Internal National Ranking Round Moot Court Competition

INTERNAL NATIONAL RANKING ROUND MOOT COURT
COMPETITION MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
TC -11
INTERNAL NATIONAL RANKING ROUND MOOT COURT COMPETITION
IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDONIANA
REVIEW JURISDICTION
CURATIVE PETITION (Criminal)
IN
REVIEW PETITION (CRIMINAL)
IN
WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL)
IN THE MATTER OF
UNION OF INDONIA……………………………..……………APPELLANT
VERSUS
WOMEN FREEDOM UNION……………………………..RESPONDENT
UNDER ARTICLE 137 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDONIA
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF REPONDENT
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS………………………………...…………………………….4
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………………......5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION………………………………………………………..8
STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………………………………………..9
STATEMENT OF ISSUES………………………………………………………….....…..11
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS……………………………………………...………..…..12
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED………………………………………………………….…...14
1. WHETHER THE CURATIVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?..................14
2. WHETHER SECTION 497, I.P.C. PROTECTS THE SANCTITY OF

MARRIAGE?..................................................................................................18
3. WHETHER THE EXEMPTION GRANTED TO MARRIED WOMEN UNDER

SECTION 497, I.P.C. VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION?....................................................................22
4. WHETHER SECTION 497, I.P.C. READ WITH SECTION 198 (2) Cr.P.C. IS
CONSTITUTIONAL?........................................................................................26
PRAYER……………………………………………………………………………………32

2
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
"& " And
AIR All Indonia Report
Anr. Another
CrPC Criminal Procedure Code
Cri. L. J. / Cr. L. J. Criminal Law Journal
Dept. Department
IPC Indonia Penal Code
ILR Indonia Law Reports
S. Section
S.C. Supreme Court
S.C.C. Supreme Court Case
Ed Editor
Hon’ble Honourable
Edn. Edition
UDHR Universal Declaration OF Human

Rights
UOI Union of Indonia
v. Versus
Vol. Volume
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES REFERRED:
1. Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, AIR 2008 SC 663

2. Avtar Singh Sekhon v. UOI, AIR 1980 SC 2041
3
3. Bowers v. Hardwick 106 S. Ct 2841

4. CBI and Ors. v. Keshub Mahindra, (1996) 6 SCC 129
5. Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon v.Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 2041
6. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
7. Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1975 AIR 1378: 1975 SCR (3) 946.
8. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 2746: 1950 SCR 88.
9. Indira Sawhney v. UOI, (1992) SUPP. 3 SCC 217.
10. Joseph Shine v.UOI 2018 SCC SC 1676
11. K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1
12. Kesav Nanda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
13. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., 1963 AIR 1295: 1964 SCR (1) 332
14. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. And Another v. Registrar General, Supreme Court of India,
(1996) 3 SCC 114.
15. Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 873, 891: (1981) 2 SCC 600.
16. Lily Thomas v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1650
17. M. Nagaraj v. UOI, (2006) 8 SCC 212.
18. M/S Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1980) 2 SCC 167.
19. Mohd. Aslam v. Union of India & Others, (1996) 2 SCC 749
20. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412. 1907.
21. NALSA v. Union of India AIR 2014 SC 1863
22. National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC
1234
23. National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others, (2014) 5 SCC 438
24. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 485
25. Neera Mathur v. L.I.C, 1992 AIR 392: 1991 SCR Supp. (2) 146.
26. Northern India Caterers v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1980 SC 674: (1980) 2 SCC
167.
27. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301.
28. Pn Eswara Iyer v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, AIR 1980 SC 808
29. R v. R., (1991) 4 All ER 481.
30. R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N., 1995 AIR 265: (1994) SCC 6 632.
31. Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, JT (2002) 3 SC 609: (2002) 4 SCC 388
32. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, 2017 SCC 963.
4
33. Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India 1985 AIR 1618, 1985 SCR Supl. (1) 741
34. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal, (2015) 7 SCC 681.
35. Sumer v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2005) Cri. LJ 540
36. UOI v. International Trading Corporation, AIR 2003 SC 3983.
37. V. Revathi v. Union of India 1988 AIR 835
38. Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 Bom. 470.
STATUTES REFERRED
1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

2. The Constitution of India, 1950.
3. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
4. The Indian Penal Code, 1860.
5. The Supreme Court Rules, Order XLVIII, Rule 6 (1966).
ARTICLE AND LEGAL JOURNALS

1. Dhruv Tiwari & Anand Vardhan Narayan, “Recolouring the colored walls of
constitution: a futile judicial exercise of creating the curative petition”, IJLPP 2.2E.
2. Law commission of India, 42nd Report on ‘The I.P.C.’, (Government of India, 1972).
3. Report on the second world conference of women UN General
Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 12 July 1993,
A/CONF.157/23
4. Report on the fourth world conference of women UN General Assembly Beijing, 4-15
September 1995 A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 Last Visited – 26 October 2020
5. Statement by the United Nations Working Group on “Discrimination against Women
in Law and in Practice.”
BOOKS REFERRED
1. Mulla, the Code of Civil Procedure (Lexis Nexis, 19th Edition, 2017).
2. Pandey J.N Constitutional Law of India (central Law Agency 56TH Ed, 2019)
3. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, I.P.C. ( L e x i s N e x i s , Nagpur, 30th Ed., 2008).
4. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, the Code of Criminal Procedure (Lexis Nexis, 22 nd Edition,
2017).
5
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

1. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979
2. European Convention of Human Rights, 1950.
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Act, 1966.
4. The International Covenant on Civil Rights, 1966.
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.
LEGAL DATABASE
1. Manupatra.
2. SCC Online.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The appellant in the present case has approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indonia to
initiate the present appeal under Article 137 of the Constitution of Indonia. The respondent
6
most humbly and respectfully submits to the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
matter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is a moral notion in Indonian society regarding ideal marriages. The past speaks that
women were mistreated in various spheres of life across religions, regions and communities.
7
Except for a few revolutionary activities, the situation changed about more or less the same
in the ancient, medieval, and early modern times. Crime against women like female
foeticide, discrimination against women, rape, etc. is common. Regardless of existing
stringent laws and safeguards to women, the Status of women has not elevated. The
unfortunate part of gender inequality in our society is that the women too, though, continued
socio-cultural conditioning, have accepted their subordinate position to men and they are
also part and parcel of the same patriarchal system.
Women Freedom Union (WFU), Non-Governmental Organization, raised its concern about
discrimination against the women in so far as Sec. 497 of Indonian Penal Code confers upon
the husband only the right to prosecute the adultery and not women, filed the Writ Petition
before Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indonia challenging constitutional validity of Sec. 497 of
the Indonian Penal Code and Sec. 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure being in violation
of Article 14, 15 and 21 of Constitution of Indonia.
On 23.02.2018, Hon'ble Supreme Court passed its judgment dismissing the Writ Petition
held that although right to be heard is a fundamental right but, law can’t be held
unconstitutional on such grounds owing to express provision under law.
Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court, WFU filed review
Petition on the ground that said judgment experiences errors apparent on the face of the
record as liberty envisaged under the Indonian Constitution will be in peril.
The said review petition was allowed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Court held that
Sec. 497 of the Indonian Penal Code and Sec. 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are
unconstitutional. v The Court further decriminalized the adultery observing that “Treating
adultery an offence, we are disposed to think, would tantamount to the State entering into a
real private realm. Under the existing provision, the husband is treated as an aggrieved
person and the wife is ignored as a victim.”
Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a review petition,
the Union of Indonia has preferred Curative Petition. The some of the grounds raised by the
Union of Indonia are as follows:
 That Sec. 497 is valid on the ground of affirmative action.
8
 All discriminations in favor of women are saved by Article 15 (3), and hence were
exempted from punishment.
 That Sec. 497 does not account for instances where the husband has sexual relations
outside his marriage would not render it unconstitutional.
 The sanctity of family life and the right to marriage are fundamental rights
comprehended in the right to life under Article 21. An outsider who violates and injures
these rights must be deterred and punished in accordance with criminal law.
 It was finally suggested that if this Court finds any part of this Sec. violative of the
Constitutional provisions, the Court should read down that part, in so far as it is violative
of the Constitution but retain the provision.
 The main purpose of enacting Sec. 497, I.P.C. is to curb crime by way of deterrence, but
declaring Sec. 497 as unconstitutional by Apex Court of the country, will not only
promote deceitful and immoral activity between man and woman but will also create
chaos in society.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. WHETHER THE CURATIVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?
2. WHETHER SEC. 497, I.P.C. PROTECTS THE SANCTITY OF MARRIAGE?
3. WHETHER THE EXEMPTION GRANTED TO MARRIED WOMEN UNDER
9
SEC.497, I.P.C VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER

THE INDONIAN CONSTITUTION?
4. WHETHER SEC. 497, I.P.C. READ WITH SEC. 198 (2) CR.P.C.. IS
CONSTITUTIONAL?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1. WHETHER THE CURATIVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE.
It is humbly submitted by the respondent in this Hon’ble court that the appeal filed by the
10
appellant under Article 137 of the constitution of Indonia is not maintainable. The concept
of Curative petition evolved in 2002 by the 5-judge bench in the Rupa Ashok Hurra v Ashok
Hurra1. The curative petition can only be allowed if the petition filed is subject to fulfillment
of the grounds specifically stated in the Ashok Hurra Case. The present petition filed by the
Appellant does not fulfill the ground as provided in the judgment. The basic aim of filing
the curative petition is to re-examine the final Judgment given by the apex court. If the
curative petition is allowed to reopen the concluded judgment of this court by filing repeated
interlocutory applications is clearly an abuse of the process of law and would have far
reaching adverse impact on the administration of the justice.
ISSUE 2 WHTHER SECTION 497 OF THE IPC PROTECTS THE SANCTITY OF

MARRIAGE?
It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that the said provision does not protect the
sanctity of the marriage as it undermines the status of women in marriage. It treats women
as the property of the husband and punishes for the other man for encroaching into the
marriage leaving the fact that it is the consensual sexual act between the man and the
women. The law drafted more than a century ago does not make men and women equally
liable for the crime of adultery. The question here arises is that only wives are held
responsible for protecting and the institution and sanctity of marriage. So, the provision does
not protect the sanctity of marriage as the sanctity of marriage is not affected only by the
sexual act of the wife but also by the man doing the same act with an unmarried women or
widow. Section 497 IPC puts man in superior position than women and also have the full
control over the body of the women/wife. Thus, destroying women’s dignity.
ISSUE 3 WHETHER THE EXEMPTION GRANTED TO MARRIED WOMEN
UNDER SEC.497, I.P.C VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED
UNDER THE INDONIAN CONSTITUTION?
It is humbly submitted under the steady gaze of this Hon'ble Court that the said arrangement
of Section 497, I.P.C. is violative of the principal rights ensured by the Constitution of India.
The exception conceded to women depends on the idea of women being the 'person in
question' and men the 'seducer' which is not, at this point pertinent or relevant in the
contemporary cultural viewpoint. Likewise, the arrangement by totally excluding women
from discipline under infidelity as an abettor separates against men as it puts the two people
1
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, JT (2002) 3 SC 609: (2002) 4 SCC 388.
11
under comparative conditions and flaw on various platforms. The Section is not the slightest
bit ensured under Article 15 (3) of the Constitution of India which doesn't accommodates
exclusion of ladies from criminal risk on the outlandish assumption of feeble status.
ISSUE 4. WHETHER SECTION 497, I.P.C. READ WITH SECTION 198 (2) Cr.P.C.
IS CONSTITUTIONAL?
It is humbly submitted to this Honourable Court that, along with Section 497, I.P.C., Section
497, I.P.C., 198 (2), of the Cr.P.C. They are held to be illegal because they violate Articles
14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. The section is simply subjective in that it regards women
as property of Husband and defines irrational gender categorization. The rule is intruding
into the individual's privacy and damages the dignity of women by allowing her husband to
control her Sexual endeavors. There is also no provision regarding homo-sexual adultery.
It will then add to a waste that has no functional application. It requires, therefore, to be
annulled because of the severability doctrine, which is that if legislation is made gender
neutral in this situation, it would have no effectiveness anymore.
ADVANCED ARGUMENTS
ISSUE1.WHETHER THE CURATIVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE.
12
1. The respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble court that the present curative
petition filed under Article 1372 is not maintainable. This argument is twofold.
Firstly, there is no strong ground for entertaining the aforesaid petition. Secondly,
the finality of the judgment must be respected.
1.1 NO STRONG GROUND FOR ENTERTAINING THE PETITION
2. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the curative petition field after
the final judgment in the review petition which was dismissed. Curative petition can
only be filed after the review petition has been dismissed and there exist strong
grounds for allowing the petition. Article 1373 was broadly interpreted in the Rupa
Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra & Anr4 to provide another constitutional remedy i.e
curative petition to the person whose review petition has been dismissed by the
Supreme Court. These grounds were provided in the Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok
Hurra & Anr5.
a) There is a violation of the principle of natural justice
b) Biasness of the judge by not disclosing his links with the party
c) Or on the account of abuse of the process of the court
3. Justice Banerjee also added that, “Curative Petitions ought to be treated as a rarity
rather than regular.” It has been held that the power of review can be exercised for
correction of a mistake and not to substitute view.6 In the present case natural justice
have been provided and there was no miscarriage of justice done in the review
petition neither there was any abuse of the process of the court. The court in the
aforementioned case stated that “in order to prevent abuse of its process and to cure
gross miscarriage of justice, it may reconsider its judgements in exercise of its
inherent powers”.
4. However in the present case there is no such grounds on which the petition can be
allowed. The curative petition cannot be allowed to the appellant if they are not
2
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Article 137
3
ibid
4
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, JT (2002) 3 SC 609: (2002) 4 SCC 388
5
Ibid
6
Lily Thomas vs. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1650
13
satisfied with the judgment as in every case one or two parties against whose the
order has been delivered would always be unsatisfied with the judgement and they
cannot approach the court for filing the Review or Curative petition as it will only
lead to the flood of appeals for a change in the decision.
5. The constitution framers intended to impose limitations on the power given to the
Supreme Court for reviewing its own judgment. As provided under the Article 137 7
of the Indonia constitution which starts with ‘Subject to any law made by the
Parliament’ rather than a non-obstante clause.8 The intention of the constitutional
bench in Rupa Hurra case was that the curative petition will be filed in only
exceptional cases. However, after the evolution of the curative petition, a number of
petitions have been filed by the litigants.
6. The court in again Rupa Ashok Hurra vs.Ashok Hurra9 made a conjoint reading of
Article 137 with Order XLVII Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules for propounding
the constitutional basis for curative petition. In Sumer v. State of Uttar Pradesh10 the
court held that just for the reappreciation of evidence, curative petition cannot be
filed. The court criticized such a petition and said that reappreciation of evidence is
impermissible.
7. Thus, it can be inferred from the above submission that the curative petitions is for
rarest of rare cases, meritorious cases will invoke the inherent jurisdiction and only
such matters will be entertained where the judgment genuinely suffers from any
miscarriage of justice.
8. Therefore, in the present case we can find that there exist no strong grounds for
entertaining the curative petition filed by the appellant. Thus, it was the duty of the
court to struck down the 159-year-old law criminalizing adultery and man is not
considered the master of the wife.
1.2 DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF JUDGEMENT MUST BE RESPECTED.
7
Supra 2
8
Tiwari & Narayan “Recolouring The Colored Walls of Constitution: A Futile Judicial Exercise of Creating
The Curative Petition” IJLPP2.2E.
9
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, JT (2002) 3 SC 609: (2002) 4 SCC 388
10
Sumer v. State Of Uttar Pradesh, 2005 CRILJ 540
14
9. Certainty and continuity are
10. the essential ingredients of the court of law. In the rule of law there is a doctrine
which provides for the finality of the judgment and bringing an end to the long
hierarchy of appeal. The conept of finality of judgment have been examined by the
court in Indonian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of Indonia & Ors.11 While
examining various authorities on the subject the hon’ble court has also examined the
law prevalent in other countries such as England, Canada.
11. ‘Republicae ut sit finis litium' is a latin maxim which provides that there should be an
end of litigation after a long hierarchy of appeals. It is rare that in an adversarial
system, despite the judges of the highest court doing their best, one or more parties
may remain unsatisfied with the most correct decision. It should be presumed that
every proceeding has gone through infiltration several times before the decision of the
Apex Court. In the instant case, even after final judgment of this court, the review
petition was also dismissed. Thereafter, even the curative petition has also been
dismissed in this case. The controversy between the parties must come to an end at
some stage and the judgment of this court must be permitted to acquire finality.
12. It would be improper to allow the parties to file application after application
endlessly. As Indonia is governed by the rule of law, finality of the judgment is
absolutely imperative and great sanctity is attached to the finality of the judgment. If
the parties are allowed to reopen the concluded case then it would clearly be
considered as an abuse of the process of law and would have adverse impact on the
administration of justice.
13. A three-Judge Bench of this court in M/s Northern Indonia Caterers (Indonia) Ltd. v.
Lt. Governor of Delhi12 held that a party is not entitled to seek a review of this court's
judgment merely for the purpose of rehearing and for a fresh decision of the case.
Departure from the normal principle that the court's judgment is final would be
justified only when compelling our substantial circumstances make it necessary to do
so. Such circumstances may be that a material statutory provision was not drawn to
the court's attention at the original hearing or a manifest wrong has been done. In
11
Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India & Ors. 1996 AIR 1446, 1996 SCC (3) 212
12
M/s Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1980) 2 SCC 167
15
Union of Indonia & Another v. Raghubir Singh 13, this Court held that the plea for
reconsideration is not to be entertained merely because the petitioner chooses to
reagitate the points concluded by the earlier decision in Sub-committee on Judicial
Accountability.
14. In Rupa Ashok Hurra, this Court observed thus: When this Court decides questions
of law, its decisions are, under Article 141, binding on all courts within the territory of
Indonia, and so, it must be the constant endeavour and concern of this Court to
introduce and maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the interpretation of
law in the country. Frequent exercise by this Court of its power to review its earlier
decisions on the ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the Court to be
more reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce
confusion which must be consistently avoided.
15. In Rupa Ashok Hurra while providing for the remedy of curative petition, but at the
same time to prevent abuse of such remedy and filing in that garb a second review
petition as a matter of course, the Constitution Bench said that except when very
strong reasons exist, the court should not entertain an application seeking
reconsideration of an order of this Court which has become final on dismissal of
review petition. In this view, strict conditions including filing of certificate by a
Senior Advocate were provided in Rupa Ashok Hurra. M. Nagabhushana v. State of
Karnataka and others14 observed that principle of finality is passed on high principle
of public policy. The court in para 13 of the said judgment observed as under:
“That principle of finality of litigation is based on high principle of public policy. In

the absence of such a principle great oppression might result under the color and
pretence of law inasmuch as there will be no end of litigation and a rich and malicious
litigant will succeed in infinitely vexing his opponent by repetitive suits and actions.
This may compel the weaker party to relinquish his right.”
16. The doctrine of res judicata has been evolved to prevent such an anarchy. That is why
it is perceived that the plea of res judicata is not a technical doctrine but a
fundamental principle which sustains the rule of law in ensuring finality in litigation.
13
Union of India & Another v. Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754
14
Naga Bhushana v. State of Karnataka and others (2011) 3 SCC 408
16
This principle seeks to promote honesty and a fair administration of justice and to
prevent abuse in the matter of accessing court for agitating on issues which have
become final between the parties.
17. Therefore it is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that the doctrine of finality
of judgment should be respected except where a glaring omission or patent mistake or
like grave error has crept in the earlier decision.15 And we can find from the present
appeal that the there is no such grave error in the decision given by the Supreme Court
for which the aforementioned petition is filed.
ISSUE 2. WHETHER SECTION 497 I.P.C. PROTECTS THE SANCTITY

OF MARRIAGE?
18. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the said provision does not
protect the sanctity of marriage and instead treats women as the property of the
husband. Adultery is a form of extramarital sex. It is sexual infidelity to one's spouse.
It originally referred only to sex between a woman who was married and a person
other than her spouse.
2.1 ADULTERY LAW STRIPS THE WOMAN OF HER SEXUAL AUTONOMY
19. This provision drafted by the Macaulay was based on the social infrastructure that
existed in those times; the secondary and economically dependent position of women
was not conducive to punish adulterous men. At the time of drafting the provision
polygamy was an everyday affair at that time, the wife was socially conditioned to
accept her husband’s adulterous relationship. She neither felt humiliated nor was it a
culture shock for her. Thus, the british declared Adultery as a crime committed by
only men.
20. It is humbly contended by the respondent that the Married woman's sexual agency
rendered wholly dependent on consent or connivance of husband as husband having
the sole right over the body of her wife. Thus, it is evident that if the adultery is done
with the consent of the husband then such act ceases to be an offence.
21. It is also contended by the respondent that the Section 497 16 of the IPC does not
bother about husband having sex outside the marriage with an unmarried woman.
15
Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib 1975 1 SCC 674
16
Section 497 of Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860
17
This provision is mainly concerned with the sexual intercourse with the wife of
another man, and hence the provision was majorly addressing the 'harm' felt by the
other man. It is all about protecting a husband’s interest in his “exclusive access to his
wife’s sexuality”.
22. The sexual autonomy of the wife is part of her inviolable rights. Though it is
important to note that the Section 497 17 does not bring in its preview an extramarital
relationship with an unmarried woman or a widow, no concern has been provided to
this. Thus, it frees man to engage in sexual relations outside the marriage to single or
an unmarried woman without any repercussion under criminal law and enabling man
to run away with it as he is having his sexual autonomy. Whereas Section 49718
denudes a woman of her sexual autonomy in making its free exercise conditional on
the consent of her spouse. In doing so, it perpetuates the notion that a woman consents
to a limited autonomy on entering marriage. The enforcement of forced female
fidelity by curtailing sexual autonomy is an affront to the fundamental right to dignity
and equality.
23. Sec. 497 disregards the sexual autonomy which every woman possesses as a
necessary condition of her existence. Implicit in seeking to privilege the fidelity of
women in a marriage is the assumption that a woman contracts away her sexual
agency when entering a marriage. Sec. 49719 disregards the sexual autonomy which
every woman possesses as a necessary condition of her existence. Implicit in seeking
to privilege the fidelity of women in a marriage is the assumption that a woman
contracts away her sexual agency when entering a marriage.
24. Therefore, it can be seen that only women are not responsible for protecting the
institution and sanctity of marriage. The present provision which has been made
unconstitutional because it does not fit the present constitutional morality. It’s not
necessary that the woman is always a victim of such crime and not the author of it. A
female too may have an urge to step outside her holy matrimony; otherwise an act of
non-consensual sex shall amount to rape. Since the provision is arbitrary and can’t
hold women captive by societal expectation and most importantly the husband is not
the owner of the wife.
17
Ibid
18
id
19
Supra 16
18
Thus, the colonial-era law criminalizing adultery strips women of their "sexual
autonomy" and treats them as a "chattel" and "property" of their husbands.20
2.2 NOTION OF MARITAL SUBORDINATION IS NOT RELEVANT IN

CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
25. Historically it is evident that the women have always been disadvantaged by the
institution of marriage. The meaning of marriage is so deeply rooted in patriarchy and
gender inequality, that, in the modern sense, it does not make sense for a young
woman to tie the knot unless she has a partner willing to reject all traditional overtures
of marriage.
26. In the eyes of law marriage is a civil contract, the consensual act of one spouse
outside the marriage should be at best the violation of that contract. Thus, making it a
civil offence but not a criminal offence. As it is contended by appellant the that the
adultery laws are needed to protect the divine and pure institution of marriage. As in
the review petition the court has rightly struck down the adultery law as it is essential
for the judiciary to recognize the divinely sanctioned contract which needs unending
legislation to keep one partner from abusing the other is not at all divine.
27. It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that the denying sexual autonomy of
a woman after being married is not moral in the society as before marriage the major
woman has the right to make individual decisions. A woman who is a major has a
right to go anywhere and live with anyone she likes without getting married. This may
be regarded immoral by society but it is not illegal. 21 Women does not pledge her
sexual autonomy to her husband after marriage and depriving her of choice to have
consensual sex with anyone outside marriage cannot be curbed. A woman's 'purity'
and a man's marital 'entitlement' to her exclusive sexual possession may be reflective
of the antiquated social and sexual mores of the nineteenth century, but they cannot be
recognized as being so today.22
28. Section 497 also denudes a married woman of her agency and identity, employing the
force of law to preserve a patriarchal conception of marriage which is at odds with
20
R. v. R., (1991) 4 ALL ER 481
21
Payal Sharma v. Supdt, Nari Niketan kalindri vihar, agra, AIR 2001 All 254.
22
Joseph Shine v. Union of India 2018 SCC SC 1676
19
constitutional morality," The provision was proved to be a denial of substantive

equality as it reinforces the notion that women were "unequal participants" in a
marriage and were incapable of freely consenting to a sexual act. Section 497 was all
about protecting a husband's interest in his "exclusive access to his wife's sexuality"
and characterizing a woman as a "passive object, denuded of agency, is a denial of
autonomy".
29. The notion that a woman is 'submissive', or worse still 'naive' has no legitimacy in the
discourse of a liberal constitution. It is deeply offensive to equality and destructive of
the dignity of the woman. it is also not relevant to the contemporary perspective
where men and women in marriage are conferred equal rights and liabilities.
Therefore it is contended by the respondent that such an arbitrary provision has no
place in the constitutional order as the constitution of Indonia provides for the
equality to women and for neutralizing the cumulative socio economic, education and
political disadvantages faced by them.
30. It is also contended by the respondent that if in a wedlock the parties have lost their
moral commitment, the marriage will fail, and punishment meted out to the third party
is not going to change that and adultery is the result, not the cause of the unhappy
marriage. If the spouses are living in harmony and love there is nothing which can be
broken by the third person.
31. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that adultery is the
consequence which arises after the collapse of faith, belief in the relief in the
relationship. So as to make it correct, the supreme has given a proper ruling by
keeping all these aspects in mind. The punishment meted out to the adulterer will
bring relief to the injured party but for the short time. Thus, it destroys the sanctity of
marriage But will also lead to the devastation of marriage life.
ISSUE 3. WHETHER THE EXEMPTION GRANTED TO MARRIED

WOMEN UNDER SECTION 497, I.P.C. VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the exemption granted to the women
from prosecution under sec. 49723 IPC is violative of the fundamental rights of the
23
Supra 16
20
constitution of Indonia and is thus not protected by article 15 (3)24 of the constitution of
Indonia.
3.1 ARTICLE 15 (3) DOES NOT PROTECT A STATUTORY PROVISION THAT

ENTRENCHES PATRIARCHAL NOTIONS IN THE GARB OF PROTECTING
WOMEN
32. Article 15(3) encapsulates the notion of 'protective discrimination'. The constitutional
guarantee in Article 15(3) cannot be employed in a manner that entrenches
paternalistic notions of 'protection'. This latter view of protection only serves to place
women in a cage.
33. Sec. 497 exempts a woman from being punished as an abettor. As contended by the
appellant the exemption seeks to be justified on the ground of being a provision that is
beneficial to women and protected under Art. 15 (3) of the Constitution but Article
15(3) does not exist in isolation. Articles 1425 to 1826, being constituents of a single
code on equality, supplement each other and incorporate a non-discrimination
principle. Article 15(3) when read with the other Articles in Part III, serves as a
powerful remedy to remedy the discrimination and prejudice faced by women for
centuries.
34. Article 14 ensures equality of law and prohibits invidious discrimination.
Arbitrariness or arbitrary exclusion are sworn enemies to equality. The invocation of
Article 15(3)27 as a carte blanche to uphold laws that impose differential benefits and
burdens upon men and women, ostensibly to the advantage of women, is unjustified. 28
Article 15(3)29 is nestled within article 14, 15, 16 of the constitution of Indonia. The
use of the phrase “nothing in this Article”, as a precursor to Article 15(3)30 suggests
that where a legislative classification might otherwise have fallen foul of the non-
discrimination guarantee of Article 15(1), Article 15(3) would save it. However, given
24
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Article 15(3)
25
26
27
Supra 23
28
Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 Bom. 470.
29
Supra 23
30
ibid
21
that Article 15(3) is itself a part of Article 15 suggests that the goal of such
classification must also fit within the concept of equality.
35. It is also submitted that reservations or quotas for women in Parliament, which serve
to correct a historical wrong, caused by the structural inequality between the sexes for
many generations, can be justified by recourse to Article 15(3) because the
differential benefits/burdens are aimed at mitigating the effects of a concrete,
historical and institutional inequality.
36. However, laws making “special provisions” for women (and children) ought to be
judicially reviewed for whether or not they bear some connection with remedying the
historical and structural subordination of women. this form of reasoning has been
entirely absent from Indonian sex discrimination jurisprudence.31
37. This particular notion was endorsed by the Fifth Law Commission which
recommended that the wife, who has sexual intercourse with a person other than her
husband, should be punished for committing adultery as the reasons that prompted
authors of the Penal Code in the nineteenth century for exempting her from
punishment are ‘not valid’ and there is ‘hardly any Justification for not treating the
guilty pair alike’.
38. In Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay 32, The Bombay High Court, relied upon the
carte blanche approach to Art. 15 (3): In this case, the Supreme Court rejected a
constitutional challenge to the adultery provision in the I.P.C., which is asymmetrical
in that women cannot be prosecuted for adultery. The Court upheld the law by a
simple invocation of Art. 15 (3), ignoring the fact that the basis of the adultery
provision was precisely the kind of stereotypical gender-based assumptions that the
Constitution intended to do away with: i.e., that women are passive partners, lacking
in sexual autonomy. This inattention to how Art. 15 (3) ought not to end up becoming
a shield to perpetuate sexual and gender-role based stereotypes has plagued the
Court’s jurisprudence ever since.33
39. Article 15(3) of the Constitution is an enabling provision which permits the State to
frame beneficial legislation in favor of women and children, to protect and uplift this
class of citizens. Section 497 is a penal provision for the offence of adultery, an act
which is committed consensually between two adults who have strayed out of the
31
Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, AIR 2008 SC 663
32
Supra 15
33
Joseph Shine v. Union of India, 2018 SCC SC 1676
22
marital bond. Such a provision cannot be considered to be a beneficial legislation

covered by Article 15(3) of the Constitution. The true purpose of affirmative action is
to uplift women and empower them in socio-economic spheres. 34 A legislation which
takes away the rights of women to prosecute cannot be termed as “beneficial
legislation.
40. The purpose of Article 15(3) is to further socio-economic equality of women. It
permits special legislation for special classes. However, Article 15(3) cannot operate
as a cover for exemption from an offence having penal consequences. A section
which perpetuates oppression of women is unsustainable in law, and cannot take
cover under the guise of protective discrimination. The aforesaid provision is also
discriminatory and therefore, violative of Article 14 and Article 15(1). As has been
held by us hereinabove, in treating a woman as chattel for the purposes of this
provision, it is clear that such provision discriminates against women on grounds of
sex only, and must be struck down on ground of being violative of article 15(3) of the
constitution.
41. It is vehemently argued that special provisions can be made for women as under Art.
15 (3) of the Constitution, but the same cannot be used to give them a license to
commit and abet crimes. Any provision which prohibits punishment is tantamount to
a license to commit the offence of which punishment has been prohibited. Further
there also exists disparity in the right to prosecute under section 198(2), the aforesaid
provision does not provide the wife right to prosecute, this provision is only reserved
for the husband of the woman involved in the relationship.
42. Thus, the main aim of the provision of Article 15(3) is to make special provision for
women and children. The reason is that “women’s physical structure and the
performance of the maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for
subsistence and her physical well-being becomes an object of public interest and care
in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.35
3.2 THE NOTION THAT MARRIED WOMAN IS A “VICTIM”, AND THE MALE
OFFENDER IS THE “SEDUCER” IS NO LONGER RELEVANT IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
34
Ibid
35
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 . 1907.
23
43. Section 497 exempts women from criminal liability. Underlying this exemption is the
notion that women, being denuded of sexual agency, should be afforded the ‘protection’
of the law. In criminalizing the accused who engages in the sexual relationship, the law
perpetuates a gender stereotype that men, possessing sexual agency are the seducers, and
that women, as passive beings devoid of sexual agency, are the seduced. The notion that a
woman is ‘submissive’, or worse still ‘naïve’ has no legitimacy in the discourse of a
liberal constitution.36 It is deeply offensive to equality and destructive of the dignity of the
woman. On this stereotype, Section 497 criminalizes only the accused man.
44. Section 497 has a significant social impact on the sexual agency of women. It builds on
existing gender stereotypes and bias and further perpetuates them. Cultural stereotypes
are more forgiving of a man engaging in sexual relations than a woman. Women then are
expected to be chaste before and faithful during marriage. Underlying this exemption is
the notion that a woman is the victim of being seduced into a sexual relationship with a
person who is not her husband. In assuming that the woman has no sexual agency, this
highlights that section 497 provides that there is no women sexual agency. It also exempts
the women as the abettor in the offence however, the exemption to women is prima facie
granted on the perusal of Sec. 497, I.P.C. by treating her as a victim.
45. This sort of differential treatment implying that women is always a victim and not capable
of making independent choices and always needs protection in all respects even for the
results of her own consensual acts clearly seems to be affecting women’s dignity and
equal status in society. It hurts the individual dignity of women and works on the unreal
presumption that woman is always a victim even in consensual sexual relationships.
46. Section 497 seeks the preservation of a construct of marriage in which female fidelity is
enforced by the letter of the law and by the coercive authority of the state. Such a
conception goes against the spirit of the rights-based jurisprudence of this Court, which
seeks to protect the dignity of an individual and her “intimate personal choices. 37 It cannot
be held that these rights cease to exist once the woman enters into a marriage.
47. The identity of the woman must be as an ‘individual in her own right’. In that sense, her
identity does not get submerged as a result of her marriage. Section 497 lays down the
norm that the identity of a married woman is but as the wife of her spouse. Underlying the
norm is a notion of control over and subjugation of the woman. Such notions cannot
withstand scrutiny under a liberal constitution.
36
Supra 18
37
Supra 18
24
48. Section 497 fails to consider both men and women as equally autonomous individuals in
society.” Thus, Ancient notions of the man being the seducer and the woman being the
victim permeate the judgment, which is no longer the case today.
ISSUE4. WHETHER SECTION 497, I.P.C. READ WITH SECTION 198

(2) Cr.P.C. IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR NOT?
49. It is humbly submitted before this honorable Court that Sec. 497, I.P.C. read with Sec.
198 (2) Cr.P.C.38 is unconstitutional. After elaborately dealing with the facts it can be
seen that there is a violation of Article 14, 15 and 21 of the constitution of Indonia and
the section has rightly been struck down as constitutionally invalid in it’s entirety. The
aforesaid section also does not provide for the penalization of homosexual adultery.
4.1 SECTION 497 VIOLATES OF ARTICLE 14, 15 AND 21 OF THE INDONIAN
CONSTITUTION
50. The true scope and nature of Article 14 of the Constitution was highlighted in
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of Indonia 39; R.D. Shetty v. Airport Authority 40; E.P
Royappa v. State Of Tamil Nadu41,. As according to the section 497, when the sexual
intercourse takes place with the consent of both the parties, punishment of only men
under adultery and exempting women does not hold a valid ground in the light of
changing societal conditions. The aforementioned provision is against the true nature
and scope of Article 14. Section 497 of the IPC is unconstitutional on the ground that
it discriminates against various genders and violates Article 14, 15 and 21 of the
Constitution of Indonia.
51. Section 497 IPC cannot be interpreted as a beneficial provision under Article 15 (3) of
the Constitution of Indonia. Article 15(3) of the constitution states as follows:
“Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for
women and children”. Article 15(3) permits affirmative action in favour of women.
This provision neither meant to exempt married women from the liability of
punishment in criminal offences nor a wife from prosecuting her husband. Balance in
the provision of both complications under the section should be observed and justified
by the Hon’ble Court, where discrimination against a particular sex would offend
38
Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), 1973
39
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR 597 1978 SCR (2) 621
40
R.D. Shetty v. Airport Authority 1979 AIR 1628, 1979 SCR (3)1014
41
E.P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu 1974 AIR 555 1974 SCR (2) 348 1974 SCC (4) 3
25
Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of Indonia, when men and woman are on equal
footing.
52. The scope of Article 15(3) of the Constitution of Indonia was explained by this
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thota Sesharathamma and Anr v. Thota Manikyamma and
Other42, as Its effect must be tested on the anvil of socio- economic justice, equality of
status and to oversee whether it would sub serve the constitutional animation or
frustrates. Art. 15(3) relieves from the rigour of Art. 15(1) and charges the State to
make special provision to accord to-women socioeconomic equality. As a fact, Art.
15(3) as a forerunner to common code does animate 'to 'make law to accord socio-
economic equality to every female citizen of Indonia, irrespective of religion, race,
caste or region.
Therefore, the purpose of Article 15(3) is to further socio-economic equality of
women. It cannot operate as a license for criminal exemption as provided under
Article 15(3).
53. It is also important to note that Section 497 provided with 198(2) does not provide a
woman to prosecute her husband. It expressly lays down as follows, “no person other
than the husband of the woman shall be deemed to be aggrieved by any offence
punishable under section 497 or section 498 of the said Code.” 43 Therefore the
woman is left with no remedy and the wives of those men committing adultery are
also equally aggrieved by the adulterous act.44 Excluding her from the purview of
initiating criminal prosecution has no rhyme or reason. Such an exclusion is unjust,
illegal and arbitrary and violative of the fundamental rights under Article 14 and 15 of
the Constitution of Indonia.
54. Section 497 of the Indonian penal code and section 198(1) read with section 198(2) of
the criminal procedure code go hand in hand and constitute a legislative packet to deal
with the offence committed by an outsider to the matrimonial unit who invades the
peace and privacy of the matrimonial unit and poisons the relationship between the
two partners constituting the matrimonial unit. The government by this impugned
section is favoring class legislation which is violative of Article 14.
42
Thota Sesharathamma and Anr v. Thota Manikyamma and Others 1991 SCR (3) 717 1991 SCC (4) 312 JT
1991 (3) 506 1991 SCALE (2)434
43
Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), 1973
44
Supra 18
26
55. The fundamental principle is that Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits
reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation which classification must
satisfy the twin tests of classification being founded on an intelligible differentia
which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are
left out of the group and that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object
sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
56. The equality principles were reaffirmed in the Second World Conference on Human
Rights at Vienna in June 199345 and in the Fourth World Conference on Women held
in Beijing in 199546. Indonia was a party to this convention and other declarations and
is committed to actualize them. In 1993 Conference, gender-based violence and all
categories of sexual harassment and exploitation were condemned. A part of the
Resolution reads thus: “The human rights of women and of the girl child are an
inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights. 47 The World
Conference on Human Rights urges governments, institutions, inter-governmental and
non-governmental organizations to intensify their efforts for the protection and
promotion of human rights of women and the girl child.” Some of the most important
International Covenants under Art. 26 of ICCPR 48, and Art. 7 of the UDHR, 1948 49,
declares that all are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of the laws. Sec.497 had a great impact on the sexual agency of
the women. Upon identification of patriarchal and paternalistic undertones of the
provision. Thus, it can be said that It builds on existing gender stereotypes and bias
and further perpetuates them.
57. Section 497 of the IPC is unconstitutional for the further reason that the right to
engage in sexual intercourse is an intrinsic part of right to life under Article 21 of
Constitution of Indonia. Griswold v. Connecticut50, Bowers v. Hardwick51 were some
of the foreign judgement which acted as a foundation for privacy to be considered as a
45
Report on the second world conference of women UN General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action, 12 July 1993, A/CONF.157/23,
Last visited – October 26, 2020
46
Report on the fourth world conference of women UN genral Assembly Beijing, 4-15 September 1995
A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 Last Visited – 26 October 2020
47
Ibid
48
International Covenant on the civil, and political rights, 1966 Art. 26
49
Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948
50
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
51
Bowers v. Hardwick 106 S. Ct 2841
27
fundamental right. There is no reason to criminalize consensual sexual intercourse

between two adults.
58. K S Puttaswamy v. Union of Indonia,52 a nine-judge Constitution Bench declared that
the right to privacy is a fundamental right under Art. 21, stating: “Sexual privacy is an
integral part of right to privacy.” To "shackle" sexual freedom of a woman and allow
criminalization of consensual relationships was a denial of the right of sexual privacy
and considering a citizen as a property of others was an "anathema" to the ideal of
dignity.
59. Women in Indonia have the right to make autonomous decisions. Thus in Anuj Garg
v. Hotel Association of Indonia53, this Court held that personal autonomy includes
both the negative right of not to be subject to interference by others and the positive
right of individuals to make decisions about their life, to express themselves and to
choose which activities to take part in.
60. Secrecy is an essential adjunct to the private life. The exercise of secrecy in relation to
facts that bear a highly personal character is the very essence of personal autonomy.
Such a view renders the provision criminalizing sexual intercourse between two
consenting and willing adults as being illegal and unconstitutional. The mutual
decision of two agreeable adults to participate in sexual activity goes to the very core
of the privacy jurisprudence and calls for removal of any restrictions on a person’s
decision to participate or not participate in a sexual activity.
61. United Nations Working Group on discrimination against women in law and in
practice in 201254, stated “The United Nations Working Group on discrimination
against women in law and in practice is deeply concerned at the criminalization and
penalization of adultery whose enforcement leads to discrimination and violence
against women.” Therefore, for this reason as well, the above said provisions are only
liable to be struck down as unconstitutional”.
62. Furthermore, under section 198(2) the right to prosecute the adulterer is restricted
only to the husband of the adulteress but has not been extended to the wife of the
adulterer. Thus, it violates the principle of natural justice. The procedural law which
52
K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1
53
Supra 16
54
United Nations Working Group on discrimination against women in law and in practice, 2012
28
has been enacted in Sec. 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 re-enforces the
stereotypes implicit in Sec. 497.
Hence, the aforesaid provision on the ground of being obnoxious and also in violation
of fundamental rights and should be made unconstitutional as rightly decided by the
Apex court. It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that the Sec. 497, I.P.C.
read with Sec. 198 (2) Cr.P.C. is unconstitutional in its entirety and has been rightly
struck down by this court.
4.2 SECTION 497 DOES NOT PENALIZE HOMOSEXUAL ADULTERY
63. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble court that the Supreme Court in Navtej
Singh Johar v. union of Indonia55 ruled unanimously that Section 377 was
unconstitutional "in so far as it criminalises consensual sexual conduct between adults
of the same sex". As section 377 has been decriminalized then the acts within its
ambit would not constitute an unnatural offence.
64. The recent judgment of NALSA v. Union of Indonia56 has made Transgender as a
third gender. By recognizing transgenders as third gender, the Court is not only
upholding the rule of law but also advancing justice to the class, so far deprived of
their legitimate natural and constitutional rights. The section does not speak anything
pertaining to the third gender and provisions pertaining to them are unclear creating a
confusion while transgender is legally considered as a third gender but there is no
provision of inclusion of gays, lesbians, bisexuals in the same.
65. The aforesaid provision lacks in providing the adultery provision for third gender.
Also, no amendment was made in respect of the third gender after the nalsa vs union
of Indonia case to make section 497 gender neutral. It is submitted that section 497 of
IPC and 198 (2) of CrPC makes it clear that only men can be penalized for
commission of offence of adultery which is vulnerable to the constitutional challenge
under article 14, 15 and 21 of the constitution of Indonia.
55
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 485
56
NALSA v. Union of India AIR 2014 SC 1863
29
66. This provision was challenged before this Hon’ble Court on three occasions, firstly in
Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay 57 and Another secondly in Sowmithri Vishnu v.
Union of Indonia58 and finally, in V. Revathi v. Union of Indonia59 and also However,
in view of the emerging jurisprudence on Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution
and the changed social conditions, the writ petition filed by Women’s Freedom Union
for reconsideration of the Section 497 and sec 198(2) as to be declared
unconstitutional has been rightly struck down in its entirety.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
AND AUTHORITIES CITED, IT IS HUMBLY PUT FORWARD TO THIS HON’BLE
COURT THAT:
57
Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 Bom. 470
58
Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India 1985 AIR 1618, 1985 SCR Supl. (1) 741
59
V. Revathi v. Union of India 1988 AIR 835
30
 THE CURATIVE PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE
 SEC. 497, I.P.C. DOES NOT PROTECTS THE SANCTITY OF MARRIAGE
 THE EXEMPTION GRANTED TO MARRIED WOMEN UNDER SEC. 497,

I.P.C. VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
 SEC. 497 OF I.P.C. READ WITH SEC. 198 (2) OF Cr.P.C. IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND MAY PASS ANY SUCH ORDER, OTHER ORDER THAT IT DEEMS FIT IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE. AND FOR THIS,
PETITONER AS IN DUTY BOUND SHALL HUMBLY PRAY.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY
COUNSELS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
31

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INTERNAL NATIONAL RANKING ROUND MOOT COURT

COMPETITION MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

INTERNAL NATIONAL RANKING ROUND MOOT COURT COMPETITION

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDONIANA

CURATIVE PETITION (Criminal)

REVIEW PETITION (CRIMINAL)

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL)

WOMEN FREEDOM UNION……………………………..RESPONDENT

UNDER ARTICLE 137 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDONIA

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF REPONDENT

1. WHETHER THE CURATIVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?..................14

2. WHETHER SECTION 497, I.P.C. PROTECTS THE SANCTITY OF

3. WHETHER THE EXEMPTION GRANTED TO MARRIED WOMEN UNDER

"& " And

AIR All Indonia Report

CrPC Criminal Procedure Code

Cri. L. J. / Cr. L. J. Criminal Law Journal

IPC Indonia Penal Code

ILR Indonia Law Reports

S.C. Supreme Court

S.C.C. Supreme Court Case

UDHR Universal Declaration OF Human

UOI Union of Indonia

1. Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, AIR 2008 SC 663

3. Bowers v. Hardwick 106 S. Ct 2841

1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

ARTICLE AND LEGAL JOURNALS

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

 That Sec. 497 is valid on the ground of affirmative action.

SEC.497, I.P.C VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER

ISSUE 1. WHETHER THE CURATIVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE.

ISSUE 2 WHTHER SECTION 497 OF THE IPC PROTECTS THE SANCTITY OF

ISSUE1.WHETHER THE CURATIVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE.

1.1 NO STRONG GROUND FOR ENTERTAINING THE PETITION

a) There is a violation of the principle of natural justice

c) Or on the account of abuse of the process of the court

1.2 DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF JUDGEMENT MUST BE RESPECTED.

9. Certainty and continuity are

“That principle of finality of litigation is based on high principle of public policy. In

ISSUE 2. WHETHER SECTION 497 I.P.C. PROTECTS THE SANCTITY

2.2 NOTION OF MARITAL SUBORDINATION IS NOT RELEVANT IN

constitutional morality," The provision was proved to be a denial of substantive

ISSUE 3. WHETHER THE EXEMPTION GRANTED TO MARRIED

3.1 ARTICLE 15 (3) DOES NOT PROTECT A STATUTORY PROVISION THAT

marital bond. Such a provision cannot be considered to be a beneficial legislation

ISSUE4. WHETHER SECTION 497, I.P.C. READ WITH SECTION 198

fundamental right. There is no reason to criminalize consensual sexual intercourse

4.2 SECTION 497 DOES NOT PENALIZE HOMOSEXUAL ADULTERY

 THE CURATIVE PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE

 SEC. 497, I.P.C. DOES NOT PROTECTS THE SANCTITY OF MARRIAGE

 THE EXEMPTION GRANTED TO MARRIED WOMEN UNDER SEC. 497,

 SEC. 497 OF I.P.C. READ WITH SEC. 198 (2) OF Cr.P.C. IS

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