a journal of political

philosophy

volume 2/3 spring 1972

page

157 Jacob klein about plato's philebus

183 dain a. trafton on corneille's horace

194 harry v. Jaffa torn sawyer: hero of middle america

226 martin diamond the dependence of fact upon

martinus nijhoff, the hague

edited at

queens college of the city university

of new york
interpretation
a journal of political
philosophy
volume 2 issue 3

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hilail gildin executive editor

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kenneth w. thompson

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interpretation

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 157

*
ABOUT PLATO'S PHILEBUS

Jacob Klein

To speak about a Platonic dialogue, about a Platonic dialogue, means

to do violence to it. A sense of guilt
will, therefore, be a continuous source
of pain within me while I am speaking. But I cannot resist the temptation
to shed some light some as it were on the Philebus. 1 hope
moonlight,
you will forgive me 1 cannot for sounding extremely pedantic, for
speaking much longer than I should, and for making it sometimes very
difficult for you to follow.
Let me state five basic points on which my
talking about the Philebus
wiU rest.

First: a Platonic dialogue is not a treatise or the text of a lecture; it is

not comparable in this respect to a work of Aristotle or, for that matter,
to any of Plotinus's Enneads as edited
by Porphyry. A Platonic dialogue
is usually a drama, a mime, in which what happens cannot be separated
from what is said and argued about.
Secondly: however serious the purpose and the content of a Platonic
dialogue, its seriousness is permeated by playfulness; indeed, as we can
read in the sixth letter attributed to
Plato, seriousness and play are sisters.
The comical aspect of a Platonic dialogue can never be completely dis
regarded.
Thirdly: no Platonic dialogue can be said to represent what might be
doctrine."
called and has been called the "Platonic The dialogue may well
1
hint, though never "with perfect
clarity,"

at genuine and ultimate thoughts

of Plato, the thinker. The Sophist, for example, does that most certainly.

But an unimpeachable source provides us with more direct information

about Plato's thinking than he himself ever put down in writing. This
source is Aristotle, who spent twenty years at that place of leisure, the
Academy, and heard what Plato himself said. I assume that we have to pay
attention to Aristotle's reports, never forgetting that Aristotle has his own
way of describing other people's thoughts, a peculiar terminology rooted in
his own thinking and not in the thinking of those other people about whom

he reports.
Fourthly: in the last two centuries scholars, not all, but most of them,
have tried to understand the Platonic dialogues as belonging to different
"development"
stages of a in Plato's own thinking. Now, it is of course
possible that Plato, in his long life, changed his views on many and

perhaps even on most important points. But to follow a Platonic dialogue

means to take it as it is, as one whole, in which the interlocutors play a

* A lecture St. John's College,

given at Annapolis, Maryland, on May 20, 1971.
i Soph. 254 C.
 158 Interpretation

definite and unique role and in which what is said and what is happening
does not depend on anything that is said and is happening in any other
"development"
dialogue. Before we could understand any in Plato's
thinking, it is incumbent on us to understand each dialogue in its own
terms. This understanding is not helped by assigning a dialogue to a
certain period in Plato's life. Yet, in the case of the Philebus, it will not be

unimportant to take notice of not in

the time this dialogue was written
"developmental"
order to track some deviation in Plato's thinking, but
merely to establish whether certain statements in the dialogue may refer
to somebody's conspicuous behavior within the Academy in Plato's later
days. And, happily enough, there is general agreement that the Philebus
is a late dialogue, although some of the reasons for this dating might be
questionable.
Fifthly: every word in a Platonic dialogue counts, andfor somebody in
the dialogue to remain silent may count even more. That's why talking
about a dialogue must
necessarily remain insufficient.

And now let us approach the Philebus. The conversation takes place
in Athens; we do
learn exactly where; it may be at a gymnastic school
not

or at a wrestling school. What we read is a part of a very long conversation

which begins some time in the afternoon. There are three interlocutors:

Socrates, Protarchus, Philebus: many young men, half a dozen or a dozen

perhaps, are listening. Socrates is, well, Socrates a man devoted to
inquiries and discussions and a friend and lover of youth. Protarchus is
the Athenian, Calhas. Philebus is not known at all.
son of a well-known

He is one of the few personages in the Platonic dialogues, like Callicles,

Diotima, Timaeus, invented by Plato; if they do not remain nameless, like
the Stranger from Elea and the Stranger from Athens, their names are

appropriately coined. The name of Philebus indicates that he is a "lover of

youth"

as Socrates is. Philebus seems to be young, but slightly older than

Protarchus and all the listening young men around them.2

The title of the dialogue as it has been handed down to us is Philebus.
This title is never mentioned in the writings of Plato's contemporaries.
Aristotle refers to what is said in the dialogue at least eight times, mention
ing Plato once. There seems to be no reason, however, to doubt that the
"Philebus"
title is genuine. Moreover, there is one good reason which
speaks for its authenticity. The dialogue contains 2,369 hnes
forcefully
(I did not count them, but somebody did). Of these 2,369 lines only 23
are spoken by Philebus (those I counted). He raises his voice altogether

only 14 times. Under these circumstances, who else but Plato could have
chosen the name of Philebus for the title of the dialogue? There will be
more to say about this matter later on.
The main question raised in the dialogue is: What is the best human
life? And this question has to cope primarily with the all-pervasive feeling

a 16 B.
 A bout Plato's Philebus 1 59

of pleasure, common to all living beings haunting, filling, mocking us.

All of us without exception want tobe pleased in thousands and

thousands of different ways: we seek to lie down or to sit comfortably;
we hke hearing things that flatter us; we enjoy good company, witty words,
good drink delight in traveling, in going to the theatre or
and food; we
to the movies, in looking at beautiful things; we love caresses, precious

gifts, wild emotions; we loose ourselves with rapture in exerting power,

in sexual satisfaction, in ecstasies, and so on, and so on. A list of
pleasures like the one I have just given is not to be found in the dialogue,

but an infinite number of possible pleasures is implied in the arguments

we are facing. It is Philebus who looks at Pleasure as the highest good,
who sees in Pleasure not only the best of human possessions, but the
goal after which all living beings strive. Pleasure (f|5ovr|) is the goddess

he worships. And quite a few of us, I think, follow him.

Socrates does not. He contends that there is something better and more

desirable than pleasure, to wit, thoughtfulness in deciding how to act (to

(poovetv), is intelligible only (to voeiv), the
the apprehending of what
power of memory (to fteuvrio-'dai) and that which is akin to these, right

opinion (56|a opdr)) and true calculations (odry&Eig Xoyiauni); but Socrates

carefully adds that these powers are better and more desirable than
pleasure for those beings who are able to share in these powers; only to
beings who have this ability will these powers be profitable, now and in
the future.
This juxtaposition of both contentions, of that of Philebus and of that
of Socrates, is made by Socrates very shortly after we begin reading. It
is introduced by Socrates with the foUowing words: "See, then, Protarchus,
what the assertion is which you are now to accept from Philebus, and
what our assertion is, against which you are to argue, if you do not agree
them?"
3 These
with it. Shall we give a summary of each of words are

the very first words of the dialogue. But what immediately is

strikes us

that they cannot be understood as indicating beginning of a con

the

versation; they just continue what was said before; if they were the

beginning of a conversation, the vocative nocoTcipxe would be preceded

"then"

by co (cb nrjcuTarjY,> not simply notbxaQxe); and the words

"now"

(Sf|) and (vuvi) would not be used. Listen again: "See, then

Protarchus, what the assertion is which you are now to accept from
Philebus . The dialogue has no true beginning. Nor does it have a
. .

true ending. This is the last sentence we read, spoken by Protarchus:

"There is still a little left, Socrates; you will certainly not give up before
We do
remains."

we do, and I shall remind you of what not yet under

stand why the dialogue has no beginning and no ending. But we see (and
this is important), when we begin reading, that Protarchus has to take
over the thesis upheld by Philebus. More about that later.
Enjoyment and thoughtfulness are the two banners that Protarchus and

s il A.
160 Interpretation

Socrates are respectively waving. The life of pleasure and the life of
thoughtfulness face each other. But it becomes clear immediately that
Socrates is considering some other life superior to both of them.4 He will
keep reverting to this third life. It will finally be described in the last
pages of the dialogue.

What follows the juxtaposition of the two views, that of Philebus and
Socrates'
Protarchus on the one hand and that of Socrates on the other, is
insistence that pleasure has many different aspects: "For, when you just
simply hear her named, she is one thing, but surely she takes on all sorts

of shapes which are, in a way, unlike each

other."5
Socrates gives two

simple, though significant, examples: the pleasures of a hcentious man are

very different from those of a self-restrained man, who enjoys his very
self-restraint; the pleasures of a fool are very different from those of a
thoughtful man, who enjoys his very thoughtfulness. No, says Protarchus,
the sources of pleasure may be different, may have an opposite character,
but "how can pleasure help being of all things most like pleasure, that is,
itself."6
hke Yes, says Socrates, color and figure are what they are, but
colors and figures can be very, very different and even, in the case of

colors, most opposed to each other, like black and white. Protarchus does
not see how this could make him change his mind. Socrates tries for the
third incisively, anticipating
time, this time be said later in the
what will

dialogue. No argument, he says, disputes that pleasant things are pleasant.

But Protarchus's contention, which upholds Philebus's conviction, implies
that all pleasant things are good. That's what is wrong. Pleasant things
are for the most part bad and only some are good. But you, Protarchus,
says Socrates, call all of them good, although you might be forced by the
argument to agree that they are otherwise different. Protarchus tacitly
admits that pleasures may be very different from each other, and even
opposed to each other, but sticks to his main point that pleasures, inas

much as they are pleasures, are always good.

At this point Socrates goes back to his own contention, namely, that
thoughtfulness (q)o6vr|0ig) and the apprehension of the intelligible (vovq)
are good. He adds to these for the first time knowledge (Ejucnfpr|)
and predicts that many kinds of knowledge will come to the fore, some

among them unlike each other. Should it turn out that some are even

opposed to each other, could he, Socrates, then cling to the point that all
himself"
knowledge is alike and not unlike Protarchus "save in an

absurdity?

Protarchus is pleased that both, his assertion and that of Socrates,

receive the same treatment and is now willing to grant that there are many
different pleasures just as there are many different knowledges (we have
to note that he does not mention opposite pleasures and knowledges).

4 11 D.
s 12 C.
12D/E.
 About Plato's Philebus 161

Socrates is satisfied with Protarchus's concession about the manyness

within knowledge and within pleasure and speaks as follows: "With no

concealment, then, Protarchus, of the differentiation within my good and

within yours, but
facing it squarely, let us be bold and see if perchance,
on examination, it will tell us whether we should
say that the good is
thing."7
pleasure or thoughtfulness or some other third It is the second

time that Socrates reverts to thepossibility that something third may be

the best of human possessions. He proceeds by strengthening this state
ment by an assertion which has a wide, wide range.
This is one of the transitions in which the dialogue abounds. (Paren
thetical in the 2nd century A.D. Galen wrote a treatise
remark: entitled
Philebus,"
"On the transitions in the which is unfortunately not extant).

Let me say a few words about the transition we are now facing.
Up to this point the talk was about things most familiar to all of us,
about pleasure and about thoughtfulness and about knowledge, this last
word taken in its colloquial and vague sense. The talk was concerned

about our lives in this our world. What Socrates is undertaking now is to
lift the conversation to a level of all-embracing universality, disregarding
pleasure and knowledge altogether. He will come back to them after a
short while and then launch out to an even higher level. Why does he do

that? The answer is: to find the ultimate sources of what is so close to us

and usuaUy unquestioned

by us. The dialogue seeks to link the most
common to the most uncommon and fundamental. To find the link will
Socrates'
require a great deal of vigor on part.

The manyness within pleasure and within knowledge leads Socrates

"astounding" one"

to remind Protarchus of the assertions that "many are

and that "one is many."9

There is nothing particularly surprising and
difficult about these assertions if they refer to visible and tangible things,
which come into being and perish. A man, for example, is one, but he is

also many, because he has many members and parts. But when we con
looks,"
sider intelligibles, the eISt] of things, the "invisible which can be
encountered only in speech of which is one and
(iv Wyco), and each one
becomes
many"

unique, the "one and problem extremely perplexing

(Socrates mentions four of the intelligibles: the One Man, the One Ox,
the One Beauty, the One Good). That's where the trouble sets in. Any

young man, says Socrates, challenging those present, any young man, once
he has tasted the flavor of that perplexity and thinks he has found a
treasure of wisdom, does not spare anyone, neither himself, nor his parents,
nor any human being, who can hear him, and joyfully sets every possible

argument in motion, confounding everybody. Protarchus feels hit. "Do you

Socrates,"
not see, he says, "how many we are and that we are all young
men? Are you not afraid that we shall join with Philebus and attack you,

7 14 B.
8 14 C.
162 Interpretation

Socrates'

if you revile us?"9

But challenge works. Protarchus wants

Socrates to find a better road than was used up to now and to lead them

on.

Socrates retorts that there is a better road, which he always loved, which
is easy to point out, but very difficult to foUow. Whatever human art has
Socrates'

discovered had been brought to light through it. description of

this better road marks a new transition in the dialogue.
to some
men,"

Socrates calls this road a "gift of gods to which we owe

Prometheus together with some gleaming fire (let me remind you: Prome
theus stole the fire he gave to men). The ancients, who were better than
we and lived nearer the gods, says Socrates with deadpan seriousness, have
handed down to us the tradition that all the things which are ever said
to exist are sprung from One and Many and have, inherent in their nature,
Limit (jtspac;) and Infinitude (cuiEtpia). We shall come back to this point

in a little while. What Socrates emphasizes now is that we must, in every

case, look for one eI8o? (he uses the word Ibea here) and next for two, if
there be if not, for three or some other number; and we must
two, and

treat each of these t'ibt] in the same way, that is, subdivide each of them,
"until we can see that the original one is not just one and many and
is."

may bid farewell to infinity,

10 Then we
infinite, but also how many it
bid fareweU to the ibia of infinity.
Protarchus wants Socrates to clarify what he has said. No wonder!

Socrates provides this clarification by pointing to the letters of the alphabet.

The sound which we emit through our mouth can be called one, yet it is
infinite in diversity. A god or a godlike man, as an Egyptian story teUs,
observed, however, that there are distinct vowel sounds, semi-vowel

sounds and consonants in Greek 7 vowels, 3 semi-vowels or sonants

(X, p, a), and 14 consonants, more exactly 10, if we include the rough
breathing sound h and exclude the 5 double consonants. This means that

between the oneness and the infinitude of sound there are definite numbers

of sounds. One has to know all of them to possess the art of reading and

writing. Socrates emphasizes the numbers of sounds and letters. But this
example of the alphabet and the example of the numbers of musical inter

vals, which Socrates also gives, are meant to let Protarchus and Philebus
and us understand that there are numbers in the realm of the zlbx\. Later in
"
the dialogue clearly distinguish between numbers of un
Socrates will

equal units, that is, numbers of sensible things, and pure mathematical

numbers of units, that is, of units which do not differ at all from each
12
other. But we learn from Aristotle that Plato also spoke of eidetic

numbers, of numbers of units which are themselves nothing but ilbr\.

To try to find them means to embark upon that better, but difficult road.

16 A.
to 16 D.
n 56 D-E.
12
See esp. Met. XIV, 3, 1090 b 32ff.
 About Plato's Philebus 163

Protarchus
and Philebus do not understand what is going on. Philebus

especially does not see what the theme of numbers, which Socrates has

injected into the discussion, has to do with the alternative of pleasure and
thoughtfulness, which was in question. Socrates reminds him that they
were wondering how each of them, pleasure as well as thoughtfulness,
was one and many, and whether "each of them possessed a number
infinite,"
,3
before becoming that is to say, whether there were t'ibx\ of
pleasure as well as of thoughtfulness, which then are dispersed among
beings that continually come into being and perish and that live their lives
in pleasure and thought.
Protarchus is perturbed. He understands what Socrates is after. He
cannot find an answer to the question. He wants Philebus to answer it.
And he formulates the follows: "I think Socrates is asking us
question as

whether there are or are not of pleasure, how many there are and of
elbt\
thoughtfulness."
u
what sort they are, and the same of Philebus does not
utter a word. But Socrates remarks: "What you say is most true, son of
Callias."
15
He underscores the importance of this fact by addressing
Protarchus ceremonially as son of Callias.
Protarchus is intent on bringing the discussion about pleasure and

thoughtfulness to a satisfactory end. We learn from whathe says that

Socrates promised that he would stay on and not go home before this
end was reached. This promise must have been given, we have to assume,
during the discussion which preceded what we read in the dialogue, and

we should not forget that. Protarchus demands that Socrates stop perplex
ing him and the other young men and decide either to divide pleasure and

knowledge into their ei8t| himself or to let that go, if there be some other
way to solve the matters at issue among them. Socrates is willing to do the
latter, and this marks a new transition in the dialogue.
Socrates claims playfuUy that some god has just reminded him of
some talk about pleasure and thoughtfulness, which he heard when he
was dreaming or perhaps when he was awake. What he heard was that
neither pleasure nor thoughtfulness was the good, but some third thing,
different from both and better than both. We remember, of course, that
Socrates himself had intimated this twice. He does it now for the third
time. If this could be clearly shown now, says Socrates, pleasure would
not be the victor andit would no longer be necessary to divide pleasure
into its ei8t). And Socrates adds that, while the discussion proceeds, this
will become still clearer.

What foUows leads to three insights: (1) it is the lot of the Good and
only of the Good to be self-sufficient; (2) if we take the life of pleasure and
the thoughtful hfe separately, so that the life of pleasure is totally divested

knowledge, and the

of any thought, any any opinion, any memory,

is 18 E.
19 B.
15 Ibid.
164 Interpretation

thoughtful life, on the other hand, totally untouched by any pleasure,

both lives in this bare form cannot be conceived as self-sufficient, as
desirable and as good; (3) only a life made up of a mixture of pleasure

and thoughtfulness and sharing in both will be the kind of life everybody
would choose. Let me remark that Socrates and also Protarchus list under

the powers associated with thoughtfulness the power of apprehending the

intelligibles, vov which in common parlance may simply mean good
sense. This term will now play a central role for quite a while. Socrates
concludes: it has been sufficiently shown that Philebus's goddess, Pleasure,
cannot be considered identical with the good. Thereupon Philebus raises
his voice: "Nor is your vov; the good, Socrates; it will be open to the same
Socrates'
objections.'16
Let us hear reaction: "My voiig perhaps, Philebus;
but not so the true vovc,, which is also divine; that one, I guess, is different.
I do not as yet claim for the vovg the prize of victory over the combined

life, but we must look and see what is to be done about the second
"
speaking to Philebus: "Each of us might
prize."

Socrateson, goes still

perhaps put forward a claim, one that vovg is responsible for this combined

life, is its cause, the other that pleasure is: and thus neither of these two
would be the good, but one or the other of them might be regarded as the
life]."
,8
cause [of the combined Then, turning to Protarchus, Socrates
claims he might keep up his fight against Philebus in an even stronger

way and might contend "that in this life it is votjg that is more akin
mixed

and more similar than pleasure to that, whatever it may be, which makes
that life both desirable and As to pleasure, he adds, "it is farther
good."

19
behind than the third place, if my yovc, is at all to be trusted at
present."

"cause"
The emphasis in this passage is clearly on the terms voiig and
"cause"
(amov). What remains unclear is the sense in which the term is
to be taken and the rank to be attributed ultimately to the voiig. And let
Socrates'
us not for a moment forget own voijg.

Socrates suggests that it might be better to leave pleasure and not to

pain her by testing her in the thus proving her in

most precise way and

the Protarchus disagrees. Socrates asks whether Protarchus dis

wrong.

agrees because he, Socrates, spoke of paining pleasure. It is the second

time that pain is mentioned in the dialogue. It is done jokingly. Pain

was mentioned for the first time when Socrates dealt with the thought
ful life, totally untouched by pleasure. The way he put it then was this:

"Would be willing to live possessing thoughtfulness and voiig and

anyone

knowledge and perfect memory of all things, but having no share, great
or small, in pleasure, or in pain, for that matter, but being utterly un
sort?"
20
affected by everything of that The question, which is supposed

is 22 C.
it 22C-D.
is 22 D.
" 22 E.
20 21 D/E.
 About Plato's Philebus 165

to be negated, in this form actually involves a difficulty: one

when put

would perhaps be willing to accept a thoughtful pleasureless life, which

does not involve us in any pain. The third time pain will be mentioned is
going to show pain as a close companion of pleasure and as a real evil.
Socrates'
Protarchus says he is not
pleasure,"

shocked by phrase "paining

Socrates'
but rather by apparent attempt to stop talking about pleasure

altogether and because Socrates does not seem to understand "that not

one of us will let you go yet until you have brought the argument about
end."
21
these matters to an This is the second time Socrates is warned

about
leaving too early.

Whew, Socrates exclaims, and predicts that a long and difficult dis
cussion hes ahead of them. To fight the battle of the voiig for the second
prize requires new weapons in addition to those already used. A new

beginning has to be made, and this will mean a new transition in the
dialogue.
Let us be on our guard in making this beginning, says Socrates, and

we should indeed pay attention to these words. Socrates suggests that

everything that now exists in the world be distributed in a twofold, or

rather in a threefold way. The results of this distribution are very different
from each other. They are called by Socrates, indiscriminately and un-
"tribes."

precisely, tlbr\ or yivt], which I shall translate by the word The

first two have been mentioned before as a kind of Promethean gift: the
"limitless" "limit"
(to araipov) and the (to jtEpctg). The third is the mixture

of these two into one. This is not to be taken literally, as we shall see in
a moment: let us be on our guard. And now Socrates adds: "But I cut

a considerably ridiculous figure, I think, when I attempt a separation into

22
Socrates: "It
enumeration."

tribes and an Protarchus wonders why.

besides."
23
seems to me, a fourth tribe is needed It turns out that Socrates
means the cause of the commixture of those first two. And Protarchus, who

is eager to supplyfifth, even a separation, is told in

namely the power of

affable words that this fifth is not needed now, but that if it be needed

later, he should excuse Socrates for going after it. The mentioning of
Protarchus's proposal and the way of handling it cast a doubt on the

necessity of the fourth tribe, the cause. There might be something strange
and even ridiculous indeed about that. We should be on our guard.

Let us consider one of the first two tribes, namely to cbtEipov. The
English translations are all adequate: the limitless, the endless,
following
the boundless, the unlimited, the infinite, the innumerable, the indefinite.
the indeterminate. And we must not forget the homonym cfatsipog, meaning
the inexperienced one, upon which word Plato does not fail to pun. 24
"limit,"
As to the second tribe, to jtspag, the it becomes almost im-

21 23 B.
22 23 D.
23 Ibid.
24 17 E.
166 Interpretation

mediately apparent that, although Socrates keeps using this term, he also
limit,"
substitutes for it the phrase "that which has to jtspag evov, that is
"limited."
to say, the Protarchus and the other young men as weU as we
are somewhat confused. Socrates proposes to investigate how each of
"limitless" "limited,"

them, the and the are both "one and many"; for he
contends that each one of them is up split and scattered into many. He
"limitless,"
starts with the warning Protarchus again: "What I ask you to
debatable."
25
consider is difficult and

Here are special cases of this tribe, parts of its manyness: "hotter and
smaUer,"

"greater "exceedingly
colder," slower,"

"quicker and and and

lacking."
26
"excessive In there is "the more
slightly,"

and each as well as

less"
Each them is constantly advancing the
of (to uaXXov te vxxi t|ttov).
and never stationary in sharp contrast to what is determined by a fixed
number, by just "that much": if such a number advances, it ceases to
exist. What captures our attention is the expression to \1aXk6v te xai tJttov.
"limitless"
This expression is meant to gather together the tribe of the and
27
to put upon it the seal of a single nature. It is used six times in the
passage we are now considering and once more much later on. Once the
particle te is omitted. This omission focuses our attention on the use of
this particle in all the other cases. The verbs related to this expression are
all in the dual. And Socrates summarizes pointedly: "By this argument the
limitless." "hmitless"
2S
hotter and its opposite become together The is a
less,"
pair. The expression "the more as well as the as the seal of a single

nature, seals a duality. And this duality remains completely indeterminate.

"limitless"
The is an indeterminate pair.
"limit," "hmited,"
But what about the on the one hand, and the that
limit," "limited"
"which has on the other? Let us take the first. It is, as

Socrates quite clearly states, 29 contrary to "the more as well as the less";
it is the equal, and equality, the double, and any number in firm relation
to another number or a measure in firm relation to another measure, that

is, everything which "puts an end to the variability between the opposites
and makes them proportionable and harmonious by the introduction of
number."
30

"limited"
We understand that what Socrates means by this tribe of the
is what we read in the Fifth Book of Euclid's Elements. This book is in
all
probability either a perhaps somewhat condensed copy of an original
work of Eudoxus or imitates this work. Who is Eudoxus? He was born in

Cnidus, on the shores of Asia Minor, came to Athens and stayed at Plato's
Academy for a while. He was an astronomer, a mathematician, and a

25 24 A.
"Lacking"
2 is not mentioned. It is lacking in deed.
27 25 A.
28 24 D.
28 25A/B.
30 25 D/E.
 About Plato's Philebus 167

geographer; he firmly established the doctrine of ratios and proportions,

including those of numerically incommensurable magnitudes; he tried to
"mix"
the ei8r|, as understood by Plato, with all the sensible things;
and what is most important to
he declared pleasure to be the
us

supreme good. Buthis goddess, as she is for Philebus.

pleasure was not

Eudoxus, as Aristotle reports, "seemed to be a man of exceptional

temperance, and hence he was thought to uphold this view not because
he was a lover of pleasure, but because it seemed to him that it was so in
truth."
3i
Socrates, as we see in the dialogue, disagrees.
"hmited"
The tribe of the then consists of ratios. The tribe of the
"limitless,"
scattered the araipov, in its infinite manyness found its unity
of
32
in the of "the more and its
opposite,"

seal that is, in "the more as well

less." "limited,"
as the The tribe of the the manyness of determinate ratios,
has not yet found its unity. This unity was only postulated, was only, as
to." "reference"
Socrates says, "referred There was indeed a direct to the
"limit"
33
itself (Eig to itepag). And Socrates concludes: "The limit did not

contain a multitude nor did we feel a difficulty that it might not be one
nature."
34
by
It is at this point that we might turn to Aristotle's reports about Plato's
unwritten words to confirm what we found in the dialogue and to win
greater clarity.

In the Sixth Chapter of the First Book of the Metaphysics 35 Aristotle

says of Plato: "It is peculiar to him [i.e., Plato] to posit a duality instead
of the single Limitless, and to make the Limitless consist of 'the Great and
SmaU.' "
the In the Third Book of the Physics, where Aristotle discusses
36 again:
the aitEipov at great length, we read in the Fourth Chapter "For
Small.' "
Plato there are two Infinites, 'the Great and the We see thus
confirmed what we read in the Philebus, except that Aristotle, in his own
"great" "small"

way, uses the words and without their comparative

37
forms. He keeps using these words, in speaking about Plato, at many
other places. But, what is more important, in Books XIII and XIV of
"elements,"
the Metaphysics Aristotle mentions several times two as he
"numbers"
puts it, which, according to Plato,
out of are derived. We
numbers,"

have to understand that Aristotle has in mind "eidetic assem

dyad"
blages of 6i5t). These two sources are the "indeterminate (f| dopiOTog
"one"
8vfxg) and the (to ev). We recognize the indeterminate pair of the
dyad,"
Philebus in the "indeterminate the duality of the Limitless, "the
less."
more as well as the But we see now that what was named the

si Arist. Met.
XII, 8, 1073 b 17ff.; Proclus, In Eucl. Comm. (Teubner) pp. 67,
2ff.; Arist. Met. I, 9, 991 a 14f.; Nic. Eth. X, 2, 1172 b 9ff.
32 26 D.
33 25 B.
34 26 D.
35 987 b 26-28.
s 203 a 15.
37 Cf. 37 C end.
168 Interpretation

"One."
"Limit"
in the Philebus can also be named the What Aristotle
everything, that
"elements"
calls the can be called the ultimate sources of

which has the first rank both as beginnings and as ruling powers. That is
what is meant by dpxr), in common parlance as well as in most thoughtful

speech. We should not assume, I think, that Plato had a definitely fixed
name for each of these dpxat. The terms the Good, the One, the Precise

itself, the Same, the Limit, and perhaps the Whole are aU suited to one
of the dpxai, depending on the context in which they are used. As to the
dyad,"
names of the second ao/i], the "indeterminate "the more as well
less,"
as the and the Other (which also implies a duality 38) seem aU of them

no less suitable. In the Philebus Socrates, in putting a seal on the tribe of

the cbiEipov, makes its intrinsic character perfectly clear. But the character
"limit,"
of the jtspag, the remains obscured.
"mixture" "Limitless"
Now let us take up the third tribe, the of the and
"Limit." "mixing"
of the What does here mean? It means that the two
"Limitless," dyad," "Limit,"

dpxai, the the "indeterminate and the the

"One,"
exert their power on each other. What happens then may be
dyad" "One,"
described as follows. The "indeterminate duplicates the that

is to say, produces two entities, two i8r|, duplicates each of these

"divides"

ei8t| we may also say each of these i8r| and keeps on du

plicating we have to assume up to a certain point. In Aristotle's reports
dyad"
the "indeterminate is explicitiy characterized as a "doubling
(8uojtoiog). 39 It is the ultimate source of definite manyness, of
power"

"numbers,"
in the realm of the Ei8n as weU as in our world. In the earlier
"infinitude"
passage, when Socrates first introduced the Promethean gift of
"limit"
and of and urged that in every case a definite number of tibr\ had
to be found (the alphabet helping him to clarify this point), there was
"Limitless"

hardly a discernible hint that the with its doubling power is

responsible for the multiplicity of the ei8i> You wiU remember that in
"limitless,"
this the
context the infinite, was ultimately dismissed. Not so
"Limit,"
in the world in which we live. What happens here is this: the
"One," dyad"
the transforms the "indeterminate into a determinate one,
that is to say, transforms the two constantly and indeterminately changing
terms of the dyad into two stationary and determinate ones and keeps

doing this, produces, in other words, a multitude of ratios. That's why

limit."
Socrates can call the manyness of ratios "the offspring of the 40

We understand now what confused Protarchus and us when Socrates

limit," "limited," "limit"
substituted "that which has the for the itself.
"limited,"
The the assemblage of ratios, is already a part of the mixture,
of the third tribe. But it represents a mixture, or rather mixtures, of a
special kind, mathematical partnerships that can give to parts of the
world we live in a certain Tightness, remove the excess and
indefiniteness,

ss Cf. Soph. 255 D and 256 E-257 A.

so Met. XIII, 7, 1082 a 15 and 8, 1083 b 36.
25 D.
 About Plato's Philebus 169

41
and produce balance and right measure. Such mathematical partner

ships engender, for example, health, establish the entire genuine art of

music, bring about the temperate seasons and all the bounties of our world,
beauty and strength of the body, and all the beauties of the soul. And
Socrates, addressing Philebus directly and speaking about that proper
42
partnership (6p0f| xoiycovia) of mathematical ratios, has this to say:

"For this goddess, my beautiful Philebus, beholding the wanton violence

and universal wickedness which prevailed, since there was no limit of

pleasures or of excess in them, established law and order [vo^og xai Ta|ig]

in which there is limit. You say she exhausted us; I say, on the contrary,
safe."
43
she kept us Socrates addresses Philebus, but we cannot help
thinking Eudoxus. Philebus remains completely silent. Socrates turns
of
Protarchus?"
to Protarchus: "How does this appear to you, And
Socrates."
44
Protarchus answers: "It is very much how I feel,
Let the common power of the two dpxai determines the
us conclude:

mixture.Sometimes the community of this power is lacking.

Socrates turns now to the fourth tribe, the cause. You wUl remember
that Socrates seemed somewhat reluctant to add this fourth to the first

three. And indeed, is there any need for it? The common power of the
"Limitless' "Limit"
and the appeared as the cause of the mixture and of
Socrates'
what is engendered in this mixture. Listen now to words:

"Should I sound a false note if I caUed the fourth the cause of the mixture
45
Socrates
generation?"

and And listen to what one moment earlier says

with regard to all the first three tribes: "That which fabricates all these,
the cause, we call the fourth, it has been sufficiently
as shown to be

distinct from the others."46

That has not been shown at all! How can

ultimate sources, dpxi, be caused by something else? If that were so, the
"Limitless" "Limit,"
first two tribes, the and the would not be what they
are.
"cause,"
The exploration of this fourth tribe, the is left pending, and

Socrates makes a new transition, which helps him to turn backwards.

What was the purpose, he asks, of coming to the point they have
reached? They were trying to find out whether the second prize belonged
to pleasure or to thoughtfulness ((ppovnaig). They had posited, Socrates
reminds Protarchus and us, that the mixed life was the victor. We can

see now, he continues, to which tribe it belongs, namely, to the third

"limitless"
and all that is
tribe, formed by the mixture of all that is
limit."
47
"bound by the And now Socrates asks Philebus to which of the

41 26 A.
42 25 E.
43 26B-C.
44 26 C.
45 27B/C.
46 27 B.
47 27 D.
170 Interpretation

three tribes his life of unmixed pleasure belongs. The full question is this:
have pleasure and pain a limit or are they among the things which admit
less?"
"the more as well as the Philebus's answer is: "Yes, among those
which admit the more; for pleasure would not be aU the good, if it were
'more.'"48
not limitless in multitude and in the Socrates dryly replies:
49
This is how is intro
evil."

"Nor would pain, Philebus, be aU the pain

duced in the discussion for the third time, and this time decisively. For
Socrates adds he would grant Philebus that both, pleasure and pain, are

in the tribe of the Limitless. We note Philebus meant only pleasure, not
Socrates'
pain. addition is decisive.
Pleasure and pain are a limitless pair. One of the consequences of this

finding is that there are noei8t| pleasure, in the strict sense of this word.
of

We remember that Socrates had intimated that the discussion would show
in a clearer way why it would not be necessary to divide pleasure into its
ei8t)- Socrates will use this term later on in discussing pleasure, but it wiU

not have to be taken in its strict sense.

The next question Socrates asks Protarchus and Philebus is: to what

tribe thoughtfulness, knowledge and voiig shall be assigned without impiety.

Socrates explains: "For I think that our risk is not a small one in finding
now."

50 PhUebus:
or not finding the right answer to what is being asked
do."
51
"You exalt your own god, Socrates, you Socrates: "And you your
52 same."

goddess, my friend. But the question calls for an answer, aU the

Protarchus intervenes and urges Philebus to answer. Whereupon Philebus
says: "Did you not, Protarchus, choose to reply in my place?"53
This is
the last time Philebus raises his voice. Let us look back for a moment.

At the beginning of our reading we learn that Protarchus will defend

Philebus's thesis of pleasure, because Philebus himself, as Protarchus says,
tired"

"has grown (the Greek word is d^EipnxE, a pun on the word

ditEtpov). A little later Philebus has an opportunity to regret that he spoke

up again and calls upon his own goddess to witness that he does regret.
many"

When the "one and question comes up, Protarchus remarks: "It is
54
best for the inquirer
repose."

perhaps not to disturb Philebus in his sweet

And now he wiU be silent aU the time, even when pleasure, his goddess,
is thoroughly discussed. What is he doing aU this time? Just listening?
Socrates'
Protarchus has some difficulty in answering last question,
namely, to what tribe knowledge and vor>g should be assigned, and asks
Socrates to answer this question himself. Socrates is wiUing. He declares:

48 27 E.
49 28 A.
50
Ibid.
si 28 B.
52 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
54 15 C [tacit to the proverb: xiveiv xccxdv eu
reference \ii\ xeijievov].
 About Plato's Philebus 171

"What difficult,"55
you enjoin me to do is not and he repeats: "It is
easy."

Let us be on our guard. All wise men

thereby really
agree, and

exalt themselves, says Socrates, that voiig is king of heaven and earth.
50
Socrates adds: "Perhaps they are
right."

"cosmological"
What foUows is indeed an easy, but not too convincing
account, which ends with the statement that voiig belongs to that of the
67
four tribes
all."

which was called "the cause of Notice, please, again,

all."

And Socrates have last

answer."

"of adds: "Now, you at your

Protarchus: "Yes, and a

very sufficient one; and yet you answered without
it."
5S
my noticing Socrates: "Yes, Protarchus, for sometimes playing
"cosmological"
59
provides rest from serious
pursuit."

We understand: the
account, which makes the voiig the cause of all the other tribes, was a

playful account. We are not sure whether this voiig is the "divine
mentioned before. And let us not forget that, within the confines
of human life, the best, voiig could obtain, was the second prize.
Socrates concludes this entire discussion of the four tribes by pointing to
"limit"

voiig and to pleasure. He does not mention anything pertaining to

"mixture."
and to the Let us remember, he says, "that votig was akin to
cause and belonged roughly speaking [o"xe86v] to this tribe and that
pleasure was itself limitless and belonged to the tribe which, in and by
60
itself, has have
end."

not and never will either beginning or middle or

We must add that this holds also for pain. As we have seen, the dialogue,

too, has neither a beginning nor an end, and for that matter, no middle.
The graph of a Platonic dialogue usually not always looks like this:

But the graph of the Philebus looks hke this:

55 28 C.
5 Ibid.
57 30 E.
58 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
60 31 A.
1 72 Interpretation

The dialogue itself, taken as a drama, in which we, the readers or listeners,
are involved, seems If it does that, it must
to resemble pleasure and pain.

be pleasurable and painful. We wUl have to wait and see But we ... .

need not wait to register the most important result of the preceding dis

AU the pleasures and small or great, which pervade our

cussion. pains,
hves, reflect in their duality an ultimate source, one of the dpxai, namely
dyad."
the "indeterminate It is thus that some of our most familiar and

common experiences are tied to one of the highest points human reflection

can reach.

Socrates now abandons this high level and turns to a much lower one.

A new transition is made. Only about a third of the dialogue has been

considered so far. I shall be able to proceed much faster from now on.

The nextis to see, says Socrates, where each of them, that is, voiig
task

and pleasure, can be found and by means of what affection both come

into being, whenever they come into being. m Note, please, that the voiig
mentioned here is said to come into being and cannot, therefore, be under

stood as the eternal divine voiig. Socrates takes pleasure first, and im
mediately adds that it is impossible to examine pleasure sufficiently apart

from pain.
Socrates'
contention is that pain and pleasure emerge in the combined
"limitless" "limit"

tribe, the one, we remember, where the and the join

together and form a mathematical
partnership conducive to balance and
right measure. When this balance is broken in us, living beings, "a dis
ruption of nature and a generation of pain also take place at the same
time."
62
"If, on the other hand, balance is being restored and is returning
generated."

63 destruction is
to its own nature, pleasure is The process of

pain, and the process of restoration is pleasure. When we are being

emptied, we are becoming hungry and pained; when we are fiUing up again

through eating, we are pleased. And the same can be said of thirst. It is
shown later that it is not the body that hungers or thirsts or has any such

affection, that the body cannot, therefore, be pained or pleased. Pleasure

and pain belong to the soul, and to the soul only. But sometimes, or rather
often enough, as in the case of hunger and thirst, the body is involved.
Whenever this is the case, we face one kind of pleasure and pain.

Another kind of pleasure and pain does not involve the body at all. It
arises within the soul itself as the sweet and cheering hope of pleasant

things to come and as the fearful and woeful expectation of painful things

to come. Both the pleasant and the painful expectations originate within

the soul in memory. Socrates proceeds to give a circumstantial description

of this origin by passing from perception to memory, to forgetfulness, to
recollection, and finally to desire. But he ends this passage by reverting
to pleasure and pain that involve the body. He points to a man who is

si 31 B.
62 31 D.
63 Ibid.
 About Plato's Philebus 173

empty and suffers pain, but who, because of his memory, hopes to be
fUled again and enjoys this hope. "At such a time, then, a man, or any
once."
*4
other living being, has both pain and joy at If, however, an empty
man is without hope of being filled, a twofold feeling of pain arises in
him. The stress is on the duality of pleasure and pain. The possibility of a

twofold pain and although this is not mentioned of a twofold pleasure

emphasizes the duality even more. Let us not forget its ultimate source.

Looked at in this passage is also a life in which there is no feeling of

pleasure or pain at all, but only thoughtfulness and voiig. Such a hfe had
been considered much earlier in the dialogue and had been rejected as

totaUy undesirable, lacking self-sufficiency and, therefore, goodness. Now

life."
Socrates calls it "the most divine Protarchus chimes in: "Certainly
65
it is that gods feel either its
opposite."

not hkely joy or And Socrates

them."

agrees: "No, it is very unlikely; for either is unseemly for Socrates

adds that they may consider this point later on, if it would help the

argument; they might give voiig credit for it in contending for the second

prize. We shall be watching.

A new transition takes place. What follows can be subdivided into three
is "On false
pleasures."

parts, and the title that can be given to all of them

This is what happens in part one: Protarchus is unwilling to agree that
pleasures and be false; he accepts the possibility of false
pains could

opinions, but rejects the possibility of false fears, false expectations, and
false pleasures; a lengthy discussion foUows which culminates in the
has
gods,"

"friend
man,"

assertion that a "just, pious and good a of the

man"

thoroughly bad
pleasures,"

"true while an "unjust and can only

pleasures"

imitate the "true

pleasures,"

have "false which to the point

6a
of ridicule; and the same can be said of pains.

This, now, is what happens in part two: we are reminded that pleasure
and pain are a hmitless pair tied to "the more as well as the less"; any
one who feels pleasure in any way always really feels pleasure; but these
and also as pleasures to be felt
pleasures may be felt as present pleasures
in the future; the latter ones may be false because they may not come into
being as expected, not as great and intense as expected; and when, in our
feelings, we are trying to compare pleasures with pleasures, or pains with

pains, or pleasures with pains, we may reach entirely false results, because
of the limitless and indeterminate character of both, pleasure and pain.
The third part of this passage does not concern false pleasures directly,
but rather pleasures falsely understood or falsely judged. The theme of

pleasure and pain is a common topic in Plato's own time, widely discussed
by outstanding men. One of the opinions about pleasure, rejected by
Socrates, is that freedom from pain is identified with pleasure. For some

men this opinion amounts to the firm denial of the existence of pleasures

64 36 B.
65 33 B.
m 39E-40C.
174 Interpretation

altogether. For them that which Philebus and his friends caU pleasures
judgments."
67
aremerely escapes from pain. These men are men "of harsh
Socrates does not mention any names, but it is highly probable that
Antisthenes is one of these men. Antisthenes is reputed to have said:
hands."
"Should I ever meet Aphrodite, I would strangle her with my own

I have condensed this passage of the dialogue to the utmost. But you
understand that it chaUenges the conviction of Philebus radicaUy. Let us
look at him again. He has not said a word. Is he reaUy listening? We know,
he had grown tired. Has not his sweet repose mentioned by Protarchus a
long time ago transformed itself into sound sleep? And sleep, sound,
dreamless sleep, we should observe, excludes any feeling of pleasure and
life,"

pain, brings about, in other words, a condition of the "most divine

yet a condition not compatible with Philebus's own aspirations. Yes, there
he lies, the beautiful Philebus, with closed eyes
ears,and closed while

Socrates continues the inquiry, imposed upon him by Philebus, Protarchus,

and the other young men. In sharp contrast to Philebus's fatigue and
Socrates'
68
somnolence are vigor and straightforwardness.

A subtle transition is brought to pass inasmuch as Socrates takes those

judgments"
men "of harsh with whom he disagrees as allies. He is going
to describe more accurately what pleasure means to these men, who

oppose it or deny its

We have already seen that pain and joy
existence.

can be felt at the same time. The point is now emphasized: pain and

pleasure do not only constitute an indeterminate pair, but they also mix

with each other. This is again shown by Socrates in a tripartite way. Some

mixtures of pleasure and pain are those in which both pleasure and pain,
involve the body, as, for example, itching and scratching, which Protarchus
69
evU."

tends to consider a "mixed Some mixtures are those in which the

body and the soul contribute the opposite elements, "each adding pain or
pain,"
70
pleasure to the other's pleasure and as, for example we have
heard that before a man suffers from thirst, is pained by bis bodily
emptiness, but rejoices in his hope to be filled, a hope entertained only by
his soul. The third kind of mixture is the most important; it is the one
in which the soul and only the soul is involved. Socrates gives as examples
of pains belonging to this third kind: anger, fear, longing, mourning, love,
jealousy, envy and hy asks: "Shall we not find them full of ineffable
pleasures?"

71
He then refers in one sentence only to anger and to
mournings and longings in order to show the mixture of pain and of
Socrates'
pleasure in them. Protarchus fully agrees. next question is: "And
you remember, too, how people, at tragedies, enjoy the spectacle and at
time weep"! 72 "Yes,
certainly,"

the same says Protarchus. Whereupon

67 44C-D.
68
See, for example, 34 D 4-8 and 38 B 3-4.
es 46 A.
70 47 C.
7i 47 E.
72 48 A.
 About Plato's Philebus 175

Socrates asks: "And the condition of our souls at comedies do you know
that there is a
pleasure?"

73 Protarchus's
there, too, mixture of pain and

is: "I do it is
understand."

answer not quite Socrates confirms that not

easy to understand such a condition under such circumstances, and Protar

chus, on his part, confirms that it is not easy for him. It is not easy for us
either.

This is the short beginning of the discussion about the third kind of
mixture of pleasure and pain, which involves only the soul. And now,
surprisingly, Socrates launches into a lengthy explanation of what happens
to spectators at comedies. It takes no less than four pages, and ends with
Socrates'
contention that pain is mixed with pleasure not only for
spectators in the theatre, where tragedies and comedies are performed
life."
74
but also "in ah the tragedy and comedy of Today, we are prone
"tragedy"
to caU any horrible or simply sad event a and a funny one a
"comedy."
But that was not done in ancient times. The expression
life"

"tragedy and comedy of in the dialogue is highly unusual and even

paradoxical. It is almost unique; a somewhat similar phrase referring to
tragedy, not to comedy, can be found only in Plato's Laws. 75 Why is this
expression used in the Philebus? Let us hear what Socrates says.

He takes up envy first. Envy is a pain of the soul, but we also see an

envious man rejoicing in the evils that befall those close to him. Thus

envy is both pain and pleasure. Socrates then takes up the ridiculous. The
ridiculous is in the main the consequence of a disposition in the human soul
which contradicts the famous inscription at Delphi. A ridiculous man is
a man who does not know himself. This folly of not knowing oneself can
have three aspects: (1) the conceit of being richer than one is; (2) the

conceit of being more beautiful than one is; (3) the conceit of being more

virtuous than one is, especially wiser than one is (8oooo(pia). This third
kind of conceit is the most numerous. Now, we tend to laugh at men thus
conceited. But two cases must be distinguished here. Those who are

laughed may be strong and able to revenge themselves, and are then
at

powerful, terrible, and hateful; for folly in the powerful is hateful and
base. Or they are weak and unable to revenge themselves, and then they
are truly ridiculous. When we laugh at the follies of such men, who may be

our friends, we feel pleasure. But to feel pleasure at the follies of our

friends is what envy brings about, since it is envy that makes us rejoice
in the evils that befall these our friends, and envy is painful. Therefore,
when we laugh at what is ridiculous in our friends, we mix pleasure and

pain.

It is not quite clear how all this explains what happens at comedies,
although Protarchus appears to be satisfied. Socrates adds that all that

was said by him so far concerned only envy, mourning, and anger (he

73 ibid.
74 50 B.
75 817 B.
176 Interpretation

omits longing, which was also mentioned by him in that one sentence

he before passing on to tragedies and comedies). And now,

uttered

Socrates declares, he need not go further and Protarchus ought to accept

the assertion that there are plenty of mixtures of pain and of pleasure.

But now something extraordinary happens that sheds more light on the

theme of comedy.

You wiU remember that the young men, who surround Socrates,
extracted from him the promise not to go home before bringing the

discussion about pleasure and thoughtfulness to a satisfactory end. And

you wUl also remember that Protarchus, later on, reminded Socrates of

this promise and assured him that not one of the young men would let
him go before the end of the discussion was reached. Listen to what

Socrates says now: "Tell me then: will you let me off, or will you let
midnight come? I think only a few words are needed to induce you to
76
How strange! Why on earth does Socrates utter these
off."

let me words?

Is this the Socrates who is known for his never abating eagerness to

discuss things? Has he grown tired like Philebus? Or is it that envy has
life"
entered not only the Xoyog but also the stage, the "comedy of
presented in the dialogue? Incredible as it might seem, Socrates appears to
"divinely"

be envious seeing Philebus asleep, asleep, without pleasure

77
and pain. Does that not mean that Socrates is pained by this envy and

yet also pleased by the ridiculous aspect of Philebus's sleep, which

friend
wisdom,"

manifests the latter's "conceit of the 8o|o0ocpia of

Philebus? But what about us, who read or hear the words of the dialogue
and are the spectators of this "comedy of life"? Well, we are puzzled and

pleased by realizing that Socrates of all people is envious at this moment,

and we are also pained by witnessing what happens to him. We might

refuse to that this is what is going on at this moment, but this

accept

refusal would only mean that we expect to be pained and pleased, // we

accepted it.
Yes, the dialogue is pleasurable and painful in deed (Epycp), in addition

to dealing with pleasure and pain in speech (Xoyco). And is there any need

to mention the pain and the pleasure one feels in reading, or listening to,
the dialogue in all its deliberately complex and inordinate convolution?
We understand now, I think, why the title of the dialogue is Philebus.
Socrates proceeds, of course. He takes up now and this is a new
transition the pure pleasures, that is, pleasures unmixed with pain.

Socrates lists five kinds of such pleasures, four of them conveyed to us by

our senses, one involving that which cannot be sensed. The first four
kinds of pure pleasure have their source in beautiful
figures, in beautiful
colors, in clear sounds and in many odors. The beautiful figures are not
beautiful living beings or paintings, but "says the 78argument"

50 D.
77 Cf. Apology 40C-E.
78 51 C.
 About Plato's Philebus 111

straight Une drawn with the help of a ruler, a circular line drawn with the

help of a compass, plane figures drawn with the help of these same tools,
79
and solid figures constructed with the help of suitable instruments. The
beautiful colors are pure colors, in which there is
trace of any other
no

color. Clear sounds are those that send forth a single pure tone. The

pleasures these figures, colors, and sounds generate are pure pleasures,
unmixed with pain. As to the pleasures of smell, they are, as Socrates
divine."
playfully says, "less The last kind of pure pleasure and this is
deeply serious is thatwhich has its source in the known or the knowable,

accessible to human beings without hunger for learning and without pangs

of such hunger. 80 What Socrates means is contemplation O&Ecopia), which

is not preceded by Epoag, the desire to know, as we feel it in the pursuit of

knowledge. This pleasure of contemplation is felt byexceedingly few.

The transition now made leads to a passage that again has three parts,
of which again the third is the most important. The first part extends

in some way the realm of pure pleasures by the statement that what
characterizes such pleasures is due measure. The second part makes us

understand that the pure pleasures are, because of their purity, also true

pleasures. In the third the longest part Socrates refutes "certain

ingenious people"81
while accepting one of their premises. These "in
little later to there is
people"

genious are reduced a one man, and hardly

any doubt that this man is Aristippus. His premise, which Socrates
accepts, is that pleasure consists in a process of generation and has no
stable being. What is rejected by Socrates is that such a process in itself
is a good. To refute this assertion, Socrates proposes to consider the
relation that the process of coming into being (yEveaig) has to being (cuoia).
The question is: which one of the two is for the sake of the other? Protarchus
rephrases the question as follows: do ships exist for the sake of shipbuilding
oris shipbuilding for the sake of ships? Protarchus knows the answer to this
question, of course, but Socrates gives the answer in an all-comprising form:
"Every instance of generation is for the sake of some being or other, and all
being."
82
generation is always for the sake of Now, the being for the sake
of which the process of generation takes place is "of the order of the
the process of generation itself is
good,"

while not of that order. Therefore,

says Socrates, we must be grateful to him who pointed out that there is

only a generation, but no being of pleasure. He makes a laughingstock of

all those who find their highest end in pleasure and know that pleasure

is nothing but a process of generation. For their highest end is not of the
order of the good. Protarchus concludes: "It is a great absurdity, as it
83
to teU us that pleasure is a
good."

appears, Socrates,

79 53 A-B.
so 52 A.
si 53 C.
82 54 C.
83 55 A.
178 Interpretation

There is transition, in which courage, self-restraint and vovc are

a new

mentioned and which begins to move the dialogue upward. The task is

now to consider voiig and knowledge carefully and to find out what is by

nature purest in them. We expect that their truest parts will be joined with

the truest parts of pleasure in the desired mixed life.

Two kinds of knowledge distinguished. One is necessary to produce
are

things, the other serves education and nurture. The productive knowledge,
how"
the "know of the producing arts, is taken up first, and here again a

division is to be made. Some of those parts are acquired by practice and

toil, aided by guessing, and lack precision. They do not use sufficiently
the arts of counting, measuring, and weighing. This holds, Socrates says,
for music, as it is commonly practiced, for medicine, agriculture, piloting,
and generalship. But in the arts of building, shipbuilding, and house
building, for example, there is much more precision, because measuring
and the use of ingenious instruments play a much greater role in them.
It is at this point that Socrates divides the
arts of counting and of measur

ing (not, however, that of weighing) into two kinds. Some counting refers
to visible and tangible units, which are all unequal; but there is also

counting of units that do not differ at all from each other. This kind of
"arithmetic."

counting is the basis of the true art of numbering, of true

The art of measuring may also refer either to visible and tangible things
or to entities that cannot be sensed. To measure, and to deal with, the
"geometry,"
latter entities means to be engaged in not for the purpose of

production and trade, but for the purpose of knowing. And this holds also
for the careful study of ratios and proportions. These true arts of number

ing and measuring serve education and nurture. We see that there is a
kind of knowledge purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than
another. This purity of knowledge brings about much greater clarity and

precision and much more truth.

But there is, beyond that pure mathematical knowledge, the power of
dialectic. It deals with Being, True Being, with that which always im
mutably is. Protarchus remembers at this point the claim of Gorgias that
the art of persuasion, the rhetorical art, surpasses all other arts. Socrates
replies that he was not thinking of the art that surpasses all others by being
"greatest," "best,"
the "most to men; he was
useful"

the the and thinking

of the art or the knowledge which is most concerned about clearness,
precision, and the most true, however little and of little use it might be.
Socrates asks Protarchus to look neither at the usefulness nor at the

reputation of the various sciences, but to consider whether there is a

power in our souls which is in lovewith Truth and does everything for the

sake of Truth. Would this power possess thoughtfulness (cppovnaic) and

votic in the greatest purity? Protarchus concedes that this must be so.
To be in love with Truth does not mean to possess it or to contemplate

it. It means to pursue it, to try to findit, indefatigably, unremittingly; to

pursue it means to submit to the power of discourse, a power that is able

to discover in the spoken or silent words that which make

speaking and
 About Plato's Philebus 179

thinking ultimately possible, namely the unchangeable and, thereby, true

beings. But, as Socrates points out, the many existing arts and the men
engaged in them do not submit to the power of discourse, but are satisfied

with their opinions. If a man sees fit to investigate nature, he spends his
hfe in studying this world of ours that is to say, tries to find out how it
came into being, how it is acted upon and how it acts itself. By doing
that, that man toils to discover transient productions of the present, the
future and the past, not what unchangeably always is. And Socrates asks:

"How can we gain anything stable about things which have no stability
whatsoever?"84
The argument compels us thus to see that the stable, pure,
and true, can only be found in what is eternally the same without change or
it."
85
mixture or, Socrates surprisingly adds, "in what is most akin to He
mav mean the moving, but never changing celestial bodies.

This passage which deals with the purest knowledge ends with the re
peated reference to voiig and cpoovnoig, which have to be honored most.
This reference is the last transition in the dialogue to the last passage of
the dialogue.
This last passage is about the most desirable life, in which thought
fulness and pleasure are mixed. Socrates undertakes now to make this
mixture with the help of Protarchus. We expected and still expect that
the pure pleasures and knowledge will be joined in this mixture.
the purest

Before the mixing beeins, Socrates reminds Protarchus and us of what

had been said before. Philebus had claimed that pleasure was the true goal
"good" "pleasant,"
of every living being and that these two words, and
"good"
mean the same thing. Socrates, on the other hand, claimed that
"pleasant"
and mean different things and that the share of thoughtfulness
in the good is greater than pleasure's. They had agreed, Socrates continues,
that any living being, in whom the good is present always, altogether, and
in all ways, has no further need of anything, but is perfectly self-sufficient;
but that neither a life of pleasure unmixed with thoughtfulness nor a
thoughtful life unmixed with pleasure was a desirable life.

Directly related to the task of making the mixture is the task of

winning a clear the good in the well-mixed life, or at

understanding of
86
least an outline of be better able to find out to what in the
it, so as to

well-mixed life the second prize should be assigned. We remember that

Socrates had raised the question before. At that time the possible recipients
of the second prize were voiig and pleasure. Note that in this last passage

of the dialogue voiig has not been mentioned so far.

This is now what Socrates says jovially and playfully just before he
begins to make the mixture: "Let us make the mixture, Protarchus, with

a proper prayer to the gods, Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever he be

84 59 B.
85 59 C.
86 61 A.
180 Interpretation

87
Dionysus leads
mixing."

who presides over the on revellers and presides

over orgies; he stands here for pleasure. Hephaestus is known for his
thoughtful and sober craftmanship. Socrates continues: "We are like wine

pourers, and beside us are fountains that of pleasure may be hkened to

a fount of honey, and the sober, wineless fount of thoughtfulness to one

of pure, health-giving water of which we must do our best to mix as weU

possible."
88
as

The first question is: should Socrates and Protarchus mix all pleasure

with all thoughtfulness? Socrates observes that this would not be safe. It
would be better to mix first that pleasure which was more truly pleasure

with that knowledge which was most true and most precise. Protarchus
agrees. But Socrates is not satisfied. Let us assume, he says, a man who

is thoughtful about justice itself, that is, about the i8og of justice, and is
guided in his reasoning about everything that truly is by his apprehension

of the intelligible, by his voeiv (it is the first time that vovc is mentioned in
this last passage of the dialogue). If this man is fully cognizant of the
mathematical circle and the all-embracing celestial sphere, but is ignorant
of our human sphere human circles, will this man have sufficient
and

knowledge? No, says Protarchus, it would be ridiculous for a man to be

mean,"

concerned only with divine knowledge. "Do you Socrates asks,

"that the unstable and impure art of the untrue rule and circle is to be
89 that is
mixture?"

put with the other arts into the Yes, says Protarchus,
necessary, if any man is ever to find his way home. Socrates and Protarchus
go further. They put music, which they said a while ago was fuU of

guesswork and lacked purity, and all the deficient kinds of knowledge

mingling with the pure into the mixture.

Then Socrates turns to the pleasures. Here again the pure and true
pleasures are not the only ones to be put into the mixture. For the first
and only time in the dialogue Socrates mentions "necessary pleasures,"90

by which he means pleasures connected with the satisfaction of vital needs,

and adds them to the pure ones. And the further question arises: is it not
advantageous and harmless to let all pleasures be a part of the mixture,
just as it was harmless and advantageous to let all the arts and all knowl
edge be such a part? Whereupon Socrates says: "There is no use in asking
us, Protarchus; we must ask the pleasures themselves and the different
91
kinds
another."

of thoughtfulness about one That's what Socrates does.

He asks first the pleasures: "Would you choose to dwell with the whole
of thoughtfulness or with none at
all?"
92 And Socrates lets them answer

that for any tribe to be solitary and unaUoyed is neither possible nor

87 61 B/C.
88 61 C.
88 62 B.
ao 62 E.
si 63A/B.
82 63 B.
 About Plato's Philebus 181

profitable: "We think the best to live with is the knowledge of all other
93 ourselves."

things and, so far

is possible, the perfect knowledge of
as

Let us not forget, it is Socrates whom we hear speaking. It is highly

doubtful whether the pleasures can speak and can have any knowledge
of themselves. And now Socrates turns to thoughtfulness and voiig. (It is
the second time that voiig is mentioned in this last passage of the dialogue.)
Socrates asks them whether they want the greatest and most intense
pleasures to dwell with them in addition to the true and pure pleasures.
And Socrates replies for them that is, for thoughtfulness and voiig that
the true and pure pleasures are almost their own, and also those which
are united to health and self-restraint and all those which are handmaids
of virtue; they should be added to the mixture; as to the pleasures which
madden the souls of men, which are the companions of folly and of aU

the other vices, it would be senseless to mix them with the voiig.

This is the third time that vo-ug is mentioned in the passage, while

thoughtfulness (cppovnaig), by Socrates, is left

which was also addressed

out. When Socrates has finished replying in the name of both voiig and

cppovnoig, he says to Protarchus: "Shall we not say that this reply which
the voiig has now made for itself and memory and right opinion is thought
94 so."

Which voiig
ful
sensible?"

and And Protarchus says: "Very much

is this voiig? Is it the "divine that Socrates contrasted with his own

in his reply to Philebus a long time ago? No, it is Socrates who was
"easy"

speaking guided by his own voiig. It is not the voiig that the
and that the sages, in
all"

cosmological account found to be "the cause of

It is not
earth."

exalting themselves, declare to be "king of heaven and

the fourth tribe of the Promethean gift, which Socrates introduced, fearing
Socrates'
to appear ridiculous by doing that. own voiig is responsible for
the kind of mixture he makes to produce the life which combines thought
fulness and pleasure, is the cause of this life. It is neither the cause of the
"limitless" "limit,"
commixture of the and of the nor the cause of these
first two tribes of the Promethean gift.
all"

What does the original introduction the voiig as the "cause of

of

and the subsequent somewhat veiled rejection of this voiig mean? I think

it means a subtle mocking of Plato's great pupil Aristotle. Aristotle's

thoughts must certainly have been familiar to Plato in his late years. A
passage in an ancient that informs us about Aristotle's life,
manuscript,95

hints at lively controversies between Plato and Aristotle. Plato appears to

have nicknamed Aristotle 6 voiig, and to have once said, when Aristotle
was not present at a meeting: "The voiig is absent; dullness reigns in the
We do know that the investigation of the different meanings
room."

lecture

83 63 B/C.
84 64 A.
ss Codex Marcianus. See Paul Friedlander's Akademische Randglossen in Die
Gegenwart der Griechen im Neueren Denken, Festschrift fiir Hans-Georg Gadamer,
I960, p. 317.
182 Interpretation

of cause (akta) and of the divine voiig plays a decisive role in Aristotle's
works. What the dialogue intimates is that voiig is above all a human

possession, and that Socrates is the embodiment of this voiig.

Socrates completes the mixture by pointing to the necessity that truth
must be a part of it, and then asks what is the most precious in it and the
chief cause for this mixed life to be most lovable. The answer is: due
measure and proportion which bring about beauty and excellence. Nobody
is ignorant of this. We should more properly, however, consider these

three, beauty, truth, due measure, as the components of the goodness of

the mixture. We see, first: vovc is more akin to truth than pleasure;
secondly: nothing could be found more immoderate than pleasure and

nothing is more in harmony with due measure than voiig and knowledge;
and thirdly: voiig has a greater share in beauty than pleasure.
And now, finaUy, Socrates gives a list of the best human possessions in
their proper order. First something like Measure, Due Measure, Propriety,
and like everything which must be considered of the same order. Secondly
comes what is well proportioned, beautiful, has been completed and is

sufficient, and all that belongs to that very family. Socrates continues: "As
to the third this is my prophecy if you insist on voiig and cppovnatg,
truth."
96
you will not wander far from the Is vong relegated to the third
place? No, it is elevated to the proper rank, if you consider the role the
triad played in the entire dialogue. Fourthly come the different kinds of

knowledge, the arts, the true opinions; and fifthly the painless pure

pleasures of the soul, some of which accompany knowledge and some of

which as we have seen accompany perceptions (observe that knowledge
was not mentioned before among the pure pleasures, presumably because
the pursuit of knowledge involves the desire to know, involves Epcog, in
which pain and pleasure are mixed). There is no sixth place, says Socrates,

quoting Orpheus. He reminds us that neither voiic nor pleasure is the good
itself, since both are devoid of self-sufficiency. But within the mixed life,
which is the victor, voiig has now been given the second prize, while
Socrates'
pleasure as own voiig had predicted a long time ago is further
behind than the third place. Note that this holds even for pure pleasure

and that the satisfaction of vital needs is not mentioned at all. Pleasure is
fifth. We should be aware that, according to the tradition, the people
"Pythagoreans"
called associated the goddess Aphrodite with the number

five.
The list given by Socrates is strangely and inordinate. It is
unprecise

indeed only an outline of the good in the mostdesirable life. The cbtapov,
"limitless," "indeterminate,"
the the reigns, though not supremely, in the
dialogue.

I shall not keep you until midnight. Good night! But there wiU be
a discussion.

86 66 B.