Weighing the Scales:

The Internet’s Effect On State-Society Relations

D W. D
Professor
Tufts University

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and global civil society?1 Does the internet lead to greater democratization and liber-
alization? The findings of political scientists on this question could best be described
as ambiguous—that is, there are two very different narratives that can answer this
question.2 The more popular and prominent argument is that the internet dramati-
cally lowers the costs of networked communication; therefore, civil society groups are
better able to mobilize action to influence governments. Countless articles have been
written about how the internet has facilitated social movements both to advocate for 31
international treaties—like the Landmine Convention; and to block movement on
initiatives—such as the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. Decentralized forms of
civil society, like Facebook or Twitter, are particularly likely to thrive with the emergence
of Web 2.0 technologies that facilitate user-created content.3 The networked structure
of online communities closely mirrors the networked structure of global civil society.
The coordination of worldwide protests that took place in the run-up to the war in
Iraq is but one example of this phenomenon. The growth of the blogosphere as a force
in American politics is only the latest manifestation of this trend.
The counter-argument is that states are becoming increasingly savvy in their
regulation of the information revolution. The code that forms the backbone of the
Internet’s architecture leaves several critical nodes vulnerable to regulation by govern-
ments.4 Discriminating governments have the capacity to decide which elements of
digital information they choose to let in and which elements they can screen out. Beyond
information, authoritarian governments have been willing to make life uncomfortable

D W. D is currently a professor of international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University. He was previously an assistant professor of political science at the University
of Chicago. He maintains a blog at ForeignPolicy.com. He is the author of All Politics Is Global (2007).

Copyright © 2010 by the Brown Journal of World Affairs

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for the citizens who use online activities to threaten the regime in power. Governments
ranging from China to Iran to Belarus have demonstrated a willingness to crack down
on civil society activists and bloggers who defy the state.
These contradictory trends highlight the points of contention inherent in
analyzing how information and communication technology (ICT) affects the art and
science of politics. Does the Internet empower the coercive control of governments at
the expense of citizen activists, or vice versa? As someone who has at different times
advanced both sides of this argument, I fully recognize and appreciate the complexities
of this question.5 Forty years ago, economist Albert Hirschman noted that democratic
revolution is “unpredictable because it took the very actors by surprise and unrepeatable
because once the event has happened everybody is put on notice and precautions will be
taken by various parties so that it won’t happen again.”6 In gauging the effects of Web
2.0 technologies, the unpredictability is even more powerful. The pace of technological
change, combined with the learning effects of authoritarian regimes, poses a daunting
challenge for scholars and observers.
In this article, I offer a preliminary answer—that while the internet has prob-
ably empowered non-state actors more than states, the effect of this empowerment is
not consistent across all types of political environments. In open societies, there is no
question that the Internet has enhanced the power of civil society vis-à-vis the state.
32 However, in dealing with totalitarian governments or international governmental ne-
gotiations, the information revolution does not fundamentally affect the state’s ability
to advance its interests.
There is an internal tension contained in this answer, and it comes to the
surface when considering the ability of online activism to trigger an abrupt shift in
public attitudes towards authoritarian states. A quiescent public dramatically lowers
the costs of repression for a government. However, information technologies have the
capacity to dramatically redirect the “information cascades” that promote quiescence.
This forces authoritarian governments into making a more stark choice than they would
otherwise prefer. These governments must crack down on the global flow of information
even further if they wish to insure against the threat of “people power” revolts. In the
process, however, they deny themselves the opportunity to exploit the vast economic
potential of the information society.
This article is divided into five sections. The next section reviews in greater depth
the contrasting takes within the political science literature regarding the effect of ICT
on state-society relations. The third section discusses how the information revolution
has affected transaction-cost economics. This discussion serves as a useful metaphor in
understanding how ICT affects the ability of civil society to mobilize and the ability of
states to repress. The fourth section examines the choices states face when encountering

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 Weighing The Scales
a civil society empowered with information technology. The final section discusses the
relative brittleness of authoritarian governments in a world of information cascades.

HERE COME THE SMART MOBS

Scholars have generated prodigious amounts of theory and evidence to support the con-
tention that the internet and other communication technologies empower global civil
society (GCS). Part of the logic is the compatibility of their organizational structures.
Most observers argue that global civil society is organized like a network, “characterized
by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange.”7
Different nodes of a network must be able to exchange information for this type of
organization to be effective. The denser the network—in terms of the number of nodes,
connections, and diversity of participants—the more effective non-state actors can be.
One undeniable trigger for the emergence of GCS has been the persistent decline in
the costs of transportation and communication. The development of the internet, the
proliferation of cellular phone networks, and the deregulation of air travel enhance the
networking power of global civil society.
Researchers have argued that global civil society played a crucial role in a variety
of international negotiations, ranging from human rights advocacy to the Landmine
Convention. Perhaps the first exemplar case is the role that transnational activist 33
networks played in the failure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).
The MAI was an OECD initiative launched in 1995 that would have standardized
how governments could regulate foreign direct investment. A broad array of activist
groups opposed the aims of the MAI, and took active steps to sabotage the negotia-
tions. Anti-MAI organizations posted draft versions of the treaty on their web sites.
Activists, representing 600 organizations from approximately 70 countries, dogged
the negotiators at the OECD headquarters in Paris. In 1998, they also protested the
agreement at meetings of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). French officials acknowledged
civil society opposition as a factor in the breakdown of negotiations.8 Stephen Kobrin
concludes, “The story of the MAI is a cautionary tale about the impact of an electroni-
cally networked global civil society.”9 Other scholars studying global civil society share
this assessment, though it is not without its detractors.10
At the domestic level, it has been commonly predicted that the information
revolution empowers civil society at the expense of the state. Internet enthusiasts have
long dismissed the ability of states to block specific kinds of online content. In 1993,
John Gilmore, a co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, famously concluded:
“The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.” Civil society activists

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and bloggers have played a prominent role in agitating for greater openness in repressive
societies. Weblogs provided crucial information for protestors during Ukraine’s “Orange
Revolution” in November and December of 2004. They also provided an accessible
window to global media outlets through which reporters could interpret and report
on breaking news. For the protestors themselves, some blogs functioned as message
boards—otherwise known as focal points—for coordinating street actions.
The advent of Web 2.0 technologies such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter
have provided civil society activists with additional mechanisms for coordinating social
action. In 2009, Facebook’s VP for global communications and public policy observed,
“Some of the most interesting uses of Facebook have been for the purpose of social
action, which is essentially political action.11 Twitter became a means of rapidly mobiliz-
ing flashmobs—coordinated gatherings via instant messaging—in Moldova; Facebook
became an important forum for Pakistanis to discuss the future of their society.12 In
the aftermath of the June 2009 disputed presidential election in Iran, the U.S. State
Department’s Policy Planning Staff requested that Twitter delay its scheduled main-
tenance—to allow protestors to communicate with each other and the outside world.
Graphic videos of Neda Agha-Soltani being shot to death in Tehran were uploaded to
YouTube, acting as a focal point for protestors in Iran. With the Iranian government
imposing severe restrictions on the activities of Western media outlets, journalists began
34 relying on Web 2.0 sites as sources of information to supplement their news accounts.
Prominent bloggers such as Andrew Sullivan and Nico Pitney acted as information
aggregators of various Twitter feeds emanating from Iran.13
These anecdotes suggest that, under certain circumstances, online activists
can affect politics in regimes where there is no thriving independent media sector. For
starters, activist websites can become an alternative source of news and commentary
in countries where traditional media are under state control. Blogs and social network-
ing technologies are more difficult to control than television or newspapers, especially
under regimes that are tolerant of some degree of free expression. Faced with various
domestic obstacles, online activists based inside these countries, connected to diaspora
communities based outside these countries, can try to influence foreign media, with
knock-on effects at home. Political scientists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink note
in Activists Beyond Borders that activists who are unable to change conditions in their
own countries can leverage their power by taking their case to transnational activists,
who in turn publicize abuses and lobby their governments. Keck and Sikkink call
this a “boomerang effect,” since repression at home can lead to international pressure
against the regime from abroad. Indeed, the advent of Web 2.0 technologies allow many
online activists to make direct appeals to the global public sphere, bypassing editorial
gatekeepers in traditional media outlets.

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 Weighing The Scales
THE STATE STRIKES BACK

Despite the apparent symbiosis between the growth of the information society and
global civil society, other scholars have pointed out that repressive states have been
able to control information technologies more effectively than previously thought.
Technological measures to regulate the internet include the creation of firewalls and
proxy servers, routers, and software filters to block content labeled as undesirable.
Non-technological measures include the imprisonment of relevant individuals, active
policing, high taxation of internet access, and pressuring internet service providers
(ISPs).14 Even if these measures are not 100 percent effective, their enactment affects
the cost/benefit analysis of activists seeking to use the internet as a means of acquir-
ing officially frowned-upon content. As legal scholars Jack Goldsmith and Timothy
Wu have observed, if governments can raise the cost of internet transactions, they can
regulate internet transactions, even if the regulation is imperfect.”15 Combined, these
steps can block undesired content, as well as retard internet use.
The result has been effective government regulation of internet content across
countries. For totalitarian states, the modes of regulation have been historically crude
but effective. Cuba simply outlaws the sale of personal computers to individuals; until
2002, Myanmar outlawed the personal ownership of modems.16 The Syrian government
has arrested numerous citizens for using the internet to send information about govern- 35
ment demonstrations.17 Saudi Arabia censors the internet by requiring all Web access
to be routed through a proxy server that the government edits for content, blocking
access to pornographic, religious, and politically sensitive material.18 An assessment of
the Saudi filtering system concluded that substantial amounts of Web content are ef-
fectively inaccessible from Saudi Arabia. Similarly successful internet restrictions have
been imposed in countries as diverse as Tunisia and Vietnam.19
Cross-national studies provide strong support for the argument that au-
thoritarian and totalitarian regimes have been successful in blunting the spread of
the internet. One 2001 study found that the combined internet bandwidth used by
eight Arab countries was roughly equal to 500 cable modem subscribers in the United
States. Communications scholars Richard Beilock and Daniela Dimitrova found that
countries with lower Freedom House scores for civil liberties had significantly lower
internet usage—even after controlling for economic development. Princeton professor
Helen Milner’s research into internet diffusion yields similar results. Using multiple
measures of regime type, time series cross-sectional regressions demonstrate that, ceteris
paribus, democracies permit much greater online access, both in terms of internet users
per capita and internet hosts per capita.20

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State control over the internet goes beyond crude repression techniques, how-
ever. Authoritarian states with a greater interest in maximizing economic growth have,
to date, succeeded in restricting political content on the internet without sacrificing
commercial possibilities. Singapore would be the exemplar for this sort of regulatory
framework. The government has been eager to attract foreign investment in informa-
tion technologies. At the same time, a 1996 law requires all political parties, religious
organizations, and any individuals with Web pages discussing either religion or politics
to register with the Singapore Broadcasting Authority.21 Singapore’s approach has been
the model for many East Asian governments, including China.22 Starting in 2000, China
passed a series of laws criminalizing the production or consumption of “unauthorized”
political content.23 In July 2002, China was able to persuade more than 300 internet
service providers and web portals, including Yahoo!, to sign a voluntary pledge promis-
ing to refrain from “producing, posting, or disseminating pernicious information that
may jeopardize state security and disrupt social stability.”24 The central government
also re-routed attempts to access search engines like Google to search engines owned
or regulated by the government.25
State efforts at censorship have also succeeded in disrupting Web 2.0 technolo-
gies when it serves government interests. Governments can stymie their citizens’ access
to a large fraction of the blogosphere by filtering out standardized blog URLs such as
36 Blogger or Typepad. In 2005, China required all bloggers with independent web sites
to register with the government. Microsoft, acceding to the Chinese regime’s request,
also blocked blog entries that contained words like, “freedom,” “democracy,” “human
rights,” and “demonstration.”26 Google and Yahoo! took similar steps.
Increasingly, however, coercive governments are learning how to turn Web 2.0
technologies to their advantage. By monitoring social networking sites like LiveJournal,
Belarusian authorities were able to end the use of “smart mob” tactics in 2006; as Evgeny
Morozov observes, “social media created a digital panopticon that thwarted the revolu-
tion; its networks, transmitting public fear, were infiltrated and hopelessly outgunned
by the power of the state…The emergence of new digital spaces for dissent also lead
to new ways of tracking it.”27 Similarly, the Iranian government struck back at Green
Revolution protesters by identifying their leadership through their use of Facebook and
Twitter. Expatriates who criticized the regime discovered that their relatives still in Iran
faced persecution.28 Chinese hackers engaged in cyber-attacks on Google and other
Western multinationals in an effort to secure intellectual property and information
about Chinese human rights activists. By March 2010, the government’s interference
with Google’s activities in China grew so extensive that the company pulled its search
engine out of the country altogether.

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 Weighing The Scales
It should be noted that this activity is not limited to authoritarian states. The
U.S. Department of Justice requested AOL, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Google to hand
over search results data to revive a child pornography law; three of the four firms im-
mediately complied.29 The Israeli military has formed a unit to combat anti-Israeli
rhetoric on Web 2.0 platforms.30

A TRANSACTION COSTS METAPHOR

As the previous section suggests, parsing out how ICT affects the tug-of-war between
states and civil society activists is exceedingly difficult. Metaphorically, the problem is
akin to the one economists faced when predicting how the communications revolution
would affect the optimal size of the firm. Beginning with Ronald Coase, economists have
argued that individuals face transaction costs when they use the market, and that these
costs determine the optimal size of firms.31 Transaction costs can range from the time
spent searching for more information about prices, costs, and the reputations of other
buyers and sellers. If these costs of market exchange exceed those of more hierarchical
governance structures—i.e., firms—then hierarchy would be the optimal choice.
As communication costs have fallen over the past years and decades, the obvious
prediction from transaction costs economics would have been a concomitant decline
in the optimal size of the firm.32 There were lots of predictions about how the com- 37
munications revolution would lead to an explosion in independent entrepreneurship.33
Empirically, however, there has been minimal change. Corporate size remains relatively
unchanged in the aggregate. To be sure, the internet has encouraged firms to engage in
various forms of outsourcing, off-shoring, and subcontracting as forms of experimenta-
tion in management.34 This has not affected aggregate firm size, however.
Part of the reason for this lack of change has been that the information revolu-
tion has lowered the organizational costs of hierarchy as well. Better data management
has enabled large firms in the retail sector to rationalize their inventory management,
dramatically boosting their productivity.35 Better data mining techniques have improved
the efficiency of online advertising and marketing. While individuals encounter fewer
costs in contracting with the market, firms experience fewer costs in managing their
internal hierarchies. Indeed, for some sectors—e.g., retail finance, and professional
services—the information revolution has increased the optimal size of the firm.
The implications of this discussion for the internet’s effect on states and civil
society should be apparent. There is a tendency among pundits to pay attention to
how the internet lowers the costs of organization among citizen activists. However,
what must be acknowledged is that the internet also lowers the costs of government
monitoring. Even if a government chooses not to censor online political activity, the

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enhanced monitoring capabilities make it easier for the state to anticipate and regulate
civic protests. Repressive governments can monitor opposition websites, read Twitter
feeds, and hack e-mails—and crack down on these services when necessary. The Iranian
government’s enhanced ability to squash the Green Movement is one example of this
trend.

WHO DOES THE INTERNET EMPOWER?

Political scientists and international relations scholars think of power as a zero-sum

commodity. The more power that one actor acquires, the less relative power there
is for others. This begs two questions: First, even if ICT facilitates the coordination
capabilities of both states and civil society groups, which actors are more empowered?
Second, does the change in the distribution of power fundamentally affect politics at
the domestic and global levels?
The answer to the first question is relatively clear—civil society groups benefit
more from the information revolution. This is mostly due to the paucity of pre-internet
tools these groups had at their disposal. The non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
that form the backbone of global civil society lack significant amounts of the hard power
resources that governments possess. NGOs are characterized by limited budgets, small
38 staffs, and have a limited ability to compel state action. Long before the information
revolution, governments were already able to rely on a welter of coercive instruments.
The information revolution has allowed NGOs to better utilize their political tools. It has
allowed previously non-existent actors, such as bloggers, to make their political presence
felt. Although the net shift in the distribution of power is less than cyber-enthusiasts
believe, the size of pre-existing coercive resources means that the marginal benefit from
the internet is lower for governments than for non-governmental actors.
Is this shift in the distribution of power an important one, however? The answer
to this question has less to do with the power of information technology and more to
do with the power of norms. Even if the internet empowers global civil society, the
question is whether governments are willing to tolerate more vocal citizen activists or
not. In democratic governments, the stable rule of law automatically stacks the norma-
tive deck in favor of non-state actors. Unless governments are willing to deploy their
coercive capabilities, then obviously civil society elements will gain from the informa-
tion revolution.
However, there are arenas of political contestation where existing norms—or the
lack thereof—permit the regulation or control of civil society groups. In international
negotiations, for example, global civil society advocates deride the “green room” process,
in which key decisions are made by powerful states behind closed doors. However,

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 Weighing The Scales
because it would dilute their influence, great powers are decidedly unwilling to open
up the green room. Analysis of the various UN conferences reveal that over time, states
have become more adept at excluding various NGOs from key bargaining sessions and
preparatory committee meetings.36 Even in the case of content regulation of the internet
itself, global civil society and human rights activists have been thwarted in their efforts
to establish a norm of online press freedom. At Tunis in 2005, for example, the first
World Summit for the Information Society’s official Plan of Action encouraged govern-
ments to “combat
combat illegal and harmful content in media content,” a stark reminder of
the limits of civil society influence on multilateral negotiations.37 Because the power
of liberal norms remains constrained at the global stage, it is unlikely that this state of
affairs will change anytime soon.
Similarly, governments determined to cement their grip on power will also be
willing to flout norms of open expression. These governments will be able to blunt the
ability of civil society groups to exploit the internet. In February 2005, a spokesman
for Amnesty International told the BBC that the organization, “has recorded a grow-
ing number of cases of people detained or imprisoned for disseminating their beliefs
or information through the internet, in countries such as China, Syria, Vietnam,
the Maldives, Cuba, Iran, and Zimbabwe…It is also shocking to realize that in the
communications age just expressing support for an internet activist is enough to land
people in jail.”38 Following the most recent wave of democratic transitions, authoritar- 39
ian governments in Belarus and Uzbekistan stepped up their crackdown on internet
activists in response to rising internal dissent.39
It would seem, therefore, that the internet merely reinforces the pre-existing
dynamics between states and non-state actors. In societies that value liberal norms—de-
mocracies—the internet clearly empowers non-state actors to influence the government.
In arenas where liberal norms are not widely accepted—interstate negotiations and
totalitarian governments—the internet has no appreciable effect.
However, there is one category where the internet could prove to have a pivotal
effect on state-society relations—the large group of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian
states that wish to exploit the economic possibilities of the information society. There
is increasing evidence that greater access to global information flows increases growth
opportunities for states.40 However, any state that permits internet or cellular phone
use for commercial possibilities will face difficulties in perfectly censoring undesirable
communication or halting all attempts at political coordination.

INFORMATION CASCADES AND ILLIBERAL CIVIL SOCIETIES

Given the other coercive tools of government, imperfect censoring would appear at first

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glance to be a minor inconvenience. However, the wave of revolutions and uprisings
in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, Lebanon, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Moldova, Myanmar, and
Iran suggest one area where information and communication technologies can have a
dramatic effect—correcting information cascades.
An informational cascade takes place when individuals acting in an environ-
ment of uncertainty strongly condition their choices on what others have done previ-
ously. More formally, an information cascade is a situation in which every actor, based
on the observations of others, makes the same choice independent of his/her private
information signal.41 Less formally, an information cascade demonstrates the power of
peer pressure—many individuals will choose actions based on what they observe others
doing.
Information cascades can often lead to suboptimal outcomes when compared
with decentralized and independent decision-making.42 In repressive societies, infor-
mation cascades often lead citizens to acquiesce to government coercion, even if a
broad swath of the public would prefer coordinated action. Citizen coordination and
mobilization is highly unlikely among risk-averse actors unless there is some assurance
that others will behave similarly. At the same time, however, a shock to the system—a
scheduled election, natural disaster, sporting event, or unrest in a neighboring coun-
try—can trigger spontaneous acts of protest or a reverse in the cascade. This explains
40 why repressive societies often appear stable for years and yet without warning can face
a massive scaling up of protests and civic action.43 A little bit of public information can
reverse a long-standing informational cascade that contributed to citizen quiescence.
Even if people may have previously chosen one action, seemingly little information
can induce the same people to choose the exact opposite action in response to a slight
increase in information.44
The spread of information technology increases the fragility of information
cascades that sustain the appearance of authoritarian control. This effect creates win-
dows of opportunity for civil society groups. While governments may be able to censor
internet content and repress activists during periods of “normal” levels of unrest, that
ability may not remain constant over time. This is particularly true as more and more
Web 2.0 technologies are created that bypass the state’s ability to control the flow of
information. At moments when a critical mass of citizens recognizes their mutual dis-
satisfaction with their government, the ability of the state to repress can evaporate. In
some cases of “people power” mobilization, government-controlled media outlets have
often switched sides and supported activists against repressive governments.45 Such
moments dramatically increase the state’s price of using coercion to reassert political
control. The role of new media—be it Twitter or text messaging—has the potential to
be even more significant.

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 Weighing The Scales
If repressive governments were previously unaware of the information revo-
lution’s effect on political coordination, the most recent wave of democratization has
undoubtedly made them cognizant. Recent events in Moldova and Iran demonstrate
that repressive governments can still coexist with the information revolution. If civil
society movements fail to dislodge a repressive government during the first set of
large-scale protests, that government will be more likely to keep information cascades
working in its favor. And yet, while these governments can choose to crack down even
harder on civil society groups that exploit the
Extremists, criminals, terrorists,
internet, the long-term opportunity costs of
such a crackdown are also on the increase. a n d h y p e r- n a t i o n a l i s t s h a v e
Over time, authoritarian governments will embraced the information society
be faced with a difficult choice—accept a
greater risk of popular revolt, or engage in just as eagerly as classical liberals.
costly acts of repression. Finally, even if repressive societies become more open, they will
not automatically become more liberal. The term “networked civil society” conjures an
image of law-abiding, civic-minded activists committed to Western notions of liberal
democracy. The reality is quite different. In the United States, the internet has fuelled
extremist groups dedicated to the proposition that the Bush administration caused
the 9/11 attacks, or that Barack Obama is actually a radical Muslim not born in the
United States. As Cass Sunstein has observed, online networking allows for information 41
to be filtered through rigid ideological lenses, contributing to more extreme political
beliefs.46
These effects are equally likely to be at play in the rest of the world. The 1979
revolution in Iran and 1994 genocide in Rwanda showed that information technolo-
gies are conduits for any kind of information transmission—not just “desirable” forms.
Extremists, criminals, terrorists, and hyper-nationalists have embraced the information
society just as eagerly as classical liberals. Insurgents have used text messaging from
cell phones to recruit, track, and intimidate other Iraqis—as well as set off improvised
explosive devices. One of the most robust forms of online activism in China has been
nationalist outrage over Chinese investments in the United States. In Lebanon, the po-
litical actor that has adapted to Web 2.0 technologies the quickest has been Hezbollah.
YouTube is popular among Mexican criminal gangs because they can upload assassina-
tion videos as a form of intimidation. Russian nationalists contributed to cyber-attacks
against Georgian websites, and have targeted ethnic minorities via Google Maps.47
The U.S. State Department has begun to invest serious resources into the use
of online technology to promote civic activism. In November 2009, Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton announced the Civil Society 2.0 Initiative to build the capacity of
grassroots organizations through the use of blogs, social networks, and other Web 2.0

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 D W. D
technologies. In her announcement, she pledged the United States would “send experts
in digital technology and communications to help build capacity” for civil society
groups worldwide.48 In January 2010, Clinton gave a follow-up speech on internet
freedoms in which she charged that a “new information curtain” was being imposed
by repressive governments. She further acknowledged the complex effects of Web 2.0
technologies: “while it is clear that the spread of these technologies is transforming our
world, it is still unclear how that transformation will affect the human rights and the
human welfare of the world’s population.”49
This recognition of Web 2.0’s complex effects is a promising sign of policy-
maker acuity. The Civil Society 2.0 Initiative might yield the desired results, but it still
suffers from two misperceptions. First, it presumes that these technologies primarily
aid “good” groups. Second, it assumes that the biggest impediment to the flowering
of digital liberalism comes from the heavy hand of the state. It is certainly possible
that the initiative fails because of the coercive apparatus of a repressive government. It
is equally likely, however, that the initiative succeeds—in empowering illiberal forces
across the globe. : $

NOTES

1. A previous version of this paper was presented at the April 2005 Conference on the Global Flow of
42
Information, Yale University, New Haven, CT. I am grateful to Charli Carpenter, Patrick Meier, Jacob T.
Levy, Henry Farrell, Emily Meierding, Marvin Ammori, Michael Froomkin, and especially Jack Balkin
for their feedback and encouragement. The usual caveat applies.
2. Howard Rheingold, Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 2003); Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs, “Development and Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 84 (September/
October 2005): 77-86; Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets
and Freedom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody (New York:
Penguin Press, 2008); Patrick Philippe Meier, “The Impact of the Information Revolution on Protest
Frequency in Repressive Contexts,” presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting,
New York, NY, March 2009; Jacob Groshek, “The Democratic Effects of the Internet, 1994—2003,”
International Communications Gazette 71 (April 2009): 115-136; Evgeny Morozov, “How Dictators Watch
Us on the Web,” Prospect, November 18, 2009.
3. For a fuller discussion of Web 2.0, see Charli Carpenter and Daniel W. Drezner, “IR 2.0: The
Implications of New Media for an Old Profession,” International Studies Perspectives 11 (August 2010):
forthcoming.
4. Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999). Rajiv Shah
and Kay Kesan, “Manipulating the Governance Characteristics of Code,” Info 4 (September/October
2003): 3-9.
5. Daniel W. Drezner, “The Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing the State Back In.” Political
Science Quarterly 119 (Fall 2004): 477-498; Daniel W. Drezner and Henry Farrell, “Web of Influence,”
Foreign Policy 145 (November/December 2004): 32-40.
6. Albert Hirschman, “The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding,” World Politics 22
(April 1970): 342.
7. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998):
8. See also Emilie Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler and Alex Montgomery, “Network Analysis in International
Relations,” International Organization 63 (Summer 2009): 559-592.

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 Weighing The Scales
8. Government of France, “Rapport sur l’Accord Multilateral sur l’invetissement (AMI),” September
1998. http://www.finances.gouv.fr/pole_ecofin/international/ami0998/ami0998.htm, accessed 18 July
2002.
9. Stephen Kobrin, “The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations,” Foreign Policy 112 (Fall 1998): 98.
Kobrin elaborates on these arguments in “Economic Governance in an Electronically Networked Soci-
ety,” in Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker, eds., The Emergence of Private Authority in Global
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). See also Ronald Deibert, “International
Plug ‘n Play? Citizen Activism, the Internet, and Global Public Policy.” International Studies Perspectives
1 (July 2000): 255-272.
10. Craig Warkentin and Karen Mingst, “International Institutions, The State, and Global Civil So-
ciety in the Age of the World Wide Web,” Global Governance 6 (June 2000). For contrary takes on the
GCS effect on the MAI, see Edward M. Graham, Fighting the Wrong Enemy (Washington: Institute for
International Economics, 2000), and Daniel W. Drezner, All Politics Is Global: Explaining International
Regulatory Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), Chapter One.
11. Quoted in Lee Hudson Tselik, “New Media Tools and Public Diplomacy,” http://www.cfr.org/pub-
lication/19300/, 11 May 2009.
12. On Moldova, see Evgeny Morozov, “Moldova’s Twitter Revolution,” http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.
com/posts/2009/04/07/moldovas_twitter_revolution, 7 April 2009; on Pakistan, see Sanjeev Berry, “Paki-
stanis Debate their Future on Facebook.” Huffington Post, 18 May. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/san-
jeev-bery/pakistani-debate-their-fu_b_204272.html.
13. On Iran, see Mark Landler and Brian Stetler, “Washington Taps Into a Potent New Force in Di-
plomacy,” New York Times, 17 June 2009, and Robin Wright, “In Iran, One Woman’s Death May have
Many Consequences,” Time, 21 June 2009.
14. Jesse Scanlon, “7 Ways to Squelch the Net,” Wired, August 2003.
15. Jack Goldsmith and Timothy Wu, Who Controls the Internet? (New York: Oxford University Press,
2006).
16. Robert Lebowitz, “Cuba Prohibits Computer Sales,” Digital Freedom Network, March 26, 2002; 43
Associated Press, “Internet Remains Prohibited in Myanmar,” 3 May 2000; Myanmar’s subsequent ex-
pansion of Internet access was strictly regulated to screen out any politically sensitive material. See Amy
Kazmin, “Burmese get Glimpse of Superhighway,” Financial Times, 25 April 2002.
17. BBC News, “Iran’s President Defends Web Control,” 12 December 2003; Nazila Fathi, “Iran Jails
More Journalists and Blocks Web Sites,” New York Times, 8 November 2004; BBC News, “Syrian Jailed
for Internet Usage,” 21 June 2004.
18. Khalid Al-Tawil, “The Internet in Saudi Arabia,” Telecommunications Policy 25 (September 2001):
625-632.
19. Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski and Jonathan Zittrain, Access Denied: The Practice
and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008).
20. Richard Beilock and Daniela Dimitrova, “An Exploratory Model of Inter-country Internet Diffu-
sion,” Telecommunications Policy 27 (April/May 2003): 237-252; Helen Milner, “The Digital Divide: The
Role of Political Institutions in Technology Diffusion,” Comparative Political Studies 39 (March 2006):
176-199. See also Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regimes: the Impact of the
Internet on Authoritarian Rule (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
21. Garry Rodan, “The Internet and Political Control in Singapore.” Political Science Quarterly 113
(Spring 1998): 63-89.
22. Ibid; Georgette Wang, “Regulating Network Communication in Asia,” Telecommunications Policy
23 (April 1999): 277-287; Shanthi Kalathil, “China’s Dot-Communism,” Foreign Policy 122 (January/
February 2001): 74-5.
23. Ethan Gutmann, “Who Lost China’s Internet?” The Weekly Standard, 25 February 2002.
24. Christopher Bodeen, “Web Portals Sign China Content Pact,” Associated Press, 15 July 2002.
25. Joseph Kahn, “China Toughens Obstacles to Internet Searches,” New York Times, 12 September
2002.
26. BBC, “Microsoft Censors Chinese Blogs,” 14 June 2005. If a Chinese blogger uses these terms,

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 D W. D
the user receives a pop-up warning that states: “This message contains a banned expression, please delete
this expression.”
27. Morozov, “How Dictators Watch Us on the Web.”
28. Farnaz Fassini, “Iranian Crackdown Goes Global,” Wall Street Journal, 4 December 2009.
29. Declan McCullagh and Elinor Willis, “Feds Take Porn Fight to Google,” CNET News, 19 January
2006.
30. Anshel Pfeffer and Gili Izikovich, “New IDF unit to fight enemies on Facebook, Twitter,” Ha’aretz,
December 1, 2009.
31. Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4 (November 1937): 386-405; Armian Al-
chian and Harold Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and the Economic Organization.” American
Economic Review 62 (December 1972): 777-795; Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, and Armian Alchian,
“Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process.” Journal of Law and
Economics 21 (October 1978): 297-326.
32. A decade ago, the Economist concluded “Most previous technological breakthroughs have increased
the optimal size of firms either by reducing production costs and increasing economies of scale, as with
electricity and steam, or by reducing transport costs, as with railways, thus favouring concentration. By
contrast, outside the digitisable sectors such as software the Internet reduces economies of scale in most
of the economy by increasing the opportunities for outsourcing and by lowering fixed costs.” Economist,
“Knowledge is Power,” 21 September 2000.
33. Chris Anderson, The Long Tail (New York: Hyperion, 2006); Benkler, The Wealth of Networks.
34. Suzanne Berger et al, How We Compete (New York: Currency Books, 2005).
35. See Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian, Information Rules (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999);
Eric Brynjolfsson and Loren Hitt, “Beyond Computation: Information Technology, Organizational Per-
formance, and Business Performance,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (Fall 2000): 23-49; William W.
Lewis, The Power of Productivity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), chapter four.
36. Ann Marie Clark, Elizabeth Friedman, and Kathryn Hochstetler, “The Sovereign Limits of Global
44 Society,” World Politics 51 (October 1998): 1-35.
37. Quoted in David Souter, “The View from the Summit: A Report on the Outcomes of the World
Summit on the Information Society,” Info 6 (January/February 2004): 6-11.
38. Quoted in Jo Twist, “Global Blogger Action Day Called,” BBC News, 22 February 2005.
39. Internet Censorship Explorer, “Belarus… A Bit of the Old and New,” http://ice.citizenlab.org/?p=89,
19 March 2005; Daniil Kislov, “Ferghana.Ru’s open letter to sponsors of the Uzbek provider UzSciNet
in the UN Central Asian Development Program,” http://enews.ferghana.ru/detail.php?id=7472527472
5.291,1752,17888839, 13 April 2005.
40. Leonard Waverman, Meloria Meschi and Melvyn Fuss, “The Impact of Telecoms on Economic
Growth in Developing Countries.” Centre for Economic Policy Research, March 2005; Economist, “Call-
ing Across the Divide,” 12 March 2005.
41. Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer , and Ivo Welch, “Informational Cascades and Rational Herding:
An Annotated Bibliography.” Working paper, UCLA/Anderson and Ohio State University and Yale/SOM.
42. James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (New York: Random House, 2004).
43. See, for example, Susanne Lohmann, “The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday
Demonstrations in Leipzig East Germany, 1989-91,” World Politics 47 (October 1994): 42-101.
44. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer , and Welch, “Informational Cascades and Rational Herding.”
45. See, for example, Roman Olearchyk, “Regime’s Control over TV Media Crumbling,” Kyiv Post, 25
November 2004; Sebastian Usher, “Ukraine State TV in Revolt,” BBC News, 26 November 2004.
46. Cass Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
47. Data in this paragraph comes from Morozov, “How dictators watch us on the web,” and Peter
Singer, Wired for War (New York: Penguin Press, 2009).
48. Hillary Clinton, “Remarks at Forum for the Future,” Marrakech, Morocco, November 3, 2009.
Accessed at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/11/131236.htm.
49. Hillary Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” Washington, DC, 21 January 2010. Accessed at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm

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