LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR no. 125865 January 28, 2000

Summary: ,  
slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity
Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name
of official duty.

FACTS:

      Jeffrey Liang, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian
Development Bank (ADB),
Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB
In 1994 Liang was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of
oral defamation , for allegedly uttering defamatory words against Joyce Cabal

Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC.

After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of
the Security Officer of ADB.
The next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from
the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the
country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is
immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution
dismissed the criminal cases. 

         MTC: dismissed the complaint stating that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal
processes
         RTC: Upon a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People of the Philippines
annulled and set aside the order of MTC
       SC: Denied petition for review on the ground that the immunity granted to officers and
staff of the ADB
-is not absolute and is limited on the official capacity and
- immunity CANNOT cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral
defamation in the name of official duty
         A motion of reconsideration is filed

ISSUE: W/N the crime of oral deflamation enjoys immunity

HELD: NO,  slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official
capacity

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process with regard
to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.

HELD:

(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity.

Courts cannot blindly adhere to the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is
covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the
right to due process not only of the accused but also of the prosecution.

Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to
the exception that the acts must be done in “official capacity”. Hence, slandering a person
could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow
the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.

NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such
as this case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only
when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no
preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Hence, SC denied the petition.

US vs Look Chow, 18 Phil 573

G.R. No.L-5887. December 16, 1910.
Subject Matter: Applicability of the provisions of Art 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Summary: ,  

The Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try (1) unlawful possession of opium on a
foreign vessel and (2) unlawful sale of opium on Philippine soil.

foreign vessels stationed in its port.

In the Look Chaw case,  Look Chaw was charge of illegal possession and sale of
opium —
-the foreign vessel was in transit —
-the opium was landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil —

Facts:
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality,
that it came from Hong Kong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports in Manila
and Cebu.

in August 19, 1909, the Port of Cebu and internal revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went
aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found two sacks containing
opium.
 Look Chaw admitted  that he had bought these sacks of opium in Hong Kong with the
intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that as his hold had
already been searched several times for opium he ordered two other chinamen to keep the
sack. All the evidence found properly constitutes corpus delicti.

  2 charges were filed against Look Chaw at the Court of First Instance of Cebu:
o   unlawful possession of opium
  unlawful sale of opium

The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within
its district, on the wharf of Cebu. The court sentenced him to5 years imprisonment, to pay a
fine of P10,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvencyxxx  It further
ordered the confiscation, in favor of the Insular Government.

Issue:
Whether courts of local state can exercise its jurisdiction over foreign vessels
stationed in its port. (W/N the Philippine court has jurisdiction.)
Held:
Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try unlawful possession of opium on
a foreign vessel and unlawful sale of opium on Philippine soil.
GR: The mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute
a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being
considered as an extension of its own nationality.
XPN: However, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is
prohibited within the Philippines, in the present case, a can of opium, is landed
from the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the
penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime. Only the court
established in the said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an
agreement under an international treaty.
Modified by reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and
P1,000
_____

Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:

Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine

Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessels
being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not
apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed
from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the
laws of the land is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the
penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court other
than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the
absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
 People vs Wong Cheng, 46 Phil 729
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

SUMMARY:
The appellee Wong Cheng is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the
merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in
Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.

RULING: the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard
merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters.
The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters thus the
Philippine courts have a right of jurisdiction over the said offense.

Facts:
The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General, filed an appeal
that urges the revocation of a demurrer sustained by the Court of First
Instance of Manila presented by the defendant.

The defendant, accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the

merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while the said vessel was
anchored in Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the shores of the city.

In the said demurrer, the defendant contended the lack of jurisdiction of the
lower court of the said crime, which resulted to the dismissal of the case.

Issue:
Whether the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard
merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters.

Held:

Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters thus the
Philippine courts have a right of jurisdiction over the said offense.
The Court said that having the opium smoked within our territorial waters even
though aboard a foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public order because it
causes such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore, the
demurrer is revoked and the Court ordered further proceedings.

  2 fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law

1. French rule-according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign

merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country
within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed
UNLESS: their commission affects the peace and security of the territory
 2. English rule
-based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States
-according to which crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in
general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
committed.

Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at
present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this
matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.

In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:

. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or
crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any
other country, but when she came within three miles of a line drawn from
the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within
territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton,
International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs.
490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then
subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such
limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper
political agency. . . .

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit
was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object
of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the
disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a
ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory
those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere
possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.
 US vs Ah Sing, 36 Phil 978
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign vessel which arrived in
the port of Cebu from Saigon.

Ah Sing was charged for possession of eight cans of opium which were found by
authorities during a port search. 
He bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board and had them in his
possession during the said trip. The 8 cans of opium were found in the ashes below
the boiler of the steamer's engine by authorities who made a search upon
anchoring on the port of Cebu.

The defendant confessed that he was the owner of the opium and that he had
purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the
opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands
is criminally liable in the Philippines.

Held:
Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, the Court expressly hold that any person who
unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when
the prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which has come
direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdiction limits of the Philippines,
is guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium, unless contrary circumstances
exist or the defense proves otherwise.

Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurd to think that the accused was merely
carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of
so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive that the accused needed so
large an amount of opium for his personal use. No better explanation being
possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium to be
brought into the Philippine Islands. We accordingly find that there was illegal
importation of opium from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To
anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it be said that these statements do
not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not present.
Hence, Ah Sing was proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal importation.

A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case and the facts in the
present instance is readily observable.
In the Look Chaw case, the charge case the illegal possession and sale of opium —
in the present case the charge as illegal importation of opium;

in the Look Chaw case the foreign vessel was in transit —

in the present case the foreign vessel was not in transit;

in the Look Chaw case the opium was landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil —
in the present case of United States vs. Jose ([1916], 34 Phil., 840), the main point, and
the one on which resolution turned, was that in a prosecution based on the illegal
importation of opium or other prohibited drug, the Government must prove, or offer
evidence sufficient to raise a presumption, that the vessel from which the drug is
discharged came into Philippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on board.
In the Jose case, the defendants were acquitted because it was not proved that the
opium was imported from a foreign country; in the present case there is no question but
what the opium came from Saigon to Cebu. However, in the opinion in the Jose case,
we find the following which may be obiter dicta, but which at least is interesting as
showing the view of the writer of the opinion:

DEL SOCORRO VS. WILSEM                                                 G.R. No. 193707 December

10, 2014

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They
were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their
marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court
of Holland.

Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma,
Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the
arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to
Roderigo. 

Respondent Wilsem remarried again a Filipina and resides again the Philippines
particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. 

Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed
the complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien

ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the
Philippine law?

RULING:
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not
to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as
the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is
not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party who
wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving
the foreign law.

In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity
to support.

While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is
not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon
Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose
upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or
after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,
345 SCRA 592 (2000), has already enunciated that: True, foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give
justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract
that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a
parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith,
such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of
great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is
entitled thereto.

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.

YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the
foreigner is living here in the Philippines and committed the offense here.
 AAA vs. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018

DOCTRINE:
RA. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity  per se but the psychological
violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is
the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw.
Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by
which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the
circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship
mayor may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the
mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in
the commission of the offense.

FACTS:

AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced
2 children. In May 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he
acquired permanent resident status in September 2008. This petition nonetheless
indicates his address to be in Quezon City where his parents reside and where AAA
also resided from the time they were married until March 2010, when AAA and
their children moved back to her parents’ house in Pasig City.

AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no
financial support, and only sporadically. This allegedly compelled her to fly extra
hours and take on additional jobs to augment her income as a flight attendant.
There were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their
CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly
started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he
allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011
when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during
her visit with their kids. As can be gathered from earlier cited Information, despite
the claims of varied forms of abuses, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient
basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his
alleged marital infidelity.

A warrant of arrest and hold departure order were issued but BBB continued to
evade arrest. Consequently, the case was archived. However, on November 6, 2013,
an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus Motion to Revive
Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest was filed
on behalf of BBB. The motion to quash was granted on ground of lack of jurisdiction
(acts complained of had occurred in Singapore).

AAA’s motion for reconsideration was denied so she sought direct recourse to the
Supreme Court via petition for review under Rule 45 on pure question of law. In the
main, AAA argues that mental and emotional anguish is an essential element of the
offense charged against BBB, which is experienced by her wherever she goes, and
not only in Singapore where the extra-marital affair takes place; thus, the RTC of
Pasig City where she resides can take cognizance of the case. In support of her
theory, AAA specifically cites Section 7 on Venue of R.A. 9262 and Section 4 on
liberal construction of the law to promote the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and their children.
In his Comment, BBB contends that the grant of the motion to quash is in effect an
acquittal; that only the civil aspect of a criminal case may be appealed by the
private offended party, and that the petition should be dismissed for having been
brought before the Court by AAA instead of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
as counsel for the People in appellate proceedings. BBB also asserts that the
petition is belatedly filed.
 
ISSUES:
 Whether or not the rtc has jurisdiction over psychological abuse under RA.
9262 when committed through marital infidelity and the alleged illicit
relationship took place outside the Philippines

Philippine courts have jurisdiction over psychological violence under RA no. 9262
because what the law punishes is the violence against women and their children,
not the marital infidelity per se

There is merit in the petition.

As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in

the complaint or Information, threshing out the essential elements of psychological
abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial. In Dinamling v. People, this Court already had
occasion to enumerate the elements of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of
R.A. No. 9262, as follows:

The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with
whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with
whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman’s child or children, they
may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal
and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or
access to the children or similar such acts or omissions.
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental
or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means
employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect
caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish
psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of
commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And
to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of
the victim as such experiences are personal to this party.

R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes psychological violence causing mental or emotional

suffering on the wife, NOT marital infidelity per se. Otherwise stated, it is the
violence inflicted under the circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital
infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological
violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the
spouses and for a myriad reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be
causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional
suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the commission of the
offense.

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v. People, the Court

explained that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental
rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have
taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or
to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case
is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
show, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else,
the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

Section 7, R.A. 9262 “Venue” pertains to jurisdiction.

As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed
where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. While the psychological violence as the means employed by the
perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally essential
also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the
complainant. The resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the
indispensable element of damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:

The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses employed by

the accused, as show in the vouchers, might have been perpetrated in Quezon City
does not preclude the institution of the criminal action in Mandaluyong where the
damage was consummated. Deceit and damage are the basic elements of estafa.
The estafa involved in this case appears to be transitory or continuing offense. It
could be filed either in Quezon City or in Rizal. The theory is that a person charged
with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is in part
committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and
essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and
some in another, the court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it
being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case will exclude the
others.

Acts of violence against women and their children may manifest transitory or
continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and
requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some
occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein the any of the crime’s essential
and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it
being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the
other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly
tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

It is necessary for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or
act of violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a),
Paragraph (c) was committed outside the Philippine territory, that the victim be a
resident of the place where the complaint was filed in view of the anguish suffered
being a material element of the offense. In the present scenario, the offended wife
and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010.
Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information
relates to BBB’s marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the purpose
of formally charging the husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable
doubt for purposes of conviction. It likewise remains imperative to acquire
jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns itself is simply whether or
not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed
within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that
even if the alleged extra-marital affair causing the offended wife mental and
emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution
under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.

Dorado vs People

Facts:
On April 15, 2004, at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Ronald was
talking to his friends Raniel, Delon Busar, Annan Luna, Jerome Amergo and a
certain Erwin (Ronald's group) along A. Reyes Street, Lower Bicutan, Taguig. At
that very time, Dorado, carrying a sumpak, and his friends, Confessor and
Cabiaso (Dorado's group), arrived and threw stones and bottles at Ronald's
group.Ronald's group scampered for shelter toward the talipapa and hid inside to
avoid being hit by the stones and bottles. When Ronald thought that Dorado's
group was no longer-in the vicinity, they came out of hiding. Dorado's group,
however, was out there waiting for them. When they finally surfaced, Dorado's
group resumed throwing stones at Ronald's group. During the commotion,
Dorado fired his sumpak and hit Ronald between the eyes. Ronald fell
unconscious for about ten (10) minutes while Dorado's group ran away.
Thereafter, Ronald was brought to the Rizal Medical Center by Raniel and Delon
Busan.
Issues:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.[8]
Ruling:
Dorado argues that his defenses of alibi and denial should be fully appreciated by
the Court as there was enough evidence to support them; that he was at his
home at the time of the incident; that defense witness Ofelia testified that he
was not the one who shot Ronald; and that the barangay officials did not find the
sumpak in his possession.
The Court finds merit in the petition.Dorado was a minor at the time of the
commission of the crime
A perusal of the records will readily show that Dorado was a sixteen (16) year old
minor at the time of the commission of the crime on March 15, 2004. The
Informations filed against him consistently stated his minority.[11] For said
reason, he must benefit from the provisions of R.A. No. 9344, or the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, as amended. Even though the said law was
enacted on April 28, 2006, the same must still be retroactively applied for the
benefit of Dorado pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law —
favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to
the accused are given retroactive effect).[12]
To recapitulate, R.A. No. 9344 provides that only those minors above fifteen (15) years
but below eighteen (18) years of age who acted with discernment shall not be exempted
from criminal responsibility.
"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability
of a minor x x x who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known
and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances
accorded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of
the act, but also after and even during the trial."
After a judicious study of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution did not make
an effort to prove that Dorado, then a sixteen (16)-year old minor, acted with
discernment at the time of the commission of the crime. The RTC decision simply stated
that a privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of Dorado must be
appreciated as it was proven that he was a minor at the time of the incident. Glaringly,
there was no discussion at all on whether Dorado acted with discernment when he
committed the crime imputed against him.
Discernment cannot be presumed even if Dorado intended to do away with Ronald.
Discernment is different from intent.
The distinction was elaborated in Guevarra v. Almodovar.[25] Thus:
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a
felony, freedom and intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have
defined the term "discernment," as used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of
People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:"The discernment that constitutes
an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of
age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two
distinct thoughts. While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the
former refers to the desire of one's act while the latter relate to the moral significance
that person ascribes to the said act. Hence, a person may not intend to shoot another
but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to
the same person in .negligently handling an air rifle. It is not correct, therefore, to argue,
as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted
with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his
friend, thus, did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable
result of his negligence.
Considering that there was no determination of discernment by the trial court, the Court
cannot rule with certainty that Dorado was criminally responsible. As earlier stated, there
can be no presumption of discernment on the part of the CICL. In the absence of such
determination, it should be presumed that the CICL acted without discernment.

Principles:
"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal
liability of a minor x x x who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such
capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration
all the facts and circumstances accorded by the records in each case, the very
appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor,
not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even
during the trial."

CORPUZ VS PEOPLE, GR NO. 180016

FACTS:

Private Complainant Danilo Tangcoy and Petitioner Corpuz met at a Casino in

Olongapo where Danilo Tangcoy at that time was engaged to a business of lending
money to casino players and owned some pieces of jewelry. Lito Corpuz offered to
sell some pieces of jewelry on a commission basis. They both agreed that petitioner
(Lito Corpuz) shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the
same items, within a period of 60days. The period expired without petitioner
remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private
complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he
will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail. Petitioner was
sued for estafa. After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged. The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied
the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the penalty imposed were excessive

RULING:

As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this
case, the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of
crimes involving property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these
penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the
Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on
this question and since the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the
case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici
curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on
the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno,
Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral
arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as
counsel de oficio of the petitioner.

After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this

Court finds the following:

There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties

that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today,
based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago
in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that
would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in
amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through
this Court's decisions, as that would been croaching upon the power of another
branch of the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation
without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5,which
reads:

ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed
but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. -
Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable bylaw, it shall render the proper
decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be
made the subject of penal legislation
 Hernan vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 217874 Dec 5, 2017

FACTS:
Ophelia Hernan was convicted by the RTC of the crime of malversation. Hernan’s
first counsel filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which had no appellate
jurisdiction over the case. The CA took cognizance of the appeal and affirmed the
conviction but later set aside its decision for lack of jurisdiction.

Hernan procured a new counsel who appealed to the Sandiganbayan. The SB

affirmed the conviction so the second counsel filed a motion for reconsideration
blaming the first counsel in failing to elicit facts that would have acquitted Hernan
of the charge. The SB denied the MR in a Resolution dated August 31, 2010 which
became final and executory on June 26, 2013.

On July 26, 2013, Hernan again changed to a third counsel who filed a motion to
reopen the case and stay the execution of the judgment because the second
counsel allegedly failed to receive 2010 SB Resolution. Hernan’s second counsel was
appointed to the PAO and thus changed office address. However, the SB was not
notified of the change of address. Hernan’s counsel invoked the ruling in People v.
Chavez wherein the Court held that entry of judgment without receipt of the
Resolution was premature. But the SB still denied the motion to reopen on
December 4, 2013 finding the motion to be a prohibited second MR.

On January 9, 2014, Hernan’s third counsel filed a “Petition for Reconsideration

with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of Prayer for Stay of Execution of
Judgment”. On February 2, 2015, the SB denied the petition finding the petition a
third MR which was likewise prohibited.

Hernan’s counsel then filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari against the final
resolution of the SB on May 14, 2015.  Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion
in the denial of the Sandiganbayan of her motion to reopen of the case since
evidence, not produced before the trial court, would warrant reversal of the
conviction.

ISSUE:
Did the Sandiganbayan gravely abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen
the case? Is reopening of the case the proper remedy after a judgment has already
become final and executory?
RULING:

No. The SB did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motions to
reopen the case.
The requisites of reopening the case are:
1. the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction;
2. the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion;
3. the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted;
4. the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and
5. the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated
within thirty days from the issuance of the order.

Reopening must be before finality of judgment. In this case, it took three years after
the entry of the judgment before a motion to reopen the case was filed. The
judgment has long become final and executory.

But when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of an amendatory

law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court can
direct reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to
correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.