G.R. No.

137000               August 9, 2000

CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a
LOPEZ, respondents. holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a
DECISION Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to
PURISIMA, J.: renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

SUMMARY: Respondent Rosalind Lopez was born in 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent
Australian mother. She then married Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino. Rosalind Lopez was elected as Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and
governor of Davao Oriental in 1992 and her election was contested by her opponent on the ground of Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he
her alleged Australian citizenship. The COMELEC dismissed the petition, applying the principle of jus filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his
sanguinis. American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.

Later, Lopez ran for re-election and her qualifications were again questioned by her opponent on the Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian
same ground of foreign citizenship. The COMELEC again dismissed the petition. passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation
of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to
In 1998, Lopez again ran for re-election as governor and her qualifications were yet again questioned
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Thus, at the most, private
by her opponent, petitioner Valles. Again, the COMELEC dismissed the petition on the ground of res
judicata. If not for res judicata, the COMELEC based its decision on the following: respondent had dual citizenship—she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

(1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus The next contention of Valles is that Dual Citizenship is proscribed in RA 7160 or the Local
sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was Government Code. The Code provides:
married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January "SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her elective local position:
Australian passport was accordingly cancelled
x x x           x x x          x x x
Issue: whether Lopez is a Filipino or Australian citizen and whether she can run for Governor of
Davao Oriental (d) Those with dual citizenship;

Held: She is Filipino. Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. The SC again disagreed and cited the case of Mercado where the Court explained that dual
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly
his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the pronounced:
basis of place of birth.
"xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20
The SC cited The Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, the laws governing citizenship during the must be understood as referring to ‘dual allegiance’. Consequently, persons with mere dual
time that Lopez was born or on May 16, 1934. The two laws respectively provide: citizenship do not fall under this disqualification."

(PB 1902) SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein
who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, THE CASE: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336,
and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.

FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western
(Jones Law) SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte,
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to
in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be settle in the Philippines.
citizens of the Philippine Islands,…
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only
1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang
respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao
duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian
the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine
private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. citizenship, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:

As to the argument of Valles that Lopez renounced her Philippine Citizenship when she applied for "A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows that
and was granted an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence respondent was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of
(ICR). her late father... and consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the
Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the contrary
The SC denied this contention and cited the cases of Aznar vs. COMELEC and Mercado vs. notwithstanding.
Manzano and COMELEC, thus:
 On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other
evidence substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner that b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of
respondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as Residence (ICR), and
a mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and
deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and consequence. The evidence c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent contemplated
renunciation of her Filipino citizenship". Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had
renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate of
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent expressly declared
Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as under oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her
SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the Philippine citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.
said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC
92-54. As regards the COMELEC’s finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship
on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re- her Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy
election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically restore the status of private
questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336. respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire
Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under
On July 17, 1998, the COMELEC’s First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration
petition, and disposing as follows: of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her
alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless
"Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the instant person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.
case on the merits trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows that petitioner herein
has presented no new evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle of res
95-066. The present petition merely restates the same matters and incidents already judicata to the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but likewise in the Resolution Immigration, that:
of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any new evidence and matter substantial in nature,
persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, "xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
the dismissal of the present petition follows as a matter of course. administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to
x x x           x x x          x x x be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. xxx"

"WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues ISSUE: WHETHER Private Respondent Lopez is a Filipino or Australian (FILIPINO)
tendered, We find no convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb and reverse
the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This RULING: The petition is unmeritorious. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the present petition. COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336
AFFIRMED. Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for
SO ORDERED." governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The RATIO:
same was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.
PRINCIPLES OF JUS SANGUINIS VS. JUS SOLI
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the citizenship
of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child
follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth , as
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of
citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo place of birth.
Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino
citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome,
her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet,
renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines
as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the
Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as
qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor. the Jones Law.

Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The
placing reliance on the admitted facts that: Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:

a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who
Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-
September 19, 1988; nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent
 thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the (1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours) (2) By express renunciation of citizenship;

The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides: (3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a
foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said (4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their (5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred (6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed
and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some other forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been
country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized granted: and
to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the (7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United
States under the laws of the United States if residing therein. (underscoring ours) In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioner’s
contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC
11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.
Private respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines
Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that
citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his
Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen Philippine citizenship.
of the Philippines.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit: holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of
candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this termination of his American citizenship.
Constitution.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an
this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For
renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As held
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does
not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian
majority, elect Philippine citizenship. passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian
citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another
subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, country has not been included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent must
her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.
Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian
citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship. Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual
citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of
NO RENUNCIATION OF PH CITIZENSHIP Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:

Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, "SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner elective local position:
cited private respondent’s application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an x x x           x x x          x x x
Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
 respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in
x x x           x x x          x x x these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a
reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the
Again, petitioner’s contention is untenable. merits, the petition cannot prosper.

In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in
the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without
performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries,
be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification
must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:

"xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx
20 must be understood as referring to ‘dual allegiance’. Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification."

Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her
from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship,
it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of
candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate
of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares
that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath,
operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private
respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian
citizenship.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992,
the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary
Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the
aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that private respondent must go
through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.

RES JUDICATA OF COMELEC CASES

Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative
proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any
subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner
of Immigration. He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally
does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs.
Republic, an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order
that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person

is a party;

2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof, and

3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the
weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these
antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. Indeed,
there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No.
95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private