Book HandbookOfHumorResearch

HANDBOOK OF
HUMOR RESEARCH
Volume I
Volume I
Basic Issues
HANDBOOK OF
HUMOR RESEARCH
Edited by
PAUL E. MCGHEE and

JEFFREY H. GOLDSTEIN
Springer-Verlag
New York Berlin Heidelberg Tokyo
Paul E. McGhee Jeffrey H. Goldstein
Department of Home and Family Life Division of Social Psychology
Texas Tech University Temple University
Lubbock, Texas 79409, U.S.A. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122, U.S.A.
With 8 Figures
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Main entry under title:
Handbook of humor research.
Includes bibliographies and indexes.
Contents: v.I. Basic issues-v. 2. Applied studies.
1. Wit and humor-Psychological aspects-Addresses,
essays, lectures. 2. Wit and humor-Social aspects-
Addresses, essays, lectures. 3. Wit and humor-Research
-Addresses, essays, lectures. I. McGhee, Paul E.
II. Goldstein, Jeffrey H.
BF575.L3H36 1983 152.4 83-6675
©1983 Springer-Verlag New York Inc.

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1983
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Jacket illustration by Stuart Leeds.

Typeset by Ampersand Inc., Rutland, Vermont.
9 8 765 432 I
ISBN-13: 978-1-4612-5574-1 e-ISBN-13: 978-1-4612-5572-7

DOI:IO.1007/978-1-4612-5572-7
Preface
About a decade ago we edited The Psychology ofHumor. Besides the summary
chapter and bibliography of about 400 items, the book contained eleven original
papers that represented the state of knowledge at that time. We confess that it
was not easy to fill that volume with first-rate contributions. In a few instances
we invited contributors only on the basis of having heard through the grapevine
that they were doing interesting work on humor. Our sources proved reliable
and we were pleased with the results. We even made new friends as a result of
these blind invitations. But the fact remains that in the early 1970s there was
only a handful of social scientists studying humor and laughter.
The history of humor research prior to the 1970s can also be characterized in
terms of the short-term commitment to investigating humor among those who
did venture out and try their hand at designing humor studies. For reasons that
remain unclear, many investigators published only one or two humor studies
before abandoning the area in favor of some other research domain. We have
the impression that for decades social scientists have been very intrigued by the
idea of studying humor. Psychologists have suspected for a long time that humor
somehow is very important in the lives of people. We find laughter and humor
occurring almost wherever we find people engaged in social interaction. The
fact that we usually feel better when we laugh suggests that laughter may
somehow be important for our health and well-being. When any of us who are
engaged in humor research describe to others what we are doing, we are
consistently met with reactions of interest and fascination.
Given all the apparent interest in humor, why did it take so long (until the
mid-1970s) for humor research to "catch on"? One reason may be that humor,
like play, remains an elusive concept. There is still no agreement on how humor
vi Preface
should be defined. Nor is there agreement on how appreciation or comprehen-

sion of humor should be determined. For example, should we simply observe
the amount of laughter or smiling shown or should we ask individuals to make
some kind of intellectual judgment about how funny something is? Each
approach has its own problems and the two measures generally have only a low
to moderate positive relationship with each other. Because of this confusion
about measuring humor enjoyment, many investigators have simply obtained
both measures and reported whichever one produced significant results.
Numerous other methodological problems plague the "serious" humor re-
searcher. Most of these have only recently begun to be confronted as an
increasing number of investigators from a variety of fields has been drawn to
studying humor. Many of these problems are discussed in this book.
A second reason for the long delay in the attraction of investigators toward
studying humor has been the feeling among many scientists that humor is a
"fringe" area of research. That is, when we don't understand cancer, nutrition,
basic properties of memory, and so forth, how can we justify spending our time
studying humor? Fortunately, research in the 1970s has finally convinced a
growing number of people that humor is important. The two volumes in the
Handbook 0/ Humor Research attest to the fact that humor has an important
link to many areas of human behavior.
Research on different aspects of humor has accelerated so much that in
editing the Handbook we faced a challenge quite different from that which
confronted us a decade ago. In planning for the Handbook o/Humor Research,
we began by listing possible contributors for areas we thought should be
represented. It soon became clear that there were far too many contributors to
be included in one volume. After our editor at Springer-Verlag suggested that
the Handbook be a two-volume work, our problem seemed simplified.
However, so many investigators were making valuable contributions that we
now ran the risk of losing old friends because of our selective invitations. A
comprehensive bibliography of publications on humor and laughter could not be
included since it would run to more than 100 printed pages. In 1977 such
a bibliography contained over 1100 items (Goldstein, McGhee, Smith,
Chapman, & Foot, 1977*). Today, a thorough bibliography would contain
several thousand items.
Volume I of the Handbook 0/ Humor Research, Basic Issues, contains
chapters that summarize existing research, discuss key conceptual and
methodological issues, and present new theoretical developments. We have
made every effort to represent the major disciplines in approximate proportion
to their involvement with humor and laughter. There is one chapter each on
·Goldstein, J. H., McGhee, P. E., Smith, J. R.. Chapman, A. J., & Foot, H. C. Humour, laughter
and comedy: A bibliography of empirical and nonempirical analyses in the English language. In
A. J. Chapman & H. C. Foot (Eds.), It's a funny thing humour. Oxford Pergamon Press,
1977.
Preface vii
sociology, linguistics, and anthropology, and several that stem from various
psychological perspectives. If we have learned anything from the study of
humor it is that oversimplified, global explanations are inadequate to the task.
The contributors to the Handbook have avoided such simplistic answers. The
focus on specific issues within the broad area of humor, laughter, and comedy
liberates the theorist and basic researcher from premature and unwarranted
generalizations. By restricting their field of view, students of humor are better
able to deal with the complexity of the phenomenon.
Methodological issues are discussed in several chapters, but they form the
primary concern of Marianne LaFrance's chapter. She directly confronts one of
the key problems in using smiling and laughter as an index of degree of humor
appreciation, namely, that it is difficult to tell the difference between genuine
humorous laughter and social or artificial laughter. She provides a framework
for using Paul Ekman's scoring system for facial expression of affect to
distinguish real from feigned signs of funniness.
Chapter 2 by Paul McGhee examines psycho-physiological research and
issues associated with humor. The first part of the chapter discusses the role of
arousal in humor, summarizes existing data on physiological correlates of
humor, and examines the nature of metacognitive processes involved in making
judgments about funniness. The second half discusses the differential roles of
the right and left hemispheres in humor.
The next two chapters focus on cognitive aspects of humor. Jerry Suls's
chapter reviews theories and research concerned with cognitive processes
involved in humor appreciation, giving special attention to the extension of
incongruity-resolution theory to disparagement humor. William Pepicello and
Robert Weisberg summarize existing findings from linguistic analyses of humor
and draw attention to issues that must be addressed before real progress can be
made in our understanding of linguistic forms of humor. Considerable attention
is given here to develomental changes in children's linguistic humor. Chapter 6
by McGhee is entirely devoted to developmental studies of humor, focusing
primarily on issues that must be addressed in order to investigate humor
development across the life span.
Chapter 5 by Dolf Zillmann reviews theories and research in the area of
disparagement humor. Special attention is given to the "evolution" of these
theories and to attempts to integrate disparagement theory with other attempts
to explain humor.
Chapters 7 and 8 deal with social and sociological aspects of humor. Tony
Chapman discusses the many functions served by laughter and humor in the
context of social interaction. He is critical of many researchers' failure to obtain
measures of laughter in studies of humor and calls for greater rigor in the
conduct of humor research generally. Several pitfalls are discussed that may
interfere with the obtaining of valid findings in studying laughter and humor.
Gary Fine reviews sociological approaches to the study of humor. In discussing
humor and social roles, attention is given to the fool, the clown, the wit and
viii Preface
joker, and the comedian. Studies of the use of humor in context are examined
along with reference group humor and the relationship between humor and
group culture.
Mahadev Apte's chapter discusses methods used by anthropologists to study
humor and also reviews selected areas of anthropological theories and research
related to humor. Specific attention is given to joking relationships, humor in
religion, and trickster studies. Problems in conducting anthropological humor
research are also discussed. Finally, Chapter 10 by Howard Pollio presents a
field theory of humor. This phenomenological theory depicts laughter and
smiling as "embodied social events" and stresses the importance of the feelings
of the laughing or smiling person.
Both volumes of the Handbook of Humor Research are intended for
students, researchers, and practitioners in psychology, sociology, anthropology,
linguistics, mass communications, medicine and nursing, education and human
development, interested in (a) a handy source of information about humor,
laughter, and comedy, (b) a rich source offresh theoretical and research insights
into the nature and functioning of humor, and (c) a guide for the enhancement,
use, and application of humor. With regard to information, the Handbook
summarizes current and classical literature on humor and laughter. Literature
reviews focus on theories of the nature of humor, on the relationship of humor to
language, cognition and social functioning, on biological and physiological
features, and on the presence, use, and effects of humor in a wide variety of
settings. Included also are theoretical integrations, philosophical speculations,
methodological suggestions, and thoughtful analyses of humor and all its
attendant phenomena. Indeed, we hope the Handbook will serve as a fertile
ground for research ideas. Finally, the Handbook ofHumor Research contains
chapters that instruct on the development and enhancement of humor, both in
oneself and in others. As a whole, then, these chapters should help the reader to
further develop his or her own sense of humor as well as to understand the
nature, development, and functions of humor.
Paul E. McGhee
Jeffrey H. Goldstein
Contents
Felt Versus Feigned Funniness: Issues in Coding Smiling and

Laughing Marianne LaFrance 1
2 The Role of Arousal and Hemispheric Lateralization in Humor
Paul E. McGhee 13
3 Cognitive Processes in Humor Appreciation Jerry M. Suls 39
4 Linguistics and Humor William J. Pepicello and .
Robert W Weisberg 59
5 Disparagement Humor Do/f Zillmann 85
6 Humor Development: Toward a Life Span Approach
Paul E. McGhee 109
7 Humor and Laughter in Social Interaction and Some
Implications for Humor Research Antony J. Chapman 135
8 Sociological Approaches to the Study of Humor
Gary Alan Fine 159
9 Humor Research, Methodology, and Theory in Anthropology
Mahadev L. Apte 183
10 Notes Toward a Field Theory of Humor Howard R. Pollio 213
Author Index 231
Subject Index 245
Contributors
Mahadev L. Apte, Department of Anthropology, Duke University, Durham,

North Carolina 27706, U.S.A.
Antony, J. Chapman, Department of Applied Psychology, University of Wales
Institute of Science and Technology, Cardiff, Wales, United Kingdom
CF37UX.
Gary Alan Fine, Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455, U.S.A.
Marianne LaFrance, Department of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut
Hill, Massachusetts 02167, U.S.A.
Paul E. McGhee, Department of Home and Family Life, Texas Tech
University, Lubbock, Texas 79409, U.S.A.
William J. Pepicello, Hahneman Medical College, MS 503, 230 N. Broad
Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102, U. S.A.
Howard R. Pollio, Department of Psychology, University of Tennessee,
Knoxville, Tennessee 37996, U.S.A.
Jerry M. Suls, Department of Psychology, State University of New York-
Albany, Albany, New York 12222, U.S.A.
Robert W. Weisberg, Department of Psychology, Temple University,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122, U. S.A.
Dolf Zillmann, Department of Communication, Indiana University,
Bloomington, Indiana 47401, U. S.A.
Chapter 1
Felt versus Feigned Funniness:

Issues in Coding Smiling and Laughing
MARIANNE LAFRANCE
Full well they laughed with counter/eited glee

At all his jokes, for many a joke had he. Oliver Goldsmith
A smile is the chosen vehicle for all ambiguities. Herman Melville
A not-infrequent way to begin a treatise on humor is to state that although the

"problem" has been with us for centuries, the "solution" remains as elusive as
ever. Humor seems to evade our best attempts to explain it just as jokes lose
somc;:thing when they are explained. It is almost as if humor contains a
mechanism designed to foil any attempt to capture its essence. But there
appears to be agreement on at least one thing and that is that people laugh and
smile when they find something funny. Although the causes and consequences
of humor may be difficult to pin down, its manifestation is apparently beyond
dispute.
Is the association of humor with laughing really so transparent? Koestler
(1964) clearly thought so, likening the connection to that of the "tell-tale
clicking of the geiger-counter [that] indicates the presence of radioactivity" (p.
31). However, Berlyne (1972) recognized the problem to be a little more
complicated citing laughter as a "strange and complicated pattern of behavior
which warrants much more intensive study than it has received from specialists
in the psychology of humor" (p. 50). The present chapter is directed toward
This chapter was written while the author was on sabbatical at the Human Interaction Laboratory,
University of California, San Francisco.
2 Marianne LaFrance
examining the relationship between humor and laughing and smiling by looking
at facial expressions of affect. More specifically, research on facial action is
examined for clues as to whether or when laughter and smiling can be taken for
genuine signs of felt funniness.
At first glance, laughing seems to be a superlative dependent variable. As to
its presence or absence, high inter-observer reliability seems assured, and as to
its measurement qualities, a number of objective indices are possible including
timed latency and duration, as well as amplitude and intensity. The same
applies to smiling.
What then seems to be the problem? The problem is one of validity. Although
people laugh when they find something funny, they also laugh when a "joke" is
seen to be anything but funny. Moreover, people can be very straight-faced in a
truly humorous situation, giving little sign of felt mirth. In fact, many would
argue as Tomkins (1980) has that "facial behavior ... is as ambiguous in its
meanings as any other behavior, and we interpret such behavior at its 'face'
value at our peril" (p. 160).
To date these vagaries have not hounded the humor researchers. In contrast
to many psychological phenomena, humor has been operationalized in few and
simple ways that appear obvious and unassailable. Subjects are either asked to
rank-order jokes for funniness (Godkewitsch, 1972) or observers assess the
degree of a subject's response using a scale. For example, the scale might begin
with "no response noted," move to "smile varying in magnitude from a gentle to
a broad smile," next to "laugh varying from one with normal voice sounds to
one involving moderately active head and shoulder movements," and end with
"explosive laugh" (Pollio, Mers, & Lucchesi, 1972).
There are several problems with defining humor as smiling-laughing or self-
reported funniness. First, the operationalizations assume that an isomorphism
exists between degree of felt funniness and degree of visible response. But the
person laughing the loudest may be the least amused, while the person smiling
the least may be suppressing full-flow fun until a more appropriate context can
be found. In both cases, the response is less to the humor present than to the
operating social context. A second problem with these operationalizations of
humor is the constraint they put on what can be considered humorous.
Measurements of laughter amplitude may be a good indicator of the kinds of
things that people laugh at, but not necessarily the range of things that they find
humorous. Finally, regarding the relationship of smiling to laughing as one of
degree rather than kind may blind researchers to the possibility that there are
types of laughter and types of smiles all of which may vary as to their
association with each other.
Progress in understanding humor may proceed when the response to humor is
operationalized more carefully and exhaustively. Work in the field of nonverbal
communication and particularly that being done on the facial expression of
emotion can assist by providing the means for coding faces in well-defined and
highly refined ways. When the face is coded thusly, it becomes the carrier of
Felt versus Feigned Funniness 3
multiple meanings that extend beyond the one or two simple phrases usually
ascribed to it by humor researchers.
DESCRIPTIONS OF LAUGHS AND SMILES
To describe a smile seems the height of excess. Smiles and laughter are
recognizable and apparent to anyone. Nevertheless, the task has occupied
scientists for over a century. Darwin (1872) wrote of the smile that:
By drawing backwards and upwards of the corners of the mouth, through the
contraction of the great zygomatic muscles, and by the raising of the upper lip, the
cheeks are drawn upwards. Wrinkles are thus formed under the eyes, and, with old
people, at their outer ends ... As in laughing and broadly smiling the cheeks and
upper lip are much raised, the nose appears to be shortened, and the skin on the bridge
becomes finely wrinkled in transverse lines, with other oblique longitudinal lines on
the sides. The upper front teeth are commonly exposed. A well marked nasa-labial
fold is formed, which runs from the wing of each nostril to the corner of the mouth.
(p. 210)
As to laughter, he wrote:
The sound of laughter is produced by a deep inspiration followed by short, interrupted,

spasmodic contractions of the chest, and especially of the diaphragam .... From the
shaking of the body, the head nods to and fro. The lower jaw often quivers up and
down, as is likewise the case with some species of baboons when they are much
pleased ... during laughter the mouth is opened more or less widely, with the corners
drawn much backward, as well as a little upwards; and the upper lip is somewhat
raised. (p. 200)
Dearborn (1900) added that in laughing and smiling there occur:
clonic spasms of the diaphragm in number ordinarily about eighteen perhaps, and
contraction of most of the muscles of the face .... The upper eyelid is elevated, as are
also, to some extent, the brows, the skin over the glabella ... the head in extreme
laughter is thrown backward; the trunk is straightened even to the beginning of bending
backward, until (and this usually happens soon), fatigue-pain in the diaphragm and
accessory abdominal muscles causes a marked proper flexion of the trunk for its relief.
The whole arterial vascular system is dilated ... the eyes often slightly bulge forwards
and the lachrymal gland becomes active. ordinarily to a degree only to cause a
"brightening" of the eyes. (p. 853-854)
In current research, the concern has focused on discriminating types of

smiles. The common ingredient in the smile is described as nO less than an
upward and lateral movement of the mouth comers (Blurton-Jones, 1971). The
primary candidate muscle, the contraction of which results in a smile, is the
4 Marianne LaFrance
zygomatic major (Ekman & Friesen, 1982), but other muscles can also effect a
mouth comer raise such as the zygomatic minor, buccinator, risorious, and
caninus muscles and these result in differential appearances (Ekman, Friesen,
& Ancoli, 1980).
Ethologists have also been interested in describing different forms of smiling.
Grant (1969) lists eight types of smiles and grins based on the degree of mouth
comer pull, the position of the upper and lower lips relative to the teeth, the
unilaterality or bilaterality of the action, and the jaw position. Brannigan and
Humphries (1972) differentiate 10 smiles and grins looking at appearance
changes in the mouth region. McGrew (1972) distinguishes between a "grin
face," "play face," and "smile." Van Hooff (1972) describes the facial,
postural, and vocal features in old-world monkeys and apes that effect two smile
variations, the "silent bared-teeth face" and the "relaxed open-mouth face,"
that he argues are homologous to human smiling and laughing.
At issue in all these descriptions is the opportunity they afford for comparing
and contrasting types of smiles and laughs and for checking which ones are
indicative of genuine humor and which ones suggest feigned expression.
Moreover, such fine-grain descriptions afford the testing of more highly
differentiated hypotheses about the causes or functions of humor. For example,
distinctions could be made between amusement smiles, mocking or superior
smiles, and nervous smiles by reference to specific facial features associated
with happiness, contempt, or fear, respectively.
MEASUREMENT OF FACIAL MOVEMENT
Most observational coding systems are constructed for particular uses and
hence do not necessarily travel well. In contrast, Ekman and Friesen (1978)
have developed a system that exhaustively describes facial movement in
objective terms-Facial Action Coding System (FACS). Thus, an investigator
trained in FACS can apply it to any question where variation in facial
expression is of interest. Before showing how F ACS could profitably be applied
to humor research, let me describe some of the main features of the system.
In complete form, F ACS includes the coding of all separate, visible, muscle-
based facial changes and their intensity, laterality, temporal location, and
timing. More specifically, F ACS distinguishes among 44 action units. One
such action unit (AU) associated with happiness is AU 12, named the "lip
comer puller." For each AU, the FACS manual describes the muscle involved,
the appearance changes that result from contraction of the relevant muscle, how
to perform the action, and the minimum requirements for scoring it. In the case
of AU 12, the minimum requirements describe three visual changes: a change in
the nasolabial furrow, which is raised up and laterally slightly; a change in the
infraorbital triangle, which is slightly raised and seen by reference to the lifting
and puffing out of the side top comer of the infraorbital triangle; and a change in
the lip comers, which are slightly elongated and angled up.
Also included in the full scoring are intensity, the strength of the action unit
on a 5-point scale from "barely noticeable" to "maximum intensity"; laterality,
whether the action unit appears equally on both sides of the face, on one side
only, or more on one side than the other; location, the precise time points for the
start and end of the action unit; and timing, elapsed time from onset to apex,
apex duration, and elapsed time from apex to completion. Each discriminable
action unit is comparably scored.
The FACS is objective and exhaustive and chief among its advantages is its
ability to detect distinct facial movements that occur simultaneously. Conse-
quently, expressive blends and mixed affect can be cause for clarification rather
than confusion.
FEIGNED VERSUS FELT FUNNINESS
The rationale for such compulsivity is the speculation that variations in one or
more of these scoring features are associated with meaningful psychological
variations. That is to say, other action units that give the appearance of a smile
may be unrelated to amusement and so suggest the presence of a feigned smile
and/or some other reaction. Similarly, variations in intensity, symmetry,
location, and timing may cue the operation of something quite different from
genuine humor.
Specific Action Units
While AU 12 has been found to relate systematically to self-reported

happiness (Ekman, Friesen, & Ancoli, 1980), there are additional action units
that can effect an upward lift to the lips and these are hypothesized to relate
more to "unfelt smiles," even negative affect (Ekman & Friesen, 1982). AU 14
is one such unit. AU 14 tightens the corners of the mouth and may result in
dimple-like wrinkles beyond the lip corners. The appearance is of a tight or
"fixed smile." AU 13 is another action unit that causes changes in the mouth
and cheek areas but is hypothesized to be unrelated to happiness. This unit,
called the "cheek puffer," raises the cheeks through the action of the caninus
muscle. Although it has not yet been tested empirically, it seems likely that
observers asked to code any instance of "smiling" might include cases in which
AU 13 and AU 14 were visible along with AU 12. At present, theory suggests
that of these three action units, only AU 12 is related to amusement (Ekman &
Friesen, 1978; 1982). It is important to note, however, that there has been no
research to date relating any facial action to humor per se. In the Ekman,
Friesen, and Ancoli (1980) study, subjects were asked to indicate the
frequency, duration, and intensity of their "happiness" while watching films of a
gorilla playing in a zoo and a puppy playing with a large flower. It remains open
6 Marianne LaFrance
Table 1-1. Abbreviated descriptions of appearance characteristics of selected FACS

action units. *
AU Number FACS Name Appearance Changes
6 Cheek Raiser Lifts the cheeks upward and draws skin

toward the eyes from the temple and
cheeks; narrows eye opening and
may cause crow's feet wrinkles to
appear at outer corner of the eye
opening.
7 Lid Tightener Narrows eye opening by tightening eye-
lid; lower lid is raised covering more
of the eyeball than normal and
causing a bulge to appear in the
lower lid.
12 Lip Corner Puller Pulls the lip corners obliquely up and
back; deepens furrow running from
nostril to lip corner.
13 Cheek Puffer Lifts and puffs out cheeks by pulling up
on lip corners; narrows, tightens, and
raises lip corners.
14 Dimpler Tightens mouth corners by pulling
inward producing wrinkles
(sometimes a dimple) and/or a bulge
at lip corners.
*For a complete description of these action units see Ekman and Friesen (1978). Information
reprinted by permission of P. Ekman.
as to whether scales of "amusement" or "funniness" would have yielded

comparable correlations with AU 12.
One clear benefit deriving from coding all discriminable facial muscle
changes is being able to note which combination of action units goes with which
affects. For example, it has been argued (Ekman & Friesen, 1982) that AUs 6
and 7 frequently accompany AU 12 during genuine happiness and hence their
absence may be telling. AU s 6 and 7 effect changes in the eye region with the
former raising the cheek and gathering skin inward around the eye producing
crows-feet wrinkles and the latter tightening the upper and lower eye lids
causing bulging below the lower eye lid. Such speculation was foreshadowed
more than a 100 years earlier by Darwin (1872). He reported that Duchenne
accounted for a false smile by reference to insufficient contraction of the
orbicular muscles (the ones responsible for AUs 6 and 7). Darwin agreed but
went further by pointing to insufficient raise and rigid curvature of the upper lip
as well as a difference in the nasolabial furrow.
Not only may certain AUs be absent in the false smile but others may be
present. Ekman and Friesen (1982) have speculated that if a smile is attempting
to mask negative affect, AUs associated with the negative feeling may be visible
along with the smile. For example, the brows may be drawn down and/or
together implicating anger, or the lips may be pressed together suggesting an
attempt to dampen or suppress the smile. By focusing just on the smile and
neglecting to look elsewhere on the face for additional actions that theoretically
should or should not be there during genuine pleasure, unfounded conclusions
may result.
Smile Location
A recurrent observation from the humor literature is that the act of laughing is
typically set off suddenly, such as by a "punch line" (Hertzler, 1970). It is
possible then to gauge the authenticity of the smile-laugh response by timing its
appearance in reference to this point. Specifically, it has been suggested that a
false smile is one that occurs "too early or too late" (Ekman & Friesen, 1982).
Premature or delayed laughter may thus be a sign that humor is expected rather
than experienced.
Another aspect of location is the occurrence of smiling in the behavioral
sequence, again pointing to the need to code behaviors in addition to the smile
or laugh. For example, Sroufe and Waters (1976) hypothesized that smiling is
likely to occur after the onset of the release of a psychological tension produced
by a process of cognitive evaluation. Consequently, one could look for
behaviors suggestive of build up such as brow knits, eye narrowing, and jaw
drop. One study has provided supportive data. Oster ( 1978) found that prior to
one smile form in very young infants there predictably occurred precursory
brow knits with characteristic appearance and timing, generating a hypothesis
that such a smile expressed cognitive mastery. Given the predominance of
cognitive theories of humor (McGhee, 1979), such a sequence may be worth
exploring. In any case, regularities in the sequence of antecedent and
subsequent acts in the behavior of the smiler/laugher must be looked at for
information regarding the "why" and "what for" of smiling and laughing in
humor.
Timing of Smiling/Laughing
A useful principle in accounting for nonverbal behaviors that are noticed and
that strike a false cord is that the behavior deviates in some way such as in
expected duration or intensity (LaFrance & Mayo, 1978). Tomkins (1980) has
argued with respect to smiling that" a smile that is either faster or slower and/or
more or less wide than an innate smile tells the other that one is really not
amused" (p. 160). Some preliminary data have in fact pointed to the normal
time boundaries of a genuine smile. McGrew (1972) for instance characterized
a "grin face" as "reflexive and fleeting in appearance" (p. 44). Ekman and
8 Marianne LaFrance
Friesen (1982) report that most felt smiles were between two-thirds of a second
and four seconds in length. It would be informative to know whether boundaries
could be determined for laughter as well.
Timing also involves durations to apex, apex length, and offset time. Here
again, Ekman and Friesen (1982) report that false smiles differ from felt ones in
all three aspects: onset time is too short, apex time is too long, and offset is
irregular.
Laterality of a Smile
Smiling typically is symmetrical but it is not uncommon to see a "split" smile in

which only one side of the mouth is pulled obliquely upward. Research suggests
that such smiling is deliberate and likely false. Deliberate smiles were found to
differ from spontaneous smiles in children in terms of the visible asymmetries in
facial movement. Specifically, more asymmetries were found with deliberate
than with spontaneous expressions (Ekman, Hager, & Friesen, 1981).
HUMOR IMPLICATIONS OF FACIAL RESPONSES
Smiling and laughter are fundamental yet complicated human responses. We

smile and laugh for dozens of reasons and there are dozens of kinds of smiling
and laughing, only a few of which may be related to humor. Humor research to
date has tended to sidestep this complexity but not without cost. Advances in
the coding of facial expression may be a worthwhile investment with benefits
accruing both to theory and method in humor research.
Relationship between Smiling and Laughing
Prevailing practice has it that the relationship between smiling and laughing is a
matter of degree rather than kind. Darwin (1872) established the precedent by
stating that "a man smiles-and smiling, as we shall see, graduates into
laughter" (p. 196). Current empirical research has followed suit varying only in
the number of positions on the scale (Pollio et aI., 1972). Despite the
obviousness of the relation, there have been disagreements. McDougall (1923)
insisted that smiling and laughing have different origins but Berlyne (1972)
concluded that though they are distinct, the smile and laugh are not inde-
pendent. The matter is far from settled: Duncan and Fiske (1977) report
substantial positive correlations between smiling and laughing in dyadic
conversations but Pollio et al. (1972) found smile and laugh duration to be
unrelated in response to comedy albums.
This is not the place to resolve the issue but rather to suggest how more fine-
grain coding of nonverbal responses to humor might aid in its resolution.
Smiling and laughing may be separately scalar. The F ACS system (Ekman &
Friesen, 1978) scores each facial action unit on a 5-point intensity scale;
laughter may be similarly scaled. However, it may be that under certain
circumstances smiling intensity is more highly correlated with felt funniness
than laughing intensity.
Kinds of Smiling and Laughing
One of the intriguing aspects of the relationship between humor and laughing is
the repeated observation that laughter can be found at occasions that are
singularly nonhumorous, such as derisive or triumphant occasions. Unfor-
tunately, little comes of the observation save for the recognition that there are
different kinds of laughter. Research in nonverbal communication may provide
the methods for operationalizing these differences. For example, Scherer
(1974) used a Moog synthesizer to systematically vary levels of seven acoustic
cues and measured the impact of these variations on observer inferences about
perceived emotional states. This kind of methodological approach seems a
promising avenue for differentiating types of laughter (including feigned vs. felt
laughter) in conjunction with other objective indices such as amplitude,
frequency, and duration.
With regard to smiling, research is somewhat further along. Using the Facial
Action Scoring System, Ekman & Friesen (1982) have distinguished among
"felt, false, and miserable smiles" and and Ekman (Note 1) adds another 16
kinds to the list. For humor researchers, being able to distinguish between types
of smiles may bring methodological and theoretical clarity. As to the former,
feigned responses to humorous stimuli may be screened out from faithful
responses. As to the latter, more precision may be obtained in testing
hypotheses about the causes or functions of humor. If, for example, one is
interested in testing the notion that humor represents "masked aggression," a
facial expression representing a blend of happiness and anger may be more
evident that one indicating pure happiness. Or if one were investigating whether
surprise were critical to humor appreciation, a facial blend of surprise and
happy components may be more telling than one containing anger or fear. Or if
one were checking the possibility that superiority were a key ingredient in
humor, then faces could be scored for presence of contempt along with
happiness. In sum, the face can be scored not only for differing components and
intensities in the mouth region but also for concurrent or overlapping
components in the other regions of the face. Expansion of the response variable
could presumably effect diminution of possible causal variables.
10 Marianne LaFrance
SOCIAL CONTEXT OF SMILING AND LAUGHING
There may be many reasons to laugh and many kinds of laughter, but the
occasion is nearly always a social one. Bergson (1911) pointed to this in his
classic work on laughter: "However spontaneous it seems, laughter always
implies a kind of secret freemasonry, or even complicity, with other laughters,
real or imaginary" (p. 6), This "complicity" complicates things for humor
researchers who would use laughter as an index of funniness to particular
humorous material. Are people smiling and laughing in response to some funny
input or to the fact that others are smiling and laughing or both?
Within the nonverbal communication literature, it is well recognized that
expressive behavior can be both indicative and communicative (LaFrance &
Mayo, 1978). In other words, facial signs are not only informative about the
expressor's internal state but also have an impact on others who are present.
Smiling and laughing are no exception. Moreover, smiling and laughing can
have a kind of reverberating effect on the individuals involved, stimulating them
to even more response.
The challenge is in being able to link particular responses to particular
stimuli. One possible tack is to bring greater attention to the duration and timing
of smiling and laughing and to do this in reference to other preceding,
concurrent, and subsequent events. It may be that laughter is cyclic in nature; if
so, there are now methods available for handling the resulting data (Gottman,
1979). It may be that laughter in response to felt funniness has a different
duration and/or timing than laughter in response to other laughter.
Another aspect of the context of humor has to do with the social rules for
smiling and laughing. Social situations frequently call for duplicity not
authenticity. Feigned laughter is functional; fabricated smiling is serviceable.
Research in nonverbal communication suggests methods for testing when the
response is feigned or felt. In addition, the issue could be approached head-on
by giving research participants the opportunity to report when their reactions
were indicative or communicative and correlating this with particular facial
and/or vocal configurations.
CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this chapter has been to suggest how humor research might profit
from a little borrowing from research in nonverbal communication and
particularly that from the area of facial expression of emotion. The advantages
of a coding system such as the Facial Action Coding System developed by
Ekman and Friesen (1978) are twofold: methodological and conceptual. As to
the former, measurement of smiling and laughing responses to humor can
achieve greater validity than heretofore; as to the latter, refinement of coding
can lend greater theoretical precision.
Felt versus Feigned Funniness II
There are disadvantages too with the application of a system like the FACS.
It is expensive in terms of training required to implement it-the estimate comes
to around 100 hours of training to reach satisfactory levels of coding reliability
(Ekman & Friesen, 1978). It is expensive in terms of coding hours required-
taking as much as 60 minutes to score 1 minute of data. The question here as in
any empirical research comes down to whether the benefits accruing from usage
are worth the cost of securing them. Nevertheless it does seem apparent that the
understanding of humor is a goal worthy of the effort.
REFERENCE NOTE
I. Ekman, P. Liars and lie catchers. Book in preparation, 1982.
REFERENCES
Bergson H. Laughter: An essay on the meaning ofthe comic. New York: McGraw-Hill,
1911.
Berlyne, D. E. Humor and its kin. In J. H. Goldstein & P. E. McGhee (Eds.), The
psychology of humor. New York: Academic Press, 1972.
Blurton Jones, N. G. Criteria for use in describing facial expressions of children. Human
Biology, 1971,43,365-413.
Brannigan, C. R., & Humphries, D. A. Human non-verbal behavior, a means of
communication. In N. Blurton Jones (Ed.), Ethnological studies of child behavior.
London: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
Darwin, C. The expression of the emotions in man and animals. London: Murray,
1872.
Dearborn, G. V. N. The nature of the smile and the laugh. Science, 1900, 9, 851-856.
Duncan, S., & Fiske, D. W. Face-to-face interaction: Research, methods, and theory.
Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1977.
Ekman, P., & Friesen. W. V. Nonverbal leakage and clues to deception. Psychiatry,
1969,32,88-105.
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. Facial Action Coding System. Palo Alto, Cal.: Consulting
Psychologists Press. 1978.
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. Felt, false and miserable smiles. Journal of Nonverbal
Behavior. 1982, 6, 238-252.
Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., & Ancoli, S. Facial signs of emotional experience. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology. 1980, 39, 1125-1134.
Ekman, P., Hager, J. C., & Friesen, W. V. The symmetry of emotional and deliberate
facial actions. Psychophysiology, 1981,18, 101-106.
Godkewitsch, M. The relationship between arousal potential and funniness of jokes. In 1.
H. Goldstein and P. E. McGhee (Eds.), The psychology of humor. New York:
Academic Press, 1972.
12 Marianne LaFrance
Gottman, J. M. Detecting cyclicity in social interaction. Psychological Bulletin, 1979,

86, 338-348.
Grant, E. C. Human facial expression. Man. 1969,4,525-536.
Hertzler, J. O. Laughter: A social scientific analysis. New York: Exposition Press,
1970.
Koestler, A. The act of creation. London: Hutchinson, 1964.
LaFrance, M., & Mayo, C. Moving bodies: Nonverbal communication in social
relationships. Monterey, Cal.: Brooks/Cole, 1978.
McDougall, W. An outline ofpsychology. London: Methuen, 1923.
McGhee, P. E. Humor: Its origin and development. San Francisco: Freeman, 1979.
McGrew, W. C. An ethological study of children's behavior. New York: Academic
Press, 1972.
Oster, H. Facial expression and affect development. In M. Lewis & L. A. Rosenblum
(Eds.), The development of ajJect. New York: Plenum Press, 1978.
Pollio, H. R, Mers, R, & Lucchesi, W. Humor, laughter, and smiling: some preliminary
observations of funny behaviors. In J. H. Goldstein & P. E. McGhee (Eds.), The
psychology of humor. New York: Academic, 1972.
Scherer, K. R Acoustic concomitants of emotional dimensions: Judging effect from
synthesized tone sequences. In S. Weitz (Ed.), Nonverbal communication. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1974.
Sroufe, L. A., & Waters, E. The ontogenesis of smiling and laughter: A perspective on
the organization of development in infancy. Psychological Review, 1976, 83,
173-189.
Tomkins, S. S. Affect as amplification: Some modifications in theory. In R Plutchik &
H. Kellerman (Eds.), Emotion: Theory, research, and experience. New York:
Van Hooff, J. A. R A. M. A comparative approach to the phylogeny of laughter and
smiling. In R A. Hinde (Ed.), Non-verbal communication. London: Cambridge
University Press, 1972.
Chapter 2
The Role of Arousal and

Hemispheric Lateralization in Humor
PAUL E. MCGHEE
The interdisciplinary focus of these two volumes underscores the fact that
humor can be explained or discussed from many different vantage points. This
diversity is essential to the ultimate achievement of a comprehensive under-
standing of humor. Most attempts to explain humor have focused on cognitive,
social, emotional, linguistic, psychodynamic, sociological, or anthropological
variables, as these two volumes attest. Relatively little attention has been given
to more reductive explanations of humor. The present chapter will focus on
theoretical issues and data related to psychophysiological explanations of
humor.
PHYSIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF HUMOR
An enduring popular conception of humor (first advanced over 120 years ago by
Spencer, 1860) suggests that the laughter that accompanies humor serves to
reduce built-up energy or tension. Spencer argued that laughter serves as a form
of "safety valve" for relieving excess energy built up in the nervous system.
Darwin's (1872) "principle of the direct action of the nervous system"
strengthened this view with its claim that "when the sensorium is strongly
excited, nerve force is generated in excess, and is transmitted in certain definite
directions, depending on the connection of the nerve cells and partly on habit."
Freud (1905/1960) also adopted this notion, arguing that laughter is a means of
releasing excessive "psychic energy." The sUbjective feeling of reduced tension
14 Paul E. McGhee
after laughing has probably sustained the belief that there must be a
corresponding physiological energy release.
Contemporary neurophysiological explanations of humor are best exempli-
fied by the views of the late Daniel Berlyne (1960, 1969, 1972). Berlyne (1972)
criticized the energy release hypothesis, noting that:
This kind of hypothesis is not viewed very favorably nowadays, mainly because the
underlying notion of a quantity of pent-up "nerve force," "energy," "excitation," or
"tension" that demands release receives little support from our present knowledge of
how the nervous system works. Nevertheless, laughter seems clearly to be capable of a
cathartic effect. (p. 52)
The key properties of humor stimuli that lead to humor appreciation were
referred to by Berlyne (1960, 1969, 1972) as their "collative properties."
These properties are defined not in terms of the stimulus alone, but in terms of
absolute stimulus qualities as these relate to the individual's knowledge of those
properties. Any arousal changes that occur in connection with a given stimulus
depend on the outcome of comparing one's knowledge about comparable stimuli
experienced in the past with the properties of this particular stimulus. The most
important collative properties of stimuli are novelty, complexity, incongruity,
and, perhaps, redundancy. Berlyne argued that these stimulus properties cause
arousal changes that account for the extent of humor experienced.
Berlyne's (1972) position on humor was derived from a broader base of
research concerned with the relationship between pleasure and arousal change.
As arousal resulting from a stimulus increases, it is presumably associated with
increased pleasure (positive hedonic tone) up to a point, and reduced pleasure
beyond that point. Extremely high levels of arousal were considered to be
experienced as aversive. Berlyne noted that as arousal increases, only the
reward system is initially activated. As arousal continues to increase. an
aversion system becomes activated in addition to the reward system. The extent
of pleasure experienced depends on the relative levels of activation of these two
systems. At extremely high levels of arousal, the relatively greater activation of
the aversion system should interfere with enjoyment of a joke or cartoon.
Anything that reduces this arousal should be welcomed and experienced as
pleasurable. For example, iflaughter at a joke helped lower such high arousal,
hearty laughter would be expected once the punch line occurred.
Berlyne (1960, 1972) suggested that two separate arousal mechanisms
combine with the activation of the reward and aversion systems of the central
nervous system to determine the pleasure experienced in humor. An arousal
"boost" mechanism contributes to enjoyment by elevating arousal to moder-
ately high levels that are themselves enjoyable apart from any subsequent drop
in arousal. The arousal boost mechanism presumably does not involve any
significant activation of the aversion system. In the case of the arousal "jag"
mechanism, pleasure occurs when arousal reaches a very high level and is then
sharply reduced. This reduction is pleasurable because arousal has become high
The Role of Arousal and Hemispheric Lateralization in Humor 15
enough to be aversive. As will be noted later in this chapter, it remains unclear

whether cartoons and jokes are capable of producing such high levels of arousal
that the arousal is experienced as aversive, with the subsequent drop in arousal
being a significant contributor to the level of funniness experienced. If this does
occur in humor, it would appear to be restricted to humor that taps highly
sensitive or anxiety-related content areas.
Berlyne's position has generally been interpreted to mean that arousal should
be related in an inverted-U fashion to humor appreciation. That is, if both the
arousal boost and jag operate in humor, progressively greater levels of arousal
should initially be associated with increased enjoyment because only the reward
system is activated. Once arousal gets high enough to activate the aversion
system further increases should reduce the overall enjoyment of the humor
detected.
Wilson (1979) has argued that if the punch line is associated with a sharp
reduction in arousal, the arousal jag mechanism should lead to increased
pleasure as arousal levels rise. He noted that this seemed to suggest a positive
linear relationship between arousal level and humor appreciation rather than an
inverted-U relationship. In his view, it is the operation of the arousal boost
mechanism alone that might be expected to produce the latter relationship.
Arousal boosts are pleasurable up to a point, but then become increasingly
unpleasurable, so that their reduction becomes a source of pleasure. Wilson
cqncludes that if both mechanisms do operate in humor, it is difficult to
formulate a clear prediction of the nature of the curve that should result. His
suggestion is that the operation of both mechanisms should lead to increased
funniness followed by decreased funniness, but then an additional increase in
funniness as arousal gets progressively higher. If only a portion of the arousal
continuum is represented, a positive linear relationship may be obtained at
either the lower or upper ranges of arousal on the basis of the operation of the
arousal boost and jag mechanism, respectively. Wilson further notes that it is
not clear just how much of a downturn should occur in the enjoyment curve (due
to the boost mechanism) before additional arousal will begin to add to funniness
(due to the jag mechanism).
This points out a critical limitation of Berlyne's arousal-based explanation of
humor: namely, it allows all possible combinations of relationships between
measured arousal change and degree of humor appreciation. A positive or
negative linear relationship and an inverted- U shaped curve are all compatible
with his model. In short, Berlyne's model is not testable since it cannot be
disproved. Godkewitsch (1976), a close associate of Berlyne, argued that
several distinct predictions can be derived from Berlyne's theory. A key issue in
evaluating Berlyne's position lies in the question of whether humor stimuli that
do not tap highly sensitive "affect-laden" areas are capable of producing
arousal changes of sufficient magnitude to be experienced as aversive. While
this is probably not an answerable question, the present writer's operating
assumption is that investigators who have examined physiological correlates of
humor appreciation have not presented their subjects with cartoons or jokes that
16 Paul E. McGhee
would be expected to produce such extreme arousal fluctuations. This suggests

that positive linear relationships should be obtained in most studies, with an
occasional inverted- V relationship. V-shaped relationships should never be
obtained.
Finally, Godkewitsch (1976) has stressed that any investigator attempting to
test Berlyne's view must consider the distinction between the arousal level an
individual brings to the humor situation (e.g., as a result of anger or sexual
excitement) and the arousal changes that result from the humor stimulus itself.
An adequate test of Berlyne's theory requires that individuals not be previously
highly aroused due to other circumstances, or that this arousal be taken into
account.
Physiological Correlates of Humor Appreciation
Investigators studying the relationship between arousal and humor have clearly
shown that humor is associated with increased activity of the sympathetic
nervous system (e.g., Averill, 1969; Levi, 1965; Sternbach, 1962). Similar
activation occurs in very different emotional states, such as sadness and anger
(Averill, 1969; Levi, 1965). The fact that epinephrine secretion occurs in both
anger and humor points to the general importance of sympathetic arousal in
each of these emotional states. Early support for the contribution of such
arousal to funniness of a humor stimulus was provided in Schachter and
Wheeler's (1962) classic siudy. They found that injection of subjects with
epinephrine led to increased laughter while watching a humorous film. Other
studies have shown that the experiencing of humor is associated with increased
heart rate (Averill, 1969; Fry, Note 1; Godkewitsch, 1976; Goldstein,
Harman, McGhee, & Karasik, 1975; Jones & Harris, 1971; Langevin & Day,
1972; Martin, 1905; and Spencer, 1860), increased skin conductance (Averill,
1969; Godkewitsch, 1976; Goldstein et aI., 1975; and Langevin & Day, 1972),
increased muscle tension (Chapman, 1973, 1976; Spencer, 1860), altered
respiratory patterns (Fry, Note I; Fry & Rader, 1977; Fry & Stoft, 1971;
Lloyd, 1938; Spencer, 1860; and Svebak, 1975, 1977), and characteristic EEG
changes (Svebak, 1982). Given this convincing evidence that humor does
increase arousal, the important question is whether the amount or other
properties of arousal experienced during humor is related to the level of
appreciation or funniness experienced.
Heart Rate. Both Godkewitsch (1976) and Langevin and Day (1972) found a
positive linear relationship between funniness ratings given to jokes or cartoons
and the maximum heart rate occurring during their presentation. Langevin and
Day found a similar relationship for amount of heart rate change. In an
especially noteworthy finding, Godkewitsch found a positive relationship
between self-reports of arousal and funniness ratings (if subjects prove to be
reliable in judging their own arousal, future studies could use self-report
measures instead of directly recording arousal changes). He failed, however, to

find any significant relationship between amount of heart rate reduction
following the punch line and funniness ratings. Averill (1969) showed subjects a
comedy, a sadness-inducing film, or a control film and found that those who saw
the comedy experienced the greatest amount of heart rate increase. Also,
consistent with the above findings, maximum heart rate was positively related to
ratings on a sadness-mirth scale. Finally, Goldstein, Harman, McGhee, and
Karasik (1975) found that the degree of arousal change (either an increase or
decrease) between a base rate period and the question portion of riddles was
related to funniness ratings in an inverted-U fashion. A marginally significant
similar relationship was obtained for amount of arousal increase and funniness
ratings.
With the exception of the Goldstein et al. data, then, findings using heart rate
measures point toward a positive linear relationship between arousal and degree
of humor appreciation. Since Goldstein et al.'s heart rate change measure seems
comparable to Langevin and Day's (1972) measure, it may be the kind of
humor stimuli used that account for the differences in findings. Goldstein et al.
were the only investigators to use riddles, where there is a predictable format for
provision of the punch line. Future research should consider the possibility that
varying qualities of the humor stimulus may alter the relationship obtained
between arousal and funniness.
GSR. Findings for skin conductance are consistent with the general pattern of
heart rate data, showing a positive relationship between funniness ratings and
GSR (Galvanic Skin Response) amplitude or log GSR across a wide range of
humor stimuli (Averill, 1969; Godkewitsch, 1976; Langevin & Day, 1972). It
should be noted that both Godkewitsch and Langevin and Day found that
extremely unfunny jokes or cartoons can produce greater GSR reactivity than
funny ones. Both the heart rate and GSR data appear to provide stronger
support for Berlyne's arousal boost mechanism than for the arousal jag
mechanism.
Muscle Tension. Spencer (1860) observed over a century ago that humor was
accompanied by an increase in muscle tension. This finding has recently been
confirmed by Chapman (1973, 1976). Chapman (1976) divided subjects into
subgroups who had given high or low funniness ratings to the jokes. Muscle
tension was greater among the high funniness rating group at periods 30, 40, and
50 seconds into the joke, as well as 20 seconds after the joke (measurements
were not taken at the punchline or 10 seconds afterwards because of the
confounding influence ofthe act oflaughing). If muscle tension is considered an
index of arousal, then these findings add further support to the view that humor
stimuli that produce greater levels of arousal are experienced as funnier.
Respiratory Changes. Studies of respiratory changes during humor are of

only limited value in determining the relationship between arousal and humor
18 Paul E. McGhee
since there is no clear link between amount of arousal and respiratory changes
beyond the fact that laughter is associated with deeper and faster breathing (Fry
& Rader, 1977; Martin, 1905; Spencer, 1860). Fry and Rader (1977) and
Lloyd (1938) found that expiration during laughter is considerably more
prolonged than inspiration. Fry and Stoft (1971) note that there is such a high
imbalance of expiration over inspiration in laughter that a pulmonary gas deficit
usually results, requiring several respiration cycles to return to normal. Fry and
Rader ( 1977) have provided a detailed analysis of both common properties and
individual differences across laughs and laughers.
Only Svebak(1975, 1977) has linked respiratory measures to level of humor
appreciation. In one study ( 1975), he found that greater abdominal inspiration-
expiration trunk circumference change was associated with more frequent and
more enduring laughter among women (but not men). A second study by
Svebak (1977) has clear implications for the role of arousal in humor. Drawing
from the work of Christiansen (1972), he distinguished between three different
respiration patterns. He provides support for the view that one of these,
"sighing," can be used as an index or situationally induced anxiety or tension
(arousal). Subjects who showed the sighing pattern prior to being shown a
humorous television program showed the greatest amount of laughter during the
program. While this arousal was present before the appearance of the humorous
event(s), the findings are consistent with the view that increased arousal leads to
increased funniness.
Brain Wave Changes. Attempts to link humor to changes in electrical activity

of the brain have been rare. Svebak (1982) noted that the right hemisphere is
superior to the left one in the processing of emotions, but that this asymmetry
does not apply to the processing of happiness. In support of this view, he found
that the appreciation of humor (accompanied by laughter) was associated with
relatively concordant EEG alpha in the two hemispheres. Those who laughed at
a short video comedy program showed less discordant alpha than did the
nonlaughers. Svebak noted that theories of humor commonly stress such factors
as incongruity and the integration of cognitive opposites or of a rational and an
irrational frame of reference. "These definitions suggest that a coordination of
otherwise separate processes is typical in humor appreciation, and these
processes seem to reflect the two functional modes attributed to each of the
hemispheres" (Svebak, 1982, p. 136).
In a study that may have important implications for humor, Kutas and
Hillyard (1980) examined "event-related brain potentials" or ERPs that
accompany the unexpected appearance of an inappropriate word at the end of a
sentence. They note that "unexpected or surprising stimuli are typically
followed, after some 300 to 600 msec, by a positive ERP component known as
the P300." While physically deviant "large" ending-words were accompanied
by positive waves, semantically deviant ending-words were followed by
negative brain waves. These were also found to be stronger after extreme
semantic mismatches than after moderate ones. They concluded that these
negative waves appear to "reflect the interruption of ongoing sentence

processing by a semantically inappropriate word and the 'reprocessing' or
'second look' ... that occurs when people seek to extract meaning from
senseless sentences" (p. 204). Since similar processing must go on in
incongruity-based humor, a similar pattern of negative ERPs may accompany
humor.
Implications for Arousal Theory. In general, the studies reviewed here

provide stronger support for the arousal boost than for the arousal jag
mechanism described by Berlyne (1972). In most cases a positive linear
relationship was obtained between amount of arousal increase produced and
judged funniness of the humor stimulus. The limited available data suggest that
amount of arousal decrease following the punch line is not related to funniness.
Since there is no reason to assume that the arousal levels experienced in
connection with the humor provided were so high as to become unpleasant, we
can tentatively conclude that in the normal context of humor events, greater
amounts of induced arousal are associated with increased enjoyment. It appears
likely that sexual or aggressive themes, collative properties and other stimulus
characteristics (as well as characteristics of the humor recipient) that serve to
elevate arousal combine in a yet-to-be-determined fashion to produce a greater
or lesser sense of funniness. These findings must be restricted, however, to cases
in which the arousal changes brought about are strictly a result of the humor
stimuli themselves. A number of studies (which will not be reviewed here) have
been completed that include prior manipulations of the level of arousal subjects
(presumably) bring to the humor stimulus. These studies have not included
physiological measures of arousal, but if prior arousal is very high it may be
possible to demonstrate a contribution of arousal jags to experienced funniness.
In several of die studies discussed above, a distinction was made between
arousal increases resulting from the "build up" material of a joke and changes
resulting from insight into the punch line. Godkewitsch (1976) noted that
humor-related arousal came mainly from the punch line-not from the joke
body. Chapman (1976), however, found that the muscle tension of his high
funniness rating group was greater than that of the low group before the punch
line as well as after it. Also, muscle tension increased regularly during the joke
for all subjects, although more for the high-funniness rating group. This suggests
that arousal-induced funniness depends on qualities of the joke other than those
specifically associated with resolution at the punch line. It may be that any
source of arousal, whether due to the joke body, a hostile or sexually excited
state, or whatever, contributes in an additive fashion to the subsequent
enjoyment derived from the punch line. Cantor, Bryant, and Zillmann's (1974)
finding that prior exposure to highly arousing material increased funniness
ratings given to cartoons and jokes supports the view that excitation or arousal
from one source may transfer and contribute to increased enjoyment of humor.
Jokes that are conducive to a general anticipation of the punch line (without
20 Paul E. McGhee
giving away the exact punch line) may also be conducive to heightened arousal
during the joke body.
Laughter, Arousal, and Humor
One of the greatest puzzles in the study of humor continues to be why the
mental experience of humor should be associated with the motor response of
laughter. While most of us can experience mild amusement without showing
more than a brief smile, extremely funny experiences tend to automatically
trigger laughter. The reason for this may lie in our general tendency to increase
physical activity in states of heightened emotional arousal. In threatening
situations, this activity probably originally took the form of "fight or flight." The
use of energy through physical exertion may aid in the process of returning
arousal to a normal adaptive range, regardless of the particular form taken by
that exertion. Haberman (1955; cited by Fry & Stoft, 1971) noted European
research that showed that vigorous laughter provides an average of over 75%
increase in energy expenditure relative to a resting state. Given the many
muscle systems involved in laughter, it should be an effective means of reducing
arousal or felt tension.
While laughter does appear to (help) reduce the arousal produced by humor
experiences, the timetable and exact nature of arousal change at the punch line
and following it (up to a return to a baseline of arousal) remain unclear. Given
the strong repeated expirations of air during laughter and the accompanying
increased muscular exertion, muscle tension, heart rate, and GSR should all
increase as a direct result of the laughter. It may be, then, that strong laughter
actually adds to humor-induced arousal before eventually reducing it. The real
significance of arousal changes for the subjective experience of funniness will
remain uncertain until arousal changes surrounding the punch line are better
understood.
There is some basis for arguing that laughter serves a general arousal-
reduction function, apart from its connection with humor. In "nervous
laughter," for example, the act of laughing appears to help regulate felt tension.
Also, Nerhardt (1970, 1976) and Deckers (Deckers & Devine, 1981; Deckers
& Kizer, 1975) have found that laughter occurs in weight-lifting experiments
when there is a discrepancy between the weight expected and the weight
actually encountered. This laughter appears to serve to return the arousal
resulting from the expectancy violation back to a base level range. It is probably
the awareness of this arousal reduction that sustained the earlier belief
(discussed above) that laughter actually releases energy from the nervous
system.
Rothbart (1973) and Sroufe (Sroufe & Waters, 1976; Sroufe & Wunsch,
1972) have also put forth arousal-related explanations of laughter, although
these are restricted to infants and young children. Rothbart argued that arousal
changes alone do not determine whether laughter or some other response
occurs; rather, this depends on the child's evaluation of the context surrounding
the arousal. As long as arousal does not increase excessively, an evaluation of
the situation as safe or inconsequential will lead to laughter. But if arousal does
get high, or the stimulus or context is judged to be threatening, laughter will be
replaced by some other (presumably negative) emotional response. Sroufe and
his associates also stress the importance of contextual factors for infant laughter.
They use the term "tension" instead of "arousal" and argue that an increase
followed by a decrease in tension is required for laughter or smiling to occur.
The greater and more rapid the build-up of tension, the greater the probability of
laughter occurring instead of smiling.
Sroufe's position is similar to the more physiologically based view of
Tomkins (1962). Tomkins argued that laughter and other positive affects result
from the changes in neural firing that accompany sudden drops in stimulation.
Tomkins (as did Darwin, 1872, nearly a century earlier) also considered
laughter to be simply an intense form of smiling: "As such it is activated in the
same way as the smile except that the general density of stimulation which is
suddenly reduced begins at a higher level in the case of laughter ... " (p. 370).
Actually, for Tomkins it is the combination of the original degree of intensity of
stimulation and the suddenness of the drop in neural firing that determines
whether laughter or smiling occurs.
Both existing data and theoretical views, then, suggest that the link between
arousal changes and laughter is a very general one that does not necessarily
require a humor experience as a prerequisite. While it is difficult to speculate
about when in human evolutionary history the capacity for humor began to
appear, it seems likely that this general relationship between laughter-smiling
and arousal (in a positive or safe context) developed first. As the cognitive
experience of humor developed out of a more general disposition toward play
(see McGhee, 1979), its associated arousal changes must have been incor-
porated into the general system linking laughter to arousal. While it is
commonly acknowledged (e.g., see Giles & Oxford, 1970) that there are several
forms of nonhumorous as well as humorous laughter, virtually no attempt has
been made to study how these different kinds of laughter differ. It would be of
immense value to the progress of humor research if humorous laughter could be
distinguished either behaviorally or physiologically from other forms of
laughter. (See Chapter I by LaFrance.)
It should be emphasized that the existing data do not yet allow for any firm
conclusions about the relationship between humor, laughter, and arousal. Most
of the data reviewed above are based on funniness ratings provided after the
physiological measures have been obtained. The clearest theoretical link
between arousal and humor appreciation, however, applies to laughter, not
humor. Since laughter and funniness rating measures generally show only a
moderate positive correlation with each other, it is not clear how variations in
findings in different studies relating arousal changes to funniness ratings should
be interpreted. Most investigators have chosen not to measure laughter, perhaps
because of the artifactual influence of the act of laughing upon the arousal
22 Paul E. McGhee
measures used. Future investigators should attempt to overcome this difficulty,

however, since laughter appears to be the most basic form of response to having
experienced humor. Little attention has been given to how information about
one's own arousal or laughter is utilized in making judgments of funniness.
Issues related to this process are discussed in the following section.
Finally, the question of whether laughter results from arousal increases or
decreases or causes decreases in arousal remains unclear. Do we laugh in order
to bring arousal back down once humor has elevated it, or is the laughter
somehow a mere by-product of an arousal drop that has already occurred?
Neither existing theoretical views nor data provide consensus on this. Similarly,
do the positive relationships obtained between funniness ratings and arousal
induced by jokes and cartoons point toward a causal influence in which extent of
arousal change determines funniness, or to a circumstance where arousal
change is a mere by-product of funniness? Leventhal and Safer (1977) noted
that existing data do not permit any firm conclusions on this issue. It seems
likely that both are operating to varying degrees in different humor contexts.
The mental experience of increased funniness should contribute to increased
arousal, and the act of laughing may momentarily add to this arousal increase
before the arousal drop occurs. But the apparent "transfer value" of arousal in
contributing to funniness, suggested by the findings of Cantor et al. (1974),
indicates that arousal resulting from a joke should also contribute to its
funniness. Since these issues seem central to the very essence of the nature of
humor, there is a great need for research to clarify the time relationship between
gaining insight into the humor event (Le., understanding it), laughter, and
various dimensions of underlying arousal fluctuation. Berlyne (1972) noted
over a decade ago that variations in the time scale of arousal changes may hold
the key to understanding both the relationship between arousal and degree of
funniness and the manner in which arousal changes in humor differ from arousal
changes in structurally similar phenomena (e.g., problem solving).
Metacognitive Influences on Perceived Funniness
In the past decade, a growing body of research in cognitive psychology has

focused on the extent of knowledge about one's own cognitive activity (e.g.,
Flavell, 1979; Flavell, Speer, Green, & August, 1981). This research has
demonstrated that children only gradually develop the ability to monitor their
own cognitions. Metacognitive issues have not been addressed in the study of
humor, but there are several key questions that must be raised in order to
improve upon our present shallow understanding of the relation between
arousal, laughter, humor comprehension, and funniness ratings.
In view of the issues discussed previously in this chapter, the central question
concerns how individuals use perceptions of their own arousal changes or
laughter in making judgments about funniness. For the most part, we remain
quite ignorant of how we come to decide that a given joke should be a 6 on a 7-
point funniness scale instead of some other rating. While most of us feel
confident about whether something is or is not funny, do we find it funny only
because we notice our laughter or because of cognitions that we monitor
independent of our laughter? Studies of children's humor have demonstrated
that jokes or cartoons that pose some moderate level of effort for comprehension
are judged to be funnier than those that are either very easily understood or
understood only with extreme effort (McGhee, 1976; Zigler, Levine, & Gould,
1966, 1967). It is not clear whether these children (school-aged) were aware of
the difficulty they had in understanding the material presented, but this would
appear to be a good starting point for studying metacognitive determinants of
judgments of funniness.
Research completed in the 1970s by Howard Leventhal and his associates
underscores the importance of initiating the study of metacognitive processes in
humor. Their data suggest that males and females differ in the information (at
least regarding laughter) used to make decisions about funniness. When shown
either a slapstick film or cartoons accompanied by a laugh track, both high
school (Leventhal & Mace, 1970) and college students (Cupchik & Leventhal,
1974) showed increased laughter, relative to a non-laugh-track condition. In
both studies, though, only females also rated the cartoons as funnier in the laugh
track condition. In a second study, Leventhal and Mace (1970) asked first
through fifth graders to either laugh a lot at the film or not laugh at all. Again,
instructions to laugh increased the laughter of both sexes, but only girls also
rated the film to be funnier when they laughed at it more. Women also both
laughed more and rated cartoons as being funnier at an end-of-the-semester beer
party than in a laboratory, while men laughed more at the cartoons at the party
without rating them as funnier in that context (Leventhal & Cupchik, 1975). It
is important to note that women can discount their elevated laughter in making
judgments about funniness if instructed to do so. Panagis, Leventhal, and
Caputo (Note 2) found that when both sexes were asked to pay careful attention
to the nature of the audience reaction and the quality of the cartoon, males and
females gave comparable funniness ratings. Without these instructions, women
again gave higher funniness ratings in the presence of high laughter on a laugh
track.
These findings strongly suggest that different factors enter into making
funniness judgments among males and females. Females seem to monitor their
own laughter more in making this judgment. Leventhal and Mace (1970) argued
that this pattern of findings for funniness is simply one manifestation of a
general trend toward females taking their own expressive reactions into account
in making judgments about events, while males are more likely to keep their
expressive reactions independent of their intellectual judgments.
Godkewitsch's (1976) finding that subjects were quite accurate in estimating
their own arousal during jokes may be especially important for determining the
extent to which the monitoring of one's arousal enters into making funniness
judgments. It may not be sufficient, though, to simply correlate perceived self-
arousal scores with funniness ratings since subjects may become consciously
24 Paul E. McGhee
aware of their arousal during humor only when asked to evaluate it. As in the
case of laughter monitoring, careful attention in studies along these lines should
be given to sex differences and other sources of individual differences.
While the main focus of this chapter has been on the influence of arousal and
laughter on judgments of funniness, serious consideration must also be given to
cognitive evaluations of various aspects of the cartoon or joke itself. The joke
may be judged to be funny because of the clever incongruities represented,
because of allusions to sexual activity, because a member of a disliked group is
put down, and so forth. These are the kinds of dimensions individuals are most
likely to refer to when they are asked to explain why the event was (or was not)
funny. But since information on humor comphrension is typically not obtained
(although this is occasionally done in studies using children), it is difficult in
most studies to be certain that the joke recipient has really understood the
"intended" humor. In this writer's view, since humor is most essentially a
cognitive experience (McGhee, 1979), additional research on the kinds of
cognitive evaluation that occur in connection with humor events should be
especially fruitful in improving our understanding of the determinants of
intellectual judgments about humor. Arousal may prove to interact with
cognitive appraisal dimensions in key ways to determine perceived funniness
or it may be shown to be a mere by-product of cognition. Arousal may also
prove capable of influencing laughter without necessarily influencing judgments
of funniness.
HEMISPHERE LATERALIZATION AND HUMOR
Hemisphere Differences in Cognitive Processing Style
An increasing amount of attention has been given in the past decade to the
differential capacities of the right and left cerebral hemispheres (see Springer &
Deutsch, 1981, and Tucker, 1981, for reviews). Language competence has long
been known to be typically associated with the left hemisphere (at least among
right-handed individuals), and nonverbal functions (e.g., music and visual form
perception) have been assumed to be associated with the right hemisphere (e.g.,
see Kimura, 1973; Milner, 1962). More recent research, however, has
suggested that the critical property that differentiates the two hemispheres may
be processing style, with the left hemisphere being specialized for relational,
sequential, or analytical processing and the right specialized for simultaneous or
holistic processing (Bever, 1980; Das, Kirby, & Jarman, 1979; Tucker, 1981).
Bever (1980) has argued that language is mediated by the left hemisphere
simply because language requires relational or sequential (hereafter used
interchangeably) processing. He also presents data that support the position
that music and form perception may be mediated by the left hemisphere if tasks
in these areas are specifically set up to require relational processing. Thus, it
appears to be the kind of processing required within a modality, and not the
modality itself, that determines the relative involvement of the two hemispheres.
Das, Kirby, and Jarman ( 1975) distinguished between these two processing
styles as follows:
Simultaneous integration refers to the synthesis of separate elements into groups,

these groups often taking on spatial overtones. The essential nature of this sort of
processing is that any portion of the result is at once surveyable without dependence
upon its position in the whole .... In order for the human organism to grasp systems of
relationships, it is necessary that the components be represented simultaneously. In
this fashion, the relationships among components can be explored and determined.
(p. 89)
Successive information processing refers to processing of information in a serial order.

The important distinction between this type of information processing and simul-
taneous processing is that in successive processing the system is not totally surveyable
at any point in time. Rather, a system of cues consecutively activates the
components ... the most obvious example of ... successive processing is human
speech. The structure of grammar is such that the processing of syntactical
components is dependent upon their sequential relationships within sentence
structure. Thus. grammatical structures which have to be understood in terms of their
relationships are affected by disturbance of simultaneous synthesis, whereas sequen-
tial structures are affected by successive synthesis. (p. 89)
Das, Kirby, and Jarman (1975) note that many complex intellectual tasks
involve elements of both types of processing and probably include fluctuations
back and forth between the two as the cognitive demands of the task change.
Finally, Tucker ( 1981) concluded that
The right hemisphere's neuropsychological organization appears especially suited to

integrating information from a variety of channels into what Semmes (1968) termed a
'single supramodal space.' The right hemisphere's excellence in the holistic organi-
zation of analogue data results in a form of nonverbal conceptualization similar to
that termed . syncretic' by Werner (1957). In contrast to articulated and differentiated
concepts. syncretic experience entails the fusion of a variety of sensory and cognitive
elements into a global construct. (p. 23)
Anatomical Basis for Hemisphere Differences. One recent study has pro-
vided data that suggest that anatomical differences in neuronal organization
may at least partially account for the different processing styles of the two
hemispheres. Gur, Packer, Hungerbuhler, Reivich, Obrist, Amamek, and
Sackheim (1980) used radioisotope techniques and found a greater amount of
white matter in the right than in the left hemisphere, suggesting that the right
hemisphere may be characterized by a greater degree of interconnectedness
among different regions than the left hemisphere. Tucker ( 1981) notes (as Gur
et aI., 1980, had earlier) that this finding
26 Paul E. McGhee
supports the suggestion from earlier clinical observations (Semmes, 1968) that the
receptotopic distribution of information across the cortex is focal and discrete in the
left hemisphere but more diffuse and generalized in the right hemisphere. (p. 38)
Each hemisphere's pattern of organization at a neuronal level may thus be uniquely
suited to its preferred cognitive operations .... The left hemisphere's focal and
discrete layout seems compatible with a tendency toward analytic and cognitive
organization, whereas a more diffuse and global neuronal pattern in the right
hemisphere seems to coincide nicely with holistic cognitive operations. (p. 38)
Role of the Right Hemisphere in Understanding

Complex Linguistic Material
Howard Gardner and his associates have recently completed a series of studies
with patients who have suffered damage to the right hemisphere (usually as a
result of a stroke). These studies have consistently shown that while right-
hemisphere damage does not affect basic language functions, it does interfere
with comprehension of a number of subtle and complex aspects of language.
Patients with right-hemisphere lesions have been found to show reduced ability
to: (1) determine connotations of common words (Gardner & Denes, 1973), (2)
interpret metaphors (Winner & Gardner, 1977), (3) appreciate antonymic
contrasts (Gardner, Silverman, Wapner, & Zurif, 1978), (4) organize randomly
ordered sentences into coherent narratives (Wapner, Hamby, & Gardner,
1981), and (5) detect bizarre or incongruous elements in a story (Wapner et aI.,
1981). Wapner et aI. found that for both shorter and longer story narratives,
right-hemisphere patients could understand and remember isolated details of a
story, but had difficulty integrating the information into a consistent whole and
in judging the appropriateness or fit of different story elements. They also noted
that
the patients' apparent insensitivity to incongruities reflected, at least in some cases, a

compulsion to justify the bizarre incongruity rather than a total insensitivity to the
incongruity. Patients seem at least tangentially aware that something does not fit and
yet are either unwilling or unable to frankly label the anomalous element as such. (p.
27)
Wapner et aI. (1981) concluded from the overall pattern of their data that
patients with right-hemisphere lesions show an impaired plausibility metric.
That is, they lack the capacity shown by individuals with normal brains to judge
whether a particular stimulus element is appropriate within a particular
context.
Thus, even as a patient may challenge a statement which normal controls consider to
be perfectly plausible, the same patient may accept, or even strive to justify that non-
canonical element which is immediately challenged or ignored by a normal control.
Bereft of a structure into which to place the element, unaware of (or insensitive to) the
rules which generally govern discourse in the area, the patient must make an
assessment based only on the element itself. And so, when a patient's individual
answer or remark is examined without respect to context, it generally seems
appropriate. (p. 27)
Another related, but somewhat more abstract way of characterizing the difficulties of
these patients is to stress their problems in acquiring a sense of overall gestalt of
linguistic entities. Patients seem unable to appreciate the relations among the key
points of the story .... The basic schema-the major episodes organized in an
appropriate manner-seems disturbed, if not totally destroyed, while it may well be
spared even in linguistically compromised left hemisphere patients. (p. 28)
Gardner (1981) concludes elsewhere that right-hemisphere patients "lack the

ability to set up a 'scaffolding' for a story. They are unable to figure out the
underlying architecture or composition, the nature of, and relationship between,
the various parts and characters of a story. Instead, each part stands alone, a
single brick unrelated to any other-or to the entire edifice" (p. 76). In short, "it
is the left hemisphere that, when isolated, tends to miss the point in linguistic
material" (Gardner, 1981, pp. 76-77; italics are the present author's).
Gardner and his associates do caution that not all right hemisphere patients
show the behaviors described above. The role of severity and location of the
lesion(s) has not yet been determined, but variation along these Jines
undoubtedly contributes in an important fashion to the exact nature of the
resulting cognitive impairment. While sample sizes were too small to be
conclusive, they note (Gardner, 1981; Wapner et ai., 1981) that these deficits
are most common among patients with large lesions in the frontal areas of the
right hemisphere.
Humor and the Right Hemisphere
The most common characteristic of attempts to explain humor is probably an

emphasis on the importance of incongruity (see McGhee, 1979, for a detailed
discussion of issues in connection with incongruity). Incongruity may be neither
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for humor, but it is at least cental to much
of the humor we experience. The findings discussed in the previous section
suggest that the postulated simultaneous or holistic processing capacities of the
right hemisphere play a central role in producing awareness of incongruous
relationships- regardless of whether the incongruities are experienced as
humorous. McGhee (1979) emphasized the importance of a clear under-
standing or knowledge of the normal scheme of things (i.e., relationships that
typically hold between stimulus elements in a given context) as a prerequisite
for perceiving humor (given a playful mental set) in an incongruous or distorted
depiction of those elements. It is precisely this contextually based intellectual
mastery over events that right hemisphere patients appear to have lost. If an
individual cannot readily store and recall information relative to varying
contexts, the essential cognitive prerequisites for (at least certain forms of)
humor should be missing. Thus, patients with right-hemisphere impairment
28 Paul E. McGhee
should show a severely disturbed sense of humor, including inappropriate

laughter, inappropriate humor production, and sharply reduced humor compre-
hension.
Spontaneous Laughter. Laughter disorders have long been known to medical

researchers. Duchowny discusses this topic in detail in Volume II so only
limited attention will be given to it here. It should be remembered in considering
this evidence that laughter is not a clear index of the extent of underlying humor
that the individual has experienced. Laughter is highly susceptible to social
context (see Chapter 7 by Chapman) and generally shows only a moderate
positive relationship with funniness ratings given by the same person. Disorders
of laughter, then, do not necessarily imply disorders of some aspect of humor
appreciation.
Sackheim, Weiman, Gur, Greenberg, and Hungerbuhler (Note 3; cited by
Tucker, 1981) found that right-hemisphere damage was associated with
frequent spontaneous outbursts of laughter. Similarly, sedation of the right
hemisphere with sodium amytal produces increased laughter (Perria, Rosadini,
& Rossi, 1961; Terzian, 1964). One study has been completed in which the
laughter observed is clearly in response to humor stimuli. Gardner, Ling,
Flamm, and Silverman ( 1975) showed a series of cartoons to both right and left-
hemisphere patients and found that right-hemisphere patients showed much
more variability in their laughter. That is, they were much more likely to show
either extremely high amounts of laughter or no laughter at all in comparison
to normals or left-hemisphere patients. Gardner et at. noted that extreme
laughter often occurred in the absence of evidence of comprehension, and that
cartoons that were understood were frequently accompanied by an absence of
any laughter. They also concluded that these findings are consistent with the
view that the right hemisphere may be especially important for the production of
emotionally appropriate responses (Gainotti, 1972; Gardner, 1975). It will be
suggested below that metacognitive processing factors may also be altered by
right-hemisphere damage, so that judgments about funniness are based on
different considerations than is normally the case.
Spontaneous Joking. Evidence on the effect of brain damage on spontaneous

joking is very sparse, in comparison to laughter. The limited data that are
available, however, are consistent with those obtained for laughter. Thus,
Gainotti (1972) found an increased frequency of joking among right-hemisphere
patients. Perria, Rosadini, and Rossi (1961) and Terzian (1964) found that
sedation of the right hemsphere produced increased joking. Other clinical
reports, however, suggest that the jokes that right-hemisphere patients do tell
tend to be inappropriate and to be told at inappropriate times (Gainotti, 1972;
Gardner, 1975; Geschwind, Note 4; Weinstein & Kahn, 1955). It appears,
then, that right-hemisphere damage may be more disruptive to the joking
component of one's sense of humor than damage to the left. The role of the
specific area and extent of damage remains undetermined.
The Role of Arousal and Hemispheric Lateraiization in Humor 29
Humor Comprehension and Appreciation. Wapner, Hamby, and Gardner

(1981) found that, in comparison to normal controls, right-hemisphere patients
showed a reduced ability to offer a reasonable explanation for cartoon humor
and chose both a significantly lower percentage of correct choices of the
funniest caption from among four possible captions Uoking, non sequitur,
straightforward neutral, and straightforward sad) and a greater percentage of
non sequitur endings as funniest. They concluded that "the result with non
sequiturs suggests that the right hemisphere patients recognize the importance
of the form of a joke but they have difficulty fully interpreting a joke's content."
That is, both the correct punch line and the non sequitur satisfied the normal
prerequisite for a joke (not directly following from the joke stem), but the non
sequitur lacked meaningful coherence. Right-hemisphere patients also showed
less differentiation (in terms of funniness ratings) between funny and unfunny
items than did normals. This resulted from their tendency to give higher ratings
to the unfunny items; their ratings for stimuli recognized as jokes were
comparable to those of normals. Wapner et al. suggested that right-hemisphere
damage may be most disruptive of the ability to appreciate unfamiliar humor,
while tending to leave intact memory for old humor. This view was based on
right-hemisphere patient's ability to &till tell previously memorized jokes and to
distinguish familiar foils (e.g., "Why did the chicken cross the road?" "To get to
the other side.") from unfamiliar ones. Finally, Winner and Gardner (1977)
found that when appropriate or literal pictorial depictions of simple meta-
phorical expressions were presented to normals and left-hemisphere patients,
they laughed and found the literal pictures absurd. Right-hemisphere patients,
however, did not see them as amusing and were as likely to choose the literal as
the appropriate picture as "going best" with the metaphoric sentence.
Brownell, Michel, Powelson, and Gardner (Note 5) argued that both surprise
and coherence are important in humor based on incongruity. They also noted
that these two dimensions correspond well with the two-stage theories of humor
offered by Shultz (1972, 1976) and Suls (1972). According to these views, one
must first identify the incongruity (that leads to surprise) and then resolve it by
showing how the depicted relationships make sense in some unexpected way. In
discussing the findings presented above, Brownell et al. suggested that right-
hemisphere patients appear able to reach only the first of the two stages of
processing required for full appreciation of the humor depicted. They show
surprise at a relationship that is incongruous or unexpected, but they are unable
to integrate the punch line information with information from the rest of the joke
to provide a coherent overall package of meanings. "Integration in this context
requires a listener to review the elements of the joke and to identify a new,
internally consistent, line of reasoning from which the punch line could well
follow as part of a coherent narrative .... This pattern of deficits also clarifies
an earlier claim that right hemisphere patients' narrative deficit is due to an
inability to integrate content across parts of a narrative unit" (Brownell et al.,
1982). It may be, then, that disruption of the sense of humor as a result of right-
hemisphere damage is simply one additional by-product of a general reduction
30 Paul E. McGhee
of cognitive capacities in connection with tasks or activities requiring the rapid

integration of divergent information; that is, requiring simultaneous or holistic
cognitive processing.
An Integrated Model of Hemisphere Involvement in Humor
The findings reviewed above strongly suggest that the right hemisphere plays a
central role in the comprehension and appreciation of humor. While caution
must always be exercised in drawing conclusions about normal brain functions
on the basis of data from damaged brains (Springer & Deutsch, 1981), patients
with right-hemisphere lesions show deficits in numerous capacities in a
nonhumor context that should interfere with normal humor appreciation, as
well. These include a reduced ability to: (1) consider connotations of words, (2)
interpret simple metaphors, (3) organize information into coherent sequences,
(4) detect bizarre or incongruous elements, (5) integrate details into a broader
coherent whole, (6) judge plausibility of an event relative to a particular context,
(7) consider interrelationships between parts, and (8) go beyond specific details
to "get the point" of a message. Data from the limited number of humor studies
completed with individuals with right- or left-hemisphere damage are consistent
with the view that it is the right hemisphere that performs the insightful
integration of the key elements of information that must be meaningfully linked
before the humor can be understood and appreciated. If the left hemisphere
must fend for itself, the individual may be surprised by the humor stimulus (see
Brownell et aI., 1982), but will be unable to determine how the surprising event
does meaningfully fit in. A given joke, cartoon, or spontaneous humorous
incident requires simultaneous awareness of several key bits of information
represented in the current stimulus event, along with pertinent context-related
knowledge derived from past experience. The right hemisphere's greater
interconnectedness of neurons makes it better suited to perform this function
than the left hemisphere.
Normally, of course, the two hemispheres do not operate in isolation from
one another. Tucker (1981), for example, noted that "the human brain must be
considered something of a binary system, with two functionally differentiated
information-processing subsystems." How, then, do the two hemispheres
interact in processing humor, and what role is played by the left hemisphere? In
the case of verbally mediated humor, left hemisphere processing should
predominate up to the punch line. That is, language automatically entails
relational or sequential processing because words must follow each other in
time. As one reads or listens to a joke, incoming information is continually
related to what has been said and to what is expected to follow. In the case of
straightforward communications, the left hemisphere is fully competent to
understand statements and respond appropriately. When the unexpected and
incongruous information in a joke is delivered (in the punch line), however, the
left hemisphere appears unable to go beyond registering surprise. It is the right
hemisphere that comes into play at this point and produces the simultaneous
awareness of two meanings (as in a pun) or of diverse elements that must be
brought together in order to appreciate the humor potentially present.
Cartoon humor should be processed in the same fashion, unless the cartoon is
simple enough to be understood with one quick glance. As the individual scans
the surface of the drawing, increasing amounts of information are picked up in
sequential fashion. Eventually incongruous or inconsistent information will be
detected. The cartoon will not be understood until other information available
from either the cartoon or the individual's prior experience is seen to provide a
meaningful and coherent link with the elements forming the incongruity. Again,
this presumably requires right-hemisphere involvement.
Fouts (Note 6) appears to have been the first person to speculate about the
roles of simultaneous and successive processing in humor. He argued (at the
second International Conference on Humor in Los Angeles) that both processes
are involved in humor. Simultaneous processing was first considered to lead
to a global perception of key relationships; the humor recipient then sequentially
compares the pattern just received with the expected pattern-that is, with what
has happened in the past. According to Fouts, it is only after this sequential
process leads to a comparison of the present incongruous event with expected
relationships drawn from one's memory that humor occurs. This position, then,
appears to link the humorous insight most directly to left-hemisphere function-
ing, although both hemispheres clearly contribute in key ways. The position
outlined here differs from that of Fouts in that I have argued that simultaneous
processing in the right hemisphere plays the most important role in the
humorous insight. At some level, the individual is aware of both the expected
relationship and the current incongruous relationship at the same time.
Sequential processing is considered to come into play after the humor has been
perceived, as the individual thinks about why the joke or cartoon is funny or
otherwise reflects about the contents of the punch line or drawing.
An Optimal Balance of Right- and Left-hemisphere Processing? Every

comedian knows that timing and delivery are critical to maximizing humor. A
punch line must be compact and not drag out the critical information necessary
for "getting" the joke. Freud (1905/1960) observed decades ago that "wit says
what it does say, not always in a few, but always in too few words." If humor
does characteristically involve a sequence of left followed by right (and perhaps
again left) hemisphere cognitive processing, brevity may enhance humor in
either phase. That is, a prolonged build-up prior to the punch line may interfere
with humor by disrupting the expectation that the funny part always comes
within certain reasonable time limits. If too much time is spent in the sequential
processing phase of the joke, the punch line may be more likely to be
experienced as a "letdown." The punch line itself may either present the critical
information for joke comprehension in a brief and compact fashion or in a slow
and prolonged fashion. The latter may interfere with humor appreciation by
fostering a switching back to a left hemisphere mode of processing just at the
32 Paul E. McGhee
point where a sudden right-hemisphere-mediated insight should be occurring.

That is, a quick integration of pertinent information may be central to
maximizing funniness, and a punch line that is not sufficiently compact may
interfere with this timing.
Previous research with children (McGhee, 1976, 1979; Zigler, Levine, &
Gould, 1966, 1967) has shown that humor appreciation is maximized when
some optimal moderate amount of cognitive effort is required for compre-
hension. Reconceptualized in view of the present considerations, it is not clear
whether the" optimal challenge" explanation offered for this finding applies to
the left-hemisphere- or right-hemisphere-oriented activities presumed to be
involved in humor appreciation. McGhee's (1976) interpretation of his data,
however, suggests that it is the amount of effort required to achieve the holistic
synthesis of key elements presumably accomplished by the right hemisphere
that accounts for the data obtained. This suggests that if the right hemisphere
achieves the necessary insight too quickly (or easily) the joke will not be very
funny. Similarly, if the insight is achieved only after considerable thought
(presumably including some amount of analytical or sequential processing)
funniness will be sharply reduced. Some optimal moderate level of effort or time
required for successful integration and resolution of incongruous elements
appears to maximize funniness. Increased joke complexity may reduce humor
not so much because the insightful integration of key elements is itself more
difficult, but rather because it places the individual in a predominantly
analytical or left-hemisphere frame of mind.
This explanation may also account for the common observation that trying to
analyze or explain humor interferes with funniness. McGhee (1975, un-
published data), for example, found that children who were asked to explain
why jokes were funny laughed less if the jokes were complex or challenging, but
not if they were simple. McGhee (1979) explained this finding in terms of a
switch from a playful to a serious frame of mind, but it may be that the request
for an analysis of the jokes simply disrupted humor by placing greater emphasis
on sequential processing. This reduction of humor occurs even if adults provide
the explanation of what is funny about a cartoon or joke (Rothbart, 1976).
The notion that a set to analyze or explain humor leads to relatively greater
left-hemisphere involvement is supported by data obtained by Bever (1980).
Bever found that although music is commonly assumed to be processed mainly
by the right hemisphere, trained musicians (who are more analytical when
listening to music) showed better recognition of melodies played through the
right ear (received first by the left hemisphere) than through the left ear.
Musically naive listeners showed better recognition through the left ear. If the
left hemisphere plays a more active role in analyzing music, it probably does so
in connection with humor as well.
Finally, future research on meta cognitive processes in humor should include
attention to issues related to hemispheric differences in cognitive processing.
Caputo and Leventhal (Note 7) obtained evidence suggesting that males and
females may differ in the extent to which information resulting from right- and
left-hemisphere processing influences judgments of funniness. They fed the

sound track of cartoons (including audience laughter) into either the right ear or
left ear. Males rated the cartoons funnier when heard through the right ear,
while females rated them funnier when heard through the left ear. In Leventhal's
view, this difference is due to females' generally greater reliance on emotional or
holistic cues in forming judgments. Future studies along these lines can clarify
the differential contribution of the two hemispheres to humor by measuring the
relative amounts of right- and left-hemisphere involvement at different points in
the presentation of cartoons and jokes.
SUMMARY
This chapter examines existing research and theory concerning the role of
arousal in humor and discusses issues and data that have implications for the
possible differential operation of the two cerebral hemispheres in humor.
Primary attention is given to Berlyne's (1972) view that an arousal boost and
arousal jag mechanism are both involved in determining the extent of pleasure
derived from humor. Berlyne's position has led to confusion as to whether
arousal change should be related to humor appreciation in a positive linear,
inverted-V, or V-shaped fashion. Since all possible relationships can be
interpreted as being consistent with Berlyne's model, it is concluded that the
model is inherently untestable. Physiological data provide stronger support for
the operation of the arousal boost than the arousal jag mechanism in
contributing to funniness, although this may be due to the failure of investigators
to use humor stimuli that produce very high levels of arousal in subjects. While
extent of humor appreciation does appear to be positively related to amount of
arousal change associated with most jokes or cartoons, the chain of causal
influence operating between arousal change, laughter, and cognitions related to
humor comprehension and appreciation remains unclear.
Existing research and theory pointing to a different style of cognitive
processing by the two cerebral hemispheres are discussed, leading to the
conclusion that the right hemisphere may playa critical role in understanding
and appreciating humor. Studies of patients who have suffered damage to the
right hemisphere ( especially the frontal areas) point to deficits, in comparison to
normals, in comprehension of both metaphors and humor. These patients have
particular difficulty in judging the appropriateness of a given stimulus event
within a specified context; they commonly fail to see the meaningful coherence
of incongruities composing a joke or cartoon. It is proposed that simultaneous
processing associated primarily with the right hemisphere plays the key role of
achieving humorous insights, although sequential processing associated with the
left hemisphere will usually be involved in providing pertinent information
34 Paul E. McGhee
necessary tor achieving such insights. It is also proposed that an optimal

balance of right- and left-hemisphere processing is critical for maximizing the
funniness of a joke or cartoon.
REFERENCE NOTES
1. Fry, W. F. Instinctual and physiologic bases of the humor experience. Paper
presented at the meeting of the Western Psychological Association, Vancouver,
September 1969.
2. Panagis, D. H., Leventhal, H., & Caputo, G. C. Sex differences in integrating focal
and contextual cues. Unpublished manuscript, University of Wisconsin, 1975.
3. Sackheim, H. A., Weiman, A. L., Gur, R. C. Greenberg, M. S., & Hungerbuhler, J.
P. Functional brain asymmetry in the experience of positive and negative emotions:
Lateralization of insult in cases of uncontrollable emotional outbursts. Unpublished
manuscript, 1980.
4. Geschwind, N. An approach to a theory of localization of audition in the human
brain. Paper presented at the International Neuropsychology Symposium, Roc-
Amadour, France, 1976.
5. Brownell, H. H., Michel, D., Powelson, J., & Gardner, H. Surprise and coherence:
Sensitivity to verbal humor in right hemisphere patients. Unpublished manuscript,
1982.
6. Fouts, R. S. Chimpanzee language and humor. Paper presented at meeting of the
Second International Conference on Humor, Los Angeles, August 1979.
7. Caputo, G. C., & Leventhal, H. Sex differences in lateralization effects for holistic-
subjective processing. Unpublished manuscript, University of Wisconsin, 1975.
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Chapter 3
Cognitive Processes in
Humor Appreciation
JERRY SULS
When we think about humorous experience our attention is typically focused on

its affective or emotional aspects. After all, jokes can liven up an evening or
boost our egos at the expense of a disenfranchised group. The affect surrounding
humor may make us overlook the cognitive effort that is essential for its
comprehension and appreciation. Also, the cognitive processes may be missed
because, when humor is most effective, the mental work occurs instantaneously
and apparently without effort. But producing and understanding one's native
language are no less phenomenologically instantaneous and effortless. None-
theless, there is substantial evidence from the fields of linguistics and cognitive
psychology that complex mental processes are at work (Fodor, Bever, &
Garrett, 1974; Chomsky, 1965). The understanding and appreciation of humor
should not be expected to be a less complex process.
The present chapter is concerned with the operation of mental processes that
allow for the comprehension and appreciation of humor. It is not a compre-
hensive review and will give special attention to the cognitive incongruity-
resolution model that is primarily concerned with verbal and cartoon humor.
Cognitive theories of humor are not a new development; Hazlitt, Schopenhauer,
Kant, and others speculated about the cognitive processes implicated in humor.
To set the stage for contemporary developments, a brief review of historical
theories follows.
EARLY COGNITIVE APPROACHES
Several early philosophers and essayists looked for an explanation for humor-
why is it funny-and thought they found it in the incongruous or surprising
40 Jerry Suls
elements presented by humorous materials. The Scottish poet and philosopher

James Beattie (1776) proposed the idea that" ... laughter arises from the view
of two or more inconsistent, unsuitable, or incongruous parts or circumstances
considered as united in a complex object or as acquiring a sort of mutual
relation from the peculiar manner in which the mind takes notice of them." A
simpler statement was offered by the critic William Hazlitt (1819): "The
essence of the laughable is the incongruous, the disconnecting of one idea from
another, or the jostling of one feeling against another." This is one of the first
semblances of an incongruity theory and the notion was echoed by Kant (1790)
and Schopenhauer (18 I 9). The English philosopher Herbert Spencer (1860)
also subscribed to an incongruity account, but he tried to tie it to physiological
or biological elements. Thus, he suggested that laughter results from an
overflow of surplus energy through the muscles or respiratory system. This
surplus results when the serious expectations of a person are not met and
instead their attention is directed to something frivolous.
More recently, Arthur Koestler (1964) proposed that humor results from
bisociation-the perceiving of a situation or idea in two habitually incompatible
frames of reference. The bisociation causes an abrupt transfer of the train of
thought from one matrix to another governed by a different logic or rule of the
game. Koestler maintains that bisociation is not only a feature of humor, but of
other forms of creativity, such as art and scientific insight. Of course, the
obvious question is why jokes evoke laughter, while scientific discoveries and
great works of art usually evoke respect or sympathy, or solemnity on occasion.
Koestler argues that what emotion is generated depends in a large part on the
emotional climate. Scientific reasoning and discovery are done in a neutral or
detached emotional climate. Art is generally viewed with a sympathic or
admiring tone. Koestler thought that humor occurs in a climate of aggressive-
ness or anxiety. Thus, according to this theory humor shares many features with
other works, but is distinctive because of the climate it occupies. As we shall
see, the importance of emotional climate comes up in more than one of the
recent approaches that have been advanced.
Even from this limited survey, the reader can appreciate the role that
incongruity was seen to play in humor, but the reader should also recognize that
some of these statements are ambiguous. For Hazlitt it appears that only
incongruity is essential to create humor, but for others such as Beattie and
Koestler, the argument is more complex. For example, it is not entirely clear
what Beattie meant when speaking of incongruent ideas considered together as
an assemblage. Similarly, Koestler's ideas about bisociation suggest that it is
not sufficient that two formerly incompatible ideas are juxtaposed, but must be
combined to form a new product. Despite these ambiguities, all of these
approaches set the stage for more recent psychological perspectives.
Cognitive Processes in Humor Appreciation 41
RECENT PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES·
Incongruity Theories
One contemporary view follows directly from the observations of Hazlitt, Kant,
and others in positing that incongruity is the necessary and sufficient element
that elicits humor. Nerhardt (1976, 1977) argues that humor is a consequence
of the discrepancy between two mental representations, one of which is an
expectation (presumably derived from, for example, the main body of a joke
preceding the punch line) and the other is some other idea or percept (for
example, as contained in the punch line). According to this account, the greater
the divergence of a stimulus from expectation in one or more dimensions, the
funnier the stimulus. Of course not all surprises are funny. Opening the door to
one's closet and finding a corpse is unlikely to inspire laughter. Recognizing this
problem, Nerhardt (1977) suggests that perception of incongruity must occur in
a safe or nonthreatening environmental to evoke humor.
To test this model Nerhardt (1970) conducted a series of ingenious
experiments in which expectations and divergence from expectation were
manipulated. For example, in one study he had subjects lift a series of weights
under the guise that weight discriminations were being tested. The final weight
in the series was greatly discrepant from the prior weight (either much heavier
or much lighter). Consistent with Nerhardt's thesis, subjects smiled or laughed
more the more discrepant the final weight was from expectation, a result that
has been replicated by Gerber and Routh (1975), Deckers and Kizer (1975),
and Deckers, Jenkins, and Gladfelter (1977). The latter study is especially
interesting because the experimenters had a series of control conditions. In one
condition the subject was led to expect a much heavier weight and had previous
experience with it. In this case humor was low compared to experimental
subjects whose expectations were "rudely" disconfirmed.
Nerhardt's approach argues that incongruity is a necessary and sufficient
condition to produce humor, given that the stimulus receives a safe interpre-
tation. And indeed it seems clear that many instances of real life humorous
experiences and ones devised by comedians and film directors fall under this
category. However, there are forms of verbal and cartoon humor that appear to
involve a more complex process-something beyond mere incongruity.
Incongruity-Resolution Theory
As mentioned above, some of the earliest writings on humor (for example by

Beattie) considered surprise or incongruity but talked about the" assemblage of
42 Jerry Suls
the incongruent elements" as if they could be held together by some common

thread. That is, at some level the incongruous elements can be seen to fit
together. This notion is the inspiration for what has been called the "in-
congruity-resolution theory" of humor advanced independently by Jones
(1970), Shultz (1972), and Suls (1972). Stated quite simply, the theory is that
humor results when the perceiver meets with an incongruity (usually in the form
of a punch line or a cartoon) and then is motivated to resolve the incongruity
either by retrieval of information in the joke or cartoon or from his/her own
storehouse of information. According to this account, humor results when the
incongruity is resolved; that is, the punch line is seen to make sense at some
level with the earlier information in the joke. Lacking a resolution the
respondent does not "get" the joke, is puzzled, and sometimes even frustrated.
The resolution phase is a form of problem solving, an attempt to draw
information or inferences that make a link or provide a fit between the initial
body of the joke, cartoon, or situation and its ending (see Figure 1).
To illustrate, consider the following joke: A group of kidnappers is arrested,
tried, and sentenced to 15 years on a chain gang. But they escape, 12 of them
chained together at the ankle, getting by the guards posing as an immense charm
bracelet.
In this joke we have an incongruous punch line-prisoners escaping by posing
as a charm bracelet-but there is more here because by being chained together
the prisoners do in an odd way resemble a charm bracelet. There is some fit
between the incongruity and the other information in the joke. Recall that for
Find rule
that makes
ending follow
from preceding
material
Is rule found? I
l
YES
t
NO
I Laughter II Puzzlement I
Figure 3-1. Incongruity Resolution Model. (From "A Two-Stage Model for the
Appreciation of Jokes and Cartoons" by J. Suls, in J. H. Goldstein and P. E. McGhee,
Eds., Psychology of Humor, New York: Academic Press, 1972. Copyright 1972.
Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)
Nerhardt incongruity alone is sufficient, but if that were so then we should be

able to substitute that the prisoners escaped by posing as a fruit salad or some
other non sequitur. We submit that this substitution is not as funny as the
original because it does not provide for any apparent resolution.
Or another example: Professor: "Mr. Twirp, what do you know about French
syntax?" Student: "Gosh, I didn't know they had to pay for their fun". The
punch line is incongruous but makes sense because of the phonetic ambiguity of
syntax (sin tax). The process of incongruity resolution is akin to problem
solving, but it appears to be much faster, almost automatic-more like viewing
the Necker cube from a different perspective or having an "insight experience"
than solving a crossword puzzle. It is worthwhile noting that the problem solving
involved in humor appreciation may only be recognized when a joke has the
recipient stumped, when he/she is trying to figure out why everyone else is
laughing and can perceive the incongruity, but cannot figure it out. Someone
who does not know that the city of Venice has a series of canals that substitute
for streets would be very confused by Woody Allen's joke about the girl he met
in Europe who ran off to Venice, became a street-walker and drowned.
If a problem-solving process underlies humor appreciation then why do not
all successful problem-solving efforts produce humor? First, it seems clear that
the respondent must be in a playful set and the emotional climate must be
appropriate. As McGhee (1972) noted, humor is usually presented with cues
that signify that it is not to be taken seriously. The accompanying play cue
facilitates processing of the material via fantasy assimilation, that is, in a make-
believe sense. Two implications can be drawn from the preceding point. By
recognizing that the punch line is only a part of a joke, the respondent
understands that it need not evoke concern, fear, or distress. In addition, a
fantasy set allows for resolutions that may not be fully satisfactory or logical.
This implication will be considered in greater detail in a later section.
Humorous material also often contains tendentious elements that other kinds
of puzzles or problems do not typically have. Freud (1905/1960) was one of the
first to point out the extent to which sexual or aggressive material is represented
in jokes. Of course, he argued that humor is appreciated because it expresses
these libidinous sexual or aggressive impulses that are disguised by symbolism
and incongruities-what Freud called "joke work." Although the Freudian
approach was very influential in the first half of this century, it has received less
interest in recent years primarily because there is no firm evidence supporting
the idea that humor serves a cathartic function (see McGhee, 1979, pp. 19-21).
On the other hand, Freud's observations about the structural elements (the
"joke work") of jokes strongly influenced the development of the incongruity-
resolution model. And obviously Freud was correct in pointing out that much
humor is based on or about sexual, aggressiveness, or anxiety-inducing themes.
However, since some forms of humor do not possess tendentious elements, the
presence of sexual or aggressive material cannot be the distinguishing
characteristic differentiating humor problem solving from other forms of
problem solving.
44 Jerry Suls
Another way in which humor is different from other problems is that it may
evoke what Berlyne ( 1972) called" arousal jags." This term refers to conditions
that generate an increase in arousal that is then quickly reduced that presumably
brings pleasure. Shultz (1976) has suggested that the incongruity-resolution
model can be incorporated with Berlyne's arousal jag notion if it is assumed that
the perception of joke incongruity increases the subject's level of cognitive
arousal and a successful resolution serves to decrease arousal back to baseline.
However, Shultz also acknowledges that such a conception is purely heuristic
since there is currently no way to assess cognitive arousal in a precise way.
Another problem is that certain kinds of nonhumorous puzzles may also
produce arousal jags but do not instigate laughter. A tentative answer to this
dilemma will be reserved for a later section. The reader is referred to McGhee's
chapter in this volume for a detailed discussion of arousal mechanisms and
humor.
Experimental Evidence
The earliest empirical work to emphasize that some form of problem solving is
implicated in humor came from Zigler, Levine, and Gould (1967). They
suggested that appreciation of humor requires comprehension of the material
and that appreciation should be highest when the material requires a moderate
amount of challenge or effort. Appreciation will be low when the joke material is
too easy or extremely difficult to understand. In one investigation using
cartoons of varying levels of difficulty with children in the second, third, fourth,
and fifth grades, Zigler et al. found some evidence for the so-called cognitive
congruency principle. However, McGhee (1977) observed that neither Zigler et
al. nor McGhee ( 1971) in another investigation had been able to specify a priori
a relative difference in the amount of cognitive effort required by different
children to understand the humor.
A more recent study (McGhee, 1976) provided a better test by employing
children who varied in the degree to which they had acquired conservation and
class inclusion. Jokes were presented to them in which the humor derived from
the violation of the concepts. For example a joke requiring conservation was:
Mr. Jones went into a restaurant and ordered a whole pizza for dinner. When the
waiter asked if he wanted it cut into six or eight pieces, Mr. Jones said: "Oh, you'd
better make it six! I could never eat eight."
Here the humor appears to result from recognizing ,that Mr. Jone's last
statement violates the conservation of mass. McGhee found, consistent with the
cognitive congruency notion, that appreciation of jokes like the one above was
greatest for children who had just recently acquired the requisite concepts, while
reduced appreciation was shown by children who did not yet possess
conservation or had mastered it some years previously.
In general, these results strongly implicate the importance of cognitive

processes and cognitive challenge for humor, but McGhee's and earlier studies
do not provide a test of incongruity-resolution theory per se. Although the
findings of Zigler et al. and McGhee relate to the comprehension of the humor
material, they do not specify whether it is the incongruity or the resolution phase
or both that require an optimal challenge to enhance appreciation.
The most direct evidence for the incongruity-resolution model comes from a
series of studies conducted by Shultz and his colleagues. In these studies Shultz
examined the role of incongruity and resolution by creating incongruity-
removed and resolution-removed versions of verbal jokes or cartoons. If these
elements are essential, then removal of either one should decrease appreciation
of the joke. Shultz and Horibe (1974) presented children in grades 1, 3, 5, and 7
with a series of original, resolution-removed, or incongruity-removed jokes. For
example a child was shown the original:
"Doctor, come at once! Our baby swallowed a fountain pen!" "I'll be right over. What
are you doing in the meantime?" "Using a pencil."
The reader will note that in the original "Using a pencil" is incongruous but
follows from the ambiguity of the question that precedes it "What are you doing
in the meantime?" -meaning what are you using as a substitute for the pen. As
Shultz and others have pointed out, linguistic ambiguity is a common way that
humor provides incongruity and potential resolution.
Other children received a resolution-removed version of the joke:
"Doctor, come at once! Our baby swallowed a rubberband!" ''I'll be right over. What
are you doing in the meantime?" "Using a pencil."
In this version, there is still an incongruity. Using a pencil is an odd answer to

"What are you doing in the meantime?" But there is no resolution because a
pencil can't substitute for a rubberband.
Finally, other subjects were given an incongruity-removed version of the
joke:
"Doctor, come at once! Our baby swallowed a fountain pen!" "I'll be right over. What
are you doing in the meantime?" "We don't know what to do."
Each child was presented via tape recording a series of jokes, one-third of each
type. The child was asked to provide a funniness rating on a scale and the
experimenter also noted the child's overt reaction (smiling or laughing). The
results showed that the 8-, 10-, and 12-year-olds found the original forms
funnier than the resolution-removed jokes and the resolution-removed jokes
funnier than the incongruity-removed jokes. Interestingly, the 6-year-olds
showed no difference between the original and resolution-removed forms, but
both were funnier than forms without incongruity. Shultz has suggested that at
46 Jerry Suls
an early stage of development (prior to the onset of concrete operational

thought) only incongruity is required to elicit a humor response, but at 8 or older
both incongruity and resolution are required. The details of Shultz's develop-
mental theory and other data on the development of humor are not the subject of
this chapter. However, we can note that the general outline of incongruity-
resolution theory is consistently supported at least for children of 8 years or
older. And there are some data that suggest that even younger children may
appreciate joke resolutions if the humor stimulus is easy to understand (Pien &
Rothbart, 1976). In addition, the same general pattern of results obtained by
Shultz and Horibe (1974) has also been shown with original, incongruity-
removed, and resolution-removed cartoons (Shultz, 1972) and riddles (Shultz,
1974) in populations of children and adults as well (Jones, 1970).
Although Shultz's and Jone's results are consistent with the incongruity-
resolution model, there are problems with the methodology employed. For
example, Pien and Rothbart (1977), as well as Nerhardt (1977), point out
problems in creating resolution-removed forms of humor materials.
If a researcher does not retain the same incongruity for both original and resolution-
removed forms, the incongruity alone condition may present a different level of
incongruity than the original version ... (thus) if the original version ... is pre-
ferred ... we do not know whether it is due to appreciation of resolution aspects or to
appreciation of additional incongruities present. (Pien & Rothbart, 1977, p. 212)
They gave, as an example, a cartoon used by Shultz (1972) that in its original
form shows a cow with an "out-of-order" sign and a girl walking angrily away
with an empty pail. In the resolution-removed version, the picture only shows a
cow with the "out-of-order" sign. Pien and Rothbart contend that the original
contains more incongruity (girl's angry expression and the empty pail) than the
altered version. These criticisms are well-taken although they do not apply to all
of the materials used in past studies. One way around the problem is to use the
method of convergent operations (Campbell & Fiske, 1959) and find other
ways to examine the impact of incongruity and resolution.
A study by Wicker, Thorelli, Barron, and Ponder (1981) takes such a
different approach. Wicker et al. had a large group of subjects rate a series of
jokes first for funniness and then on 13 other scales to assess dimensions
suggested by various accounts of humor. Some of the dimensions included
surprise, incongruity, resolution, anxiety, originality, importance, superiority,
and emotional involvement. Subjects' ratings were averaged for each of the
jokes on each of the scales and intercorrelations among scales over joke
averages were computed. These correlations were then subjected to a principal-
components factor analysis that revealed that ratings of surprise, resolution, and
originality correlated strongly with funniness and defined a factor on which
funniness ratings loaded. Ratings of painfulness and anxiety were also positively
correlated with funniness but defined a factor essentially independent of it.
Perhaps of greatest importance, partial correlations showed that painfulness and
anxiety scales were related to funniness through their common relationship with
the incongruity and resolution scales. Not only do these data suggest that both
incongruity and resolution are important in the appreciation of humor, they also
suggest that affective elements may influence humor through their effect on
cognitive mechanisms related to resolution. Thus, it appears that painful or
anxious material increases funniness not simply because it allows greater
tension release, but also because it is associated with increases in surprise and
resolution. This is indicated by the fact that
whatever variance the emotionality (painfulness, anxiety, emotional involvement)

ratings do not share with surprise-resolution ratings, they also do not share with rated
humor. This pattern of results is the one that would be obtained if the relationship
between emotionality scales and humor were mediated by incongruity-resolution
mechanisms." (Wicker et aI., 1981, p. 367)
Wicker et al.'s results provide additional support for the incongruity-resolution

formulation although, as they note, it is possible that the scales used may have
been more sensitive to incongruity-resolution mechanisms than to mechanisms
discussed by other theories (e.g., incongruity theory, psychodynamic theory).
Alternatively, results may have differed if overt mirth responses had been
assessed. Even given these caveats, these data taken together with Shultz's
studies of verbal jokes, riddles, and cartoons make a good case for the
incongruity-resolution formulation.
Two Models or One? Probably We Need Two
Suls (1972, 1977) and Shultz (1972, 1976) emphasize the importance of
incongruity and resolution for humor (for adults) while Nerhardt (1977)
believes that incongruity is sufficient. Also, Rothbart (1973, 1976) maintains
that incongruity that is perceived as safe is sufficient to evoke humor. Indeed,
the weight discrimination experiments reviewed earlier involve no obvious
resolution so it does appear that even among adults incongruity may in some
cases be sufficient. We submit, though, that most humor, particularly of a verbal
form, has an incongruity-resolution structure. Indeed Shultz (1977) examined
verbal humor from the folklore literature of cultures very different from Western
technological society-Chinese jokes, riddles from nonliterate cultures, and
Japanese riddles and folk-tales. The presence of incongruity and resolution
features was found in the vast majority of the materials (for example, of 242
Chinese jokes examined, 210 possessed incongruity and resolution). The
incidence of incongruity humor is rarer and generally involves nonverbal,
physical gags (Nerhardt's weight study is in essence a physical gag) as in
slapstick or situations where a need to make sense of things may not be urgent,
for example, when a person is intoxicated. But such cases for adults are
probably the exception rather than the rule.
48 Jerry Suls
Whether one model or two is necessary to describe the cognitive processes

underlying the humorous experience is a question far from settled. The issue is
complicated by several issues. In most studies using weight discrepancy to test
the mere incongruity theory, laughing and smiling were assessed but not humor
ratings (Deckers & Kizer, 1975; Nerhardt, 1970). This presents a problem
since laughing and smiling are not the same as humor. We can find something
humorous but neither laugh nor smile. Conversely, laughter may be induced by
many circumstances-fright, guilt, nervousness-that are not funny. Based on
these considerations, one might argue that the weight discrimination studies
only demonstrate that incongruity produces laughter, but not necessarily humor.
Perhaps this is not a problem, however, as other investigations (Deckers et aI.,
1977) collected humor ratings as well as measures of laughing and smiling and
found similar results: higher ratings of perceived humor when confronted with a
greatly discrepant weight. Even this demonstration is not completely con-
vincing. By providing subjects with a humor scale to respond to after the
incongruous incident, the experimenter may have provided demand cues (Orne,
1962) that the experience was supposed to be interpreted as humorous. This
same problem, incidentally, also applies to some other studies of mere
incongruity. For example, Shurcliff's (1968) study in which subjects anxiously
expected to have to withdraw blood from a white rat only to discover it was a
toy.
Even if research favoring the mere incongruity theory did not possess these
problems, it is still possible that a form of resolution would be present even in
the weight discrimination studies. Perhaps, the "resolution" was the recognition
by the subject that the incongruity had been purposely setup by the experi-
menter, and the subject's reaction to it and not the weight discrimination was the
real aim of the study.
Although this interpretation seems plausible, the present author still leans
toward the position that some humorous experiences are the result of mere
incongruity. One only has to think of some scenes from Mel Brooks's movies
where the situations involve the juxtaposition of completely incongruous
elements (e.g., the Spanish Inquisition staged as an Esther Williams movie with
bathing beauties, elaborate fountains, and an underwater dance in History o/the
World, Part I). However, at the risk of repeating myself, humorous experiences
based on incongruity-resolution are much more common especially for adults
and for children by the middle years (8-11) and provide the basis for most
verbal humor. Of course, one might reconcile the existence of two models by
positing that incongruity alone is funny, but incongruity followed by resolution
is funnier. This solution is appealing but has one serious flaw: There are
instances where the mere perception of an incongruity produces confusion and
frustration (see Figure 3-1) and other cases, such as the Spanish Inquisition
routine, where the incongruity alone is perceived as humorous. It is as if the
respondent is aware of instances when something more than incongruity is
involved and feels he/she must find it, but in other cases recognizes that no
resolution or "fit" is possible. How we are able to recognize the difference
between these two different kinds of humor is not clear and has been given
virtually no attention. One tentative suggestion is that when the incongruity is
extremely divergent from expectations the respondent assumes that no
resolution is possible and as a result perceives no need to attempt a "fit." But
when the incongruity falls somewhere between the expected and unexpected,
the need for resolution becomes salient and engenders frustration if it is not
found. Unfortunately, these conjectures can only be empirically examined when
we develop the tools to operationalize discrepancy or incongruity; up till now
the scaling of incongruity has received little attention.
Leventhal's Dual Process Model and Its Relevance for Humor
Cognitive models emphasize processes concerned with comprehension and

interpretation, but there must be some direct connections between cognitive
processes and affective/emotional mechanisms in humor appreciation. Perhaps
the most intriguing recent attempt to incorporate humor with emotion or affect is
Leventhal's (1979) information processing model. In this formulation
Leventhal is concerned with how emotions, like humor, are the result not just of
the person's objective judgment of a stimulus (such as a joke) but of
environmental inputs (presence of other people) and subjective expressive cues,
for example, kinesthetic feedback from smiling or laUghing.
According to Leventhal there are two distinct, albeit interacting, modes of
making judgments that lead to appraisal. One level of processing involves
objective stimulus-oriented judgments of the joke, such as its incongruity,
resolution, and other attributes, that are integrated to form an overall appraisal.
The other level of processing, a subjective mode, is based on kinesthetic
feedback from expressive reactions as well as objective appraisal of joke
quality. Interestingly, according to this approach expressive reactions are not
independent of social or external influences. For example, if other people are
laughing, the subject is also likely to do so, which should feed 'into subjective
processing. Presumably, both the outputs of SUbjective and objective processing
modes are integrated and lead to overall joke appraisal. Although both modes
Focal Stimulus ~ Appraisal

(joke of cartoon)
\ " " ,s/eling ~ Judgement

Contextual Stimulus
(audience laughter) - - - -.... Expression
Figure 3-2. Leventhal's Appraisal Model. (From "Individual Differences, Personality

and Humour Appreciation" by H. Leventhal and M. A. Safer, in A. J. Chapman and
H. C. Foot, Eds., It's a Funny Thing, Humour, London: Pergamon Press, 1977.
Copyright 1977. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)
50 Jerry Suls
should be operative, Leventhal contends that females are more likely to employ
inner feelings about the stimulus (subjective processing), while males are more
likely to make their appraisals on the basis of external features (objective
processing). This argument is based on suppositions that characterize males as
analytical and field independent and females as subjective and field dependent
Consistent with their hypothesis, Leventhal and Cupchik (1975) found that
variables that raise the subject's level of spontaneous expressive behavior (such
as a setting that permits laughter or canned laughter) also raised the level of
perceived funniness, but only for females. Males also laughed more, but ratings
of humor were unaffected. The inference from this and other studies (Cupchik &
Leventhal, 1974) is that males rely more on objective-stimulus based cues while
females rely more on SUbjective-expressive based cues.
Leventhal and Cupchik (1976) suggest that the sex difference occurs because
of differential reliance on the left or right cerebral hemispheres. Presumably,
females' reliance on emotional cues stems from the influence of the right
hemisphere that is a major center for holistic or emotional analysis. In contrast,
males rely more on objective cues because of the greater role played by the left
hemisphere that processes information objectively. Results consistent with their
reasoning were found in a study in which males and females received humorous
material and heard canned laughter through the left ear (right hemisphere) or the
right ear (left hemisphere). If females rely more on right hemisphere processing,
then they should find the material funnier when heard through the left ear. In
contrast, males should rate the material as funnier when heard through the right
ear. The results were as predicted, suggesting some general differences in
hemispheric dominance between males and females in processing of humorous
material.
Of more present relevance is the fact that the dual process model provides a
way to understand how contextual cues (canned laughter or the presence of
others) influence the appreciation of humor quite independent of the structural
properties of humor (e.g., incongruity, resolution). In fact, we might speculate
that audience cues and other facilitators of expressive reactions may be
responsible for some instances of laughter when incongruity or resolution
structures are absent (e.g., the giddy audience that will laugh at anything).
Another aspect of Leventhal's approach may provide insight into the
observation that humor processing appears to be automatic and spontaneous.
Leventhal proposes that the linkage between expressive cues (facial expression)
and evaluative reactions is normally automatic, but is disrupted if the person
deliberately focuses attention on the ongoing response. Thus, it follows that
humor should be lost by self-consciousness and indeed experimental data show
that deliberate attention to one's laughter diminishes enjoyment of the
experience (Cupchik & Leventhal, 1974). Given these considerations, it is not
surprising that the comprehension of joke material must be a spontaneous,
almost automatic process for humor to result It also follows that explaining a
joke will never be as funny as processing it naturally. This point is emphasized
because Rothbart ( I 976) has argued that if incongruity resolution is involved in
humor, then subjects should find an incongruous picture funnier when the
incongruity is pointed out and explained than if only the incongruity is pointed
out. Finding that the explanation of the incongruity was not perceived as funny
by her subjects was interpreted by Rothbart as evidence that resolution is not
required and may even detract from humor appreciation. However, in light of
the above comments it should be apparent that by explaining the incongruity
Rothbart disturbed the usual automaticity and disrupted the spontaneous link
between facial expression and evaluative appraisal. For these reasons,
Rothbart's experiment is not a cogent test of the incongruity-resolution
model.
It is hoped that by now the reader can recognize the potential of Leventhal's
scheme for conceptualizing the processing of humorous stimuli and for
providing an explanation of phenomena where the incongruity-resolution model
is not sufficient. As knowledge about the links between expressive cues and
emotional experience and dual processing increases so might our understanding
of the complex set of factors that influence the humorous experience.
Extension of Incongruity Resolution Model to Disparagement Humor
Incongruity-resolution theory is couched in cognitive terms and, for that reason,

readers may assume that the model is most appropriate for understanding
intellectual humor. However, the model may also provide an explanation for
tendentious humor, particularly the kind that involves disparagement. In such
humor, one party is disparaged or aggressed against by another party (either
another character in the joke or the narrator). For example:
Question: If a 1DO-pound student senator and a 200-pound student senator jumped off
a tall building at exactly the same moment, who would come out ahead?
Answer: The rest of the campus. (Taken from Wicker et ai., 1980).
Theories about this kind of humor, such as superiority theory (LaFave, 1972)
or dispositional theory (Zillmann & Cantor, 1976), assume that humor
increases with negative sentiments and decreases with positive sentiments
toward the debased agent. More simply, appreciation should be maximal when
our friends humiliate our enemies and minimal when our enemies manage to get
the upper hand over our friends (Zillmann & Cantor, 1976). The reader is
referred to Chapter 5 by Zillmann for a review of research on this theory.
Suls ( 1977) has suggested that the incongruity-resolution model may be able
to account for disparagement humor if it is recognized that in such humor the
punch line (incongruity) typically involves a surprising misfortune. According
to Suls, a respondent who sympathizes or identifies with the disparaged party is
less likely to make sense of the unexpected misfortune or resolve the joke. That
is, for the sympathetic respondent the incongruity should not fit. On the other
hand, the more hostile or superior we feel toward the disparaged joke character,
52 Jerry Suls
the more the surprising misfortune will seem to fit or "make sense" based on
how we feel about the victim. Thus, for the example above, students with
negative attitudes toward their politically oriented classmates should enjoy the
above joke because there is more resolution.
Is there any evidence to support this approach? In 1977 Suls provided a
review suggesting that the results of past disparagement studies can be
interpreted within the new framework. Since then a study was designed and
conducted to examine whether affective reactions toward joke protagonists
impact on joke resolution.
Wicker, Barron, and Willis (1980) had college students rate written jokes for
funniness and on a series of scales such as surprise ("Did you feel surprised by
the ending?"), resolution ("When over your surprise, did the unexpected thing
in the joke make sense?") and anxiety ("Did the joke refer to a topic about
which you feel anxious?"). The jokes were varied on the degree of equity of
retaliation in an exchange of insults, the status of the two parties in the
exchange, and popularity of the victim of the joke squelch. A major finding of
the study was that jokes with disliked victims were rated as both funnier and
higher in resolution than were jokes with neutral or liked victims. In other
words, when the unfortunate outcome was perceived as "fitting," the joke was
perceived as funnier. Wicker et al. also found that when the misfortune was seen
as overretaliation, rated funniness and resolution decreased. Further, when
perceived resolution was controlled via analysis of covariance, the effect of the
degree of retaliation was nonsignificant. The suggestion of these results is that
disparagement enhances humor only if it is seen· as providing a reasonable
resolution and that feelings toward protagonists influence humor appreciation
via the resolution of incongruity.
Problems for the Incongruity-Resolution Model
The incongruity-resolution model has obtained experimental support for its

major contentions, but there are some unresolved problems that should be
noted. First, it is not clear whether incongruity or incongruity-resolution
theories should be considered models of humor comprehension or models of
humor appreciation. This was a point initially raised by McGhee and Goldstein
(1972) and still applies. Cognitive models describe the elements that the
respondent needs to perceive and understand to "get" the joke, but is
comprehension sufficient to produce laughter or a humorous experience? The
problem has been acknowledged to some extent since Shultz, Suls, Jones,
Nerhardt, and Rothbart all make reference to arousal properties of humor that
are thought to accompany cognitive processing and provide the motivational!
affective impetus. Although Berlyne's, Leventhal's, and to some extent Suls's
integration of disparagement humor with the incongruity-resolution model
suggests a way to bridge the gap between affective and cognitive variables, full
synthesis has not been attempted. At this point the cognitive models are
considered models of comprehension and appreciation, though it is recognized

that they are incomplete.
Turning to another problem, Rothbart and Pien (1977) have argued that in
many jokes "resolution of incongruity may not make the incongruity completely
meaningful and may sometimes add new elements of incongruity" (p. 37). They
provide as an example: "Why did the elephant sit on the marshmallow?
Because he didn't want to fall in the hot chocolate" (p. 37). The answer
provides an explanation of the incongruity (an elephant sitting on a marsh-
mallow), but also introduces a new element of incongruity: an elephant sitting in
a cup of hot chocolate. Rothbart and Pien argue from this and other examples
that incongruity must be sufficient to produce humor and that in some cases
resolution only adds more incongruity. These observations are interesting, but
represent a misreading of the incongruity-resolution model. Although it is
assumed that an incongruity must be perceived to fit in some fashion with earlier
premises of the joke, it is not assumed that the fit must be complete or perfect; in
fact joke structure seems to require that some rules are violated. In one sense we
agree with Rothbart and Pien: in humor we are not engaging in the usual kind of
problem solving where the aim is no loose ends; in humor there is a "willing
suspension of disbelief' or mode of fantasy assimilation (McGhee, 1972;
1979). However, a good fit should provide more enjoyment than a "bad" one.
In contrast, Rothbart and Pien suggest that humor with remaining incongruities
leads to more appreciation than humor with a more complete resolution. This
differential prediction has yet to be tested.
A third issue concerns the fact that there are stimuli that are considered
humorous but do not possess an incongruity or resolution structure. I will call
such stimuli instances of "meta-humor" because I think they provide enjoyment
by playing off the fact that they pretend to be humor but do not possess all of the
requisite features. One example is the shaggy dog story that involves an
indefinitely prolonged narrative of incidents all of the same kind that ends with a
non sequitur punch line (Paulos, 1980). Another instance is the familiar Henny
Youngman quip: "Take my wife, please." By now it is well known, no longer
surprising, and used to introduce humorous material. It gains its impact from
playing off of joke features. The humor comes from violating the properties
expected of humor and the listener understands that the joker had this intent; in
fact this understanding is the joke's resolution. An analogous situation operates
when Johnny Carson obtains more laughs by fluffing a joke than telling it
correctly. When Carson starts the joke again, he is playing off and commenting
on the fact that there is even a right way to make nonsense (incongruities).
Meta-humor is a more complex form of humor than the types we considered
earlier, and one suspects that it is not until adolescence or adulthood that it is
fully appreciated because it involves understanding the structure of structure, an
aspect of formal operational thought.
The last problem to be discussed concerns how humor stimuli can be
differentiated from other events such as logical puzzles, and artistic creations
that are experienced as pleasurable that involve similar mechanisms as jokes
54 Jerry Suls
and cartoons but do not evoke humor. As noted earlier, one suggestion
emphasizes that humor is occasioned by a set or cue that it be processed as "this
is play" or "not to be taken seriously" (cf. McGhee and Johnson, 1975).
However, one must be careful because this can be reduced to the circular
statement that funniness is what is funny (Leventhal & Safer, 1977). Perhaps
Rothbart's (1973, 1976) assertion that humorous stimuli must be interpreted as
safe or nonthreatening escapes the circularity. Of course, artistic stimuli are
also safe but are not considered humorous. (There are exceptions here too, for
example, the work of Claes Oldenburg). Perhaps the difference is, as Berlyne
(1972) observed, that humor presents extreme divergencies from what is
expected while aesthetic productions use milder deviations. But even this seems
less than satisfactory if one considers recent avant garde art and music that
offer extreme divergencies.
One solution is that humor must possess three critical features: (1) a "play"
cue, (2) extreme divergence, both considered above, and in addition (3) a
certain appropriate time scale for the perception and processing of joke
materials. Timing may be critical for two aspects of humor processing. First, in
oral presentation the joke premise must be told in such a way that the listener
has enough time to generate an (erroneous) expectation and therefore be
surprised by the punch line. Provided with too much time the listener may
anticipate the punch line correctly; provided with too little time no expectation
will be generated. The emphasis on timing frequently mentioned by comedians
suggests this is an important ingredient in producing humor.
There is also another phase in the process where time is of importance-in
the resolution of the incongruity. We submit that resolution must occur quickly
or the humorous experience is minimal. This may be connected to Berlyne's
(1972) contention that fluctuations in arousal must be rapid to be pleasurable.
Presumably, successful incongruity resolution serves to bring arousal provided
by the incongruity back to baseline. Consistent with this suggestion is
Goldstein's (1970) finding that joke appreciation increased as time to
understand the joke decreased. More data are obviously needed as well as new
inventive research techniques to ascertain whether the three elements-play
cue, extreme incongruity, and timing-can satisfactorily distinguish humorous
from nonhumorous stimuli that share some features in common.
SUMMARY
In the present chapter we discussed some of the cognitive processes implicated

in humor appreciation with special emphasis on the incongruity-resolution
model. Supportive evidence was surveyed and an extension of the cognitive
model to affective disparagement humor was considered. In a fmal section,
problems for the cognitive conception were reviewed and some tentative
solutions proposed. While the incongruity-resolution model is not a complete
account, it describes a part of the humor experience. Many questions remain.

The student of humor should readily recognize the relevance of Groucho
Marx's quip:
When I came to this country I hadn't a nickel in my pocket. ... Now I have a nickel in
my pocket.
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Campbell, D. T., & Fiske, D. W. Convergent and discriminant validation by the
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Chomsky, N. Aspects of a theory of syntax. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965.
Cupchik, G. c., & Leventhal, H. Consistency between expressive behavior and the
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Chapter 4
Linguistics and Humor
WILLIAM J. PEPICELLO and ROBERT W. WEISBERG
Both psychologists and linguists have discussed the nature of linguistic humor
as distinct from forms of humor based on such cultural categories as politics or
obscenity or on cognitive categories such as the visual stimulus of slapstick.
Linguists have been primarily concerned with manipulations of grammatical
categories in producing humorous effect (Green & Pepicello, 1978; Hockett,
1977; Pepicello, 1980; Scott, 1965, 1969). Psychologists have primarily dealt
with linguistic humor as an extension of the study of incongruity and its
resolution (e.g., Shultz & Robillard, 1980; Suls, 1972). However, both types of
study share a common focus, namely, that much of the linguistic humor that
appears in traditional riddles and jokes is based on ambiguity, that is, on a word
or phrase that has more than one possible meaning.
As an example, consider the humorous question-and-answer sequence
presented by Shultz (1974):
Q: Why did the cookie cry?

A: Because its mother had been a wafer so long.
Shultz treats the sequence in terms of child's ability to appreciate the

incongruity created by the phonological sequence (:lweyf:lr), and thereby to
judge the sequence to be humorous. That is, such studies are concerned with the
child's ability to reinterpret in a humorous way a question-and-answer sequence
in which the answer seems to make no sense relative to the question. The
resolution of this incongruity, in this case the recognition of the ambiguous
phrase, then serves as a basis for humorous interpretation.
A strict linguistic analysis of the same sequence involves a delineation of the
60 William J. Pepicello and Robert W. Weisberg
relevant stress and juncture phenomena that distinguish "away for" (;}wey+f;}r)
from "a wafer" (;}+weyf;}r). Such studies focus on the structural aspects of
linguistic humor and describe how phonological, morphological, and syntactic
categories can be manipulated to produce ambiguities that are then employed
humorously through a vehicle such as the question-answer format of riddles.
It seems obvious that these two types of analysis are complementary. That is,
the linguistic analysis serves to explicate the relations among the phonological
strings arising from the two possible interpretations of the joke, the initial or
incongruous interpretation and the final or resolved interpretation. However,
there has been little if any real integration of the two approaches. As we shall
see, understanding of linguistic humor is enhanced through such an integration
since both analyses view language as a structured system of rule-governed
behavior, the playful manipulation of which in certain definable ways is
generally recognized as witty or humorous. Given this common focus of works
dealing with linguistic humor, this chapter will suggest how such studies can be
profitably integrated. Toward this end we shall review the literature from both
fields, showing how the groundwork for integrated studies may be laid. A basic
tenet of our proposed integration will be an initial narrowing of focus for such
studies an issue to which we return below.
We begin with a linguistically based analysis of major genres of linguistic
humor. There has been a problem concerning definitions of major types of
linguistic humor, and we shall attempt to provide a reasonably coherent,
although somewhat limited, framework for classification that is amenable to the
interdisciplinary approach we advocate. In a related issue, we shall address the
problems attendant to the classification of the types of ambiguity involved in
linguistic humor. Once we have defined the generic and structural parameters of
linguistic humor, we shall review the relevant literature from psychology and
suggest how it might be refocused so as to help provide, in combination with the
linguistic analyses we shall review, a more comprehensive treatment of
linguistic humor.
GENRES OF LINGUISTIC HUMOR
Preliminary to our discussion of the study of linguistic humor, we must address

a basic issue for all such studies, the definitions of the various genres of
linguistic humor. One finds terms such as riddle, joke, joking question, pun,
conundrum, and enigma used almost interchangeably, although the forms of
these types of humor vary considerably. This fact, as we shall see, has
hampered many studies since generic consistency is necessary as a starting
point if one is to draw valid conclusions from the data.
By way of illuminating this problem, let us consider the definition of the
riddle, which has received the most attention in studies of linguistic humor and
which we shall argue should serve as the paradigm for the study of linguistic
Linguistics and Humor 61
humor. The definition of the riddle (and so the object of riddle study) has varied
greatly in the literature. Taylor (1948) described the "true riddle" as a
description "in terms intended to suggest something entirely different";
Abrahams and Dundes (1972) define the riddle as a question "framed with the
purpose of confusing or testing the wits of those who do not know the answer";
Shultz (1974) views the riddle as "a question followed by a surprising or
incongruous answer." While all of these characterizations are in fact partly
accurate, they do not distinguish riddles from other humorous forms such as
ethnic jokes or riddle parodies such as "Why do elephants paint their toenails
red? So they can hide in cherry trees."
What is in order, then, is an initial narrowing of the focus of linguistic humor
to a set of data that exhibits common characteristics. Toward that end, Green
and Pepicello (1979) define the riddle as a humorous form that is: (1) based on
the question-answer format; (2) potentially solvable from the information
included in the question, if the riddlee is able to determine the witty devices for
confusion employed in the riddle; (3) solvable by virtue of participation in a
cultural system (Le., shared language, world view, and tropes); and (4) placed in
a conventional locus within a particular tradition in a performance context. This
definition immediately eliminates most ethnic jokes or parodies since such
question-answer sequences are not solvable, but rather consist of a setup and a
punch line that must be learned by rote. The elephant joke presented above is an
example of a riddle parody. It has the surface form of a riddle, but the answer is
not derivable from the question.
This definition of the riddle genre provides a starting point for generic
classification of linguistic humor in general. For if we begin with an analysis of a
fairly well-defined set of data, we can then extend or revise the analysis as other
types of linguistic humor are treated. Let us consider next the types of linguistic
strategies that have been discussed in connection with riddles as we have
defined them.
Linguistic Analyses of Riddles
The first attempts at the application of linguistic theory in riddle analysis are
found in Scott (1965, 1969). In his earlier work, Scott proposed a tagmemic
model for riddles. That is, he suggested that the riddle can be viewed as having a
slot-filler structure where various fillers (i.e., content) are inserted into the
appropriate slots (Le., the riddle's question-answer structure). However, Scott
was not concerned in this work with developing a linguistic approach to the
riddle via tagmemics; thus he encouraged others to pursue his suggestions
without developing them himself.
In Scott's later work, we find a more definite linguistic approach to the
characterization of riddles. In dealing with the notion of topic-comment analysis
introduced by Georges and Dundes (1963), Scott contended that it is useless as
an analytical tool for riddles. He considered the following example:
A blue napkin full of pears. (Sky full of clouds.)
Scott claimed that a traditional immediate constituent analysis of this phrase

would yield a topic (or referent), a blue napkin, and a comment (or
specification), full of pears. These elements correspond to the notions of
referent and description in the riddle. He then contended that a generative-
transformational analysis of the same phrase would yield an underlying
structure such as that shown in Figure 1. Scott correctly points out that, as we
see from Figure 4-1 ,pears is really the underlying subject of this riddle. He then
equates the notion of topic with subject (S) and equates comment with verb
phrase (VP). He thus claims that pears is part of the topic in the generative
analysis but also part of the comment in the immediate constituent analysis.
Scott claims, then, that the underlying propositions of any riddle may not have
the same syntactic configuration as the actual surface structure of the riddle.
Thus, he claims that topic-comment analysis will yield different results at
different levels and is therefore invalid.
While the logic of Scott's argument is persuasive, it begins from a faulty
premise. For he has incorrectly assumed that any subject, at an underlying or
napkin
is blue
Figure 4-1. Underlying structure of the riddle" A blue napkin full of pears." (Sky full of
clouds).
surface level, is to be equated with topic and that any VP, at any level, is to be
equated with comment. This is simply a misinterpretation of topic-comment
analysis, for topic-comment is a method of analysis carried on at a syntactic
level only at the surface level (see Green & Pepicello, 1979).
More recently, Ben-Amos (1976) offered a brief description of linguistic
ambiguity in riddles. He made reference to two subcategories, "phonetic
ambiguity" and "semantic ambiguity." His example of the former is:
What's black and white and red all over? (A newspaper)
He claimed that the homophony of red and read is purely phonetic. This
characterization missed the important point that the homophony is caused by
the morphology of English in this case since the adjective red is homophonous
with the irregular past participle of the verb read. Thus, the phonological
identity results from two very different derivational histories, making it
necessary to distinguish the two words in question. So the issue here is
morphological not phonological. Similarly, what Ben-Amos referred to as
semantic ambiguity is demonstrated by him in the riddle:
Has eyes, cannot see. (A potato)
He claimed that one word can refer to several objects. Again, he missed the
point that the real ambiguity here is phonological since eye, in all of its semantic
interpretations, is pronounced the same and is the same part of speech, a noun.
(This example differs from the "red/read all over" version discussed above.)
We might further point out that the term "semantic ambiguity" is vacuous since
all ambiguity is, by definition, semantic; the same is true of the term "phonetic
ambiguity" since ambiguity results from the surface phonological identity of two
different underlying structures (see Green & Pepicello, 1978).
Sutton-Smith (1976) proposed a classification of riddle structure based on
the semantic devices employed by the riddler to confuse the riddlee. These
devices involve for the most part a reclassification of semantic elements or an
unexpected inversion of these elements. This analysis falls short on several
counts. First, although he claimed that his studies based on children's riddles do
not for the most part fit the systems proposed by Georges and Dundes (1963),
nor by Abrahams (1968), his "reclassification" types of riddles are based on
the same kinds of semantic oppositions discussed in those works. Second,
Sutton-Smith misconstrued the term "homonym," apparently confusing it with
"homograph." Specifically, he claimed that the terms hot dog (a warm canine)
and hot dog (a weiner) are homonyms, when in fact the pronunciations of these
two phrases are distinguished in English by their stress patterns. In the latter
case, primary stress is on hot, in the former case, on dog. Thus, while the two
phrases are indeed spelled alike, they are not homonyms. Sutton-Smith's
misinterpretation of homonyms and of their potential for causing ambiguity lead
him to a statement of the semantic relations in the riddle form. His conclusions,
since they were based on the same sorts of observations made by Scott, echo
Scott's findings.
Perhaps the greatest array of humorous strategies playing on linguistic
structure is found in Hockett (1977), although his analysis ignored generic
distinctions. Hockett dealt with both the external and internal linguistic
structures of humorous genres, although his focus was primarily on the linguistic
strategies employed across genres. His external classification of "jokes" (his
cover term for a variety of humorous vehicles) was based on a bipartite structure
consisting of a buildup and a punch line, for example, "Tough luck," said the
egg in the monastery, "out of the frying pan into the friar." A compound joke
involves a single buildup with two or more punches. An example of a compound
joke would be to add additional egg puns or monastery puns to the previous
examples, such as "What a cruel yolk," or "Such a dangerous habit." Various
combinations of simple and compound jokes may be employed in what Hockett
terms a "complex" joke.
It is Hockett's analysis of the internal linguistic strategies of jokes that is most
instructive, however. Here he distinguished two types, prosaic and poetic jokes.
Prosaic jokes do not involve linguistic manipulation per se, but play rather upon
cultural situations, interactions, and institutions. Poetic jokes, on the other
hand, involve what Hockett called "accidents in the design of English," by
which he meant humor based on grammatical forms and their usage or
misusage. Poetic jokes are for Hockett of two types: puns and non-puns. Puns
may be perfect (involving homophony) or imperfect (involving near homo-
phony). Of the former type we find examples like a sign that reads "Cohen and
Son, Tailor and Attorney. Let Us Press Your Suit." The latter type is
exemplified by our earlier example where friar and fire are contrasted.
Imperfect puns may also involve metathesis, according to Hockett, for example,
"What's the difference between a fisherman and a dunce? One baits hooks, the
other hates books."
Hockett's poetic category also contains what he terms non-puns; for example,
the word-reversal in an example like:
At an army post they put some one-armed bandits into the Officers' Club. The slot
machines were in the Officers' Quarters, and soon the officers' quarters were in the
slot machines.
Finally in this category he included certain jokes that turn on stress and juncture
phenomena, as in the following examples:
What do you do with a stiff neck? (Compare: What do you do with a stiff? Neck?)
What's that rolling down the road ahead? (Compare: What's that rolling down the
road? A head?)
Hockett pointed out that a basic fact that holds true for all poetic jokes is that
they are nontranslatable, since they are dependent upon English-specific
grammatical categories. He also pointed out that many poetic jokes are based
on the types of grammatical structures that result from speech errors, e.g., the
metathesis in spoonerisms such as "Let me sew you to your sheet" for" Let me
show you to your seat."
Block Elements. All of these linguistically oriented studies are concerned,

either directly or indirectly, with a partial definition of the notion of "block
element," that element that impedes the perception of the ambiguous element
that is present in the types of humor being treated here. The notion of the block
element has been treated from several perspectives, primarily in relation to
riddles. Georges and Dundes (1963), for example, defined block elements in
terms of internal contradictions or "oppositions" in the riddle description.
Abrahams (1968) took this analysis further in delineating four types of strategy
used to impair the image (or Gestalt) in a riddle: (1) opposition, (2) incomplete
detail, (3) too much detail, (4) false Gestalt.
Another focal point of those cognitive studies that seek to define the nature of
the block element of riddles has been the problem of ambiguity in the riddle.
Basic in this regard is the work of Hamnett (1967), who claimed that "riddles
and riddling may illuminate some of the principles that underlie classification in
social action and cognition generally and can, in particular, indicate the role that
ambiguities play in the classificatory process." He rightly pointed out that in
riddling, an ambiguous word or element (the block) can be seen as belonging to
two or more frames of reference, according to the interpretation forced on it, and
may even be seen as belonging to several frames of reference that may otherwise
be disparate in nature. Similar, though less precise, statements of the problem of
ambiguity in riddles are to be found in Haring (1974), Harries (1971), and Scott
(1965). These works all deal with ambiguity as a "semantic fit" that is impaired
in the riddle form. The nature of this semantic fit has eluded all attempts at
characterization, however. More recently, Ben-Amos (1976) dealt briefly with
the notions of "cultural ambiguity" and "empirical ambiguity," but in a
classificatory rather than an explanatory manner.
The analyses we have been discussing, while they are valuable in under-
standing various aspects of riddles, are broad in scope, blending anthropo-
logical, psychological, and linguistic classifications of the block element. Green
and Pepicello (1978) and Pepicello (1980) began from a narrower, strictly
linguistic base in outlining a number of linguistic strategies involved in creating
block elements, and hence wit, in orally transmitted Anglo-American riddles.
The majority of these strategies involve grammatical ambiguity, that is, words
or phrases that have more than one underlying semantic structure but are
identical in surface form as a result of processes at the phonological,
morphological, or syntactic levels of grammar. The classification scheme
developed by Green and Pepicello is presented in Table 4.1.
We find that the basic strategy employed at the phonological level is simple
lexical ambiguity, as in:
What turns but never moves? Milk.

Table 4-1. Linguistic strategies in verbal humor.

Strategy Riddle Joke
I. Phonological
A. Lexical What turns but never The French missionaries
moves? Milk moved westward through
the North American
wilderness converting the
Indians, mainly to dust.
B. Minimal What's the difference Sign on the gate of a nudist
pairs between a baby and a coat? club in October: Clothed
One you were, one you for the season.
wear.
C. Metathesis What's the difference A knife that slices through
between a midget witch and four loaves of bread at once
a deer fleeing from hunters? could be advertised as a
One's a stunted hag, the four-loaf cleaver.
other a hunted stag.
D. Stress/ What bird is in lowest Two men were in a bar. One
Juncture spirits? A bluebird. said, glancing at a girl,
"Say, isn't that Hortense?"
The other replied, "She
looks perfectly relaxed to
me."
II. Morphological
A. Based on What's black and white and A woman asked me if I'd
irregular red/read all over? A like to have my palm read,
morphology newspaper. and when I said yes she
painted it.
B. Morphologi- What bow can no one tie? Do you have any sixes
cally A rainbow. you'd like shot or any
analyzed threes you'd like bagged?
C. Exploitation What kind of ears does a I must say you're looking
of bound train have? Engineers. couth, kempt and sheveled
morphemes today.
D. Pseudomor- What's the key to a good The key to the success of
phological dinner? A turkey. the Seagram family has
been whiskey.
III. Syntactic
A. Phrase How is a duck like an icicle? I'd like to look up your
Structure Both grow down. sister some time. Mind if I
borrow your speculum?
B. Transfor- What do you call a man who I can marry anyone I please,
mational marries another man? A Ijust haven't found anyone I
minister. please yet.
Table 4-1. (continued)

Strategy Riddle Joke
C. Idiom What goes most against a If you hit me I'll wax roth,
farmer's grain? His reaper. and then Roth will be all
slippery.
D. Syntax/Mor- Why can you not starve to Knock Knock. Who's there?
phological death in the desert? Because Cantaloupe. Cantaloupe
homophony of the sandwiches (sand who? Can't elope tonight-
which is) there. Dad's got the car.
IV. Other
A. Pre- How many balls of string
supposition does it take to reach the
moon? One, if it's long
enough.
B. Parody Why do elephants paint
their toenails red? So
they can hid in cherry
trees.
Here, two different underlying semantic elements have identical surface form,
turns.
Pepicello (1980) noted several additional linguistic strategies, at the
phonological level. For instance, we also find examples like:
What is the difference between a baby and a coat? One you were, one you wear.
What is the difference between a midget witch and deer fleeing from hunters? One is a
stunted hag. the other is a hunted stag.
What bird is in lowest spirits? A bluebird.
In the first example we find a contrast of the minimal pairs were and wear,
minimal pairs being pairs of words that differ by only one phoneme in
pronunciation. In the second case we find metathesis or sound reversal
employed as a strategy in stunted hag versus hunted stag. Finally, we see stress
and juncture exploited to contrast a sad bird (blue bird) with a specific avian
species (bluebird).
At the morphological level we find four basic ambiguity-producing strategies.
The first is seen in riddles like:
What's black and white and red/read all over? A newspaper.

Here the fact that the verb read plus its past participle morpheme is
homophonous with the simple adjective red is exploited. Two closely related
morphological strategies are seen in:
What bow can you never tie? A rainbow.

What kind of ears does a train have? Engineers.
In the first example, one morpheme (here -bow) from a larger morphemic
construction (i.e., a word) is used as ifit were an independent word with which it
is homophonous. In the second example, the independent word ear is
deliberately confused with the bound morpheme -eer, a bound morpheme being
one that cannot stand alone as a word. We find this type of morphological
strategy extended further in examples like:
What is the key to a good dinner? A turkey.
Here the independent word key is deliberately confused with a phonological

sequence taken from the word turkey, but the sequence in question is not even a
morpheme of the independent word, that is, -key is not a morpheme of turkey.
This strategy is termed pseudomorphological.
Finally, at the syntactic level there are three basic strategies. The first is what
has been called "phrase structure ambiguity" (or phrasal ambiguity, Miller,
1981), where a given surface sequence of words has more than one syntactic
anlysis, for example:
How is a duck like an icicle? Both grow down.
A second strategy involves ambiguous sequences that arise when two different
underlying structures have an identical surface form as a result of their
respective syntactic derivations (i.e., "transformational ambiguity"), as in:
What do you call a man who marries another man? A minister.
Here the underlying structure of X marries Y to Z is exploited, namely, the

constituent to Z has been deleted, rendering the sequence identical in surface
form to X marries Y where X and Yare entering into matrimony.
The final pure syntactic strategy involves the deliberate confusion of idioms
with their identical literal counterparts, as in:
What goes most against a fanner's grain? His reaper.
Here the idiom go against the grain meaning annoy is contrasted with a literal
reading of the same surface sequence.
At the syntactic level we also find riddles based on mixed strategies, like:
Why can you not starve to death in the desert? Because of the sandwiches (sand which
is) there.
Here the morphological construction of a plural noun is homophonous with a

portion of a relative clause. This strategy obviously involves more than one
grammatical level; we have classified it, after Pepicello (1980), according to its
major grammatical strategy. The same is true of some strategies discussed
earlier.
Thus, given the restricted focus of linguistic strategies in oral1y transmitted
riddles, Green and Pepicel10 found 12 clearly distinct categories of strategies.
From this base they extended their analysis to sight and spelling riddles (Green
& Pepice110, 1980) and to metaphorical riddles (Pepicello & Green, in press). In
this latter work it is shown that metaphorical riddles of the type dealt with by,
for instance, Taylor (1948) or Maranda (1971), range from a type akin to
lexical ambiguity where metaphor has become idiomatized, to a true meta-
phorical ambiguity where the riddle form deals in pure description. The latter is
exemplified by the following metaphorical riddle:
What's got a heart in its head? A peach.
The former is seen in examples like:
Where .is the smallest bridge in the world? On your nose.
The validity of the 12 linguistic strategies delineated by Green and Pepicello

is borne out if we compare the analysis of related data found in Hockett (1977).
In Hockett's work, the 12 strategies identified above appear in nonriddle
humorous sequences that Hockett simply termed "jokes."
We have also noted in Table 1 two other related forms. The presupposition
riddle is a true riddle, but does not hinge on a linguistic ambiguity of the sorts
already discussed. Rather, as noted by Yalisove (1978), the block element
involves the presupposition entailed in the phrase "balls of string," which
implies a ball of string of a specific size. Finally, as discussed earlier, the riddle
parody, while having the surface form of a riddle, is not a riddle at all.
PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION IN THE LITERATURE
Having now outlined a basic linguistic approach to riddles, we can examine the
psychological literature that attempts to deal with the development of, the
sensitivity to, and the appreciation of linguistic ambiguity and humor based on
such ambiguity. While commendable as regards methodology, in general this
literature is unfocused from the perspective of linguistic theory. This problem is
exemplified in the linguistic base found in several influential studies by Shultz

and his colleagues (e.g., Shultz, 1974; Shultz & Horibe, 1974; Shultz & Pilon,
1973). These works employ linguistic classifications for wit-producing am-
biguity that confuse various levels, and thus the strategies involved in the riddles
or jokes with which they deal. Examples of the stimulus classification used in
these studies are found in Table 4-2.
As one example of a problem, we find in these works a distinction between
Table 4-2. Classification of ambiguities by Shultz and Pilon (1973).
Lexical Ambiguity
He went lion hunting with a club. He went lion hunting with friends.
No one liked the plant. No one liked the factory.
This restaurant even serves crabs. This restaurant even serves lobster.
He put some gas in the tank. He put some gas in the car.
He often goes to the bank. He often goes to the river.
He did not have enough dough. He did not have enough money.
Phonological Ambiguity
The doctor is out of patience (patients). The doctor has lost his temper.
He stepped over the lion (line). He stepped over the stick.
He bought it because of the sail (sale). He bought it because it was half price.
The baby bear has a big pa (paw). The baby bear has a big daddy.
I have enough for eighty (eight tea) cups. I have enough for eight cups.
He saw three pears (pairs). He saw the fruit.
Sur/ace-Structure Ambiguity
He laughed at the school. He laughed in the classroom.
He sent her kids story books. He sent the children some story books.
He is looking up the street. He is looking down the street.
She helped the boy with the hat. She helped the boy put on his hat.
The fat sailor's wife likes to cook. The sailor's fat wife likes to cook.
He saw a man eating fish. He saw a ferocious fish.
Deep-Structure Ambiguity
The shooting of the Indians was bad. It was bad to shoot the Indians.
The duck is ready to eat. The duck is ready to eat the food.
It is really quite wonderful to see. It is really a wonderful sight.
He did not like disturbing children. He did not like disturbing the children.
The mayor asked the police to stop drinking. The mayor asked the police
to arrest, drunks.
They are visiting sailors. They are visiting Europe.
"phonological" and "lexical" strategies. While the lexical category corresponds

to the lexical ambiguity described above, the phonological category includes
indifferently stress and juncture, minimal pairs, morphological strategies, and
some lexical strategies, as seen in the following examples that are all termed
" phonological":
I have enough for eighty (eight tea) cups. (stress and juncture)
Waiter, what's this?
It's bean soup, Ma'am.
I'm not interested in what it's been, what is it now? (Minimal pairs)
The doctor is out of patience (patients). (morphological)
He saw three pairs (pears). (lexical)
There is not a separate category for morphological strategies in these works.

The basic problem here is the definition of phonological ambiguity as "when a
given phonological sequence can be interpreted in more than one way." This in
fact is the definition for all ambiguity. Furthermore, Schultz's distinction
between lexical and phonological ambiguity seems in reality to be based on
homography, at least in part. Shultz and Pilon (1973), for example, made a
distinction between "He goes to the bank" and "He saw three pairs (pears),"
classifying the former ambiguity as lexical and the latter as phonological.
However, in both cases we have identical phonological strings, and as far as
auditory presentation is concerned, the examples are equivalent. Shultz and
Pilon classified the examples differently only because of spelling differences in
the latter case, but that seems to be irrelevant as far as listening is
concerned.
Matters are no better at the syntactic level where these studies contrast
"surface structure" ambiguity with "deep structure" ambiguity. In the former
case we are told that ambiguity results from the words in a sentence having two
possible bracketings, as in:
He sent her kids story books.
Such cases fall under the category of transformational ambiguity discussed

above, where two different underlying structures undergo different derivational
processes that result in identical surface forms. In the case of deep-structure
ambiguity we are told that "two different deep structures are mapped onto a
single surface structure." The problem with this definition is that it again is too
general since it allows for what we described as phrase-structure ambiguity as in
a case like John looked over the car, as well as transformational ambiguity, as
in The duck is ready to eat, which in fact is an example of so-called deep-
structure ambiguity given in Shultz and Pilon (1973).
Thus, the surface-deep distinction of these studies confuses phrase-structure
and transformational ambiguities. Indeed, He sent her kids story books and The
duck is ready to eat are both transformation ally ambiguous, while they would
be treated as separate types in the works being discussed. Failure to distinguish
types of ambiguity, as we shall discuss, may have serious consequences for the
usefulness of these studies.
Similar confusions of levels are found in other works, for example, Fowles
and Glanz (1977), and Hirsch-Pasek, Gleitman, and Gleitman (1978). In the
former work we find that surface ambiguity includes morphological, stress and
juncture, and transformational ambiguities, as seen in the following examples:
What room can no one enter? A mushroom (morphological)

What happened to the man who fell from a lO-story building? Nothing, he had on his
light fall suit. (stress and juncture)
What has four wheels and flies? A garbage truck. (transformational)
The deep ambiguity category also contains transformational ambiguities, as

well as some nongrammatical riddles, for example:
What makes people go bald? Having no hair.

What animals can jump higher than a house? All animals-houses can't jump.
Such riddles exploit presuppositions underlying the question in the riddle and
are not dependent upon purely grammatical strategies for their wit.
Hirsch-Pasek et al. (1978) offer the largest proliferation of categories. Here
lexical ambiguity includes only minimal pairs (e.g., quackervs. cracker) that, it
should be noted, are not ambiguous. Further, the surface-structure versus deep-
structure ambiguity distinction postulated by Hirsch-Pasek et al. suffers from
the same type of confusion discussed above with these categories, where man
eating fish is considered to be a surface ambiguity, while Make me a milkshake
is deep structure; in fact, both are transformationally ambiguous. In the former
case, the two underlying constructions contain relative clauses that are then
reduced, namely, fish that eats man and man who was eating fish. In the latter
instance one underlying structure looks much like the surface example, while
the other is roughly Make a milks hake for me that then undergoes a
transformation called Dative Movement that deletes for and moves me into
direct object position.
While Hirsch-Pasek et al. recognized morphemic exploitation in riddles, for
example, engineers versus engine ears, they did not make the distinctions
between types, as we outlined earlier, that we consider necessary and often
included examples that are probably best categorized differently. For example,
Hirsch-Pasek et al. categorized the riddle that exploits sandwiches versus sand
which is as morphological, when it is more appropriately classified as syntactic,
as we have discussed. Hirsch-Pasek et al. categorized the following as
morphological also:
Do you think that if I wash, my face will be clean? Let's soap for the best.
Since this example turns on stress and juncture, it is probably best classed as a
phonological riddle.
A final problem arises in several works (e.g., Fowles & Glanz, 1977; Shultz,
1974) concerning the inclusion of jokes and/or riddles that are not linguistically
based in the data to be analyzed. We touched upon this area briefly in our
discussion of Hirsch-Pasek et al. above. As pointed out by Yalisove (1978), one
needs to distinguish between nongrammatical categories, such as those
exemplified in the following examples:
How many balls of string does it take to reach the moon? One, if it's big enough.
Where can you always find money? In the dictionary.
How do you get six elephants in a VW? three in front, three in back.
In the first example we are dealing with presuppositions about the world and
upsetting normal presuppositions about balls of string for witting effect. In the
second example, which Yalisove calls a "name mention" strategy, much the
same is true. The third example is simply a riddle "parody," as are ethnic jokes,
that is a question-answer sequence designed to allow the questioner to deliver a
punch line that is impossible for the person questioned to guess.
Let us now examine the implications that the lack of focus from the linguistic
perspective has for the psycholinguistic studies we have been discussing and
how a refocusing along the lines suggested above might affect such works.
PSYCHOLINGUISTIC ANALYSES OF HUMOR
Psychological analyses of linguistic humor have been based on the notions of

incongruity and resolution (e.g., Shultz & Robillard, 1980; Suls, 1972).
According to this view, a situation is perceived as humorous if(a) the perceiver
detects an incongruity in the situation (e.g., the situation in some way violates
the person's expectations, which surprises, perplexes, or arouses the person)
and (b) the person is able to resolve the incongruity, so that the situation is seen
to be sensible when viewed in the appropriate way. This resolution is assumed
to reduce the arousal produced by the initial perception of incongruity, and such
decreases in arousal are seen as pleasurable (Berlyne, 1972; also see Chapters
2 and 3 in this volume).
As an example of the application of this viewpoint to the analysis of linguistic
humor, consider Shultz's (1976) discussion of a quip attributed to W. C. Fields:
Mr. Fields, do you believe in clubs for children? Only when kindness fails.
According to Shultz, this remark is funny because at first Fields's answer makes
no sense to us, which produces incongruity. However, when we realize that
Field's remark makes sense if one interprets "clubs for children" as meaning
"beating children with clubs," we can resolve the incongruity, which results in
our finding the remark humorous instead of merely perplexing. Thus we see that
the basis for the perception of humor in this remark depends on the perplexed
person's ability to detect the ambiguity of the phrase "clubs for children."
Psychological researchers in humor have found linguistic material to be an
important area of study because language seems to provide an ideal arena for
the study of people's ability to detect and resolve incongruities. Language is
seen as a structured system involving rule-governed behavior of several different
sorts. These linguistic rules can be assumed to make explicit the expectancies of
the fluent speaker and so can serve as the criterion for the structural analysis of
a piece of verbal humor (Shultz & Robillard, 1980).
As discussed above, linguistic theory has been taken as providing a formal
analysis of ambiguity, which theoretically can make possible the specification of
the exact sort of incongruity involved in a given piece of verbal humor. Based on
this view, the almost exclusive thrust of psycholinguistic research in humor has
involved assessment of people's sensitivity to various sorts of linguistic
ambiguity since this sensitivity is assumed to be necessary, although not
sufficient, for the perception of verbal humor. A related research aim has been
to measure people's appreciation of verbal humor that allegedly hinges on the
detection and resolution of incongruities based on ambiguities of various
sorts.
The Metalinguistic Question
In addition, some researchers have been interested in appreciation of verbal

humor because such appreciation can provide evidence concerning children's
metalinguistic competence. With adults, one can obtain reliable judgments
concerning linguistic phenomena in a relatively straightforward manner-one
simply has to ask the appropriate question. However, children have difficulty in
answering questions about language per se (Hirsch-Pasek et aI., 1978).
Therefore, if one could get reliable evidence that children respond appropriately
to jokes that hinge on ambiguities of various sorts, one would have indirect
evidence concerning children's metalinguistic knowledge. Furthermore, it has
been argued that the ability to manipulate language as an object is important for
the development of reading (e.g., Fowles & Glanz, 1977). If comprehension of
linguistic humor involves analysis of language as an object, then such
comprehension should be related to reading skills. Thus, children's responsive-
ness to verbal humor is a phenomenon with potentially wide-ranging impli-
cations.
DEVELOPMENTAL STUDIES OF APPRECIATION

OF LINGUISTIC HUMOR
There have been a number of studies in recent years of children's developing

appreciation of linguistic humor. One set of studies has attempted to measure a
child's response to ambiguous sentences ofthe various sorts already discussed,
as well as to riddles and jokes that hinge on the various sorts of ambiguity. A
second type of study has attempted to test various aspects of the incongruity-
resolution theory by altering riddles in specific ways.
Children's Sensitivity to Ambiguity
An early study in this area was that of Shultz and Pilon (1973). Children in
grades 1, 4, 7, and 10 were presented with ambiguous sentences and were asked
to paraphrase the sentences and to match the sentences with pictures
representing the two possible meanings of each sentence. These methods were
used to determine if the child was sensitive to the two meanings of the
ambiguous sentences.
As mentioned earlier, questions can be raised about the classification system
used by Shultz and his colleagues, especially concerning the sentences
classified as phonologically ambiguous (see Table 4-2). Several of these
sentences do not involve ambiguity at all (e.g., lion vs. line; eighty vs. eight tea;
and perhaps pa vs. paw). Furthermore, the other sentences in this category are
not distinguishable from those called lexically ambiguous, except that the latter
sentences are also spelled identically in both versions, while the phonological
ambiguities involve different spellings. However, since the sentences were
presented auditorally, this distinction seems irrelevant. Therefore, Shultz and
Pilon's (1973) results for these two categories of ambiguities will be grouped
together. We shall refer to these as phonological ambiguities. Also, as
mentioned earlier, the surface structure-deep-structure distinction made in
these studies turns out to involve confabulation of several different sorts of
ambiguities. Therefore, these results will be grouped together and discussed as
syntactic ambiguities.
On both the paraphrase and picture-matching measures, the phonological
ambiguities were more easily detected than the syntactic ambiguities. Further-
more, the first graders were not sensitive to any type of ambiguity, while the
tenth graders did well in detecting phonological ambiguity but were not nearly
perfect in detecting syntactic ambiguity.
Brodzinsky (1977) used Shultz and Pilon's (1973) categorization system to
classify jokes that were presented to fourth-grade children. Comprehension and
appreciation scores were obtained from the children. The results supported
those of Shultz and Pilon (1973). Comprehension and appreciation scores were
higher for the phonologically based jokes than for the syntactic ambiguities.
Additional support for the finding that phonologically based humor is
appreciated at an earlier age than is syntactically based humor comes from
studies by Shultz (1974) and Shultz and Horibe (1974).
Two studies have raised questions concerning the linguistically based
analysis of verbal humor proposed by Shultz and his colleagues. Fowles and
Glanz (1977) tested a very small sample of children in grades 1-3 and used
riddles involving Shultz's categories of phonological, phrasal, and transforma-
tional ambiguities. In addition, they also examined what they called "meta-
linguistic" riddles such as:
What is at the end of everything? The letter "g."
Comprehension and recall scores did not support the developmental trends
found by Shultz and his colleagues. However, the fact that Fowles and Glanz's
classification of riddles was inconsistent, as mentioned earlier, the small sample
size and restricted age range make the Fowles and Glanz study very difficult to
interpret. Be that as it may, since in their opinion the linguistic variables were
not predictive of riddle difficulty, Fowles and Glanz examined a number of
other variables in a post hoc analysis. Again, although the small subject sample
makes all conclusions extremely speculative, Fowles and Glanz found that on
the whole children were better able to retell riddles that were familiar, short,
simple in syntax, and in which the setup did not favor a single intrepretation of
the ambiguous element. Comprehension was easier for riddles that contained
familiar vocabulary and that were concrete in both meanings of the ambiguous
elements. In sum, although the Fowles and Glanz study has some linguistic and
methodological problems, these investigators have pointed out some potentially
relevant variables which should be taken into account in further studies of the
development of appreciation and comprehension of linguistic humor.
As part of a large-scale study of the relationship between linguistic skills and
metalinguistic judgments, Hirsch-Pasek et al. (1978) investigated children's
responses to riddles and jokes. The children, good and poor readers in grades
1-6, were asked to rate the humor in riddles and jokes and to explain why each
was funny. Two aspects of this study are worthy of note. First, as mentioned
earlier, Hirsch-Pasek et al. raise questions about the adequacy of Shultz's
categorization system, although their own system is not without problems.
Second, the Hirsch-Pasek et al. study is unique in this area because it involves a
theoretical rationale for investigating various sorts of riddles. Specifically,
Hirsch-Pasek et al. argue that children should be most sensitive to those riddles
that hinge on "deeper" or more meaningful aspects of language, rather than
surface properties. The basis for this prediction comes from studies that
demonstrate that children can segment a sentence into words much earlier than
they can segment words into syllables. Presumably, segmentation of a sentence
into words depends on meaning, while syllable segmentation of words does
not.
Based on this viewpoint, one would predict that riddles and jokes hinging on
transformational ambiguities should be easier to understand than those based on
phrase-structure ambiguities. Furthermore, Hirsch-Pasek et al. would also seem
to predict that riddles and jokes based on minimal pairs (e.g., If you put three
ducks in a box, what do you have? A box of quackers.) should be hardest to deal
with because the only relation between the punch line and the expected word
(Le., crackers and quackers) is arbitrary and has nothing to do with underlying
meaning. The same should be true of jokes and riddles involving morphological
strategies (e.g., How does a train hear? Through its engine ears.) since in this
case also the surface material must be dealt with directly, without any reliance
on underlying meaning.
Hirsch-Pasek et al. tested these various predictions through detailed analysis
of the children's performance on the various categories of riddles. However,
given our earlier questions about the categorization system used by Hirsch-
Pasek et aI., these comparisons are equivocal. For example, one important
comparison was between phrase structure and transformational ambiguities, but
we saw earlier that both these categories may contain riddles based on
transformational ambiguities, which nullifies any conclusions. Several of the
other categories used by Hirsch- Pasek et al. suffer from similar problems.
Hirsch-Pasek et al. also concluded that the poor readers were uniformly
worse than the good readers in dealing with all categories of material. This
finding may raise a problem, as Hirsch-Pasek et al. note, because from their
viewpoint reading skills should be important only on those categories involving
manipUlation of surface form, but the deficiency of poor readers was found
across all types of materials. However, given the problems with classification of
materials, a potentially interesting set of analyses must, in our opinion, await
more precise classification of stimulus materials.
In conclusion, analysis of several of the most important studies in this area
indicates that little more than the most tentative conclusions can be drawn, due
to problems of classification of stimulus materials.
Incongruity and Resolution
If, as many have argued, humor depends on resolvable incongruity, then ifeither
the incongruity were removed from a joke or the incongruity were not
resolvable, then that joke should not be funny. Two studies (Shultz, 1974;
Shultz & Horibe, 1974) presented modified riddles and jokes in an attempt to
examine these two predictions from incongruity/resolution theory. As an
example of the modifications, consider the following riddle (Shultz, 1974);
Why did the cookie cry? Because its mother was a wafer so long.
The resolution-removed version of the riddle has as its answer: Because its
mother was a wafer. This revision does not contain all the material needed for
the ambiguous string and therefore does not allow the riddlee to reinterpret the
string to resolve the incongruity. This should result in mere confusion rather
than humor. The incongruity-removed version of this riddle had as its answer:
Because it was left in the oven too long. This answer follows plausibly from the
question, without incongruity and resolution (assuming that cookies can feel
discomfort and cry), and therefore it too should not be funny.
The subjects in the two studies were children in grades 1, 3, 5, and 7 (ages 6,
8, 10, and 12). The children provided funniness ratings and explanations for the
jokes and riddles, and the experimenter independently rated the child's mirth
response. The results were similar across the two studies. Overall, the original
form of the joke or riddle was judged to be funnier than the two altered forms.
Also, the children's explanations of the jokes and riddles indicated that the
modifications had had the desired effects. For example, when the incongruity
was removed, the children made no mention of it, and little mention was made
of the hidden meaning of the riddle or joke. This is to be expected since
removing the incongruity involves eliminating the ambiguity.
There was also an interaction with age, with the youngest children in the
Shultz and Horibe (1974) joke study finding the original and resolution-
removed forms equally funny, while the older children found the original form
funnier than both the modified forms. Shultz and Horibe interpret this finding to
indicate that there is an initial stage of humor appreciation based on unre-
solvable incongruity, or nonsense, and a second stage based on resolvable
incongruity. However, the riddle study (Shultz, 1974) found that the youngest
children rated all forms equally funny, which raises problems for the
unresolvable incongruity view since the incongruity-removed riddles had no
unresolvable incongruity.
In sum, these two studies are consistent in demonstrating that altering jokes
and riddles in certain ways significantly reduces their humor, in a manner
seemingly consistent with incongruity-resolution theory. Further, given the sorts
of analyses carried out in these studies, problems of stimulus classification do
not arise since all comparisons are within riddle or within joke.
PRODUCTION OF LINGUISTIC HUMOR
As mentioned earlier, psycholinguistic studies of humor have been concerned

almost exclusively with humor appreciation. Two studies, however, examined
the production of linguistic humor. McDowell (1979) carried out a field study of
children's riddling, while Shultz and Scott (1976) examined joke production in a
laboratory study.
McDowell was concerned with the creativity involved in children's riddling.
His basic theoretical claim is that creativity in riddling depends on the child's
ability to manipulate the conceptual categories of the culture. According to
McDowell, as children become familiar with the categories of the culture, they
become aware of contradictions or anomalies in these categories. These

contradictions are then creatively exploited by the child in producing riddles. As
an example, consider a riddle like "What did the rug say to the floor? Don't
move, I've got you covered." McDowell argues that this riddle would be
produced as a result of the child's analysis of the cultural category of
"conversants." The child is examining the boundaries of this category by
creating improbable scenarios. In this way, the child learns the boundaries of
categories by violating them in producing riddles. Thus, in McDowell's view,
the cognitive processes involved in creating a riddle begin with an analysis of
underlying conceptual structure; production of a verbal vehicle is a subsequent
step. McDowell analyzes several children's riddle sessions to support this
view.
However, there is some question as to whether children's riddling exhibits the
creativity assumed by McDowell (See Weisberg & Pepicello, Note 1, for
further discussion.) In the sessions recorded by McDowell, the developmental
progression seems to be from flawed novel productions to correctly reproduced
traditional riddles, that is, those riddles that the children have acquired from
others. Thus, as the children get older, the riddles they produce are decreasingly
novel. This would indicate that these riddles are not the result of the children's
deep analysis of the conceptual structure of the culture but rather are the result
of the child's attempt at clever verbal play per se. This then leaves us with the
question of how the traditional riddles arose. Weisberg and Pepicello (Note 2)
argue that traditional riddles arose when it was noticed that an utterance like
"Don't move, I've got you covered," which is typically produced in a particular
context, could also be applied to rugs and floors (Le., What did the rug say to
the floor? Don't move, I've got you covered). That is, it was noticed that literal
interpretation of an utterance makes that utterance relevant to other circum-
stances, with humorous consequences. Contrary to McDowell's view, this latter
position assumes that riddle production starts not at the underlying conceptual
level but at the surface linguistic level. Another source of riddles is novel
combinations produced as speech errors, such as metathesis (Le., spooner-
isms).
A similar view has recently been proposed by Shultz (1976), who argues that
creators of verbal humor may first notice an ambiguity, say in some statement,
and then construct a humorous vehicle to exploit the ambiguity. Shultz and
Scott (1976) had adults create jokes from verbal stimuli that were altered forms
of jokes involving only resolution or incongruity information, as discussed
above. As an example, the original joke might be the following already-
discussed W. C. Fields one liner:
Do you believe in clubs for young people? Only when kindness fails.
The resolution form would then be:
Do you believe in clubs for young people? Yes.

The incongruity form would be:
Do you believe in social groups for young people? Only when kindness fails.
According to the view that the humorist must first notice an exploitable
ambiguity, it should be easier to produce ajoke from the resolution information
since the ambiguity is present there. This situation thus mirrors what is assumed
to occur in real life. The incongruity information, on the other hand, is only
perplexing, with no obvious basis for humor, and should not be particular
effective as a stimulus. The results of Shultz and Scott (1976) supported this
interpretation, with more good jokes produced by their subjects in response to
resolution information.
In summary, although very few studies of verbal humor production have been
carried out, the results that are available indicate that creation of humorous
material may depend in many cases on the humorist's exploiting a potentially
humorous segment in the speech stream. These segments can involve ambi-
guities, as examined by Shultz and Scott (1976), or speech errors (e.g.,
metathesis, as discussed earlier in this chapter). There are additional sources of
humor in the speech stream, such as a word that differs from another word by
only one phoneme (e.g., crackers vs. quackers), and perhaps further studies of
the sort carried out by McDowell (1979) would shed some light on how these
potentially humorous strings are exploited in real time by humorists.
Redefinition
The first point to emerge from this review is that important theoretical
conclusions in this area are at present premature, due to problems concerning
definitions of relevant stimulus variables. We have seen that investigators differ
so greatly in their linguistic categorizations of jokes and riddles that no detailed
theoretical predictions can be tested. Thus, our first suggestion is that
researchers go back to the beginning and reanalyze stimulus materials in order
to reach a consensus as to how differences among riddles and jokes are to be
analyzed. We have presented the framework in Table 1 as a possible basis for
such a reanalysis, although we realize that it does not provide all the
answers.
Incongruity-Resolution Theory
At present, the dominant theoretical view in the psychological literature is

incongruity-resolution theory. However, there are several gaps between the
theory and data that bear close examination because they may point to some
limitations of the theory.
First, it seems to us that closer attention could be a paid to analysis of specific
examples; it may be the case that not all riddles and jokes use incongruity and
resolution in the same way. As an example, Shultz (1976) analyzes the

following riddle: "Why did the cookie cry? Because its mother had been a wafer
(away for) so long." He claims that the riddlee first interprets the ambiguous
phonological string as "a wafer," and this produces incongruity that is resolved
by reinterpreting the string as "away for." An informal study that we have
carried out indicates, however, that most people first interpret the string as
"away for," and only secondarily see" a wafer" as a possibility. The reason that
this informal finding is potentially interesting is that the initial intepretation as
"away for" should produce little or no incongruity. It therefore should require
no resolution (see the above discussion of this riddle) and thus should not be
seen as an effective riddle. The fact that this is an effective riddle seems to
require some reanalysis, or at least elaboration, on the part of theorists. It is also
crucially important that large numbers of examples of this sort be analyzed to
determine in some detail the ways in which incongruity and resolution are
involved in riddles and jokes. Yalisove's (1978) analysis ofriddles into pun-in-
question versus pun-in-answer is a step in the right direction, although Yalisove
makes no attempt to analyze these categories on a theoretical level.
Finally, it is important to establish the breadth of the incongruity-resolution
principle in verbal humor. Shultz (1976) has stated that approximately half of
the verbal humor he has analyzed was based on incongruity resolution. This, of
course, leads one to ask for an analysis of the factors involved in the remaining
material. In addition, even in those cases in which incongruity resolution serves
as the basis for humor, it is important to assess the relevance of factors such as
those considered by Fowles and Glanz (1977) discussed earlier. (See Chapter 3
by Suls for further discussion of related issues.)
Production versus Comprehension
As mentioned earlier, one area that has received almost no attention from
researchers is the production of linguistic humor. Difficulties in controlling
stimulus materials obviously have contributed to the dearth of production
studies, but Shultz and Scott (1976) carried out a well-designed study of
production of linguistic humor. In addition, McDowell's (1979) field study of
children's riddling sessions, while not allowing direct experimental control of
stimulus conditions, did produce important data concerning factors involved in
children's "real-time" production of riddles. It might be possible to elaborate on
these two designs in order to get further insight into production of linguistic
humor.
In conclusion, the study of linguistic humor is an area that has attracted the
attention of researchers from many disciplines. However, due to a lack of
communication among these various disciplines, a deep understanding of the
factors involved in the production of appreciation of linguistic humor has been
slow in emerging. The present chapter has emphasized critical issues that we
believe will have to be addressed before real progress will be made.
82 William J. Pepiceilo and Robert W. Weisberg
REFERENCE NOTE
1. Weisberg, R. W., & Pepiceilo, W. J. Outline of a model of riddle production.
Unpublished manuscript, Temple University, 1982.
REFERENCES
Abrahams, R. D. Introductory remarks to a rhetorical theory of folklore. Journal of
American Folklore, 1968,81, 143-158.
Abrahams, R. D., & Dundes, A. Riddles. In R. Dorson (Ed.), Folklore andfolklife: An
introduction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.
Ben-Amos, D. Solutions to riddles. Journal ofAmerican Folklore, 1976,89,249-254.
Berlyne, D. E. Humor and its kin. In J. H. Goldstein and P. E. McGhee (Eds.), The
Brodzinsky, D. M. Children's comprehension and appreciation of verbal jokes in relation
to conceptual tempo. Child Development, 1977, 48, 960-967.
Fowles, B., & Glanz, M. E. Competence and talent in verbal riddle comprehension.
Journal of Child Language, 1977,4,433-452.
Georges, R. A., & Dundes, A. Toward a structural definition of the riddle. Journal of
American Folklore, 1963, 76, 111-118.
Green, T. A., & Pepicello, W. J. Wit in riddling: A linguistic perspective. Genre, 1978,
11,1-13.
Green, T. A., & Pepicello, W. J. The folk-riddle: A redefinition of terms. Western
Folklore, 1979,38,3-20.
Hamnett, I. Ambiguity, classification and change: The function of riddles. Man, 1967,
2,379-393.
Haring, L. On knowing the answer. Journal of American Folklore, 1974, 87,
197-207.
Harries, L. The riddle in Africa. Journal of American Folklore, 1971,84, 377-393.
Hirsch-Pasek, K., G1eitman, L. R, & G1eitman, H. What did the brain say to the mind?
A study of the detection and report of ambiguity by young children. In A. Sinclair,
R. J. Jarvella, & W. J. M. Levelt (Eds.), The child's conception of language. Berlin:
Springer-Verlag, 1978.
Hockett, C. The View from Language. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1977.
Maranda, E. K. A tree grows: Transformation of a riddle metaphor. In P. Maranda &
E. K. Maranda, (Eds.), Structural Models in Folklore and Transformational
Essays. The Hague: Mouton, 1971.
McDowell, J. H. Children's riddling. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press,
1979.
Miller, G. A. Language and speech. San Francisco: Freeman, 1981.
Pepicello, W. J. Linguistic strategies in riddling. Western Folklore, 1980,39, 1-16.
Pepiceilo, W. J., & Green, T. A. New approach to riddle analysis. Columbus, Oh.:
Ohio State University Press, in press.
Scott, C. Persian and Arabic riddles: A language-centered approach to genre
definition. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University and Mouton, 1965.
Scott, C. On defining the riddle: The problem of a structural unit. Genre, 1969,2,
129-142.
Shultz, T. R Development of the appreciation of riddles. Child Development, 1974,45,
100-105.
Shultz, T. R A cognitive-developmental analysis of humor. In A. J. Chapman & H. C.
Foot (Eds.), Humor and laughter: Theory, research, and applications. London:
Wiley, 1976.
Shultz, T. R, & Horibe, F. Development of the appreciation of verbal jokes.
Developmental Psychology, 1974,10, 13-20.
Shultz, T. R, & Pilon, R Development of the ability to detect linguistic ambiguity.
Child Development, 1973,44,728-733.
Shultz, T. R, & Robillard, J. The development of linguistic humor in children:
Incongruity through rule violation. In P. McGhee & A. Chapman (Eds.), Children's
humour. Chichester, England: Wiley, 1980.
Shultz, T. R, & Scott. M. B. The creation of verbal humor. Canadian Journal of
Psychology, 1974,28,421-425.
Suls, J. M. A twcrstage model for the appreciation of jokes and cartoons: An
information-processing analysis. In J. H. Goldstein & P. E. McGhee (Eds.) The
Sutton-Smith, B. A developmental structural account of riddles. In B. Kirshenblatt-
Gimblett (Ed.), Speech play: Research and resource for the study of linguistic
creativity. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976.
Taylor, A. English riddles from oral tradition. Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1948.
Yalisove, D. The effect of riddle structure on children's comprehension of riddles.
Developmental Psychology, 1978, 14,173-180.
Chapter 5
Disparagement Humor
DOLF ZILLMANN
Much has been said and written about humor that disparages, belittles, debases,
demeans, humiliates, or otherwise victimizes. A myriad of observations and
opinions on the subject eventually found expression in theoretical proposals,
and these proposals have been reviewed in considerable detail (e.g., Berlyne,
1969; Keith-Spiegel, 1972). The research efforts spawned by the proposals,
together with theoretical advances and refinements suggested or demanded by
the findings, also have been detailed and summarized (e.g., La Fave, 1972;
Zillmann & Cantor, 1976). Obviously, there is little merit in restating the
various theoretical views and in rehashing research findings that have been
reported repeatedly already. This chapter, consequently, traces the evolution of
disparagement theory in its essentials only and then focuses on new develop-
ments, both theoretical and empirical, that have occurred since the publication
of the reviews in the early and mid-seventies. More specifically, extensions of
theoretical approaches to disparagement humor are reported and the generality
and specificity of these approaches is assessed. Efforts at integrating disparage-
ment theory with other approaches to humor are reported. New findings
concerning the ontogeny of mirthful reactions to disparagement are discussed.
Finally, the discontent with the "incompleteness" of disparagement-centered
theories of humor is detailed, and recent efforts at removing the apparent
incompleteness of older models in the construction of more integrative theories
are described. Much attention is given to the issue of converting the potential
enjoyment of disparagement into amusement.
86 Dolf Zillmann
THE GRAND OLD VIEWS
The first systematic specifications of conditions under which the disparagement

of a person or of persons evokes mirthful reactions in onlookers, along with
those conditions under which it does not, were offered by Greek philosophers.
Suggestions by Plato and Aristotle, in particular, have received much
attention.
In Philebus, through the dialogue between Socrates and Protarchus, Plato
developed a classification for the ludicrous. Essentially, he suggested that the
exhibition of ignorance-based vain conceit of beauty, wisdom, or wealth by
friends constitutes the ludicrous and ought to be met with laughter-or perhaps
more appropriately, punished by laughter. Plato insisted that exultation
resulting from witnessing enemies suffer misfortunes is natural, morally proper,
and, hence, nonhumorous. He further contended that the display of ignorance
and conceit by powerful friends is detestable rather than funny. In the face of the
capacity for repraisals, it apparently is considered unwise, and therefore
improper, to rejoice when mishaps befall the mighty.
Aristotle in Poetics paid comparatively little attention to the moral appro-
priateness of exultation and gaiety. He concentrated on the sources of
merriment and came to the conclusion that weakness and ugliness, regardless of
social circumstances, are the chief conditions that embody the ludicrous. He
added the qualification, though, that reactions of grief are incompatible with
mirth, and that whenever the misfortunes befalling others are too severe (such as
in case of grave illness or death) the ludicrous ceases to exist and mirth cannot
manifest itself.
It was left to Hobbes to popularize the view that the infirmities of others
constitute the principal source of laughter and mirth. In what amounts to asides
in Human Nature (1650/1966) and Leviathan (1651/1968), Hobbes brought
into being what has come to be known as the "superiority theory of humor." He
proposed that "those grimaces called laughter" express the passion of glory,
which people experience "by the apprehension of some deformed thing in
another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves" (1651/
1968, p. 125). As in the older views, Hobbes dwells on the infirmities and
imperfections of others. But he differs in the projection of who laughs at whom.
Whereas Plato and Aristotle had suggested that the infirmity stricken would
draw the laughter of the powerful and unblemished, Hobbes thought that it
would be the imperfect and blemished-those in greater need of self-
enhancement-who would laugh at others who seem even less endowed and
more unfortunate. Hobbes thought laughter marked the inferior. "It is incident
most to them," he wrote, "that are conscious of the fewest abilities in
themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their favour, by observing the
imperfections of other men" (1651/1968, p. 125).
Hobbes' conception of laughter and its kin as self-glorification has entered
into a number of more recent views of humor and mirth (cf. Bain, 1880; Carus,
1898; Dunlap, 1925; Leacock, 1935; Rapp, 1947, 1949; Sidis, 1913; Stanley,
Disparagement Humor 87
1898; Wallis, 1922). All these views, which are typically classified as
superiority theories, build on the idea that laughter is a spontaneous response of
triumph that derives mainly from a favorable comparison of the self to others.
Those others, needless to say, tend to be inept, ugly, dumb, clumsy, weak, poor,
and so forth, and the sudden revelation of these traits in characteristic behaviors
is what is seen as prompting the self-enhancing comparisons that fuel laughter.
Hazlitt (1826/1926) captured the thrust of the argument in his cynical
comment, "We grow tired of every thing but turning others into ridicule, and
congratulating ourselves on their defects" (p. 239). And Baudelaire (1855/
1961) amplified the moral concern with self-glorifying humor that Plato and
Hobbes, among many others, had voiced by characterizing laughter as the most
reliable indication of the satanic spirit in man.
DISPARAGEMENT OF THE UNAFFILIATED
The reasoning on disparagement humor gained substantially from the recog-

nition that reactions of exultation to witnessing persons suffer debasement
depend in large measure on the affective disposition toward these persons.
Counter to the contentions of Aristotle, Hobbes, and their legacy, people seem
to discriminate socially in their enjoyment of infirmities in others. Ugliness,
stupidity, and ineptness appear to generate greater merriment when exhibited by
those who are disliked than when displayed by those who are liked. Misfortunes
and setbacks, in short, seem funnier when befalling enemies than when befalling
friends. (Plato, as will be recalled, did not deny that witnessing the disparage-
ment of enemies tends to foster great merriment, but attempted to define away
such merriment, that is, he considered the reaction as something other than
humor.)
The dispositional dependence of the enjoyment of disparagement was first
formally proposed by Wolff, Smith, and Murray (1934). These investigators
developed a conceptual distinction between affiliated and unaffiliated entities
(i.e., anything, not merely persons) on the basis of James' (1890) notion of the
"empirical self." According to James, all things persons can call their own, such
as their bodies, abilities, pets, spouses, children, clothes, houses, ancestors,
friends, reputation, vehicles, and bank accounts, constitute the larger self and
are deemed affiliated objects. Wolff et al. argued that, regardless of the way in
which object affiliations may have come about, persons would adopt attitudes
toward the objects in question that are similar to the attitudes they hold toward
themselves. This view derives from James' statements about the individual's
feelings toward the larger self: "If they [i.e., the objects] wax and prosper, he
feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down" (1890,
p. 291). The disparagement of an affiliated object, then, amounts to disparaging
the person connected with it; and as the disparagement of self by others is
generally deplored rather than enjoyed, the disparagement of any affiliated
88 Dolf Zillmann
object is expected to result in disappointment and annoyance rather than in

amusement and mirth. In contrast, mirth cannot be considered inhibited and is
expected to go unimpaired when disparagement is directed at an unaffiliated
object-that is, at anything outside the larger self to which the individual is not
bound by affection. Wolff et al. consequently arrived at "an unaffiliated object
in a disparaging situation" as the formula for amusement and mirth.
Wolff et al. thus have advanced the superiority theory of humor by specifying
a limiting condition for mirth. They have created a dichotomy of the objects of
this world: affiliated and unaffiliated ones. And they have proposed that
witnessing the disparagement of unaffiliated objects-as it provides a moment's
glory of superiority-is likely to produce mirth; whereas witnessing affiliated
objects thus treated will not, because any degradation of cherished entities is
ultimately degrading to the self.
In addition to their efforts in theory construction, Wolff et aI. pioneered
research on humor by subjecting their propositions to rigorous testing. They
determined the effects of imposed affiliations, such as those based on ethnicity
and gender, on the appreciation of disparagement humor. Specifically, they
predicted that jokes disparaging Jews would be appreciated less by Jews than by
non-Jews, and their findings bore out this prediction. They also observed that
men appreciated jokes ridiculing women more than women did, while women
exceeded men in their appreciation of jokes disparaging men. More recent
research failed, however, to confirm such general effects of gender affiliation
(e.g., Cantor, 1976; Losco & Epstein, 1975). Additionally, research by
Middleton (1959) brought only partial support to the proposal of Wolff at al.
concerning ethnicity. It was observed that Negroes surpassed whites in their
appreciation of anti-white jokes; but Negroes and whites did not differ in their
appreciation of anti-Negro jokes.
REFERENCE GROUPS AND IDENTIFICATION CLASSES
The dispositional approach of Wolff et al. was expanded and refined in the work
of La Fave and his collaborators (e.g., La Fave, 1961, 1972; La Fave, Haddad,
& Maesen, 1976).
La Fave originally offered the formula that something "is humorous to the
extent that it enhances an object of affection and/or disparages an object of
repulsion," and that it "is unhumorous to the extent that it does the opposite"
(1972, p. 198). The dispositional nomenclature was soon abandoned, however,
in favor of specifications in terms of groups and classes. "Object of affection"
was replaced by "positive reference group" and "positive identification class,"
and "object of repulsion" became "negative reference group" and "negative
identification class." But all these substitutions did not alter the proposition as
such: objects toward which positive attitudes were held were placed into the
positive classes, objects toward which attitudes were negative were placed into
the negative classes, and-to use La Fave's analogy-seeing the good guys
stick it to the bad guys was deemed to produce merriment, the reverse not
Whether expressed in attitudinal terms or conceptualized in reference groups
or identification classes, the model is based on an assumed dichotomy of
sentiment, and it projects both negative and positive sentiments to control and
influence mirthful reactions to witnessing disparagement. Repulsion, resent-
ment, hate, or simply negativeness are recognized as dispositional forces that
motivate mirth. Obvious as such recognition may seem, it was not well
integrated in earlier formulas for the enjoyment of disparagement humor. Wolff
et aI., for instance, did not stipulate that "unaffiliated" objects be resented-
despite the fact that Murray (1934) had linked the enjoyment of derisive humor
to the respondents' possession of egotistic, hostile, and world-derogatory
sentiments. In their formal model, "unaffiliated" amounted to lack of affiliation
or absence of a positive bond, not negative disposition. La Fave's formula, in
contrast, is specific on negativeness. (The formula is, of course, equally specific
on positiveness. This makes for the confusing projection that witnessing the
enhancement of an object in a positive identification class is a sufficient
condition for amusement. Such a proposal departs from common conceptuali-
zations, as witnessing the benefaction of a friendly party usually is considered
enjoyable but not funny. The emerging conceptual difficulties have been
discussed elsewhere (Zillmann & Cantor, 1976), and suggestions concerning
reactions to the enhancement of some object that is not linked to the debasement
of another receive further attention later in this chapter.)
Although the conceptualization of humorous situations as happenings
between "identification classes" is abstract enough to encompass any entity in
any specifiable situation, the parallel reasoning in terms of reference groups
proved to be confining. The research conducted by La Fave and his
collaborators essentially extended that of Wolff et al. in exploring the
enjoyment of the disparagement of persons from one well-defined social group
at the hands of persons from another well-defined group by members of the
disparaging group as well as by members of the disparaged group. The paradigm
is, of course, that of ethnic humor (e.g., La Fave, 1977). In this realm of
disparagement humor, La Fave and his collaborators have instituted a
methodological improvement: group affiliations that had been taken at
face value were now empirically ascertained. La Fave, McCarthy, and Haddad
(1973), for example, suspected that Americans are not necessarily pro-
American and Canadians not necessarily pro-Canadian, and they determined
the pertinent attitudes in order to identify genuine pro-Americans and genuine
pro-Canadians. The enjoyment that can be derived from seeing, say, a
Canadian disparage an American should, according to their model, be greater
for pro-Canadians than for Canadians; and it certainly should be greater for pro-
Canadians than for pro-Americans. Similarly, witnessing an American dis-
parage a Canadian should be more enjoyed by pro-Americans than by
Americans, Canadians, and pro-Canadians. The findings largely confirmed
these expectations. La Fave, Billinghurst, and Haddad (cited in La Fave,
Haddad, & Maesen, 1976) employed attitudinal assessments analogously to
90 Dolf Zillmann
classify profeminist and antifeminist men and women. Enjoyment of anti-

feminist humor, as might be expected, could be far better predicted from the pro
and antidistinctions than from gender alone. La F ave, Haddad, and Marshall
( 1974) furthermore ascertained pro and con attitudes concerning a highly
specific political cause (a student sit-in protesting departmental policies) and
found attitudes to be predictive of the enjoyment of disparagement humor.
The empirical determination of reference-group membership and identi-
fication classes thus is undoubtedly superior to judging affiliations at face value.
It might be considered crucial, in fact, because it potentially explains findings
that are inconsistent with assumption-based theoretical projections and that
seem to challenge superiority models. For instance, the perplexing findings
concerning gender (i.e., the greater enjoyment of female-disparaging humor by
both men and women) might be resolved by attitudinal assessments concerning
gender. It is conceivable that gender would fail to emerge as the salient
reference group it is presumed to be. Most importantly, however, the
measurement of attitudes might show that members of apparent social
aggregates can hold negative sentiments toward their group. Such sentiment
would explain the enjoyment of humor that features social self-incrimination.
Humor of this kind has always been popular. It abounds in ethnic humor. Much
Jewish humor, for example, is patently self-disparaging (e.g., Freud, 1905/
1958). But Jews seem to enjoy it as much as non-Jews, if not more so. Socially
self-derogatory humor obviously challenges the formula that what is being
enjoyed in disparagement humor is seeing the good guys triumph over the bad
guys-unless the social ties are assumed to be less stable than reference-group
theories suggest. Attitudinal assessments just might reveal such an instability,
and to the extent that sentiment is not bound by formal affiliations and may run
counternorm, a member of a particular group should be able to enjoy the
humiliation of one of his or her own kind.
DISPOSITION THEORY OF HUMOR
This disposition theory of humor and mirth (Zillmann & Cantor, 1972, 1976)
transcends reference groups and identification classes. Prediction of the
enjoyment of witnessing disparagement is based on affective dispositions
toward the parties involved, that is, toward the disparaging and the disparaged
entities. These dispositions may be positive (e.g., affection, admiration, love) or
negative (e.g., resentment, condemnation, hate), and they are expected to vary
in intensity. Both the hedonic quality and the intensity of affect are empirically
ascertained, and the likelihood and magnitude of mirth resulting from witnessed
disparagement is projected from this ascertainment. Obviously, the affective
dispositions under consideration may correspond with group affiliations (e.g., a
Jew may feel sympathy toward other Jews and antipathy toward KKK
members), and if so, disposition theory can accomodate reference group theory.
But such correspondence need not exist (e.g., a professor might hold a negative
disposition toward other professors and be more sympathetic toward students

than peers), and if this is the case, any conceptualization in terms of groups and
classes is considered pointless, immaterial, and potentially misleading. In
particular, the conversion of graduated attitudinal assessments into dicho-
tomous classifications-as practiced in the theory of identification classes-is
regarded to be counterproductive, as information that is crucial to making
accurate predictions is lost in the process. (It is worthy of note that La Fave et
al. (1976) rephrased their original formula, making it sensitive to the degree to
which attitudes are positive or negative. Although they maintained the
identification-class nomenclature, they essentially arrived at a dispositional
model.)
A more important point of departure from the thinking in terms of groups and
classes are the dispositional dynamics proposed in disposition theory. Positive
and negative affective reactions (or affection and resentment, love and hate,
etc.) are conceived of as acute, transitory states that are superimposed on
comparatively stable dispositions that mayor may not be consistent with them.
Their treatment as short-lived states is significant in that it allows the projection
of resentment-based mirth among close friends and lovers, even in response to
the self. There is no contradiction in expecting the best of friends to be
temporarily annoyed with one another, a circumstance that should motivate
mirth from witnessed disparagement. Similarly, it is not contradictory to expect
that persons with high self-esteem (Le., a generally positive disposition toward
themselves) might bungle and be temporarily annoyed with themselves, making
them respond mirthfully to disparaging evaluation because of their own apparent
ineptness. Remember that Hobbes, in Human Nature and Leviathan, noted
that people tend to laugh at their inferior former self: "Men laugh at the follies of
themselves past" (165011966, p. 46). Conceptually, then, enduring positive
dispositions may be superseded and temporarily displaced by negative affect,
and the latter acute state should motivate mirth in response to the disparage-
ment of the agent or entity toward which the negative affect is directed. Such
mirth-motivating affective reactions may come and go, and to trace them by
classifying persons or objects that evoke them as members of positive
identification classes that become members of negative identification classes,
just to make a nomenclature applicable, is obviously without heuristic value or
predictive utility.
In formal terms, the disposition theory of humor and mirth is based on the
premise that persons respond affectively to a multitude of stimulus conditions,
that the affective reaction is discernable as hedonically positive or negative, and
that it varies in intensity. Thus founded, it posits the following relationships:
1. The more intense the negative disposition toward the disparaged agent or
entity, the greater the magnitude of mirth.
2. The more intense the positive disposition toward the disparaged agent or
entity, the smaller the magnitude of mirth.
3. The more intense the negative disposition toward the disparaging agent or
entity, the smaller the magnitude of mirth.
92 Dolf Zillmann
4. The more intense the positive disposition toward the disparaging agent or
entity, the greater the magnitude of mirth.
Mirth, then, is said to vary proportionally with the negativeness of the
affective disposition toward the disparaged party and with the positiveness of
the affective disposition toward the disparaging party, and jointly so. It should
be noticed that all propositions concern disparagement specifically. The
benefaction or enhancement of one party by another is not a condition for
enjoyment in this model of disparagement humor. The mirth-producing event-
namely, disparagement-is thoroughly negative. There is nothing positive about
the critical behavioral exchange. However, the fact that one party succeeds in
debasing another may, of course, be deemed self-enhancing.
Evidence supportive of the disposition theory of humor comes from research
in which the disparagers and/or disparagees were manipulated or selected to
draw reactions of sympathy or antipathy (e. g., Cantor & Zillmann, 1973;
Chapman, Smith, & Foot, 1977; Zillmann & Cantor, 1972). In this context, the
disparagement of an antipathetic agent by a sympathetic one was expected to
produce a maximum of mirth; the reverse a minimum or none at all. In the
investigation conducted by Zillmann and Cantor, for instance, disparagement
occurred between professors and students-among other superior-subordinate
groupings. To the extent that a touch of mutual resentment characterizes such a
superior-subordinate relationship, it may be expected that disparagement is
appreciated and deemed funny when it victimizes those who are resented,
especially when it is delivered by those with whom the respondent shares the
negative disposition. Those who suffered subordination should thus particularly
enjoy seeing superiors disparaged; and those who had cause for discontent with
subordinates should particularly enjoy seeing subordinates disparaged. Figure
5.1 illustrates the two discussed social avenues of disparagement. These
cartoons were actually used in the experiment, among many other stimuli. Either
the upper or the lower version was presented to persons of the subordinate or
superior variety, and the magnitude of humor reactions was found to follow the
predicted pattern. In the subsequent study by Cantor and Zillmann, sympathy
and antipathy toward the disparaged agents were directly measured. Disparage-
ment was brought about by accident, unidentified sources, children, and
animals. All disparagers were rather neutral dispositionally. As predicted, mirth
reactions were the more intense, the more pronounced the negative affective
disposition toward the disparaged object. Figure 5.2 gives an example of the
manipulation. In this instance, the policeman evoked antipathy while the
zookeeper proved sympathetic. The humiliation that is about to happen in the
cartoon produced more enjoyment when the victim was resented than when he
was liked. The investigation by Chapman et al. attests further to the usefulness
of dispositional assessments in predicting mirth reactions; so do investigations of
political disparagement humor by Priest (1966) and by Zillmann, Bryant, &
Cantor, (1974).
An investigation by Zillmann and Bryant (1974) linked the dispositional
reasoning with moral considerations. Apparently, respondents to disparagement
OVER,AND ... ... POW!
(b)
OVER,AND ... ... POW!
Figure Sol. Example of upward (a) and downward (b) directed disparagement humor.
Persons experienced as superiors enjoyed the cartoon more when disparagement was
downward directed than when it was upward directed. Persons experienced as
subordinates exhibited the reverse preference. (From "Directionality of Transitory
Dominance as a Communication Variable Affecting Humor Appreciation" by
D. Zillmann and J. R. Cantor, Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 1972,24,
191-198. Copyright 1972 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by
permission of the publisher.)
94 Dolf Zillmann
Figure 5-2. Humorous disparagement of a disliked (a) versus a liked (b) character.
Persons with negative dispositions toward policemen and positive ones toward zoo
keepers enjoyed version a more than version b. (From "Resentment toward Victimized
Protagonists and Severity of Misfortunes They SutTer as Factors in Humor Appre-
ciation" by J. R. Cantor and D. Zillmann, Journal of Experimental Research in
Personality, 1973, 6, 321-329. Copyright 1973. Reprinted by permission of the
publisher.)
exercise moral judgment in relating the circumstances that produce antipathy to

the severity of the disparagement. For instance, a flagrantly transgressive act on
the part of the disparagee-to-be seems to call for harsh, punitive disparagement.
A minor transgression, in contrast, demands minor disparagement only. The
findings support such a relationship between deserving and receiving debasing
treatments. It appears that only this correspondence (i.e., the "punishment"
fitting the "crime") leaves the respondents' sense of justice undisturbed and
mirth reactions free to unfold. Debasing treatments that are too severe or too
mild, relative to the events that fostered negative sentiments, seem to perturb
intuitive justice and, hence, impair mirthful reactions.
Recently, McGhee and his collaborators (McGhee & Lloyd, 1981; McGhee
& Duffey, 1983a, 1983b) have traced the emergence of the dispositional factor
in the enjoyment of disparagement humor in children ranging from 3 to 7 year
olds. Across these age groups, boys consistently thought it funnier when
accidental mishaps victimized parties other than their own kind; and apparently
the more so, the less favorable the dispositions toward these other parties
seemed to be. Girls exhibited similar preferences, except in comparisons of girl
versus boy disparagees. As in the research with adults (cf. Cantor, 1976),
females failed to side with females in enjoying the disparagement of males more
than that of females. Girls, it seems, generally do not develop positive
dispositions that favor their gender over the opposite (and/or negative
dispositions that favor the opposite gender over theirs) as boys seem to do.
These likely dispositional developments have not been directly assessed,
however. Nonetheless, the indicated dispositional "confusion" appears to be
particularly strong in girls from low-income families. Such girls thought the
disparagement of girls to be funnier than that of boys (McGhee & Duffey,
1983b). The dispositional inconsistencies concerning gender have a parallel in
race and ethnicity. Only white children (3 to 6 year olds) found it funnier to see
a child of another racial/ ethnic group disparaged than to see a child of their own
kind thus treated (McGhee & Duffey, 1983a). Black and Mexican-American
children did not exhibit such preferences, presumably because at this stage they
have not yet developed dispositions that are more positive toward their own
kind than toward whites and/or more negative toward whites than toward their
own kind.
EXTENSIONS OF DISPOSITION THEORY
The disposition theory of humor has been expanded in order to explain the
enjoyment that audiences and spectators derive from suspenseful drama
(Zillmann, 1980) and from sports events (Zillmann, Bryant, & Sapolsky,
1979). These extensions have received support from numerous experimental
investigations (e.g., Bryant, Brown, Comisky, & Zillmann, 1982; Zillmann &
Cantor, 1977; Zillmann, Hay, & Bryant, 1975). The particular propositions
supported are as follows:
96 Dolf Zillmann
1. Enjoyment deriving from witnessing the debasement, failure, or defeat of a

party, agent, or object increases with the intensity of negative sentiment and
decreases with the intensity of positive sentiment toward these entities.
2. Enjoyment deriving from witnessing the enhancement, success, or victory of
a party, agent, or object decreases with the intensity of negative sentiment
and increases with the intensity of positive sentiment toward these
entities.
3. Annoyance deriving from witnessing the debasement, failure, or defeat of a
party, agent, or object decreases with the intensity of negative sentiment and
increases with the intensity of positive sentiment toward these entities.
4. Annoyance deriving from witnessing the enhancement, success, or victory of
a party, agent, or object increases with the intensity of negative sentiment
and decreases with the intensity of positive sentiment toward these
entities.
5. Propositions 1 through 4 apply jointly. Consequently, all contributions to
enjoyment and/or annoyance combine in total enjoyment or annoyance. In
this integration of contributions, annoyance is conceived of as negative
enjoyment, and contributions to enjoyment and to annoyance are assumed to
combine in an additive fashion.
In terms of liked and disliked persons or groups, this general disposition
model projects, first of all, that disparagement fosters euphoria when it
victimizes disliked parties and that it fosters dysphoria when it victimizes liked
parties. Seeing devious persons get their just deserts and villains duly punished
is undoubtedly cause for euphoria; so is witnessing a despised player or team get
clobbered by superior opposition. And seeing someone who had it coming
humiliated-with a grand, witty, yet devastating put-down-seems to fall nicely
in place. The suggestion that, in drama and sports, seeing an esteemed party
subjected to abuse and defeat will be deplored rather than enjoyed, is also
obvious and noncontroversial. At this point, however, disparagement humor
ceases to be a parallel condition. The witty humiliation of a genuinely liked
party that is undoubtedly considered undeserving of such treatment is not likely
to evoke appreciable distress. It is not likely to produce much of a mirth reaction
either. Unlike in drama and sports, where the victimization of persons held dear
tends to evoke reactions of sorrow and grief and stir up anguish, the humorous
disparagement of these people (or their disparagement in humor) is at worst
considered in poor taste and "off color" -or so it seems. In contrast to drama
and sports as genres of entertainment, humor apparently carries with it a
protection against duress; whereas disparagement of resented parties can be
enjoyed (usually!), the aversions that should be produced by such disparage-
ment when directed at "dispositionally inappropriate" targets (at objects of
affection, that is) can be largely avoided or, at least, held to minimal
intensities.
The general model further projects that the enhancement or benefaction of
liked parties fosters euphoria, and that the same treatment of disliked parties
fosters dysphoria. Indeed, in drama and sports it tends to be gratifying to see

liked protagonists or players come to glory. It also might be considered
undebatable that, were villains to "get the girls" or obnoxious athletes to
become champions of the world, reactions to drama and sports would be on the
distressing, disturbing, enraging, and dysphoric side~ But where is the parallel
for humor? In general, and perhaps in principle, it is not a laughing matter to
see, for example, an admired prima ballerina receive a bouquet or an adorable
child from a poor family win a million dollars in the lottery. The benefaction of
liked and deserving parties in humor may well be sanctioned and applauded,
even enjoyed; but it is difficult to see how it could spark amusement and
laughter-unless, through transformations such as in irony, the apparent
benefaction is converted into something akin to disparagement. Analogously, it
appears that the benefaction of disliked and undeserving parties can promote
amusement and gaiety only when recognized as cynicism or the like, not when
taken at face value. Untempered benefaction, as suggested earlier, is simply not
a viable theme for humor.
The comparison of the dispositional mechanics of drama and sports, on the
one hand, and of tendentious humor on the other, thus reveals that humor
thrives on the debasement of the resented, and that other components play an
entirely secondary, supportive role. Many factors, it seems, contribute to
enjoyment as such; but only one theme elicits amusement and laughter-that is,
the droll, waggish, and jocose mirth response that separates the enjoyment of
humor from that of drama, sports, music, and potentially all other forms of
entertainment. Interestingly, while such subclassification of enjoyment tends to
be generally accepted and is consensual in this sense, the distinctions in
question still await rigorous definitional treatment.
ENJOYMENT VERSUS AMUSEMENT
If, then, disparagement is the central theme of dispositionally motivated mirth,

and benefaction is secondary in that it can only be accomplished through
disparagement (i.e., it may accrue to the party that succeeds in disparaging
another), does witnessing the disparagement of a disliked person or thing by a
liked person or thing universally evoke amusement? Obviously not! A look back
at drama and sports is telling. For instance, an audience might exult as the
proverbial hero beats up on a proverbial villain, and spectators might jump for
joy as their basketball team tripled the score of the potent yet despicable
opposition. Enjoyment is not in doubt. But not too many would care to
characterize this enjoyment as amusement (or mirth of the humor variety).
There is, consequently, no assurance that amusement will come from
witnessing disparagement under the most appropriate dispositional circum-
stances. Such basal insight is of enormous consequence. It shows, essentially,
that disposition theory proper is a theory of enjoyment, not of amusement and
98 Dolf Zillmann
humor. It shows that the theory predicts joy, exultation, euphoria, and their
hedonic inverses-at least, for domains of human conduct in which these
emotional reactions may be freely expressed. And it shows that the unamended
theory is incomplete as a theory of humor.
Such insight is not exactly new. For instance, Hobbes, although insisting that
humor derives mainly from witnessing the infirmities and the disparagement of
others, also noted that "whatsoever it be that moveth laughter, it must be new
and unexpected," and it must amount to "elegant discovering" (1650/1966,
p. 46). The most succinct expression of this view that disparagement alone
(even if dispositionally appropriate) is not a sufficient condition for humor,
comes from Freud (1905/1958), however.
Freud conceived of tendentious humor (i.e., mainly hostile and obscene
humor) as a stimulus condition composed of tendentious and nontendentious
elements. Tendentious elements are those that pertain to vital needs whose
satisfaction is blocked. Nontendentious elements are rather innocuous stimuli
associated with amusement, gaiety, and laughter. These latter elements are
usually subsumed under the heading "joke-work" (Witzarbeit), which refers to
formal techniques of humor such as the "play on words." Berlyne (1969, 1972)
arrived at a distinction similar to that between tendentious and nontendentious
elements, speaking of need- and drive-related ecological factors in contrast to
innocuous collative variables. His collative variables (novelty, surprise,
incongruity, strangeness, complexity, ambiguity, puzzlement, and apparent
contradiction) essentially constitute what Freud called joke-work. But while
Berlyne concerned himself with the arousal properties of the various elements of
humor and pondered the impact of summed arousal on mirth, Freud's reasoning
focused on the necessity of joke-work in the liberation of mirth and, hence, on
the conversion of covert enjoyment into overt amusement.
Freud has often been credited with the idea that the enjoyment of
disparagement humor is due, in large measure, to the camouflage of the hostility
contained in it. Blunt hostilities, this interpretation suggests, are socially
objectionable; any enjoyment that their expression would motivate needs to be
repressed for fear of social repercussions. Hostilities that are camouflaged by
joke-work, in contrast, are not fully recognized for what they are, making them
more acceptable and even enjoyable. Such a view is somewhat counterintuitive.
How, for instance, can persons who are motivated to enjoy someone's disparage-
ment be appreciative of humor in which the hostile, disparaging acts are cleverly
concealed and go unrecognized? Additionally, this view is at variance with
much of the research evidence on the dispositional facilitation of the enjoyment
of hostile humor (cf. Zillmann, 1977). Most importantly, however, it seems to
misrepresent Freud's position. It appears that this misrepresentation is simply
due to translation. Freud used the term "Verkleidung," which indeed translates
into "camouflage." But he also used "Einkieidung," which is translatable as
"embodiment," "investiture," "adornment," or "embellishment." The fact
that he used both terms rather interchangeably would suggest that camouflage in
the sense of disguise or coverup was not the intended meaning. If this
translational correction is accepted, Freud's proposal regarding the liberation of

mirth in response to tendentious humor can be substantially reinterpreted.
First of all, and also in contrast to common interpretations, Freud detected
tendentious elements in humor generally. "Strictly speaking," he said, "only the
jest is nontendentious" (1958, p. 107; this author's translation), the "jest" being
a mirth-producing, innocuous stimulus whose presentation is linked to moods of
gaiety and elation. Given, then, that humor generally contains both tendentious
and nontendentious elements, he went on to make a daring assumption:
Respondents are unable to tell exactly which elements of a humorous stimulus
condition evoke how much of their reaction of pleasure. Freud argued that a
humorous stimulus "makes a total impression of enjoyment on us, without our
being able to determine at once what share of pleasure derives from its joke
characteristics and what share from its apt thought-content. We are constantly
making mistakes in this apportionment. ... We do not know what it is that gives
us pleasure and what we laugh about" (p. 107; this author's translation). And he
suggested that this uncertainty in our judgment regarding the apportionment of
joy to inducing stimuli may have given rise to the development of humor per
se.
The implications of the proposed imprecision in the apportionment are
readily illustrated by the enjoyment of obscene humor. To Freud's mind, such
humor produces mirth mainly because it constitutes a transitory overcoming of
sexual repressions. "In the case of dirty jokes, generally, we commit glaring
errors of judgment about the 'quality' of these jokes as far as it depends on formal
conditions; the technique of dirty jokes is mostly rather poor, but their effect on
laughter is enormous" (p. 82; this author's translation). Freud implied that the
plain report of obscenities would not have a similar effect and clearly treated the
involvement of some joke-work as a necessary condition for the elicitation of
mirth. The wrapping of obscenities-and for that matter, of hostilities-in a bit
of nontendentious joke-work, he felt, "bribes and confuses our critical skills"
(p. 107; this author's translation). And presumably because of this relaxation of
rational restraint we are able to enjoy what we otherwise could not enjoy.
Had Freud been more explicit about the proposed process, he would no doubt
have explained it in terms of control exerted by the superego. But the relaxation
of restraint can be more parsimoniously explained (i.e., without far-reaching
assumptions about the structure of the self) as the result of anticipations (cf.
Zillmann, 1979). The individual can be seen as being forced by the anticipation
of social reproach for socially inappropriate expressions of joy to inhibit such
expressions. In general, rejoicing at seeing one's enemy suffer needs to be
inhibited. However, the presence of nontendentious elements of humor can set
the individual free to express his or her euphoria because such a reaction can be
attributed to the humorous elements. The individual can virtually blame any
"inappropriate" mirth reaction on "something that was funny" about an
incident, and he or she may be quite liberal in detecting something that qualifies
as funny. If, for example, we witness our neighbor backing his brand-new car
into his mailbox, and a negative disposition predisposes us to enjoy this and
100 Dolf Zillmann
makes us burst out in laughter, we can always tell ourselves that we laughed
because of the peculiar way in which the mailbox was deformed, the peculiar
expression on our neighbor's face, the peculiar squeaking noise of the impact, or
a dozen other peculiar things. The important thing is that we do not have to
believe that we are cruel enough to have enjoyed our neighbor's misfortune.
Construing another's inferiority or misfortune as funny thus saves us from a
dilemma and permits us-in our expression of joy-to be malicious without
having to be apprehensive about being reprimanded by anybody, including
ourselves. It permits us, in a way, to be malicious with dignity.
As an alternative to the suggestions by Freud, Suls (1977) has recently
promoted an incongruity-resolution model of disparagement humor that
integrates tendentious and nontendentious elements. Essentially, Suls thought
to bring together the two major, all-too-indepehdent approaches to humor,
namely, those notions that concentrate on disparagement and those that focus
on joke-work. The most characteristic interpretation of the latter approach is
usually referred to as incongruity theory (cf. Berlyne, 1969; Keith-Spiegel,
1972). Truthful to the label, it projects amusement as the result ofthe encounter
of something incongruous; that is, of an aggregate of elements that thwarts
expectations in that it contains some parts that are odd and unfitting. In so-
called "cognitive-perceptual theories" of this approach (e.g., Jones, 1970;
Shultz, 1972; Suls, 1972), the bewildering reaction to incongruity is considered
a first stage only. The resolution of the incongruity is viewed as the essential
second stage, and mirth is said to depend on reaching the second stage.
Experimentation with children lends strong support to this stage model (e.g.,
Shultz, 1972, 1974). Suls proposed that such incongruity resolution is vital to
the enjoyment of disparagement, too; he suggested that amusement from
disparagement humor should be the greater, the less ambiguous and drawn out
the resolution of any incongruity associated with the disparagement. Wicker,
Barron, and Willis (1980) have presented data in support of this proposal. They
have shown, among other things, that amusement in response to disparagement
humor tends to decline with the "sensicalness" of the resolution.
Suls' proposal has merit in that it unites approaches to humor that, as theories
of limited scope, have coexisted in relative isolation. Hopefully it will stimulate
further integrative efforts. However, the proposal does not directly address the
question of why, through the addition of incongruities and their resolution, the
disposition ally motivated enjoyment of disparagement would find expression in
amusement.
MISATTRIBUTION THEORY OF HUMOR
Although in the initial presentation of the disposition theory of humor (Zillmann

& Cantor, 1976) the necessity of the involvement of cues capable of converting
enjoyment into amusement (so-called "humor cues") had been duly stressed,
the mechanics of this conversion have been formalized and tested only recently
(Zillmann & Bryant, 1980). Specifically, Freud's suggestions concerning the
individual's inability to properly apportion mirth to particular elements of a
complex stimulus situation, as discussed earlier, have been further developed in
an attributional analysis. This analysis, applied to the enjoyment of disparage-
ment humor, yielded the following propositions:
1. Witnessing the intentional or accidental infliction of misfortunes upon
entities toward which negative dispositions are held and/or that are
considered deserving of such treatment motivates positive affective reac-
tions.
2. In social encounters characterized by sincerity, the overt manifestations of
these reactions need to be inhibited. The inhibiton results from the
anticipation of social reproach for violations of the known rules of good
social conduct. However, such inhibition tends to become habitual and to
generalize to nonsocial situations.
3. The presence of innocuous humor cues (Le., nontendentious mirth-evoking
stimuli; stimuli fostering Witzarbeit; collative variables of humor) in the
misfortunes removes the basis for the anticipation of social reproach in that
the overt expression of mirth can be attributed to these humor cues. This
attribution-or more accurately, this misattribution-thus "justifies" and
"legitimizes" the normally censured open enjoyment of the disparagement of
detested entities. As amusement, joy in response to tendentious elements is
virtually liberated by the presence of nontendentious elements of humor.
Clearly, such projections hinge on the assumption that people are poor judges
of what, exactly, makes them laugh. If particular innocuous humor cues were
unmistakably linked to particular amounts of amusement, misconception could
not occur. Only to the extent that the mirth response to such stimuli is highly
variable and its magnitude can not be foretold, can it be expected that the
individual may misconstrue a high-magnitude mirth response that feeds on
witnessing the disparagement of a resented party as a reaction primarily caused
by "the humor" in the situation.
The implications of these presumed attributional processes for the enjoyment
of disparagement humor were determined by an experimental investigation in
which humorous disparagement was decomposed into its component parts;
namely, tendentious and nontendentious elements. There were, consequently,
three pertinent conditions: the first one entailed both disparagement and
innocuous humor cues; the second one featured the raw, unembellished
disparagement; and the third one involved the innocuous humor cues only. As
the proposed liberation of mirth presupposes negative sentiment, these
conditions were cross varied with negative sentiment versus a control in which
no particular sentiment was evoked.
Operationally, both male and female subjects individually interacted with a
female experimenter who treated them either in a condescending, rude manner
or in a neutral fashion. After thus establishing a negative versus a neutral
102 Dolf ZiIImann
affective disposition, subjects communicated with the experimenter via closed-

circuit television (or more accurately, the subjects believed to do so, but
actually responded to a prepared videotape). The experimenter presented a
variety of toys (such as building blocks), and subjects evaluated their suitedness
for television advertising. In this context, they witnessed one of three things:
a. The experimenter, who had poured herself a cup of tea, presented an
unmarked cube. The cube suddenly sprang open, with ajack popping out and
swaying on a spring. The event caused her to lose control of her cup, and she
spilled the piping hot tea all over herself.
b. The unmarked cube never opened. Nonetheless, its handling caused the
mishap specified under (a).
c. The jack popped out of the box as in (a). It failed to cause a mishap,
however.
The subjects' facial reactions during the cube-handling and the events
connected with it were unobtrusively recorded on videotape. Judges, who were
naive about the experiment and its conditions, later analyzed these recordings
for expressions of amusement and laughter. The findings are presented in Table
5.1. As there were no gender differences whatsoever, these findings apply to
males and females equally.
Facially expressed mirth in response to the innocuous humor cues only, as
can be seen, was modest and independent of prevailing sentiment or disposition.
In sharp contrast, mirth in response to the mishap alone was very much a
function of affective disposition toward the victim. When the victim was met
with affective indifference, mirth was minimal; but when she was resented,
mirth was clearly in evidence and reached a moderate level. Most importantly,
however, in the condition where subjects witnessed both the mishap and the
humor cues, facially expressed mirth proved to be the sum of mirth evoked by
Table 5-1. Facially expressed mirth in response to humorous situations differently

composed of tendentious and nontendentious elements.
Situations
No Mishap. Mishap. No Mishap.
Dispositions Humor Cues Humor Cues Humor Cues
Neutral 15.1 ab 7.P 23.9 bc
Resentment 12.7ab 28.3 c 50.3 d
Note. Means having no letter in their superscripts in common differ atp < .05 by Newman-Keuls'
test.
From "Misattribution Theory of Tendentious Humor" by D. Zillmann and J. Bryant, Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 1980,16, 146-160. Copyright 1980. Reprinted by permission of
the publisher.
the component parts when the victim was met with indifference; but when the
victim was resented, mirth exceeded this sum significantly. In the critical,
dispositional condition, then, mirth was pronounced and more than the sum of
the reactions to the constituent's parts. If it is assumed-as is done in mis-
attribution theory-that in the absence of mirth-liberating humor cues the
individual is forced to hold back the expression of enjoyment, the moderate
reaction to the pure mishap can be considered subdued and the pronounced
reaction to the embellished mishap minus the reaction to the pure embellish-
ment indicative of the enjoyment motivated by negative sentiment. But
regardless of the reconstruction of the magnitude of motivated mirth, the
findings are entirely consistent with the propositions of the misattribution theory
of tendentious humor, and they support the theory in this sense.
THE "INTRINSIC" PUZZLE
The misattribution theory of humor has the disquieting corollary that disparage-
ment, in and of itself (and regardless of dispositions toward disparager and
disparaged), is not funny. Dependent upon the dispositional conditions
articulated in disposition theory, disparagement may motivate enjoyment-even
evoke overt enjoyment under some circumstances. It will not produce
amusement, however, unless humor cues are part and parcel of any disparage-
ment. Dispositional analyses thus seem to beg the question as to what makes
humor humor (or what makes something funny). Dispositional considerations, it
could be argued, forecast the intensity of mirth reactions, not their particular
euphoric mode or status. Put simply, they project how funny a disparaging event
will be to whom; but they fail to predict whether or not it will befunny in the first
place. Disposition theory proper, then, might be considered a theory of humor
facilitation (or humor impairment) rather than a theory of humor per se. The
disposition theory of humor obviously relies on elements alien to dispositional
considerations to arrive at predictions of amusement an<;l funniness. It relies on
collative variables such as novelty, surprise, incongruity, and the like. Only the
involvement of these variables appears to assure humor, and presumably so
because of particular intrinsic properties of the stimuli they subsume.
It might seem advisable to put forth a general classification of innocuous-
stimulus conditions that are intrinsically funny and that, therefore, are capable
of triggering smiles and laughter in response to disparagement-as long as they
are properly integrated with the disparaging happenings. Moreover, one might
be inclined to acknowledge that searching for the "essence of humor" in
disparaging situations and in the dispositions toward the parties involved is a
moot undertaking, and that the search ought to focus on nontendentious stimuli
as they seem to hold greater promise of being "intrinsically funny." Both
reactions would be rash, however. It turns out that all efforts at classifying
seemingly intrinsically-funny stimulus conditions have failed to differentiate
104 Dolf Zillrnann
between stimuli that consistently produce mirth and those that consistently do
not. Novel, surprising, incongruous, strange, complex, ambiguous, puzzling,
and contradictory stimuli (cf. Berlyne, 1969, 1972) stimulate amusement on
some occasions, but not on others. Situations that contain ample novelty and
surprise, such as seeing the pope get shot, may bewilder us, get us upset, or
leave us indifferent rather than make us laugh-even in the case the dispositions
were favorable to enjoyment. The collative variables thus do not subsume
"intrinsically funny" stimuli, and their presence in disparaging situations might
be considered facilitative of humor but not essential to it. Stimuli of this type do
not necessarily qualify as "humor cues."
Those who have searched for the apparently elusive innocuous stimulus
conditions that consistently evoke smiles and laughter-that assure humor, so to
speak-have come to acknowledge the significance of the context in which
innocuous, potentially mirth-inducing stimuli are presented. McGhee (1972),
for instance, stipulates that cues calling for "fantasy assimilation" be present,
and Rothbart (1973, 1976) similarly insists on the presence of cues that signal
"play" or "fun." For example, children tend to construe riddles in which
incongruities are featured as problems to be resolved in earnest; only when
given a "play" hint do they respond to them in a humored fashion (e.g.,
Rothbart & Pien, 1977).
It would appear, then, that stimuli drawn from the so-called collative
variables and stimuli that signify playfulness (or lack of seriousness) are both
necessary to elicit smiles and laughter. Both types of stimuli, it seems, are
necessary to convert the resentment-motivated enjoyment of disparagement into
amusement. Notwithstanding the significance of this function, little is known
about the stimulus combinations in question. Do certain stimuli have intrinsic
properties that link them to merriment specifically? Is the signification of play
arbitrary and entirely the result of cultural convention? Or do intrinsic
properties combine with conventions in unique ways to signal funniness-and
through such signaling set us free to enjoy disparagements that we otherwise
could not?
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307-323.
Chapter 6
Humor Development:
Toward a Life Span Approach
PAUL E. McGHEE
The study of humor development progressively increased through the decade of

the 1970s. Evidence of the resurgence of interest in this long-neglected area of
development may be found not only in the increasing number of journal articles
devoted to it, but also in the recent reissueing of Wolfenstein's (1954)
psychoanalytically oriented Children's Humor in 1978 and the publication of
Children's Riddling (McDowell, 1979), Humor: Its Origin and Development
(McGhee, 1979), and Children's Humour (McGhee & Chapman, 1980). Most
of this research has focused on the elementary school years, with studies of
preschoolers being second most frequent. Surprisingly, very few studies have
dealt with humor among adolescents, and those have rarely been develop-
mental in nature. While college students remain the most frequently studied age
group in this as well as other areas of research, these studies have also rarely
been conceptualized to examine developmental change. While a number of
studies have used subjects at various points in the postcollege adult years, the
author knows of only one that investigated humor development among the
elderly (Schaier & Cicirelli, 1976). Thus, while a decade or so ofresearch has
sharply increased our understanding of the development of humor up to about
junior high school age, we remain completely ignorant of developmental
changes from early adolescence through the years of advanced aging. The
present chapter is designed to draw attention to this void and to begin to
stimulate a life span approach to research on humor development.
Because of the recency of the research reviews provided by McGhee (1979)
and McGhee and Chapman (1980), this chapter will not attempt to thoroughly
review research on humor development. Rather, attention will be given to
110 Paul E. McGhee
general issues that must be considered in any attempt to explain humor

development. Studies completed since 1979 will be discussed only if they mark
breakthroughs into new areas of research on humor development or are
pertinent to the issue being discussed.
NEW AREAS OF RESEARCH
Several chapters in the volume edited by McGhee and Chapman (1980) were
designed to stimulate research in areas of children's behavior and development
that should have close links to humor development. Tower and Singer (1980)
discuss the importance of imaginative play in early childhood, noting the
cognitive, social, and emotional benefits it has for the child. Since humor is seen
as evolving out of imaginative play, these benefits hold for humor as well.
McGhee (1979, 1983) and Horgan (1981) have similarly noted the early close
relationship between humor and imaginative play. Gardner (1980) discusses
the close relationship between humor and the realms of metaphor and story
comprehension (literary development). Shultz and Robillard (1980) provide a
systematic analysis of phonology, morphology, semantics, syntax, and prag-
matics as a means of determining probable sources of linguistic humor in
children as a result of violation oflearned rules. McGhee (l980a) discussed the
relationship between humorous and nonhumorous forms of creativity, between
fantasy play and humor, and between creating versus responding to humor, and
presented data on behavioral precursors of high amounts of fantasy play.
Davies and Apter (1980) presented data on the effect of humor on learning
among children and noted the general lack of research in this area.
Horgan (1981) has opened up a promising new area of research by studying
in detail the humor of her daughter between 16 and 48 months of age. Focusing
on both linguistic and cognitive issues, she provided support for McGhee's
(1979) proposed stage sequence of humor development. While her daughter's
humor seemed to be very advanced at each age level (apparently due to the
early exposure to language games), the sequential changes in her humor
productions are noteworthy. The earliest form of humor shown by the child
(Kelly) took the combined form of executing actions appropriate to another
object and giving an accompanying mislabeling of the present object. Kelly
learned the word "shoe" at 16 months of age, at a point where her vocabulary
was less than 20 words. "Several days later, she put her foot through the
armhole of a nightgown, saying 'shoe,' accompanied by shrieks of laughter.
Later that day, she put her foot into a tennis ball can, saying 'shoe' and
laughing" (p. 218). Horgan referred to this as violation of semantic categories.
Horgan also noted that as soon as Kelly began forming two-word sentences, she
started forming jokes based on violation of semantic restrictions (e.g., "bed cry"
plus laughter).
Humor Development: Toward a Life Span Approach III
Throughout her development, the acquisition of a new word would stimulate a joke
attempt of this type. When she was I; II I told her I was proud of her. She correctly
surmised that only people are proud of you. She used ajoke to 'show off (and to test)
her knowledge: Daddy's proud of you. Grandma's proud of you. Uncle David's
proud of you. Hamburger NOT proud of you. Ha, ha. Of course, sometimes her
analyses were incorrect and her jokes failed. After asking me why men could not wear
dresses and contemplating my response about customs, she concluded that customs
were something that only men had. Daddy has a custom. Uncle David has a custom.
Mommy has a custom! Ha, ha, mommies can't have customs! The clock has a
custom! Ha, ha, clocks can't have customs! (p. 219)
While these types of joking should normally appear at later ages, they support
the general notion that a "mastery-play cycle" occurs in connection with all
incongruity-based humor and make-believe play. Horgan adds an important
extension of the notion of a master-play cycle with her observation that humor
initiation that takes the form of producing distortions of acquired knowledge
may serve to check the accuracy or firmness of one's understanding by testing
hypotheses about the nature of that knowledge. A similar notion was advanced
over a decade ago by Helmers (1965). In a related position, Alford (1980)
proposed that "humor enhances our awareness of our expectations" (p. 253).
This sort of joke-telling is a very effective strategy for a language learner: you hear a
new word, make a hypothesis about the semantic restrictions, and test your hypothesis
by violating those restrictions. Thus, Kelly learned from our responses that she had
correctly analysed proud. but had incorrectly analysed custom. (Horgan, 1981,
p.219)
Phonetic game patterns were found by Horgan (1981) to begin at 20 months,

and they became more sophisticated as Kelly got older. "At 1;8, she said Cow
go moo. Mommy go mamoo. Daddy go dadoo. Ha, ha . ... at 3;3 ... banana
became banaTA, dinner became dinTER, strawberry became strawberTEE,
Kelly became KeITEE, Mommy became MomTEE, etc. Her special way of
talking was always accompanied by much giggling" (p. 219). For this form of
humor to appear, according to Horgan, the child must realize the arbitrary
nature of words and not see them as essential properties of objects.
By 27 months, Kelly began to develop jokes based on the changing of
established patterns. These included such jewels as Little Bo People had lost
her steeple" and Rudolph the red-nosed reindeer, you'll go down and get a
hamburger." By 30 months, Kelly began making up her own riddle-like
questions and answers (without having heard them from others). The following
sequence occurred with her father:
K: What did Mommy woke?

D: I dunno. What did Mommy woke?
K: Up. (p. 221)
112 Paul E. McGhee
One of the major issues associated with the early development of humor
concerns the question of when the capacity for humor first appears. Also, does
the earliest humor occur in connection with simple incongruities or in
connection with tendentious content (Freud, 1905/1960)? McGhee (1979) has
argued that symbolically mediated incongruity humor is the first form of humor
experienced by children, but no pertinent data have been available in
connection with this issue. Horgan (1981), however, did find that elements
relating to conflict over sex, aggression, or siblings did not appear in Kelly's
jokes until after 28 months. This suggests that nontendentious forms of humor
do appear first.
Studies of children's humor have generally not included different socio-
economic (SES) or raciaVethnic groups. While subjects other than white middle-
class children have occasionally been used, no attempt has been made to
determine how humor development may vary as a function of SES or raciaV
ethnic status. McGhee and Kach (1981) and McGhee and Duffey (1983a,
1983b) recently attempted to change this state of affairs by studying the humor
of preschool black, Mexican-American, and Anglo children. The latter two
studies look at age and group differences in preferences for different types of
disparagement humor and are discussed in Chapter 5. McGhee and Kach
(1981) tested children between about 3 and 6 years of age by giving them
"clown hats" and providing them with a general set to try to be funny. Black and
Mexical-American low-income and Anglo middle-income children were placed
together in same-sex and same-age pairs in a small room and were told that they
could do or say anything they wanted to in order to try to be funny. Their
behavior was videotaped for a 6-minute period.
Few age differences (3 to 4h vs. 4h to 6) were observed in the kinds of humor
produced among any of the three subject groups, a finding that is consistent with
McGhee's (1979) view that major changes in the quality of humor occur at
about 3 and 7 years of age. In a comparison between black and Mexican-
American children (both low income), group differences were obtained only for
two infrequently occurring behaviors. So these two groups were combined for
subsequent comparisons with the middle-class Anglo group. A general
distinction was made between verbal and vocal forms of humor and physical or
behavioral forms. The low- and middle-income groups did not differ on any
form of behavioral attempts at humor (e.g., making faces, falling down,
wrestling-pushing-hitting, and running-jumping-dancing). For all three groups,
the latter two categories were the most frequent behavioral categories of humor.
McGhee and Kach noted, however, that these activities (commonly known as
"rough and tumble play") generally occur in the broader context of having fun,
and may not have constituted specific attempts to be funny-at least in the same
sense that falling down is an attempt to be funny. The only significant group
differences occurred for verbal and vocal forms of humor. The middle-income
Anglo children showed more frequent nonwordlnonsense-word sequences,
"taboo" words or statements, screaming and squealing, and yelling and
Humor Development: Toward a Life Span Approach 113
shouting than the low-income black and Mexican-American children. The

former group also generally made more frequent attempts at initiating humor,
initiated more verbal and vocal humor, and were scored in a greater variety of
humor categories than the latter group.
These findings suggest that the physical or behavioral aspects of early humor
development may be commonly shared across a wide range of rearing
conditions, and that it is only the verbal and vocal aspects of humor that may
vary as a function of racial-ethnic or SE S status or other dimensions assumed to
have a major environmental impact on the course of a child's development.
These data were obtained, however, in a relatively artificial situation.
Comparable studies need to be completed in more naturalistic settings, using
investigators of the same racial-ethnic background as the individuals studied.
Implications of Research on Children's Play
Shultz and Robillard (1980) noted that research on the development of

linguistic forms of humor has been sparse. It should be noted, however, that the
last decade or so has witnessed a sharp increase in research and discussion in
the broad area of play. Much of this research has focused on cognitive and
verbal forms of play and has clear implications for the development of humor.
Since humor is commonly seen as one form of playful activity, our under-
standing of humor development should progress more rapidly by considering
pertinent findings from research on children's play. These findings may be
especially useful to developmentalists interested in humor since much of the
play research has been completed by anthropologists and sociologists. The
laughter that is often observed in connection with these studies of verbal and
imaginative play strongly points to the fact that these investigators are indirectly
studying humor as well as play. These studies will not be reviewed here, but the
following major references should be a rich source of hypotheses about humor
development: Bates (1979), Chukovsky (1963), Garvey (1977a, 1977b),
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1976), McLoyd (1982), Pelligrini (1981),
Schwartzman (1978), Singer (1973), Sutton-Smith (1976a, 1976b), and
Yawkey and Pelligrini (1983).
GENERAL ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF

HUMOR DEVELOPMENT
The present section considers a number of broad issues that must be addressed
by any thorough analysis of humor development. In most cases, only limited
attention has been given to these issues-even in the context of investigations of
children's humor. None of these issues have been raised in connection with a
life-span approach to studying humor development.
114 Paul E. McGhee
What Develops in Humor Development?
While well over 100 studies of children's humor have been published since
1970, this apparently obvious question has not yet been asked. Most of the
research has focused on appreciation of cartoons or jokes selected in advance by
the experimenter, although a few studies have examined humor comprehension
or frequency of humor initiation in naturalistic settings.
It is now generally agreed that humor is a complex multidimensional
phenomenon, so the key question becomes which aspects of humor remain
relatively unchanged (or change in an unsystematic way) and which show
systematic change as a function of increasing age? In the latter case, we must
also consider whether the pattern of changes described holds for people
generally or varies as a function of individual experience or status variables.
Humor Comprehension. In the case of children's humor, the most obvious

general developmental change occurs in connection with the kind or level of
humor children are capable of understanding. McGhee's (1979) four stages of
humor development through the first seven or eight years specify particular
cognitive capacities as prerequisites for understanding specific forms of humor.
For example, a child must have a primitive image-based representational
capacity to find humor in acting on one object as if it were another object
Similarly, puns and other jokes requiring simultaneous awareness of two
different meanings of a word appear to require some degree of concrete-
operational thought capacities. In short, every joke or cartoon can presumably
be said to require some minimal level of cognitive development for compre-
hension of the humor depicted, given familiarity with the stimulus elements
involved. In the case of jokes based on violation of specifiable concepts (e.g.,
table, dog, conservation of mass or weight, class inclusion, etc.) that have close
links to commonly measured changes in cognitive development, this minimal
level is rather obvious. For most jokes and cartoons, however, the level of
cognitive functioning required for getting "the point" remains uncertain.
Virtually no attention has been given in developmental studies of humor to
the notion of complexity of the humor stimulus. Zigler, Levine, and Gould
(1967) defined difficulty level of cartoons in terms of the comprehension score
obtained by a child, but this approach has been criticized because ofthe lack of
any necessary relationship between the comprehension score obtained and the
amount of effort required to achieve the degree of comprehension that score
represents. McGhee (1976) defined difficulty level of jokes in terms of the
length of time since the cognitive abilities required for humor comprehension
were acquired. Each of these approaches, then, defines complexity or difficulty
level in terms of the relationship between the humor stimulus and the child's
cognitive abilities. Future investigators should attempt to develop means of
distinguishing levels of stimulus complexity on the basis of properties of the
humor stimulus itself.
If level of cognitive development does play the pivotal role of determining the
kind or level of humor an individual can understand, then the transition from
concrete- to formal-operational reasoning should lead to a new level of humor
comprehension and appreciation. However, no attempt has yet been made to
determine the nature of new forms of humor that accompany the new cognitive
capacities of early adolescence. Neither Shultz (1972, 1976) nor McGhee
(1979) attempted to link humor development to cognitive development beyond
the concrete-operational period.
There is no apparent basis for expecting any general developmental trend for
humor comprehension beyond adolescence. Developmental psychologists are
generally agreed that formal operations thinking is the peak level of functioning
achieved throughout adulthood for most individuals. Beyond adolescence, then,
age-related differences in humor comprehension should be best explained in
terms of influences on individual differences in comprehension. If a general age
trend in humor comprehension does hold for the adult years, it would most
likely be based on the greater experience (and its associated increased
familiarity with the elements composing jokes) ofthe older adult. In the case of
advanced aging, there is some basis for predicting a negative relationship
between age and humor comprehension. While the question of the extent (if
any) of cognitive deterioration associated with advanced aging remains
controversial, Schaier and Cicirelli (1976) argued that a gradual loss of
operational thought capacities should lead conservation-violation jokes, which
are directly dependent on concrete-operational thought for comprehension, to
become funnier (because understanding them becomes more of a challenge)
with increasing age. They tested 50- to 80-year-olds and found that compre-
hension did drop with increasing age while appreciation went up. Investigations
of age-related changes in humor comprehension, then, may show systematic
developmental changes only at the two ends of the life cycle.
Humor Appreciation. General developmental trends in children's humor

appreciation should follow the same pattern that holds for changes in humor
comprehension. That is, as progressive underlying cognitive development
enables the child to understand new forms of humor, those new forms are
preferred over forms the child has been able to understand for some time. For
example, once children acquire the capacity for understanding linguistic
ambiguity at around the age of 7, they find puns and other double-meaning jokes
much funnier than humor based on playing with the sounds of words
(characteristic of the preschooler). This appears to reflect the operation of a
general "mastery-play cycle" that holds for many areas of development.
Children maintain a relatively serious frame of mind in connection with a new
cognitive skill or domain of behavior until they feel they have mastered it; after
this they include it with other forms of play behavior. In the case of humor, once
a child becomes confident of the normal relationship between stimulus elements
or achieves a new level of understanding through acquisition of new cognitive
skills, he/she enjoys distorting that knowledge or understanding in the guise of a
joke. Whatever cognitively based stages are found for humor comprehension up
116 Paul E. McGhee
to adolescence, then, should lead to a parallel set of stages of humor

appreciation. Again, cognitively based stages of humor appreciation should not
occur after adolescence, unless systematic cognitive regression (e.g., in terms of
Piagetian stages) is shown to occur in connection with advanced aging.
Content-based Developmental Change. To this point, no mention has been

made ofthe role of joke or cartoon content in humor development This is due to
the fact that cognitively determined developmental changes in humor should be
independent of any specific content That is, a double-meaning joke might
include aggressive or sexual themes (or the key ambiguous word itself may be
an aggressive or sexual word) or be free of any apparent tendentious quality. If
systematic age-related changes in humor appreciation do occur (at least for
major subgroups of people) with the content of humor stimuli, they are most
likely to result from common-life circumstances or experiences shared by
people at different ages. Chapter 5 by Zillmann is devoted to research on
disparagement humor. Views advanced by Wolff, Smith, and Murray (1934),
LaFave (1972; LaFave, Haddad, & Maesen, 1976), Zillmann and Cantor
(1976), and others emphasize that in cartoons or jokes in which one person is
victimized or put down by another, funniness depends on the nature of the joke
recipient's identification with or disposition toward the individuals represented
in the joke. Generally speaking, if a person toward whom one is favorably
disposed (or whom one sees as similar to oneself in some way) puts down
someone toward whom one is negatively disposed (or whom one sees as unlike
oneself), the joke is likely to be funnier than when the reverse is true. For
example, a Democrat is likely to find it funnier when a Democrat puts down a
Republican, while a Republican should show the opposite preference.
McGhee and Lloyd (1981) and McGhee and Duffey (1983a, 1983b) have
recently shown that this pattern of response to disparagement begins to appear
as early as the preschool years. For example, preschoolers find greater humor in
seeing an adult victimized than in seeing a child victimized (see Chapter 5 for a
detailed discussion of these findings). Zillmann and Cantor (1972) found that
college students found greater humor in seeing a professor (vs. another student)
victimized and in seeing a son (vs. a father) and an employer (vs. an employee-
who is in a subordinate position) victimized. These findings (and others
reviewed in Chapter 5) suggest that if basic elements of life circumstances and
(conflict-related) relationships with others can be placed along a developmental
continuum, it may be possible to predict a developmental sequence of changes
in humor preferences across the life span. For example, most individuals might
be expected to show the following sequence of humor preferences: (1) child
victimizes parent, (2) student victimizes teacher, (3) employee victimizes
employer or boss, (4) spouse of one's own sex victimizes spouse of opposite
sex, (5) parent victimizes child, and (6) old person victimizes young person.
This sequence assumes that individuals' sense of personal identity moves from
child to student to employee to husband or wife, and so forth. Individuals who
get married before getting a job should show a preference for jokes that put down
the opposite sex spouse before preferring jokes that put down a boss.
At this point, the only developmental studies to be completed along these

lines have focused on preschoolers and first graders. While support for
disposition theory (Zillmann & Cantor, 1976) has been demonstrated this
early, future investigators should attempt to determine whether sequential
changes in one's identity or life circumstance are reflected in a parallel sequence
of changes in preferences for disparagement humor. Nondevelopmental studies
(reviewed in Chapter 5) indicate that while most individuals show humor
preferences in the direction predicted by disposition theory, many do not. This
suggests that many individuals will also fail to show the kind of systematic
developmental change described above. In future research, attention should also
be given to the reason why some individuals fail to show the expected sequence
of developmental change. For example, a good starting point would be to
determine why females (children and adults) frequently do not respond in the
direction predicted by disposition theory, while males do (see McGhee, 1979,
and Chapter 5 for further related discussion).
The most fruitful approach to studying content-related humor development
across the life span may be to analyze spontaneously produced humor at
different age levels. Several psychoanalytic writers (e.g., Freud, 1905/1960;
Kris, 1938; Wolfenstein, 1954) have argued that humor is commonly used as a
coping mechanism; that is, as a means of overcoming current sources of anxiety
or conflict. To the extent that different periods of the life span can be
characterized by different sources of conflict, then, the content of initiated
humor should vary accordingly. Goldstein, Suls, and Anthony (1972) noted,
however, that many cases of humor preference may actually be due to the
cognitive salience of particular themes rather than resulting from motivational
arousal. They were able to increase the funniness of jokes involving such
content areaS as medicine, music, or automobiles simply by increasing the
cognitive salience of those areas. Thus, it should be possible to predict changes
in content areas of humor preferences across the life span if age-related changes
in salience of different humor themes are discovered. Jokes involving school-
related themes should be funnier during one's educational years, while jokes
involving politics should become funnier as one becomes more attuned to
political issues. Similarly, jokes involving employee relationships should
become funnier after one takes his or her first job, while jokes about mother-in-
laws should become funnier after one is married. Individual differences in
humor development at any point in the life span could also be characterized in
terms of differences in salience of particular themes. Thus, a golfer should laUgh
more at golf jokes, while a football player or fan should laugh more at football
jokes. Goldstein et al. found that motivational determinants of humor enjoyment
interact with cognitive salience, so studies of humor development along these
lines should control for motivational states that may interact with cognitive
salience in determining appreciation.
Investigators who study variation in the content of initiated humor aCross the
life span should sample the humor initiated in several different situations. It may
be that while systematic age changes in humor content do occur, the humor
initiated at any single age level also varies as a function of the composition of
118 Paul E. McGhee
the social situation (work vs. home vs. church, etc.). Thus, any developmental
changes that occur may be observed in some contexts, but not others.
Frequency ofInitiated Humor. The frequency of intiated humor is one of the

more obvious sources of individual differences at all age levels. It may be,
however, that in spite of this wide variability across individuals, some age levels
are generally associated with increased humor initiation, while others are
relatively barren of attempts at humor. The 6- to 8 -year-old period, for
example, appears to be one of sharply increased interest in humor in most
children, probably as a result of the achievement of an understanding of riddles,
puns, and other jokes based on word play. The early years of adolescence may
again see a surge in joking activity as a means of dealing with anxiety and
tension associated with increased sexuality. We have no data comparing the
frequency of humor initiation among aging populations with that among older or
younger adult groups. Investigators examining age-related changes in the
content of initiated humor should be able to obtain frequency data at the same
time.
Individual Differences versus General Developmental Trends
To this point, this section has focused on developmental changes in humor that
are generally characteristic of individuals as they move from infancy through
old age. This is generally referred to as the nomothetic approach. This is
probably the best starting point for a life span investigation of humor
development since age differences are especially striking during childhood.
Within these general age-related changes, however, individual differences in the
frequency, content, and types of humor initiation and in the manner and
intensity of humor responsiveness are equally striking. During the adult and
aging years, individual differences in humor should prove to be more
pronounced than similarities within age group.
Brodzinsky and Rightmyer (1980) have recently stressed the need for more
research on individual differences in humor development, noting that two
general approaches to such research might be adopted. The differential
approach is similar to the nomothetic approach in that it is aimed at producing
general laws or descriptions of behavior. It differs, however, because of its focus
on how general patterns of development vary as a function of subjects'
differential status on some dimension used to group individuals (sex, SES, a
personality measure, etc.). The goal of the differential approach is to determine
why developmental trends vary as a function of the status variable studied.
Brodzinsky and Rightmyer noted that most research on individual differences in
humor development has been based on this approach.
The idiographic (or ipsative) approach focuses on developmental change and
continuity within the individual, regardless of how such patterns relate to those
of other groups. It acknowledges that considerable variability in humor-related

behavior occurs within as well as between different subgroups, and attempts to
explain those individual patterns of development. "This most often takes the
form of describing and explaining the specific behavioral and psychological
attributes that characterize a person over the course of development, including
how the attributes are organized, and what influence they have on the
individual's psychological growth and adjustment ... " (Brodzinsky &
Rightmyer, 1980, p. 184). To a great extent, this approach amounts to
obtaining a detailed case history of the individual, and then searching for
commonalities in the backgrounds or present behavior of individuals with
particular humor characteristics.
The Differential Approach. Numerous studies of humor differences among

various subgroups have been completed using adults (see Chapman & Foot,
1976, 1977), but these have rarely been developmental in nature. Brodzinsky
and Rightmyer (1980) reviewed research on individual differences in children's
humor and concluded that status on cognitive variables was more consistently
related to group differences than was status on personality or gender dimen-
sions. Measured IQ was generally positively related to humor comprehension,
but not appreciation. Level of cognitive development (from a Piagetian
perspective), however, has been found to influence both appreciation and
comprehension of jokes and cartoons. While a few studies have examined the
relationship between personality variables and children's humor, Brodzinsky
and Rightmyer note that these studies also have not been of a developmental
nature.
The most frequently studied source of group differences in humor has been
sex differences. Again, since these have recently been reviewed in detail by
Brodzinsky and Rightmyer (1980) and McGhee (1979), they will not be
discussed in detail here. In short, the existing research includes many findings of
significant sex differences, but there is little consistency in the pattern of
findings across studies. This inconsistency suggests that any dimensions of
humor appreciation or initiation that might develop differently among males and
females may also interact with other aspects of the stimulus, person, or social
context that have not been controlled in earlier studies.
In general, the differential approach has contributed little to our present
understanding of humor development beyond a demonstration of the importance
of the level of cognitive development achieved. In the case of sex differences,
this may be due to the fact that sex differences have rarely been the intended
focus of the research. Rather, males and females have simply both been
included, with sex differences being documented when they occur. It is even
more surprising to find that virtually no attempt has been made to study
differential development of humor as a function of SES and racial-ethnic
variables. The recent work of McGhee and Kach (1981), McGhee and Lloyd
(1981), and McGhee and Duffey (l983a, 1983b) marks an important step
120 Paul E. McGhee
along these lines with very young children, but comparable studies need to be
extended across the life span. SES, racial-ethnic, or sex differences in humor
that occur at one point in the life span will not necessarily occur at other age
levels (see discussion below on continuity/stability of humor).
Research on cognitive style may hold the most promise (within the
differential approach) for improving our understanding certain aspects of humor
development across the life span. Cognitive style refers to the manner in which
an individual processes information-in our case, information contained in a
cartoon or joke. Brodzinsky and his associates (Brodzinsky, 1975, 1977;
Brodzinsky, Feuer, & Owens, 1977; Brodzinsky, Tew, & Palkovitz, 1979) have
completed a series of studies with children ranging between 6 and 12 years of
age linking degree of reflection-impulsivity (Kagan, Rosman, Day, Albert, &
Phillips, 1964) or conceptual tempo to humor comprehension and appreciation.
These studies consistently show that reflective children (slow accurates on the
Matching Familiar Figures Test) show better humor comprehension than
impulsives (fast inaccurates), but impulsives show more laughter. Presumably,
it is the cautious and more systematic information processing strategies of the
reflective child that lead to increased understanding of what is going on in a
joke. Impulsive children, on the other hand, tend to show elevated overt mirth in
spite of this reduced comprehension.
It is important to note that when prompted by the experimenter to rethink the
meaning of jokes or ambiguous sentences, impulsive children showed compre-
hension scores comparable to those of reflective children (Brodzinsky, 1977;
Brodzinsky et aI., 1977). This supports the view that humor differences among
these children are a matter of cognitive style, not cognitive ability. It does
appear, however, that reflective children are more discriminating in the amount
of smiling and laughing they show to jokes. While reflectives showed varying
amounts of mirth depending on the complexity of the joke, impulsives showed
equal levels of laughter to all jokes-and even laughed at nonjoke control
stimuli.
These findings clearly demonstrate the kind of difficulties that plague the
humor researcher and may partially account for the inconsistent findings often
obtained in different areas of humor research. While there has been little serious
discussion of how individuals go about "deciding" how funny a joke is or how
much to laugh at it (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of metacognitive processing
issues), most investigators appear to assume that qualities of the humor stimulus
play a central role in determining the nature and level of response that occurs.
But this appears to be true only for reflective children. If laughter is the key
dependent variable, the nature of the data obtained may greatly depend on the
relative number of reflectives and impulsives in different experimental con-
ditions. Future studies might profitably treat reflection-impulsivity as a
"blocking factor" and expose equal numbers of reflectives and impulsives to
each experimental condition.
Amount of reflection-impulsivity has not been related to humor measures in
adolescent, adult, or aging populations. However, the fact that this aspect of
cognitive style has been found to be stable over periods of several years
(Bronson, 1966, 1967; Kagan & Kogan, 1970; Sigel & Brodzinsky, 1977)
suggests that its relationship to humor comprehension and appreciation may
also be relatively stable.
The significance of Brodzinsky' s work within the differential approach lies in
the fact that it has clear implications for how different (groups of) individuals
begin to develop their own unique sense of humor. Even though underlying
acquisition of particular cognitive skills determines which jokes a child has the
capacity to understand, reflective children are likely to become more cognitively
focused in their sense of humor and to be less overtly responsive (Le., laugh
less). At later ages, these individuals may develop a preference for more subtle
or complex forms of humor. These may also be the persons who develop a
"dry" sense of humor. Impulsive children, who are less discriminating in their
laughter, are likely to become best known for the responsive aspects of their
sense of humor. Full comprehension does not seem to be necessary for them to
erupt in hearty laughter. Impulsives have also been found to show greater
elevation of laughter than reflectives under conditions of social facilitation
(Brodzinsky, Tew, & Palkovitz, 1979), suggesting that their tendency to "laugh
at anything" may be even more exaggerated in the presence of laughing
others.
Thomae (1979) noted that data published from long-term longitudinal studies
over the past 25 years have "pointed to a high degree of consistency of
personality from early adolescence into adulthood" (p. 287). Using the research
on conceptual tempo as a model, it should be fruitful to relate highly stable
dimensions of personality to humor initiation, responsiveness, and develop-
ment. Once the role of key personality dimensions, SES, sex, cognitive level,
and other subject status variables in humor development has been determined,
we will be in a better position to evaluate findings resulting from the ideographic
approach (discussed below). We will not fully understand humor development
until we can simultaneously consider (and meaningfully interpret) information
associated with: (1) general developmental trends in humor development, (2)
variations in general trends as a function of status variables, and (3) individual
experiences and characteristics associated with humor differences. At this
point, most of our knowledge of humor development has come from the first
research strategy. The need for additional research using the other two
strategies is clear.
The Ideographic Approach. Investigations of humor development within the

ideographic approach have been rare. Most studies have used in-depth
interviews or other sources of information to examine early childhood behavior,
characteristics, and experiences that occurred in the backgrounds of profes-
sional comedy writers or comedy performers (e.g., Fry & Allen, 1975; Janus,
1975; Wilde, 1968). These studies are an important source of testable
hypotheses about influences on humor development, but it is difficult to draw
even tentative conclusions about humor development based on their findings
122 Paul E. McGhee
since their samples were clearly atypical relative to the general population.
Also, no attempt was made to compare background characteristics of
professionals in writing or performing humor to those of other individuals who
do not make a living in connection with humor. For example, the finding that
comics or comedy writers experience high amounts of early stress or conflict
would not be of particular interest if a nonhumor control group showed the same
kind of background.
Fisher and Fisher (1981) recently reported findings of a detailed analysis of
the background and current psychological characteristics of a group of
comedians and clowns. Their approach was more systematic than those of prior
investigators, in that they utilized a standardized interview procedure and
administered the same psychological tests to all subjects. They also included
two control groups, permitting a better judgment of the potential significance of
a given characteristic or experience for the development of humor-related
behavior. This project is a good model for other investigators planning to use a
case-history approach to studying humor development. This kind of approach is
necessary to identify early precursors that serve to channel the child in the
direction of enhanced humor development. It must be remembered, however,
that data obtained for professional humorists will not necessarily generalize to
individuals with enhanced humor development in the general population. The
Fishers' findings are discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of Volume II.
One study has been completed that examined the relationship between both
early maternal behavior and early characteristics of the child's own behavior
and subsequent humor behavior. McGhee (1980b) observed the frequency of
laughter and verbal and behavioral initiation of humor among 3- to 5-year-old
and 6- to II-year-old children who were part of the longitudinal sample of the
Fels Research Institute. Data from detailed observations of maternal behavior
were available (in the permanent Fels files) from birth through 6 years of age,
while observational data on children were available from age 3 up to the child's
present age.
Only a few characteristics of early maternal behavior were found to be
predictive of sense-of-humor development (defined in terms of a combined
score, based on frequency of verbal and behavioral initiation of humor and
frequency of laughter during spontaneous social play), but the nature of these
predictions depended on the age at which the child's humor-related behavior
was observed. Boys and girls, 3 to 5 years of age, who showed heightened
humor development had a history of very positive relationships with their
mothers. Their mothers were generally warm and approving and tended to baby
and be protective of them up to age three. This had the effect of providing these
children with an environment that was free of conflict, danger, and difficult-to-
solve problems. While these same variables continued to be predictive of the
preschooler's sense of humor after age three, they were accompanied by an
association with a lack of maternal affection. This reduced affection is
especially noteworthy in view of the reversed pattern of predictions from
maternal behavior among the older children.
Six- to ll-year-olds with higher sense-of-humor scores tended to have

mothers who were not protective (females only) and not babying (both sexes).
This is a surprising reversal of predictions found for 3- to 5-year-olds and
suggests that for very young children a positive background in which the child is
spared from difficult interchanges with the environment is conducive to
increased humor behavior. Among 6- to ll-year-olds, however, exposure to
challenging and potentially hazardous situations in which mothers withhold help
in solving problems seems to promote increased humor and laughter. This
finding is important, in that it provides a clear reminder that different parent
behaviors and one's own experiences or behavior characteristics may have
varying significance for humor development, depending on the individual's age.
Thus, it is quite likely that if humor behavior shows little stability or continuity
across the life span, the maternal and child behavior predictors discussed here
will not generalize to an adult sample. In the case of the impact of lack of
babying and protectiveness, however, there is some evidence that professional
comics and clowns have a similar background (see Fisher & Fisher, 1981, and
Chapter 4 of volume 2).
The finding that children who initiate humor more often were obliged by their
mothers to cope with problems and conflicts on their own supports the well-
known psychoanalytic view (e.g., see Freud, 1960, or Wolfenstein, 1954) that
many individuals develop skill at using humor as a means of coping with
difficult or anxiety-arousing circumstances. It has often been pointed out (e.g.,
Fry & Allen, 1975; Janus, 1975) that comedians and comedy writers tend to
come from homes judged to be high in conflict or stress. Consistent with this
pattern, elementary-school-aged girls from the Fels longitudinal study showed a
positive relationship between the amount of conflict and general adjustment
problems in the home in the first 3 years and subsequent humor development.
The best predictors of children's subsequent humor development were
characteristics of the children's own behavior from age 3 to their present age.
This was especially true of the elementary-school-aged sample. For boys and
girls in both samples, prior physical and verbal aggressiveness were the
strongest predictors of humor development. In the elementary-school-age
sample, children with higher sense of humor scores also had a prior history of
dominance in their interaction with other children, greater talkativeness,
precocious development of language skills, and greater restlessness. Thus, it is
the highly energetic child with a history of physical and verbal assertiveness in
social situations who is most likely to show increased frequency of laughter and
humor initiation.
Early attempts to seek attention, affection, and emotional support from
adults, along with frequent requests for help on tasks and recognition seeking for
achievement-related behaviors were also positively related to frequency of
humor-related behavior for both sexes (elementary-school sample only). Thus,
in spite of their dominating and generally assertive style of interaction with
peers, young humorists had a history of being especially sensitive to adult
reactions and appeared to gear much of their behavior to getting some kind of
124 Paul E. McGhee
positive reaction from adults. This was accompanied (among boys) by a

tendency to be highly conforming to adult demands. Such conformity among
boys who were highly aggressive is surprising and supports the view that
positive adult reactions were very important to them. In another surprising
finding, both boys and girls with higher humor scores also had a history of being
very imitative of other children. It is not clear, at this point, how this finding can
be reconciled with their general social dominance over their peers. Finally,
these children were highly persistent in their efforts to master gross motor skills,
but showed little persistence in attempts to master fine motor skills (such as
crafts and puzzles).
Bell and McGhee (Note 1) adopted a different approach in an attempt to
determine the generalizability (to an older sample) of the finding that individuals
who show more frequent humor initiation and laughter have a history of social
assertiveness, including dominance and aggression. They obtained self-report
data (ratings on a 5-point scale) from college students on their current
perceptions of themselves in all of the areas demonstrated by McGhee (1980b)
to be associated with enhanced humor development. Subjects were also
administered the Snyder Self-Monitoring Scale (a measure of individuals'
ability to use social behavior to achieve interpersonal goals), the Texas Social
Behavior Inventory (a general measure of social self-esteem and comfort in
social situations), a Machiavellianism scale (a measure of a general manipula-
tive orientation and attitude toward others) and the Bem Sex Role Scale. Both
males and females who rated themselves as more frequent initiators of humor
(this was highly correlated with self-ratings oflaughter) also saw themselves as
more physically and verbally aggressive and more talkative. Also, for both
males and females, scores on the Snyder Self-Monitoring Scale were strongly
positively related to humor scores, while the other three scales were only weakly
related. Thus, college students who are frequent initiators of humor do not
necessarily have high social self-esteem or high social comfort. They also do not
have a generally manipulative approach to others; rather, they are simply skilled
at behaving in a manner that is effective in helping to reach important social
goals.
The consistency of prediction of humor scores by measures of aggression in
both children and college students is striking, and suggests that strong social
assertiveness may be an important prerequisite for becoming a joker or clown at
any age. Future investigators should extend examination of these relationships
to other parts of the life span. Consistent with the data reviewed here, McGhee
(1979) concluded that individuals with an early history of social assertiveness
and dominance over others are drawn to humor as a means of maintaining this
pattern of social interaction. The effective humor initiator is able to maintain
control of ongoing social interaction, but does so in a way that is not only
socially acceptable, but even sought out and rewarded with laughter and
generally positive attention. McGhee (1980b) suggested that it appears to be
about kindergarten to second grade that this redirection of aggressive and
dominating behavior into joking and clowning is most likely to occur.
Stability of Humor
One of the classic issues in developmental psychology concerns the continuity

or stability of behavior. It was suggested earlier that changes in cognitive
development lead to qualitatively new forms of humor during childhood. While
all children presumably show these changes, individual characteristics and
experiences also cause specific children to develop unique qualities in their
sense of humor. In spite ofthese general and individual areas of developmental
change, however, certain aspects of humor initiation or appreciation may
remain stable over time. Does the child who frequently initiates humor maintain
this behavior throughout the life span? Does preference for certain content areas
(e.g., sexual, aggressive, and incongruity) remain stable? In spite of the
significance of this issue for our understanding of humor development, virtually
no effort has been made to determine which aspects of one's sense of humor
remain stable and which vary as a function of age, social setting, or other
factors.
Case-history studies of comedy writers, comedians, and clowns suggest that
(for this select group, at least) the quantitative aspects of humor are highly
stable between childhood and adulthood. That is, most professional humorists
did more clowning and joking than other children from early childhood on
(Fisher & Fisher, 1981; Fry & Allen, 1975; Janus, 1975; Wilde, 1968). It does
not follow from these findings that frequent initiators of humor in a general
sample of children will maintain this pattern into adulthood, although this would
seem to be the best prediction to make. Longitudinal studies of individuals at
different points of the life cycle are necessary to obtain this information. The
one study completed along these lines indicated that preschoolers were stable in
the amount of laughter shown over a I-year period (Brackett, 1933). No data
were provided for frequency of initiated humor.
In spite of the absence of pertinent data, there is a clear basis for predicting
continuity of humor responsiveness and initiation. Amount of laughter at jokes
or cartoons was shown earlier to be closely related to degree of reflection-
impulsivity. Since reflection-impulsivity was noted to be quite stable over
periods of several years, amount of laughter at humorous events should also be
relatively stable. Chess (1967) and others have noted that temperamental
patterns can be identified in infancy that remain stable into adulthood. If a
predisposition toward high or low amounts of laughter in appropriate contexts
can be shown to be associated with dimensions of temperament known to be
stable, this would provide an additional basis for predicting stability of
responsiveness to humor.
Predictions for stability of frequency of initiated humor are clouded by the
fact that individuals may "get hooked" on humor at any point in childhood or
adolescence. Carol Burnett, for example, did not begin to develop her skills at
humor until late adolescence (Meryman, 1978). Once a child or adult does
begin to do more joking and clowning, however, the behavior should be
sustained (as long as he/she is reasonably good at it). The laughter and other
126 Paul E. McGhee
positive reactions provided by others present should provide sufficient re-

inforcement to sustain the behavior, and continued practice should improve
humor skills to the point where even stronger social support is obtained. Future
longitudinal studies should focus on both the percentages of children who begin to
show increased humor initiation at different ages and the extent to which
stability (e.g., over a 5- or to-year period) varies as a function of the age range
studied. Most children become more interested in humor between 6 and 8 years
of age, apparently because of their new ability to understand verbal ambiguities.
This suggests that frequency of initiated humor may not become stable until the
elementary school years. Since little is known about humor beyond the college
years, it is difficult to speculate about stability over long periods of time (i.e.,
decades).
Finally, future investigators should also examine the stability of humor across
situations. Does the child, adult, or old person who frequently initiates humor in
one context also do so in others? It may be that certain individuals are
consistently high in initiated humor only in particular social circumstances,
while others remain productive of humor regardless of the context. Attention
should also be given to stability of dimensions of humor preference. An
individual mayor may not be consistent in amount of initiated humor and yet
show high degrees of consistency in preference for certain types of humor.
Influences on the Rate and Direction of Humor Development
It has been suggested here that some aspects of humor development are shared
by all individuals (at least during childhood and perhaps adolescence), while
other aspects are shared only by certain subgroups or are unique to the
individual. The present section discusses mechanisms and processes that might
account for changes in humor comprehension, appreciation, or production at
different points in the life span.
Maturation. If underlying maturational processes contribute in any signifi-

cant way to humor development, it is most likely to be as a result of influences
on cognitive development during childhood. Since level of cognitive develop-
ment has been linked to changes in the kinds of humor children can understand,
determination of maturational influences on humor amounts to a determination
of the role of maturation in cognitive development. This suggests that
maturation should not have any influence on humor development beyond early
adolescence.
Reinforcement and Modeling. The most probable explanation for the fact that
some individuals initiate more humor than others is that they have received
greater reinforcement for doing so. Thus, the pertinent issues become: (1) the
nature of these reinforcements, (2) the importance of the age at which they
occur, and (3) their source in the social environment. Surprisingly, virtually no
attempt has been made to investigate the effect of parental or peer reinforcement
of efforts at humor on subsequent measures of the quantity or quality of humor
shown.
Two types of reinforcement may be distinguished in connection with humor:
intrinsic and extrinsic (presumably social). Considerable attention has been
given to the intrinsic reinforcing properties of humor. Berlyne (1960, 1969,
1972) has explained humor in terms of its association with underlying changes
in arousal, arguing that moderate arousal boosts and arousal jags (a larger
arousal increase followed by a sudden drop in arousal) have high reinforcement
potential regardless of their source (this view is discussed in detail in Chapter
2). McGhee (1979) offered a related position, drawing from Piaget's (1952)
notion that the "need" to explore novelty is built into a child's nervous system.
In support of this view, considerable evidence is available indicating that infants
show the greatest attention (and smile more) to moderate levels of discrepancy
from prior experience (McCall & McGhee, 1977). Both Singer (1973) and
McGhee (1979) have argued that this built-in tendency may be one of the
strongest motivating forces behind young children's frequent engagement in
fantasy activity (including humor). In short, incongruity humor and other forms
of fantasy activity are reinforcing because they provide new forms of stimulation
and help maintain an optimally interesting environment.
These views suggest that humor is intrinsically enjoyable and that the
tendency to produce humor should be strengthened simply by coming up with
ideas thought to be funny. Presumably, this source of reinforcement is operating
on a similar basis in all young children with comparable levels of intelligence.
Extreme individual differences in humor initiation as early as the late preschool
years, then, must be explained on the basis of other sources of reinforcement.
The most obvious probable source of such reinforcement, of course, is the
child's parents. Surprisingly, no attempt has been made to observe parental
reactions to their children in order to determine their impact on humor
development. There is considerable evidence from case histories that profes-
sional comedians, clowns, and comedy writers tended to have models of joking
and clowning in one or both parents (or a grandmother) during childhood
(Fisher & Fisher, 1981; Fry & Allen, 1975; Janus, 1975; Wilde, 1968). These
parents were likely to have reinforced comparable behaviors in their children. In
some cases, these professionals also imitated radio or television models as
children (Schwartz, 1978).
Bell and McGhee (1982) obtained data consistent with these findings in a
large sample of college students. Males who rated themselves as being more
frequent initiators of humor also rated their fathers as having done more joking
and clowning. The same relationship was obtained with mothers among female
subjects. In neither case was this relationship significant for the parent of the
opposite sex. McGhee (l980b), however, found that among elementary school
children, observed frequency of humor initiation in spontaneous social play was
not significantly related to a home visitor's recall of maternal joking and
clowning while interacting with their children (no data were available for
128 Paul E. McGhee
fathers). Bass (1981) found that parents who participated more in their
children's pretend play in a laboratory setting had children who more frequently
engaged in pretend. While this study did not focus on humor, the close
relationship between preschoolers' humor and make-believe play suggests that
this relationship should hold for humor as well.
Assuming that future research will demonstrate that social reinforcement does
increase the frequency of attempts at humor initiation, attention should also be
given to why parental or peer laughter at jokes or clowning behavior is
reinforcing. The positive attention and affection gained from others' laughter
may prove to be important at all ages. This may be an especially strong
influence on children who have higher needs to obtain attention or affection
from parents or peers. Since data for both young adults and children point to
dominance and aggression as early characteristics of the person who initiates a
lot of humor, these individuals may have experienced less frequent positive
sources of attention than less dominating and less aggressive children. As
suggested earlier, these children may have learned quite early that joking or
clowning produced positive reactions in other people but still allowed them to
maintain a sense of power or control over others.
Humor might also be more reinforcing for some individuals than others
because it helps reduce anxiety or stress. Thus, children who experience greater
amounts of conflict while growing up should have greater incentive to develop
effective humor skills. Regardless of the basis for the reinforcing properties of
others' laughter, future research should include a determination of the
effectiveness of such reinforcement at different points during the life span. The
limited available evidence suggests that individuals who show enhanced humor
development were already working on developing humor skills by the time they
entered school. While varying influences undoubtedly contributed to the
increased clowning and joking of different individuals, it remains to be
determined whether comparable influences would be equally effective in
increasing attempts at humor in adolescence and early or late adulthood. Future
research should include subjects across the life span and determine not only
factors that are conducive to increased humor production at different age levels,
but also those that contribute toward reduced joking, clowning, and laughter.
Both sets of influences may prove to be relatively independent of age,
depending instead on variation in experiences of life circumstances.
The laughter component of sense of humor appears to be especially sensitive
to social influence, suggesting that parental modeling of laughter could
contribute significantly to humor development. Chapman (1973b), Chapman
and Wright (1976), Fuller and Sheehy-Skeffington (1974), and Smyth and
Fuller (1972) found that laughter of others facilitates one's own laughter. Also,
both children and adults show increased laughter in the presence of canned
laughter (from a laugh track) (Chapman, 1973a; Cupchik & Leventhal, 1974;
Leventhal & Cupchik, 1975; Leventhal & Mace, 1970). There remains some
question, however, as to whether this socially facilitated laughter is humorous
laughter or just social laughter. The fact that these studies also indicate that
females show a corresponding increase in funniness ratings in the presence of

canned laughter while males do not suggests that frequent exposure to laughing
models may have different influences on humor development among males and
females. This issue is discussed further in Chapter 7.
Brown and his associates (Brown, Brown, & Ramos, 1981; Brown, Wheeler,
& Cash, 1980) recently completed studies using both children and adults that
were designed to separate genuine imitation learning from mere social
facilitation of laughter in response to humor stimuli. They had subjects observe
a laughing or non laughing model who was either listening to a tape recording (in
one study) or reading magazine cartoons alone. When the observer-subjects
subsequently had their turn with the recording or cartoons (they were tested
without anyone else being present), those who had seen a laughing model
laughed more at the humor stimuli than those who had observed a nonlaughing
model. In Brown et al.' s view, the results cannot be explained in terms of
social facilitation since no others were present at the time. They conclude that
imitation learning does contribute to the amount one laughs at humorous
material. Thus, children raised in families with parents or other adults who show
frequent laughter should themselves become more overtly responsive in humor
situations. Since frequency of laughter and humor initiation tend to be positively
correlated, laughing models or other social influences that serve to elevate one's
own laughter may also contribute to elevated humor production. The individual
who laughs more at jokes, cartoons, or clowning may simply become more
interested in humor and begin to do more initiating of humor because of the
generally heightened enjoyment derived from humor.
CONCLUSIONS
Our present understanding of humor development amounts to a limited
understanding of the development of children's humor in the preadolescent
years. No attempt has been made to study humor development in adolescence,
adulthood, or the aging years. The only exception to this can be found in the
small number of studies of early backgrounds of professional humorists. While a
great deal of research has been completed on college students and adults (as
may be seen in the rest of the chapters in these two volumes), this research has
not focused on developmental changes in humor. Many studies of children have
similarly not been developmental in nature. All of these studies, however, can
serve as a starting point for a life-span investigation of humor development. An
attempt has been made here to underscore general issues that must be
considered in any developmental approach to humor, regardless of the period of
the life span in question. The greatest need at the present time would appear to
be information on the relative stability of humor-related behavior at different
parts of the life span. Assuming that certain aspects of humor turn out to be
relatively stable, while others vary as a function of age and context,
130 Paul E. McGhee
investigators should examine age-related changes in factors that are conducive

to changes in humor production and responsiveness. The nomothetic, differen-
tial, and ideographic approaches should all be adopted in a life-span investiga-
tion of humor development since each contributes unique information toward an
improved understanding of the nature and underlying causes behind develop-
mental changes in humor.
REFERENCE NOTE
1. Bell, N. J., & McGhee, P. E. Social interaction implications of humor. Paper
presented at meeting of the Southwestern Society for Research in Human Develop-
ment, Galveston, 1982.
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Chapter 7
Humor and Laughter in Social Interaction

and some Implications for Humor Research
ANTONY J. CHAPMAN
In modem analyses of humor and laughter, social scientists have begun to

recognize the potential importance of social variables. But this recognition is by
no means universal. For example, Berlyne (1972) alleged that because laughter
can be generated in a solitary individual, "it seems doubtful that its prime
significance is a social one" (p. 51). The view taken in this account is more in
line with that of Hertzler (1970) who wrote of laughter: "[ it] is a social
phenomenon. It is social in its origin, in its processual occurrence, in its
functions, and in its effects" (p. 28). That view borders on an extreme, but
nonetheless humor's social functions may be its most crucial for modem man.
Humor can serve as a useful and convenient triggering device permitting
laughter to serve a myriad of functions in a manner that is, at least physically,
harmless.
As we will see later in this chapter, laughter can reveal group allegiances,
communicate attitudes, and help in establishing and reaffirming dominance in a
status hierarchy. For the individual, instances of humor can serve a number of
functions simultaneously, and these depend on the social context, a single joke
can have multiple and variegated effects on the jokesters, targets, and
bystanders. In part its effects must inevitably be mediated by the perceived
values, motives, and intentions of the initiator, and in turn the effects on the
initiator must depend to some extent on the perceived reactions of the
recipients. Additionally, evidence summarized below suggests that some of
humor's major functions have to do with aiding members of small groups to
engage in smooth interactions.
The emphasis of this chapter is on reviewing empirical work with children.
From the outset of such work, psychologists have stressed the significance of
136 Antony J. Chapman
the social situation in relation to laughter. The following is a short selection of

statements from reports of observational studies completed more than 50 years
ago: "Laughing was found to be highly social" (Brackett, 1933, p. 125;
Brackett, 1934, p. 89); "Out ofthe 223 situations in which laughter was noted,
only 14 ... occurred when the child was alone" (Kenerdine, 1931, p. 229);
"Children seldom laughed when with adults or alone" (Enders, 1927, p. 353).
It was also maintained in contemporaneous reports that for any form of humor
appreciation to be displayed by two-year-olds required either incongruity or an
involvement in unacceptable social situations (Bridges, 1932; Kenerdine,
1931). In the same era various observers set great store by gross motor activity
as a correlate of laughter (Ding & Jersild, 1932; Enders, 1927; Gregg, Miller,
& Linton, 1929; Kenerdine, 1931; Wilson, 1931), but such activity was itself
invariably recorded as children played together. It now seems probable that
social factors had a strong influence whereas kinesthesis per se probably did
not. It has transpired that these pioneering research endeavors have had little or
no enduring impact except to attest to the social nature of laughter.
Accepting published articles as a criterion, empirical interests lay dormant for
a period of about 35 years, beginning in the mid-1930s and ending with a
publication in 1970 by Leventhal and Mace. Early researchers failed to inspire
subsequent generations because they provided only the weakest theoretical and
empirical foundations for future work: their studies can be faulted in terms of
conception and execution (Chapman, 1972).
Those early studies recorded laughter as it occurred in situ-during children's
free play and routine activities. There are enormous attractions and some
benefits in such a naturalistic approach, and some of the inherent problems can
now be resolved, circumvented, or minimized (cf. Fine, 1977 a; Ransohoff,
1975). However, then and now, in any form of participant observation (e.g.,
Fine, 1977b), it can never be known to what extent data are influenced by the
researcher's presence; the later discussion about "experimenter effects" applies
here, but with yet greater force. A second weakness applies to both participant
and nonparticipant techniques: they usually imply post hoc analyses. Also,
observational work has tended to involve in-depth study of rather few children; a
fundamental question then arises about the extent to which the sample of
children is representative of the population as a whole.
Although in the past 10 years or so the upsurge of interest and activity in
humor research has gained increasing momentum, it remains the case that
remarkably little is known about humor's functions in everyday interactions.
One reason is that, in contrast to the wealth of studies on most other ubiquitous
features of life, there has been rather a dearth of trenchant, systematic research
on humor. A second reason is that those studies that have been reported on
social aspects of humor have drawn on a diverse range of loosely formulated
theoretical perspectives. A good proportion of them has given priority to
extending knowledge about social behavior, social development, and group
processes, rather than to exploring the dynamics of humor per se. Conse-
quently, the research literature is rather fragmented. A third reason is that by
Humor and Laughter in Social Interaction 137
and large humor studies have not been sufficiently exhaustive in the measures
and procedures adopted. A fourth reason is that precious few psychologists
have examined the disparate circumstances under which humor is created and
instigated; nearly all researchers have confined themselves to studying
responses to humor stimuli, and they themselves have selected and arranged the
presentation of stimuli.
There are also other reasons why our corpus of knowledge is surprisingly
spartan, and one of prime significance to this chapter relates to the inadequate
consideration given to the social dimensions of experiments: research has been
too insensitive, truncated, and even asocial. It has tended to be laboratory
based; and, like many of the more subtle aspects of human behavior, humor
loses much of its character when placed under insensitive laboratory scrutiny.
Under such scrutiny there is typically a conscientious purging of all possible
causes of bias and extraneous influence. But with the baby can go the bath
water, and often the price to be paid for "experimental realism" is a crucial loss
of "mundane realism" (cf. Breakwell, Foot, & Gilmour, 1982).
An index as to the artificiality and sterility of much of the humor research to
date is that the majority of researchers do not incorporate any measure of
laughter in their work. One suspects that this is because they know from
experience that many of the persons they are observing will not actually laugh.
Hence humor researchers, particularly psychologists, have tended to focus on
the content, structure, and psychological function of humor, and in so doing they
have tended to disregard its immediate behavioral consequences. Yet in the
layperson's mind humor and laughter are stored together. Indeed, for many
people, the quality of a joke, a comic performance, or a humorous anecdote may
be remembered by the amount of laughter personally emitted.
Behavioral measures, particularly duration and frequency of laughing and
smiling, have been embodied in only a small proportion of studies, usually those
of a more naturalistic brand. Often these studies have also included subjective
evaluations of funniness: that is, ratings solicited and registered as in other
humor studies. It is a matter for some concern, then, that the two types of
measures (viz., expressive behaviors and subjective ratings) are not always well
correlated (cf. Leventhal & Cupchik, 1975; Leventhal & Mace, 1970; Young &
Frye, 1966). Our own research is not typical in this regard, but the general lack
of consistent and statistically significant correlations must cast doubt on the
value and validity of research methods and ipso facto on the generality of
research conclusions.
To anyone glancing through published articles, it is immediately apparent
that dependent variables are coarse. Doubtless new and refined behavioral
measures could be developed that would be more sensitive than the common
duration and frequency varieties. More than a decade ago Pollio, Mers, and
Lucchesi (1972) demonstrated the potential of oscillographic recordings of
laughter. From the traces of a sound spectroscope one can, for example, extract
measures of amplitude, latency, and patterning of responses. As far as smiling is
concerned, human ethologists have already proffered a large number of
mutually independent, anatomical descriptions corresponding to different kinds

of smiles, and of course, there can be variations in intensity as well as kind.
With access to appropriate resources it may be feasible, for instance, to make
qualitative discriminations between various forms of expressiveness corre-
sponding to different types of eliciting conditions.
Obviously the inclusion of laughter and smiling measures is no panacea or
guarantee of rigorous, incisive, or heuristic research. Indeed measures of overt
mirth bring with them conceptual and methodological difficulties, some shared
with the more conventional "subjective evaluation" approach, others peculiar
and intrinsic to themselves. Though laughter and smiling may have different
phylogenetic origins (cf. van Hooff, 1972), they clearly converge functionally as
nonverbal components of humor appreciation. A bout of laughter is often
interspersed with smiling, and smiles are invariably associated with the end of
laughter and usually with the beginning too. Common experience affirms that
smiling is frequently a nascent or low intensity form of laughter, and often in
visual terms the casual observer can see little or nothing to separate the two
behaviors; the auditory modality provides the only distinguishing characteristic.
The vocal sounds of laughter are quite distinct from the softer exhalation of
breath that may be concomitant with the genesis or life of a smile. In studies
outlined in the next section, laughter has been operationally defined as
inarticulate vocal sounds of a reiterated ha-ha type, while smiling has been
defined as upward stretching of the mouth occurring without vocal sound.
Despite contiguities and perceptual similarities connecting laughs and smiles,
their causes on any occasion may not be identical and may not even overlap to
any marked extent. For example, sudden, raucous, or ebullient laughter can be
immediately preceded by a serene "nonmirthful" smile, one that is entirely
sociable in its origins and nature. How one can discriminate reliably between
"sociable" and "mirthful" smiles-granted that one is prepared to accept even
temporarily such a simple dichotomy-has yet to be fathomed (although
Chapter 1 by LaFrance marks an important beginning). Perhaps it is not always
possible: the one may be overlayed or intertwined with the other, and
ascendancy may vacillate as attention fluctuates between the humor and other
elements comprising the person's psychological and physical environments.
Then again, laughter and smiling can each be observed in the complete absence
of humor. Smiling can be exhibited without any hint of laughter, and, seemingly,
both behaviors (separately or in combination) can on different occasions be
affiliated to anyone of a broad gamut of emotions (see the final section).
This chapter does not seek to offer solutions to problems of measurement, nor
does it prescribe ways in which experimenters should design their research or
conduct themselves within experiments. To attempt any of these things would
be much too ambitious and foolhardy. At this early stage in the multi-
dimensional ontogenesis of humor research it is possible only to sound a few
caveats and to attract attention to some fundamental issues. The first of these
issues is that the generalizability of humor research is called into question when
laughter is rarely in evidence. On a day-to-day basis, humor often gives rise to
laughter, and the amount and richness of self-perceived laughter may partly
govern an individual's judgment as to the funniness of the antecedent humor ( cf.
Bem, 1967). There is always the possibility that some humor stimuli may be
more susceptible than others to context for their maximal impact: that is, a
subject's rank ordering of stimuli for funniness might change according to
whether those stimuli were received under strictly controlled laboratory
circumstances or, say, under more naturalistic settings when laughter might
emanate freely. Expressed more formally, it is unwise to proceed as though it
were known that the inhibitory effects of the laboratory are invariably of a
uniform, linear nature. The potency of some types of humor, some joke
structures, some forms of presentation, and so forth, may be affected relatively
more than others.
A second important issue, namely, that experimenters can influence humor
responsiveness, leads us toward something resembling Pandora's box. It may be
that experimenters more readily affect expressive reactions than subjective
assessments, or laughter more than smiling. Some experimenters may have
greater influence than others across all measures. Some may influence some
individuals but not others. The possible artifacts and confoundings are various
and intricate, and they are daunting to anyone endeavoring to concoct a simple
experiment. In the text that follows we see that to begin contemplating these
effects is to do more than indulge in idle and disquieting speculation. There are
already some empirical grounds for believing that experimenter effects can be of
central importance. In humor research with children, some of the salience,
pervasiveness, and complexities of experimenter effects have already come to
light. In the coarse of time they should themselves illuminate our main subject
matter, humor, and responsiveness to humor.
EXPERIMENTER AND COMPANION EFFECTS
This section summarizes data already published by the author and his
colleagues and briefly presents some new findings on experimenter effects. The
raison d'etre of the research is to demonstrate the significance of social
psychological variables for humor responsiveness and for humor research
generally. In the main the work relates to the influence ofthe social environment
on children's responsiveness to one another in humor situations. As a matter of
policy, the experimenter has usually been physically absent from those
situations. From the studies reviewed there are good reasons to suppose that
effects associated with child-companions would be magnified if the companion
were instead an adult (e.g., an experimenter).
Most of the studies are based on a naturalistic form of laboratory experiment,
and the theoretical underpinnings are derived from social facilitation theory ( cf.
Geen & Gange, 1977; Glaser, 1982; Weaver, 1978), social intimacy theory
(cf. Patterson, 1976, 1982), and laughter theory (e.g., Berlyne, 1969;
Chapman, Note 1, in press; Chapman & Foot, 1981; Rothbart, 1973, 1976).
The children are 4 to 11 years old and come from lower-class and middle-class
British homes. They are of mixed ability and are usually tested in pairs, where
pairings are formed randomly from same-sex classmates. While in a mobile
laboratory (cf. Foot & Chapman, 1975) situated on their school grounds, they
have been videotaped listening to tape-recorded humor or watching comedy
cartoon films. Subsequently the videotapes have been transcribed by the
experimenter( s) and assistants using an event-recorder system that in recent
times has been computerized (cf. Chapman, Smith, & Foot, 1980; Gormly,
Chapman, Foot, & Sweeney, 1980). In accounts published elsewhere various
dependent measures have been described, but it suffices here to refer just to
duration scores for laughter and smiling. In most of our research, as intimat.ed
previously, expressive responses for boys and girls have been closely match~d
to subjective ratings offunniness (Chapman, 1976; Chapman et at, 1980).
The mobile laboratory has two compartments, the main one of which is a
children's playroom. It is extremely pleasant for children; as subjects they give
every indication of thoroughly enjoying their visits. The second compartment is
smaller and houses the experimenter( s) and recording apparatuses. The video
installation comprises several microphones, a microphone-mixer unit, three
cameras, several monitors, and a split-screen device. A second video system is
installed for showing color cassettes, and the main monitor within that system is
the sole item of electronics visible to children. As far as we have been able to
discern no children have ever discovered that they were being filmed in our
humor study or even known that we had special interests in humor and laughter.
These and other general aspects of methodology have been discussed elsewhere
(e.g., Chapman, 1976, 1979; Chapman et at, 1980). However, in view of
above comments about the insensitivity and contrived nature of most humor
research, it is as well to note here that subjects paid "warm-up" visits to the
laboratory and were thoroughly acquainted with the experimenter(s) before any
trial was started. (Without warm-ups, Chapman & Speck, 1977, found that
first-born children were more responsive than others in the early stages of
triadic sessions; no doubt other studies on individual differences would show
that warm-up sessions are an essential requisite for "social" research.) No child
was ever noticed displaying discomfort or apprehension. On the contrary, an air
of eager excitement runs through a school while the "caravan"/"trailer" is
there.
Studies now to be summarized were originally conceived against the
background of general impressions about humor and laughter being essentially
social. If in everyday life humor is initiated according to social circumstances
and according to the composition of the surrounding company, and if overt and
covert reactions are determined or modified by corresponding circumstances,
then in empirical settings the social climate may play a fundamental role in
creating research outcomes. Unless adequate precautions are taken, the
experimenter is likely to be a prominent and unwitting influence in defining and
developing the parameters of that climate. It was considered not outside the
bounds of possibility that the experimenter's behavioral involvement could

sometimes be of overriding significance, affecting research data more than the
humor itself. The following studies add grist to that possibility and demonstrate
that there is cause for serious concern.
Study I: Different Experimenter, Different Effects
Pairs of 7-year-olds, 20 of each sex, watched a 6-minute cartoon film in the

presence of one of two experimenters, P and Q, who shared equally the role of
adult-companion across conditions (for more details, see Foot & Chapman,
1976). Another 10 pairs of children (five of each sex) watched the film on their
own. There were several experimental manipulations, but for present purposes
the finding to be spotlighted relates to the differing and serendipitous effects
associated with P and Q. Originally they were obliged to divide duties in the
way outlined because neither could make time to run all subject pairs. Hence
they endeavored to behave identically across all sessions; they responded
minimally, with only brief, intermittent smiles and laughs of low intensity.
Naturally they rehearsed carefully before the onset of the experiment, and by
studying video-recordings they also checked on themselves and each other at
the end of each of the 10 days of testing. (During these checks they avoided
observing subjects' reactions as far as possible, although subjects' laughter was
audible.) In terms of lengths and frequencies of their laughs and smiles, the
procedural goal was achieved: performances across the "experimenter-present"
sessions were closely standardized throughout the experiment, and P's and Q's
modes of interaction were not obviously distinguishable. However, there were
gross and systematic differences in the effects of the two experimenters: with P,
children smiled three times as much (two-tailedp < .01) and laughed five times
as much (two-tailed p < .01) as with Q. Generally speaking P facilitated
responsiveness and Q inhibited it. Children laughed more in the absence of Q
(two-tailedp < .05); in the absence of P, on the other hand, there tended to be
less smiling and laughter, although nonsignificantly so.
The general methodological message arising from this study is straight-
forward to interpret: it should not be assumed that humor researchers working
under nearly identical conditions will yield equivalent patterns of findings. To
derive a remedy is not so simple, but one recommendation would be that
whenever possible, experimenters (and others) should not be present with
subjects during experimental trials.
Study II: Observe-Laughter Dies
Removing experimenters from subjects' spatial surroundings may help prompt

the kind of explosive laughter that in 1972 Pollio et al. noted had not been
claimed in any study. In our research, such laughter is common (cf. Chapman,
Note 2). On occasions, however, we too have inadvertently contrived to stifle it.
The laughter of adult subjects in the study by Osborne and Chapman (1977)
was more of a private, tranquil, and transitory kind than seemed apposite for the
humor. Our personal impressions were that it bore none of the hallmarks of
laughter occurring routinely outside the laboratory: it did not appear dynamic,
attractive, or infectious, and there were no profound body movements, tears, or
noticeable changes in respiration.
A part of the explanation for our being able to simulate "real-life" laughter in
an unprecedented and reliable way is that generally our subjects do not know
that they are observed. The single exception with children is this second study,
the Osborne and Chapman experiments, that was specifically designed to
determine whether humor responsiveness may be suppressed by knowledge of
being observed.
The subjects were 7- and 8-year-olds, and they listened to tape-recorded
humor on their own (for details of the humor, see Chapman, 1972). Eight pairs
were informed of a viewing-screen facility in the mobile laboratory; a second
eight pairs were not so informed. The former were specifically told that, because
the experimenter was otherwise occupied, he would not have the time or
opportunity to look through the screen. In other respects all pairs were given
identical instructions. For instance, all were given the same information as to
how the experimenter knew when it was time to return to their playroom, having
been told previously that the dividing walVscreen was "completely sound-
proofed" (Chapman, Note 3).
It was found that children who did not know that they could be observed
laughed four times as much as the others but smiled only 60% as much (two-
tailed p < .005, for both behaviors). It would appear that in place of laughter a
more subdued form of behavior (in this case, smiling) can appear when subjects
are aware that they can be observed. However it should be emphasized that as
far as could be ascertained subjects were not thinking in terms of participation in
a study, let alone a humor study where laughter might be deemed an appropriate
or expected reaction. They were encouraged to see their involvement as one of
several visits to the "caravan," for which apparently there was no special or
ulterior purpose and that required no effort on their part-in the school context,
it was described by the teachers as "a treat." One may speculate, therefore, that
observation can kill the spontaneity in natural laughter and that the attenuation
of laughter would have been greater in this study if the children had known that
they were under continuous observation. It seems to be the case that subjects'
laughter is diminished in quantity and quality whenever there is a hint, however
subtle, that it is an expected behavior or that it is to be observed by someone in
an objective manner. In humor research, then, there is much to be said for the
spatial and temporal removal of the experimenter from observationaVtesting
environments. Whether or not that removal is practicable is quite another
matter.
Study III: Make 'Em Laugh-Be Free and Easy Beforehand
So often in published research one wants, as a reader, to know more about the
procedural details than is reported. Correspondingly, at least in social
psychological works, one often, as a writer, craves for more space-then one
could supply more precise information and refer to matters that as a general rule
may not be so much as mentioned. It could be that a lot of this material is far
from redundant. This third study shows that experimental data may be
influenced by procedures "outside the experiment," that is, in those periods
prior to the onset of trials, rarely it ever mentioned, when in fact there is room
for massive heterogeneity in the treatment of the children (or adults) who are
about to serve as subjects.
The experiment arose from informal observations in the earliest days of our
research (Chapman, 1972). An experimenter sometimes felt an awkwardness
with a particular child or pair of children while en route from a classroom to the
mobile laboratory; for no obvious reason the interaction was stilted and
overformal. This was usually associated with a "quiet" experimental trial, one
in which there was relatively little responsiveness to the humor and, for dyads,
perhaps little social interaction. With triads and larger groups no corresponding
effect was noticeable to the experimenter. For various schools it would take
between 2 and 4 minutes to walk to the laboratory, and several techniques were
tried for occupying those periods of time. The present study is a preliminary
investigation of the efficacy of two such techniques, both involving interaction
between experimenter and pairs of subjects.
In one condition 10 same-sex pairs of 7- and 8-year-olds were engaged in a
question-and-answer form of sustained interaction in which a series of
predetermined questions was posed until arrival at the laboratory. As they
stepped out of the classroom children were told of the need to answer questions.
The questions were nonthreatening, covering routine aspects of school, the
number, ages, and sex of their siblings, holidays, pastimes, and favorite
television programs. In a second condition, a second set of 10 same-sex pairs of
7- and 8-year-olds were allowed to determine the interaction for themselves:
members of a pair, singly or together, were allowed to run ahead, or to walk
alongside the experimenter and talk as they pleased. The experimenter would
respond as necessary to keep the conversation going, if he sensed that was what
the children wanted. If a child wished to hold his hand, that too was allowed. Of
course the specific nature of the experiment was a taboo topic, and no
information was given that was contained in instructions to be conveyed inside
the laboratory. Once inside, all children received standard intructions and so
forth, and they listened to the same humor as in Study II.
No hypotheses were developed formally, but the outcome was consonant
with that expected from prior experiences. Children subjected beforehand to the
experimenter-determined interaction laughed only 20% as much as those in the
self-determined, open-ended interaction, and they smiled less than half as much.
In statistical terms the differences were highly significant (two-tailedp < .001,
for both behaviors). Formalizing and ritualizing the "preexperiment" pro-
cedures clearly had a massively adverse effect on children's responsiveness.
Subsequently subjects of experiments always found their own way to the
laboratory door for experimental trials, and the experimenter awaited their
arrival inside the playroom. Usually this has been the practice after the first of
the warm-up visits. What has happened in other humor studies is known only to
the individual researchers and their close colleagues, but identified here is still
another important cluster of variables that has to be reckoned with. It would not
be safe to imagine that effects are "randomized out" through balanced
experimental designs, for the effects may be more salient for particular types of
humor or particular classes of subjects, and so forth. Doubtless different
researchers would exert varying influence overall, any individual researcher
would vary in influence within and across days, and individual differences
between experimenters would presumably interact with individual differences
between subjects.
Other Studies: Humor-Mainly to Do with the Company?
The remainder of this section is devoted to briefly summarizing other studies by

the author and colleagues. Together these studies illustrate that social
psychological factors play a significant part in determining the appreciation of
humor and are of paramount significance in the elicitation of laughter. In a
series of factorial experiments 7- and 8-year-olds were paired with 9-year-old
confederate-companions. In the mobile laboratory subjects and confederates
wore headphones, the subjects listening to humor and believing their com-
panions to be doing likewise, but the companions having in fact been trained to
respond to instructions delivered through the second channel of the stereo-
phonic tape-recorder; the instructions related to various behaviors, according to
experimental designs and independent variables. In other experiments, also in
the mobile laboratory, small same-age groups of subjects, without confederates,
watched cartoon films. As indicated earlier, the subjects were 4 to 11 years of
age. Within the constraints of experimental designs and subject availability,
they were always selected on the basis of age alone. They were allocated
randomly to experimental conditions, with five boys and five girls in each, or
five boy groups and five girl groups in each.
By presenting the same humor across subjects, it has been shown that the
amount that subjects laugh and smile is dependent on a range of interpersonal
and interactional factors: the amount the companion laughs (e.g., Chapman,
1974); the degree the companion appears to engage in "humorous smiling"
(e.g., Chapman & Chapman, 1974); the extent to which the companion looks at
the subject (e.g., Chapman & Wright, 1976); how close they sit together (e.g.,
Chapman, 1975 a); the extent to which they are oriented face-to-face with one
another (Chapman, 1976); whether the companion can attend to humor, though
it may not matter whether it be the same humor (e.g., Chapman, 1974, 1975b;
Chapman & Wright, 1976); and whether or not the companion while laughing
encroaches into the body space of the subject (Chapman, 1976). If there is more
than one companion, then the amount that those companions look at one
another is a powerful influence on the subject's overt mirth (Chapman, 1975b).
As indicated later, the age of the companion can have some consequence for so-
called "humorous laughter" (Chapman, Note 4, 1979a), but an age difference
of two years between 7 and 9-as between subjects and confederates-has no
noticeable effect (e.g., Chapman & Wright, 1976). Whether the subject and
companion are friends is an extremely important factor (e.g., Foot, Chapman,
& Smith, 1980), and above all it appears to be the case that sharing the social
situation is crucial for the facilitation of "humorous laughter" (e.g., Chapman,
1975b, 1976; Foot, Chapman, & Smith, 1977). When the companion is
another child of approximately the same age, then the subject's laughter and
smiling are invariably enhanced relative to "baseline" levels of solitary
children. That is the case even when the companion appears to ignore the
subject and is dour and unresponsive to the humor. However, equivalent studies
using adult companions (e.g., Study I above; Chapman et aI., 1980) have
sometimes yielded reduced responsiveness in children.
Other studies have been outlined in Chapman et al. (1980). They stem
directly from those just mentioned but are more obviously naturalistic. As well
as being based in the mobile laboratory several studies have incorporated
observations of children in the playground, in the classroom, and in the school
hall. Like earlier studies, these have invariably included a variety of SUbjective
measures, and occasionally indices of children's joke-telling and humor creation
have also been included. Most studies have embodied a form of replication and/
or extension of those mentioned above. At the same time, additional dimensions
of systematic inquiry have fostered the emergence of new findings. For instance,
facilitation effects were found to be greater when small groups were increased in
size from two to four members, but an increase from four to six produced no
further effect. When shown the same cartoon films, small and large groups
differed in how and where they laughed: not only did members of large groups
(e.g., 50 members) laugh appreciably longer overall, but some of the events
triggering their laughter drew only blank expressions from children in the small
groups. Similarly, repeated presentations of films led to increased laughter in
large but not small groups. There was evidence, too, of a developmental trend in
susceptibility to social influence: with increasing age across the 5- to 8-year-old
range there was an increase in the social facilitation of laughter and smiling.
A combination of mechanisms may account for the facilitation effects (cf.
Chapman, 1973b). For example, the subject's behavioral responses may be
amplified by the companion making the subject more reactive to the humor, by
providing extra eliciting stimuli for laughter, by dis inhibiting responses, and/or
by drawing the subject's attention to humor stimuli that otherwise would have
passed by unnoticed. Attention-gaining and attention-maintaining aspects to
humor and laughter are particularly exercised when situations are experienced
as low in intimacy (cf. Foot et aI., 1977). Conversely an attention-breaking
function may be brought into force when a situation is too high in intimacy. Both
these functions are restorative, deployed to regain a more pleasant level of
intimacy.
We have found an interesting sex difference in this regard: in both like-sex
and mixed-sex dyads/groups boys give the appearance of preferring lower levels
of intimacy than girls, and the attention-gaining/maintaining function is
enforced less by them. It has been our impression that the girls in our research
have generally tended to be more sociable: they have seemed to concentrate
more on the social elements of their environments, while the boys have instead
concentrated more on the humor per se. This impression has been gleaned
during the course of many studies involving several thousands of children aged 4
to II years; that is, across the entire age span studied. The girls tend to be more
attentive to their companions (e.g., in terms oflooking a good deal more at their
faces and in terms of reciprocating reactions and generally sequencing their
behaviors to suit those of their companions), but relative to the boys they are
affected rather little by the age and sex of those companions.
A sex difference in age-of-companion effects was brought out clearly in an
experiment in which 7-year-olds, 9-year-olds, and II-year-olds were paired in
five age combinations (7/7, 7/9, 9/9, 9/11, 11 /11); members of pairs were of
like-sex so that in a 5 X 2 design, sex of dyad was the second independent
factor. Consistent with our usual practice, and again within the constraints of
the design, children were randomly assigned to groups, and test sessions were
sequentially randomized. Care was taken that the members of any dyad were
not acquainted, other than by sight (cf. Chapman, Smith, Foot, & Pritchard,
1979; Foot, Chapman, & Smith, 1979). The children listened to humor, as in
Study II above, and duration and frequency measures were taken for laughter,
smiling, and eye contact (cf. Chapman, Note 5). On none of these measures was
there an age-of-comparison effect for girls. Nor was there any effect for 7-year-
old-boys. However, for 9-and Il-year-old boys, there were effects on all
measures: the 9-year-olds' scores were significantly greater when with com-
panions of the same age or older than when with a younger companion, and the
scores of II-year-old boys were likewise greater with same-age companions
than with younger ones. In this study, as before, the girls seemed more sensitive
to the congeniality of the prevailing social situation. At least in terms of looking
behavior, they were relatively more attentive than boys to their companions and
this was particularly so for those who were assigned younger companions. Sex
differences in the initiation of humor are probably yet more marked (Chapman
et aI., 1980), but we have not studied them extensively. Nonetheless, it is safe to
say that children as young as 7 years regard joke-telling as something of a male
prerogative, and in the company of the experimenter they seemed often to
compete with each other to respond first, to respond most, and even to respond
most effusively.
The presence and behavior of companions, whatever their ages, are usually
so overwhelmingly influential that even the label "humorous laughter" begins to
seem inappropriate: it has to be recognized as something of a misnomer. Humor
may often help to engender laughter but so may other stimuli (cf. Chapman &
Foot, 1976, 1977) and it may be sufficient on only very rare occasions; the
social climate probably has to be right for Pollio et al.'s "explosive" laughter,
otherwise internal amusement may be all that prevails. A "social arousal"
explanation has been advanced (e.g., Chapman, 1975a, 1975b, 1976) in which
it is suggested that "humorous laughter" is instigated to alleviate the
individual's arousal when it reaches uncomfortable proportions in everyday
encounters. In any two-person interaction a ceiling level of intimacy is gradually
attained (Patterson, 1976), but it can be envisaged that the parties involved
occasionally fall out of synchrony: one may begin to promote intimacy rather
more swiftly than the other finds comfortable. The injection of humor into the
conversation allows the other interactant to rapidly diminish his or her
discomfort by laughing. Externally provided humor may serve equally well.
Dissipation of arousal can come about, for example, through momentarily
withdrawing from the conversation and through temporarily reducing the
strength of various nonverbal signals: that is, the eyes can be closed, the head
thrown back, the body turned away, interpersonal proximity decreased, and so
forth. Conversely interactants who work in unison toward a speedy growth in
intimacy can capitalize on joke-telling: this allows them to stare continuously, to
reduce interpersonal distance, and so forth, and it is especially at such moments
that laughter can itself induce and augment laughter in others.
The great virtue of moderating social interactions in this fashion is that the
mid-term and longer-term effects are usually in the direction of boosting
friendliness. An interaction has been pleasantly disrupted, mutually com-
fortable levels of nonverbal responsiveness have been invoked, and the dialogue
is then continued with intimacy again ascending. There are few events as
pleasurable as laughing uproariously at a shared joke, and through germane
humor, appropriately phrased and delivered, one can with some impunity pry
for information, issue rebukes, disclose attitudes, and so on. Also, laughter can
help to alleviate various forms of motivational arousal (Chapman, 1975b;
Levine, 1969), and under most circumstances it is seen as a harmless and
attractive behavior, having connotations of joie de vivre.
The "social arousal" explanation is not intended to encompass theater or
cinema audiences where by design there is considerable attenuation in the
immediacy of social cues normally associated with companionship. In audi-
toriums, small groups of friends and acquaintances sit among strangers, and
some people may be entirely among strangers; all sit in low illumination, and
their seating configurations are impersonal. A professional entertainment aspect
predominates, and presumably there is then a more direct relationship between
quality of comic performance and amount of laughter generated. But a
successful comic does not simply regurgitate a prearranged set of jokes (cf. Fry
& Allen, 1975), that would not be enough to overcome the intrinsic passivity of
the audience and the inert formality of the environment. Most comedians and
comediennes "interact" subtly with their audiences. They may apparently take
those audiences into their confidence and invite everyone, seemingly on an
individual basis, to identify with the predicaments depicted, with the fictitious
protagonists, and with the role they ascribe themselves in the proceedings
described. Typically psychological and socioeconomic features that they have
in common with the audience are accentuated, and they portray themselves as
honest and open characters, or perhaps as naive pawns in events beyond their
understanding. Personal feelings and perhaps preposterous actions may be
divulged. Or at least there is a pretence that all this is so. Hence, for each of
us as members of such an audience, the comic artist seems to be in direct
communication. So it is for each individual, and so it is when any of us is
engrossed with the characters in a film or a book; it is as though we were
there.
For most of us laughter bubbles to the fore only rarely when there is no one
else around. These are occasions when we relive amusing accidents or when in
daydreams we conjure up thoughts of others. Sometimes an author can levitate
us so that we "lose" ourselves in the story and imagine ourselves as first-hand
witnesses to funny events. When we laugh it is as though we were actually
present. Therein lies an explanation as to why laughter, an essentially social
response, can find expression when we are on our own: we may be alone
physically, but we are not alone psychologically-there is, at those moments, a
great deal of incongruence between the physical and psychological environ-
ments.
GROUP INFLUENCES
So far in this chapter, after the introductory remarks, there has been a tacit and
almost exclusive emphasis on research with children. This reflects the slant of
the author's own contributions, though it has been argued that the methodo-
logical implications arising therefrom could apply with equal compulsion to
studies of young and old. It also reflects the fact that research on children's
humor has advanced considerably more than that on adults (cf. McGhee, 1979;
McGhee & Chapman, 1980). In this section of the chapter, the emphasis on
children is maintained as far as possible, but in examining the literature
pertaining to group influences, a broader sweep is necessitated because, against
the drift of other trends, most analyses in their original form refer to adults
only.
In the main, social psychological contributions to the humor literature are
concerned more with group processes than with interaction as such, and aside
from some of the areas of concentrated effort surveyed elsewhere (see Chapter 8
by Fine), the impact of those contributions has been diffuse, not to say
negligible. A tenet of most research, at all levels of social psychological
analysis, is that humor and laughter are linked to communication (cf. Davis &
Farina, 1970; Gruner, 1976, 1978; La Gaipa, 1977; Zillmann, 1977). Even so,
a diverse range of matters has been addressed, relating to structure, content, and
function of humor, and studies are disparate both in conceptual and methodo-
logical domains. In recent times there has been a small but welcome growth of
anthropological and cross-cultural research as well as research at the level of
society (e.g., Goldstein, 1977; Matusewicz, 1976; Wilson, 1979; see also
Chapters 8 & 9).
Although a distinctive social-developmental approach has yet to take form,
many of the functions and processes identified for adults are observable in
children aged 7 years or so (cf. Chapman et aI., 1980). How and when they
begin to emerge is a matter for speculation. Jacobson (1947), for example, has
argued that laughter grows as a social response during childhood. If so, most
development is early in life, for in 7-year-olds one can witness comic activity
constituting an integral part of coping strategies (cf. Coser, 1959; Mechanic,
1962; Milgram, 1965); in many classrooms a "clown" (cf. Goodchilds, 1959;
Klapp, 1950) is easily detected-usually a boy, highly popular, and regarded
with much affection, but not one of the group's leaders; a group's "pecking
order" (cf. Coser, 1960) can be seen in operation, with regard to who is the
target of the humor, who instigates it, and how much response there is from the
group as a whole: and "cognitive similarity" (cf. Wolosin, 1975) within group
members is a factor governing the regularity with which humor is created and
the amount of reaction from group members. As yet no one has suggested for
children, as Wolosin (1975) has done for adults, that different phases in the life
of a group are notable for the differential propensity for laughter. However, we
have formed the impression that children as young as 7 years are able to
manipulate humor to test the standing of their relationships and to help transfer
the group from one stage of development to another (cf. Tuckman, 1965).
Informal observations suggest that still younger schoolchildren can use humor
to induce change in group esteem.
These assertions are derived from informal observations and remain to be
tested, but an experiment on ethnic humor showed convincingly that, like
adults, children as young as 4 years can reveal their group allegiances and
antagonisms by the amount they respond to humor (Chapman, Smith, & Foot,
1977); these results were entirely consonant with Zillmann and Cantor's (1976)
disposition theory of mirth. Adults certainly vary their humor and responsive-
ness according to group identities. For example, in the case of men, a preference
for sexist humor is confined to instances where women are the butts, and for
women there is a corresponding preference for humor in which men are the butts
(e.g., Chapman & Gadfield, 1976).
In a number of studies humor has been shown to have broad implications for
intergroup relations. Although to the proverbial "fly-on-the-wall," a joke may
appear innocuous, it may in fact serve multiple and contrasting functions for
other recipients. For instance, for members of one group, a joke may increase
morale and consolidate them as a group while at the same time sustaining or
intensifying aggression towards outsiders. Those outsiders may be encouraged

by the same joke to reciprocate hostilities. Such effects have been reviewed
extensively elsewhere (e.g., La Fave, 1977; Martineau, 1972; Zillmann &
Cantor, 1976), and there is related discussion in Chapter 5. Several theoretical
models have been proposed, notably by Martineau (1972), Kane, Suls, and
Tedeschi (1977), and Giles, Bourhis, Gadfield, Davies, and Davies (1976), but
none has met with more than neutral acclaim, and there is no widespread or
fervent support for anyone of them. Even the authors and advocates of the
models have neglected to subject their views to sustained and detailed empirical
inquiry. Exceptions are the efforts by La Fave and colleagues and by Zillmann
and colleagues on ethnic and disparagement humor (see Chapman et al., 1977;
and Chapter 5).
Martineau (1972) constructed a descriptive model relating to the social
implications of humor. Working from sociological and anthropological bases, he
observed that although humor can "lubricate" interactions and relationships, it
can also be abrasive and cause or aggravate interpersonal friction. He then
described typologies of situations in which humor is manifested and the possible
outcomes. Intergroup humor that disparages an out-group was considered to
have the potential to increase morale and solidify the in-group and to introduce
or foster a hostile disposition toward that out-group. Other functions were
described for other kinds of intergroup humor, and another set of functions was
described for conditions where two or more groups are represented in an
interactive setting. If the humor is perceived as favoring or esteeming one group,
it is said to foster consensus and social integration or else to foster disintegration
of the relationship. If, instead, the humor actually disparages one group, it may
promote a redefining of the relationship or it may again encourage dis-
integration. For intragroup situations, a different set of functions is detailed.
Equally viable is the descriptive model of Bourhis, Gadfield, Giles, and Tajfel
(1977) that is based upon Tajfel's (1974) general theory of intergroup relations.
Bourhis et al. also identify variations in humor and its consequences according
to structural variations in social settings. Their model, like the others above, has
the potential for broad application. Others do not. For example, Heider's
cognitive balance model (cf. Goldstein, 1976) is not able to account for the
success of self-ridiculing humor among group members.
The Martineau formulation does not consider why blame or praise might not
serve in place of humor to further the group's objectives, but there are
corresponding lacunae in virtually all theories of humor and theories oflaughter.
The "theories" are in effect statements of properties or statements of function.
They do not begin to explain why humor occurs or why laughter occurs.
Atypically the model by Kane et al. (1977) does set out to explain why humor
per se should be invoked and why specific types of humor might eventuate under
specific types of social conditions. It is unusual, therefore, in that it focuses on
humor initiation rather than responses. In fact, it overtly disregards the target
and audience and consequently it is an incomplete analysis from the standpoint
of an interactionist. Unfortunately too, Kane et al.'s initial "prospectus" has not
been supplemented by the comprehensive treatise promised therein; nor has it

received attention from empirical researchers. Hence we are left with a
tantalizingly unfinished critique.
The arousal model of Giles et al. (1976) is the humor model best geared to
interaction. Elements of the social context are seen as crucial at various stages
in the humor process, and the way humor is structured and presented is said to
depend upon why humor is introduced and how the audience is perceived. The
model incorporates not just the attributes and cognitions of the humor source
and recipients, but also the social factors that impinge upon them. It is therefore
an expansive model, but one restricted to an individual social level of analysis
and to dyadic interchanges.
This brief overview has necessarily omitted reference to a vast number of
studies, many of which have examined the causes and consequences of humor
as it has appeared in various guises during social interaction. For example, there
exists a diverse collection of small-group studies (e.g., Bradney, 1957;
Goodrich, Henry, & Goodrich, 1954; Miller, 1967; Radcliffe-Brown, 1940;
Sykes, 1966; Zenner, 1970), and a set focusing on the antecedents of wittiness
(e.g., Goodchilds, 1972; Goodchilds & Smith, 1964; Smith & Goodchilds,
1959, 1963). As Fine (1977b) has commented, however, an unfortunate aspect
to these studies is that they fail to acknowledge that each group has a unique
history and culture. To regard it otherwise is tantamount to regarding it as an ad
hoc assembly of individuals. and to formulate research on that basis will be
unprofitable or of limited value in the long run; important factors that underlie
the traditions of humor initiation and responsiveness are certain to escape
notice.
NONHUMOROUSLAUGHTER
It has been emphasized elsewhere (e.g., Chapman, in press; Chapman & Foot,
1976, 1977; Giles & Oxford, 1970; Sherman, 1975, 1977), but bears saying
again, that much laughter is generated under circumstances devoid of humor,
and of course not all "humorous laughter" is genuinely shared or pleasurable.
Sometimes "humor" is offensive to certain members of an audience who might
well dispute whether it is actually "humor." It is not uncommon for people to
laugh at others. Probably all of us know how hurtful and debilitating it can be
when on the receiving end of such laughter. Good jokes may be quickly
forgotten (cf. Chapman, 1973a; Chapman & Crompton, 1978), but not so the
occasion when someone laughs at us.
Without devising a total taxonomy of human experience, it may be
impossible to delineate sets of conditions under which laughter is never to be
observed. Laughter can prosper when individuals are oppressed, impoverished,
or in acute pain: those very circumstances may be manna for laughter. As far as
we know laughter can erupt in association with any of the emotions; certainly it
can be witnessed in fear, embarrassment, contempt, and grief, as well as in love
and joy. It has been intimidated that for humorous laughter a "playful mood"
must be a part of the proceedings (cf. McGhee, 1979), but sometimes laughter
can constitute part of a stoic effort to safeguard against loss of face or to disguise
embarrassment. Occasionally, then, it is feigned or forced, and the person's
demeanor is far from light hearted at that time. Such laughter is not likely to be
exuberant and uncontrolled, but some forms of nonhumorous laughter are
extremely effusive: that which can arise from tickling a child is a case in point.
In tickling, the playful attitude is all important, and for anyone child only a
limited number of others may be successful in producing the convulsive forms of
behavior and the total satiation that ensues (Rickwood, 1978).
In other words, in tickling, and in all the other nonhumorous events that can
lead to laughter, the social environment again seems to be more than catalytic.
Even if one considers infancy and the very first laughs that occur, there are
grounds for believing that an appropriate social context is crucial (cf. Sroufe &
Waters, 1976). It has been shown, for instance, that some stimuli, such as a
face mask, can be used on different occasions to evoke both laughter and crying;
which of these behaviors manifests itself depends upon the social context in
which the stimuli are featured. Alas, however, psychological knowledge about
nonhumorous laughter is starkly sparse-even more so than for humorous
laughter. As yet there is no substantial body of empirical research.
REFERENCE NOTES
1. Chapman, A. J. Humor and social responsiveness. Paper presented at the Bi-Annual
General Meeting of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology,
Weimar (DDR), 1978.
2. Chapman, A. J. Children's humour and laughter. Paper presented to the Annual
Conference of the British Psychological Society, Developmental Section, Durham,
1982.
3. Chapman, A. J. Response to humor or to the social situation? Paper presented to the
Third International Conference on Humor, Washington, D.C., 1982.
4. Chapman, A. J. Children's social interactions in same-age and mixed-age dyads.
Paper presented to the Developmental Section at the London Conference of the
British Psychological Society, 1977.
5. Chapman, A. J. Mixed-age effects in children's social and humor responsiveness.
Paper presented to the Second International Conference on Humor, Los Angeles,
1979.
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Chapter 8
Sociological Approaches to the Study of Humor
GARY ALAN FINE
Most humor and laughter imply a social relationship, a connection between self
and other. Just as one cannot tickle oneself, so, too, one can hardly tell oneself a
joke or playa prank on oneself. A jocular event typically requires a minimum of
two persons to succeed-or, for that matter, to fail. Although I shall not argue
whether an event is funny if there is no one present to observe it, any adequate
understanding of the dynamics of humor must include a social analysis.
Despite the importance of a social approach to humor, sociologists have not
studied humor with anything like the frequency or fervor of their colleagues in
psychology. Humor has not been the legitimate subject area in sociology that is
has been in psychology. Part of the reason for this difference is related to the
way in which humor has been treated in the two disciplines. In psychology,
jokes or cartoons can be used effectively as experimental stimuli, and these
stimuli are easy to administer to subjects. Since the primary concern of the
psychologist is the reaction of the individual to the stimuli, the social
relationship is not important; the social relationship that does exist-that
between the subject and the experimenter-is typically ignored (for exceptions
see Davis & Farina, 1970; Shurcliff, 1968). The sociologist typically examines
the social context of humor. Although this generalization does not apply to all
types of humor research in sociology, at the very least the social context must
implicitly be taken into account. This increases the difficulty of research. No
longer can humorous stimuli be given to individual subjects, but rather the social
forces that influence the creation and appreciation of humor must be
considered.
It is not true that few sociological studies of humor have been published.
Although the number does not approach those in psychology, over the past 40
160 Gary Alan Fine
years there has been a steady, if small, stream of articles that examine humor as
social communication. In this chapter I shall provide a brief description of the
major traditions of sociological research on humor. With the growth and
increased specialization of sociology, there has been a modest growth in the
number of humor studies (most recently by scholars who can be classified as
belonging to the symbolic interactionist tradition), but at the same time there
have been fewer studies dealing with humor in the leading sociological journals.
In the period 1942-1959 there were six articles dealing with humor in the
American Sociological Review and the American Journal of Sociology, the
two leading American sociological journals. Since 1959 there has not been an
article primarily on humor published in either; the sociology of humor is not
defined as a topic of general interest for scholars in sociology.
Still, there have been several attempts to apply sociological theory to humor.
Perhaps this represents part of the problem with this subfield. Humor
researchers typically take established sociological traditions and attempt to
apply them to humor rather than generating new theories. Among the areas
where humor research has been conducted in sociology are: the relationship
between humor and social roles, the nature of joking relationships, the
contextual rules of humor performance, ethnomethodological approaches to
humor and laughter in conversation, humor and group culture, reference group
theory, humor and ethnic group relations, and humor and social control. This
diverse array of topics indicates that humor is a tool that can be used in
numerous ways and has implications for understanding many corners of our
social environment.
Humor is by its nature an indication of some sort of discontinuity in the social
system. This discontinuity is what gives humor its power and, indeed, its humor.
As Murray Davis astutely notes: " ... I contend that sociologists without a
sense of humor will never be able to understand the workings of the social
world, for humor separates its seemingly seamless joints, making them visible,"
(Davis, 1979, p. 109). Whether we call this visibility of the seemingly seamless
joints bisociation (as does Koestler, 1964) or incongruity, it is apparent that
humor reflects a contrast in meaning between two incompatible views of a
scene. Humor results from the audience resolving these two conflicting images
in a way that makes sense, given the distorted logic of humor. Humor is a
puzzle, a problem that must be solved for mirth to result. That humor can be
thought of in terms of incongruity, however, does not mean that that is the only
way in which it can be viewed. Some argue that incongruity alone is not
sufficient for humor, although most agree that there needs to be some element of
surprise for a remark to be considered humorous. However, other possible
motivations have been proposed for humor that are more directly sociological or
psychological, whereas the incongruity model is primarily grounded in treating
humor as a text.
The two most common alternative models for humor involve thinking of it as
arising out of a sense of superiority (the Hobbesian view, which has most
forcefully been stated recently, by Gruner, 1979) or as reflecting relief in being
Sociological Approaches to the Study of Humor 161
able to express previously unacceptable emotions. Other chapters discuss these

theories in more detail; these motivations for humor serve as a backdrop for the
research to be discussed in the rest of this chapter.
HUMOR AND SOCIAL ROLES
Within most societies there are roles or positions that are conducive to the
display performance of humor. Some people are allowed to joke and others are
even expected to joke. In this chapter I will examine four roles commonly
encountered in American culture: the fool, the clown, the joker, and the
comedian. Although these roles overlap, there is enough that distinguishes them
to treat them separately.
The Fool
The fool has had a long and one might even say a distinguished history
throughout the world. It is common to think offools in light of their roles at court
functions, in terms of Medieval European fools-such as Lear's fool in
Shakespeare's King Lear. However, I shall not describe the literary, historical,
or anthropological position of the fool (see Welsford, 1935; Willeford, 1969).
The fool is a figure of fun, who derives much of his humorous power from the
fact that he actually is, or is playing the role of someone who is "foolish" or
intellectually insufficient. Much of the humor of the fool role comes from the
combination of his public stupidity with his insight.
Klapp (1962), in discussing major social types in American life, names the
fool, along with the hero and the villain. In an early article, Klapp (1949)
suggests that there are 10 types of fools, distinguishable on the basis of their
behavior: (l) antic fool, (2) comic fool, (3) rash fool, (4) clumsy fool, (5)
deformed fool, (6) simple fool, (7) weak fool, (8) comic butt, (9) pompous fool,
and (10) mock hero. In his later book (1962), he limits the categories to five,
divided on the basis of the fool's functions:
1) incompetents (clumsy, rash, simple, weak) who illustrate and penalize ludicrous
role failures;
2) types which discount people who claim more than they have, thus correcting
certain status-abuses and pretensions;
3) non-conforming types which ridicule deviants and outsiders;
4) overconformers who suffer comic rebuke because they have been too enthusiastic
in complying with group standards; and
5) certain types (especially comic butt, clever fool) having conspicuous functions as
outlets for aggressive tension.
(Klapp, 1962, p. 69).
162 Gary Alan Fine
Because of Klapp's concern with depicting the fool as a social type, he does not
describe what fools actually do; rather, he presents the symbolic images of the
fool and connects these images to prominent figures who might be seen as fools
of various types. For Klapp, fool types reveal our national character. People are
what they laugh at, and, through laughing, they are engaging in social control
and in unifying themselves through "the communion of laughter." Daniels and
Daniels (1964) claim that the fool role is a tolerated deviant type. As such, the
"career fool" has rules of conduct that differ from the rules applied to others.
The career fool has a "licensed freedom." For this freedom the fool has to be
willing to be the butt of jokes and the target of laughter. People do not just show
disrespect for the fool; they admire what the fool can get away with-
particularly the license that he has with his superiors (for example, in the
military). Daniels and Daniels conclude that: "The fool can be the embodiment
of each man's wish to escape from the full burden of responsibility which he
carries" (1964, p. 227). Because of his privileged position, the fool has a special
power.
The Clown
Closely related to the fool in popular terminology and global scope (e.g.,
Charles, 1945) is the clown. Indeed, we may use the two terms interchangeably
to describe an acquaintance. The clown, however, has the second meaning of a
performer, as in circuses (for a structural, semiotic analysis of clowns see
Bouissac, 1976; see Tarachow, 1951 for a psychoanalytic view). Whether one
sees the circus clown as mediating between cultural order and natural disorder,
between the adult and the child, or between joy and sadness, there is something
about the clown's behavior that is both realistic and absurd. Unlike most comic
actors, there is a basic sadness in the clown's behavior-a sense that the clown
is almost part of "polite" society, but not quite. The keying for this
clownishness is, in the circus, the makeup that the clown wears, a throwback to
tribal society and perhaps a reaffirmation of cultural evolution. In everyday
interaction, the clown and the fool are virtually identical, with clowns being
most similar to Klapp's functional categories one and three: Incompetents and
Nonconforming Types. However, many clowns wish to appear clownish; their
clowning behavior is more deliberate than is true of many fools.
Bales (1970) categorizes group members into 27 personality "types" based
on the dimensions of Dominance versus Submission (Upward-Neutral-
Downward), Affectivity (Positive-Neutral-Negative), and Task-Oriented ver-
sus Emotionally Expressive (Foward-Neutral-Backward). He sees the clown as
Upward and Backward (UB):
The [UBI member ... seems ascendant and expressive, nontask oriented, perhaps
unconventional or even deviant. He seems neither clearly friendly nor unfriendly, but
entertaining. joking. dramatic, relativistic. free in his associations, taking pleasure in
play, activity, novelty, and creativity. In the realization of his own values he seems to
be trying to move toward value-relativism and expression of underlying emotions and
feelings. "Life is more a festival than a workship for moral discipline." (p. 245)
Bales notes that suffering may be part of this individual's social role. Continual
joking places a strain on the social system, just as does continual seriousness.
The clown may find his act inappropriate if used too frequently or with too great
intensity, because, as Bales notes, it prevents the group from achieving its task-
oriented goals.
The Wit and Joker
Some people have a humorous remark for all occasions. Their witty or sarcastic
remarks put a situation into a perspective-a perspective that often diminishes
the situation's significance. As Duncan (1962) notes, humor is a "passage by
incongruity from one view to another which society provides as an escape from
the crushing weight of traditions or the painful anxiety developed by conflicting
loyalties" (p. 257). Jokers lift, at least temporarily, this "crushing weight" and
so can be important members of a group (Davis, Gebhard, Huson, & Spaeth,
1961).
There is evidence that the wit or joker is typically a high status group
member, often dominant and gregarious, and strongly influences the direction of
group interaction (Dunphy, 1969; O'Connell, 1969). The wit appears not only
to be a definite personality type (see Chapter 4 by Fisher and Fisher in Volume
II) but also to have a clear social role (Cloyd, 1964; Goodchilds, 1959, 1972;
Goodchilds & Smith, 1964; Smith & Goodchilds, 1959). Goodchilds and
Smith made a distinction between the sarcastic wit and the clowning wit, finding
the former more influential than the latter. Further, there is evidence that groups
that contain a deliberate wit do better on a problem-solving task than do groups
without such wits (Goodchilds & Smith, 1964). This is possibly due to the
joker's introduction of new ideas for others to react to.
Insufficient research has been conducted on the practical joker to understand
the social role of this person. Of course there are different types of practical
jokers varying in the humor and viciousness of their jokes (see Grotjahn, 1957).
Like jokes generally, practical jokes provide a diversion for the group and may
promote group solidarity (Posen, 1974; Scott, 1974; Roy, 1959-1960).
The Comedian
Recently books and articles have been written about the background of the
comedian (Fry & Allen, 1975; Janus, 1975; Fisher & Fisher, 1981) and some
has been written about comedic style (see Pollio & Edgerly, 1976). Perhaps
more important to the sociologist of humor is how comedians go about making
164 Gary Alan Fine
people laugh. Salutin (1973) demonstrates that comedians-in her case

burlesque comedians-are concerned with impression management (see
Stebbins, 1982, for a related analysis of magicians). Unlike members of a group
who can rely on the sympathy of their friends and acquaintances for support and
comfort, the professional comedian faces a group of strangers-strangers to
him/her and for the most part strangers to each other. Being defined as a
comedian may have both helpful and harmful consequences for the professional
comedian. Some audience members may be predisposed to laugh at this person
who has already been defined as funny, whereas other members ofthe audience
may challenge a comedian to make them laugh-a task that once defined in that
way is extremely difficult to achieve. Some audiences are characterized as
"good" and others as "dead" or "hostile," but there has not been research on
what the factors are that lead to such classifications (Sanders, 1974).
Salutin notes that burlesque comics have particular problems in that they are
thought of as sexually deviant by society and that working in a "sex show" is
considered an index of having failed as a comic. As a result the comic must
distance himself from his role and must be able to put down hecklers, usually by
degrading the audience. Comediennes face problems equal in magnitude, if not
in content. Being a comic is seen as inappropriate for a woman, and so to get
laughs, many female comics deride themselves (at least until recently).
Whereas male comedians attack the audience, female comedians side with the
audience in attacking themselves to gain some measure of sympathy (Levine,
1976).
Good comedians are adept at using metacommunication with the audience to
tell them when to laugh. They may choose to telegraph the joke or make it
"lappy" (put it in the audience's lap, so that even the least alert audience will
catch on). From this point of view the comedic performance is not like a
monologue but a conversation that the comedian is continually adjusting
depending on the response (Tomlinson, Note 1). The comedian's role requires
him to get a laugh at reasonable intervals if his economic future is not to be
threatened, and yet in doing this he must pretend that his failures (of which all
comedians have many) don't really maUer. He must be very much into his role
and yet maintain a critical role distance at all times.
HUMOR IN CONTEXT
Humor, like all interpersonal behavior, is socially situated. That is, it is

embedded in a particular social environment. For humor to work-that is, to be
funny-it must be responsive to the immediate situation and to be appropriate to
the normative properties of the more general social circumstances. Participants
must define these behaviors or speech events as humorous, and this evaluation
is socially constructed (or negotiated) in context. In this section, I shall focus on
three approaches to contextual humor, again somewhat overlapping but
sufficiently distinct to pursue separately. Specifically I shall examine: (1) the

development of joking-type relationships and kidding in modem industrial
societies, ignoring the many joking relationships in nonindustrial societies, (2)
the contextual rules for humor, particularly the effects of power, status, and sex
on what may be said in public, and (3) the ethnomethodological approach to
conversational analysis, both the analysis of jokes and laughter.
Joking Relationships
Industrial societies, unlike many non-Western societies (e.g., Brandt, 1948;

Hammond, 1964; Radcliffe-Brown, 1952), do not have formalized role
relationships in which the participants are required to joke with each other in
lieu of serious communication. Our cultures are not sufficiently tightly
structured and stratified to permit such a formalized relationship. However,
there are places in which the large amount of joking does take place, and
although these instances would not technically qualify as ajoking relationship in
a strict anthropological sense, they have typically been called such in the
literature. Joking (or teasing or kidding) relationships have been found among
groups of friends and also among groups of co-workers. We do not find joking
relationships in the family or among relatives; whether this is because such
relationships do not occur or have not been examined is an open question.
No one should be greatly surprised that much joking is found among groups of
friends, particularly friends who are together for extended periods of time
(LeMasters, 1975) or in isolated areas (Traylor, 1973). These joking
relationships seem (or at least seemed) particularly characteristic of all-male
groups. Perhaps because males are constrained from revealing personal
information that could make them vulnerable, their expressive culture revolves
around the display of emotion through humor much more than is true among
women. This joking relationship starts early in the boy's life and is developed by
preadolescence (Fine, 1980, 1981). Joking and teasing is an indicator that the
parties are having a good time. In an ethnography of life in a working class
tavern, LeMasters (1975) found that banter and kidding were almost con-
tinuous among certain members of the group. Some of the remarks that were
made in this context might have provoked fights if they had been made by
strangers. In addition, the exchange of kidding is important for maintaining the
equal status of the participants. The ability to kid demonstrates the equality of
the status relationship and also shows intimacy, which cannot be expressed
directly but must be indicated indirectly by mentioning topics that would be
taboo elsewhere.
Joking relationships are also found in work environments. This is not
surprising in that co-workers are likely to become friends, particularly if they
work in close proximity. Although joking on the job probably occurred as soon
as there were workers and tedious jobs, the first discussion of this phenomenon
was in the context of the Hawthorne studies (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939;
166 Gary Alan Fine
see also Homans, 1950; White, Boorman, & Brieger, 1976}, the now classic
study of industrial sociology. In the bank wiring room, workers joked with each
other, played tricks on each other, and otherwise had a good time in the course
of the workday, as much as was possible given the constraints of the situation.
Perhaps the most influential study of joking in a factory was the participant
observation conducted by Roy (1959-1960; see Handelman, 1976). Roy found
that one set of machine operators had developed a quite intricate set of joking
norms and procedures by which they structured the workday and dealt with
potential personal conflict and strains. These joking occasions came to be
ritualized, such as "banana time" (the memorable title of Roy's article), which
consisted of one worker stealing another worker's banana-an event that
occurred each day at nearly the same time. While the ritualized quality of the
joking day is surprising (but see Nickerson, 1974) and is due to the isolated
conditions in which these men worked, joking relationships are found among
peers in all occupations. Studies of department store clerks (Bradney, 1957),
coal miners (Vaught & Smith, 1980), mental hospital employees (Coser, 1960),
and printing-press workers (Sykes, 1966) have yielded similar findings showing
that workers kid and joke with each other to relieve the tedium of the work.
These findings are consistent with the finding in the "sociology of work" that
there is always an "underside" or unofficial aspect to any job.
Contextual Rules
Joking is a strategic activity. By that I mean that not everyone canjoke about all
topics in all situations. Joking must be understood in light of the presentation of
self that one is displaying in the joke and in light of the expectations of one's
audience.
Defining the situational rules for joking is difficult in that the standards for
appropriate joking are not explicit and may not even be known consciously. The
appropriateness of joking depends on the situation. Since jokes can be used to
define both situations and selves (Fine, 1983), one should examine the goals of
humor. Jokes that are designed to "put down" another person will differ in
content depending on whether that person is present. If the target is present,
such jokes typically maintain a veneer of diplomacy covering their message; if
the target is absent, such niceties can be ignored and replaced by brutal
sarcasm. Although jokes are used to focus on uncomfortable topics (such as
dying), making them acceptable or manageable, the joker must be very careful
to ensure that the joke does not irreparably destroy any social relationships
(Emerson, 1969). While jokes create social meanings (e.g., Zijderveld, 1968),
such social construction must occur on a solid foundation.
There are circumstances in which people expect to laugh and as a result
almost anything will receive a laugh. This is particularly true at some comedy
performances at which the audience has a prior positive attitude to the
comedian and on certain occasions among friends when they find that they can't
control their giggling (what Fry, 1963, calls a "humor orgy"). In such
circumstances one might say that people have become sensitized to laugh, and
that they do so with vigor and gusto.
Researchers have analyzed specific contextual components of humor such as
status and sex roles. With regard to the former it is well established that humor
is more often directed down the status hierarchy than up it, particularly in light
of formal role relations. Coser's (1959) now classic analysis of humor in a
psychiatric staff conference demonstrates that doctors were far more likely to
make jokes at the expense of nurses or interns than the reverse (see also
Goodrich, Henry, & Goodrich, 1954). The superiority theory of humor (cf.
Gruner, 1979) claims that a joke is basically an attack, and even those who
refuse to accept this perspective completely cannot deny that much humor does
contain aggressive elements. From this it is apparent that a joke that is publicly
aimed at a superior is a rare and fragile thing. Yet, humor can be used by
superiors to promote rapport with subordinates (Malone, 1980), or by
psychiatrists with patients (Greenwald, 1977; Mindess, 1976; O'Connell,
1976).
Humor is also a strategic tool to communicate sexual desire between men and
women; however, the only published studies examine how men communicate
with women through laughter and jokes. Davis and Farina (1970) demonstrated
experimentally that men laugh more at risque jokes when they are told by an
attractive female than when they are told by an unattractive female. An
ethnographic study indicates how risque jokes operate in context. Walle (1976)
investigated the so-called "bar rush," that time near closing when men search
for women to "pick up." Walle suggests that the shift from an impersonal to a
personal relationship can be facilitated through humor. By communicating
through sexual humor the man can gauge the woman's willingness for additional
contact without having a direct invitation rejected. If the jokes produce a
positive response, the male assumes (often correctly) that the woman is open to
intimate contact. Even if the jokes are rejected. the man at least keeps some
measure of self-esteem in that the woman did not reject him-just his jokes.
Humor also plays a role in establishing community. Just as obscene humor
can gauge sexual availability, so it can be used to indicate that one is a
knowledgeable member of a social group. In a study of preadolescent joking
(Fine, 1982), I found that obscene humorous talk was a regular part of
preadolescent life, and that it served as a marker for indicating that the speaker
was competent in those sexual areas that preadolescents believe characterize
adult life. Such remarks, however, are localized in time and space; pre-
adolescents are careful to ensure that their adult guardians are absent before
they make overtly sexual jokes. Sexual joking, in addition to demonstrating
communitas, also provides a setting in which boys can learn about sexual
matters without revealing their ignorance "seriously." While some serious
discussions of sexual behavior do occur, much material is transmitted in joking
encounters (Fine. 1982. 59-66).
168 Gary Alan Fine
Conversational Analysis
Perhaps the group of sociological researchers who have given humor and
laughter the greatest amount of "serious" attention are ethnomethodologists and
conversational analysts. They ask how listeners know that there is a call for
laughter at the end of a skein of talk-how can people make sense out of these
strange, ambiguous things that we call humor, laughter, and smiling?
What is a smile? Kinesthetist Ray Birwhistell ( 1970) notes that while smiling
appears to be universal in all cultures, the rules for smiling must be learned.
Specifically he suggests that smiles do not overrule context-that is, that a smile
must be appropriate to the context; it doesn't change the context or meaning of a
situation. Birdwhistell notes that just saying that someone smiled doesn't mean
much:
A "smile" in one society portrays friendliness, in another embarrassment, and in still

another may contain a warning that unless tension is reduced hostility and attack will
follow. (p. 35)
One can point to a considerable variety of smiles that might communicate

different messages: a wicked smile, a sickly smile, a crooked smile, a sardonic
smile, and a wistful smile, just to name a few of the labels given to smiles. Each
smile has its own symbolic significance and each has particular interactional
slots into which it can properly be placed. There exists a complex grammar of
smiling.
The same can be said for laughter. Just as there are dozens of smiles, so there
is a wide range of ways in which one can laugh, from a belly laugh to a guffaw to
a giggle to a cackle to a side-splitting laugh. Laughs also vary in amplitude,
length, timbre, and even content. According to ethnomethodologists, people
convey different messages through laughter and use laughter to respond to
conversational talk in different ways. Further, laughter doesn't just occur but is
invited. Jefferson (1979; Jefferson, Sacks, & Schegloff, Note 2) has indicated
that the placement of laughter in a conversation and the sort of laughter that is
used is not random but rather is highly structured. By examining conversations
in which laughter occurs, one can see how it is invited (such as through pauses
in talking or breathing) and how it serves to further the conversation.
Hehehs (conversational laughs) are one way in which persons can proffer or
display affiliation with one another during a conversation (Schenkein, 1972).
That the heheh of some second speaker can be heard to support some
intendedly non serious first speaker's utterance reveals on its occurrence a
coincidence of thought, attitude, sense of humor, and the like. Some hehehs are,
therefore, consciously placed into conversation. Conversely, by withholding a
heheh from a slot in which one is appropriate-as in the slot following a first-
speaker joke-a person can disaffiliate, put down, ridicule, tum the tables on,
make uneasy, or cause trouble for a first speaker; similarly, the utterance of a
heheh in some slot that makes it an inappropriate intrusion is one way to suggest
the foolishness of some first speaker-as when one gigles during a story in
which a speaker expects sympathy for an interactional error. In short, hehehs
can accomplish complex interactional ends by communicating messages
(Schenkein, 1972, p. 371).
Implicit in conversational analysis is the assumption that one's behaviors are,
if not consciously chosen, at least precisely regulated in a way that would seem
to exclude random or accidental behavior. Ironically, conversational analysis
that is supposedly an offshoot of ethnomethodology and phenomenological
sociology is one of the most deterministic of sociologies, although the source of
this determinism is typically not specified.
In addition to laughter, jokes have been analyzed by conversational analysts,
most notably Harvey Sacks. Sacks (1975, 1978) analyzed a single "dirty joke"
told by one teenage boy to two others. He demonstrates that this joke follows
conventions of talk and is an "artful" piece of narrative. By this Sacks means
"that not only is it ... elaborately organized, but that some aspects of its
elaborate organization can be found to be occupied with the following kind of
job: concealing some of the ways the joke works on its recipients from those
recipients, while directing them to attend to it in rather sharp ways" (1978, p.
250). Without detailing Sacks's subtle argument about the significance of this
joke about oral sex, the argument is that jokes are highly complex constructions
that may operate (somehow-the motivation is not clear) in ways that the
participants don't quite realize and that carry with them a considerable subtlety
of knowledge about the construction of stories generally (parallel construction)
and the construction of dirty jokes in particular (secondary meanings). In this
joke, the boys are refering to the meanings that marriage, sexuality, and oral-
genital interactions have for them. Even minor details such as pauses, internal
laughter, or attribution can provide the basis for making the narrative
meaningful. At the heart of the ethnomethodological analysis of humor is the
belief that all talk is meaningful, and that only a close reading of the text can
provide the analytic insight necessary to peel away the seeming randomness of
talk.
HUMOR AND GROUP CULTURE
Humor can provide a symbolic resource for various kinds of groups. Anyone
who has participated in a group for any length of time can attest to the fact that
certain remarks come to characterize groups, and often these remarks are in the
form of jokes or witticisms. As Abrahams (1978) notes:
... [A]s soon as a group begins to sense its enduring "groupness" through both
shared goings on and the expectation of what is to come (as in waiting in a queue
170 Gary Alan Fine
overnight or being stranded at an airport for days), the development of new expressive
lore will go from small items to larger ones; special in-group terms Uargon, slang,
cant), nicknames, proverbs, superstitions and situated joking will arise. (p. 23)
I have termed the localized culture of a group its idioculture, specifying it as "a
system of knowledge, beliefs, behaviors, and customs shared by members of an
interacting group to which members can refer and employ as the basis of further
interaction" (Fine, 1979, p. 734). Members find that they share experiences in
common and these experiences can be referred to with the expectation that they
will be understood by other members of the group and can be used to create
meaning in the group. Humor is particularly useful in this way in that it allows
the group to deal collectively with a wide range of content that could not be
expressible otherwise (Fine, 1977).
The power of the group culture can be recognized by anyone who enters a
group that has been in existence for some time. Most groups, particularly those
characterized by informality, develop a set of joking references that may be
unrecognizable to those outside the group (Domhoff, 1974). Thus, the ritual of
"banana time" is meaningless unless one had been a part of the group
(Handelman, 1976, Roy, 1959-1960). Nowhere is this more apparent than in
the study of Boontling (Adams, 1971), a secret language created by a group of
men in the Northern California town of Boonville. This group was apparently
close friends, and it was easy to see how the nucleus of the secret language could
develop. The primary functions of Boontling were that it was an enjoyable
linguistic game to play, that speakers could make humorous remarks about
nonspeakers without their being aware of what was being said, and that
nonusers could be made to make linguistic gaffes, such as the example of how a
middle-aged female was lured to use the Boontling world for bear manure
("beartrack") to refer to a berry cobbler (Adams, 1971, p. 28).
How does a humorous remark come to characterize a group and to be used by
them? I have proposed five mechanisms through which humor enters the
idioculture of a group (Fine, 1977). First, for a remark to become part of an
idioculture its content must be comprehensible to the group. While the remark
need not have been heard in that form, it must, after the fact, make sense. Ajoke
about a subject of which an audience is totally unaware will not provoke a smile,
unless the subject matter is fully explained within the joke. Second, the remark
must be usable in the group context-not taboo or otherwise offensive.
Dropping one's trousers might in some circumstances be wildly amusing, but in
other groups would be shocking or sexually arousing. Third, the humorous
remark must be functional. It must support a goal toward which members are
striving (e.g., relief or social control). The humorous remark must also be
appropriate in light of the friendship and power relations in the group (as
discussed above). Humor typically supports the status hierarchy of the group.
Finally, the humorous remark must be "triggered." Numerous potentially
humorous remarks might meet the four other criteria, but only a few actually
enter the idioculture of a group and are repeated sufficiently often that they
come to characterize the group. A triggering mechanism is defined as an event
that produces humor; because of the huge range of events that could potentially
trigger humor, this suggests that the a priori prediction of the humor culture of a
group is impossible and reminds us of the situationally grounded character of
humor.
REFERENCE GROUP HUMOR
Probably no other area in the sociology of humor has received as much attention
as has the relationship between reference groups and humor. Sociologists
(Hyman, 1942; Merton, 1968; Sherif, 1936) claim that an individual views the
world from a social frame of reference; this framework is often derived, at least
in part, from the groups to which he/she belongs. The first study that examined
the effect of group affiliation on humor was conducted 50 years ago by Wolff,
Smith, and Murray (1934). They attempted to determine whether there were
differences between the responses of Jews and gentiles to jokes that disparaged
Jews. In accord with their expectations, the researchers found that anti-Jewish
jokes were funnier to gentiles than to Jews. For the gentiles, the Jews in the
jokes were "unaffiliated objects" and, thus, liable to being made fun of, while for
Jews the Jewish butts had a positive valence. The investigators then attempted
to substantiate their hypothesis with regard to "unaffiliated objects." They
argued that if the Jews in the humor were replaced by another group, there
should be no differences between Jews and gentiles in the humor ratings. The
anti-Jewish jokes were changed to anti-Scottish jokes, a change that made sense
since the original humor dealt with the shared negative stereotypes of greed and
stinginess. The researchers discovered to their surprise that Jews found these
anti-Scottish jokes less humorous than did non-Scottish gentiles. The authors
had not considered that subjects could identify with groups of which they were
not members. They comment in a post hoc analysis that "one type of affiliation
was based upon resemblance-affiliation by similiarity-to the extent that
subjects who are conscious of possessing a trait enjoy hearing that trait praised
in others and dislike hearing it debased" (Wolff et aI., 1934, p. 361).
Following in this tradition, Middleton (1959) explored the subcultural
variation in humor by comparing the appeal of racial jokes disparaging blacks
and whites to matched groups of subjects of both races. Middleton assumed that
white subjects would react more favorably than blacks to antiblack humor, and
conversely, that black subjects would be more receptive than whites to antiwhite
jokes. In fact, Middleton found that black subjects reacted more favorably to
antiwhite jokes than did white subjects, but, counter to prediction, black subjects
reported enjoying the antiblack humor no less than did whites. Apparently racial
172 Gary Alan Fine
groups are (were) membership groups to which subjects would not necessarily
psychologically relate as reference groups.
LaF ave (1961; see also 1972) attempted a more extensive test of reference
group theory. He presented written religious jokes to each of four groups of
subjects. Each subject group consisted of members from one of four religious
sects: Southern Baptists, Catholics, Jehovah's Witnesses, and agnostics.
Subjects evaluated jokes that contained dialogue between representatives of two
(of the four) presumably antagonistic groups. LaFave's results supported his
vicarious superiority hypothesis. Jokes tended to be judged as relatively funny
by those individuals whose reference group was esteemed and whose out-group
was disparaged, and conversely, not funny by those whose reference group was
disparaged and out-group esteemed. Further, jokes that esteemed a person's
reference group were preferred to those esteeming a nonreference group;
likewise, jokes lampooning a person's reference group were judged unfunny
relative to those belittling one of the out-groups.
Since the early 1960s a large number of studies have attempted, usually
successfully, to expand and replicate Lafave's findings. Studies of political
attitudes have been particularly common (Linsk & Fine, 1981; Priest, 1966;
Priest & Abrahams, 1970; Zillmann, Bryant, & Cantor, 1974). These studies
generally found that one enjoys jokes aimed at one's political foes better than
those aimed at one's friends. Similar findings have emerged from studies on
attitudes toward feminism (La Fave, et aI., 1976; Priest, 1972). Other studies
have examined student sit-ins (La Fave, Haddad, & Marshall, 1975),
Canadian-American relations (La Fave, McCarthy, & Haddad, 1973), and
relations between professors and students (La Fave, Haddad, & Maesen,
1976). While researchers disagree as to whether there is a curvilinear
relationship between the vitriol of attacks against an out-group and humor
appreciation (Priest, 1972; Zillmann & Bryant, 1974) or a linear relationship
(La Fave, et aI., 1976), there is general agreement that reference group theory
(by whatever name: disposition theory, identification class theory, or social
identification theory) helps to explain the evaluation of group-directed humor.
There is evidence that the reference group effect applies not only to the
evaluation of humor, but to the perception of the actual target of humor as well.
Linsk and Fine (1981) found that when presented with potentially ambiguous
cartoons, subjects were more likely to define them as attacking a group that they
denigrated rather than one that they supported. This finding of perceptual
selectivity was more pronounced for political attitudes (liberalism-
conservatism) than for support for women's liberation. In the latter case,
perceptual selectivity only applied to male respondents but not to females, who
showed the expected evaluation effect.
These studies support the notion that meaning is read into humor, rather than
necessarily being present all along. As LaFave, Haddad, and Maesen (1976)
comment: "Nothing is funny to everyone and anything seems potentially funny
to someone" (p. 85).
SOCIAL COHESION, CONFLICT, AND CONTROL
Perhaps the dominant theoretical paradigm in sociology (even if it is now more

often implicit rather than explicit) is functionalism. So, it is only proper than we
should conclude our discussion of sociological approaches to humor by
examining the social functions of humor. Although dozens, if not hundreds. of
specific functions of humor might be proposed, three seem of particular and
general significance: humor promotes group cohesion, it provokes intergroup ( or
intragroup) conflict; and it provides social control. One might note that
provoking conflict is contrary to traditional functional theory, but more recent
analyses (Coser, 1956) have indicated that conflict can have functional
consequences for a social system, and so we shall include it here.
Cohesion
One of the first goals of any group is to remain unified in the face of a variety of
actual or potential forces that might disrupt or threaten it. Groups under stress
may develop a sense of humor as a response to this threat. Perhaps the most
obvious example of this phenomenon is "gallows humor." Gallows humor is
that humor that grows out of a tragic situation in which an oppressed group
attempts to transform their misery by poking fun at their oppressors. Actually
the term "poking fun" may be misleading in that the humor is bitter and
corrosive but has the effect of making all the group members realize that they
are in the same situation, thus indirectly building their confidence. The classic
study of gallows humor by Obrdlik (1942) describes the humor of the Czech
freedom fighters battling long odds against the Nazi invaders and their Czech
collaborators. Similar analyses have suggested that humor performed a
cohesive role among concentration camp inmates (Kogon, 1958) and in the civil
rights movement (Arnez and Anthony, 1968).
Often if the members of one group laugh at the actions of another group, it
serves to integrate the first group, through what Dupreel (1928) calls "the
laughter of inclusion." This laughter need not only apply to oppressed groups
but can be a cohesive device for any social group. Miller (1967) in his
examination of a Chippewa Indian tribal council found that one of their
categories of humor is humor that promotes group solidarity. He notes that this
humor is directed internally through testing, mutual ribbing, good fellowship,
and even humorous self-deprecation. In a spirit of harmony, the group realizes
that the fact that they are able to laugh at each other's foibles indicates that they
have a trusting, communal relationship. Likewise, the fact that there is shared
laughter is a social marker that indicates that group members share a common
perspective (Dresser, 1967) and, hence, reduces the ambiguity about the moral
boundries of the group (Davies, 1982). We can think of laughter as communi-
cation of approval from the laugher to the teller of the joking remark, and in
174 Gary Alan Fine
cases in which there is loud, long, and unanimous laughter, the message is that
there is consensus on the message of the joke.
Conflict and Control
Rather than discuss these two social functions of humor separately, it makes
sense to view them together in that they are often found in the same remark, and
whether they serve functions of control or conflict can depend on the way in
which the humor is used. These functions are analogous to the reference-group
effect described above. Both deal with an individual's orientation to a group,
and for both the affective relationship to a group makes the joke or the humorous
response appropriate or inappropriate. Whereas the reference group analysis
focuses on the internal attitudes and perspectives of the individual, the conflict!
control perspective focuses on the public behaviors of group members.
Many sociologists (Martineau, 1967, 1972; Stephenson, 1951) have argued
that humor serves two major social functions: social conflict and social control.
Conflict humor includes such forms as: irony, satire, sarcasm, burlesque,
caricature, and parody. It is indirect aggression and serves to separate a group
from an undesireable, deviant out-group and may even provoke hostility by that
group, as in the case of satiric remarks designed to anger the opposing group
(see Elliot, 1960).
The control function of humor, and incidently laughter (Lumley, 1925), is
aggressive as well. It differs, however, in that it does not divide or separate
groups but attempts to make group members accept group norms and disavow
deviance, often through ridicule (Powell, 1977). As Highet ( 1962) comments:
"The purpose of satire is, through laughter and invective, to cure folly and
punish evil" (p. 156). The "kidding" that occurs among friends may well be an
example of this kind of humor. Although overtly nonpunitive, it reveals the
expectations that friends have for each other (Fine, 1983).
Martineau (1972) differentiates between in-group and out-group directed
humor. Depending on the type of humor (esteeming or disparaging), humor may
control in-group behavior, foster demoralization and social disintegration ofthe
group, or induce a hostile attitude toward an out-group. The outcome of the
humor depends on the position of the teller, his attitude to the target group, and
the social situation.
The group functions of humor have been particularly studied for the civil
rights movement. Arnaz and Anthony (1968) see "Negro humor" as social
satire and argue that the items a group laughs at reflects their culture. This
humor may serve three purposes: ( 1) a satire of the customs of the group, akin to
a control function; (2) public humor, poking fun at the group, that serves control
functions and also relieves the aggression that others feel toward them-in this
case reducing conflict; and (3) social satire that the in-group directs at their
foe-that produces social solidarity and may also increase conflict. The
analyses of black humor over the past 50 years suggests that one of the
functions of black humor is to express dissatisfaction with those who are

dominant (the white community) and simultaneously, perhaps paradoxically, to
control their own otherwise overtly aggressive impulses (Burma, 1946; Dollard,
1939; Hannerz, 1969; Myrdal, 1944; Prange & Vitols, 1963). Abrahams
(1970) suggests that humor told by young black males need not only be
directed against whites (or even not primarily directed against whites) but
against the matriarchical structure of black society; their humor (and related
forms such as the dozens and black toasts) is directed at black women.
The potential conflict function of humor may be very serious. While humor
by its nature is supposed to be "unserious," and by definition it is so, there are
some cases in which the conflictual elements of humor are so evident that they
are taken seriously. One is reminded that former Secretary of Agriculture Earl
Butz was forced to resign because the "jokework" in an overtly racist joke was
so transparent that the public felt that his true attitudes were revealed, and his
claim that it was just a joke and didn't represent his "true" feelings was
unacceptable. Likewise, in certain totalitarian countries (such as the Soviet
Union) one can receive a prison sentence in a forced labor camp for telling a
joke that is deemed to be subversive (Bauer & Gleicher, 1953). The Soviets
rightly recognize that humor can be subversive in character and in intent.
However, this retaliation to humor may leave the retaliator open to charges that
he/she is paranoid, unable to be kidded, insecure, or brutal. This rarely becomes
an issue because as Campbell (1964) noted: " ... the subtlety of gossip and
ridicule as sanctions is that, since they do not generally operate in his presence,
they offer a man no excuse for violent response" (p. 315). Humor deals with
ambiguous topics and may do so in ambiguous ways. As psychoanalysts have
long recognized, humor expresses underlying issues that cannot be expressed
directly. In doing this it provides a sense of social control for the participants on
how to deal with these threatening or embarrassing topics. Ransohoff (1975)
contends that the humor of a group of disturbed girls allowed them to deal with
"common aggression and common regression" in the form of the sexual issues
that they have to work through. Such humor can signify that certain behaviors
are acceptable and that others are taboo without ever directly saying so and thus
without risking direct rebuke.
The ambiguity in the function of humor is also related to the way in which it is
interpreted. When humor is viewed positively it may control or solidify; when it
is defined as an affront it can cause conflict or demoralization. Zenner (1970) in
analyzing the humor of the Druzes, an Arab tribe residing in Israel, argued that
their humor is ambiguous; it arouses aggression and then serves to displace it,
revealing the Druzes' social reality. He hypothesized that: ( 1) interethnic joking
involves the deprecation of the out-group and enhances the self-images of the in-
group (see also Dundes, 1975); (2) anti-in-group humor reveals self-hatred, and
(3) conversely, interethnic joking sidesteps the issue of superiority and is used to
bind the in-group and out-group. His evidence did not support the second
hypothesis since jokes that seem to denigrate the in-group serve positive
functions-such as serving social control in enforcing normative regulation.
176 Gary Alan Fine
Depending on the circumstance, interethnic joking may bind the two groups
together or may serve to separate them and provoke conflict.
CONCLUSIONS
Humor involves communication among at least two people-either directly or

indirectly. We rarely laugh alone and never tell ourselves jokes outloud or play
jokes on ourselves. One might even wonder if a joke told in a deserted forest
would be funny. In other words, does the humor in a joke derive from the joke
content or from the interpretation of it. Most sociologists of humor agree with
LaFave et al. (1976) that jokes only become jokes because of the social
responses to them.
In this chapter my goal was to present some of the ways in which humor can
be said to be socially regulated. This social regulation is shown through the roles
that people play, their joking relations with others, the rules for public joking,
the way that jokes must be socially constructed as talk, the role of groups as
humor repositories, and the social functions that humor has in group life.
Certainly humor is not entirely determined by social forces. Psychological,
aethetic, linguistic, physiological, and historical features all influence how we
respond to humor. But without a social referent, humor would make no sense.
Although humor has not succeeded in breaking into the mainstream sociological
journals and becoming the focus of central sociological analysis, hopefully this
chapter has served to indicate ways in which this might come about. Through
humorous talk we make taken-for-granted realities explicit, and since it is based
in interaction, the explication is collective. This development of meaning in
humor is critical to the task of sociology and of sociologists, and for this reason
alone, the sociology of humor is worthy of extensive and continued study.
REFERENCE NOTES
1. Tomlinson, G. The contextualization of humor. Unpublished manuscript, 1977.
2. Jefferson, G., Sacks, H., & Schegloff, E. Preliminary notes on the sequential
organization of laughter. Unpublished manuscript, 1973.
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Chapter 9
Humor Research, Methodology, and

Theory in Anthropology
MAHADEV L. APTE
The objectives of this paper are the following: (1) to outline the state of the art of
humor research in terms of its nature and scope in anthropology; (2) to examine
methodological issues in the general area of anthropological research and their
impact on humor research; and (3) to discuss anthropological contributions to
theoretical developments in humor research.
Anthropology is a broad discipline and includes archaeology, linguistic
anthropology, physical anthropology, and sociocultural anthropology. How-
ever, this paper will be restricted to humor research in sociocultural anthro-
pology. Archaeology has no direct relevance to the study of humor, and the
focus of humor research in physical anthropology has been on investigating the
phylogenetic aspects of laughter and smiling as expressions of emotions among
higher primates (Andrew, 1963, 1965; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970; Van Hooff,
1972).
NATURE AND SCOPE OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL INQUIRY
In order to fully understand and appreciate the nature of humor research in

sociocultural anthropology it is necessary to briefly state the major objectives of
the discipline. Primarily, four goals are to be achieved: (1) to describe and
analyze individual sociocultural systems with a holistic perspective; (2) to
develop broad generalizations about such specific aspects of human socio-
cultural systems as behavior, social institutions, beliefs, and values, by small-
and large-scale systematic comparisons; (3) to examine and explain the nature
184 Mahadev L. Apte
and range of variation among sociocultural systems over time and space; and
( 4) to develop general theories about numerous aspects of human sociocultural
existence. These objectives are not separate but interdependent and mutually
reinforcing. However, each objective involves different methodologies and
perspectives.
The first objective involves detailed ethnographic data gathering pertaining to
individual cultural systems and subsequent analysis and description. Anthro-
pological literature is full of ethnographic accounts obtained by participant
observation of individual societies and cultures from all corners of the world.
The holistic approach, so fundamental to sociocultural anthropology in the
study of individual sociocultural systems, is based on the rationale that
particular aspects of such systems cannot be understood in isolation but only as
parts of the whole. It is the integration of many aspects that makes the system
operative and functional.
The second and third objectives entail comparisons of different cultural
systems for the purpose of developing generalizations and formulating hypo-
theses. Such comparisons may be limited in nature, involving just a few
cultures, or they may be extensive, involving many cultures from different parts
of the world. While anthropologists discuss universals, they recognize that
"true" universals do not exist simply because all human societies in the world
have not been described. Nonetheless, the goal is to strive for broad-based
generalizations about cross-cultural uniformities by developing hypotheses from
the comparison of even a few cultures, then testing them by examining
additional cultures. Comparisons also lead to an awareness of differences
among cultures (Kobben, 1970).
The last objective, which is the culmination of the others, is to develop
general theories to explain the diverse and multifaceted nature of human
existence and the underlying common biological and psychological foundations.
Such theory building involves: (1) formulation of conceptual categories useful
for analyzing and explaining individual cultures; (2) development of broad
typologies that help determine the range and scope of-cross-cultural variation;
(3) development of hypotheses and generalizations that enumerate not only
properties common to human sociocultural systems but also interconnections
between their structural elements; and ( 4) hypotheses that explain why specific
aspects are characteristic of some cultures but not of others.
HUMOR RESEARCH IN ANTHROPOLOGY:

STATE OF THE ART
I will examine the nature and scope of anthropological research on humor

within the disciplinary framework just outlined. Humor has been studied by
anthropologists in a topical fashion. The major topics investigated so far are:
Humor Research, Methodology, and Theory in Anthropology 185
institutionalized joking within the context of kinship and other types of social
relationships; humor in religion; description and analysis of tricksters, the
mythological and folkloristic figures considered ludicruous: linguistic humor,
especially verbal banter, insults, riddles, and so forth; and in recent years, the
nature and sociocultural significance of play and games. In addition, brief and
sporadic descriptive accounts of humorous episodes, types of humor, attitudes
toward humor, appropriate or inappropriate humor in various social inter-
actions, techniques used in humor, and so forth, are scattered in ethnographies
of many cultures. The focus of such accounts is not the analysis of humor per se,
but its relevance to other aspects of culture.
Overview of Existing Research
Among the five topics mentioned above, the first three have received
considerable attention by anthropologists. The existing anthroplogicalliterature
pertaining to each topic is summarized below with special emphasis on some
broad trends.
Joking Relationships. The social phenomena commonly identified by the

phrase "joking relationships" involve playful behavior between two individuals
who recognize special kinship or other types of social bonds between them.
Such behavior displays reciprocal or nonreciprocal, verbal or action-based
humor, including joking, teasing, banter, ridicule, insult, horseplay, and other
similar manifestations, usually, but not always, in the presence of an audience.
Joking relationships have been extensively investigated by anthropologists. The
earliest mention of the phenomenon goes back to the last decade of the
nineteenth century (Moreau, 1943). In the early twentieth century attention
began to be focused on the nature of joking relationships and their significance
in the social fabric of many societies; thus ethnographic data on joking behavior
started to accumulate from many cultures around the world. As for the phrase
"joking relationship," it is difficult to pinpoint when it was first used. However,
it was well established in anthropological literature by the 1920s. The sub-
Saharan cultures of Africa are particularly characterized by the prevalence of
diverse types of such relationships and ethnographic research in this area by
British social anthropologists provided a major impetus to the study of this
topic.
In the mid-fifties anthropologists became aware that behavior comparable to
kin-based joking relationships also occurred in large-scale, complex, industrial-
ized societies between individuals who were not related by kinship or other
similar social-structural ties. This awareness led to anthropological studies of
nonkin joking relationships in numerous social settings. These studies have
continued until the present time (Bradney, 1957; Coser, 1960; Handelman &
Kapferer, 1972; Howell, 1973; Loudon, 1970; Lundberg, 1969; Malefijt, 1968;
Pilcher, 1972; Sykes, 1966).
186 Mahadev L. Apte
Since anthropologists have studied many types of joking relationships in all

kinds of societies, their research findings are quite diverse in nature. Anthro-
pologists have proposed many definitions, both narrow and broad in scope, of
the phenomenon of joking relationship (Brant, 1948; Bradney, 1957; Kennedy,
1970; Lundberg, 1969; Radcliffe-Brown, 1940), and many new phrases and
terms have been coined to describe its numerous attributes. Among the many
definitions provided by anthropologists, Radcliffe-Brown's (1940, p. 195)
definition of joking relationship as "a relation between two persons in which one
is by custom permitted, and in some instances required, to tease or make fun of
the other, who in turn is required to take no offense" seems to have been the
most widely accepted by scholars.
Most studies of joking relationships are descriptive and are confined to single
societies. Only a few are comparative in their approach or analytical in their
orientation (Howell, 1973; Murdock, 1949). Radcliffe-Brown (1940, 1949)
was the first to propose a comparative theory of joking relationship in structural
and functional terms and his influence is evident in many later studies of both
kin-based and nonkin joking relationships (see bibliography in Howell, 1973,
and Apte, Note 1, chapter two, for references to this literature). While it is not
possible to present all research findings of these studies here, some general
observations can be made.
Despite the major dichotomy of kin-based and nonkin joking relationships,
both categories share some common attributes. First of all, a relationship has to
be established or has to exist between individuals who wish to engage in joking
behavior. Such a relationship may exist either because of the ascribed kinship-
based status of individuals or because of the sharing of a common environment
such as when working together. In other words, strangers do not make fun of or
tease each other. Second, joking behavior itself is characterized by teasing,
sexual innuendos, mock insults, obscene remarks concerning an individual's
sexual organs and prowess, playfulness, banter, and so forth. Underlying such
behavior are symbolic associations between animals and humans and between
specific objects and sexual organs of men and women. Cultural notions of
incongruent, outrageous, or deviant manifestations of personalities, behavior,
and so forth, are also important in such joking activities. Beyond these rather
broad shared aspects, however, kin-based and nonkin joking relationships are
marked by significant differences.
Kin-based joking relationships in pre literate or traditional societies seem
complex in nature. Generally, joking relationships seem to occur only among
secondary relatives and not among members of nuclear families. Among
secondary relatives, joking relationships occur both within and across genera-
tions. An important aspect of these relations is that they are category oriented
and obligatory in nature so that if any individual related to another in a specific
way wishes to initiate joking irrespective of the willingness or lack of it on the
part of his/her joking partner, he/she can do so. Some joking relationships are
asymmetrical. One such type of asymmetrical joking relationship discussed in
the literature (Goody, 1959; Hammond, 1969; Radcliffe-Brown, 1940, 1949)
is that between nephew and maternal uncle. Generally, the nephew takes all
kinds of liberties with his uncle who bears them without retaliation for a variety
of reasons. Kin-based joking relationships also occur among potential sexual or
marriage partners in many societies. For instance, cross cousins who are
preferential marriage partners in many African cultures joke freely with each
other and engage in sexual exchanges and horseplay. Joking relationships
between men of certain kinship categories are common as are those between
men and women. However, existing literature indicates that women rarely
establish kin-based joking relationships with other women.
In preliterate and traditional societies in Africa there also occur joking
relationships between clans, tribes, and villages. These actually exist between
individuals belonging to different clans, tribes, or villages that collectively have
relations of either hostility or dependence and reciprocity. In the case of clans it
may depend on whether their totem objectives either complement or oppose
each other. For instance, among the Amba people of Northern Rhodesia,
persons from the Crocodile clan have joking relationships with members of the
Fish clan and those of the Snake clan with those of the Grass clan
(Stephaniszyn, 1950). Colson (1953) and Stephaniszyn (1950) give lists of
such paired clans having joking relationships. A related and important aspect of
such interclan joking relationships is mutual assistance in making funeral
arrangements in the event of the death of either partner. Therefore such
relationships are also called "funeral friendships." Funeral friends joke about
such arrangements as they do about each other's clan objects. They also take
extreme liberties in mutual insults by way of referring to each other's sexual
organs. According to Stephaniszyn (1950), not all individuals take advantage of
existing opportunities to form interclan joking relationships, especially those
based on funeral friendships.
While anthropologists have used the term "joking" to describe diverse
behavioral interactions among individuals, many ethnographic descriptions of
such behavior raise doubts about whether the interaction is indeed joking.
Often, what is described appears to be cruel and harrassing. Even when joking
takes place it is ritualized and conventional rather than spontaneous and
innovative. As Sharman (1969) has noted, it is even debatable in some
instances whether anthropologists studying joking behavior were really inter-
ested in humor. Rather, they were interested in the significance of joking
relationships to social structure, and the study of humor per se had no place, at
least originally, in such anthropological research.
Existing studies of nonkin joking relationships in industrial societies suggest
that these occur in the context of workplace such as offices of white-collar
workers (Howell, 1973), hospitals (Coser, 1960), factories (Handelman &
Kapferer, 1972; Lundberg, 1969; Sykes 1966), department stores (Bradney,
1957), and shipyards (Pilcher, 1972) or in the context of informal social
gatherings (Loudon, 1970; Malefijt, 1968). The major attribute of nonkin joking
relationships is that they are voluntary in nature and are oriented toward
specific individuals with both partners willing to establish them. Friendship is
188 Mahadev L. Apte
often their basis. While nonkin joking involves sexual teasing, innuendos, and
some horseplay, one specific study emphasizing the sexual nature of such
relationships in a factory (Sykes, 1966) suggests that those who engage in
obscene joking and horseplay in public are not likely to have sexual
relationships in private.
In general, joking occurring in nonkin relationships appears to be creative
rather than ritualized. It also seems to be conducive to group solidarity and
identity. While women in appropriate kinship categories in pre literate societies
do not seem to develop joking relationships, those in industrial societies do
establish joking relationships with other women.
In order to indicate the nature of anthropological studies of joking relation-
ships, two studies are summarized below, one of kin-based and another of the
nonkin type. Hammond (1964) has described joking relationships among the
Mossi in the Voltaic Republic of West Africa. There occur the following types
of joking relationships among the Mossi: (1) between a man and his mother's
elder brothers and their wives; (2) between a man and his wife's sisters, and
between a woman and her husband's brothers; (3) between clans; (4) between
males who belong to the same age sets; (5) between certain villages; and (6)
between Mossi and other ethnic groups. Hammond lists separation, reciprocity,
ambivalence, equality, and independence as the five structural features that
characterize the relationships between joking partners.
While Hammond discusses all of the types listed above, he gives a more
detailed description of what he calls sibling-in-Iaw joking. Married men and
women joke with their spouses' siblings when they visit. Such joking generally
involves humorous deriding of the sibling-in-Iaw's appearance, lack of energy,
skill at work, intelligence, or ability to perform household chores such as
cooking satisfactorily. Those being derided cannot take offence but can joke
back in similar fashion. Hammond's major observation is that while such joking
may appear to be for pleasure, it serves the function of a person indirectly
communicating dissatisfaction with his/her spouse's work, appearance, be-
havior, and so forth. In other words, while joking is carried out with a sibling-in-
law, it may actually be aimed at one's spouse. Direct criticism of one's spouse is
generally avoided because the potential for marital conflict is high due to clan
exogamy, the considerable age difference between husbands and wives, stress
due to polygyny, subordinate status of women, and possible dissatisfaction of a
wife's parents at the inadequacy of bride-wealth payments (Hammond, 1964,
p. 264). Hammond concludes on the basis of his analysis that the function of
joking relationships among the Mossi is social control, reduction of frustration
without face-ta-face conflict, and maintenance of communication.
Pilcher (1972) conducted an ethnographic study of the community of
longshoremen and their families working and living in and around Portland,
Oregon. He found that joking behavior among longshoremen was closely linked
to the work place and was characterized by blasphemy, cursing, obscenity,
insults, and nicknames. Pilcher emphasized that obscenities used by long-
shoremen to address each other did not express hostility, but rather suggested
"friendship, affection, and warm personal feelings" (p. 103). Thus the "mutual
vituperation" of the workers expressed "exactly the opposite of its overt
meaning" (p. 103).
As soon as men arrived at the docks before the start of work and gathered in
the lunchroom, they began to insult each other, and there developed a
competition of who could come up with the most vile insult. Combined with
verbal assaults there were bodily assaults that were carried out so realistically
as to fool outsiders. However, the longshoremen themselves perceived such
actions as merely games from which to derive a good deal of enjoyment. An
important aspect of this joking behavior was that it was not carried out in front
of family members, women, or any schoolchildren visiting the docks.
It was theorized by Pilcher that joking relationships and related behavior
among longshoremen were the result of work-related tension due to the danger
of working on ships, which created irrational anger and aggression. Joking
behavior was the accepted way of releasing this tension and controlling
aggression. Pilcher felt that this function of joking fitted quite well in the
framework suggested by Radcliffe-Brown (1940, 1949), namely, that joking
behavior controls real aggressive and antagonistic feelings so that a "stable
system of social behavior may be maintained through group solidarity"
(p. 112).
Humor in Religion. Anthropological studies of humor in religion (also called

"ritual humor") are extensive and diverse. Indian tribes in North America and
societies in sub-Saharan Africa have provided the principal impetus and
ethnographic data for research on this topic. In contrast, relatively few
ethnographic studies of ritual humor in cultures from other parts of the world
have been undertaken.
The beginnings of ritual humor studies can be found in the early days of
anthropology because of considerable interest in what was perceived by
Western anthropologists to be an incongruous phenomenon, namely, humorous
behavior in the sacred realm of rituals and ceremonies among American
Indians. In this connection, it was noticed that a few select individuals, either
specially trained or marked by some special status, were responsible for
humorous activities, and they were variously labeled as "ritual clowns,"
"sacred clowns," or "ceremonial buffoons." A good summary of the major
themes of humor in the ceremonials of American Indians as described in early
ethnographic accounts is to be found in Steward (1930). These accounts have
since been supplanted by later ethnographic and analytical studies (Bricker,
1973; Codere, 1956; Crumrine, 1969; Hieb, 1972; Howard, 1962; Makarius,
1970; Norbeck & Ferrar, 1979; Parsons & Beals, 1934; Titiev, 1975).
Humor in the context of religious ceremonies in specific cultures of Africa
has also been described (Evans-Pritchard, 1929; Gluckman, 1963; Nadel,
1942/1946, 1954). Norbeck (1963) presents the most extensive listing of
examples in his survey of African rituals. Humor in the context of rituals in
190 Mahadev L. Apte
South Asia has also been described by anthropologists (Amarasingham, 1974;

Marriott, 1968; Miller, 1973).
Along with ethnographic studies, which describe ritual humor in specific
cultures, there also exist comparative studies, many of which are limited to
comparing this phenomenon in cultures of North American Indians (Bricker,
1973; Honigmann, 1942; Levine, 1961; Makarius, 1970; Parsons & Beals,
1934; Radin, 1914; Ray, 1945; Steward, 1930). A few studies (Charles, 1945,
Norbeck, 1961, 1974; Van den Berghe, 1963) discuss ritual humor within a
broader comparative perspective.
Ritual humor is characterized by purposeful verbal and nonverbal behavior
by individuals and groups in which persons of high status and authority,
foreigners, and rituals and ceremonies are parodied, sexual activities are
simulated in an exaggerated manner, and simulated defecation and urination are
carried out with scatological overtones. In addition, behavior contrary to that
considered appropriate in social interaction or not keeping with social status
and roles of individuals is also a part of ritual humor. The ethnographic
literature is full of many such accounts that cannot be adequately summarized
here. However, a few general observations can be made concerning the types of
ceremonies in which ritual humor occurs, the characteristics of such humor, and
the roles and functions of humorists.
Humor occurs during two major types of rituals: (1) calendrical ceremonies
that mark change of seasons, planting and harvesting activities, and birth and
death anniversaries of prophets and important saints; and (2) rituals marking the
important transitions in the lives of individuals, that is, birth, initiation, puberty,
marriage, death, and so forth. Generally, ritual clowns are responsible for
humorous activities during calendrical festivals, and in rituals celebrating
transitions, relatives and friends of the person( s) undergoing the rites joke and
engage in humorous activities.
A significant aspect of humor in religion is contrary or inverse behavior that is
manifested in numerous ways. Norbeck (1963) has listed many examples of
men and women in different African cultures dressing up in each other's
clothing and imitating behavior characteristic of the opposite sex. Among
American Indians, contrary behavior also involves saying the opposite of what
is meant, walking backward, reversing the sitting posture by lying on the ground
with feet up in the air, sitting on animals backwards while riding, groaning under
a light load while pretending not to be bothered by a heavy one, shooting arrows
backward in mock battles, and so on. Such contrary behavior also allows
individuals of low status to ridicule and make fun of those of high social
status.
Sexual and scatological acts are much emphasized in ritual humor. Obscene
singing and verbal repartee regarding the nature of each other's sexual organs
and prowess are carried out by ritual clowns. Nonverbal obscene and
scatological behavior is also quite widespread and often consists of exaggerated
imitation of sexual intercourse and masturbation performed with long wooden
phalli. Additionally, obscene horseplay, touching and grabbing sexual organs,
chasing women and young girls, and pretending phallic advances toward them
are common practices of ritual clowns among American Indian tribes as well as
in African and Asian cultures. Simulated or real consumption of feces and urine
or water mixed with mud is also part of such humor, as is exaggerated
performance of defecation and urination.
Humor in religion also involves burlesque of foreigners and of those in
authority. The latter seems a way of social control since such burlesque often
criticizes those who did not carry out their official duties properly or were
arrogant and high handed. Burlesque of foreigners satisfies collective ethno-
centrism.
In American Indian cultures the privilege of ritual clowning is generally
restricted to members of clown societies, secret fraternities, and sodalities.
Those who act as clowns often have a high status. They are also associated with
supernatural spirits and are believed to have special magical and healing powers
(Makarius, 1970). During religious ceremonies among the American Indian
cultures, clowns serve other functions such as keeping order, gathering materials
needed for ritual activities, and so forth. Young men who wish to act as clowns
have to serve as apprentices for some years before they are recognized as full-
fledged ritual clowns.
Ritual humor occurring among American Indians in Mexico and the
southwestern United States has been described by many anthropologists
(Bourke, 1891; Bricker 1973; Crumrine, 1969; Parsons & Beals, 1934; Titiev,
1975). The following is a summary of ritual clowning from Crumrine (1969)
who has described and analyzed its occurrence during the Easter ceremonial
among the Mayo Indians in Mexico. Crumrine has also presented a general
theory explaining the occurrence of ritual clowning among American Indians on
the basis of his description and analysis. Only the descriptive part of his paper
is summarized below.
Ritual clowns among the Mayo Indians belong to a sodality, dress in an
unusual fashion, and wear helmet-type masks made of goat or sheep hide. Most
masks are worn with the long black, white, or brown hair of the hide on the
outside and have "long, narrow pointed ears, a long pointed nose, and a face
area cleared of hair with painted eyes and mouth" (Crumrine, 1969, p. 3). The
clowns cover themselves with a large white cloth sewed to a blanket, wear khaki
color pants, leather belts with deer or goat hoof rattles around their waists, and
strings of cocoon rattles around their lower legs to support their pants. They
carry wooden knives and swords, which they clack together to attract attention;
others carry drums, violins, toy guns, balls, or small wooden phalli. Overall, a
ritual clown's dress creates "a striking, troubling, and intriguing creature." They
also have" a characteristic shaking motion, slightly like a dog shaking off water,
which sets in motion all their rattles" (p. 3).
These ritual clowns engage in burlesquing many activities. They parody
marriage ceremonies in which one clown impersonates a female, takes the arm
of another, and the two march with great pomp from the end of the church to the
center of the altar while being teased and pestered by a third clown. As soon as
192 Mahadev L. Apte
the "marriage" at the altar is over, they engage in horseplay, pressing their
masks together several times creating the "realistic illusion" of kissing and then
pantomime sexual intercourse as the female clown lies on the floor. The clowns
imitate animal sexual behavior during which one climbs on the back of another
with much bouncing and shaking of the cocoon rattles. They hold the wooden
phalli they carry between their legs and suggestively play with them.
Illness and curing activities are also burlesqued. One clown pretends to eat a
tomato and "immediately falls to the floor, writhing with pain. He grasps his
stomach, his chest or his legs" (p. 2). By rattling he attacts the attention of other
clowns who gather around him, massage his body, and poke him in the
stomach.
The clowns tease the participants in the ceremonial. They engage in contrary
behavior such as crossing themselves with the left instead of the right hand.
They are also preoccupied with oral and anal behavior. They pretend to feed
themselves feces, use a rubber doll's foot at the end of their wooden swords to
poke around the other clowns' anuses. Such "goosing" is frequent. A clown
carrying a glass baby bottle with a rubber nipple sucks it, sticks it up to the anus
of another and sucks it again. The clowns even pretend to "defecate" upon the
sacred objects.
Different historical explanations have been proposed by anthropologists for
the existence of the institution of ritual clowning among American Indians.
Beals has suggested that ritual impersonation and humor existed among the
Indians of Mexico and southwestern United States before their contact with the
Spanish missionaries and their subsequent conversion to Christianity. Parsons,
on the other hand, suggests that ritual clowning was introduced by the Spanish
conquests (Parsons & Beals, 1934). Interestingly, contrary behavior, a major
aspect of ritual humor, occurs in many African cultures (Norbeck, 1963;
Turner, 1964) and also during religious ceremonies among the Hindus in South
Asia (Marriott, 1968; Miller, 1973).
Trickster Studies. Anthropologists and folklorists have studied tricksters in

the oral literature of many cultures, especially those in North America and
Africa. The early trickster studies concentrated on gathering the "trickster
tales" in individual American Indian tribes. Such collections were part of the
large-scale and systematic efforts undertaken by anthropologists in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (see Ricketts, 1964, for an extensive
bibliography of the early collections of all types of folklore texts among
American Indians).
Despite this extensive data collection, there were only a few analytical and
interpretative studies of trickster tales from specific cultures (Hill & Hill, 1945;
Opler, 1940; Stem, 1953). In contrast, studies discussing the general nature of
some specific aspect of the trickster figure based on comparison of data from
various American Indian tribes and those presenting theories to explain the
origins and relevance of the trickster to religious ideology and social reality have
been many, originating with Boas (1898) and continuing until the present
(Abrahams, 1968; Boas, 1914; Carroll, 1981; Levi-Strauss, 1955; Lowie,
1909; Radin, 1914, 1952, 1956/1969; Ricketts, 1964, 1966; Schemerler,
1931; Thompson, 1946, 1966; Vogelin, 1949).
Studies of tricksters from areas of the world other than North America are
relatively few. Luomala (1949) has presented a detailed analysis of the trickster
from Oceania called Maui. Evans-Pritchard (1967) has edited an anthology of
Zande trickster tales from East Africa. Herskovits and Herskovits (1958) have
analyzed the tales of two tricksters from Dahomean oral literature. Finnegan
(1970) has evaluated the trickster characters from the narratives of many
African cultures. Only a couple of comparative studies of the trickster theme
from different parts of the world have been undertaken. Street (1972) has
compared the Zande and Winnebago tricksters and Apte (Note 1) has
presented a detailed analysis of the trickster concept, taking into consideration
tricksters from many parts of the world.
Tricksters are male personages of unusual origin and are considered to be
immortal. They are anthropomorphic or theriomorphic in shape, have unusual
anatomical and physiological traits, behave in incongruent ways, and display
strange personalities. Among American Indians, tricksters have been identified
with the bluejay, coyote, hare, mink, and raven. In African cultures, such
animals as the antelope, jackal, spider, squirrel, tortoise, and weasel are
portrayed as tricksters (Finnegan, 1970). Individual trickster figures are
assumed to possess the physical characteristics of the specific animals
associated with them. However, most tricksters are capable of transforming
themselves into any object, animal, or human. They also possess anatomical
and physiological incongruities such as a grotesque form, intestines outside the
body, a long penis wrapped around the body, eyes that are uneven and both
inside and outside the sockets, and so forth. Tricksters also lack a sense of unity
and coordination of their body parts. They generally have an insatiable appetite
for food and sex and have little or no control over the body processes of waste
elimination.
Most trickster tales consist of the advantures tricksters engage in to satisfy
their basal desires. They steal, cheat, injure, or even kill animals and humans
and seduce women to achieve their goals. They do not hesitate to behave in
ways that are taboo, deviant, outrageous, and generally antisocial. However,
tricksters do not always succeed in achieving their goals. They are frequently
outsmarted by others or they suffer the consequences of their own stupidity.
While individual tricksters in different cultures seem to be characterized by
specific personality traits, it is possible to extrapolate some common ones. Most
tricksters are pranksters and egotistical. They are clever, selfish, cruel,
deceitful, cunning, and sly. However, they are also boastful, foolish, lazy,
inordinate, and ineffective. They are infantile, lack restraints and social
responsibilities, are prone to blunders, and lack the ability to distinguish
between good and evil. They get distracted easily from what they set out to do
and often lose sight of their objectives.
194 Mahadev L. Apte
Tricksters constitute humor stimuli because they appear to be configurations

of biological, psychological, behavioral, and sociocultural incongruities that
develop due to the juxtapositions of elements that are considered unexpected,
inappropriate, and illogical in the sociocultural realities of most human
beings.
Lack of General Studies of Humor in Anthropology
Generally absent in anthropological literature are systematic and through

analyses of the multifaceted nature of humor in terms of its development,
various techniques used in its development, its different genres, its appreciation
as expressed in overt behavior, its relevance to and functions within the context
of individual cultures, general theories designed to explain its nature and scope,
and systematic comparative studies either limited or broad in scope of its
substantive and formal aspects in different cultures.
There are attitudinal, historical, methodological, and other reasons for this
state of affairs. It appears that humor has not been considered by anthro-
pologists to be on par with such other topics of investigation as the institution of
marriage, kinship, socialization patterns, technology, food habits, economic
transactions, language, religion, political institutions, folklore, ideology, and
values, all of which are described and analyzed in studies of individual cultures
and are presented in most standard ethnographies.
The lack of significance attached to humor in anthropological studies is
reflected in introductory textbooks of sociocultural anthropology, which do not
even mention humor as an aspect of individual cultures worthy of investigation.
The term "humor" does not appear in the indexes of some popular sociocultural
anthropology texts (Hoebel 1966; Kottak 1979; Selby & Garretson 1981;
Spradley & McCurdy 1975; Swartz & Jordan 1976). The lack of interest in
humor in general is also reflected in its absence in historical and evolutionary
studies of human cultural development.
While there is no clear evidence to suggest reasons for the development of
such an attitude, it is possible to speculate. For example, while humor and its
appreciation appear to be panhuman traits, they have perhaps not been a key
factor in the development of sociocultural systems and in the survival and
perpetuation of the human race. Also, humor does not seem to have the
organizational potentiality of the other domains investigated by anthro-
pologists.
Historically, anthropologists have been concerned with investigating cultures
as integrated systems about which generalizations can be developed. Most of
the topics mentioned above appear to have patterned attributes, in terms of
which a people never studied before can be described. This fact, added to the
holistic perspective in anthropology, has tended to emphasize the more obvious
institutionalized aspects of the phenomenon of humor.
METHODOLOGY OF HUMOR RESEARCH

IN ANTHROPOLOGY
Different methodologies are used in sociocultural anthropology for ethnography

and for comparative studies. It should be emphasized that in general, methods
used for ethnographic and comparative studies of humor are the same as those
used for the study of a sociocultural system as a whole or of any of its specific
aspects. Thus in much of the discussion that follows, methods are discussed in
general, and only where they vary for humor research are additional explana-
tions given.
A point worth mentioning here is that in sociocultural anthropology, until
recently there was little discussion of methods (Cohen, 1970). Students learned
how to do ethnography by observing their teachers or by the trial-and-error
approach that led to a sink-or-swim kind of training in the field (Mead, 1970).
Anthropology thus stood apart from other social sciences in terms of its relative
lack of elaboration and systematic discussion of research methods. In recent
years this situation has been remedied and there are now many detailed and
exhaustive publications outlining numerous methodological techniques, their
advantages and disadvantages, and the kinds of data and analyses they entail.
The following list of references, though fairly representative of this growing
literature, is by no means exhaustive (Agar, 1980; Berreman, 1962; Edgerton &
Langness, 1974; Honigmann, 1970, 1976; McCall & Simmons, 1969; Moore,
1961; Naroll & Cohen, 1970; Pelto & Pelto, 1978). However, at present there
do not exist studies specifically devoted to the elaboration of methods for
ethnographic and comparative studies of humor. In what follows, I shall first
discuss the goals and methodology of ethnographic studies of humor followed
by those of comparative studies of humor.
Ethnographic Research
Traditionally, anthropologists have attempted to study a whole culture by

immersing themselves totally in it. Increasingly, however, they have undertaken
fieldwork to gather data on specific aspects of culture or to study particular
problems, thus narrowing the scope of investigation. Even when specific aspects
are studied, some knowledge of the rest of the culture is essential in order to put
the problem being investigated into a proper perspective. This is particularly so
in doing ethnography of humor because humor is based on exaggerating or in
some other way distorting sociocultural norms, patterns, and so forth, so as to
create incongruity and ludicrousness.
Generally, ethnographic research has tended to be exploratory and open-
ended in nature. Few anthropologists try to systematically test hypotheses that
they formulated before fieldwork. One reason for this is the uncertainty of the
fieldwork situation and the possibility of hypotheses proving to be untestable.
196 Mahadev L. Apte
Anthropologists who invest their time, energy, money, and so forth, into
choosing a field site and going there are likely to retain their chosen setting and
change their research plans rather than the other way around (LeVine,
1970).
Ethnographic research is exploratory and open-ended because fieldwork on
which it is based is unstructured, at least in the early stages when the
ethnographer has to adjust to the reality of living in another culture. Despite the
new emphasis on "scientific rigor" and on objective and standarized procedures
for ethnographic research (Pelto & Pelto, 1978), a personal approach whereby
an investigator immerses himself in a culture in order to empathize and
communicate with its members is still preferred by many sociocultural
anthropologists (Honigmann, 1976).
These trends plus the highly elusive nature of humor suggest a personalized,
unstructured approach in studying it in the field. The ethnographic study of
humor, in my view, should be exploratory in nature and should be open-ended.
The lack of substantive data on many aspects of humor in specific cultures is not
conducive to the development of specific hypotheses that can be tested. Thus,
while it is possible to undertake fieldwork to study only humor, the actual
investigation should remain open-ended as opposed to being restricted just to
humor.
Participant Observation. The major technique used in fieldwork is participant

observation, which entails understanding the culture by participation in and by
systematic observation of as many different aspects of it as possible. The
primary objective of participant observation is to understand the social
structural regularities and the conceptual framework and values supporting
them by collecting samples of behavior and events. Additionally, keeping
detailed field notes, holding informal and formal interviews with key informants,
recording narrative texts of all types, collecting life histories and kinship terms,
conducting surveys, using questionnaires, and preparing maps are some other
techniques used.
Participant observation involves recording all kinds of phenomena. These
may include routine interaction among individuals of the same age, sex, social
status, and among those who differ from one another in these respects. Also
included would be behavior in role playing, events that involve performance or
dramatization by specialists, and so forth. These are all potential humor-
generating contexts that require different types of record keeping. After his
initial exploratory period, the ethnographer should be able to separate these
occasions and should determine their significance for his field notes.
The reliability and overall quality of data gathered by ethnographers varies
due to differences in the following: native language proficiency, accuracy and
detail of record keeping, access to social events, language used in writing field
notes, and the conceptualization and evaluation of the generality of cultural
events. Some of these aspects are discussed below.
Since humor development in any culture involves much verbal interaction

and communication, data gathering can be successful only ifthe ethnographer is
highly proficient in the local language. Though anthropologists often have some
knowledge of the language when they arrive at the field setting, few have a high
linguistic proficiency in it. This may be due to lack of teaching materials and the
unavailability of formal instruction for the languages of the cultures they wish to
study.
The sooner the ethnographer masters the local language, the better he will be
at participant observation of humorous events. Without language proficiency,
many opportunities for understanding and recording humor may be missed.
There is a tendency on the part of ethnographers to depend on bilingual
informants. Such a dependence may filter or distort humor data since the
informants may consciously or unconsciously omit many substantive aspects of
humorous events.
Another difficulty in participant observation is that the ethnographer cannot
be at all places at all times. Unless he purposefully and systematically varies the
kind of social situations he observes, the ethnographer may miss many
humorous instances. Often his age, sex, and foreign status may prevent him
from observing or participating in certain social situations, such as events
restricted to members of the opposite sex. to elders, and so forth.
In many cultures, the ethnographer may not be able to record humorous
episodes in the private domain such as during interactions among family
members, friends, adolescent companions, and so on. For collecting such data
he has to depend on the ability, memory, and willingness of his informants.
While some exploration and unstructured observation is inevitable in the
initial stages of participant observation, after the ethnographer has developed a
minimal understanding of the culture, he needs to focus on social situations that
have a greater potential for incidents of humor than others. on individuals who
are prone to initiating humor, and on social roles and topics that provoke
humor.
Participant observation entails asking questions at the time specific events
occur. Malinowski (1961, p. 8) emphasized that "whenever anything dramatic
or important occurs, it is essential to investigate it at the very moment of
happening, because the natives cannot but talk about it, are too excited to be
reticent, and too interested to be mentally lazy in supplying details."
In recording humor events, it is crucial to recognize the differences between
humor developments that are spontaneous, fleeting, and in some ways unique,
and those that are patterned, in the sense that factual generalizations can be
made about them. It is the latter events that are most likely to provide the
ethnographer with insights into the nature of humor and its linkages to the rest of
the culture.
What language should be used in recording observations is also an important
issue. If the ethnographer is highly proficient in the local language, the exact
utterances of verbal humor should be recorded. For recording narrative texts, a
198 Mahadev L. Apte
high degree of proficiency may not be necessary since there is ample

opportunity to check and recheck such texts as tales, myths, riddles, proverbs,
children's rhyming games, and so forth. Therefore, recording of humor data in
oral literature is perhaps an easier task than recording spontaneous humor
events or humor occurring in daily interaction. Here, the difficulties are that
other individuals present on such occasions may not remember the exact words
later. The ethnographer's ability to observe and make quick notes simul-
taneously may prove to be most useful.
The language used for recording is also a crucial factor in the later scrutiny of
field notes for analytical purposes. According to Spradley (1979), the
ethnographer should identify the type of each field entry, that is, whether it is in
amalgamated, verbatim, or concrete language. Amalgamated language here
means a mixture of native language expressions and ethnographer's own
language. Awareness of different strategies and techniques for making field
notes and the type of language used in them is most crucial for humor study
since much of it is verbal in nature.
Informants as Sources ofData. While the ethnographer can record events he

witnesses, their explanation and significance may not always be apparent to
him. Information and comments by the members of the culture being studied are
often necessary to discover why a certain utterance, action, behavior, object,
person, or whatever is amusing.
The ethnographer needs to formulate what types of questions to ask once he
has witnessed and identified incidents he considers humorous. Such questions
are necessary to discover any hidden or metaphorical meanings of words,
phrases, and acts; to learn the norms of behavior that may -have been
transgressed or exaggerated, or the notions of appropriateness that may have
been violated, and so on. In other words, questions should extricate the
internalized cultural knowledge of members to which they unconsciously
compare the structural elements of humorous events. If the ethnographer has
formulated his own explanations as to why events, objects, or actions are
humorous, he should check them out with his informants.
During their fieldwork, most ethnographers depend on key informants (Agar,
1980; Pelto & Pelto, 1978). These are individuals who usually show initiative
by approaching the ethnographer, with whom he may establish good rapport,
and who may be quite articulate, knowledgeable, and willing to talk. They are
generally quicker to understand what the ethnographer is attempting to do than
others and can be trained to "conceptualize cultural data in the frame of
reference employed by the anthropologist" (Pelto & Pelto, 1978, p. 72). If the
association between such individuals and the ethnographer lasts for a sufficient
time, some may even employ the ethnographer's theoretical concepts in
analyzing their own culture. Key informants are also those individuals who are
specialists in some cultural knowledge, occupation, role, or technique. For
instance, in gathering narrative texts and various genres of folklore, old men and
women, reputed storytellers, public speakers, or shamans are preferred.
In general, the higher the number of informants of diverse background

available to the ethnographer, the better he can achieve the following goals:
checking and verifying interpretations and making judgments regarding the
appropriateness of social behavior. Yet, ethnographers should also be prepared
to face situations where the natives are not communicative or introspective and
therefore volunteer little information. In such instances, eliciting information
may be a time-consuming and frustrating task (Langness, 1970).
The ethnographer should also be prepared for contradictions and dis-
crepancies among informants' interpretations and explanations and even
between a single informant's verbal statements and. actions. Occasionally,
topics could be sensitive so that informants may not be willing to talk, especially
in the presence of other people, as in cases involving sexual and scatological
aspects of humor (Nimmo, 1970), where individuals of high status are the butts
of jokes or ridicule, or where humor development may be related to tabooed
actions and behavior.
In acquiring information about ideologies, values, norms, and so forth, the
ethnographer needs to be aware of what informants consider to be ideal
situations, roles, and behavior; in other words, how things should be rather than
how things really are. Such a distinction is useful for the analysis of humor
because judgments of distortion, incongruence, exaggeration, deviance, and so
forth are sometimes compared with the ideal life-style.
Technical Equipment. The use of such technical equipment as tape recorders,

cameras, and video machines is convenient for recording humorous events. In
some types of humor development visual effects may be crucial if they are based
on action, appearance, gestures, horseplay, practical jokes, and other physical
manifestations. An added advantage of such records is that they enable the
ethnographer to describe humorous events in greater detail and with more
accuracy, emphasizing their textual and substantive aspects, since recorded
events can be viewed or listened to as often as many be necessary.
The tape recorder is particularly useful to ethnographers who are not highly
proficient in the local language. Perhaps the most difficult part of using such
tools in the field situation may be the unpredictability of the occurrence of
humorous events. Despite the usefulness of technical equipment, ethnographers
should avoid the temptation of using it in lieu of field notes and interviews with
informants.
Criteria for Identification of Humorous Events and Problems of Pattern

Establishment. While the ethnographer can, as a rule of thumb, identify the
occurrence of humorous events on the basis of such overt behavior as smiling
and/or laughter, he needs to spend some time in the culture before he can begin
to discriminate between different kinds and degrees of smiling and laughter.
Smiling and laughter can and do convey messages and sentiments other than
humor, such as happiness resulting from accomplishment of various tasks,
embarrassment, companionship, positive reception and welcome to visitors
200 Mahadev L. Apte
including the ethnographer, greetings, and overall positive feelings and attitudes.
There is much subjectivity, subtlety, and intuition involved in properly
interpreting the expressions of smiling and laughter, and a personal approach is
inevitable. Generally, extreme degrees of smiling or laughter may suggest
humor stimuli, but the ethnographer nevertheless needs to verify such an
assumption.
Ethnographers have traditionally grappled with the issue of how many
instances of a cultural phenomenon need to be witnessed or how many
informants need to have reported it to claim that a pattern exists. Whiting and
Whiting (1970) have suggested stability of the behavior over time and paired
comparisons in which one individual consistently exhibits a certain behavior
when interacting with another as possible criteria for pattern establishment.
This issue is closely related to sampling. While the best sample for pattern
discovery may be a random one, Honigmann (1970) is of the opinion that the
nonprobability sampling method is widely used and is acceptable in anthro-
pology. He prefers a "judgment sampling" where the ethnographer selects
informants with distinctive qualifications such as occupational status, sex, age,
length of residence in the community, and so forth. This provides more valid
data than "opportunistic sampling" where the ethnographer depends only on
those people with whom he becomes familiar in the exploratory stages of his
fieldwork. Unfortunately ethnographers tend to rely on opportunistic sampling
for their data. In this connection Honigmann (1976) is of the opinion that the
major criterion in pattern establishment is the ethnographer's confidence in the
generalization he develops, which is traditionally inductive in nature.
Some scholars (Agar, 1980; Middleton, 1970) have suggested the role of
learner or of a student! child for the ethnographer in order to find out the patterns
of culture. In such a role, the ethnographer may unintentionally or deliberately
commit many faux pas and thus may become the butt of humor in the field
situation. Exploiting such instances for questioning and getting information and
opinions should help the ethnographer to discover notions of appropriate
patterns of behavior, appearance, role playing, and customs, and the values and
ideologies supporting them. Therefore, the learner's role is useful to an
ethnographer studying humor as is evident from accounts provided by some
anthropologists (Bohannan, 1966; Boissevain, 1970; Chagnon, 1968; Lee,
1969).
It has generally been accepted in anthropology that certain kinds of
ethnographic data gathered by the technique of participant observation are
subjectively conceptualized and cannot always be quantified. Therefore, pattern
establishment and development of generalizations is a matter of personal
judgment. Such is often the case with regard to humor. The kinds of controlled
experiments conducted by psychologists in their humor research are neither
possible nor feasible in the actual field setting of ethnographic research.
Observation, careful recording, constant checking and rechecking of infor-
mation, sensitivity to informants' comments, intuitive judgments regarding the
plausibility of explanations offered, constant reformulation and reconceptuali-
Humor Research, Methodology. and Theory in Anthropology 201
zation of data as additional information becomes available, ability to draw

inferences from overt events, and speculative ability are the key elements
needed in the anthropological study of humor.
Comparative Studies
The methodological issues in comparative studies of humor are the same as

those in comparative anthropological studies in general. Since almost no
comparative studies of humor exist, a discussion of methodology used in them is
hypothetical at this stage. However, such a discussion is useful for studies that
may be undertaken.
Objectives of Comparative Studies. The objectives of comparative studies are

to develop broad generalizations and explanations. These may pertain to the
universal or near-universal nature of certain social institutions, sociocultural
processes, categories, or practices, or they may pertain to regularities of
relationships among certain cultural elements in similar societies. Generaliza-
tions and explanations can be presented as hypotheses formulated on the basis
of analyses of individual cultures and can then be validated by examining
comparable ethnographic evidence across several cultures. For instance, in a
study of the joking relationship in culture X, it is found that kinship emphasizes
patrilineality and that bride-givers are lower in status than bride-receivers. It is
also found that a man has a nonreciprocal joking relationship with his wife's
brother(s), that is, he can freely initiate joking with his wife's brothers without
being treated in kind. Such a finding may lead to the formulation of the following
hypothesis:
In patrilineal societies a man has a nonreciprocal joking relationship with his
male affinal relatives of the same generation when he can initiate joking
without fear of retaliation either by joking or by other means.
Many patrilineal societies can be examined in order to find out if such a
hypothesis is valid. If other significant variables are found, they can be used to
either change the hypothesis or to develop others.
Prerequisites for Comparative Studies. First of all, a general framework of

analysis needs to be developed within which cultures to be compared are
described and analyzed. Second, researchers need to agree upon the conceptual
categories to be used in investigating individual cultures. Such concepts need to
be universal and culture free in nature (Kluckhohn, 1961). Third, comparative
studies also invoke belief in causality, regularities, classification, and relation-
ships on a universal scale (Ember, 1970).
In sociocultural anthropology, comparative studies have been completed
without the prerequisites mentioned above. In the early years of the discipline,
cultures were described and analyzed by individual scholars without a
202 Mahadev L. Apte
systematic theoretical framework. Only as a result of many such ethnographic

studies over a period of time did a tentative theoretical framework begin to
develop. Now anthropologists generally agree that cultures need to be analyzed
in terms of such major and well-known categories as: physical environment;
technology and tools; food production; language; social institutions of marriage,
kinship, and child rearing; religion and life-cycle rites; political organization and
economic transactions; behavior, roles, and status; and value systems that
support social institutions and customs. These are categories that have been
"crudely serviceable" and "in broad form though not in content, they represent
rough empirical universals into which descriptive data can conveniently be
grouped" (Kluckhohn, 1961, p. 90). Continuing efforts to establish such
universal categories by George Murdoch and his associates in connection with
the Human Relations Area Files (Moore, 1970) indicate further refinement
along these lines.
However, no analytical framework and culture-free conceptual categories
have been developed for comparative studies of humor in anthropology. One
solution to this problem is to use the concepts and analytical categories created
by psychologists and other scholars of humor. As additional ethnographic
studies of humor are undertaken, the usefulness and relevance of a conceptual
framework and of categories may become evident.
Problems in Comparative Studies. Comparative studies of humor in anthro-

pology also face problems such as the subjective nature, unquantifiability, and
unevenness of ethnographic humor data and the use of ethnographic examples
out of their sociocultural context for comparative purposes. These are discussed
below.
Although descriptions of different types of institutionalized humor in
individual cultures exist, they are highly subjective. None of them explicitly
states the methodological techniques used or provides operational definitions of
humor. They do not state what criteria were used in identifying and defining
humorous events. It is probable that instances considered humorous by
ethnographers on the basis of their own ethnocentric notions may not be
perceived as such by members of the cultures investigated. Conversely,
ethnographers may fail to record incidents not considered humorous by them
though they might be so to the indigenous people. Differential criteria among
ethnographers and between ethnographers and members of individual cultures
may therefore create discrepancies.
In addition, there exist intracultural differences concerning individuals'
perceptions of stimuli as humorous that depend on their age, sex, social status,
occupation, upbringing, education, and so on. The extent to which the
ethnographer's description pertains to the common core of humor as perceived
by individuals from different backgrounds and social strata is difficult to judge.
A great deal depends on the extensiveness of fieldwork, on the judgment sample
of informants from whom data were gathered (Honigmann, 1970), and on the
sensitivity of the ethnographer.
A move in the opposite direction, to make humor data representative, is to

treat all observed events as being part of the characteristic nature of humor in a
specific culture. The danger in such an approach, however, is that no
discrimination is made between humor that is institutionalized and patterned
and that which is sporadic, spontaneous, and individualistic.
Determining the quality and appropriateness of ethnographic data from any
particular culture for comparative studies is another problem. Given the fact
that the quality of ethnographic information on individual societies varies, it is
necessary to judge the quality of such information. Criteria need to be
developed on the basis of which such judgments can be made. The following
criteria, among others, can be useful in this connection: length of time spent in
the field by the ethnographer; training and reputation of the researcher; the
sampling technique used for gathering data; the number and types of informants
used by the ethnographer; particular or general scope of the fieldwork; and the
quantitative nature of evidence presented for any generalizations made.
The unevenness of ethnographic humor data across cultures is another related
problem. Since anthropologists do not use the same techniques with equal rigor,
data are uneven. As there are no controls, there is much room for individual
variation in judgment, intuition, and style of fieldwork. Thus the kind and
amount of ethnographic information collected during fieldwork varies from one
individual ethnographer to another depending on professional training, personal
abilities, sensitivity to field situation, and speculative ability.
An issue often raised in comparative studies in anthropology is that of
distortion due to taking ethnographic facts out of their cultural context for the
purpose of comparison. This is a legitimate objection, especially in view of
anthropologists' emphasis on the holistic perspective in analyzing and des-
cribing individual sociocultural systems. The situation can, however, be
remedied by developing hypotheses that compare the relationships between
culture traits, rather than comparing single traits in isolation. The same can be
said about humor events. For instance, rather than simply proposing a
generalization stating that the joking relationship is common in pre literate
societies, a generalization could emphasize the type of joking relationship as it is
correlated with the nature of kinship and its social obligations or with the
practices of marriage, and so forth. The hypothesis discussed earlier in this
section illustrates this point. Hypotheses of this type are preferable and can be
validated as demonstrated in a recent cross-cultural study of sexual attitudes
and practices (Broude & Grenne, 1976).
Generalizations emphasizing cross-cultural uniformities can be verified if the
degree of abstraction is high, meaning that many ethnographic details are left
out. A possible danger here is that a high degree of abstraction may result in
generalizations that are too obvious and trivial. On the other hand, emphasis on
ethnographic details to illustrate a wide range of differences may lead to the
neglect of important similarities shared by cultures.
A recent anthropological comparative study (Apte, Note 1) is an attempt to
alleviate the overall lack of comprehensive cross-cultural research on humor. It
204 Mahadev L. Apte
is based on available ethnographic data from several cultures and posits many
hypotheses that emphasize cross-cultural uniformities and differences in humor
and the interconnections of humor to other sociocultural factors. In particular,
these hypotheses pertain to such topics as: joking relationships; nature of the
trickster; relationship of language use and attitudes to development of linguistic
humor; the role of performance in humor; differences between men's and
women's humor; and the relationship between socialization processes and
children's humor. In order to go beyond this first comprehensive comparative
treatment of humor in anthropology, what is needed is the gathering of extensive
detailed ethnographic data on humor from many more cultures, systematic
analyses of humor phenomena in individual societies, and careful, well-
conceived comparative studies that use systematic methodology.
SOCIOCULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORIES

OF HUMOR
Limitation of space does not permit me to evaluate many anthropological

theories of humor individually. Rather, I shall discuss them in general terms in
this section. Anthropological theories of humor are primarily topical in nature
and have been developed to explain those aspects of humor that anthropologists
have studied extensively, such as joking relationships, humor in religion, and
trickster tales. In what follows, some general comments will first be made
regarding theories relevant to each of the topics just mentioned followed by a
few observations applicable to most of them.
Joking Relationships
Anthropological theories of the joking relationship generally emphasize social-

structural factors such as sex, age, generation or type of kin relationships in the
development of institutionalized joking. Very few theories (Beidelman, 1966;
Brukman, 1975) propose explanations about the substantive nature of joking in
terms of the actual verbal messages used, the nonverbal behavior accompanying
it, the sexual overtones, the subtle nuances, the symbolic and metaphoric nature
of linguistic and cultural materials upon which it is based, and the implicit
cultural expectations regarding its outcome.
Although explanations of the joking relationship have been presented within
different theoretical frameworks (Kennedy, 1970), in general, anthropologists
have preferred theoretical explanations within the structural/functional frame-
work. This has been primarily due to the influence of Radcliffe-Brown (1940,
1949) whose theoretical approach was functional with an emphasis on a
comparative prospective. Radcliffe-Brown proposed several functions of
institutionalized joking within the context of kinship such as reduction of
hostility, release of tension, and avoidance ofreal conflict. Even earlier Lowie
(1920) proposed that the major function of the joking relationship was social
control. Other proposed functional theories of the joking relationship include
emotional catharsis and indirect communication (Hammond, 1964), release of
sexual impulses and aggression (Murdock, 1949), pure entertainment and
drama (Kennedy, 1970), social etiquette and screening procedures for group
membership (MalefIjt, 1968), release of strenuous and dangerous work-related
tension (Pilcher, 1972), symbolic indicators of strong affinal ties (Freedman,
1977), exclusiveness of association (Stevens, 1978), a badge of group identity
(Lundberg, 1969), and exploration of potential closeness in social relations
(Howell, 1973). This list of functional explanations is by no means complete.
Many of the above anthropologists consider their theories to be global. While
some (Freedman, 1977; Stevens, 1978) have proposed only unitary functional
explanations, others (Hammond, 1964; MalefIjt, 1968; Radcliffe-Brown, 1940,
1949) have proposed multiple ones. It is not clear in the case of those who
propose several functional theories whether each joking activity serves all
functions, or if the context determines the function. The possibility that different
types of joking relationships may have different functions has not been taken
into account.
Most functional theories are merely inferred. Thus they are speculative and
hypothetical in nature and have not been empirically validated. Many of them
have been inductively developed as they are often based on observations and
analysis of joking relationships in a single culture.
Another drawback of anthropological theories of both kin-based and nonkin
joking relationships is that the concept of friendship and its importance in joking
relationships, especially nonkin relationships in industrial societies, has not
been satisfactorily studied.
Humor in Religion
Theoretical explanations of humor in religion also have a structuraVfunctional

orientation. Burlesque, parody, and contrary behavior are analyzed in terms of
such structural elements as: the ritual settings in which they occur; the
humorists' social status and functions within and outside the context of rituals;
the topics, themes, and techniques used; and the audience's response. These
theories are functional in the sense that they purport to explain the putative or
"real" purpose of humor initiation from both the natives' and the investigators'
viewpoints. Many functional theories emphasize in general terms the psycho-
logical benefIts of humor by claiming that it satisfIes the need for cathartic
release of tension and of antisocial feelings and for vicarious gratifIcation of
sexual urges and other infantile desires usually repressed in normal social
interactions.
Sociological theories emphasize social control as the chief function of humor
in religion. It is stated that burlesquing and parodying provide a channel for
206 Mahadev L. Apte
ridiculing those who deviate from norms of appropriate role-and status-related

behavior.
On the whole, none of the theories satisfactorily explains why the religious
context is chosen over other social situations for the initiation of humor that
supposedly serves cathartic and social control functions. In this respect,
theories (Honigmann 1942; Spicer 1954) that suggest that humor is developed
to reduce the tension due to the seriousness of the rituals themselves make
better sense.
As in the case of the joking relationship, many theories of humor in religion
are presented as global. Yet, such claims are rarely validated empirically.
Many theories have paid considerable attention to humor in religion initiated
by specialists known as ritual clowns or ceremonial buffoons and have
emphasized its textual, performative, and symbolic aspects. Yet, the theories,
which focus on them, do not seem to satisfactorily explain, with a few notable
exceptions (Makarius, 1970), the anomalous position of ritual clowns and their
contradictory roles, which straddle the dichotomy of'the Sacred and the
Profane. Additionally, this emphasis on ritual clowns perhaps diverted the
attention of anthropologists from studying humor developed by others in
different kinds of religious events. For example, existing theories do not
satisfactorily explain why in many rite-of-passage rituals those who develop
humor are closely related to individuals going through the rite.
Trickster Tales
There are fewer anthropological theories explaining the widespread occurrence

of tricksters in the oral literature of North American and African cultures than
of joking relationships and humor in religion. The existing theories seem to
primarily emphasize the entertainment function of trickster tales along with
their etiological relevance. Interestingly, the primary focus of the theoretical
literature has been on how to explain the incongruous combination of two
opposing roles, one of" culture hero" and another of "baffoon," merged in the
trickster figures. Tricksters are considered culture heros because they transform
the world into a habitable place by bringing such natural elements as sun, rock,
islands, fire, rain, and so forth, into it They are buffoons because they behave
stupidly in trying to trick people in order to satisfy their hunger and sexual
desires and suffer innumerable consequences due to their foolish actions.
The fundamental problem in the theoretical explanations relating to the
duality of roles mentioned above is that despite its persistance in theoretical
discussions of the trickster, the phrase "culture hero" is a misnomer, as pointed
out by Boas (1898). Tricksters are not altruistic, noble, generous, caring, and
farsighted. They lack the vision of and a motivation to act for the ultimate good
of human societies. They acquire fire, water, sun, and other elements solely to
satisfy their own selfish desires.
Such scholars as Boas ( 1898), Ricketts (1964, 1966), and Radin (1969) have
proposed that the trickster figures, which are configurations of opposite roles,
are found primarily in societies in the earlier stages of cultural evolution, such as
hunting! gathering ones. As cultures move to the agricultural state, the two roles
get separated, the figures become purely tricksters, and they occupy a less
important place than culture heroes in the oral literature of agricultural
societies.
General Comments
Some general comments about anthropological theories of humor are in order at

this stage. Most anthropological theories though relevant to specific kinds of
humor appear to be similar because they demonstrate some common attributes.
For example, many theories are particularistic because they are proposed to
explain humor phenomena in specific cultures. When global status is claimed
for these theories, it is only by induction and not on the basis of systematic
comparison of and support from ethnographic data from many cultures.
Anthropological theories of humor appear to emphasize the contextual
aspects, that is, in explaining humor, they focus on its interrelationship to other
sociocultural traits. In this sense they are both structural and functional in their
orientation. There are fewer theoretical explanations of humor in terms of its
textual, substantive, or symbolic nature. There is frequently a psychological
orientation to anthropological theories that makes them speculative because
they cannot be backed by empirical and experimental validation.
A major theme recurring in anthropological theories is that expressions of
humor are the result of attempting to resolve ambivalence in social situations,
roles, statuses, cultural values, and ideologies. For example, ambivalence
occurs because of conflict between social obligations and self-interest, between
fear and amusement, between disapproval and envy of deviant behavior,
between infantile urges and restrictions of sociocultural norms, and so on. In
institutionalized joking, in ritual clowning, or in listening to trickster tales,
humor may provide a relief from this ambivalence.
CONCLUSIONS
The objectives of this paper were to present briefly the nature and scope of
anthropological research, methodology, and theories of humor and to empha-
size the many problems inherent in humor research in anthropology. Sugges-
tions were made for future anthropological research on humor with the hope that
researchers will broaden their horizons by attempting to gather ethnographic
data on many aspects of humor in numerous sociocultural domains hitherto not
208 Mahadev L. Apte
studied. As for methodology, there appears to be a need to explicitly state the

methods used in collecting ethnographic data so that such data can be used in
comparative studies, and the validity of proposed theories can be evaluated. On
the theoretical level, developing culture-free conceptual categories and formu-
lating a general theoretical framework could serve as the basis of future
anthropological research on humor.
REFERENCE NOTE
1. Apte, M. L. Humor and laughter: An anthropological perspective. Book in
preparation, 1983.
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Chapter 10
Notes toward a Field Theory of Humor
HOWARD R. POLLIO
Every theory both depends upon and attempts to explain a particular set of facts
or observations. It seems fair, for example, to say that Hobbes considered a
deformed person or someone slipping on a wet street as crucial for his theory of
humor and that Bergson had something like a marionette or a jack-in-the-box in
mind. Kant saw the unexpected denouement of a clever comic remark as crucial
whereas Freud openly admitted that, for the case of sexual humor at least, he
was thinking about a smutty joke told by men of breeding in the presence ( either
real or imagined) of a lady of breeding. Each theorist started from a different
reference point and the specific nature of these starting points has served to
provide each theory with its own unique orientation and assumptions.
Similarly, the theory offered in the present paper grows out of a particular set
of questions and concerns. Although most of these seem to deal with the
underside of human life-that is, the taboo, the profane, the scatalogical, the
hostile- I offer them with the justification that it was the data and not personal
perversity that made me choose them as central to a theory of humor.
1. Why are successful, professional comedians paid so much money and why
do we honor them so little? Why do they often tend to come from minority
groups?
2. Why are sex and aggression major themes for evoking loud and long laughter
and why are word play and/or intellectual incongruity not nearly as powerful
or successful?
3. Why should humor about taboo topics produced by peers or by professional
comedians evoke more laughter (and be judged as funnier) in a group of
friends than in a group of strangers?
214 Howard R. Pollio
4. Why, in many nonliterate societies, should there be such a close relationship

between the profane clown and the sacred priest? Between religious rites and
rites of ridicule?
5. Why should spontaneously produced humor involving friends by composed
of so many remarks that seem to target, negatively, one or another member
of the group?
6. Why are laughing and smiling the unique body responses associated with
humor? Are these two behaviors simply different levels of the same response
or do they define two quite different classes of response?
Now that's quite a list of questions to contend with, especially since some
concern societal issues in humor, some the immediate social situation
surrounding the comic event, some the personal qualities of the humor maker
and/or appreciator, and some the actual bodily responses appropriate to
humorous situations. What is required to encompass all of these concerns would
seem to be nothing less than a complete description of the total field of events-
both near and far-against which humorous actions and ideas manage to
emerge and do their work.
No psychological theory has ever been able to account for all relevant aspects
of the field serving as background for even simple psychological phenomena; the
only approach that tried was that offered by Lewin and his students (1935,
1951). Largely because this work derived its inspiration from Gestalt
psychology it was quite sensitive to the structure of the psychological field
at the time of the specific event considered. For the case of humor, Lewin's
approach suggests that comic events only appear against the more extensive
background defined by society, other people, and the specific person in the
specific situation now doing the joking, laughing, and/or smiling.
While a great many theorists have attempted to recognize the figure-ground
nature of laughter and humor, it remained for Bergson (1911/1956) to restore
laughter (and through laughter, humor) to its social ground and for Plessner
(1970) to restore it explicitly to its bodily ground. Although Plessner's theory is
not nearly as well known as many of the major theories (including Bergson's), it
does offer a good starting point largely because it focuses attention on the
person as he or she laughs or smiles in the context of a full, rich social setting.
While Plessner's theory also sometimes seems more concerned with biological
than social matters, it does encourage us to look at the phenomenal experience
of the person as he or she laughs or smiles and, in so doing, directs us to the
meaning of these two very human events for the person producing them. As
such, Plessner directs us to the laugher's body as a major nexus connecting the
world of the person with that of others and society.
LAUGHING AS AN EMBODIED SOCIAL EVENT
In his book, The Act of Creation (1964), Koestler offered a diagram very much
like the one in Figure 10-1 to express his understanding of laughter and the
Notes toward a Field Theory of Humor 215
Figure 10-1. Koestler's (1964) diagram of a human laugh.
implied description seems apt: Laughter does indeed seem as if it were an

explosion both from the point of view of the laugher and from that of some other
person(s). This insight, however, is not unique to Koestler. Roget, in his
Thesaurus, offered the following set of cliched expressions concerning laughing:
"to burst out laughing," "to be convulsed with laughter," "to crack up," "to
split one's sides laughing," and so on. Other cliches suggest that we must either
"hold ourselves in" or "control ourselves" not to laugh. While both the diagram
and the cliches seem fitting, what exactly is going on that makes us experience
laughter both in others and ourselves as requiring "control" and what exactly is
it that is "breaking up" or "splitting?"
Here Plessner comes to our aid: What is "breaking up" is the person and
what is being "broken up" is the person's experience of his or her body in some
specific situation, in some specific society, in some specific period of history; in
short, the person has "exploded" or "broken out" from the psychological limits
imposed by the contemporary situation and for a moment is afforded the
experience of what some philosophers (such as Sartre) might term radical
freedom. On an experiential basis, laughter provides a continuing body
metaphor for freedom in which the person experiences himself as free of the
constraints imposed by others, society, time, and even his own body. Like the
more general concept of freedom, however, the experience of freedom afforded
by laughing is fleeting for the person must always return "to this body, in this
situation, in this society, in this era" once the episode of laughter has run its
course. The experience of laughter is neither a strictly intellectual nor emotional
one; rather it is a total person response to the specifics of a particular
contemporary situation.
Mindess (1971), from a more psychoanalytic point of view, has offered a
similar perspective on the relationship between laughter and freedom (or
liberation, as he chose to term it). For Mindess, each person is beset by a
number of personal and social constraints-conformity, inferiority, normality,
rationality, naivete, egotism, and so forth-that serve to limit his or her

freedom. These constraints are adhered to largely because the person has little
choice in the matter if he or she is to remain a member of society. Given this
state of affairs, humor serves periodically to liberate the person from such
constraints by rendering them meaningless or absurd. Such liberation, however,
can only be ephemeral for we, as individuals, continue to depend upon the
support provided by the very constraints we occasionally manage to escape
through humor.
In describing "freedom from conformity," Mindess presents this paradox as
follows:
We simply do not know how to define ourselves except in relation to other members of
our species. If we reject, therefore, the standards of one group, we will soon accept the
standards of another. The moment of choice is a moment of heightened self-
awareness, but that moment is, and will always be, fleeting.
The spirit of humor is synonymous with that moment. It is iconoclastic. It is
rebellious ... Its joy is the joy of release, and release is exciting only as reaction to the
constricting conditions out of which it is born. (1971, pp. 40-41)
In this, Mindess correctly recognizes that there is and can be no absolute or

radical freedom and that the "liberation" provided by laughter is necessarily
contingent and transitory.
If laughter provides an experience that is at once so valuable and so fleeting,
we can answer our first question and see why we tend to be ambivalent about
individuals who are able to provoke laughter in us on demand. Comedians, as
comic jesters before them, are valued precisely because they bring about
moments of freedom from the pressure of polite (and not so polite) constraints
arising from social training and the presence of other people. They are honored
so little, on the other hand, because their actions seem to change our world so
little and because the moments they offer are so brief and so unrelated to
"practical" action.
The observation that a large number of comedians come from minority
groups may be explained by the fact that as members of minority groups they
have been less subject to-and also less rewarded by-the constraints brought
to bear on members of the majority group( s). Comedians have less at stake in
breaking social constraints that inhibit other members of their society who have
learned more conventional perceptions and more conventional behaviors. While
marginality has its drawbacks, it seems to provide a unique set of perspectives
and experiences conducive to the production of comedy.
From a psychological point of view what is significant about the moments of
freedom produced by comic artists is that they suggest each human being
emerges as a specific person both for himself and for others only against the
complex ground provided by everyday reality, what Berger and Luckmann
(1966) termed "the here of my body and the now of my present." To this
definition we must add the here-and-now of my situation and of my society; by
situation we mean my experience of other people in the immediate environment

and by society we mean the values, foibles, taboos, and mores of the social
world as experienced by me. For this reason, a theory of humor, like a theory of
the person, must always be an interpersonal one in which both the historical and
momentary social field is as important as the focal "comic" event itself.
One way to conceptualize this state of affairs is to turn around Koestler's
somewhat fanciful diagram of the human laugh (see Figure 10-2) and thereby
see the person as a figure defined by a ground of social forces of the type
described by Lewin and as experienced by each of us whenever we overstep a
social taboo or enter into an unknown social setting. If we consider our
experience of ourselves as partially grounded in socio-psychological forces, it is
possible to answer our second question and understand why taboo topics evoke
a larger laugh than non taboo topics. For the case of taboo material, the social
forces operating against an expression of the topic, or even of a response to an
expression of that topic, are stronger than for non taboo material; hence, they
require greater personal "force" to oppose, and when opposed, the resulting
explosion of laughter is likely to be stronger. Since inhibiting social forces are
experienced as more confining in the context of strangers than in the context of
friends, to come now to issues raised by our third question, it is reasonable to
expect that comedians and peers who deal in the taboo will produce less
laughter (and be less appreciated) in a group of strangers than in a group of
friends. Within the context of strangers, the person may even feel embarrassed
and find the situation aversive rather than pleasant.
The situation is quite different for a group of friends. Here, the degree of
social constraint is experienced as less powerful and the tendency to respond to
a taboo joke or remark a good deal easier. When examining responses produced
by members of a group of friends to taboo jokes, Murphy and Pollio (1975) did,
however, find that individual group members often spoke to one another
following the occurrence of taboo jokes suggesting they were trying to determine
Figure 10-2. Possible pattern of "social forces" serving to constrain response to a

"taboo" remark or joke.
iftheir response to the joke was a "proper" one and if their cohorts responded in
the same way. Although some degree of social constraint is experienced in a
group of friends, it is a good deal less intense than in groups of strangers.
These results and observations suggest that we laugh at taboo jokes not only,
or even primarily, because we have overcome an "internal" source of inhibition
as Freud (1905/1960) seemed to suggest, but because we have overcome
constraints in the here-and-now of our contemporary situation. Comedians and
other purveyors of laughter generally tackle taboo topics for just this reason:
They mean to highlight the specific, and sometimes arbitrary, social forces that
constrain our world. Although we may talk about the hostility of a comedian
like Don Rickels we realize that he is only exploding the ordinary conventions
of social interactions-conventions that at one time or another have coerced us
all-and in so doing he frees us from them for the moment. The comedian
ordinarily has a natural safeguard built into his/her antics in that most jokes or
comic remarks are brief and it is this brevity that both allows them to elude
social constraint (as Freud said long ago) as well as to minimize any experience
of personal discomfort we might have in laughing at them. The hostile comedian
offers us a trade-off: a moment of discomfort for a moment of freedom.
Profane/sacred clowns, to come now to our fourth question, also use the fact
that laughter provides momentary freedom from constraint. Here, however, the
clown-priest is attempting to let other members of his society know that he (as
priest) understands that the various prohibitions and religious rules of the
society are confining and that people might wish to be free ofthem. By attacking
them in ritual, comic form he asserts they are difficult, he asserts he knows you
want to be free of them, and he asserts they are necessary. The close
relationship between the sacred and the profane is one in which a mocking of
sacred rules reinforces their sanctity and the comic-priest (and his cohorts)
know and respect this even as their humor ceremonies provide temporary relief
from prohibitions significant to the group. Be defaming the sacred, the comic-
priest publicly recognizes the difficulty of observance and, in so doing, reasserts
the moral order. "Even as he (the comic fool) plays out his deviant role, he
serves as a defining boundary of what is proper ... (and) ... may have the
effect of encouraging the stability of a system by preventing it from going too far
in anyone extreme direction" (Fisher and Fisher, 1981, p. 192).
This analysis further strengthens the hypothesis that laughter must be
considered not only in terms of its meaning for an individual but also in terms of
its meaning for other people. Bergson (1911/1956) undoubtedly had this in
mind when he wrote that to "understand laughter we must put it back into its
natural environment, which is society, and above all we must determine its
functioning, which is a social one.... Laughter always implies a kind of secret
freemasonry or even complicity, with other laughters, real or imagined"
(p. 4-5). Laughter begets laughter for people who are, or are in the process of
becoming, a group and the truth of this assertion is nowhere better seen than in
the ability of a record or tape containing nothing but laughter to evoke laughter
in an audience. Even the distant TV station understands the social nature of
laughter when it includes an obviously phony laugh track so as to distract the

solitary viewer from an experience of aloneness that surely follows on the heels
of solitary and, hence, unanswered laughing.
But laughter, according to Bergson, also has a more sober and didactic
purpose: "to correct" the human tendency to become mechanical in its actions.
For Bergson there is no greater sin than the mechanical masquerading as the
living and laughter is meant to correct this state of affairs whenever and
wherever it occurs. If one major purpose of laughter is to reach out to correct
unfreedom (rigidity), it seems fitting that the bodily form of laughter should be
so fixed and involuntary (Le., rigid). Thus, laughter serves to illustrate what it
means to correct at the same time as it provides an experience of what it seeks to
promote.
The social nature of human laughter can also be seen in terms of an analysis
of humorous remarks that occur in an ongoing group. Results provided by
Scogin and Pollio (1980) indicate that as many as two-thirds of all humorous
remarks in a group are directed at some specific person or situation and that the
majority of these remarks are deprecating in tone. Although it may seem
paradoxical that negative remarks outnumber positive remarks in ongoing
groups, we need to remember that the definition of a humorous remark as
negative was made by a nongroup member, usually a psychologist or
sociologist. If we change our point of view from that of objective observer to that
of involved group member, it is possible to see that being the "target" of a
negative humorous remark is to be noted as a highly visible member of the group
who "can take it." Thus targeting is often experienced as a sign of esteem and
what is negative for an observer need not be negative for a participant, targets
included.
Coming now to our fifth question, laughing at a targeted remark need not be
experienced as a hostile gesture but one indicating a good deal of positive group
feeling. Considered in this light, laughter would seem best described as a type of
centrifugal behavior that "reaches out" from the person to others in the
immediate situation. Such reaching out beyond the self, however, can be
perceived either as a vigorous social act or as a type of attack. While such
perception is always possible, laughter never need connote hostile intent; rather,
within the context of an ongoing group, it is probably better understood as a
personally emphatic act. Laughing, joking people are not demeaning, destruc-
tive people in the sense of trying to embarrass or bully others; rather they are
people who are moving out to meet and respond to their situation and thereby to
involve themselves communally with others in that situation.
SMILING AS AN EMBODIED SOCIAL EVENT
For both the laughing person and for the person with whom he or she is
laughing, there is a reasonable congruity in experience that can best be
described as explosive freedom. Can we capture some similar significant core to

the human experience and expression of smiling? If Koestler's diagram of the
laugh proved useful for an analysis of laughter, let us begin by considering a
prototypic presentation of the human smile in terms of that ubiquitous
contemporary social icon, the "happy face" (see Figure 10-3). In addition, as
a point of contrast, let us also develop a somewhat newer icon, the "unhappy
face" (see Figure 10-3). These two diagrams, taken side by side, offer an
interesting comparison that serves to highlight an essential perceptual property
of human smiling: the tendency to provide an impression of "up." This
impression is much stronger if we consider not only the form traced by the lips
and mouth, but the total bodily configuration accompanying a smile that
includes an upward movement of the head and a generally expectant but gradual
movement away from the body center. The smiling person thus conveys a
general perceptual impression of being uplifted and enlarged as well as one of
being expectantly open to the contemporary social world.
If we move from the perceptual to the experiential side of a smile what is seen
as "up" by someone else is experienced as light or bouyant by the smiling
person. Although the smiling person may also experience some tendency to
move toward others it is not as strongly centrifugal an activity as laughing for
the smiling person never explodes from the immediate situation. Rather, he or
she continues to experience a rootedness in body and situation. What is
experienced by the person being smiled at, on the other hand, is a pleasant and
expectant invitation to interact. As such, the behavior is centrifugal not as an
experience of freedom from situation but as an expression of controlled and
gentle movement toward another person. Perhaps this difference is what
McDougall (1922) had in mind when he noted that the smiling face was
beautiful and the laughing face was contorted or even ugly.
This difference between laughing and smiling may also help explain why
these two behaviors have sometimes been considered as different levels of the
same response. If the laugh provides an experience of freedom and the smile one
of lightness it is possible to see that some smiles may represent an incomplete
"breaking away" of the person from his or her situation .. Such smiles, however,
must be differentiated from a second, more usual, type of smile that functions as
Figure 10-3. Contemporary social representations for the "happy face" and the
"unhappy face."
an invitation to interact. This second type of smile may range from a bonding
smile between infant and caretaker, to a seductive smile between consenting
adults, to a smile of entreaty (or appeasement) between individuals of unequal
rank or power.
The distinction between smile as incomplete laugh and smile as invitati'on to
interact can perhaps be seen best in the developing child. As is well documented
(Ambrose, 1961; McGhee, 1979; Nowicki, 1977) smiling regularly precedes
laughing in infant development, often by as much as 2-3 months. From both a
theoretical and an empirical standpoint (Bowlby, 1969; Goldstein, 1957) the
earliest smiles produced by the infant and responded to by the mothering one
usually function as signals of bonding; they both request-and confirm-the
bond between infant and adult. Although the smile continues to have this
meaning (and effect), certain theorists such as Kagan (1971 )-and Piaget
before, and McGhee (1979) after-have attempted to interpret smiling as a
sign of rudimentary understanding brought about by an infant's growing ability
to assimilate an originally unfamiliar event to an existing schema. Under this
interpretation the smile means: "I've understood or mastered something I
originally found strange or puzzling." This smile of recognition, or mastery,
signals the end of a problem and thereby seems more related to a triumphant
laugh than to the bonding smile that often transpires between the younger infant
and his or her parent.
While it is possible to view the infant's earliest laughs as simply adding noise
to the smile of bonding, the major concomitants to laughter in both older infants
and preschool children turn out to be more intensely exciting events that
alternately frighten the child and assure him/her that everything is "really all
right" (Ambrose, 1961; Nowicki, 1977; Rothbart, 1976). The game of peek-a-
boo or of throwing the infant in the air and catching him/her are characteristic of
such events for the infant; jumping off a high platform or going down a big slide
are characteristic of such events for the preschool child.
In all of these situations, laughter seems to occur only once the danger is over
and the child is free to abandon him/herself to the now nonfrightening, but
previously frightening, situation. Although not yet the experience of radical
freedom it will later become, this laughter does indicate the end to a potentially
frightening state of affairs in which the child experienced being affected by
"forces" outside him/herself. On this basis, the laugh may simply mean: "I am
now free from the experience of danger" and serves to connect it with the
meaning of its more adult counterpart. In terms of adults present in the situation,
the young child's laugh is a clear reaching out that only can be responded to by
laughter. As such, it provides the adult with an experience of communion with
the child on the basis of freedom from their shared situation. This twofold
consequence would seem reason enough for adults to repeat the cycle, thereby
strengthening, even further, the bond between parent and child.
This line of analysis would seem to help answer our sixth and last question.
From the present point of view, smiling must be seen as a gesture of invitation to
bond whereas laughter must be seen as a gesture of communion through shared
freedom from constraint. Both laughing and smiling are centrifugal activities
that afford the person a means of reaching beyond him/herself. For the case of
smiling, however, such reaching out would seem to have a clear target in other
people; for the case of laughing, such reaching out would initially seem to be
unconcerned with other people and simply represent an explosive reaction to
the present situation. If shared by others, however, laughter also is capable of
bringing about an experience of social communion.
If we move from the side of gesture to that of experience, laughing and smiling
again yield somewhat different pictures. Laughing, preeminently, provides
momentary release from social and/or personal restraint and seems to present a
prototypic body experience of freedom. Smiling, on the other hand, provides an
experience of bodily lightness, as well as an orientation toward others, and
seems to present a prototypic body experience of happiness or satisfaction. For
both laughing and smiling, however, the behaviors are not epiphenomenal to
some more basic experience of humor; rather, by their very bodily form, they
provide the experiential and interpersonal ground out of which humor as a
uniquely human process must be defined and understood both by the laughing!
smiling person as well as by the theorist who would attempt to capture its
meaning.
THEORETICAL ISSUES RAISED BY

A FIELD THEORY OF HUMOR
Relationship to the James-Lange Theory of Emotion
William James brought psychology into the twentieth century with his book
Principles a/Psychology (1890/1950). In this encyclopedic work he sketched a
theory of emotion that since that time has come to be called the J ames-Lange
theory. As a first approximation, he described the theory as follows:
Our natural way of thinking about ... emotions is that the ... perception of some fact
excites ... the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily
expression. My theory, on the contrary, is that bodily changes follow directly the
perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of (these) changes is the emotion.
Common-sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are
frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis
here to be defended ... says that this order of sequence is incorrect and that we feel
sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that
we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be.
(James, 1890/1950, pp. 449-450)
Although the fate of this approach to emotion had been argued for the past 80
years or so, much of the debate has been of the form: which comes first, the
emotional experience or the bodily reaction. Regardless of the answer-
emotion first, bodily reaction second; bodily reaction first, emotion second-
simply asking the question in this way assumes a mind/body split that James did
not intend. If we read further in the chapter on emotion, we find James points
out that" if our hypothesis is true, it makes us realize more deeply than ever how
much of our mental life is knit up with our corporeal form, in the strictest sense
of the term" (James, 1890/1950, p. 467). If we substitute "experience" for
"mental life," we can see that James tried to describe emotional phenomena in
terms of an indissoluable union between experience and corporeality that later
theorists would couch in Cartesian, cause-effect, language. For James there was
no separation between behavior and experience when the person was in the
midst of an emotional event.
Does this mean that the scientific attempt to define sequential (causal)
relationships between emotional experiences, bodily reactions, and mental
states is wrong? The answer here is no if we can be sure that the attempt does
not mistake its analytic approach as anything more than an intellectual
construction deriving its support from a more primary experience of unity
among (what will later be called) "elements" of the event. The danger with a
strictly analytic approach to laughing (and smiling) is that it may tend to
forget-or even hide-its rootedness in the more direct and less reflected
experiences that precede formal scientific analysis. When we return to the
unreflected world of emotional experience we find no separation of movement
and experience; only the unity of a lughing/smiling person in this or that
situation, talking to this or that person, concerning this or that topic. Laughing
and smiling are total person events in which experience and bodily movements
are given as two distinct, but inseparable, moments of the same event that later
reflection may divide into components for purpose of analysis.
Does this mean that it is impossible to produce smiling and laughing as a
consequence of some prior "mental event," or, alternatively, to produce an
experience of lightness or joy on the basis of simply setting one's face and body
in the form of a smile or laugh? The answer to both questions is, again, no; it is
quite clear that we can smile or laugh as a consequence of "wanting to smile or
laugh" (we are all actors to some degree) and that we can and do experience
some of the "emotion" associated with smiling and laughing if we place our
bodies in the proper form. These "facts," however, have little effect on either
James's theory or on the one proposed in in the present paper because they refer
not to naturally occurring events but to events that have been deliberately
performed to determine if it is possible to produce, on demand, either the
"bodily" response or the "emotional" reaction associated with humor. As such,
these questions request mechanical movements and contrived emotions and not
the living response/experience appropriate to more naturally occurring humor-
ous events.
Relationship to Superiority Theories of Humor
Superiority theories of humor originate in the insight that laughter often seems
to accompany feeling superior toward some other person or situation. Keith-
Speigel (1972) summarize this general approach quite well when she noted:
Elation is engendered when we compare ourselves favorably to others as being less

stupid, less ugly, less unfortunate, or less weak. According to the principle of
superiority, mockery, ridicule, and laughter at the foolish actions of others are central
to the humor experience. (p. 6)
To understand the origins of this approach to humor it is necessary to return

to the living world of everyday human events so as to see behind the abstract
principle of superiority. If we do this we note that superiority theories build on
situations of the following type:
a. Sudden victory over an opponent in battle; triumph in an athletic contest
b. A distinguished looking person slipping on a banana peel (or just simply
falling down)
c. A person with a big nose or outsized ears (or some other" deformity"); a
silly or insane person
d. A drunken person talking" silly" and! or falling down
e. A pie in the face of another person
While this list could be extended, the essential ingredients all come down to
the formula defined by Hobbes as "sudden glory":
... laUghter is caused either by some sudden act oftheir own, that pleaseth them; or
by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they
suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of
the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own
favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. (1651/1914, p. 36)
The first aspect of this quotation to note is that it concerns only laughter; if
smiling is considered at all it is generally described as a weak or low level cousin
to the laugh as conveyed in French by the word sous-rire (sublaugh) and in
German by the word liicheln (little laugh). What this emphasis on laughter
suggests in the context of superiority theory is that such principles have more to
do with the experience offreedom from one's body and situation and less to do
with the experience of lightness or invitation characteristic of smiling.
With this limitation in mind, superiority theories appeal to situations in which
the body of some other person, or of the laughing person him or herself, is quite
significant. Consider the first of these situations-sudden victory over an
opponent-that for many theories (e.g., Gruner, 1979; Rapp, 1951) is the
prototype. Being involved with an opponent, in either a life and death struggle or
in an athletic event, involves the body of both participants in a very confined
and confining way. With victory, however, the body of the victor is freed from
control by the opponent (or situation) whereas the body of the vanquished is
more tightly confined by constraints imposed by the superior athlete or
combatant. Laughter is obviously the proper response for it provides a further
augmentation to the relief appropriate to release from bodily or situational
confinement.
The remaining situations do not so literally involve an experience of freedom
from bodily constraint. They do, however, clearly focus the laugher on the
bodily activities of another person. In all of these cases, the body has been made
focal by an act (falling down) or by a characteristic (large nose, etc.) of the
person in question. For the laugher to experience freedom here he/she must
first identify with the other person and then respond (with laughter) to the fact
that the body of the other, which I identify with because he/she is another
person, is not my body and that I, at this moment, am free of the unfortunate
situation of his/her body. This kind of laughter, even though it might seem to
assert only superiority, also asserts a reaching out toward the "victim" in
sympathy. Only ifI identify with the victim as like me in some way will I be able
to laugh at his/her situation and, thereby, express the freedom I feel from his or
her unfortunate actions or body.
The person falling down also may laugh. The crucial factor here seems to be
that the person experiences the falling body as different from his/her ordinary
body and, if the fall is not serious, will possibly experience a moment offreedom
from body and situation. Laughter has the possibility of bringing about more
laughter, and laughter on the part of the victim may represent an implicit request
for a response from someone else. As Scogin and Pollio (1980) noted in a
different context, what is called "nervous laughter" may have a similar intent:
As a highly focused body event representing a request for relationship with
others.
Bergson (1911/1956) offered a somewhat different analysis of superiority
humor in tenns of his famous fonnula for what is laughable-the mechanical
encrusted on the living-in which the comic person is seen as a thing with life
removed. If laughter is the unique human behavior that expresses momentary
freedom from body, then a mechanical body only calls attention to the fact that
our body (fortunately) is no such thing, and we laugh both as a recognition of the
difference and as affinnation of its significance. What we also affinn by
laughing is our identification with the thing-like aspect of our body even as we
somewhat shakily assert our intennittent freedom from it. As Plessner (1970)
put it: We both are a body and have body and laughter is our expression of this
fact of existence.
Relationship to Incongruity Theories
If a person winning a sudden victory over a foe, a man slipping on a banana

peel, a drunk. or a person with a big nose all represent reference situations for
superiority theories of humor, then the double take and the experience of
surprise at unexpected events represent reference situations for incongruity
theories. All theories of humor, in one way or another, seem to recognize that
"unexpectedness," or at least "suddenness," is an important aspect to events
and situations that evoke laughter and smiling; the difference for incongruity
theories is that this fact becomes a central postulate. What is also usually
recognized by most theories is that unexpected, illogical, or surprising elements
often bring about reactions incompatible with laughter such as being curious,
puzzled, confused, or shocked. The double take provides an appropriate bodily
description of what the person does in responding to such events because it
suggests the person takes another look in order to resolve the situation into
something familiar or to determine that the situation is not very important, even
if surprising.
This description of what happens following the perception of an incongruous
event fits well with recent cognitive theories of humor (Shultz, 1976; Suls,
1972) that describe two stages as necessary for getting the point of a joke:
puzzlement at incongruity and ( subsequent) resolution of incongruity. Although
there has been some question as to whether resolution is necessary for joke
appreciation (Rothbart, 1976) the general consensus seems to be that some sort
of resolution does take place even if only to recognize that no sensible resolution
is possible. What incongruity theory in its cognitive form seems to have done is
to put both the first and second takes, of the more observable double take, into
the head of the would-be laughter in the form of two cognitive processes:
puzzlement and resolution. Unfortunately, cognitive theories tend to consider
incongruity and its resolution as purely mental acts and thereby come to
undervalue-or even exclude entirely-the embodied, total-person response to
such situations.
That incongruity need not be a cognitive event to evoke laughter is well
documented in a study by Nerhardt (1970) who had subjects in a laboratory
evaluate the heaviness of a set of weights. Results were quite clear in showing
that subjects laughed when asked to judge a weight that was a good deal heavier
or lighter than the relatively narrow training series presented to them for initial
evaluation. A similar experiment was reported by Deckers and Kizer (1974)
who noted that subjects laughed and smiled when presented with weights well
above and well below an initial test series. They also found more laughter and
smiling were evoked by an unexpected heavier weight than by an unexpected
lighter weight although there was no such asymmetry in results reported by
Nerhardt.
What seems most important about these experiments is that in attempting to
elucidate the relationship of laughter to incongruity, a motor task, rather than a
verbal-conceptual task, was used. These results thus call attention to the role of
the body in responding directly to "incongruous" or "unexpected" events. Ifwe
take the point of view of the subject in one or both of these experiments, it is
possible to see that the subject must have developed an expected amount of heft
required to deal with weights in the training series. If lifting the final weight did
not come off easily because it was much heavier than the training series, the
subject literally was forced to a "second take" (i.e., heft) of the weight. If the
final item was much lighter, the subject was also required to do a "double take"
to attenuate his or her reaction relative to the force required. In both cases, the
subject was thrown back directly on his/her body and in both cases forced to
recognize the thing-like nature of that body and of his/her intermittent freedom
from it. In these experiments, the subject was first made more aware of his/her
body and on discovering that it was not incompetent in dealing with the now-
changed situation was able to experience freedom both from the puzzling nature
of the situation and from a body initially" surprised" by that situation.
It is important to note that the subject ultimately was able to resolve the
situation and that the double take (more accurately, double heft) was
accomplished easily in both the "heavier" and "lighter" cases. It seems
reasonable to wonder what would happen if the final weight were nailed down or
so heavy that it could not be lifted. Under these circumstances, unexpectedness
might lead not to puzzlement, resolution, and laughter in that order but to
puzzlement, frustration, and anger in that order. Being able to lift the weight
successfully seems an important ingredient in yielding laughter; if the subject
were unable to lift the weight, puzzlement would likely become resentment at
having been tricked. Under such circumstances, incongruity would become
treachery and laughter, anger as the limits of bodily constraint were not
overcome but further emphasized by the task.
The structure of these experiments serves to define what is meant by
unexpected (and incongruous) in a remarkabley clear and nonmentalistic way:
It is simply the strength of lift learned in regard to the range of weights used in
the training series. As such, the limits of the series (translated into body exertion
required for .a given lift) define the limits of expected response. Like all
boundaries they both define and constrain what mayor may not be done in the
situation. In this regard, they are like the rules of more intellectual tasks, such as
those defined by language or concepts, that also both encourage and limit what
may be thought or said in particular context. If laughter expresses an experience
of freedom, then unexpectedness provokes laughter only if the limits of a
structure (or stricture) are exceeded and their constraints overcome. Laughter
signals a sudden, successful, and temporary end to the limits imposed by a
situation whether this situation requires direct motoric action, as in lifting
weights, or more "cognitive" action, as in solving intellectual tasks or jokes.
Both in terms of its conditions of emergence and resolution, timing is all
important: Prolonged incongruity leads only to frustration or ennui whereas
slowly emerging incongruity is neither surprising nor absorbing. As both Freud
and Shakespeare noted, brevity is the soul of wit, and too-long, too drawn-out
jokes, like too-long, too drawn-out problems, only yield experiences of
annoyance and not release. To be sure when a long drawn-out problem is finally
solved, the resulting cry of "Eureka!" is likely to contain laughter; just as surely,
however, a long drawn-out problem will often lead only to an abandonment of
the problem or to a feeling of discomfort brought about by an inability to get free
of it. There is a tradeoff between being captured by a problem and getting free of
it and if either is experienced as taking too long, laughter is unlikely. It also is
important to note that the moment of freedom itself has to be relatively brief, for
being disembodied (i.e., free from the constraints of body and situation) for too
long may be experienced as uncomfortable. Both the incongruous event and its
resolution must be brief if the situation is to be experienced as laughable rather
than as unsettling.
While this analysis of incongruity has been pursued in terms of bodily
incongruity, it also applies to more intellectual situations and tasks not only
because the human being is a unified field comprising both mind and body, but
because compelling problems always have bodily concomitants. Noncompelling
incongruities such as occur in simple word play or trivial jokes-that can be
described as forcing only an intellectual double take-evoke slight smiles and
not loud laughs and, in this case, the smile truly is an attentuated laugh as befits
a small problem. In its more powerful fOI"Q1, laughter at incongruity indicates
both that the event has been compelling in its control and that its resolution is
experienced as freedom from such control. Under this interpretation, incon-
gruity theory merges with superiority theory and both, in turn, must be seen as
deriving from a more general analysis of the meaning of laughing and smiling as
human events that depend both on us and on the people with whom we laugh
and smile. There seems to be no alternative but to conclude that humor is an
embodied field event involving issues of limits and transcendence and that this is
the case whether we start with incongruity or superiority as our basic theoretical
premise.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

There is an old saying often used when a joke or comic story falls flat "You had
to be there to know why it was funny." This insight forms a basic core of the
present approach to humor. But what does it mean to say: "You had to be
there?" First of all, it suggest that humor is a fragile phenomenon quite
dependent on social and interpersonal conditions present in a particular
situation. It also suggests that over and above the immediate situation are a
great many societal institutions and traditions serving to define what is taboo
and what is acceptable and that these larger social concerns function as distant,
but significant, contexts for the present one. It also suggests that "being there"
requires not only a mental commitment, but the embodied participation of an
engaged person. In short, "being there" implies a field theory of humor that
pays full attention to the laughing/smiling person in the full, rich context of his
or her contemporary first-person world.
But what does the laughing/smiling person experience? Ordinary experience
and ordinary language both suggest that the laughing person experiences
momentary freedom from his/her embodied situation, while the smiling person
experiences a feeling of bouyance (or lightness) that orients him/her toward

other people. Laughing and smiling are seldom different levels of the same
response; rather, they express different interpersonal meanings both for the
smiling/laughing person and for the person(s) with whom he/she laughs or
smiles. If laughter is preeminently a bodily gesture of freedom, then smiling is
preeminently a gesture of interpersonal invitation and/or bonding. Both
behaviors, however, reach out beyond the person to his or her world and in this
way serve to bring about their interpersonal effects.
A rather important consequence to the present analysis is that laughter (as
Hobbes, Bergson, and Plessner recognized) is probably a more useful indicator
of humor than smiling. This, in tum, suggests that there is a natural fittingness to
the behavioral form of the laugh both in terms of its experiental and
interpersonal meaning as "explosive behavior." On this basis, laughter would
seem more closely tied to other "explosive" activities such as are usually
described by the terms aggressive or sexual. While these two behavioral classes
do not exhaust human actions that reach out to the world in a particulary
vigorous way, they do seem to represent natural content areas for the humorous
thrust and its appropriate retort, that oflaughter. Aggression and sex are natural
topics because they embody a similar physiognomy to laughter: Their
relationship is neither accidental nor surprising.
A final consequence to the present theory of humor is that "incongruity" and
"surprise" are special cases (albeit large and important ones) that partake, in
their own special ways, of a more comprehensive analysis of laughter as a
bodily metaphor for freedom. From the present point of view, the basic body
response underlying incongruity is the "doubletake," whereas the basic
response underlying superiority is release from constraint. In both cases, the
laugher momentarily experiences freedom from his/her body in its situation
even as he/she identifies with its thing-like properties. Laughter, as Plessner put
it, is that condition by which we assert both that we are a body and that we have
a body and that there is nothing we can do to escape this eccentric fact of human
existence.
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Books, 1966.
Bergson, H. Laughter: An essay on the meaning of the comic. New York: McMillan,
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Bowlby, J. Attachment and loss. New York: Basic Books, 1969.
Deckers, L., and Kizer, P. A note on weight discrepancy and humor. Journal of
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Fisher, S., and Fisher, R. Pretend the world is funny and forever. Hillsdale, N.J.:
Erlbaum, 1981.
Goldstein, K. The smiling of the infant and the problem of understanding the "other."
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Gruner, C. R. Understanding laughter: The workings of wit and humor. Chicago:
Nelson-Hall, 1978.
Hobbes, T. Leviathan. New York: Dutton, 1914. (Originally published, 1651.)
James, W. The principles of psychology. New York: Dover, 1950. (Originally
published, 1890.)
Kagan, J. Change and continuity in infancy. New York: Wiley, 1971.
Keith-Spiegel, P. Early conceptions of humor: Varieties and issues. In J. H. Goldstein
and P. E. McGhee (Eds.), The psychology of humor. New York: Academic Press,
1972.
Lewin, K. A dynamic theory ofpersonality. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935.
Lewin, K. Field theory in social science. New York: Harper, 1951.
McDougall, W. Why do we laugh? Scribners, 1922, 71,359-363.
Mindess, H. Laughter and liberation. Los Angeles: Nash, 1971.
Murphy, B., and Pollio, H. R. The many faces of humor. Psychological Record, 1975,
25, 545-558.
Nerhardt, G. Humor and inclination to laugh: Emotional reactions to stimuli of different
divergence from a range of expectancy. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 1970,
11, 185-195.
Nowicki, D. R. Smiling and laughing in human infancy: A naturalistic perspective.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The University of Tennessee, 1977.
Plessner, H. Laughing and crying. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
Rapp, A. The origins of wit and humor. New York: Dutton, 1951.
Rothbart, M. Incongruity, problem-solving, and laughter. In A. J. Chapman and H. C.
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Scogin, F. J., and Pollio, H. R Targeting and the humorous episode in group process.
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Author Index
Roman type refers to page numbers in Volume I, italic type refers to page numbers in
Volume II.
Abrahams, J., 172, 180 Andermann, F., 97, 106

Abrahams, RD., 61, 63, 65, 82,169, Andersen, C., 101, 104
175,176,183,192,208 Anderson, RE., lSI, 168
Achari, A.N., 101, 104 Andrew, RJ., 183,208
Adamec, RE., 99, 104 Angelman, H., 102, 104
Adams, c.e., 170, 177 Annis, A.D., 162, 168
Adams, D., vi, vii Anthony, D.B., 173, 174, 177
Adams, W.J., 173, 191 Anthony, S., 117, 131
Agar, M.H., 195, 198,200,208 Apte, M.L., vii, 186, 193, 203, 208
Agnetti, V., 91, 98, 99, 107 Apter, M.J., 110, 131,121,125,165,
Albert, 1., 120, 132 169, 178, 179, 191
Alexander, A., 165, 168 Arfe1, G., 98, 99, 105
Alford, R, 111, 130 Aristotle, 86, 104
Allen, M., 121, 123, 125, 127, 131, Aroex, N.L., 173, 174, 177
148, 155, 163, 178,43, 59, 81, 86 Ascough, J.e., 178, 192
Allen, S., 10 Asher, R., 162, 168
Allport, G. W., 48, 58 August, D., 22, 35
Alpers, B.J., 90, 104 Aveni, A., 149, 171
Amarasingham, L.R, 190,208 Averill, J.R., 16, 17,34,119,124
Amarnek, W.S., 25, 36
Ambrose, A.J., 221, 229 Bacon, P., 171
Ames, F.R, 91, 99, 104 Badt, F., 101, 105
Ancoli, S., 4, 5, 11 Bagchi, B.K., 100, 106
232 Author Index
Bain, A, 86, 104 Bohannon, L., 200, 208

Baker, RA, 121, 124 Boissevain, J., 200, 208
Bales, RF., 162, 177,48, 58 Bonney, N.L., 154, 159, 171
Barchilon, J., 57, 58 Boorman, S., 166, 180
Barcus, F.E., ISO, 168 Bornemeier, W.C., 121, 124
Bard, P., 90, 105 Boskin, J., 115, 124
Barron, W.L., 46, 47, 52,57, 100, 106 Bouissac, P., 162, 177, 130, 141
Bass, S.H., 128, 130 Bourhis, RY., 150, 151, 153, 155
Bates, E., 113, 130 Bourke, J.G., 191,208
Baudelaire, C., 87, 104 Bower, B.D., 102, 105
Bauer, RA, 175, 177 Bowlby, J., 221, 229
Beals, RL., 189, 190, 191, 192,211 Boyd, I.H., 114, 116, 126
Bear, D.M., 93, 105 Boynton, K.R, 160,165,172,179,181,
Beattie, J., 40, 55 182, 193
Beaussart, M., 99, 106 Brackett, C.W., 125, 130, 136, 153
Bebin, J., 100, 101, 104, 106 Bradford, AL., 173, 191
Beidelman, T.O., 204, 208 Bradney, P., 151, 153, 166, 177, 185,
Bell, N.J., 124, 127, 130 186,187,208
Bern, D.J., 139, 152 Brandsma, J., 62, 63, 86, 125
Ben-Amos, D., 63, 65, 82 Brandt, C.S., 165, 177, 186,208
Bender, M., 94, 105 Brannigan, e.R, 4, 11
Benjamin, l, 121, 126 Breakwell, G.M., 137, 153
Berenson, B.G., 67, 71, 74, 86 Brian, B.C., 67, 86
Berger, AA, 137, 141 Bricker, V.R, 189, 190, 191,208
Berger, P.L., 216, 229 Bridges, K.M., 136, 153
Bergin, AE., 67, 85, 86 Brieger, R, 166, 180
Bergson, H., 10, 11,214,225,229,53, Brigham, le., 156, 161, 168
115, 124 Bright, M., 87
Berlo, D.K., 163, 168 Brinkman, D., 162, 168
Berlyne, D.E., 1,8,11,14,15,19,22, Brody, M., Ill, 124
33,34,44,54,55,73,82,85,98, Brodzinsky, D.M., 75, 82,118, 119,
100, 104, 127, 130, 135, 139, 153, 120, 121, 130, 133
117, 124, 181, 191 Bronson, W.e., 121, 130, 131
Berreman, G.D., 195,208 Broude, G.J., 203, 208
Bess, B.E., 42, 47, 59 Brown, D., 95,105,129,131, vi, 162,
Bever, T.G., 14, 32, 34, 39, 55 165, 167, 168, 169, 186, 191
Bier, J., 136, 141 Brown, G.E., 129, 131
Bierich, J.R, 101, 105 Brown, S.B., 98, 107
Bigsby, C.W.E., 131,141 Browne, RB., 131, 141
Birdwhistle, R, 168, 177 Browne, T., 27
Birnbaum, D. W., 149, 170 Brownell, H.H., 29, 30, 34
Bishop, B.R, 161, 171 Browning, RC., 75, 85, 173, 176, 191
Bladin, P.F., 99, 105 Brukman, J., 204, 208
Blair, W., 136, 141 Bryant, J., 19, 22, 34, 92, 95, 101, 102,
Block, J., 48, 58 105, 107, 172, 181, vi, 143, 148,
Bloomfield, I., 68, 85 157, 159, 160, 162, 165, 167, 168,
Blunck, W., 101, 105 169, 172, 173, 176, 179, 181, 182,
Blurton-Jones, N.G., 3, 11 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190,
Boas, F., 193,206,207,208 191, 192, 193
Author Index 233
Buchwald, A, 144, 145 Chuangtzu, 24, 30

Buchwald, J.S., 181, 191 Chukovsky, K., 1I3, 131
Buckman, E.S., 70, 86 Cicirelli, V.C., 109, 115, 133
Bucy, P.C., 96, 106 Clarke, A, 101, 105
Burbridge, R T., 68, 86 Cleveland, S., 56, 58
Burchfiel, V.L., 99, 105 Cloyd, J.S., 163, 177
Burma, J.H., 175, 177 Codere, H., 189, 208
Bums, W., 158, 169 Cohadon, F., 106
Bushnell, D.D., 118, 124 Cohadon, S., 106
Cohen, J.S., 42, 58
Cahill, J., ISO, 167 Cohen, R, 195, 21I
Calidcott, J.M., 100, 101, 107 Coleridge, S.T., 34,39
Cameron, P., 153, 172 Colover, J., 101, 104
Campbell, D.T., 46,55 Colson, E., 187, 209
Campbell, J.K., 175, 177 Comisky, P.W., 95, 105,160, 167, 173,
Campbell, T., 148, 170 185, 186, 187, 191
Canfield, J., 17 Comite, N.D., 101, 105
Cantor, J.R, 19,22,34,51,57,85,88, Corsini, RJ., 62, 86
89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 100, 105, Coser, R.L., 149, 154, 166, 167, 173,
107, 1I6, 1I7, 134, 149, 150, 157, 177,185,187,209,112,114,116,
172,181,147,152,157,159,164, 120, 121, 122, 125
167, 168, 169, 172, 184, 185, 191 Cousins, N., vi, vii, 3, 20, 109, 113,
Cantu, RC., 101, 105 119, 122, 124, 125
Caputo, G.C., 23, 32, 34 Covert, C., 123, 127
Carkhuff, RR, 67, 71, 74, 86 Craig, C.S., 163, 171
Carl, L.M., 163, 169 Crane, J.S., 186, 187, 191
Carroll, M.P., 193,208 Crompton, P., 151, 153,165, 169, 178,
Carus, P., 86, 105 179, 191
Cash, M., 129, 131 Crowley, W.F., 101, 105
Castell, AK.S., 79, 86 Crumrine, N.R, 189, 191,209
Castell, RB., 79, 86 Cupchik, G.C., 23, 35, 36, 50, 55, 128,
Chagnon, N., 100, 108 131,132,137,156
Chaney, D., 129, 141 Curry, T., 149, 171
Chao, D., 96,99, 105 Cutlet, G.B., 101, 105
Chapko, M.K., 156, 160, 169
Chapman, AJ., vi, viii, 16, 17, 19,35, Daly, D.D., 96, 98, 105
92, 105, 1I0, 119, 128, 131, 136, Damsteegt, D., 124, 125
140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, Daniels, A.K., 162, 177
148,149, 151, 152, 153, 154,157, Daniels, R.R, 162, 177
165, 169, 178, 179, 191 Dannenmaier, W.D., 50, 58
Chapman, W.A., 144, 153 Darwin, C., 3, 6, 8, II, 13,21,25,
Charles, L.H., 162, 177, 190,208 117, 125
Charney, M., v, 133, 141 Das, J.P., 24, 25, 35
Chassan, J.B., 67, 86 Davidson, E.S., 166, 169
Chen, RC., 101, 102, 105 Davies, A.P., 1I0, 131, 150, 151, 153,
Chess, S., 125, 131 121, 125, 165, 169, 178, 179, 191
Childs, AW., 70, 86 Davies, C., 173, 177, 140, 141
Chomsky, N., 39, 55 Davies, G.J., 150, 151, 153
Christiansen, B., 18, 35 Davies, L.J., 153, 169
234 Author Index
Davis, J.A., 163, 177 Edgerton, RB., 195,209

Davis, J.M., 149, 154, 159, 167, 177, Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I., 183, 209
158. 169 Eidelberg, L., 33, 40
Davis, M., 160, 177 Einstein, A., 26, 30, 31
Davison, C., 93. 101. 105 Eisenberg, H.M., 100, 107
Davison, P., 129. 141 Ekman, P., vi, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
Dawson, D.M., 93. 107 Elliot, RC., 174, 177
Day, D., 120, 132 Elliott, S., 165, 169, 186, 191
Day, H.I., 16, 17,119,126 Ellis, A., 65, 86
Day, K.D., 160. 172. 174. 175. 193 Ellis, K., 154, 169
Dearborn, G.V.N., 3,11 Ember, M., 201, 209
DeBock, H., 156, 161, 172 Emerson, J.P., 166, 177,109,110,112,
Deckers, L., 20,35,41,48,55,226, 114, 115, 117, 120, 123, 125
229 Emerson, RW., 27
Deleuze, G., 61. 85, 86 Enders, A.C., 136, 154
Demmy, N., 96, 99, 108 Enderstein, 0., 91, 99, 104
Denes, G., 26, 35 Epstein, S., 88, 105
Deutsch, G., 24, 30, 37 Ettinger, RF., 178. 192
Devine, J., 20, 35 Euripides, 133
Dewane, C., 68,86 Evans-Pritchard, E.E., 189, 193,209
Dickens, C., 134
Dickson, W.J., 165, 180 Farina, A., 149, 154, 159, 167, 177,
Ding, G.F., 136, 154 J58, 169
Dollard, J., 175, 177 Farrelly, F., 62. 63. 65, 86. 123, 125
Domhoff, G.W., 170, 177 Fasio, F., 91. 98, 99. 107
Dooley, L., 50, 58 Fearing, F., 150, 171
Dostoevski, F., 27. 30 Fedio, P., 93, 105
Dowman, C.E., 106 Feinberg, J.F., 153, 170
Dresser, J.W., 173, 177 Feinsilber, M., 143. 169
Drew, J.H., 101, 105 Fere, C., 101, 105
Dreyer, R, 91, 97, 100. 101, 105 Ferrar, C.R, 189,211
Druckman, R, 96, 99, 105 Ferrier, D., 89
Duchowny, M.S., vi, 99, 105 Feuer, V., 120, 130
Dudek, S.Z., 43, 54, 55, 58 Fine, G.A., vii, 136, 151, 154, 165,
Duffey, N.S., 95,105,106,112,116, 166, 167, 170, 172, 174, 178, 179,
119, 132 116. 125. 131. 140, 142
Duncan, H.D., 163, 177 Fink, E.L., 115, 125
Duncan, S., 8, 11 Finnegan, R, 193,209
Dundes, A., 61, 63, 65, 82,177,140. Fischer, C., 67. 86
141 Fisher, RL., 122, 123, 125, 127, 131,
Dunlap, K., 86, 105 163,178,218,230, v, vi, 42, 43,
Dunlop, D., 131. 141 44, 45. 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52,
Dunphy, D.C., 163, 177 53, 54. 55, 56, 57, 59
Depreel, E., 173, 177 Fisher, S., 122, 123, 125, 127, 131,
Durelli, L., 91, 98, 99, 107 163, 178, 218, 230, v, vi, 42. 43,
44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52,
Earls, P.L., 173, 192 53, 54, 55, 56, 57. 58, 59
Eble, K., 121, 125 Fiske, D.W., 8, 11,46,55
Edgerly, J., 163, 179 Fitzgerald, R, 98, 106
Author Index 235
Flamm, L., 28, 35 Geschwind, N., 28, 34, 102, 107

Flavell, J., 22, 35 Gessini, L., 100, 106
Fodor, 1., 39, 55 Gianotti, G., 102, 105
Foerster, 0., 97, 105 Giesbrecht, L.W., 156, 161, 168
Fontes, B., 155, 170 Gilbert, D., 137, 142
Foot, H.C., vi, viii, 92,105,119,131, Giles, H., 21, 35,150,151, 153, 155
137,140, 141, 145, 147, 149, 151, Gillespie, D.F., 131, 142
153,154,157, 169 Gilmour, R,137, 153
Forster, F.M., 101, 102, 105 Giorgi, A, 67, 86
Fouts, RS., 31, 34 Gittes, RF., 93, 107
Fowles, B., 72, 73, 74, 76, 81, 82 Gladfelter, E., 41, 48, 55
Fox, RC., 112, 117, 120, 125 Gladstone, A.I., 165, 170, 177, 192
Frankl, V., 64, 65, 86, 120, 123, 125 Glanz, M.E., 72, 73, 74, 76, 81, 82
Freedman, J., 205, 209 Glanz, R, 136, 142
Freud, S., 13,31,35,43,55,90,98, Glaser, AN., 139, 155
99,105,112,117,123,131,218, Gleicher, D.B., 175, 177
230,39,40, 114, 116, 125, 145, Gleitman, H., 72, 74, 76, 82
169, 177, 192 Gleitman, L.R, 72, 74, 76, 82
Frey, W.H., 119, 125 Gloor, P., 97, 106
Friesen, W.V., 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 Gluckman, M., 209
Fry, W.F., Jr., 16, 17, 18,20,34, 35, Goddard, G.V., 99, 106
121, 123, 125, 127, 131, 147, 155, Godkewitsch, M., 2, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19,
163, 167, 178,3, 43, 59, 81, 85, 23, 35, 119, 125
8~ 11~ 11~ 11~ 11~ 12~ 125 Goldstein, J.H., vi, viii, 16, 17, 35, 52,
Frye, M., 137, 157 54,55,56,117,131,149,150,
Fuller, RG.C., 128, 131 155,68, 86, 110, 119, 126, 140,
142, 143, 169
Gadfield, N.J., 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, Goldstein, K., 221, 230
155 Golub, RR, 74, 82, 86
Gagel, 0.,97, 105 Goodchilds, J.D., 149, 151, 155, 163,
Gainotti, G., 28, 35 178
Ganga, A, 91, 98, 99, 107 Goodenough, D.R., 55, 59
Gange, J.J., 139, 155 Goodman, J., v, 3, 6, 21
Gans, H., 131, 142 Goodrich, A.T., 151, 155, 167, 178,
Gardner, H., 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35, 121, 126
37,110, 131 Goodrich, D.W., 151, 155, 167, 178,
Gardner, J., 119, 125 121, 126
Garfield, S., 67, 85, 86 Goody, J.R., 186,209
Garfield, W., 67, 68, 86 Gormally, J., 71, 86
Garretson, L., 194,212 Gormly, C.M.R, 140, 155
Garrett, M., 39, 55 Gottman, J.M., 10, 12
Garvey, C., 113, 131 Gould, L., 23,32,37,44,57,114,134
Gascon, G.G., 96, 98, 99, 102, 106 Graeven, D.B., 147, 170
Gastaut, H., 98, 99, 107 Grant, E.C., 4, 12
Gebhard, RU., 163, 177 Green, F., 22, 35
Geen, RG., 139, 155 Green, T.A., 59, 61, 63, 65, 69, 82
Gell Mann, M., 25 Greenacre, P., 50, 56, 59
Georges, RA, 61, 63, 65, 82 Greenberg, B., 151, 170
Gerber, W.S., 61, 63, 65, 82 Greenberg, M.S., 28, 34, 102, 107
236 Author Index
Greene, S.J., 203 Hezel, R., 148, 165, 168, 169, 173,
Greenwald, H., 167, 178,65,86 175, 185, 186, 187, 188, 191, 193
Gregg, A., 136, 155 Hicks, V., 79, 86
Grossman, S., 65, 75, 86 Hieb, L.A., 189,209
Grotjahn, M., 163, 178,65, 87, 111, Highet, G., 174, 178
121, 126 Hill, C.E., 71, 86
Gruner, C.R, 149, 155, 160, 167, 178, Hill, D.W., 192,209
224,230,162, 163, 164, 170, 192 Hill, H., 120, 126, 136, 141
Gula, J., 173, 185, 191 Hill, W.W., 192, 209
Gumpert, J., 98, 101, 106 Hillyard, S.A., 18, 36
Gur, R.C., 25, 28, 34, 36, 102, 107 Hinton, J.L., 155, 170
Hirsch-Pasek, K., 72, 74, 76, 82
Haberman, G., 20, 36 Hobbes, T., 86,91,98, 105,224,230,
Haddad, J., 88, 89, 90, 91, 105, 116, 35
132, 172, 176, 179 Hoebel, E.A., 194,209
Hager, J.C., 8, 11 Homans, G.C., 166, 178
Haley, J., 65, 87 Honigmann, J.J., 190, 195, 196,200,
Hall, G.C., 102, 106 202, 206, 209
Hall, M.M., 102, 106 Horibe, F., 45, 46, 57, 70, 76, 77,
Hamby, S., 26, 27, 29, 37 78, 83, 133
Hammond, P.B., 165, 178, 186, 188, Horn, G., 178, 192
205, 209 Horowitz, S., 97, 106
Hamnett, I., 65, 82 Hosta, G., 99, 101, 107
Handelman, D., 166, 170, 178, 185, Houston, A.C., 148, 170
187, 209 Howard, J.H., 189,210
Handelman, S.M., v Howell, RW., 185, 186, 187,205,209
Hannerz, U., 175, 178 Huber, A., 69, 74, 82, 87
Hansotia, P., 98, 101, 106 Humphrey, G.L., 181, 191
Haring, L., 65, 82 Humphries, D.A., 4, 11
Harman, J., 16, 17,35 Hungerbuhler, J.P., 25, 28, 34, 36, 102,
Harries, L., 65, 82 107
Harris, A.J., 153, 170 Huson, C., 163, 177
Harris, L., 165, 168, 186, 187, 188, 191 Hutchison, S.A., 124, 126
Harris, P.E., 16, 36 Hyman, H., 171, 178
Hauck, W.E., 178, 192
Hay, T.A., 95, 107 Inge, M.T., 142
Hayes, D.S., 149, 170 lonesco, E., 37, 40
Haymaker, W., 93, 95, 106 Ironside, R., 93, 95, 97, 106
Haynes, RB., 166, 170
Hayworth, D., 113, 126 Jacobson, E., 149, 155
Hazlitt, W., 40, 55, 87,105,113, 126 Jacome, D.E., 98, 106
Heisenberg, W., 25 Jaffe, A., 123, 126
Helmers, H., Ill, 132 Jaffe, L., 123, 126
Henry, J., 151, 155, 167, 178,121, 126 James, W., 87, 105,222,223,230
Herron, E.W., 55, 59 Jandolo, B., 100, 106
Herskovits, F.S., 193,209 Jankelevitch, V., 78, 87
Herskovits, M.J., 193,209 Janus, B.R, 42, 47, 59
Hertzler, J.O., 7, 12, 135, 155 Janus, S.S., 121, 123, 125, 127, 132,
Hesse, H., 29, 31 163, 178,42, 47, 55, 59
Author Index 237
Jarman, RF., 24, 25, 35 Kluver, H., 96, 106

Jasper, H., 107 Kobben, AJ.F., 184, 210
Jeavons, P.M., 102, 105 Koestler, A, 1, 12,40,55,160,179,
Jefferson, G.A, 168, 176, 178 214,230,53, 81, 87, 113, 118, 126
Jenkins, S., 41, 48, 55 Kogan, N., 121, 132
Jersild, AT., 136, 154 Kogon, E., 173, 179
Jewesbury, E.C.O., 93, 106 Kolb, B., 102, 106
Johnson, I.S., 149, 170 Kottak, C.P., 194,210
Johnson, S.F., 54, 56 Kowet, D., 164, 170
Jolly, E., 151, 168 Kramer, H.C., 96, 106
Jones, J.M., 16, 36,42,46,55, 100, Kreindler, H., 93, 106
105 Kris, E., 117, 132
Jordan, D.K., 194,212 Krugman, D.M., 164, 168
Judson, H.F., 25, 29, 31 Krus, D.M., 50, 59
Kubie, L. S., 82, 83, 87, 111, 126
Kach, J.A., 112, 119, 133 Kumata, H., 163, 168
Kagan, J., 120, 121, 132 Kutas, M., 18, 36
Kahn, RL., 28, 37
Kahn, S., 151, 170 Labrentz, H.L., 69, 74, 87
Kambouropoulo, P., 147, 170 Lafave, L., 51, 55, 85, 88, 89, 90, 91,
Kando, T.M., 129, 142 105,116,132,150,156,172,176,
Kane, T.R, 150, 155 179
Kaneko, S.Y., 68, 69, 87 Lafrance, M., vii, 7,10,12
Kant, I., 40, 55, 111 LaGaipa, J.J., 149, 156
Kapferer, B., 185, 187,209 Lamb, C.S., 123, 126
Kaplan, H., 114, 116, 126 Lampton, W.E., 162, 170
Kaplan, R.M., 178, 187, 192 Landrum, L., 131, 142
Karasik, R, 16, 17,35 Langevin, R, 16, 17,36,119,126
Kazdin, A.E., 67, 87 Langness, L.L., 195, 199,209,210
Keith-Spiegel, P., 85, 100, 105, 224, Lanyl, RL., 42, 59
230,59, 111, 126 Lao Tzu, 24,31
Kelly, J.P., 147, 170 Laurette, G., 98, 99
Kelman, H., 93, 101, 105 Lavoie, P., 102, 106
Kenderdine, M., 136, 155 Leacock, S.B., 86, 105
Kennedy, J.F., 1 Lear, N., 144
Kennedy, J.G., 186,204,205,210 Lee, RB., 200, 210
Kepler, T.F., 24, 31 Leech, C.K., 99, 106
Kierkegaard, S., 30 Lehtinen, L., 99, 100, 106
Killinger, B.E., 69, 74, 82, 83, 87 LeMasters, E.E., 165, 179
Kimura, D., 24, 36 Leopold, N.A., 96, 98, 106
King, M., 67, 87 Lesser, G., 174, 177, 192
Kirby, J.R, 24, 25, 35 Leventhal, H., 22, 23, 32, 34, 35, 36,
Kirshen Blatt-Gimblett, B., 113, 132 49,50,54,55,56,128,131,132,
Kivald, A,99, 100, 106 136,137,156
Kizer, P., 20, 35, 41, 48, 55, 226, 229 Levi, L., 16, 36
Klapp, O.E., 149, 155, 161, 178 Levine, J., 23, 32, 37, 44, 56, 114, 134,
Klein, D.M., 162, 167, 186, 187, 192 147, 156, 190,210,79,87, 111,
Klein, J., 68, 87 115, 116, 122, 126
Kluckhohn, C., 201, 202, 210 Levine, J.B., 164, 179
238 Author Index
Levine, RA., 196,210 Maranda, E.K., 69, 82

Levinson, D.J., 71, 87 Markiewicz, D., 163, 170
Levi-Strauss, C., 193,210 Marriott, M., 190, 192,210
Lewin, K., 214, 230 Marshall, N., 90, 105, 172, 179
Lewis, M.H., 160, 169 Martin, J.P., 92, 101, 106
Lilly, J., 28, 29, 31 Martin, L.J., 16, 18,36
Lindsey, D., 121, 126 Martineau, W.H., 150, 156, 174, 179
Lindzey, G., 48, 58 Masie, E., 17
Ling, P.K., 28, 35 Maslow, A., 81
Linsk, F.L., 172, 179 Matsumura, T., 100, 102, 108
Linton, E., 136, 155 Matthews, S., 62, 63, 86
List, C.F., 100, 101, 104, 106 Matusewicz, C., 149, 156
Livingston, K., 99, 104 Matusik, M.C., 100, 107
Lloyd, E.L., 16, 18, 36 Mayo, C., 7, 10, 12
Lloyd, S.A., 95, 106, 116, 119, 133 McCall, G.J., 195,210
Lob, H., 98,99, 107 McCall, R, 127, 132
Loiseau, P., 99, 106 McCarthy, K., 89, 105, 172, 179
Lombroso, C. T., 96, 98, 99, 102, 106 McCurdy, D.W., 194,212
Long, M., 154, 170 McDougall, W., 8, 12, 220, 230, 117,
Longo, L.P., 99, 106 126
Lorenz, K., 116, 126 McDowell, J.H., 78, 80, 81, 82, 109,
Loriaux, D.L., 101, 105 132
Losco, J., 88, 105 McGhee, P.E., vi, vii, 7, 12, 16, 17,
Loudon, J.B., 185, 187,210 21,23,2~ 27, 3~ 35, 36,43, 44,
Lowie, RH., 193, 205, 210 52, 53, 54, 56, 95, 104, 105, 106,
Lucchesi, W., 2, 8, 9, 12, 137, 141, 156 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117,
Luckmann, T., 216, 229 11~ 122, 124, 12~ 13~ 133, 148,
Lumley, F.E., 174, 179 152, 156,221,230,4~ 5~ 6~ 8~
Lumsdaine, A.A., 165, 170, 177, 192 110, 122, 127, 143, 169, 177, 178,
Lundberg, G.C., 185, 186, 187,205, 192
210 McGrew, W.C., 4, 7, 12
LuomaIa, K., 193,210 McIntyre, C. J., 170, 177, 192
Luther, M., 27 McIntyre, D.C., 99, 106
Lynn, R, 181, 192 McLoyd, V.C., 113, 133
McLuhan, M., 121, 127
Mace, W., 23, 36, 128, 132, 136, 137, Mead, M., 195,210
156 Mead, W.B., 143, 169
Maclain, L.W., 98, 106 Mechanic, D., 149, 156, 178, 192
Maclean, P.D., 90, 95, 106 Medoff, N.J., 175, 193
Maesen, W.A., 88, 89, 91, 105, 116, Mendelsohn, H., 145, 170
132, 172, 176, 179 Mers, R, 2, 8, 9, 12, 137, 141, 156
Makarius, L., 189, 190, 191,206,210, Merton, R, 171, 179
46,59 Meryman, R, 125, 133
MaIamuth, N.M., 153, 170 Meyer, K., 149, 171
MalefJjt, A.M. de W., 185, 187,205, Meyer, T., 160, 167
210 Meyer, T.P., 156, 170
Malinowski, B., 197,210 Meyer, W.J., 100, 107
MaIone, P.B., 167, 179 Meyersohn, R, 129, 141
Manson, 1.1.,100, 101, 107 Mikes, G., 116, 117, 127
Author Index 239
Michel, D., 29, 30, 34 O'Connell, W.E., 163, 167, 179,63,64,

Middleton, J., 200, 211 65, 79, 87, 122, 123, 127
Middleton, R, 88, 106, 171, 179 Olivier, A., 97, 106
Milgram, S., 149, 156 Olmsted, D.W., 149, 171
Miller, D.B., 190, 192,211 Oltman, P.K., 55, 59
Miller, F.C., 151, 156,173,179 Opler, M.E., 192,211
Miller, G.A., 68, 82 Ore, G.D., 96, 108
Miller, G.R, 171 Orne, M. T., 48, 56
Miller, M., 136, 155 Osborne, K.A., 142, 156
Mills, c.K., 89, 107 Oster, H., 7,12
Milner, B., 24, 36 Owens, J., 120, 131
Mindess, H., 167, 179,215,216,230, Oxford, G.S., 21, 35,151,155
65, 87, 111, 116, 123, 127
Mintz, L.E., vi, 130, 142 Packer, I.K., 25, 26
Money, J., 99, 101, 107 Palkovitz, R, 120, 121, 131
Monrad-Krohn, G.H., 90, 107 Palmore, E., 153, 171
Moody, RA., 3, 21, 109, 110, 113, Panagis, D.H., 23, 34
117, 122, 123, 124, 127 Papez, J.W., 90, 107
Moore, F.W., 195,202,211 Papworth, G., 99, 105
Moreau, RE., 185, 211 Parks, S., 165, 168
Mori, K., 98, 99, 107 Parsons, E.C., 189, 190, 191, 192,211
Morris, S.J., 147, 170 Pascoe, G.C., 178, 187, 192
Mulder, D.W., 96,98, 105 Paskind, H.A., 93, 107
Murdock, G.P., 186,205,211 Patterson, M.L., 139, 147, 156
Murphy, B., 217, 230 Paulos, J.A., 53, 56
Murray, E., 67, 86 Pelligrini, A.D., 113, 133
Murray, H.A., 87, 89, 106, 116, 133, Pelto, G.H., 195, 196, 198,211
171, 181 Pelto, P.J., 195, 196, 198,211
Mutani, R, 91, 98, 99, 107 Pendleton, J., 137, 142
Myrdal, G., 175, 179 Penfield, W., 97, 107
Penfold, J.L., 100, 101, 107
Nadel, S.F., 189, 211 Pepicello, W.J., vii, 59, 61, 63, 65, 67,
Nelson, D.A., 178, 192 69, 79, 82
Naroll, R, 195, 211 Perreault, R M., 164, 171
Nerhardt, G., 20, 36, 41, 46, 47, 48, 56, Perria, L., 28, 36
226, 230 Perrin, R, 99, 104
Nickerson, B.E., 166, 179 Peterson, J.P., 70, 74, 87
Nimmo, H.A., 199,211 Phillips, W., 120, 132
Norback, C.T., 146, 147, 160, 171 Piaget, J., 133
Norback, P.G., 146, 147, 160, 171 Piddington, R, 145, 171
Norbeck, E., 189, 190, 192,211 Pien, D., 46, 53, 56, 104, 106
Norris, D., 102, 107 Pilcher, W.W., 185, 187, 188,205,211
Northcott, H.C., 155, 170 Pilleri, G., 96, 107
Nosik, W.A., 96, 99, 108 Pilon, R, 70, 71, 75. 83
Nowicki, D.R, 221, 230 Plato, 86, 106, 143, 171
Plautus, 35, 40
Obrdlik, A.J., 173, 179, 120, 12 7 Plessner, H., 214, 225
Obrist, W.D., 25, 36 Poeck, K., 93, 96, 107
Occhipinti, E., 100, 106 Poland, W.S., 68,87, 111, 127
240 Author Index
Pollio, H.R, viii, 2, 8, 9, 12, 137, 141, Robinson, V.M., VI: 109, 110, 111, 112,
156,163,179,217,219,225,230 114, 115, 116, 120, 121, 122, 123,
Pompili, A., 100, 106 127
Ponder, M.R, 46, 47, 57 Roethlisberger, F.J., 165, 180
Posen, I.S., 163, 179 Rogal, 0.,98, 107
Potts, R, 148, 170 Roger, J., 98, 99, 107
Powell, B.S., 123, 127 Rogers, C., 121, 127
Powell, C., 156, 174, 179 Rogers, M.P., 93, 107
Powelson, J., 29, 30, 34 Rogers, P., 41, 43, 59
Prange, A.J., 175, 179 Rogers, W., 1
Priest, RF., 92, 106, 172, 179 Rokeach, M., 156, 160, 172
Prince, G., 18, 21 Roland, e.G., 122, 127
Pritchard, E., 146, 154 Rosadini, G., 28, 36
Pruskauer-Apostol, B., 93, 106 Rose, G.J., 111, 127
Roses, A.O., 99, 106
Quesney, L.F., 97, 106 Rosman, B.L., 120, 132
Rossi, G.F., 28,36
Radcliffe-Brown, A.R, 151, 156, 165, Rothbart, M.K., 20,32,36,46,47,50,
180,186,189,204,205,211,39, 53, 54, 56, 104, 106, 140, 156,
40 221, 226, 230
Rader, C., 16, 18,35 Rothman, RA., 149, 171
Radin, P., 190, 193,207,211 Roubicek, J., 99, 107
Ramos, J., 129, 131 Routh, D.K., 41, 55
Ransohoff, R, 136, 156, 175, 180 Roy, D.F., 163, 170, 180
Rao, T.A., 96, 100, 107 Rubin, L., Jr., 136, 142
Rapp, A., 86, 106, 224, 230 Ryan, J.K., 150, 171
Ray, V.F., 190,211
Reardon, K.R, 165, 168, 182, 190 Sackheim, H.A., 25, 28, 34, 36, 102,
Redlich, F.C., 79, 87 107
Reese, RL., 122, 127 Sacks, H., 168, 169, 176, 180
Reich, P., 93, 107 Saenger, G., 150, 171
Reid, L.N., 164, 168 Safer, M.A., 22, 36, 49, 56
Reid, P.T., 155, 171 Sakamoto, Y., 100, 102, 108
Reilly, S., 184, 185, 191 Salameh, W.A., vi, 43, 45, 47, 53, 54,
Reiner, C., 144 55, 57, 58, 59, 81, 85, 87
Reitz, R, 176, 193 Salutin, M., 164, 180
Reivich, M., 25, 36 Sanders, e., 164, 180
Reps, P., 31 Sapolsky, B.S., 95,107,154, 165, 168,
Rice, M.L., 148, 170 171, 184, 191
Richardson, C., 152, 167 Sargent, S., 162, 168
Richman, J., 153, 171 Savage, D., 100, 108
Ricketts, M.L., 192, 193,207,211,212 Schachter, S., 16, 36, 119, 127
Rickwood, L.V., 152, 156 Schaier, A.H., 109, 115, 133
Rightmyer, J., 118, 119, 130 Scheff, T.J., 109, 110, 118, 124, 127
Rivier, J., 101, 105 Schegcoff, E., 168, 176
Roback, A.A., 79, 87 Schemerle~ H., 193, 212
Robillard, J., 59, 73, 74, 83, 110, 113, Schenkein, J.N., 168, 180
133 Scherer, K.R, 9, 12
Author Index 241
Schienberg, P., 69, 87 Slawson, J., 156, 160, 171

Schleicher, M.P., 160, 167, 176, 190 Smith, C.E., 87, 106, 116, 133, 171,
Schonberg, D., 101, 105 181
Schopenhauer, A., 40, 56 Smith, D.L., 166, 180
Schramm, W., 177, 178, 179, 184, 192 Smith, E.E., 151, 155, 157, 163, 178,
Schulz, M.F., 120, 127 180
Schutt, C.O., 100, 108 Smith, J.R., vi, viii, 92, 106, 140, 145,
Schutz, C.E., 135, 142 146, 147, 149,154,157, 169
Schwartz, B.E., 68, 87 Smith, M.D., 152, 171
Schwartz, T., 133 Smith, RE., 178, 192
Schwartzman, H.B., 113, 133 Smyth, M.M., 128, 133
Scogin, F.J., 217, 225, 230 Sohler, T.P., 79, 87
Scott, C., 59, 61, 65, 83 Solomon, P.J., 147, 170
Scott, J.R, 163, 180 Sorel, E., 163, 171
Scott, M.B., 78, 79, 80, 81, 83 Spaeth, J.L., 163, 177
Seely, J., 163, 168 Speck, L.J.M., 140, 154
Seggar, J.F., 155, 170 Speer, J., 22, 35
Seidler, J., 149, 171 Spencer, H., 13, 16, 18,37,40,57,
Selby, H., 194,212 117, 127
Sem-Jacobsen, C.W., 96, 97, 107 Spicer, E.H., 206, 210
Semmes, J., 26, 37 Spiegelman, M., 150, 171
Sethi, P.K., 96, 100, 107 Spinner, B., 153, 170
Shaffer, J.P., 50, 59 Spradley, J.P., 194, 198,212
Shakespeare, W., 36, 37, 40 Springer, S.P., 24, 30, 37
Sharman, A., 187,212 Sroufe, L.A., 7,12,20,37, 152, 157
Sheehy-Skeffington, A., 128 Stanley, H.M., 86, 106
Sher, P.K., 98, 107 Stark-Adamec, c., 99, 104
Sherif, M., 171, 180 Stebbins, R, 180
Sherman, L.W., 151, 156 Stein, H.F., 156, 171
Shils, E., 129, 141 Steinhart, P., 24, 31
Schultz, T.R., 29,37,42,44,45,46, Stephaniszyn, B., 187,212
47,56,57,59,61,70,71,73,74, Stephenson, R.M., 115, 127
75,76,77,78,79,80,81,83, Stem, T., 192,212
100, 106, 110, 113, 115, 133,226, Sternbach, R., 16,37
230, 158, 159, 171 Sternthal, B., 163, 171
Shurcliff, A., 48, 57, 159, 180 Stevens, P., Jr., 205, 212
Sidis, B., 86, 106 Steward, J., 189, 190,212
Sigel, I., 121, 133 Stocking, S.H., 154, 171
Silberberg, A., 165, 169, 186, 191 Stoft, P.E., 16, 18,20,35,125
Silverman, J., 26, 28, 35 Street, B.V., 193,212
Simmons, J.L., 195,210 Streicher, H.W., 154, 171
Simon, N., 145 Streicher, L.H., 154, 159, 171
Simon, R J., 154, 170 Stumphauzer, J.S., 161, 171
Singer, D.G., 177, 192 Sugimoto, T., 100, 102, 108
Singer, J.L., 110, 113, 127, 133,177, Sully, J., 127
192 Suls, J.M., vii, 29, 37,42,47,51,52,
Sjoberg, G., 42, 59 57,59,73,83,100,106,117,131,
Skura, M., 34, 40 150, 155, 226, 230
242 Author Index
Surlin, S.H., 156, 161, 171, 172 Tyler, R, 137

Sutton-Smith, B., 63, 83, 113, 133 Tynan, K., 43, 59
Suzuki, D.T., 26
Svebak, S., 16, 18, 37, 118, 124, 127, Walle, A., 167, 180
128 Wallis, W.O., 87, 106
Swartz, J.D., 55, 59 Walsh, F.B., 98, 108
Swartz, M.J., 194,212 Walsh, J.J., 113, 117, 128
Swash, M., 93, 96, 101, 108 Wapner, S., 50, 59
Swazey, J.P., 125 Wapner, W., 26, 27, 29, 35, 37
Sweeney, e.A., 140, 155 Wartella, E., 148, 170
Sykes, A.J.M., 151, 157, 166, 180, 185, Washid, S., 99, 100, 108
187,188,212 Waters, E., 7, 12, 20, 37, 152, 157
Watkins, B.A., 148, 170
Tajfel, H., 150, 153, 187, 192 Weaver, S.M., 139, 157
Tamborini, R, 187, 192 Weber, T., 153, 172
Taniuchi, K., 100, 102, 108 Wehmeyer, W., 91, 97, 100, 101, 105
Tarachow, S., 162, 180 Weil, A.A., 96, 99, 108
Tate, E.D., 156, 161, 172 Weiman, A.L., 28, 34, 102, 107
Taubman, M.T., 70, 87 Weinberg, M.D., 178, 193
Taylor, A., 61, 69, 83 Weinstein, E.A., 28, 37
Taylor, L., 102, 106 Weisberg, RW., vii, 79, 82
Tedeschi, J., 150, 155 Wells, H.G., 27
Tedesco, N.S., 154, 172 Welsford, E., 161, 180
Terry, RL., 178, 192 Weltregnyi, A., 98, 99, 107
Terwilliger, C., 150, 171 Werner, H., 37,50, 59
Terzian, H., 28, 37,96, 108 Wertheim, A.F., 139, 142
Tew, J.D., 120, 121, 130 Wessell, M.L., 123, 128
Thomae, H., 121, 133 Wheeler, K.J., 129, 131
Thomas, J.W., 178, 192 Wheeler, L., 16, 36,119, 127
Thomas, L., 29 Whitaker, C., 65, 88
Thompson, S., 193,212 Whiter, D.M., 137, 142
Thorelli, 1M., 46, 47, 57 White, H., 166, 180
Thoreau, H.D., 27 Whiting, B., 200, 212
Thorndike, R, 150, 172 Whiting, J., 200, 212
Thorpe, J.S., 55, 59 Wicker, F.W., 46, 47, 52, 57, 100, 106
Thumin, F.J., 50,58 Wilde, L., 121, 125, 127, 133,43,51,
Thurber, J., 20, 116 52, 59, 144, 145, 172
Titiev, M., 189, 191,212 Wilde, 0., 36, 37, 40
Tomkins, S.S., 2, 7,12,21,37 Wilhelm, S., 42, 59
Tomlinson, G., 164, 176 Wilhoit, G.C., 156, 161, 172
Torkildsen, A., 96, 97, 107 Willeford, W., 161, 181,41, 59
Tower, A., 166, 169 Williams, B.R., 160, 172, 179, 181,
Tower, RB., 110, 133 182, 193
Traylor, G., 165, 180 Williams, M., 100, 108
Trousseau, A., 98, 108 Willis, A.C., 52, 57, 100, 106
Tucker, D.M., 24, 25, 28, 30, 37 Willis, E., 146, 172
Tuckman, B.W., 149, 157 Wilson, e.0., 136, 157
Turner, V.W., 192,212 Wilson, C.P., 15, 37, 149, 157
Tyler, J., 158, 169 Wilson, S.A.K., 93, 94, 108
Author Index 243
Winner, E., 26, 29, 37 Young, R.D., 137, 157

Witkin, H.A., 55, 59
Witty, P., 166, 172 Zalis, T.A.A., 112, 128
Wolf, M.A., 160, 165, 168, 172, 179, Zenner, W., 151, 157, 175, 181
181, 182, 190, 193 Zigler, E., 23, 32, 37, 44, 57, 114,
Wolfenstein, M., 109, 117, 123, 133 134
Wolff, H.A., 87,106,116,113,171, Zijderveld, A.C., 166, 181
181 Zillmann, D., vii, 19,22,34,51,57,85,
Wolosin, R.J., 149, 157 89,90,92,93,94,95,98,99,100,
Woods, M.E., 178, 192 101, 102, 106, 107, 116, 117, 134,
Wright, D.S., 128, 131, 144, 145, 154 149,150,157,172,181, vi, 143,
Wright, J.C., 148, 170 147, 148, 154, 157, 159, 160,
165,
Wunsch, J.P., 20, 37 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174,
175, 176, 177, 179, 181, 182, 183,
184, 186, 187, 190, 191, 192, 193
Yalisove, D., 69, 73, 81, 83 Zinsser, w.K., 131, 142
Yanok, G., 144, 172 Ziv, A., vi, vii, 4, 20, 121, 128
Yanok, S., 144, 172 Zorn, E., 5
Yasuna, A., 166, 169 Zurif, E.B., 26, 35
Yawkey, T.D., 113, 133 Zwerling, I., 65, 75, 88
Subject Index
Roman type refers to page numbers in Volume I, italic type refers to page numbers in
Volume II.
Advertising, humor in, 140, 156-157, Behavior therapy, 66

163-164 Bisociation, 40
Affective disorders, 92 Brain damage
see also Emotion humor and, 29
Age differences, 44-46, 52-54, 75-78, joking and, 28
109-130,159-160 language comprehension and, 26-27
Aggression, 116, 123-124,101, 116 laughter and, 28
Amusement, 97-100 Brain wave changes, 18-19
Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis and Burlesque, 137
laughter, 93, 101
Anger, 90 California personality inventory, 43, 44,54
Ankylosing spondylitis, 119 Carroll, Lewis (C.L. Dodgson), 50-51,
Anthropological research, 183-208 56
Anxiety, 1, 63, 69, 110, 145 Cartoons, 42, 136, 149-150, 151-153,
humor and, 115, 116, 177 158
Arousal, 118 content, 151-153
humor and, 14-22, 127, 151, political,136, 149, 159, 162, 163
157-158 Cartoon violence, 166
Arousal boost, 14-16, 127 Catharsis, 111, 118
Arousaljag, 14-16,44,127 Cerebral cortex
Assertiveness, 123-124 emotion and, 89
Attention and humor, 4, 183-184 laughter and, 95-96
Attitude change, 163-164 respiration and, 95
246 Subject Index
Circus, 41, 137 language and, 37, 38

Clowns, 162-163, 189,34,38,41-42, poetry and, 36
43,48,50 subjects of,28
class, 149 theories of, 33
ceremonial, 46 Comedy clubs, 138
religion and, 41 Comedy writers, 42, 56, 146
Cognitive challenge, 32, 44-45, Comic almanacs, 135
114-115 Comic books
Cognitive processes, 39-54 contents of, 150-151
Cognitive processing style, hemispheric juvenile delinquency and, 151
differences in, 24-33 Comic creativity, 34, 39, 54
Cognitive salience, 117 jokes and,34
Cognitive similarity, 149 Comic perspective 7-8
Cognitive style, 120-121 Comic strips, 136-137, 143
Comedians, 122, 163-164, 216, content of, 150
135-137 reading and, 150-151, 166
aggressiveness in, 54 Comic themes, 44-54, 58
attitudes of, toward parents, 47-49, 57 Commedia del arte, 133, 134
audience and, 33, 36, 143 Communication, 149, 167
body image and, 50-51, 56 Companion effects, 144-148
as compared to actors, 42, 44, 45, 53 Comparative studies, 201-204
as compared to artists, 44, 47, 54, 58 Comprehension, 29, 52-53,81, 114-115,
and concern with good and evil, 44-49 120
depression and, 55 Conflict humor, 174
energy and, 34 Content analysis, 131, 146
goals of, 46 Contextual rules, 166-167
intelligence of, 47, 54 Control function, 174-175,205-206
morality of, 57 Conversational analysis, 168-169
omnipotence themes and, 34 Coping mechanism, 117, 123
parents of, 52-54 Creativity, 110,4, 18-19, 33, 34, 54,
personality of, 41-58 56, 58, 64, 81
professional, 13, 48, 54, 55 Crying, 90, 100, 103, 113, 118
psychopathology and, 55-56 stress and, 119
Rorschach protocols and, 44-54
self-image of, 54 Developmental change, 44-46, 52-54,
sex differences and, 45, 47 75-78, 109-130
size imagery and, 49-51 behavioral precursors of, 122-124
social class and, 42 cognitive level, 114-115
socialization of, 46, 48, 51, 57 content based, 116-118
TAT and, 44-54 differential approach and, 119-121
timing of, 34, 38, 39 in elderly, 115
values of, 48, 49 ideographic approach and, 121-124
verbal fluency of, 54 longitudinal study of, 122-124
views of comedy of, 45, 51, 144-145 maturational influences on, 126
Comedy nomothetic approach and, 118
as religion, 23 parent influences on, 122-123,
as social interaction, 33 127-128
dreams and, 39 reinforcement and modeling and,
illusion and, 34 126-129
Subject Index 247
stability and, 125-126 Gelastic epilepsy, 93, 97, 98-101

Differential approach, 118-121 amnesia and, 98
Direct Decision Therapy, 65 hypothalamus versus limbic, 100
Disparagement humor, 51, 52, 85-104, induction and, 98
121, 152, 157 treatment of, 101
development of, 116-118 Graffitti, 140
sex differences and, 11 7 Group culture, 169-171
Dominance, 123-124, 135 Group influences, 148-151, 163
Down's syndrome, 102 Group therapy, 70, 112
Drama, 37 GSR, 17
Editorial cartoons Healing, see Health

persuasion and, 162-163 Health and humor, 3, 109-128
see also Political cartoons Health education
Education humor and, 109, 111, 121-122
entertainment and, 173 humanistic approach to, 110
humor and, 4, 173-193 Heart rate, 16-17
Educational television and humor, 148, Hemisphere differences
160, 173-176, 179, 185 anatomical basis of, 25-26
EEG,98-100 cognitive processing style and, 24-27
Emotion, 222-223, 97 humor and, 27-33
brain and, 89 Holistic medicine, 119
health and, 109 Hostile humor, 116
humor and, 109 Hostility, 157
induced,90, 96-97 Humor
limbic system and, 90, 94-95 adaptation and, 81, 112, 144
sham, 5-11, 90 in advertising, 156-157, 163-164
Entertainment, 144, 157-161 aggression and, 116, 116
Epilepsy, see Gelastic epilepsy ambiguity and, 25
Ethnic humor, 12, 140 American, 132-134
Ethnographic research, 195-201 anxiety and, 177
Exaggeration and humor, 36, 134 applications of, 2, 111, 112, 123
Experimenter effects, 139-144 arousal and, 14-22, 127, 151,
Eye contact, 144 157-158
cognitive challenge and, 32, 44-45,
Facial Action Coding System, 4-11 114-115
Facial diplegia, 93 as communication, 149, 167,113, 145
Family therapy, 65 comprehension of, 29, 52-53, 81,
Feigned funniness, 5-11 114-115, 120
Field theory, 213-229 conflict and, 174
Feminist humor, 89-90 contextual rules of, 166-167
Figure-ground, 214 control function of, 174-175
Film, 138, 143 coping and, 110, 113, 120, 144
Folklore, 34, 132 cues, 145
Fool, 161-162 development of, 109-130,2, 7-20,
Friends versus strangers, 217-2 J 8 122
Funeral friendships, 187 disparagement, 51-52, 85-104
as diagnostic tool, 75-79
Gallows humor, 173, 120, 124 as distraction, 177
248 Subject Index
Humor (cont.) satire and, 162

education and, 4, 121-122, 173-193 scatological, 190
educational television and, 148, selective exposure to, 174-176
173-176 self-actualization and, 64
effectiveness in therapy of, 68-70 sensitivity to, 8-10, 12
and elderly, 109, 115 sex differences in, 49-50, 117, 119,
and emotion, 222-223, 109 45,47, 70
entertainment and, 157-161 sexual arousal and, 158
exaggeration and, 13-15 sexist, 149
functions of, 111, 112, 113-122, 145, social change and, 115
187-188 social class differences in, 112, 119
group culture and, 169-171 as social control, 115
in group therapy, 70 social cues and, 91
harmful effects of, 82-84, 110-111 social distance and, 114
health and, 109-124 socialization and, 46, 48, 51, 57, 122
in hospital setting, 114-115, 120, 121, sociological studies and, 159-176
124 social roles and, 161-164
intergroup, 150 in speech, 162
intragroup, 150 stereotypes and, 166
incongruity, 41, 54, 73-74, 77-81, stress and, 1, 116-119, 123
100, 225-228,5~ 158 techniques of, 13-20, 70-79
joking relationships and, 165-166 tendentious, 98, 101-103, 112,218
justice and, 95 tests of, 79, 81
learning and, 4, 17, 165-166, in textbooks, 165, 186
177-188 themes of, 121
in lectures, 178, 186-187 therapeutic uses of, 66-82
lifted weights and, 226-227 timing of, 160, 175-176, 180-181
linguistics and, 59-81 trickster studies and, 192-194
metacognitive influences on, 22-24 tragedy and, 117
modeling and, 122 vigilance and, 183-184
naturalistic context of, 164-169 see also Laughter
origins of, 122 Humor Rating Scale, 71, 72-74
pathology and, 92 Humoral theory, 117
persuasion and, 161-165 Humorist, see Comedian
physiological correlates of, 16-20 Hypothalamus, 94-95, 97
physiological theories of, 13-24, laughter and, 97, 99
30-33
political, 172,149, 159, 162, 163 Ideoculture, 170
popular culture and, 129-141 Ideographic approach, 118, 121-124
problem solving and, 81, 140 Imaginative play, 110, 111, 128
production, 78-81,110,118,137,81 Improvisation, see Comedy clubs
in psychotherapy, 119, 122-124 Incongruity, 39-54,53, 121, 158
publications, 109, 136, 160, 194 resolution of, 41, 54, 74, 77-81, 159
racial-ethnic differences in, 88-90, 95, Individual differences, 118-124, 158
112, 119, 171-172 Informants, 198-199
recall and, 178-179 Intelligence, 119
religion and, 189-192, 205-206 Intergroup humor, 150
relevant versus irrelevant, 184-189 Interpersonal competence, 124
ritual, 189-192 Intragroup humor, 150
Subject Index 249
Irony, 63, 185 and liberation, 216

limbic system and, 94-97, 99, 103
Jokes, 33, 75, 139-140, 144 motor patterns, 136,91, 93-94
books of, 132 multiple sclerosis and,93, 101
content of, 153 muscle tone and, 116
dissemination of, 144 in neonates, 98, 103
ethnic, 140 nonhumorous, 151-152
favorite, 65, 75 observation of, effects of, 141-142
in medical setting, 115-117 pathological, 91-104, 110-111
mass media and, 144 physical characteristics of, 3
stereotypes and, 153, 166 physiology of, 111-113, 117-119
Joking relationship, 165-166, 185-189, in psychotherapy, 111-112
204-205, 115 relationship of, to smiling, 8-9
Journalism and humor, 134-136 respiration and, 97, 118
sex differences and, 146
Knowledge distortion, Ill, 115 sharing, 146-148
size of group and, 145
Language and comedy, 36-37, 38 social context of, 10,91-92, 103
Laughter social facilitation of, 128-129
activation of, 97 temporal lobe and, 93, 96
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis and, 93, tension reduction and, 13-14
101 threshold, 96, 103
brain tumor and, 94 Learning
catharsis and, 118 attention and, 177
cerebral cortex and, 95-96, 103 humor and, 110,4,17,122,177-188
conversational, 168-169 rehearsal and, 177
components of, 94, 97, 99 Liberation and humor, 216
as embodied social event, 214-219 Limbic system
emotion and, 91 emotions and, 90, 94-95
epilepsy and, 93, 98-101 laughter and, 95-97, 99, 103
excessive, 91-92, 96, 100 Linguistic humor, 59-81, 110-113
as exercise, 118 block elements of, 65-69
experimenter effects on, 139-144 deep structure of, 70-73
explosive, 147, 215 lexical ambiguity as, 70-73
feigned, 5-11 phonological ambiguity as, 70-73, 110
forced, 92-93, 96 production of, 78-81
and freedom, 215-218 riddles as, 61-69
frontal lobes and, 96, 98 surface structure ambiguity as, 70-73
functions of, 145 Logotherapy, 65, 123
group influences on, 148-151 Longitudinal study, 122-124
health and, 113, 118
healthy versus pathological, 110-111 Magazines, humor in, 135-136, 176
heart rate and, 119 Mass media, 138-139
hemispheric lateralization and, 28, humor in, 143-172, 174-176
102, 118-119 learning and, 177-188
hypothalamus and, 97, 99 see also specific media
incidence of, 143, 147 Mastery play cycle, 111, 115
inhibition of, 92 Metacognition, 22-24, 121
kinds of, 9 Metacommunication, 164
250 Subject Index
Metalinguistic ability, 74 Provocative therapy, 62-63, 66, 82, 123

Metaphor, 110 assumptions in, 4, 63
Methodology, 138-152, 195-204, humor and, 63
66-69, 71, 80, 82, 91, 131, 174 Psychoanalytic theory, 50, 65, 68, 70,
MMPI,55 75, 109, 115
Motivation, 4, 80 Psychopathology among comedians,
Multiple sclerosis and laughter, 93, 101 55-56
Muscle tension, 17 Psychosomatic illness, 109
Music, 176 Psychotherapy
dimensions of, 71
Natural High Therapy, 63-64, 66, 82, ethical issues in, 82
123 humor in, 61-85, 112, 119
creativity and, 64 outcome of, 82
role playing and, 64 research in, 66-70
self-actualization and, 64 see also specific types of therapy
Naturalistic context, studying humor in,
164-169
Racial-ethnic differences in humor,
Newspapers, 145, 149-150
88-90,112,119,171-172
humor in, 162
Racism
Nomothetic approach, 118
humor and, 149-151, 155-156, 161,
N onhumorous laughter, 151-152
167
in mass media, 154
Obscene humor, 134
Radio, 138
Rage, 90
Paradoxical intention, 65
Rational-Emotive Therapy, 65
Parkinson's disease, 93
Recovery from surgery, 2
Parody, 190
Reflection-impulsivity, 120-121
Participant observation, 196-198
Reinforcement and modeling effects,
Pattern establishment, 199-201
126-129
Personality and comedy, 43-58, 79
Religion, 189-192, 41
Physical orientation and laughter, 144
clowns and, 41
Physical proximity and laughter, 144
functions of, 23, 26
Physiological arousal, see Arousal
Physiological correlates of humor and Reference group and humor, 171-172
Respiratory changes in laughter, 17-18
laughter, 16-20
Reversal theory, 17-19
Play, 113
Riddles, 61-69, 78-79, 111, 118
cues, 43, 54
Ridicule, 110, 165
face, 4
Ritual, 189-192
Playful mood, 152
Role playing, 64
Poetry, 36
Political humor, 172
cartoons, 149, 159, 162-163 Sarcasm, 11, 110
Popular culture Satire, 162
definition of, 129 Selective exposure, 160
humor and, 129-141 Self-actualization, 64
public attitudes and, 141 Self-disclosure, 62
research on, 130 humor and, 82
Power, 161-162 Self-esteem, 64
Practical jokes, 163, 5 Self-fulfilling prophecy, 17
Subject Index 251
Sex differences, in humor and laughter, Television

49-50,95, II7, II9, 146, 165, audience for, 140, 146
158-159 comedy and, 143
Sexism content analysis of, 147
humor and, 149-151, 153-156, educational, 148, 160
166-167 education and, 144
in mass media, 154 humor and, 146, 160
Sex role reversal, 190 jokes and, 144
Sexual arousal and humor, 158 situation comedy on, 139
Sexual humor, II6, 167, 190,164 tendententions humor on, 148
Sham mirth, 5-II, 92 see also Mass media
Sham rage, 92 Temperament, 125
Sibling-in-Iaw joking, 188 Temporal lobe
Situation comedy, see Television dysfunction, 96
Smiling, 137-138, 168,90-91, 112-113 laughter and, 93, 96
facial muscles and, 89 smiling and, 96
forms of, 3-4, 9 Theater, 137
as embodied social event, 219-222 of the absurd, 37
social context of, 10 Theories of humor:
temporal lobe and, 96 arousal, 14-22
Social class differences, in humor, 112, cognitive, 39-44, 47-54
II9 disposition, 51-52, 87-104, 157
Social cohesion, 173-174 dual process model, 49-51
Social influences, 135-152 field, 213-229
companion effects of, 144-148 Freudian, 43, 98-99, II7
experimenter effects of, 139-144 hemispheric lateralization, 30-33
social facilitation and, 128-129, incongruity, 41, 225-228, 158
145-151 incongruity-resolution, 41-54, 73-74,
Socialization, 46, 48, 51, 57, 122 77-81, 100
Social psychological research, 135-152 joking relationship, 204-205
Social roles, 161-164 linguistic, 60-81
clown as, 162-163 misattribution, 100-103
comedian as, 163-164 physiological, 13-24
fool as, 161-162 reference group, 88-90, 171-172
wit/joker as, 163 reversal, 17-18
Sociological research, 159-176 sociological, 150
Stability of humor, 125-126 superiority, 86,160,224-225,34
Stages of humor development, 110-115 tension reduction, 13-14, 2
Status, 167-170 Tickling, 152,33
Stereotypes, 166 Tragedy, 29
Story comprehension, 110-113 comedy and, 53, 54
Stress and humor, 1, 5, 9, 14, 116-119 Trickster, 192-194, 206-207
Structuralism, 131
Swift, Jonathan, 50-51, 56 Vaudeville, 13 7
Violence, 166
Teaching Wit, 151

with humor, 109, 111. 121-122, 173 versus the comic, 145
see also Education, Health education and the unconscious, 145

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HANDBOOK OF

PAUL E. MCGHEE and

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

©1983 Springer-Verlag New York Inc.

Jacket illustration by Stuart Leeds.

ISBN-13: 978-1-4612-5574-1 e-ISBN-13: 978-1-4612-5572-7

should be defined. Nor is there agreement on how appreciation or comprehen-

Felt Versus Feigned Funniness: Issues in Coding Smiling and

Mahadev L. Apte, Department of Anthropology, Duke University, Durham,

Felt versus Feigned Funniness:

Full well they laughed with counter/eited glee

A smile is the chosen vehicle for all ambiguities. Herman Melville

A not-infrequent way to begin a treatise on humor is to state that although the

DESCRIPTIONS OF LAUGHS AND SMILES

The sound of laughter is produced by a deep inspiration followed by short, interrupted,

Dearborn (1900) added that in laughing and smiling there occur:

In current research, the concern has focused on discriminating types of

MEASUREMENT OF FACIAL MOVEMENT

FEIGNED VERSUS FELT FUNNINESS

Specific Action Units

While AU 12 has been found to relate systematically to self-reported

Table 1-1. Abbreviated descriptions of appearance characteristics of selected FACS

AU Number FACS Name Appearance Changes

6 Cheek Raiser Lifts the cheeks upward and draws skin

as to whether scales of "amusement" or "funniness" would have yielded

Smiling typically is symmetrical but it is not uncommon to see a "split" smile in

HUMOR IMPLICATIONS OF FACIAL RESPONSES

Smiling and laughter are fundamental yet complicated human responses. We

Relationship between Smiling and Laughing

Kinds of Smiling and Laughing

SOCIAL CONTEXT OF SMILING AND LAUGHING

Gottman, J. M. Detecting cyclicity in social interaction. Psychological Bulletin, 1979,

The Role of Arousal and

PHYSIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF HUMOR

enough to be aversive. As will be noted later in this chapter, it remains unclear

would be expected to produce such extreme arousal fluctuations. This suggests

Physiological Correlates of Humor Appreciation

measures instead of directly recording arousal changes). He failed, however, to

Respiratory Changes. Studies of respiratory changes during humor are of

Brain Wave Changes. Attempts to link humor to changes in electrical activity

negative waves appear to "reflect the interruption of ongoing sentence

Implications for Arousal Theory. In general, the studies reviewed here

Laughter, Arousal, and Humor

measures used. Future investigators should attempt to overcome this difficulty,

Metacognitive Influences on Perceived Funniness

In the past decade, a growing body of research in cognitive psychology has

HEMISPHERE LATERALIZATION AND HUMOR

Hemisphere Differences in Cognitive Processing Style

Simultaneous integration refers to the synthesis of separate elements into groups,

Successive information processing refers to processing of information in a serial order.

The right hemisphere's neuropsychological organization appears especially suited to

Role of the Right Hemisphere in Understanding

the patients' apparent insensitivity to incongruities reflected, at least in some cases, a

Gardner (1981) concludes elsewhere that right-hemisphere patients "lack the

Humor and the Right Hemisphere

The most common characteristic of attempts to explain humor is probably an

should show a severely disturbed sense of humor, including inappropriate

Spontaneous Laughter. Laughter disorders have long been known to medical

Spontaneous Joking. Evidence on the effect of brain damage on spontaneous

Humor Comprehension and Appreciation. Wapner, Hamby, and Gardner