Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                
Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • 98 views

    Bermudez v. Executive Secretary, 213 SCRA 733 (1999) PDF

    Uploaded by

    Arvhie Santos
    This case discusses the appointment of Conrado Quiaoit to the position of Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac over Rodolfo Bermudez. Bermudez challenged the appointment, arguing it was invalid because the Secretary of Justice did not recommend Quiaoit to the President as required by the Revised Administrative Code. The Supreme Court held that the recommendation requirement was directory rather than mandatory. It found the legislative intent was not to make the recommendation an absolute prerequisite. The power to appoint is discretionary for the President. As long as the appointee is qualified, the lack of an express recommendation does not make the appointment invalid.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Bermudez v. Executive Secretary, 213 SCRA 733 (1999) PDF

    Uploaded by

    Arvhie Santos
    98 views2 pages
    This case discusses the appointment of Conrado Quiaoit to the position of Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac over Rodolfo Bermudez. Bermudez challenged the appointment, arguing it was invalid because the Secretary of Justice did not recommend Quiaoit to the President as required by the Revised Administrative Code. The Supreme Court held that the recommendation requirement was directory rather than mandatory. It found the legislative intent was not to make the recommendation an absolute prerequisite. The power to appoint is discretionary for the President. As long as the appointee is qualified, the lack of an express recommendation does not make the appointment invalid.

    Original Title

    Bermudez v. Executive Secretary, 213 SCRA 733 (1999).pdf

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    This case discusses the appointment of Conrado Quiaoit to the position of Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac over Rodolfo Bermudez. Bermudez challenged the appointment, arguing it was invalid because the Secretary of Justice did not recommend Quiaoit to the President as required by the Revised Administrative Code. The Supreme Court held that the recommendation requirement was directory rather than mandatory. It found the legislative intent was not to make the recommendation an absolute prerequisite. The power to appoint is discretionary for the President. As long as the appointee is qualified, the lack of an express recommendation does not make the appointment invalid.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    98 views2 pages

    Bermudez v. Executive Secretary, 213 SCRA 733 (1999) PDF

    Uploaded by

    Arvhie Santos
    This case discusses the appointment of Conrado Quiaoit to the position of Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac over Rodolfo Bermudez. Bermudez challenged the appointment, arguing it was invalid because the Secretary of Justice did not recommend Quiaoit to the President as required by the Revised Administrative Code. The Supreme Court held that the recommendation requirement was directory rather than mandatory. It found the legislative intent was not to make the recommendation an absolute prerequisite. The power to appoint is discretionary for the President. As long as the appointee is qualified, the lack of an express recommendation does not make the appointment invalid.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    of 2

    Bermudez vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No.

    131429

    Bermudez vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 131429


    Case Digest

    Facts:
    Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-In-Charge
    of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Justice Secretary
    Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other
    hand, would appear to have had the support of then Representative Jose Yap. On 30 June
    1997, Quiaoit was appointed by President Ramos to the coveted office. Quiaoit received
    a certified xerox copy of his appointment and, on 21 July 1997, took his oath of office
    before Executive Judge Angel Parazo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 65) of Tarlac,
    Tarlac. On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and immediately informed the
    President, as well as the Secretary of Justice and the Civil Service Commission, of that
    assumption. Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of Provincial Prosecutor claiming that
    the original copy of Quiaoits appointment had not yet been released by the Secretary of
    Justice.
    On 17 September 1997, Bermudez and Quiaoit were summoned to Manila by Justice
    Secretary Guingona. The three met at the Department of Justice and, following the
    conference, Bermudez was ordered to wind up his cases until 15 October 1997 and to
    turn-over the contested office to Quiaoit the next day.
    On the basis of the transmittal letter of Regional State Prosecutor de Leon, Quiaoit,
    as directed, again so assumed office on 16 October 1997. On even date, Bermudez was
    detailed at the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region III, in San Fernando,
    Pampanga.
    Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the
    appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the
    Revised Administrative Code of 1987.

    Issue:
    Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the
    President can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit

    Held:
    No
    Ratio:
    The legislative intent is, of course, primordial. There is no hard-and-fast rule in
    ascertaining whether the language in a statute should be considered mandatory or
    directory, and the application of a ruling in one particular instance may not necessarily be
    apt in another for each must be determined on the basis of the specific law in issue and
    the peculiar circumstances attendant to it. More often than not, the problem, in the final
    analysis, is firmed up and addressed on a case-to-case basis. The nature, structure and
    aim of the law itself is often resorted to in looking at the legislative intent. Generally, it is
    said that if no consequential rights or liabilities depend on it and no injury can result from
    ignoring it, and that the purpose of the legislature can be accomplished in a manner other
    than that prescribed when substantially the same results can be obtained, then the statute
    should be regarded merely as directory, rather than as mandatory, in character.

    The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the
    right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for
    himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and
    eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power

    Supreme Court, given the above disquisition, that the phrase upon recommendation
    of the Secretary, found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the RAC, should be
    interpreted, as it is normally so understood, to be a mere advise, exhortation or
    endorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory
    upon the party to whom it is made.

    You might also like