CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 

(Promulgated June 21, 1988) 

  
CHAPTER I. THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.

Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement.

Cases:

SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant, vs. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M.

MARTIJA, respondents.
CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995

RESOLUTION

 MELO, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline,
National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally
Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with
unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to
frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain.

The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal
Case No. 7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate
civil action Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and
by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the
Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps.
Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of a
sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps.
Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the
Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and
evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of
Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously
attached by complainant was levied upon.
It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito
Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt
number to wit" Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411
dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.

Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of
the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant
might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and
recommendations:

Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the
records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents
admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the
Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of
Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated in said title of February 7,
1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state,
the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said
registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.

Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment
which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg
to stand on.

However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances
and in their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated
1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using,
apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty.
Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo
paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current membership dues, on February 20, 1990,
under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline.

The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who
alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP
official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and
pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her
employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of
every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially
when he practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP
Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.

The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2-4,
Resolution)

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to
expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A
lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is
required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation
of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND
him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the
same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of
the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA ELENA MORENO VS. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA

A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005

Facts: Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which amounts to
P11, 000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored because the account against which is
drawn is closed. Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The Commission recommended the suspension from
the practice of law for three (3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C.
Fernandez, transmitted the records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b)
of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report regarding various
aspects of the case. The Report further made mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely
suspending the respondent for having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification
of a commercial document.

Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against a
closed account.

Held: The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance
that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao
v. Medel, we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year’s
suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the
obligation. In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, apparently been found guilty by final
judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for
which he has been indefinitely suspended. Considering that he had previously committed a similarly
fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a
more severe penalty. In fact, we have long held that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for
conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of
Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, “the review of respondent's conviction no longer
rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate
argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a
member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to
protect the administration of justice.”

CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT

AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.

Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or
the oppressed.

Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse to
render legal advice to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the
latter's rights.

Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.

Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed unless the
circumstances so warrant.

Cases:

ULEP V LEGAL CLINIC

FACTS: Petitioner prays that respondent cease and desist from issuing ads similar to annexes A and
B and to prohibit them from making ads pertaining to the exercise of the law professions other than
those allowed by law.

 Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560 for a valid marriage
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Pls call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041
8:30am-6pm
7F Victoria Bldg, UN Ave, Mla

 Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON
 An Atty in Guam, is giving FREE BKS on Guam Divorce thru the Leg Clinic beg Mon-Fri during
office hours

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Probs, Visa

ext. Quota/Non-quota Res and Special Retiree’s Visa.

Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.

Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina

Sp/Shil. Call Marivic

THE LEGAL CLINIC, etc

Petitioner’s Claim:

 Ads are unethical and demeaning of the law profession and destructive of the confidence of
the community in the integrity of the members of the bar.

 As a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the ads

Respondent’s Comment:

 They are not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of leg support services thru
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines

 Even if they are leg services, the act of advertising them should be allowed under Bates v.
State bar of Arizona

ISSUES

1. WON the services offered by The Legal Clinic constitutes practice of law?

2. WON their services can be advertised?

HELD

1. Yes. The Practice of law involves any activity, in or out of the court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and expertise

 To engage in the practice is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the
profession; to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge/skill
  Not limited to the conduct of cases in court; includes legal advice and counsel and
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured regardless
of WON they’re pending in court

3 types of legal profession activity:

1. legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations

2. preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by
ordinary layman

3. appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine
rights of life, liberty and property according to law, in order to assist in proper inter and
enforcement of law

Respondent’s description of its services shows it falls within the practice of law:

 Giving info by paralegals to laymen and lawyers thru the use of comps and modern info tech

- computerized legal research, document search, evidence gathering, locating

parties/witnesses to a case, fact finding investigations, assistance to laymen in need of
services from agencies like birth, marriage, prop, bus registrations, etc.

- *even if some of the services offered merely involve mechanical and technical know
how like installing computer system for law offices, this doesn’t make it an exception to
the general rule

 gives out leg info to laymen and lawyersnot non-advisory and non-diagnostic

- ex. foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption – have to explain to client the
intricacies of the law and advise him on the proper course of action

 what its ads represent and what it will be paid for

 It doesn’t matter that they don’t represent clients in court since practice of law isn’t limited to ct
appearances but also leg research, leg advice and drafting contracts

 Phil Star Art – Rx for Leg Problems, int by proprietor Atty Nogales:

- Takes care of probs as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic sit

- lawyers, who like drs, are specialists in various fields and can take care of it (taxation,
crim law, medico-leg probs, labor, litigation, fam law)

- backed up by paralegals, counselors and attys

 - caters to clients who can’t afford big firms

- can prepare a simple deed of sale or affidavit of loss and also those w/ more extensive
treatment

The fact that they employ paralegals to carry out its services doesn’t matter; what’s important is that
it’s engaged in the practice of law ‘cause of the nature of the services it renders, which brings it within
the statutory prohibitions against ads
- only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who’s in good and regular standing is
entitled to the practice of law
- public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified
in education and character to protect the public, court, client and bar from
incompetence/dishonesty of those unlicensed to the practice and not subject to the discipline
of court

2. No. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer, in making known his legal
services, shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective info/statement of facts

- not supposed to use any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement re his qualifications/legal services

- not supposed to pay representatives of the mass media in return for publicity to
attract legal business

Canons of professional Ethics (before CPR) provides that lawyers shouldn’t resort to indirect ads for
professional employment like furnishing newspaper comments, publishing his pictures with causes
the lawyer’s been engaged in, importance of his position and other self-laudation.

Stands of legal profession condemn lawyer’s advertisement of his talents like a merchant does of his
goods because of the fact that law is a profession.

The canons of profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct.

Good and efficient service to a client and the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching
public attention; this shouldn’t be done thru propaganda.
EXCEPTIONS:

expressly allowed –

- publication in reputable law lists of informative data that’s not misleading and may
include only:

name, professional assoc, adds, nos, branches of law practiced, date and place
of birth and admission to the bar, schools attended w/ dates of grad, degrees ,
public offices, posts of honor, legal authorships, legal teaching positions,
membership and offices in bar association, legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities, listings in other reputable law lists, names and adds of references
with written consent and clients regularly represented

- can’t be mere supplemental feature of paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical

that’s published for other purposes

- never in a law list that are calculated or likely to deceive/injure the public/the bar or
lower the dignity/standing of the profession

- ordinary simple professional card allowed – name, law firm, add, no and special
branch of law practiced

- publication of simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or change in

partnership, assoc, firm name or office add, for the convenience of the profession

- have name listed in phone directory but not under designation of special branch of
law

Necessarily implied from the restrictions:

Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: allowed lawyer to publish a statement of leg fees for an initial
consultation or give, upon request, a written schedule of fees or estimate for spec services as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers

- none expressly/impliedly provided for in the Canons of Professional Ethics or Code of

Professional Responsibility

*survey conducted by the American Bar Assoc on the attitude of the public about
lawyers after viewing TC commercials – pub

dropped significantly:

Trustworthy – 71-14%

Professional – 71-14%

Honest – 65-14%

Dignified – 45-14%
With the present situation of our legal and judicial system, to allow the publication of like
advertisements would aggravate what’s already a deteriorating pub of the legal profession whose
integrity’s been under attack by media and the community in general.

- all efforts should be made to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the leg
profession

Atty Nograles (prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of the Leg Clinic) is
REPRIMANDED w/ a warning that a repetition will be dealt w/ more severely for misbehavior in
advertising his services and aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.

B.M. No. 2012             February 10, 2009

PROPOSED RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE FOR PRACTICING LAWYERS

RESOLUTION

RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE

SECTION 1. Title. - This Rule shall be known as "The Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service."

SECTION 2. Purpose. - This Rule seeks to enhance the duty of lawyers to society as agents of
social change and to the courts as officers thereof by helping improve access to justice by the less
privileged members of society and expedite the resolution of cases involving them. Mandatory free
legal service by members of the bar and their active support thereof will aid the efficient and effective
administration of justice especially in cases involving indigent and pauper litigants.

SECTION 3. Scope. - This Rule shall govern the mandatory requirement for practicing lawyers to
render free legal aid services in all cases (whether, civil, criminal or administrative) involving indigent
and pauper litigants where the assistance of a lawyer is needed. It shall also govern the duty of other
members of the legal profession to support the legal aid program of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule:

(a) Practicing lawyers are members of the Philippine Bar who appear for and in behalf of
parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies, including but not limited to the National
Labor Relations Commission, National Conciliation and Mediation Board, Department of Labor
and Employment Regional Offices, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and
National Commission for Indigenous Peoples. The term "practicing lawyers" shall exclude:

(i) Government employees and incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to
practice;

(ii) Lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court;

 (iii) Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in law student practice in duly accredited
legal clinics of law schools and lawyers of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
peoples’ organizations (POs) like the Free Legal Assistance Group who by the nature of
their work already render free legal aid to indigent and pauper litigants and

(iv) Lawyers not covered under subparagraphs (i) to (iii) including those who are
employed in the private sector but do not appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of
law and quasi-judicial agencies.

(b) Indigent and pauper litigants are those defined under Rule 141, Section 19 of the Rules of
Court and Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga (G.R. No.150135, 30
October 2006, 506 SCRA 81);

(c) Legal aid cases are those actions, disputes, and controversies that are criminal, civil and
administrative in nature in whatever stage wherein indigent and pauper litigants need legal
representation;

(d) Free legal aid services refer to appearance in court or quasi-judicial body for and in behalf
of an indigent or pauper litigant and the preparation of pleadings or motions. It shall also cover
assistance by a practicing lawyer to indigent or poor litigants in court-annexed mediation and in
other modes of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Services rendered when a practicing
lawyer is appointed counsel de oficio shall also be considered as free legal aid services and
credited as compliance under this Rule;

(e) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is the official national organization of lawyers in the
country;

(f) National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) is the committee of the IBP which is specifically
tasked with handling legal aid cases;

(g) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) is the committee of the IBP which is specifically tasked
with disciplining members of the Bar;

(h) IBP Chapters are those chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines located in the
different geographical areas of the country as defined in Rule 139-A and

(i) Clerk of Court is the Clerk of Court of the court where the practicing lawyer rendered free
legal aid services. In the case of quasi-judicial bodies, it refers to an officer holding an
equivalent or similar position.

The term shall also include an officer holding a similar position in agencies exercising quasi-
judicial functions, or a responsible officer of an accredited PO or NGO, or an accredited
mediator who conducted the court-annexed mediation proceeding.

SECTION 5. Requirements. -

(a) Every practicing lawyer is required to render a minimum of sixty (60) hours of free legal aid
services to indigent litigants in a year. Said 60 hours shall be spread within a period of twelve
(12) months, with a minimum of five (5) hours of free legal aid services each month. However,
where it is necessary for the practicing lawyer to render legal aid service for more than five (5)
hours in one month, the excess hours may be credited to the said lawyer for the succeeding
periods.
For this purpose, a practicing lawyer shall coordinate with the Clerk of Court for cases where
he may render free legal aid service. He may also coordinate with the IBP Legal Aid
Chairperson of the IBP Chapter to inquire about cases where he may render free legal aid
service. In this connection, the IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter shall regularly
and actively coordinate with the Clerk of Court.

The practicing lawyer shall report compliance with the requirement within ten (10) days of the
last month of each quarter of the year.

(b) A practicing lawyer shall be required to secure and obtain a certificate from the Clerk of
Court attesting to the number of hours spent rendering free legal aid services in a case.

The certificate shall contain the following information:

(i) The case or cases where the legal aid service was rendered, the party or parties in
the said case(s) for whom the service was rendered, the docket number of the said
case(s) and the date(s) the service was rendered.

(ii) The number of hours actually spent attending a hearing or conducting trial on a
particular case in the court or quasi-judicial body.

(iii) The number of hours actually spent attending mediation, conciliation or any other
mode of ADR on a particular case.

(iv) A motion (except a motion for extension of time to file a pleading or for
postponement of hearing or conference) or pleading filed on a particular case shall be
considered as one (1) hour of service.

The Clerk of Court shall issue the certificate in triplicate, one (1) copy to be retained by
the practicing lawyer, one (1) copy to be retained by the Clerk of Court and one (1) copy
to be attached to the lawyer's compliance report.

(c) Said compliance report shall be submitted to the Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter
within the court’s jurisdiction. The Legal Aid Chairperson shall then be tasked with immediately
verifying the contents of the certificate with the issuing Clerk of Court by comparing the copy of
the certificate attached to the compliance report with the copy retained by the Clerk of Court.

(d) The IBP Chapter shall, after verification, issue a compliance certificate to the concerned
lawyer. The IBP Chapter shall also submit the compliance reports to the IBP’s NCLA for
recording and documentation. The submission shall be made within forty-five (45) days after
the mandatory submission of compliance reports by the practicing lawyers.

(e) Practicing lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial
bodies the number and date of issue of their certificate of compliance for the immediately
preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the required information would cause the
dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.

(f) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4(a)(i)
and (ii), shall fill up a form prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that year, they are
employed with the government or incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to practice or
lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court.
 The form shall be sworn to and submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office together
with the payment of an annual contribution of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000). Said contribution
shall accrue to a special fund of the IBP for the support of its legal aid program.

(g) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4(a)(iii)
shall secure a certification from the director of the legal clinic or of the concerned NGO or PO
to the effect that, during that year, they have served as supervising lawyers in a legal clinic or
actively participated in the NGO’s or PO’s free legal aid activities. The certification shall be
submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office.

(h) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4(a)(iv)
shall fill up a form prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that year, they are neither
practicing lawyers nor covered by Section (4)(a)(i) to (iii). The form shall be sworn to and
submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office together with the payment of an annual
contribution of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) by way of support for the efforts of practicing
lawyers who render mandatory free legal aid services. Said contribution shall accrue to a
special fund of the IBP for the support of its legal aid program.

(i) Failure to pay the annual contribution shall subject the lawyer to a penalty of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000) for that year which amount shall also accrue to the special fund for the legal
aid program of the IBP.

SECTION 6. NCLA. -

(a) The NCLA shall coordinate with the various legal aid committees of the IBP local chapters
for the proper handling and accounting of legal aid cases which practicing lawyers can
represent.

(b) The NCLA shall monitor the activities of the Chapter of the Legal Aid Office with respect to
the coordination with Clerks of Court on legal aid cases and the collation of certificates
submitted by practicing lawyers.

(c) The NCLA shall act as the national repository of records in compliance with this Rule.

(d) The NCLA shall prepare the following forms: certificate to be issued by the Clerk of Court
and forms mentioned in Section 5(e) and (g).

(e) The NCLA shall hold in trust, manage and utilize the contributions and penalties that will be
paid by lawyers pursuant to this Rule to effectively carry out the provisions of this Rule. For this
purpose, it shall annually submit an accounting to the IBP Board of Governors.

The accounting shall be included by the IBP in its report to the Supreme Court in connection
with its request for the release of the subsidy for its legal aid program.

SECTION 7. Penalties. -

(a) At the end of every calendar year, any practicing lawyer who fails to meet the minimum
prescribed 60 hours of legal aid service each year shall be required by the IBP, through the
NCLA, to explain why he was unable to render the minimum prescribed number of hours. If no
explanation has been given or if the NCLA finds the explanation unsatisfactory, the NCLA shall
make a report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors that the erring lawyer be
declared a member of the IBP who is not in good standing. Upon approval of the NCLA’s
 recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors shall declare the erring lawyer as a member not
in good standing. Notice thereof shall be furnished the erring lawyer and the IBP Chapter
which submitted the lawyer’s compliance report or the IBP Chapter where the lawyer is
registered, in case he did not submit a compliance report. The notice to the lawyer shall
include a directive to pay Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) penalty which shall accrue to the
special fund for the legal aid program of the IBP.

(b) The "not in good standing" declaration shall be effective for a period of three (3) months
from the receipt of the erring lawyer of the notice from the IBP Board of Governors. During the
said period, the lawyer cannot appear in court or any quasi-judicial body as counsel. Provided,
however, that the "not in good standing" status shall subsist even after the lapse of the three-
month period until and unless the penalty shall have been paid.

(c) Any lawyer who fails to comply with his duties under this Rule for at least three (3)
consecutive years shall be the subject of disciplinary proceedings to be instituted motu
proprio by the CBD. The said proceedings shall afford the erring lawyer due process in
accordance with the rules of the CBD and Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. If found
administratively liable, the penalty of suspension in the practice of law for one (1) year shall be
imposed upon him.

(d) Any lawyer who falsifies a certificate or any form required to be submitted under this Rule
or any contents thereof shall be administratively charged with falsification and dishonesty and
shall be subject to disciplinary action by the CBD. This is without prejudice to the filing of
criminal charges against the lawyer.

(e) The falsification of a certificate or any contents thereof by any Clerk of Court or by any
Chairperson of the Legal Aid Committee of the IBP local chapter where the case is pending or
by the Director of a legal clinic or responsible officer of an NGO or PO shall be a ground for an
administrative case against the said Clerk of Court or Chairperson. This is without prejudice to
the filing of the criminal and administrative charges against the malfeasor.

SECTION 8. Credit for Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE). - A lawyer who renders
mandatory legal aid service for the required number of hours in a year for the three year-period
covered by a compliance period under the Rules on MCLE shall be credited the following: two (2)
credit units for legal ethics, two (2) credit units for trial and pretrial skills, two (2) credit units for
alternative dispute resolution, four (4) credit units for legal writing and oral advocacy, four (4) credit
units for substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence and six (6) credit units for such subjects
as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee under Section 2(9), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.

A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid service for the required number of hours in a year for at
least two consecutive years within the three year-period covered by a compliance period under the
Rules on MCLE shall be credited the following: one (1) credit unit for legal ethics, one (1) credit unit
for trial and pretrial skills, one (1) credit unit for alternative dispute resolution, two (2) credit units for
legal writing and oral advocacy, two (2) credit units for substantive and procedural laws and
jurisprudence and three (3) credit units for such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE
Committee under Section 2(g), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.

SECTION 9. Implementing Rules. - The IBP, through the NCLA, is hereby given authority to
recommend implementing regulations in determining who are "practicing lawyers," what constitute
"legal aid cases" and what administrative procedures and financial safeguards which may be
necessary and proper in the implementation of this rule may be prescribed. It shall coordinate with the
various legal chapters in the crafting of the proposed implementing regulations and, upon approval by
the IBP Board of Governors, the said implementing regulations shall be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final approval.

SECTION 10. Effectivity. - This Rule and its implementing rules shall take effect on July 1,2009 after
they have been published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE,
HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications
or legal services.

Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used.
The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm
indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased.

Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdrawal from the firm and his
name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law currently.

Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.

CANON 4 - A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM

BY INITIATING OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM AND IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH
STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW
STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

Bar Matters:

BAR MATTER NO. 850 

[October 02, 2001]

MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (MCLE)

RESOLUTION
 ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING 
LEGAL EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE 
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the Philippine
Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on Legal
Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby approves, the following Revised Rules
for proper implementation:

RULE 1 
PURPOSE

SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. – Continuing legal education is required of members of

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast
with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the
practice of law.

RULE 2 
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. - Within two (2) months from the approval of these Rules
by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted and shall commence the
implementation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program in accordance with
these Rules.

SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. – Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall
complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education activities
approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:

(a)  At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit units.
(b)  At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four (4) credit
units.
(c)  At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution equivalent to five
(5) credit units.
(d)  At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural laws,
and jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit units.

(e)  At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy equivalent to four
(4) credit units.
 
(f)  At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international
conventions equivalent to two (2) credit units.
 
(g)  The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by the
MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units.

RULE 3 
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. - The initial compliance period shall begin not later than three
(3) months from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance period for members
admitted or readmitted after the establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for
thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous compliance period.chan
robles virtual law library

SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. - Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE requirement shall be
divided into three (3) compliance groups, namely:

(a) Compliance group 1. - Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila are
assigned to Compliance Group 1. 
(b)  Compliance group 2. - Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to Compliance Group 2. 
(c)  Compliance group 3. - Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned to Compliance Group 3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity wherever it may be available to
earn credit unit toward compliance with the MCLE requirement.

SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after establishment of the program. –
Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program shall be assigned
to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the date of admission
or readmission.

The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first day of the month
of admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same
Compliance Group.

(a)  Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member is not required to comply with the program requirement for the initial
compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member shall be required to complete a number of hours of approved continuing
legal education activities equal to the number of months remaining in the compliance period in which
the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall be required to complete a number of hours
of education in legal ethics in proportion to the number of months remaining in the compliance period.
Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next whole number.

RULE 4  
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS

SECTION 1. Guidelines. – CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with
the MCLE requirement under the Rules, based on the category of the lawyer’s participation in the MCLE activity. The
following are the guidelines for computing credit units and the supporting documents required therefor:  
 

PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION
PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY
APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED RULES
1. PARTICIPANT/  1 CU PER HOUR OF CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE
ATTENDEE ATTENDANCE WITH NUMBER OF HOURS
 1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR THE PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE OR
RESOURCE SPEAKER  SUBJECT PER SPONSOR’S CERTIFICATION
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR   ½ OF CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION FROM
COMMENTATOR/  SUBJECT PER SPONSORING ORGANIZATION
MODERATOR/  COMPLIANCE PERIOD
COORDINATOR/ 
FACILITATOR
2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW
2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU FOR THE PUBLISHED BOOK
LESS THAN 100 PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.2 BOOK EDITOR ½ OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK WITH PROOF
AUTHORSHIP AS EDITOR
CATEGORY
2.3 RESEARCH PAPER  ½ OF CU FOR THE DULY CERTIFIED/PUBLISHED
INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/  SUBJECT PER TECHNICAL REPORT/PAPER
CREATIVE PROJECT COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF ½ OF CU FOR THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE
AT LEAST TEN (10) SUBJECT PER
PAGES COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.5 LEGAL 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED
NEWSLETTER/  NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL
LAW JOURNAL EDITOR
2.6 PROFESSORIAL FULL CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF LAW DEAN
CHAIR/  SUBJECT PER OR BAR REVIEW DIRECTOR
BAR REVIEW LECTURE  COMPLIANCE PERIOD
LAW TEACHING/

RULE 5  
CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS

SECTION 1. Classes of credit units. -Credit units are either participatory or non-participatory.

SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. - Participatory credit units may be claimed for:

(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, conventions, symposia, in-
house education programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussion. 
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource speaker,
moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. - Non-participatory credit units may be claimed per
compliance period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for publication, e.g.,
in the form of an article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to the legal education of the
author member, which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the member's practice or
employment. 
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
 RULE 6 
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS

SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. - Credit hours are computed based on actual time spent in
an education activity in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in decimals.

RULE 7  
EXEMPTIONS

SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. - The following members of the Bar are exempt from
the MCLE requirement:

(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and
Undersecretaries of Executive Departments; 
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives; 
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired members
of the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers
covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial education; 
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Justice; 
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General; 
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel; 
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions; 
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman; 
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions; 
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least
ten (10) years in accredited law schools;chan robles virtual law library 
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and Professorial
Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and 
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. - The following Members of the Bar are likewise
exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors.

SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement - A member may file a verified
request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post graduate
study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of the
requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to be
established by the MCLE Committee.

SEC. 4. Change of status. - The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month in which
a member ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same day
as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.

SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. - Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE
requirement shall be under oath and supported by documents.

RULE 8  
STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF EDUCATION ACTIVITIES
SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. - Subject to the implementing regulations that may be
adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education program may be granted approval in
either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is an accredited provider and certifies that the
activity meets the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is specifically mandated by
law to provide continuing legal education.

SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. - All continuing legal education activities must meet the
following standards:chan robles virtual law library

(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal subjects and the
legal profession, including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that
enhance legal skills or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral
advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials must be
distributed to all participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the time the activity is
offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free from
interruption like telephone calls and other distractions.
RULE 9 
ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS

SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. - Accreditation of providers shall be done by the MCLE

Committee.

SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. - Any person or group may be accredited as a

provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be renewed, upon written application. All providers of
continuing legal education activities, including in-house providers, are eligible to
be accredited providers. Application foraccreditation shall:

(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee; 

(b) Contain all information requested in the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.

SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. - All approved accredited providers shall agree to the

following: 
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the provider for at
least four (4) years after the completion date. The provider shall include the member on the official
record of attendance only if the member's signature was obtained at the time of attendance at the
activity. The official record of attendance shall contain the member's name and number in the Roll of
Attorneys and shall identify the time, date, location, subject matter, and length of the education
activity. A copy of such record shall be furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the amount of _______ hours of
which _____ hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity; 
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities prescribed by these Rules
and such regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying the time, date, location,
subject matter and length of the activity. 
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing legal education activity
by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members of the IBPBoard of Governors, or designees of the Committee
and IBPBoard for purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules. 
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the activity, the time devoted to
each topic and identity of the instructors. The provider shall make available to each participant a copy
of THE MCLE COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity Evaluation Form. 
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation Forms for a period of not
less than one (1) year after the activity, copy furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this program or issues a
spurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.

SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation. - The accreditation of a provider may be renewed every

two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider fails to comply with any of the requirements of these
Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities for the preceding period.

SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. - The accreditation of any provider referred to in Rule 9

may be revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and for good
cause.

RULE 10 
FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER

SECTION 1. Payment of fees. - Application for approval of an education activity or accreditation as a

provider requires payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the Schedule of MCLE Fees.

RULE 11 
GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. Compliance card. - Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance
Card before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath that
he has complied with the education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the
exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned to the Committee not later than the day after the
end of the member's compliance period.

SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. - Each member shall maintain sufficient record of
compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be provided
to the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3© of Rule 9 should be a sufficient record of
attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall also be maintained by
the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.

RULE 12 
NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. - The following shall constitute non-compliance:

(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period; 
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption; 
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt status) within
the prescribed period;chan robles virtual law library 
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within sixty
(60) days from receipt of non-compliance notice; 
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period; 
(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade
compliance with the MCLE requirements.

SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance. - Members failing to comply
will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days
from the date of notification to file a response clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing
compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain the following language near the
beginning of the notice in capital letters:
IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE
REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE LISTED
AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL
SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE.

Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may use this period to attain
the adequate number of credit units for compliance. Credit units earned during this period may only
be counted toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement unless units in excess of
the requirement are earned, in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement.chan robles virtual law library

RULE 13 
CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. - A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the
end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.

SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. - A member who fails to comply with the requirements after
the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be listed as a delinquent member of
the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The investigation of a member for non-
compliance shall be conducted by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the
MCLE Committee.

SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. - Membership fees shall continue to accrue at the active rate
against a member during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent member.

. 
RULE 14 
REINSTATEMENT  
.
SECTION 1. Process. - The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated when the
member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment of non-
compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary credit units to meet the requirement for the
period of non-compliance during the period the member is on inactive status. These credit units may
not be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. Credit units earned during
the period of non-compliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior compliance period
requirement may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.
SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process. - The termination of listing as a
delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE Committee.

RULE 15 
COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Composition. - The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members, namely, a
retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4) members respectively nominated by
the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme Court and
associations of law schools and/or law professors.

The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall be appointed by
the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as may be
determined by the Court.

SEC. 2. Duty of committee. - The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such implementing
rules as may be necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation with
the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme
Court. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. - Subject to approval by the Supreme Court, the MCLE
Committee shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing,
reporting, approval and other necessary functions.

SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. - The MCLE Committee shall submit to the Supreme Court for
approval, an annual budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE
Program.chan robles virtual law library

This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000, following its publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001 

 .

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. 

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

B.M. No. 1922             June 3, 2008

RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED

IN ALL PLEADINGS/MOTIONS.
Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 3, 2008

"Bar Matter No. 1922. – Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel’s MCLE Certificate of Compliance
or Certificate of Exemption. – The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2, 2008, of
Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson, Committee on Legal Education and Bar
Matters, informing the Court of the diminishing interest of the members of the Bar in the MCLE
requirement program.

The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Education and Bar
Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the
courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance
or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance
period. Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and
the expunction of the pleadings from the records.

The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation." Caprio-Morales Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on official leave. (adv216a)

Very truly yours,

MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA(sgd)

Clerk of Court

CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN

THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR TASKS.

Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to
see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of
establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for
disciplinary action.

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Cases:

PCGG vs Sandiganbayan

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the
efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect
on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK
had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur
daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank.[1] It was later found by the Central
Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related
interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as
uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which
reached a total of P310 million.[3] Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its
financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK
insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general
public, and ordering its liquidation.[4] A public bidding of GENBANK's assets was held from
March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.
[5] Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court
of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation
as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.

In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of
President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and
his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for 'reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against
respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua,
Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry
C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo,
Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co,
Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc.,
Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development
Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing
Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant,
Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development
Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio
Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan.[6] In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on
properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former President Marcos.

Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.[7] After the filing of
the parties' comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.
These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et
al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then
resumed his private practice of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for

respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.
0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General[10] and counsel to Central Bank, 'actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which
was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
Respondent Mendoza allegedly 'intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et
al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank's officials on
the procedureto bring about GENBANK's liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank
in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of and was docketed as Special Proceeding No.
107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting 'engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG's

motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005.[11] It found that the PCGG failed to
prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza's former function as Solicitor
General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent
Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term
as Solicitor General.[12] It further ruled that respondent Mendoza's appearance as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act
No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a
former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before
the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public
office.[13] The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.[14]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan's Second

Division to the Fifth Division.[15] In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG's motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza.
[16] It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the
arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The
PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated
December 5, 2001.[17]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[18] The PCGG alleged that the Fifth
Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any matter in
which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not
waive the objection to respondent Mendoza's appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the
resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.
[19]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import
and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the
government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.

Substantive Issue

The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent
Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: 'A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the
said service.

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive
in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern
codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were
comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation
conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any
obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including
specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore
settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty,
confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but
ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ
markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial
oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the
pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but
the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single
colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some standards
of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of
the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the
colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable
fees.[20]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The nineteenth century has been termed the 'dark ages' of legal ethics in the United States. By
mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the
drafter of the highly influential New York 'Field Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of
conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in
the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman
and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a
lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a
new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and
statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations
' e.g., the 'do no falsehood oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural
law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of
agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence
law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory
of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had
some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards
were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by
contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered
a new era in American legal ethics.[21]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers
in their practice ' the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical
standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical
guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave
detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures,
however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths.
Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding
rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations
themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded
by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again,
picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most
notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task
of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members.[22]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The
1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states' codes, and it was the foundation for
the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.[23]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the
full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine
Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.
[24]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among
their concerns was the 'revolving door or 'the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter
government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they
can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service.[25] These concerns
were classified as adverse-interest conflicts' and 'congruent-interest conflicts. 'Adverse-interest
conflicts' exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private
practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the
government and the interests of the current and former are adverse.[26] On the other hand,
'congruent-interest representation conflicts' are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily
to former government lawyers.[27] For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the
canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA
amended one canon and added thirteen new canons.[28] To deal with problems peculiar to former
government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for 'adverse-interest
conflicts' and 'congruent-interest representation conflicts.[29] The rationale for disqualification is
rooted in a concern that the government lawyer's largely discretionary actions would be influenced by
the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of
parties who might later become private practice clients.[30] Canon 36 provides, viz.:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he
has previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after
his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or
passed upon while in such office or employ.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46
and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.[31]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics.[32]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed
more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a
committee to study the 'adequacy and effectiveness' of the ABA Canons. The committee
recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to
distinguish between 'the inspirational and the proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in
enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible
participation in matters during their employment with the government.

The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional
Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to
which the lawyer must adhere.[34] In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)[35] became the applicable
supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved
the Model Code.[36]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite
standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a
whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The Model Rules used the 'restatement format, where the conduct standards were
set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give better
guidance and clarity for enforcement 'because the only enforceable standards were the black letter
Rules. The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on
narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the
content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements
particularly with regard to conflicts of interests.[37] In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9,
citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of
anxious clients as well as the norm's indefinite nature.[38]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed
Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The
Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with
new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals particularly with
former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 ' A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment
in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2,
Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase 'investigated and
passed upon with the word 'intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to both 'adverse-
interest conflicts' and 'congruent-interest conflicts.

The case at bar does not involve the 'adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil
Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether
there exists a 'congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The 'congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of 'matter referred to in the rule
and, second, the metes and bounds of the 'intervention made by the former government lawyer on
the 'matter. The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined 'matter as any discrete,
isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific
party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the 'matter which was the subject of intervention by respondent
Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent
Mendoza as constituting the 'matter where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:[40]

The PCGG's Case for Atty. Mendoza's Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in
issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty.
Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the
Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its
liquidation with the CFI of .

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key
officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy
Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then
Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B.
Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr.,
where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty.
Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent
portion of the said memorandum states:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that
the following procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and
evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is
believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to
resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and
indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to
liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings
which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it
was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in
order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the bank's liquidation. The
pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:

...

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum
of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with
copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by
P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then
CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the 'matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved
in the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation
and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of . In fine, the Court should resolve whether
his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within
the concept of 'matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in
Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. ' Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate
supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the
condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve probable
loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in
writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of
the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall
designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance,
as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect
and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the
powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing
mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions.

...

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with
safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order
its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank
shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings
which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution.
The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual
liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and
to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall
designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or
finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the
Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets
of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to
money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose
of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the
appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under
this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can
be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made
in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank
from implementing its actions under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act,
unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in
bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is
pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The
restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the
Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an
amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the
damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction.
The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the
restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and
ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an
otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions
caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial
community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver
under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law,
general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827,
Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK
is not the 'matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA
Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the 'drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term 'matter and cannot disqualify.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent
Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the
said act of respondent Mendoza which is the 'matter involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely
different from the 'matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for
themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central
Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to
Allied Bank. The 'matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the
procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition
in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No.
107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject 'matter in
Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by
respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does
not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank.
Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the
issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank
due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the
legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without
saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent
Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the 'intervention contemplated by Rule 6.03.
'Intervene means, viz.:

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or

come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or
modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on
both sides of an intervening river . . .)[41]

On the other hand, 'intervention is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of
others.[42]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word 'intervene. Under the first

interpretation, 'intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or
has no effect or little influence.[43] Under the second interpretation, 'intervene only includes an act
of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings.[44] We hold that this second
meaning is more appropriate to give to the word 'intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not
exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as 'x x x
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law.

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided

that a former government lawyer 'should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection
with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ. As
aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase 'which he has investigated or passed upon resulted in
unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in
DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government
service, had 'substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the
rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that 'a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter
in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee.

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is
an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor
General. For another, the record is arid as to theactual participation of respondent Mendoza in the
subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of
the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks
the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type
of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the
GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the
Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the
Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of
government.

II

Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on
the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is
a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date,
the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.

In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
took account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to
the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance.
Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause achilling effect on government recruitment of able
legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered by the
private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that situation. The observation
is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them
defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher
income in private practice.[45] Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering
government service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them
from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and
cause the firm with which they become associated to be disqualified.[46] Indeed, 'to make
government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter.
[47]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass
opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that
the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted 'the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in
order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and
embarrass the opponent, and observed that the tactic was 'so prevalent in large civil cases in recent
years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary.[48] Even the United States Supreme
Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals' description of disqualification motions as 'a
dangerous game.[49] In the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is
difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was
resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the
hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar
was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to theSandiganbayan and docketed as
Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to
disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the
client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification
motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in
whom the client has confidence.[51] The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often
without the benefit of the work done by the latter.[52] The effects of this prejudice to the right to
choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule
on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan:
'An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving
the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them
to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of
private employment does not enjoy such freedom.[53] He adds: 'Any system that affects the right to
take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official
independence.[54] The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once
occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor
General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that
allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives
him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of
the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.

No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the
freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a
former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm.[55] Former government lawyers
stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence
in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly
speculative exercise at best[56] which can lead to untoward results.[57] No less than Judge Kaufman
doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental
effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its attorneys which the
canons seek to protect.[58] Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in
the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct[59] and some courts have
abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists,
and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case,
and the public.[60]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors
lawyers who 'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides' carries the danger that former
government employee maycompromise confidential official information in the process. But this
concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent
Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different
matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares
of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official
information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent 'sides' to
be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents
Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary,
he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling
it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central
Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense
of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of
loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in
government service.[61] The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who
plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted
to prosecute less vigorously.[62] In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in
1960: 'The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well occur during the
period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government policies.
[63] Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as 'probably excessive.[64] He opines 'x x x it is
hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his
or her last client ' the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the
'best government lawyers ' the ones who were hardest to beat ' not the least qualified or least
vigorous advocates.[65] But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar.
There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate
GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues
defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the 'excessive
influence of former officials' or their 'clout.[66] Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this
concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: 'Much of what appears to be an
employee's influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her position, power that
evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x.[67] More, he contends that the concern
can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: 'x x x The idea that, present
officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the
present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in
federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials
will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism.[68]

III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong
of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr.
Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and
rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor
General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to
disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any
standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if
applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and
deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur. 

Panganiban and Tinga, JJ., Please see separate opinion.

Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., Please see dissenting opinion.

Azcuna, J., I was former PCGG Chair.

Chico-Nazario, J., No part.