Character formation nationalism and patriotism pdf

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Nationalism against patriotism nationalism and patriotism demonstrate the individual's relationship to his nation. The two are often confused and are often believed to mean the same thing. However, there is a huge difference between nationalism and patriotism. Nationalism means giving greater importance to unity through cultural
backgrounds, including language and heritage. Patriotism refers to love for the nation, with more emphasis on values and beliefs. When talking about nationalism and patriotism, one cannot avoid the famous quote of George Orwell, who said that nationalism is the 'worst enemy of peace'. According to him, nationalism is a sense that his
country is superior to the other in all aspects, while patriotism is just a sense of admiration for the way of life. These concepts show that patriotism is by nature passive and that nationalism can be a little aggressive. Patriotism is based on affection, and nationalism is rooted in rivalry and resentment. It can be said that nationalism is by
nature militant, and patriotism is at peace. Most nationalists assume that their country is better than any other, while patriots believe their country is one of the best and can be improved in many ways. Patriots believe in friendly relations with other countries, while some nationalists don't believe it. In patriotism, people around the world are
considered equal, but nationalism implies that only people who belong to their own country should be considered equal. A patriotic person tends to tolerate criticism and tries to learn something new from it, but the nationalist cannot tolerate any criticism and considers it an insult. Nationalism makes a man think only of the virtues of his
country, not its shortcomings. Nationalism can also make one despise the virtues of other nations. Patriotism, on the other hand, is about valuing accountability, not just valuing loyalty to one's own country. Nationalism tries to find justification for mistakes made in the past, while patriotism allows people to understand both flaws and
improvements. Summary: Patriot: Expresses the emotion of love for his country in a passive way Nationalist: Strives for independence and interests and the dominance of the nation and expresses his love or concern for the country in an active political way. Help us improve. Rate this post! (92 votes, average: 3.29 out of 5) Work off-
campus? Find out more about our remote access options This Labour argues against dismissing as 'populist nationalism' any positive view of our own nation and ignoring patriotism as its antithesis. The European nation exists in two senses: as a large social group, a community of real people and as an abstract community of cultural
values promoted by the humanities-based intellectual elites. The widespread prejudice that condemns any positive expression of the relationship to the nation has proved counterproductive because it has prompted ever stronger spontaneous reactions in the form of primitive nationalist egotism. This has weakened the commitment that
people feel toward their nation and the humanistic potential that the nation possesses as a cultural community of values. Consequently, anti-national European intellectual elites bear some responsibility - along with those preaching neoliberal individualism - for the success of populist demagogues and the decline of patriotic values. Given
today's state of education, reviving humanist culture for national elites seems impossible, making the continuation of the rise of primitive nationalism unstoppable. Why is having a positive relationship with your own nation today always associated with the 'extreme right'? If Marine Le Pen says the EU is harming France's national interests,
it's extreme right-wing nationalism; it's the euthana wing. if Angela Merkel says that a strong EU is in Germany's national interest, it is ... What? When Montenegrins decided to extend their autonomy within Serbia to independence, this was generally accepted, including by the EU. When the Scottish or Catalan parliament seeks to reach
statehood for its nation by referendum, the EU condemns it as separatism and nationalism. When Helmuth Kohl negotiated the unification of the two German states, without asking the population for their opinion, it was celebrated, and still is, as an act of a patriotic statesman. Quod sewing Jovi...? In the turbulence that followed the Brexit
decision, the migration crisis and the upheaval in Italy, speeches by the German chancellor and french president could find a place to reflect on the difference between nationalism and patriotism. Is it a promising sign of an emerging paradigm shift, or just a tactical maneuver? Based on this work on my old axiom that we cannot analyze
nationalism without analysing the nation. To this I would only add the assertion that from a historical perspective the nation is a specific European phenomenon, and one of the main reasons for this is that it originally took shape (and to date still exists) in two interconnected senses - or in other terms, at two interconnected levels: at the
level of a large social community that exists in reality (it is a 'sociological fact') and at the level of the abstract community (common) cultural values , i.e. as a specific cultural construct. This offers us a new and innovative approach or perspective from which we can study the processes that led to the formation of modern European nations.
Below, I will try to document and explain why the nation is currently devalued and marginalized in terms of a community of shared values. as a sociological fact continues to thrive. The cause of this inconsistency is the neoliberal shift that occurred on the scale of values, one result of which is a decline in education in the humanities.
Another factor was the postmodern campaign against nationalism, which was supported by the European Union, among others. I focus my discussion here on the situation of 'young nations', the nations that 'national movements' have formed – both in the East and the West. It is a term used for movements that during the nineteenth
century tended to acquire for their nation all the attributes associated with being a nation and having succeeded in most cases they continued to achieve the formation of a national state. Whether someone likes it or not, that's how most of the countries that exist in Europe today. A peculiar chorus has established himself in the current
intellectual climate in the mainstream media: when someone speaks fondly of their nation, they immediately call themselves a 'nationalist'. An individual or a group of individuals may be nationalists - but can the 'nation' be nationalist? Can the nation have an opinion? What is the nature of the relationship between an individual and his or
her nation? If one of us were to wonder what comes to mind and what we mean when we use the term 'nation', while trying to steer clear of any prefabricated markings in our thinking, we would find that this term is used with two meanings, corresponding to the two above levels. These two meanings are also interconnected: one meaning
(feeling) is the meaning of the nation as a specific kind of collective (social group), and the other refers to the nation as an abstract community of cultural values. What I'm about to say about the 'two meanings' of that term is nothing substantially new. I'm not trying to rediscover something we already know. It says that when the concepts of
Europe or humanity are used, the difference between the abstract (cultural construct to which the term refers) and the specific (sample of the inhabitants concerned) interpretations is almost more self-evident, but when it comes to the expression of nations, this difference must be rediscovered and explained. In the first and concrete sense
of this term, when we talk about the nation, we are talking about a large social group or community, objectively existing collection of citizens who are aware of their affiliation, for example Poland, Germany or the Czech Nation, and who act according to that sense of belonging, who can grow in strength to the point where it becomes
identified with that nation. This type of group exists objectively, but this has not always been the case; such groups emerged in Europe during the modernisation of the 18th the nineteenth century. Individuals, who form members of a social group or community called 'nation', communicate and communicate with each other during daily
activities. They work together, have conflicts, each agrees well with some people, better with others and finds others unbearable; they merge or fall apart differently and go their own way. The individual's relationship with the nation cannot be comprehensively accepted within a well-worn and indeed ambiguous expression of nationalism.
The nature of individuals' relationship to their nation can range from a sense of belonging, to identifying with a group, to patriotism and even nationalism. The nation serves as a kind of framework for all this. Sooner or later, in most cases, members of this group become citizens of one country, speak the same language and share similar
life experiences and customs, which is why they understand each other well. I have dedicated most of my research to studying the nation in this regard, social groups, communities or, as Anthony Smith calls it, sociological facts. Today I realize that this perspective was one-sided, although I still believe that this level is crucial to the
existence of the nation. In my reflections on the formation of a nation, I have paid little attention to the way a nation exists in our minds or imagination and the way it exists in our everyday lives in a different sense, where it marks an over-individual unit, a construct that people know and consciously or unconsciously consider something
positive. A nation in this sense figures as an abstract community, as something that holds or represents certain values. The core value, however, is not the very social group called the nation but the cultural content, attributes or characteristics associated with this personalized understanding of the nation, which are perceived as something
intangible, abstract, and which members of the 'nation', and specific social groups, can proudly embrace. More specifically: this ever-changing polymorphic abstract entity includes cultivated language (which is primarily considered a symbol and value), its past and present works of literature, art and music, and a common historical past,
whether glorious or shared suffering. It also includes achievements in science and technology and remembering how some members of the nation have contributed to human progress. In some nations, the values of the nation also include religion, or pride in the democratic system of the nation or the welfare state. Together with this, it is
more or less oblivious to the idea that a measure or criterion of value is a way in which these cultural achievements or historical works can be presented as which enriches the supranational community – Europe or humanity in general. It is understandable that the concepts of individual citizens about what is or is not a national value differ
in any case. The nation's cohesion rests on how strong the sense of consensus is about what constitutes the values of the nation. This notion of the nation as an abstract community of cultural values is not imposed from the top down; it was created as the result of the actions of the members of the educated elites, who consciously
embraced the emerging nation, and consequently, it was precisely this conception of the nation as a value spread among the members of their ethnic community who considered the nation in the spe. What are we supposed to call these efforts or actions? If we are willing to work with labels, we could say that nationalism originates mainly
at the level of the nation's social reality, in a space of conflict where material interests clash and power struggles are fought. By contrast, acts that act for the benefit of the nation as a community of cultural values should generally be spoken of under the expression of patriotism. In some languages, however, that term has a different
connotation, and it does not seem to be a substitute for the term 'romantic nationalism', as Joep Leerssen understands it, or the term 'humanist nationalism' in the sense put forward by Carlton Hayes. Where do these two levels of national existence intersing? The nation, as an abstract community and as a cultural value, was created as a
result of the efforts of real people, who considered themselves, and today are still considered members of their nation, and for whom being a member of the nation – in terms of social group but abstract community – was not just a source of pride. , but also, and above all, signified the individual's commitment to this national community.
This includes the idea of an obligation to participate in improving and enriching national values. This idea, where belonging to the nation is understood as value and commitment, is a legacy of europe's nineteenth century. This is the legacy of an era when 'small peoples' – in terms of concrete large communities – were in the process of
forming. Phase B of national agitation, the stage in which the national movement turns and addresses a certain population as members of the nation in spe, so went hand in hand with a purposeful effort to develop and enrich the nation in terms of the abstract cultural community. In other words, here we can talk about the existence of the
people as something that has historical roots, as if it had grown from the traditions of European humanism, baroque and enlightened times of patriotism, and later romanticism. Should anyone object that this has been said many times before in respect, we're talking about a mere cultural construct, they'd be right. However, what is crucial is
that in Europe they have been and sometimes still understood and persecuted as constructs that seek to humanise humanity. The way in which a nation in terms of a social group can intertwine with a nation and communicate with it as an abstract cultural community, as a commitment to humanity, is one of the basic reasons why we
consider nations a specific European phenomenon. That, of course, is by no means the only reason. If we want to analyse the roots of the modern nation and at the same time ask what is the source of the positive connotations that there are everywhere in Europe, we need to look for the context in which this term was used in the distant
past. The most general context was provided by the Old Testament, from which the Europeans learned about a nation that was persecuted and conquered and had to fight its enemies. And she fought with the Lord's help, because it consisted of an 'chosen people'. The relationship (of the people) to the nation was significantly influenced
by historical stories from ancient history – stories of the patriotism of Greek villages fighting the Persians and perhaps more importantly the stories of the successful Roman republic and its brave republicans. Couldn't the image of 'Cives Romanus' serve as the archetype of modern patriotism? However, as is commonly known, natio was a
neutral term in ancient history and referred to regional communities; however, this did not mean that there were no conflicts between groups that differed by language. Not surprisingly, ethnic communities are commonly referred to as lingua. The myth of the Mediaeval Knights was international, but over several centuries, the knights went
from serving their king to service to their country, their homeland, and after they won their hand on state power in the monarchy of the Estate, they themselves became representatives of the 'nation'. In some cases this was expressed explicitly in the early modern era in political terminology: Polish nobility proudly wore the label 'Natio
Polonica', hungarians were 'Natio Hungarica' and the English term 'nation' was still extended beyond the confines of the closed aristocratic class. However, of greater importance for the later processes of nation formation were objective changes through which European culture and society went through, which had only an indirect influence
on the nations, but created the necessary preconditions for their formation. The first such change that warrants a mention is the rise of humanism, which offered a new image of humanity as a value (in itself), but reintroduced the stories of patriotism from Antiquity. The Reformation introduced the goal of converting church services,
especially scripture, into a national language and turning a impertrous mass of believers into members of an autonomous religious community. Indeed, most European national movements could later follow the foundations of their printed language until the time of the Reformation. The next and perhaps crucial building blocks that formed
the nation's originally unpurposed concept stemmed from the regional patriotism of the secularized Enlightenment, which obliged educated elites to work for the benefit or well-being of their homeland, whose inhabitants were increasingly coming to mention the term 'nation'. More importantly, however, it was how enthusiastic the
Enlightenment scholars were with knowledge, and a growing number of them began to consciously use knowledge for the benefit of their nation. In doing so, they laid the foundations of the nation as a community of cultural values and launched Phase A of their national movement. That phase then gained its emotional charge from
romanticism – and became a value. All of this did not happen by accident or arbitrary, but in response to the existential uncertainty and deep crisis of values that had been placed in the collapse of the old feudal system of addiction. I mention this long journey from neutral 'natio' or 'gens' to an emotionally connotative nation here so I can at
least briefly explain what I see as the source of the peculiarities of the European nation. Nowhere else in the world do we know about this evolutionary trajectory. Although political formations appeared on other continents in the twentieth and sometimes (most notably in Latin America) even in the nineteenth century called 'nations', they
originated in completely different civilizational environments with completely different cultural traditions. Most of them were merely units of political power whose ruling elites only subsequently sought to find symbols, objects or historical narratives that could serve as a substitute for the cultural community. Only in some Asian countries was
the European concept of a nation imported as an instrument to modernize the country, but without the tradition of Enlightenment and Romanticism. Despite this obvious difference, all these processes of nation formation, in Europe and beyond, are mentioned in english literature with the same expression – nationalism. Whether it is for
practicality or ignorance, it is nevertheless a source of misunderstanding, especially when the expression of nationalism, which globalisation has now transformed (meaning), is used as a tool for analysing Europe's past. Looking at the nation from the perspective of its two meanings is not intended as just some but as a challenge and a
proposal for a new paradigm for the purpose of historical study. I don't know if anyone has ever tried to exploit that distinction and link these two levels as a starting point for a comparative study of the nation's formation process, but it would be useful to do so. In the familiar debates about whether nations (and nationalisms) already existed
in the premodern age or even in ancient history, it would certainly be useful if significant evidence of the collective cohesion of groups that were defined in ethnic terms at the time could be seen as a sign of the formation of a premodern nation and a community of cultural values. This community is different from the modern nation in that
most of the non-noble population did not identify with it. That's why I prefer not to talk about the nation then as a great social group, even in the above examples of Natio Polonica or Natia Hungarica. Although in the rhetoric of the secular and ecclesiastical elites at the time we can find statements and phrases that are similar to what was
later heard during modern national struggles, such as expressing hatred towards foreigners, it would be utterly wrong to use the label 'nationalism' to describe them. To be fair, it should be noted that the social exclusivity of the nation as a community of common values that was open only to the noble elites of feudal society only began to
crumble with the rebellions of Flemish cities in the first half of the fourteenth century and the Husit movement in czech countries a century later. , when national cohesion has spread to society as a whole. The crucial time for both meanings of the nation happened only with the beginning of modern processes of nation formation. This is
partly due to the fact that every European nation has gone through the process of formation sooner or later in the context of modernising European society. The organic part of this modernisation was the expansion of education (not just literacy) among the wider population. It was only by this time that it was possible for the sense of
national consciousness to spread successfully. In other words, it was only once a certain level of education that the nation, in terms of cultural abstraction and as a community with a common destiny, became understandable and attractive to the general population. This, however, was not an education as we understand it today, or as
learning practical skills. Instead, the most important prerequisite for the expansion of national culture was that the elites of almost every European country in the nineteenth century received a humanist education based on historicism, worship of classical virtues (patriotism is one such virtue), literature, philosophy and understanding of art. I
will set aside the national states that emerged as a direct successor to the media cultural (and political) community of feudal elites and limit myself to the national movements that ultimately led to the formation of small peoples and their states. In this case, it was during phase A of the national movements that the nation was defined and
constructed as an abstract community by a group of scientists and educated lay people, who, in the spirit of Enlightened patriotism, studied past and literary traditions, folk culture, language and the way of life of the 'own' nation. Phase A has consequently played a crucial and irreplaceable role in shaping the nation in the future into a
community of cultural values. During Phase B, patriotically educated elites sought to gain acceptance of this construct among their compatriots, i.e. among members of their ethnic community. As this group took shape and took the form of mass movement during Phase C, the culture of this abstract national community became richer, the
national past was discovered, discussed and reinterpreted and there was an improvement in education and quality of life. Only through a successful mass movement, speaking after the wider layers of the population embraced and embraced the basic attributes of the cultural community as their own, a sense of nationality encompassed
both the meanings of national existence: the nation as a social group and the nation as a community of shared cultural values. In the opening session of the parliament of the (newly united) Italian kingdom, the following many quoted words were said: 'We made Italy, now we have to make Italians.' If we interpret that the state structure
marked by Italy means a value community of Italian elites, we can consider this statement as a model of expressions of two levels or meanings on which the nation is formed: a community of common cultural values has been established (and moreover, we have seen its roots as stretching all the way back to the times of ancient Rome),
but the creation of a nation as a large social unit. , that is, the mass adoption of a positive understanding of (Italian) national identity remains a task for the future. In the Italian case, it would take many decades. The heroic battles of the Polish patriots to reclaim lost statehood in the uprisings of 1830, 1848/1849 are known. However, the
majority of the Polish-speaking rural population did not participate in this fight; Until the 1860s, Poland's leading patriots usually did not seek the mass inclusion of the peasant population within the Polish nation at all. Attempt to create Polish as a large social community, an organic unit that would encompass all citizens, did not start in
much of the Polish territory until the 1860s. The 'Polish nation' as an abstract community, one of the common cultural values for which Polish patriots (most of them from nobility) made the ultimate sacrifice, was generally embraced for more than a century before the Polish nation actually formed in the real sense of the word, i.e. as a
'sociological fact'. The very opposite relationship between the two meanings of the formation of the nation from that observed in the Polish case was a Serbian case. The first Serb uprisings (1805 and 1815) were already a mass uprising in some regions and were more akin to peasant wars. Serbian ethnic territory occupied the Ottomans,
and as a result, the Serbian elites (except those in Vojvodina on Hungarian territory) did not experience humanism or enlightenment. The basic segment of the population in the central part of the territory of Serbia is committed to quasi-anethed, patriotic beliefs. The emergence of the nation as a social formation so somehow occurred
before conscious patriotic efforts began to work to build a nation as a community of cultural values. In a situation where most people were illiterate, the 'nation' as an abstraction was for many decades based on ornately communicated poetic works and on the historical myth of the lost Serbian kingdom communicated in the form of epic
poems. The Serbian and Polish examples represent two extreme poles on the scale of different relationships that can exist between the nation as a social reality and cultural construct during the national movement. Most other national movements lie between two extremes represented by Poles and Serbs, and czechs can present as one
example. The foundations of the Czech cultural community in its abstract sense were laid by the scholars of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, i.e. phase A of the Czech national movement. Followers of the movement, influenced by romanticism, during the Phase B movement sought to spread knowledge about the dimensions
of the values of the Czech nation (for example, its history, folklore and literary work). After the success of the national movement, members of the nation as a social group came to identify with the community of their nation's shared cultural values. For most national movements, the formation of a nation similarly took place on two levels,
albeit more or less overdue. These movements then led to the formation of a community I call a small people, where the small does not refer to the number of members or the (small) size of the territory the group has occupied, but is a toxic reference. Being part of a small nation category also means being attributed to similar collective
stereotypes – for example, that such they had a sense of external threat and that their existence as a nation was not given. New directions for the study of the evolution of nations and the examination of their specificities can thus be sought by analysing the relationship between the two levels of the nation described above. The two levels
of the existence of a nation can be observed even in this day and age, when nations are already fully formed communities. And today we can find a productive point from which we will move to analyse the issues of nationality in Europe, including the roots of nationalism. However, the relationship between the two levels of the nation's
existence and the significance they have for each other has taken a different form in recent decades. Let's move out of the nation's primary position as a truly existing social group that is internally differentiated – not only in social terms or in terms of interests but also by the level of education and by the different orientations of people. That
is why all members of the nation do not perceive their relationship to their nation in terms of abstract cultural value or understand the content of this entity in the same way: in an excessive sense, we could say that everyone has their own idea of the structure and characteristics of their nation in terms of abstract community and about the
values of that people. This tension between a nation as a cultural construct and a nation as a social group is one that helps explain the many problems associated with the national constitution with which a certain part of every nation is struggling in modern Europe. Then we can ask: To what extent is the traditional concept of belonging to
the nation – which embraces the idea that this relationship includes commitment, the idea that belonging or national identification of services – is compatible with a critical view of certain segments of that same nation, whether that means a particular individual or an entire group. If we are not aware that we use the term nations on two
levels, it is easy to equate the critical view of a particular segment of the nation, class or professional group with the rejection or condemnation of the nation as a whole. This way of confusion and pooling of concepts and values, which occurs when the shortcomings of an individual or group are generalized into an attribute of national
character, is nothing new. But today it is certainly a stronger phenomenon than it was in the past. There used to be a general social consensus that what's called a nation in terms of an abstract community is a positive value. We can show this in an example of historical consciousness. The concept of a common national destiny often
changes in response to changes in modern society. It is not certain whether it is still true today that The image of the nation's past and the more generally accepted that image is, the more consolidated the abstract notion of the nation is too. Yet even differing opinions about certain events in national history in no way undermine the real
idea that (the nation) is given history - as 'our' history - yet the shared history of every member of the nation. As an abstract value community, the nation exists not only in a country where its individual members understand its relationship to its nation as one in which they belong to a historically shaped community, but more than that is
expected to identify with the abstract construcation of the nation as a cultural value. This assumption has been taken for granted in the past. To what extent does it also apply in the present? It is a relationship to the nation as an abstract value community that today may be in danger of being disturbed or eroded. The reason why the nation
as a valued community today is so fragile and vulnerable is that its existence depends on a certain level of cultural knowledge shared by the entire population and on the active and nationally engaged leadership of the elites, which has been mobilised by their education in the humanities. If the population does not have an adequate level of
education, they will not be able to resist the manipulation of the media, which opportunism represents the nation in a negative rather than positive light compared to Europe. Everything then depends on how active the elites are, the ones that should be, but often not the main vehicles by which the value of the nation is communicated.
Where does the risk lie? If the relationship were disrupted or even destroyed, ultimately, a nation at the level of an abstract community of values could lose its cultural essence. In the eyes of members of their 'own' social group, the nation would cease to exist as an entity invested in values and moral imperatives. The nation, however,
would continue to exist as a community, especially because it is usually cemented together in the form of a political institution - that is, the state of the nation. What would be the consequences of this? Although European national states (i.e. their elites) would be officially defined as a civic community, their inhabitants would usually see
themselves as members of the nation, but without feeling any commitment to the nation as an abstract community of values. The ideologues of European unification were originally led by a noble goal to prevent any further epidemics of poisonous nationalism, which they rightly blamed for the horrors of both the First and Second World
Wars. This opinion was taken as axiomatic, as the only political concept and as a fundamental principle of European unification. However, what they did not realize, or did not want to admit, is that the nation exists in two senses – in terms of abstract value and in a concrete sociological sense. That's because they shared or uncritically
accepted the wrong idea that the nation (no matter what) was nothing more than a construct created by the nationalists. And as a construct and source of evil nationalism, he had to be marginalized and 'deconstructed'. The main goal has become to improve citizenship education among members of one nation in terms of social group.
Coupled with neoliberal individualism, this education achieved unquestionable success in that it even came to the question of the very meaning of the existence of the nation. Yet given the deplorable state that education is in the humanities in the present, it is understandable that many supporters of European unification have ignored
another sense of national existence - the nation as a cultural value. Daily empirical experience shows that nations have never ceased to exist as social structures. Yet how can the idea of a nation survive in the minds of people who have become, or rather learned to become, not members of the nation but citizens of the state? Why would
he survive? As the image of the nation fades as a cultural ideal, and as an abstract community, its members, above all its intellectual elite, will also lose the belief or sense that they have a commitment to this nation as a whole and as a value. It is difficult to motivate a person to be replaced by a mandatory commitment to the state. The
state is just a large number of citizens living together. Its citizens can and must offer the best possible services: safety on the streets, good roads, good schools and so on. However, I do not know whether a citizen state can assume the role or position of a nation as an abstract community of values with the ability to emotionally motivate
them to operate outside the sphere of profit and material advantage. Why would a citizen sacrifice a state, which is an institution, not a cultural value or an object of pride; sacrifice at a level given in the name of the nation by the ancestors of citizens as abstract value? Yet almost everywhere in modern Europe the states are states of the
nation, so almost everywhere we are witnessing significant hypocrisy: officially, the state seems to be talking to its citizens, but in reality, turning to them as members of the nation in its sense as a social group. It's obvious to everyone, but it's not politically correct to say it openly. However, can a State be transferred as a medium that can
be invested national values? Today we would probably find that a large number and perhaps most members of the Czech, German or Danish nations have no interest in the heritage or heritage of their national culture, do not consider that knowledge of their national history is important, and if they do, often some involve belittling the main
figures in that history. If there was a depreciation of this abstract community in its value, then understandably, the willingness, and probably the ability, to do something in name or to use this community beyond what is legally required of citizens (but not members of the nation) would disappear. Who today would be willing to sacrifice their
position in society or even lay down their lives for their country to fight the occupation of a foreign state, especially if their civil rights remain intact? Who would be willing to sacrifice themselves to fight the risk of losing the national language if they are guaranteed the same standard of living anyway? Isn't the fragmentation of Europe into
many small nations a pointless luxury? If we believe that the path to the formation of a nation was a 'mistake of history', which is so sometimes seen, then the question should be asked: Was it really in the interest of creating civil society to fight the Napoleonic occupation of Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century? If we believe
that the principle of citizenship overrides the principle of the nation, then the idea of a unified, civic, monolingual French Napoleonic Europe seems to be the most rational development in the modernization of our continent, and thus as an alternative to the formation of the peoples of Europe. If we consider that the relationship of the
members of the nation to their nation as values weakens, it is not just the result of civic upbringing; this is also the result of the anti-humanist technocratic concept of curricular and extracurious education in general. Let's try to test the following hypothesis: Axiom that civil principle is incompatible with national identity is difficult to prove, and
if it is argued in practice, then this is possible by the decline of education in the humanities. Because of the decline of the humanities, most members of the nation in their sense as a social group, as well as its educated elites, lose or have already lost the elementary knowledge necessary to maintain tradition and national culture, because
they have ceased to consider it a value. The nation, however, still exists as a 'sociological fact', and its members need to belong somewhere and identify with something. There is still an expectation that belonging to the nation is of some usefulness or at least satisfaction to its members. The most striking way to this satisfaction and
strengthening of deflated national identity, and at a small cost or sacrifice, is through sport. There is no specific form of education needed to provide this sense of satisfaction; it is sufficient for the media to engage in manipulation. As a result, the need for educated elites in national life is diminishing – as is their responsibility. This isn't just
about the experience people have when they attend a sporting event in person. Information about these events enters a communication system that connects citizens – members of the nation. This information thus becomes a new kind of code, as it replaces the old cultural codes. These cultural codes are now disappearing or have almost
completely already disappeared, partly as a result of the fragmentation of cultural life. There are almost no more works of art, events or figures in national cultural life that become part of the general discourse because they are recognised and personally embraced by the majority of citizens. This is another reason why sport serves as an
'essentialistic' way in which awareness of belonging to the nation as a social group is shown. However, in the new circumstances it is no longer associated with positive cultural values and instead has become a value-neutral phenomenon and lives more as an awareness of belonging or tie that is usually unrelated to the notion of
commitment or service. This is a clear signal of a new role or content of national identity: more and more members of the nation in its sense of actual existing groups do not regard their affiliation to the nation as a common value or obligation, but above all expect some kind of benefit or usefulness from belonging to it. They want to live off
the national community, but they're not ready to live for it. This can take the form of some material benefit - for example, it can offer protection in the form of a national market or national competitiveness, or it can provide security or some form of prestige - such as the sense of joy he experienced after witnessing the nation's victory at a
sporting event. In this, however, the concept of the nation is reminiscent of the concept of the state. And like the state, the nation is then seen primarily as an institution that provides services to its members. Belonging to the community, or simply belonging somewhere, or being considered an anthropological constant. However, with most
members of a nation denied access to patriotic education, the idea of a nation as a value to be nurtured is increasingly a side to its members. Among a large segment of the nation's members, therefore, their relationship to the nation is embodied in simple slogans - such as 'my nation first of all', 'Czech lands' the Czech People, Alternative
für Deutschland or America in the first place. In many cases, the same people, who at this level declare their love for the nation, in the face of general insecurity, which can easily be conjuddicated and manipulated by the 'populist' media, the self-proclaimed 'bleachers of the people', who run their appeals to the nation and its interests, it is
not difficult to gain sympathy and support for this segment of the nation. But they do not do so to invite them to work selflessly on behalf of their homeland, but to demand more and more new benefits from the nation - or, more accurately, from the national state. If the understanding of the nation as a cultural value is lost, patriotism
disappears, and the door then opens to the rise of simple nationalism. Who's to blame for this? Are it just those populists who 'seduce' the people? Not really. The co-optance for this is borne by those who complain most about the rise of primitive nationalism, namely the intellectuals (including EU ideologues) who created space for this
nationalism (and perhaps sometimes even provoked it) unilaterally and blindly assigning primacy to citizenship over patriotism and who were unable to distinguish nationalism from patriotism. They are the ones who have contributed the most to the deconstruction of individualism as commitment and values. In this we have a school
example of 'throwing a baby with bath water'. Therefore, there is no doubt that a 'nation' in terms of a social group can exist even when it is not explicitly tied to the nation as a cultural construct. We can again and again look at efforts to strengthen the national self-consciousness of members of the nation as a social group, without that
being based on reviving the idea of a nation as an abstract value community and as something that must be nurtured. Instead, the egotistical instincts of the individual, instincts such as xenophobia and racism dwell, and there is a risk of waves of nationalist group passions, whose aim will not be to serve the nation in terms of cultural or
civic value, but to affirm the interests of a group under the guise of so-called national interests. This can happen both within the national community and in relation to other nations. On the other hand, it is important to understand that after achieving statehood, the independence or autonomy of the national nation as abstract values.
Although cultural values in the correct sense of the word fade from this abstraction, the value of 'independence' or 'autonomy' remains. Let us ask the question from the opposite angle: Can a nation as an abstract cultural value exist when most members of the nation as a social group do not know or recognize the nation in this sense?
There are some reasons for optimism here. The nation in its abstract sense - as an idea and cultural value - endures wherever a small minority of members of that social group recognises it. It survives partly in the minds and in the thinking of this minority among the elites, but above all in the vast potential of cultural wealth that resides in
writings, monuments, documents and works of art and science. The question is whether there is still any theoretical hope for some kind of new national revival – in terms of reactivation of national values held as intellectual potential or resources. If this reactivation does not happen, it will happen that in terms of the abstract community the
nation ceases to have any cultural value, and the nation in terms of social group will become only a collective of people who speak the same language and are citizens of the same state, which is accidentally designated as a nation. Why would these people maintain or even nurture this language that has become merely an instrument of
communication and which in itself has ceased to be a value, and even lost its function as a symbol of the abstract cultural community? How can ordinary citizens accept literature as a value when they have almost completely given up reading? The question that must then be asked is: under what conditions can group members be united
by the belief that, since they belong to the same nation, they have a common interest that can be called the national interest? This, however, is an issue that deserves its own separate treatment. Wherever the construct of a nation as an abstract community sees the loss of the traditional idea of serving on behalf of the nation, as part of
humanity, what is left is an empty notion in which it is possible to project xenophobia and so on, and thus open the door to nationalism. In other words, as a marker for the abstract community of values, the notion of nations will not disappear completely, but it will be transformed because members of the nation need something to be proud
of. However, the object of their pride may be phenomena that have nothing in common with the cultural community. The nation as a cultural community thus becomes an empty term and can even degenerate into a tool for a campaign of nationalist hatred. However, it remains hopeful that this dangerous tendency can at least be curtailed
or restricted if elites nurture national identity. patriotism instead of despising patriotism. Here it is appropriate to recall Tom Nairn's well-known metaphor of two of Janus's faces – the nation and the identity with it, can show not only his positively patriotic face, but also the hateful and negative nationalist face. As a result of all this, today's
nation becomes something different from what the nation was in the traditional sense of the word during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and this difference should be respected even where the object of empirical research is. With some exaggeration, you could say that the 'modern nation' whose origins I studied actually don't really
exist today. I try to draw attention here to the fact that to reduce the present issue of the nation only to the goal of eliminating so-called nationalism means entering a vicious circle and just leaning towards windmills. The problem is much more complicated and one that we will only be able to analyse in a qualified way if from the position we
have to begin to take the first examination of the object of nationalism, or the nation, as (both) constructs and reality. We must also bear in mind the well-known but almost forgotten fact that this is a phenomenon we encounter on two interconnected levels: in terms of a large social group of citizens and in terms of the abstract community of
cultural values. And it doesn't matter here if it's a nation or a nation without a country we're considering. This distinction could be very useful as a basis for further research into nationalism and could provide insight into new aspects of the problem. Of course, such an approach must take into account that the nation as an abstract
community in a historical perspective is a true European phenomenon. I find it unproductive to set the principle of nationality contrary to civil principle. The State has a mission as an institution that provides services to its citizens; requires them to comply with its laws and offer guarantees of security and respect for their rights. However,
unlike the nation, the state is primarily a set of citizens, to whom it provides services and an administrative structure, and is usually not interested in giving forms to emotional connections or reviving historical awareness of the age of belonging. This says something that we are talking about civil rights and obligations in the relationship
between individual and state; but in the relationship between individual and nation we expect a relationship of commitment, solidarity and responsibility. Put simply, the state is expected to provide, but the nation is something to be worked for. Both entities – state and nation – undeniably have their historically confirmed function in people's
lives. Our current experience however, that a nation as a sociological fact that exists as a social group cannot be solved by disintegration within a civic community called the state. The more nations in terms of social group lose ties to the nation as an abstract value community, the greater the danger that proponents of aggressive, primitive
nationalism will realize with their messages among citizens. Should we respect the activities of those who advocate nationalism as the work of people who seek to revive national self-consciousness and affirm postulate patriotism? Since the process of failing education, which has been discussed above, I find irreversible, I question how
even the most unfavorable attempts to revive a healthy, non-aggressive national consciousness could be successful, the reason that these efforts cannot be relied on to identify people with the nation as value. Attempts to strengthen identification with a nation that is not based on understanding and embracing the nation as a port of
cultural value in itself are in danger of actually strengthening the opposite tendency: the rise of group egotism, the rise of nationalism in the appropriate sense of the word. For this reason, I fear that trying to raise national awareness or awareness among young people will not turn them into patriots, willing to work selflessly for the benefit of
their nation and its culture, but will instead produce superficial blur or braggarts across the line of football fans. Even if a government or government decided to take that path towards reviving the humanities, it would fail. Today, people are capable of learning it almost extinct. One reason for this is that for decades the only acceptable form
of school education has been to acquire practical skills that are useful 'for life'. This dogma, supported by the Bologna system, is almost unwavering, especially in the age of digital learning, and as a result, attempts to revive the idea of the nation as values have little chance of success. This observation may sound optimistic to our
postmodernists and technocrats about the promise of liberation from the burden of the national past and opening the door to a digitised and globalised idyll of the future of an economically united Europe. However, they must understand that, as I have already pointed out, the destruction of the nation in terms of cultural value is
counterproductive, because the consequence of this will not be the end of primitive nationalism, but, on the contrary, its strengthening. This is what we are experiencing today: among the growing segment of the nation as social groups, primitive slogans have taken the place of cultural values. If there was a serious crisis, it would be almost
impossible to prevent an explosion Nationalism. Translation by Robin Cassling The full text of this article iucr.org is unavailable due to technical difficulties. Difficulties.

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