Burgos versus CA, G.R. No. 169711, Feb.

8, 2010

Facts:
On 1992 assailants attacked the household of Sarah Marie Palma killing Sarah et.al. Four months after the
incident, the police arrested suspects, who pointed two others and respondent Co who allegedly masterminded
the whole thing. After 10 years of hiding, respondent Co surrendered. The prosecution charged him with two
counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder. Upon arraignment, Co pleaded not guilty to the charges.
On September 25, 2002 respondent Co filed a petition for admission to bail which the RTC granted on the
ground that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the
RTC denied the same prompting petitioner to seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction
before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed without involving the OSG, in violation of
jurisprudence and the law, specifically, Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied it for lack of merit. Thus, this case is about the legal
standing of the offended parties in a criminal case to seek, in their personal capacities and without the Solicitor
General’s intervention, reversal of the trial court’s order granting bail to the accused on the ground of absence
of strong evidence of guilt.
 
Issue:
Do private offended parties have legal standing, without Solicitor General’s intervention, to seek reversal of
trial court’s order granting bail to the accused?

Ruling:
No. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state.  Only the state, through its appellate
counsel, the OSG, has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court.
As a general rule, the mandate or authority to represent the state lies only in the OSG.  Thus it is patent that the
intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the Solicitor General, in this case, the unequivocal
mandate to appear for the government in legal proceedings.  The Court is firmly convinced that considering the
spirit and the letter of the law, there can be no other logical interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code
than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to “represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of a lawyer. For the above reason, actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if not
initiated by the Solicitor General, are, as a rule summarily dismissed. The Court denies the petition
and affirms the Court of Appeals.
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA v. ANDRES B. REYES, GR No. 102342, 1992-07-03
Facts:
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in
violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of
Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990
The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal on May 30, 1990.[2]
The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2,
1990.
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but
the motion was denied.
the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of
the Rule on Summary Procedure:
Section 1. Scope. -- This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:
B. Criminal Cases:
1.                Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2.                Violations of rental law;
3.                Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4.                All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged
does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the
civil liability arising therefrom. x x x" (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation:
Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted
de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by... the
offended party.
She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription
for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin to Run,"
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: x x x Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and... punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
Section 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing
violations of law not included in the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)
Issues:
the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances.
Ruling:
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to
offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in... the
last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are
violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner,
which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by... that rule... the Court
feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there
be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules... on Criminal Procedure, the latter
must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
"diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"... the instant case is for violation of a municipal
ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months,[8] and is thus covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure.
under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably
with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary
judicial proceedings until its too late.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced
from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11,
1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326.
It was not interrupted by the filing... of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have
interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez,
but this was done... only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
 Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 175730,
July 5, 2010
OCTOBER 13, 2018

FACTS:

On July 23, 1987, the Republic through the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil complaint
for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against petitioner Herminio T.
Disini (Disini), spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos (Marcos spouses) and Rodolfo B. Jacob
(Jacob). The same was docketed as Civil Case No. 0013 and assigned to the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan (respondent court). Summons for Disini was issued on July 29, 1987. Per Sheriff’s
Return dated September 4, 1987, the summons was unserved on the ground that petitioner did not
live at the given address, which was No. 92 Kennedy St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. The
occupants of said address were the Roman family.

Between 1987 up until 2002, multiple attempts to serve summons to Disini were all in vain, as his
whereabouts could not be ascertained. Finally, service of summons by publication was resorted to
and by August 27, 2002, petitioner was declared in default for failure to file his responsive pleading
within 60 days from the publication of the summons. On February 17, 2003, with the motion to
drop Sison as party-defendant still pending, the Republic asked the Sandiganbayan to hold in
abeyance the pre-trial until the said motion had been resolved.

The records of the Sandiganbayan became silent from the year 2003 to 2006, then petitioner
Disini’s wife and children filed a petition in a Swiss Federal Court to remove a previously issued
freeze order on their Swiss accounts. On August 18, 2006, the Swiss Federal Court rendered a
partial decision ordering the counsel for the Republic of the Philippines to submit a forfeiture order
from a Philippine court with regard to the assets of Liliana and Herminio Disini not later than
December 30, 2006; otherwise, the Swiss Federal Court would revoke the freeze order on the
Disini Swiss accounts.

This deadline spurred the Republic (through the PCGG) to file an Urgent Manifestation and Motion
with the Sandiganbayan on November 30, 2006. The Republic prayed for the resolution of its
Urgent Motion to Resolve (its motion to drop Rafael Sison as party-defendant). Should the
resolution of this pending motion be favorable to the Republic, it likewise prayed for the setting of
the ex parte presentation of evidence at an early date.

On December 7, 2006, petitioner Disini filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and for Leave to
File and Admit Attached Answer, together with an Answer to Amended Complaint with
Compulsory Counterclaims. He maintained that he was unaware of the civil case pending against
him because he never received summons or other processes from the court, nor any pleadings from
the parties of the case. His only fault, he averred, was that he was ignorant of the proceedings in the
case because of the absence of a proper notice. Petitioner asked the respondent court to look at his
meritorious defenses.

He then invoked the liberality of the courts in lifting default orders to give both parties every
opportunity to defend their cases, and pointed out that the proceedings, being in their pre-trial stage,
would not be delayed by petitioner’s participation therein.
On December 18, 2006, the Sandiganbayan resolved to deny petitioner’s Motion to Lift Default
Order.

Given the validity of the service of summons, the respondent court held that petitioner’s failure to
file a responsive pleading within the allotted period resulted in his default. The respondent court
refused to lift the order of default on the ground that there was no fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence that would justify such an action.

Petitioner then filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and an Extremely Urgent
Manifestation and Motion on December 19, 2006. Aside from asking for reconsideration, petitioner
also prayed that the republic’s ex parte presentation of evidence be held in abeyance until the
resolution of his motion for reconsideration.

On August 7, 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution denying petitioner’s Extremely Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan court gravely abused its discretion in declaring the defendant
in default and not lifting its default order against petitioner Disini

(2) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan court gravely abused its discretion when it allowed the
Republic to present its evidence ex-parte while petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the stay
of the default order had not yet been resolved.

HELD:

(1) NO

In his Petition, petitioner originally sought the nullification of the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan on the theory of lack of jurisdiction over his person, premised on the alleged
impropriety in the service of summons.
However, petitioner subsequently filed several motions with the Sandiganbayan which sought
various affirmative reliefs from that court, sans any qualification of the nature of its appearance and
without reserving or reiterating its previous objection on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person.
In regard to the Motion for Leave to Take Deposition (which is the last pleading on record), it is
important to note that there are two instances when the defendant can take depositions under
Section 1 of Rule 23: (1) after the court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or the property
subject of the action; and (2) after an answer has been served. Both instances presuppose that the
court has already acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. By seeking the relief contained in this
provision, petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Thus, petitioner may be held to have waived his objections regarding the lack of
jurisdiction over his person by seeking affirmative relief through the said provision.

While petitioner bewailed the mode of service of summons on him and questioned the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over his person, he has rendered his own arguments moot by his
voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Jurisprudence holds
that an objection based on lack of jurisdiction over the person is waived when the defendant
files a motion or pleading which seeks affirmative relief other than the dismissal of the
case.

(2) Yes. There is forum shopping when one party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other court.

In filing a Second Motion to Lift the Order of Default with the Sandiganbayan while the instant
Petition is pending with this Court, petitioner has unfairly doubled his chances of securing the
lifting of the default order. “This misdeed amounts to a wagering on the result of [petitioner’s] twin
devious strategies, and shows not only [his] lack of faith in this Court in its evenhanded
administration of law but also [his] expression of disrespect if not ridicule for our judicial process
and orderly procedure.”

Because of the forum-shopping committed by petitioner, the Court cannot grant the relief he prayed
for.
(x)
[ GR NO. 163797, Apr 24, 2007 ]
WILSON CHUA v. RODRIGO PADILLO 

Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, respondents, are the owners of Padillo
Lending Investor engaged in the money lending business in Lucena City. Their
niece, Marissa Padillo-Chua, served as the firm's manager. Marissa is married
to Wilson Chua, brother of Renita Chua, herein petitioners.

One of Marissa's functions was to evaluate and recommend loan applications

for approval by respondents. Once a loan application had been approved,
respondents would authorize the release of a check signed by them or their
authorized signatory, a certain Mila Manalo.
Sometime in September 1999, a post-audit was conducted. It was found that Marissa
was engaged in illegal activities. Respondents filed complaints against petitioners and
several others with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Lucena
City. Believing that a more serious offense should have been charged against
petitioners, respondents interposed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice.
Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 62401. They alleged that in issuing the Resolution dated January 3,
2000 directing the Prosecutor's Office of Lucena City to file the corresponding
Information only against Marissa, the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion. They prayed that the Court of Appeals order the Lucena City Prosecutor to
withdraw the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-182 and instead, file several
Informations against petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY,

the Court orders the DOJ, City Prosecutor, Lucena City to include Wilson Chua and
Renita Chua as accused in the said case.
In reversing itself, the Court of Appeals found that it overlooked certain facts and
circumstances which, if considered, would establish probable cause against Wilson and
Renita.

Ruling : petition
denied and AFFIRM the Amended Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62401. Costs against petitioner.
(x)

Pinote vs ayco

FACTS:

Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the
defense in a criminal case to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses,
even in the absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case.
State Prosecutor Pinote was at that time undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine
Heart Center in Quezon City.

On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case, Pinote refused to cross-
examine the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, maintaining that
prior proceedings conducted in his absence were void. Judge Ayco considered the
prosecution to have waived its right to cross-examine the two defense witnesses.

Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by Pinote against Judge Ayco
for “Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Ayco violated the Rules on Criminal Procedure for allowing
the defense to present evidence in the absence of a prosecutor

HELD: As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and
direction of the public prosecutor. If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit,
however, or in case there are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be
authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court. Once so
authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the
termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is
revoked or otherwise withdrawn.

Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not
merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on
this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is
necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the
rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people.

Judge Ayco’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the
case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is
entitled to due process, so is the State.

Judge Ayco’s lament about Pinote’s failure to inform the court of his inability to attend the
hearings or to file a motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently file a motion for
reconsideration of his Orders allowing the defense to present its two witnesses on said
dates may be mitigating. It does not absolve Judge Ayco of his utter disregard of the Rules.
39. People v. Piccio
August 6, 2014
GR. 193681
Prosecutions
Siplon

Facts: Gimenez, President of Phil. Integrated Advertising Agency, advertising arm of Yuchengco Group of Companies,
filed an affidavit for libel before Office of City Prosecutor against Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI) for
posting “Back to the Trenches: A Call to Arms, AY/HELEN Chose the War Dance w/ Coalition. As alleged in the
complaint, was highly defamatory and libelous. The Office of City Prosecution of Makati City found probable cause to
indict 16 trustees, officers, and/or member of PEPCI.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners, being mere private complainants, may appeal an order of the trial court dismissing a
criminal case even without the OSG’s conformity.

Ruling: No.
It is well-settled that the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Court and the CA is vested
solely in the OSG which is the law office of the Government whose specific powers and functions include that of
representing the Republic and/or the people before any court in any action which affects the welfare of the people as the
ends of justice may require.
Here, it is clear that petitioners did not file their appeal merely to preserve their interest in the civil aspect of the
case.1âwphi1 Rather, by seeking the reversal of the RTC’s quashal of the information in Criminal Case No. 06-875 and
thereby seeking that the said court be directed to set the case for arraignment and to proceed with trial, it is sufficiently
clear that they sought the reinstatement of the criminal prosecution of respondents for libel. Being an obvious attempt to
meddle in to the criminal aspect of the case without the conformity of the OSG, their recourse, in view of the above
discussed principles, must necessarily fail. To repeat, the right to prosecute criminal cases pertains exclusively to the
People, which is therefore the proper party to bring the appeal through the representation of the OSG.
 People of the Philippines vs Uy

G.R. No. 157399 November 17, 2005

Facts: The accused, Uy, Gamus and Ochoa, public officers being employed by the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR), was charged for allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation (NPC)
intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) for the amount of P183, 805,
291.25 was indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of Malversation through Falsification of
Commercial Documents for conspiring, confederating with the private co-accused where they falsify or cause to be
falsified the NPC’s application for the managers check with the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Sandigan Bayan
rendered a decision acquitting Uy, and Ochoa being found guilty for the said crime and is ordered to pay the equal amount
malversed solidarily with Uy. Ochoa then appealed, He claims that his conviction was based on the alleged sworn
statement and the transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant NPC personnel and the report of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Appellant maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined at the
Heart Center and upon assurance it would not be used against him. He was not assisted by counsel nor was he apprised of
his constitutional rights when he executed the affidavit.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused were violated?

Held: The decision of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed. Considering that his statement was taken during the administrative
investigation of NPC’s audit team and before he was taken into custody. As such inquest was still a general inquiry into
an unsolved offense. Appellant cannot claim that he is in police custody because he was confined at the time at Heart
Center and he gave this statement to NPC personnel, not to police authorities. The interview where the sworn statement is
based was conducted by NPC personnel for NPC’s administrative investigation. Any investigation conducted by the NBI
is a separate proceeding, distinct and independent from the NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together
with the latter.