Halaguena Vs PAL

G.R. No.
172013 October 2, 2009
PATRICIA HALAGUEÑA, MA. ANGELITA L. PULIDO, MA. TERESITA P. SANTIAGO, MARIANNE

V. KATINDIG, BERNADETTE A. CABALQUINTO, LORNA B. TUGAS, MARY CHRISTINE A.
VILLARETE, CYNTHIA A. STEHMEIER, ROSE ANNA G. VICTA, NOEMI R. CRESENCIO, and
other flight attendants of PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INCORPORATED, Respondent.
Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) on
different dates prior to November 22, 1996. They are members of the Flight Attendants and Stewards
Association of the Philippines (FASAP), a labor organization certified as the sole and exclusive
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the flight attendants, flight stewards
and pursers of respondent.
Respondent and FASAP entered into a CBA incorporating the terms and conditions of their
agreement for the years 2000 to 2005, hereinafter referred to as PAL-FASAP CBA.
Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, provides that:
A. For the Cabin Attendants hired before 22 November 1996:
3. Compulsory Retirement
Subject to the grooming standards provisions of this Agreement, compulsory retirement shall be fifty-
five (55) for females and sixty (60) for males. x x x.
Petitioners and several female cabin crews manifested that the aforementioned CBA provision on
compulsory retirement is discriminatory, and demanded for an equal treatment with their male
counterparts. This demand was reiterated in a letter5 by petitioners' counsel addressed to respondent
demanding the removal of gender discrimination provisions in the coming re-negotiations of the PAL-
FASAP CBA.
President of FASAP submitted their 2004-2005 CBA proposals6 and manifested their willingness to
commence the collective bargaining negotiations between the management and the association, at
the soonest possible time.
On July 29, 2004, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction7 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City against respondent for the invalidity of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-
FASAP CBA. The RTC set a hearing on petitioners' application for a TRO and, thereafter, required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
RTC ruling
Case seeks a declaration of the nullity of the questioned provision of the CBA, which is within the
Court's competence, with the allegations in the Petition constituting the bases for such relief sought.
The RTC issued a TRO on August 10, 2004,enjoining the respondent for implementing Section 144,
Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA.
Motion for reconsideration was also denied. RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining respondent from further implementing Sec. 144, Part A of the PAL-
FASAP CBA pending the resolution of the case.
CA Ruling
Respondent files Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction praying that the order of the RTC, which denied its objection to its
jurisdiction, be annuled and set aside for having been issued without and/or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the respondent court is by us declared to have NO JURISDICTION OVER THE

CASE BELOW and, consequently, all the proceedings, orders and processes it has so far issued
therein are ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Respondent court is ordered to DISMISS the case. Subject
Matter is a Labor Dispute or grievance is contrary to law and jurisprudence.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioners' action challenging the legality or
constitutionality of the provisions on the compulsory retirement age contained in the CBA between
respondent PAL and FASAP.
SC Ruling:
YES, it is under RTC jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of the court is determined on the basis of the material
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief prayed for irrespective of whether plaintiff is
entitled to such relief.
In the case at bar, the allegations in the petition for declaratory relief plainly show that petitioners'
cause of action is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA.
The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the
application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret the constitution
and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction.
In Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani, this Court held that not every dispute between an employer
and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of
their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under
Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship
which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective
bargaining agreement.
Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions between employees and employer where the
employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different
source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court.18 Here, the employer-
employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action ultimately
arose from different sources of obligation, i.e., the Constitution and CEDAW.
Thus, where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other
labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction
over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the labor arbiter and the NLRC. In
such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in
wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the
general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily
ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to
these agencies disappears.
If We divest the regular courts of jurisdiction over the case, then which tribunal or forum shall
determine the constitutionality or legality of the assailed CBA provision?
This Court holds that the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrators do not have the power to
determine and settle the issues at hand. They have no jurisdiction and competence to decide
constitutional issues relative to the questioned compulsory retirement age. Their exercise of
jurisdiction is futile, as it is like vesting power to someone who cannot wield it.
In Saura v. Saura, Jr.,21 this Court emphasized the primacy of the regular court's judicial power
enshrined in the Constitution that is true that the trend is towards vesting administrative bodies like
the SEC with the power to adjudicate matters coming under their particular specialization, to insure a
more knowledgeable solution of the problems submitted to them. This would also relieve the regular
courts of a substantial number of cases that would otherwise swell their already clogged dockets. But
as expedient as this policy may be, it should not deprive the courts of justice of their power to
decide ordinary cases in accordance with the general laws that do not require any particular
expertise or training to interpret and apply. Otherwise, the creeping take-over by the
administrative agencies of the judicial power vested in the courts would render the judiciary
virtually impotent in the discharge of the duties assigned to it by the Constitution.
In the same vein, the dispute in the case at bar is not between FASAP and respondent PAL, who
have both previously agreed upon the provision on the compulsory retirement of female flight
attendants as embodied in the CBA. The dispute is between respondent PAL and several female
flight attendants who questioned the provision on compulsory retirement of female flight attendants.
Thus, applying the principle in the aforementioned case cited, referral to the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration would not serve the interest of the petitioners.
Besides, a referral of the case to the grievance machinery and to the voluntary arbitrator under the
CBA would be futile because respondent already implemented Section 114, Part A of PAL-FASAP
CBA when several of its female flight attendants reached the compulsory retirement age of 55.
Further, FASAP, in a letter dated July 12, 2004, addressed to PAL, submitted its association's
bargaining proposal for the remaining period of 2004-2005 of the PAL-FASAP CBA, which includes
the renegotiation of the subject Section 144. However, FASAP's attempt to change the questioned
provision was shallow and superficial, to say the least, because it exerted no further efforts to pursue
its proposal. When petitioners in their individual capacities questioned the legality of the compulsory
retirement in the CBA before the trial court, there was no showing that FASAP, as their
representative, endeavored to adjust, settle or negotiate with PAL for the removal of the difference in
compulsory age retirement between its female and male flight attendants, particularly those employed
before November 22, 1996. Without FASAP's active participation on behalf of its female flight
attendants, the utilization of the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration would be pointless.
The trial court in this case is not asked to interpret Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA.
Interpretation, as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, is the art of or process of discovering and
ascertaining the meaning of a statute, will, contract, or other written document. 24 The provision
regarding the compulsory retirement of flight attendants is not ambiguous and does not require
interpretation. Neither is there any question regarding the implementation of the subject CBA
provision, because the manner of implementing the same is clear in itself. The only controversy lies in
its intrinsic validity.
Although it is a rule that a contract freely entered between the parties should be respected, since a
contract is the law between the parties, said rule is not absolute. (Pakistan International Airlines
Corporation v. Ople).
The question as to whether said Section 114, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA is discriminatory or not
is a question of fact. This would require the presentation and reception of evidence by the parties in
order for the trial court to ascertain the facts of the case and whether said provision violates the
Constitution, statutes and treaties. A full-blown trial is necessary, which jurisdiction to hear the same
is properly lodged with the the RTC. Therefore, a remand of this case to the RTC for the proper
determination of the merits of the petition for declaratory relief is just and proper.

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G.R. No.

172013 October 2, 2009

PATRICIA HALAGUEÑA, MA. ANGELITA L. PULIDO, MA. TERESITA P. SANTIAGO, MARIANNE

Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, provides that:

A. For the Cabin Attendants hired before 22 November 1996:

WHEREFORE, the respondent court is by us declared to have NO JURISDICTION OVER THE

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