Macasiano vs Diokno GR 97764 (August 10, 

1992)
211 SCRA 464
G.R. No. 97764
August 10, 1992
Facts:
Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan,
Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets and the establishment of a flea market thereon. This was passed pursuant to
MMC Ordinance No.2 and was approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority on July 20, 1990.

On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a contract agreement whereby the latter shall
operate, maintain & manage the flea markets and/or vending areas in the aforementioned streets with the obligation
to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque.

On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz &
Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also wrote a letter to Palanyag ordering the destruction of the flea market.

Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The trial court upheld the assailed
Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing his letter-order against Palanyag.

Issues:
WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque authorizing the lease & use of public
streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea market is valid.

Held:
No.

J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets are local roads used for public service and
are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government devoted to
public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no
authority to control/regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.

Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established
by law.
The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when
circumstances show that such property is no longer intended/necessary for public use/service. Once withdrawn, the
property then becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned and only then can said LGU use the property as
an object of an ordinary contract. Roads and streets available to the public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic
are still considered public property devoted to public use. The LGU has no power to use it for another purpose or to
dispose of or lease it to private persons.

Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it can’t be considered approved by the
Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance with the conditions it imposed for the approval of said
ordinance.

The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down by the Constitution and laws such as
the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety &
convenience, maintain peace & order and promiote the general prosperity of the inhanbitants pf the local units.

As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand the demolition of the illegally constructed stalls
in public roads & streets. The officials of the respondent municipality have the corresponding duty arising from
public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose.

The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable during its time.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 97764. August 10, 1992.]

LEVY D. MACASIANO, Brigadier General/PNP Superintendent, Metropolitan Traffic

Command,Petitioner, v. HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Branch,
62, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE,
METRO MANILA, PALANYAG KILUSANG BAYAN FOR SERVICE, Respondents.

Ceferino, Padua Law Office for Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for service.

Manuel de Guia for Municipality of Parañaque.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; PUBLIC CORPORATION; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE; RESOLVING ITS

VALIDITY; LAWS IN FORCE AT ITS ENACTMENT CONTROL. — In resolving the question of
whether the disputed municipal ordinance authorizing the flea market on the public streets is
valid, it is necessary to examine the laws in force during the time the said ordinance was
enacted, namely, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as Local Government Code, ‘in
connection with established principles embodied in the Civil Code on property and settled
jurisprudence on the matter.

2. PROPERTY OF PROVINCES, CITIES, AND MUNICIPALITIES; CLASSIFICATION; PROPERTY FOR

PUBLIC USE. — The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for
public use and patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what consists of property for
public use, Article 424 of Civil Code states: "ART. 24. Property for public use, in the provinces,
cities and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains,
public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities
or municipalities. "All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be
governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws."cralaw virtua1aw library

3. PROPERTY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVOTED TO PUBLIC SERVICE; DEEMED PUBLIC; UNDER

THE ABSOLUTE CONTROL OF CONGRESS; LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO
CONTROL OR REGULATE THEM UNLESS SPECIFIC AUTHORITY IS VESTED UPON THEM BY
CONGRESS; AUTHORITY TO BE INTERPRETED ACCORDING TO BASIC PRINCIPLES OF LAW; ART.
424 OF THE CIVIL CODE. — Properties of the local government which are devoted to public
service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress (Province of
Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334). Hence,
local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public
properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. One such example of this
authority given by Congress to the local governments is the power to close roads as provided in
Section 10, Chapter II of the Local Government Code, which states: "SEC. 10. Closure of roads.
— A local government unit may likewise, through its head acting pursuant to a resolution of its
sangguniang and in accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code, close any
barangay, municipal, city or provincial road, street, alley, park or square. No such way or place
or any part thereof shall be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. A
property thus withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which
other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed."
However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to local government units to close
roads and other similar public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic
principles already established by law. These basic principles have the effect of limiting such
authority of the province, city or municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. Article 424
of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to
public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and
cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private persons.

4. ROADS AND STREETS ORDINARILY USED FOR VEHICULAR TRAFFIC CONSIDERED PUBLIC
PROPERTY; LOCAL GOVERNMENT HAS NO POWER TO USE IT FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE OR TO
DISPOSE OF OR LEASE IT TO PRIVATE PERSONS. — However, those roads and streets which are
available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered
public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has no power to use it
for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.

5. PROPERTY WITHDRAWN FROM PUBLIC USE; BECOMES PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY OF THE

LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT; CAN BE OBJECT OF ORDINARY CONTRACT. — When it is already
withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local
government unit concerned (Article 422, Civil Code; Cebu Oxygen, etc. Et. Al. v. Bercilles, Et Al.,
G.R. No. L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). It is only then that the respondent
municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to
the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed" in accordance with the last
sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 333, known as Local Government Code. Such
withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract
(Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles, Et Al., G.R. No. L-40474, August 29, 1975,
66 SCRA 481).

6. POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT; NOT ABSOLUTE; SUBJECT TO LIMITATION SET BY

THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS. — Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not
absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down by the Constitution and the laws such as our
Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount
considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community.

7. LEGAL RIGHT OF GENERAL PUBLIC TO DEMAND THE DEMOLITION OF ILLEGALLY

CONSTRUCTED STALLS IN PUBLIC ROADS AND STREETS. — As what we have said in the
Dacanay case, the general public have a legal right to demand the demolition of the illegally
constructed stalls in public roads and streets and the officials of respondent municipality have
the corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to
their specific public purpose.

8. BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 337 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE); REPEALED BY R.A. NO. 7160
(LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991); SECTION 5(D) THEREOF. — However, at this point, We
find it worthy to note that Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, known as Local Government Code, has
already been repealed by Republic Act No. 7160 known as Local Government Code of 1991
which took effect on January 1, 1992. Section 5(d) of the new Code provides that rights and
obligations existing on the date of effectivity of the new Code and arising out of contracts or any
other source of prestation involving a local government unit shall be governed by the original
terms and conditions of the said contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were
vested.

DECISION

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, which granted the writ of preliminary
injunction applied for by respondents Municipality of Parañaque and Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for
Service (Palanyag for brevity) against petitioner herein. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The antecedent facts are as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which
authorized the closure of J. Gabrielle, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena
Streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market
thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MCC Ordinance
No. 2, Series of 1979, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets,
roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas,
under certain terms and conditions.

On July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 86, s. 1990 of the
municipal council of respondent municipality subject to the following conditions: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the majority of the
residents do not oppose the establishment of the flea market/vending areas thereon;

2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending area shall be marked
distinctly, and that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by pedestrians;

3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly designated;

4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once the reclaimed
areas are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority.

On June 20, 1990, the municipal council of Parañaque issued a resolution authorizing Parañaque
Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the
establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending
areas.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative,

entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea
market in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the
municipal government of Parañaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent
Palanyag on the said streets.

On September 13, 1990 petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan
Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J.
Gabrielle St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to respondent Palanyag.

On October 16, 1990, petitioner Brig. General Macasiano wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag
giving the latter ten (10) days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market stalls shall
be dismantled.

Hence, on October 23, 1990, respondents municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a
joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction,
to which the petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On October 24, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin petitioner
from enforcing his letter-order of October 16, 1990 pending the hearing on the motion for writ of
preliminary injunction.

On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No.
86 s. 1990 of the Municipality of Parañaque and enjoining petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano from
enforcing his letter-order against petitioner Palanyag.

Hence, this petition was filed by the petitioner thru the Office of the Solicitor General alleging
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
judge in issuing the assailed order.

The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by
the municipal council of Parañaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or
thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid.

The Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner, contends that municipal roads are used for public
service and are therefore public properties; that as such, they cannot be subject to private
appropriation or private contract by any person, even by the respondent Municipality of
Parañaque. Petitioner submits that a property already dedicated to public use cannot be used for
another public purpose and that absent a clear showing that the Municipality of Parañaque has
been granted by the legislature a specific authority to convert a property already in public use to
another public use, respondent municipality is, therefore, bereft of any authority to close
municipal roads for the establishment of a flea market. Petitioner also submits that assuming
that the respondent municipality is authorized to close streets, it failed to comply with the
conditions set forth by the Metropolitan Manila Authority for the approval of the ordinance
providing for the establishment of flea markets on public streets. Lastly, petitioner contends that
by allowing the municipal streets to be used by market vendors, the municipal council of
respondent municipality violated its duty under the Local Government Code to promote the
general welfare of the residents of the municipality.

In upholding the legality of the disputed ordinance, the trial court ruled: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . that Chapter II Section 10 of the Local Government Code is a statutory grant of power
given to local government units, the Municipality of Parañaque as such, is empowered under that
law to close its roads, streets or alley subject to limitations stated therein (i.e. that it is in
accordance with existing laws and the provisions of this code).

x          x           x

"The actuation of the respondent Brig. Gen. Levi Macasiano, though apparently within its power
is in fact an encroachment of power legally vested to the municipality, precisely because when
the municipality enacted the ordinance in question — the authority of the respondent as Police
Superintendent ceases to be operative on the ground that the streets covered by the ordinance
ceases to be a public thoroughfare." (pp. 33-34, Rollo)

We find the petition meritorious. In resolving the question of whether the disputed municipal
ordinance authorizing the flea market on the public streets is valid, it is necessary to examine
the laws in force during the time the said ordinance was enacted, namely, Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, otherwise known as Local Government Code, ‘in connection with established principles
embodied in the Civil Code on property and settled jurisprudence on the matter.
The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what consists of property for public use, Article
424 of Civil Code states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the
provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities. chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

"All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code,
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws."cralaw virtua1aw library

Based on the foregoing, J. Gabrielle G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Gacia Extension and Opena
streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of
respondent municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service
are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress (Province of Zamboanga del
Norte v. City of Zamboanga, L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334). Hence, local
governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties
unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. One such example of this authority
given by Congress to the local governments is the power to close roads as provided in Section
10, Chapter II of the Local Government Code, which states: chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

"SEC. 10. Closure of roads. — A local government unit may likewise, through its head acting
pursuant to a resolution of its sangguniang and in accordance with existing law and the
provisions of this Code, close any barangay, municipal, city or provincial road, street, alley, park
or square. No such way or place or any part thereof shall be closed without indemnifying any
person prejudiced thereby. A property thus withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed
for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be
lawfully used or conveyed." (Emphasis ours)

However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to local government units to close
roads and other similar public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic
principles already established by law. These basic principles have the effect of limiting such
authority of the province, city or municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. Article 424
of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to
public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and
cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the
requirement of due process which should be complied with before closing a road, street or park,
the closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from
public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for
public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then
becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit concerned (Article 422, Civil Code;
Cebu Oxygen, etc. Et. Al. v. Bercilles, Et Al., G.R. No. L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481).
It is only then that the respondent municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose for
which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or
conveyed" in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 333, known as
Local Government Code. In one case, the City Council of Cebu, through a resolution, declared
the terminal road of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City as an abandoned road, the same not
being included in the City Development Plan. Thereafter, the City Council passed another
resolution authorizing the sale of the said abandoned road through public bidding. We held
therein that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city street and to vacate or withdraw the
same from public use. Such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the
object of an ordinary contract (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles, Et Al., G.R. No.
L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). However, those roads and streets which are available
to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public
property devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has no power to use it for
another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons. This limitation on the authority of
the local government over public properties has been discussed and settled by this Court en
banc in "Francisco v. Dacanay, petitioner v. Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr., Et Al., Respondents., G.R.
No. 93654, May 6, 1992." This Court ruled: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents’ market stalls are
sought to be evicted are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921. A
public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil
Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract
(Villanueva, Et. Al. v. Castañeda and Macalino, 15 SCRA 142 citing the Municipality of Cavite v.
Rojas, 30 SCRA 602; Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil. 869; and Muyot v. De
la Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860).

"As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the
public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to
them. Such leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public
to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few
should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace,
safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to
protect. chanrobles law library

"The Executive Order issued by acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del ‘96 Street
as a vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government
contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles’
Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the
purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality has the authority to pass the
disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered
approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance by respondent
municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance, to
wit: cralawnad

1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the majority of the
residents do(es) not oppose the establishment of the flea market/vending areas thereon;

2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending area shall be marked
distinctly, and that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by pedestrians;

3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly designated;

4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once the reclaimed
areas are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority. (p. 38, Rollo)

Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied with the foregoing
conditions precedent to the approval of the ordinance. The allegations of respondent municipality
that the closed streets were not used for vehicular traffic and that the majority of the residents
do not oppose the establishment of a flea market on said streets are unsupported by any
evidence that will show that this first condition has been met. Likewise, the designation by
respondents of a time schedule during which the flea market shall operate is absent.
Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congested with people,
houses and traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license
and allow the establishment of a flea market along J. Gabrielle, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia
Extension and Opena streets in Baclaran would not help in solving the problem of congestion.
We take note of the other observations of the Solicitor General when he said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . . There have been many instances of emergencies and fires where ambulances and fire
engines, instead of using the roads for a more direct access to the fire area, have to maneuver
and look for other streets which are not occupied by stalls and vendors thereby losing valuable
time which could, otherwise, have been spent in saving properties and lives.

"Along G.G. Cruz Street is a hospital, the St. Rita Hospital. However, its ambulances and the
people rushing their patients to the hospital cannot pass through G.G. Cruz because of the stalls
and the vendors. Once can only imagine the tragedy of losing a life just because of a few
seconds delay brought about by the inaccessibility of the streets leading to the hospital.

"The children, too, suffer. In view of the occupancy of the roads by stalls and vendors, normal
transportation flow is disrupted and school children have to get off at a distance still far from
their schools and walk, rain or shine.

"Indeed one can only imagine the garbage and litter left by vendors on the streets at the end of
the day. Needless to say, these cause further pollution, sickness and deterioration of health of
the residents therein." (pp. 21-22, Rollo)

Respondents do not refute the truth of the foregoing findings and observations of petitioners.
Instead, respondents want this Court to focus its attention solely on the argument that the use
of public spaces for the establishment of a flea market is well within the powers granted by law
to a local government which should not be interfered with by the courts.

Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to limitations
laid down by the Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of
such powers should be subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-being of the
members of the community. Every local government unit has the sworn obligation to enact
measures that will enhance the public health, safety and convenience, maintain peace and order,
and promote the general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective,
the local government should refrain from acting towards that which might prejudice or adversely
affect the general welfare.

As what we have said in the Dacanay case, the general public have a legal right to demand the
demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads and streets and the officials of
respondent municipality have the corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city
streets and restore them to their specific public purpose.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

The instant case as well as the Dacanay case, involves an ordinance which is void and illegal for
lack of basis and authority in laws applicable during its time. However, at this point, We find it
worthy to note that Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, known as Local Government Code, has already
been repealed by Republic Act No. 7160 known as Local Government Code of 1991 which took
effect on January 1, 1992. Section 5(d) of the new Code provides that rights and obligations
existing on the date of effectivity of the new Code and arising out of contracts or any other
source of prestation involving a local government unit shall be governed by the original terms
and conditions of the said contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were vested.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court
dated December 17, 1990 which granted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner
as PNP Superintendent, Metropolitan Traffic Command from enforcing the demolition of market
stalls along J. Gabrielle, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.