G.R. No.

214073

THIRD DIVISION

October 4, 2017

G.R. No. 214073

BICOL MEDICAL CENTER, represented by Dr. Efren

SJ. Nerva, and the DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
represented by HEALTH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Petitioners
vs.
NOE B. BOTOR, CELJUN F. YAP, ISMAEL A. ALBAO,
AUGUSTO S. QUILON, EDGAR F. ESPLANA II, and
JOSEFINA F. ESPLANA, Respondents

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:
Prima facie evidence is evidence that is not rebutted or
contradicted, making it good and sufficient on its face to
establish a fact constituting a party's claim or defense.1

This resolves the Petition for Review2 filed by Bicol

Medical Center and the Department of Health, assailing
the February 28, 2014 Decision3 and August 26, 2014
Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
129806.

Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital (Provincial Hospital)

was established in 1933 as a 25-bed provincial hospital
located along Mabini Street, now Peñafrancia Avenue,
Naga City. The Camarines Sur Provincial Government
eventually subsidized the operations of a private hospital
located at Concepcion Pequefia, Naga City and
transferred the Provincial Hospital there.5

Road Lot No. 3, which stretched from Panganiban Road

to J. Miranda Avenue, is a service road which leads to the
Provincial Hospital.6

The Provincial Hospital was eventually converted to the

Bicol

Regional Training and Teaching Hospital (Training and

Teaching Hospital).7

Sometime in 1982, the Camarines Sur Provincial

Government donated about five (5) hectares of land to
the Ministry of Health, now the Department of Health,8
as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
13693.9 The Training and Teaching Hospital and Road
Lot No. 3 were included in this donation.10

The Training and Teaching Hospital became the Bicol

Medical Center (BMC) in 1995.11 Sometime in 2009,
BMC constructed a steel gate along J. Miranda Avenue to
control the flow of vehicle and pedestrian traffic entering
the hospital premises.12

On March 21, 2012, Dr. Efren SJ. Nerva (Dr. Nerva), BMC
Chief I, issued Hospital Memorandum No. 0310,13 which
ordered the rerouting of traffic inside the BMC
Compound. Salient portions of this Memorandum read:

To: All Officials and Employees This Center

Subject: Traffic Re-routing inside the BMC Compound

In line with the Traffic Re-routing of the Center, the
exit gate at the MCC Quarters shall be closed and the
OPD Exit Gate shall be used for the exit of pedestrians
and motor vehicles effective April l, 2012.

For information and dissemination purposes.14

This rerouting scheme closed the steel gate for vehicles

and pedestrians along J. Miranda Avenue, relocating it
from the eastern side of the hospital to the western side
effective April 1, 2012.15 The relocation of this gate was
implemented for security reasons and to make way for "
[m]assive development within the Complex."16

The gate closure drew a lot of criticism from the

community, and on May 19, 2012, Atty. Noe Botor (Atty.
Botor) wrote to Naga City Mayor John Bongat (Mayor
Bongat), asking for the reopening or dismantling of the
gate for being a public nuisance.17

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Naga City passed a

resolution authorizing Mayor Bongat to dismantle the
gate.18 However, instead of dismantling it, Mayor Bongat
filed a Verified Petition with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against BMC. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 2012-0073 and raffled to
Branch 24, Regional Trial Court, Naga City.19

Atty. Botor, Celjun F. Yap, Ismael A. Albao, Augusto S.

Quilon, Edgar F. Esplana II, and Josefina F. Esplana
(Intervenors) were allowed to intervene and submit their
complaint-in-intervention.20

A few months later, ground-breaking ceremonies for the

construction of the Cancer Center Building21 were
conducted, with construction intended to begin in
January 2013. When fully completed, the Cancer Center
Building would take over "about three-fourths (3/4) of
the width of Road Lot No. 3."22

On December 21, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied

Naga City's application for injunctive relief, ruling that
Naga City failed to prove a clear and unmistakable right
to the writ prayed for.23

On February 22, 2013, the Regional Trial Court denied

the motion for reconsideration filed by the Intervenors.24

Only the Intervenors filed a petition for certiorari before

the Court of Appeals.25

On February 28, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted the

petition and emphasized that only a prima facie showing
of an applicant's right to the writ is required in an
application for writ of injunctive relief.26

The Court of Appeals opined that the Intervenors were

able to prove the public character of Road Lot No. 3,
considering that "the general public had been using [it]
since time immemorial," with even Dr. Nerva admitting
that he passed through it when he was young. The Court
of Appeals also gave due weight to the 1970s Revised
Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and its Identification
Map, which support the Intervenors' assertion of the
public nature of Road Lot No. 3.27
The Court of Appeals concluded that Naga City and the
Intervenors were able to present prima facie evidence of
their right to the writ. However, the Court of Appeals
pointed out that whether or not the Revised Assessor's
Tax Mapping Control Roll should prevail over BMC's title
over the property is a factual matter that should be
threshed out in the trial court.28 The dispositive portion
of the Court of Appeals Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant

petition is hereby GRANTED. The court a quo is
hereby DIRECTED to issue a writ of mandatory
preliminary injunction in the case a quo.

SO ORDERED.29 (Emphasis in the original)

On August 26, 2014, the Court of Appeals30 denied the

motions for reconsideration filed by BMC and the
Department of Health. However, the Court of Appeals
emphasized that the injunction was not directed against
the construction of the Cancer Center Building but
against the relocation of the service road and gate
closure.31

On September 29, 2014, petitioners BMC and the

Department of Health filed this Petition for Review on
Certiorari32 before this Court. Petitioners claim that
although Road Lot No. 3 has been open to vehicles and
pedestrians as BMC's service road, it was never intended
for use by the general public and was not owned by Naga
City, as evidenced by the certification issued by the
Office of the City Engineer of Naga City.33

Petitioners assert that they have set up a gate on Road

Lot No. 3, which is closed' at night, on weekends, and
during holidays for security reasons and.for the welfare
of patients and hospital staff.34

Petitioners maintain that Dr. Nerva's closure of the road

and relocation of the gate was in preparation for the
construction of the Cancer Center Building.35 Thus, the
preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the Court of
Appeals had the effect of halting construction of a
government project, a violation of Presidential Decree
No. 181836 and this Court's Administrative Circular No.
11-2000, which reiterated the prohibition on the issuance
of injunctions in cases involving government
infrastructure projects.37

Petitioners claim that the ₱5l,999,475.26 contract for the

Cancer Center Building has been awarded to OCM Steel
Corporation, the winning contractor, and the Notice to
Proceed dated February 3, 2014 has been issued,
signalling the mobilization stage of the construction of
the Cancer Center Building.38
Petitioners emphasize that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the injunction over the relocation of the
service road and closure of the gate did not violate
Presidential Decree No. 1818 because the Cancer Center
Building, a government project, will be constructed right
where the gate stands.39

Petitioners point out that the Cancer Center Building will

be constructed along Road Lot No. 3; hence, there is a
need to close this road due to the excavation and
construction, which will make it dangerous for
pedestrians and vehicles alike to pass through.40

Petitioners likewise underscore that the intervenors, now

respondents, failed to support their claim that Road Lot
No. 3 was a public road41 or that they had a clear right to
the injunctive relief prayed for.42 Furthermore,
respondents also allegedly "failed to prove that the
invasion of the [ir] right sought to be protected [was]
material and substantial" and that there was an urgent
necessity for the issuance of the writ to prevent serious
damage.43

Finally, petitioners applied for a temporary restraining

order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the
reopening of the gate since doing so would affect the
construction of the Cancer Center Building.44
On October 8, 2014, this Court issued two (2)
Resolutions. The first Resolution45 granted petitioners'
motion for extension to file their petition. The second
Resolution46 issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the implementation of the Court of Appeals
February 28, 2014 Decision and August 26, 2014
Resolution, which directed the Regional Trial Court to
issue a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction on the
closure of Road Lot No. 3. The second Resolution also
required respondents to comment on the petition.47

On January 13, 2015, respondents filed their Comment

on the Petition,48 where they disputed petitioners' claim
that Road Lot No. 3 was always a component or service
road of BMC. Respondents contend that Road Lot No. 3
existed as a public road long before any hospital was
constructed on it and assert that it remains to be a public
road to this day.49

Respondents also dispute petitioners' claim that the road

closure was for the construction of the Cancer Center
Building since Dr. Nerva's memorandum was for no other
purpose than to reroute traffic within the hospital
complex.50

Respondents likewise point out that when they filed their

intervention before the Regional Trial Court and their
petition before the Court of Appeals, there were still no
plans to construct the Cancer Center Building.
Furthermore, BMC allegedly failed to support its claim
that there were indeed plans to build the Cancer Center
Building.51 Nonetheless, respondents explain that they
are not against its construction but are merely asking
that it not be illegally built on a public road.52

Finally, respondents ask that this Court lift its issued

temporary restraining order against the assailed Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution.53

In its Resolution54 dated February 25, 2015, this Court

noted respondents' comment and denied their prayer to
lift the temporary restraining order. It likewise directed
petitioners to file their reply to the comment.

In their Reply,55 petitioners reiterate their stand that

Road Lot No. 3 is a private property.56 Petitioners also
rebut respondents' assertion that they only belatedly
brought up the construction of the Cancer Center
Building because this project was nonexistent.57
Petitioners attached photos58 to prove that the
construction of the Cancer Center Building was in
progress.59

The single issue to be resolved by this Court is whether

or not the Court of Appeals erred in directing the
Regional Trial Court to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction on the closure of Road Lot No. 3.

The Petition is meritorious.

Department of Public Works and Highways v. City

Advertising Ventures Corp.60 defined a writ of
preliminary injunction as follows:

[A] writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary and

interlocutory order issued as a result of an impartial
determination of the context of both parties. It entails
a procedure for the judge to assess whether the
reliefs prayed for by the complainant will be rendered
moot simply as a result of the parties' having to go
through the full requirements of a case being fully
heard on its merits. Although a trial court judge is
given a latitude of discretion, he or she cannot grant a
writ of injunction if there is no clear legal right
materially and substantially breached from a prima
facie evaluation of the evidence of the complainant.
Even if this is present, the trial court must satisfy itself
that the injury to be suffered is irreparable.61

A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to:

[P]reserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant's

showing of two important requisite conditions,
 namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima
facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are
violative of that right. It must be proven that the
violation sought to be prevented would cause an
irreparable injustice.62

Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the

instances when a writ of preliminary injunction may be
issued:

Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary

injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted
when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief

demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of: or
in requiring the perfonnance of an act or acts,
either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-

performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice
to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is

doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
 procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.

Jurisprudence has likewise established that the following

requisites must be proven first before a writ of
preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory,
may be issued:

(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable

right to be protected, that is a right in esse;

(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such

right;

(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent

irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) No other
ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to
prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.63

In satisfying these requisites, the applicant for the writ

need not substantiate his or her claim with complete and
conclusive evidence since only prima facie evidence64
or a sampling is required "to give the court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction pending the
decision of the case on the merits."65
Tan v. Hosana66 defines prima facie evidence as
evidence that is "good and sufficient on its face. Such
evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to
establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts
constituting the· party's claim or defense and which if not
rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient."67

Spouses Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank68 then discussed

the requisites and the proof required for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction:

The plaintiff praying for a writ of preliminary injunction

must further establish that he or she has a present
and unmistakable right to be protected; that the facts
against which injunction is directed violate such right;
and there is a special and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damages. In the absence of
proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the
plaintiff, an order for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction will be nullified. Thus, where the
plaintiff's right is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary
injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of an actual existing right is not
a ground for a preliminary injunction.

However, to establish the essential requisites for a

preliminary injunction, the evidence to be submitted
by the plaintiff need not be conclusive and complete.
 The plaintiffs arc only required to show that they have
an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their
complaint. A writ of preliminary i11iunction is generally
based solely on initial or incomplete evidence. Such
evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to
give the court an evidence of justification for a
preliminary injunction pending the decision on the
merits of the case, and is not conclusive of the
principal action which has yet to be decided.69

(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

To prove its clear legal right over the remedy being

sought, Naga City presented before the trial court the
1970s Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and
its Identification Map which both identified Road Lot No.
3 as being in the name of the Province of Camarines
Sur.70 Witnesses' testimonies were also presented to
corroborate Naga City's claims of the public nature of
Road Lot No. 3.71

Respondents claimed that as members of the general

public, they had every right to use Road Lot No. 3, a
public road.72

On the other hand, BMC presented TCT No. 13693,73

which covered a total land area of 53,890m2 within Barrio
Concepcion, Naga City with the Ministry of Health, now
Department of Health, as the registered owner. It is not
disputed that Road Lot No. 3 is part of the property
covered by TCT No. 13693.

BMC likewise presented a certification74 from the City

Engineer of Naga City which read:

This is to certify that the road from Panganiban Drive

up to the entrance and exit gate of Bicol Medical
Center is not included in the list of Inventory of City
Road[s] of Naga City.

Given this 14th day of December 2012 for record and

reference purposes.75

A careful reading of the records convinces this Court that

respondents failed to establish prima facie proof of their
clear legal right to utilize Road Lot No, 3. Whatever right
they sought to establish by proving the public nature of
Road Lot No. 3 was rebutted by the Department of
Health's certificate of title and the City Engineer's
categorical statement that "the road from Panganiban
Drive up to the entrance and exit gate of [BJ\1C] was not
included in the list" of city roads under Naga City's
control.76

Instead of merely relying on a tax map and claims of

customary use, Naga City or respondents should have
presented a clear legal right to support their claim over
Road Lot No. 3.

Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc.

77 explained that a clear legal right which would entitle
the applicant to an injunctive writ "contemplates a right
'clearly founded in or granted by law.' Any hint of doubt or
dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of
preliminary injunctive relief."78

Absent a particular law or statute establishing Naga

City's ownership or control over Road Lot No. 3, the
Department of Health's title over the BMC compound
must prevail over the unsubstantiated claims of Naga
City and respondents. Department of Health's ownership
over Road Lot No. 3, with the concomitant right to use
and enjoy this property, must be respected.

Respondents likewise cannot rely on the supposed

customary use of Road Lot No. 3 by the public to support
their claimed right of unfettered access to the road
because customary use is not one (1) of the sources of
legal obligation;79 hence, it does not ripen into a right.

II

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in

limiting prima facie evidence merely to the evidence
presented by Naga City and respondents and in
disregarding altogether petitioners' evidence,80 which
had the effect of squarely rebutting Naga City and
respondents' assertions. The Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate the nature of the ancillary remedy of a writ of
preliminary injunction as against the ex parte nature of a
temporary restraining order.

During the hearing for the application for writ of

preliminary injunction, the trial court correctly weighed
the evidence presented by both parties before
dismissing Naga City's application:

On 21 December 2012, the court a quo handed down

the first assailed Order denying the application for
injunctive relief. According to said court, Naga City
failed to comply with the jurisprudential requirements
for the issuance of said injunction, to wit: 1) the right
of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; 2) the
invasion of the right is material and substantial; and 3)
urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage.

Anent the first requirement, the court a quo noted that

even on the assumption that the 1970's Revised
Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and its
Identification Map were both authentic documents,
the same would not overcome BMC s ownership of
 the property as evidenced by its title. BAMC’s title
covers all property within its bounds, which naturally
included Road Lot No. 3.

The court a quo thereafter proceeded to conclude

that since Naga City failed to clearly establish its right
over the said road, then logically, it would not also be
able to show compliance with the second requisite,
which necessitates a material and substantial invasion
of such right.

On the third requirement, the court a quo took into

consideration the testimonies of two of the herein
petitioners, Eliza M. Quilon (hereinafter Quilon) and
Josefina F. Esplana (hereinafter Esplana), who both
have businesses in the area and who said that their
respective enterprises started suffering from losses
after the closure of Road Lot No. 3. However,
according to the court a quo, the losses of Quilon and
Esplana hardly qualify as irreparable injury required by
jurisprudence in granting the writ of preliminary
injunction. This is so, as the court declared, because
the alleged business losses that had been purportedly
caused by the closure of Road Lot No. 3 were easily
subject to mathematical computation.81 (Emphasis
supplied)

Writs of preliminary injunction are granted only upon prior

notice to the party sought to be enjoined and upon their
due hearing.1âwphi1 Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court provides:

Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without

notice; exception. - No preliminary injunction shall be
granted without hearing and prior notice to the party
or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from
facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application
that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice,
the court to which the application for preliminary
injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary
restraining order to be effective only for a period of
twenty (20) days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided.
Within the said twenty-day period, the court must
order said party or person to show cause, at a
specified time and place, why the injunction should
not be granted, determine within the same period
whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be
granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding
order.

However, and subject to the provisions of the

preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme
urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice
and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a
multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single
sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining
order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from
issuance but he shall immediately comply with the
provisions of the next preceding section as to service
of summons and the documents to be served
therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-
two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is
pending shall conduct a summary hearing to
detem1ine whether the temporary restraining order
shall be extended until the application for preliminary
injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total
period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order
extended twenty (20) days, including the original
seventy-two hours (72) hours provided herein.

In the event that the application for preliminary

injunction is denied or not resolved within the said
period, the temporary restraining order is deemed,
automatically vacated. The effectivity of a temporary
restraining order is not extendible without need of any
judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall
have authority to extend or renew the same on the
same ground for which it was issued.

However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a

 member thereof, the temporary restraining order shall
be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the
party or person sought to be enjoined. A restraining
order issued by the Supreme Court or a member
thereof shall be effective until further orders.

Thus, Rule 58 requires "a full and comprehensive hearing

for the determination of the propriety of the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction,"82 giving the applicant an
opportunity to prove that great or irreparable injury will
result if no writ is issued and allowing the opposing party
to comment on the application.

On the other hand, a temporary restraining order that is

heard only with the evidence presented by its applicant is
ex parte, but it is issued to preserve the status quo until
the hearing for preliminary injunction can be conducted,
Miriam College Foundation, Inc v. Court of Appeals83
explained the difference between preliminary injunction
and a restraining order as follows:

Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage

of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or
final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a
person to perform to refrain from performing a
particular act or acts. As an extraordinary remedy,
injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the
status quo of things and is generally availed of to
 prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of
the case can be heard. A preliminary injunction
persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of
the action without the court issuing a final injunction.

The basic purpose of restraining order, on the other

hand, is to preserve the status quo until the hearing of
the application for preliminary injw1ction. ; Under the
former A§5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A§S, Batas Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge
(or justice) may issue a temporary restraining order
with a limited life of twenty days from date of issue. If
before the expiration of the 20-day period the
application for preliminary injunction is denied, the
temporary order would thereby be deemed
automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the
judge on the application for preliminary injunction
within the said 20 days, the temporary restraining
order would automatically expire on the 20th day by
the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that
effect being necessary. In the instant case, no such
preliminary injunction was issued; hence, the TRO
earlier issued automatically expired under the
aforesaid provision of the Rules of Court.84 (Citations
omitted)

It is true that some issues are better threshed out before

the trial court, such as if the donation to the Department
of Health by the Camarines Sur Provincial Government
contained an encumbrance for the public to continue
using Road Lot No. 3, or the validity of this donation.85
The Court of Appeals, however, erred when it completely
disregarded the evidence presented by petitioners,
reasoning out that the question of whether or not Naga
City's evidence should prevail over BMC's title over the
property was supposedly a factual matter that should be
threshed out in the trial court.86

By focusing solely on Naga City and respondents'

evidence to determine if there was prima facie evidence
to issue the writ of preliminary injunction while the case
was being heard in the lower court, the Court of Appeals
misappreciated the nature of a writ of preliminary
injunction. To reiterate, a preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy issued after due hearing where both
parties are given the opportunity to present their
respective evidence. Thus, both their evidence should be
considered.

As it is, absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion,

there was no reason for the Court of Appeals to reverse
the trial court's denial of respondents' application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents
were unable to present prima facie evidence of their clear
and unmistakable right to use Road Lot No. 3.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to GRANT the Petition.

The assailed February 28, 2014 Decision and August 26,
2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 129806 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The temporary restraining order issued by this Court in

its October 8, 2014 Resolution is made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN SAMUEL R. MARTIRES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had

been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution

and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Wa-acon v. People, 539 Phil. 485, 494 (2006) [Per

J. Velasco, Third Division].

2 Rollo, pp. 9-34.

3 Id. at 35-46. The Decision was penned by

Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred
in by Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and
Leoncia Real-Dimagiba of the Fourth Division, Court
of Appeals, Manila.

4 Id. at 47-48. The Resolution was penned by

Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred
in by Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and
Leoncia Real-Dimagiba of the Special Former Fourth
Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

5 About Bicol Medical Center, available at

<http://gwhs-stg02.i.gov.ph/~s2dohbmcgov/?
q=about-bmc> (last accessed on September 11,
2017).

6 Rollo, p. 36.

7 Id.

8 Id.

9 Id. at 49.

10 Id. at 36.

11 Id.

12 Id. at 12 and 36.

13 Id. at 51.
14 Id. at 51.

15 Id. at 12.

16 Id.

17 Id. at 37.

18 Id.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id. at 54-58.

22 Id. at 37-38.

23 Id. at 38.

24 Id. at 39.

25 Id.

26 Id. at 41.

27 Id. at 41-42.

28 Id. at 42.

29 Id. at 46.
30 Id. at 47-48.

31 Id. at 48.

32 Id. at 9-33.

33 Id. at 11-12, 50.

34 Id. at 12.

35 Id. at 16.

36 Prohibiting Courts from Issuing Restraining

Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving
Infrastructure and Natural Resource Development
Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the
Government (1981).

37 Rollo, pp. 17-18.

38 Id. at 18.

39 Id. at 20.

40 Id. at 21.

41 Id. at 21-22.

42 Id. at 22-23.

43 Id. at 25··-26.
44 Id. at 27-29.

45 Id. at 64.

46 Id. at 65-68.

47 Id. at 65.

48 Id. at 103-113.

49 Id. at 104-105.

50 Id. at l05.

51 ld. at 106-107.

52 Id. at 107.

53 Id. at 110.

54 Id. at 115-116.

55 Id. at 132-142.

56 Id. at 134.

57 Id. at 135.

58 Id. at 171-175.

59 Id. at 138.
60 GR. No. 182944, November 9, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file•"/jurisprudence/20l6/november2016/182944.pdt
> [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]

61 Id.at13.

62 Philippine Nationai Bank v. Cast alloy Technology

Corporation, 684 Phil 438, 445 (2012) [Per J. Reyes,
Second Divi5ion] citing Los Banos Rural Bank, Inc. v.
Aj!·ica, 433 Phil. 930, 935 (2002) [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division]. See also Power Sites
and Signs, Inc. v. United Neon, 620 Phil. 205, 217
(2009) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].

63 St. James College of P aranaque 11. Equitabl? PCI

Bank, 641 Phil. 452, 466 (2010) [Per J. Velasco, Jr.,
First Division] citing Bifian Steel Corporation v. Court
a/Appeals, 439 Phil. 688, 703-704 (2002) [Per J.
Corona, Third Division] and Hutchison Ports
Philippines Ltd v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority,
393 Phil. 843, 859 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago,
First Division].

64 Republic v. Evangelista, 504 Phil. 115, 123 (2005)

[Per J. Puno, Second Division], citing Buayan Cattle
Co., Inc. v. Quintilian, 213 Phil. 244, 254 (1984) [Per
J, Makasiar, Second Division].
65 Olalia v. Hizon, 274 Phil 66, 72 (1991) (Per J.
Cruz, First Division].

66 G.R. No. 190846. February 3, 2016, 783 SCRA 87

[Per J. Brion, Second Division]

67 Id. at 101 citing Wa-acon v. feople, 539 Phil. 485

(2006) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division].

68 545 Phil. 138 (2007) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Third

Division].

69 Id. at 160-161.

70 Rollo, p. 38.

71 Id. at 39.

72 Id. at 104.

73 Id. at 49.

74 Id. at 50.

75 Id.

76 Id.

77 701Phil64 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second

Division].
78 Id. at 69, citing Boncodin v. National Power
Corporation Employees Consolidated Union (NECU),
534 Phil. 7 41, 7 54 (2006) [Per C.J. Panganiban, En
Banc] and Spouses Arcega v. Court of Appeals, 341
Phil. 166 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].

79 CIVIL CODE, art. 1157 provides:

Article 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;

(3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(5) Quasi-delicts.

80 Rollo, pp. 42-43.

81 Id. at 38-39.

82 Spouses Lago v. Abul, 654 Phil 479, 490(2011)

[Per J. Nachura, Second Division].

83 401 Phil 431 (2000)[Per J. Kapunan, First

Division].

84 Id. at 447--448.
 85 Rollo, pp. 42-43.

86 Id. a 42.

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