BASBAS v ENTENA

G.R. No. L-26255 June 30, 1969 Basbas’s claim to preference in purchasing the land, in case the said land is to be sold,
or to his right to redeem it in 2 years should the land be sold without his knowledge, is
predicated upon Sections 11 and 12 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic
FACTS: Act 3844):
l Basbas is the leasehold tenant of a riceland owned by Rufino.
l Rufino sent a letter to Basbas informing the latter that the land was for sale and SEC. 11. Lessee's Right of Pre-emption. — In case the agricultural lessor decides to sell
that Basbas was given a certain period to communicate his intention to purchase the landholding, the agricultural lessee shall have the preferential right to buy the same
it. under reasonable terms and conditions x x x
l Basbas sent a reply accepting the offer, although disagreeing with the price.
Basbas also mentioned that he was enlisting the aid of the government in SEC. 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption. — In case the landholding is sold to a third
purchasing the land. person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right
l Basbas sent a letter to the Land Authority asking for help to acquire the land. The to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That the entire
Land Authority replied that his request is being processed and action will be taken landholding sold must be redeemed: x x x
thereon once the Land Bank has been fully organized.
l Rufino executed a Deed of Sale covering the riceland in favor of Sps. Flaviano and The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from the
Angelina. registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption.
l Rufino and his wife executed an affidavit stating that Basbas was notified of the There is no showing that the Land Reform Council has proclaimed that the government
sale before its conveyance, that Basbas refused or failed to exercise the right of machineries and agencies in the region are already operating, as required by section 4
pre-emption granted under the Agricultural Land Reform Code. of Republic Act 3844.Granting that Sections 11 and 12 are operative, yet this Court has
l The submission of the affidavit enabled the registration of the Deed of Sale in ruled in a past case that the timely exercise of the right of legal redemption requires
favor of Sps. Flaviano and Angelina. either tender of the price or valid consignation thereof. The redemption price should
l Basbas filed a case before the CAR seeking to compel Rufino to sell the land to either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in court. Only by such
him. means can the buyer become certain that the offer to redeem is one made seriously
l CAR dismissed the case because Basbas failed to make tender of payment and and in good faith.
consignation of the purchase price; hence, the landowner cannot be compelled
to sell the land to him. As shown by the evidence in this case, the redemptioner has no funds and must apply
for them to the Land Authority, which, in turn, must depend on the availability of funds
from the Land Bank. It then becomes practically certain that the landowner will not be
ISSUE: able to realize the value of his property for an indefinite time beyond the two years
Whether tender of payment and judicial consignation of the purchase price are redemption period.
necessary before a tanant-lessee may avail himself of the right of pre-emption or of
redemption provided in Sec 11 & 12 of the Agricultural Land Reform. In this case, there was neither prior tender nor did judicial consignation accompany the
filing of the suit. Unless tender or consignation is made requisite to the valid exercise
RULING: of the tenant's right to redeem, everytime a redemption is attempted, a case must be
The appealed order granting the motion to dismiss the complaint is affirmed. filed in court to ascertain the reasonable price. On the other hand, a prior tender by
the tenant of the price that he considers reasonable affords an opportunity to avoid
litigation, for the landowner may well decide to accept a really reasonable offer,
considering that he would thereby save the attorney's fees and the expense of
protracted litigation.

Section 74 of the Land Reform Act (RA 3844) establishes a "Land Bank of the
Philippines" intended "to finance the acquisition by the Government of landed estates
for division and resale to small landholders, as well as the purchase of the landholding
by the agricultural lessee from the landowner." No expression in this part of the law,
however, indicates, or even hints, that the 2-year redemption period will not
commence to ran until the tenant obtains financing from the Land Bank, or stops the
tenant from securing redemption funds from some other source.
GR No. 145568 which clearly exceeded the 25% maximum amount prescribed by law. Therefore, the
HEIRS OF ENRIQUE TAN,Sr. vs. REYNALDA POLLESCAS Tan Heirs cannot validly dispossess Reynalda of the landholding for non-payment of
rental precisely because the lease rental claimed by the Tan Heirs is unlawful.
FACTS:
• Petitioners Tan were co-owners of a coconut farmland.Esteban Pollescas was
the original tenant of the land. Upon Esteban’s death, his son Enrique
succeeded him and was appointed tenant by the landowners. However, DOCTRINE:
respondent Reynalda, Esteban’s surviving second spouse, demanded that the
Tans recognize her as Esteban’s successor. • Section 36 of RA 3844 as amended enumerates the grounds for dispossession
• Reynalda filed a complaint before DARAB, questioning the tenancy of the tenants landholding, to wit:
relationship of Tan and Enrique. DARAB ruled in favor of Reynalda, declaring SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.Notwithstanding any
her as the lawful tenant of the Land. DARAB apportioned the harvests agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall
between the Tans and Reynalda based on the customary sharing system continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his
which is 2/3 to the landowner and 1/3 to the tenant. dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
• Reynalda failed to deliver the 2/3 of the harvest. Tan heirs demanded the executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
payment thereof, but Reynalda ignored such demand.
• Tan heirs filed a case for estafa for her failure to pay and deliver the share. (1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the
Petitioner: The agreement was extinguished due to non-payment of lease (the 2/3 of National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or
the harvest). some other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
Respondent: The Tans demand excessive amount disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests
ISSUE: on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years;
• WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT REYNALDA IS (2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and
OBLIGED TO PAY ONLY 1/4 OR 25% OF THE NORMAL HARVEST AND NOT 2/3 conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is
WHEN THE SUBJECT LAND WAS NOT YET PLACED UNDER THE LEASEHOLD caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;
SYSTEM PURSUANT TO SECTION 12 OF RA 6657 (3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other
HELD: YES than what had been previously agreed upon;
In this case, the Tans seek ejectement of Reynalda from the Land due to non-payment (4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under
of lease rental. In order for non-payment of the lease rental to be a valid ground to paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;
dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding, the amount of the lease rental (5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially
must first of all be lawful. If the amount of lease rental claimed exceeds the limit damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or
allowed by law, non-payment of lease rental cannot be a ground to dispossess the negligence of the agricultural lessee;
agricultural lessee of the landholding. (6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided,
That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of
Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended mandates that not x x x more than 25% of the seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be
average normal harvest shall constitute the just and fair rental for leasehold. In this a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular
case, the Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease rental, crop is not thereby extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of
paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.

• SEC. 28. Termination of Leasehold by Agricultural Lessee During Agricultural

Year.The agricultural lessee may terminate the leasehold during the
agricultural year for any of the following causes:

(1) Cruel, inhuman or offensive treatment of the agricultural lessee or any

member of his immediate farm household by the agricultural lessor or his
representative with the knowledge and consent of the lessor;

(2) Non-compliance on the part of the agricultural lessor with any of the
obligations imposed upon him by the provisions of this Code or by his contract with
the agricultural lessee;

(3) Compulsion of the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm
household by the agricultural lessor to do any work or render any service not in any
way connected with farm work or even without compulsion if no compensation is paid;

(4) Commission of a crime by the agricultural lessor or his representative against

the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm household; or

(5) Voluntary surrender due to circumstances more advantageous to him and

his family.
GR No. L-25327 o A. The end of agricultural year when the National Land Reform
HIDALGO vs HIDALGO Council makes the proclamation declaring the region or locality a
land reform area or;
FACTS: o B. The shorter provided in the share tenancy contracts expires;
• Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo (Policarpio) was the owner of 2 o C. The share tenant sooner exercises his option to elect the leasehold
agricultural parcels of land. He executed a deed of sale in favor of the system.
Respondents.
• 2 Cases:
• CASE 1: Respondent-vendor sold the 22,876 sqm parcel of land together with
2 other parcels of land for P4,000.00. Petitioner spouses Igmidio and Martina
as tenants thereof, alleged that the parcel of land worked by them was worth
P1,500.00
• CASE 2: respondent-vendor sold the 22,876 sqm parcel of land for P750.00
and petitioner spouses Hilaro and Adela as tenants, seek by way of
redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same price of P750.00
• For several years, petitioner-tenants worked on the lands as share-tenants.

ISSUE:
WON the plaintiffs as share tenants, are entitled to redeem the parcels of land they
are working from the purchasers thereof, where no notice was previously given to
them by the vendor. Is the right of redemption granted by Sec 12 of RA No. 3844
applicable to share tenants?

HELD:
• No. the court explained that a share tenant is altogether different from a
leasehold tenant and their respective rights and obligations are NOT CO-
EXTENSIVE or CO-EQUAL. The right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the
Land Reform Code is applicable only to leasehold tenants because said
provision of law clearly grants to the agricultural lease and nobody else.
• The court opined that the essence of the Agricultural Reform Code is the
abolition of the Agricultural Share Tenancy as proclaimed to its title. Sec.4 of
the code expressly outlaws agricultural share tenancy as to contrary to public
policy and decrees its abolition.
• Based on transitory provision that existing share-tenancy contracts were
allowed to continue temporarily in force and effect notwithstanding their
express abolition until whichever of the following events to occur:
Manuel Guerrero and Maria Guerrero v. CA and Apolinario Benitez plaintiff and his family lived, thus, making plaintiffs feel that they (defendants) meant
business. Hence, this case for reinstatement with damages.
DOCTRINE: Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of
tenancy relationships. The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, ISSUE: Whether a tenancy relationship exists between the parties Guerrero and
plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion of growth and the care of Apolinario Benitez
the plants or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general
industry. RULING: YES. The law denes "agricultural tenancy" as the physical possession by a
person of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for
FACTS: In 1969, plaintiff Apolinario Benitez was taken by defendants-spouses Manuel the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his
and Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing within immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the
their 21-hectare coconut plantation in Aurora, Quezon. Plaintiff was allowed for that harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or
purpose to put up a hut within the plantation where he and his family stayed. in money, or in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199. The Agricultural Tenancy Act, as
amended.)
In addition to attending to the cows, he was made to clean the already fruit-bearing
coconut trees, burn dried leaves and grass and to do such other similar chores. During With petitioner reference to this case, "share tenancy" exists whenever two persons
harvest time which usually comes every three months, he was also made to pick agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes
coconuts and gather the fallen ones from a 16-hectare portion of the 21-hectare the land and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of
plantation. He had to husk and split the nuts and then process its meat into copra in the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor available
defendants' copra kiln. For his work related to the coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be
proceeds from the copra he processed and sold in the market. For attending to the divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective
cows, he was paid P500 a year. contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199: Sec. 166(25) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).

Sometime in the early part of 1973, plaintiff was refrained from gathering nuts from In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural laborer is any agricultural salary or piece worker
the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of the plantation from where he used to but is not limited to a farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code
gather nuts. He felt aggrieved by the acts of defendants and he brought the matter to expressly provides otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a
the attention of the Office of Special Unit in the Office of the President in Malacañang, consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor
Manila. This led to an execution of an agreement whereby defendants agreed, among practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment"
others, to let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of the plantation as tenant (Sec. 166 (15) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).
thereon and that their relationship will be guided by the provisions of Republic Act No.
1199. The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. In this case, the fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all
phases of farm work from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although
Then in July, 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a
portion of the plantation with threats of bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits tenant, not a mere farm laborer (delos Reyes v. Espinelli, s u p r a; Marcelo v . de Leon,
therefrom. Defendant spouses, the Guerreros, then assigned defendants Rogelio and 105 Phil. 1175).
Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of the nuts and the processing thereof into copra.
Defendants Guerreros also caused to be demolished a part of the cottage where
Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and
respondent is their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a "tercio basis" that
is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the petitioner-landowners. Though not a positive
indication of the existence of tenancy relations per se, the sharing of harvests, taken
together with other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in this case,
strengthens the claim of respondent that indeed, he is a tenant.

The petitioners entered into an agreement which in clear and categorical terms
establishes respondent as a tenant, to wit: A G R E E M E N T "This agreement entered
into by and between Manuel Guerrero hereinafter referred to as tenant." . . . The
petitioners, however, contend that the word "tenant" in the aforequoted agreement
was used to mean a hired laborer or farm employee as understood and agreed upon
by the parties. The fact that their relationship would be guided by the provisions of
Republic Act 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines militates against
such an assertion. It would be an absurdity for Republic Act 1199 to govern an
employer-employee relationship. If as the petitioners insist a meaning other than its
general acceptation had been given the word "tenant", the instrument should have so
stated. Aided by a lawyer, the petitioners, nor the respondent could not be said to have
misconstrued the same.

Therefore, in clear and categorical terms, the private respondent appears to be nothing
else but a tenant.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of
the appellate court is AFFIRMED.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 79310, (b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares — Thirty
Jul 14, 1989, percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments
175 SCRA 343 (1989) negotiable at any time.

Facts: (c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five percent (35%) cash,
In G.R. No. 79777, the subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland
worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants
were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under (2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred
P.D. No. 27. shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set
by the PARC;
Petitioners are questioning constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229.
Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in (3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value. However, in an
amended petition, petitioners contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (4) LBP bonds
(except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it Issue:
suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures. Whether or not Sec. 18 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners
of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than
money, which is the only medium of payment allowed.
Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the Held:
landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and No. It cannot be denied from these case that the traditional medium for the payment
the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just
pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal
compensation for the land. here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an
ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose.
landowner: What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions: The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned — of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed
Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial their owners.
instruments negotiable at any time. the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation
provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the
Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has
influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered
institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need
for its enhancement.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to
be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the
other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the
areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is
noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because
the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford
a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the
government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are
"negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the
landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares
of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value
equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA, Yap, Heirs of Santiago, Agricultural Management include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit that should have been
And Development Corp. made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can
be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed.
Facts: Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) (G.R. The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the
No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals, granting private expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the
respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. However, upon motion filed by traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in
private respondents, the petitions were ordered consolidated. Likewise, petitioners cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full
seek the reversal of the Resolution, denying their motion for reconsideration. payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is
transferred.
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR
and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Issue: Whether or not there should be a distinction the deposit of compensation and
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and LBP with determination of just compensation
respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the
provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari Held: To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already
and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they
argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been
and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by deprived of the possession and use of such properties is an oppressive exercise of
the LBP, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the eminent domain. It is unnecessary to distinguish between deposit of compensation
DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as (provisional) under Section 16(e) and determination of just compensation (final) under
provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Private respondents also assail the fact that Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same.
the DAR and the LBP merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the The immediate effect in both situations is the same the landowner is deprived of the
compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately
taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in compensated.
bonds. The respondent court rendered the assailed decision in favor of private
respondents. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court
denied the same, hence, the instant petitions.

Issue: Whether or not the deposit may be made in other forms besides cash or LBP
bonds

Held: In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to
enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no
basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as
compensation for his property because Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that
the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". If it were the intention to
LBP vs. Rufino G.R. No. 175644. October 2, 2009. Section 17 of RA 6657 and the DAR issuances implementing it. RTC cannot resort to
Doctrine: any other means of determining just compensation, aside from Section 17 of RA 6657
In computing for the just compensation related to land taken under the and DAR AO 6-92.
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), computation should be based on
Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92. Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92, as
amended, are mandatory and not mere guides that the can be disregarded.

Facts:
Respondents' claim, in 1989, that they voluntarily offered their parcel of agricultural
land situated in Barangay San Benon, Irosin, Sorsogon to the government for CARP
coverage at P120,000 per hectare. Acting thereon, petitioner Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) issued a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition dated October 21,
1996 declaring that out of the total area indicated in the title, 138.4018 hectares was
subject to immediate acquisition at a valuation of P8,736,270.40 based on the
assessment of petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).
Respondents having found the valuation unacceptable, the matter was referred to the
DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the conduct of summary administrative
proceedings to determine just compensation. DARAB sustained LBP's valuation.
Subsequently, the issue was raised by the respondents’ to RTC which ruled that the
market data approach is more realistic and consistent with law and jurisprudence to
identify just compensation for the full and fair equivalent of the property. The Court of
Appeals sustained the trial court's valuation.

Issue:
Whether the market data approach or Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92 will
apply in the computation of just compensation.

Ruling:
Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92, as amended, are mandatory and not mere
guides that the RTC may disregard.

In fixing the just compensation in the present case, the trial court, adopting the market
data approach merely put premium on the location of the property and the crops
planted thereon which are not among the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657.
And the trial court did not apply the formula provided in DAR AO 6-92, as amended.
This is a clear departure from the settled doctrine regarding the mandatory nature of
LBP vs. BANAL § AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest,
G.R. No. 143276 pursuant to DAR A.O No. 13, Series of 1994
20 July 2004
• On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court.
Facts:
• Respondent spouses Banal were registered owners of a 19.3422-has of an Issue: Whether or not the valuation of the land correctly computed.
agricultural land in Basud, Camarines Norte. A portion of the land consisting of
6.2330-has [5.4730-has of which is planted to coconut & 0.76-has planted to palay] Ruling: No.
was compulsorily acquired by DAR through CARL.
• In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several factors
• Petitioner LBP made the valuation of the said property: enumerated in Sec. 17 of RA 6657, as amended:
o 5.4730 of coconut land = P148,675.19 o Cost of acquisition of the land;
o 0.7600 of riceland = P25,243.36 o Current value of like properties;
o Total value = P173,918.55 o Nature of the property;
o Actual use;
• Respondent spouses rejected the valuation. Thus, a summary administrative o Income;
proceeding was conducted before the PARAD, to determine the value of the land. o Sworn valuation by the owner;
PARAD affirmed the valuation of LBP. o Tax declarations;
o Assessment by government assessors;
• Respondents then filed with the RTC a petition for determination of just
compensation & prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00 per hectare for both • Such factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR A. O. No. 6, Series
coconut & riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00. of 1992, as amended by DAR A. O. No. 11, Series of 1994:

• RTC ruled that the just compensation for the coconut land was at P657,137.00 & o LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00. The trial court used the
following formula: The above formula shall be used if all 3 factors are present, relevant & applicable –
o Coconut land: LV = Land Value; CNI = Capitalized Net Income; CS = Comparable Sales; MV = Market
§ Average Gross Production (AGP) x 0.70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of Value per Tax Declaration
coconut) = Net Income
§ NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) applying the capitalization o If CS is not present and CNI & MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
formula under RA3844 LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

o Rice land o If CNI is not present, and CS & MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
§ 2.5 x AGP x Govt. Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH, LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
using the formula under EO 228
 o If both CS & CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula
shall be:
LV = MV x 2

• In the case at bar, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure & the
fundamental requirements in determining just compensation for the property.
o First, it dispensed with the hearing & merely ordered the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous
since the determination of just compensation involves the examination
of the factors specified in Sec. 17, RA 6657, as amended.
o Second, it merely took judicial notice of the average production figures in
another pending case & applied the same to the present case without
conducting a hearing & worse, without the knowledge or consent of the
parties. Well settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when
said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the
same judge.
o Lastly, it erred in applying the formula prescribed under EO 228 & RA
3844, as amended, in determining the valuation of the property; & in
granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR A. O. No. 13, Series of
1994.

• It must be stressed that EO 228 covers private agricultural lands primarily devoted
to rice & corn, while RA 3844 governs agricultural leasehold relations between the
person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor, & the person who personally cultivates the same.
Here, the land is planted to coconut & rice and does not involve agricultural
leasehold relation. What the trial court should have applied is the formula in DAR
A. O. No. 6, as amended by DAR A. O. No. 11.

• As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR A. O.

No. 13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land but to those lands taken
under PD 27 & EO 228 whose owners have not been compensated. In this case,
the property is covered by RA 6657, as amended, & respondents have been paid
the provisional compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEONILA CELADA
SAC correctly assumed jurisdiction over determination of just compensation
FACTS: The SAC did not err in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for determination of just
Celada owns an agricultural land, 60% of which was identified in 1998 by the compensation despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as suitable for compulsory acquisition under the DARAB. As the Court held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the RTC,
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Upon indorsement to it for field sitting as a SAC, has ‘original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
investigation and valuation, Land Bank valued the said land at P299,569.61. DAR determination of just compensation to landowners.’ This ‘original and exclusive’
offered the same amount to Celada as just compensation. Celada, however, rejected jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if DAR would vest in administrative
the offer. The matter was then referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) for officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate
summary administrative hearing on the determination of just compensation. court for the review of administrative decision. Although the new rules speak of
During the pendency of the DARAB case, Celada filed a petition for judicial directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as SACs, the original
determination of just compensation, alleging that the current market value of her land and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs.
was at least P2,129,085.00. In its answer, Land Bank raised the affirmative defense of It should be emphasized that the taking of property under the CARP is an exercise of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. It contended that Celada must first await the power of eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination
the outcome of the DARAB case before taking any judicial recourse. Meanwhile, the of just compensation is a judicial function. Thus, the SAC properly took cognizance of
DARAB Provincial Adjudicator affirmed the valuation made by Land Bank. Thereafter, Celada’s petition for determination of just compensation.
the Special Agrarian Court (SAC), where Celada’s petition was filed, rendered judgment
fixing the value of the land at P354,847.50, finding that Celada’s evidence showed that SAC erred in fixing just compensation based on valuation of neighboring lands
the neighboring lands of similar classification were paid higher than what was quoted The SAC, however, erred in setting aside Land Bank’s valuation of the land on the sole
by Land Bank. It denied Land Bank’s affirmative defense. The Court of Appeals basis of the higher valuation given for neighboring properties. It did not apply the DAR
dismissed Land Bank’s appeal. valuation formula which considers capitalized net income, comparable sales and
Land Bank maintains that the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over Celada’s petition market value per tax declaration as components of land value.
for judicial determination of just compensation despite the pendency of the
administrative proceedings before the DARAB. It also contends that the SAC erred in
fixing the just compensation of the land based on the valuation of neighboring lands
instead of its actual land use.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for judicial
determination of just compensation pending administrative proceedings before the
DARAB;
2.) Whether or not the SAC erred in fixing the just compensation of the land based on
the valuation of neighboring lands

HELD:
The petition is GRANTED.
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBC) vs. Soriano G.R. Nos. 180772 and 180776 interest pursuant to Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No.
May 6, 2010 13, series of 1994, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 2, series of 2004.

Doctrine: Just Compensation; Old formula (E.O. 228) vs. New Formula (Sec. 17, R.A. No. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the CA affirmed the decision of the
667); If just compensation is not settled prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, RTC (SAC).
it should be computed in accordance with the said law, although the property was
acquired under Presidential Decree No. 27; The DAR’s land valuation is only preliminary Issues:
and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other 1. Whether or not the determination of just compensation for the subject land is
interested party. In the exercise of their functions, the courts still have the final say on covered by
what the amount of just compensation will be. the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
2. Whether or not the interest rate imposed by the trial courts of 6% per annum from
Facts: the
Domingo and Mamerto Soriano are the registered owners of several parcels of rice date of taking on 21 October 1972 until full payment of the just compensation, is
land situated in Albay. Out of the 18.9163 hectares of land owned by the respondents, correct.
18.2820 hectares were placed under the Operations Land Transfer and the CARP
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 and Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. of Appeals.
LBP pegged the value of 18.0491 hectares of land at P482,363.957 (P133,751.65 as land
value plus P348,612.30 incremental interest), while the remaining 0.2329 hectare was 1. YES, HOWEVER IN THIS CASE THE SUPREME COURT SUSTAINED THE FORMULA USED
computed at P8,238.94. BY THE TRIAL COURT BECAUSE THE RECORDS OF THE CASE ARE BEREFT OF ADEQUATE
DATA. If just compensation is not settled prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 6657,
Not satisfied with the valuation, respondents, on 23 November 2000, instituted a it should be computed in accordance with the said law, although the property was
Complaint for judicial determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court acquired under Presidential Decree No. 27. In this case, while the subject lands were
of Legazpi City, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC). acquired under PD No. 27, the complaint for just compensation was only lodged before
the court on 23 November 2000 or long after the passage of RA No. 6657 in 1988.
Respondents alleged that they are entitled to an amount of not less than P4,500,000.00 Therefore, Section 17 of RA No. 6657 should be the principal basis of the computation
as just compensation. for just compensation.

The SAC rendered a judgment, ordering LBP to pay the respondents P894,584.94 (the Nevertheless, with the passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the CARL in 1988,
just compensation of the 18.0491 hectares of irrigated riceland is P133,751.79, plus new guidelines were set for the determination of just compensation, however in this
increment of 6% per annum computed annually beginning October 21, 1972, until the case, the fixing of just compensation should therefore be based on the parameters set
value is fully paid, and of the 0.2329 hectare of rain fed riceland is P8,238.94 plus 12% out in Republic Act No. 6657, with Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No.
interest per annum, beginning August 17, 1998, until the value is fully paid or a total of 228 having only suppletory effect. As much as this Court would like to determine the
P894,584.94 as of this date.) The SAC applied the formula prescribed under Executive proper valuation based on the DAR formula “Land Value= (Capitalized Net Income x
Order No. 228 in determining the valuation of the property, i.e., Land value = Average 0.6) + (Comparable Sales x 0.3) + (Market Value per Tax Declaration x 0.1)”, the records
Gross Production x 2.5 x Government Support Price. It likewise granted compounded of this case are bereft of adequate data. To write finis to this case, the Supreme Court
uphold the amount derived from the old formula. However, since the application of
the new formula is a matter of law and thus, should be made applicable, the parties
are not precluded from asking for any additional amount as may be warranted by the
new formula.

2. YES. Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that redistribution of
agricultural lands be subject to the payment of just compensation. Moreover, the
landowner’s right to just compensation should be balanced with agrarian reform. The
concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also payment within a reasonable
time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
“just.” To condition the payment upon LBP’s approval and its release upon compliance
with some documentary requirements would render nugatory the very essence of
“prompt payment.” Therefore, to expedite the payment of just compensation, it is
logical to concluded that the 6% interest rate be imposed from the time of taking up
to the time of full payment of just compensation.
Landbank vs. Wycoco the bases of determining just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at
without considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value
Facts: of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size,
Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare unirrigated and shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon. Since these factors were not
untenanted rice land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-206422 and considered, a remand of the case for determination of just compensation is
situated in the Barrio of San Juan, Licab, Nueva Ecija. Pursuant to the CARP, Wycoco necessary. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution
voluntarily offered to sell his land to the DAR for P14.9 million. The evidence presented especially where the case involves a vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the
by Wycoco in support of his claim were the following: (1) Transfer Certificate of Title requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be
No. NT-206422; (2) Notice of Land Valuation; and (3) letter dated July 10, 1992 promptly resolved in the negative. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact
rejecting the counter-offer of LBP and DAR. However, the offered price of the DAR is is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with
only P2,280,159.82, thus, he rejected the offer. He then filed a case before the RTC for if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes
the determination of just compensation. The RTC ruled in his favor. It ruled that there that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not
is no need to present evidence in support of the land valuation inasmuch as it is of judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial
public knowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of
Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took judicial a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.
notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at
P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00.

Issue:
WON the just compensation determined by the RTC was valid and within its
jurisdiction.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

Sec. 3. Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of
any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or
on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to
be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

xInasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at
bar, the trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead
of practically assuming a valuation without basis. While market value may be one of
Land Bank of the Philippines, Petitioner v. ESTHER ANSON RIVERA, ANTONIO G. However, as regards the costs of suit, Land Bank is exempt. Rule 142 Costs Section
ANSON AND CESAR G. ANSON, Respondents 1.Costs ordinarily follow results of suit. Unless otherwise provided in these rules, costs
Perez, J.: shall be allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of coursebut the court shall have
power, for special reasons adjudge that either party shall pay the costs of an action, or
FACTS: that the same be divided, as may be equitable.No costs shall be allowed against the
Respondents are co-owners of a parcel of land under the coverage of Operation Land Republic of thePhilippines unless otherwise provided by law.
Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 in 1972.Only 18.8704 hectares of the since LBP is performing a governmental function in agrarian reform proceeding, it is
total are of 20.5254 hectares were subject of the coverage. The Land Bank of the exempt from the payment of costs of suit as provided under Rule 142, Section 1 of the
Philippines directed payment, and the Respondents instituted a suit to determine the Rules of Court
value of the property. They computed that it was P2,668,302.00 for the entire
landholding of 20.5254 hectares. Petition Granted. But Land Bank is exempt from costs of suit.

The RTC declared that Land Bank should only pay Php1,297,710.63. Petitioner filed a
petition for Review at the CA, which held that Land Bank should only pay P823,957.23,
plus interest of 12% per annum on the amount ofP515,777.57. Land Bank disagrees
with the 12% interest and appeals to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the 12% interest is justified.

HELD:
Yes.

Constitutional Law: Expropriation

The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum
equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed
by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one
who desires to sell, if fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.Thus,if
property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interest on its just value
to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation
is actually paid or deposited with the court.In fine, between the taking of the property
and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position
as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. THE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES THE AMOUNT OF PHP 130.00 PER SQ M IS REASONABLE AND JUST CONSIDERING THE
GR No. 217985-86 – March 21 2018 – Tijam NATURE OF THE PROPERTY INVOLVED
FACTS: RA 6657, Sec. 17. Determination ofJust Compensation. -
just compensation, the cost
• Apo was the registered owner of a 115.2 hectare land. It voluntarily offered of acquisition of the land, the current value of the like properties, its nature, actual use
to sell the subject property to the government for purposes of the CARP. Apo and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
was referred to LBP for the initial valuation of the subject property. assessment made by government assessors · shall be considered. The social and
• Apo was informed that the value of the subject property was 16.5484Php per economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
sqm or only a total amoung ot 165,484.47Php per ha. Apo rejecter this offer. Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from
• Meanwhile, DAR requested LBP to deposit the amount of 3,814,053.53 as any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
initial payment for the subject property, at the rate of 3.3102Php per sqm. factors to determine its valuation.
• December 1996: TCT in the name of Apo was cancelled and the subject
property was transferred in the name of the Republic. Factors for imposing the amount of 130Php per sqm:
• Apo then filed a complaint for determination of just compensation with the (1) The subject property is planted with commercial bamboos and is located
DARAB. Unfortunately, the said case remained pending for almost 6 years almost in the heart of Tagum City.
without resolution. (2) The parcel of land adjacent thereto were sold at a higher rate, specifically
• Apo then filed a complaint for determination of just compensation before the from a low of 146.02Php per sqm to as high as 580Php per sqm.
RTC, which referred it to 3 commissioners to ascertain the just, fair and (3) It is error to apply Apo Fruits Corporation v. CA (2007) in the instant case
reasonable value of the prop. because the subject property was not included in the valuation by the court
in the said case.
COMMISIONERS: recommended the amount of 130Php per sqm or the amount of
149,783,00Php for the entire 115.2 hectare as just compensation. LBP IS LIABLE TO PAY LEGAL INTEREST FROM THE TIME OF THE TAKING OF THE
RTC: rendered a decision adopting the findings of the commissioners. PROPERTY UNTIL FULL PAYMENT THEREOF
CA: modified RTC decision. The just compensation is set at 103.33Php per sqm. There The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum
shall be 12% interest per annum on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed
computed from Dec. 9, 1996, the date when the Government took the land, to May 9 by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
2008, the time when LBP paid the balance on the principal amount. competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one
who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if
ISSUE: property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having
(1) W/N the amount of 103.33 per sqm is the just compensation for the subject jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just
property value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when
(2) W/N the 12% interest on the unpaid just compensation should be counted compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking
from December 9, 1996, the time of the taking until full payment, to only until of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the
May 9 2008, the time when LBP paid the balance on the principal amount. owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the
taking occurred. (Republic v. CA – 2002)
HELD:
The award of interest is intended to compensate the property owner for the income it
would have made had it been properly compensated for its property at the time of the
taking. It is imposed in the nature of damages for delay in payment which, in effect,
makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance to ensure
prompt payment of the value of the land and limit the opportunity loss of the owner.

In LBP v. PH-Agro Industrial Corporation (2017), the SC ruled that “the requirement of
the law is not satisfied by the mere deposit with any accessible bank of the provisional
compensation determined by it or by the DAR, and its subsequent release to the
landowner after compliance with the legal requirements set forth by R.A. No. 6657.”

In the present case, LBP merely deposited the amount of 3,814,053.53Php as initial
payment of the just compensation. The RTC's valuation in its decision as just
compensation for the subject property is 149,783,000.27Php. There is a staggering
difference between the initial payment made by the LBP and the amount of the just
compensation due to Apo. It should be noted that the subject property has already
been taken by the government on December 9, 1996.

Thus, LBP is liable to pay legal interest of 12% counted from December 9, 1996, the
time of the taking until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013 until fully
paid, the just compensation shall earn 6% legal interest in accordance with Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
Daez v CA • Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been
finally denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the
FACTS: same riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657.
• Eudosia Daez, now deceased, was the owner of a 4.1685hectare riceland in • In an order dated March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OICDirector Eugenio B.
Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by Bernardo allowed Eudosia Daez to retain the subject riceland but he denied
respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and the application of her eight (8) children to retain three (3) hectares each for
Manuel Umali under a system of sharetenancy. The said land was subjected their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct management thereof
to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program under Presidential Decree as required by law. Aggrieved, they appealed to the DAR.
(P.D.) No. 27 as amended by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474. Thus, the then • On August 26, 1994, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, set aside the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform acquired the subject land and issued Certificates order of Regional Director Bernardo in a Resolution.
of Land Transfer (CLT) on December 9, 1980 to private respondents as • Eudosia Daez filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied on January
beneficiaries. 19, 1995.
• In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her husband, Lope, • She appealed Secretary Garilaos decision to the Office of the President which
declared ownership over 41.8064 hectares of agricultural lands located in ruled in her favor. The dispositive portion of the Decision of then Executive
Meycauayan, Bulacan and fourteen (14) hectares of riceland, sixteen (16) Secretary reads:
hectares of forestland, ten (10) hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of
residential lands in Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included in their 41.8064hectare "WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are hereby SET ASIDE and
landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685hectare riceland in judgment is rendered authorizing the retention by Eudosia Daez or her heirs of the
Meycauayan. 4.1685 hectare landholding subject thereof.
• On July 27, 1987, DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina issued an Order denying
Eudosia Daezs application for exemption upon finding that her subject land is SO ORDERED."
covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner being owner of the aforesaid
agricultural lands exceeding seven (7) hectares. • Aggrieved, private respondents sought from the Court of Appeals, a review of
• On June 29, 1989, Eudosia Daez wrote a letter to DAR Secretary Benjamin T. the decision of the Office of the President. On January 28, 1999, the said
Leong requesting for reconsideration of Undersecretary Medinas order. But Decision of the Office of the President was reversed.
on January 16, 1992, Secretary Leong affirmed the assailed order upon finding
private respondents to be bonafide tenants of the subject land. ISSUE(S):
• Undaunted, Eudosia Daez brought her case on February 20, 1992 to the Court 1. W/N the finality of judgment in exemption (PD27) does preclude the
of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals, however, subsequent institution of application for retention (RA 6657).
sustained the order of Secretary Leong. 2. W/N the heirs of Eudosia Daez may exercise their right of retention over the
• Eudosia pursued her petition before this court but we denied it and also subject 4.1685 riceland.
denied her motion for reconsideration. 3. W/N the land awards made pursuant to the governments agrarian reform
• On August 6 and 12, 1992, the DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to program are subject to the exercise by a landowner of his right of retention.
private respondents. Thereafter, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued the
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).
HELD:
 1. NO implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice
Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts. P.D. No. 27, against the landowner.
which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers tenanted rice
or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Secretary
the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of of Agrarian Reform, we held that landowners who have not yet exercised their
sharecrop or leasetenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under R.A.
may apply for exemption. If either of these requisites is absent, the land is not covered No. 6657.
under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not apply for retention where his ownership over
the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed. Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite
even the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to farmerbeneficiaries. What
Thus, on one hand, exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted must be protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to either stay on the land
to rice or corn crops even if it is tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it chosen to be retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land
is devoted to rice or corn crops. with similar or comparable features.

On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of 3. YES.
retention are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2) there The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner
must be a system of sharecrop or leasetenancy obtaining therein; and (3) the size of from retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, series of
the landholding must not exceed twentyfour (24) hectares, or it could be more than 1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of
twentyfour (24) hectares provided that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered the landowners retained area.
lands and more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of "other agricultural lands".
A certificate of title accumulates in one document a comprehensive statement of the
Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from status of the fee held by the owner of a parcel of land. As such, it is a mere evidence of
coverage of OLT an those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a ownership and it does not constitute the title to the land itself. It cannot confer title
landowners right of retention, are different. where no title has been acquired by any of the means provided by law.

Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for In the instant case, the CLTs of private respondents over the subject 4.1685hectare
retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in riceland were issued without Eudosia Daez having been accorded her right of choice as
one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no to what to retain among her landholdings. The transfer certificates of title thus issued
procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of on the basis of those CLTs cannot operate to defeat the right of the heirs of deceased
the subject 4.1865hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same Eudosia Daez to retain the said 4.1685 hectares of riceland.
land was denied in a decision that became final and executory.

2. YES.
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to
qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land
acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by
Heirs of Juan Grino, Sr. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform (G.R. No. 165073, 30 June view of the fact that the landholdings are tenanted and Griño has other
2006) landholdings with an area of 50 hectares. The conveyance of the 50 hectares
landholdings in favor of DBP sometime in 1985 has no legal effect of
Doctrine: Allowing the heirs to resurrect the long entombed issue of retention under exempting the tenanted landholdings from Operation Land Transfer
the circumstances of this case would not only be a major setback for the government's considering that the conveyance happened only in 1985, several years after
agrarian reform program, but would be unjust as well to the individual tenants- the subjecting of the said properties under the coverage of Operation Land
beneficiaries who are now full-pledged owners of the lands they till. Transfer.

Facts: Griño was the owner of a parcel of agricultural land, covered by TCT No. T-53350 2. Where a landowner is not entitled to retain land under PD 27, he cannot avail
2 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo containing an area of 9.35 hectares. He was also the of the right of retention over the same land under RA 6657. It is established
owner of a 50-hectare parcel of land which he, on February 8, 1972, mortgaged to the that Griño was not entitled to exercise his retention right over subject
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to secure the payment of a loan. On property under PD 27. As such, he is also not entitled to exercise said right
October 21, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. under RA 6657. If Griño had no retention rights under PD 27 and RA 6657, it
27 (PD 27), "Decreeing The Emancipation Of Tenants From The Bondage Of The Soil follows that his heirs, who are his successors-in-interest, cannot also
Transferring To Them The Ownership Of The Land They Till And Providing The exercise the same right under PD 27 and RA 6657.
Instruments And Mechanism Therefor." Griño's 9.35 hectare land was placed under
the coverage of PD 27 because it is tenanted riceland. The CLTs covering a portion 3. When the heirs of Griño filed their application for retention under RA 6657 in
thereof was issued in favor of his tenants. 1997 they had to contend with an existing adverse ruling by the DAR in 1989.
The estate and the individual heirs are likewise estopped by laches from
He later filed for cancellation of the CLTs and died before DAR Regional Director questioning the denial for retention. The denial was made on September 25,
dismissed his petition pursuant to LOI 474, as implemented by MAR Memorandum 1989 and the heirs' present petition was made only on March 17, 1997 or 7
Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978. His heirs sought the exemption of the 9.35 hectare 1⁄2 years later. At this point, laches has set in, laches being "the failure or
land from the coverage of either PD 27 or the CARL, contending that Griño had seven neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
children and if a landowner is entitled to 5 hectares as retention limit, the remaining which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.
land of Griño would not be enough for his children, the 50-hectare land of Griño having
already been ceded to the DBP. DAR RD dismissed the petition. It was later elevated to
DAR Secretary and the CA which also dismissed their case.

Issue: WON Griño’s heirs have the right to retain subject land.

[Ruling: No, because of the following:

1. The reckoning date for the application of Operation Land Transfer is October
21, 1972, the date of effectivity of P.D. 27, which is the law applicable in this
case. By operation of law, as of October 21, 1972, the subject landholdings
were covered by Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 in
Estribillo vs. DAR and hacienda maria there had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
EMANCIPATION PATENTS; INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are ordinary titles which become
indefeasible one year after their registration.
Facts:
The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents Issue:
(EPs) over parcels of land located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur. The Whether Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as
parcels of land, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a forested indefeasible as TCTs issued in registration proceedings?
area which have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent
Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners, together with other persons, occupied and Held:
tilled these areas believing that the same were public lands. HMI never disturbed Yes. Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, provides that certificates of title issued in
petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful cultivation thereof. HMI acquired administrative proceedings are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial
such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales Patent No. 2683 proceedings:
in 1956 by virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three
parcels of land with a total area of 527.8308 hectares. HMI, through a certain Joaquin The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-
Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under the acquired lands to the landless would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP
coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed would still be subject to contest, just because his certificate of title was issued in an
petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be administrative proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the
covered under said law. indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as that in the Public Land
Act.
The RARAD rendered a Decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs The Decision was
based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by the Hacienda Maria Action Team. After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree
Petitioners' TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed a Motion for No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is
Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department of required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the RARAD Decision. farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27), the TCTs issued to
After the DARAB denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs.
to the Court of Appeals with their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of "The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration
Appeals denied the assailed Resolution: of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent, .
. . . Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral
The petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person."
executed by Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the
corresponding Special Power of Attorneys executed by the other petitioners The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic
authorizing him to sign for their behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the
of Civil Procedure, as amended. Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration with Torrens system of registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes
Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for the Admission of Special Power of Attorney Chapter IX on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves,
(SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his Co-Petitioners." The Court of entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.
Appeals denied the motion. Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that
People v. Donato of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a
fine not exceeding P20,000.00. It is, therefore, a bailable offense… Therefore,
Facts: before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of
Private respondent Rodolfo Salas alias “Commander Bilog” raised publicly and took right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
arms throughout the country against the Government of the Republic of the perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. Upon the other hand, if the offense
Philippines for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government. That from 1970 charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion.
to the present, the above-named accused in their capacities as leaders of the It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited
aforenamed organizations (NPA and CPP), in conspiracy with, and in support of the to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.
cause of, the organizations aforementioned, engaged themselves in war against the However, under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer punishable by
forces of the government, destroying property or committing serious violence, and prision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on
other acts in the pursuit of their unlawful purpose 24 October 1990 and which took effect after publication in at least two newspapers of
In a separate petition for habeas corpus (separate case GR 76009) for private general circulation, amended, among others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code by
respondent Salas was filed with the SC but was dismissed on the basis of the agreement increasing the penalty for rebellion to Reclusion Perpetua. However, this amendatory
of the parties under which herein private respondent "will remain in legal custody and law cannot apply to the private respondent for acts allegedly committed prior to its
will face trial before the court having custody over his person" and the warrants for the effectivity. It is not favorable to him (a.k.a. no retroactive effect)
arrest of his co-accused are deemed recalled and they shall be immediately released
but shall submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person. 2. We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however, waived his right
In his Order of 7 July 1987 11 public respondent Judge Donato, taking into to bail in G.R. No. 76009.
consideration Executive Order No. 187, granted private respondent's petition for bail,
fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon private respondent the additional CUSTODY - "Custody" has been held to mean nothing less than actual imprisonment. It
condition that he shall report to the court once every two (2) months within the first is also defined as the detainer of a person by virtue of a lawful authority, or the "care
ten (10) days of every period thereof. (This was challenged by petitioner by alleging and possession of a thing or person."
that private respondent Salas waived his right to bail in the separate case mentioned When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:
above.) b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court
having custody over his person.
Issue: they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain in actual physical
Whether the right to bail may, under certain circumstances, be denied to a person who custody of the court, or in actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the
is charged with an otherwise bailable offense, and whether such right may be waived. stipulation concerning his co-petitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall
Held: WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July 7, 1987 and July 30, 1987 of the warrants of arrest against them; they agreed, however, "to submit themselves
in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo C. Salas to the court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should be made of the
alias Commander Bilog/Henry, Josefina Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and Jose Milo deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction between legal custody and
Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora, for Rebellion, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. court having custody over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having
jurisdiction over the persons of his co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely
Ratio: intended to emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but
1. We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private should remain in custody.
respondent for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134
BAIL - In defining bail as:
. . . the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, . . .
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits no other meaning or
interpretation for the term "in custody of the law" than that as above indicated. The
purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet
secure his appearance at the trial. 39 It presupposes that the person applying for it
should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of liberty. 40
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private
respondent had unequivocably waived his right to bail.
VALIDITY – But, is such waiver valid? We hereby rule that the right to bail is another
of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the
accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. NEPOMUCENO PRODUCTIONS, INC.,
FILM ADVERTISING MEDIA EXHIBITIONS, INC. (FAME), LUIS NEPOMUCENO, AMPARO The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to
NEPOMUCENO, and JESUS NEPOMUCENO, respondents. notify the mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the nature and condition of
G.R. No. 139479, December 27, 2002 the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given
to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the property. Clearly, the statutory
FACTS: requirements of posting and publication are mandated, not for the mortgagor’s
PNB granted respondents a 4 Million Pesos credit line to finance the filming of the benefit, but for the public or third persons. In fact, personal notice to the mortgagor in
movie Pacific Connection. The loan was secured by mortgages on respondents real and extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary, unless stipulated. As such,
personal properties. it is imbued with public policy considerations and any waiver thereon would be
Respondents defaulted in their obligation. Petitioner sought foreclosure of the inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No. 3135.
mortgaged properties. The auction sale was re-scheduled several times without need Moreover, statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage
of republication of the notice of sale, as stipulated in the Agreement to Postpone Sale, foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with and slight deviations therefrom will
until finally, the auction sale proceeded, with petitioner as the highest bidder in the invalidate the notice and render the sale at the very least voidable.
amount of P10,432,776.97.
Aggrieved, respondents filed an action for annulment of foreclosure sale and damages
with injunction. In its Decision, the court a quo ordered the annulment and setting
aside of the foreclosure proceedings and auction sale on the ground that there was
lack of publication of the notice of sale. Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the decision of the court a quo.

ISSUE:
Whether the parties to the mortgage can validly waive the posting and publication
requirements mandated by Act No. 3135.

HELD:
No. Act. No. 3135, as amended, governing extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages on
real property is specific with regard to the posting and publication requirements of the
notice of sale. It is well settled that what Act No. 3135 requires is: (1) the posting of
notices of sale in three public places; and, (2) the publication of the same in a
newspaper of general circulation. Failure to publish the notice of sale constitutes a
jurisdictional defect, which invalidates the sale.
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or
guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right
is not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of
others, or would be against public policy or morals and the public interest may be
waived.