3Republic of tbe ~biHppines

~uprcme Qtourt
ftf[anHa

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 232455

PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:

PERALTA, CJ, Chairperson,

- versus - CAGUIOA,
CARANDANG,
ZALAMEDA, and
TEODORO ANSANO y GAERLAN,JJ
CALLEJA,
Accused-Appellant. Promulgated:

DEC O2 2020
x---------------------------------------------,-

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before this Court is an ordinary appeal 1 filed by the accused-appellant

Teodoro Ansano y Calleja (Ansano) assailing the Decision2 dated February
20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08223, which
affirmed the Decision3 dated November 16, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court
of YYY, ZZZ4, Branch 26 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. SC-12326, finding
Ansano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape.

The Facts

An Information was filed against Ansano for the rape of minor AAA, 5
which read:

1
See Notice of Appeal dat~d March 10. 2017; rollo, pp. 111-112.
2
Rollo, pp. 2-16. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, with ~ssociate Justices Ramon
A. Cruz and Henri Jean Paul B. lnting (now a Member of this Court) concurring.
3
CA rollo, pp. 12-15, Penned by Pairing Judge Cynthia R. Marifio-Ricablanca.
4
The names of the City and the·Province are replaced with fictitious initials pursuant to SC Adm. Cir. No.
83-15 dated July 27, 2015.
The name of the victim i.<:: replaced with fictitious initials pursuant to SC Adm. Cir. No. 83-15 dated July
27, 2015.
 ---- .•. -·-·····- --·---· -- ··--·----··-·--·-··--------.--- ____ ,!I ____ _

Decision 2 G.R. No. 232455

.. •

That on or about April 6, 2005, in the Municipality of [XXX],

. Province of [ZZZJ and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
· ' · above-'-named accused, while conveniently armed and provided with a bolo,
with_ lewd design ·arid with force and intimidation, did then and there
[willfully], unlawfully_ and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one
[AAA], a minor who at the time was only fifteen (15) years of age, against
her will and consent, the act of the accused being prejudicial to the
psychological development of the said minor.

CONTRARY TO LA W. 6

Upon arraignment, Ansano entered a plea of not guilty. Pre-trial and

trial on the merits then ensued.

The version of the prosecution, as summarized by the trial court and

affirmed by the CA, is as follows:

The complaining witness is AAA, 15 years old, student and a

resident ofXXX. She testified that she filed this case of rape against accused
Teodoro Ansano, whom she pointed to and identified in open court. She
stated that she did not know him at first, but when she went to the Municipal
Building, she came to know him because of his niece who is her friend. On
April 6, 2005, at about 5 :00 o'clock in the afternoon, she was going to fetch
her father at Narra, where he was then selling goods at the river. This was
at [GGG]7 near the river. Accused Ansano was then carrying a bolo,
wearing a long-sleeved shirt and long pants used in the farm; while she was
wearing red t-shirt and school uniform skirt. Ansano poked his bolo at her
and told her to go with him to the falls near the Narra tree. Because she was
afraid and he threatened to kill her if she does not go with him, she went
along. When they were nearing the falls, he turned the other way. He held
her tightly by the shoulder, dragged her to a secluded area with bamboo
trees and coconuts and told her to sit down and not to shout, still poking the
bolo at her. He then removed his clothes, undressed her, laid her down,
kissed her neck and placed his penis into her mouth. She cried very hard
and vomited at that time. Thereafter, accused inserted his penis into her
vagina. It was painful. Accused rested for a while, and then did it again.
Thereafter, accused put on his clothes and directed her to remain lying down
until he left the place. He also told her not to tell anyone about the incident
because he knew her and her parents, he knew what time she went to church,
what time she went to bed and that she was always with her cousin. He then
left and proceeded to the direction going to Narra. After he left, she put on
her clothes and went home. She proceeded to bed and cried. Her mother
asked her why she was crying and she told her that she was raped. She could
hardly speak because she was still crying. Her father went to the place of
the incident but the person who abused her was no longer there, so her father
reported the incident to the police station.

She came to know the name and identity of the accused on March
19, 2006 at 8:00 o'clock in the evening, when she saw him in their house

6
CA rollo, p. I 1.
7
The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances and other information which tend to establish
or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family, or household members, shall not
be disclosed to protect her privacy, and fictitious initials shall, instead, be used, in accordance with
People v. Cabalquinto (533 Phil. 703 (2006]) and Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated
September 5, 2017
Decision 3 G.R. No. 232455

having a drinking spree with her father. She was able to recognize him
("namurnukhaan"); ·he has a scar and "butil-butil" on his face; he has a
moustache and "medyo singkit". She came to know his name for the first
time when she went to the XXX Municipal Hall, where accused was
detained because of the case filed by BBB. She was shown a picture of the
accused, which she examined clearly, and she was sure that he was the one
who raped her.

Because she was raped, she went to [ZZZ] Provincial Hospital for a
medical examination. At the time of the incident on April 6, 2005, she was
[just] thirteen (13) years old. She presented her Certificate of Baptism
issued by Santo Cristo of Bulacan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, showing that
she was born on September 14, 1991 and baptized on September'25, 1991.
She does not have a Certificate of Live Birth, as her birth was not registered
because the midwife who attended to the delivery of her mother went
abroad.

Upon cross-examination, she stated that she had been residing in

XXX, since the year 2005, and that she had not known the accused, even by
face, before April 6, 2005. She came to know him through BBB who was
then living in their house, when accused had a drinking spree with her father
on March 19, 2006.

xxxx

The next prosecution witness was Dr. Maria Cheryl Obcemea xx x

[and] [h]er qualification as an expert witness was admitted by the defense.
She testified that according to their records, she examined the patient AAA
on April 7, 2005 at [ZZZ] Provincial Hospital. She was the one who
physically examined AAA and her findings was reduced into writing in a
Medico-Legal Report. Said findings indicate "Perineum: hymen-multiple
fresh laceration 7 and 5 o'clock position; minimal bleeding." 8

On the other hand, the accused relied on denial and alibi to establish his
innocence. The version of the defense was summarized by the RTC, again as
affirmed by the CA, as follows:

The defense presented accused himself, Teodoro Calleja Ansano, 45

years old, single, slipper maker and residing at XXX. He stated that he does
not personally know AAA. On April 6, 2005, at around 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, he was at Villa Pokan with his friends Rudy Monfero, Albert
Concordia and Nick Esmejarda. They arrived at 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon at Villa Pokan to go swimming there and left at around 5 :00
o'clock. They went home going their separate ways: Rudy and Albert to
Ilayang Taykin, Nick to Poblacion and he (Ansano) to XXX. Upon reaching
his house, he immediately went to sleep and woke up the next morning,
April 7 at around 6:00 o'clock. On his way home to XXX, he did not meet
AAA, nor did he poke a bolo on her neck and rape her.

The Court noted the manifestation of defense counsel that Ansano

has no scar on his face at the time he testified in court.

Id. at 3-5.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 232455

When cross-examined, he stated that he does not know AAA and

her father CCC; that he came to know in court that their house is more or
less one kilometer away from his house; that on April 6, 2005, he and his
friends Rudy, Albert and Nick left at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon;
that [Villa Pokan] is more or less one kilometer away from his house; that
up.on reaching his house, he immediately went to sleep and woke up the
following day. 9

Ruling of the RTC

After trial on the merits, in its Decision 10 dated November 16, 2015, the
RTC convicted Ansano of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the
said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Teodoro Ansano y Calleja

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, defined and
penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353 or the Rape Law of 1997. Thus, he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. In addition thereto, he is
ordered to pay AAA the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of moral damages,
and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED. 11

The RTC was convinced by the testimony of AAA identifying Ansano

as the one who sexually abused her. It found such testimony to be clear,
consistent, spontaneous, and unrelenting, thus establishing that it was Ansano
who sexually abused her on April 6, 2005. The RTC likewise found her
testimony to be corroborated through the testimony of the medico-legal who
conducted a medical examination on AAA. Thus, as between her credible
testimony and Ansano' s bare denial, the RTC ruled that the evidence at hand
established Ansano' s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Aggrieved, Ansano appealed to the CA. 12

Ruling of the CA

In the questioned Decision 13 dated February 20, 2017, the CA affirmed

Ansano' s conviction, and held that the prosecution was able to sufficiently
prove the elements of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Judgment dated

November 16, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court, 4th Judicial Region, Branch
26, [XXX], [ZZZ], in Criminal Case No. SC-12326 finding accused-

9
Id. at 5-6.
10
Supra note 3.
11
CA rollo, pp. 14-15.
12
Supra note 1.
13
Supra note 2.
Decision 5 'G.R. No. 232455

appellant TEODORO ANSANO y .CALLEJA GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt ofrape, is hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION.
The Court sentences accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay AAA the amount of
Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral damages, and
another Php75,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED. 14

The CA noted that AAA's testimony was clear, consistent, and

spontaneous, and that she positively identified Ansano as the perpetrator. 15
Moreover, her claim that she was assaulted was supported by the medico-legal
examination, which found multiple fresh lacerations on her hymen. The CA
held that there was therefore no doubt that AAA was indeed assaulted.

As to the identification of Ansano as the perpetrator of the crime, the

CA explained:

The alleged inconsistency of AAA's testimony with regard to the

time she first saw the accused-appellant face to face only on March 19, 2006
was properly explained during her re-direct examination. Again, there is no
inconsistency as to having known accused-appellant's name only on May
15, 2006. That is different from having to see the accused-appellant again
for the first time on March 19, 2006 after the rape incident that occurred on
April 6, 2005.

Accused-appellant's claim of the absence of scar on his face may be

true. However, AAA also identified accused-appellant through his other
physical features such as, "butil-butil sa mukha," "medyo singkit," and his
moustache. In this case, AAA consistently testified that she was able to see
and recognize accused-appellant as her rapist. 16

Finally, the CA also ruled that Ansano's alibi cannot be given probative
value, as AAA's positive identification, which was clear and credible, has
destroyed Ansano's alibi which, in tum, was unsupported by·evidence. The
CA thus affirmed Ansano' s conviction.

Hence, the instant appeal.

Issue

Proceeding from the foregoing, for resolution of this Court is the issue
of whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant.

14
Rollo, p. 15.
15
Id. at 11.
16
Id. at 14 ..
Decision 6 G.R. No. 232455

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious. The Court acquits Ansano on the ground of

reasonable doubt.

At the outset, it bears emphasis that "the Court, in the course of its
review of criminal cases elevated to it, still commences its analysis from the
fundamental principle that the accused before it is presumed innocent." 17 This
presumption continues although the accused had been convicted in the trial
court, as long as such conviction is still pending appeal. As the Court
explained in Polangcos v. People: 18

Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that

every accused is presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. It is "a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by
procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that
an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of the
prosecution's evidence and not on the weakness of the defense."

This presumption in favor of the accused remains until the judgment

of conviction becomes final and executory. Borrowing the words of the
Court in Mangubat, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., "[u]ntil a promulgation
of final conviction is made, this constitutional mandate prevails." Hence,
even if a judgment of conviction exists, as long as the same remains
pending appeal, the accused is still presumed to be innocent until his
guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in People v. Mingming,
the Court outlined what the prosecution must do to hurdle the presumption
and secure a conviction:

First, the accused enJoys the constitutional

presumption of innocence until final conviction; conviction
requires no less than evidence sufficient to atTive at a moral
certainty of guilt, not only with respect to the existence of a
crime, but, more importantly, of the identity of the accused
as the author of the crime.

Second, the prosecution's case must rise and fall on

its own merits and cannot draw its strength from the
weakness of the defense. 19 (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary to such principle, the Court has also laid down the following
guidelines in its review of rape cases:

(a) an accusation ofrape can be made with facility and while the
accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge; 20
17
Polangcos v. People, G.R. No. 239866, September 11, 2019, accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.
ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65740>.
1s Id.
19 Id.
20
People v. Sta. Ana, 353 Phil. 388, 402 (1998).
 Decision 7 G.R. No. 232455

(b) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are
usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; 21 and

(c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense. 22

From these principles, and based on its own careful review of the
records of the case, the Court rules that a reasonable doubt exists as to
Ansano's culpability. While the Court does not doubt AAA's claim that she
had been raped, the Court does not, however, have moral certainty that it was
Ansano who committed the dastardly act.

Verily, a successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on

proof of two things: the identification of the author of the crime and his actual
commission of the same. An ample proof that a crime has been committed
has no use if the prosecution is unable to convincingly prove the
offender's identity. The constitutional presumption of innocence that an
accused enjoys is not demolished by an identification that is full of
uncertainties. 23

The Court has always been mindful that "[t]he greatest care should be
taken in considering the identification of the accused, especially when this
identification is made by a sole witness and the judgment in the case totally
depends on the reliability of the identification. " 24 This stems from the
recognition that testimonial evidence, unlike other forensic evidence such as
fingerprint and DNA testing which are real or object evidence, are subject to
human errors which may be intentional or unintentional. In People v. Nunei1 5
(Nunez), the Court elucidated:

The frailty of human memory is a scientific fact. The danger of

inordinate reliance on human memory in criminal proceedings, where
conviction results in the possible deprivation of liberty, property, and even
life, is equally established.

Human memory does not record events like a video

recorder. In the first place, human memory is more selective
than a video camera. The sensory environment contains a
vast amount of information, but the memory process
perceives and accurately records only a very small
percentage of that information. Second, because the act of
remembering is reconstructive, akin to putting puzzle pieces
together, human memory can change in dramatic and
unexpected ways because of the passage of time or

21 Id.
22 Id.
23
People v. Tumambing, 659 Phil. 544,547 (2011).
24
People v. Rodrigo, 586 Phil. 515, 528 (2008).
25
819 Phil. 406 (2017).
Decision· 8 G.R. No. 232455

subsequent events, such as exposure to "postevent"

information like conversations with other witnesses or media
reports. Third, memory can also be altered through the
reconstruction process. Questioning a witness about what he
or she perceived and requiring the witness to reconstruct the
experience can cause the witness' memory to change by
unconsciously blending the actual fragments of memory of
the event with information provided during the memory
retrieval process.

Eyewitness identification, or what our jurisprudence commendably

refers to as "positive identification," is the bedrock of many
pronouncements of guilt. - However, eyewitness identification is but a
product of flawed human memory. In an expansive examination of 250
cases of wrongful convictions where convicts were subsequently
exonerated by DNA testing, Professor Brandon Garett (Professor Garett)
noted that as much as 190 or 76% of these wrongful convictions were
occasioned by flawed eyewitness identifications. Another observer has
more starkly characterized eyewitness identifications as "the leading cause
of wrongful convictions."

xxxx

The bifurcated difficulty of misplaced reliance on eyewitness

identification is borne not only by the intrinsic limitations of human
memory as the basic apparatus on which the entire exercise of identification
operates. It is as much the result of and is exacerbated by extrinsic factors
such as environmental factors, flawed procedures, or the mere passage of
time. 26

In another case, the Court acknowledged that:

Identification testimony has at least three components. First,

witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves perception
of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details
of the event. Third, the witness must be able to recall and communicate
accurately. Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at
each of these three stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire,
retain, and retrieve information accurately, they are limited by normal
human fallibilities and suggestive influences. 27

Thus, American jurisprudence has followed - and local jurisprudence

later on adopted - a "totality of circumstances tesf' in determining the
reliability, or at times even the admissibility, of a witness' out-of-court
identification of the accused.

26
Id. at 415-417.
27
People v. Teehankee, Jr., 319 Phil. 128, 179 (1995), citing LAFAVE AND ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
HORNBOOK SERIES 353 (1992 Ed.).
 Decision 9 G.R. No. 232455

The jurisprudential test of

"totality of circumstances"

The totality of circumstances test was first applied by the Court in

People v. Teehankee 28 (Teehankee ), wherein it applied the test as laid down
by the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) in Neil v. Biggers29
(Biggers) and Manson v. Brathwaite30 (Brathwaite):

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various

ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to
face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where
photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done
thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons
lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification
contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of
the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its
compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that
time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure. 31 (Emphasis supplied)

Essentially, the problem with eyewitness testimony is that the human

mind is not just limited in terms of perception, but that human memory is also
highly susceptible to suggestion. Hence, the jurisprudence on the matter, like
Biggers and Brathwaite, dealt with the propriety of police procedures
employed to arrive at the identification of the accused. The rule that was
thereafter adopted was that "convictions based on eyewitness identification at
trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that
ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification." 32 It was explained that "[s]uggestive
confrontations are disapproved because they increase the likelihood of
misidentification, and unnecessarily suggestive ones are condemned for the
further reason that the increased chance of misidentification is gratuitous." 33

In the case of Foster v. California, 34 the accused was initially put in a

line-up of three men, with the accused being almost six feet in height while
the other two men in the line-up were just 5'5" and 5'6." The eyewitness was
unable to identify the accused as the perpetrator, but asked for a one-on-one
confrontation with the accused. Even with this, the eyewitness was still
28 Id.
29
409 U.S. 188 (] 972)
30
432 U.S. 98 (1977)
31
People v. Teehankee, Jr., supra note 27 at 180.
32
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
33
Neil v. Biggers, supra note 29 at 198.
34
394 U.S. 440 (1969)
Decision 10 G.R. No. 232455

uncertain that it was indeed the accused who committed the crime. A week or
more later, the same eyewitness was shown another line-up of five men. Only
the accused was present in both the first and second line-ups. After having
been shown the second line-up, the eyewitness became "sure" that the accused
was the perpetrator. Applying the totality of circumstances test and the
standard of "likelihood of irreparable misidentification," the SCOTUS set
aside the out-of-court identification of the accused for having violated the
latter's right to due process. The SCOTUS explained:

Judged by that standard, this case presents a compelling example of

unfair lineup procedures. In the first lineup arranged by the police, petitioner
stood out from the other two men by the contrast of his height and by the
fact that he was wearing a leather jacket similar to that worn by the robber.
See United States v. Wade, supra, at 388 U.S. 233. When this did not lead
to positive identification, the police permitted a one-to-one confrontation
between petitioner and the witness. This Court pointed out in Stovall that

"[t]he practice of showing suspects singly to persons

for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup,
has been widely condemned."

Even after this, the witness' identification of petitioner was

tentative. So, some days later, another lineup was arranged. Petitioner was
the only person in this lineup who had also participated in the first lineup.
See Wall, supra, at 64.This finally produced a definite identification.

The suggestive elements in this identification procedure made it all

but inevitable that David would identify petitioner whether or not he was,
in fact, "the man." In effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, "This
is the man." See Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U. S. 404, 407 (dissenting
opinion). This procedure so undermined the reliability ofthe eyewitness
identification as to violate dueprocess. 35 (Emphasis supplied)

The SCOTUS clarified, however, that the presence of suggestive

elements in the identification process adopted by the police officers, on its
own, would not automatically result in the inadmissibility of the out-of-court
identific.ation. In Brathwaite, the SCOTUS emphasized that "reliability is the
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony" 36 and
that the "factors to be considered xx x include the opportunity of the witness
to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention,
the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty
demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the
confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect
of the suggestive identification itself." 37

This was the context of the totality ofcircumstances test adopted by the
Court in Teehankee. Years after Teehankee, the Court would adopt additional
guidelines for police officers, and safeguards for the accused, in the conduct
35
Id. at 442-443.
36
Manson v. Braithwaite, supra note 30 at 114.
37 Id.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 232455

of out-of-court identification. In People v. Villena, 38 the Court said that "to

avoid charges of impermissible suggestion, there should be ·nothing in the
photograph that would focus attention on a single person." 39 Subsequently, in
People v. Pineda, 40 the Court added that:

[t]he first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is that a

series of photographs must be shown, and not merely that of the suspect.
The second rule directs that when a witness is shown a group of pictures,
their arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one of
the pictures pertains to the suspect. 41

The Court in Pineda applied the totality ofcircumstances test, but also added
that the following factors may be considered in determining the reliability of
the out-of-court identification:

A well-known authority in eyewitness identification made a list of

12 danger signals that exist independently of the identification procedures
investigators use. These signals give warning that the identification may be
erroneous even though the method used is proper. The list is not exhaustive.
The facts of a particular case may contain a warning not in the list. The list
is as follows:

(1) the witness originally stated that he could not identify

anyone;

(2) the identifying witness knew the accused before the

crime, but made no accusation against him when questioned
by the police;

(3) a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying

witness' original description and the actual description of the
accused;

(4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the witness

erroneously identified some other person;

(5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the accused;

(6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to
identify him;

(7) before the commission of the crime, the witness had

limited opportunity to see the accused;

(8) the witness and the person identified are of different

racial groups;

38
439 Phil. 509 (2002).
39
Id. at 524-525.
40
473 Phil. 517 (2004).
41
Id. at 540.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 232455

(9) during his original observation of the perpetrator of the

crime, the witness was unaware that a crime was involved;

(10) a considerable time elapsed between the witness' view

of the criminal and his identification of the accused;

(11) several persons committed the crime; and

(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial identification.42

From the foregoing jurisprudential tests and guidelines, the Court finds
in this case that the out-of-court identification by AAA failed to pass the test
of reliability to establish the identity of the accused as the perpetrator beyond
reasonable doubt.

Application of the totality of

circumstances test in the present
case

To reiterate, the totality ofcircumstances test requires the Court to look

at the following factors in weighing the reliability of the out-of-court
identification: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of
the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of
any prior description given by the witness; (4) the length of time between the
crime and the identification; (5) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.

(a) The first two factors: opportunity to view, and degree of attention.

Discussions relating to these factors include, for example, the duration

of the commission of the crime, the lighting conditions, and whether the
eyewitness was put on alert that he or she must remember the identity of the
particular person, among others.

In the present case, the Court recognizes that the witness had a good
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, given that they
spent considerable time together during the commission of the crime. The
witness also said that the crime happened around 5 :00 in the afternoon, thus
the lighting conditions were well enough for her to see the face of her
assailant. As well, it could be said that AAA had a high degree of attention,
especially on the identity of her assailant, during this time as they were the
only people in the crime scene.

Despite these, however, AAA's identification of Ansano as the

assailant fails the rest of the other· factors to be considered.

42
Id. at 547-548.
 Decision 13 G.R. No. 232455

(b) Accuracy of any prior description.

AAA's description of her attacker was general and related mostly to,
not her assailant's physical features, but what he was wearing at the time of
the crime. In her direct testimony, the only descriptions that she gave were
that: "[hJe is taller than I am,· he was carrying a bolo; he was wearing a long-
sleeved shirt; he was wearing long pants he used in the farm, sir. " 43 These
were her only descriptions of her assailant as she was narrating the rape
incident. The description that her assailant had a scar on his face and that it
had "butil-butil" came after, when she saw Ansano on March 19, 2006.

More importantly, however, the records show that the additional

description did not match Ansano. She testified as follows:

Q Can you please tell to the Honorable Corni, how were you able to
come to know the name and identity of the accused?
A I was able to recognized (sic) his face at the time of the incident on
March 19, 2006 at 8 o'clock in the evening. I saw him in our house
having a drinking spree with my father, sir.

Q And while the accused was having a drinking spree with your father
at that night, where were you at that time?
A I was in our house, playing with my cousins, sir.

Q How far were you to the place of your father and the accused were
there (sic) having a drinking spree?
A Our house is near the road and my father and the accused having a
drinking spree beside the road, sir.

Q What happened next after their having a drinking spree?

A I felt nervous, Sir.

Q Why?
A Because I was able to recognized (sic) his face, sir.

ATTY. ANONUEVO I would like to quote m vernacular

"namumukhaan''

COURT Put it on the record.

WITNESS Because "namumukhaan ko po siya"

Q And when you say "namumukhaan", what do you mean by that?

A Because in my mind, I was able to recall his face that he is the one
who abuse[d] me, sir.

Q Now, you said that you were able to recall that the accused was the
one who abuse[ d] you because of his face, what are those identifying
[marks] to his face?

43
TSN dated April 23, 2007, p. 5.
Decision 14 G.R. No. 232455

A He has a scar in [his] face, sir.

INTERPRETER Witness pointing on her left cheek with her finger.

FISCAL What else, if any?

WITNESS And he has "butil-butil sa mukha", sir.

·Q Aside from those, what else, if any?

A He has a moustache, he has an eye which is "medyo singkit", sir.44

However, on another hearing date, before the prosecution cross-

examined Ansano, the defense made the following manifestation which was
duly noted by the trial court:

ATTY. ANONUEVO Before the public prosecutor conduct[s] his

cross-examination, I am requesting the witness, the accused, to
please face the Honorable Presiding Judge. I just want to make it of
record that the face of the witness has no scar whatsoever which will
be verified by the Honorable Court.

COURT Verified.

ATTY. ANONUEVO I would like to make it of record that the

Honorable Presiding Judge has confirmed that the accused has no
scar whatsoever on his face. 45

The prosecution made a counter-manifestation that the scar may have

been gone since it had been four years between AAA's identification and the
time the accused took the witness stand. 46 However,

[t]he Court has, time and again, declared that if the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one of which
being consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other or others
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence in view of the constitutional
presumption of innocence has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is
thus insufficient to support a conviction. 47

In other words, doubts - no matter how slight, as long as they are reasonable
- created in the identity of the perpetrator of the crime, should be resolved
in favor of the accused. 48

(c) The length of time between the crime and the identification

The Court also held in Nunez that:

44
TSN dated June 25, 2008, pp. 13-15.
45
TSN dated February IO, 2010, p. 3.
46 Id.
47
Franco v. People, 780 Phil. 36, 50 (2016).
48
Peoplev. Vargas, 784Phil.144, 156(2016).
 Decision 15 G.R. No. 232455

The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of the

length of time between the crime and the identification made by the witness.
'It is by now a well-established fact that people are less accurate and
complete in their eyewitness accounts after a long retention interval than
after a short one.' Ideally then, a prosecution witness must identify the
suspect immediately after the incident. 49

In the present case, AAA was raped in April 2005. She supposedly saw
her assailant again in March 2006, and was finally able to definitively point
to Ansano as her assailant in May 2006. There was thus, more or less, one
year between the time the crime was committed to the time of the
identification.

In People v. Rodrigo 50 (Rodrigo) a time lapse of 5 ½ months between

the commission of the crime and the out-of-court identification was one of the
factors that led the Court to hold that the identification of the accused was
unreliable. The present case, in comparison, even involves a longer passage
of time. While a longer passage of time per se will not automatically make an
eyewitness recollection unreliable, it certainly impacts its overall reliability
when considered along with the other factors in the totality of circumstances
test.

(d) The last two factors: the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification, and the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.

The Court notes that AAA did not show a high level of certainty in her
initial identification of Ansano. For instance, in her testimony quoted above,
she used the word "namumukhaan" instead of "nakilala" when she saw
Ansano on March 19, 2006. More glaring, however, was that she needed a
second look for her to be able to ascertain that Ansano was her assailant -
this time, through a photograph while Ansano was detained for another
charge. AAA testified as follows:

Q Now, Madam Witness, you stated that, that was the time on March
19, 2006 were able to identify the face of the accused, the one who
raped you that afternoon of April 6, 2005, when for the first time did
you come to know his name?
A When I went to the Municipal Hall, sir.

Q Where specifically in Municipal Hall?

A In Municipal Hall of [ZZZ], sir.

Q What office?
A In the office of the police, sir.

Q Were you able to know his name at the Police Station?

49
People v. Nunez, supra note 25 at 428.
50
Supra note 24.
Decision 16 G.R. No. 232455

A I was then asking if the accused was still at the Municipal Jail
because he was then detained because of the case filed by [BBB], 51
Slf.

Q And the policemen told you the name of the accused?

A Yes and he shown (sic) the picture of the accused, sir.

Q And after that what did you do?

A· I examine the picture clearly and I am sure that he is the one
who raped me, sir. 52 (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing testimony, apart from being an indication of AAA's level

of uncertainty as to her identification of Ansano, is more importantly an
indication that the identification was marred by improper suggestion.

To recall, the Court has already said in Pineda that:

[t]he first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is that

a series of photographs must be shown, and not merely that of the suspect.
The second rule directs that when a witness is shown a group of pictures,
their arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one of the
pictures pertains to the suspect. 53

This is so because:

[w]here a photograph has been identified as that of the guilty party,

any subsequent corporeal identification of that person may be based not
upon the witn~ss's recollection of the features of the guilty party, but upon
his recollection of the photograph. Thus, although a witness who is asked to
attempt a corporeal identification of a person whose photograph he
previously identified may say, "That's the man that did it," what he may
actually mean is, "That's the man whose photograph I identified."

xxxx

A recognition of this psychological phenomenon leads logically to

the conclusion that where a witness has made a photographic identification
of a person, his subsequent corporeal identification of that same person is
somewhat impaired in value, and its accuracy must be evaluated in light of
the fact that he first saw a photograph. 54

Pineda itself involved an acquittal of the accused on the ground that,

among others, the eyewitness was shown only two photographs of suspected
highway robbers while there were a total of six perpetrators to be identified,
thereby effectively suggesting to the eyewitness that the men in both photos
belonged to the group of the perpetrators. Similarly, in Rodrigo, the

51
Supra note 7.
52
TSN dated June 25, 2008, p. 16.
53
People v. Pineda, supra note 40.
54
Id. at 540, citing PATRICK M. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 68-69 (1965 .
 Decision 17 G.R. No. 232455

eyewitness was shown only one photo before making the identification. In
finding this out-of-court identification unreliable, the Court explained:

The initial photographic identification in this case carries serious

constitutional law implications in terms of the possible violation of the due
process rights of the accused as it may deny him his rights to a fair trial to
the extent that his in-court identification proceeded from and was
influenced by impermissible suggestions in the earlier photographic
identification. In the context of this case, the investigators might not
have been fair to Rodrigo if they themselves, purposely or unwittingly,
fixed in the mind of Rosita, or at least actively prepared her mind to,
the thought that Rodrigo was one of the robbers. Effectively, this act is
no different from coercing a witness in identifying an accused, varying only
with respect to the means used. Either way, the police investigators are
the real actors in the identification of the accused; evidence of
identification is effectively created when none really exists. 55 (Emphasis
supplied)

The same thing can be said about AAA's identification of Ansano in

this case. That she was shown only one photograph, when considered with the
other factual circumstances of this case, only leads to the logical conclusion
that the identification might have been marred by improper suggestions.

Again, the circumstances of AAA's identification of Ansano were that

almost a year after the rape incident, she supposedly recognized him as her
assailant as he was having a drinking spree with her father. She, however, only
knew of his name two months after, or on March 19, 2006, when she went to
the municipal hall to inquire if Ansano was still detained for the case filed by
her best friend, BBB, who was also Ansano's niece. Incidentally, BBB was
also present when AAA first "recognized" Ansano in the drinking spree with
her father. She narrated:

Q How did you come to know that he is indeed a resident of [GGG,

:XXX,ZZZ]?
A Because of my best friend [BBB] and she is his niece, sir.

Q You mean to say that, through [BBB], you came to know that the
accused is from [GGG, XXX, ZZZ]?
A Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q And you were able to see him face to face through [BBB]?
A No, sir, he had a drinking spree with my father.

Q You were with [BBB] when that incident happened?

A Yes, sir.

Q That was March 19, 2006?

A Yes, sir.

55
People v. Rodrigo, supra note 24 at 529-530.
Decision 18 G.R. No. 232455

Q What time more or less was that, when you were able to meet face
to face the accused?
A More or less 8 o'clock in the evening, sir.

Q March 19, 2006?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you were with [BBB]?

A Yes, sir.

Q In what particular place, you were (sic) then with [BBB] on that
date?
A In our house, sir.

Q Your house is near the house of [BBB]?

A No, sir. [BBB] once live[d] in our house.

Q You want you (sic) tell the court that, on that day, March 19, 2006
that was the very first time that you came face to face [with] the
accused?
A Yes, sir. 56

It·is important to note that the records reflect that the present charge
was once consolidated with a case filed by BBB against Ansano, but BBB
eventually decided to not pursue the case and this case thus proceeded on its
own. While the records do not reflect the exact nature of the case filed by
BBB, it could reasonably be inferred that it was likewise a rape or sexual
assault charge for it to have been initially consolidated with this case.

To the mind of the Court, there is a reasonable possibility that the

confluence of these circumstances may have, albeit inadvertently, improperly
suggested to the mind of AAA that Ansano was her assailant. It is true that
the latter finding - on the possible effect of BBB on the identification - did
not arise from State action; thus, this finding would not amount to a violation
of Ansano' s right to due process that would render the identification
inadmissible, This does not, however, preclude the courts from taking the said
finding into consideration as evidentiary inquiries do not end on questions of
admissibility. "Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight
of evidence." 57 Hearsay evidence, for instance, cannot be given credence
whether objected to or not for it has no probative value. 58 Eyewitness
testimony, like all other evidence, must not only be admissible - it must be
able to convince. ·

Ultimately, the Court's independent assessment of the reliability of the

out-of-court identification when the totality of circumstances test is applied
resulted in reasonable doubt on the said identification. All told, the foregoing
findings ultimately impressed upon the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt

56
TSN dated December 10, 2008, pp. 5-7.
57
People v. Parungao, 332 Phil. 917, 924 (1996).
ss Id.
 Decision 19 G.R. No. 232455

- to reiterate, not on the fact that the crime happened, but rather - on the
identity of the accused. Acquittal must perforce follow.

The Court's reminders

The Court laments that neither the R TC nor the CA was able to discuss
the doubt on Ansano's identity as the perpetrator of the crime even though the
issue was glaring in the records of the case. Both the RTC and the CA focused
on whether the crime indeed happened and examined AAA's testimony only
through that lens. The RTC simply said that "[t]he clear, consistent and
spontaneous testimony of [AAA] unrelentingly established how Ansano
sexually [assaulted] her on April 6, 2005 with the use of force, threat and
intimidation." 59 The CA was unfortunately as terse, as it held that: "AAA
positively identified accused-appellant as the perpetrator. The clear,
consistent and spontaneous testimony of AAA established that accused-
appellant committed rape against the victim," 60 adding that Ansano's defense
of alibi and denial simply failed to stand in light of AAA's positive
identification. 61

The Court thus takes this opportunity to remind courts that "[a]
conviction for a crime rests on two bases: (I) credible and convincing
testimony establishing the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime; and (2) the prosecution proving beyond reasonable doubt that all
elements of the crime are attributable to the accused." 62 "Proving the
identity of the accused as the malefactor is the prosecution's primary
responsibility. Thus, in every criminal prosecution, the identity of the
offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof bey~md reasonable
doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to
prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime
can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of
the criminal beyond reasonable doubt." 63

Also, while the defenses of denial and alibi are inherently weak, they
are only so in the face of an effective identification64 which, as discussed, was
not present in this case.

Lastly, while it was true, as the CA noted, that "no young woman,
especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and thereafter testify about her ordeal in a
public trial if she had not been impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to
her," 65 this does not mean that the said testimony should be accepted
wholesale. It bears stressing that:

59
CA rollo p. 14.
60
Rollo, p. 11.
61
Id. at 13.
62
People v. Pineda, supra note 40 at 537.
63
Peoplev. Espera, 718 Phil. 680,694 (2013).
64
See People v. Pineda, supra note 40 at 548.
65
Rollo, p. 11.
Decision 20 G.R. No. 232455

the testimonies from aggrieved parties should not simplistically be

equated to or treated as testimonies from detached parties. Their testimonies
should be handled with the realistic thought that they come from parties
with material and emotional ties to the subject of the litigation so that they
cannot be accepted and held as credible simply because the defense has not
adduced evidence of ill-motivation. 66

Like all other evidence, they must be independently assessed.

As a final note, the Court ends with the following discussion in People
v. Fernandez: 67

Given the foregoing findings, we are not concluding that

complainant has not been a victim of rape, or that appellant's defense of
alibi and denial can be given full faith and credence. We only stress that her
testimony was unable to pass the exacting test of moral certainty that the
law demands and the rules require to satisfy the prosecution's burden of
overcoming appellant's presumption of innocence.

A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond

reasonable doubt-moral certainty that the accused is guilty. The defense
may be weak, but the prosecution is even weaker. As a result of this finding,
it will be unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised.

The Court has aptly said: "It is better to liberate a guilty man than to
unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved by the required
quantum of evidence. Hence, despite the Court's support of ardent crusaders
waging all-out war against felons on the loose, when the People's evidence
fails to prove indubitably the accused's authorship of the crime of which
they stand accused, it is the Court's duty - and the accused's right - to
proclaim their innocence. Acquittal, therefore, is in order. 68

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby

GRANTED. The Decision dated February 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08223 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Teodoro Ansano y Calleja is ACQUITTED
of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED
IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is being lawfully
held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of New

Bilibid Prisons for immediate implementation. The said Superintendent is
ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of
this Decision the action he has taken.

66 People v. Rodrigo, supra note 24 at 539.

67
434 Phil. 435 (2002).
68
Id. at 455.
Decision 21 G.R. No. 232455

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

OSDADO . PERALTA
Chief J~stice
Chairpehon

Associate Justice

SAMUEC~
--=Associate
~EN
Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.