Socrates Vs Sandiganbayan Digest Rule 110

Socrates v SB, Feb 20, 1996
1.Facts: Petitioner alleged that there was violation of his right to a speedy trial by reason of the unreasonable delay
of six (6) years between the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the filing of the information, invoking
doctrine laid down in the leading case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan where the Court held that an inordinate delay of
three (3) years in the conduct and termination of the preliminary investigation is violative of the constitutional rights
of the accused to due process and speedy disposition of his case.
Issue: Whether there is a fixed period of delay in the resolution of Preliminary Investigation to violate the right of the
accused to speedy disposition?
Ruling: No. In the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular
regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
It is palpably clear that the application of the Tatad doctrine should not be made to rely solely on the length of time
that has passed but equal concern should likewise be accorded to the factual ambiance and considerations. In the
cases at bar, while there may have been some delay, it was petitioner himself who brought about the situation of
which he now complains.
A speedy trial is one conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the
oppression of an accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. In the cases at bar,
12
while there may have been some delay, it was petitioner himself who brought about the situation of which he now
complains.
2. Facts: petitioner avers that the informations filed against him on which the order of suspension was based, are
null and void in view of the non-inclusion of his co-principals which thus constitutes a violation of petitioner's right to
due process and equal protection of the law and, therefore, ousted respondent court of its jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner alleges that in Criminal Case No. 18027, the board of directors of ERA Technology Corporation should
have been included as principals by indispensable cooperation because without them he could not possibly have
committed the offense.
Also, he claims that in Criminal Case No. 18028, the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who issued the
resolutions authorizing the purchase and repair of the motor launch should likewise have been included as
principals by inducement or indispensable cooperation, considering that petitioner was allegedly merely
implementing their resolutions. Hence, according to him, since the informations are null and void, the suspension
order which is based thereon should necessarily also be declared null and void. We find no merit in petitioner's
arguments.
Ruling: First, the rule under Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as reformulated in Section 2, Rule 110 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is that all criminal actions must be commenced either by complaint or
information in the name of the People of the Philippines "against all persons who appear to be responsible for the
offense involved." The law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against whomsoever the
evidence may show to be responsible for an offense. This does not mean, however, that they shall have no
discretion at all; their discretion lies in determining whether the evidence submitted justify a reasonable belief that a
person has committed an offense. What the rule demands is that all persons who appear responsible shall be
charged in the information, which conversely implies that those against whom no sufficient evidence of guilt exists
are not required to be included. 32
This notwithstanding, it has equally been ruled that the failure of the fiscal to include the other public officials who
appear to be responsible for the offense charged as co-accused in the information filed against the accused does
not in any way vitiate the validity of the information under the Rules.33
removal of public officers.

A look into the legislative intent,
along with the legislative scheme,
convinces
us the more that the power of
suspension should be lodged with
the court.
While the law may not be a model
of precise verbal structure, the
intent is
there. Section 13 requires as a pre-
condition of the power to suspend
that
there be a valid information.
Validity of information, of course,
is determined
by the Court of First Instance
where the criminal case is
pending. That is
essentially a judicial function.
Suspension is a sequel to that
finding, an
incident to the criminal
proceedings before the court.
Indeed, who can
suspend except one who knows the
facts upon which suspension is
based?
We draw support from
Lacson vs. Roque, supra
, at page 469: "We are
certain that no authority or good
reason can be found in support
of a
proposition that the Chief
Executive can suspend an officer
facing criminal
charges for the sole purpose of
aiding the court in the
administration of
justice. Independent of the other
branches of the Government, the
courts
can well take care of their own
administration of the law."
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, an important
legislation, should
not be artificially construed so as to
exclude the courts from the power
to
suspend — a prime tool designed
by Congress to prevent the power
which
an official wields from frustrating
the purity and certainty of the
administration of justice. Surely,
we should not be pedantically
exacting in
reading its provisions. We should
rather say that if the court's
power of
suspension incident to the court
proceedings is to be withheld or
narrowed
by construction, Congress should
have spelled it out in no uncertain
terms. .
..
The Court then hastened to
clarify that such a view may
not be taken as an
encroachment upon the power of
suspension given other officials,
reiterating in the
process that a line should be
drawn between administrative
proceedings and
criminal actions in court, that one
is apart from the other.
Elucidating further on the
possible danger which may
arise if the power of
suspension, in consequence of a
criminal action under Republic
Act No. 3019 is vested in any
authority other than
the court, it declared that:
There is reasonable ground to
believe that Congress did really
apprehend
danger should the power of
suspension in consequence of a
criminal case
under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act be lodged in any
authority
other than the court. Quite apart
from the fact that the court has a
better
grasp of the situation, there is one
other factor, and that is, the rights of
the
person accused. The court could
very well serve as a lever to balance
in one
equation the public interests
involved and the interests of the
defendant.
And then, there is the danger that
partisan politics may creep in. The
hand
of political oppression cannot just
be ignored especially if the
majority
members of the Provincial Board
and the defendant public local
elective
officer are on opposite sides of
the political fence. Power may
be abused.
Conversely, if both are of the
same political persuasion, the
suspending
authority will display reluctance in
exercising the power of suspension.
It is
thus that the statute should catch up
with the realities of political life.
There
is indeed the dispiriting lesson that
in a clash between political
considerations
and conscience it is the latter that
quite often gets dented . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Therefore, since suspension is
incident to removal and should
proceed from
one who should logically do so,
and considering that in the
operation of a
given statute fairness must have
been in the mind of the
legislators, we
brush aside needless refinements,
and rule that under Section 13
of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, once a valid information
upon the
provisions thereof is lodged with
the Court of First Instance, that
court has
the inescapable duty to suspend the
public official indicted thereunder.
These cases have long been on
the line, unduly stretched
beyond their logical
parameters and the permissible
time frame. Indeed, it is high
time, ironically in
fairness to petitioner himself, that
the same be now calcined in the
judicial crucible
into their ultimate configuration.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petitions in
G.R. Nos. 116259-60 and
118896-97 are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit,
with costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno
and
Mendoza, JJ.,
concur

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Socrates v SB, Feb 20, 1996

removal of public officers.

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