Bell, D. Before The Democratic Peace

497491
2013
EJT20310.1177/1354066113497491European Journal of International RelationsBell
EJIR
Article
European Journal of
International Relations
Before the democratic peace: 2014, Vol. 20(3) 647–670
© The Author(s) 2013
Racial utopianism, empire and Reprints and permissions:
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the abolition of war DOI: 10.1177/1354066113497491
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Duncan Bell
University of Cambridge, UK
Abstract
During the final quarter of the 20th century, the democratic peace thesis — the idea
that democracies do not fight each other — moved to the centre of scholarly debate
throughout the Western world. Much of this work traces its origins to the European
Enlightenment, focusing especially on Immanuel Kant. Yet this narrative ignores earlier
20th-century debates about the possibilities of global peace, and the role of democracy
within them. In this article, I analyse some prominent, but now largely forgotten, strands
of political thinking in the United States and Britain during the first half of the 20th century.
They form an important part of the genealogy of the democratic peace thesis. I start by
delineating four types of argument about peace that were popular in the 19th century:
liberal-systemic, radical-liberal, socialist and republican. I then introduce two other modes
of argument that circulated at the turn of the 20th century: the ‘democratic war thesis’
(the idea that democracies are war-prone) and the ‘empire peace thesis’ (the argument
that only imperial states are capable of assuring perpetual peace). I follow this with a
discussion of racial utopianism — the claim that the unification of the Anglo-Saxons could
eliminate war, securing peace and justice on earth. This white supremacist vision was a call
for the racial pacification of the globe.
Keywords
Anglo-America, democratic peace, empire, race, utopia, war
Corresponding author:
Duncan Bell, University of Cambridge, 7 West Road, Cambridge, CB3 9DT, UK.
Email: dsab2@cam.ac.uk
Downloaded from ejt.sagepub.com at University-Ulster at Belfast on April 20, 2015

648 European Journal of International Relations 20(3)
If England and America were one they would be able to maintain the
peace of the world and general disarmament.
(W.T. Stead, The Americanization of the Worl, 1902: 409)
Introduction
The dream of perpetual peace has fascinated Western thinkers for at least two centuries.
Today, it is most commonly associated with the globalization of representative democ-
racy. A world of democracies, we are advised, would be a world free from the evil of war.
The end of history, then, is figured as the terminal point — the ultimate telos — of liberal
democratic capitalism. Scholarly arguments have played an important performative role
in elaborating and sustaining this vision. Rooted at the very heart of International
Relations (IR), where it offers ‘as close as anything we have to an empirical law’ (Levy,
1988: 661–662), the democratic peace (DP) thesis has escaped from the academy into the
wider world, exerting a deep influence on practical politics.1 Political theorists also fre-
quently invoke the idea to bolster the normative case for global reform, with John Rawls,
for example, suggesting that it underpins ‘the Law of Peoples as a realistic utopia’ (1999:
46).
The idea of pax democratica is usually traced to Immanuel Kant’s essay ‘Perpetual
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’ (1795), a historical interpretation cemented by
Michael Doyle’s influential writings (1983a, 1983b, 1986), although other notable
figures have also been anointed, including Thomas Paine (Walker, 2000) and Jeremy
Bentham (Baum, 2008).2 This mythopoeic story conceals as much as it reveals, for the
intellectual history of perpetual peace is both more complex and more problematic
than the Enlightenment fable allows. The conventional narrative encodes problems of
both canonicity and periodization. Focusing on select figures from the canon misses
much of the contextual specificity of arguments about eradicating war, while concen-
trating on the late 18th century passes over in silence the febrile debates about popular
politics and violence that followed the uneven spread of democratic regimes during
the 19th and 20th centuries. It misses, that is, the dual victory of democracy as popu-
lar institution and normative ideal. Long predicted, this world-historical success nev-
ertheless led to a revaluation of assorted democratic shibboleths. At the end of the
19th century, as purportedly democratic states engaged in a frenzy of imperial vio-
lence, many thinkers began to question the pacific character of democratic states and
explored alternative paths to peace.
Nineteenth-century arguments linking democracy and peace were invariably monadic,
stipulating that democracies were more peaceful than other kinds of regime. The dyadic
formulation of the DP so familiar today — the empirical observation that democracies do
not fight one another — emerged only in the mid-20th century. Doyle identified Clarence
Streit as the first commentator to espouse it (1986: 1162, n.2). An intellectual celebrity in
the late 1930s and 1940s, Streit outlined the argument briefly in Union Now, a book that
became a global best-seller and inspired the world federalist movement that flared for a
brief though spectacular moment in the 1940s (1939: 24).3 Extolling the moral equality
of individuals and insisting on the need to transfigure sovereignty through the creation of

Bell 649
supranational organizations, he proposed a transatlantic league of liberal democracies

which would ‘eliminate inter-state war’ and eventually serve as the ‘nucleus’ for a fed-
eral world order (1939: 214, 28). In recent years, Streit has been reclaimed by some IR
scholars as a pioneering liberal internationalist thinker, yet despite his protestations to
the contrary, he was as much a representative of the old imperial order as a harbinger of
a new cosmopolitan world.4 Endorsing the Western civilizing mission, he excluded
‘immature’ colonized peoples from his grand scheme, a point underscored by George
Orwell, who fulminated that the book smelt of ‘hypocrisy and self-righteousness’ (1968
[1939]: 250), and Jawaharlal Nehru, who commented that while Streit’s political ideal
was ‘attractive’, the ‘manner of approach towards that ideal’ catalysed great ‘suspicion
in India’ given the persistent imperialism of democratic states.5 Rather than signifying a
post-imperial rupture, Streit’s vision was a product — conscious or not — of a tradition
of white supremacist arguments about peace and global order that reached back into the
19th century.
In this article, I dissect fin de siècle debates about democracy, empire, race and war.
This multi faceted discourse is largely absent from historical reconstructions of modern
political thought and the constitutive disciplinary mythologies of IR. The most ambitious
projects promoted the idea of a global racial peace — the abolition of war secured by the
unification and planetary domination of the ‘Anglo-Saxons’. However, the welcome
burst of scholarship on the history of 20th-century international theory produced during
the last couple of decades has not engaged with racial visions of peace in any detail.6 Nor
has the important emerging literature on race and world politics.7 Yet accounts of racial
peace repay close attention, not least because we cannot properly comprehend the nature
of early 20th-century anglophone political thought in general, and debates over war and
peace in particular, without recognizing the normative significance ascribed to global
racial hierarchies. Robert Vitalis rightly castigates IR for upholding a ‘norm against
noticing’ the ubiquity of racialized arguments about world politics, past and present
(2000: 333). Only by acknowledging their centrality to the development of international
thought and exposing them to the glare of critical scrutiny can we begin to confront his-
torical amnesia.
The racial peace thesis was an important element of the Anglo-Saxonist ideology that
saturated political culture in the United States and the British Empire at the end of the
19th century.8 Anglo-Saxonism was ‘at once global in its power and personal in its mean-
ing, the basis of geo-political alliances and a subjective sense of self’ (Lake and Reynolds,
2008: 3). Race was viewed by many at the time as the basic ontological category of poli-
tics. It supplied the conceptual resources necessary for imagining a stratified world order,
bifurcated into ‘civilized’ and ‘backward’ peoples, and provided an authoritative ration-
ale for manifold forms of exclusion, oppression and violence, including imperial con-
quest (Bowden, 2009; Gong, 1984; Tully, 2009). But the exact meaning of race was far
from clear, its very elusiveness proving a great political strength. For most commenta-
tors, race was figured as a biocultural assemblage, a hybrid compound of ‘cultural’ and
‘biological’ claims about human evolutionary history, individual and collective charac-
ter, comportment, physiognomy, and cognitive capacity. Differences between specific
accounts of race were largely a function of the emphasis placed on (and within) the
‘cultural’ and ‘biological’ dimensions. The term ‘Anglo-Saxon’ was typically used to

classify a distinct human collectivity defined by a vague admixture of memory, shared

historical experience, habitus, cultural symbolism, sentiment and language, all circum-
scribed (but not fully delineated) by whiteness. Not all whites were Anglo-Saxon, but all
Anglo-Saxons were white. A pervasive reference point in political argument, race was
also, as we shall see, the conceptual foundation for utopian fantasies of peace.
In order to contextualize the racial and imperial discourse, I first delineate four popu-
lar visions of peace that circulated during the 19th century: structural-liberal, radical-
liberal, socialist and republican. The following section introduces what I call the
‘democratic war thesis’ and the ‘democratic empire thesis’. The former identified the
linkages between democratic political structures and inter-state conflict; the latter sug-
gested that vast empires could cooperatively govern the world and abolish war. I then
analyse the racial peace thesis, which was propounded by some of the leading thinkers
and political actors of the age, including Andrew Carnegie, Cecil Rhodes and H.G. Wells.
They argued, from different points on the political spectrum, that the Anglo-Saxons held
the key to perpetual peace.
Varieties of perpetual peace

The long 19th century witnessed the emergence of both liberal internationalism and the
transnational peace movement.9 For the first time in history, it was widely believed that
war could be eliminated through concerted human action. Although often interwoven,
we can distinguish three strands of peace argument circulating in British political debate.
Two of them were species of liberal internationalism: structural-liberal and radical-
liberal. Socialism offered an alternative.10 They differed in both their diagnoses of the
principal causes of war and in their prescriptions for how to secure peace.
Popular from the 1830s onwards, structural-liberal arguments identified the main
cause of war as a failure of political and economic cooperation between states.
Discounting domestic variables, they emphasized inter-state dynamics and argued that
free trade and the codification of international law could establish harmony. Gladstone
was the 19th-century structural-liberal reformer par excellence, Norman Angell the most
famous in the early 20th century.11 Radical-liberal diagnostic arguments focused chiefly
on domestic politics, identifying the principal causes of war in the internal ordering of
states. Their main targets were the political and economic elites, who were blamed for
the perpetuation of militarism and state aggression. In this account, war was fought in the
interests of a privileged minority, and it thus followed that increasing popular participa-
tion would decrease the prevalence of violence. Formulated evocatively by Thomas
Paine in his dissection of the belligerent character of politics ‘on the old system’ in The
Rights of Man (1906 [1791]: 88), this line of reasoning echoed loudly through the 19th
century. Richard Cobden made the point succinctly: ‘the battle plain is the harvest field
of the aristocracy, watered with the blood of the people’ (cited in Ceadel, 1996: 40). Such
arguments were reiterated, in one form or another, in the writings of James and John
Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, J.A. Hobson, L.T. Hobhouse, and Bertrand Russell.
While the radical-liberal position underpinned calls for significant domestic reform
— above all, the expulsion of the aristocracy from government and an increase in popu-
lar participation — liberals of all stripes prescribed a mixture of international commerce

Bell 651
and international law as answers to the conundrum of war. The international trade argu-
ment — a forerunner to contemporary claims about the pacific character of globalization
— was most famously promulgated by Cobden and his legion of followers, but it was a
staple of classical political economy. As John Stuart Mill argued, it is ‘commerce which
is rapidly rendering war obsolete’ (1965 [1848]: 594).12 In the closing decades of the
century, legal discourse came to assume an increasingly pivotal role (Boyle, 1999;
Koskenniemi, 2001: 11–166; Sylvest, 2009), although it never fully displaced arguments
about commerce. By 1900, international arbitration was routinely presented as the most
viable method for pacifying the system. Until World War I, few liberal thinkers counte-
nanced the formation of supranational institutions for reducing or eliminating inter-state
violence (Ceadel, 2000: 118; Sylvest, 2009); after 1918, most supported the League of
Nations or an alternative organisation with more extensive powers.
It was in advocacy of the radical-liberal position that the lineaments of a DP thesis can
be discerned, for it was widely thought that inter-state aggression would diminish as the
people assumed a more substantive political role. The pacific potential of democracy
thus became a key feature in campaigns for franchise extension throughout Europe.
Challenging what he saw as a resurgence of Spinoza’s political fatalism among his con-
temporaries, the idealist philosopher T.H. Green offered a variation on the theme in his
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation:
There is no such thing as an inevitable conflict between states. There is nothing in the nature of
the state that, given a multiplicity of states, should make the gain of the one the loss of the other.
The more perfectly each one of them attains its proper object of giving free scope to the
capacities of all persons living on a certain range of territory, the easier it is for others to do so;
and in proportion as they all do so the danger of conflict disappears. (1911: 170).13
Socialists, meanwhile, identified capitalism as the primary cause of war. They were
divided between reformers and revolutionaries. Revolutionaries, including Marx,
Luxemburg, Lenin and Trotsky, posited a necessary connection between (imperial) war
and capitalism, and they were largely dismissive of the peace movements (e.g.
Luxemburg, 1911). Proper socialists, Lenin averred, ‘understand the inevitable connec-
tion between wars and the class struggle within a country; we understand that wars can-
not be abolished unless classes are abolished and socialism is created; we also differ in
that we regard civil wars, i.e. wars waged by an oppressed class against the oppressor
class … as fully legitimate, progressive and necessary’ (1964 [1915]: 299). Universal
peace, on this account, could only be realized through the overthrow of the capitalist
order. While acknowledging that actually existing capitalism was prone to violence, the
reformists, including Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky, denied the inevitability of
capitalist war, and maintained that fundamental political and social restructuring could
mitigate the problem. Short of an anti-capitalist revolution, many socialists argued in
favour of a general strike against military mobilization (Ceadel, 2000: 173; Cooper,
1991: 210; Newton, 1985; Waltz, 1959: 128–129). The revolutionary position found few
adherents in Britain or the US, though the reformist alternative was increasingly popular
as the 19th century wore on, not least because it blurred into radical-liberalism.14

A similar range of arguments circulated in the United States, where the peace movement
was far less prominent than in Britain.15 By the turn of the 20th century, the American cam-
paign, like its British counterpart, was dominated by a moderate form of legalism that empha-
sized international legal codification and arbitration, with the latter in particular considered a
‘panacea for the creation of a warless world’ (Patterson, 1976: 13; see also Reid, 2004;
Wertheim, 2012). But in the US, there was also another strong tradition — echoes of which
could be found in British radicalism — that offered a republican critique of the morally and
politically corrosive effects of war, imperialism, and foreign entanglements. Such activities
defied the prophetic words of George Washington’s sacred Farwell Address. The peace cam-
paigner William Lloyd Garrison, son of a famous father, recoiled as the US embarked on
brutal imperial war: ‘I despair for the republic’, he complained, for ‘the example of previous
republics, wrecked on this rock of foreign empire’ was clear (1898: 211). Foreign conquest
eroded political virtue: ‘Imperial rule abroad necessitates imperial rule at home. … War is
incompatible with free government. It is the handmaid of despotism’ (1898: 208, 210).16
Optimism about the virtues of democracy faded as the 19th century drew to a close.
The reality of popular participation was far less inspiring than the confident proclamations
of the philosophers had led people to believe. Woodrow Wilson, at the time an important
political scientist, opened an essay on democracy in 1901 by noting that it was ‘no longer
possible to mistake the reaction against democracy. The nineteenth century was above all
others a century of democracy; and yet the world is no more convinced of the benefits of
democracy as a form of government at its end than it was at its beginning’ (1901: 289).17
Graham Wallas, one of Britain’s leading political thinkers, registered the ambivalence in
Human Nature in Politics: ‘in the very nations which have most wholeheartedly acquired
representative democracy, politicians and political students seem puzzled and disap-
pointed by their experience of it’ (1908: 2). One common source of scepticism was the
venerable claim that democracies were peaceful. As both Britain and the United States
became embroiled in controversial imperial wars, above all in the Philippines and South
Africa, many thinkers lost confidence in the rationality of democratic publics, with some
coming to view the fragile social psychology of the masses as a profound threat to pro-
gress and peace. The renowned ‘new liberal’ thinker L.T. Hobhouse wrote Democracy
and Reaction in response to the crisis of faith: ‘Both the friends and enemies of democ-
racy’, he observed, once ‘inclined to the belief that when the people came into power there
would be a time of rapid and radical domestic change combined in all probability with
peace abroad — for where was the interest of the masses in any war?’ (1904: 49–50). Such
hopes had been dashed: the record of reform was poor; aggression and militarism
abounded. ‘Aggrandisement, war, compulsory enlistment, lavish expenditure, Protection,
arbitrary government, class legislation, follow naturally one upon the other’, he lamented
(1904: 55). Hobhouse concluded his grim analysis by penning an epitaph for democratic
optimism: ‘the conclusion that democracies would not be warlike — if stated as a univer-
sal rule — must certainly rank among the shattered illusions’ of the age (1904: 142).
While popular, such responses were far from universal. In the United States, for example,
Progressives continued to assert that democracy — if scoured of the monopolistic eco-
nomic elites that threatened to undermine its emancipatory potential — was an answer to
the scourge of war (Thompson, 1987: 91–103). But this optimistic line of reasoning was
loudly challenged by devotees of imperial world order and Anglo-racial union.

Bell 653
War, democracy and empire

Even as monadic visions of the DP were increasingly called into question, debate over
the relationship between democracy, war and empire continued to rage. New forms of
argument emerged, including the ‘democratic war thesis’ and the ‘empire peace
thesis’.
Democratic war arguments highlighted the close connection between the franchise
and inter-state violence. They came in weak and strong variants. Inverting the DP, the
latter suggested that democracies were, by their very nature, prone to violence. They
were intrinsically bellicose. The weaker (and more common) variant suggested that dem-
ocratic norms and structures, rather than reducing or eliminating war, continued to facili-
tate it. While democracies were not especially war-prone, on this view, they nevertheless
did little to dampen the frequency of violence; instead, they offered new channels for its
expression. The spread of democratic regimes would thus not lead to a significant reduc-
tion of international conflict. Both positions drew on long-standing reservations about
the populist dangers of democratic participation, amplified by the disconcerting experi-
ence of imperial war during the 1890s.
Propounding the strong thesis, H.G. Wells argued in Anticipations (1999 [1902]), a
hugely popular volume of socio-political futurology, that democracy incentivized war
between states. Unless checked or transformed, its rapid spread was likely to result in
spirals of destruction, as democratic politicians needed to stoke fears about external
threats and ‘foster enmity between people and people’ in order to retain power (1999
[1902]: 95). Wells predicted that things would only get worse: ‘the phases of the demo-
cratic sequence are simple and sure’:
Nearer, and ever nearer, the politicians of the coming times will force one another towards the
verge, not because they want to go over it, not because anyone wants to go over it, but because
they are, by their very nature, compelled to go that way, because to go in any other direction is
to break up and lose power … the final development of the democratic system, so far as intrinsic
forces go, will be, not the rule of the boss, nor the rule of the trust, nor the rule of the newspaper;
no rule, indeed, but international rivalry, international competition, international exasperation
and hostility, and at last — irresistible and overwhelming — the definite establishment of the
rule of that most stern and educational of all masters — War. (1999 [1902]: 95)
Rebuking the bloodthirstiness of his compatriots, William James, a great admirer of

Wells, outlined a version of the weaker argument in his seminal essay ‘The Moral
Equivalent of War’. Levelling his fire at the panglossian advocates of democracy, James
argued that democratic politics simply channelled the pugnacious habits of the people in
a new direction. He singled out the dangerous volatility of ‘public opinion’, a live issue
in the aftermath of the wars in South Africa and the Philippines, both of which had gener-
ated fervid media and public support: ‘Our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone
and marrow, and thousands of years won’t breed it out of us. The popular imagination
fairly fattens on the thought of wars. Let public opinion once reach a certain fighting
pitch, and no ruler can withstand it’ (1987: 1283). E.L. Godkin, long-serving editor of
The Nation and one of the most prolific American ‘anti-imperialists’ (Beaupre, 2012),

tendered another critique of democratic passion. Initially an advocate of a Millian form

of democracy, he became increasingly disenchanted, especially during the late 1890s, as
the press and public clamoured for war against Spain. The people, it turned out, were not
as rational and pacific as predicted, while their elected leaders fomented aggression for
political advantage. According to Godkin, the jingo believed that ‘if a nation is to be
great it must, like Rome, be “imperial”; that is, must reign over a large number of com-
munities of one sort or other as “war lord,” and do them good, and elevate them, not in
their own way, but in yours’ (1897: 511). In a republican vein, he warned that the swing
to imperialism signalled the end of the American dream, its collapse into the well-trodden
patterns of history: the decline and fall of empires. Democracy, then, corrupted both the
institutions and the ideals of the republic.
The empire peace thesis, on the other hand, conjectured that war could be diminished,
even eliminated, in a world managed by great empires. It also came in two main variants.
The generic form claimed that global stability was best secured by a system of geopoliti-
cal management, in which the dominant imperial powers in the system — democracies
and non-democracies alike — maintained stability by limiting the number of autono-
mous polities (through both formal and informal modalities of rule). As such, they recon-
figured the dynamics of the security dilemma. In addition to standard accounts of
imperial propaganda, this argument could be found in unexpected places. J.A. Hobson
— so often regarded as a key anti-imperial theorist — sketched a version in Imperialism,
a book best known for its radical-liberal analysis of the vicious alliance between finance
capital and the aristocracy. Elaborating the benefits of a system of federal empires ruling
the ‘uncivilized’ spaces of the earth, he envisaged a pan-Anglo-Saxon polity taking its
place alongside pan-Teutonic, pan-Slavic and pan-Latin entities, each ‘related by ties of
common blood, language, and institutions’. He continued ‘Christendom thus laid out in
a few great federal empires, each with a retinue of uncivilized dependencies, seems to me
the most legitimate development of present tendencies and one which would offer the
best hope of permanent peace on an assured basis of inter-Imperialism’ (1902: 332).18
Agglomerating and concentrating power, then, offered the best hope for world peace.
The other variant of the argument specified that it was only democratic empires —
empires ruled by democratic states — that were potential agents of universal peace.
Combining huge economic and military resources with the moral legitimacy bestowed
by popular government, they were both capable of, and entitled to, govern the rest of the
world. In one sense, this was but the latest iteration of the venerable Western imperial
argument about the rights and duties of ‘civilized’ powers to bring progress to the ‘bar-
barian’ places of the earth, but it was inflected with two distinctly fin de siècle concerns:
physical scale and democratic participation. Democratic-empire arguments embodied
the common belief that one of the main tendencies of the age was the emergence of a
small number of massive omnicompetent political units, created either through federa-
tion or conquest (or both). Henry Sidgwick was uttering a commonplace in predicting
that ‘an extension of federalism seems to me the most probable of the political prophe-
cies relative to the form of government’ (1903: 439). Yet federalism was only thought
appropriate for advanced, ‘civilized’ polities, and rule by the ‘enlightened’ was usually
prescribed for the ‘non-civilized’, barbarian zones — those populated by non-‘white’

Bell 655
peoples. The democratic-empire thesis was a specific institutional variation on this gen-
eral racist theme.
Franklin Giddings, one of the founding fathers of American sociology, developed one
version of the argument.19 For Giddings, war could only be abolished by drastically
reducing the number of independent political units, and this meant the absorption of
smaller states by ‘democratic empires’, above all the United States and Britain. Drawing
on an evolutionary theory of social change, he rejected what he saw as Nietzsche’s fet-
ishization of power and the facile servility of Tolstoy, and argued that ‘[u]nless the whole
course of history is meaningless for the future, there is to be no cessation of war … until
vast empires embrace all nations’ (1900: 357). But not all imperial forms would suffice,
for if they were centralizing and despotic — or if they embraced socialism — they would
‘end in degeneration’ (1900: 357). Democratic empires, on the other hand, upheld the
value of individual liberty and tolerated local and ethnic differences, and as such they
provided a solid foundation for creating perpetual peace.20 Balancing universalism and
particularism in a productive equilibrium, the grateful subject populations would recog-
nize the beneficence of their overlords and social evolution could be channelled in a
pacific direction:
Only when the democratic empire has compassed the uttermost parts of the world will there be
that perfect understanding among men which is necessary for the growth of moral kinship.
Only in the spiritual brotherhood of that secular republic, created by blood and iron not less
than by thought and love, will the kingdom of heaven be established on earth. (1900: 357)
A similar argument was defended by the eminent British idealist philosopher D.G.
Ritchie.21 Like Giddings, he believed in both civilizational imperialism and the possi-
bility of perpetual peace — indeed, he regarded the former as a necessary condition for
the latter. The lesson he drew from Kant had nothing to do with democracy or republi-
canism, but instead concentrated on political autonomy: ‘Kant saw quite clearly’,
Ritchie maintained, ‘that there is only one way in which war between independent
nations can be prevented; and that is by the nations ceasing to be independent’ (1901a:
157). The ‘prevention of war within great areas’ would thus follow from the absorption
of small states by large ones, either through coercion or voluntary union (1901a: 157).
Again taking his cue from Kant, Ritchie argued that while federation — ‘the greatest
political invention of modern times’ (1901a: 152) — was an important solvent of sov-
ereignty, insofar as it eliminated the anarchic international state of nature, it was radi-
cally incomplete and democratic empires were required to rule the backward
populations of the earth:
A federation of civilized nations may be possible, when they are all constitutionally governed;
but there may also remain large parts of the earth unfit for constitutional government. Tropical
lands are apt to become black anarchies or white tyrannies; and in the interest of black and
white alike the controlling hand of governments influenced by the ideas of temperate and
civilized countries is absolutely necessary…. This is a federation of the world, which is not an
altogether visionary ideal. The ‘European Concert’, international congresses of all kinds,

existing federal institutions — these are the germs out of which may grow the diminution, the
mitigation, and, possibly, the cessation of wars. (1901a: 157–158).
Arguments of this kind did not go unchallenged. J.M. Robertson, another prominent
British liberal, replied directly to Ritchie, accusing him of utilizing faulty consequen-
tialist reasoning to encourage endless foreign conquest in the name of peace. Echoing the
republican critique, he castigated such arguments for undercutting the very foundations
of democracy:
When, then, a democracy or a quasi-democracy proceeds to coerce another self-governing

community on the plea of advancing civilization, it is giving the lie to its own fundamental
principle, and the professed democrats who justify such coercion are men forsworn. And the
sequel is historically so sure that we may call it a law of political evolution. The principle of
democracy, negated at its source, suffers paralysis; and the ruling community comes to be ruled
by the brute force it had created and sanctioned. (1901: 284)22
In an account of the ‘ethics of internationalism’ published in 1906, Hobson both challenged

Ritchie and silently refuted his own earlier argument about the pacific character of ‘inter-
imperialism’. He argued that although the peoples of the world were becoming interde-
pendent, and consequently lacked good reasons for embarking on war, nefarious elites
continued to propagate a Hobbesian vision of states as autonomous self-interested units:
‘The apparent oppositions of interest between nations … are not oppositions between the
interests of people conceived as a whole; they are oppositions of class interests within the
nation’ (1906: 28). While critical of the Cobdenite line that commerce would eliminate war
— on the grounds that it had failed to take account of the role of class interests in generat-
ing conflict — Hobson reserved his greatest ire for the ‘new imperialists’ who dreamt that
empires would establish perpetual peace. The result was deeply reactionary: ‘a few gigan-
tic empires dividing the earth between them, coterminous with one another, powerful, defi-
nite and rich, will form a new sort of equilibrium of forces — fear, not gain, and not love,
is designated as the ultimate peacemaker’ (1906: 23). Singling out Ritchie, whom he nev-
ertheless praised as one of the ‘great ethical teachers in England of recent years’ (1906: 27),
Hobson stressed that such a vision was anathema to internationalism because it was based
on a flawed social ontology and eradicated individual and national liberty. Instead, he out-
lined a more subtle variant on the monadic DP argument:
the conception of a real republic, by which is meant an effective democracy, is essential to the
achievement of peaceable relations between the nations of the world; not of course the mere
form of a republic, not a form in which the power of the people is usurped by bosses and
formally registered by the vote of the people, but a real republic in which the people themselves,
the several units, express themselves with freedom and equality in the determination of their
own affairs. (1906: 28)
The argument for democracy could be restated, in other words, by drawing a distinction
between form and content — much as the American Progressives were doing across the
Atlantic. The crude simulacra of democracy existing at the time provided a cloak of

Bell 657
legitimacy for the continued rule of war-mongering elites, for only in an authentic
democracy, free from the distorting effects of class power, would the people recognize
that peaceful cooperation was in their interest. In order to salvage the DP argument from
the cauldron of imperial aggression it was necessary to re-evaluate the meaning of
democracy itself, demarcating its aberrant and ideal forms. This complex task was under-
taken by numerous thinkers during the ensuing decades.
Ending the ‘murder of men by men’: Fin de siècle racial

utopianism
It was this freighted political conjuncture that spawned the discourse over Anglo-
American unity. In the decades following the War of Independence, relations between
Britain and the US oscillated between mutual suspicion and antagonism, but as the 19th
century drew to a close, thinkers and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic argued for
closer cooperation (Anderson, 1981; Campbell, 2007; Kupchan, 2010: 73–112). The
1890s was the turning point: a trickle of interest turned into a flood. This discursive shift
established the intellectual foundations for the ‘special relationship’ that was to play such
a fundamental role in the 20th century and beyond.
Drawing on constructivist insights, Srdjan Vucetic argues that patterns of Anglo-
American cooperation originate in the erection of a ‘racial peace’ between the two pow-
ers at the end of the 19th century (2011a, 2011b). The rapprochement was ‘established
on the basis of race, or, more specifically, because American and British elites succeeded
in framing their community as a single Anglo-Saxon brotherhood’ (2011b: 403–404).
Democracy played only a derivate role: ‘the Anglo-American elites indeed understood
each other as fellow democrats, but their antecedent ontology was always race, not
regime type’ (2011b: 413; cf. Kupchan, 2010). While concurring with this, I want to
move beyond Vucetic’s persuasive analysis by elucidating the ways in which race was
figured not simply as an aspect of Anglo-American relations, but as a world-historical
force capable of transforming human existence. The process that Vucetic identified was
an intra-racial peace project — the realization of a security community between the
‘Anglo’ powers. But the discourse of the time encompassed a far more ambitious claim
about universal racial peace: interstate war itself could be abolished through Anglo-
world unity. Joseph Chamberlain, at the time Secretary of State for the Colonies, pro-
claimed that the ‘union — the alliance, if you please — the understanding between these
two Great nations is indeed a guarantee for the peace of the world’ (1899: 7). Lyman
Abbott, a leading American Congregationalist theologian and political commentator,
dreamt of an Anglo century — even millennium: ‘[T]hese two nations, embodying the
energy, the enterprise, and the conscience of the Anglo-Saxon race, would by the mere
fact of their cooperation produce a result in human history which would surpass all that
present imagination can conceive or present hope anticipate’ (Abbott, 1898: 521). A dec-
ade later, a distinguished Australian politician was still proclaiming that ‘[p]eace could
have no better champions. Humanity could have no better allies. Their united power is
the best guaranty the world has ever had of a new reign of justice, liberty and progress in
all parts of the globe’ (Reid, 1909: 409).23

Adopted by thinkers across the political spectrum, projects for the unification of the
Anglo-Saxons were in principle compatible with liberal, radical, socialist and republican
analyses of the causes of war. A wide array of institutional configurations were proposed.
The least ambitious were plans for closer political and economic cooperation between
the United States and the British Empire. Others advocated a defensive treaty between
the two powers. The most far-reaching, produced largely though not exclusively by
British thinkers, demanded the formal political (re)unification of the Anglo-world. These
ranged from the creation of a racial isopolity — common citizenship between the con-
stituent polities of the Anglo-world (Bell, 2013) — to full-blown federal union. Though
differing widely in their proposed institutional architectures, the schemes were all prem-
ised on the pivotal importance of race as a factor in world politics, and in particular on
the ethico-political superiority of the Anglo-Saxons.
I want to argue that we can interpret aspects of the debate over the future of the Anglo-
world as expressions of utopian desire. By viewing them through this prism, we can
recover a sense of their transformative ambition and locate them within the wider cul-
tural matrix that produced them. While the late 19th century witnessed an explosion of
utopian literary production (Claeys, 2009), scholars have failed to read this burst of
social prophecy and the discourse of global racial peace in the same analytical frame.
Both, though, were responses to a ramifying set of social, political, economic and cul-
tural anxieties, and both expressed a desire to confront or defuse those anxieties through
establishing novel forms of life. They also both placed the latest scientific and techno-
logical discoveries at the heart of their projects, seeing in them the material and symbolic
means through which their grandiose ambitions could be achieved. We can illuminate the
dynamics of fin de siècle utopianism and imperial discourse by interpreting them as
articulations of similar anxieties and dreams.
However, before proceeding, it is first necessary to outline what I mean by utopia, for
in political theory it is a term loaded with conflicting meanings (Levitas, 1990), while in
IR it is typically employed as a dismissive insult rather than a perspicacious analytical
category. On my account, a political project can be considered utopian if, and only if, it
invokes or prescribes the radical transformation or elimination of at least one of the per-
vasive practices or ordering principles that shape human collective life. These include
poverty, socio-economic inequality, war, the biochemical composition of the environ-
ment and the ontological constitution of human beings, including death itself. Utopianism
of this kind is premised on the idea of a fundamental change in the order of things.24 We
see in the fin de siècle debates over world order a strain of argument which figured the
Anglo-world (and especially Anglo-America) as a utopian polity that was realizable
through intentional human action. Human ingenuity, and above all the manipulation of
new technologies, both communicative and political, could create a racial-political order
that guaranteed peace on earth.
The late 19th-century debate over universal racial peace was triggered by the publica-
tion of Andrew Carnegie’s essay ‘A Look Ahead’ in 1893. Originally an emigrant from
Scotland, by the 1890s, Carnegie was one of the world’s wealthiest and most powerful
men, an infamous strike-breaker, a stalwart of the peace movement on both sides of the
Atlantic, and a leading critic of American and British imperialism. He was also a tireless
proponent of Anglo-American union and racial utopianism. These diverse commitments

Bell 659
cohered neatly in his mind. Following his ‘master’ Herbert Spencer, Carnegie believed
that the world was evolving inexorably from a violent past to a cooperative, peaceful
future — from ‘militant’ to ‘industrial’ stages of society, in Spencerian terms.25 Although
inevitable, human progress could be accelerated or retarded by political choices.
Imperialism was retrograde, damaging to the imperial power and its victims alike, but
Anglo-racial union was capable of securing a better future for the world. To hasten the
end of history, Carnegie advocated the formal (re)union of Britain, the United States, and
Canada — though he was never very clear about the specific institutional arrangement he
had in mind (e.g. Carnegie, 1893, 1909). The detail, though, was less important to him
than the empirical conditions and the moral imperatives that demanded union. The
Anglo-Saxons, he asserted, were bound by ‘language, literature, religion, and law’; they
differed only — and superficially — in their political institutions (1893: 10). Race was
the key factor. Writing of the peaceful resolution of the Venezuela dispute, he proclaimed
that ‘[r]ecent events have proven, I assume, to the satisfaction of most men that “Race”
is the most powerful determining influence upon men … for upon Race hang common
language, Religion, literature, law, and, in the main, political institutions. When these
elements are subtracted from human nature or action it will be found that not much of a
controlling character remains’ (1898: 1). The ‘English-speaking race’, as he was fond of
calling it, were the pioneers of progress, the leading-edge of human development.
Utilizing a common trope, Carnegie maintained that new technological conditions
meant that reunion was essential. The late 19th century saw a major cognitive shift, a
revolution in political consciousness, as perceptions of time and space were reconfigured
by the impact of the electrical telegraph. This created a new governance episteme in
which projects for the creation of globe-spanning political communities came to be seen
as both feasible and necessary (Bell, 2007, 2012). Electrical communication technolo-
gies were, Carnegie proclaimed, ‘the most important factor in rendering political union
possible, and I venture to say inevitable’, for they sustained an imagined Anglo-
community straddling the Atlantic (1893: 11). The reunified polity would inaugurate an
era of peace: ‘The new nation would dominate the world and banish from the earth its
greatest stain — the murder of men by men’ (1893: 12–13). Moreover, the transition to
the new world order would be peaceful, for ‘such a giant among pigmies would never
need to exert its power, but only to intimate its wishes and decisions’, and, as such,
global disarmament would invariably follow, as it ‘would be unnecessary for any power
to maintain a great standing army or a great navy’ (1893: 13). In a racialized account of
unipolarity, Carnegie insisted that the reunited Anglo-polity would simply deter other
states from attempting to compete. He energetically supported both Anglo-American
union and international arbitration as engines of peace for the remainder of his life.
While Carnegie was not the first to preach the creed of racial utopia, his essay spawned
considerable debate.26 Most commentators recognized the utopian ambition of his argu-
ment, though reactions ranged from the celebratory to the scornful. Admiring yet scepti-
cal, the British naval strategist Charles Beresford wrote that ‘[w]ere it possible for his
happy dream to be converted into a reality, the English-speaking nations could control
the future of the world, insure perpetual peace and prosperity, and maybe advance the
advent of the millennium’, while for the American historian and naval theorist A.T.
Mahan, Carnegie’s vision was ‘rational though premature’ (Mahan and Beresford, 1894:

570, 555). Both men offered their own more modest plans for Anglo-American coopera-
tion in reply.27 Not all responses were so polite. Goldwin Smith, a British émigré to
North America and by then the most prominent intellectual in Canada, poured scorn on
the idea:
But such a thing as a political or even a diplomatic unity of the English-speaking communities
scattered over the globe is surely inconceivable. Supposing such a union possible, what definite
object would it have? Where would its centre be? Who would direct its policy? By its irresistible
power, we are told, it would impose peace upon the world. Unfortunately, consciousness of
irresistible power is more apt to incline to aggression than to the enforcement of peace, while
the jealousy which such combination would excite could hardly fail to lead to counter-
combination and call the rest of the world to arms. (1893: 172)28
Most of its advocates spent little time discussing the mechanisms that would translate
Anglo-unity into perpetual peace, though we can discern two (usually interwoven)
lines of argument. One focused on brute geopolitical power: the combined military and
industrial resources of the Anglo-world would be so overwhelming that potential com-
petitors would be deterred from challenging it or each other. The other focused on
moral legitimacy: the Anglo-Saxons could and should claim this privileged role due to
their unique political virtues. Conjoined, they formed a potent moralized geopolitical
vision. In a typical example of the genre, Beresford wrote of his own plan for a defen-
sive alliance that ‘[g]eographically, and by virtue of character and numbers, such an
alliance would be irresistible in promoting peace. Who can doubt that the heavy sword
which the united Anglo-Saxon race could throw into the balance would constitute them
the arbiters between contending nations?’ He then adduced a normative claim about
the special responsibilities bestowed by racial superiority: ‘And what race has ever
shown itself more fitted to such power, so honestly likely to wield it with honour and
justice?’ (1899: 382).
The project for a new Anglo century created unlikely intellectual alliances. Cecil
Rhodes, W.T. Stead and H.G. Wells, for example, all promoted the utopian ideal. An
advanced liberal and an influential figure in the British peace movement, Stead was one
of the foremost journalists in the Anglo-American world (Luckhurst et al., 2012). He was
both a long-standing friend of Carnegie, the self-professed political radical and anti-
imperialist, and a fawning admirer of Rhodes, the most controversial imperialist of the
day. Rhodes once lamented that he felt helpless gazing into the night sky, that he would
‘annex the planets’ if he could (1902: 190). While cosmic empire remained forever out-
side his grasp, he was convinced that peace on earth was possible. He maintained that the
greatest tragedy of modern history was the splitting asunder of the two main branches of
the ‘Anglo-Saxon race’ in the American War of Independence, and that the only way to
repair the damage, and to fulfil the providential role of the race, was to reunite the two
polities. Rhodes wrote to Stead, ‘that if we had not lost America, or even if now we could
arrange with the present members of the United States Assembly and our House of
Commons, the peace of the world is secured for all eternity!’ Rhodes thought that the
American constitution was superior to the British, and he was happy for the Americans
to lead the English-speaking peoples if the British were not prepared to assume the

Bell 661
sacred role. Ideally, though, the job of securing perpetual peace could be shared between
them, and he proposed a solution to the constitutional dilemma: ‘We could hold your
federal parliament for five years at Washington and five at London’ (1902: 73). In a letter
written in 1891, Rhodes prophesized that union with the United States would mean ‘uni-
versal peace’ within one hundred years (1902: 66). As one of his admirers wrote in a
posthumous homily, ‘Rhodes wanted peace and the power to enforce it. To his idea [sic]
the understanding of the Anglo-Saxon race meant the necessary peace of the world’
(Cust, 1902: 113).
In his fulsome commentary on Rhodes’s writings, Stead concurred that the ‘English-
speaking race is one of the chief of God’s chosen agents for executing coming improve-
ment in the lot of mankind’ (1902: 100), and he elaborated on this fantasy in his
best-selling The Americanization of the World. He started by observing that the Americans
had overtaken the British in most aspects of life, and that those ruling in London now
faced a stark choice: ally with the United States in a grand project of earthly redemption
or become increasingly irrelevant, as the empire slowly weakened and the settler colo-
nies seceded and looked to Washington for leadership. In colony after colony, country
after country, American influence was outstripping that of the British, while Britain itself
was slowly being Americanized. The process was both irresistible and a cause for cele-
bration: ‘there is no reason to resent the part the Americans are playing in fashioning the
world in their image, which, after all, is substantially the image of ourselves’ (1903: 2).29
He sought, then, to ‘constitute as one vast federated unity the English-speaking United
States of the World’ (1903: 397). Such a polity would beget perpetual peace. If ‘England
and America were one’, Stead predicted, ‘they would be able to maintain the peace of the
world and general disarmament’ (1902: 409):
war would by degree die out from the face of the earth. If you had the Anglo-Saxon race acting
on a common ground, they could determine the balance of power for a fully peopled earth. Such
a moral force would be irresistible and argument would take the place of war in the settlement
of international disputes. As the second great result of the cohesion of the race we should have
life quickened and developed, and unemployed energies called into action in many places
where they now lie stagnant. (1903: 435)
For Stead, then, racial union would accelerate existing efforts to ‘civilize’ the rest of the
world. Intra-racial peace would thus establish the conditions for an irresistible liberal
empire that would ultimately create universal racial peace.
A self-professed socialist, Wells emphasized the importance of Anglo-American unity
over the course of his long and celebrated career.30 In Anticipations, he predicted the
emergence of a world state ruled over by a new techno-managerial class of ‘efficients’
— the ‘kinetic men’ of the future. Unlike most of his comrades, Wells did not regard
capitalism as the primary or sole cause of war. It was the very existence of the sovereign
state that generated conflict (1934: 689), and like many other late Victorians, he thought
that the best solution was to reduce the number of units populating the system. The uni-
fication of the ‘English-speaking peoples’ assumed a crucial role in this task. This ‘great
federation’ would have its headquarters in the ‘great urban region that is developing
between Chicago and the Atlantic’. Adopting a similar time horizon to Rhodes, he

predicted that by the year 2000, the English-speaking people would constitute a federal
state, united by ‘practically homogeneous citizenship’, and that this polity would govern
all the ‘non-white states of the present British Empire, and in addition much of the South
and Middle Pacific, the East and West Indies, the rest of America, and the larger part of
black Africa’. It would maintain — and enforce — the peace of the world. Like many of
his contemporaries, he regarded this political ‘synthesis’ as ‘probable’. His account was
vanguardist in a double sense, for not only were the English-speaking peoples to lead the
way to a further global ‘synthesis’ — a world-state-to-come — but this drive was itself
led by a select group of individuals, men (sic) of energy, determination, and drive, who
would help to dissolve, either through social revolution or in the wake of war, the remain-
ing barriers to its realization found in ‘deliquescing’ modern societies. The efficients
would act as a largely uncoordinated ‘Secret Society’ — an idea also pushed by Rhodes
— to help bring about a new era in human history. However, peace would not follow
automatically. Wells mixed hard-edged pessimism with his idealism, and, like Kant, he
thought that violence would be needed to pacify reactionary elements of the global popu-
lation (e.g. 1934: 678). A war would be fought to end all war, but once the resistance had
been extirpated, peace and justice would reign.
The issue of transition — of how to move from a world of war to a world of peace
— marked an important division within the discourse of racial utopianism. For many of
its advocates, including Carnegie and Stead, the movement would itself be peaceful;
their utopianism thus encompassed the mechanisms and the telos of transformation.
Others, like Wells, argued that war would be necessary to achieve peace. This vision of
racial peace-through-conflict was also a common feature of the popular ‘future war’
literary genre that flourished at the end of the 19th century. A steady stream of novels
portrayed colossal global clashes culminating in Anglo-American alliance and the final
abolition of conflict. In Britain, Louis Tracy’s popular The Final War concluded with
Britain and the United States defeating the combined powers of Europe and fulfilling
the ‘destiny of the race’: ‘to soothe ambition, to repair injustice, to mete out to all free-
dom before the law of justice’. Perpetual peace beckoned: ‘So peace ruled: not that
sullen silence which harbours in its breast poisonous passions, but a peace such as the
world had never known, deep, eternal, and serene’ (1896: 458). Similar volumes
appeared in the United States. Thus Stanley Waterloo’s Armageddon, Benjamin Rush
Davenport’s Anglo-Saxon’s, Onward! and S.W. Odell’s, The Last War, all published in
1898 as the US launched an imperial war against Spain, end with future Anglo-world
cooperation heralding everlasting peace.31 Odell, for instance, concluded his genocidal
tale with the Anglo-Saxons finally extinguishing the last gasp of resistance to their
model of ‘human perfection’ in the year 2600. With the creation of the ‘United States of
the World’, ‘[t]he dream of the ages has been realized and peace assured to the human
race forever’ (1898: 160).
As these writings highlight, it was not just British commentators who thought that
universal peace was achievable through Anglo-Saxon union. Father of a famous son,
John Randolph Dos Passos, an important New York lawyer and author of The Anglo-
Saxon Century and the Unification of the English-speaking People, was similarly opti-
mistic. As time and space were reconfigured, so the world came to seem simultaneously
more dangerous and more open to transformation through human agency. It was time

Bell 663
to create a racial union, which would, among many benefits, lead to the ‘elimination of
war and the advancement of civilisation’, because ‘power lodged in the proper hands
hurts no one’ (1903: vii, xiii). In a quasi-Hegelian vein, the workings of reason in his-
tory offered proof:
History, in all its stages, conjectural, traditional, and authentic, discloses with almost painful
clearness that there are underlying forces governing the progress of the human race, which are
made manifest in successive ages only by their results, and with which conscious volition seems
to have but little to do. … If I am right in what I have said of the Anglo-Saxon race in its two
great branches, the inference becomes clear. To that race primarily belongs in a preponderating
degree the future of mankind, because it has proved its title to its guardianship. (1903: 47)
Writing a decade after the turn-of-the-century frenzy of Anglo triumphalism, the journal-
ist H. Perry Robinson asserted, without much in the way of argument, that ‘[t]he ultimate
domination of the world by the Anglo-Saxon (let us call him so) seems to be reasonably
assured; and no less assured is it that at some time wars will cease’. All that remained
was the issue of political will: ‘The question for both Englishmen and Americans to ask
themselves is whether, recognizing the responsibility that already rests upon it, the
Anglo-Saxon race dare or can for conscience’ sake — hang back and postpone the advent
of Universal Peace, which it is in its power to bring about — to-day, no matter what the
motives of jealousy, or self-interest, or of self-distrust may be than retrain it’ (1911: 19).
Although racial utopianism of this kind was blunted by the horrors of World War I, it
continued to find supporters deep into the 20th century.
Conclusion
In this article, I have analysed some of the most prominent arguments about perpetual
peace circulating in the Atlantic world at the end of the 19th century. At the time, long-
standing radical claims about the inherent peacefulness of democracy were often chal-
lenged as democratic states launched imperial wars in Africa and Asia. Meanwhile, the
utopian energies of the earlier peace campaigners had drained away as the transnational
peace movement campaigned incessantly for international arbitration and the juridifica-
tion of the international system. The most ambitious projects for abolishing war centred
on global imperial management and the racial unity of the Anglo-Saxons.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the following for their insightful comments: Martin Ceadel, Gregory Claeys, Joel Isaac,
Daniel Matlin, Stefano Recchia, Casper Sylvest, John A. Thompson and Stephen Wertheim.
Thanks also to participants in seminars at the Universities of Birmingham and Cambridge, and the
Association of Political Thought conference in Oxford (2013). The article is dedicated to the mem-
ory of Istvan Hont, a magnificent scholar and friend.
Funding
Research for this article was generously supported by the Centre for Research in the Arts, Social
Sciences and Humanities (Cambridge), the Cambridge Humanities Fund, and the Leverhulme Trust.

Notes
1. For a review of the empirical literature, see Hayes (2011). On the DP’s performative dimen-
sions, see Hobson et al. (2011); Ish-Shalom (2013); Oren (1995).
2. An interesting case has also been made for Giuseppe Mazzini, writing in the mid-19th
century (Recchia and Urbinati, 2009). The popularity of Kant’s argument has waxed and
waned (Easley, 2005). Moreover, it has often been mischaracterized. Cavallar (2001), for
example, suggests that Doyle misses the complex relation between the transcendental and
practical dimensions of Kant’s philosophy. For Kant’s context, see Nakhimovsky (2011).
3. For intellectual context, see Wooley (1988).
4. For prominent references to Streit, see Ikenberry (2001: 178); Deudney (2007: 241, 335n);
Weiss (2009: 260).
5. Letter from Nehru to Samuel Spalding, 23 February 1940, ‘India’ file, Box I: 65, Streit
papers, Library of Congress. Streit remained sensitive to this charge. In testimony before
Congress in 1947, he insisted that ‘there was no color line in my choice of founders [of the
League of Democracies]. My choice was based on political principle. I proposed to begin the
Union of the Free with the most experienced democracies, and so I omitted not only India
and China but Russia and many other white countries’ (Statement to the House Committee on
Immigration and Naturalisation, 7 March 1945, ‘India’). This was largely to miss the point of
the critique, though, as Streit simply reiterated the racialized language of mature/immature so
central to imperial strategies of exclusion.
6. This literature is surveyed in Bell (2010a) and Schmidt (2012a). Valuable examples include:
Ceadel (2000); Schmidt (2012b); Sylvest (2009). Barkawi (2010), Schmidt (1998: ch. 4) and
Vitalis (2000, 2010) address the pivotal role of empire and race in disciplinary history.
7. The closest analysis to my own is Vucetic (2011a), which I address later in the article. Hobson
(2012: chs 4–5) covers the period, but does not discuss this discourse. For important interven-
tions on race and IR, see the special editions of Alternatives (26(4), 2001) and the Cambridge
Review of International Affairs (26(1), 2013); Doty (1993); Shilliam (2006, 2008).
8. On conceptions of ‘whiteness’ in an ‘Anglo-world’ context, see Anderson (1981); Kramer
(2002); Lake and Reynolds (2008: esp. Part II); Schwarz (2011: chs 1–3).
9. On 19th-century British liberal internationalism, see Sylvest (2009); Bell and Sylvest (2006).
On transnational dimensions of the peace movement, see Howard (2008: ch. 2); Cooper
(1991); Mazower (2012: 3–154).
10. I have adapted the threefold typology used by Laity (2001: 9–10), who distinguishes liberal,
radical and socialist arguments. However, this terminology can be misleading, for most radi-
cals were self-professed liberals.
11. On Gladstone, see Ceadel (2006); on Angell, see Ceadel (2009). See Sylvest (2009) on the
hesitant shift towards international institutions in liberal thought at the turn of the century.
12. Mill also thought that colonialism had pacifying effects by reducing the number of units in the
international system (Bell, 2010b).
13. Green’s conclusions were largely liberal-systemic — free trade and the ‘dream of an interna-
tional court with authority resting on the consent of independent states’ (1911: 179).
14. Much of the most innovative socialist thought emanated from Germany, see Chickering (1975).
15. On the US peace movement, see DeBenedetti (1980); Patterson (1976).
16. Note, though, that the republican tradition also contained the resources for justifying imperi-
alism (Bell, 2009).
17. Wilson himself wrote very little about democracy and foreign affairs until World War I, and
even then his views were ambiguous, though he clearly held some version of the monadic
account. As Thompson (2013) notes, he was not an advocate of extensive democracy promo-
tion, not least because he thought democracy was only suitable for societies with suitable
social conditions and ‘character’ (an argument ultimately derived from Burke).

Bell 665
18. Lenin picked out this passage for critique (and comparison with Kautsky’s writing) in
Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, where he described it as expressing ‘the cant of
English parsons’ (1996 [1916]: 122).
19. Giddings, who held the first chair of sociology in the US (at Columbia), features in
Hobson’s (2012) account of the Eurocentrism of IR theory, as well as Vitalis’s analysis
of the racial origins of IR (2010: 916–917), though neither explores this dimension of his
thought.
20. Despite his claim about tolerance, Giddings was adamant that progressive democracies
required ethnically homogeneous populations, and he supported strict immigration controls.
See here the material in Box 3, Giddings papers, Butler Library, Columbia University. This
was a common argument (Lake and Reynolds, 2008).
21. For the idealist context, see Boucher (1994); Morefield (2005).
22. Ritchie responded to Robertson by reiterating his earlier views and offering a cosmopolitan
critique of sovereignty (1901b: 494).
23. Reid was a former Premier of New South Wales and the fourth Prime Minister of Australia.
24. As such, this account differs significantly from the immanentist approach inspired by Ernst
Bloch (cf. Brincat, 2009; Levitas, 1990: ch. 4).
25. On Carnegie’s political thought, see Eisenstadt (2007). For Carnegie’s veneration of Spencer,
see, for example, his letters to John Morley (9 October 1900, Fol. 78), and Herbert Spencer
(10 October 1900, Fol. 78), Andrew Carnegie papers, Library of Congress.
26. While his 1893 essay attracted wide attention, Carnegie had long been preaching unity. See,
for example, ‘Home Rule in America: A Political Address’, St Andrew’s Hall, Glasgow, 13
September 1887 (Box 250, Carnegie papers). He claimed paternity of the idea, suggesting
Cecil Rhodes must have taken it from him after hearing it discussed by their mutual friend
Stead (Letter to Stead, 30 May 1903, Fol. 94, Carnegie papers).
27. An Anglophile, Mahan welcomed the Anglo-American rapprochement, writing to one
British correspondent ‘In my honor, reverence, and affection, Great Britain stands only
second to my own country’, and noting that he felt a sense of ‘race patriotism’ (letter to
Col. Sterling, 13 February 1896, Mahan papers, Reel 2, Library of Congress). Yet (contra
Carnegie) he was deeply sceptical of both plans for political union and international arbitra-
tion. In an earlier letter to G.S. Clarke, he wrote: ‘Carnegie is nowhere — and vaporous’ (29
July 1894, Reel 2).
28. Smith and Carnegie did cooperate on one issue, though: the campaign to merge Canada with
the United States. Indeed, Carnegie funded some of Smith’s (wildly unpopular) efforts to
advance the cause in Canada. See Carnegie, letter to Smith, 6 February and 4 May 1896, Fols
36 and 37, Carnegie papers.
29. For discussion of this trope, see Bell (2007).
30. The scholarship on Wells typically argues that he dropped his early racial vision in favour of
a more cosmopolitan one during World War I. Although I think there were greater continuities
in his thought, I leave this question aside here. For IR accounts of Wells, see Deudney (2001);
Partington (2003).
31. For overviews of the genre, see Clarke (1992); Franklin (1998: ch. 1); Matarese (2001: chs 2–3).
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Author biography
Duncan Bell is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Studies, University
of Cambridge, and a Fellow of Christ’s College, Cambridge. He works on the history of political
thought, focusing on modern imperial ideologies, and aspects of contemporary international politi-
cal theory. He is the author of The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order,
1860–1900 (Princeton, 2007), and the editor of several volumes, the most recent of which (with Joel
Isaac) is Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War (Oxford, 2012).

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497491

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(W.T. Stead, The Americanization of the Worl, 1902: 409)

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supranational organizations, he proposed a transatlantic league of liberal democracies

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classify a distinct human collectivity defined by a vague admixture of memory, shared

Varieties of perpetual peace

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War, democracy and empire

Rebuking the bloodthirstiness of his compatriots, William James, a great admirer of

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tendered another critique of democratic passion. Initially an advocate of a Millian form

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When, then, a democracy or a quasi-democracy proceeds to coerce another self-governing

In an account of the ‘ethics of internationalism’ published in 1906, Hobson both challenged

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Ending the ‘murder of men by men’: Fin de siècle racial

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Wells HG (1934) Experiments in Autobiography, 2 vols. London: Gollancz.

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