FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-19-1925. June 3, 2019.]

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 17-2937-MTJ)

MADELINE TAN-YAP , complainant, vs. HON. HANNIBAL R. PATRICIO,

Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), President
Roxas-Pilar, Capiz , respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO , J : p

This administrative complaint stemmed from a Complaint for Recovery of

Possession and Damages led by Nemesio Tan (Tan), father of complainant Madeline
Tan-Yap (complainant), against Robertson Benigla (Benigla), father-in-law of
respondent Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, docketed as Civil Case No. V-09-11 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capiz. In the said case, the parties entered into a
Compromise Agreement which was approved by the RTC. The pertinent portions
thereof read:
xxx xxx xxx
2) That [Benigla] admits [Tan's ownership of] Lots 703 and 706, both
of Pilar Cadastre, the properties subject of the above-entitled case;
3) That, the parties agreed to cause the relocation of the properties
involved to determine the exact location of the cockpit and other structures
subject matter of the complaint;
4) That, the (costs or expenses for the) relocation shall be borne by
the parties pro[-]rata;
xxx xxx xxx
6) That, the parties shall peacefully cooperate in the conduct of the
relocation survey;
7) That, in case the relocation survey will show that the cockpit and
the other structures constructed are inside the properties owned by [Tan],
[Benigla] shall voluntarily remove the same immediately and return possession
thereof to [Tan], however, if said cockpit and structures are outside of Lots 703
and 706, [Tan] shall seek the dismissal of the above-entitled case;
8) That, failure of any of the parties to comply with the terms and
conditions of this compromise agreement shall entitle the aggrieved party to le
an ex-parte motion for execution; cSEDTC

xxx xxx xxx 1

Complainant alleged that, pursuant to the said court-approved compromise
agreement, the trial court issued an order directing a private surveying company to
conduct a relocation survey on Lot Nos. 703 and 706. After the survey was done, it was
found that the cockpit lay inside Lot No. 706. Benigla, however, questioned this nding
claiming that the private surveyor who conducted the survey was not a licensed
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 geodetic engineer. He, thus, asked the trial court to designate a surveyor from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. This motion was, however, denied,
as well as the motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, Benigla led a certiorari petition
before the Court of Appeals (CA). However, the CA did not grant Benigla's prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order; thus, complainant led a Motion for
Execution of the Judgment which was granted by the trial court. Accordingly, a Writ of
Execution was issued on February 6, 2015 and, together with a Demand for
Compliance/Delivery of Possession, the same was served upon Benigla on February 26,
2015.
In the morning of March 10, 2015, Sheriff IV Romeo C. Alvarez, Jr. (Sheriff
Alvarez) and Process Server Edgar Dellava (Process Server Dellava), both of the RTC of
Capiz, Branch 19, went to the premises of Lot Nos. 703 and 706 for the nal
implementation of the writ of execution. However, they were met by respondent judge
who told them that he would not allow the fencing of Lot Nos. 703 and 706.
Respondent judge claimed that he and his wife, Ruby Benigla Patricio (Ruby), actually
own the adjoining Lot No. 707, and not his father-in-law, Benigla. Respondent judge
allegedly lamented that he and Ruby were not impleaded as defendants in Civil Case
No. V-09-11 notwithstanding the fact that they owned the adjoining Lot No. 707,
consequently, they were not noti ed of the relocation survey that was conducted on Lot
Nos. 703 and 706. Respondent judge thus suggested that, if Sheriff Alvarez and his
men were to push thru with the implementation of the writ of execution, "something
untoward might happen." Respondent judge then declared that he would le a
manifestation before the trial court as regards the situation at hand. Because of these,
Sheriff Alvarez and Process Server Dellava, along with the men who were supposed to
fence Lot Nos. 703 and 706, left the premises.
In his Report of March 13, 2015, 2 Sheriff Alvarez mentioned that during the
confrontation with respondent judge, a host of motorcycle-riding men started going
back and forth in the premises. This fact, coupled by respondent judge's statement that
"kung padayonon nyo, basi magkinagamo" (if you continue with the implementation,
something untoward might happen), impressed upon Sheriff Alvarez and his
companions that their security was at risk; hence, they decided to just leave the place.
After this, respondent judge's wife, Ruby, led with the RTC a Motion to Intervene
and Opposition to the Implementation of the Writ of Execution and Issuance of Writ of
Demolition 3 dated March 16, 2015. In the ling of this motion, Ruby was assisted by
respondent judge himself, who a xed his signature above the printed name "JUDGE
HANNIBAL R. PATRICIO" on page three of the said motion.
Nevertheless, the RTC denied this motion for lack of merit in an Order 4 dated
March 24, 2015. SDAaTC

Given these facts, complainant contended that respondent judge violated the
New Code of Judicial Conduct: (1) when he unduly intervened in the implementation of
the writ of execution; (2) when he threatened Sheriff Alvarez and the latter's
companions and stopped them from carrying out the writ of execution; (3) when he
assisted his wife Ruby in ling a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. V-09-11; and (4)
when he abandoned his work station on the day of the supposed implementation of the
writ of execution.
In his Comment, 5 respondent judge denied the accusations against him. He
claimed that the intended fencing of Lot Nos. 703 and 706 pursuant to the writ of
execution would have prejudiced him and his wife insofar as their Lot No. 707 was
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 concerned; that the sketch plan on which the relocation and fencing would be based
was incorrect and invalid because on its face, it omitted to show that Lot Nos. 706 and
703 were bounded or surrounded by Lot No. 707; that this was the reason why he
believed that the implementation of the writ of execution and the intended relocation
and fencing of Lot Nos. 703 and 706 would have resulted in the encroachment on their
Lot No. 707; that his action was justified under Article 429 of the Civil Code under which
the owner of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof, and under which the owner may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property.
Respondent judge denied that he threatened to stop Sheriff Alvarez from
implementing the writ of execution; that all he did was to engage Sheriff Alvarez in a
conversation, that is, by "telling, arguing, and asking the sheriff to afford him and his
wife the time (until Friday or March 13, 2015) for him and his wife to be able to le the
proper manifestation in court with respect to their rights over Lot No. 707, Pilar
Cadastre, that would be affected or encroached upon by the relocation and fencing of
Lot Nos. 706 and 703 x x x." 6 Respondent judge claimed that Sheriff Alvarez in fact did
not mention in his report that he (respondent judge) threatened Sheriff Alvarez or would
have in icted bodily harm upon him; that he even assured Sheriff Alvarez that, should it
be con rmed that no encroachment would result from the fencing of Lot Nos. 703 and
706, he himself (respondent judge) would help in putting up said fence; that his
statement that "trouble might ensue should Sheriff Alvarez proceed with the
implementation" was not synonymous with the use of brute force. In ne, respondent
judge insisted that he was only trying to protect his and his wife's proprietary rights,
and that he never acted beyond the bounds of the law.
Respondent judge added that he and his wife were entitled to their day in court
and it was this fact that prompted him to assist his wife in preparing and ling the
motion to intervene; that the assistance he provided his wife was anchored on their
interest in Lot No. 707, and not on any intention on his part to engage in the private
practice of law. Respondent judge denied that he abandoned his post on the day of the
supposed implementation of the writ of execution since he was on sick leave that day.
acEHCD

Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)

In its Report and Recommendation, 7 the OCA found that respondent judge
improperly interfered with the implementation of the writ of execution and that this
interference constituted conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer, viz.:
In the instant case, there was a valid writ of execution to be implemented.
Respondent Judge Patricio committed an unlawful act when he interfered with
the nal implementation of the writ. Such act was improper for the esteemed
o ce of a magistrate of the law and is tantamount to x x x conduct
unbecoming a judicial o cer. He practically took the law into his own hands
when he stopped the implementation of the writ invoking his proprietary rights.
As a judge, respondent Judge Patricio should be familiar with the laws and the
appropriate legal remedies to protect his and his wife's right[s] over Lot No. 707,
which was allegedly encroached [upon] by plaintiff Tan. Respondent Judge
Patricio's defense that he merely asserted his right to prevent the encroachment,
invasion, and usurpation of Lot No. 707 owned by him and his wife cannot
justify his assailed action. He should have realized that the public would expect
him to act in a manner re ecting the dignity and integrity of a judge. His
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 demeanor as a judge should always be with utmost circumspection. 8
Even then, the OCA recognized respondent judge's intention to protect his and
his wife's property rights, thus:
Still, respondent Judge Patricio cannot be completely faulted for
protecting his and his wife's proprietary rights. This is but human nature. Such
action cannot be considered grossly repugnant. Thus, while he was previously
penalized for another infraction, a ne of P20,000.00 is the appropriate penalty
after taking into account the attendant circumstances. 9
Thus, the OCA recommended that:
1. the instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter; and
2. Presiding Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
President Roxas-Pilar, Capiz, be FINED in the amount of P20,000.00 for
violation of Canon 4, Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or any
similar act would be dealt with more severely. 1 0
SDHTEC

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the ndings and recommendation of the OCA but modi es
its recommended penalty.
To recall, respondent judge was charged with the following: (1) that he unduly
intervened in or interfered with the implementation of the writ of execution; (2) that he
resorted to threats and intimidation to stop the implementation of the writ of
execution; (3) that he assisted his wife in ling a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. V-
09-11; and (4) that he abandoned his work station on the day of the supposed
implementation of the writ of execution.
At the outset, the Court nds no merit to the charge that respondent judge
abandoned his work station on March 10, 2015 since a Certi cation 1 1 from the O ce
of Administrative Services of the OCA shows that he was on sick leave that day.
Nevertheless, the Court holds that the other charges have been substantiated.
Respondent judge did not deny his presence at the premises of the properties subject
of Civil Case No. V-09-11 on March 10, 2015. Respondent judge also admitted that he
prevented the fencing of Lot Nos. 703 and 706 because he believed that the sketch
plan on which the fencing of these said properties would be based was erroneous for
failing to indicate on its face that Lot Nos. 703 and 706 were bounded by Lot No. 707
which he says was owned by him and his wife Ruby, on account of which a possible
encroachment on their property might have resulted if the fencing would have pushed
through. HSAcaE

The Court finds respondent judge's rationalization of his actions unacceptable.

One thing is clear — the implementation was pursuant to the lawful order of the
RTC in Civil Case No. V-09-11. While respondent judge might have some misgivings on
the accuracy of the sketch plan, he of all people should have known that, under the
circumstances, he could not insist on his opinion about the sketch plan as the same
had already been submitted to, evaluated, and passed upon by the court. As a judge, he
should know that it was incumbent upon him to resort to suitable judicial remedies that
he could avail of, and not to interfere with the implementation of a lawful order of the
court through recourse to an unwarranted shortcut.
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 Respondent judge's reliance on Article 429 1 2 of the Civil Code is misplaced. The
doctrine of "self-help" enunciated in this article applies only when the person against
whom the owner has the right to use force (in order to exclude the former from the
latter's property) is really an "aggressor." 1 3 In this case, Sheriff Alvarez was not an
aggressor, as indeed he could not have been one, because as an o cer or agent of the
court, he was simply carrying out his o cial duty to implement the writ of execution
covering Lot Nos. 703 and 706. The OCA was correct in saying that respondent judge
effectively took the law into his own hands, when he stopped the implementation of the
writ of execution using threats and intimidation. Needless to say, he also clearly failed
to accord due respect to legal processes.
While it may be true that respondent judge did not employ actual force in its
literal sense when he stopped the implementation of the writ of execution, the threats
he uttered (that something untoward might happen if the writ of execution were carried
out) effectively prevented or stopped the carrying out of the writ of execution. It has
been held that: "Such threat of violence is absolutely unbecoming [of] a judge who is
expected to display proper decorum." 1 4 It bears stressing that a judge "must exhibit
the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He should
choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other
words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas which means that a magistrate
should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering
harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be
temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language." 1 5 Likewise, as a
holder of a judicial o ce that commands respect, respondent judge should accord
respect to another o cer of the court, a sheriff who is implementing a writ of
execution.
All told, respondent judge violated Canon 2, Sections 1 and 2, and Canon 4,
Sections 1 and 2, of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
which provide, viz.: HESIcT

CANON 2
Integrity
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial o ce
but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must rea rm the people's
faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must
also be seen to be done.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 4
Propriety
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept
personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
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 themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Canons 1 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandate:
"CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
CANON 11 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE
TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS."
"Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicial o ce tends to
diminish the people's respect for the law and legal processes. He also fails to observe
and maintain the esteem due to the courts and to judicial officers." 1 6
With respect to respondent judge's act of assisting his wife in preparing a
motion to intervene in Civil Case No. V-09-11 and a xing his signature thereon, the
Court agrees with respondent judge that the same does not constitute private practice
of law. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Floro, Jr., we held: 1 7
x x x [W]hat is envisioned by 'private practice' is more than an isolated court
appearance, for it consists in frequent customary action, a succession of acts of
the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a
lawyer. In herein case, save for the 'Motion for Entry of Judgment,' it does not
appear from the records that Judge Floro led other pleadings or appeared in
any other court proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe to
conclude, therefore, that Judge Floro's act of ling the motion for entry of
judgment is but an isolated case and does not in any wise constitute private
practice of law. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that Judge Floro is
obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is the
petitioner. 1 8 caITAC

To be sure, it does not escape the Court's attention that the title "Judge" is
appended to respondent judge's name appearing on the motion to intervene. The Court
has already stated that:
While the use of the title ['Judge' or 'Justice'] is an o cial designation as
well as an honor that an incumbent has earned, a line still has to be drawn
based on the circumstances of the use of the appellation. While the title can be
used for social and other identi cation purposes, it cannot be used with the
intent to use the prestige of his judicial o ce to gainfully advance his personal,
family or other pecuniary interests. Nor can the prestige of a judicial o ce be
used or lent to advance the private interests of others, or to convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to in uence
the judge. To do any of these is to cross into the prohibited eld of impropriety.
19

Since respondent judge was asking for relief from the RTC through the subject
motion, he should not have used therein his title "Judge." For even if he did not intend to
take undue advantage of his title, it nevertheless gave the appearance of impropriety
considering the circumstances of the case. 2 0 The same may be construed as an
attempt "to in uence or put pressure on a fellow judge (the Presiding Judge of the RTC
handling Civil Case No. V-09-11) by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus is
in the right." 2 1
Indeed, the aforementioned inappropriate actions of respondent judge constitute
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judicial O cer. Under Sections 10 and 11, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, unbecoming conduct is a light charge which is sanctioned by any of the
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 following: (1) a ne of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or;
(2) censure; (3) reprimand; and (4) admonition with warning. Considering, however, that
respondent judge was herein found guilty of three counts of Conduct Unbecoming of a
Judicial O cer, and considering further that he was already previously adjudged guilty
of gross ignorance of the law, manifest bias, and partiality in MTJ-13-1834 (Carbajosa
v. Judge Hannibal R. Patricio) 2 2 wherein he was meted out a ne of P21,000.00, the
Court believes that respondent judge ought to be meted out a ne in the amount of
P40,000.00, with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.
As nal note: it may not be amiss to state that a judge should so behave at all
times as to promote public con dence in the integrity of the judiciary, and avoid
impropriety and appearance of impropriety in all activities. 2 3 "His personal behavior,
not only while in the performance of o cial duties but also outside the court, must be
beyond reproach, for he is the visible personification of law and justice." 2 4
WHEREFORE , respondent Judge Hannibal R. Patricio of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, President Roxas-Pilar, Capiz, is hereby found GUILTY of three counts of
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judicial O cer for which he is imposed a FINE of
P40,000.00, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or any similar act would be
dealt with more severely. ICHDca

SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, C.J., Jardeleza and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Carandang, * J., is on official leave.

Footnotes
* On official leave.

1. Rollo, p. 39.
2. Id. at 57-59.
3. Id. at 60-63.
4. Id. at 64.
5. Id. at 67-85.

6. Id. at 76; italics supplied.

7. Id. at 152-159.
8. Id. at 158.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 158-159.

11. Id. at 146.

12. Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation of his property.
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 13. Paras, Edgardo, L., Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Volume II, Sixteenth Edition
(2008), p. 146.
14. Jabon v. Judge Usman, 510 Phil. 513, 543 (2005).
15. Tormis v. Judge Paredes, 753 Phil. 41, 54 (2015).

16. Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta, 603 Phil. 94, 103 (2009).
17. 520 Phil. 590 (2006).
18. Id. at 636.
19. Ladignon v. Judge Garong, 584 Phil. 352, 357-358 (2008).
20. Id. at 358.

21. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Floro, Jr., supra note 19 at 636-637.
22. See Decision dated October 2, 2013 in said case.
23. Atty. Molina v. Judge Paz, 462 Phil. 620, 629 (2003).
24. Id.

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