Pharmaceutical Valuation Methodology & Case Studies: Karl Heinz Koch European Pharmaceuticals

Pharmaceutical
Valuation
Methodology &
Case Studies
Karl Heinz Koch
European Pharmaceuticals
21 February 2008 Slide 2
Content
Valuation Methodologies - An Overview 3
Static Valuation Methodologies (Pros and Cons) 4-8
Dynamic Valuation Methodologies (Pros and Cons) 9
Vontobel Pharma Valuation ("Net Portfolio Add-On Potential") 10-21
Case Studies:
- Special Situations (i.e. Roche, Novartis) 22-39
- Nycomed - "Life Beyond Pantoprazole" 40-44

Valuation Overview
Static Dynamic
Geared De-Geared Discounted Economic

(e.g. P/E, (e.g. EV/x) Cash Flow Value Added
P/CF) (DCF) (EVA)
P/E rel., EV/x rel.,

PEG EV/x/g
Static "Geared" Valuation Methods (1)
Price per share relative to Earnings per share, the so-called "PER"
Pros:
"Simple" (no adjustments needed)
Widely used because they are "simple"
Cons:
Misleading due to lack of comparability
Different accounting philosophies (shareholder focus versus tax

authorities)
Different balance sheet structures ("Gearing")

Gearing affects P/E ratios (PER)
USD million Company A Company B

Market Capitalisation 100 50
Level of debt 0 50
Cost of debt (interest rate p.a.) 12% 12%
Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) 10 10

Net interest 0 6
Pre-tax profit (PTP) 10 4
Taxes (@ 35%) 3.5 1.4
Net profit 6.5 2.6
PER 15.4x 19.2x

Static "Geared" Valuation Methods (2)
Price per share relative to Cash Flow per share, so-called "P/CF"
Pros:
More accurate cross-company comparability within a sector (assuming
similar capital structures)
More accurate assessment of "cash" operating performance
Cons:
Not as widely used due to lack of information that spots "cash" from
"non-cash" items
Insufficiently accounts for minority interests, capital requirements and

is even more sensitive to "gearing" than a PER
Static "De-Geared" Valuation Methods (1)
Enterprise Value (EV) relative to "Revenues" per share
Pros:
Values assets of a company by looking at the whole enterprise (hence
the term "enterprise value") independent of the capital structure of
the company (which is different from just looking at "equity" in the
case of geared valuation methods); (known as Proposition 1 by Miller
and Modigliani)
Allows for a distinction between a company's "core" and "non-core"

assets (widely used by so-called "company raiders")
Cons:
Imperfections of markets mean that companies are not always able to
restructure their balance sheet at will or at negligible cost
Strong assumptions built into EV methodology: tax neutrality between

equity and debt,
Static "De-Geared" Valuation Methods (2)
Enterprise Value (EV) = Market Capitalisation + Value of net debt

(average for the year) - Estimated Value of "non-core" assets
Pros:
Removes the often significant distortion due to different capital
structures
Allows to value individual businesses
Cons:
Not as widely used due to adjustments needed ("can not be easily
commanded on traditional financial services such as Bloomberg")
Sometimes difficult assumptions needed to value non-core businesses

and impact of tax wedges due to imperfect capital markets
Dynamic Valuation Method - DCF
Discounted Cash Flow Model
Pros:
Allows valuation of companies with no near-term sustainable cash
flow streams (or even loss making companies, i.e. biotechnology)
Appropriate for businesses with discretionary cost structures and long

product cycles, such as pharmaceuticals
Cons:
A large part of the NPV is driven by the growth rates in the terminal
value which are difficult to predict
Many businesses do not lend themselves to the long-term predictions

needed for a DCF model (though pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies do)
Vontobel Pharmaceutical Valuation Model based on

"Net Portfolio Add-On Potential"
Relative Valuation Multiples for Pharmaceuticals
25
20
+10x
Multiple (x)
15
PER Median 12.2x
-4x
10
0
Sanofi
BMS
Lilly
GSK
Merck Inc.
Abbott
AZN
JNJ
Pfizer
Wyeth
Novartis
Lundbeck
SGP
Novo
Merck KGaA
Roche
PER 2008 EV/EBITDA 2008 EV/Sales 2008
Large Variances in Relative Valuation Multiples
12
10
8
6
Multiple (x)
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
Sanofi
GSK
BMS
Lilly
Merck Inc.
Abbott
AZN
Wyeth
Pfizer
JNJ
Lundbeck
SGP
Novo
Novartis
Merck KGaA
Roche
PER '08E vs median EV/EBITDA '08E vs median EV/Sales '08E vs median
Why Has Valuation Analysis Been Poor in the Past?
Relative Earnings Multiples (geared or de-geared) Can Be Misleading

because:
Much of a stock's value is driven by future drug revenues, which are difficult
to predict accurately
A. they tend to penalize innovative companies since they are the ones that
have to absorb the high cost of large-scale clinical studies and market
introduction;
B. they favor companies that lack new product flow, not least as profitability
measures tend to rise in the short term due to a lack of (product) investment
opportunities
Furthermore, relative valuation multiples do not take into account important

quality differences because "growth is not simply growth" and only
sustainable growth driven by new products determines valuations in the
sector.
generic exposure as % of sales
Ro
ch
e(
in
c.
pr
op
.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
DN
A)
Ba
ye
r
SG
Ab P
bo
tt
W
M e ye
rck th
&
Co
No .
No v
vo arti
No s
rd
isk
Eli
Lil
ly
AZ
N
Patent losses - The Only Certainty
GS
K
BM
S
Sa P
no f
fi- iz er
Av
en
tis
JN
J
21 February 2008
Slide 14
generic exposure vs pipeline potential (as % of sales)
Ro
ch
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in
c.
pr
op
.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
DN
A)
Ba
ye
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SG
Ab P
bo
tt
Wy
Me e
rck th
&
Co
No .
No v
vo arti
No s
rd
isk
Eli
The Difference is in The Balance
Lil
ly
AZ
N
Sa
no G
fi- SK
Av
en
tis
BM
S
Pf
iz e
r
JN
J
21 February 2008
Slide 15
Winners And Losers ... Broadly Speaking (Phase 1-3)
50%
40%
30%
% of 2006 sales
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
-30%
y
S
s
t is
r
K
P
r
J
.
isk
h
tt
il l
iz e
)
ye
rti
Co
BM
JN
SG
GS
et
AZ
NA
bo
en
L
rd
va
Ba
Pf
Wy
&
.D
Eli
Ab
Av
No
No
rck
op
fi-
o
Me
no
v
pr
No
Sa
c.
in
e(
ch
Ro
Net portfolio "add-on" potential (pipeline potential - generic exposure)

Winners And Losers ... Strictly Speaking (Phase 3)
40%
30%
20%
% of 2006 sales
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
-30%
-40%
ly
S
tis
r
tis
K
J
.
isk
h
A)
tt
iz e
ye
Co
BM
JN
GS
SG
Lil
et
AZ
bo
ar
en
DN
rd
Ba
Pf
Wy
&
v
Eli
Ab
av
No
No
rck
op
fi-
vo
Pr
Me
no
No
cl .
Sa
in
e(
ch
Ro
Net portfolio "add-on" potential (pipeline potential - generic exposure)

Big Pharmaceuticals - An Industry Fallen From Grace
18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008E 2010E
US/EU Big Pharma Rx sales growth (l.c.)

3-Phase DCF Model - FCF Growth EU Universe
8.0%
6%
6.0%
4%
4.0% 3% 3%3% 3% 3% 3%
2% 2%
2.0%
0%
0.0%
0% 0%
-2.0%
-2%
-4.0%
-6.0% -5%
Novartis Roche Sanofi-aventis GlaxoSmithKline AstraZeneca
1st phase 2nd phase terminal

Healthcare Continuum - Risk Perceptions
Big Pharma
BioPharma
Biotech
Assessing Quality of Growth - Appropriate Discount Rate

Low risk (++)/High risk (--) ++ + 0 - --
Premium/Discount per quality
-0.40% -0.20% 0.00% 0.20% 0.40%
characteristic
++ (significantly + (better than sector - (w orse than sector -- (significantly
0 (sector average)
better than sector) average) average) w orse than sector)
Pipeline Potential or Portfolio
Replacement Rate (Sum of probability-
w eighted peak sales of all pipeline > 50% 40% - 50% 30% - 40% 20% - 30% 0% - 20%
projects expressed as % of current
sales)
Generic Exposure or Portfolio Rate
at Risk (Sum of all sales losing patent
10% 10% - 20% 20% - 30% 30% - 50% above 50%
protection in the coming 5 years
expressed as % of sales)
Incremental potential of base
portfolio (Sales of the underlying
> 36% 26% - 35% 16% - 25% 0% - 15% < 0%
base portfolio - not new , not at generic
risk - as % of current sales)
No leadership
Therapeutic Leadership (Franchise
according to LODH No notable
strengths indicating high sustainability 3 leadership 2 leadership 1 leadership
definition, but among therapeutic franchise
of future cash flow s - Minimum 10% in positions positions position
top 5 in 2 or more strength
USD 10 bn+ market segment)
areas
Geographical Exposure (% of
US revenues of US revenues of US revenues of US revenues of
revenues in the profitable and higher > 60% US revenues
45% - 60% 30% - 45% 15% - 30% 0% - 15%
grow th US market)
Business Diversification (% of
revenues derived from prescription 75% - 99% 50% - 74% 25% - 49% < 25%
100% Rx revenues
medicines (not vaccines, not blood Rx revenues Rx revenues Rx revenues Rx revenues
plasma)
TOTAL COMPANY-SPECIFIC RISK

(PREMIUM (-)/ DISCOUNT (+) Aggregate of Aggregate of
Aggregate of
(Negative risk premium is a bonus and premium quality discount quality
average quality on
increases the value by low ering the characteristics on -1.2% 1.2% characteristics on
discount rate
overall discount rate (Rf + Rm). discount rate discount rate
0%
Positive risk premium low ers the value -2.4% 2.4%
by raising the overall discount rate)
Special Situation - Novartis "Structurally Flawed" (Buy - PT: CHF 68)

Novartis relative to MSCI Euro Pharma Index

27/2/08
80
75
70
-20%
65
60
55
50
-30%
45
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
NOVARTIS 'R'
REL.PERF. TO DRUGS EURO
-10%
Source: DATASTREAM
Novartis Branded Rx Outperforms a Declining Industry
18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008E 2010E
Novartis Branded Rx sales growth (l.c.) US/EU Big Pharma Rx sales growth (l.c.)
A Bird's View
Stars Cash
Cows
New Drugs Growth
Lucentis
Gleevec Femara
Diovan
Exjade
Certican Exelon
Enablex
Exforge Sebivo Myfortic
Zometa
Aclast Xolair Stalevo Elidel
Eucreas a Tasigna Foradil Sandostatin LAR
Tekturna Lescol
Pipeline Drugs
AGO Optaflu Neoral

LBH Tegretol
Tekt. QAB RAD FTY720 Miacalcic
Menveo Clozaril
FDC 149 AS (MS)
QAB Men B Lotrel Voltaren Lamisil
SOM LBQ Visudyne
FDC EPO albuf Zelnorm
NVA Famvir
Mycograb Trileptal
? ACZ Aurograb Dogs
AEB071
Cost Phase Return Phase Market Share

Structurally Sound ...
100%
90%
80%
70%
Others
60%
50%
FTY720
40% QAB149
agomelatine
30%
Lucentis Lotrel
20% Exforge Diovan
Eucreas (G) Femara
10% Tekturna Lamisil
Tasigna Trileptal
agomelatine Zometa
0% Aclasta
Risk adjusted pipeline Generic risk as % of 2007 Incremental potential of
potential as % of 2007 sales base portfolio as % of
sales 2007 sales (2007-12)
New Product Cycle - "Show Me The Money"
20,000
Sales in USD mn
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
2002 2004 2006 2008E 2010E 2012E
Annual sales of drugs losing patents
Annual sales of new drugs
Annual sales of base portfolio (not new, not generic)
Valuation And Earnings Discrepancy
100%
1013
90% 16357
80% 1253
EBIT vs EV contribution
70% 22320
60%
50%
40% 7217
30% 55896
20%
10%
0%
EBIT EV
Pharmaceuticals & Vaccines Sandoz Consumer Health

Back-Integrated Sum-of-Parts (SOP) Valuation

in million USD 2007 2008E
Novartis share price (in CHF) 50.8 50.8
Novartis share price in USD (Fx: 1.0) 50 50
Number of shares (diluted) * 2330 2287
Market Capitalisation 116500 114350
Net Cash * 7400 11457
Cash value of Roche equity holding (in USD) 11193 11193

Roche bearer share price (in CHF) 210 210
Nbe of Roche bearer shares owned by Novartis 53.3 53.3
Enterprise Value (EV) 97907 91700
Sandoz (generics) sales 7169 7972

Mean peer EV/Sales multiple 2.8x 2.6x
Implied EV (Sandoz) 20073 20726
Consumer Health (OTC, animal, vision) sales 5426 5842

Mean peer EV/Sales multiple 3.2x 3.0x
Implied EV (Consumer Health) 17363 17526
Corporate overhead EBITDA >638 >468

Mean peer EV/cost 5.0x 5.0x
Implied EV (Corporate overhead) >3190 >2340
Implied EV of Pharmaceuticals & Vaccines 63661 55788
Pharmaceutical sales 24025 25277

Vaccines (& Diagnostics) sales 1452 1646
Total Pharmaceuticals & Vaccines/Dx sales 25477 26923
Pharmaceutical EBITDA 7688 8368

Vaccine (& Diagnostics) EBITDA 448 485
Total Pharmaceutical and Vaccine/Dx EBITDA 8136 8853
Implied Pharmaceuticals & Vaccine/Dx EV/Sales (x) 2.5x 2.1x

Mean peer sector EV/Sales multiple 3.5x 2.8x
Discount Novartis versus peers 828% 826%
Implied Pharmaceuticals & Vaccine EV/EBITDA (x) 7.8x 6.3x
Mean peer sector EV/EBITDA multiple 11.5x 8.5x
Discount Novartis versus peers 832% 826%
Novartis - A Takeover Target?
50 44
40
30
20
10 6.3x 6.5x
-10
-20
-30 -24
Novartis Pfizer
Net add-on potential (%) EV/EBITDA (x)

Big Pharma's Pain is Generic's Gain
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008E 2010E
US/EU Big Pharma Rx sales growth (l.c.) US/EU Generic (Gx) sales growth (l.c.)
Market Does Not Appear to Value Sandoz (Generics)

Due To Potential "Conflict of Interest"
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008E 2010E
US/EU Generic (Gx) sales growth (l.c.) Novartis Generic sales growth (l.c.)
Special Situation - Roche "High on DNA" (Buy - PT: CHF 235)

Roche NVES relative to MSCI European Pharmaceuticals

260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
ROCHE HOLDINGS GSH.
Rel to MSCI Pharma
Source: DATASTREAM
Roche Rx Substantially Outperforms Peers
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008E 2010E
US/EU Big Pharma Rx sales growth (l.c.) Roche Pharmaceutical Sales

Substantially Scalable...
"Stars" "Cash
Cows"
Growth
Tarceva
Bonviva (ex.-US)
Herceptin
(ex-US)/Jap)
Xeloda
Avastin
(ex.-US/Jap) Mabthera
New Drugs
Valcyte
(ex-US/Jap)
Pegasys
Bondronat CellCept
Fuzeon Tamiflu
Pipeline Drugs
Mircera
Actemra Dilatrend
(RA) ocrelizumab EPO
Xenical Kytril
(ex-US) (ex-US)
Pertuzumab
(ex-US) Viracept/ Rocephin
HPV16
Fortovase
R1583
(diabetes) R1626 Accutane
(HepC)
R1658
(dyslipidemia) "Dogs"
"Pipeline"

Structurally Sound ...
100%
90%
80%
70%
60% DNA
50%
40% Other
30% Mircera
M/ocralizum ab
20% Actem ra
CellCept
10% Avastin NeoRecorm on DNA
0% Dilatrend Roche
Risk adjusted pipeline Generic risk as % of Increm ental potential
potential as % of 2007 2007 sales of base portfolio as %
sales of 2007 sales (2007-12)
New Product Cycle - "Show Me The Money"
20,000
15,000
Sales in CHF mn
10,000
5,000
0
2002 2003E 2004 2005 2006E 2007E 2008E 2009E 2010E
-5,000
Annual sales of drugs losing patents

Annual sales of new drugs
Annual sales of base portfolio (not new, not generic)
Back-Integrated Sum-of-Parts (SOP) Valuation

Price Nbe of shares Market Cap
Roche NVES + Bearer
NVES 191 699 133509
Bearer 210 160 33616
Total in CHF mn 167125
Genentech (DNA) (in USD) 81 1070 86670

FX 1.0
DNA in CHF mn 86670
Roche ownership (56%) 48535
Chugai (Japan) 1087 551 598937

Fx 1.01
Chugai in CHF mn 5930
Roche ownership (51%) 3024
"Equity value" of underlying Roche (CHF mn) 115566 115566 115566 115566
2005 2006 2007 2008E

Net cash owned by Roche (90% of total) 8163 12286 15041 18619
Enterprise value (EV; CHF mn) 107403 103279 100525 96946
2005 2006 2007 2008E

Roche Rx and Dx Sales 23,962 28,101 30,918 32,331
Implied sales multiples 4.5x 3.7x 3.3x 3.0x
Global sector mean 3.8x 3.6x 3.5x 2.8x
Premium (Discount) 18% 2% 87% 7%
Roche Rx and Dx EBITDA 7796 9035 10569 11513

Implied EBITDA multiple 13.8x 11.4x 9.5x 8.4x
Global sector mean 12.6x 11.5x 10.5x 8.5x
Premium (Discount) 9% 81% 89% 81%
Nycomed "Life After Pantoprazole"

Preparing for Life Beyond Pantoprazole...
Stars Cash
Cow s
Growth
New drugs
Preotac Alvesc Bradley Pharm a
Tachosil
Om naris
Angiom ax
Pipeline drugs
Instanyl
ZyCom b Im agify Protonix

TransMID
Alvesco + LABA FDC
Dogs

Overcoming the Pantoprazole Patent Overhang...
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
Others
30% Alvesco Protonix/
+ FDC pantoprazole
20%
10% Om naris ?
0%
Risk adjusted pipeline Generic risk as % of Increm ental potential of
potential as % of 2007 2007 sales base portfolio as % of
sales 2007 sales (2007-12)
Risk Profiling of Nycomed

Risk Grade 5 (low risk) 4 3 2 1 (high risk)
Pipeline Potential (Portfolio replacement rate) 50% or more >= 30% - 50% >= 15% - 30% 0 to 15% 0
(Sum of probability weighted value of

pipeline projects / current sales base)
-0.40% -0.20% 0.00% 0.20% 0.40%
Generic Risk (Portfolio rate at risk) <= 10% >= 10% - 20% >= 20% - 30% >= 30% - 50% above 50%
(Sales at risk of losing patents in coming 5

years at 100% / current sales base)
-0.40% -0.20% 0.00% 0.20% 0.40%
Incremtental potential of
> 36% 26% - 35% 16% - 25% 0% - 15% < 0%
underlying portfolio
(Sales of the underlying product portfolio -

not new, not at risk of patent loss - as % of -0.40% -0.20% 0.00% 0.20% 0.40%
current sales)
No leadership and not

3 leaderships in 2 leaderships in 1 leaderships in No leadership +
among top 10 in 3
Therapeutic Leadership therapeutic groups of therapeutic groups of therapeutic groups of among top 10 in 3
therapeutic groups at
average size $10bn+ average size $10bn+ average size $10bn+ therapeutic groups
least
(Based on world market shares and serves

as an indicator of a company's success in -0.40% -0.20% 0.00% 0.20% 0.40%
franchise building, ie., knowledge building)
US sales of 60% or
Geographical Exposure US sales of > 45% US sales of > 30% US sales of > 15% US sales of < 15%
more
(% of sales (direct and indirect -0.40% -0.20% 0.00% 0.20% 0.40%

sales) in the fast growing "free" US
market)
100% of sales from > 75% of sales from > 50% of sales from > 25% of sales from < 25% of sales from
Business Diversification
prescription drugs prescription drugs prescription drugs prescription drugs prescription drugs
(% of sales derived from prescription drugs) -0.40% -0.20% 0.00% 0.20% 0.40%
What Would an Appropriate Discount Rate for

Nycomed Be?
12.0%
10.0% 0.75%
0.56% 0.50% 0.50% 0.75% 0.75% 0.8%
8.0%
4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4%
6.0%
4.0%
2.0% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.50%
0.0% -0.7% -0.2% -0.3% -0.2%

-1.0%
-2.0%
Roche (7.5%) AZN (8.3%) Novartis GSK (8.95%) Sanofi- Nycomed
(8.8%) aventis (~10%)
(8.3%)
Risk free Market risk premium Company spec. Risk premium Pipeline risk premium
Remember ... Valuation is Not Strictly a Science But More Like an Art !
"Not everything that can be counted counts and not everything that counts can be counted"
(Albert Einstein)

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Pharmaceutical

Valuation Methodologies - An Overview 3

Static Valuation Methodologies (Pros and Cons) 4-8

Dynamic Valuation Methodologies (Pros and Cons) 9

Vontobel Pharma Valuation ("Net Portfolio Add-On Potential") 10-21

- Special Situations (i.e. Roche, Novartis) 22-39

- Nycomed - "Life Beyond Pantoprazole" 40-44

Geared De-Geared Discounted Economic

P/E rel., EV/x rel.,

Static "Geared" Valuation Methods (1)

Widely used because they are "simple"

Different accounting philosophies (shareholder focus versus tax

Different balance sheet structures ("Gearing")

Gearing affects P/E ratios (PER)

USD million Company A Company B

Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) 10 10

PER 15.4x 19.2x

Static "Geared" Valuation Methods (2)

More accurate assessment of "cash" operating performance

Insufficiently accounts for minority interests, capital requirements and

Static "De-Geared" Valuation Methods (1)

Enterprise Value (EV) relative to "Revenues" per share

Allows for a distinction between a company's "core" and "non-core"

Strong assumptions built into EV methodology: tax neutrality between

Static "De-Geared" Valuation Methods (2)

Enterprise Value (EV) = Market Capitalisation + Value of net debt

Allows to value individual businesses

Sometimes difficult assumptions needed to value non-core businesses

Dynamic Valuation Method - DCF

Discounted Cash Flow Model

Appropriate for businesses with discretionary cost structures and long

Many businesses do not lend themselves to the long-term predictions

Vontobel Pharmaceutical Valuation Model based on

Relative Valuation Multiples for Pharmaceuticals

Large Variances in Relative Valuation Multiples

Why Has Valuation Analysis Been Poor in the Past?

Relative Earnings Multiples (geared or de-geared) Can Be Misleading

Furthermore, relative valuation multiples do not take into account important

Winners And Losers ... Broadly Speaking (Phase 1-3)

Net portfolio "add-on" potential (pipeline potential - generic exposure)

Winners And Losers ... Strictly Speaking (Phase 3)

Net portfolio "add-on" potential (pipeline potential - generic exposure)

Big Pharmaceuticals - An Industry Fallen From Grace

US/EU Big Pharma Rx sales growth (l.c.)

3-Phase DCF Model - FCF Growth EU Universe

1st phase 2nd phase terminal

Healthcare Continuum - Risk Perceptions

Assessing Quality of Growth - Appropriate Discount Rate

TOTAL COMPANY-SPECIFIC RISK

Special Situation - Novartis "Structurally Flawed" (Buy - PT: CHF 68)

Novartis relative to MSCI Euro Pharma Index

Novartis Branded Rx Outperforms a Declining Industry

AGO Optaflu Neoral

Cost Phase Return Phase Market Share

Structurally Sound ...

New Product Cycle - "Show Me The Money"

Valuation And Earnings Discrepancy

Pharmaceuticals & Vaccines Sandoz Consumer Health

Back-Integrated Sum-of-Parts (SOP) Valuation