NAVIGATING AN UNSETTLED WORLD (MALEEHA LODHI)

Four key policy areas pose immediate challenges and have to be simultaneously
addressed: 1) Navigating the US-China confrontation 2) Dealing with occupied
Kashmir and managing relations with an implacably hostile India 3) Helping
Afghanistan win the peace but also preparing for less hopeful scenarios 4)
Balancing relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Rising tensions between the US and China have a direct bearing on Pakistan. Even
as Islamabad does not want this stand-off to affect its relations with either of the
two countries, which is easier said than done. What has been described as a new
cold war will intensify in a US election year when President Donald Trump has
made China-bashing a central plank of his re-election campaign. He is both playing
off a bipartisan political consensus and fortifying anti-China public sentiment that
preceded the pandemic and has been strengthened by it.

The pandemic has also reinforced US plans to reduce economic dependence on

China by reconfiguring or diversifying global supply chains and pursuing a more
overt contain-China policy. When this gets underway it may result in India
emerging as a stronger economic partner of Washington. This will also bolster the
longer-standing American strategy to project India as a strategic counterweight to
China especially as India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi seems willing to
play that role.

The implications for Pakistan of the US-India entente are already evident by
Washington’s tepid response on Kashmir and continuing augmentation of India’s
military and strategic capabilities. Thus, closer US-India relations will confront
Pakistan with a regional environment of greater strategic imbalance.
Concern about CPEC and China’s Belt and Road Initiative has prompted frequent
US criticism of these megaprojects. A White House report sent last month to
Congress is more explicit, asserting that BRI will give China “undue political
influence and military access”. Statements by American officials that CPEC will
impose a heavy debt burden on Islamabad represent unsubtle though vain efforts to
drive a wedge between Pakistan and China. While Islamabad will want to avoid
getting in the cross hairs of US-China friction it is obvious that Pakistan’s strategic
future lies with China. CPEC is emblematic of China’s aim to strengthen Pakistan,
economically and strategically, and must be our overriding priority.

Pakistan’s relations with China remain on a positive trajectory but will need
regular reinforcement. Close consultation with Beijing on key global and regional
issues, including Afghanistan, will be important.

Ties with the US have improved, but lack substantive content. For now, the main
commonality is Afghanistan. That too will be tested in coming months when
hurdles are encountered in the fragile Afghan peace process. Nevertheless, it is
important to keep engagement on a positive track while accepting the limits of the
relationship.

Islamabad thus needs to think long term and prepare for different scenarios that
might emerge in Afghanistan keeping in view machinations by regional countries
acting as spoilers in Afghanistan’s peace effort.

Pakistan’s most imposing challenge however will remain managing relations with
India where the Modi government is bent upon crushing the Kashmiri resistance by
unprecedented levels of repression and orchestrating anti-Muslim sentiment and
pogroms in India. Dialogue with Delhi is ruled out by its brutal and illegal actions
in occupied Jammu and Kashmir, where even medical services have been denied
during the pandemic, and India’s refusal to discuss the issue. Aggressive moves by
India on the Line of Control and covert actions in Balochistan represent a toxic
mix that have sent tensions soaring with Pakistan. Prime Minister Imran Khan’s
repeated warnings about a possible false flag Indian operation underlines the
growing danger.

Faced with this, Pakistan will have to avoid any engagement for the sake of
engagement with India unless Pakistan’s concerns are accommodated in future
talks. This is hard to see under Modi.

On Kashmir, Pakistan needs a strategic approach and a sustained diplomatic

campaign — not an on-off approach. Tweets are not a diplomatic strategy. Noise is
not a policy. A strategy for a changed global environment should preserve our
principled stance while mobilising international support for a peaceful Kashmir
settlement. This means pushing the boundaries at the international level. For a
start, a virtual meeting of OIC foreign ministers should be sought, taking
advantage of the rising concern among many OIC countries about India’s anti-
Muslim actions. Once the situation permits, Pakistan should also seek a meeting of
the UN Human Rights Council exclusively on occupied Kashmir to refocus world
attention on the egregious human rights violations there.

Space limits detailed consideration of policy towards the Middle East. Most
importantly, Pakistan should deftly balance its relations between Saudi Arabia and
Iran, who remain locked in a tense stand-off, and stay the course on a policy that
avoids being drawn into their rivalry, however challenging it may be given
Pakistan’s increased financial reliance on Riyadh.

STRATEGIC SHIFTS (AMIR RANA)

Pakistan’s role in the Afghan peace process is vital. It was widely appreciated as
being instrumental in sealing the US-Afghan Taliban deal of Feb 29. But this does
not reflect any change in Pakistan’s strategic approach. Instead, it supports its
long-standing position; it has long been advocating that a negotiated settlement
between the Taliban and other Afghan stakeholders is a viable solution for
Afghanistan.

Pakistan has facilitated talks between the US and the Taliban because of several
reasons. First, the US has acknowledged Pakistan’s stance of negotiated settlement.
Secondly, the Belt and Road Initiative and CPEC were also factors because China
does not want a major, protracted conflict near a key belt of its ambitious
connectivity initiative. Similarly, Pakistan’s internal security concerns as well as
its urge to correct its global image have proved to be critical reasons.

It requires an in-depth inquiry to examine how effectively Pakistan used these

factors and to what extent they have influenced the country. However, Pakistan’s
strategic doctrine appears to have remained unchanged in the process mainly
because the geopolitical and strategic challenges facing the country have still not
been resolved. Nevertheless, these challenges have become more complicated after
India revoked the special status of India-held Kashmir last year on Aug 5, which
was granted under Article 370 of the Indian constitution.

Pakistan tried hard to raise the issue before the international community and on the
relevant platforms — especially focusing on human rights abuses in held Kashmir.
These efforts yielded results, and international media and rights groups took the
atrocities in Kashmir seriously. However, Pakistan has not cultivated enough
political and diplomatic support to force India to review its brutal practices in
Kashmir. China supported Pakistan’s stance at the UN Security Council but that
was not enough to pressurise India. However, a real setback was experienced when
the Muslim bloc led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE obstructed all Pakistani efforts
to use the Organisation of the Islamic Conference platform for Kashmir. It showed
that the religious bond is relevant in international relations only when coupled with
a strong economy. South Asia is the region Pakistan considers the least essential,
or perhaps it does not fit in well with the state’s ideological framework. Pakistan’s
close bilateral relations with South Asian nations would have generated political
capital to pursue its geo-economic and political interests in the region.

Despite introducing structural and stabilisation reforms, Pakistan is desperately

looking for economic revival. The power elites’ continuing practices reflect that
they are mainly capitalising on the strategic importance of the country, which they
believe can perform miracles time and again by diverting international investment
and aid towards Pakistan. The nuclear arsenal and strong military forces have
contributed to this confidence. Afghanistan is central to this approach, from where
the country can extract global support. Afghanistan is important for Pakistan not
only in the context of the Indian presence in its backyard but also for strategic
reasons, and the US has exploited it very well.

Pakistan’s cooperation in the Afghan peace process facilitated the improvement of

its global image, reduced the trust deficit in its relations with the US, and helped it
get loans from international financial institutions. But Pakistan’s cooperation on
Afghanistan has not generated support for its stance on Kashmir. Second, in its
efforts to balance its relationship with the US and China, Pakistan has significantly
lost focus on CPEC, which was a rare opportunity for the revival and strengthening
of its economy. However, Pakistan has not used the Afghanistan factor effectively.
Some say the fear of being blacklisted by the FATF, the international financial
watchdog, has forced it to extend more support to the US in Afghanistan. The
FATF has proved a lethal factor, neutralising Pakistan’s efforts to take advantage
of its cooperation in Afghanistan.

Maintaining an equilibrium in its relationship with China and the US is another

challenge for Pakistan. The country has a history of ups and downs in its
relationship with the US, but it cannot afford a standstill with China, as the
relationship has an altogether different nature in the geopolitical, geo-economic,
and geostrategic contexts. The impression, which has developed during the last two
years, that Pakistan is eager to restore its relationship with Washington has created
resentment in Beijing. The slowdown of CPEC has strengthened suspicions.

SAARC ON VENTILATOR
With the US finding it difficult to steer the wheel of the international liberal order,
the spirit of global solidarity and cooperation remains on a slippery slope. The US
- the architect of this world order - emphasised on globalising the economy,
something which the Bretton Woods institutions helped achieve in the previous
decades. Today however, as right-wing conservative, hyper-nationalistic politics
and populist regimes gain momentum, the international liberal order is under
retreat.
Brexit was a critical sign of how integrated regional cooperations such as the EU
can dismantle through a referendum. In South Asia, even though it carries potential
like no other region, we see how Saarc has remained on a ventilator since its
creation. Pakistan and India - being at constant daggers drawn - is one fundamental
reason why South Asia is the least integrated region in the world. But today the
current geo-political landscape has added more fuel to fire.
India has gone to lengths in a bid to stall Saarc. To undermine the regional
organisation, India is now turning to the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) to alter its foreign policy
interest and disregard Pakistan. No surprise that New Delhi has begun to look for
alternative “multilateral regional/sub regional organisations” that do not include
Pakistan. Being called a “slow boat to nowhere” by Indian strategic analyst C Raja
Mohan, chances of Saarc coming back into the spotlight seem remote, especially
when Indian ambition to become a regional hegemony looms large in the
complexed region.
Kashmir is another bone of contention between India and Pakistan which gives
little hope to Saarc’s revival. With Indian brutality and mass violations of basic
rights escalating in the vulnerable Kashmiri valley, Pakistan will never sit on the
same table with Indian authorities. Kashmir remains the most contentious issue in
the South Asian region, which has also led to the cancellation of the 2016 Saarc
Summit in Islamabad. No summit has taken place since the Uri attack.
This year, Covid-19 pandemic exposed the existing fault lines in South Asia with
collapsing health systems, choking economies, and poverty reaching
unprecedented levels. These must act as a wake-up call for the regional countries.
It is time for regional solidarity and Saarc is the ideal platform for making regional
cooperation a reality.
One simply cannot neglect the trade potential this region carries. According to the
World Bank, South Asia’s trade potential currently hovers around $67 billion,
almost thrice the current trade of about $23 billion. The Covid-19 crisis has given
the region a new window of opportunity for economic independency. Today,
through the use of Saarc, South Asian countries now have an opportunity to come
together to remove tariffs on medical devices, protective gear and essential
products.
With accelerated climate change manifesting, South Asia must focus on a robust
regional- level response to curb climate vulnerabilities, where all nations are on the
same page. If states are constantly hostile, ecological disruption will gain more
momentum and cause damage of unprecedented nature and scale. Only a unified
narrative will help mitigate the impacts of ecological disruption.
During the inauguration of the historical Kartarpur Corridor in November 2019,
Pakistan’s FM Shah Mahmood Qureshi stated, “If the Berlin Wall could fall and
Kartarpur Corridor be opened — the issue of Kashmir can also be solved,” which
would mean the end of the Line of Control (LoC). Even though Pakistan’s foreign
policy has been ambiguous on multiple occasions, this time, it sent out the right
message. The Kartarpur Corridor shows how there are chances of reconciliation
between two nuclear-armed archrivals.
With political and economic vulnerabilities looming large and climate trauma
becoming ever so prominent, regional solidarity in South Asia is an urgent need.
One thing the Covid-19 crisis has taught us that diseases, terrorism and accelerated
climate change are all borderless challenges which must be countered in
coordinated forums. Today more than ever, Saarc needs a revival.

DIPLOMATIC SPAT
PAKISTAN-India relations, already in the throes of an extended cool phase, have
over the past few days deteriorated further as New Delhi has initiated a quarrel
with this country, possibly to deflect attention from its internal and external crises.
On Tuesday, the Indians asked Pakistan to reduce staff strength at the high
commission in New Delhi by half. Pakistan answered in kind, based on the
principle of reciprocity. Tension had already been increasing: on Monday two
employees of the Indian mission in Islamabad returned to their country after they
were involved in an accident in Islamabad, in which a pedestrian was hurt. Fake
currency was retrieved from the Indians. A few weeks ago, two personnel of the
Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi were declared personae non grata by the
Indians. Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi issued a stern warning to India
on Wednesday, saying this country would respond with full force to any
“misadventure”.
Regarding the scaling down of diplomatic strength, India has alleged that Pakistani
diplomatic staffers were involved in “acts of espionage”, and has trotted out the old
bogey of support for “cross-border terrorism”. Pakistan has denied these charges
emphatically, stating that this country’s diplomatic staffers “always function within
the parameters of international law and diplomatic norms”. Whatever India’s
spurious reasons, it seems that those who call the shots in New Delhi have chosen
to vilify Pakistan in order to deflect growing domestic criticism of the BJP-led
government over its bungled handling of both internal and external problems. Like
many countries across the globe, India has been hit hard by Covid-19, with hospital
beds unavailable in major cities such as Mumbai and Delhi. On the external front,
India has suffered an embarrassing rout in its recent skirmish with China along the
LAC. There are growing calls inside India for ‘revenge’, and the response to the
stand-off with China by the normally tough-talking Prime Minister Narendra Modi
has been seen as inadequate, especially by the ultra-nationalists. Thus, in an effort
to look ‘strong’, the Indian establishment has cooked up the latest crisis with
Pakistan.

MODI’S TRAP (INDIA V CHINA)

Comprising almost one-third of the world’s population, both China and India are
competing for global respect. Over the last few decades, with an immense amount
of investment in education of their masses, developing emerging markets, and
global branding of their nations, both have finally developed a stable middle class
— the backbone of the global financial system that primarily acts as a catalyst for
the global economy.
While this competition is intense in its search for new markets and raw materials, a
few areas such as global warming and the World Trade Organisation show an
unprecedented cooperation and union between the two countries, to the point
where the West (the US in particular) seems to be the common enemy. Staunch,
organised objections and reservations to WTO and Kyoto/Paris accords are a few
trademarks of the Sino-Indian friendship.
Trade between the two is estimated to be at a historic high of $84 billion. Both
countries, more so than the West, have a monopoly over commodity markets
(ranging from oil and gas to lentils and canola oil) across the globe. As a matter of
fact, to avoid bidding in search of new assets, the National Oil Company of India
has forged an informal consultation alliance with the Chinese Petroleum Company.
With similar rich histories, traditions, and multiculturalism of over 3,000 years,
both countries thus face similar challenges as well. Both countries have difficulty
in the UN when it comes to their unimpressive record on human rights.
The above points noting the similarities between the two nations lead to an
important question: What was going through Modi’s mind when he decided to take
on China? The Indian prime minister has based his limited but high-profile conflict
strategy on the assumption that under current circumstances, China will not
escalate any conflict in the region due to the following:
(a) It would raise uncertainty in the already in turmoil capital markets of mainland
China, which may impact the much needed liquidity that the regime requires to
come out of this economic crisis.
(b) The Chinese regime currently faces perhaps its biggest challenges in the last 50
years, which include (i) accusations put forward by several countries, including the
US, Australia and France of a Covid-19 cover-up, (ii) the future of Hong Kong
protests and its amalgamation in mainland China, and (iii) the future of Chinese
firms after the international blockade of Huawei. The downfall of Huawei, while
orchestrated by the US, is an absolute delight for the European, South Korean and
Japanese tech sectors, as it brings a long-sought fair and competitive balance to the
global tech market.
With these limitations to a Chinese response, Modi has finally set the stage to
preserve his legacy as the man who will bring about India’s emergence as an
international giant. The climax of this conflict would result in a sombre and
permanent solution, which would demonstrate to the world that India could not
only stand against a global giant but also resolve complex democratic conflicts in a
reasonable manner.
The current Indian regime has various audiences to this conflict. Firstly, there’s
Vietnam and Cambodia, which are some of the fastest-growing economies in the
world and in need of a reliable defence partner against China, making India a likely
future ally. The recent rift between the US and South Korea over the purchase of
an $8bn defence system, coupled with the constant manoeuvring of US/North
Korea relationship, South Korea, along with Japan, is looking for a fellow Asian
power to confront China.
The grand prize that Modi wants to deliver to his nation is a permanent member,
non-veto seat in the UN Security Council, something which his arch rival Pandit
Nehru could only dream of, which would be a delight for its newfound allies,
including Israel.

THE US-CHINA RIVALRY (TALAT MASOOD)

The United States-China rivalry has intensified, as presidential elections in the US
get closer. Both President Donald Trump and Democratic Party nominee Joe Biden
have taken an aggressive position against China. It is a multifaceted attack that
challenges China’s economic policies as being exploitive and against World Trade
Organization (WTO) standards that are harming US interests. On the political front
Washington is denouncing Beijing’s recently enacted Hong Kong national security
law. It considers it a breach of the special status that Hong Kong was supposed to
enjoy for 40 years. The US is also critical of Chinese policy on Taiwan and its
handling of the Tibet situation.
President Trump emphatically blames China for being the originator for the spread
of the coronavirus. This allegation has no solid basis but is meant to keep the
pressure and demolish China’s international standing. At the strategic level it is
persuading Russia to bring China in the negotiations of the arms limitations treaty.
The US claims that China is fast building up a sophisticated nuclear arsenal and
missile capability and its inclusion in the negotiations is necessary. This is a major
area of interest on which the US would like to keep the pressure on China. It is
possible that China’s build-up is being exaggerated to bring it under a strategic
regime. As expected, China would not be a party to any restrictive arms control
regime at this stage.
The US-China relations are far more complex and parallel with the previous US-
Russia relations during the Cold War do not apply. The two leading world
economies are closely integrated and mutually supportive. While President Trump
would like to extract trade concessions, tighten technology transfers and focus on
indigenisation of strategic components, maintaining economic and commercial
relations are in mutual interest. China is currently the US’ largest goods trading
partner with the goods trade totaling approximately $660 billion both ways,
according to 2018 figures. The balance of trade is heavily tilted in China’s favour
with goods exports to the US at $539.5 and imports at $120 billion. China has
indicated that it would increase its imports. Meanwhile, the US is trying to
diversify imports and rely where feasible by stepping up its own indigenous
capability. At a time when millions of workers have lost jobs in the US, this shift
in policy is also politically popular. Despite these changes to reduce and diversify
imports from other sources, economies of the US and China will remain
interdependent. There is no clear alternative of China for the US in the near future.
It is possible that after the US elections, there might be an easing of confrontational
policies.
During a recent Zoom session, eminent author and political and security analyst
Anatol Lieven was of the view that the US — having a bitter experience from its
bellicose policies including the earlier in Vietnam and recent in Afghanistan and
Iraq — is unwilling to undertake military operations.
It, however, is stepping up its economic pressure on China so that it yields to its
economic and political objectives. China would only go that far to accommodate
US interests without compromising on its primary objectives.
President Trump’s aggressive policy toward China is having an adverse fallout on
its ally, Britain. Cyber security and policy differences on Huawei have created
dents between the two allies. The next few weeks will see how this unfolds.
The South East nations — Japan, South Korea, Australia — are supportive of US
in its policy to keep political and economic pressure on China. India is fully
backing President Trump’s China policy as it coincides with its conflict in the
Himalayas. But the economies of all these countries are so closely intertwined with
China that no one country would like tensions to rise to a stage where its economy
would suffer.
The Western industrial complex however finds the current political confrontation
with China an opportunity to reassert itself and expand its global market share.
Trump’s policies are self-centred and personalised and that is pulling the US down.
While the world at large is focused on dealing with the scourge of Covid-19 what
is different is that the US is so absorbed in its own problems that it has abdicated
its leadership’s responsibility.
With US presidential elections a few months away people would judge Trump’s
achievements and failures more objectively.
In the foreign policy realm, there have been serious setbacks. Initially, President
Trump has been optimistic in being able to get a deal with North Korea in
denuclearising it and invested considerable time and his reputation by engaging
with its leader Kim Jong-un.
It would not be an exaggeration that the state of relations now is much worse than
when engagement with Kim was initiated.
Trump is averse to international agreements and the hasty US withdrawal from the
WTO is a classic manifestation of it. The President is contemptuous towards the
IMF and World Bank and these have serious implications for the world order.
Having walked out of the nuclear agreement with Iran, the US has created a
security vacuum that has left other signatories to the agreement in a limbo.
Whereas it has been building India to challenge China at the regional level but the
recent skirmish between India and China must have realised that the power
potential between them is heavily tilted in favour of China. The US will be
cautious and not involve directly in the China-India conflict while supporting India
diplomatically. It would consider it an opportunity to enhance its trade and step up
its sale of sophisticated weapon systems to India.
The opinion in India is also divided on what extent it should align itself with the
US for Indian leaders and establishment have their own aspirations of playing an
independent role in world affairs.
Despite US efforts to thwart China it has succeeded in carving an important
position in the world order. China, through its BRI projects, is expanding its
influence in African and Asian countries.
Henry Kissinger recently aptly remarked, “the world situation is very grave”. In
this scenario it becomes even more important that world powers cooperate rather
than pursue confrontational policies.

UNCERTAINTY CLOUDS AFGHAN TALKS (M. LODHI)

President Donald Trump seems determined to pull out the bulk of US troops from
Afghanistan ahead of the November polls and portray this as fulfilment of his
pledge and an ‘achievement’, especially when he has little to claim by way of any
foreign policy success. The withdrawal of US forces as envisaged under the Feb 29
US-Taliban agreement is proceeding ahead of schedule. The coronavirus pandemic
may be a compelling reason to expedite the pullout.
The prospect of commencing intra-Afghan talks is still clouded in uncertainty
despite the US aim to have them convened later this month. The principal hurdle is
the persisting stalemate on the issue of prisoners. Under the Doha deal the Afghan
government was committed to release up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners. So far just
over 4,400 prisoners have been freed by Kabul and around 660 by the Taliban in
the swap. From the outset the Taliban’s condition to begin intra-Afghan talks was
the release of all 5,000 prisoners. US officials have tried to persuade them to start
the talks and let the rest of the prisoner release happen in due course. But the
Taliban have not agreed.
Meanwhile, President Ashraf Ghani has continued to drag his feet on releasing the
prisoners arguing that many of them are dangerous militants or guilty of serious
human rights abuses. The Taliban regard this as just a pretext to delay the talks. It
is entirely possible that Kabul is prevaricating as this may be the last source of
leverage that President Ghani enjoys ahead of the talks, which he is reluctant to
give up at this point. Instead, he has offered different proposals on the issue but the
Taliban have rejected any piecemeal prisoner release. This remains the main
impediment in the process that was expected to begin in March, days after the
Doha agreement, but it continues to hang in the balance.
The uptick in violence in Afghanistan is also vitiating the atmosphere for dialogue.
It is, however, not unusual for combatant parties in such a situation to sustain or
escalate attacks to strengthen their negotiating position ahead of talks. Reduction
of violence and a “permanent and comprehensive ceasefire” are a top agenda item
in intra-Afghan negotiations according to part four of the Doha Agreement. It is,
therefore, unlikely that before formal negotiations begin either of the two parties
will refrain from mounting military pressure on the other.
Nevertheless, any spectacular attack could set back peace efforts. Pompeo’s tweet
after his conversation with Mullah Baradar, which said that he warned him against
attacks on American personnel, reflected Washington’s concern for its troops’
security but it also fuelled the impression that there is implicit acceptance that
some fighting between Afghan forces and the Taliban will continue despite US
calls for a reduction in violence.
If the impasse over the prisoners issue is overcome the Taliban are committed to
joining intra-Afghan talks soon after. Agreement will then have to be forged on
issues such as venue and who will be the mediator for the talks at least in the
beginning. The inaugural meeting to kick off the talks is expected to be in Doha,
but thereafter there are several proposals on where subsequent rounds could be.
They include Doha or shifting to Oslo, Germany or Uzbekistan. Ghani has also
proposed that each subsequent round should be held in a different location.
Once talks begin, the US would be obliged under the Doha Agreement to begin an
administrative review of sanctions and the rewards list against members of the
Taliban. It is also committed to start consultations with other UN Security Council
members to delist Taliban members from the Council’s sanctions list.
Of course, the thorniest issues lie ahead in complex intra-Afghan negotiations once
they are launched. Achieving a lasting ceasefire by agreeing on its scope and terms
and setting up a mechanism for its enforcement will pose a major challenge. How
“joint implementation mechanisms” mentioned in the Doha deal would be evolved
seems particularly problematic. For example, would this mean that areas under
Taliban control would be ‘legally’ accepted by Kabul when such an arrangement is
implemented?
An even more formidable challenge in direct talks will be to reach agreement on a
political settlement. The joint declaration between the US and Afghan government,
announced along with the Doha Agreement in February, envisages a ‘framework
agreement’ to emerge from intra-Afghan talks. This would involve settling
contentious issues of provisional power sharing, constitution and human rights, and
equally vexed matters relating to demobilisation of Taliban forces and their
reintegration. In recent virtual meetings with regional and international partners,
President Ghani has sought support for his position that the end state should be a
republic in an effort to pre-empt the Taliban’s expected demand for Afghanistan to
be declared a Sharia state or emirate.
Then there is the question of whether an interim government would be needed to
transition to the ‘new post-settlement Afghan Islamic government’, which is
ambiguously mentioned in the Doha accord and is to be determined by the intra-
Afghan dialogue. President Ghani has repeatedly ruled out any interim or
provisional government arguing that this is contrary to the constitution. But the
question is whether the Taliban will accept power sharing without a new political
arrangement first being installed.
A long and difficult path lies ahead to secure a negotiated end to the Afghan war.
What seems certain is President Trump’s intent to withdraw US forces from
Afghanistan regardless of whether the intra-Afghan talks make progress or yield an
outcome. Indications that he may want a speedier withdrawal if talks are just
initiated suggests that the intra-Afghan dialogue is seen as Washington’s exit door
out of Afghanistan. The implications of this for Pakistan should not be lost on
Islamabad.

PROPOSED IRAN-CHINA DEAL

AS the Trump administration moves further towards confrontation with China and
as China makes it clear that even while wanting to avoid a fight it will push back, a
new factor has suddenly captured the headlines. This is a proposed agreement
between China and Iran under which according to a ‘final draft’ received by The
New York Times from Iranian sources China will invest $400 billion in Iran and
receive in return Iranian fossil fuel — oil and gas — at discounted prices. The
initial report on this so-called agreement which is not part of
the NYT revelation had said the discount was to be 32 per cent on the prevailing
market price. Many commentaries in Iran have welcomed this agreement. Others
have been suspicious.
On the face of it, there could be nothing better for Iran than an agreement that
enabled Iran to sell its oil in return for the sort of investment that the leaked paper
talks about. Currently, subject to some correction, reports from normally reliable
sources suggest that Iran has 30 tankers each capable of carrying two million
barrels. Its onshore storage is said to be about 63m barrels. In other words, about
120m barrels which, instead of being a source of income, are drawing on scarce
resources to finance the storage.
It is true that before the JCPOA was signed in 2016 Iran had huge problems
marketing its oil and had learnt many ways to evade the sanctions that were
imposed at that time. They were credited rightly with having devised clandestine
means to market their oil and these channels are probably being used even now.
But the level of surveillance has gone up manifold since those days and in my view
if the sale entailed a discount of 20pc then it probably entails a discount of more
than 30pc today for the ship to ship transfers at sea taking place whenever the
satellite is not operating in the area.
The Iranians have set aside the agreement reached with India for Indian
participation in the construction of the railroad from Chabahar to Zahidan for
connectivity to Afghanistan and Turkmenistan and thence to Europe where India
was expected to invest $1.6 billion and have also abrogated the agreement for
Indian development of the Farzad-B gas field where an Indian investment of $6bn
was expected. The Indians have said that difficulties arose because of US
sanctions, while the Iranians said no progress was made in negotiations but that
they would welcome India’s return. This, of course, is verbiage. The current
Iranian expectation is that with their rail expertise and thirst for fossil fuel, China
will step in for both but this is not the Chinese focus.
China recognises, as the UBS Bank of Switzerland’s study of December 2019
shows, that for the next 25 years the US dollar will remain the dominant reserve
currency for central banks across the world. It also recognises that there has been
little change in the leading role that the dollar plays in international trade. It will
try to increase the role of the renminbi in international trade through currency
swaps and other renminbi denominated trade but this will take a great deal of time.
Sanctions imposed by the US will work quite well given the dollar’s dominance of
international trade.
China’s principal focus is on the South China Sea and the steps the US is taking in
this area to limit China’s ability to work out arrangements with its Asean
neighbours and to use the Hong Kong issue to seek condemnation of China’s
alleged breach of the ‘one country two systems’ that was promised for Hong Kong.
The US has moved from suggesting that the countries of the region should take a
concerted position on China’s territorial claims to terming them illegal and a
breach of the freedom of navigation required under UNCLOS (law of the sea
convention). The US says that it observes UNCLOS but has not ratified it because
it cannot muster the political will to get 66 senators to ratify the convention which
many senators see as an unacceptable restriction on America’s freedom of action.
China has also to be concerned about the US decision to insist that China become a
party to arms control talks when the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces)
treaty has been abrogated. This is a matter of concern to Europe since they fear that
the US will now ask for the stationing of these missiles in Europe but is also a
matter of concern in terms of allowing these weapons into the South China Sea
where China has these weapons but has very restricted ICBM (intercontinental
ballistic missiles) capabilities.
Much has been made in the NYT about the fact that this agreement would allow
China to develop military capabilities in the Persian Gulf region in the ports it
develops. The truth is that China developed one base outside the South China Sea
(Djibouti) only because the Western alliance said China was benefiting from the
anti-piracy operations of Western navies without making a contribution. In my
view, it has no interest in trying to question, let alone match, American naval
supremacy in the Persian Gulf area.

HEADING TOWARDS A NEW COLD WAR

The new cold war is different from the one that was fought for almost half a
century after the end of the Second World War. That long and bloody conflict did
not settle one major issue that was at the centre of the war. What would be the
ideology that would be followed to define the system of governance once radical
nationalism as promoted by Germany, Italy and Japan had been defeated? What
survived were two competing systems: governance built on individual rights or
governance in which almost total power was assigned to the state. The United
States was the champion and promoter of the first; the Soviet Union of the second.
This battle of ideas was fought in new geographic space created by the demise of
European colonialism. Several states in the continent of Europe had ruled over vast
tracts of land for more than a hundred years. When they were forced to leave by
the aggressive development of nationalism in Asia and Africa, a number of
independent nations emerged. Independence came but the question of the style of
governance was not settled. That was the ground on which the two large powers
that came out victorious fought in what came to be called the “Cold War”.
Jawaharlal Nehru’s India and some of the African leaders who had led the struggle
for independence from colonial rule were attracted to the Soviet system. They
believed that Lenin and Stalin had found a way for quickening the pace of
economic development and social transformation. The US, using a series of
defense pacts, pushed for the adoption of its system.
It would have been hard to imagine that Afghanistan in the 1980s would
demonstrate in a vivid way the shortcomings in the Soviet system of governance.
Moscow invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and after suffering unimaginable losses of
blood and treasure pulled out its last soldier in 1989. Two years later the USSR
collapsed. The world is now heading towards another cold war but this one is being
fought principally by the US aiming at China as its adversary. However, other
states have also gotten involved. Afghanistan is still in play but has been joined by
Hong Kong.
There is a consensus among those who watch Afghanistan and speculate about its
future that it is a hard country to understand and also hard to predict the direction
in which it is moving. What is contributing to the present situation is the
involvement once again of Russia in the country. The Russians, humiliated in the
1980s by a rag tag army of Afghan fighters who refused to tolerate the presence of
Moscow’s forces in their country, are trying again. This time it is playing a
different game: not occupation but influence. John W Nicholson who commanded
the US and NATO-led international forces in Afghanistan from March 2016 to
September 2018, was the longest serving commander of NATO forces in
Afghanistan. He was the first to sound the alarm that the Russians were cultivating
the Taliban.
“In late 2017 when I was commander of NATO and US forces in Afghanistan an
Afghan governor whom I knew well and trusted came to my headquarters in
Kabul,” wrote the retired general in an article published by The Washington Post in
its issue of July 14, 2020. “He brought a small cache of weapons that he said had
been provided to the Taliban by the Russian operatives coming across the northern
border from Tajikistan.” This time around they have conditioned the help to the
Taliban on their killing of American troops. Cash would be provided if the Taliban
could prove that they had caused American deaths.
What should the US do as the story of the provision of arms to the Taliban became
public? The general summed up his advice in the heading he gave to the above
referenced article: The article came with the title: “We must respond forcefully to
Russia and the Taliban.” The change in the Russian strategy that was brought to
the attention of the general during his tenure in the field was significant. Before
this switch, Moscow had facilitated US logistics through Central Asia, providing
an alternative route for the supply of men and equipment to the NATO forces in
Afghanistan. The Russians were now providing money to the Taliban to kill the
Americans who, despite the thinning in their ranks, were still present in large
enough numbers to provide easy targets for the Taliban.
What kind of response was the general advocating? He wanted senior American
leaders in Washington to give a clear signal to the Russians that this behaviour
would not be tolerated. He would like to see a pause in the withdrawal of
American troops until the time it becomes clear that the Russians were out of the
Afghan game. “Our long war in Afghanistan will have an enduring end only if
agreement is reached at the peace table. The current peace process rests on a
foundation of hard-fought gains by Afghan security forces, with the support of the
US and our coalition partners. In recent months each time when progress is made
at the table, it is met with increased violence on the ground by the Taliban, who are
supported by Russia.”
The US is now embarked in the process of disengaging itself from Afghanistan.
The troop pullout is a part of the agreement Washington reached with the Taliban
on February 29, 2020, when the two sides signed a deal in Doha. The US departure
has begun without the various ethnic, religious, and political groups having arrived
at any kind agreement on how to manage the country. Not only is there a lack of
agreement among the many players within the country, those outside the country’s
borders have not defined their interest in Afghanistan. Once we factor in foreign
interests the situation is considerably more complicated than was the case during
the post-World War II Cold War. Then basically two world powers competed for
influence in the country. Now there are several nations that would like to influence
developments in Afghanistan. China, India, Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are
keen to promote their strategic interests in the geographic space of which
Afghanistan is an important part.
This time around it is not one cold war that was being fought. There are many in
which different parties are engaged. Hong Kong is another area of growing
conflict. I will conclude with a quote from a newspaper analysis of how Hong
Kong is splitting the world. “At the United Nations Human Rights Council in
Geneva, 53 nations — from Belarus to Zimbabwe — signed a statement supporting
China’s new security law for Hong Kong. Only 27 nations on the council criticised
it, most of them European democracies, along with Japan, Australia and New
Zealand. Such blocs would not have been unfamiliar at the height of the Cold
War.” How this particular crisis will develop will be the subject of an article in the
future.
ISRAEL-UAE DEAL
THE peace deal between Israel and the UAE announced on Thursday seemingly
came out of the blue. But for those aware of happenings in the Middle East, the
relationship between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi had been blossoming behind the
scenes for many years.
Thursday’s announcement by US President Donald Trump was only a formal
acknowledgement of these clandestine efforts. Especially over the past year or so,
efforts towards normalisation had gained pace, with cultural exchanges between
the Zionist state and the Gulf sheikhdom, as well as efforts on social and
mainstream media, to help pave the way for the establishment of ties.
While the three main protagonists of this move — the US, Israel and the UAE —
have hailed it with fulsome adjectives such as “bold” and “historic”, the
Palestinians have been less sanguine. A spokesman for President Mahmoud Abbas
termed the deal “disgraceful” while Hamas has described it as a “stab in the back”.
Israel, built on the ruins of Palestine, and the UAE, on the tip of the Gulf, share no
geographical borders, so why the rush towards normalisation? Clearly, both these
states — leading members of the American axis — share common geostrategic
goals, and the welfare of the Palestinians certainly does not seem to be one of
them.
Both Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi are at daggers drawn with Tehran, and this alliance
will certainly send alarm bells ringing in the latter capital. Moreover, the sheikhs
that rule the UAE share a visceral dislike of political Islam — including its leading
proponents in the Arab world, the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas (the latter
being an offshoot of the former).
Israel, on the other hand, has faced off with Hamas in Gaza numerous times,
butchering the hapless civilian population in the process. Also, Hamas is a key ally
of Iran, which means Israel and the UAE can now openly compare notes in order
to confront their respective bêtes noires. And of course, Mr Trump will use the
deal to show his evangelical voter base that he has added another ally for Israel in
the Arab world.
Peace in the Middle East is a goal everyone cherishes. But peace must be based on
justice and fair play; otherwise such ‘peace deals’ are fig leaves for capitulation.
The Israel-UAE deal is being hailed for stopping the illegal annexation of the West
Bank by Tel Aviv. This is a blatant untruth as soon after the deal was announced,
Benjamin Netanyahu told the media “there is no change to my plan to extend
sovereignty” over the occupied territories.

TRUMP VS CHINA
PRESIDENT Donald Trump’s re-election campaign is in full swing; currently,
he’s trailing 12 points behind Joe Biden in polls, primarily because of his poor
handling of the Covid-19 pandemic. A flamboyant populist by nature, Trump is a
unique politician, whose policies evolve around the revival of America as a global
economic power. This reassertion of America’s power includes a very public spat
with a formidable opponent — the People’s Republic of China.
As a student of history one often wonders about the thought process of candidate
Trump. During his brief political career, he has demonstrated that his actions are
based on singling out his opponents, and then leading a forceful propaganda
campaign against them.
The 2016 presidential poll campaign is a clear reflection of the Trump mindset, the
first and foremost task of which was to tarnish Hilary Clinton’s image by attacking
her credibility and integrity, with a promise of sending her to jail. Next, Trump
needed to secure the southern evangelical belt; to do that he used heavy
Islamophobic rhetoric against Muslims, which was followed by a sharp focus on
blue-collar white voters — his central demographic — where he led the charge
against China, coupled by rage-fuelled tirades against Hispanic and Latino
communities as he promised voters a wall on the Mexican border. All these
strategies worked well as Trump’s fear-inducing rhetoric struck a chord of
insecurity within US voters, and ‘make America great again’ became Trump’s
emblem.
His appointment of Rex Tillerson as secretary of state was the first indication of a
shift in US foreign policy, where the future focus of the US would be on its
commercial interests rather than its historic strategic allegiances. As a result, the
US has now renegotiated two major trade treaties, Nafta and the US-China Trade
Agreement. While Trump boasts about the success of these treaties, the reality is
quite the opposite. As per Moody’s, as a result of the US-China trade treaty,
America has lost around 300,000 manufacturing jobs, and due to Trump’s tariffs
on China, an average US household is losing approximately $1,000 per annum of
their disposable income.
The effort to hold China accountable has been perhaps one of the most difficult
tasks for the Trump administration, and might be the key feature of the Trump
doctrine. In the latest Sino-American conflict, while the US is fully backed and
supported by Japan, India, South Korea, the UK and Australia, it faces fair
resistance from France, Germany, and Italy as they are heavily dependent on China
for their exports.
President Xi Jinping’s Vision 2025, which foresees China’s advancement and
leadership into technology, AI, and the robotics sectors, would bring China at a par
with the West. The ongoing US sanctions against Huawei may at first seem
microscopic and company-specific, but the key objective of these sanctions is to
stop the unconditional transfer of technology to China. In other words, China has
been put on notice, and, going forward, all Chinese advancements in technology
and regional expansion will be monitored by the US and its allies.
This is a short-term solution or a Band-Aid fix to a long-term problem. When
competing with China, the real competition is with a 5,000-year-old market force
which invests (i) aggressively in potential (not emerging) markets; (ii) in foreign
markets with no political influence or impact on internal policy; (iii) in colossal
landmark infrastructure projects in developing countries; and (iv) heavily in its
own internal healthcare, and food supply chains. Besides, it has a history of
producing world class megacities with state-of-the-art infrastructure. All of these
are qualities that were once associated with the US.
In addition, with their innate brilliance and work ethic today, Asian-Americans
occupy a very respectable status within American society. Mainstream American
media has marked Trump’s tirade against China as racist rants against the Asian-
American community at large. Furthermore, the Americans realise deep down that
heavy tariffs on China will result in inflation, affecting their own economic well-
being.
Dealing with a new, resilient China and the Covid-19 pandemic has proven to be
Trump’s Achilles heel. The president’s initial denial about the existence of a
pandemic, or his indifference to it, and the urgency displayed regarding the
opening of the economy truly reflects his capitalist nature. While Canada, New
Zealand, and China have shown their humane face in combating the pandemic, the
Trump administration seems to be more worried about the financial impact of the
same. Thus, Trump’s clash with China/Covid-17 may indeed bring about his own
political doom, as the potential internal/external backlash continues to threaten
Trump’s hold on the White House.
FAIT ACCOMPLI (UAE-ISRAEL)
This ‘normalisation’ of relations simply formalises the existing ground reality, and
comes as no surprise. In the past few years, we have seen unprecedented economic
and security cooperation between the UAE and Israel, one aspect of which was the
increasing use by the UAE (and also Saudi Arabia and Bahrain) of the cutting-edge
Israeli spyware Pegasus, which can only be sold with Israeli governmental
approval. More recently, the two countries pledged to collaborate on research and
technology to combat Covid-19. These are just two small examples.
Naturally, any such formal announcement had to include a mention of the
Palestinians, an issue that still resounds with the semi-mythical ‘Arab street’, and
so the UAE has linked this agreement to the ending of annexations by the Israeli
government. This is rightly being considered as a fig leaf to retain some degree of
decency in what is otherwise a fairly naked power play, and one wonders if the
deal would stand cancelled if more annexations do take place or the next time
Israel decides to bombard the Palestinians.
Stranger still is the framing of this as a ‘peace’ deal as these countries were never
at war. In fact, they share a common adversary in the shape of Iran and it is Iran
that is almost certainly the main target of this alliance. That then means that the
UAE deal will likely be followed by similar deals being signed between Israel and
Bahrain, Oman and then perhaps Saudi Arabia, though there is silence on that front
so far and perhaps the UAE has stolen the initiative from its larger partner here.
However, while an eventual formal recognition by Saudi Arabia is not imminent
by any means, it is not off the table either as there has been a growing thaw for
over a decade between Saudi Arabia and Israel, again spurred by a shared anxiety
over Iran’s influence. The kingdom may, in fact, prefer to keep the relationship
informal to avoid serious criticism.
In this dynamic, while lip service will certainly be paid to the Palestinian cause, it
will be a distant concern when compared to the need by the Gulf states and Saudi
Arabia (a goal shared by Israel) to contain and roll back Iranian influence and —
though this is a secondary priority — undercut Turkey as well. So it is no surprise
that the same countries praising the current deal are the very ones who applauded
Donald Trump’s stillborn Israel-Palestine ‘deal of the century’ and the ones who
condemned it are also the ones who are raging against the Israel-UAE deal.
Turkey, which maintains relations with Israel, has been particularly strident.
Why formalise a de facto alliance at all? One reason is likely increasing concern
about America’s growing withdrawal from Middle Eastern affairs and the effects
of its disinterest in direct interventions in the region. In that scenario, what
becomes of tiny UAE, a country of 10 million in which 9m are foreigners who
cannot be naturalised? Addicted to punching far above its weight and keen to flex
military muscle, ‘little Sparta’ is nonetheless a victim of demographics and can in
no way match its intended rivals (bombing Yemen doesn’t count) without a solid
system of alliances if push does eventually come to shove.
In a world where the US may not readily march to the defence of Gulf monarchies,
Israel becomes the safest bet, given that close ties with it also allow for a certain
protection when it comes to the vagaries of US domestic politics. A similar
calculation can be made by Saudi Arabia, especially given how invested they have
been in building personal relations with Trump and his family.
If, as seems increasingly likely, Trump loses the elections a deal with Israel would
provide considerable insurance even if the Biden administration reverses or
moderates Trumps’ ‘maximum pressure’ approach to Iran. With more such
announcements in the pipeline, at least if Jared Kushner is to be believed, Israel
emerges as the biggest winner here, gaining much-needed legitimacy and regional
allies who can help mute criticism of its actions.
As for Trump, he may be hoping that this will gain him some plaudits — and thus
votes — in the upcoming elections but it’s debatable as to how much importance
the average American voter places on foreign affairs. However, it will likely win
him the largely unstinting support of the Israeli lobby and its affiliates.

NO BIG DEAL? (UAE-ISRAEL)

THE foreign ministers of Israel and the UAE openly exchanged phone calls this
week. It was more a case of ‘hear my ring’ than ‘wear my ring’, but the
engagement has nonetheless publicly been formalised, and a marriage made in
Washington is on the cards.
Perhaps it should not have come as a surprise. It was an open secret that the two
parties had been flirting for decades. Intelligence links reportedly stretch back as
far as the 1970s, but the relationship blossomed into a more meaningful romance
more recently, when the old ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ dynamic acquired
greater potency during the Obama administration’s overtures to Iran.
Then Donald Trump appeared on the American electoral landscape, and their
Israeli links helped both the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS),
and his regional mentor Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), the crown prince of Abu
Dhabi, gain access to the inner circles. Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law,
was an obvious conduit.
All of the Gulf states have long been loyal allies of the US. And for much of that
period their overt hostility to Israel has been tempered by a covert envy relating not
only to the nation’s technological prowess and its nuclear capability, but to its
privileged status as Uncle Sam’s golden child in the Middle East. Apart from being
by far the most favoured recipient of American largesse in the region, in the eyes
of successive US administrations it could also do no wrong. Particularly egregious
excesses earned, at best, a mild and meaningless reprimand.
MBS and MBZ wanted a piece of that, and under Trump — a fellow worshipper of
Mammon — they have largely succeeded. It doesn’t hurt, from the American point
of view, that the UAE, alongside Saudi Arabia, is among the keenest clients for US
military hardware — and both nations’ propensity to deploy it against much
weaker foes has been amply demonstrated in Yemen for more than half a decade.
Reaching a peace deal in Yemen might indeed have been an achievement for the
UAE, five years after it collaborated with the Saudis in an intervention that both
naively thought would achieve its objectives within months, if not weeks. Instead,
it finds cause for pride in making peace with a nation with which it has never been
at war.
Unlike Egypt in 1979 and Jordan 15 years later, the UAE’s accommodation with
Israel isn’t a shift from hostilities to frivolities and fraternisation. Abu Dhabi and
Washington have sought to frame Israel’s suspension of its declared intent to
annex more of the occupied West Bank as a key aspect of the deal. That is sheer
nonsense, given that Benjamin Netanyahu’s electoral promise has already been on
hold pending a green light from the White House, with the Trump administration
getting cold feet over the idea of endorsing such an outrageous violation of
international law by its pet state.
The song sheets were not coordinated, though. Trump says annexation is off the
table. Netanyahu says it definitely is not, but the settlers who live on occupied
Palestinian territory aren’t convinced. David Friedman, the US ambassador to
Israel, says the word ‘suspend’ was chosen carefully, and it means a ‘temporary
halt’. It’s unlikely the UAE will have any say in if and when that ‘halt’ slides to
‘go’ — but then, the Emirates habitually thrive on fantasies.
From the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, it was forbidden to mention Israel in the
newspapers. Every reference had to be changed to ‘the Zionist entity’. It went
beyond the news media. The word ‘Israel’ and its derivatives were blacked out in
dictionaries, the shape of the nation was obliterated in atlases, and so on.
The absurdity of the rule was plain as day. So was the hypocrisy of it all. Like most
other Arab states, the UAE back then paid lip service to the cause of Palestinian
self-determination. In that context, perhaps not much has changed. Nor would it be
entirely surprising if it turned out that Mohammed Dahlan, a brutal foe of both the
Palestinian Authority and Hamas and now a ‘security adviser’ to MBZ, played a
leading role in both the new deal and the 2010 assassination in Dubai of a senior
Hamas leader.
On the brighter side, one must acknowledge the diminution of that hypocrisy. For
states such as the UAE — with Oman and Bahrain likely to follow, and perhaps
even the Saudis if MBS gets his way — it makes far more sense to collaborate with
the kindred semi-fascist authoritarian state that Israel has become under Netanyahu
than to fake a moral superiority that can fool only imbeciles.
There’s no denying, though, that the Middle East dynamic has shifted in the past
few days — towards a coalescence of authoritarian impulses, and away from the
long-standing pretence of empathy with the eternally dispossessed Palestinians.

THE LUKEWARM WAR (INDIA CHINA IRAN)

WHEN the Iran-India deal on Chabahar port was announced in 2016, it sent
considerable shockwaves through strategic circles in Pakistan, and rightly so.
Viewed as part of India’s encirclement strategy, Chabahar was seen not only as a
potential rival to Gwadar, but also as an indication of India’s widening regional
influence and as a potential outpost for India on Pakistan’s western flank.
Taking a wider-angle look, it also had the potential to cut off Pakistan from Afghan
trade as the project, and the accompanying rail link from Chabahar to Zahedan and
then on to Zaranj in Afghanistan could eventually have, if not exactly replaced, but
at least curtailed Afghan transit trade through Pakistan.
A year later, the capture of India spy Kulbhushan Jadhav, who also operated out of
Chabahar, added to these anxieties given that it was unlikely at best that his anti-
Pakistan activities were not known to, and tolerated by, Iranian authorities. The
noose was tightening and strangulation seemed inevitable with an openly hostile
India to the east, a nearly equally hostile Afghanistan — considered to be heavily
influenced by India — to the west and now Iran seemingly joining in.
But a lot can change in four years, and recently there were reports that Iran had
decided to cut India out of the railway project and go it alone. Quoting sources in
the Iranian government, media reports claimed that this was due to India’s
reluctance to initiate their part of this project in the light of its increasing bonhomie
with the US and also the related fear of sanctions, even though Chabahar had been
given a special waiver by the United States.
Adding to this was a statement by Mohammad Ali Hosseini, the Iranian
ambassador to Pakistan, which seemed to obliquely refer to India by mentioning
“foreign governments found reluctant in their relations with Iran and need others’
permission for their even normal interactions, for sure they won’t be capable of
planning and implementing such long-term cooperation contracts”.
Subsequently, there came a statement from a deputy to Iran’s ports and maritime
organisation, Farhad Montaser, saying that India had never been a part of such a
deal and that sanctions had nothing to do with Iran and India’s cooperation in
Chabahar. But while such diplomatic signalling and denials are par for the course,
it is very clear that the regional picture is changing to India’s detriment.
And as far as Iran is concerned, this has less to do with a railway and more to do
with a comprehensive deal signed with China. Described as a “sweeping economic
and security partnership”, the deal is said to encompass $400 billion dollars of
investments and entails cooperation in the military sphere as well.
Following this, there have been several statements from Iran in support of the Belt
and Road Initiative and CPEC, with Hosseini even talking about linking Gwadar
and Chabahar to China by rail and conjuring up visions of a ‘golden ring’ of China,
Russia, Iran and Pakistan.
While the Iran-China deal is said to have been on the cards since 2016, it is clear
that it is America’s belligerent attitude towards Iran that has now pushed Iran
further into the Chinese orbit, and the corollary effect will likely be a
corresponding decrease in Indian influence in Iran. That, in turn, will result in a
reduction of the pressure on Pakistan, as hyperbole aside, Chinese involvement in
Iran is a net gain for Pakistan, not only because it reduces Indian influence in the
post-Galwan world, but also makes Iran a potential partner with a vested interest in
Pakistan’s security and reduces the chances of Tehran being a potential adversary.
As for Chinese ingresses into the subcontinent, New Delhi has its own
intransigence, and insistence on refracting foreign policy through the prism of
domestic political considerations governed by a narrow supremacist ideology. For
further proof of that, look no further than Nepal which is being pushed further and
further into the Chinese orbit in large part thanks to India’s bullying attitude.
This, the developments in Iran and the all-too recent humiliation at the hands of
China in Galwan, will of course push India closer to the US which has in recent
weeks upped its rhetoric against China, and has sent aircraft carriers to the South
China Sea for the second time this month in a clear show of force aimed at
deterring Beijing and boosting the morale of US allies in the region. Coupled with
the US reaction to Hong Kong’s new security law and the actions taken against
Huawei, first by America and now by the UK, we can see the lines being drawn
once again and the beginning of what looks like a new Cold War, with much of the
world divided into competing camps whether by design or, in our case, by default.

DAUNTING PATH TO AFGHAN PEACE

Once the Jirga cleared the way for the release by its Aug 8 declaration, the Taliban
signalled readiness for talks to begin as soon as Aug 10. That is what they
conveyed to US special representative Zalmay Khalilzad. Preparations got into
swing to convene the inaugural meeting in Doha. Discussion also took place about
whether that meeting should be held virtually or in person on Aug 16 for which the
Qataris wanted Khalilzad’s attendance. Tentative information about a Doha
meeting was conveyed to many countries including Pakistan, the plan being to
invite 22 states, mostly virtually.
But then Kabul again demurred despite the fact that Ghani signed an order for the
release following the Jirga’s decision. His justification for refusing to free the
remaining 320 Taliban prisoners was the same — they would pose an
‘international’ security threat and confront Western countries with a “new wave of
drugs”. Rejecting this argument, the Taliban in a statement on Aug 15, declared
that the accusations against these detainees were unfounded and merely an attempt
by Kabul to create hurdles in the peace process and stoke international concerns.
The latest impasse has further vitiated the environment for the peace talks. But it
has also fuelled some media speculation that the Afghan government may be
dragging its feet and deliberately delaying the talks until the US presidential
election, just over two months away now. The aim may be to try, if Joe Biden
wins, to persuade his administration to change course or to at least slow down the
US military withdrawal from Afghanistan. If true, this represents a grievously
mistaken assumption. Apart from banking on an uncertain electoral outcome it also
presupposes that Biden would reverse course on a process well underway,
especially with Washington’s recent announcement that by election time American
troops would go down to less than 5,000 in Afghanistan. This suggests that any
delay-till-elections tactic would leave the Ghani government in an even weaker
position than it is in now.
US officials can be expected to mount renewed pressure on Ghani to relent even as
the Afghan president continues to stir up concerns among European countries
about the release of so-called hardcore Taliban fighters. Washington has already
made it evident that it wants to speedily get intra-Afghan talks going given
President Trump’s desire to bring the bulk of US troops home by the November
election and deliver on his previous campaign promise.
Developments over the past several months, since the Doha agreement, have
magnified the challenges intra-Afghan talks will face considering the obstacles that
have been encountered to initiate them. Even on who the Taliban say they are
prepared to negotiate with is a source of contention. On several occasions the
Taliban have said they will not negotiate with the Kabul government but with the
wide spectrum of ‘all parties to the conflict’. It reiterated recently that “The Islamic
Emirate does not recognise the Kabul administration as a government but views it
as [a] Western imported structure. We only accept negotiations that were described
in the historic Doha agreement … that cover all parties to the Afghan conflict”.
On the two big agenda items in future negotiations — a framework agreement and
a ‘comprehensive and permanent ceasefire’ — the positions of the two parties are
as far apart as they can be. So also, is mutual mistrust. The Afghan government has
already set a number of pre-negotiations ‘redlines’ for the talks. They include the
demand for a ‘humanitarian’ ceasefire during or before the talks, no compromise
on the democratic and human rights ‘gains’ made in the past decades, and ‘respect’
for the Republic’s constitution. The Taliban can be expected to push back against
many of these redlines.
On a ceasefire, the Taliban’s preference seems clear — that agreement on a
permanent ceasefire should follow and not precede the successful conclusion of
negotiations on the political road map and power sharing. Only recently Taliban
representatives apparently told UNAMA officials that the historical experience of
similar negotiations elsewhere indicate that a ceasefire comes after and not before
agreement on other substantive issues.
Reaching a framework agreement or a political settlement will pose an even
greater challenge. Consensus will not be easy to evolve on vexed issues such as
provisional power sharing, the Afghan constitution and human rights, and equally
contentious matters relating to demobilization of Taliban forces and their
reintegration. It is hard to envision any middle ground, for example, between the
Afghan government’s position to preserve the republican character of the
constitution and the Taliban’s insistence on declaring Afghanistan an Emirate or
Sharia state.
Therefore, if talks commence in coming weeks the peace process is expected to be
long and tough with little guarantee of a successful conclusion if the parties stick to
their well-known positions. Winning the peace in Afghanistan remains a daunting
challenge even though the stakes will be much higher for all parties in post-
America Afghanistan.
ISRAEL-UAE TIES (PAKISTAN IMPLICATIONS)
THE recent decision by the UAE and Israel to normalise ties is testament to a fast-
changing landscape in the Middle East. While the deal should not come as a
surprise, it carries at least four implications for Pakistan.
The first is that it has necessitated that Pakistan clarify its own position on the
question of Israel-Palestine. The Foreign Office affirmed that while peace and
stability in the Middle East continue to be a key priority for Islamabad, the
question of Palestine would continue to condition its approach to the region. The
prime minister reiterated that Pakistan would not recognise Israel until Palestinian
rights are upheld.
These clarifications are important, given speculation in Haaretz last year that
Pakistan was considering a potential opening with Tel Aviv. But the situation on
the ground is complicated. Any external realignment by Pakistan must first
contend with sensitivities to anti-Israel sentiment on the street, anchored in deep-
rooted public sympathy with the Palestinian cause. While Israel and the UAE have
sought to window-dress their recent deal in a promise by the former to suspend
annexation in the West Bank, in truth annexation is already a de facto reality.
High-level policy statements clarifying Pakistan’s official position and opposing
any normalisation of the status quo thus telegraph continued principled support for
the Palestinian cause, emerging geopolitical pressures notwithstanding.
Second, the deal is likely to further cleave the Middle East, with Gulf states led by
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi on one side, and Iran and Turkey on the other. It is clear
that the latest US-sponsored deal is a vessel for firming up opposition to Iran’s
growing regional power and influence, which the Gulf states, Israel and the US
view as a threat. Both the Saudis and Emiratis view the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood
backed by Turkey, and Shia Iran’s perceived regional expansionism, with hostility.
Impressions of growing geopolitical confluence between Turkey, Iran and China
have heightened these fears.
Iran is negotiating a $400 billion 25-year strategic partnership with China, which
may allow Tehran to circumvent US sanctions and access a large basket of funds in
return for the oil it sends to Beijing. Islamabad’s historical and strategic association
with Saudi Arabia, and its geographic proximity to Iran, make it necessary that
Pakistan avoid selecting parochial binaries either in West Asia or in the Indian
Ocean that place additional demands on its foreign policy choices in the region.
Good relations with both continue to be a strategic necessity; forgoing either at the
altar of great power gambits can spur extremist impulses both inside Pakistan and
the neighbourhood.
Third, Pakistan needs to be worried about India’s deepening engagement with the
Arab Gulf, which has come at the expense of Arab support against India’s
atrocities in occupied Jammu & Kashmir. The muted reaction in Arab capitals to
India’s attack on Balakot has legitimated some of these concerns. Pakistan’s
relations with Riyadh have been affected by the kingdom’s hedging on Kashmir.
Meanwhile, New Delhi’s stand-off with Beijing and its cooling relations with
Tehran, exemplified by the potential loss of Chabahar Port to China, suggest India
may edge even closer to the Arab Gulf and find succour in an Arab détente with
Tel Aviv, a key Indian defence partner.
It is no secret that Indo-Israeli defence cooperation has been steadily ratcheted up
against Pakistan since 2008, most notably in the Balakot encounter. For Pakistan,
the worry is that India’s growing influence in the Middle East will compel fewer
buyers in West Asia outside Turkey and Iran to take up the Kashmir cause at the
risk of upsetting equations with New Delhi. Pakistan must thus dispassionately
rework its diplomatic toolkit in the Gulf if drumming up support for Kashmir is to
stand any chance.
Fourth, in the shadow of retreating multilateralism, the UAE-Israel deal symbolises
a further decline in the Muslim world’s relevance as a flag bearer of its traditional
political causes of Palestine and Kashmir. While Pakistan has been aggrieved at the
slowness with which the OIC has responded to the Kashmir issue, the OIC’s
indifference is symptomatic of a broader apathy and shift from its original
objectives to constituent geopolitical compulsions. This has created space for non-
Arab Muslim countries, such as Malaysia and Turkey, to attempt to take up the
mantle of Muslim leadership.
Last year’s Kuala Lumpur Summit sponsored by the two is a case in point. The
implication for Islamabad is that while it recalibrates its expectations of any
blanket Muslim solidarity on both the Kashmir and Palestine causes, it can
potentially stand to benefit from new opportunities that allow it to clearly define its
own role in the Muslim world, either as vanguard or a follower of the leads of
others.

RARE DEFEAT AT THE UN (USA, IRAN AND

MULTIPOLARITY)
In a sign of changing times, the United States suffered a humiliating defeat at the
UN Security Council. The UNSC rejected a US resolution calling for an extension
of arms embargo on Iran. The only other nation that voted for the resolution was
the Dominican Republic. The European allies of the US — the UK and France —
abstained while China and Russia opposed.
Was there any rationale for the extension of an unwarranted embargo? Why is the
US so obsessed with Iran acquiring weapons when other regional countries are
piling up their arms arsenals at a huge cost to their populations? When there was a
time to restrict Iran’s nuclear ambitions, an agreement was signed with Tehran.
Why did Trump walk out of that agreement in a U-turn that has become a hallmark
of US policy under his leadership?
The resolution failing miserably reflects a faltering foreign policy. It shows the
lack of foresight and murky understanding of global political trends. More
importantly, the rejection signifies the growing flexibility in the policy of major
European allies of the US with regard to their near subservience to American
global interests.
It appears the post-WWII security architecture where Western Europe would show
unqualified support to US interventions is undergoing substantive, though gradual,
changes. How this complete subordination to overriding US interests played havoc
with global peace will be a matter for historians to assess. But clearly such blind
subjugation to Washington’s ‘commands’ have cost the world dearly.
The post-war US has supported dictators, rather than promoting democracy and
pluralism, as long as such autocratic rulers operated within a framework
compatible with America’s global interests. In 1953, the US, with the help of the
UK, toppled the first democratically elected government of Dr Mosadegh.
Installing Shah Reza Pehlavi as the absolute ruler was then considered a major
victory for the CIA. Little did anyone know it would be the harbinger to
tumultuous events in years to come and the US would bite the dust. But such
interventions by the ‘superpower’ continued unabated. In 1973, the government of
Salvador Allende of Chile was removed by another CIA-supervised operation.
Allende was democratically elected but removed because Washington feared he
would forge close ties with Cuba and socialist leanings would spread. That was the
first 9/11. In 2003, Saddam Hussein, a dictator who was not coming on board, saw
his country invaded on the unfounded claim that it possessed weapons of mass
destruction. In 2001, Afghanistan was invaded. Till now, the world doesn’t know
why the US pursued a senseless war that has no victors and many losers. In 2013,
another democratically elected leader, Egypt’s Mohammad Morsi was removed in
a CIA-supported military coup reaffirming that the US would not tolerate
democratic governance if they did not endorse Washington’s policies.
In all these mad ventures for control, hegemony and assertion of might, the US was
fully supported by its European allies as well as Japan, South Korea, Australia, etc.
But now there are growing difficulties as the US pursues its relentless expansionist
agenda. Poor leadership is one big difference now. The growing chasm between
the whites and coloured segments of US population is spreading disaffection and
despair. Trump’s tactics to divide America are bearing fruit. The lack of leadership
in Washington has forced US allies to formulate their own visions of security
without a US umbrella. America’s weakening economy, growing unemployment
and its inability to cope with corona have had serious implications for its global
role.
Major European partners of the US and the NATO member states are no longer in
awe of US military power. The world is becoming multipolar. Regional alliances
are becoming more relevant. China’s emergence and growing economic clout is
forcing countries to acknowledge the emerging reality and align with agendas that
are not premised on military means for achieving political goals.
The rejection of US global vision would take time to complete. For a new vision to
emerge and take root, would take time. But the writing on the wall is clear. It’s the
beginning of the end of the American empire.

AFGHANISTAN: RENEWED HOPES FOR PEACE

The release of the last group of Taliban prisoners by the Ashraf Ghani government
has removed the crucial snag towards the intra-Afghan dialogue between the
Afghan government’s negotiating team headed by Abdullah Abdullah and the
Taliban headed by Sheikh Abdul Hakeem. The new development bodes well for
peace in Afghanistan, depending on accommodation of each other’s point of view
and provision of space.
While the United States of America is the biggest stakeholder in this peace
process, Russia, China and Central Asian States also have direct interests due to
their geographical proximity with Afghanistan. Similarly, Pakistan will also be one
of the greatest beneficiaries because it shares a border of 2,430 kilometres with
Afghanistan and has longstanding trade, cultural and religious ties. Pakistan has
also remained embroiled in the conflict which has deeply affected not only its
foreign policy but also socio-economic structure, particularly in Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Therefore, the stakes for Pakistan in the eventual
peace are quite high.
With the release of a 320 Taliban prisoners and likely release of the remaining 120
as well as the departure of the Afghan government’s negotiating team to the Qatari
capital to prepare for the long-awaited peace talks with the Taliban, hopes for
peace have revived once again. However, skeptics like Sher Jan Ahmadzai, the
director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska Omaha, are
of the opinion that according to publicly available information, the Taliban have
followed only one of the seven conditions as agreed in its peace accord with the
US by releasing 1,000 Afghan prisoners. While the rest of the conditions, more
importantly severing of ties with militant organisations, Al Qaeda in particular,
have yet to be met.
Observers of international repute have not been able to confirm whether the
Taliban have severed their ties with Al Qaeda; and the Taliban have been unable to
provide any proof of doing so. The UN reports of 2019 and May 2020 also suggest
that the Taliban met frequently and remained in contact with Al Qaeda to
coordinate “operational planning, training and the provision by the Taliban of safe
havens for Al Qaeda members inside Afghanistan”. This is why Ryan Crocker, a
diplomat during the times of Obama, has said “this deal is a surrender.”
An upsurge in the level of violence has been observed since the inking of the Doha
Agreement between the US and the Taliban. The insistence of some Taliban
fighters to continue with their jihad “until an Islamic system is established” lends
credence to analysis that the Taliban are not actually interested in peace, but using
this as a tool for the eventual takeover of Kabul to the exclusion of others.
Although the negotiating team headed by Abdullah is backed by the President
Ashraf Ghani, the Taliban still do not recognise the Government of Afghanistan.
This is considered a serious flaw in the Doha Agreement. Despite all its flaws, the
present negotiating team represents all shades of opinion including the women in
Afghanistan, barring the Taliban. Therefore, they are in a significantly stronger
position at the negotiation table and would be able to shape up a political setup
inclusive of all. One’s thinking is that the inclusion of the Afghan government in
the final talks is imperative for durable peace. Consistent exclusion of the Afghan
government from the process will end up in a mess.
Opinion polls in Afghanistan, portraying the mind of the Afghan, indicate that
people are ready to accept some compromises for peace. But many question
whether the Taliban can be held accountable for what they have promised. They
also fear losing the meaningful achievements that came out of international
engagement in Afghanistan, such as women’s empowerment, increased freedom of
speech and a more vibrant press.
Certainly those hard-earned rights soaked with Afghan blood will be of primary
focus at the table among other issues. In the given situation, the key for success lies
with the Taliban as they had been given all sorts of concessions so far, the most
significant of them being their removal from the international terrorists list.
Therefore, the Taliban have to provide space and leverage to others, including the
Afghan government.
Since all the aforementioned countries have high stakes in peace, they must play
their role as guarantors. For the success of negotiations, terms of reference should
also be framed, particularly those related to the future political setup and inclusion
of the Taliban in mainstream political life of Afghanistan.

BAHRAINI RECOGNITION (ISRAEL-ARAB WORLD

EDITORIAL)
AFTER the UAE became the third Arab state in decades to recognise Israel last
month, it had been predicted that this would create a domino effect, with other
Arab and Muslim states following suit. Sure enough, Bahrain joined this growing
cluster of states on Friday, while other Arab/Muslim countries may be waiting in
the wings for an opportune moment to publicly announce their embrace of the
Zionist state. Like the UAE move, President Donald Trump gleefully announced
the ‘breakthrough’ on Twitter, heaping accolades on his “GREAT friends” Israel
and Bahrain. Indeed, out of all the Arab states, the Gulf sheikhdoms are prime
contenders where the recognition of Israel is concerned, with or without the
resolution of the Palestine question. The Gulf Arabs are under the American
security umbrella with many — including Bahrain — hosting major military bases,
while several among them are also on poor terms with Iran. Therefore, there is
little surprise that these states are willing to accept Israel, with the US offering
friendly ‘advice’ on the benefits of doing so.
The Palestinians, expectedly, are not so happy about the move, with the PLO
describing the Bahraini decision as a “betrayal of the Palestinian cause”, while
Hamas has called for the “virus of normalisation” to be resisted. And while their
rulers are describing the decision in glowing terms, many Bahrainis have expressed
their dismay on social media with Manama’s move. Indeed, any consensus on the
Palestine question within the Arab/Muslim world is very quickly dissolving. At a
recent online Arab League meeting, foreign ministers of the bloc were not able to
come up with a resolution condemning last month’s normalisation of ties between
Israel and the UAE. This indicates that some powerful players in the League
clearly feel uneasy about condemning the deal, and thereby upsetting the US.
The aforementioned developments indicate the existence of two very distinct
camps in the Muslim world; the pro-American camp, which includes the Gulf
Arabs, has no qualms about jettisoning the Palestinians’ legitimate demands and
getting on the next plane to Tel Aviv. The other camp, which includes Iran and
Turkey, is very vocal about the Palestinian issue and has condemned those rushing
towards normalisation. In such a situation, the OIC or a similar forum of Muslim
states needs to debate the issue thoroughly. The Palestinians and their supporters
must be given such a forum to express their reservations about normalisation
without a just resolution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. The UAE and Bahrain should
also be allowed to express their justifications for establishing relations with Israel.
Making peace with Israel is not impossible, as long as the Palestinians are satisfied
that their national and human rights will be guaranteed in any peace deal.
Moreover, external powers should not be allowed to use diverging views on the
Israel issue within the Muslim world to isolate certain states, such as Iran.

TALKING TURKEY (MIDDLE EAST)

WHEN the UAE-Israel deal was announced, the two Middle Eastern countries that
most vociferously condemned it were Turkey and Iran. While Iran’s position is
consistent with its policies, and informed by the already intense tension between it
and the Arab states and Israel, Turkey’s anger at the UAE requires closer analysis,
as it is a factor of the growing, and relatively under-reported regional rivalry
between Turkey and the UAE.
This may seem like an odd match-up but increasingly, this rivalry is becoming a
defining feature of Middle Eastern politics and beyond. It isn’t exactly a recent
phenomenon either, and is tied to the competing visions the two countries have for
the region. For the UAE, any hint of democracy in the Middle East is anathema as,
in their view, it will first propel the Muslim Brotherhood into power and — even if
it doesn’t — will weaken the autocratic hold of the Gulf monarchies.
Turkey, despite the authoritarian leanings and nationalist policies of President
Erdogan, remains a democracy and at least ideologically has a degree of sympathy
for the Muslim Brotherhood. And so, in the 2000s we saw that while Ankara
warmed to the Brotherhood and allied causes, the UAE conducted purges against
the movement’s members and suspected sympathisers, removing them from
positions in the state and educational institutions. This culminated in a major
crackdown on the MB by the UAE in late 2011 and in 2014, the MB was declared
a terrorist organisation.
But before this had come the ‘Arab Spring’, which sent the Gulf monarchies into
panic mode as they saw an existential threat to their rule emerge. Turkey, on the
other hand, saw it as something of a godsend and acted accordingly, extending
moral support to the protesters.
When elections took place in Egypt and Mohamed Morsi took power, it seemed for
a moment that things were going Turkey’s way. It didn’t last, of course, and the
reaction of the two countries to the Sisi coup was predictable: Turkey condemned
it and the UAE welcomed it, shoring up the new regime with large amounts of cash
and diplomatic support.
In the aftermath of the attempted coup in Turkey in 2016, suspicions grew in
Ankara that the UAE — which showed thinly veiled delight at the coup — had in
fact supported the putschists. Along with hints from Erdogan himself, Turkish
media ran with stories alleging that the UAE had spent as much as $3 billion in the
effort which it said was in line with the kingdom’s support for reactionary elements
in Egypt and Sudan.
It has only gotten worse since then, and today we see the UAE and Turkey
confront each other in a variety of theatres as the former tries to stymie Turkish
plans at every opportunity. Take Syria: Ankara is bitterly opposed to the Assad
regime and supported not only the initial anti-government protests but later also the
rebel movements against Assad. In contrast, the UAE was more sympathetic to the
Assad regime and has allegedly funded the Kurdish PKK — considered a terrorist
organisation by Turkey, the US and the EU —in an apparent effort to strengthen it
against Turkey.
Along with offering words of support for the largely Kurdish YPG, the UAE also
labelled the Turkish 2019 offensive across the Syrian border (aimed at curtailing
the activities of the YPG) as “a threat to peace”, sparking another diplomatic war
of words. Significantly, Turkey sided with Qatar when its relations with Saudi
Arabia and the UAE soured, sending relief goods and stationing 5,000 Turkish
troops in the beleaguered state.
The latest theatre of this expanding conflict is Libya, where the UAE has opened
its considerable coffers in support of Khalifa Haftar, the heavily medalled general
whose Lebanese National Army’s months-long offensive on Tripoli recently ended
in defeat despite all-out support by the Gulf states, Egypt and France. According to
a UN report, the UAE conducted dozens of secret flights to Haftar-controlled
airbases supplying him with cutting-edge weapons. Here we see Turkey again on
the opposite side, supporting the UN-recognised Government of National Accord.
It’s not just about ‘flipping’ countries into your camp to act as ideological allies,
because for Turkey a friendly Libya offers further ingress into the Mediterranean.
And if Turkey wants something, you can bet the UAE will try to prevent it, and so
in the latest tensions between Turkey and Greece in the eastern Mediterranean we
see the UAE predictably throwing its full support to Greece, even sending four F-
16s to Crete for joint training with the Greek military. The stakes are high for
Turkey here, as it drills for much-needed gas and energy supplies but faces
increasing opposition from European powers, notably France, aiming to curtail its
interests and expand their own, making them ready allies for the UAE. Turkey, on
the other hand, has fewer regional allies and will have to modulate its strategic
policy very carefully in the coming decade.

WHAT TO KNOW ABOUT AFGHANSITAN PEACE

NEGOTIATIONS? (CFR)
Overview
A peaceful settlement to the ongoing war in Afghanistan may now be within reach.
In February 2020, the United States reached an agreement with the Taliban, and
also signed a declaration with the government of Afghanistan to encourage the
start to an intra-Afghan peace process. Many challenges still stand in the way of a
successful outcome to these negotiations and, with it, an end to the United
States' longest war. The Center for Preventive Action (CPA) has compiled this
resource page on the prospects for peace in Afghanistan, including background on
the recently signed agreements, the main challenges and concerns surrounding the
implementation of the agreements, and the roles of powerful regional actors and
their influence.
   
After lengthy negotiations, the U.S.-Taliban agreement and U.S.-Afghan
government joint declaration were signed in February 2020. These agreements
have been seen as necessary and important first steps to intra-Afghan negotiations
—and therefore to achieving peace in Afghanistan—but they do not guarantee that
intra-Afghan negotiations will be successful.
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, leader of the Taliban delegation, signs an agreement
with U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad
in Doha, Qatar, on February 29, 2020. Ibraheem al Omari/Reuters
The U.S.-Taliban “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” [PDF] was
signed by U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay
Khalilzad and the Taliban’s Political Deputy and Head of the Political Office
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar on February 29, 2020, in Doha, Qatar.
The agreement follows more than eighteen months—and nine rounds—of peace
talks, involving Khalilzad, representatives from the Taliban, delegations from the
Afghan government, and numerous other special representatives or envoys from
neighboring or regional countries and international organizations. The signing of
the deal was preceded by a seven-day reduction in violence agreement that was
seen as a test of the Taliban’s ability to control its forces.
The agreement outlines four goals, with the last two dependent on the status of the
first two:
1. Armed groups will be prevented (by the Taliban and Afghan security forces)
from using Afghanistan as a base for acts against the United States and its allies.
The Taliban agreed that it will not threaten the United States or its allies, and that it
will prevent armed groups and others in Afghanistan from doing the same. The
Taliban also committed to sending “a clear message” that it will not cooperate with
those intent on such activities.
2. Foreign forces will withdraw from Afghanistan, including U.S. troops and
contractors and coalition forces.
The United States committed to withdrawing all of its military forces—as well as
those of allies, partners, and civilian security personnel—within fourteen months
of signing the agreement, pending the Taliban’s demonstration of commitment to
the agreement. Presumably as a show of good faith, the United States also
committed to drawing down its troops to 8,600, and withdrawing from 5 military
bases within the first 135 days.
3. Intra-Afghan negotiations were notionally scheduled to begin on March 10,
2020.
The start of negotiations has been dependent on the ability of the Taliban and the
Afghan government to release one thousand prisoners and five thousand prisoners
respectively, with the ultimate goal of releasing all political prisoners three months
after talks begin. Once negotiations have started, the United States has committed
to reviewing its sanctions against the Taliban, and working with the UN Security
Council and Afghan government to remove their Taliban-related sanctions as well.
Preventive Action Update
A snapshot of global hot spots along with expert analysis on ways to prevent and
mitigate deadly conflict from the Center for Preventive Action. Quarterly.
4. The agenda for intra-Afghan negotiations will include discussion of how to
implement a permanent and comprehensive cease-fire, and a political roadmap
for the future of Afghanistan.
The United States and the Taliban agreed that they seek a “post-settlement Afghan
Islamic government.” Pending successful negotiations and an agreed-upon
settlement, the United States has agreed to seek economic cooperation from allies
and UN member states for Afghan reconstruction efforts, and has pledged no
further domestic interference in Afghanistan.
In addition to the formal, signed agreement [PDF] between the United States and
the Taliban, it has been reported by the New York Times and others that the
agreement also includes classified annexes. In February 2020, members of
Congress wrote a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of
Defense Mark T. Esper outlining their concerns over these annexes, specifically
over suggestions that the United States would begin sharing intelligence with the
Taliban. U.S. Defense and State Department officials have since indicated that
there are classified elements of the agreement that likely reference conditions for
the United States’ troop drawdown.
U.S.-Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Declaration
The same day that U.S. and Taliban negotiators signed the U.S.-Taliban agreement
in Doha, Secretary of Defense Esper, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) Secretary Jens Stoltenberg, and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani signed a
joint declaration [PDF] in Kabul, Afghanistan. Similar to the U.S.-Taliban
agreement, the joint declaration identifies four goals for achieving peace in
Afghanistan and regional stability, with the last two goals dependent on the status
of the first two:
1. Prevent terrorist groups from using Afghanistan as a base for attacks against
the United States and its allies.
Unlike the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the joint declaration specifically references
terrorist groups al-Qaeda and the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Khorasan, rather
than “armed groups.” The United States and NATO committed to continue training
Afghan security forces (per existing security agreements [PDF]) and conducting
counterterrorism operations, while the Afghan government committed to
preventing these terrorist groups from using Afghanistan as a base and continuing
to conduct counterterrorism and counter-narcotic operations.
2. Establish a timeline for withdrawing all foreign troops from Afghanistan.
Similar to the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the United States agreed to reduce its forces
to 8,600 within the first 135 days of signing the agreement, and to withdraw all of
its troops within 14 months, pending the Taliban’s fulfillment of its agreement with
the United States. The United States also agreed to continue seeking funds for the
training, equipping, and advising of Afghan security forces.
3. Agree on a political settlement for the future of Afghanistan, following intra-
Afghan negotiations.
The Afghan government agreed to join intra-Afghan negotiations, provided the
Taliban meets the conditions outlined in the U.S.-Taliban agreement, and
committed to discussions about prisoner releases. With the United States, the
Afghan government also agreed to begin reviewing its sanctions against the
Taliban after intra-Afghan negotiations begin. The United States, for its part,
confirmed its commitment to seeking UN Security Council approval for future
agreements, working with the Afghan government on reconstruction efforts, and
refraining from interference in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs.
4. Establish a permanent and comprehensive cease-fire.
Both the U.S.-Taliban agreement and joint declaration resolve to establish a
permanent cease-fire in Afghanistan as a precondition for achieving a political
settlement.
In addition to these goals, the United States, NATO, and the Afghan government
have agreed that they will work together to ensure that Afghan institutions
continue to promote social and economic advances, protect the rights of Afghan
citizens, and support democratic norms.
The Intra-Afghan Negotiations
Under the U.S.-Taliban agreement, talks between the Afghan government and the
Taliban were supposed to begin on March 10, 2020, following an initial prisoner
swap. However, the Afghan government had not been consulted on or agreed to the
exchange, in which the Afghan government would commit to releasing five
thousand Taliban prisoners and the Taliban would release one thousand Afghan
security forces prisoners. As a result, the prisoner exchange immediately became a
contentious issue and talks were delayed.
Despite initial disagreements over the prisoner exchange as well as ongoing
Taliban attacks on Afghan government forces, however, the Taliban and Afghan
government began to discuss a timeline and location for intra-Afghan talks. In
March 2020, the Afghan government named a twenty-one member negotiation
team for the talks, comprised of “politicians, former officials and representatives of
civil society,” including five women. The Afghan government also eventually
agreed to an initial release of 1,500 prisoners and to negotiate on the release of
additional prisoners as part of an ongoing process.
Under the power-sharing agreement reached between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah
Abdullah in May 2020, Abdullah was named chairman of the High Council for
National Reconciliation, a group that will have final say on whether or not to sign
any agreement negotiated with the Taliban. In June 2020, the Taliban and Afghan
government confirmed that they will meet in Doha for the first round of talks; the
Afghan government, however, was careful in its framing of the prospective
meeting, emphasizing that no agreement or consensus had been reached on a
location for direct negotiations. In late July, the Afghan government and Taliban
observed a three-day cease-fire in observance of Eid al-Adha and, finally, in
September 2020, representatives of the Afghan government and Taliban held a
ceremony to mark the official start to peace talks in Doha.
Challenges and Concerns
After nearly two decades of war and several stalled peace talks, the United States,
the Afghan government, and others are eager to see renewed efforts to negotiate
peace in Afghanistan. Peace is not guaranteed, however, and numerous challenges
remain—including implementing the U.S. agreements with the Taliban and Afghan
government and kickstarting viable intra-Afghan talks, as well as addressing
systemic domestic challenges in Afghanistan.
Implementing the U.S.-Taliban and U.S.-Afghan Government Agreements
The United States’ allies and coalition partners, as well as the UN Security
Council and regional parties to the conflict have expressed support for the U.S.-
Taliban agreement and U.S.-Afghan joint declaration. However, these recent
efforts toward peace in Afghanistan will be difficult to enact given the uncertainty
around the United States’ timeline for troop withdrawal and removal of sanctions
on the Taliban, concerns about the future of counterterrorism operations within the
frameworks of these agreements, and the Taliban’s apparent resurgence over the
past year.
First, it is uncertain how the United States and allies will be able to assess that
necessary conditions have been met for a full drawdown of military forces, and
whether the United States will be able to renegotiate, and ultimately remove,
sanctions on the Taliban. The first 135 days of the agreement have passed and the
United States has reduced troop levels to 8,600 and removed troops from 5 bases,
as stipulated by the U.S.-Taliban agreement and the joint declaration with the
Afghan government. However, Taliban attacks increased across the country
following the signing of the agreement and it remains to be seen whether and how
the United States will respond. The United Nations’ Afghanistan sanctions
monitoring team has also raised concerns [PDF] about the ability of the United
States and UN Security Council to remove sanctions on the Taliban given its
connections with al-Qaeda and whether it will be possible to address the Taliban’s
reliance on narcotics trafficking for profit.
Second, in order to prevent “armed groups” or “terrorist groups” from using
Afghanistan as a base, both the U.S.-Taliban agreement and joint declaration
acknowledge that the Taliban and Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
(ANDSF) will need to conduct counterterrorism operations. However, neither
agreement acknowledges or grapples with whether the Taliban and ANDSF—and
coalition forces, as appropriate—will coordinate these operations, how they will
validate that attacks have not been carried out or supported by subgroups within
the Taliban, nor how the Taliban will prove that it has suppressed Islamic State in
Khorasan operations. Moreover, the Taliban’s connections to al-Qaeda, largely
through the Haqqani network, could prove difficult to sever. Despite agreeing to
sever ties with terrorist groups under the agreement signed with the United States,
a UN report [PDF] published in May 2020 found that the Taliban remains in close
contact with al-Qaeda.
Finally, despite observing short cease-fires since the agreement was signed, the
Taliban seems to have escalated its military campaign against Afghan security
forces. In June 2020, the Afghan government reported that attacks by the Taliban
were up nearly 40 percent over the previous three months when compared to the
same time last year. In July, President Ghani warned that ongoing high levels
of violence pose a serious challenge to the beginning of negotiations, and the
Afghan government said that more than 3,500 security forces personnel have
been killed since February.
The internal cohesion and perceived weaknesses of both the Afghan government
and the Taliban will also play a role in the ability for all parties, including the
United States, to implement these agreements.
Challenges to the Intra-Afghan Negotiations
Intra-Afghan negotiations resulting in tangible peace and a credible power-sharing
agreement in Afghanistan face real challenges. Issues include the concerns around
the prisoner swap; the composition of a future Afghan state and government, and
reintegrating the Taliban into the Afghan security forces; and the internal
cohesion of the Taliban and Afghan government, and whether the Taliban is
actually committed to an intra-Afghan peace process, or is using its participation as
a bargaining chip to further its own objectives.
First, concerns around the prisoner swap had to be resolved before prospects for
intra-Afghan talks became a reality. The Afghan government had initially balked at
releasing prisoners on the Taliban’s list, insisting many of them were too
dangerous. In August 2020, however, the Afghan government convened a loya
jirga—a grand assembly of elders—to discuss and eventually approve the release
of the approximately four hundred remaining Taliban prisoners who had been
accused of major crimes. Following a decree from President Ghani, as of
September 2020, the Afghan government had released all five thousand of the
prisoners from the list requested in exchange for nearly eight hundred and fifty
Afghan security forces. The final six Taliban prisoners, accused of playing a role in
the deaths of American, Australian, and French nationals, and whose proposed
release had prompted international protest, were also released and flown to Qatar
to be placed under house arrest, clearing the way for negotiations to formally
begin.
Second, questions over the composition of a future Afghan state will need to be
resolved for negotiations to be considered a success. The Afghan government and
Taliban will need to address fundamental concerns about ideology, as well as
broad-ranging and practical concerns about power-sharing, transitional justice, and
disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating the Taliban into the Afghan security
forces. The Taliban’s stated goal for Afghanistan has been to re-create the Islamic
Emirate that was overthrown in 2001. If the Taliban is serious about participating
meaningfully in these negotiations and coming to a power-sharing agreement with
the Afghan government, it will have to be flexible and willing to compromise on
this goal, as well as others.
Third, the Taliban and Afghan government face internal challenges that threaten
their cohesion and credibility. The Afghan government is fragile. It has faced
internal divisions over Ghani’s acceptance of the U.S.-Taliban agreement (which
the Afghan government did not participate in) and has been caught up in
negotiations over the disputed outcome of the September 2019 Afghan presidential
elections. Those elections resulted in a months-long dispute over the outcome,
which resulted in both Ghani and Abdullah taking the presidential oath of office in
March 2020. While the power-sharing agreement reached by Ghani and
Abdullah in May 2020 allows Abdullah to lead the High Council for National
Reconciliation, as well as name half of the members of the Afghan government’s
cabinet, tensions between Ghani and Abdullah, as well as their respective political
camps, remain high. Further fractures in their relationship would threaten the
ability of the Afghan government to present a unified front in negotiations with the
Taliban. Beyond the top-level political tensions, the Afghan government is also
plagued by high-levels of corruption and a strained ability to exert control outside
of Kabul and a few other major cities. Powerful officials, warlords, and politicians
representing Afghanistan’s larger minority ethnic groups may challenge any
agreement the government tries to reach with the Taliban.
For the Taliban, internal divisions have complicated implementation of the U.S.-
Taliban agreement and raised questions about the Taliban's meaningful
participation in intra-Afghan talks. Although Taliban deputy leader Mullah Abdul
Ghani Baradar signed the U.S.-Taliban agreement on behalf of the group, the
Taliban is not a monolith. It has many different factions that will need to be
acknowledged or accommodated in any negotiations. Some members of the
Taliban have already refused to acknowledge the agreement and some may be
seeking to strengthen ties with the Islamic State in Khorasan. Because some of
these factions may not be willing to compromise, the prospect that further
splintering within the movement could seriously hinder efforts toward peace.
Finally, after perceiving a signed deal with the United States as a victory, the
Taliban could prolong negotiations to appease the United States—biding its time
while the U.S. military completes its withdrawal and enabling the group to then
ramp up its military campaign and attempt to overthrow the Afghan government.
The Taliban’s recent escalation of violence not only raises questions about its
ability to control members of the organization, but also about the Taliban’s
commitment to the agreements it signs. If the Taliban simply uses participation in
negotiations to appease outside actors or pursue alternate objectives, peace could
be compromised.
CPA recently published a Contingency Planning Memorandum, “A Failed Afghan
Peace Deal,” by Seth G. Jones, Harold Brown Chair and director of the
Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Jones discusses the significant hurdles remaining for an intra-Afghan peace deal,
and outlines steps the United States can take to prevent a failed peace deal in
Afghanistan.
Domestic and Regional Challenges
A number of domestic issues in Afghanistan will play a role in determining the
outcome of the Afghan peace negotiations. Addressing and resolving the future
roles of women and civil society, as well as establishing and strengthening the rule
of law and government, will be crucial for achieving lasting peace. Regional
stability—or instability—and the novel coronavirus pandemic could also affect the
future of peace in Afghanistan. So, too, will the Afghan government and Taliban’s
ability to carry out counterterrorism operations be important for ensuring a secure
and stable country.
Women's Rights
The extent to which Afghan peace negotiations are able to incorporate women’s
rights, including fundamental human rights, will affect the possibilities for peace in
Afghanistan. Women face barriers at all levels of Afghan society, and the quota of
women serving in official positions is still low.
The Role of Civil Society
The U.S.-Taliban agreement and U.S.-Afghan government joint declaration do not
contain provisions carving out a space for civil society organizations to participate
meaningfully in discussions about the country’s future. This could affect the
inclusiveness of the intra-Afghan negotiations and the ability of the negotiations to
reflect concerns of the wider population.
Governance and the Rule of Law
Important questions concerning a future Afghan government revolve around its
composition, the judiciary (including transitional justice) system, and the rule of
law.
Regional Stability and Security
The stability of Afghanistan is inherently connected to regional stability and
security. Destabilizing trends in bordering countries, and their possible spillover
into Afghanistan, would likely threaten progress on a peace process.
Counterterrorism
While Afghanistan faces domestic challenges related to counterterrorism within its
own borders, the transnational nature of terrorism means that several terrorist
networks, including al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Khorasan, are still active in
Afghanistan and across the broader Middle East and South Asia. Preventing
terrorism from spreading within Afghanistan has been a core objective of the
United States, and how to address terrorism has been a large point of discussion in
negotiations.
Regional Perspectives
The future of peace in Afghanistan will depend on how major regional powers,
including Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and the European Union, act in ways that
could undermine the peace process—or propel it forward. Tensions among the
major powers—the United States, China, the European Union, India, and Russia—
and others are increasing, which could affect the outcome of the Afghan peace
process as each power attempts to secure its own interests in the region. Moreover,
deteriorating bilateral relationships between two or more regional powers (for
example, between the United States and Iran) could also undermine efforts to
cooperate, or otherwise sway the outcomes of intra-Afghan negotiations.
The decades-long war in Afghanistan and ensuing regional instability affects each
of these regional powers; likewise, regional powers have their own interests in
Afghanistan, and may use subversive means to secure them. For example, Iran is
known to fund networks of proxy militias throughout the Middle East, and is
interested in both countering the United States and supporting groups in
Afghanistan that align with broader Iranian objectives. Similarly, Russian foreign
policy toward Afghanistan appears to operate on several levels, only some of
which are transparent. While the Kremlin invited representatives of the Taliban to
peace talks with the Russian government in 2019, recent U.S. intelligence
reports have revealed that the Kremlin’s relationship with the Taliban may extend
beyond negotiations to undermining U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.
China, which shares a border with Afghanistan, is interested in a
stable Afghanistan that facilitates the growth of the Belt and Road Initiative and in
counterterrorism initiatives that prevent terrorist spillover into China’s western
provinces. India, which often views Afghanistan through its relationship with
Pakistan, is interested in containing terrorism and checking Pakistan’s power in the
region. Pakistan, which shares a long and complex history with Afghanistan, must
balance a number of interests and relationships, including with the United States
and international financiers, while contending with domestic politics that often
oppose the involvement of these powers in Pakistani and Afghan affairs. The EU
and NATO are major regional powers that have a stake in seeing a secure, stable
Afghanistan, for the collective security of the states that each power represents,
and also to scale back commitments in a time of global financial loss.
As intra-Afghan talks provide an opportunity for charting a path forward, these
external parties to the conflict will play an outsized role in ensuring that
negotiations result in a stable, comprehensive deal that reflects the priorities of all
parties to the intra-Afghan talks.
Read more about the role of outside powers in Afghanistan by exploring the CFR
Backgrounder, "U.S.-Taliban Peace Deal: What to Know," by Lindsay Maizland.

FROM THE AFGHAN PEACE DEAL, A WEAK AND PLIABLE

NEIGHBOR FOR PAKISTAN
If the U.S. military withdrawal does not lead to a further descent into chaos in
Afghanistan, next-door Pakistan could be the real winner.
t was three days after the Sept. 11 attacks when Pakistan’s president yielded to the
American demands — but also delivered a warning.
President Pervez Musharraf told the American ambassador in Islamabad that his
country would assist the United States in its looming war against the Taliban, long
the recipients of Pakistan’s patronage. But, he said, he hoped the war would be
short and limited in scope, and would not create a hostile neighbor for Pakistan.
“You are there to kill terrorists, not make enemies,” he said, according to a now-
declassified diplomatic cable, adding that Pakistan wanted a “friendly” government
in Kabul.
In fact, the Afghan war has been long, bloody and destabilizing. But more than 18
years later, and after years of secret machinations by Pakistan’s spy service to help
equip and finance the Taliban, a fragile deal brokered last weekend holds the
promise of an ideal outcome for Islamabad: a weak and pliable neighbor that
Pakistan can influence long into the future.
Pakistan’s political and military establishment has long hoped for an end to the
grinding violence in Afghanistan and the eventual withdrawal of American forces
from the country, both of which the United States and the Taliban tentatively
agreed to in Doha, Qatar. Moreover, the Taliban control large parts of the Afghan
countryside — far from the control of the American-backed government in Kabul
— ensuring that Pakistan’s longtime proxies wield considerable control over the
country’s direction.
“The Taliban and Pakistan’s military that backs them see this as their victory,” said
Husain Haqqani, a former Pakistani ambassador to the United States and a senior
fellow at the Hudson Institute. “Pakistan bet on the Taliban for so long on the
assumption that the Americans would leave someday.”
And yet regional experts warn that Pakistan risks playing a dangerous game if the
American military withdrawal leads to a further descent into chaos — fueling a
full-scale civil war in which India, Russia and others back different factions and
dragging Pakistan into a protracted conflict.
Douglas London, a retired C.I.A. officer who ran counterterrorism operations for
South and Southwest Asia, said Pakistan’s primary focus in Afghanistan was
limiting the influence of India. For this reason, he said, “the bottom line is that
Pakistan is far more comfortable working with the Taliban, which is preferred over
the current government in Kabul.”
But, he said, they recognize that a full Taliban takeover of Afghanistan could be
bloody and further draw in regional adversaries like India. For that reason, he said,
for Pakistan the “status quo and some degree of chaos they influence is preferable
to one extreme or the other.”
Pakistan’s longstanding ties to the Taliban were born from the Afghan civil war of
the 1990s, when Islamabad saw the Pashtun group as a valuable proxy against
other warring factions that had the support of India. That relationship was
radioactive after the Sept. 11 attacks, when it became obvious that Al Qaeda had
planned the strikes from a safe haven the Taliban had provided for the terrorist
group.
The Bush administration forced Pakistan to make a stark choice: Sever ties with
the Taliban and become a partner in America’s planned war against global
terrorism, or possibly become a target of that war.
Mr. Musharraf and his successors held up part of the bargain: working with the
C.I.A. to hunt down Qaeda operatives in Pakistan and allowing the spy agency to
unleash a withering drone campaign in the country’s tribal areas. But Islamabad
never fully cut ties with the Taliban, and the country’s military intelligence agency,
the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, spent years covertly supporting
Taliban fighters in Afghanistan and shielding some of the group’s leaders inside
Pakistan.
Today, some Pakistani officials argue that the Taliban is far different from the
fanatical band once led during the Sept. 11 era by Mullah Mohammed Omar. The
group is more pragmatic, they say, understanding the importance of political
influence in a power-sharing arrangement. One senior Pakistani intelligence
official in Islamabad described the Taliban simply as a political party.
It is Pakistan’s assessment, they say, that the Taliban struck a deal from a position
of strength: The United States felt compelled to leave a war that the Taliban could
have continued fighting for years. The senior Pakistani intelligence official did not
hide what was his country’s primary focus in Afghanistan: The use of Afghan soil
in collaboration with India is a red line, the official said.
The intelligence agency’s support for the Taliban strained — and eventually
ruptured — America’s relationship with Pakistan, a longtime ally that the United
States saw as a bulwark against Soviet expansion during the Cold War.
And yet American leaders wrestled with just how much to push Pakistan to cut ties
to the Taliban, worried that pressure from Washington could undermine the
military’s grip on the nuclear-armed country and lead to an Islamist takeover of
Pakistan. This “too big to fail” attitude led to Pakistan having outsize influence
over the strategy for America’s flailing war in Afghanistan.
Shortly after Barack Obama was elected president in 2008, Vice President-elect
Joseph R. Biden Jr. traveled to Kabul to meet with Hamid Karzai, the Afghan
president. As recounted in “Directorate S,” a book on the Afghan war by the
journalist Steve Coll, Mr. Karzai asked for help from the new administration in
getting the Pakistani government to clear out Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan.
“Mr. President,” Mr. Biden replied bluntly, “Pakistan is 50 times more important
than Afghanistan for the United States.”
More than a decade later, the United States is trying to get out of the country and
leave the warring Afghan factions to determine the country’s future. In the near
term, that means negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban that
could eventually lead to the group gaining representation in Kabul.
But the history of strife in the country does not portend a stable future of power
sharing, and some regional experts see the prospect of a repeat of turmoil of the
1990s — when the Soviet withdrawal left a power vacuum and led to the Taliban
takeover. That possibility, they say, could lead regional powers like India and Iran
to support their favored groups with money and weapons.
“If the Taliban try to take complete control of Afghanistan, they will get resistance.
It could intensify the civil war and bring other regional actors in,” said Carter
Malkasian, a former Pentagon adviser who spent two years in Afghanistan’s
Helmand Province as a State Department political officer.
The possibility of Pakistan becoming enmeshed in a long and costly civil war on
its western front might be enough for military civilian leaders in Islamabad to tread
carefully when using a hidden hand to influence the politics of a war-weary nation.
The goal, Mr. Haqqani said, might be to “continue to have the Taliban as proxies
while trying to contain their wildest instincts.”

WHAT HAS PAKISTAN GAINED FROM US-TALIBAN PEACE

DEAL? (THE DIPLOMAT)
The agreement between the United States and the Afghan Taliban has begun a
process that can potentially bring peace to Afghanistan.
However, the agreement between the Taliban and the United States has already
come under pressure from actors that feel sidelined or stand to lose politically from
the intervention of external states in Afghanistan. In this regard, Pakistan’s role,
which has remained crucial as far as the first phase of the peace talks is concerned,
is being hailed by Afghan leaders as Islamabad positions itself for a more
entrenched space in the negotiation process.
Since the agreement-signing ceremony, both Washington and the Taliban appear to
have showcased an intent to uphold the deal, but at the same time are determined
to use military power to defend their interests. Already, the Taliban have
attacked the Afghan forces. In apparent retaliation, the United States has carried
out airstrikes against the Taliban and urged the group to halt “needless attacks.”
The situation emerged when the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani refused to endorse
the Doha agreement’s clause that calls for the release of a substantial number of
Afghan Taliban fighters before the intra-Afghan dialogue begins. President Ghani
has asked the Taliban to leave Pakistan before he can consider their prisoner
release demand: “If Taliban have set release of their prisoners as a condition for
intra-Afghan talks, we also have conditions; they should tell me when are they
going to leave Pakistan,” said Afghan President Ashraf Ghani while addressing
rally in Nangarhar.
The presence of Pakistan’s foreign minister in Doha during the signing ceremony
and engagement with the Taliban and the United States’ leadership at all critical
gatherings underline the country’s relationship with the group. When asked by a
journalist about Islamabad’s role in reaching the deal, Qureshi said this “wouldn’t
have happened without Pakistan.”
However, for the majority of the mainstream political leaders and parties in
Afghanistan, Pakistan’s role is being forced upon them against their will as is the
case with the Afghan Taliban agreement. Ghani and other political leaders are not
happy with the agreement as it gives everything to the Taliban and takes away
almost all leverage which the Kabul regime may have against the group or
legitimacy in the eyes of the international negotiators.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in a recent interview criticized Ghani’s
position over the Afghan Taliban prisoners release by saying that “There will be
lots of noise. Everyone is competing for attention and time in the media.”
Reportedly, on Wednesday, President Ghani refused to meet Zalmay Khalilzad,
America’s chief negotiator with the Taliban. The next day, Khalilzad met with the
Taliban leadership to discuss “next steps” of the agreement’s implementation. It’s
important to note that these meetings and statements come in the wake of U.S.
President Donald Trump’s phone call to the head of the Taliban’s political office,
Abdul Ghani Baradar. “We had a good conversation…the relationship is very good
that I have with the mullah,” Trump said about his conversation with Baradar.
All these developments should be seen as a win in Islamabad, for it offers Pakistan
everything that the country could have hoped from its Afghan policy. Frankly,
Pakistan’s link with the Taliban and the Haqqani network has become its greatest
asset as the ongoing negotiation phase that Islamabad completely approves, offers
the country an ideal opportunity to isolate its state and non-state detractors in
Afghanistan. Admiral Mike Mullen, the former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff once described the Haqqanis that work closely with Afghan Taliban as
“veritable arm” of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies. A couple of weeks
ago, Sirajuddin Haqqani, a senior Haqqani network leader and an ally of Afghan
Taliban penned an article in the New York Times calling for dialogue to resolve
Afghanistan’s security woes. For Islamabad, it’s a remarkable turn of events:
groups and leaders that America once targeted and asked Pakistan to take action
against are being seen as reformers and offered opportunities to sit across
diplomats and receiving calls from world leaders.
Over the last few months, several high ranking members of the Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) have been killed in Afghanistan as the country’s counter-terrorism
gains expand beyond its borders. “TTP doesn’t operate from our territories but
from the Kabul held areas. This question should be put to them,” said Suhail
Shaheen, the Afghan Taliban spokesperson, while answering a question on TTP’s
sanctuaries in Afghanistan.
Arguably, Pakistan and the Taliban have everything to gain by protecting the first
phase of the peace deal and that is also something which Islamabad may have
conveyed to the Taliban. The understanding between the Taliban and Pakistan has
to be that the deal’s collapse should not come from the Taliban; rather, the
responsibility of such an outcome has to rest with Afghanistan’s political
leadership.
In the coming days and weeks, an outcome of this nature appears likely as political
leaders and groups from all quarters of Afghanistan scramble to secure space with
Taliban negotiators.
Policymakers in Islamabad realize the opposition they face in Afghanistan’s
political landscape. Understandably, Islamabad’s response to this sheer rejection of
Pakistan’s role is to further push for reconciliation with the Taliban argument as
that retains Islamabad’s clout in Afghanistan. “Attitudes will have to be corrected
along with deals … those who wanted to create obstacles were present before as
well…we can create a favorable environment, cannot take a decision for you,”
said Qureshi in an apparent response to Ghani’s comments relating to Taliban links
with Pakistan.
Going forward, Islamabad’s role may not be as critical overtly in the intra-Afghan
peace process as it was during the first phase of the process. However, the debate
on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan’s future may become critical to the negotiations
between the Taliban and the Afghan government. In fact, it may be an issue that
can make or break the most crucial phase of the peace talks.
President Ghani’s demand that the Taliban break their ties with Pakistan is not
going to materialize any time soon. Ghani’s position is a manifestation of
frustration and the growing isolation of the Afghan regime in the face of
Islamabad’s importance over the issue. Moreover, Islamabad’s significance is
being supported, intentionally or unintentionally, by the United States’ insistence
to deal with the Taliban above everyone else in Afghanistan. It’s unclear what the
Afghan government, whose own constitutional future is unclear, will gain by
targeting Pakistan and the Taliban. For Ghani, the most feasible option could be to
bring together political leadership of the country to form a united front to negotiate
with the Taliban. However, that may require Ghani to step down from the
presidency, a step that he is unwilling to take.
In any case, Pakistan would want to see the Afghan Taliban furthering its position
in Afghanistan now that they have won much-needed legitimacy that previously
was missing from their ranks. The ongoing squabbling among the Afghan political
leadership is merely a concern for Islamabad. It’s something that won’t bother
Pakistan as it only consolidates Islamabad’s position and the acceptability of its
role internationally.