Muller, the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of
the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner
(Helmut Muller) against his former Filipina spouse. It held that the
foreigner cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is
clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Petition is DENIED.

Shinryo v RRN Inc, GR 172525 Oct 10, 2010

FACTS
Petitioner Shinryo Comp Inc and private respondent RRN Inc are domestic corporations
organized under Philippine laws. Respondent filed a claim for arbitration against petitioner
before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission for recovery of unpaid account while
petitioner filed counter claim for overpayment.
It was shown that the petitioner and respondent executed an agreemenr and conditions of
subcontract. Respondent signified its willingness to accept and perform for petitioner in any of
its projects described in conditions of sub-contract and other sub-contract documents. The
parties also agreed that respondent will perform variation orders for the Philipp Morris
Greenfield Project. In connection with it, petitioner supplied manpower chargeable against
respondent.
Respondent was not able to finish the entire works with petitioner due to financial difficulties.
Petitioner partially paid the respondent. Respondent, through its former counsel sent a letter
to petitioner demanding for the payment of its unpaid balance. Thereafter, petitioner sent a
letter to respondent denying any unpaid account and the failure in their negotiations for
amicable settlement.
Respondent, through its new counsel, advised petitioner of their intention to submit the
matter to arbitration. Thereafter, their dispute was submitted to arbitration.

ISSUE
WON the claimant’s claim for inventory of excess materials constitutes to unjust enrichment as
a quasi-contract.

HELD
No. The court of appeals committed a grave reversible error in affirming that the CIAC award
for the values of inventoried materials considering that the respondent RRN has no basis to
claim because Engr Bonifacio admitted that respondent or from petitioner and that it was
petitioner that actually installed the said materials as part of remaining works that the
petitioner took over from respondent RRN.
The claim for the value of inventoried materials is a doubled claim or a doubled entry because
in the computation of the final account, respondent RRN was credited the full contract price
and the cost of variations which included the inventoried materials.

Elpidio Uy v CA
Facts of the Case:
Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), Pool Formation Trust
Agreement (PFTA), PNB  and Public Estates Authority (PEA) entered into an
agreement to implement the Heritage Memorial Park.  BCDA was the Project Owner
and tasked to sell Heritage Park Investment Certificates to buyers. As trustee, PNB is
given the legal and beneficial title to hold the certificates. The certificate holders
organized themselves into a non-stock, non-profit corporation, Heritage Park
Management Corp. (HPMC).
            Now, PEA and Uy’s business (Edison Dev’t and Construction) executed a
Landscaping and Construction Agreement whereby the business will do all the
landscaping and the construction of a terrasoleum. Since there was delay in the
construction, the Heritage Park Executive Committee terminated the construction
contracts so HPMC assumed all the duties and responsibilities of PEA.
Uy filed a complaint against PEA before the Construction Industry Arbitrary
Commission (CIAC) where it sought to recover payments for the construction already
done in the project.  The CIAC awarded monetary claims to Uy and a Notice of
Garnishment was served on HPMC.
HPMC then filed a petition for Injunction/Prohibition before the CA on the
ground that the CIAC had no jurisdiction since HPMC was not impleaded as a party in
the case before CIAC. HPMC contended it is an indispensable party since it holds the
certificates, any claim against PEA is a claim against all parties who contributed funds
to the project.  Uy’s contention is that HPMC is not a party-in-interest since it was only a
mere trustee of the funds and would not be directly benefited or injured by the outcome
of the case.

Issue:
            Whether or not HPMC is a real party-in-interest or an indispensable party.

Held:
            Indispensable party.  An indispensable party is one whose interest will be
affected by court’s action in litigation and without whom there can be no final
determination of the case. A party’s interest in the subject matter and in the relief
sought are so intertwined that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an
absolute necessity.
            According to the provisions of PFTA, PEA would turn over to HPMC all the
contracts relating to Heritage Park. At the time of the filing of the CIAC case, PEA
already assigned its interests to HPMC and therefore, no longer a party-in-interest.
HPMC now stands to be benefited/injured in the suit. Since HPMC was not impleaded,
there cannot be an effective, complete and equitable resolution of the dispute.
Notes on indispensable parties:
*Does CIAC have jurisdiction? YES. Both parties agree to submit the dispute for
arbitration. However, CIAC should’ve dismissed the case on the grounds that HPMC
was not impleaded. Indispensable parties must be joined as either plaintiffs or
defendants. When they are not joined, it is the duty of the court to stop trial and order
its inclusion.
*The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties lies on the plaintiff.
Defendant has no tight to compel.

VINCENT MERCADO, petitioner vs. MA.CONSUELO TAN, defendant

G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000

FACTS:

The accused, Vincent Mercado was in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a
marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976. Despite the prior marriage he
got married to complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991. On October 5,
1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel
with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the
institution of the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr.
Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22,
1993. On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was
lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and
in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and
Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void. Despite this, the Trial Court
charged Vincent with bigamy since his prior marriage was still subsisting at the
time he had contracted his second marriage. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling of the trial court. The petitioner then filed a case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Is the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage necessary for

remarriage?

RULING:

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed decision.

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But here, the
final judgment declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not
before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for
bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the
crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent
marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally dissolved.

It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is
not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a
judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second
marriage.

OMC Carriers v Nabua GR 148974

FACTS
On august 4, 1995 at about 3pm, an Isuzu private tanker with plate no PCH
612, owned by and registered in the name of petitioners OMC Carriers, Inc. and then being
driven by its employee Jerry Analucas, was cruising along Quirino Highway towards the general
direction of Largo Quezon City. At Brgy Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City, the aforesaid
private tanker hit a private vehicle, an Isuzu Gemini with plate no NDF 372, which was making a
left turn towards a nearby Caltex Gasoline station. The impact heavily damaged the right side
portion of the latter motor and mortally injured its 18-yr-old driver, Reggie Nabua, who was
later pronounced dead on arrival at the Fairview Polymedic Hospital.
Respondent spouses Berlino and Rosario Nabua, the parents of the victim, filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners and the General Manager of OMC Carriers, Chito Caluag, before
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 224. On January 19, 1998, the RTC rendered a decision of
which was in favor of the plaintiffs. The petitioner then appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
On Dec 28, 1999, the CA rendered a decision which affirmed the decision of the RTC with
modifications.

ISSUE
WON the OMC Carriers Inc., demonstrated diligence of a good father of a family.
WON the CA erred when it affirmed the RTCs award of attorney’s fees was without legal basis.

HELD
1. No. The defendant company failed to produce in court any record or other
documentary proof tending to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its drivers and buses,
notwithstanding the calls therefore by both the trial court and the opposing counsel,
argues strongly against its pretentions.
2. Death indemnity has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00. Hence, the amount
awarded by the RTC and the CA must be reduced accordingly. On the issue of moral
damages, prevailing jurisprudence fixes moral damages of P50,000.00 for death. The
rule on the award of attorney’s fees is that there must be a justification for the same.
On this note, after reading through the text of the CA decision, this Court finds that the
same is bereft of any findings of fact and law to justify the award of attorney’s fees.

WILSON PO CHAM v. ATTY. EDILBERTO PIZARRO

A.C. No. 5499, 16 August 2005

The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity,

which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor to thus render him unworthy of the privileges which his license and
the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned with disbarment or suspension.

Upon Atty. Edilberto Pizarro’s representations to complainant Wilson

Po Cham (Po Cham) that a certain parcel of land being offered for sale to him
was alienable and disposable, Po Cham gave Atty. Pizarro two checks
representing the purchase price of the said property. Po Cham subsequently
took possession of the property and installed a barbed wire fence at its
front portion. Soon after, however, a forest guard approached him and informed
him that the property could not be fenced for the reason that it was part of the
Bataan National Park. Upon investigation, Po Cham discovered that the
property is not an alienable or disposable land susceptible of private ownership.

Po Cham demanded the return of the purchase price but Atty. Pizarro did not
heed to the demand. Po Cham thereafter charged Atty. Pizarro of violation of his
oath as a member of the Bar.

The Supreme Court (SC) referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision. The
IBP, in its Report and Recommendation, found Atty. Pizarro to have violated his
oath as a member of the Bar. It recommended his suspension from the practice
of law for 3 months, subject to the approval of the members of the Board of
Governors. The case was forwarded to the SC for final action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Pizarro violated his solemn oath as a lawyer

HELD:

The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity,

which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor to thus render him unworthy of the privileges which his license and
the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned with disbarment or suspension.

Atty. Pizarro has utterly failed to substantiate his documented claim of having

irrevocable rights and interests over the property which he could have conveyed
to Po Cham. Atty. Pizarro must thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing
Po Cham to purchase non-existent ―irrevocable rights, interest and
participation‖ over an inalienable property.

Diño v. Jardines
G.R. No. 145871; January 31, 2006

FACTS:
On January 31, 1987, Lina Jardines (respondent) executed in her favor a Deed of
Sale with Pacto de Retro  over a parcel of land with improvements, the
consideration for which amounted to P165,000.00.

It was stipulated in the deed that the period for redemption would expire in six
months or on July 29, 1987. Such period expired but neither respondent nor
any of her legal representatives were able to redeem or repurchase the subject
property.

As a consequence, absolute ownership over the property has been

consolidated in favor of petitioner, Diño.

Respondent contends that:

(a) the Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro  did not embody the real intention of the
parties; the transaction actually entered into by the parties was one of simple
loan and the Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro was executed just as a security for
the loan,

(b) the amount borrowed by respondent during the first week of January 1987
was only P50,000.00 with a monthly interest of 9% to be paid within a period of
six months, but since the said amount was insufficient to buy construction
materials for the house she was then building, she again borrowed an
additional amount of P30,000.00. It was never the intention of respondent to
sell her property to petitioner,
(c) the value of respondent’s residential house alone is over a million pesos and
if the value of the lot is added, it would be around one and a half million pesos;
it is unthinkable that respondent would sell her property worth one and a half
million pesos for only P165,000.00, 

(d) respondent has even paid a total of P55,000.00 out of the amount borrowed
and she is willing to settle the unpaid amount, but petitioner insisted on
appropriating the property of respondent which she put up as collateral for the
loan, and

(e) respondent has been the one paying for the realty taxes on the subject
property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the transaction between Diño and Jardines is an equitable
mortgage

HELD:
Yes, it is an equitable mortgage.

In the instant case, the presence of the circumstances provided for under
paragraphs (2) and (5) of Article 1602 of the Civil Code, and the fact that
petitioner herself demands payment of interests on the purported purchase
price of the subject property, clearly show that the intention of the parties was
merely for the property to stand as security for a loan. The fact that it was not
true that the price was not grossly inadequate does not make the transaction
that of absolute sale.

The presence of even one of the above-mentioned circumstances as

enumerated in Article 1602 is sufficient basis to declare a contract of sale with
right to repurchase as one of equitable mortgage. As stated by the Code
Commission which drafted the new Civil Code, in practically all of the so-called
contracts of sale with right of repurchase, the real intention of the parties is
that the pretended purchase price is money loaned and in order to secure the
payment of the loan, a contract purporting to be a sale with pacto de retro is
drawn up.

Also,  Article 1603 of the Civil Code provides that in case of doubt, a contract
purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed as an
equitable mortgage.
Heirs of Completo v. Albayda, Jr.

Heirs of Redentor Completo, and Elpidio Abiad v. Sgt. Amando Albayda, Jr.

2010 / Nachura [Negilgence > Standard of conduct > Special circumstance]

Facts

Albayda is a Master Sergeant of the PH Air Force, and Completo was the taxi driver of a Toyota
Corolla which was owned by Abiad. Albayda was riding a bike on his way to the office, when
Completo's taxi bumped and sideswept him, causing serious physical injuries. He [Albayda] was
brought to the PH Air Force General Hospital, but he was transferred to the AFP Medical Center
because he sustained a fracture and there was no orthopedic doctor available in the first
hospital. He was confined from 27 Aug 1997 to 11 Feb 1998, and again in 23 Feb to 22 Mar
1998 [approx. 7 months].

     Conciliation before the barangay failed, so Albayda filed a complaint for physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against Completo before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Pasay. Completo filed a counter-charge of damage to property through reckless imprudence
against Albayda. The Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for
Albayda's complaint, and Completo's complaint [against Albayda] was dismissed. Albayda
manifested his reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against Completo and
Abiad.

     Albayda alleged that Completo's negligence is the proximate cause of the incident. He
demanded the following damages and their respective amounts: Actual damages -
276,550; Moral damages - 600,000; Exemplary damages - 200,000; Attorney's fees - 25,000 +
1,000 per court appearance. 

     On the other hand, Completo alleged that he was carefully driving the taxicab when he heard
a strange sound from the taxicab's rear right side. He found Albayda lying on the road, holding
his left leg, so he brought Albayda to PH Air Force General Hospital. Completo asserted that he
was an experienced driver, and that he already reduced his speed to 20km even before
reaching the intersection. In contrast, Albayda rode his bicycle at high speed, causing him to
lose control of the bicycle. Completo said that Albayda had no cause of action.

     Several people testified for each side, but here are some notes on the testimony of the
owner of the taxi driver, Abiad. Abiad said that aside from being a soldier, he also held
franchises of taxicabs and passenger jeepneys, and being a taxicab operator, he would wake up
early to personally check the taxicabs. When Completo applied as a taxicab driver, Abiad
required him to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver's license. Completo never figured
in a vehicular accident since he was employed, and according to Abiad, he [Completo] was a
good driver and good man.

     RTC rendered judgment in favor of Albayda, and the defendants are ordered to pay actual
[46k] and moral [400k] damages, and attorney's fees [25k]. Upon appeal at the CA, the court
affirmed RTC's decision with modifications [no more actual damages; awarded temperate
damages [40k]; moral damages only 200k; Completo and Abiad are solidarily liable to pay
Albayda; added legal interest].

Issues and Holding

1. WON CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who caused the collision. NO
2. WON Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of the family.
YES
3. WON the award of moral and temperate damages and attorney's fees for Albayda had
no basis. NO / NO / YES
Ratio
On Negligence

It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a

preponderance of evidence the motorist's breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff,
that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury to the
plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered. NCC 2176
quoted, and said that the question of the motorist's negligence is a question of fact. Usually,
more will be required of a motorist [25mi/hr = 37ft/sec] than a bicyclist [10mi/hr = 15ft/sec] in
discharging the duty of care because of the physical advantages the former has over the latter.

It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise reasonable

diligence.

 He was overspeeding at the time he hit Albayda's bicycle; he did not slow down even
when he approached the intersection
 Such negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Albayda
 It was proven that Albayda had the right of way since he reached the intersection ahead
of Completo
NCC 2180 cited - obligation imposed by NCC 2176 is demandable also for those persons for
whom one is responsible. Employers are liable for damage caused by employees, but the
responsibility ceases upon proof that employers observed the diligence of the good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of employees. The burden of proof is on the
employer. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for QD is
solidary. The employer's civil liability for his employee's negligent acts is also primary
and direct, owing to his own negligence in selecting and supervising them, and this liability
attaches even if the employer is not in the vehicle at the time of collision.
     In the selection of employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. With respect to supervision, employers
should formulate SOPs and monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for
breaches. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious [secondary]
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence. 

ABIAD'S EVIDENCE CONSISTED ENTIRELY OF TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, AND THIS IS

INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT
IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF COMPLETO.

On Damages

CA rightfully deleted the award of actual damages because Albayda failed to present
documentary evidence to establish the amount incurred. Temperate damages may be recovered
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be
proved with certainty. Moral damages are awarded in QDs causing physical injuries, so the
award is proper. The award of attorney's fees is deleted for failure to prove that petitioners acted
in bad faith in refusing to satisfy respondent's just and valid claim.

BPI v. Suarez Digest

G.R. No. 167750
March 15, 2010
Carpio, J.:

Facts:
1. Reynaldo Suarez is a lawyer who used to maintain both savings and current account with
petitioner in its Ermita branch. Sometime in 1997, respondent had a client who wanted to
buy several parcels  of land in Tagaytay but the latter did not want to deal directly with the
owners of said land. 

2. Suarez and his client entered into an agreement where the former will be the one to
purchase the lands. Both likewise agreed that the client would deposit money in Suarez'
BPI account and thereafter, he would issue the checks for the sellers.

3. The client deposited a check with BPI branch. Aware that a check has 3-days clearing
time, Suarez' assistant called the bank which confirmed that the said amount had been
credited to his account on that same day. Relying on this confirmation, Suarez issued five
(5) checks in the name of the sellers. Unfortunately, all checks were dishonored due to
insufficient funds. A penalty amounting P57,000 was also debited from his account. The
checks were dishonored despite the assurance by RCBC, the drawee bank that the amount
has been debited from the account of the drawee. 

4. On top of this, the bank noted on the checks 'DAIF' (drawn against insufficient fund) and
not 'DAUD''  (drawn against uncollected deposit). The bank offered to reverse the penalty
but denied Suarez claim for damages. Suarez rejected this offer hence the case filed for
damages.

5. The lower court ruled in favor of Suarez and awarded actual, moral, and exemplary
damages. BPI appealed but the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court ruling. The CA
ruled that the bank was negligent in handling the accounts of the respondent hence the
latter's entitlement to damages. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner bank is liable for its negligence in handling the
respondent's account

1. No, BPI was not negligent because it was justified in dishonoring the checks for lack of
sufficient funds in Suarez account. There was no sufficient evidence to prove that BPI
conclusively confirmed the same-day crediting of the amount of the check to Suarez
account. While BPI has the discretion to disregard the 3-day clearing policy, Suarez failed
to prove his entitlement to such privilege. 
2. The award of actual damages is without basis since BPI is justified in dishonoring the
checks for being drawn against uncollected deposit, hence BPI can rightfully impose the
said penalty charges against Suarez' account.

3. The award of moral damages has no basis because Suarez failed to prove that his
claimed injury was proximately caused by the erroneous marking of the 'DAIF' on the
checks.

4. Suarez is however entitled to nominal damages due to BPI's failure to exercise the
diligence required as the bank's business is deemed to be affected with public interest. The
bank must at all times maintain a high level of meticulousness and should guard against
injury attributableto negligence or bad faith on its part. Suarez therefore has the right to
expect a high level of care and and diligence from BPI.

G.R. No. 156207     September 15, 2006

Lessons Applicable: Promissory Notes and Checks (Negotiable Instruments Law)

FACTS: 

 Warliza Sarande deposited in her account at Philippine Commercial

International (PCI) Bank a PCI Bank TCBT Check of P225K. 

 December 5 1991: Upon inquiry by Serande at PCI Bank on whether

the TCBT  Check had been cleared, she received an affirmative answer. 

 Relying on this assurance, she issued 2 checks drawn against the

proceeds of TCBT Check. 

 PCI Bank Check No. 073661 dated 5 December 1991 for P132K

which Sarande issued to respondent Rowena Ong owing to a business
transaction. 

 On the same day, Ong presented to PCI Bank requesting

PCI Bank to convert the proceeds into a manager's check, which the PCI
Bank obliged. 

 December 6 1991: Ong deposited PCI Bank Manager's Check in her

account with Equitable Banking Corporation

 December 9 1991: she received a check return-slip informing her that

PCI Bank had stopped the payment of the check on the ground of irregular
issuance. 

 Despite several demands made, it was refused

 Ong was constrained to file a Complaint for sum of money,

damages and attorney's fees against PCI Bank

 CA affirmed RTC: favored Ong

ISSUE: W/N Ong can hold PCI liable

HELD: YES.  Petition is DENIED. CA affirmed.

 By admitting it committed an error, clearing the check of Sarande and
issuing in favor of Ong not just any check but a manager's check for that
matter, PCI Bank's liability is fixed

 certification = acceptance, 

 Equitable PCI as drawee bank is bound on the instrument upon

certification and it is immaterial to such liability in favor of Ong who is a
holder in due course whether the drawer (Warliza Sarande) had funds or not
with the Equitable PCI Bank

 No unjust enrichment

SECTION 52. What constitutes a holder in due course. – A holder in due course

is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:

(a) That it is complete and regular upon its face;

(b) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice it
had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact;

(c) That he took it in good faith and for value;

(d) That at the time it was negotiated to him, he had no notice of any infirmity
in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.

The same law provides further:

Sec. 24. Presumption of consideration. – Every negotiable instrument is

deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every
person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for
value.

Sec. 26. What constitutes holder for value. – Where value has at any time been
given for the instrument, the holder is deemed a holder for value in respect to
all parties who become such prior to that time.

Sec. 28. Effect of want of consideration. – Absence or failure of consideration is

a matter of defense as against any person not a holder in due course; and
partial failure of consideration is a defense pro tanto, whether the failure is an
ascertained and liquidated amount or otherwise.

 manager's check 

 an order of the bank to pay, drawn upon itself, committing in

effect its total resources, integrity and honor behind its issuance

 regarded substantially to be as good as the money it represents

 same footing as a certified check

 The object of certifying a check, as regards both parties, is

to enable the holder to use it as money.

 check operates as an assignment of a part of the funds to

the creditors 

Sec. 187. Certification of check; effect of. – Where a check is certified by the

bank on which it is drawn, the certification is equivalent to an acceptance
Section 63 of the Central Bank Act to the effect "that a check which has been
cleared and credited to the account of the creditor shall be equivalent to a
delivery to the creditor in cash in an amount equal to the amount credited to his
account

Sec. 62. Liability of acceptor. – The acceptor by accepting the instruments

engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance; and admits
–

(a) The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature, and his
capacity and authority to draw the instrument; and

(b) The existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse.