T&H Shopfitters Corporation v.

T&H Shopfitters Union

G.R. No. 191714 | February 26, 2014
Mendoza, J.
Topic: Unfair Labor Practices
Case Doctrine/s:
ULP relates to the commission of acts that transgress the workers’ right to organize. As specified in Articles
248 [now Article 257] and 249 [now Article 258] of the Labor Code, the prohibited acts must necessarily relate
to the workers’ right to self-organization.
Recit Ready:
Facts:
THS-GQ Union filed a petition for certification election. petitioners sponsored a field trip to Iba, Zambales, for
its employees. The officers and members of the THS-GQ Union were purportedly excluded from the field trip.
On the evening of the field trip, a certain Angel Madriaga, a sales officer of petitioners, campaigned against
the union in the forthcoming certification election. Due to the heavy pressure exerted by petitioners, the votes
for “no union” prevailed.

Issue:
WON ULP acts were committed by petitioners

Held:
Yes. ULP relates to the commission of acts that transgress the workers’ right to organize. As specified in Articles
248 [now Article 257] and 249 [now Article 258] of the Labor Code, the prohibited acts must necessarily relate
to the workers’ right to self-organization. Indubitably, the various acts of petitioners, taken together,
reasonably support an inference that, indeed, such were all orchestrated to restrict respondents’ free exercise
of their right to self-organization.
Facts:
Respondents, officers and members of respondent union (T & H Shoplifters Corporation/Gin Queen Workers
Union or “THC-GQ”), are employees of T & H Shoplifters Corporation and Gin Queen, which they treated as a
single entity and their sole employer.

THS-GQ Union filed a petition for certification election. An order was issued to hold the certification election.

Meanwhile, petitioner Ben Huang (Huang), Director for Gin Queen, informed its employees of the expiration of
the lease contract between Gin Queen and its lessor and announced the relocation of its office and workers to
Cabangan, Zambales. Later, the said union officers and members were made to work as grass cutters in
Cabangan.

Later, petitioners sponsored a field trip to Iba, Zambales, for its employees. The officers and members of the
THS-GQ Union were purportedly excluded from the field trip. On the evening of the field trip, a certain Angel
Madriaga, a sales officer of petitioners, campaigned against the union in the forthcoming certification election.

The employees were escorted from the field trip to the polling center in Zambales to cast their votes. Due to
the heavy pressure exerted by petitioners, the votes for “no union” prevailed. The THS-GQ Union filed its
protest.

Respondents averred that the following week after the certification elections were held, petitioners retrenched
THG-GQ Union officers and members assigned at the Zambales plant. Respondents claimed that the work
weeks of those employees in the SBFZ plant were drastically reduced to only three (3) days in a month.

Gin Queen claimed that due to the decrease in orders from its customers, they had to resort to cost cutting
measures to avoid anticipated financial losses. Thus, it assigned work on a rotational basis. It was of the
impression that the employees, who opposed its economic measures, were merely motivated by spite in filing
the complaint for ULP against it.

Respondent (THC-GQ Union) and its officers and members filed their Complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP)
by way of union busting, and Illegal Lockout.
 LA/RTC/NLRC/CA Ruling/s:
LA: Dismissed the complaint. In the case at bar, we carefully examined the grounds raised by the complainants
[herein respondents] as basis for claiming that the respondents [herein petitioners] committed unfair labor
practices by way of illegal lockout, one of which is the alleged transfer of 17 workers to Subic Bay Freeport
Zone, however, we are dismay (sic) to know that not even one of these 17 workers is a complainant in these
cases. While the labor union may represent its members in filing cases before this Office, at least these
members must show their intention to file a case by signing in the complaint to prove that they have grievances
against their employer which was lacking in these cases. Further, there was no showing that the transfer of
these 17 workers is considered an unfair labor practice of the respondents considering that their transfer was
effected long before the union was organized.

NLRC: Reversed. It may be concluded that the respondents [herein petitioners] committed unfair labor practice
acts consisting in interfering with the exercise of the employees’ right to self-organization (specifically,
sponsoring a field trip on the day preceding the certification election, warning the employees of dire
consequences should the union prevail, and escorting them to the polling center) and discriminating in regard
to conditions of employment in order to discourage union membership (assigning union officers and active
union members as grass cutters on rotation basis).

CA: Sustained the NLRC ruling. The CA held that errors of judgment are not within the province of a special
civil action for certiorari. It declared that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies that had acquired expertise
in matters entrusted to their jurisdiction were accorded not only respect but finality if they were supported by
substantial evidence. The CA noted that the NLRC considered the evidence and applied the law in this case,
thus, no grave abuse of discretion could be imputed on the part of the NLRC in reversing the LA ruling.
Issue/s:
WON ULP acts were committed by petitioners
SC Ruling/s:
Yes.

In the case at bench, petitioners are being accused of violations of paragraphs (a), (c), and (e) of Article 257
(formerly Article 248) of the Labor Code,[13] to wit:

Article 257. Unfair labor practices of employers.—It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the
following unfair labor practices:

(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;

xxxx

(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;

xxxx

(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in
order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. x x x

The concept of ULP is embodied in Article 256 (formerly Article 247) of the Labor Code,[14] which provides:

Article 256. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof.—Unfair labor practices
violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate
interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with
each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion
of healthy and stable labor-management relations.

xxxx
In essence, ULP relates to the commission of acts that transgress the workers’ right to organize. As specified
in Articles 248 [now Article 257] and 249 [now Article 258] of the Labor Code, the prohibited acts must
necessarily relate to the workers’ right to self-organization x x x.[15]

In the case of Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association — NATU v. Insular Life Assurance Co.
Ltd.,[16] this Court had occasion to lay down the test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, that is, whether the employer has engaged in
conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees’ rights; and
that it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by
statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer
does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining.

The questioned acts of petitioners, namely: 1) sponsoring a field trip to Zambales for its employees, to the
exclusion of union members, before the scheduled certification election; 2) the active campaign by the sales
officer of petitioners against the union prevailing as a bargaining agent during the field trip; 3) escorting its
employees after the field trip to the polling center; 4) the continuous hiring of subcontractors performing
respondents’ functions; 5) assigning union members to the Cabangan site to work as grass cutters; and 6)
the enforcement of work on a rotational basis for union members, all reek of interference on the part of
petitioners.

Indubitably, the various acts of petitioners, taken together, reasonably support an inference that, indeed, such
were all orchestrated to restrict respondents’ free exercise of their right to self-organization. The Court is of
the considered view that petitioners’ undisputed actions prior and immediately before the scheduled
certification election, while seemingly innocuous, unduly meddled in the affairs of its employees in selecting
their exclusive bargaining representative.
 Insular Life Assurance Employees Association v. Insular Life
G.R. No. L-25291 | January 30, 1971
Castro, J.
Topic: Unfair Labor Practices
Case Doctrine/s:
The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive efforts
at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them
should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the
right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through their collective
bargaining representatives.
Recit Ready:
Facts:
Petitioner Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of respondent employer after a deadlock on collective
bargaining. The Companies sent out two (2) letters to the strikers individually: (a) urging them to abandon their
strike and return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and,
subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be
replaced; and (b) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the
strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike.

Issue:
WON the employer was guilty of ULP

Held:
Yes. The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive
efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were open for
them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with
the right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through their
collective bargaining representatives.
Facts:
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers &
Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter “the
Unions”), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective
bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter “
the Companies”) .

Negotiations were conducted on the Union’s proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of
union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed a notice of strike for “deadlock on collective bargaining.”

The Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building.

The Companies sent to each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:

“We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.

“However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:

“1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.
“2. Take your meals within the office.
“3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office where comfortable
cots have been prepared.
“4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
“5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.
“6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.
“The decision to make is yours—whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or in the fairness of the
Management.”

The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced to desist
by the aforesaid letter.

Later, the Companies again sent individually to the strikers a letter (exhibit B), quoted hereunder in its entirety:

“The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.

“Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our decision.

“We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for long. We have
continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you.

“If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal
charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the home office. If by
this date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your replacement.

“Before, the decisions was yours to make.

“So it is now.”

The CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies, specifically charging the
Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action,
by sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise
of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if they
did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the
members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union membership
and degree of participation in the strike.

The Companies filed their answer denying all the material allegations of the complaint, stating special defenses
therein, and asking for the dismissal of the complaint.
LA/RTC/NLRC/CA Ruling/s:
Court of Industrial Relations: dismissed the Unions’ complaint for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

Issue/s:
WON the employer was guilty of ULP
SC Ruling/s:
Yes.

“The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive efforts
at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them
should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the
right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through their collective
bargaining representatives.” (31 Am. Jur. 563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. [CA 9th] 133 F2d 676,
146 ALR 1045)

Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining agreement to
negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in connection with changes in the
agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the
union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees’ bargaining
representative (Melo Photo Supply Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332).
Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of interference. Thus, the act of
a company president in writing letters to the strikers, urging their return to work on terms inconsistent with their
union membership, was adjudged as constituting interference with the exercise of his employees’ right to
collective bargaining (Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d 621). It is likewise an act of interference for the
employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a time specified therein, otherwise
new employees would be engaged to perform their jobs. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their
homes, with the employer or his representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking,
constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend
to undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the
employer’s molestation.
 Ren Transport v. NLRC
G.R. No. 188020 | June 20, 2016
Sereno, C.J.:
Topic: ULP by Employer
Recit Ready:
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Ren Transport (SMART) is a registered union, which had a 5-year CBA with Ren
Transport. The 60-day freedom period of the CBA passed without a challenge to SMART'S majority status as
bargaining agent. SMART thereafter conveyed its willingness to bargain with Ren Transport but the latter failed
to reply to the former’s demand. 2 members of SMART wrote to DOLE-NCR, informed them that majority of the
members of SMART had decided to disaffiliate from their mother federation to form another union, Ren
Transport Employees Association (RTEA). SMART contested the alleged disaffiliation through a letter. During
the pendency of the disaffiliation dispute at the DOLE-NCR, Ren Transport stopped the remittance to SMART
of the union dues that had been checked off from the salaries of union workers as provided under the CBA and
on 19 April 2005, Ren Transport voluntarily recognized RTEA as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file employees of their company.
SMART filed with the LA a complaint for unfair labor practice against Ren Transport. The LA found Ren
Transport guilty of acts of unfair labor practice. The NLRC affirmed. The CA affirmed that ruling as to ULP.

SC: Ren Transport committed acts of unfair labor practice as Ren Transport violated its duty to bargain
collectively with SMART and interfered with the exercise of the employees' right to self-organize. If there is no
petition for certification filed during the freedom period, then the employer "shall continue to recognize the
majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for certification election is filed." In the
present case, no petition for certification election challenging the majority status of SMART was filed during the
freedom period; therefore, SMART remained the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees.
Given that SMART continued to be the workers' exclusive bargaining agent, Ren Transport had the
corresponding duty to bargain collectively with the former. Ren Transport's refusal to do so constitutes an unfair
labor practice. Further, as the LA found, the failure to remit the union dues to SMART and the voluntary
recognition of RTEA were clear indications of interference with the employees' right to self-organization.
Facts:
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Ren Transport (SMART) is a registered union, which had a 5-year CBA with
Ren Transport set to expire on 31 December 2004. The 60-day freedom period of the CBA passed without a
challenge to SMART'S majority status as bargaining agent. SMART thereafter conveyed its willingness to
bargain with Ren Transport, to which it sent bargaining proposals. Ren Transport, however, failed to reply to
the demand.

Subsequently, 2 members of SMART wrote to DOLE-NCR. The office was informed that a majority of the
members of SMART had decided to disaffiliate from their mother federation to form another union, Ren
Transport Employees Association (RTEA). SMART contested the alleged disaffiliation through a letter. During
the pendency of the disaffiliation dispute at the DOLE-NCR, Ren Transport stopped the remittance to SMART
of the union dues that had been checked off from the salaries of union workers as provided under the
CBA. Further, on 19 April 2005, Ren Transport voluntarily recognized RTEA as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of their company. On 6 July 2005, SMART filed with the labor
arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice against Ren Transport.
LA/RTC/NLRC/CA Ruling/s:
The LA found Ren Transport guilty of acts of unfair labor practice - since the disaffiliation issue remained
pending, SMART continued to be the certified collective bargaining agent; hence, Ren Transport's refusal to
send a counter-proposal to SMART was not justified. The LA also held that the company's failure to remit the
union dues to SMART and the voluntary recognition of RTEA were clear indications of interference with the
employees' exercise of the right to self-organize.

On appeal, the NLRC issued a decision affirming the LA’s finding of unfair labor practice on the part of Ren
Transport. Union dues were ordered remitted to SMART. The NLRC also awarded moral damages to SMART,
saying that Ren transport's refusal to bargain was inspired by malice or bad faith. The precipitate recognition
of RTEA evidenced such bad faith, considering that it was done despite the pendency of the disaffiliation dispute
at the DOLE-NCR.
In a petition for certiorari under rule 65, the CA partially granted the petition. It deleted the award of moral
damages to SMART, but affirmed the NLRC decision on all other matters. The CA ruled that SMART, as a
corporation, was not entitled to moral damages.
Issue/s:
Whether Ren Transport committed acts of unfair labor practice.
SC Ruling/s:
YES, Ren Transport committed acts of unfair labor practice.
-Ren Transport violated its duty to bargain collectively with SMART. Violation of the duty to bargain
collectively is an unfair labor practice under Article 258(g) of the Labor Code. It bears stressing that Ren
Transport had a duty to bargain collectively with SMART. Under Article 263 in relation to Article 267 of the
Labor Code, it is during the freedom period — or the last 60 days before the expiration of the CBA — when
another union may challenge the majority status of the bargaining agent through the filing of a petition for a
certification election. If there is no such petition filed during the freedom period, then the employer "shall
continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for certification
election is filed." In the present case, no petition for certification election challenging the majority status of
SMART was filed during the freedom period— the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the five-year CBA.
SMART therefore remained the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. Given that SMART
continued to be the workers' exclusive bargaining agent, Ren Transport had the corresponding duty to bargain
collectively with the former. Ren Transport's refusal to do so constitutes an unfair labor practice.

Consequently, Ren Transport cannot avail itself of the defense that SMART no longer represents the majority
of the workers. The fact that no petition for certification election was filed within the freedom period prevented
Ren Transport from challenging SMART'S existence and membership. Moreover, it must be stressed that,
according to the labor arbiter, the purported disaffiliation from SMART was nothing but a convenient, self-
serving excuse. This factual finding, having been affirmed by both the CA and the NLRC, is now conclusive
upon the SC.

-Ren Transport interfered with the exercise of the employees' right to self-organize. Interference with the
employees' right to self-organization is considered an unfair labor practice under Article 258 (a) of the Labor
Code. In this case, the LA found that the failure to remit the union dues to SMART and the voluntary recognition
of RTEA were clear indications of interference with the employees' right to self-organization. It must be stressed
that this finding was affirmed by the NLRC and the CA; as such, it is binding on the SC, especially when we
consider that it is not tainted with any blatant error. As aptly pointed out by the LA, these acts were ill-timed in
view of the existence of a labor controversy over membership in the union. Ren Transport also uses the
supposed disaffiliation from SMART to justify the failure to remit union dues to the latter and the voluntary
recognition of RTEA. However, for reasons already discussed, this claim is considered a lame excuse that
cannot validate those acts.
 Arellano University Employees and Workers Union v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 139940 | September 19, 2006
Carpio Morales, J.:
Topic: ULP by Employer
Recit Ready:
Arellano University Employees and Workers Union, the exclusive bargaining representative of about 380 rank-and-file
employees of Arellano University, Inc., filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike charging the University with ULP.
Subsequently, a majority of the members of the Union filed a petition for audit of union funds before the Office of the NCR
Director of DOLE. On March 11, 1998, then DOLE Secretary Trajano certified the Notice of Strike for compulsory arbitration
to the NLRC which the latter assigned to LA Tamayo. The LA set the dispute for hearing/conference but no settlement
was reached by the parties. The University moved for the consolidation with the ULP charge, the Interpleader it filed
against the Union and some of its members, and the Complaint the Union filed for underpayment of wages arising from
the change in the manner of computation of salary of employees and non-payment of Sunday pay, both of which involve
the same parties. Before the NLRC could act on the University's motion for consolidation, DOLE Secretary Bienvenido E.
Laguesma, certified for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC a second Notice of Strike filed by the Union on July 16, 1998
charging the University with the following: A. Violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), Art. V - withholding of
union and death benefits; b. Violation of CBA, Art. VI - non-granting of ten (10%) percent salary increase to some union
members; c. Illegal/unauthorized deductions in the payroll; d. Union interference - circulating letters against the union; and
e. Non-implementation of the retirement plan as approved by the BIR. A strike was in fact staged on August 5, 1998. The
DOLE Secretary directed the strikers to return to work within 24 hours. The order was served upon the Union on August
6, 1998, and the following day, August 7, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., the Union lifted its strike. The strike staged by the
Union on August 5-7, 1998 prompted the University to file on August 24, 1998 a petition to declare the same illegal, which
was also consolidated with the other cases.

On the allegation of union busting, the NLRC ruled that the refusal of the University to deduct penalties from the salaries
of members of the Union who failed to attend meetings was based on Article IV, Section 2 of the CBA vis-a-vis Section
1 of the same Article which requires as condition for a valid checkoff prior submission to the management of individual
checkoff authorizations, a requirement which was not met by the Union. Also, crediting the explanation of the University
that its withholding of union dues and death aid benefits was upon the written request of several union members
themselves, the NLRC held that no ULP was committed.

SC: The SC affirmed the NLRC. The University did not commit a ULP by withholding union dues and death benefits. To
constitute ULP, violations of the CBA must be gross. Gross violation of the CBA, under Article 261 of the Labor Code,
means flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions thereof. The University cannot be faulted
for ULP as it in good faith merely heeded the above-said request of Union members. However, on the NLRC's declaration
of loss of employment status of the strikers, it must be noted that an ordinary striking worker may not be declared to have
lost his employment status by mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he knowingly participated in
the commission of illegal acts during the strike.
Facts:
On December 12, 1997, the Arellano University Employees and Workers Union, the exclusive bargaining representative
of about 380 rank-and-file employees of Arellano University, Inc., filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike charging the
University with ULP as follows: 1. Interfering in union activities; 2. Union Busting - violation of CBA's Article IV, Section 2;
3. Union Busting - disregarding the union's request to deduct penalties from its members who were absent and without
justifiable reasons during union meetings; and 4. Contracting Workout - the management is contracting out services and
functions being performed by Union members. The Notice of Strike was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-12-520-97.
Subsequently, a majority of the members of the Union filed a petition for audit of union funds before the Office of the NCR
Director of DOLE. On March 11, 1998, then DOLE Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano certified the Notice of Strike for
compulsory arbitration to the NLRC which the latter assigned to LA Tamayo. The LA set the dispute for hearing/conference
but no settlement was reached by the parties.

On July 28, 1998, the University moved for the consolidation with the ULP charge (NCMB-NCR-NS-12-520-97) the
Interpleader it filed against the Union and some of its members, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-02036-98 and
pending before LA Garduque II, and the Complaint the Union filed for underpayment of wages arising from the change in
the manner of computation of salary of employees and non-payment of Sunday pay, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
00-02-01422-98 pending before LA Reyes, both of which involve the same parties. Before the NLRC could act on the
University's motion for consolidation, DOLE Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, certified for compulsory arbitration to the
NLRC a second Notice of Strike filed by the Union on July 16, 1998, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-07-277-98, charging
the University with the following: A. Violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), Art. V - withholding of union and
death benefits; b. Violation of CBA, Art. VI - non-granting of ten (10%) percent salary increase to some union members;
c. Illegal/unauthorized deductions in the payroll; d. Union interference - circulating letters against the union; and e. Non-
implementation of the retirement plan as approved by the BIR.

A strike was in fact staged on August 5, 1998. By the same Order of August 5, 1998, the DOLE Secretary directed the
strikers to return to work within 24 hours. The order was served upon the Union on August 6, 1998, and the following day,
August 7, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., the Union lifted its strike. The strike staged by the Union on August 5-7, 1998 prompted
the University to file on August 24, 1998 a petition to declare the same illegal, docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-
06897-98, which was also consolidated with the other cases.

LA/RTC/NLRC/CA Ruling/s:
The NLRC found that what triggered the strike was the Union's suspicion that the petition for audit of union funds was
initiated by the University. The NLRC found the therein petitioners to have initiated, out of their own volition, the filing of
the petition. It thus concluded that there was no factual basis to hold the University guilty of interference in union activities.
On the allegation of union busting, the NLRC ruled that the refusal of the University to deduct penalties from the salaries
of members of the Union who failed to attend meetings was based on Article IV, Section 2 of the CBA vis-a-vis Section
1 of the same Article which requires as condition for a valid checkoff prior submission to the management of individual
checkoff authorizations, a requirement which was not met by the Union. Besides, the NLRC held, the law mandates that
the Union should not be "arbitrary, excessive or oppressive" in imposing a fine.

Respecting the second Notice of Strike, the NLRC found that only the charges of violation of the CBA for withholding union
dues and death benefits, and the non-implementation of the retirement plan, as approved by the BIR, were left for
resolution as the Union dropped the other issues raised therein after the NCMB hearings. Crediting the explanation of the
University that its withholding of union dues and death aid benefits was upon the written request of several union members
themselves, the NLRC held that no ULP was committed.

In NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-02036-98, the NLRC ruled that the University may not be held guilty of ULP for refusal to
heed the demand of the Union that salaries of its members be deducted for their failure to attend union meetings: firstly,
because the Union itself failed to meet the requirements provided for in Sections 1 and 2, Article IV of the CBA; and
secondly, an interpleader had been filed by the University for the parties to litigate their claims before the NLRC. The
NLRC also ruled that the resolution calling for such deduction was not valid as it was not even signed by the majority of
Union officers and circulated to the members.

In NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-06897-98 (the University's petition to declare the strike staged by the Union on August 5-
7, 1998 illegal), the NLRC granted the petition and declared the loss of employment status of all the strikers for knowingly
defying the Return-to-Work Order of the DOLE Secretary dated August 5, 1998, said Order having been served upon the
union on August 6, 1998 but it was only on August 7, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., that the strike was lifted. The petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision but it was denied. Hence, they elevated the decision to the CA via
petition for certiorari which was dismissed.
Issue/s:
Whether the University committed a ULP by withholding union dues and death benefits.
SC Ruling/s:
No. The then prevailing Rules Implementing the Labor Code, Book V, Rule XVIII provided that: Section 1. Right of union
to collect dues. - The right of the incumbent bargaining representative to check off and to collect dues resulting therefrom
shall not be affected by the pendency of a representation case or an intra-union dispute.

To constitute ULP, however, violations of the CBA must be gross. Gross violation of the CBA, under Article 261 of the
Labor Code, means flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions thereof. Evidently, the
University cannot be faulted for ULP as it in good faith merely heeded the above-said request of Union members.

On the NLRC's declaration of loss of employment status of the strikers, the pertinent provision of the LC is Article 264.
Under this provision, an ordinary striking worker may not be declared to have lost his employment status by mere
participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during
the strike. While the University adduced photographs showing strikers picketing outside the university premises, it failed
to identify who they were. It thus failed to meet the "substantiality of evidence test" applicable in dismissal cases.

Petitioner-union members must thus be reinstated to their former position, without backwages. If reinstatement is no
longer possible, they should receive separation pay of 1 Month for every year of service in accordance with existing
jurisprudence. With respect to the union officers, their mere participation in the illegal strike warrants their dismissal.
 Digital Telecommunications Philippines v. Digitel Employees Union
G.R. No. 184903, 10 October 2012
Perez, J.
Topic: ULP by the employer
Case Doctrine/s:
The closure of Digiserv pending the existence of an assumption order coupled with the creation of a new
corporation performing similar functions as Digiserv leaves no iota of doubt that the target of the closure
are the union member-employees. These factual circumstances prove that Digitel terminated the services
of the affected employees to defeat their security of tenure. The termination of service was not a valid
retrenchment; it was an illegal dismissal of employees.
RECIT READY:
FACTS: Digitel Employees Union and Digitel commenced collective bargaining negotiations which resulted
in a bargaining deadlock. Despite the order of the Labor Secretary to execute a CBA, still, no CBA was
forged. During the pendency of the controversy, Digitel Service, Inc. (Digiserv) filed with the DOLE an
Establishment Termination Report stating that it will cease its business operation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Digitel committed acts of ULP when it dismissed employees from its department
Digeserv

HELD: The closure of Digiserv pending the existence of an assumption order coupled with the creation of
a new corporation performing similar functions as Digiserv leaves no iota of doubt that the target of the
closure are the union member-employees. The termination of service was not a valid retrenchment; it was
an illegal dismissal of employees.
Facts:
In 1994, Digitel Employees Union (Union) became the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file
employees of Digitel

Digitel Employees Union and Digitel commenced collective bargaining negotiations which resulted in a
bargaining deadlock. Despite the order of the Labor Secretary to execute a CBA, still, no CBA was forged
between Digitel and the Union. Some Union members abandoned their employment with Digitel. The
Union later became dormant. 10 years thereafter, Digitel received the President of the Union, a letter
containing the list of officers, CBA proposals and ground rules. Digitel was reluctant to negotiate with the
Union and demanded that the latter show compliance with the provisions of the Union’s Constitution and
By-laws on union membership and election of officers.

Esplana and his group filed a case for Preventive Mediation before the NCMB based on Digitel’s violation
of the duty to bargain. During the pendency, Interactive Technology Solutions, Inc. (I-tech) was
incorporated. Then, Labor Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute.

During the pendency of the controversy, Digitel Service, Inc. (Digiserv) filed with the DOLE an
Establishment Termination Report stating that it will cease its business operation. The closure affected at
least 100 employees, 42 of whom are members of the herein respondent Union.

Alleging that the affected employees are its members and in reaction to Digiserv’s action, Esplana and
his group filed another Notice of Strike for union busting, illegal lock-out, and violation of the assumption
order. Digitel filed a petition with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) seeking cancellation of the Unions
registration
LA/RTC/NLRC/CA Ruling/s:
RD: dismissed the petition for cancellation of union registration for lack of merit
BLR: dismissed the appeal of Digitel and affirmed decision of RD

Issue/s:
Whether or not Digitel committed acts of ULP when it dismissed employees from its department Digeserv
SC Ruling/s:
YES. There is no doubt that Digitel defied the assumption order by abruptly closing down Digiserv. The
closure of a department is not illegal per se. What makes it unlawful is when the closure is undertaken
in bad faith.

The closure of Digiserv pending the existence of an assumption order coupled with the creation of a new
corporation performing similar functions as Digiserv leaves no iota of doubt that the target of the closure
are the union member-employees. These factual circumstances prove that Digitel terminated the
services of the affected employees to defeat their security of tenure. The termination of service was not
a valid retrenchment; it was an illegal dismissal of employees. It needs to be mentioned too that the
dismissal constitutes an unfair labor practice under Article 248(c) of the Labor Code which refers to
contracting out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization. At the height of the labor
dispute, occasioned by Digitel’s reluctance to negotiate with the Union, I-tech was formed to provide, as
it did provide, the same services performed by Digiserv, the Union members’ nominal employer. The
finding of unfair labor practice hinges on Digitel’s contracting-out certain services performed by union
member employees to interfere with, restrain or coerce them in the exercise of their right to self-
organization.
 Employees Union – Davao v. Bank of the Philippine Islands
G.R. No. 174912, 24 July 2013
Mendoza, J.
Topic: ULP by the employer
Case Doctrine/s:
ART. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. – x x x Accordingly,
violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no
longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement
shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.
Clearly, only gross violations of the economic provisions of the CBA are treated as ULP. Otherwise, they
are mere grievances.
RECIT READY:
FACTS: BOMC is primarily engaged in providing and/or handling support services for banks and other
financial institutions, is a subsidiary of Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI) operating and functioning as an
entirely separate and distinct entity.

The service agreement was likewise implemented in Davao City. Later, a merger between BPI and Far
East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) took effect with BPI as the surviving corporation. Thereafter,
BPI's cashiering function and FEBTC's cashiering, distribution and bookkeeping functions were handled
by BOMC. Consequently, twelve (12) former FEBTC employees were transferred to BOMC to complete
the latter's service complement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of BPI to outsource the cashiering, distribution and bookkeeping functions
to BOMC is not in conformity with the law and the existing CBA and thus, constitute unfair labor practice

HELD: Clearly, only gross violations of the economic provisions of the CBA are treated as ULP.
Otherwise, they are mere grievances.

In the present case, the alleged violation of the union shop agreement in the CBA, even assuming it
was malicious and flagrant, is not a violation of an economic provision in the agreement. The provisions
relied upon by the Union were those articles referring to the recognition of the union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees, as well as the articles on union
security, specifically, the maintenance of membership in good standing as a condition for continued
employment and the union shop clause. It failed to take into consideration its recognition of the bank’s
exclusive rights and prerogatives, likewise provided in the CBA, which included the hiring of employees,
promotion, transfers, and dismissals for just cause and the maintenance of order, discipline and
efficiency in its operations.
Facts:
BOMC is primarily engaged in providing and/or handling support services for banks and other financial
institutions, is a subsidiary of Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI) operating and functioning as an entirely
separate and distinct entity.

The service agreement was likewise implemented in Davao City. Later, a merger between BPI and Far
East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) took effect with BPI as the surviving corporation. Thereafter,
BPI's cashiering function and FEBTC's cashiering, distribution and bookkeeping functions were handled
by BOMC. Consequently, twelve (12) former FEBTC employees were transferred to BOMC to complete
the latter's service complement.
BPI Employees Union-Davao City-FUBU (Union), objected to the transfer of the functions and the twelve
(12) personnel to BOMC contending that the functions rightfully belonged to the BPI employees and that
the Union was deprived of membership of former FEBTC personnel who, by virtue of the merger, would
have formed part of the bargaining unit represented by the Union pursuant to its union shop provision in
the CBA.

The Union then filed a formal protest. During the Labor Management Conference, BPI invoked
management prerogative stating that the creation of the BOMC was to preserve more jobs and to
designate it as an agency to place employees where they were most needed.

On the other hand, the Union charged that BOMC undermined the existence of the union since it reduced
or divided the bargaining unit. While BOMC employees perform BPI functions, they were beyond the
bargaining unit's coverage. In contracting out FEBTC functions to BOMC, BPI effectively deprived the
union of the membership of employees handling said... functions as well as curtailed the right of those
employees to join the union.

Particularly in dispute is the validity of the transfer of twelve (12) former FEBTC employees to BOMC,
instead of being absorbed in BPI after the corporate merger. The Union claims that a union shop
agreement is stipulated in the existing CBA. It is unfair labor practice for employer to outsource the
positions in the existing bargaining unit

LA/RTC/NLRC/CA Ruling/s:
BPI then filed a petition for assumption of jurisdiction/certification with the Secretary of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE), who subsequently issued an order certifying the labor dispute to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration.

The DOLE Secretary directed the parties to cease and desist from committing any act that might
exacerbate the situation.

The NLRC ruled upholding the validity of the service agreement between BPI and BOMC and dismissing
the charge of ULP.

The CA upheld the ruling of the NLRC, hence this petition.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the act of BPI to outsource the cashiering, distribution and bookkeeping functions to BOMC
is not in conformity with the law and the existing CBA and thus, constitute unfair labor practice
SC Ruling/s:

NO. ART. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. – x x x Accordingly, violations
of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as
unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes
of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to
comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.

Clearly, only gross violations of the economic provisions of the CBA are treated as ULP. Otherwise, they
are mere grievances.

In the present case, the alleged violation of the union shop agreement in the CBA, even assuming it
was malicious and flagrant, is not a violation of an economic provision in the agreement. The provisions
relied upon by the Union were those articles referring to the recognition of the union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees, as well as the articles on union
security, specifically, the maintenance of membership in good standing as a condition for continued
employment and the union shop clause. It failed to take into consideration its recognition of the bank’s
exclusive rights and prerogatives, likewise provided in the CBA, which included the hiring of employees,
promotion, transfers, and dismissals for just cause and the maintenance of order, discipline and
efficiency in its operations.

The Union, however, insists that jobs being outsourced to BOMC were included in the existing
bargaining unit, thus, resulting in a reduction of a number of positions in such unit. It is incomprehensible
how the "reduction of positions in the collective bargaining unit" interferes with the employees’ right to
self-organization because the employees themselves were neither transferred nor dismissed from the
service.

As far as the twelve (12) former FEBTC employees are concerned, the Union failed to substantially
prove that their transfer, was motivated by ill will, anti-unionism or bad faith so as to affect or interfere
with the employees’ right to self-organization. It is to be emphasized that contracting out of services is
not illegal per se. It is an exercise of business judgment or management prerogative. Absent proof that
the management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise
of judgment by an employer. In this case, bad faith cannot be attributed to BPI because its actions were
authorized by CBP Circular No. 1388, Series of 199333 issued by the Monetary Board of the then
Central Bank of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas). The Court agrees with BPI that D.O.
No. 10 is but a guide to determine what functions may be contracted out, subject to the rules and
established jurisprudence on legitimate job contracting and prohibited labor-only contracting.
 Rivera v. Espiritu
G.R. No. 135547| 23 January 2002
QUISUMBING, J.
Topic: (ULP by the employer- Company Unionism)
Case Doctrine/s:
Under Article 248 (d) [NOW ARTICLE 259] of the Labor Code, a company union exists when the employer acts [t]o
initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization,
including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters.
Facts:
• On June 5, 1998, PAL pilots affiliated with the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) went on a
three-week strike, causing serious losses to the financially beleaguered flag carrier. Faced with bankruptcy, PAL
adopted a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more than one-third.
• PAL Employees Association (PALEA) went on strike to protest the retrenchment measures adopted by the airline.
The strike ended when PAL and PALEA agreed to a more systematic reduction in PALs work force and the
payment of separation benefits to all retrenched employees.
• President Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 16 creating an Inter-Agency Task Force (Task Force) to address
the problems of the ailing flag carrier. It was empowered to summon all parties concerned for conciliation,
mediation for the purpose of arriving at a total and complete solution of the problem. Conciliation meetings
were then held between PAL management and the three unions representing the airlines employees, with the
Task Force as mediator.
• PAL management submitted to the Task Force an offer by private respondent Lucio Tan, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of PAL, of a plan to transfer shares of stock to its employees. One portion of said plan reads:
“In order for PAL to attain (a) degree of normalcy while we are tackling its problems, we would request for
a suspension of the Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) for 10 years.”
• The Board of Directors of PALEA voted to accept Tans offer and requested the Task Forces assistance in
implementing the same. Union members, however, rejected Tans offer. Under intense pressure from PALEA
members, the unions directors subsequently resolved to reject Tans offer.
• PAL informed the Task Force that it was shutting down its operations effective September 23, 1998, preparatory
to liquidating its assets and paying off its creditors. The airline claimed that given its labor problems,
rehabilitation was no longer feasible, and hence, the airline had no alternative but to close shop. PALEA sought
the intervention of the Office of the President in immediately convening the parties. On September 19, 1998,
PALEA informed the DOLE that it had no objection to a referendum on the Tans offer. 2,799 out of 6,738 PALEA
members cast their votes in the referendum under DOLE supervision held on September 21-22, 1998. Of the
votes cast, 1,055 voted in favor of Tans offer while 1,371 rejected it.
• On September 23, 1998, PAL ceased its operations and sent notices of termination to its employees. PALEA board
wrote President Estrada anew, seeking his intervention. PALEA offered a 10-year moratorium on strikes and
similar actions and a waiver of some of the economic benefits in the existing CBA. Tan, however, rejected this
counter-offer.
• On September 27, 1998, the PALEA board again wrote the President. Some of the terms and conditions, subject
to ratification by the general membership are the following:
To assure investors and creditors of industrial peace, PALEA agrees, subject to the ratification by the general
membership, (to) the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten (10) years, provided the following safeguards
are in place:
a. PAL shall continue recognizing PALEA as the duly certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file ground
employees of the Company;
b. The union shop/maintenance of membership provision under the PAL-PALEA CBA shall be respected.
c. No salary deduction, with full medical benefits.
5. PAL shall grant the benefits under the 26 July 1998 Memorandum of Agreement forged by and between PAL and PALEA,
to those employees who may opt to retire or be separated from the company.
6. PALEA members who have been retrenched but have not received separation benefits shall be granted priority in the
hiring/rehiring of employees.
7. In the absence of applicable Company rule or regulation, the provisions of the Labor Code shall apply.
• PAL management accepted the PALEA proposal and the necessary referendum was scheduled. On October 7,
1998, PAL resumed domestic operations. On the same date, seven officers and members of PALEA filed a petition
to annul the September 27, 1998 agreement entered into between PAL and PALEA.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the 10-year suspension of the CBA under the PAL-PALEA agreement virtually installed PALEA as
a company union for said period, amounting to unfair labor practice, in violation of Article 253-A of the Labor
Code mandating that an exclusive bargaining agent serves for five years only.

SC Ruling/s:
No.
Petitioners allege that the 10-year suspension of the CBA under the PAL-PALEA agreement virtually installed PALEA as
a company union for said period, amounting to unfair labor practice, in violation of Article 253-A of the Labor Code
mandating that an exclusive bargaining agent serves for five years only.
The questioned proviso of the agreement reads:
a. PAL shall continue recognizing PALEA as the duly certified-bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file
ground employees of the Company;
Said proviso cannot be construed alone. In construing an instrument with several provisions, a construction must be
adopted as will give effect to all. Under Article 1374 of the Civil Code, contracts cannot be construed by parts, but
clauses must be interpreted in relation to one another to give effect to the whole. The legal effect of a contract is not
determined alone by any particular provision disconnected from all others, but from the whole read together. The
aforesaid provision must be read within the context of the next clause, which provides:
b. The union shop/maintenance of membership provision under the PAL-PALEA CBA shall be respected.
The aforesaid provisions, taken together, clearly show the intent of the parties to maintain union security during the
period of the suspension of the CBA. Its objective is to assure the continued existence of PALEA during the said period.
We are unable to declare the objective of union security an unfair labor practice. It is State policy to promote unionism
to enable workers to negotiate with management on an even playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they
were to individually and separately bargain with the employer. For this reason, the law has allowed stipulations for
union shop and closed shop as means of encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice in the
protection of their rights and interests vis--vis the employer.
Petitioners contention that the agreement installs PALEA as a virtual company union is also untenable. Under Article
248 (d) [NOW ARTICLE 259] of the Labor Code, a company union exists when the employer acts [t]o initiate, dominate,
assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of
financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters. The case records are bare of any showing of such acts
by PAL.
We also do not agree that the agreement violates the five-year representation limit mandated by Article 253-A. Under
said article, the representation limit for the exclusive bargaining agent applies only when there is an extant CBA in full
force and effect. In the instant case, the parties agreed to suspend the CBA and put in abeyance the limit on the
representation period.Hence the PAL-PALEA agreement dated September 27, 1998, is a valid exercise of the freedom to
contract. Under the principle of inviolability of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution, the contract must be upheld.
 Great Pacific Life Employees Union v. Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation
G.R. No. 126717, 11 February 1999
BELLOSILLO, J.
Topic: (ULP by the employer)
Case Doctrine/s:
While an act or decision of an employer may be unfair, certainly not every unfair act or decision constitutes unfair labor
practice (ULP) as defined and enumerated under Art. 248 (Now Art. 259) Of the Labor Code. The decision of respondent
GREPALIFE to consider the top officers of petitioner UNION as unfit for reinstatement is not essentially discriminatory
and constitutive of an unlawful labor practice of employers under the cited provision. Discriminating in the context of
the Code involves either encouraging membership in any labor organization or is made on account of the employee's
having given or being about to give testimony under the Labor Code.
Facts:
• GREAT PACIFIC LIFE EMPLOYEES UNION and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (GREPALIFE)entered
sometime in 1990 into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) to take effect 1 July 1990 until 30 June 1993.
• About a month and a half before the expiration of the CBA, the parties submitted their respective proposals and
counter-proposals to serve as bases for their discussions on its projected renewal. The ensuing series of
negotiations however resulted in a deadlock prompting petitioner Great Pacific Life Employees Union (UNION
hereon) to file a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department
of Labor. Despite several conciliatory conferences before the Board, the impasse could not be resolved. Thus,
petitioner UNION led by its President Isidro Alan B. Domingo and Vice President Rodel P. de la Rosa went on
strike.
• Respondent GREPALIFE required all striking employees to explain in writing within 48 hours why no disciplinary
action, including possible dismissal from employment, should be taken against them for committing illegal acts
against the company in the course of the strike, particularly on 4 and 5 November. They were warned that failure
to submit their explanations within the prescribed period would be construed as waiver of their right to be heard.
The company directive was apparently triggered by some violent incidents that took place while the strike was
in progress. Strikers reportedly blocked all points of ingress and egress of the company premises in Makati City
thus preventing GREPALIFE employees reporting for work from entering their respective offices. These
employees and third persons doing business with the company, including lessees of the GREPALIFE building,
were allegedly forced by the strikers to submit their cars/vehicles, bags and other belongings to illegal search.
• Complying with the order, UNION President Domingo and some strikers explained that they did not violate any
law as they were merely exercising their constitutional right to strike. Petitioner De la Rosa and the rest of the
strikers however ignored the management directive.
• GREPALIFE found the explanation of Domingo totally unsatisfactory and considered de la Rosa as having waived
his right to be heard. Thus, both UNION officers were notified of the termination of their services, effective
immediately, as Senior Benefits Clerk and Senior Data Analyst, respectively. All other strikers whose explanations
were found unacceptable or who failed to submit written explanations were likewise dismissed. Notwithstanding
their dismissal from employment, Domingo and de la Rosa continued to lead the members of the striking union
in their concerted action against management.
• NCMB resumed conciliatory conferences between the disputants. GREPALIFE submitted a draft Agreement
denominated by petitioner UNION as the "last and final offer by Management”. The UNION and GREPALIFE
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) before the NCMB which ended their dispute. The MOA
provided in its Par 4 (on dismissals) that —
(a) (Except for Domingo and de la Rosa) employees/members of the Union subject of dismissal notices on
account of illegal acts committed in the course of the strike shall be given amnesty by the Company and
reinstated (under) the same terms and conditions prior to their dismissals following the signing of this
 agreement; (b) Messrs. Domingo and de la Rosa hereby reserve their right to question before the NLRC the
validity or legality of their dismissal from employment . . . .
• Domingo and de la Rosa filed a joint letter of resignation with respondent company but emphasized therein
that "their resignation is submitted only because the same is demanded by the Company, and it should not be
understood as a waiver — as none is expressly or impliedly made — of whatever rights they may have under
existing contracts and labor and social legislation." The MOA was subsequently incorporated in a new CBA
which was signed on 4 March 1994 but made effective on 1 July 1993 until 30 June 1996.
• On 2 June 1994 Domingo and de la Rosa sue GREPALIFE for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and damages.

LA/RTC/NLRC/CA Ruling/s:
•Labor Arbiter sustained the charge of illegal dismissal.
•Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Respondent NLRC rejected the finding
below that Domingo and de la Rosa were illegally dismissed, contending that a just cause for dismissal had been
sufficiently established. However, it agreed that respondent company failed to comply strictly with the
requirements of due process prior to termination. It modified the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
• Respondent GREPALIFE's motion for reconsideration was denied. Pending finality thereof, respondent company
and Domingo entered into compromise agreement, which they submitted to the NLRC for approval. NLRC
considered the case against Domingo terminated, and denied De la Rosa's motion for reconsideration.
Issue/s:
Whether or not petitioner De la Rosa’s claim that respondent company unreasonably singling out the top officers of
the UNION, including himself as unfit for reinstatement constitutes unfair labor practice is correct.

SC Ruling/s:
No.

While an act or decision of an employer may be unfair, certainly not every unfair act or decision constitutes unfair labor
practice (ULP) as defined and enumerated under Art. 248 (now Art. 259) of the Labor Code.
There should be no dispute that all the prohibited acts instituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers'
right to self-organization. Thus, an employer may be held liable under this provision if his conduct affects in whatever
manner the right of an employee to self-organize. The decision of respondent GREPALIFE to consider the top officers of
petitioner UNION as unfit for reinstatement is not essentially discriminatory and constitutive of an unlawful labor
practice of employers under the above-cited provision. Discriminating in the context of the Code involves either
encouraging membership in any labor organization or is made on account of the employee's having given or being about
to give testimony under the Labor Code. These have not been proved in the case at bar.

To elucidate further, there can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not similarly situated. A union
officer has larger and heavier responsibilities than a union member. Union officers are duty bound to respect the law
and to exhort and guide their members to do the same; their position mandates them to lead by example. By committing
prohibited activities during the strike, De la Rosa as Vice President of petitioner UNION demonstrated a high degree of
imprudence and irresponsibility. Verily this justifies his dismissal from employment. Since the objective of the Labor Code
is to ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace, the dismissal of undesirable labor leaders should be upheld.
It bears emphasis that the employer is free to regulate all aspects of employment according to his own discretion and
judgment. This prerogative flaws from the established rule that labor laws do not authorize substitution of judgment of
the employer in the conduct of his business. Recall of workers clearly falls within the ambit of management prerogative.
The employer can exercise this prerogative without fear of liability so long as it is done in good faith for the advancement
of his interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or
valid agreements. It is valid as long as it is not performed in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner
or out of malice or spite.

That respondent company opted to reinstate all the strikers except Domingo and de la Rosa is an option taken in good
faith for the just and lawful protection and advancement of its interest. Readmitting the union members to the exclusion
of Domingo and de la Rosa was nothing less than a sound exercise of management prerogative, an act of self-preservation
in fact, designed to insure the maintenance of peace and order in the company premises. The dismissal of de la Rosa
who had shown his capacity for unmitigated mischief was intended to avoid a recurrence of the violence that attended
the fateful strike in November.

Hence, the petition is DISMISSED.

 A.C. RANSOM LABOR UNION-CCLU v. NLRC
Gr No. L-69494; May 29, 1987
Mellencio-Herrera
Topic: ULP by the employer
Case Doctrine/s:

When the notion of legal entity is used as a means to perpetrate fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the
evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, and or confuse legitimate issues the veil which
protects the corporation will be lifted

Recit ready

Somtime in 1972, the then Court of Industrial Relations found Petitioner Corp. AC RANSOM guilty of unfair
labor practice. Petitioner was then ordered to pay the backwages of 22 employees, but the petitioner corporation
opposed it on ground that it was in a precarious financial position. It then filed a clearance application to cease
operation and terminate employees which was granted by the SOLE.

Union filed a motion for execution and garnishment, alleging that Petitioner corporation is trying to evade its
liability by alleging financial loss, when in reality it only changed its business name to ROSARIO; which was a
corporation which had the same line of business, same officers, same personnel, and same place for business.

The LA Genilo granted the motion for execution, and held that the corporation and its officers are liable. NLRC
reversed the decision, and held that the veil of corporate fiction cannot be pierced in this case.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC erred in finding that the corporations’ officers are not liable.
Ruling: Yes. It was undisputed that the CIR rendered a decision that found the petitioner guilty of ULP. Such
decision became final and executory, and as such the corporation and its officers are held jointly and severally
liable to pay the backwages of the 22 employees.
Facts:

In a joint Decision in two earlier cases rendered by the then Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) on August 19,
1972, it held that AC RANSOM was guilty of Unfair Labor practice.

The backwages due the 22 employees having been computed at P 199,276.00 by the (CIR) Examiner,
successive Motions for Execution were filed by the UNION on January 27, 1973 and March 1, 1973, all of which
RANSOM opposed stressing its "precarious financial position if immediate execution of the backwages would
be ordered." Upon the UNION's Motion of April 22, 1973 asking the CIR that RANSOM be ordered to deposit
with the Court the backwages due them.

RANSOM manifested that it did not have the necessary funds to deposit and asked that the employees'
earnings elsewhere during this suspension be deducted. After several hearings, a recomputation was made
and the award of P199,276.00 was reduced to P 164,984.00.

The records show that, upon application filed by RANSOM on April 2, 1973, it was granted clearance by the
Secretary of Labor on June 7, 1973 to cease operation and terminate employment effective May 1, 1973,
without prejudice to the right of subject employees to seek redress of grievances under existing laws and
decrees. The reasons given by RANSOM for the clearance application were financial difficulties on account of
obligations incurred prior to 1966.
On January 21, 1974, the UNION filed another Motion for Execution alleging that although RANSOM had
assumed a posture of suffering from business reverse, its officers and principal stockholders had organized a
new corporation, the Rosario Industrial Corporation (thereinafter called ROSARIO), using the same equipment,
personnel, business stocks and the same place of business. For its part, RANSOM declared that ROSARIO is
a distinct and separate corporation, which was organized long before these instant cases were decided
adversely against RANSOM.

It appears that sometime in 1969, ROSARIO, a closed corporation, was, in fact, established. It was engaged in
the same line of business as RANSOM with the same Hernandez family as the owners, the same officers, the
same President, the same counsel and the same address at 555 Quirino Avenue, Paranaque, Rizal. The
compound, building, plant, equipment, machinery, laboratory and bodega were the same as those occupied
and used by RANSOM. The UNION claims that ROSARIO thrives to this day.

LA: Held that the corporations’ officers and agents liable.

NLRC: Reveresed the LA decision. MR also denied.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the Corporation’s officers are liable.

Ruling/s:
.
Yes. Incontrovertible is the fact that RANSOM was found guilty by the CIR, in its Decision of August 19, 1972,
of unfair labor practice; that its officers and agents were ordered to cease and desist from further committing
acts constitutive of the same, and to reinstate immediately the 22 union members to their respective
positions with backwages from July 25, 1969 until actually reinstated.

The CIR Decision became final, conclusive, and executory after this Court denied the RANSOM petition for
review in 1973. In other words, this Court upheld that portion of the judgment ordering the officers and agents of
RANSOM to reinstate the laborers concerned, with backwages. The inclusion of the officers and agents was
but proper since a corporation, as an artificial being, can act only through them.

In other words, the officers and agents listed in the Genilo Order except for those who have since passed away,
should, as affirmed by this Court, be held jointly and severally liable for the payment of backwages to the 22
strikers.

A.C STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (NUBE) v. Confesor (SOLE)

G.R. NO. 114974 : June 16, 2004;
 Callejo Sr.
Topic: ULP by the employer

Case Doctrine/s:

In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to
support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the case at bar, the Union bases its claim of
interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from the Unions negotiating panel.

Recit ready

The Bank and the Union was nearing the end of its CBA and decided to renegotiate its terms. During the
negotiations, the parties could not agree on the economic provisions of the CBA, prompting Diokno
(Negotiating officer of the bank) to suggest to exclude Umali (Union officer) from the negotiations, as Umali
only made the negotiations more complicated. No agreement was reached and the Union filed a notice of
strike with the NCMB, on ground of ULP. The bank then filed a complaint for ULP.
SOLE Confesor assumed jurisdiction which consolidated the complaints and later on ordered the dismissal of
the both complaints for ULP. Bank then filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not SOLE Confesor committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for
ULP.
Ruling: No. In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence
is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the case at bar, the Union bases its
claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from the Unions negotiating
panel.
The alleged ULP was based on the employers violation of Section 8(a) (1) and (5) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), which pertain to the interference, restraint or coercion of the employer in the
employees exercise of their rights to self-organization and to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing; and the refusal of the employer to bargain collectively with the employees
representatives.In both cases, the National Labor Relations Board held that upon the employers refusal to
engage in negotiations with the Union for collective-bargaining contract when the Union includes a person
who is not an employee, or one who is a member or an official of other labor organizations, such employer is
engaged in unfair labor practice under Section 8(a) (1) and (5) of the NLRA.
The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion made by Diokno to
Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from which it can be inferred that the Bank consciously adopted such
act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise of the right to self-organization and collective bargaining of
the employees, especially considering that such was undertaken previous to the commencement of the
negotiation and simultaneously with Divinagracias suggestion that the bank lawyers be excluded from its
negotiating panel.

Facts:
Standard Chartered Bank (Bank) is a foreign banking corporation doing business in the Philippines. The
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the Bank is the Standard Chartered Bank
Employees Union (Union).
In August of 1990, the Bank and the Union signed a five-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a
provision to renegotiate the terms thereof on the third year. Prior to the expiration of the three-year period but
within the sixty-day freedom period, the Union initiated the negotiations. On February 18, 1993, the Union,
through its President, Eddie L. Divinagracia, sent a letter containing its proposals covering political provision
and thirty-four (34) economic provisions.
In a Letter dated February 24, 1993, the Bank, through its Country Manager Peter H. Harris, took note of the
Unions proposals. The Bank attached its counter-proposal to the non-economic provisions proposed by the
Union. The Bank posited that it would be in a better position to present its counter-proposals on the economic
items after the Union had presented its justifications for the economic proposals.

On March 12, 1993, the parties met and set the ground rules for the negotiation, Diokno suggested that the
negotiation be kept a family affair. The proposed non-economic provisions of the CBA were discussed first.
Even during the final reading of the non-economic provisions on May 4, 1993, there were still provisions on
which the Union and the Bank could not agree. Temporarily, the notation DEFERRED was placed therein.
Towards the end of the meeting, the Union manifested that the same should be changed to DEADLOCKED to
indicate that such items remained unresolved. Both parties agreed to place the notation
DEFERRED/DEADLOCKED.
On May 18, 1993, the negotiation for economic provisions commenced. A presentation of the basis of the
Unions economic proposals was made. The next meeting, the Bank made a similar presentation. Towards the
end of the Banks presentation, Umali requested the Bank to validate the Unions guestimates, especially the
figures for the rank and file staff. In the succeeding meetings, Umali chided the Bank for the insufficiency of its
counter-proposal on the provisions on salary increase, group hospitalization, death assistance and dental
benefits. He reminded the Bank, how the Union got what it wanted in 1987, and stated that if need be, the
Union would go through the same route to get what it wanted.

Upon the Banks insistence, the parties agreed to tackle the economic package item by item. Upon the Unions
suggestion, the Bank indicated which provisions it would accept, reject, retain and agree to discuss. The Bank
suggested that the Union prioritize its economic proposals, considering that many of such economic
provisions remained unresolved. The Union, however, demanded that the Bank make a revised itemized
proposal.
Diokno stated that, in order for the Bank to make a better offer, the Union should clearly identify what it
wanted to be included in the total economic package. Umali replied that it was impossible to do so because
the Banks counter-proposal was unacceptable. He furthered asserted that it would have been easier to
bargain if the atmosphere was the same as before, where both panels trusted each other. Diokno requested
the Union panel to refrain from involving personalities and to instead focus on the negotiations. He suggested
that in order to break the impasse, the Union should prioritize the items it wanted to iron out. Divinagracia
stated that the Bank should make the first move and make a list of items it wanted to beincluded in the
economic package. Except for the provisions on signing bonus and uniforms, the Union and the Bank failed to
agree on the remaining economic provisions of the CBA. The Union declared a deadlock and filed a Notice of
Strike before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on June 21, 1993, docketed as NCMB-
NCR-NS-06-380-93.
Bank filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice and Damages before the Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Manila, docketed as NLRC Case No. 00-06-04191-93 against the
Union on June 28, 1993.The Bank alleged that the Union violated its duty to bargain, as it did not bargain in
good faith.
On July 21, 1993, then Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) Nieves R. Confesor, pursuant to Article
263(g) of the Labor Code, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute at the Bank.The
complaint for ULP filed by the Bank before the NLRC was consolidated with the complaint over which the
SOLE assumed jurisdiction. The SOLE issued an order that dismissing the complaint for ULP and ordering
the parties to execute a CBA.

Issue/s:

Whether or not SOLE Confesor committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for ULP.

Ruling/s:

.
No. In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is
required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the case at bar, the Union bases its
claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from the Unions negotiating
panel.

The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion made by Diokno to
Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from which it can be inferred that the Bank consciously adopted such
act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise of the right to self-organization and collective bargaining of
the employees, especially considering that such was undertaken previous to the commencement of the
negotiation and simultaneously with Divinagracias suggestion that the bank lawyers be excluded from its
negotiating panel.
The records show that after the initiation of the collective bargaining process, with the inclusion of Umali in the
Unions negotiating panel, the negotiations pushed through. The complaint was made only on August 16,
1993 after a deadlock was declared by the Union on June 15, 1993.
It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought. The accusation occurred after the arguments
and differences over the economic provisions became heated and the parties had become frustrated.It
happened after the parties started to involve personalities. As the public respondent noted, passions may
rise, and as a result, suggestions given under less adversarial situations may be colored with unintended
meanings. Such is what appears to have happened in this case.
 11. Employees Union of Bayer Phils., FFW (EUBP) vs. Bayer Philippines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 162943 December 6, 2010
Ponente: Villarama Jr., J.
Topic: Unfair Labor Practice by the Employer
Case Doctrine/s:
When a valid and binding CBA had been entered into by the workers and the employer, the latter is behooved to observe
the terms and conditions thereof bearing on union dues and representation, and if the employer grossly violates its CBA
with the duly recognized union, the former may be held administratively and criminally liable for unfair labor practice.
Facts:
During the negotiations, EUBP rejected Bayer’s 9.9% wage-increase proposal resulting in a bargaining deadlock.
And EUBP staged a strike, prompting the Secretary of DOLE to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. Pending the
resolution of the dispute, respondent Remigio and 27 other union members, without any authority from their union
leaders, accepted Bayer’s wage-increase proposal. EUBP’s grievance committee questioned Remigio’s action and
reprimanded Remigio and her allies. After a while, the DOLE Secretary issued an arbitral award ordering EUBP and Bayer
to execute a CBA. Meanwhile, barely 6 months from the signing of the new CBA, during a company-sponsored seminar,
Remigio solicited signatures from union members in support of a resolution, containing the decision of the signatories
to: (1) disaffiliate from FFW, (2) rename the union as Reformed Employees Union of Bayer Philippines (REUBP), (3) adopt
a new constitution and by-laws for the union, (4) abolish all existing officer positions in the union and elect a new set of
interim officers, and (5) authorize REUBP to administer the CBA between EUBP and Bayer. The said resolution was signed
by 147 of the 257 local union members. A subsequent resolution was also issued affirming the first resolution. A tug-of-
war then ensued between the two rival groups, with both seeking recognition from Bayer and demanding remittance of
the union dues collected from its rank-and-file members. Bayer remitted the union dues to REUBP and later on they
agreed to sign a new CBA.
LA/RTC/NLRC/CA Ruling/s:
LA and NLRC dismissed the complaints for Unfair Labor Practice on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the act of the management of Bayer in dealing and negotiating with Remigio’s splinter group
despite its validly existing CBA with EUBP can be considered unfair labor practice? YES
SC Ruling/s:
The Supreme Court ruled that a CBA is entered into in order to foster stability and mutual cooperation between
labor and capital. An employer should not be allowed to rescind unilaterally its CBA with the duly certified bargaining
agent it had previously contracted with, and decide to bargain anew with a different group if there is no legitimate reason
for doing so and without first following the proper procedure. If such behavior would be tolerated, bargaining and
negotiations between the employer and the union will never be truthful and meaningful, and no CBA forged after
arduous negotiations will ever be honored or be relied upon.
It is axiomatic in labor relations that a CBA entered into by a legitimate labor organization that has been duly
certified as the exclusive bargaining representative and the employer becomes the law between them. Additionally, in
the Certificate of Registration issued by the DOLE, it is specified that the registered CBA serves as the covenant between
the parties and has the force and effect of law between them during the period of its duration. Compliance with the
terms and conditions of the CBA is mandated by express policy of the law primarily to afford protection to labor and to
promote industrial peace. Thus, when a valid and binding CBA had been entered into by the workers and the employer,
the latter is behooved to observe the terms and conditions thereof bearing on union dues and representation. If the
employer grossly violates its CBA with the duly recognized union, the former may be held administratively and criminally
liable for unfair labor practice.
 National Union of Workers in the Hotel Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF) Dusit Hotel Nikko
Chapter vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163942 November 11, 2008
Ponente: Velasco Jr., J.
Topic: Peaceful Concerted Activities; Nature of a Strike
Case Doctrine/s:
The Union’s concerted violation of the Hotel’s Grooming Standards which resulted in the temporary cessation and
disruption of the Hotel’s operations is an unprotected act and should be considered as an illegal strike.
Facts:
The Union is the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file employees of Dusit Hotel Nikko (Hotel).
The Union submitted its CBA negotiation proposals to the Hotel. As negotiations ensued, the parties failed to arrive at
mutually acceptable terms and conditions. Due to the bargaining deadlock, the Union filed a Notice of Strike on the
ground of the bargaining deadlock with the NCMB. Thereafter, conciliation hearings were conducted which proved
unsuccessful. Soon thereafter, the Union held a general assembly at its office located in the Hotels basement, where
some members sported closely cropped hair or cleanly shaven heads. The next day, more male Union members came to
work sporting the same hair style. The Hotel prevented these workers from entering the premises claiming that they
violated the Hotels Grooming Standards. In view of the Hotels action, the Union staged a picket outside the Hotel
premises. Later, other workers were also prevented from entering the Hotel causing them to join the picket. For this
reason, the Hotel experienced a severe lack of manpower which forced them to temporarily cease operations in three
restaurants. Consequently, the Hotel issued notices to Union members, preventively suspending them and charging
them with the following offenses: (1) violation of the duty to bargain in good faith; (2) illegal picket; (3) unfair labor
practice; (4) violation of the Hotels Grooming Standards; (5) illegal strike; and (6) commission of illegal acts during the
illegal strike.
The next day, the Union filed with the NCMB a second Notice of Strike on the ground of unfair labor practice and
violation of Article 248(a) of the Labor Code on illegal lockout. The Hotel terminated the services of 29 Union officers and
61 members; and suspended 81 employees for 30 days, 48 employees for 15 days, 4 employees for 10 days, and 3
employees for 5 days. On the same day, the Union declared a strike. Starting that day, the Union engaged in picketing
the premises of the Hotel. During the picket, the Union officials and members unlawfully blocked the ingress and egress
of the Hotel premises. The Union filed its third Notice of Strike with the NCMB, this time on the ground of unfair labor
practice and union-busting.
LA/RTC/NLRC/CA Ruling/s:
NLRC Decision: It ordered the Hotel and the Union to execute a CBA within 30 days from the receipt of the
decision. NLRC ruled that the strike conducted was illegal. CA affirmed NLRC’s decision.
Issue/s:
Whether legal or not are the following acts of the Union:
(1) Reporting for work with their bald or cropped hair style on January 18, 2002; and
(2) The picketing of the Hotel premises on January 26, 2002?
SC Ruling/s:
Court holds that the Union’s concerted violation of the Hotel’s Grooming Standards which resulted in the
temporary cessation and disruption of the Hotel’s operations is an unprotected act and should be considered as an illegal
strike.
Art. 212 of the Labor Code defines a strike as “any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.” In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 537 SCRA 171 (2007), we cited the various categories of an illegal strike, to wit:
Noted authority on labor law Ludwig Teller, lists six (6) categories of an illegal strike, viz.: (1) [when it] is contrary to a
specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or (2) [when it] violates a
specific requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or (3) [when it] is
declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice against non-union
employees; or (4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of
non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or (5) [when it] is declared in violation
of an existing injunction[, such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art.
263 of the Labor Code]; or (6) [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive
arbitration clause.
In view of the Union’s collaborative effort to violate the Hotel’s Grooming Standards, it succeeded in forcing the
Hotel to choose between allowing its inappropriately hair styled employees to continue working, to the detriment of its
reputation, or to refuse them work, even if it had to cease operations in affected departments or service units, which in
either way would disrupt the operations of the Hotel. This Court is of the opinion, therefore, that the act of the Union
was not merely an expression of their grievance or displeasure but, indeed, a calibrated and calculated act designed to
inflict serious damage to the Hotel’s finances or its reputation. Thus, we hold that the Union’s concerted violation of the
Hotel’s Grooming Standards which resulted in the temporary cessation and disruption of the Hotel’s operations is an
unprotected act and should be considered as an illegal strike.
 INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW vs. INTERPHIL LABORATORIES, INC.
G.R. No. 142824. December 19, 2001
Kapunan, J.
Topic: Nature of a Strike
RECIT-READY
FACTS:
A meeting was held where the union officers asked whether Allesandro Salazar, VP-HR Department of
respondent company, would be amenable to make the new CBA effective for two (2) years. Salazar, however,
declared that it would still be premature to discuss the matter. The very next day, all the rank-and-file employees
of the company refused to follow their regular two-shift work schedule. Salazar was told that the employees
would only return to their normal work schedule if the company would agree to their demands. Salazar again
told the union officers that the matter could be better discussed during the formal renegotiations. Apparently
unsatisfied, the overtime boycott continued. In addition, the employees started to engage in a work slowdown
campaign. Respondent company filed with the NLRC a petition to declare illegal petitioner union's "overtime
boycott" and "work slowdown" which, according to respondent company, amounted to illegal strike.

ISSUE: W/N the overtime boycott or work slowdown is justified

RULING: NO
It was established that the employees adhered to the work schedule since they followed, without any question
or complaint, the two-shift schedule while their CBA was still in force and even prior thereto. It is thus undisputed
that members of the union by their own volition decided not to render overtime services. Petitioner union even
admitted this in its Memorandum. Such admission confirmed the allegation of respondent company that
petitioner engaged in "overtime boycott" and "work slowdown" which was taken as a means to coerce
respondent company to yield to its unreasonable demands. More importantly, the "overtime boycott" or "work
slowdown" by the employees constituted a violation of their CBA, which prohibits the union or employee, during
the existence of the CBA, to stage a strike or engage in slowdown or interruption of work.
DOCTRINE:
A slowdown is a "strike on the installment plan;" as a willful reduction in the rate of work by concerted action of
workers for the purpose of restricting the output of the employer, in relation to a labor dispute; as an activity by
which workers, without a complete stoppage of work, retard production or their performance of duties and
functions to compel management to grant their demands.

A slowdown is generally condemned as inherently illicit and unjustifiable, because while the employees
"continue to work and remain at their positions and accept the wages paid to them," they at the same time
"select what part of their allotted tasks they care to perform of their own volition or refuse openly or secretly, to
the employer's damage, to do other work;" in other words, they "work on their own terms."
FACTS:
Prior to the expiration of the CBA, Allesandro Salazar, VP-HR Department of respondent company, was
approached by Nestor Ocampo, the union president, and Hernando Clemente, a union director, inquiring about
the stand of the company regarding the duration of the CBA. Salazar told them that the matter could be best
discussed during the formal negotiations. A meeting was held where the union officers asked whether Salazar
would be amenable to make the new CBA effective for two (2) years. Salazar, however, declared that it would
still be premature to discuss the matter. The very next day, all the rank-and-file employees of the company
refused to follow their regular two-shift work schedule. The employees stopped working and left their workplace.

Salazar immediately asked for a meeting with the union officers. Enrico Gonzales, a union director, told Salazar
that the employees would only return to their normal work schedule if the company would agree to their
demands as to the effectivity and duration of the new CBA. Salazar again told the union officers that the matter
could be better discussed during the formal renegotiations. Apparently unsatisfied, the overtime boycott
continued. In addition, the employees started to engage in a work slowdown campaign, thus substantially
delaying the production of the company.

Respondent company filed with the NLRC a petition to declare illegal petitioner union's "overtime boycott" and
"work slowdown" which, according to respondent company, amounted to illegal strike. Respondent company
filed with the NCMB an urgent request for preventive mediation aimed to help the parties in their CBA
negotiations. The parties, however, failed to arrive at an agreement.

Petitioner union filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike citing unfair labor practice allegedly committed by
respondent company. The union staged a strike. The Secretary of Labor issued an assumption order and
directed respondent company to "immediately accept all striking workers back to work,” and the petitioner union
to " comply with the return-to-work orders.” A judgment was rendered declaring the 'overtime boycott' and 'work
slowdown' as illegal strike; the respondent union officers to have lost their employment status; and the
respondents guilty of unfair labor practice. The union went to the CA, which however dismissed their petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the overtime boycott or work slowdown is justified
RULING: NO
The LA found that respondent company had to adopt a continuous 24-hour work daily schedule by reason of
the nature of its business and the demands of its clients. It was established that the employees adhered to the
said work schedule, and thus are deemed to have waived the eight-hour schedule since they followed, without
any question or complaint, the two-shift schedule while their CBA was still in force and even prior thereto. The
two-shift schedule effectively changed the working hours stipulated in the CBA. As the employees assented by
practice to this arrangement, they cannot now be heard to claim that the overtime boycott is justified because
they were not obliged to work beyond eight hours.

It is thus undisputed that members of the union by their own volition decided not to render overtime services.
Petitioner union even admitted this in its Memorandum. Such admission confirmed the allegation of respondent
company that petitioner engaged in "overtime boycott" and "work slowdown" which was taken as a means to
coerce respondent company to yield to its unreasonable demands. More importantly, the "overtime boycott" or
"work slowdown" by the employees constituted a violation of their CBA, which prohibits the union or employee,
during the existence of the CBA, to stage a strike or engage in slowdown or interruption of work.
 RAMIREZ vs. POLYSON INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. No. 207898. October 19, 2016
Peralta, J.
Topic: Nature of a Strike
RECIT-READY
FACTS:
Polyson met with the officers of Obrero Pilipino, the union of its employees, led by the union president, herein
petitioner Ramirez. Obrero asked that it be voluntarily recognized by Polyson as the exclusive bargaining agent
of the rank-and-file employees of Polyson, but the latter refused and opted for a certification election. Polyson
received a rush order from one of its clients. The supervisors approached the operators but were told that they
would be unable to work overtime because they have other commitments. This resulted in the delay in delivery
of the client's order and eventually, the cancellation thereof by reason of such delay. The management then
conducted an investigation where Visca and Tuting, two of their workers, claimed that petitioners were the ones
who pressured them to desist from rendering overtime work. The management informed petitioners of their
termination on the ground that they instigated an illegal concerted activity resulting in losses to the company.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners are guilty of an illegal act and, if so, whether such act is a valid ground for their
termination

RULING: YES; YES

The evidence on record clearly establishes that herein [petitioners] resorted to an illicit activity. The act of
inducing and/or threatening workers not to render overtime work, given the circumstances surrounding the
instant case, was undoubtedly a calculated effort amounting to 'overtime boycott' or 'work slowdown.'
[Petitioners], in their apparent attempt to make a statement — as a response to [Polyson's] refusal to voluntarily
recognize Obrero as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees, unduly
caused [Polyson] significant losses.
DOCTRINE:
Nothing in the law requires that a slowdown be carefully planned and that it be participated in by a large
number of workers. The essence of this kind of strike is that the workers do not quit their work but simply
reduce the rate of work in order to restrict the output or delay the production of the employer. It has
been held that while a cessation of work by the concerted action of a large number of employees may more
easily accomplish the object of the work stoppage than if it is by one person, there is, in fact no fundamental
difference in the principle involved as far as the number of persons involved is concerned, and thus, if the act
is the same, and the purpose to be accomplished is the same, there is a strike, whether one or more
than one have ceased to work. Furthermore, it is not necessary that any fixed number of employees should
quit their work in order to constitute the stoppage a strike, and the number of persons necessary depends in
each case on the peculiar facts in the case and no definite rule can be laid down.
FACTS:
Polyson met with the officers of Obrero Pilipino, the union of its employees, led by the union president, herein
petitioner Ramirez. Obrero asked that it be voluntarily recognized by Polyson as the exclusive bargaining agent
of the rank-and-file employees of Polyson, but the latter refused and opted for a certification election. Furious
at such refusal, the Obrero officers threatened the management that the union will show its collective strength
in the coming days.

Polyson received a rush order from one of its clients for the production of 100,000 pieces of plastic bags. The
management of Polyson informed the operators of its Cutting Section that they would be needing workers to
work overtime because of the said order. The supervisors approached the operators but were told that they
would be unable to work overtime because they have other commitments after their shift. This resulted in the
delay in delivery of the client's order and eventually resulted in the cancellation thereof by reason of such delay.
The management then conducted an investigation and a hearing where Visca and Tuting, two of their workers,
claimed that petitioners were the ones who pressured, induced or threatened them to desist from rendering
overtime work. After evaluation of submitted explanations, the management informed petitioners of their
termination on the ground that they instigated an illegal concerted activity resulting in losses to the company.
Petitioners contended that Polyson is guilty of unfair labor practice.

Subsequently, Obrero filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB. Thereafter, the DOLE Secretary certified the labor
dispute to the NLRC for immediate compulsory arbitration where the parties were required to maintain the
status quo. The NLRC found petitioners illegally dismissed, but later reversed itself after submission by Polyson
sufficient evidence. The CA affirmed the NLRC.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners are guilty of an illegal act and, if so, whether such act is a valid ground for their termination
RULING: YES; YES
The evidence on record clearly establishes that herein [petitioners] resorted to an illicit activity. The act of
inducing and/or threatening workers not to render overtime work, given the circumstances surrounding the
instant case, was undoubtedly a calculated effort amounting to 'overtime boycott' or 'work slowdown.'
[Petitioners], in their apparent attempt to make a statement — as a response to [Polyson's] refusal to voluntarily
recognize Obrero Pilipino — Polyson Industries Chapter as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
the rank-and-file employees, unduly caused [Polyson] significant losses.

In addition, the Court finds no error in the findings of the NLRC in its questioned Resolution that, contrary to
petitioners' claims, the slowdown was indeed planned. The Court agrees with both the NLRC and the CA that
petitioners are guilty of instigating their co-employees to commit slowdown and they accomplished their purpose
when the slowdown resulted in the delay and restriction in the output of Polyson
 NARANJO v. Biomedica Healthcare, Inc
G.R. No. 193789 September 19, 2012
VELASCO, Jr., J
Topic: Forms of Strike; Mass Leave
Case Doctrine/s:
In no case can the absence of 5 employees be considered as “concerted” which is defined as “mutually contrived or
planned” or “performed in unison”

Facts:
Petitioners are employees of Biomedica Health Care, Inc:
1. Alex Q. Naranjo (Naranjo)-Liaison Officer
2. Ronald Allan V. Cruz (Cruz)-Service Engineer
3. Rowena B. Bardaje (Bardaje)-Administration Clerk
4. Donnalyn De Guzman (De Guzman)-Sales Representative
5. Rosemarie P. Pimentel (Pimentel)-Accounting Clerk||

Said petitioners were absent for personal reasons on November 7, 2006 which happened to be the birthday of
Carina Motol, president of Biomedica. Later that day, petitioners reported for work after receiving a text message for
them to proceed to Biomedica, but upon arrival, they were denied entry.

The next day, the petitioners were not allowed to enter the premises, and Carina Motol purportedly informed
petitioners, using foul language, to just find other employment. Correspondingly, Biomedica issued notice of
preventive suspension and notice to explain. In the said notices, Biomedica accused the petitioners of having
conducted an illegal strike and were accordingly directed to explain why they should not be held guilty of and
dismissed for violating the company policy against illegal strikes.

Notably, these petitioners were also the same employees who filed a letter-complaint before the DOLE alleging
Biomedica’s failure to remit SSS and PAG-IBIG contributions, violations of minimum wage law, etc.

This prompted for the petitioners to file a complaint for constructive dismissal.

Thereafter, Biomedica served notices of termination of employment against petitioners.

LA/RTC/NLRC/CA Ruling/s:
LA - The Labor Arbiter found that, petitioners engaged in a mass leave akin to a strike. He added that, assuming
that petitioners were not aware of the company policies on illegal strikes, such mass leave can sufficiently be
deemed as serious misconduct under Art. 282 of the Labor Code. Thus, the Labor Arbiter concluded that petitioners
were validly dismissed.|||

NLRC - The NLRC reversed the LA and found and so declared petitioners to have been illegally dismissed

CA- The CA reinstated LA’s decision and ruled that, indeed, petitioners staged a mass leave in violation of
company policy. This fact, coupled with their refusal to explain their actions, constituted serious misconduct that
would justify their dismissal

Issue/s:
(1) Was there a mass leave akin to a strike?

SC Ruling/s:
(1) No.

a. The phrase "mass leave" may refer to a simultaneous availment of authorized leave benefits by a
large number of employees in a company.|||
In the factual milieu at bar, Biomedica did not submit a copy of the CBA or a company memorandum
or circular showing the authorized sick or vacation leaves which petitioners can avail of. Neither is
there any document to show the procedure by which such leaves can be enjoyed. Absent such
pertinent documentary evidence, the Court can only conclude that the availment of petitioners of
their respective leaves on November 7, 2006 was authorized, valid and in accordance with the
company or CBA rules on entitlement to and availment of such leaves.
b. Moreover, a mass leave involves a large number of people or in this case, workers.
Here, the five (5) petitioners were absent on November 7, 2006. The records are bereft of any
evidence to establish how many workers are employed in Biomedica. There is no evidence on record
that 5 employees constitute a substantial number of employees of Biomedica. And, as earlier stated,
it is incumbent upon Biomedica to prove that petitioners were dismissed for just causes, this includes
the duty to prove that the leave was large-scale in character and unauthorized. This, Biomedica failed
to prove.
 LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION v. NLRC
G.R. No. 121948 95494-97 Septemb er 7, 1995
Puno, J
Topic: Requisites for a valid strike

Case Doctrine/s:
The seven (7)-day waiting period is intended to give the Department of Labor and Employment an opportunity to
verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.|||

Facts:
Petitioner Lapanday Workers Union (Union) is the duly certified bargaining agent of the rank and file employees
of|||Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation| (private respondent)

Petitoner Union has a collective bargaining agreement with private respondents, covering the period
from December 5, 1985 to November 30, 1988. A few months before the expiration of their CBA, private
respondent initiated certain management policies which disrupted the relationship of the parties.

Hence, the Union filed on August 25, 1988, a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB).|||

Nevertheless, the differences between the Union and private respondent were settled, prompting for the Union to
notify NCMB that there were no more bases for the notice of strike.

Later, however, an unfortunate event broke the peace of the parties. On September 8, 1988, Danilo Martinez a
member of the Board of Directors of the Union, was gunned down in his house in the presence of his wife and
children. The gunman was later identified as Eledio Samson, an alleged member of the new security forces of
private respondent.

Thus, the relations between the Union and the private respondent further detoriated which even prompted for City
Mayor Rodrigo Duterte to intervene, but to no avail.

Hence, on October 3, 1988, a strike vote was conducted among the members of the Union and those in favor of
the strike won overwhelming support from the workers. The result of the strike vote was then submitted to the
NCMB on October 10, 1988. Two days later, or on October 12, 1988, the Union struck.

LA/RTC/NLRC/CA Ruling/s:
LA - Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva ruled that the Union staged an illegal strike|||
NLRC – entered a new judgment, but still maintaining that the Union conducted an illegal strike

Issue/s:
 (1) Was there an illegal strike?

SC Ruling/s:
(1) Yes. We rule that strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is plainly illegal as it was held within the
seven (7)-day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste
in holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor and Employment from verifying whether it carried the
approval of the majority of the union members. It set to naught an important policy consideration of our law on
strike. Considering this finding, we need not exhaustively rule on the legality of the work stoppage conducted by the
union and some of their members on September 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the ruling of the public
respondent on the matter is supported by substantial evidence.||
 TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. v. NLRC
G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007
Velasco, Jr., J.
Topic: Illegal Strikes
Recit Ready:
FACTS:
Union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB based on Toyota’s refusal to bargain. Union officers and members
failed to render the required overtime work, and instead marched to and staged a picket in front of the BLR
office. Toyota experienced acute lack of manpower resulting in huge losses.

Toyota filed a petition to declare the strike illegal with the NLRC and prayed that the erring Union officers,
directors, and members be dismissed.

After the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the Toyota dispute, the Union again staged strikes. The
NLRC found the strikes illegal as they violated Art. 264 of the Labor Code which proscribes any strike or lockout
after jurisdiction is assumed over the dispute by the President or the DOLE Secretary.

ISSUES:

1. WON the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal strikes
2. WON the union officers are liable for unlawful strikes or illegal acts during a strike

RULING:

1. Yes. The Union failed to comply with the following requirements: (1) a notice of strike filed with the
DOLE 30 days before the intended date of strike, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (2)
strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned
obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (3) notice given to the DOLE of
the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are
mandatory and the failure of a union to comply with them renders the strike illegal.
2. Yes. Art. 264(a) sanctions the dismissal of a union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal
strike or who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a lawful strike. It is clear
that the responsibility of union officials is greater than that of the members. The Union officials were
in clear breach of Art. 264(a) when they knowingly participated in the illegal strikes.

Case Doctrine/s

Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists six (6) categories of an illegal strike, viz:

(1) [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental
functions; or

(2) [when it] violates a specific requirement of law, such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a
valid strike]; or

(3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor
practice against non-union employees; or
(4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-
strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or

(5) [when it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction, such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by
the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or

(6) [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.

Art. 264(a) of the Labor Code provides that a member is liable when he knowingly participates in an illegal act
"during a strike." While the provision is silent on whether the strike is legal or illegal, we find that the same is
irrelevant. As long as the members commit illegal acts, in a legal or illegal strike, then they can be terminated.

The rule on vicarious liability of a union member was abandoned and it is only when a striking worker "knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike" that he will be penalized with dismissal.

Facts:

The Union is a legitimate labor organization and is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank
and file employees. Union submitted its CBA proposals to Toyota, but the latter refused to negotiate in view of
its pending appeal to the DOLE Secretary.

Union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB based on Toyota’s refusal to bargain. NCMB-NCR converted the
notice of strike into a preventive mediation case on the ground that the issue of whether or not the Union is the
exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees was still unresolved by the DOLE Secretary.

Union officers and members failed to render the required overtime work, and instead marched to and staged a
picket in front of the BLR office. Toyota experienced acute lack of manpower in its manufacturing and production
lines and was unable to meet its production goals resulting in huge losses of PhP 53,849,991.

Toyota filed a petition to declare the strike illegal with the NLRC arbitration branch and prayed that the erring
Union officers, directors, and members be dismissed.

DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued an Order certifying the labor dispute to
the NLRC. The Secretary directed all striking workers to return to work at their regular shifts.

After the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the Toyota dispute on April 10, 2001, the Union again
staged strikes on May 23 and 28, 2001. The NLRC found the strikes illegal as they violated Art. 264 of the
Labor Code which proscribes any strike or lockout after jurisdiction is assumed over the dispute by the President
or the DOLE Secretary.

Issue/s:

1. WON the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal strikes
2. WON the union officers are liable for unlawful strikes or illegal acts during a strike

Ruling:
1. Yes.

The illegality of the Union’s mass actions was succinctly elaborated by the labor tribunal, thus:

Such mass actions staged before the Bureau of Labor Relations on February 21-23, 2001 by the union
officers and members fall squarely within the definition of a strike (Article 212 (o), Labor Code). These
concerted actions resulted in the temporary stoppage of work causing the latter substantial
losses. Thus, without the requirements for a valid strike having been complied with, we were
constrained to consider the strike staged on such dates as illegal and all employees who participated in
the concerted actions to have consequently lost their employment status.

The Union failed to comply with the following requirements: (1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE
30 days before the intended date of strike, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (2) strike vote
approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by
secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the
voting at least seven days before the intended strike.

These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply with them renders the
strike illegal.

Moreover, the aforementioned February 2001 strikes are in blatant violation of Sec. D, par. 6 of
Toyota’s Code of Conduct which prohibits "inciting or participating in riots, disorders, alleged strikes
or concerted actions detrimental to [Toyota’s] interest." The penalty for the offense is dismissal. The
Union and its members are bound by the company rules, and the February 2001 mass actions
and deliberate refusal to render regular and overtime work on said days violated these rules. In
sum, the February 2001 strikes and walk-outs were illegal as these were in violation of specific
requirements of the Labor Code and a company rule against illegal strikes or concerted actions.

On March 28 to April 12, 2001, the Union barricaded the gates of the Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants and
blocked the free ingress to and egress from the company premises. Toyota employees, customers, and
other people having business with the company were intimidated and were refused entry to the plants.
These strikes were illegal because unlawful means were employed. The acts of the Union
officers and members are in palpable violation of Art. 264(e), which proscribes acts of violence,
coercion, or intimidation, or which obstruct the free ingress to and egress from the company
premises.

While it may be conceded that there was no work disruption in the two Toyota plants, the fact still
remains that the Union and its members picketed and performed concerted actions in front of the
Company premises. This is a patent violation of the assumption of jurisdiction and certification
Order of the DOLE Secretary, which ordered the parties "to cease and desist from committing
any act that might lead to the worsening of an already deteriorated situation."

2. Yes. The union officers are liable for unlawful strikes or illegal acts during a strike.

Art. 264(a) sanctions the dismissal of a union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike or
who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a lawful strike. It is clear that the
responsibility of union officials is greater than that of the members. The Union officials were in clear
breach of Art. 264(a) when they knowingly participated in the illegal strikes.
Moreover, an ordinary striking employee cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike.
There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike and the striker who
participated in the commission of illegal act[s] must be identified.

The rule on vicarious liability of a union member was abandoned and it is only when a striking worker
"knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike" that he will be penalized with
dismissal.

In the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. CIR, the court ruled "Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be ‘substantial.’ Substantial evidence which
means that such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a
conclusion."

No precise meaning was given to the phrase "illegal acts." It may encompass a number of acts that
violate existing labor or criminal laws, such as the following:

(1) Violation of Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that "[n]o person engaged in picketing shall
commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the
employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares";

(2) Commission of crimes and other unlawful acts in carrying out the strike;54 and

(3) Violation of any order, prohibition, or injunction issued by the DOLE Secretary or NLRC in connection
with the assumption of jurisdiction/certification Order under Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code.

This enumeration is not exclusive, and it may cover other breaches of existing laws.
 Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines vs. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.
G.R. No. 140992, March 25, 2004
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J
Topic: Illegal Strikes
Recit Ready:
Facts: Respondent Sulpicio Lines and petitioner Samahang Mangaggawa sa Sulpicio Lines renegotiated
their CBA, but did not come into an agreement. As a result, Samahan filed a notice of strike with NCMB. The
labor Secretary ordered any strike or lockout to be enjoined.

Samahan filed with NCMB a second notice of strike claiming that Sulpicio committed acts constituting ULP
due to union busting. As a result, Samahan conducted a strike vote and they did not report to work, and
gathered in front of North Harbor.

Sulpicio filed a complaint with NLRC for illegal strike. NLRC ruled in favor of Sulpicio Lines and gave it the
option to terminate Samahang’s union officers who joined the strike.

Issue: WON strike was illegal.

Ruling: Yes, the strike was illegal because it did not comply with the requirement of a valid strike as
provided in Art. 263 and 264 of the Labor Code which provides that:

1. A strike shall be filed with the Department of Labor and Employment at least 15 days if the issues raised
are unfair labor practice or at least 30 days if the issue involved bargaining deadlock. However, in case of
dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-
laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-
off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately;

2. The strike shall be supported by a majority vote of the members of the union obtained by secret ballot in a
meeting called for the purpose; and

3. A strike vote shall be reported to the Department of Labor and Employment at least seven (7) days before
the intended strike.

Here, it doesn’t show that Samahan observed the 7-day strike ban; and that the results of the strike vote
were submitted by petitioners to the Department of Labor and Employment at least seven (7) days before the
strike. Hence, the strike was illegal.

Case Doctrine/s:

The requirements such as the filing of a notice of strike, strike vote, and notice given to the Department of
Labor are mandatory in nature. Thus, even if the union acted in good faith in the belief that the company was
committing an unfair labor practice, if no notice of strike and a strike vote were conducted, the said strike is
illegal.

Facts:
Respondents Sulpicio Lines, Inc. and Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines Inc. executed a CBA for a
term of 5 years from October 17, 1990. After 3 years, they renegotiated but it remained at stale.
Samahan filed a notice of strike with NCMB due to collective bargaining deadlock. Respondent file with the
Office of Secretary a petition praying that the Labor Secretary assume jurisdiction. Labor Secretary issued an
order enjoining any strike or lockout.
Samahan filed with NCMB a second notice of strike alleging that Sulpicio Lines committed acts constituting
unfair labor practice amounting to union busting. As a result of the alleged ULP, Samahan immediately
conducted a strike vote, and Samahan did not report for work, and gathered in front of North Harbor on May
20.

Labor Secretary directed the striking employees to return to work and certified the labor dispute to the NLRC
for compulsory arbitration. Sulpicio Lines filed a complaint with NLRC for illegal strike.

NLRC issued a Resolution declaring the strike of petitioner’s officers and members illegal with notice to
respondent of the option to terminate Samahan’s officers employment. Also, NLRC dismissed Samahan’s
complaint against Sulpicio.

Samahan filed an MR but was denied.

In the CA, it ruled that NLRC has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of legality of strike; that the temporary work
stoppage by the officers amounted to illegal strike; the strike was illegal because it failed to comply with the
mandatory procedural requirements of a valid strike; and that the dismissal of Samahan’s officers in an illegal
strike is valid as provided in the Article 264(a) of the Labor Code.

Samahan filed MR but was denied. Hence, it filed a petition for review on certiorari. Samahan alleged that a
day of stoppage does not amount to illegal strike. It further alleged that it erred in sustaining the dismissal and
in ruling that NLRC has jurisdiction over a petition to declare the strike illegal.

Issue/s:

WON the strike was illegal.

Ruling/s:
Yes the strike was illegal. It failed to to comply with the mandatory requirements of Article 263 (c) and (f) of
the Labor Code.

"ART. 263. STRIKES, PICKETING AND LOCKOUTS.

xxx

(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file
a notice of strike x x x with the Ministry (now Department) at least 30 days before the intended
date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the
absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by
any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from
employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-
laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day
cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.

xxx

(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose.
x x x. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the
same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry (now
Department) may at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the
conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union x x x shall furnish the Ministry (now
 Department) the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject
to the cooling-off period herein provided.

Here, it doesn’t show that Samahan observed the 7-day strike ban; and that the results of the strike vote
were submitted by petitioners to the Department of Labor and Employment at least seven (7) days before the
strike.

As explained in National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC the requirements such as the filing of a notice of strike,
strike vote, and notice given to the Department of Labor are mandatory in nature. Thus, even if the union acted
in good faith in the belief that the company was committing an unfair labor practice, if no notice of strike and a
strike vote were conducted, the said strike is illegal.

In addition, the claim of Samahan that what occurred was merely one day of absence and not illegal strike is
erroneous. Strike means "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute." It shall comprise not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves,
sitdowns, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities.14

Here, the basic elements of a strike are present. First, petitioner’s officers and members, a total of 167 employees,
in a concerted manner, did not report for work on May 20, 1994. Second, they gathered in front of respondent’s
office at North Harbor to participate in a strike voting conducted by petitioner. Third, such union activity was an
effect of petitioner’s second notice of strike by reason of respondent’s unfair labor practice/s.
 BIFLEX V. FILFLEX
G.R. No. 155679
December 19, 2006
Carpio-Morales, J.
DOCTRINE:
Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general strike, an extended
sympathy strike. It affects numerous employers including those who do not have a dispute
with their employees regarding their terms and conditions of employment. Employees who
have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they are scheduled to work,
refuse to work and instead join a welga ng bayan commit an illegal work stoppage.
RECIT READY:
FACTS:
The labor sector staged a welga ng bayan to protest the accelerating prices of oil. Petitioner-
unions, led by their officers, herein petitioners, staged a work stoppage which lasted for
several days, prompting respondents to file a petition to declare the work stoppage illegal for
failure to comply with procedural requirements.
Subsequently, respondents resumed their operations. Petitioners, claiming that they were
illegally locked out by respondents, assert that aside from the fact that the welga ng bayan
rendered it difficult to get a ride and the apprehension that violence would erupt between those
participating in the welga and the authorities, respondents’ workers were prevented from
reporting for work.
On their putting up of tents, tables and chairs in front of the main gate of respondents’
premises, petitioners, who claim that they filed a notice of strike on explain that those were for
the convenience of union members who reported every morning to check if the management
would allow them to report for work

ISSUE: Was the strike illegal?

HELD: Yes, it was illegal.
Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general strike, an extended
sympathy strike. It affects numerous employers including those who do not have a dispute
with their employees regarding their terms and conditions of employment. Employees who
have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they are scheduled to work,
refuse to work and instead join a welga ng bayan commit an illegal work stoppage.
There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention, or that they
were allowed by respondents, to join the welga ng bayan, their work stoppage is beyond legal
protection.
FACTS:
Some of the petitioners were officers of Biflex (Phils.) Inc. Labor Union while the others were
the officers of Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Labor Union. The two petitioner-unions,
which are affiliated with NAFLU, are the respective collective bargaining agents of the
employees of corporations. Respondents Biflex (Phils.) Inc. and Filflex Industrial and
Manufacturing Corporation (respondents) are sister companies engaged in the garment
business. Situated in one big compound along with another sister company, General Garments
Corporation (GGC), they have a common entrance. One day, the labor sector staged a welga
ng bayan to protest the accelerating prices of oil. On even date, petitioner-unions, led by their
officers, herein petitioners, staged a work stoppage which lasted for several days, prompting
respondents to file a petition to declare the work stoppage illegal for failure to comply with
procedural requirements. Subsequently, respondents resumed their operations. Petitioners,
claiming that they were illegally locked out by respondents, assert that aside from the fact that
the welga ng bayan rendered it difficult to get a ride and the apprehension that violence would
erupt between those participating in the welga and the authorities, respondents’ workers were
prevented from reporting for work.
Petitioners further assert that respondents were "slighted" by the workers’ no-show, and as a
punishment, the workers as well as petitioners were barred from entering the company
premises.
On their putting up of tents, tables and chairs in front of the main gate of respondents’
premises, petitioners, who claim that they filed a notice of strike on explain that those were for
the convenience of union members who reported every morning to check if the management
would allow them to report for work. Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the work
stoppage was illegal since the following requirements for the staging of a valid strike were not
complied with: (1) filing of notice of strike; (2) securing a strike vote, and (3) submission of a
report of the strike vote to the DOLE.
LABOR ARBITER’S DECISION:
The Labor Arbiter, by Decision, finding for respondents, held that the strike was illegal.
NLRC’S DECISION:
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, it holding that there was no
strike to speak of as no labor or industrial dispute existed between the parties. It accordingly
ordered respondents to reinstate petitioners to their former positions, without loss of seniority
rights, and with full backwages from the date of their termination.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the strike was illegal
HELD:
Yes, it was illegal.
Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general strike, an extended
sympathy strike. It affects numerous employers including those who do not have a dispute
with their employees regarding their terms and conditions of employment. Employees who
have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they are scheduled to work,
refuse to work and instead join a welga ng bayan commit an illegal work stoppage.
Even if petitioners’ joining the welga ng bayan were considered merely as an exercise of their
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly or freedom to petition the government for redress
of grievances, the exercise of such rights is not absolute. For the protection of other significant
state interests such as the "right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to
expansion and growth" enshrined in the 1987 Constitution must also be considered, otherwise,
oppression or self-destruction of capital in order to promote the interests of labor would be
sanctioned. And it would give imprimatur to workers’ joining demonstrations/rallies even
before affording the employer an opportunity to make the necessary arrangements to
counteract the implications of the work stoppage on the business, and ignore the novel
"principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers" aimed at fostering
industrial peace. There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their
intention, or that they were allowed by respondents, to join the welga ng bayan, their work
stoppage is beyond legal protection.
 Air Line Pilots Association of the Philippines vs. CIR
G.R. No. L-33705. April 15, 1977
Topic: Illegal Strikes
Case Doctrine/s:
Strike is defined as “any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial
dispute.”

Recit ready
Facts: Gaston was dismissed from employment for failure to comply with return to work order. Several other pilots filed
their mass resignation after being led to believe that the same was a valid way of contesting the dismissal of Gaston wo
was their union president.

Issue: WON the mass resignation was a legitimate “concerted activity” within the meaning of strike.

Ruling: No. Strike is defined as “any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial dispute.” What the mentioned pilots did cannot be considered as mere “temporary stoppage of work.” What
they contemplated was evidently a permanent cut-off of employment relationship with PAL.

Facts:
These are two petitions for certiorari (L-33705 and L-35206), consolidated for purposes of decision because they involve
more or less the same parties and interlocking issues.

In L-35206, the President of the Philippines certified a labor dispute between members of ALPAP and the PAL to the
Court of Industrial Relations and the case was assigned to Judge Paredes who issued a return-to-work order.

Strikers returned to work, except (according to the PAL) two pilots, one of them being Gaston who allegedly refused to
take the flights assigned to him. Due to his refusal, PAL terminated Gaston’s services and the same was reported to CIR
who was supposed to hear the same but Gaston failed to appear claiming that the CIR is not the proper forum.

Meanwhile, PAL filed an urgent ex parte motion with the industrial court to enjoin the members of ALPAP from
proceeding with their intention to retire or resign en masse. Judge Paredes issued an order commanding ALPAP members
not to strike or in any way cause any stoppage in the operation and for PAL not to severe employment. ALPAP filed a
motion for the reconsideration claiming involuntary servitude but the same was denied. Hence, a substantial majority of
the members of ALPAP staged a mass resignation and/or retirement. The same was accepted by PAL with caveat that
pilots concerned will not be entitled to any benefit or privilege as the same constituted a violation of orders of industrial
court.

Meanwhile, Gaston filed a motion for contempt against PAL stating that his dismissal was without just cause and in
violation of the Order of the industrial court. He also prayed for reinstatement. Later, 21 pilots who filed their retirement
from PAL filed a petition in the industrial court praying also that they be readmitted to PAL or, failing so, that they be
allowed to retire with the benefits. They alleged that they were led to believe by Gaston that such a mass resignation or
mass retirement was a valid exercise of their right to protest the dismissal of Capt. Gaston in connection with the certified
dispute that was pending. That later on they came to know that such was enjoined by Court ‘under the pain of dismissal
and forfeiting of rights and privileges

CIR Ruling
Judge Paredes suspended the hearing of the said petitioners’ plea until this Court shall have decided L-33705. Later,
industrial court en banc passed a resolution reversing Judge Paredes’ order on the ground that the question of the
employee status of the pilots who were seeking reinstatement with PAL has already been resolved in an earlier case
which found that the said pilots have already lost their employee status.

Issue/s:
WON the mass resignation of pilots constituted a legitimate concerted activity.
SC Ruling/s:
NO. Contrary to Gaston’s argument that the pilots’ retirement/resignation was a legitimate concerted activity, citing
Section 2(1) of the Industrial Peace Act which defines “strike” as “any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted
action of employees as a result of an industrial dispute,” it is worthwhile to observe that as the law defines it, a strike
means only a “temporary stoppage of work.” What the mentioned pilots did, however, cannot be considered, in the
opinion of this Court, as mere “temporary stoppage of work.” What they contemplated was evidently a permanent cut-
off of employment relationship with their erstwhile employer, the Philippine Air Lines. In any event, the dispute below
having been certified as existing in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the said pilots’ rank disregard for
the compulsory orders of the industrial court and their daring and calculating venture to disengage themselves from that
court’s jurisdiction, for the obvious purpose of satisfying their narrow economic demands to the prejudice of the public
interest, are evident badges of bad faith.

Further, A legitimate concerted activity is a matter that cannot be used to circumvent judicial orders or be tossed around
like a plaything. Definitely, neither employers nor employees should be allowed to make a judicial authority a now-
you’ve-got-it-now-you-don’t affair. The courts cannot hopefully effectuate and vindicate the sound policies of the
Industrial Peace Act and all our labor laws if employees, particularly those who on account of their highly advance
technical background and relatively better life status are far above the general working class spectrum, will be permitted
to defy and invoke the jurisdiction of the courts whenever the alternative chosen will serve to feather their pure and
simple economic demands.
 Abaria vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 154113. December 7, 2011
Topic: Illegal Strikes
Case Doctrine/s:
Labor Code makes a distinction between workers and union officers who participate in an illegal strike: an ordinary
striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he or she
committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he
knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike.
Recit ready
Facts: NAMA-MCCH-NFL filed a Notice of Strike but the same was deemed not filed for want of legal personality as DOLE
issued a certification that the group of Nava was not a registered labor organization. Despite such, Nava and her group
still conducted a strike. As a result, the union officers and striking members were dismissed.
Issue: WON dismissal was proper.
Ruling: see case doctrine.

Facts:
National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of Metro
Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI). Nava, the president of President of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa MCCH (NAMA-
MCCH-NFL), wrote Rev. Iyoy expressing the union’s desire to renew the CBA, attaching to her letter a statement of
proposals signed/endorsed by 153 union members. Nava also requested that some employees be allowed to avail of
one-day union leave with pay. However, MCCHI returned the CBA proposal for Nava to secure first the endorsement of
the legal counsel of NFL as the official bargaining representative of MCCHI employees.

Atty. Alforque informed MCCHI that the proposed CBA submitted by Nava was never referred to NFL and that NFL has
not authorized any other legal counsel or any person for collective bargaining negotiations. In his letter addressed to
Nava, Ernesto Canen, Jr., Jesusa Gerona, Hannah Bongcaras, Emma Remocaldo, Catalina Alsado and Albina Bañez, Atty.
Alforque suspended their union membership for serious violation of the Constitution and ByLaws.

Meanwhile, upon the request of Atty. Alforque, MCCHI granted one-day union leave with pay for 12 union members.
The next day, several union members led by Nava and her group launched a series of mass actions such as wearing black
and red armbands/headbands, marching around the hospital premises and putting up placards, posters and streamers.
Atty. Alforque immediately disowned the concerted activities being carried out by union members which are not
sanctioned by NFL. MCCHI directed the union officers led by Nava to submit within 48 hours a written explanation. Rev.
Iyoy, MCCH Administrator, also directed Nava and other union officers to appear before his office for investigation in
connection with the illegal strike wherein they reportedly uttered slanderous and scurrilous words against the officers
of the hospital, threatening other workers and forcing them to join the strike. Said union officers, however, invoked the
grievance procedure.

NAMA-MCCH-NFL filed a Notice of Strike but the same was deemed not filed for want of legal personality as DOLE issued
a certification that the group of Nava was not a registered labor organization. Despite such, Nava and her group still
conducted a strike vote in which majority of union members approved the strike. MCCH issued a cease-and-desist order
to the rest of the striking employees stressing that the concerted activities spearheaded by the Nava group is illegal
without a valid Notice of Strike and warning them that non-compliance will compel management to impose disciplinary
actions against them. For their continued picketing activities despite the said warning, more than 100 striking employees
were dismissed.
Unfazed, the striking union members held more mass actions. MCCHI filed a petition for injunction in the NLRC. A
temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued. City Government of Cebu also ordered the demolition of the structures
and obstructions put up by the picketing employees as the same are public nuisance or nuisance per se. Thereafter,
several complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice were filed by the terminated employees against MCCHI,
Rev. Iyoy, UCCP and members of the Board of Trustees of MCCHI.

LA/NLRC Ruling
Executive Labor rendered his decision dismissing the complaints for unfair labor practice in NLRC. declared the strike and
picketing activities illegal. The termination of union leaders were upheld as valid but MCCH was directed to grant
separation pay. NLRC affirmed the ruling but held that dismissal of union officers were valid; hence, the payment of
separation pay was deleted. The decision was affirmed by CA.

Issue/s:
1. WON the strike and picketing activities were illegal.
2. WON Nava, et al were validly dismissed.
3. WON striking union members (including Abaria) were validly dismissed.

SC Ruling/s:
1. Yes . ART. 263 provides workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective
bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection. The right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and
picket and of employers to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and
respected.

NAMA-MCCH-NFL was not a duly registered or an independently registered union at the time it filed the notice
of strike on March 13, 1996 and when it conducted the strike vote on April 2, 1996. It could not then legally
represent the union members. Consequently, the mandatory notice of strike and the conduct of the strike vote
report were ineffective for having been filed and conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which has no legal personality

Furthermore, the strike was illegal due to the commission of the following prohibited activities: (1) violence,
coercion, intimidation and harassment against non-participating employees; and (2) blocking of free ingress to
and egress from the hospital, including preventing patients and their vehicles from entering the hospital and
other employees from reporting to work, the putting up of placards with a statement advising incoming patients
to proceed to another hospital because MCCHI employees are on strike/protest. As shown by photographs
submitted by MCCHI, as well as the findings of the NCMB and Cebu City Government, the hospital premises and
sidewalk within its vicinity were full of placards, streamers and makeshift structures that obstructed its use by
the public who were likewise barraged by the noise coming from strikers using megaphones. Affidavits executed
by several hospital employees and patients narrated in detail the incidents of harassment, intimidation, violence
and coercion, some of these witnesses have positively identified the perpetrators. The prolonged work stoppage
and picketing activities of the striking employees severely disrupted hospital operations that MCCHI suffered
heavy financial losses.

The findings clearly established that the striking union members created so much noise, disturbance and
obstruction that the local government authorities eventually ordered their removal for being a public nuisance.
The illegal strike also lasted for five months.
2. Yes. Art. 264 of the Labor Code makes a distinction between workers and union officers who participate in an
illegal strike: an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There
must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be
terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he
commits an illegal act during a strike.

Considering their persistence in holding picketing activities despite the declaration by the NCMB that their union
was not duly registered as a legitimate labor organization and the letter from NFL’s legal counsel informing that
their acts constitute disloyalty to the national federation, and their filing of the notice of strike and conducting
a strike vote notwithstanding that their union has no legal personality to negotiate with MCCHI for collective
bargaining purposes, there is no question that NAMA-MCCH-NFL officers knowingly participated in the illegal
strike.

3. NO. With respect to the dismissed union members, although MCCHI submitted photographs taken at the picket
line, it did not individually name those striking employees and specify the illegal act committed by each of them.
As to the affidavits executed by non-striking employees, they identified mostly union officers as the persons who
blocked the hospital entrance, harassed hospital employees and patients whose vehicles were prevented from
entering the premises. Only some of these witnesses actually named a few union members who committed
similar acts of harassment and coercion. Consequently, we find no error committed by the CA in ruling that the
dismissal of union members who merely participated in the illegal strike was illegal.

Since there is no clear proof that union members actually participated in the commission of illegal acts, they are
not deemed to have lost their employment status. However, they are not entitled to backwages but should be
awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

With respect to backwages, the principle of a “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor” remains as the basic factor
in determining the award thereof. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay
unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or
dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working. While it was found that respondents expressed their
intention to report back to work, the latter exception cannot apply in this case as it is required that the strike be
legal.

Under the circumstances, respondents’ reinstatement without backwages suffices for the appropriate relief. If
reinstatement is no longer possible, given the lapse of considerable time from the occurrence of the strike, the
award of separation pay is in order.
 Bigg’s vs. Boncacas
G.R. No. 200487 | March 6, 2019
Caguioa, J.
Topic: Illegal Strike
RECIT READY
Facts:
Bigg’s Employees Union allegedly conducted two illegal sit-down strikes (Feb 16 and March 5, 1996) in the premises of
the company which resulted in the dismissal of multiple union members who participated. Union filed for an unfair
labor practices, illegal dismissal and damages. Bigg restaurant questioned the validity of the strikes for failure to
comply with the mandatory requirements of filing a Notice of Strike and to observe the 15-days cooling-off period of
the first strike and the illegality of the second strike due to the acts of violence, aggression, vandalism, and blockage of
the free passage to and from Bigg's premises committed by the Union members.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Feb 16 and March 5, 1996 strikes were valid.

HELD:
No. Both strikes are rendered illegal. Feb 16, strike did not comply with the mandatory requirements of conducting a
strike under Article 278 of the Labor Code (Notice of Strike and cooling period). No substantial evidence was presented
to prove that the company conducted a Union Busting in order to forego the mandatory requirements. For the second
strike, it complied with the procedural requirements of a valid strike. However, it was established that the striking
union members committed acts of violence, aggression, vandalism, and blockage of the free passage to and from Bigg's
premises, which is a clear violation of Article 279 of the Labor Code. Hence, was also rendered invalid.

Case Doctrine/s:

Under Article 278 (formerly Article 263) of the Labor Code, there are different procedural requirements depending on
the ground of the strike:

(1) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or
the employer may file a notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 days before the intended date thereof. In
cases of unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or
recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of
its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with
the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is
threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.

(2) The notice must be in accordance with such implementing rules and regulations as the Minister of Labor and
Employment may promulgate.

(3) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the Ministry to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation
to effect a voluntary settlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of
days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a lockout.

(4) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining
unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. the union or the
employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or
lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.
Facts:
Bigg’s, Inc., a chain of restaurant in Naga City, was the employer of herein petitioners who forms part of the Bigg’s
Employees Union (Union), a legitimate labor organization registered with DOLE.

It was alleged that the Union conducted two illegal “sit-down strike” in Bigg’s restaurant. The first was allegedly
conducted on February 16, 1996 and the other one was on March 5, 1996.

Bigg’s restaurant alleged that the February 16 strike was illegal because it did not comply with the requirements of
sending Notice of Strike to the NCMB. Neither did the union obtain the "strike vote" from its members. According to
Bigg's, the union belatedly filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB on the same day to conceal the illegality of the sit-
down strike. Bigg's issued a memorandum to the striking union members placing them under preventive suspension and
requiring them to explain their actions within 24 hours from notice. The union members did not comply with the
company's order. Thus, they were sent employment termination letters on February 19, 1996.

On the other hand, the union members accuse Bigg's of interfering with union activities. Allegedly, in February 1996,
union members were asked to withdraw their membership under threat of losing their employment. Employees Mariano
Aycardo and Marilyn Jana were dismissed from service purportedly due to their union membership. The Union also
alleged that they were prevented from entering the company’s premises and was suspended for participating in a sit-
down strike.

Hence, the Union filed a complaint before the NCMB for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal, and damages. While
Bigg’s filed for illegal strike against the union members. The two cases were consolidated. When mediation reached an
impasse, the union conducted another strike on March 5, 1996.

Bigg's further alleges that during the strike on March 5, 1996, the union members were disruptive and violent. They
prevented ingress and egress of employees and customers to and from the company's premises.
LA/RTC/NLRC/CA Ruling/s:
LA Ruling:
On the issue of the illegality of strikes, the LA ruled in favor of Bigg’s restaurant and held the two strikes as illegal due to
the failure of the Union to comply with Article 263 of the Labor Code, which provides for the procedural requirement in
conducting a legal strike.

NLRC Ruling:
The NLRC reversed the LA’s decision and ruled that the February 16 strike was valid because it was grounded on unfair
labor practices committed by Bigg's. As such, the union members were not bound to wait for 15 days from the filing of
the Notice of Strike before staging the same. The NLRC also ruled that there was no evidence to establish that the
union members displayed violence.

However, on motion for reconsideration, the NLRC reversed its own ruling and reinstated the LA Decision.

CA Ruling:
The CA partially granted the appeal. CA overturned the findings of the NLRC as to the finding of a sit-down strike on
February 16, 1996 and held that Bigg’s failed to adduce substantial evidence with only one representative attesting the
alleged sit-down strike. Also, Bigg’s was found guilty of anti-unionism and due to this it was no longer necessary to file
the requisite notice of strike. While the March 5 strike was ruled illegal for having conducted with violence
Hence, a petition or review under Rule 45 was filed.
Issue/s:

Whether the strikes held on February 16, 1996 and March 5, 1996 were illegal.

SC Ruling/s:

Yes. Both strikes were held illegal. As defined under Article 219 (formerly Article 212) of the Labor Code, a strike means
any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.

The Labor Code and the IRR limit the grounds for a valid strike to: (1) a bargaining deadlock in the course of collective
bargaining, or (2) the conduct of unfair labor practices by the employer.

Only a certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may declare a strike in case of a bargaining deadlock.
However, in cases of unfair labor practices, the strike may be declared by any legitimate labor organization.

In both instances, the union must conduct a "strike vote" which requires that the actual strike is approved by majority of
the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned. The union is required to notify the regional branch of the
NCMB of the conduct of the strike vote at least 24 hours before the conduct of the voting. Thereafter, the union must
furnish the NCMB with the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout. This seven-day
period has been referred to as the "seven-day strike ban" or "seven-day waiting period."

The case on hand is a strike on the ground of unfair labor practices.

A strike grounded on unfair labor practice requires: (1) the strike may be declared by the duly certified bargaining agent
or legitimate labor organization; (2) the conduct of the strike vote in accordance with the notice and reportorial
requirements to the NCMB and subject to the seven-day waiting period; (3) notice of strike filed with the NCMB and
copy furnished to the employer, subject to the 15-day cooling-off period. In cases of union busting, the 15-day cooling-
off period shall not apply.

With regard to the first strike conducted by the union members on February 16, 1996, the Court holds that the CA
committed reversible error in overturning the findings of the NLRC and LA. The CA held that no substantial evidence was
presented to prove that the union staged a "sit-down strike" as only one representative from Bigg's attested to the fact.
However, a review of the records proves that there were several employees who attested. The Union also failed to prove
that there was a Union Busting.

In fine, the union's failure to comply with the mandatory requirements, Notice of Strike and failed to observe the cooling-
off period, rendered the strike on February 16, 1996 illegal.

For the March 5 strike, the Court upheld the unanimous decisions on its illegality. Striking union members committed
acts of violence, aggression, vandalism, and blockage of the free passage to and from Bigg's premises. Article 279
(formerly 264) (e) of the Labor Code provides that “No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence,
coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or
obstruct public thoroughfares.”
 Grand Boulevard Hotel vs. Genuine Labor Organization
G.R. No. 153665 | July 18, 2003
Callejo, Sr., J

Case Doctrine/s:
The requisites for a valid strike are as follows: (a) a notice of strike fled with the DOLE thirty days before the
intended date thereof or fifteen days in case of ULP; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose;
(c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike.37 The
requisite seven-day period is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike
really carries the approval of the majority of the union members. The notice of strike and the cooling-off period
were intended to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. The requirements are mandatory and
failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. 38 A strike simultaneously with or immediately
after a notice of strike will render the requisite periods nugatory.

Moreover, a strike that is undertaken, despite the issuance by the SOLE of an assumption or certification
order, becomes a prohibited activity and, thus, illegal pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended.

Facts:
On February 27, 1987, Genuine Labor Organization of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries
Silahis International Hotel Chapter (GLOWHRAIN-Silahis) (respondent union for brevity) and the petitioner
Grand Boulevard Hotel (then Silahis International Hotel, Inc.) executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) covering the period from July 10, 1985 up to July 9, 1988. The petitioner thereafter dismissed some of
its employees and suspended others who were members of the respondent union. On May 26, 1987, the
respondent union filed a notice of strike with the Department of Labor and Employment, National Capital
Region (DOLE-NCR), based on the following grounds a) Illegal dismiss b) Illegal suspension c) CBA
violations and d) Harassments.

On June 4, 1987, the then Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE for brevity) issued a status quo
ante bellum order certifying the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code; and further directing the employees to
return to work within forty-eight hours from receipt of the order,4 and for the petitioner to accept all returning
employees under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the labor dispute. The respondent union
complied with the order of the SOLE. On May 9, 1990, the respondent union filed another notice of strike against
the petitioner on account of alleged violations of the CBA and the illegal dismissal of nine employees. The
matter was docketed as NCMB-NCR Case No. 06-400-90. On May 23, 1990, the SOLE issued another status
quo ante bellum order certifying the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, directing the nine employees
to return to work and enjoining both parties from engaging in any strike or lockout that would exacerbate the
situation. The parties were also directed to sign a CBA within fifteen days from notice of the said order.
LA/RTC/NLRC/CA Ruling/s:
The Labor Arbiter, although sympathetic with the respondent union, held that for the latter's failure to comply
with the requirements laid down in Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, the strike that was staged on
November 16, 1990 up to November 29, 1990 was illegal.

Respondents appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC ratiocinated that the compliance by therein respondents of the
requirements laid down in Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code respecting the September 27, 1990 notice
of strike filed by the union cannot be carried over to the November 16, 1990 notice of strike.
The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but the NLRC issued an Order dated
November 16, 1994 denying the same.

Dissatisfied, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before this Court docketed as G.R. No.
153664. Edna Dacanay, another officer of the union, filed a similar petition before this Court docketed as G.R.
No. 153665. Upon motion of the petitioner, the petitions were consolidated. Pursuant to the ruling of this Court
in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC,25 the petitions were remanded to the Court of Appeals (CA). It rendered
a decision giving due course to and granting the petitions; and ordering the remand of the case to the labor
arbiter for the determination of backwages due to the respondent officers under the said decision.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the certification of non-forum shopping embedded in the resolution of the Board of
Directors failed to specifically authorize Jose Ma. Nuñez to file the petition at bar for and in behalf of the
petitioner.

2. Whether or not CA erred in its ruling that the petitioner committed (ULP) and acted oppressively against
the respondents; and in concluding that the strike staged by the respondents.
SC Ruling/s:
1. No.

A reading of the comment of the said respondents reveals that they do not assail the sufficiency of
the certification of non-forum shopping submitted by the petitioner; rather, they aver that the resolution of the
Board of Directors of the petitioner appended to the petition does not specifically authorize Jose Ma. Nuñez to
file the petition at bar for and in its behalf.

There is no doubt that the resolution of the Board of Directors is broad enough as to authorize Jose Ma.
Nuñez to file the petition at bar for and in behalf of the petitioner.

2. No.

The CA did not commit any error in ruling that the petitioner was guilty of ULP when it dismissed all
the officers of the respondent union despite the certificate orders of the SOLE and in defiance of the said
orders; and the respondents believed in good faith that indeed the petitioner committed ULP which belief
cured whatever defects there may have been in the November 16 to 29, 1990 strike staged by the
respondents. The findings of the CA, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings are supported by the
evidence on record, thus:

In the case at bar, petitioners staged the strike because of alleged unfair labor practices
committed by respondent Silahis, to wit, termination of two hundred (200) employees in the
guise of retrenchment program, despite the certification order of then Secretary Ruben Torres
(Order dated October 31, 1990) enjoining a strike lockout. However, the Labor Arbiter and the
respondent NLRC did not rule on petitioners' claim of unfair labor practices committed by
respondent Silahis but merely declared the strike illegal for not complying with the required
notice and cooling-off period and the certification order. But whether or not the retrenchment
program was valid or not, is not material in this case. The issue is whether or not there was
warranted belief in good faith on the part of petitioners that respondent Silahis was then
committing acts of unfair labor practices.
 Philippine Diamond Hotel vs Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union
G.R. No. 158075 | July 18 2003
Ponente
Topic: (liability of officers and ordinary union members)
Case Doctrine/s:
AS the appellate court correctly held, the union officers should be dismissed for staging and participating in the illegal
strike following Art 264 par 3. “any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status.

An ordinary striking worker cannot thus be dismissed for mere participation in the illegal strike. There must be proof
that he committed illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union officer who may be dismissed by mere knowingly
participating in an illegal strike and or committing an illegal act during a strike.
Facts:
The union failed to conduct a certification election. Subsequently, it notified the petitioner of its intention to negotiate
a CBA for its members. Petitioner then advices the union that it is not the certified union as it was not certified by DOLE,
it could not be recognized as such. The union announced that its executive officers as well as its director will go on strike,
thus a vote for it was taken. Nevertheless, the strike continued, there after concialiation conferences were immediately
taken by the NCMB. A second strike was conducted. One of the Supervisor of the hotel was seen along with other
supervisor, they were then thus terminated by the petitioner.
Subsequently NLRC issued a TRO directing the strikers to immediately “cease and desist from obstructing the free ingress
and egress from the hotel” however despite this, they refused to dismantle their set up.
DOLE acting secretary then certified the case and ordered compulsory arbitration in NLRC.
The supervisors dismissed also filed an illegal dismissal.

LA/RTC/NLRC/CA Ruling/s:
NLRC declared that strike was illegal. It also dismissed the complaint of the supervisors.
CA affirmed but modified the decision of NLRC; ordering restatement and backwages of union members.

Issue/s:
W/N there was a legal strike?
W/N those ordered reinstated are entitled to backwages?

SC Ruling/s:
1.No, SC finds the strike illegal.
Under Art 255, only the labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit is the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining.
It is doctrinal that the exercise fo the right of private sector employees to strike is not absolute. Even if the purpose of a
strike is valid, the strike may still be held illegal where the means employed are illegal. Thus the employment of violence,
intimidation, restraint or coercion in carrying out concerted activities which are injurious to the rights to property renders
a strike illegal. And so is picketing or the obstruction to the free use of property or the comfortable enjoyment of life or
property, when accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence and coercion as to constitute nuisance.

AS the appellate court correctly held, the union officers should be dismissed for staging and participating in the illegal
strike following Art 264 par 3. “any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status.
An ordinary striking worker cannot thus be dismissed for mere participation in the illegal strike. There must be proof
that he committed illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union officer who may be dismissed by mere knowingly
participating in an illegal strike and or committing an illegal act during a strike.
In this case there were photographs showing that some of the workers-strikers who joined the strike indeed committed
illegal acts – blocking the free ingress and egress from the hotel, holding noise barrage, threatening guests and the like.
However the list given did not identify the ones who actually committed illegal acts. SC remanded the case to the LA to
determine the respective liabilities of the strikers listed by petitioner.

2. GR: when in case of strikes even if it is legal, strikers may not collect their wages durint the days they did not go to
work on the principle that “a fair day’s wage” accrues only for a “fair day’s labor”
In PTUCvs CIR the court made 2 distinction between 2 types of employees involved in ULP:
1. Discriminatorily dismissed – entitled to backpay from the date of the act of discrimination; from the day of discharge
2. Voluntarily go on strike even if it is in protest of an ULP – not entitled of backpay
Exception of “No backwages rule”
1. when employees were illegally locked to compel them to stage a strike
2. the employer is guilty of the grossest form of ULP
3. when the employer committed discrimination in the rehiring of strikers refusing to readmit those against whom thre
were pending criminal cases while admitting nonstrikers who were also criminally charged.
4. workers who staged a voluntary ULP stike offered to return to work unconditionally but the employer refused to
reinstate them.
None of these circumstances were present in the instant case.

SolidBank vs Gamier
G.R. No. 159460| November 15, 2010
Ponente
Topic: (Liability of officers and ordinary union members)
Case Doctrine/s:
Under Art 264, the law makes distinction between union officers and members. It is only when he commits illegal acts
during a strike that he may be declared to have lsot employment status. The responsibility of union officers, as main
players in an illegal strike is greater than that of the members.

Facts:
There was a deadlock in the negotiations of the economic provisions of the CBA proposed by the Union and petitioner.
Thus respondent union filed a notice of strike . During the Collective bargaining negotiations, some Union members
staged a series of mass actions. SOLE then assumed jurisdiction in the impending actual strike. The secretary then
resolved all economic and non economic provisions, however the union officers and members were dissatisfied, and
held a protes and rally infront of the officer of the Secretary. This created a series of boycotts from the employees of the
different branches from cebu, Bacolod and Naga.Out of 712 employees, only 513 returned to work, the said 199 were
given 24 hours to explain why they should not be dismissed. As a result 129 employees were dismissed. Thus illegal
dississal were filed.
LA/RTC/NLRC/CA Ruling/s:
LA: it dismissed the comaplaint of Gamier, Condevillar, Arriola and De guzman. Their participation in the illegal strike
violated the Secretary of Labor’s return to work order.
NLRC: Reversed LA.
CA: the mass action by the employees were legitimate exercise of their right to free expression, and not a strike.

Issue/s:
W/N the protest rally and concerted work abandonment staged by the respondents violated the order of the
Secretary?
W/N the respondents were validly terminated?

SC Ruling/s:
1. YES.
The term strike shall comprise not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts
to damage, destroy, or sabotage plant equipment and facilities and similar activities. Thus the fact that the conventional
term “strike” was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since
the substance of the situation and not its appearance will be deemed controlling.

2. NO. Notwithstanding the illegality of the strike, we cannot sanction petitioner’s act of indiscriminately terminating the
services of individual respondents who admitted joining the mass actions and who have refused to comply with the offer
of the management to report back to work.
Under Art 264, the law makes distinction between union officers and members. It is only when he commits illegal acts
during a strike that he may be declared to have lsot employment status. The responsibility of union officers, as main
players in an illegal strike is greater than that of the members.
Substantial evidence is enough to prove that such illegal acts were committed. Here petitioners have not adduced such
illegal acts by each of the individual respondents who are union members, instead, they simply point to their admitted
participation in the mass actions which they knew to be illegal.
 C. Alcantara and Sons vs. CA
G.R. No. 155109 | September 29, 2010
Abad
Topic: Legality of Strike
Case Doctrine

A strike may be regarded as invalid although the labor union has complied with the strict
requirements for staging one as provided in Article 263 of the Labor Code when the same is
held contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.

Facts

C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc., (the Company) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture
and processing of plywood. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Alsons-SPFL (the Union) is the
exclusive bargaining agent of the Company’s rank and file employees. The other parties to these
cases are the Union officers1 and their striking members.

The Company and the Union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that bound
them to hold no strike and no lockout in the course of its life. The parties began negotiating the
economic provisions of their CBA but this ended in a deadlock, prompting the Union to file a
notice of strike. After efforts at conciliation by the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) failed, the Union conducted a strike vote that resulted in an overwhelming majority of
its members favoring it. The Union reported the strike vote to the DOLE and, after the
observance of the mandatory cooling-off period, went on strike.

The Company, on the other hand, filed a petition with the Regional Arbitration Board to declare
the Union’s strike illegal,5 citing its violation of the no strike, no lockout, provision of their
CBA.

LA, NLRC Ruling

On June 29, 1999 the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, declaring the Union’s strike illegal for
violating the CBA’s no strike, no lockout, provision. As a consequence, the Labor Arbiter held
that the Union officers should be deemed to have forfeited their employment with the Company
and that they should pay actual damages of ₱3,825,000.00 plus 10% interest and attorney’s fees.
With respect to the striking Union members, finding no proof that they actually committed
illegal acts during the strike, the Labor Arbiter ordered their reinstatement without backwages.
The Labor Arbiter denied the Union’s counterclaim for lack of merit.

On November 8, 1999 the NLRC rendered a decision, affirming that of the Labor Arbiter insofar
as the latter declared the strike illegal, ordered the Union officers terminated, and directed them
to pay damages to the Company. The NLRC ruled, however, that the Union members involved,
who were identified in the proceedings held in the case, should also be terminated for having
committed prohibited and illegal acts.
The Union filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the NLRC decision. Finding
merit in the petition, the CA rendered a decision on March 20, 2002,10 annulling the NLRC
decision and reinstating that of the Labor Arbiter. The Company and the Union with its officers
and members filed separate petitions for review of the CA decision in G.R. 155109 and 155135,
respectively

Issue
1. Whether or not the Union staged an illegal strike;
2. Assuming the strike to be illegal, whether or not the impleaded Union members
committed illegal acts during the strike, justifying their termination from employment.
3. Whether or not the terminated Union members are entitled to the payment of backwages
on account of the Company’s refusal to reinstate them, pending appeal by the parties,
from the Labor Arbiter’s decision of June 29, 1999;
4. Whether or not the terminated Union members are entitled to accrued backwages and
separation pay.

Ruling

Yes.
A strike may be regarded as invalid although the labor union has complied with the strict
requirements for staging one as provided in Article 263 of the Labor Code when the same is
held contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.

Here, the CBA between the parties contained a "no strike, no lockout" provision that enjoined
both the Union and the Company from resorting to the use of economic weapons available to
them under the law and to instead take recourse to voluntary arbitration in settling their disputes.
No law or public policy prohibits the Union and the Company from mutually waiving the strike
and lockout maces available to them to give way to voluntary arbitration. Indeed, no less than
the 1987 Constitution recognizes in Section 3, Article XIII, preferential use of voluntary means
to settle disputes.

The Court finds no compelling reason to depart from the findings of the Labor Arbiter, the
NLRC, and the CA regarding the illegality of the strike. Social justice is not one-sided. It cannot
be used as a badge for not complying with a lawful agreement.

Yes.
Since the Union’s strike has been declared illegal, the Union officers can, in accordance with
law be terminated from employment for their actions. This includes the shop stewards. They
cannot be shielded from the coverage of Article 264 of the Labor Code since the Union
appointed them as such and placed them in positions of leadership and power over the men in
their respective work units. As regards the rank and file Union members, Article 264 of the
Labor Code provides that termination from employment is not warranted by the mere fact that
a union member has taken part in an illegal strike. It must be shown that such a union member,
clearly identified, performed an illegal act or acts during the strike

Here, although the Labor Arbiter found no proof that the dismissed rank and file Union members
committed illegal acts, the NLRC found following the injunction hearing in NLRC IC M-
000126-98 that the Union members concerned committed such acts, for which they had in fact
been criminally charged before various courts and the prosecutors’ office in Davao City.
The striking Union members allegedly committed the following prohibited acts:
a. They threatened, coerced, and intimidated non-striking employees, officers, suppliers and
customers;

b. They obstructed the free ingress to and egress from the company premises; and

c. They resisted and defied the implementation of the writ of preliminary injunction issued
against the strikers.

Cornelio Caguiat, Ruben Tungapalan, and Eufracio Rabusa depicted the above prohibited acts
in their affidavits and testimonies. The Sheriff of the NLRC said in his Report21 that, in the
course of his implementation of the writ of injunction, he observed that the striking employees
blocked the exit lane of the Alson drive with their tent. Tungapalan, a non-striking employee,
identified the Union members who threatened and coerced him. Indeed, he filed criminal actions
against them. Lastly, the photos taken of the strike show the strikers, properly identified,
committing the acts complained of. These constitute substantial evidence in support of the
termination of the subject Union members.

The mere fact that the criminal complaints against the terminated Union members were
subsequently dismissed for one reason or another does not extinguish their liability under the
Labor Code. Nor does such dismissal bar the admission of the affidavits, documents, and photos
presented to establish their identity and guilt during the hearing of the petition to declare the
strike illegal. The technical grounds that the Union interposed for denying admission of the
photos are also not binding on the NLRC.

Yes.
The terminated Union members contend that, since the Company refused to reinstate them after
the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in their favor, the Company should be ordered to pay them
their wages during the pendency of the appeals from the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

The grounds for termination under Article 264 are based on prohibited acts that employees could
commit during a strike. On the other hand, the grounds for termination under Articles 282 to
284 are based on the employee’s conduct in connection with his assigned work. Still, Article
217, which defines the powers of Labor Arbiters, vests in the latter jurisdiction over all
termination cases, whatever be the grounds given for the termination of employment.
Consequently, Article 223, which provides that the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed employee shall immediately be executory pending appeal, cannot but apply to all
terminations irrespective of the grounds on which they are based. Here, although the Labor
Arbiter failed to act on the terminated Union members’ motion for reinstatement pending appeal,
the Company had the duty under Article 223 to immediately reinstate the affected employees
even if it intended to appeal from the decision ordaining such reinstatement. The Company’s
failure to do so makes it liable for accrued backwages until the eventual reversal of the order of
reinstatement by the NLRC on November 8, 1999,24 a period of four months and nine days.
Yes.
While it is true that generally the grant of separation pay is not available to employees who are
validly dismissed, there are, in furtherance of the law’s policy of compassionate justice, certain
circumstances that warrant the grant of some relief in favor of the terminated Union members
based on equity.

Taking these circumstances in consideration, the Court regards the award of financial assistance
to these Union members in the form of one-half month salary for every year of service to the
company up to the date of their termination as equitable and reasonable.

C. Alcantara and Sons vs. CA

G.R. No. 155109 | March 14, 2012
Peralta
Topic: Grant of Separation Pay to Striking Union Members

Case Doctrine

Separation pay cannot be awarded if strike is found to be illegal, more so if the striking members
committed illegal acts.

Facts

The negotiation between CASI and the Union on the economic provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) ended in a deadlock prompting the Union to stage a strike, but
the strike was later declared by the Labor Arbiter (LA) to be illegal having been staged in
violation of the CBA’s no strike-no lockout provision. Consequently, the Union officers were
deemed to have forfeited their employment with the company and made them liable for actual
damages plus interest and attorney’s fees, while the Union members were ordered to be
reinstated without backwages there being no proof that they actually committed illegal acts
during the strike.

Notwithstanding the provision of the Labor Code mandating that the reinstatement aspect of the
decision be immediately executory, the LA refused to reinstate the dismissed Union members.
On November 8, 1999, the NLRC affirmed the LA decision insofar as it declared the strike
illegal and ordered the Union officers dismissed from employment and liable for damages but
modified the same by considering the Union members to have been validly dismissed from
employment for committing prohibited and illegal acts.10 On petition for certiorari, the Court
of Appeals (CA) annulled the NLRC decision and reinstated that of the LA. Aggrieved, CASI,
the Union and the Union officers and members elevated the matter to this Court. The cases were
docketed as G.R. Nos. 155109 and 155135.

For resolution are the (1) Motion for Partial Reconsideration1 filed by C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc.
(CASI) and (2) Motion for Reconsideration2 filed by Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Alsons-SPFL
(the Union) and the Union officers3 and their striking members4 of the Court’s Decision5 dated
September 29, 2010.

During the pendency of the cases, the affected Union members (who were ordered reinstated)
filed with the LA a motion for reinstatement pending appeal and the computation of their
backwages. Instead of reinstating the Union members, the LA awarded separation pay and other
benefits.12 On appeal, the NLRC denied the Union members’ claim for separation pay, accrued
wages and other benefits.13 When elevated to the CA, the appellate court held that reinstatement
pending appeal applies only to illegal dismissal cases under Article 223 of the Labor Code and
not to cases under Article 263.14 Hence, the petition by the Union and its officers and members
in G.R. No. 179220.

CASI only questions the propriety of the award of backwages and separation pay, while the
Union, its officers and members seek the reversal of the Court’s conclusions on the illegality of
the strike, the validity of the termination of the Union officers and members, and the award of
actual damages and attorney’s fees as well as the denial of their counterclaims against CASI.

LA, NLRC Ruling

Issue
1. Whether or not strike was illegal.
2. Whether or not petittioner is liable for backwages.
3. Whether or not the award of separation pay in the September 2010 decision was proper
(main issue).

Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we find it necessary to reconsider the Court’s
September 29, 2010 decision, but only as to the award of separation pay.

Yes.
The LA, the NLRC, the CA and the Court are one in saying that the strike staged by the Union,
participated in by the Union officers and members, is illegal being in violation of the no strike-
no lockout provision of the CBA which enjoined both the Union and the company from resorting
to the use of economic weapons available to them under the law and to instead take recourse to
voluntary arbitration in settling their disputes. We, therefore, find no reason to depart from such
conclusion.

Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code lays down the liabilities of the Union officers and members
participating in illegal strikes and/or committing illegal acts

As to the Union members, the same provision of law provides that a member is liable when he
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike. We find no reason to
reverse the conclusion of the Court that CASI presented substantial evidence to show that the
striking Union members committed prohibited acts. The commission of the prohibited acts by
the striking Union members warrants their dismissal from employment.

Yes.
As clearly narrated earlier, the LA found the strike illegal and sustained the dismissal of the
Union officers, but ordered the reinstatement of the striking Union members for lack of evidence
showing that they committed illegal acts during the illegal strike. This decision, however, was
later reversed by the NLRC. Pursuant to Article 223of the Labor Code and well-established
jurisprudence, the decision of the LA reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as
the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal. The
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing
prior to his dismissal or separation, or, at the option of the employee, merely reinstated in the
payroll. It is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the
dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.

If the employer fails to exercise the option of re-admitting the employee to work or to reinstate
him in the payroll, the employer must pay the employee’s salaries during the period between the
LA’s order of reinstatement pending appeal and the resolution of the higher court overturning
that of the LA. In this case, CASI is liable to pay the striking Union members their accrued
wages for four months and nine days, which is the period from the notice of the LA’s order of
reinstatement until the reversal thereof by the NLRC.

Citing Escario v. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division), CASI claims that the
award of the four- month accrued salaries to the Union members is not sanctioned by
jurisprudence. In Escario, the Court categorically stated that the strikers were not entitled to their
wages during the period of the strike (even if the strike might be legal), because they performed
no work during the strike. The Court further held that it was neither fair nor just that the
dismissed employees should litigate against their employer on the latter’s time.34 In this case,
however, the four- month accrued salaries awarded to the Union members are not the backwages
referred to in Escario. To be sure, the awards were not given as their salaries during the period
of the strike. Rather, they constitute the employer’s liability to the employees for its failure to
exercise the option of actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement following the LA’s decision
to reinstate the Union members as mandated by Article 223 of the Labor Code adequately
discussed earlier. In other words, such monetary award refers to the Union members’ accrued
salaries by reason of the reinstatement order of the LA which is self-executory pursuant to
Article 223. We, therefore, sustain the award of the four-month accrued salaries.

Separation Pay Issue

Yes.
As regards the separation pay as a form of financial assistance awarded by the Court, we find it
necessary to reconsider the same and delete the award pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.

Separation pay may be given as a form of financial assistance when a worker is dismissed in
cases such as the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses, closing or cessation of operation of the establishment, or in case the employee was found
to have been suffering from a disease such that his continued employment is prohibited by law.
It is a statutory right defined as the amount that an employee receives at the time of his severance
from the service and is designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period
that he is looking for another employment. It is oriented towards the immediate future, the
transitional period the dismissed employee must undergo before locating a replacement job.

As a general rule, when just causes for terminating the services of an employee exist, the
employee is not entitled to separation pay because lawbreakers should not benefit from their
illegal acts.

The rule, however, is subject to exceptions. The Court, in Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Co. v. NLRC, laid down the guidelines when separation pay in the form of financial assistance
may be allowed, to wit:

We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in
those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious
misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.

Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense
involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer
may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or
whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.

A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather
than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the punishment is
his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed
xxx

Indeed, we applied social justice and equity considerations in several cases to justify the award
of financial assistance. However, in a number of cases cited in Toyota Motor Phils. Corp.
Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission, we refrained from
awarding separation pay or financial assistance to Union officers and members who were
separated from service due to their participation in or commission of illegal acts during the
strike.

In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Pilipino Telephone Employees Association (PILTEA), the

strike was found to be illegal because of procedural infirmities and for defiance of the Secretary
of Labor’s assumption order. Hence, we upheld the Union officers’ dismissal without granting
financial assistance. In Sukhotai Cuisine and Restaurant v. Court of Appeals, and Manila
Diamond Hotel and Resort, Inc. (Manila Diamond Hotel) v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees
Union, the Union officers and members who participated in and committed illegal acts during
the illegal strike were deemed to have lost their employment status and were not awarded
financial assistance.

In Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the
strikers’ open and willful defiance of the assumption order of the Secretary of Labor constitute
serious misconduct and reflective of their moral character, hence, granting of financial
assistance to them cannot be justified. In Chua v. National Labor Relations Commission, we
disallowed the award of financial assistance to the dismissed employees for their participation
in the unlawful and violent strike which resulted in multiple deaths and extensive property
damage because it constitutes serious misconduct on their part.

Here, not only did the Court declare the strike illegal, rather, it also found the Union officers to
have knowingly participated in the illegal strike. Worse, the Union members committed
prohibited acts during the strike. Thus, as we concluded in Toyota, Telefunken, Chua and the
other cases cited above, we delete the award of separation pay as a form of financial assistance.

MSF Tire and Rubber vs. CA

G.R. No. 128632 | August 5, 1999
Mendoza
Topic: Innocent Bystander Rule

Case Doctrine

An "innocent bystander," who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the court that aside
from the grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it is entirely different from, without
any connection whatsoever to, either party to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally
foreign to the context thereof.

Facts

A labor dispute arose between Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation (Philtread) and private
respondent, Philtread Tire Workers' Union (Union), as a result of which the Union filed on May
27, 1994 a notice of strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board — National Capital
Region charging Philtread with unfair labor practices for allegedly engaging in union-busting
for violation of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. This was followed by
picketing and the holding of assemblies by the Union outside the gate of Philtread's plant at Km.
21, East Service Road, South Superhighway, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Philtread, on the other
hand, filed a notice of lock-out on May 30, 1994 which it carried out on June 15, 1994.

In an order, dated September 4, 1994,2 then Secretary of Labor Nieves Confesor assumed
jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified it for compulsory arbitration. She enjoined the
Union from striking and Philtread from locking out members of the Union.

During the pendency of the labor dispute, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Siam
Tyre Public Company Limited (Siam Tyre), a subsidiary of Siam Cement. Under the
Memorandum of Agreement, Philtread's plant and equipment would be sold to a new company
(petitioner MSF Tire and Rubber, Inc.), 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre and 20%
by Philtread, while the land on which the plant was located would be sold to another company
(Sucat Land Corporation), 60% of which would be owned by Philtread and 40% by Siam Tyre.
This was done and the Union was informed of the purchase of the plant by petitioner. Petitioner
then asked the Union to desist from picketing outside its plant and to remove the banners,
streamers, and tent which it had placed outside the plant's fence.

LA, NLRC Ruling

As the Union refused petitioner's request, petitioner filed on May 25, 1995 a complaint for
injunction with damages. The Union moved to dismiss the complaint alleging lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. It insisted that the parties were involved in a labor
dispute and that petitioner, being a mere "alter ego" of Philtread, was not an "innocent bystander
the trial court, in an order, dated March 25, 1996, denied petitioner's application for injunction
and dismissed the complaint. However, on petitioner's motion, the trial court, on July 2, 1996,
reconsidered its order, and granted an injunction.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration, the Union filed on August 5, 1996 a petition for
certiorarii and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. On March 20, 1997, the appellate court
rendered a decision granting the Union's petition and ordering the trial court to dismiss the civil
case for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue

Whether petitioner has shown a clear legal right to the issuance of a writ of injunction under
the "innocent bystander" rule.

Ruling

Petitioner asserts that its status as an "innocent bystander" with respect to the labor dispute
between Philtread and the Union entitles it to a writ of injunction from the civil courts and that
the appellate court erred in not upholding its corporate personality as independent of Philtread's.
In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Cloribell, 11 this Court, through
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stated the "innocent bystander" rule as follows:

“The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by
the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it can not be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship. The
right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe
the courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the
labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or
having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be regulated at the instance of third parti es or
"innocent bystanders" if it appears that the inevitable result of its is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they
have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights. In one case
decided by this Court, we upheld a trial court's injunction prohibiting the union from blocking the entrance to a feed mill located
within the compound of a flour mill with which the union had a dispute. Although sustained on a different ground, no connection
was found between the two mills owned by two different corporations other than their being situated in the same premises. It is
to be noted that in the instances cited, peaceful picketing has not been totally banned but merely regulated. And in one American
case, a picket by a labor union in front of a motion picture theater with which the union had a labor dispute was enjoined by the
court from being extended in front of the main entrance of the building housing the theater wherein other stores operated by
third persons were located.”
Thus, an "innocent bystander," who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the court that
aside from the grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it is entirely different from,
without any connection whatsoever to, either party to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are
totally foreign to the context thereof.

For instance, in PAFLU v. Cloribell, supra, this Court held that Wellington and Galang were
entirely separate entities, different from, and without any connection whatsoever to, the
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, against whom the strike was directed, other than the
incidental fact that they are the bank's landlord and co-lessee housed in the same building,
respectively.

Similarly, in Liwayway Publications, Inc. v. Permanent Concrete Workers Union, this Court
ruled that Liwayway was an "innocent bystander" and thus entitled to enjoin the union's strike
because Liwayway's only connection with the employer company was the fact that both were
situated in the same premises.

In the case at bar, petitioner cannot be said not to have such on to the dispute. As correctly
observed by the appellate court:
“We find that the "negotiation, contract of sale, and the post transaction" between Philtread, as vendor, and Siam Tyre, as
vendee, reveals a legal relation between them which, in the interest of petitioner, we cannot ignore. To be sure, the transaction
between Philtread and Siam Tyre, was not a simple sale whereby Philtread ceased to have any proprietary rights over its sold
assets. On the contrary, Philtread remains as 20% owner of private respondent and 60% owner of Sucat Land Corporation which
was likewise incorporated in accordance with the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre, and which now
owns the land were subject plant is located. This, together with the fact that private respondent uses the same plant or factory;
similar or substantially the same working conditions; same machinery, tools, and equipment; and manufacture the same products
as Philtread, lead us to safely conclude that private respondent's personality is so closely linked to Philtread as to bar its
entitlement to an injunctive writ.”

Although, as petitioner contends, the corporate fiction may be disregarded where it is used to
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime, or where the corporation
is used as a mere alter-ego or business conduit, it is not these standards but those of the "innocent
bystander" rule which govern whether or not petitioner is to an injunctive writ. Since petitioner
is not an "innocent bystander", the trial court's order, dated July 2, 1996, is a patent nullity, the
trial court having no jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction. No motion for reconsideration
need be filed where the order is null and void.
 PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR ASSOCIATION (PILA)
G.R. No. 170830 | August 11, 2010
BRION, J.:
Topic: Picketing
Case Doctrine/s:
A strike is the most powerful weapon of workers in their struggle with management in the course of setting their terms
and conditions of employment. Because it is premised on the concept of economic war between labor and management,
it is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and its members, and one that must also necessarily
affect management and its members.

In light of these effects, the decision to declare a strike must be exercised responsibly and must always rest on rational
basis, free from emotionalism, and unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of hot heads; it must focus on legitimate
union interests. To be legitimate, a strike should not be antithetical to public welfare, and must be pursued within legal
bounds. The right to strike as a means of attaining social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy anyone, least of all,
the employer.

Since strikes affect not only the relationship between labor and management but also the general peace and progress of
the community, the law has provided limitations on the right to strike.
Recit Ready:
Facts:
PHIMCO and PILA negotiated for its renewal. The negotiation resulted in a deadlock on economic issues, mainly due to
disagreements on salary increases and benefits. PILA staged a strike. PHIMCO filed with the NLRC a petition for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO), to enjoin the strikers from preventing - through force,
intimidation and coercion - the ingress and egress of non-striking employees into and from the company premises.

PHIMCO sent a letter to thirty-six (36) union members, directing them to explain within twenty-four (24) hours why they
should not be dismissed for the illegal acts they committed during the strike. The thirty-six (36) union members were
informed of their dismissal.

PILA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal (illegal dismissal case) with the NLRC. PHIMCO filed a
Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal (illegal strike case) with the NLRC, with a prayer for the dismissal of PILA officers and
members who knowingly participated in the illegal strike.

The NLRC rendered its Decision in the consolidated cases, ruling totally in the union's favor. It dismissed the appeal of
the illegal dismissal case, and denied PHIMCO's motion for reconsideration in the illegal strike case. PHIMCO elevated its
case to the CA through a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed PHIMCO's petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the union's strike was legal.

Ruling:
We find the PILA strike illegal. We intervene and rule even on the evidentiary and factual issues of this case as both the
NLRC and the CA grossly misread the evidence, leading them to inordinately incorrect conclusions, both factual and legal.
While the strike undisputably had not been marred by actual violence and patent intimidation, the picketing that
respondent PILA officers and members undertook as part of their strike activities effectively blocked the free ingress
to and egress from PHIMCO's premises, thus preventing non-striking employees and company vehicles from entering
the PHIMCO compound. In this manner, the picketers violated Article 264(e) of the Labor Code.
Facts:
PHIMCO is a corporation engaged in the production of matches while respondent Phimco Industries Labor Association
(PILA) is the duly authorized bargaining representative of PHIMCO's daily-paid workers.

When the last collective bargaining agreement was about to expire on December 31, 1994, PHIMCO and PILA negotiated
for its renewal. The negotiation resulted in a deadlock on economic issues, mainly due to disagreements on salary
increases and benefits.

PILA filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike on the ground of the bargaining
deadlock. Seven (7) days later, the union conducted a strike vote; a majority of the union members voted for a strike as
its response to the bargaining impasse. PILA filed the strike vote results with the NCMB. Thirty-five (35) days later, or on
April 21, 1995, PILA staged a strike. PHIMCO filed with the NLRC a petition for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order (TRO), to enjoin the strikers from preventing - through force, intimidation and coercion - the ingress
and egress of non-striking employees into and from the company premises.

PHIMCO sent a letter to thirty-six (36) union members, directing them to explain within twenty-four (24) hours why they
should not be dismissed for the illegal acts they committed during the strike. Three days later, or on June 26, 1995, the
thirty-six (36) union members were informed of their dismissal.

PILA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal (illegal dismissal case) with the NLRC. PHIMCO filed a
Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal (illegal strike case) with the NLRC, with a prayer for the dismissal of PILA officers and
members who knowingly participated in the illegal strike. PHIMCO claimed that the strikers prevented ingress to and
egress from the PHIMCO compound, thereby paralyzing PHIMCO's operations.
LA/RTC/NLRC/CA Ruling/s:
LA Ruling
LA Mayor found the strike illegal; the respondents committed prohibited acts during the strike by blocking the ingress to
and egress from PHIMCO's premises and preventing the non-striking employees from reporting for work. LA Mayor
declared that the respondent employees, PILA officers and members, have lost their employment status. PILA and its
officers and members appealed LA Mayor's decision to the NLRC.

NLRC Ruling
The NLRC decided the appeal and set aside LA Mayor's decision. The NLRC did not give weight to PHIMCO's evidence,
and relied instead on the respondents' evidence showing that the union conducted a peaceful moving picket.

PHIMCO filed a motion for reconsideration in the illegal strike case.

LA Espiritu ruled the respondents' dismissal as illegal, and ordered their reinstatement with payment of backwages.
PHIMCO appealed LA Espiritu's decision to the NLRC.

The NLRC rendered its Decision in the consolidated cases, ruling totally in the union's favor. It dismissed the appeal of
the illegal dismissal case, and denied PHIMCO's motion for reconsideration in the illegal strike case. PHIMCO elevated its
case to the CA through a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed PHIMCO's petition for certiorari.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the union's strike was legal.

SC Ruling/s:
YES.

Requisites of a valid strike

Procedurally, for a strike to be valid, it must comply with Article 263[16] of the Labor Code, which requires that: (a) a
notice of strike be filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) 30 days before the intended date thereof,
or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) a strike vote be approved by a majority of the total union membership in
the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (c) a notice be given
to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike.

These requirements are mandatory, and the union's failure to comply renders the strike illegal. The 15 to 30-day cooling-
off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute with the assistance of the
NCMB conciliator/mediator, while the seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether
the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.

In the present case, the respondents fully satisfied the legal procedural requirements; a strike notice was filed on March
9, 1995; a strike vote was reached on March 16, 1995; notification of the strike vote was filed with the DOLE on March
17, 1995; and the actual strike was launched only on April 25, 1995.

Despite the validity of the purpose of a strike and compliance with the procedural requirements, a strike may still be
held illegal where the means employed are illegal.[19] The means become illegal when they come within the prohibitions
under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides:

No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free
ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.

Based on our examination of the evidence which the LA viewed differently from the NLRC and the CA, we find the PILA
strike illegal. We intervene and rule even on the evidentiary and factual issues of this case as both the NLRC and the CA
grossly misread the evidence, leading them to inordinately incorrect conclusions, both factual and legal. While the strike
undisputably had not been marred by actual violence and patent intimidation, the picketing that respondent PILA
officers and members undertook as part of their strike activities effectively blocked the free ingress to and egress from
PHIMCO's premises, thus preventing non-striking employees and company vehicles from entering the PHIMCO
compound. In this manner, the picketers violated Article 264(e) of the Labor Code.
 INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., v. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR and ASSOCIATED
LABOR UNION (ALU)
G.R. No. 92981-83 | January 9, 1992
REGALADO, J.:
Topic: Assumption of Jurisdiction
Case Doctrine/s:
The Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the
same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend
to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive
jurisdiction.
Recit Ready:
Facts:
Associated Labor Union (Union, for brevity) filed a notice of strike against petitioner International Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(hereafter, Company) with National Conciliation and Mediation Board. After all conciliation efforts had failed, the Union
went on strike and the Company’s operations were completely paralyzed.

Subsequently, three other labor cases involving the same parties were filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). Secretary of Labor Ruben D. Torres granted the motion of Union and ordered the consolidation of
the three NLRC cases.

The Company’s subsequent motion for reconsideration of the order consolidating the cases was denied by the Secretary.
Petitioner Company assailed the aforesaid orders and alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public
respondent in the issuance thereof. Petitioner Company submits that the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the
three NLRC cases above specified is vested in the labor arbiter and that there is nothing in Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code which directs the labor arbiter to hold in abeyance all proceedings in the NLRC cases and await instruction from
the Secretary.

Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary gravely abuse his discretion when he issued the questioned orders.

Ruling:
NO.
In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute
must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the labor arbiter
has exclusive jurisdiction.

In fine, the issuance of the assailed orders is within the province of the Secretary as authorized by Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code and Article 217(a) (1) and (5) of the same Code, taken conjointly and rationally construed to subserve the
objective of the jurisdiction vested in the Secretary.
 Facts:
Prior to the expiration on January 1, 1989 of the collective bargaining agreement between petitioner International
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter, Company) and the Associated Labor Union (Union, for brevity), the latter submitted to
the Company its economic and political demands. These were not met by the Company, hence a deadlock ensued.

The Union filed a notice of strike with Regional Office No. VII of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board,
Department of Labor and Employment. After all conciliation efforts had failed, the Union went on strike and the
Company’s operations were completely paralyzed.

Subsequently, three other labor cases involving the same parties were filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).

The Union filed a motion, the case over which jurisdiction had been assumed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(hereafter referred to as the Secretary), seeking the consolidation of the three NLRC cases. Secretary of Labor Ruben D.
Torres granted the motion and ordered the consolidation of the three NLRC cases.

The Company’s subsequent motion for reconsideration of the order consolidating the cases was denied by the Secretary.
Thereafter, the Assistant Regional Director of Regional Office No. VII, as directed, assumed jurisdiction over the
consolidated cases and set the same for reception of evidence.

Petitioner Company now comes to this Court assailing the aforesaid orders and alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the public respondent in the issuance thereof. The Union, as the bargaining agent of the rank and file workers of
the Company, was impleaded as the private Respondent.

Petitioner Company submits that the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the three NLRC cases above specified is
vested in the labor arbiter as provided in paragraph (a) (1) and (5) of Article 217 of the Labor Code. Moreover, petitioner
insists that there is nothing in Article 263(g) of the Labor Code which directs the labor arbiter to hold in abeyance all
proceedings in the NLRC cases and await instruction from the Secretary.

Petitioner further contends that, granting arguendo that Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC is in
accordance with Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, still the Secretary should not have ordered the consolidation of the
three unfair labor practice cases, since the Secretary assumed jurisdiction only over the deadlock in the negotiation of
the collective bargaining agreement and the petition for contempt as a result of the said deadlock.

Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the authority to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes, vested in the
Secretary by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, extends to all questions and incidents arising therein causing or likely to
cause strikes or lockouts in industries indispensable to national interest.

Moreover, respondents counter that Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC is in accordance with Article
263(g) of the Labor Code, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 217 of the Labor Code. To rule otherwise, they point
out, would encourage splitting of jurisdiction, multiplicity of suits, and possible conflicting findings and decisions which
could only result in delay and complications in the disposition of the labor disputes.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Secretary gravely abuse his discretion when he issued the questioned orders.

SC Ruling/s:
NO.

In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute
must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the labor arbiter
has exclusive jurisdiction.

Moreover, Article 217 of the Labor Code is not without, but contemplates, exceptions thereto. This is evident from the
opening proviso therein reading" (e)xcept as otherwise provided under this Code . . ." Plainly, Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code was meant to make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the labor arbiters share jurisdiction,
subject to certain conditions. Otherwise, the Secretary would not be able to effectively and efficiently dispose of the
primary dispute. To hold the contrary may even lead to the absurd and undesirable result wherein the Secretary and the
labor arbiter concerned may have diametrically opposed rulings. As we have said," (i)t is fundamental that a statute is to
be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it.

In fine, the issuance of the assailed orders is within the province of the Secretary as authorized by Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code and Article 217(a) (1) and (5) of the same Code, taken conjointly and rationally construed to subserve the
objective of the jurisdiction vested in the Secretary.

In the present case, however, by virtue of Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary has been conferred jurisdiction
over cases which would otherwise be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters. There was an existing
labor dispute as a result of a deadlock in the negotiation for a collective bargaining agreement and the consequent strike,
over which the Secretary assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. The three NLRC cases were
just offshoots of the stalemate in the negotiations and the strike. We, therefore, uphold the Secretary’s order to
consolidate the NLRC cases with the labor dispute pending before him and his subsequent assumption of jurisdiction
over the said NLRC cases for him to be able to competently and efficiently dispose of the dispute in its totality.

Petitioner’s thesis that Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC is null and void has no merit. The aforesaid rule
has been promulgated to implement and enforce Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. The rule is in harmony with the
objectives sought to be achieved by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, particularly the Secretary’s assumption of
jurisdiction over a labor dispute and his subsequent disposition of the same in the most expeditious and conscientious
manner. To be able to completely dispose of a labor dispute, all its incidents would have to be taken into consideration.
Clearly, the purpose of the questioned regulation is to carry into effect the broad provisions of Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code.
 TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 143013-14 December 18, 2000
DE LEON, JR. J
Topic: Assumption of Jurisdiction
Facts:
Petitioners employees of private respondent, an industry indispensable to the national interest, filed a notice of strike
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) due to a deadlock in the negotiations for a new collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) with the latter. The Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment intervened
and assumed jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Art. 262, par. (g), of the Labor Code, as amended, and issued an
order enjoining any strike or lock-out. The union struck despite issuance of assumption orders, and the immediate return-
to-work order was ignored by them. Subsequently, workers who failed to report back to work were served with letters of
termination. Meanwhile, hearings were required to submit their respective position papers. The company adduced
evidence, while the union did not although it manifested that it would file a motion to dismiss for failure of the company
to prove its case. A decision was, thereafter, rendered finding the strike illegal, ordering payment of backwages and other
benefits to striking employees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the Secretary of Labor except as
to the award of backwages and financial assistance. Hence, their recourse to this Court by way of petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the striking workers lost their employment status on the ground that the strike was illegal for having
been in open, willful and knowing defiance of the assumption order and the subsequent return-to-work order.
SC Ruling/s:
It is clear from [Article 263, Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended] that the moment the Secretary of Labor assumes
jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall have the effect
of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of labor to issue
another order directing them to return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor
automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the
assumption order. However, petitioners refused to acknowledge this directive of the Secretary of Labor on September
8, 1995 thereby necessitating the issuance of another order expressly directing the striking workers to cease and desist
from their actual strike, and to immediately return to work but which directive there herein petitioners opted to ignore.

The SC have held in a number of cases that defiance to the assumption and return-to-work orders of the Secretary of
Labor after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for loss of employment status of any striking union officer or
member.
 PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC. v. SECRETARY OF LABOR JOSE BRILLANTES
G.R. No. 120751 March 17, 1999
PURISIMA J
Topic: Assumption of Jurisdiction
Facts:
The case under consideration is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the order
of then acting Secretary Jose Brillantes of the Department of Labor and Employment on the ground of grace abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Records show that public respondent assumed jurisdiction over the
labor dispute between Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA) and Phimco Industries, Inc., (PHIMCO) and issued an
order ordering all the striking workers, except those who have been handed down termination papers on June 26, 1995,
to return to work within 24 hours from receipt thereof and for the company to accept them back under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. In this petition, petitioner contended that the Honorable Acting Secretary
acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order and in assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the public respondent acted with grace abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
assuming jurisdiction over subject labor dispute.
SC Ruling/s:
The Labor Code vests in the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to the
national interest. Accordingly, upon the determination by the Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to
the national interest, he will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in the said industry.” This power, however, is not
without any limitation. In upholding the constitutionality of B.P. 130 insofar as it amends Art. 261 (g) of the Labor Code,
it stressed in the case of Free Telephone Workers Union v. Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment, the limitation
set by the legislature on the power of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute, thus” BP 130
cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to “Strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest.”

It is thus evident from the foregoing that the Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction grounded on the alleged “obtaining
circumstances” and not on a determination that the industry involved in the labor dispute is one indispensable to the
“national interest,” the standard set by the legislature, constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
excess of jurisdiction. To uphold the action of the public respondent under the premises would be stretching too far the
power of the Secretary of Labor as every case of a strike or lockout where there are inconveniences in the community,
or work disruptions in an industry though not indispensable to the national interest, would then come within the
Secretary’s power. It would be practically allowing the Secretary of Labor to intervene in any labor dispute at his pleasure.
This is precisely why the law sets and defines the standard: even in the exercise of his power of compulsory arbitration
under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary must follow the law. For “when an overzealous official by-pass the
law on the pretext of retaining a laudable objective, the intendment or purpose of the law will lose its meaning as the
law itself is disregarded.” In light of the foregoing, the SC hold that the public respondent gravely abused his discretion
in assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute sued upon in the case.