University of San Jose Recoletos

College of Law

Law on Persons and Family Relations

PARENTAL
AUTHORITY

Pinky P. Salvador
Bridging-Persons and Family Relations(07:30-08:30pm)
1. GENERAL PROVISION (Art. 209-Art. 215)

DISTINCTION
 PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Parental Authority is “the mass of rights and obligations which
parents have in relation to the person and property of their children
until their emancipation and even after this under certain
circumstances” (Sempio-Diy, 1995).

Rules as to the exercise of parental authority:

1. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over
the persons of their common children.
• In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail,
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary (Art. 211 FC) 1
2. If the child is illegitimate, parental authority is with the mother
(Art.176 FC; see also Chapter 10).
Characteristics of Parental Authority:
1. It is a natural right and duty of the parents (Art. 209 FC)2
2. It cannot be renounced, transferred or waived, except in cases
authorized by law (Art 210 FC) 3
3. It is jointly exercised by the father and the mother (Art. 211 FC)
4. It is purely personal and cannot be exercised through agents
5. It is temporary

1
Article 211
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children.  In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there
is a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged
to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority.  
2
Article 209
Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for
and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral,
mental and physical character and well-being.  
3
Article 210
Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the
cases authorized by law.  (313a)
Parental authority includes (Art. 209 FC)4
1. The caring for and rearing of children for civic consciousness and
efficiency;
2. The development of the moral, mental and physical character and
well-being of said children
Parental preference rule
The natural parents, who are of good character and who can reasonably
provide for the child are ordinarily entitled to custody as against all persons.
Tender-Age Presumption:
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.5 This choice
is not available to an illegitimate child, much more one of tender
age below 7 years old, because sole parental authority is given only
to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit or unsuitable. 6
“Compelling Reasons” 7- The mother has been declared unsuitable to
have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances:
1. Insanity
2. Abandonment
3. Neglect
4. Drug addiction
5. Affliction with a communicable disease
6. Maltreatment of the child
7. Immorality
8. Unemployment
4
Article 209
Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for
and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral,
mental and physical character and well-being.
5
Article 213(2)
The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the
child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
6
(Masbate vs Relucio, GR 235498, 30 July 2018)
7
(Tonog vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122906, February 7, 2002)
9. Habitual drunkenness
The paramount consideration in matters of custody of a child is the
welfare and well-being of the child The use of the word “shall” in Art. 213 of
the FC is mandatory in character. It prohibits in no uncertain terms the
separation of a mother and her child below 7 years, unless such separation
is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court. 8
Exercise of parental authority in case of absence, death, remarriage
of either parent, or legal or de facto separation of parents
a. Absence or death of either parent – parent present shall continue
exercising parental authority (FC, Art. 212). 9
b. Remarriage of either parent – it shall not affect the parental
authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be
the guardian of the person or property of the children (FC, Art. 213). 10
c. Legal or de facto separation of parents – the parent designated by
the court.
Filial Privilege
No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his
parents and grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a
crime against the descendant or by one parent against the other. 11
2. SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL AUTHORITY (Art. 214-Art. 217)

8
(Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, G.R. No. L-23482, August 30, 1968)
9
Article 212
In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising
parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental
authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of
the person or property of the children.
 First Sentence – death of either parent
 Second Sentence – remarriage of parent
 Either of the two will not terminate nor affect the parental authority over children.
 In case of remarriage, if clearly shown that surviving parent cannot undertake the
necessary devotion, care, loyalty and concern toward the children,  the court may
appoint another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.
10
Article 213(1)
In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court.  
11
Art. 215. 
No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and
grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the
descendant or by one parent against the other. 
 SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL AUTHORITY
It is the parental authority which the persons designated by law may
exercise over the persons and property of unemancipated children in
case of death, absence or unsuitability of both parents or in default
of a judicially appointed guardian.
Order of substitute parental authority
1. Surviving Grandparent; 12
NOTE: The law considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that
of the grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown
to be unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute
parental authority (Santos v. CA, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995).
2. Oldest brother or sister, over 21 years unless unfit or disqualified;
3. Actual Custodian over 21 year unless unfit or disqualified (FC, Art.
216); 13
4. In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or abused children
similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary
judicial proceedings to heads of children’s homes, orphanages and
similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency
(FC, Art. 217).14

3. SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY (Art. 218-219)

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

12
Article 214
In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall
be exercised by the surviving grandparent.  In case several survive, the one designated by
the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article,
shall exercise the authority.  
13
Article 216
In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise
substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
1. The surviving grandparent, as provided in Article 214;
2. The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified; and
3. The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes
necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed.
14
Article 217
In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly
situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of
children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper
government agency.  (314a)
It is the parental authority granted by law to certain persons,
entities or institutions in view of their special relation to children
under their supervision instruction or custody. It is denominated as
special because it is limited and is present only when the child is
under their supervision instruction or custody. It can also co-exists
with the parents’ parental authority.
Persons who may exercise special parental authority (FC, Art. 218)
a. The school;
b. School administrators;
c. School teachers;
d. Individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. 15
The scope of special parental authority and responsibility applies to all
authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. 16
NOTE: The nature of the liability of persons having special parental
authority over said minors for their acts or omissions causing damage
to another is principal and solidary. The parents, judicial guardians or
the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor
shall be subsidiarily liable (FC, Art. 219). 17
LIABILITY OF THOSE EXERCISING SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY
OVER THE CHILD 
1. They are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts
or missions of the child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

15
Article 218
The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged
in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while
under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside
the premises of the school, entity or institution.  
16
(St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. No. 143363, Feb. 6, 2002)
17
Article 219
Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally
and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor.  The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental
authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it
is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular
circumstances.
HOWEVER, this liability is subject to the defense that the person exercising
parental authority exercised proper diligence. 
2. The parents and judicial guardians of the minor or those exercising
substitute parental authority over the minor are subsidiarily liable for said
acts and omissions of the minor.

4. EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER THE CHILD’S

PERSON(Art. 219-Art. 224)
Right to Child’s Custody
The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the
natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound
public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state
or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship.18
Rights and Duties in Exercise of Parental Authority
• To have them in their custody (Art. 220 FC par 1) 19
• To represent them in all matters affecting their interests(Art. 200 FC
par 6)
• Demand respect and obedience and impose discipline on them (Art.
200 FC par 7&8; see also People v Silvano, 1999)
• Administer the property of a child for her/his support and education,
unless title/transfer provides otherwise (Art. 226 FC par 1)

18
(Sagala-Eslao v. CA, G.R. No. 116773, January 16, 1997)
19
Article 220
The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their
unemancipated children on wards the following rights and duties:

1. To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right
precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their
means;

2. To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and
understanding;

3. To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty,
integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in
civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;

4. To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their
activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company,
and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and
morals;

5. To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;

6. To demand from them respect and obedience;

7. To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and

8. To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.
(316a)
 • Administer the fruits and income (ONLY) of the children’s property
primarily to support the child and secondarily to use for the daily
needs of the family (Art. 226 FC par 2)20
• To give or withhold consent on marriage, pre-nuptial, donation
propter nuptias, adoption, and employment
• To disinherit them for just cause
Duties of Parents upon their children—
• Support and upbringing in accordance to their means (Art. 220 par 1)
• Educate, instruct, and provide them with moral and spiritual guidance,
and love and understanding (Art. 220 par 3)
• Defend them against unlawful aggression
• Answer for damages caused by their fault or negligence, and for civil
liability for crimes committed by them (Art. 221 FC)
• Give their lawful inheritance
Liability of parents for torts committed by their minor children (Art.
221 FC;Art. 2180 CC)—
-Parents and other persons exercising parental authority are civilly liable for
the torts of their unemancipated children:
=Provided they are living in their company, and
= Subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law, like observing
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Libi v. IAC,
1992)
-If the minor child is, therefore, not living with the parents but has been
entrusted to the care of other persons, or is an intern in school, the liability
does not apply.

20
Article 226
The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by
onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted
exclusively to the latter's support and education, unless the title or transfer provides
otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited
primarily to the child's support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family.
(321a, 323a)
-This liability of the parents and those exercising parental authority over the
child is solidary and primary and direct, not subsidiary 21
In Tamargo vs. CA, a case in involving an adopted child who killed
another, the SC did not consider that retroactive effect to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at
the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted
child.  22
23
Scope of the parent’s right to discipline the child (FC, Art. 223)
Persons exercising parental authority may:
1. Impose discipline on minor children as may be required under the
circumstances;
2. Petition the court for the imposition of appropriate disciplinary measures
upon the child, which include the commitment of the child in entities or
institutions engaged in child care or in children’s homes duly accredited by
the proper government agency.
NOTE: Such commitment must not exceed 30 days

21
Article 221
Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries
and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their
company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by
law.  
22
(Tamargo v. CA, G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992)
23
Article 223
The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising
parental authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an
order providing for disciplinary measures over the child.  The child shall be entitled to the
assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing
shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the
merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the
deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may
deem just and proper.  (318a)
 5. EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER THE CHILD’S
PROPERTY (Art. 225-Art. 227)
The Father and Mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
property of the minor child without court appointment
• In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless
there is judicial order to the contrary
- If the market value of the property or the annual income of the
child exceeds P50,000, the parent is required to furnish a bond of
not less than 10% of the value of the child’s property or income
Rules regarding the use of the child’s property (FC, Art. 226) 24
1. The property of minor children shall be devoted to their support and
education unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.
2. The parents have the right to use only the fruits and income of said
property for the following purposes:
a. Primarily, to the child’s support;
b. Secondarily, to the collective daily needs of the family.

24
Art. 226
The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by
onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted
exclusively to the latter’s support and education, unless the title or transfer provides
otherwise.
 6. SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
(Art. 228-Art. 233)
Grounds for Termination of Parental Authority
1. Permanently:
a. Death of parents;
b. Emancipation of the child;
c. Death of child (FC, Art. 228).25
2. Temporarily:– it may be revived
a. Adoption of the child;
b. Appointment of general guardian;
c. Judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the
purpose;
d. Final judgment divesting parents of parental authority; e. Incapacity of
parent exercising parental authority; f. Judicial declaration of absence or
incapacity of person exercising parental authority (FC, Art. 229). 26
NOTE: In case of temporary termination of parental authority, parental
authority may be revived thru a court judgment (Rabuya, 2009).

Grounds for suspension of Parental Authority

1. Gives corrupting orders, counsel or example;
2. Treats child with excessive harshness and cruelty;

25
Article 228
Parental authority terminates permanently:
1. Upon the death of the parents;
2. Upon the death of the child; or
3. Upon emancipation of the child.  (327a)

26
Article 229
Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates:
1. Upon adoption of the child;
2. Upon appointment of a general guardian;
3. Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose;
4. Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority; or
5. Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising parental authority.  (327a)
 3. Subjects/allows child be subjected to acts of lasciviousness (FC, Art.
231);
4. Conviction of crime with penalty of civil interdiction (FC, Art. 230) 27;
5. Culpable negligence of parent or person exercising parental authority;
6. Compels the child to beg.
NOTE: If the person exercising Parental Authority has subjected the child
or allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse, he/she shall be permanently
deprived of PA.
The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the
natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound
public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state
or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship. 28
NOTE:
• The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental
authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same
proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefore has ceased and
will not be repeated

27
Article 230
Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising the same of a crime which
carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.  The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty
or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender.  
28
(Sagala-Eslao vs CA , G.R. No. 116773, 16 January 1997)
 7. SOLO PARENTS (RA 8792)29
RA 9872 is AN ACT PROVIDING FOR BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES TO
SOLO PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN.

What is a Solo Parent?

1) A woman who gives birth as a result of rape and other crimes against
chastity even without a final conviction of the offender: Provided, That the
mother keeps and raises the child;
2) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
death of spouse;
3) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood while the
spouse is detained or is serving sentence for a criminal conviction for at least
one (1) year;
4) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
physical and/or mental incapacity of spouse as certified by a public medical
practitioner;
5) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to legal
separation or de facto separation from spouse for at least one (1) year, as
long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children;
6) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage as decreed by a court or by a
church as long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children;
7) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
abandonment of spouse for at least one (1) year;
8) Unmarried mother/father who has preferred to keep and rear her/his
child/children instead of having others care for them or give them up to a
welfare institution;
9) Any other person who solely provides parental care and support to a child
or children;
10) Any family member who assumes the responsibility of head of family as
a result of the death, abandonment, disappearance or prolonged absence of
the parents or solo parent.
 
What are the privileges of a Solo Parent?
1. Flexible Work Schedule (Note: The employer may request
exemption from the above requirements from the DOLE on
certain meritorious grounds)
2. Parental Leave of not more than seven (7) working days in
addition to leave privileges under existing laws. Provided, the
solo parent has rendered service of at least one (1) year.

RA 9872 , “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES TO SOLO

29

PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN”

 3. Educational Benefits provided by the Department of Education
(DepEd), Commission on Higher Education (CHED) and Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA)
4. Housing Benefits with liberal terms of payment on authorized
government low-cost housing projects in accordance with
housing law provisions prioritizing applicants below the poverty
line as declared by the NEDA.
5. Medical Assistance or access to comprehensive health care
program for solo parents and their children developed by the
Department of Health.
6. Comprehensive Package of Social Development and Welfare
Services as developed by Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), DOH, DepED, CHED, TESDA, Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Housing Authority
(NHA) and Department of Local and Interior Local Government
(DILG).

What are the Criteria for Support?

 A Solo Parent is eligible for assistance if his or her income in the
place of domicile falls below the poverty threshold as set by the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and was
subjected to the assessment of the DSWD worker in the area.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS AND LANDMARK CASES

Masbate vs Relucio GR 235498, 30 July 2018

CHILDS BEST INTEREST:
The Supreme Court clarified that the choice of a child over
seven (7) years of age shall be considered in custody disputes
only between married parents because they are, pursuant to
Article 211 of the Family Code, accorded joint parental
authority over the persons of their common children. On the
other hand, this choice is not available to an illegitimate
child, much more one of tender age below 7 years old,
because sole parental authority is given only to the mother,
unless she is shown to be unfit or unsuitable (Article 176 of
the Family Code).
FACTS:
After the erstwhile partners’ separation, their minor child’s custody
was given to the respondent. Petitioners (grandparents), who were
armed with an SPA executed by petitioner (mother) who went to
Manila to study and which granted them full parental rights,
authority and custody, took the minor child. This prompted
respondent to file a petition for habeas corpus and child custody,
which was however, not given due course by the trial court.
Trial court ruled among others that custody belongs to the mother
per the tender- age presumption, and that since the child was born
out of wedlock, parental authority shall be with the mother, per
Article 176 of the Family Code. Upon appeal, CA remanded the case
to the trial court and held, inter alia, that since the issue in the case
was neglect by the mother of the minor child, the case involved a
question of fact which must be resolved by trial. CA also gave
visitation rights to the respondent. Nonetheless, the appellate court
granted custody to the mother pending outcome of the case, since it
was solely the child’s mother who has parental authority over her as
she is an illegitimate child.
One of the more interesting contentions in this case was whether or
not a trial [to prove that the mother of an illegitimate child under
seven years of age is unfit] is needed. Petitioners argue that a trial
to dispute the fitness of the mother only applies to married couples,
under Article 213 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Since the
minor child is a child born out of wedlock, Article 176, and not
article 213, should govern the present case. Article 176 did not say
whether the fitness of the mother of an illegitimate child can be
disputed.
ISSUE:
Whether trial should ascertain the unfitness of the mother of an
illegitimate child under seven years of age?
HELD:
YES. The reliance of petitioners in their cited jurisprudence is
grossly misplaced, since the said case limiting the application of
Article 213 to married couples is with regard to the question of
whether or not an illegitimate child over ten years of age can choose
which parent he prefers to live with.
Simply put, the choice of a child over seven years of age (first
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) and over ten (10)
years of age (Rule 99 of the Rules of Court) shall be considered in
custody disputes ONLY BETWEEN MARRIED PARENTS because said
parents are accorded joint parental authority over the persons of
their common children. On the other hand, this choice is not
available to an illegitimate child, much more one of tender age such
as subject minor child, because sole parental authority is given only
to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit or unsuitable.
In addition, the Supreme Court pointed out that the second
paragraph of Article 213 does not even distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate children- and hence, does not factor in
whether or not the parents are married -in declaring that "no child
under seven [(7)] years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
 Tamargo v. CA, G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992
Civil Liability of Parents when child is criminally charged: Adoption
FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death.  The
petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages
against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of
the tragic incident.
In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto
Bundoc.  Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic
incident.
ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect
so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case
filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the
biological parents.
HELD:
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and
responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes
instructing, controlling and disciplining the child.  In the case at bar, during
the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with
the natural parents.  It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the
suit for damages.  “Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage
caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the
civil code”.
SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at
the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted
child.  Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child.  Under Article 35 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the
adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial
custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time
of the shooting incident.  Hence, actual custody was then with the natural
parents of Adelberto.
St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. No. 143363, Feb. 6, 2002
Special Parental Authority:
The special parental authority and responsibility applies to all
authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution.
FACTS:
St. Mary’s Academy conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-
1996 They visited schools from where prospective enrollees were studying.
Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other high school
students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their
way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel
II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove
the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin
died due to this accident. Spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos
filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and
Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys
Academy
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for the damages.
RULING:
No. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an
event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and which
was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable
for the death resulting from such accident.
The CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and
219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in
allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor
students in the jeep. However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a
finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate
cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident. In order that there may be a recovery for an
injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is
sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and
natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In
other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For,
negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action
unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the
proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner
was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. Also, there was no
evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor to drive the jeep of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva. Hence, the registered owner of any vehicle,
even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the
public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the
road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall
be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Wherefore, the
case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the
defendants excluding herein petitioner.
 Sagala-Eslao VS CA, (G.R. No. 116773, 16 January 1997)
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of
the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law
and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not
created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the
nature of the parental relationship.
FACTS:
When Maria Paz’s husband Reynaldo Eslao died, she entrusted custody of
her youngest child Angelica to her grieving mother-in-law. She then returned
to her mother’s house with Leslie. Years later, Maria Paz got married to a
Japanese-American and live with him in the US. After this she returned to
the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the US.
She then informed Teresita about her desire to take custody of Angelica her
new husband’s willingness to adopt her children. Teresita refused, and
accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica when she was 10 days old.
Maria instituted an action against Teresita over the return of the custody of
Angelica to her. After the trial on the merits, the trial court granted the
petition. CA affirmed in the full decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresita Sagala-Eslao should be given the custody of the
child?
RULING:
No. The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the
natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound
public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state
or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship.
Thus, when Maria entrusted the custody of Angelica to Teresita, what she
gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute
abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. The law allows a waiver
of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender
to a children’s home or an orphan institution.