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March 1977
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGULATORY"GUIDE
OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
Comments and suwestions for improvements In these guides ae encouraged at all Requests for single copies of Issued guides (which may be reproduced) or for place
times, and guides will be revised. as appropriate, to accommodate commeMts and ment on an automatic distribution list for single copies of future guides in specific
to reflect new information or experience. -This guide was revised as a mull of divisions should be made in writing to the US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Washington, D.C. 2055./Attention: Director. Division of Document Control.
substantive comments received from the public and additional staff review.
Since the trip function in a thermal overload device C. REGULATORY POSITION
is dependent on temperature, the degree of overload
protection provided is affected by change in ambient In order to ensure that safety-related motor
temperature at the motor or starter location. This operated valves whose motors are equipped with
aspect becomes more complex in nuclear power plant thermal overload protection devices integral with the
motor starter will perform their function, one of the
K
applications where, in some cases, the motor to be
two alternatives described in regulatory position I or
protected is inside the containment and the overload
the one described in regulatory position 2 should be
protection devices are outside the containment. In
implemented:
such a situation, the temperature difference between
the motor and the overload device could be as high as I. Provided that the completion of the safety func
2000 F under design basis conditions. Thus, the selec tion is not jeopardized or that other safety systems
tion of an appropriate trip setpoint for such a valve are not degraded, (a) the thermal overload protec
motor should take into consideration operation of tion devices should be continuously bypassed and
the valve under various temperatures for both normal temporarily placed in force only when the valve
and postulated accident conditions, including loss-of motors are undergoing periodic or maintenance
coolant accidents. testing or (b) those thermal overload protection
devices that are normally in force during plant opera
tion should be bypassed under accident conditions.
The accuracy obtainable with the thermal overload
relay trip generally varies from -5% to 0% of trip set The bypass initiation system circuitry should
point. Since the primary concern in the application of conform to the criteria of Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4,
overload devices is to protect the motor windings 4.5, 4.10, and 4.13 of IEEE Std 279-1971, "Criteria
against excessive heating, the above negative for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power
tolerance in trip characteristics of the protection Generating Stations," and should be periodically
device is considered in the safe direction for motor tested.
protection. However, this conservative design feature 2. The trip setpoint of the thermal overload
built into these overload devices for motor protection protection devices should be established with all un
could interfere in the successful functioning of a certainties resolved in favor of completing the safety
safety-related system; i.e., the thermal overload related action. With respect to those uncertainties,
device could open to remove power from a motor consideration should be given to (a) variations in the
before the safety function has been completed or even ambient temperature at the installed location of the
initiated. In nuclear power plant application, the overload protection devices and the valve motors, (b)
criterion for establishing an overload trip setpoint inaccuracies in motor heating data and the overload
should be to complete the safety function (e.g., drive protection device trip characteristics and the
the valve to its proper position to mitigate the effects matching of these two items, and (c) setpoint drift. In
of an accident) rather than merely to protect the order to ensure continued functional reliability and
motor from destructive heating. In some plants, the the accuracy of the trip point, the thermal overload
thermal overload devices are bypassed during normal protection device should be periodically tested.
plant operation, except that they are temporarily
placed in force when the valve motors are undergoing D. IMPLEMENTATION
periodic testing, The purpose of this section is to provide informa
tion to applicants regarding the NRC staff's plans for
using this regulatory guide.
Where the thermal overload protection devices are
bypassed, it is important to ensure that the bypassing This guide reflects current NRC staff practice.
does not result in jeopardizing the completion of the Therefore, except in those cases in which the appli
safety function or in degrading other safety systems cant proposes an acceptable alternative method for
because of any sustained abnormal motor circuit cur complying with specified portions of the Commis
rents that may be present. As an example, for small sion's regulations, the method described herein is be
motors (1/2 horsepower or less), the magnetic trip ing and will continue to be used in the evaluation of
devices provided in the motor combination starter submittals for construction permit applications until
breaker may not adequately protect the circuit at all this guide is revised as a result of suggestions from the
times against sustained locked-rotor currents. public or additional staff review.
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