Campaigns: The Essence

of Operational Warfare

RONALD M. D'AMURA

O .
n 6 June 1944, American and British forces stormed across the
Normandy beaches to begin Operation Overlord, the far-reaching
campaign for the liberation of Europe. The unqualified success of that bold
venture, which led to the defeat of Nazi Germany, stressed the importance
of a well-designed and well-executed campaign as an adjunct to operational
warfare. Yet, shortly after the Second World War, this notion of warfare
with its associated campaigns largely disappeared from contemporary
military thinking. More recently, however, a resurgent interest in
operational warfare as an essential step in achieving overall victory in war
has evolved among military leaders. Unfortunately, somewhat less attention
has been placed on its indivisible component-the campaign.
In order to better convey the notion of campaigning, this essay
delves into a series of campaign fundamentals from four points of view.
First, numerous campaigns of the Second World War, in Europe, the
Pacific, and Africa, illustrate the elements of war that must be amalgamated
to produce victory. Although Overlord was but one of these memorable
campaigns, a brief review of its salient points provides a useful historical
perspective of a campaign. Second, a precise definition of operational
warfare and its companion, the campaign, serves to simplify many of the
complexities inherent in these terms. Third, a comparison of campaign
planning with other planning functions further delineates the unique
wartime role of the campaign. Finally, by examining some of the cam-
I'aign's major components-the mission, the concept of operations, and the

42 Parameters
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logistics concept-we will see these disparate components quickly coalesce
under the unifying rubric of the campaign.

Operation Overlord
Strategic guidance from civilian and military policymakers as a
prerequisite to the formulation of campaigns was just as important in years
past as today. On 12 February 1944, in fact, the Allied Combined Chiefs of
Staff initiated Overlord by providing strategic guidance in the form ora
directive to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander;:
Allied Expeditionary Force. In a one-page document that granted wide
latitude in the exercise of command, the Chiefs outlined the Allies' strategic
war aim and specified general mission guidance for the Supreme Com~
mander: "Enter the continent of Europe, and ... undertake operations
aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.'"
With the Combined Chiefs' directive as guidance for what was to
be the most extensive military adventure in history, General Eisenhower.
planned and conducted the campaign to recapture Western Europe. In order
to achieve ultimate victory, he focused all his efforts on a single guiding
principle-the destruction of the enemy's forces. 2 Control of geographic
areas was important only in relation to their use for the enemy's conduct of
operations or as friendly supply and communications centers. Two such
areas of special interest were the Ruhr as the principal center for the
munitions industry in the heart of western Germany, and the Saar as the
second most important industrial region.
Throughout the campaign, but especially during its opening
phases, extensive deception measures were incorporated into the concept of
operations. As a consequence, the defending German forces were unable to
determine the exact timing, scope, and location of the initial Allied am-
phibious assault and the subsequent operations across Europe-factors that
contributed to their defeat.
Finally, Eisenhower divided the campaign into seven phases, each
consisting of a number of major sequential and simultaneous operations
that ultimately resulted in the destruction of the German armed forces and.
the achievement of his strategic aim. The first phase involved the am-
phibious assault on the Normandy beaches by British and American forces;

Colonel Ronald M. D' Amura. USMC, is the Director of Contingency Planning,

Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, at the US Army War
College. He is a graduate of the University of Michigan and holds an M.S. degree
from the University of Southern California. Colonel D' Amura twice served in
Vietnam, where he flew more than 300 combat missions in the A-6 aircraft. More
recently. he commanded Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 332 and served with
the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and the Plans Division, HQMC, as' 'a
political-military analyst and plans officer.

Summer 1987 43
Next came the establishment of a lodgment on the Continent, the buildup of
a logistics base, and the subsequent breakout from German encirclement.
The third phase saw the Allies pursue the German army across France to the
Rhine River. Here, Eisenhower's armies paused to establish another
logistics base along the western border of Germany, while continuing to
apply offensive pressure on the enemy. Upon completion of this fourth
phase, the allied armies commenced upon the next, which led to the
destruction of German forces west of the Rhine. Penultimately, they
launched the massive attack into the Ruhr. During the final phase,
remaining enemy forces were destroyed throughout Germany. 3 As history
would later record, Operation Overlord progressed substantially through
the phases and along the pattern as originally conceived.

The Campaign as Operational Art

With Overlord as a classic example of the campaign, we are now
better positioned to understand its relationship to operational warfare. The
1982 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, defines the operational level of war
as that level where available military resources are employed to attain
strategic goals within a theater of war. Here, the operational level is closely
associated with the theory of larger-unit formations and the planning and
conduct of campaigns. 4 In the 1986 edition of the same field manual, the
term "operational art" replaces "operational level," but the definition
remains essentially the same. In this latest version, operational art still
focuses on the attainment of strategic objectives through the design and
conduct of campaigns. Gone, however, is the explicit connection with large
formations-an apparent recognition that relatively small forces, such as
those involved in the Grenada operation, can fight at the operational level.
Furthermore, the new edition added the theater of operations to the theater
of war as a potential stage for operational warfare. 5 Even the Soviets refer
to operational art as focusing on strategic objectives, but, like the 1982
edition of FM 100-5, they tie campaigns to the maneuver of large military
formations. In any event, the operational level of war and operational art
are interchangeable terms used to describe warfare that achieves strategic
aims.
Clearly, then, the campaign is an integral part of operational
warfare. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have defined the campaign as "a series of
military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally
within a given time and space.'" Similarly, the 1986 version of FM 100-5
describes the campaign as "a series of joint actions designed to attain a
strategic objective in a theater of war."7 From these two complementary
definitions, it follows that the campaign can be expressed as a series of either
simultaneous or sequential operations, within a given time and space,
designed to attain a strategic aim. Because of the complexity of forces

44 Parameters
General Eisenhower was given wide latitude in the exercise of command. His
mission was "Enter the continent of Europe, and ..• undertake operations aimed
at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces."

required for modern warfare, the campaign normally will be a joint or

combined effort. Independent single-service campaigns, however, may still
exist to support a theater campaign. For example, an independent strategic
air campaign could be conducted against the Soviet Union, while a com-
bined theater campaign might be fought simultaneously in Europe's central
region.
The theater of war or theater of operations provides the setting in
which the campaign normally occurs. The theater of war is the total area of
military operations under the responsibility of a joint or combined com-
mander-in-chief. For example, the European theater of war extends from
the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Ural Mountains in the east, and from
the northern cape of Scandinavia to the Mediterranean in the south-all
under the responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Other
US theaters of war include the Pacific Command, Atlantic Command,
Central Command (Southwest Asia), and Southern Command (South and
Central America).
Just as the campaign is associated with a theater of war, it also
finds expression on the smaller stages comprising theaters of operations,
which are subdivisions of some theaters of war. In Europe, the theater of
war is divided into the three theaters of operations consisting of the North-
ern, Central, and Southern European regions-each with its own in-
dependent but coordinated plans for campaigns against Warsaw Pact

Summer 1987 45
forces. In the Pacific theater of war, the Korean Peninsula, the Indian
Ocean, and the eastern edge of the Soviet Union form separate theaters of
operations. Likewise, either Central or South America could be organized
into individual theaters within the larger theater of the Southern Command.
Campaigns in theaters of operations, though generally lacking the spatial
amplitude associated with those traversing an entire theater of war, do serve
to achieve strategic aims and thus qualify as instances of operational art.

Campaign Planning
In the conduct of the individual battles and larger military
operations that collectively comprise campaigns, planning assures that
superior combat force is channeled against enemy vulnerabilities. That is to
say, during offensive operations the campaign is designed to disrupt enemy
plans, capabilities, and freedom of action. During defensive situations, the
campaign aims to disrupt the enemy's timetable but at the same time retains
friendly freedom of action and a voids decisive engagement until an op-
portune time. Moreover, based upon planning well into the future, the
campaign permits both the scheduling of proper forces as well as the
procurement and use of necessary resources. This scheduling process
prevents the premature exhaustion of scarce resources prior to the
engagement with the enemy.
When we speak of "campaign planning," we normally have in
mind such planning as applied to the employment of forces in actual
combat, or what is called prosecution planning. It is important to realize,
however, that a prosecution plan is only one of the four types of operational
plans, which collectively accommodate planning at the various levels of
command and cover the entire spectrum from peace to war and back to
peace again.' This planning cycle is particularly useful in relating campaign
planning to operational warfare.
The first category, current operations planning, aims at deterring
potential enemies from aggression and at ensuring a high state of readiness
among military forces. Normally associated with peacetime, day-to-day
functions, it allows for the development of broad, strategically oriented
guidance and direction for the unified and specified commands, which have
broad continuing missions. At lower organizational levels, this type of
planning leads to the development and enforcement of training and
readiness standards, the conduct of routine peacetime patrols, and the
accomplishment of joint and combined operational exercises.
The second category, contingency planning, relates to peacetime
preparations for dealing with potential crises or military requirements
within a theater commander's area of responsibility. This category is most
closely associated with the development of operation and concept plans
under the. deliberate planning process of the Joint Operations Planning

46 Parameters
System or JOPS. These products of contingency planning are the many
numbered war plans, often called deployment plans, that theater com-
manders produce in response to foreseeable or potential military even-
tualities.
The third category, execution planning, pertains to the actual
commitment of forces when conflict is imminent. In other words, this
planning occurs during the transition from peace to war. Once again, JOPS
provides the framework for a process that ultimately leads to executable
operation orders. In this respect, execution planning facilitates the initial
deployment of forces and equipment to a theater of war, and supports the
employment of those forces in a manner consistent with the overall concept
for fighting the war.
The fourth and final category of planning, which we glanced at
earlier, is prosecution planning. It pertains to plans that actually employ
forces in combat in order to achieve strategic aims. By completing the cycle
from peace to war and back to peace again, prosecution planning ultimately
provides for a favorable resolution of the war. At the highest national levels,
this planning results in strategic guidance from which theater commanders
derive their mission. Armed with such guidance, these operational com-
manders then design a campaign plan as the basis for operational warfare.
Obviously, though the campaign plan is a wartime instrument, it can be
developed in part before commencement of hostilities in cases when timing
permits or the actual contingency is anticipated.

Mission and Concepts

As exemplified in Operation Overlord, there are a number of
fundamental considerations essential to the design and conduct of any well-
conceived campaign. Some of the more important of these can be explored
by looking at three different aspects of the campaign-the mission, the
concept of operations, and the concept of logistical support.
With respect to the campaign's mission, there are several im-
portant considerations. To begin, all of the military operations embraced by
the campaign must focus on the attainment of an identifiable strategic aim.
For this reason, it is essential to recognize clearly the objective for which the
campaign will be fought. The campaign plan then translates the strategic
guidance into a mission from which subordinates develop military tasks-all
of which also contribute to the accomplishment of the singular strategic
aim.
Understandably, the development of such a strategically oriented
mISSIOn requires an appreciation of the supporting, and sometimes
distracting, influence of campaigns being fought in adjacent theaters.
During a global war, for example, campaigns in the Atlantic and Southwest
Asian theaters would be inextricably linked to a European campaign.

Summer 1987 47
 All the military operations embraced by a
campaign must focus on attaining an
identifiable strategic aim.

Likewise, planning for military campaigns must include an appreciation of

the constraints and imperatives imposed on the mission by national policy.
Hence, the political imperative to conduct a forward defense of Western
European territory along the inner-German border overrides the possibility
of any alternative and arguably superior military options. Finally, the
mission must be developed so that all efforts concentrate on determining
and destroying the enemy's center of gravity. A center of gravity is, as
Clausewitz explained, "the hub of all power and movement, on which
everything depends ... the point against which all our energies should be
directed.'" For example, it might be the armed forces of the enemy, his
capital, his essential lines of communication or logistics bases, or even the
political cohesiveness of his alliances. Eisenhower, as we have seen, focused
all the strength of the Allied combined .armies on the Nazi center of gravity,
i.e. the German armed forces, during his campaign across Europe.
Moreover, the same careful consideration must be given to the identification
and protection of friendly centers of gravity as well, for their loss would lead
to certain defeat at the hands of the enemy.
Another important aspect of campaign planning is the concept of
operations. The concept must of course be compatible with previously
developed plans for mobilization, deployment, employment, or sustain-
ment. If a conflict exists between the campaign plan and these other plans,
adjustments must be made either to the campaign plan itself or to the other
supporting plans.
The operational concept must provide for the massing of sufficient
combat power at decisive points on the battlefield to assure the victory that
will lead to the attainment of the strategic aims. This concentration of force
includes the establishment of lines of operation as primary axes of advance,
the development of contingency options, known also as branches and
sequels, to account for changing circumstances, and the incorporation of
such environmental factors as climate and geography. Furthermore, it
requires strong operational reserves and forces with special capabilities,
such as airborne or amphibious, in order to help achieve the decisive
operational victories.
The operational concept must also reflect a grasp of the
culminating point-the point in time or space where the momentum of the
attack can no longer be maintained. Clausewitz pointed out the risks of

48 Parameters
strategic attacks made without a proper appreciation of the culminating
point: "Most attacks only le.ad up to the point where their remaining
strength is just enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace. Beyond
that point the scale turns and the reaction follows with a force that is usually
much stronger than that of the original attack.'''' Continued offensive
operations beyond the culminating point risk overextension, counterattack,
and defeat. In the attack, therefore, the objective is to achieve decisive
victories before reaching the culminating point; in the defense, the enemy's
culminating point must be exploited as a springboard to seize the offensive.
The concept of operations for a campaign is normally divided into
phases, which outline the commander's vision of the campaign's intended
progress. This phasing occurs under a variety of circumstances. For
example, a change in the type of operation (e.g. a shift from defensive to
offensive operations) or a change in the tempo of operations (e.g. a pause to
regroup prior to continuing offensive operations) provides an appropriate
juncture for a phase. Similarly, a change in force structure, such as the
introduction of fresh reserves or the reallocation of critical resources to lend
weight to specific operations, might also result in a separate phase. Then
too, phasing serves to accommodate the uncertainty associated with the
scheduling and concept of intermediate operations of a campaign. As
illustrated in Overlord, every phase of a well-constructed campaign is
crucial to the overall success of the campaign.

Operation Overlord provides a classic example of campaign planning.

Summer 1987 49
 Deception-the deliberate attempt to manipulate the enemy's
perception of. the battlefield-is also an inseparable part of the concept of
operations. Designed to achieve surprise, deception is most successful when
it reinforces the enemy's predisposed tendencies in analyzing friendly in-
tentions. To be effective, deception must occur over extended periods of
time, and at the same time be fully embraced by all of the forces that are a
part of the campaign.
Certainly the Allied deception concerning the intended sites for
their amphibious assaults during the Normandy invasion fully incorporated
such principles, and contributed immeasurably to the overall success of the
campaign.
In turning from the operational concept to the logistical concept of
the campaign, we encounter still another group of pertinent considerations.
One such is the requirement to forecast the resources that will be necessary
to pursue the campaign through to a successful conclusion. This anticipated
demand for future resources serves to alert higher authorities, i.e. the
national leadership or the combined and joint staffs, of the current and
future national preparations that will be necessary to win the war.
Another consideration is the degree of authority a theater com-
mander exercises over the various logistics functions within his command.
Although logistics functions are generally a national or service respon-
sibility, the theater commander retains the authority to coordinate and
establish priorities for the logistical support of his forces in order to ensure
their effectiveness in combat. The theater commander establishes a theater-
wide logistics base that provides for the needs of his varied forces. This
effort includes such far-ranging matters as arrangements for host-nation
support, the location and use of prepositioned, war-reserve stocks, and the
establishment of major lines of communication-specifically the airports,
seaports, petroleum depots, and main supply routes. All types of supply are
important, but petroleum products and ammunition deserve special at-
tention because of their critical importance on the battlefield. Medical
treatment and evacuation policies require close scrutiny, not only for the
psychological impact on sick and wounded troops, but for the equally
imposing impact on hospital requirements, force structure, and replacement
policy.

The Final Product

The campaign plan itself will be the key product of the planning
process that ties together all of the foregoing factors that bear on
operational preparations. Through the campaign plan, the theater com-
mander conveys his personal vision for fighting and winning the campaign
not only to his subordinates-the fighting components-but also to his
superiors. Moreover, it highlights the strategic aim for which the campaign

50 Parameters
is fought, again to lower and higher headquarters alike, so that all have a
clear understanding of the simultaneous and sequential operations that are
intended to achieve that strategic aim. In addition, the campaign plan serves
as the commander's tool for directing the complex operations that occur
throughout the theater. In this respect, it assists the commander in
monitoring and adjusting operations or phases, in establishing major
milestones en route to attaining the strategic aim, and in placing continuing
emphasis on the ultimate war objective.
Under the broad principles of contingency planning and execution
planning that we examined previously, several US theater commanders have
developed campaign plans in varying degrees of completeness and under a
variety of names. In the Pacific, the CINC expounds his campaign plan both
in his warfighting strategy (formerly called a campaign plan) and in war
plans prepared pursuant to the JOPS. The CINC of the Combined Forces
Command in Korea also sets forth his campaign for the defense of the
peninsula in a JOPS-associated war plan. On the other side of the world, the
CINC, US Central Command, has drawn up a series of plans that to some
degree fulfill the requirements of the campaign plan. But in all theaters,
whenever hostilities commence, expert prosecution planning in the form of
complete-and enlightened-campaign plans will be essential. Only thus
can we wage war on the operational level successfully. And only thus can we
achieve our strategic aims.

NOTES

1. Forrest C. Pogue. United States Army In World War II. The European Theater of Operations,
The Supreme Command (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, DA, 1954), p. 53.
2, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade In EuroW (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), p. 225.
3. Ibid" pp, 228-29,
4. US Dept. of the Army, Operations, FM 100·5 (Washington: GPO, 1982), pp. 2·3.
5. Ibid., 1986 edition, p. 10.
6. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary oj Military and Associated Terms.
JCS Pub, I (Washington: GPO, 1986), p, 60,
7, FMJOO-5, Operations (1986), p, JO,
8. j, E, Toth et aI., Dralt Planner's Reference Manual, It Advanced Amphibious Study Group
(Washington, D,C" USMC, 1983), 3-5-1 to 3-5-3,
9. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret ,(Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976). pp. 595-96.
10, Ibid" p, 528,

Summer 1987 51