RULE 112

1 HONASAN V PANELS OF PROSECUTORS

GR NO. 159747
13 APRIL 2004

FACTS

The petitioner, Senator Gringo Honasan and other military personnel were charged with
the crime of coup d’etat before the Department of Justice (DOJ, for brevity). Subpoena
was issued for preliminary investigation. Afterwards, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case, asserting that since the
imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman, for brevity), not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct
the corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the charge be filed in court, the
Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that can legally take cognizance of the case
considering that he belongs to the group of public officials with Salary Grade 31; and
praying that the proceedings be suspended until final resolution of his motion.
Furthermore, Petitioner claims that it is the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation under paragraph (1), Section 13,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which confers upon the Office of the Ombudsman
the power to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Ombudsman and not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation

RULING
The court ruled that the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation. According to (C) section 2, Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states “other officers as may be authorized by
law”, in this case, the Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and
Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, which specifically provides that the
Ombudsman has the authority to conduct preliminary investigation over cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan, and, in the exercise of power, it may take over, at any stage, from
any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases do not give to
the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public
officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving
public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies

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such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise
of its authority over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage,
from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. In
other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of
cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.

2 MENDOZA V PEOPLE
GR NO 197293
21 APRIL 2014

FACTS:

A complaint filed by Juno Cars, Inc. through its representative, Raul C. Evangelista, on
January 8, 2008 for qualified theft and estafa against accused, Alfredo Mnedoza
(Mendoza, for brevity). Juno Cars alleged that it hired Alfredo as employee. Its
Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia (Garcia, for brevity), conducted a partial audit of the
used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and released by the accused
without Garcia's or the finance manager's permission. The Provincial Prosecutor Rey F.
Delgado issued a resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of
information against accused for qualified theft and estafa. Alfredo moved for
reconsideration, but the motion was denied. He then filed a petition for review with the
Department of Justice. While Alfredo's motion for reconsideration was still pending, two
informations for qualified theft and estafa were filed before the Regional Trial Court.
Mendoza filed a motion for determination of probable cause before the trial court. The
trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Juno Cars
Inc. filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Juno Cars then filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the complaint. It
argued that "the determination of probable cause and the decision whether or not to file a
criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor.

Issue:
Whether or not the determination of probable cause belongs to the public prosecutor and
not the trial court

Ruling:
The court ruled that conduct of preliminary investigation and the subsequent
determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the

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public prosecutor. The conduct of preliminary investigation the conduct of the
preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of the existence of probable
cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor. If upon evaluation of the
evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient
basis to find probable cause, he or she shall then cause the filing of the information with
the court. Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence" to determine whether there
is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of
probable cause exists

** notes **
ung determination of probable cause sa trial court, that’s for the issuance of warrant of
arrest. If there is a probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest.

“The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The
preliminary investigation proper — whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should
be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial — is the function of the
Prosecutor”

3 PEOPLE V VILLANUEVA AND DURANA

GR NO. 114266
4 DECEMBER 1966

FACTS:
Rogelio Villanueva and Mamerto Durana (Durana, for brevity) were charged of the
murder of Diosdado Meniano. However, Rogelio Villanueva remain at large so only
Durana was tried . thereafter Durana was rendered guilty. Aggrieved, the accused filed an
appeal contenting that te court a quo erred in failing to consider the
fact that he was not a party respondent during the preliminary investigation of the case.
Accused argues that the instant case was filed in court for murder only against the other
accused, Rogelio Villanueva, on the basis of the resolution of the prosecutor; that he was
not made a respondent in the investigation; that despite the sworn statements of witnesses
Gloria Meniano and Elenita Meniano who pointed to him as co-conspirator, he was not
included in the charge for murder because, according to the police, he would be used as a
witness against the accused Villanueva

ISSUE:
Whether or not the information in defective on the ground of absence of preliminary
investigation

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RULING:
The court ruled that the absence of preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, nor does it constitute a ground for
quashing the information. If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed,
the trial court may, on motion of the accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation
and hold the proceedings on the criminal case in abeyance. In this case, accused-appellant
failed to invoke such right to preliminary investigation before or at the time he entered
his plea at arraignment therefore, it is an implied waiver thereof. he can no longer invoke
that right at this late stage of the proceedings.

4 QUARTO V MARCELO
GR NO 169042
5 OCTOBER 2011

FACTS:
The Department of Public Works and Highway (DPWH, for brevity) Secretary Simeon
Datumanong created a committee to investigate alleged anomalous transactions involving
the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles in 2001. After the
investigation, DPWH-IAS discovered that from March to December 2001, several
emergency repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of hundreds of DPWH service vehicles,
which were approved and paid by the government, did not actually take place, resulting
in government losses of approximately P143 million for this ten-month period alone
which resulted to the complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman charging several
high-ranking DPWH of􀀵cials and employees — including the petitioner, the
respondents, and other private individuals who purportedly benefited from the anomalous
transactions — with Plunder, Money Laundering, Malversation, and violations of RA No.
3019 and the Administrative Code. However, the Ombudsman gave the respondent
immunity in exchange for testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases
filed. The petitioner claims that before the Ombudsman may avail of the respondents as
state witnesses, they must be included first in the informations filed with the court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding the
name of the responded in the information because the granted immunity

RULING:
The court ruled that the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in excluding the
respondent in the information. In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial

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powers, the Ombudsman is generally no different from an ordinary prosecutor in
determining who must be charged. He also enjoys the same latitude of discretion in
determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause
(that must be established for the filing of an information in court) and the degree of
participation of those involved or the lack thereof. His findings and conclusions on these
matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except when he gravely abuses
his discretion, i.e., when his action amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or when he acts outside the contemplation of
law. If, on the basis of the same evidence, the Ombudsman arbitrarily excludes from an
indictment some individuals while impleading all others, the remedy of mandamus lies
since he is duty-bound, as a rule, to include in the information all persons who appear
responsible for the offense involved.

5 BUSUEGO V OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

GR NO. 196842
9 OCTOBER 2013

FACTS:
Private respondent Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa, for brevity) filed a complaint for: (1)
Concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) violation of Republic Act
No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children); and (3) Grave Threats
under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Office of the Ombudsman
against her husband, Alfredo, with designation Chief of Hospital, Davao Regional
Hospital, Apokon, Tagum City. Ombudsman, ultimately, found probable cause to indict
only Alfredo Busuego(Alfredo, for brevity) and his mistress of Concubinage. The
accused filed for a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion in the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause to indict him and his concubine for
Concubinage. The accused further argued that The Ombudsman did not refer the
complaint to the
Department of Justice, considering that the offense of Concubinage is not committed in
relation to his office as Chief of Hospital

Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
determining the probable cause during the preliminary investigation in the case at bar

Ruling

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The court ruled that The Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in the determination
of probable cause during a preliminary investigation. This is the reason why judicial
review of the resolution of the Ombudsman in the exercise of its power and duty to
investigate and prosecute felonies and/or offenses of public officers is limited to a
determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of
the Ombudsman.

6 ARROYO V DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

GR NO 199082, 199085, 199118
18 SEPTEMBER 2012

FACTS:
The Commission on Elections (Comelec, for brevity) issued Resolution approving the creation of
a committee jointly with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary
investigation on the
alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections. The Fact-
Finding Team, 8 on the other hand, was created for the purpose of gathering real, documentary,
and testimonial evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted
by the Joint Committee. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that petitioner s and other public
officers be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to
manipulate the election results. As a result, an information against the petitioner and other
officers were filed before the Sandiganbayan and corresponding warrant arrest thereof. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and contented that no law or rule authorizes the joint
committee to conduct preliminary investigation.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction under the law to conduct preliminary investigation
jointly with the DOJ.

RULING:
The Court ruled that DOJ exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Comelec to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same. It also includes not
only the power but the duty of both the Comelec and the DOJ to perform any act necessary to
ensure the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses. Omnibus Election
Code and other statutory provisions, and, there is no impediment for the Comelec and the DOJ to
create the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team for the purpose of conducting a thorough
investigation of the alleged massive electoral fraud and the manipulation of election results in the
2004 and 2007 national elections relating in particular to the presidential and senatorial elections.

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7 AGUINALDO V VENTUS
GR NO. 176033
11 MARCH 2015

FACTS:
Private respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson filed a Complaint-Affidavit
for estafa against petitioners Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez before the Office
of the City Prosecutor (OCP, for brevity). Claiming to be business partners in financing
casino players, private respondents alleged that petitioners connived in convincing them
to part with the pledge of two motor vehicles which the latter had misrepresented to be
owned by Aguinaldo, but turned out to be owned by one Levita De Castro,
manager/operator of LEDC Rent-A-Car. The OCP found probable cause to indict the
respondents for crime of Estafa under article 315 of Revised penal Code (RPC, for
brevity) petitioners jointly filed with the OCP of Manila their "Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of the Information Prematurely Filed
with the Regional Trial Court The petitioners contended that such precipitate filing of the
Information and issuance of a warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration
without the preliminary investigation having been completed because they were not
afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. In support
of their contention, they raise the following arguments: that the right to preliminary
investigation is a substantive, not merely a procedural right; that an Information filed
without affording the respondent his right to file a motion for reconsideration of an
adverse resolution, is fatally premature; and, that a denial of a complete preliminary
investigation deprives the accused of the full measure of his right to due process and
infringes on his constitutional right to liberty

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners were accorded of their right to a complete preliminary
investigation as part of their right to due process

RULING
The court ruled that the petitioners were accorded with their right to a complete
preliminary investigation. While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary
investigation is a substantive, not merely a procedural right, petitioners are wrong in
arguing that motion for reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally
premature. Petitioners in this case were afforded their right to move for reconsideration of
the adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation when they filed their "Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of Information Prematurely Filed with
the Regional Trial Court.

8 GO V CA

7
GR NO 101837
11 FEBRUAURY 1992

FACTS:
The vehicles of the petitioner, Go (Go, for brevity) and Eldon Maguan (Maguan, for
brevity) almost bumped each other. Infuriated, the petitioner went out of his car and shot
Maguan inside his car. The security guard was able to take down the petitioner’s car and
plate number. After establishing the identity of the assailant, the police launched a
manhunt for the petitioner. The petitioner presented himself in the police station. The
next day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against the
petitioner. while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an
information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot
wound(s). Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated
homicide, filed an information for murder before the Regional Trial Court. counsel for
petitioner filed with the prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper
preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful
and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was
filed. the trial court issued an order granting to leave to conduct preliminary investigation
and cancelling the arraignment. However, thee Judge motu proprio recalled and called the
conduct of preliminary investigation. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the Order, contending that the
information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had been previously
conducted, in violation of his right to due process

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s warrantless arrest is valid

RULING
The court ruled that the Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of
Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of
Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest"
effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the
shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5 (b).
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts
indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon
which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses
to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take
down the alleged gunman's car's plate number, which turned out to be registered in
petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal
knowledge.” It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of
petitioner

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9 RARO V SANDIGANBAYAN
GR NO 108431
14 JULY 2000

FACTS
Petitioner Oscar G. Raro, a lawyer, was the Corporate Secretary of the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). As such, petitioner was the Acting Manager of the Special
Projects Department that was in charge of the experimental Small Town Lottery (STL). A
complaint against the petitioner was made by Luis F. Abaño for violation of republic Act
no. 3019 anti graft and corrupt practices act (RA3019, for brevity) for causing the
employment of the members of his family in experimental STL project that was under his
supervision. NBI recommended the prosecution of petitioner based on
Abaño's complaint. the petitioner was directed to file his counter-affidavit and
controverting evidence to the complaint, with a warning that his failure "to do so shall be
construed as a waiver of his right to be heard andb the preliminary investigation shall
proceed accordingly." Petitioner filed his counter-affidavit. Sandiganbayan issued an
order for petitioner's arrest and fixed bail. Petitioner subsequently filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion for the reinvestigation contending that the "prejudicial and
indecent delay in the preliminary investigation “violated his rights to due process of law
and to speedy disposition of the case because while the complaint was filed on May 20,
1988, the information against him was filed more than four (4) years later. Petitioner
alleged further that there was a "jurally and constitutionally defective
determination of probable cause" as the complainant and his witnesses were never
personally examined by any of the officers at the Offices of the Ombudsman and the
Special Prosecutor. Neither was the complaint ever sworn to before them. He argued
once again on the failure of the NBI to conduct a reinvestigation of the case

ISSUE
Whether or not the ombudsman conducted the preliminary investigation erroneously or
irregularly

RULING:
The court ruled that the conduct of preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman is not
erroneous. Under the circumstances of this case, the Ombudsman's failure to personally
administer oath to the complainant does not mean that the Ombudsman did not personally
determine the existence of probable cause to warrant the filing of information. In
determining probable cause, an inquiry into the sufficiency of evidence to warrant
conviction is not required. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. The trial of a case is conducted precisely
for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. The record

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clearly shows that the Ombudsman exerted utmost effort to determine the veracity of
Abaño's allegations against petitioner. That it took the NBI almost two years to complete
its report on the matter does not mean that petitioner's right to speedy disposition of the
charge was brushed aside

10 DOROMAL V SANDIGANBAYAN
GR NO 85468
7 SEPTEMBER 1989

FACTS:
The petitioner, Quintin S. Doromal (Doromal, for brevity), a former Commissioner of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG, for brevity), was charged for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection
with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal International
Trading Corporation (DITC, for brevity) which submitted bids to supply of equipment to
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS, for brevity) and the National
Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC). An information was then filed by the
Tanodbayan against Doromal for the said violation and a preliminary investigation was
conducted.The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning
the jurisdiction of the “Tanodbayan” to file the information without the approval of the
Ombudsman. The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special
Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties
NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary
investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except
upon orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the information filed by the
Tanodbayan .A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner
of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, took advantage of his position by
letting his company participate in the bidding conducted by DECS and and the NMYC,
which n is prohibited by law and the constitution. The petitioner filed a motion to quash
the information on the ground that it was invalid since there had been no preliminary
investigation for the new information that was filed against him. The motion was denied
by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because
both old and new informations involve the same subject matter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the information is invalid due to the absence of preliminary investigation.
HELD:

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The court ruled that the information is invalid in the absence of preliminary investigation.
The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the
case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective;
but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their
plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the
information should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand
the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.

11. CARPIO-MORALES v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

FACTS
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman
against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of
Makati accusing them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,
otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the
five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking
Building (Makati Parking Building).
The Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a fact-finding
investigation, the said panel filed a complaint against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with
six (6) administrative cases and and six (6) criminal cases for violation of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents. The
OMB Complaint alleged that he (Binay) was involved in anomalous activities attending
the following procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building
project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati
On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to
conduct a preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases
(2nd Special Panel). Thereafter, the 2nd Special Panel issued separate orders for each of
the OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the
recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, issued on March 10, 2015, the subject
preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not
more than six (6) months without pay. Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A.
Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the preventive suspension order
against Binay, Jr., et al. On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order
was sent to Binay jr.
A petition for certiorari was filed before the CA seeking the nullification of the
preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin
its implementation.

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On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of
the preventive suspension order. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor of
Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City Vice Mayor
Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor. At noon
of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,
notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day. The
CA found that it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme
urgency of the matter and seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if it were
established that the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all
committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-
election meant that he can no longer be administratively charged.
On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested that the TRO did not state what act was
being restrained and that since the preventive suspension order had already been served
and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain. On the same day, Binay, Jr.
filed a petition for contempt. Among others, Binay, Jr. accused the Ombudsman and
other respondents therein for willfully and maliciously ignoring the TRO issued by the
CA against the preventive suspension order.
Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, the Ombudsman filed the
present petition before this Court. The Ombudsman claims that the CA had no
jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, since no injunctive writ could be
issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that
the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction.
The CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the nullification of the preventive
suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine. It found that the Ombudsman can
hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013
as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous
activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project.
ISSSUE
Whether the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman.

RULING
Yes. Jurisdiction belongs to the CA.
It remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writes
enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, jr.
The congress' passing of the first paragaraph of sec 14, RA 6770, which prohbits the
issuance of an injunction, is an encroachment of the SC's rule making authority. An
injunction, after all, is merely a provisional and auxiliary relief to preserve rights.
However, it is noted that it has not consented to this as it has not issued rules of
procedure through an administrative circular. Pending deliberation, the first paragraph of

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sec 14, RA 6770 , is ineffective until it is adopted as part of the ruke of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.

12. VILLARIN v. PEOPLE

GR NO. 175289, August 31, 2011

FACTS
That on or about January 13, 1996, in Cagayan de Oro City, pursuant to RA 7975, the
accused, Crisostomo Villarin, a public officer being the Barangay Captain of Pagalungan,
this City, with salary grade below 27, took advantage of his official position and
committed the offense in relation to his office, and the other above-named accused, all
private individuals, namely: Marlon Baillo, Cipriano Boyatac, and Aniano Latayada,
confederating and mutually helping one another to gather and possess sixty-three (63)
pieces flitches of varying sizes belonging to the Apitong specie with a total volume of
Four Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board feet valued at P108,150.00,
without any authority and supporting documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulation to the damage and prejudice of the government.
On January 14, 1997, Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation
alleging that the Joint Affidavit of the DENR which became one of the bases in filing the
Information never mentioned Villarin as one of the perpetrators of the crime while the
accusations against Baillo and Boyatac were not based on the personal knowledge of the
affiants. They also asserted that their indictment was based on polluted sources,
consisting of the sworn statements of witnesses.
Instead of resolving the Motion for Reinvestigation, the RTC, directed them to file their
Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman.
The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who entered separate pleas
of not guilty. This court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended. Petitioners filed an appeal which
was denied by the CA.

ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals, on the matter of Preliminary Investigation, decided not in
accord with jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.

RULING
The preliminary investigation was done in accordance with the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court.
There is no factual basis to the assertion that Villarin was not afforded a preliminary
investigation. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in denying Villarin’s motion for

13
reconsideration, validly relied on the certification contained in the Information that a
preliminary investigation was properly conducted in this case.
Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for
Reinvestigation. However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this
issue again. He accepted the Ombudsman's verdict, entered a plea of not guilty during his
arraignment and actively participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled
hearings, conducting cross-examinations and testifying on his own behalf. It was only
after the trial court rendered judgment against him that he once again assailed the conduct
of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for Reconsideration.Whatever argument
Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation has
therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he is
deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.

13. LARRANAGA v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 130644, March 13, 1998

FACTS
On September 15, 1997, some PNP CIG authorities went to the Center for Culinary Arts
in Quezon City to arrest Francisco Juan Larranaga. Said authorities did not have a
warrant on the assurance that Larranaga would be brought to Cebu City by his lawyer on
September 17, 1997 for preliminary investigation.
On September 17, 1997, petitioner's counsel attended the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the City State Prosecutor of Cebu. Forthwith, he moved that
his client be given a regular preliminary investigation. The motion was denied by the city
prosecutor on the ground that Larranaga should be treated as a detention prisoner, hence
entitled only to an inquest investigation. Atty. Armovit was ordered to present Larranaga
in person. He was warned that his failure would be treated as waiver of his client's right
to a preliminary investigation and he would be proceeded against pursuant to section 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an inquest investigation or a preliminary
investigtion.

RULING
A preliminary investigation is proper in this case.
Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest investigation but to a regular preliminary
investigation. Section 7 of Rule 112 cannot be invoked to justify petitioner's inquest

14
investigation. Said section clearly provides that "when a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the complaint or
information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arresting officer or person."
The records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully arrested." A preliminary
investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right
to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage.

14. BUDIONGAN JR. v. DELA CRUZ

GR. No. 170288, September 22, 2006

FACTS
Petitioner Pedro E. Budiongan, being the municipal mayor of Carmen, Bohol was
charged with a violation of R.A. No. 3019. He allegedly misapprooriated funds to be used
for realignment and for the asphalt laying of a portion of the Tan Modesto Bernaldez
Street.
Upon commencement of the project, it was discovered that there was yet no ordinance
approving the realignment of the funds. A complaint against the petitioners was filed
before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for alleging illegality in the conduct of the
bidding, award and notice to commence work since there was no fund appropriated for
the purpose.
On June 27, 2005, an Amended Information was filed charging petitioners with violation
of R.A. No. 3019, alleging that petitioners, by prematurely awarding the project despite
the absence of funds specifically appropriated for such purpose, and thereafter paying the
contract price from the Municipal Treasury which was originally appropriated for the
purchase of a road roller, caused damage and undue injury to the government.
The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information since it contains all the material
averments necessary to make out a case.

ISSUE
Whether or not the absence of Preliminary investigation impairs the validity of the
Information.

RULING
No. It does not impair the validity of the information.
The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right
conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the Information or otherwise render the same defective. It does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the
Information.15 If absence of a preliminary investigation does not render the Information

15
invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, then the denial of a motion
for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the Information or oust the court of its
jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioners were not deprived of due process because they were afforded the opportunity
to refute the charges by filing their counter-affidavitsthe modification of the offense
charged, even without affording the petitioners a new preliminary investigation, it did not
amount to a violation of their rights.

15. RODIS, SR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR No. 71404-09, October 26, 1988

FACTS
Petitioner Hermilo v. Rodis, Sr., former President of the Philippine Underwriters Finance
Corporation (PHILFINANCE) together with some other persons, was charged before the
Sandiganbayan in separate informations for five (5) counts of violation of Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash said informations as against him on the ground of lack
of preliminary investigation with the alternative prayer that the "issue and/or enforcement
of the warrant of arrests as against him be held in abeyance while he seeks a
reinvestigation by the Tanodbayan pursuant to his right of preliminary investigation.
Petitioner contends that while it may be true that lack of preliminary investigation neither
affects the jurisdiction of the court nor impairs the validity of the information filed,
nonetheless such lack of preliminary investigation affects the regularity of the
proceedings which led to the filing of the information, such that in several cases, the
Court had ordered the quashal of the information on said ground.
Respondent People of the Philippines on the other hand avers that as petitioner does not
dispute that a preliminary investigation was indeed conducted, what he is really
protesting against is the lost opportunity to participate therein due to the alleged failure of
the Tanodbayan to serve a subpoena upon him and that this alleged failure did not affect
the regularity of the preliminary investigation.

ISSUE
Whether or not the lack of Preliminary investigation or his inability to participate in the
preliminary investigation for the reason that he was not duly served with a subpoena is
not a proper ground for a motion to quash for lack of merit.

16
RULING
No. But respondent Sandiganbayan is ordered to hold in abeyance the proceedings
therein with respect to petitioner, subject to the outcome of the reinvestigation of the
Tanodbayan.
It is not disputed that a preliminary investigation was conducted by the Tanodbayan prior
to the filing of the informations. Petitioner, however, was not able to participate therein
as the subpoena addressed to him at (PHILFINANCE) his last known address, was
returned "unserved," petitioner having already severed his employment with said
company at the time of service.
Under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, if the respondent cannot
be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10)
day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by
the complainant.
While the absence of preliminary investigations does not affect the court's jurisdiction
over the case or do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective, but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before
entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of
dismissing the information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct
it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be
conducted. In this case, the Tanodbayan, has the duty to conduct the said investigation.

16. QUISAY v. PEOPLE

GR No. 216920, January 13, 2016

FACTS
On December 28, 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP-Makati)
issued a Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse Exploitation and Discrimination Act. Consequently, a Pabatid
Sakdal or Information was filed before the RTC on January 11, 2013 charging petitioner
of such crime.
Petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack of
authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. The RTC denied petitioner's
motion to quash for lack of merit. It found the Certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal
to have sufficiently complied with Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which
requires the prior written authority or approval by, among others, the City Prosecutor, in
the filing of Informations.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari. The CA
affirmed the RTC ruling. Further, it held that the Certification made in the Pabatid Sakdal
clearly indicated that the same was filed after the requisite preliminary investigation and
with the prior written authority or approval of the City Prosecutor.

17
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to
quash the Pabatid Sakdal or Information.
RULING
Yes. The CA made erroneous decision.
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a
complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named
officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts.
In the case at bar, the CA affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion to quash on the
grounds that: (a) the City Prosecutor of Makati may delegate its authority to approve the
filing of the Pabatid Sakdal; and (b) the Pabatid Sakdal contained a Certification stating
that its filing before the RTC was with the prior written authority or approval from the
City Prosecutor.
Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed
before the RTC, as there was no showing that it was approved by either the City
Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCPMakati' s division chiefs or review prosecutors.
CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to quash as the Pabatid
Sakdal or Information suffers from an incurable infirmity - that the officer who filed the
same before the RTC had no authority to do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be
quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.

17 DE OCAMPO v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

GR No. 147932, January 25, 2006

FACTS
The present case arose from a sworn statement of respondent Magdalena B. Dacarra
("Magdalena") executed before the Women’s Desk of the CPD Police Station in Batasan
Hills, Quezon City a sworn statement declaring that on December 4, 1999, her nine-year-
old son Ronald complained of dizziness upon arriving home at about six in the evening.
Ronald then vomited, prompting Magdalena to ask what happened. Ronald replied that
petitioner, who was Ronald’s teacher, banged his head against that of his classmate
Lorendo Orayan ("Lorendo"). Magdalena inspected Ronald’s head and saw a woundless
contusion. Due to Ronald’s continued vomiting, Magdalena brought him to a quack
doctor (arbularyo). The following morning, Magdalena brought Ronald to the East
Avenue Medical Center where he underwent an x-ray. The attending physician informed
Magdalena that Ronald’s head had a fracture. Blood oozed out of Ronald’s nose before
he died on December 9, 1999.
The inquest prosecutor warrants the release of the respondent for further investigation of
the charges against her as the evidence insufficient to support the charge for homicide
against the respondent. The case was referred to the investigating prosecutor for

18
preliminary investigation. The investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution finding
probable cause against petitioner for the offenses charged.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ. In her appeal to the
DOJ, petitioner contended that the investigating prosecutor showed bias in favor of
complainants for not conducting a clarificatory hearing and unilaterally procuring the
autopsy report. The DOJ Secretary held that there was no bias in complainants’ favor
when the investigating prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory hearing and unilaterally
procured the autopsy report as nothing precluded her from doing so.

ISSUE
Whether petitioner was denied due process during the preliminary investigation

RULING
No. Petitioner was not denied due process.
The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that she was denied due process when the
investigating prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory hearing. A clarificatory hearing is
not indispensable during preliminary investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a
clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the investigating officer as evidenced by
the use of the term "may" in Section 3(e) of Rule 112. It is within the discretion of the
investigation officer whether to set the case for further hearings to clarify some matters.
Petitioner was not deprived of due process since both parties were accorded equal rights
in arguing their case and presenting their respective evidence during the preliminary
investigation. Due process is merely an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner cannot
successfully invoke denial of due process since she was given the opportunity of a
hearing. She even submitted her counter-affidavit to the investigating prosecutor.

Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits.
Its sole purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether the
respondent is probably guilty of the crime. It is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. Hence, if the investigating prosecutor is
already satisfied that he can reasonably determine the existence of probable cause based
on the parties’ evidence thus presented, he may terminate the proceedings and resolve the
case.
Pemberton filed his Petition for Review before the Department of Justice

19. CHING v.SECRETARY OFJUSTICE

GR No. 164317, February 6, 2006

FACTS
Petitioner was the Senior Vice-President of Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (PBMI).
Sometime in September to October 1980, PBMI, through petitioner, applied with the

19
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (respondent bank) for the issuance of
commercial letters of credit to finance its importation of assorted goods. Respondent
bank approved the application, and irrevocable letters of credit were issued in favor of
petitioner. The goods were purchased and delivered in trust to PBMI. Petitioner signed 13
trust receipts as surety, acknowledging delivery of the goods.
Under the receipts, petitioner agreed to hold the goods in trust for the said bank, with
authority to sell but not by way of conditional sale, pledge or otherwise; and in case such
goods were sold, to turn over the proceeds thereof as soon as received, to apply against
the relative acceptances and payment of other indebtedness to respondent bank. In case
the goods remained unsold within the specified period, the goods were to be returned to
respondent bank without any need of demand. Thus, said "goods, manufactured products
or proceeds thereof, whether in the form of money or bills, receivables, or accounts
separate and capable of identification" were respondent bank’s property.
When the trust receipts matured, petitioner failed to return the goods to respondent bank,
or to return their value amounting to P6,940,280.66 despite demands. Thus, the bank filed
a criminal complaint for estafa against petitioner in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor found probable cause
for estafa. Petitioner appealed the resolution of the City Prosecutor to the then Minister of
Justice who granted the motion, thus reversing the previous resolution finding probable
cause against petitioner.The City Prosecutor was ordered to move for the withdrawal of
the Informations.
On February 27, 1995, respondent bank re-filed the criminal complaint for estafa against
petitioner before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Preliminary investigation
ensued. The City Prosecutor ruled that there was no probable cause to charge petitioner
with violating P.D. No. 115, as petitioner’s liability was only civil, not criminal, having
signed the trust receipts as surety.

ISSUE
Whether or not the officer conducting a preliminary investigation acted without or in
excess of his authority in resolving to file an Information despite the absence of probable
cause.

RULING
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that the Information
shall be prepared by the Investigating Prosecutor against the respondent only if he or she
finds probable cause to hold such respondent for trial. The Investigating Prosecutor acts
without or in excess of his authority under the Rule if the Information is filed against the
respondent despite absence of evidence showing probable cause therefor. If the Secretary
of Justice reverses the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor who found no probable
cause to hold the respondent for trial, and orders such prosecutor to file the Information

20
despite the absence of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice acts contrary to law,
without authority and/or in excess of authority.
In this case, petitioner failed to establish that the Secretary of Justice committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions. Indeed, he acted in accord with law
and the evidence.

20. ROBERTS JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 113930, March 5, 1996

FACTS
PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INC., defrauded the private complainants
through their "Number Fever Promotion" in the following manner: (1) They announced
and advertised in the media that "all holders of crowns and/or caps of Pepsi, Mirinda,
Mountain Dew and Seven-up bearing the winning 3-digit number will win the full
amount of the prize printed on the crowns/caps which are marked with a seven-digit
security code as a measure against tampering or faking of crowns and each and every
number has its own unique matching security code"; (2) enticing the public to buy Pepsi
softdrinks with aforestated alluring and attractive advertisements to become millionaires,
and by virtue of such representations made by the accused, the said complainants bought
Pepsi softdrinks.
The said accused after their TV announcement on May 25, 1992 that the winning number
for the next day was "349", in violation of their aforecited mechanics, refused as they still
refuse to redeem/pay the said Pepsi crowns and/or caps presented to them by the
complainants, who, among others, were able to buy Pepsi softdrinks with crowns/caps
bearing number "349".
Several thousand holders of "349" Pepsi crowns in connection with the Pepsi Cola
Products Phils., Inc.'s (PEPSI's) Number Fever Promotion filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City complaints against the petitioner. The complaints
respectively accuse the petitioners and the other PEPSI officials of the following crimes:
(a) estafa; (b) violation of R.A. No. 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the
Philippines; (c) violation of E.O. No. 913; and (d) violation of Act No. 2333, entitled "An
Act Relative to Untrue, Deceptive and Misleading Advertisements," as amended by Act
No. 3740.
After appropriate proceedings, the investigating prosecutor, released a Joint Resolution
where it recommended the filing of an information against the petitioners. The
information for estafa attached to the Joint Resolution was approved.
On 4 May 1993, Assistant City Prosecutor Gavero filed an Amended Information,
accompanied by a corresponding motion to admit it. The amendments merely consist in
the statement that the complainants therein were only "among others" who were

21
defrauded by the accused and that the damage or prejudice caused amounted "to several
billions of pesos, representing the amounts due them from their winning '349'
crowns/caps." The trial court admitted the amended information on the same date. The
motions filed by the accused and the Trial Prosecutor are hereby DENIED.

ISSUE
Whether or not Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered
the arrest of the petitioners without examining the record of the preliminary investigation
and in determining for himself on the basis thereof the existence of probable cause.

RULING
The answer is in the Affirmative.
A warrant can issue only if the judge is satisfied after an examination in writing and
under oath of the complainant and the witnesses, in the form of searching questions and
answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May 1993
directing, among other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the
information, amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have
the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause. And
strangely enough, he made no specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the
issuance of warrants of arrest. It may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes a
finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional requirement for the
protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even
convincing logic.

21 SOLIVEN VS MAKAISAR
G.R. 82585
14 November 1998

FACTS:
This is a consolidation of three cases wherein informations for libel were filed against
petitioners. Respondent RTC judge allegedly issued a warrant for Beltran’s arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable
cause. (The case has no facts, it went straight to the issue and the ruling. The limited facts
here are from the explanations regarding the issue.)

ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated

22
RULING:

The issue raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on
the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination
of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.

22 PEOPLE VS DELA TORRE- YADAO

G.R. 162144-54
13 November 2012

FACTS:
Combined forces of the Philippine National Police's Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence
Task Group (PNP ABRITG, for brevity) killed 11 suspected members of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang. SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command told
the press that it was a summary execution. Ombudsman filed charges against the officers.
The Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer of their cases to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City on the ground that none of the principal accused had the rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher. RTC of Quezon City ordered the provisional dismissal of the
cases for lack of probable cause. Two years later, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza
sought to revive the cases against respondents by requesting the Department of Justice

23
(DOJ) to conduct another preliminary investigation. DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez
constituted a panel of prosecutors to conduct the requested investigation. It was later
revealed that 2 of the victims were minors. Prosecution prayed for the case to be re-
raffled to the family courts. Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the prosecution’s
motion for re-raffle to a family court. She also granted the motions for determination of
probable cause and dismissed the cases against the respondents since the affidavits of the
prosecution witnesses were inconsistent with those they submitted in the preliminary
investigations before the Ombudsman for the crime of robbery.

Prosecution argues that the judge gravely abused her discretion. The prosecution stresses
that under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court Judge Yadao’s duty was to
determine probable cause for the purpose of issuing the arrest warrants solely on the basis
of the investigating prosecutor’s resolution as well as the informations and their
supporting documents. And, if she had some doubts as to the existence of probable cause,
the rules required her to order the investigating prosecutor to present additional evidence
to support the finding of probable cause within five days from notice. Rather than take
limited action, said the prosecution, Judge Yadao dug up and adopted the Ombudsman’s
findings when the latter conducted its preliminary investigation of the crime of robbery in
1996.

ISSUE:
Whether or not judge committed grave abuse of discretion

RULING:
Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1)
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2)
issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of
probable cause. But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is
not mandatory. The court’s first option under the above is for it to “immediately dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.” That is the
situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the
respondents. It is only “in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause” that the
judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from
notice. But that is not the case here.
23 PUA VS CITYBANK
G.R. 180064
16 September 2013

FACTS:

24
The vice president of Citibank Hongkong went to the Philippines and convinced the
petitioners to open an account in Citibank Hongkong so that they would be able to buy
securities from the latter. Later on, petitioners discovered that the securities sold to them
were not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, for brevity)and
that the terms and conditions covering the subscription were not likewise submitted to the
SEC for evaluation, approval, and registration. Asserting that respondent’s actions are in
violation of Republic Act No.8799, entitled the "Securities Regulation Code" (SRC, for
brevity), they assailed the validity of the subscription agreements and the terms and
conditions thereof for being contrary to law and/or public policy. Respondents sought for
the dismissal of the case for violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It pointed
out that the merits of the case would largely depend on the issue of whether or not there
was a violation of the SRC, in particular, whether or not there was a sale of unregistered
securities.

ISSUE:
whether or not petitioners’ action falls within the primary jurisdiction of the SEC

RULING:

No, case need not be filed before the SEC. It is clear that cases falling under Section 57
of the SRC, which pertain to civil liabilities arising from violations of the requirements
for offers to sell or the sale of securities, as well as other civil suits under Sections 56, 58,
59, 60, and 61 of the SRC shall be exclusively brought before the regional trial courts. It
is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that the term "shall" is a word of command,
and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is
generally imperative or mandatory.35 Likewise, it is equally revelatory that no SRC
provision of similar import is found in its sections governing criminal suits; quite the
contrary, the SRC states that criminal cases arising from violations of its provisions
should be first referred to the SEC.

Therefore, based on these considerations, it stands to reason that civil suits falling under
the SRC are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts and
hence, need not be first filed before the SEC, unlike criminal cases wherein the latter
body exercises primary jurisdiction.

24 CRUZ VS ARREOLA
A.M. RTJ-01-1642
6 March 2002

FACTS:

25
After the preliminary investigation, office of the ombudsman recommended the filing of
an information against Marilyn Carreon, an employee of the land management bureau.
Marilyn Carreon filed with the trial court an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation. The
respondent Judge considered the said motion a mere scrap of paper for non-compliance
with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the same date, a
Warrant of Arrest was issued by the respondent Judge and released by respondent Branch
Clerk of Court. Respondent Judge issued another Order deferring the implementation of
the Warrant of Arrest and later directed the Branch Trial Prosecutor to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case. The office of the city prosecutor recommended that the case
be set for trial. Petitioner argues that the judge is mandated to determine the existence of
probable cause before issuing a warrant. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not judge’s actions constitute ignorance of law

RULING:
No. It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine
probable cause personally, making it the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself
of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.

24 RAMSICAL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. 169727-28
18 August 2006

FACTS:
The Blue Ribbon and Senate Blue Ribbon Committees carried out investigations
regarding alleged anomalies in the Armed Forces of the Philippines- Philippine
Retirement Benefit Systems. The anomalies consisted of acquisition of lots, among
others. Ramiscal Jr was a retired officer of AFP and the former president of AFP-
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS, for brevity). Ramsical Jr signed
the unregistered deeds of sale covering the acquisition of certain parcels of land. Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee executed a joint-affidavit- complaint stating that based on their

26
findings, Ramsical Jr along with several others, may be charged with falsification of
public documents and violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.
Ramiscal Jr filed his first Motion for Reconsideration a supplemental motion regarding
the findings of the Ombudsman. With this, a panel of prosecutors was tasked to review
the records of the case, they found out that Ramiscal Jr., indeed participated in an affixed
his signature on the contracts and found probable cause. The Ombudsman scheduled the
arraignment of Ramiscal Jr., however, he alleged that, in finding probable cause, the
Sandiganbayan merely relied on the findings of the Ombudsman and did not take into
account the other affidavits on record.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is probable cause

RULING:
On the first issue, the rule is that as far as crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan are concerned, the determination of probable cause during the
preliminary investigation, or reinvestigation for that matter, is a function that belongs to
the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is empowered to determine, in the
exercise of his discretion, whether probable cause exists, and to charge the person
believed to have committed the crime as defined by law. Whether or not the Ombudsman
has correctly discharged his function, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
assessment of the evidence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court may
not be compelled to pass upon.
 
As a rule, courts should not interfere with the Ombudsmans investigatory power,
exercised through the Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to determine the
presence or absence of probable cause, except when the finding is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

25 OKABE VS REYES
G.R. 150185
27 MAY 2004

FACTS:
Cecilia Maruyama executed an affidavit-complaint and filed the same with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasay City charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita
Tanghal Okabe with estafa. After the requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant
City Prosecutor found probable cause for estafa against the petitioner.  The trial court
issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner. The petitioner asserts that the respondent
judge could not have determined the existence of probable cause for her arrest solely on
the resolution of the investigating prosecutor and the undated affidavit-complaint of

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respondent Maruyama. She posits that the respondent judge should have ordered the
investigating prosecutor to submit the affidavits of the witnesses of respondent
Maruyama and the latter’s documentary evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the
petitioner and the transcripts of the stenographic notes, if any, taken during the
preliminary investigation. The petitioner adds that the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discrestion as he should have personally reviewed the said documents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not judge committed grave abuse of discretion

RULING:
No, judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The task of the presiding judge when
the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is meant
such set of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause,
the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of
the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common
sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, it requires less than evidence which
would justify conviction.

In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused, the RTC judge may rely on the findings and conclusions in the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor finding probable cause for the filing of the Information.

26 LEVISTE VS ALAMEDA
G.R. 182677
3 August 2010

FACTS:
Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas in an
information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC, for brevity) of Makati. The
private complainants-heirs of De las Alas prayed for the prosecutor to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. RTC allowed the prosecution to conduct
a reinvestigation. The amended information charged Leviste with murder. Leviste argued
that private respondent did not have the right to cause reinvestigation fo the criminal case
because the information was already filed with court. Petitioner was found guilty of

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homicide. Petitioner posits that the prosecution has no right under the Rules to seek from
the trial court an investigation or reevaluation of the case except through a petition for
review before the Department of Justice (DOJ, for brevity). In cases when an accused is
arrested without a warrant, petitioner contends that the remedy of preliminary
investigation belongs only to the accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not reinvestigation should have been appealed to the DOJ

RULING:
Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public
prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit
of a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of determining whether said
persons should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court.
BEFORE THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN COURT, the private
complainant may proceed in coordinating with the arresting officer and the inquest
officer during the latters conduct of inquest. Meanwhile, the arrested person has the
option to avail of a 15-day preliminary investigation, provided he duly signs a waiver of
any objection against delay in his delivery to the proper judicial authorities under Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code. For obvious reasons, this remedy is not available to the
private complainant since he cannot waive what he does not have. The benefit of the
provisions of Article 125, which requires the filing of a complaint or information with the
proper judicial authorities within the applicable period, belongs to the arrested person.
Contrary to petitioners position that private complainant should have appealed to the DOJ
Secretary, such remedy is not immediately available in cases subject of inquest.

27 PEOPLE VS SERZO
G.R. 118435
20 JUNE 1997

FACTS:
Mario Serzo Jr., appellant, was charged with murder in an information for stabbing
Alfredo Casabal in the back. During the arraignment, appellant appeared without counsel.
Trial court appointed Atty. Wilfredo Lina-ac as counsel de oficio for the arraignment
only. Appellant, however, moved that the arraignment be reset and that he be given time
to engage a counsel of his own choice, which the trial court granted. However, the
appellant again appeared without a counsel de parte. He was nonetheless arraigned with
the assistance of Counsel de oficio Wilfredo Lina-ac. He pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial was
waived and trial was set. Atty. Lina-ac was relieved as counsel de oficio in view of
appellants manifestation and refusal to cooperate with said counsel. Appellant appeared
without counsel again, forcing the trial court to appoint another counsel de oficio, Bella

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Antonano. Counsels for both parties agreed to reset the trial, but appellant refused to sign
the minutes of the proceedings. Appellant alleges that he had been denied effective legal
representation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant was denied effective legal representation

RULING:
He was not denied of effective legal representation.

RULE 112, SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.--x x x

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a
lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. x x x

Accordingly, an accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be represented

either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be
represented by counsel is immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de
parte, however, is not absolute. The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a
counsel of choice against the statess and the offended partys equally important right to
speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the accuseds option to retain a
counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen
counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a
valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.

28 MANGILA VS PANGALINAN
Facts:
The complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and
the others to the private complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada,
and from the collection of visa processing fees, membership fees and on-line application
without lawful authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA for brevity).
Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints.
After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan
issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. Mangila was then
arrested. Mangila filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the judge did
not have authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. Court of appeals denied the
petition for habeas corpus.
Issue:
Whether or not petition for habeas corpus is the proper remedy

30
Ruling:
Habeas corpus is not a proper remedy. The object of the writ of habeas corpus  is to
inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to
require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not
issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. 
There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and
her cohorts on June 16, 2003, Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC,
was empowered to conduct preliminary investigations involving "all crimes cognizable
by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.

29 AMPATUAN VS MACARAIG
FACTS:
Ampatuan was assigned at Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police Station. He was
asked by his Chief of Police to report to the Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan.
The latter brought PO1 Ampatuan to the Provincial Director of the Philippine National
Police Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to stay at the Police Provincial Office
of Maguindanao without being informed of the cause of his restraint. The next day, PO1
Ampatuan was sent to Manila and upon arriving Manila Domestic Airport, PO1
Ampatuan was turned over to policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo
Lim by the Police Director. A press briefing was then conducted where it was announced
that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two Commission on Elections
Officials. He was then detained at the Police Jail in United Nations
Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato
Gonzaga of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty.
Alioden D. Dalaig.  PO1 Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional Headquarters
Support Group in Camp Bagong  Diwa, Taguig City.
 Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva ordered the release for further
investigation of PO1 Ampatuan. The Order was approved by the City Prosecutor of
Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector
Agapito Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan.  Police Senior Superintendent found
probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and
recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.
 This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the RTC of Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest was made without a warrant and therefore illegal

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Ruling:
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila had recommended that PO1 Ampatuan be
released from custody, said recommendation was made only insofar as the criminal
action for murder that was filed with the prosecution office is concerned and is without
prejudice to other legal grounds for which he may be held under custody. In the instant
case, PO1 Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges for Grave Misconduct . In this
case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975
(also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as
amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police
Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police
force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b)
of the said law enumerates the disciplinary actions, including restrictive custody that may
be imposed by duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter
of internal discipline.
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such
constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a
restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under
investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit
of habeas  corpus. 

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