3.poe Jr. vs. Macapagal Digest

P.E.T. Case No. 002.
March 29, 2005.

RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., protestant,
vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, protestee.
SYLLABUS
Election Law; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Pursuant to Rule 14 of the PET, only two persons, the 2nd and
3rd placers, may contest the election.—The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is
Rule 14 of the PET Rules. It provides, Rule 14. Election Protest.–Only the registered candidate for President or
for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the
election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner. Pursuant to this
rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the
rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. It
envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the
candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a
successful election contest.
Substitution by Legal Representative; In the application of Rule 3, Section 16 to an election contest, Court has
ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon
death; Even in analogous cases before other electoral tribunals, involving substitution by the widow of a
deceased protestant, in cases where the widow is not a real party in interest, Court has denied substitution by
the wife or heirs.—Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows
substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor
seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by
said Section 16. However, in our application of this rule to an election contest, we have every time ruled that a
public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, we
consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during
the pendency of the protest. In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias, we recognized substitution upon the death of the
protestee but denied substitution by the widow or heirs since they are not the real parties in interest. Similarly,
in the later case of De la Victoria v. Commission on Elections, we struck down the claim of the surviving
spouse and children of the protestee to the contested office for the same reason. Even in analogous cases
before other electoral tribunals, involving substitution by the widow of a deceased protestant, in cases where
the widow is not a real party in interest, we denied substitution by the wife or heirs.
While the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely
personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court
of all authority to continue the protest proceedings; Court has allowed substitution and intervention but only by
a real party in interest; Protestant’s widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest.—This is not to
say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the pending action. We have held as early as Vda. de De
Mesa (1966) that while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election
protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either
would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, we have allowed substitution
and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited
or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. In Vda. de De Mesa v.
Mencias and Lomugdang v. Javier, we permitted substitution by the vice-mayor since the vice-mayor is a real
party in interest considering that if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor
succeeds to the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume office. In
contrast, herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of President. Thus,
given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestant’s widow is not a real party in interest to
this election protest.
ISSUE:
May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter’s protest
case?
RULING:
The motion of movant/intervenor JESUSA SONORA POE a.k.a. SUSAN ROCES to intervene and substitute
for the deceased protestant is DENIED for lack of merit. The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential
election protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules. The Court was not unaware that a contest before election
tribunals has two aspects. First, it is in pursuit of one’s right to a public office, and second, it is imbued with
public interest. Conformably then with the law, the rules and prevailing jurisprudence, this Tribunal finds no
justifiable reason to grant the petition/motion for intervention and substitution.
Acting on the protest and considering the Notice of the Death, submitted by counsel of protestant RONALD
ALLAN POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., the Court also resolved that Presidential Electoral Tribunal Case
No. 002, entitled Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, should be as it is
hereby DISMISSED on the ground that no real party in interest has come forward within the period allowed by
law, to intervene in this case or be substituted for the deceased protestant. No pronouncement as to costs.

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P.E.T. Case No. 002.

March 29, 2005.

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