G.R. No. 176707. February 17, 2010.*

 
ARLIN B. OBIASCA,1 petitioner, vs. JEANE O. BASALLOTE, respondent.

Public Officers; Civil Service; Judgments; A final and definitive judgment can no
longer be changed, revised, amended or reversed.—In this case, petitioner did not file a
petition for reconsideration of the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 before filing
a petition for review in the CA. Such fatal procedural lapse on petitioner’s part allowed
the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 to become final and executory. Hence, for
all intents and purposes, the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 has become
immutable and can no longer be amended or modified.  A final and definitive
judgment can no longer be changed, revised, amended or reversed.  Thus, in
praying for the reversal of the assailed Court of Appeals decision which affirmed the
final and executory CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005, petitioner would want the
Court to reverse a final and executory judgment and disregard the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments.
Same; Same; Same; Motions for Reconsideration; While Section 18, Rule VI of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292) does not
supplant the mode of appeal under Rule 43, the Court cannot disregard Section 16 of the
same Rules, which requires that a petition for reconsideration should be filed, otherwise,
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision will become final and executory.—True, a
dissatisfied employee of the civil service is not preempted from availing of remedies
other than those provided in Section 18 of the Omnibus Rules. This is precisely the
purpose of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which provides for the filing of a petition for
review as a remedy to challenge the decisions of the CSC. While Section 18 of the
Omnibus Rules does not supplant the mode of appeal under Rule 43, we cannot
disregard Section 16 of the Omnibus Rules, which requires that a petition for
reconsideration

_______________

* EN BANC.
1  Based on documents submitted by petitioner himself, his full name is Arlin Balane Obiasca.
However, he also refers to himself in the records as “Arlin O. Obiasca.”

 
 
111

should be filed, otherwise, the CSC decision will become final and
executory, viz.: The decision of the [CSC] is final and executory if no petition for
reconsideration is filed within fifteen days from receipt thereof. Note that the
foregoing provision is a specific remedy as against CSC decisions involving
its  administrative  function, that is, on matters involving “appointments, whether
original or promotional, to positions in the civil service,” as opposed to its quasi-judicial
function where it adjudicates the rights of persons before it, in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that, for reasons of law, comity and
convenience, where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review
and provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts will not
entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and
the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors
committed in the administrative forum.—The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies requires that, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, where the enabling
statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of
administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a case unless the
available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities
have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum. In Orosa v. Roa, 495 SCRA 22 (2006) the Court ruled that if an
appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the administrative machinery, this
should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts. While the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to certain exceptions, these are not
present in this case.
Same; Same; Appointments; Section 12, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 amended
Section 9(h) of Presidential Decree 807 by deleting the requirement that all appointments
subject to Civil Service Commission (CSC) approval be submitted to it within 30 days.—
It is incorrect to interpret Section 9(h) of Presidential Decree (PD) 807 as requiring that
an appointment must be submitted by the appointing authority to the CSC within 30
days from issuance, otherwise, the appointment would become ineffective. Such
interpretation fails to appreciate the relevant part of Section 9(h) which states

 
 
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that “an appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the
appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and
shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the [CSC].” This provision is
reinforced by Section 1, Rule IV of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and
Other Personnel Actions, which reads: Section 1.  An appointment issued in
accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect immediately upon
its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the
duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting
the approval of his appointment by the Commission. The appointment shall remain
effective until disapproved by the Commission.  x x x More importantly, Section
12, Book V of EO 292 amended Section 9(h) of PD 807 by deleting the requirement that
all appointments subject to CSC approval be submitted to it within 30 days.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; As a rule, an amendment by the
deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning.—As a
rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to
change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made had
there been no intention to effect a change in the meaning of the law or rule. The word,
phrase or sentence excised should accordingly be considered inoperative.
Same; Same; Same; There being no requirement in Executive Order No. 292 that
appointments should be submitted to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) for attestation
within 30 days from issuance, it is doubtful by what authority the CSC imposed such
condition under Section 11, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules—it certainly cannot restore
what Executive Order No. 292 itself already and deliberately removed.—Not even the
historical development of civil service laws can justify the retention of such restrictive
provisions. Public Law No. 5, the law formally establishing a civil service system,
merely directed that all heads of offices notify the Philippine Civil Service Board “in
writing without delay of all appointments x x x made in the classified service.” The
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 was even less stringent as approval by the
Director of the Civil Service of appointments of temporary and emergency employees
was required only when practicable. Finally, Republic Act (RA) 2260 imposed no period
within which appointments were attested to by

 
 
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local government treasurers to whom the CSC delegated its authority to act on
personnel actions but provided that if within 180 days after receipt of said
appointments, the CSC shall not have made any correction or revision, then such
appointments shall be deemed to have been properly made. Consequently, it was only
under PD 807 that submission of appointments for approval by the CSC was subjected
to a 30-day period. That, however, has been lifted and abandoned by EO 292. There
being no requirement in EO 292 that appointments should be submitted to the CSC for
attestation within 30 days from issuance, it is doubtful by what authority the CSC
imposed such condition under Section 11, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules. It certainly
cannot restore what EO 292 itself already and deliberately removed. At the very least,
that requirement cannot be used as basis to unjustly prejudice respondent.
Same; Same; Same; While public office is not property to which one may acquire a
vested right, it is nevertheless a protected right.—The obvious misgiving that comes to
mind is why Gonzales and Oyardo were able to promptly process petitioner’s
appointment and transmit the same to the CSC for attestation when they could not do
so for respondent. There is no doubt that office politics was moving behind the scenes. In
effect, Gonzales’ and Oyardo’s scheming and plotting unduly deprived respondent of the
professional advancement she deserved. While public office is not property to which one
may acquire a vested right, it is nevertheless a protected right.
Same; Same; Same; Disregarding the rule that the appointment became effective
upon its issuance by the appointing authority and it remained effective until disapproved
by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) (if at all it ever was) and putting undue
importance on the provision requiring the submission of the appointment to the CSC
within 30 days will reward wrongdoing in the appointment process of public officials and
employees.—It cannot be overemphasized that respondent’s appointment became
effective upon its issuance by the appointing authority and it remained effective until
disapproved by the CSC (if at all it ever was). Disregarding this rule and putting undue
importance on the provision requiring the submission of the appointment to the CSC
within 30 days will reward wrongdoing in the appointment process of public officials
and employees. It will open the door for scheming officials to block the completion and
implementation of an appointment and render it ineffective by the

 
 
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simple expedient of not submitting the appointment paper to the CSC. As

indubitably shown in this case, even respondent’s vigilance could not guard against the
malice and grave abuse of discretion of her superiors.
Same; Same; Same; Applying the rule under Article 1186 of the Civil Code that “[t]he
condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment”
to the appointment process in the civil service, unless the appointee himself is negligent in
following up the submission of his appointment to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
for approval, he should not be prejudiced by any willful act done in bad faith by the
appointing authority to prevent the timely submission of his appointment to the CSC.—
Under Article 1186 of the Civil Code, “[t]he condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the
obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment.” Applying this to the appointment process in
the civil service, unless the appointee himself is negligent in following up the
submission of his appointment to the CSC for approval, he should not be prejudiced by
any willful act done in bad faith by the appointing authority to prevent the timely
submission of his appointment to the CSC. While it may be argued that the submission
of respondent’s appointment to the CSC within 30 days was one of the conditions for the
approval of respondent’s appointment, however, deliberately and with bad faith, the
officials responsible for the submission of respondent’s appointment to the CSC
prevented the fulfillment of the said condition. Thus, the said condition should be
deemed fulfilled.
Same; Same; Same; An appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn
or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and effect until
disapproved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).—In appointing petitioner, the
appointing authority effectively revoked the previous appointment of respondent and
usurped the power of the CSC to withdraw or revoke an appointment that had already
been accepted by the appointee. It is the CSC, not the appointing authority, which has
this power. This is clearly provided in Section 9, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules: Section
9. An appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked
by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and effect until
disapproved by the [CSC]. xxxx

 
 
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Same; Same; Same; The insistence on a strict application of the condition regarding
the submission of the appointment to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) within 30
days, would give the appointing authority the power to do indirectly what he or she
cannot do directly—an administrative rule that is of doubtful basis will not only produce
unjust consequences but also corrupt the appointment process.—Petitioner seeks to
inflexibly impose the condition of submission of the appointment to the CSC by the
appointing authority within 30 days from issuance, that is, regardless of the
negligence/diligence of the appointee and the bad faith/good faith of the appointing
authority to ensure compliance with the condition.  However, such stance would
place the appointee at the mercy and whim of the appointing authority even
after a valid appointment has been made.For although the appointing authority
may not recall an appointment accepted by the appointee, he or she can still achieve the
same result through underhanded machinations that impedes or prevents the
transmittal of the appointment to the CSC. In other words, the insistence on a strict
application of the condition regarding the submission of the appointment to the CSC
within 30 days, would give the appointing authority the power to do indirectly what he
or she cannot do directly. An administrative rule that is of doubtful basis will not only
produce unjust consequences but also corrupt the appointment process. Obviously, such
undesirable end result could not have been the intention of the law.
Same; Same; Same; The power to revoke an earlier appointment through the
appointment of another may not be conceded to the appointing authority.—The power to
revoke an earlier appointment through the appointment of another may not be conceded
to the appointing authority. Such position is not only contrary to Section 9, Rule V and
Section 1, Rule IV of the Omnibus Rules. It is also a dangerous reading of the law
because it unduly expands the discretion given to the appointing authority and removes
the checks and balances that will rein in any abuse that may take place. The Court
cannot countenance such erroneous and perilous interpretation of the law. Accordingly,
petitioner’s subsequent appointment was void. There can be no appointment to a non-
vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or her appointment
validly terminated, before another can be appointed to succeed her.

 
 
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Bersamin, J., Dissent:
 

Civil Service; Judgments; Appeals; Motions for Reconsideration; A petition for

reconsideration is not a prerequisite to the filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court.—To begin with, a dissatisfied employee may avail himself of
remedies not limited to the  petition for reconsideration. In fact, Section 18 of the
Omnibus Rules of the CSC expressly recognizes other remedies available to the affected
employee to prevent the disputed “action/decision” from becoming final and executory,
thus: Section 18. Failure to file a protest, appeal, petition for reconsideration or petition
for review within the prescribed period shall be deemed a waiver of such right and shall
render the subject action/decision final and executory. Moreover, such  petition for
reconsideration was not a prerequisite to the filing of a petition for review under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court. It was enough that the petition for review was filed “within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date
of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial
of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the
governing law of the court or agency a quo.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; A rule of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) that might
have intended to render a decision final and executory if no petition for reconsideration is
first brought against the decision or resolution will not stand and prevail over the Rule
43 of the Rules of Court, it being issued by the Supreme Court under its rule-making
authority and which has the force and effect of law, and repeals or supersedes any law or
enactment on the manner and method of appealing the decisions and orders of the
specific quasi-judicial bodies.—A rule of the CSC that might have intended to render a
decision final and executory if no petition for reconsideration is first brought against the
decision or resolution will not stand and prevail over the Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
which clearly authorizes appeals from the “awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of, or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions.” Rule 43, being issued by the Supreme Court under its rule-making
authority in Section 5(5) of Article VIII of the Constitution, has the force and effect of
law, and repeals or supersedes any law or enactment on the manner and

 
 
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method of appealing the decisions and orders of the specific quasi-judicial bodies.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court cannot interpret Executive No. 292 as having
entirely dispensed with the submission requirement in order to make an appointment
effective.—The new provision in Section 12(14) of Executive Order No. 292—“Take
appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service
including extension of Service beyond retirement age”—is a legal provision altogether
different from Section 9(h) of P.D. 807. The former is too broad in scope, for, certainly,
the CSC is not to be limited to merely approving and disapproving appointments. Even
with E.O. 292’s repealing clause (“All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly”), the requirement of submission of appointments within 30 days expressly
stated in the latter is not inconsistent with the authority of the CSC to take appropriate
action on all appointments and other personnel matters. The Court cannot interpret
E.O. 292 as having entirely dispensed with the submission requirement in order to
make an appointment effective. To hold otherwise is to deprive the CSC of the
opportunity to determine whether or not an appointee is qualified for the position to
which he is appointed, which certainly weakens the mandate of the CSC as the central
personnel agency of the Government and negates the constitutional objective of
establishing a career service steeped in professionalism, integrity, and accountability.
Same; Appointments; The appointing officer and the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), acting together, though not concurrently but consecutively, make an appointment
complete—it is from the moment that an appointee assumes a position in the Civil
Service under a completed appointment that he acquires a legal, not merely equitable,
right that is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution.—Its mere
issuance does not render an appointment to the Civil Service complete and effective.
Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292, an appointment not
submitted to the CSC within 30 days from the date of its issuance shall be ineffective.
Compliance with this statutory directive is essential in order to make an appointment to
a civil service position fully effective. Without the favorable certification or approval of
the CSC, where such approval is required, no title to the office can yet be deemed
perma-

 
 
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nently vested in the appointee; hence, the appointment can still be recalled or
withdrawn by the appointing authority. Otherwise put, the appointing officer and
the CSC, acting together, though not concurrently but consecutively, make an
appointment complete. It is from the moment that an appointee assumes a
position in the Civil Service under a completed appointment that he acquires
a legal, not merely equitable, right that is protected not only by statute, but
also by the Constitution. Said right cannot then be taken away from him,
either by revocation of the appointment or by removal, except for cause and
with previous notice and hearing.
Same; Same; The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials, resulting
in the non-observance of the pertinent rules on the matter does not render the legal
requirement, on the necessity of approval of the Commissioner of Civil Service of
appointments, ineffective and unenforceable.—The appropriate disciplining authorities
had already held Diaz, Oyardo and Gonzales to account for their misdeed, with Diaz
being sanctioned by the CSC, and Oyardo and Gonzales being held liable by the
Ombudsman. There the issue of their misdeed should end. Indeed, the Court has made
clear in  Favis v. Rupisan  that the failure of the responsible official to submit for
approval an employee’s appointment did not negate such requirement, thus: xxx. The
tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials, resulting in the non-
observance of the pertinent rules on the matter does not render the legal requirement,
on the necessity of approval of the Commissioner of Civil Service of appointments,
ineffective and unenforceable. In the circumstances, for the duration of his occupancy of
the position in question, the petitioner may be considered merely as a de facto  officer,
and may consequently be removed from office even without cause. Accordingly, that the
respondent’s appointment was not submitted to the CSC because of Diaz’s unjustified
refusal to sign it on the fallacious ground that the respondent’s PDF had not been duly
signed by Gonzales was no reason to validate the respondent’s appointment, or to grant
her any right to the position or to the guarantees provided by law.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

 
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   Adenn L. Sigua for petitioner.

   Ramiro B. Borres, Jr. for respondent.

 
CORONA, J.:
 
When the law is clear, there is no other recourse but to apply it regardless of
its perceived harshness. Dura lex sed lex. Nonetheless, the law should never be
applied or interpreted to oppress one in order to favor another. As a court of
law and of justice, this Court has the duty to adjudicate conflicting claims
based not only on the cold provision of the law but also according to the higher
principles of right and justice.
The facts of this case are undisputed.
On May 26, 2003, City Schools Division Superintendent Nelly B. Beloso
appointed respondent Jeane O. Basallote to the position of Administrative
Officer II, Item No. OSEC-DECSB-ADO2-390030-1998, of the Department of
Education (DepEd), Tabaco National High School in Albay.2Subsequently, in a
letter dated June 4, 2003,3 the new City Schools Division Superintendent, Ma.
Amy O. Oyardo, advised School Principal Dr. Leticia B. Gonzales that the
papers of the applicants for the position of Administrative Officer II of the
school, including those of respondent, were being returned and that a school
ranking should be accomplished and submitted to her office for review. In
addition, Gonzales was advised that only qualified applicants should be
endorsed.
Respondent assumed the office of Administrative Officer II on June 19, 2003.
Thereafter, however, she received a letter from Ma. Teresa U. Diaz, Human
Resource Management Officer I of the City Schools Division of Tabaco City,
Albay, informing her that her appointment could not be forwarded to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) because of her failure to

_______________

2 Rollo, p. 70.
3 Id., at p. 72.

 
 
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submit the position description form (PDF) duly signed by Gonzales.

Respondent tried to obtain Gozales’ signature but the latter refused despite
repeated requests. When respondent informed Oyardo of the situation, she was
instead advised to return to her former teaching position of Teacher I.
Respondent followed the advice.
Meanwhile, on August 25, 2003, Oyardo appointed petitioner Arlin B.
Obiasca to the same position of Administrative Officer II. The appointment was
sent to and was properly attested by the CSC.4 Upon learning this, respondent
filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against
Oyardo, Gonzales and Diaz.
In its decision, the Ombudsman found Oyardo and Gonzales
administratively liable for withholding information from respondent on the
status of her appointment, and suspended them from the service for three
months. Diaz was absolved of any wrongdoing.5
Respondent also filed a protest with CSC Regional Office V. But the protest
was dismissed on the ground that it should first be submitted to the Grievance
Committee of the DepEd for appropriate action.6
On motion for reconsideration, the protest was reinstated but was
eventually dismissed for lack of merit.7Respondent appealed the dismissal of
her protest to the CSC Regional Office which, however, dismissed the appeal
for failure to show that her appointment had been received and attested by the
CSC.8

_______________

4 Id., at p. 74.
5 Id., at pp. 164-173 (Decision dated 19 July 2004 in Case No. OMB-L-A-03-0875-H).
6 Id., at pp. 85-86.
7 Id., at p. 87.
8 Id., at pp. 95-100.

 
  
121

Respondent elevated the matter to the CSC. In its November 29, 2005
resolution, the CSC granted the appeal, approved respondent’s appointment
and recalled the approval of petitioner’s appointment.9
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for  certiorari  in the Court of Appeals
(CA) claiming that the CSC acted without factual and legal bases in recalling
his appointment. He also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction.
In its September 26, 2006 decision,10 the CA denied the petition and upheld
respondent’s appointment which was deemed effective immediately upon its
issuance by the appointing authority on May 26, 2003. This was because
respondent had accepted the appointment upon her assumption of the duties
and responsibilities of the position.
The CA found that respondent possessed all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications for the position of Administrative Officer II; that due to
the respondent’s valid appointment, no other appointment to the same position
could be made without the position being first vacated; that the petitioner’s
appointment to the position was thus void; and that, contrary to the argument
of petitioner that he had been deprived of his right to due process when he was
not allowed to participate in the proceedings in the CSC, it was petitioner who
failed to exercise his right by failing to submit a single pleading despite being
furnished with copies of the pleadings in the proceedings in the CSC.
The CA opined that Diaz unreasonably refused to affix her signature on
respondent’s PDF and to submit respondent’s appointment to the CSC on the
ground of non-submission of

_______________

9  Id., at pp. 116-128.

10 Id., at pp. 28-44. Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this
Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (retired) and Santiago
Javier Ranada (retired) of the Second Division of the Court of Appeals.

 
 
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respondent’s PDF. The CA ruled that the PDF was not even required to be
submitted and forwarded to the CSC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but his motion was denied on
February 8, 2007.11
Hence, this petition.12
Petitioner maintains that respondent was not validly appointed to the
position of Administrative Officer II because her appointment was never
attested by the CSC. According to petitioner, without the CSC attestation,
respondent’s appointment as Administrative Officer II was never completed
and never vested her a permanent title. As such, respondent’s appointment
could still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority. Petitioner
further argues that, under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order (EO) No. 292,13 every appointment is required to be submitted
to the CSC within 30 days from the date of issuance; otherwise, the
appointment becomes ineffective.14  Thus, respondent’s appointment issued on
May 23, 2003 should have been transmitted to the CSC not later than June 22,
2003 for proper attestation. However, because respondent’s appointment was
not sent to the CSC within the proper period, her appointment ceased to be
effective and the position of Administrative Officer II was already vacant when
petitioner was appointed to it.
In her comment,15  respondent points out that her appointment was
wrongfully not submitted by the proper persons to

_______________

11 Id., at p. 56.
12 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
 13 Administrative Code of 1987.
14 Sec. 11 of the Omnibus Rules reads:
Sec. 11. An appointment not submitted to the Commission within thirty (30) days from
the date of issuance which shall be the date appearing to the face of the appointment, shall
be ineffective. x x x
15 Rollo, pp. 150-160.

 
 
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the CSC for attestation. The reason given by Oyardo for the non-submission of
respondent’s appointment papers to the CSC—the alleged failure of respondent
to have her PDF duly signed by Gonzales—was not a valid reason because the
PDF was not even required for the attestation of respondent’s appointment by
the CSC.
After due consideration of the respective arguments of the parties, we deny
the petition.
The law on the matter is clear. The problem is petitioner’s insistence that
the law be applied in a manner that is unjust and unreasonable.
Petitioner relies on an overly restrictive reading of Section 9(h) of PD
80716  which states, in part, that an appointment must be submitted by the
appointing authority to the CSC within 30 days from issuance, otherwise, the
appointment becomes ineffective:
“Sec. 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission.—The [CSC] shall administer the
Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions:
 
xxx xxx xxx
 
(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the
civil service, except those of presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, police forces, firemen and jailguards, and disapprove those where the
appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An
appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the
appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is
disapproved by the [CSC], if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability of
the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or
rules:  Provided, finally, That the [CSC] shall keep a record of appointments of all
officers and employees in the civil service. All appointments requiring the approval
of the [CSC] as herein provided, shall be submitted to it by the appointing

_______________

16 The Civil Service Law.

 
 
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authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise the  appointment

becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter.” (Emphasis supplied)

 
This provision is implemented in Section 11, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of EO 292 (Omnibus Rules):
“Section 11. An appointment not submitted to the [CSC] within thirty (30) days
from the date of issuance which shall be the date appearing on the fact of the
appointment, shall be ineffective. xxx”

 
Based on the foregoing provisions, petitioner argues that respondent’s
appointment became effective on the day of her appointment but it
subsequently ceased to be so when the appointing authority did not submit her
appointment to the CSC for attestation within 30 days.
Petitioner is wrong.
The real issue in this case is whether the deliberate failure of the appointing
authority (or other responsible officials) to submit respondent’s appointment
paper to the CSC within 30 days from its issuance made her appointment
ineffective and incomplete. Substantial reasons dictate that it did not.
Before discussing this issue, however, it must be brought to mind that CSC
resolution dated November 29, 2005 recalling petitioner’s appointment and
approving that of respondent has long become final and executory.

Remedy to Assail CSC Decision

or Resolution
 
Sections 16 and 18, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules provide the proper remedy
to assail a CSC decision or resolution:
“Section 16. An employee who is still not satisfied with the decision of the [Merit
System Protection Board] may appeal to the [CSC] within fifteen days from receipt of
the decision.

 
 
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The decision of the [CSC] is final and executory if no petition for

reconsideration is filed within fifteen days from receipt thereof.
 
xxx xxx xxx
 
Section 18. Failure to file a  protest, appeal,  petition for reconsideration or
petition for review within the prescribed period shall be deemed a waiver of
such right and shall render the subject action/decision final and executory.”
(Emphasis supplied)

 
In this case, petitioner did not file a petition for reconsideration of the CSC
resolution dated November 29, 2005 before filing a petition for review in the
CA. Such fatal procedural lapse on petitioner’s part allowed the CSC resolution
dated November 29, 2005 to become final and executory.17 Hence, for all intents
and purposes, the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 has become
immutable and can no longer be amended or modified.18  A final and
definitive judgment can no longer be changed, revised, amended or
reversed.19 Thus, in praying for the reversal of the assailed Court of Appeals
decision which affirmed the final and executory CSC resolution dated
November 29, 2005, petitioner would want the Court to reverse a final and
executory judgment and disregard the doctrine of immutability of final
judgments.
True, a dissatisfied employee of the civil service is not preempted from
availing of remedies other than those provided in Section 18 of the Omnibus
Rules. This is precisely the purpose of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which
provides for the

_______________

17 Ignacio v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 163573, 27 July 2005, 464 SCRA 220, 226-227.
18 Department of Education v. Cuanan, G.R. No. 169013, 16 December 2008, 574 SCRA 41, 50.
19 Bongcac v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 156687-88, 21 May 2009, 588 SCRA 64.

 
 
126

filing of a petition for review as a remedy to challenge the decisions of the CSC.
While Section 18 of the Omnibus Rules does not supplant the mode of appeal
under Rule 43, we cannot disregard Section 16 of the Omnibus Rules, which
requires that a petition for reconsideration should be filed, otherwise, the CSC
decision will become final and executory, viz.:
“The decision of the [CSC] is final and executory if no petition for
reconsideration is filed within fifteen days from receipt thereof.”

 
 Note that the foregoing provision is a specific remedy as against CSC
decisions involving its  administrativefunction, that is, on matters involving
“appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service,”20  as opposed to its quasi-judicial function where it adjudicates the
rights of persons before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the
law.21
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that, for
reasons of law, comity and convenience, where the enabling statute indicates a
procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative
appeal or reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a case unless the
available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate
authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors
committed in the administrative forum.22In  Orosa v. Roa,23  the Court ruled
that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can

_______________

20 Section 9 (h), Civil Service Law.

21 Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 507,
529.
22 Hon. Carale v. Hon. Abarintos, G.R. No. 120704, 3 March 1997, 336 Phil. 126, 135-136.
23 G.R. No. 140423, 14 July 2006, 495 SCRA 22.

 
 
127

be made to the courts.24  While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies is subject to certain exceptions,25these are not present in this case.
Thus, absent any definitive ruling that the second paragraph of Section 16 is
not mandatory and the filing of a petition for reconsideration may be dispensed
with, then the Court must adhere to the dictates of Section 16 of the Omnibus
Rules.
Moreover, even in its substantive aspect, the petition is bereft of merit.

Section 9(h) of PD 807 Already Amended

by Section 12 Book V of EO 292
 
It is incorrect to interpret Section 9(h) of Presidential Decree (PD) 807 as
requiring that an appointment must be sub-

_______________

24 Id., at p. 28.
25 The exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies are: (1) when there is
a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there
is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury;
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears
the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when
the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12)
where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency
applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot. (Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109853, 11 October 2000, 396
Phil. 709; 342 SCRA 549.)

 
 
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mitted by the appointing authority to the CSC within 30 days from issuance,
otherwise, the appointment would become ineffective. Such interpretation fails
to appreciate the relevant part of Section 9(h) which states that “an
appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the
appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately
and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the [CSC].” This
provision is reinforced by Section 1, Rule IV of the Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, which reads:
“Section 1. An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and
rules shall take effect immediately upon its issuance by the appointing
authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he shall be
entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment
by the Commission.  The appointment shall remain effective until disapproved
by the Commission. x x x” (Emphasis supplied)

 
More importantly, Section 12, Book V of EO 292 amended Section 9(h) of PD
807 by deleting the requirement that all appointments subject to CSC approval
be submitted to it within 30 days. Section 12 of EO 292 provides:
“Sec. 12. Powers and Functions.—The Commission shall have the following powers
and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in
the Civil Service, including extension of Service beyond retirement age;
(15) Inspect and audit the personnel actions and programs of the departments,
agencies, bureaus, offices, local government units and other instrumentalities of the
government including government-owned or controlled corporations; conduct periodic
review of the decisions and actions of offices or officials to whom authority has been
delegated by the Commission as well as the conduct of the officials and the employees in
these offices and apply appropriate sanctions whenever necessary.”

 
 
129

As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases

indicates an intention to change its meaning.26 It is presumed that the deletion
would not have been made had there been no intention to effect a change in the
meaning of the law or rule.27  The word, phrase or sentence excised should
accordingly be considered inoperative.28
The dissent refuses to recognize the amendment of Section 9(h) of PD 807 by
EO 292 but rather finds the requirement of submission of appointments within
30 days not inconsistent with the authority of the CSC to take appropriate
action on all appointments and other personnel matters. However, the
intention to  amend by deletion  is unmistakable not only in the operational
meaning of EO 292 but in its legislative history as well.
PD 807 and EO 292 are not inconsistent insofar as they require CSC action
on appointments to the civil service. This is evident from the recognition
accorded by EO 292, specifically under Section 12 (14) and (15) thereof, to the
involvement of the CSC in all personnel actions and programs of the
government. However, while a restrictive period of 30 days within which
appointments must be submitted to the CSC is imposed under the last sentence
of Section 9(h) of PD 807, none was adopted by Section 12 (14) and (15) of EO
292. Rather, provisions subsequent to Section 12 merely state that the CSC
(and its liaison staff in various departments and agencies)
shall  periodically  monitor, inspect and audit personnel actions.29  Moreover,
under Section 9(h) of PD 807, appoint-

_______________

26 Laguna Metts Corporation v. Caalam, G.R. No. 185220, 27 July 2009, 594 SCRA 139.
27 Id.
28  In  Neal v. State of Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
omission of the word “white” in the 15th Amendment on suffrage rendered inoperative provisions in
existing constitutions of states reserving the right of suffrage and to jury selection to “whites”.
29 Sections 18 and 20, in relation to Sections 15 and 26, EO 292.

 
 
130
ments not submitted within 30 days to the CSC become ineffective, no such
specific adverse effect is contemplated under Section 12 (14) and (15) of EO
292. Certainly, the two provisions are materially inconsistent with each other.
And to insist on reconciling them by restoring the restrictive period and
punitive effect of Section 9(h) of PD 807, which EO 292 deliberately discarded,
would be to rewrite the law by mere judicial interpretation.30
Not even the historical development of civil service laws can justify the
retention of such restrictive provisions. Public Law No. 5,31  the law formally
establishing a civil service system, merely directed that all heads of offices
notify the Philippine Civil Service Board “in writing without delay of all
appointments x x x made in the classified service.”32  The Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 was even less stringent as approval by the
Director of the Civil Service of appointments of temporary and emergency
employees was required only when practicable. Finally, Republic Act (RA)
226033 imposed no period within which appointments were attested to by local
government treasurers to whom the CSC delegated its authority to act on
personnel actions but provided that if within 180 days after receipt of said
appointments, the CSC shall not have made any correction or revision, then
such appointments shall be deemed to have been properly made. Consequently,
it was only under PD 807 that submission of appointments for approval by the
CSC was subjected to a 30-day period. That, however, has been lifted and
abandoned by EO 292.

_______________

30 See Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. 178759, August 11, 2008, 561 SCRA 710.
31 An Act for the Establishment and Maintenance of an Efficient and Honest Civil Service in the
Philippines Islands, effective September 26, 1900.
32 Act No. 2711, effective March 10, 1917.
33 An Act to Amend and Revise the Laws Relative to Philippine Civil Service, June 19, 1959.

 
 
131

There being no requirement in EO 292 that appointments should be

submitted to the CSC for attestation within 30 days from issuance, it is
doubtful by what authority the CSC imposed such condition under Section 11,
Rule V of the Omnibus Rules. It certainly cannot restore what EO 292 itself
already and deliberately removed. At the very least, that requirement cannot
be used as basis to unjustly prejudice respondent.
Under the facts obtaining in this case, respondent promptly assumed her
duties as Administrative Officer II when her appointment was issued by the
appointing authority. Thus, her appointment took effect immediately and
remained effective until disapproved by the CSC.34Respondent’s appointment
was never disapproved by the CSC. In fact, the CSC was deprived of the
opportunity to act promptly as it was wrongly prevented from doing so. More
importantly,  the CSC subsequently approved respondent’s
appointment and recalled that of petitioner, which recall has already become
final and immutable.
Second, it is undisputed that respondent’s appointment was not submitted
to the CSC, not through her own fault but because of Human Resource
Management Officer I Ma. Teresa U. Diaz’s unjustified refusal to sign it on the
feigned and fallacious ground that respondent’s position description form had
not been duly signed by School Principal Dr. Leticia B. Gonzales.35 Indeed, the
CSC even sanctioned Diaz for her

_______________

34 This is echoed in Section 10 of the Omnibus Rules:

Section 10. An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws or rules  shall
take effect immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the
appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at
once without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the [CSC].  The appointment
shall remain effective until disapproved by the [CSC].  In no case shall an
appointment take effect earlier than the date of its issuance. (Emphasis supplied)
35 Id., at p. 9.
  
 
132

failure to act in the required manner.36 Similarly, the Ombudsman found both

City Schools Division Superintendent Ma. Amy O. Oyardo and Gonzales
administratively liable and suspended them for three months for willfully
withholding information from respondent on the status of her appointment.
“xxx xxx xxx
All along, [respondent] was made to believe that her appointment was in order.
During the same period, respondent Gonzales, with respondent Oyardo’s knowledge,
indifferently allowed [respondent] to plea for the signing of her [position description
form], when they could have easily apprised [respondent] about the revocation/
withdrawal of her appointment. Worse, when [respondent] informed Oyardo on 25 June
2003 about her assumption of office as [Administrative Officer II], the latter directed
[respondent] to go back to her post as Teacher I on the ground that [respondent] had not
been issued an attested appointment as [Administrative Officer II], even when [Oyardo]
knew very well that [respondent’s] appointment could not be processed with the CSC
because of her order to re-evaluate the applicants. This act by [Oyardo] is a mockery of
the trust reposed upon her by [respondent], who, then in the state of quandary,
specifically sought [Oyardo’s] advice on what to do with her appointment, in the belief
that her superior could enlighten her on the matter.
It was only on 02 July 2003 when [Gonzales], in her letter, first made reference to a
re-ranking of the applicants when [respondent] learned about the recall by [Oyardo] of
her appointment. At that time, the thirty-day period within which to submit her
appointment to the CSC has lapsed. [Oyardo’s] and Gonzales’ act of withholding
information about the real status of [respondent’s] appointment unjustly deprived her of
pursuing whatever legal remedies available to her at that time to protect her interest.”37

_______________

36 CA decision, p. 8.
37 The Ombudsman’s findings as quoted in the CA decision, pp. 13-14.

 
 
133

Considering these willful and deliberate acts of the co-conspirators Diaz,

Oyardo and Gonzales that caused undue prejudice to respondent, the Court
cannot look the other way and make respondent suffer the malicious
consequences of Gonzales’s and Oyardo’s malfeasance. Otherwise, the Court
would be recognizing a result that is unconscionable and unjust by effectively
validating the following inequities: respondent, who was vigilantly following up
her appointment paper, was left to hang and dry; to add insult to injury, not
long after Oyardo advised her to return to her teaching position, she (Oyardo)
appointed petitioner in respondent’s stead.
The obvious misgiving that comes to mind is why Gonzales and Oyardo were
able to promptly process petitioner’s appointment and transmit the same to the
CSC for attestation when they could not do so for respondent. There is no doubt
that office politics was moving behind the scenes.
In effect, Gonzales’ and Oyardo’s scheming and plotting unduly deprived
respondent of the professional advancement she deserved. While public office is
not property to which one may acquire a vested right, it is nevertheless a
protected right.38
It cannot be overemphasized that respondent’s appointment became
effective upon its issuance by the appointing authority and it remained
effective until disapproved by the CSC (if at all it ever was). Disregarding this
rule and putting undue importance on the provision requiring the submission
of the appointment to the CSC within 30 days will reward wrongdoing in the
appointment process of public officials and employees. It will open the door for
scheming officials to block the completion and implementation of an
appointment and render it ineffective by the simple expedient of not submitting

_______________
 38 Bince, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 106271, 9 February 1993, 218 SCRA 782, 792,
cited in Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA
507, 520.

 
 
134

the appointment paper to the CSC. As indubitably shown in this case, even
respondent’s vigilance could not guard against the malice and grave abuse of
discretion of her superiors.
There is no dispute that the approval of the CSC is a legal requirement to
complete the appointment. Under settled jurisprudence, the appointee acquires
a vested legal right to the position or office pursuant to this completed
appointment.39 Respondent’s appointment was in fact already approved by the
CSC with finality.
The purpose of the requirement to submit the appointment to the CSC is for
the latter to approve or disapprove such appointment depending on whether
the appointee possesses the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications
and whether the laws and rules pertinent to the process of appointment have
been followed.40  With this in mind, respondent’s appointment should all the
more be deemed valid.
Respondent’s papers were in order. What was sought from her (the position
description form duly signed by Gonzales) was not even a prerequisite before
her appointment papers could be forwarded to the CSC. More significantly,
respondent was qualified for the position. Thus, as stated by the CA:
 
“The evidence also reveals compliance with the procedures that should be
observed in the selection process for the vacant position of Administrative
Officer II and the issuance of the appointment to the respondent: the vacancy
for the said position was published on February 28, 2003; the Personnel
Selection Board of Dep-Ed Division of Tabaco City conducted a screening of the
applicants, which included the respondent and the petitioner; the respondent’s
qualifications met the minimum qualifications for the position of
Administrative Officer II provided by the CSC. She therefore qualified for
permanent appointment.”41

_______________

39 De Rama v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131136, 28 February 2001, 353 SCRA 94, 106.
40 Tomali v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 110598, 1 December 1994, 238 SCRA 572, 575.
41 CA decision, pp. 8-9.

 
 
135

There is no doubt that, had the appointing authority only submitted

respondent’s appointment to the CSC within the said 30 days from its issuance,
the CSC would (and could ) have approved it. In fact, when the CSC was later
apprised of respondent’s prior appointment when she protested petitioner’s
subsequent appointment, it was respondent’s appointment which the CSC
approved. Petitioner’s appointment was recalled. These points were never
rebutted as petitioner gave undue emphasis to the non-attestation by the CSC
of respondent’s appointment, without any regard for the fact that the CSC
actually approved respondent’s appointment.
Third, the Court is urged to overlook the injustice done to respondent by
citing Favis v. Rupisan42 and Tomali v. Civil Service Commission.43
However, reliance on Favis is misplaced. In Favis, the issue pertains to the
necessity of the CSC approval, not the submission of the appointment to the
CSC within 30 days from issuance. Moreover, unlike Favis where there was an
apparent lack of effort to procure the approval of the CSC, respondent in this
case was resolute in following up her appointment papers. Thus, despite Favis’
having assumed the responsibilities of PVTA Assistant General Manager for
almost two years, the Court affirmed her removal, ruling that:
 “The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials, resulting in the non-
observance of the pertinent rules on the matter does not render the legal
requirement, on the necessity of approval by the Commissioner of Civil Service
of appointments, ineffective and unenforceable.”44 (Emphasis supplied)

 
Taken in its entirety, this case shows that the lack of CSC approval
was not due to any negligence on respondent’s part. Neither was it due
to the “tolerance,

_______________

42 G.R. No. L-22823, 19 May 1966, 17 SCRA 190.

43 Supra note 40.
44 Supra note 42, p. 196.

 
 
136

acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials.” Rather, the

underhanded machinations of Gonzales and Oyardo, as well as the
gullibility of Diaz, were the major reasons why respondent’s
appointment was not even forwarded to the CSC.
Tomali,  likewise, is not applicable. The facts are completely different.
In Tomali, petitioner Tomali’s appointment was not approved by the CSC due
to the belated transmittal thereof to the latter. The Court, citing Favis, ruled
that the appointee’s failure to secure the CSC’s approval within the 30-day
period rendered her appointment ineffective. It quoted the Merit Systems
Protection Board’s finding that “there is no showing that the non-submission
was motivated by bad faith, spite, malice or at least attributed to the fault of
the newly installed [Office of Muslim Affairs] Executive Director.” The Court
observed:
“Petitioner herself would not appear to be all that blameless. She assumed the
position four months after her appointment was issued or months after that
appointment had already lapsed or had become ineffective by operation of law.
Petitioner’s appointment was issued on 01 July 1990, but it was only on 31 May 1991
that it was submitted to the CSC, a fact which she knew, should have known or should
have at least verified considering the relatively long interval of time between the date of
her appointment and the date of her assumption to office.”45

 
The Court also found that “[t]here (was) nothing on record to convince us
that the new OMA Director (had) unjustly favored private respondent nor (had)
exercised his power of appointment in an arbitrary, whimsical or despotic
manner.”46
The peculiar circumstances in Tomali are definitely not present here. As a
matter of fact, the situation was exactly the opposite. As we have repeatedly
stressed, respondent was

_______________

45 Supra note 40, p. 577.

46 Id., at p. 578.

 
 
137

not remiss in zealously following up the status of her appointment. It cannot be

reasonably claimed that the failure to submit respondent’s appointment to the
CSC was due to her own fault. The culpability lay in the manner the
appointing officials exercised their power with arbitrariness, whim and
despotism. The whole scheme was intended to favor another applicant.
Therefore, the lack of CSC approval in  Favis  and  Tomalishould be taken
only in that light and not overly stretched to cover any and all similar cases
involving the 30-day rule. Certainly, the CSC approval cannot be done away
with. However, an innocent appointee like the respondent should not be
penalized if her papers (which were in the custody and control of others who, it
turned out, were all scheming against her) did not reach the CSC on time. After
all, her appointment was subsequently approved by the CSC anyway.
Under Article 1186 of the Civil Code, “[t]he condition shall be deemed
fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment.” Applying this to
the appointment process in the civil service, unless the appointee himself is
negligent in following up the submission of his appointment to the CSC for
approval, he should not be prejudiced by any willful act done in bad faith by the
appointing authority to prevent the timely submission of his appointment to
the CSC. While it may be argued that the submission of respondent’s
appointment to the CSC within 30 days was one of the conditions for the
approval of respondent’s appointment, however, deliberately and with bad
faith, the officials responsible for the submission of respondent’s appointment
to the CSC prevented the fulfillment of the said condition. Thus, the said
condition should be deemed fulfilled.
The Court has already had the occasion to rule that an appointment remains
valid in certain instances despite non-compliance of the proper officials with
the pertinent CSC
 
 
138

rules. In  Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr.,47  the CSC challenged the
validity of the appointment of Ong on the ground that, among others, it was not
reported in the July 1995 Report of Personnel Action (ROPA), thus making
such appointment ineffective. The subject rule provided that an “appointment
issued within the month but not listed in the ROPA for the said month shall
become ineffective thirty days from issuance.” Rejecting the CSC’s contention,
the Court held that there was a legitimate justification for such delayed
observance of the rule:
“We find the respondent’s justification for the failure of the POEA to include Ong’s
appointment in its ROPA for July 1995 as required by CSC Memorandum Circular No.
27, Series of 1994 to be in order. The records show that the [Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA)] did not include the contractual appointment of
Ong in its July ROPA because its request for exemption from the educational requisite
for confidential staff members provided in [Memorandum Circular] No. 38 had yet been
resolved by the CSC. The resolution of the petitioner granting such request was received
only in November, 1995. The POEA, thereafter, reported the appointment in its
November, 1995 ROPA.”48

 
The Court reached the same conclusion in the recent case of  Chavez v.
Ronidel49  where there was a similar inaction from the responsible officials
which resulted in non-compliance with the requirement:
“Lastly, we agree with the appellate court that respondent’s appointment could not
be invalidated solely because of [Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor’s
(PCUP’s)] failure to submit two copies of the ROPA as required by CSC Resolution No.
97368. xxxx
 
xxx xxx xxx
 
We quote with approval the appellate court’s ratiocination in this wise:

_______________

47 G.R. No. 154674, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 773.

48 Id., at p. 786.
49 G.R. No. 180941, 11 June 2009, 589 SCRA 103.

 
 
139

To our minds, however,  the invalidation of the [respondent’s] appointment

based on this sole technical ground is unwarranted, if not harsh and arbitrary,
considering the factual milieu of this case. For one, it is not the [respondent’s]
duty to comply with the requirement  of the submission of the ROPA and the
certified true copies of her appointment to [the Civil Service Commission Field Office or]
CSCFO within the period stated in the aforequoted CSC Resolution. The said resolution
categorically provides that it is the PCUP, and not the appointee as in the case of the
[respondent] here, which is required to comply with the said reportorial requirements.
Moreover, it bears pointing out that only a few days after the [petitioner] assumed
his new post as PCUP Chairman, he directed the PCUP to hold the processing of
[respondent’s] appointment papers in abeyance, until such time that an assessment
thereto is officially released from his office. Unfortunately, up to this very day, the
[respondent] is still defending her right to enjoy her promotional appointment as DMO
V.  Naturally, her appointment failed to comply with the PCUP’s reportorial
requirements  under CSC Resolution No. 97-3685  precisely because of the
[petitioner’s] inaction to the same.
We believe that the factual circumstances of this case calls for the application of
equity. To our minds, the invalidation of the [respondent’s] appointment due to
a procedural lapse which is undoubtedly beyond her control, and certainly not
of her own making but that of the [petitioner], justifies the relaxation of the
provisions  of CSC Board Resolution No. 97-3685, pars. 6,7 and 8. Hence, her
appointment must be upheld based on equitable considerations, and that the non-
submission of the ROPA and the certified true copies of her appointment to the CSCFO
within the period stated in the aforequoted CSC Resolution should not work to her
damage and prejudice. Besides,  the [respondent] could not at all be faulted for
negligence as she exerted  all the necessary vigilance  and efforts to reap the
blessings of a work promotion. Thus, We cannot simply ignore her plight. She has
fought hard enough to claim what is rightfully hers and, as a matter of simple justice,
good conscience, and equity, We should not allow Ourselves to prolong her agony.
All told, We hold that the [respondent’s] appointment is valid, notwithstanding the
aforecited procedural lapse on the part of PCUP

 
 
140

which obviously was the own making of herein [petitioner].” (Emphasis supplied)

 
Respondent deserves the same sympathy from the Court because there was
also a telling reason behind the non-submission of her appointment paper
within the 30-day period.
The relevance of  Joson  and  Chavez  to this case cannot be simply glossed
over. While the agencies concerned in those cases were accredited agencies of
the CSC which could take final action on the appointments, that is not the case
here. Thus, any such differentiation is unnecessary. It did not even factor in
the Court’s disposition of the issue in Joson and Chavez. What is crucial is that,
in those cases, the Court upheld the appointment despite the non-compliance
with a CSC rule because (1) there were valid justifications for the lapse; (2) the
non-compliance was beyond the control of the appointee and (3) the appointee
was not negligent. All these reasons are present in this case, thus, there is no
basis in saying that the afore-cited cases are not applicable here. Similar things
merit similar treatment.
Fourth, in appointing petitioner, the appointing authority effectively
revoked the previous appointment of respondent and usurped the power of the
CSC to withdraw or revoke an appointment that had already been accepted by
the appointee. It is the CSC, not the appointing authority, which has this
power.50 This is clearly provided in Section 9, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules:
“Section 9. An appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be
withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force
and effect until disapproved by the [CSC]. xxxx” (Emphasis supplied)

_______________

50 Supra note 39, p. 107.

 
 
141
 Thus, the Court ruled in  De Rama v. Court of  Appeals51that it is the CSC
which is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved when such
appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable
provisions of the civil service law and regulations.
Petitioner seeks to inflexibly impose the condition of submission of the
appointment to the CSC by the appointing authority within 30 days from
issuance, that is, regardless of the negligence/diligence of the appointee and the
bad faith/good faith of the appointing authority to ensure compliance with the
condition.  However, such stance would place the appointee at the
mercy and whim of the appointing authority even after a valid
appointment has been made.  For although the appointing authority may
not recall an appointment accepted by the appointee, he or she can still achieve
the same result through underhanded machinations that impedes or prevents
the transmittal of the appointment to the CSC. In other words, the insistence
on a strict application of the condition regarding the submission of the
appointment to the CSC within 30 days, would give the appointing authority
the power to do indirectly what he or she cannot do directly. An administrative
rule that is of doubtful basis will not only produce unjust consequences but also
corrupt the appointment process. Obviously, such undesirable end result could
not have been the intention of the law.
The power to revoke an earlier appointment through the appointment of
another may not be conceded to the appointing authority. Such position is not
only contrary to Section 9, Rule V and Section 1, Rule IV of the Omnibus Rules.
It is also a dangerous reading of the law because it unduly expands the
discretion given to the appointing authority and removes the checks and
balances that will rein in any abuse that may take place. The Court cannot
countenance such erroneous and perilous interpretation of the law.

_______________

51 Id.

 
 
142

Accordingly, petitioner’s subsequent appointment was void. There can be no

appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally
removed, or her appointment validly terminated, before another can be
appointed to succeed her.52
In sum, the appointment of petitioner was inconsistent with the law and
well-established jurisprudence. It not only disregarded the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments but also unduly concentrated on a narrow
portion of the provision of law, overlooking the greater part of the provision and
other related rules and using a legal doctrine rigidly and out of context. Its
effect was to perpetuate an injustice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Puno (C.J.), Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion,

Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez andMendoza, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., I join the dissent of Justice Bersamin.
Peralta, J., I join the dissent of J. Bersamin.
Bersamin, J., Please see dissent.
Del Castillo, J., No part.

 
DISSENT

BERSAMIN, J.

 
I respectfully register my dissent to the learned and comprehensive majority
opinion ably written by an esteemed colleague, Justice Renato C. Corona,
dismissing the petition
_______________

52 Aquino v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92403, 22 April 1992, 208 SCRA 240, 250.

 
 
143

that would treat the appointment of the respondent as ineffective on the

ground that the appointment did not carry the attestation by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC).
As I write, I find myself in the same situation of Justice Joseph Story of the
United States Supreme Court nearly 200 years ago, when dissenting from his
colleagues on an important case became unavoidable for him. He said then:

“It is a matter of regret that in this conclusion I have the misfortune to differ from a
majority of the court, for whose superior learning and ability I entertain the most entire
respect. But I hold it an indispensable duty not to surrender my own judgment, because
a great weight of opinion is against me—a weight which no one can feel more sensibly
than myself. Had this been an ordinary case I should have contented myself with
silence; but believing that no more important or interesting question ever came before a
prize tribunal, and that the national rights suspended on it are of infinite moment to the
maritime world, I have thought it not unfit to pronounce my own opinion.1

 
I write this dissent, therefore, in the awareness that I had taken an
individual oath that imposed on me the duty that I cannot justly satisfy “by an
automatic acceptance of the views of others which have neither convinced, nor
created a reasonable doubt in, [my] mind.”2

Antecedents

 
For purpose of this dissent, the background of this controversy is as follows:
On 26 May 2003, respondent Jeanne O. Basallote was appointed to the
position of Administrative Officer II, Item No. OSEC-DECSB-ADO2-390030-
1998 of the Department of Edu-

_______________

1 The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388, 455 (1815).

2 Justice Sutherland, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 US 379, 401-402 (1937).

 
 
144

cation (DepEd), Tabaco National High School in Albay Province by City Schools
Division Superintendent Nelly B. Beloso.3
In a letter dated 4 June 2003,4  the new City Schools Division
Superintendent, Ma. Amy O. Oyardo (Oyardo), advised School Principal Dr.
Leticia B. Gonzales (Gonzales) that the papers of the applicants for the position
of Administrative Officer II of the school, including those of the respondent,
were being returned; and that a school ranking should be accomplished and
submitted to her office for review. In addition, Gonzales was advised that only
qualified applicants should be indorsed.
The respondent assumed as Administrative Officer II on 19 June 2003.
Thereafter, however, she received a letter from Ma. Teresa U. Diaz (Diaz),
Human Resource Management Officer I, City Schools Division of Tabaco City,
Albay, informing her that her appointment could not be forwarded to the CSC
because of her failure to submit the position description form (PDF) duly signed
by Gonzales.
The respondent sought to obtain Gonzales’ signature, but the latter refused
to sign despite repeated requests. When the respondent informed Oyardo of the
situation, she was instead advised to return to her former teaching position of
Teacher I. The respondent followed the advice.
 In the meanwhile, on 25 August 2003, Oyardo appointed petitioner Arlin O.
Obiasca to the position of Administrative Officer II. The appointment was sent
to and was properly attested by the CSC.5
The respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon against Oyardo, Gonzales, and Diaz.
In its decision, the Ombudsman found Oyardo and Gonzales
administratively liable for withholding information from

_______________

3 Rollo, p. 70
4 Id., at p. 72.
5 Id., at p. 74.

 
 
145

the respondent on the status of her appointment, and suspended them from the
service for three months; but Diaz was absolved of any wrongdoing.6
The respondent also filed a protest with the CSC Regional Office V, docketed
as Adm. Case No. ND-ARU 04-290. The protest was dismissed on the ground
that it should first be submitted to the Grievance Committee of the DepEd for
appropriate action.7
On  motion for reconsideration, the protest was reinstated, but it was
eventually dismissed for lack of merit.8 The respondent appealed the dismissal
of her protest to the CSC Regional Office, which dismissed the appeal for
failure to show that her appointment had been received and attested to by the
CSC.9
The respondent elevated the matter to the CSC, which granted the appeal
by its 29 November 2005 resolution, approving the respondent’s appointment
and recalling its approval of the petitioner’s appointment.10
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for  certiorari  in the Court of
Appeals (CA), claiming that the CSC thereby acted without factual and legal
bases in recalling his appointment, and praying for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.
 
Ruling of the CA
 
In its 26 September 2006 decision,11  the CA denied the petition
for certiorari, and upheld the respondent’s appointment

_______________

6  Id., at pp. 164- 173 (Decision dated 19 July 2004 in Case No. OMB-L-A-03-0875-H).
7  Id., at pp. 85-86.
8  Id., at p. 87.
9  Id., at pp. 95-100.
10 Id., at pp. 116-128.
11 Id., at pp. 28-44.

 
 
146

effective immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority on 26 May

2003, considering that the respondent had accepted the appointment upon her
assumption of the duties and responsibilities of the position.
The CA found that the respondent possessed all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications for the position of Administrative Officer II; that due to
the respondent’s valid appointment, no other appointment to the same position
could be made without the position being first vacated; that the petitioner’s
appointment to the position was thus void; and that contrary to the argument
of the petitioner that he had been deprived of his right to due process by not
having been allowed to participate in the proceedings in the CSC, it was the
petitioner who had himself failed to exercise his right by failing to submit a
single pleading despite being furnished with copies of the pleadings in the
proceedings in the CSC.
The CA opined that Diaz had unreasonably refused to affix her signature on
the respondent’s PDF and to submit the respondent’s appointment to the CSC
on the ground of non-submission of the respondent’s PDF, because the PDF had
not been required to be submitted and forwarded to the CSC.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied
on 8 February 2007.12
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Issues

 
The petitioner maintains that the respondent was not validly appointed to
the position of Administrative Officer II, because her appointment was never
attested by the CSC; that without the attestation, the respondent’s
appointment as Administrative Officer II was not completed and did not vest a
permanent title upon the respondent; that for that reason, the appointment
might still be recalled or withdrawn by the

_______________

12 Id., at p. 56.

 
 
147

appointing authority; that under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of

Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of  1987), every
appointment is required to be submitted to the CSC within 30 days from the
date of issuance; otherwise, the appointment becomes ineffective;13  that the
respondent’s appointment issued on 23 May 2003 should have been
transmitted to the CSC not later than 22 June 2003 for proper attestation; and
that because the respondent’s appointment had not been sent to the CSC
within the proper period, her appointment ceased to be effective and the
position of Administrative Officer II was already vacant when the petitioner
was appointed to it.
In her comment,14 the respondent, though admitting that her appointment
was not submitted to the CSC for attestation, points out that the reason given
by Oyardo for the non-submission of her appointment papers to the CSC –the
failure of the respondent to have her PDF duly signed by Gonzales—was not
valid because the PDF was not even a requisite for the submission of her
appointment for attestation by the CSC.

Recommendation

 
The petition for review should be granted, because its denial tends to negate
the authority of the CSC, the central personnel agency of the Government,15 to
scrutinize and approve appointments to the Civil Service.

_______________

13 Sec. 11. of the Omnibus Rules reads:

Sec. 11. An appointment not submitted to the Commission within thirty (30) days from
the date of issuance which shall be the date appearing to the face of the appointment, shall
be ineffective.xxx
14 Rollo, pp. 150-160.
15 Article IX, B, Section 3, Constitution.

 
 
148
 I
The majority point out that CSC Resolution dated 29 November 2005
(recalling the petitioner’s appointment and approving that of the respondent)
became final and executory by virtue of the petitioner’s failure to file a petition
for reconsideration against said resolution before filing the petition for review
in the CA, citing Section 1616and Section 18 of the Omnibus Rules of the CSC
as basis.
I cannot agree to the majority’s position.
To begin with, a dissatisfied employee may avail himself of remedies not
limited to the  petition for reconsideration. In fact, Section 18 of the Omnibus
Rules of the CSC expressly recognizes other remedies available to the affected
employee to prevent the disputed “action/decision” from becoming final and
executory, thus:
“Section 18. Failure to file a protest, appeal, petition for reconsideration or petition
for review within the prescribed period shall be deemed a waiver of such right and shall
render the subject action/decision final and executory.”

 
Moreover, such  petition for reconsideration  was not a prerequisite to the
filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It was enough
that the petition for review was filed “within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last
publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial
of petitioner’s motion for new trial or recon-

_______________

16 Section 16. An employee who is still not satisfied with the decision of the Board may appeal
to the Commission within 15 days from receipt of the decision.
The decision of the Commission is final and executory if no petition for
reconsideration is filed within 15 days from receipt thereof.

 
 
149

sideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or
agency a quo.”17
In this regard, the petitioner’s petition for review was timely filed. After
receiving on 30 January 2006 a copy of the 29 November 2005 resolution, he
filed a motion for extension of time to file petition on 14 February 2006, which
the CA granted on 20 February 2006. The petition for review was eventually
filed on 1 March 2006, which was within the period granted by the CA.
And, lastly, a rule of the CSC that might have intended to render a decision
final and executory if no petition for reconsideration is first brought against the
decision or resolution will not stand and prevail over the Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, which clearly authorizes appeals from the “awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions of, or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.”18 Rule 43, being issued by the Supreme
Court under its

_______________

69 Section 4. Period of appeal.—The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if
publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial
or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo.
Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of
the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for
review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case
to exceed fifteen (15) days. (n)
70 Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders
of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of
or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Reg-
  
 
150

rule-making authority in Section 5(5) of Article VIII of the Constitution, has the

force and effect of law,19 and repeals or supersedes any law or enactment on the
manner and method of appealing the decisions and orders of the specific quasi-
judicial bodies.20
 
II
 
The CSC, being the central personnel agency of the Government, is charged
with the duty of determining questions on the qualifications of merit and
fitness of the persons appointed to the Civil Service. An appointment to a civil
service position, to be fully effective, must comply with all the legal
requirements.21Section 9 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines)22 relevantly provides:
“Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission.—The Commission shall
administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions:

_______________

istration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory
Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic
Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission,
Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators
authorized by law. (n)
19  Inciong v. de Guia, AM R-249-RTJ, 17 September 1984, 154 SCRA 93;  Sare v. Aseron, L-
22380, April 15, 1967, 20 SCRA 1027; Pascual v. Commissioner of Customs, L-11219, 25 April 1962,
4 SCRA 1020.
20 First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110571, 10 March 1994, 231 SCRA
30, 38-40.
21 Civil Service Commission v. Tinaya, G.R. No. 154898, 16 February 2005, 451 SCRA 560, 566.
22 Promulgated on 6 October 1975.

 
 
151

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to
positions in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees,
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and
jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the
appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An appointment shall take
effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee
assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is
disapproved by the Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice
to the liability of the appointing authority for appointments issued in
violation of existing laws or rules:  Provided, finally, That the Commission
shall keep a record of appointments of all officers and employees in the civil
service. All appointments requiring the approval of the Commission
as herein provided, shall be submitted to it by the appointing
authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise, the
appointment becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter.
xxx xxx xxx”

 
Thus, the appointment must be submitted within the required period to the
CSC, which shall then ascertain, in the main, whether the proposed appointee
is qualified to hold the position and whether the rules pertinent to the process
of appointment were observed.23
However, the majority contend that Section 12, Book V of E. O. 292
(The Revised Administrative Code) already amended Section 9 (h) of P.D. 807
by deleting the requirement that appointments subject to CSC approval be
submitted to CSC within 30 days. Citing Section 12(14) and (15) of E.O. 292,24
_______________

23 Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 507,
515.
24 Section 12. Powers and Functions.—The Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:

 
 
152

the majority state that the amendatory law completely deleted not just a word
or two, but the entire last sentence of the provision.
I find the contention not well-taken.
The new provision in Section 12(14) of E.O. 292—“Take appropriate action
on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including
extension of Service beyond retirement age”—is a legal provision altogether
different from Section 9 (h) of P.D. 807. The former is too broad in scope, for,
certainly, the CSC is not to be limited to merely approving and disapproving
appointments. Even with E.O. 292’s repealing clause (“All laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly”), the requirement of submission of
appointments within 30 days expressly stated in the latter is not inconsistent
with the authority of the CSC to take appropriate action on all appointments
and other personnel matters.
The Court cannot interpret E.O. 292 as having entirely dispensed with the
submission requirement in order to make an appointment effective. To hold
otherwise is to deprive the CSC of the opportunity to determine whether or not
an appointee is qualified for the position to which he is appointed, which
certainly weakens the mandate of the CSC as the cen-

_______________

xxx xxx xxx

(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil
Service including extension of Service beyond retirement age.
(15) Inspect and audit the personnel actions and programs of the departments, agencies,
bureaus, offices, local government including government-owned or controlled corporations; conduct
periodic review of the decisions and actions of offices or officials to whom authority has been
delegated by the Commission as well as the conduct of the officials and the employees in these
offices and apply appropriate sanctions whenever necessary.

 
 
153

tral personnel agency of the Government and negates the constitutional

objective of establishing a career service steeped in professionalism, integrity,
and accountability.
In fact, despite the issuance of E.O. 292, the CSC itself has continued to
require the submission of appointments within 30 days from the dates of their
issuance. There is no better proof of this than the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. 292, whose Rule V provides:
“Section 11. An appointment not submitted to the Commission within 30
days from the date of issuance which shall be the date appearing on the face of
the appointment shall be ineffective.  The appointing authority shall be liable for
the salaries of the appointee whose appointment became ineffective. The appointing
authority shall likewise be liable for the payment of the salary of the appointee if the
appointment is disapproved because the appointing authority has issued it in violation
of existing laws or rules, making the appointment unlawful.

 
III
 
The CA ruled that the respondent’s appointment became effective from the
moment of its issuance on 26 May 2006; that she had in effect accepted her
appointment upon her assumption of the duties and responsibilities of the
position; and that the appointment could no longer be withdrawn or revoked
without cause and due process.
I insist that the CA thereby erred.
Its mere issuance does not render an appointment to the Civil Service
complete and effective. Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O.
292, an appointment not submitted to the CSC within 30 days from the date of
its issuance shall be ineffective. Compliance with this statutory directive is
essential in order to make an appointment to a civil service position fully
effective. Without the favorable certification or approval of the CSC, where
such approval is required, no title to the office can yet be deemed permanently
 
 
154

vested in the appointee; hence, the appointment can still be recalled or

withdrawn by the appointing authority.25
Otherwise put, the appointing officer and the CSC, acting together,
though not concurrently but consecutively, make an appointment
complete.26  It is from the moment that an appointee assumes a
position in the Civil Service under a completed appointment that he
acquires a legal, not merely equitable, right that is protected not only
by statute, but also by the Constitution. Said right cannot then be
taken away from him, either by revocation of the appointment or by
removal, except for cause and with previous notice and hearing.27
Herein, there is no dispute that the respondent’s appointment as
Administrative Officer II on 26 May 2006 was never attested by the CSC. Thus,
her appointment was not completed, and she did not acquire any vested right
to the position.
 
IV
 
The majority opine that the Court should not look the other way and allow
the respondent to suffer the consequences of the willful and deliberate acts of
Diaz, Oyardo and Gonzales who conspired not to submit the respondent’s
appointment to the CSC.
I cannot subscribe to the majority’s opinion.
This dissent never intends to appear as condoning the willful and deliberate
acts of Diaz, Oyardo and Gonzales vis-à-vis the respondent’s appointment. All
that I want to put across is

_______________

25 Tomali v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 110598, 1 December 1994, 238 SCRA 572, 576.
26 Abella, Jr. Civil Service Commission, supra, at note 20, p. 516, citing Aquino v. Civil Service
Commission, 208 SCRA 240.
27 Mitra v. Subido, No. L-21691, 15 September 1967, 21 SCRA 127, 142.

 
 
155

that the Court should simply implement the clear and unambiguous provisions
of the applicable law.
The appropriate disciplining authorities had already held Diaz, Oyardo and
Gonzales to account for their misdeed, with Diaz being sanctioned by the CSC,
and Oyardo and Gonzales being held liable by the Ombudsman. There the issue
of their misdeed should end. Indeed, the Court has made clear in  Favis v.
Rupisan28 that the failure of the responsible official to submit for approval an
employee’s appointment did not negate such requirement, thus:
“xxx. The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials, resulting in the
non-observance of the pertinent rules on the matter does not render the legal
requirement, on the necessity of approval of the Commissioner of Civil Service of
appointments, ineffective and unenforceable. In the circumstances, for the duration of
his occupancy of the position in question, the petitioner may be considered merely as
a de facto officer, and may consequently be removed from office even without cause.”
  
Accordingly, that the respondent’s appointment was not submitted to the
CSC because of Diaz’s unjustified refusal to sign it on the fallacious ground
that the respondent’s PDF had not been duly signed by Gonzales was no reason
to validate the respondent’s appointment, or to grant her any right to the
position or to the guarantees provided by law.
Still, the majority consider as misplaced the petitioner’s reliance
on  Favis  and  Tomali v. Civil Service Commission,29  because,  one, the issue
in Favis related to the necessity for the CSC approval, not to the submission of
the appointment within the 30-day period; and, two, the facts in  Tomali  were
different from those herein.
I cannot join the majority’s rejection of the applicability of Favis and Tomali
v. Civil Service Commission to this case. On

_______________

28 No. L-22823, 19 May 1966, 17 SCRA 190, 196.

29 Supra, at note 22.

 
 
156

the contrary, I urge that the Court take such case law as authoritative.
Favis, being of 1966 vintage, does not mention the 30-day submission period
because the case was decided under the  old  Civil Service Law, which then
required merely the submission of the appointment,  without  any prescribed
period. The 30-day submission period was introduced by P.D. 807 only in
1975. Favis is authoritative and instructive nonetheless, because it establishes
the rule that  the approval of the CSC is necessary to render an appointment
effective. With the introduction by P.D. 807 of the 30-day period within which to
submit an appointment for the CSC’s approval, it should follow that an
appointment not submitted within the period does not, and cannot, be
approved.
Tomali  states the prevailing rule that compliance with the legal
requirement for an appointment to a civil service position is essential in order
to make the appointment fully effective.  Tomali  was decided in 1994, when
P.D. 807 and E.O. 202 were already in force. Although the petitioner
in  Tomali  did not follow up on the status of her appointment, there was a
finding that the appointing authority did not unjustly favor the respondent,
thereby justifying the Court’s declaration that the non-submission of the
appointment rendered the appointment ineffective.
Nothing in  Tomali  even remotely implies that the bad faith on the part of
the appointing authority, causing the delay or the non-submission of the
appointment paper to the CSC, is sufficient excuse to do away with the 30-day
period for the submission. The Court’s statement in  Tomali  that “(t)here is
nothing on record to convince us that the new OMA Director has unjustly
favored private respondent nor has exercised his power of appointment in an
arbitrary, whimsical or despotic manner”30  is merely part of the finding that
there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respon-

_______________

30 Supra, at note 25.

 
 
157

dents.  Tomali  was, after all, a special civil action for  certiorari, which
necessarily called for a determination of whether the respondent had
committed grave abuse of discretion.
Verily, in declaring an appointment as ineffective for failure to submit it to
the CSC for approval within the prescribed period, the Court need not
distinguish between deliberate or malicious acts and mere tolerance,
acquiescence or mistake of the officials that lead to the non-submission of the
appointment to the CSC. The mere failure to submit the
appointment,  regardless of the reason for non-submission, renders the
appointment ineffective.
The majority argue that the submission of the appointment beyond the
prescribed period is not an impediment to its validity. They cite  Civil Service
Commission v. Joson31 and Chavez v. Ronidel,32 in which the Court has ruled
that an appointment remains valid despite the non-compliance of the proper
officials with the pertinent CSC rules.
In Civil Service Commission v. Joson and Chavez v. Ronidel, the inaction of
certain officials led to the non-compliance with the CSC requirement that
appointments should be included in the monthly report of personnel action
(ROPA), which must be submitted in turn to the CSC. The Court held that
legitimate justifications excused the delayed observance of or the non-
compliance with the requirement. It should be noted, however, that the
agencies concerned33  were  accredited agencies  of the CSC;  that is, they could
take final action on the appointments without first submitting the
appointments to the CSC for approval.34 Accredited agencies are required

_______________

31 G.R. No. 154674, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 773.

32 G.R. No. 180941, 11 June 2009, 589 SCRA 103.
33  Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) in  Civil Service Commission v.
Joson, and the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP) in Chavez v. Ronidel.
34 http://www.csc.gov.ph/cscwe/acc_prog.html, last visited 9 November 2009.

 
 
158

only to submit a report on appointments issued (RAI), together with the

photocopies of appointments issued during the month, within 15 days of the
succeeding month. The accredited agencies involved in  Civil Service
Commission v. Joson and Chavez v. Ronidel could take, and, in fact, took, final
action on the appointments. The submission of the ROPA was a mere
ministerial duty, because the CSC’s approval was no longer needed for such
appointments. Hence, the leniency extended by the Court to the appointees
whose names were not timely included in the ROPA should not be applied to
instances where the submission of the appointment is necessary to complete an
appointment, like herein.
 
V
 
When the petitioner was appointed as Administrative Officer II on 25
August 2003, the respondent’s incomplete appointment was effectively revoked.
The majority’s argument, that it is the CSC, not the appointing authority,
that can revoke the respondent’s appointment, because the respondent had
meanwhile accepted her appointment, citing Section 9, Rule V of the Omnibus
Rules35 and De Rama v. Court of Appeals,36 is unacceptable to me.
In my view,  De Rama v. Court of Appeals  actually bolsters the conclusion
that the petitioner’s appointment effectively revoked that of the respondent.
Indeed, De Rama states:
“Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised
Administrative Code specifically provides that “an appointment accepted by the
appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain
in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission.” Thus, it is the CSC that is
authorized to recall an appointment initially ap-

_______________

35 Section 9. An appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by

the appointing authority and shall remain in force and effect until disapproved by the Commission.
xxx
36 G.R. No. 131136, 28 February 2001, 353 SCRA 94.

 
  
159

proved, but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of
applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations.”38

 
As interpreted in  De Rama, the prohibition against the revocation of an
appointment under Section 9 presupposes that the appointment was already
initially approved by the CSC itself. It is not disputed that the respondent’s
appointment was never submitted to the CSC; hence, there was never any
chance for the CSC to initially approve her appointment, prior to the
petitioner’s appointment.
The rule has always been that an appointment is essentially a discretionary
act, performed by an officer in whom it is vested according to his best
judgment, the only condition being that the appointee should possess all the
qualifications required therefor. In the absence of any showing that the
respondent is not qualified for the position of Administrative Officer II, the
Court will not interfere with the prerogative of the appointing officer in this
case.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to grant the petition for review on certiorari.
The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 26 September
2006 and 8 February 2007, respectively, should be reversed and set aside. The
protest against the petitioner, Adm. Case No. ND-ARU 290, should be
dismissed.

Petition denied.

Notes.—The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is

inapplicable when the issue is rendered moot and academic. (Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA 144 [1999])
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when
the issue involved is a purely legal or

_______________

89 Supra, at page 107.

 
 
160

constitutional question. (Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152
[2002])

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