Scott. Platonic Anamnesis Revisited

Platonic Anamnesis Revisited
Author(s): Dominic Scott

Source: The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 2 (1987), pp. 346-366
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association
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Classical Quarterly 37 (ii) 346-366 (1987) Printed in Great Britain 346
PLATONIC ANAMNESIS REVISITED
The belief in innate knowledge has a history almost as long as th

In our own century it has been propounded in a linguistic con
sees himself as the heir to a tradition including such philoso
Cambridge Platonists and Leibniz. But the ancestor of all the
theory of recollection or anamnesis. This stands out as unique
theses not simply because it was the first, but also because it
strangest: Plato proposed not just a theory of innate knowl
knowledge, and this, of course, goes hand in hand with his inter
of the soul. But my concern here is with another difference th
unique, though it is not as clear as the previous one: in fact it
part over-looked by commentators and scholars. I wish to
theories of innate knowledge or ideas hold that much of what i
automatically and with ease, be it knowledge of moral princ
and effect or linguistic competence, anamnesis is concerned on
of hard philosophical knowledge, which most of us never reac
Before I plunge into any interpretations of anamnesis, let m
creatures of the post-renaissance innatists to clarify my own i
distinction to be made is between a theory about innate idea
knowledge of propositions. The claims that seem to have u
famous polemic against innatism' were that we know innately
speculative and practical. Under the first heading would be in
non-contradiction, and under the second religious and moral p
exists', 'The soul is immortal' and 'God is to be worshipped'
a hot issue in the seventeenth century when many clerics and
foundations of morality and Christianity under threat, and so at
by appealing to innate a priori principles, the idea being tha
principles that have been stamped upon everyone's minds,
command universal assent, but for the dissension of a few wi
The innateness of ideas was also entrenched in the philosoph
time. On this thesis, many if not all of the ideas and notions t
of conceptual thought, and so of all judgement and knowledge, ar
mind. This was Descartes' position:
...in our ideas there is nothing that was not innate in the mind or fa
only these circumstances which point to experience - the fact, for in
this or that idea, which we now have present to our thought, is to
extraneous thing, not that these extraneous things transmitted the ideas
through the organs of sense, but because they transmitted someth
See An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. I.

2 The evidence for belief in innate principles in the seventeenth cen
documented by J. W. Yolton in John Locke and the Way of Ideas (
dramatis personae include clerics from Bishop Stillingfleet to the Cam
Culverwel and Cudworth, who embraced more subtle theories of inn
the association between innatism and religion is More's Antidote Aga
in C. A. Patrides (ed.), The Cambridge Platonists (Edward Arnold,
218ff.
PLATONIC ANAMNESIS 347
occasion to form these ideas by means of an innat

nothing reaches our mind from external objects
corporeal movements... but even these movement
not conceived by us in the shape they assume in t
lengths in my Dioptrics. Hence it follows that
themselves innate in us.3
The innateness of ideas was also embraced by the Cambridge Platonists. Cudworth,
for instance, claimed that in sensible ideas there has to be a contribution from the mind,
and in the case of non-sensible ideas, such as relational ones, or 'cognitive' ideas, e.g.
wisdom, folly, etc., there is no question of an empirical contribution.4 More also
dismisses an empiricist explanation of the formation of relational ideas in his Antidote
(p. 224). Here he is discussing the idea of dissimilarity:
But now that these Relative Ideas, whether Logical or Mathematicall be no Physicall affectations
of the Matter is manifest from these two arguments. First they may be produced when there has
been no Physical Motion nor alteration in the subject to which they belong... As for instance,
suppose one side of a room whitened the other not touched or medled with, this other has become
unlike, and hath the notion of dissimile necessarily belonging to it.
Thus if there is no physical impression from without, the ideas must proceed from
within the mind.
The problem which the innateness of ideas is supposed to tackle is one about how
certain elements in human understanding could possibly have arisen if all we had for
their explanation was sense-experience. Thus one argument was that the mere passive
reception of mechanical bombardments from outside could never give rise to ideas
of colour, let alone extension, similarity and so on. This, of course, is a completely
different problem from that of the justification of moral and religious beliefs in the
wake of sceptical attack, the problem that lies behind the positing of innate practical
maxims. Nevertheless, the Cambridge Platonists, at least, espoused both theories, and
were concerned with both problems.5
What the solutions have in common, however, is that they are concerned with innate
ideas or propositions many of which are aroused automatically, and without any
conscious intellectual labour. This is obviously the case with innate ideas as these are
meant to explain the fabric of all human thought, but it is also true of the propositions
which were so fought over by the clerics and their empiricist opponents. This is made
clear from the fact that the innatists of the seventeenth century at whom Locke's
polemic was directed favoured arguments either from universal assent, or from the
immediate assent of someone to whom the principle is first proposed.6
3 Descartes, Notes Directed against a Certain Programme, tr. E. S. Haldane & G. R. T.

Ross (Cambridge, 1911), 442-3. Descartes also used the term 'innate' in a more specialized
sense to describe ideas that were not adventitious or fictitious. In the broader sense, however,
all ideas are innate, even those of primary qualities. For a discussion of this issue see
R. M. Adams, in S. P. Stich (ed.), Innate Ideas (California, 1979), 77-8.
4 R. Cudworth, A Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality (1731), 148-9.
5 Leibniz, in his attack on Locke's polemic, re-asserts the innateness of both ideas and
principles (practical and speculative). He points out that although speculative maxims may not
be explicitly known to everyone, they are innate in so far as they would be assented to as soon
as heard. He adds that they are innate also because they are in us 'potentially', suppressed as
in enthymemes (see P. Remnant and J. Bennett, G. W. Leibniz. New Essays on Human Under-
standing [Cambridge, 1982], 76). He talks on p. 84 of the mind relying on certain principles
constantly, these serving as 'the inner core and mortar of our thoughts'. Some innate principles
are in fact the necessary conditions of thought, and in using them we know them' fundamentally'.
He also espouses the innateness of ideas by making several intellectual ideas - being, unity,
substance, duration, change, action - innate to us (see p. 51).
6 Locke, Essay, Bk. I.3.?2, and Yolton, op. cit. (n. 2), 39-41.
348 DOMINIC SCOTT
How, then, does Platonic anamnesis

innate knowledge, then there is ag
renaissance innatists to the extent
fundamental moral truths. As far a
where the theory grows out of a pro
ofattaining knowledge of what virtu
the attainment of such innate kno
immense philosophical effort.
When we come to the innateness o
one line of interpretation, Plato is ad
conceptual thought is possible, and
that is too rich for the senses to hav
this interpretation seems at first sig
learning and research are wholly
interpretation, claims not only tha
perceptions by virtue of our pre-ex
notice that particulars fall short of th
for the immortality of the soul mov
a deduction of the necessary cogniti
such knowledge, it moves to the pre
The strongest evidence is to be foun
acount of the soul, Socrates talks of
thousand years as to what type of
to turn into animals having been h
after a spell as an animal. But a soul
on human form, since a man is requi
from a plurality of perceptions to a
nothing other than the recollection o
present interpretation very plausibly
anamnesis to explain the cognitive ac
intelligence to classify the data of se
is that this would not be possible
concepts.
Now, according to this interpretat
product of an interaction between
particular ideas of physical objects, a
sense-data. This enables us to see both
reading of anamnesis and the Cartes
is an innate stock of ideas, or an in
to human conceptual thought. Th
particular objects in the physical w
them in sense-perception, and so we
under universal concepts, whereas
stimulants to the innate ideas, not p
thought.
Platonic anamnesis is now rather Kantian in tone, for just as Kant made intuitions
and concepts the two essential sources of our empirical knowledge, Plato (according
to this interpretation) uses aistheta and our innate knowledge of the forms. Of course,
7 Meno 81d4-5. 8 Phaedo 74e ff.
the recollection that we all engage in m

philosopher, but that is the next stage on
the first one.
I wish to argue, as against this thesis wh
was not worried that the senses might b
thought when he proposed his theory of
the movement from beliefs (which presup
My claims need both explication and supp

elaborating them with a fascinating (and,
of anamnesis that is suggested by a fragmen
aLt ETLUT-7LaL, KpJ7TTOvTraL Tot TW av

ITEp4OEla q &ArcW. Herodotus tells us th
Persia for the Greeks. To inform the Gree
written on a wax tablet, but put a 'decoy' m
and carved the real message for the Gre
This analogy is historically interesting: b
empiricist theories about blank tablets
Platonist replies as follows: 'Of course yo
tablets etc., since it is true that we der
sense-experience; the point is that these
to reveal what lies underneath.'
Philosophically, it is even more interesting. It presents us with empiricism and
rationalism in one theory, the former for opinion, the latter for knowledge. The sensible
world, on this story, presents us with a huge number of unreliable opinions that we
leave unquestioned (like the Persian readers of the wax tablet). Deep in our soul,
however, lies the real message - our innate knowledge of the forms - which can only
be recovered if we remove the surface layer. This requires us first to be suspicious of
the surface message, to be puzzled by the world of sense-perception (like an astute
Persian spy-catcher might have been), and then to reject its claim to be reliable in
favour of what lies beneath.
Perhaps the most striking thing about this reading of anamnesis, which I shall call
'D' (for 'Demaratus'), is the rigid separation it makes between the empirical and the
rational. Unlike K, it allows us to form any number of opinions, true or false, before
we even begin to recollect. It emphasizes the element of deception in true Platonic
spirit, and it goes hand in hand with the sort of pessimism which says that most of
us do not attain knowledge at all. Like the Persians, we are content with the deceptions
of the world of experience. Most people, in fact, do not begin to recollect at all.
9 It is fascinating to note, however, that one person who dissociates himself from this
'Kantian' view of anamnesis is Kant himself. In the Critique of Pure Reason A 313/B 370 he
talks of the laborious process of recollection and identifies it with philosophy. Elsewhere,
(Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, Nr. 6050, in Kant's gesammelte Schriften [Berlin and Leipzig, 1928],
xviii (5). 434-5), he says that we recollect the ideas only with difficulty. It is thus a very recondite
affair and Kant's reason for thinking this was that he saw the ideas not as categories or concepts
of pure reason, which combine with sensible intuitions to make experience possible, but as far
surpassing these and constituting intellectual intuitions of things as they are in themselves, which
is a very different matter. In fact, Kant interpreted anamnesis as amounting to no less than a
participation in the Divine Intellect.
10 For the origin of this fragment, see Plutarch's Moralia (Loeb), ed. F. H. Sandbach, xv.
388-9; L. G. Westerink, The Greek Commentators on Plato's Phaedo (Amsterdam, 1976), ii.166.
11 VII, 239, 4.
12 See SVF II 83.
350 DOMINIC SCOTT
But if recollection is not operative d

in human cognitive development in g
human reason from bare sense-percept
unreliable and faulty? Answer: he d
empiricist theory to account for our for
the explication of such a theory.14 H
development of knowledge. There are
the other from within, and it is only
accused at this point of being too narrow
of the double-origin theory, questions
be treated as entirely distinct from th
Whereas K insists on the co-operati
forces their separation. We can mak
invoking any innate knowledge of f
separate from each other. Both the in
but D allows each of the two storehou
and so it is in effect superimposing em
judgements, the latter to account for
extraordinary boldness of D in its pes
actually recollect - zero. It is a necessar
knowledge, that we rid ourselves of the
of us are too impressed by the world
begin to recollect.
K, on the other hand, holds that r
philosophically earnest, but an essen
thinker tyrant, sophist or philosoph
Plato is advancing a thesis that explain
to maturity in terms of a continuous p
to embrace the earliest glimmers o
philosophical achievement at once: a
concept formation, the classification
formation of judgements. We have to
but also to get them wrong, to make
a process of learning, and, according t
that this is all there is to recollection: t
questions, refines and revises the opin
he is in fact completing the process o
We have seen that at first glance th
support, though most of the eviden
the Phaedo and the Phaedrus rather than from the Meno. This reflects the fact that the
theory of recollection undergoes some important changes between the Meno and the
Phaedo because of the introduction of the theory of forms. The result is that the theory
of recollection is clearer, at least in relation to the role of sense-perception, in the later
13 There was available an empiricist account of the emergence of knowledge from sensation
that is mentioned in the Phaedo at 96b, and it has been attributed to Alcmaeon (24 A 11 DK).
Its stage-by-stage account - sensation, memory, opinion, knowledge - was echoed by Aristotle
(An. Po. B19, 100a3 ff. and Met. Al, 980a27 ff.) and the Stoics (SVF II 83). On my story, Plato's
quarrel with Alcmaeon would have been with the final transition from opinion to knowledge,
not that from sensation through to opinion.
14 Notice Plato's lack of interest in Alcmaeon's theory in the Phaedo passage.
dialogue, and so more determinate position

K finds its habitat in the two later dialogu
and the Phaedrus that the battle will be foug
look at the Meno, to show that an embryonic v
by contrast, there was never any possibility
form.
(1) The Meno 80ff.
In the famous examination of the slave boy

a demonstration of anamnesis in action, and
stages:
(i) The slave boy comes to realize that what
in fact wrong. Thus, after he has elicited a f
to Meno at 82e12-13:
Now watch him recollecting sequentially, as one should recollect.
It is between this point and 84a2 that the first stage happens, and at the end of it t
slave boy is in aporia, but is at least aware that he does not know.
(ii) The slave boy now moves from the aporia towards the acquisition of tru
opinions. Yet when he has these opinions, he does not yet have knowledge (85c6 if.)
So that he who does not know about any matters, whatever they may be, may have true opinio
on such matters, about which he knows nothing?... and at this moment those opinions have be
stirred up in him just like in a dream.
(iii) It is in the final stage that knowledge is acquired, as Socrates goes on to sa

in the passage immediately following the quotation. This stage is mentioned later in
the dialogue, at 98a4, when Socrates describes the difference between knowledge an
true opinion. When we have tied down an opinion with a 'causal reckoning' w
convert it into knowledge, and this is nothing but anamnesis.
The theory aims to show that we can attain knowledge and how we can do so, bu
it shows anamnesis starting only after contact with a certain type of stimulus o
catalyst, in this case Socrates. Had the slave boy never met Socrates he might never
have started to recollect at all. Anamnesis is thus only invoked to explain the
movement from opinion towards knowledge of a priori truths. It is not used to explain
how the slave boy acquired the beliefs and concepts necessary to make sense of wha
Socrates was talking about when the examination began. Yet this is precisely wh
K would have anamnesis do: beginning from an analysis of propositional thought int
its conceptual components it makes Plato answer a problem about the formation
concepts that make language and thought possible. Yet throughout the whole of our
passage Plato shows himself only interested in propositions, and that is because
is proposing anamnesis as the solution to a problem about how we can transcend ou
opinions and achieve knowledge, rather than how raw sensation can yield any
thoughts whatsoever.
Now for a couple of objections to my interpretation. In the first place, it seems t
be ruled out by the statement 'learning and research are wholly recollection' (81 d4-
But this objection is only damaging as long as we take the sentence at 81d4-5 literally
making (av8avELv co-extensive with our word 'learn'. And we should be wary of
making such a move, as it raises some acute problems for any interpretation. If w
take the statement at face value, then should we include all learning, 'learning how
as well as 'learning that'? Does Plato include learning how to play the lyre, fo
352 DOMINIC SCOTT
instance? Do we also, under the

learning and discovery of individ
already been raised by scholars a
qualifications to be appended to th
that 'all learning' is to be taken ab
what Socrates says about recollecti
theory. It should also be remembere
statement cannot be interpreted as
with the interview of the slave bo
we should put on the statement o
not just about geometry, but al
disciplines. This provides an im
impose upon LavOcdvELv: Plato is
about [zaO(qtar-a, of which geome
A second objection to my view
Socrates, before the slave boy ha
whether he seems to you to be rec
that anything that the slave boy s
the mistakes and false starts that
But the comment at 82b5-6 appli
will indeed be some recollection. It
(to 82d 12). In fact, the consequen
whole strategy in the Meno. This
very much like the midwife story
interlocutor a number of false de
Now try saying that when Socrat
is making him recollect; try say
Socrates is using the examination
part of his programme to show th
strategy in examining the slave b
he and Meno know so that they
there was no one who knew, and s
that he is not teaching the boy but
the answers, then he may be pers
deriving knowledge from with
judgements, Socrates' programme
ourselves false judgements as well a
but how are we to know if we do
of recollection to help us find out
hands. Meno's counter-attack wou
'elenctikos' who sets up the avia
anamnesis from falling into these
as we reject any interpretation t
15 R. S. Bluck, Plato's Meno (Cambridge, 1961), 9-10, for instance, argues against
including experiences of a previous life into the matter of recollection. G. Vlastos, 'Anamnesis
in the Meno', Dialogue 4 (1965), 143ff., excludes empirical knowledge from Plato's programme.
For an extremely severe restriction on the meaning of cLavG6vELv, see A. Nehamas, 'Meno's
Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3 (1985), 1-30: on
his view, the slave boy does not recollect at all, and would only do so if he attained knowledge,
not just true opinion.
problem of how the slave boy got the ri

explain how he could converse with Socrat
(2) The Phaedo 72e3-76e7

As far as the Meno is concerned, I am onl
be used to explain the emergence of our p
to the Phaedo, however, the introduction
allows us to go beyond this negative claim
to Plato. I wish to claim that the dual onto
of a wax tablet ready to accept the impr
of innate knowledge, knowledge of the for
I was outlining at the beginning of this es
fits the text of the Phaedo beautifully.
The first task is to show that the textual
is not nearly as strong as it may have se
where Plato's interest in the theory of rec
to prove the immortality of the soul, his
the soul must have existed before it was e
Plato sets out four conditions for recollec
(i) we must have known a beforehand
(ii) we must not only recognize f but
(iii) a must not be the object of the sam
(iv) when a resembles g, we must consid
to a (74a5-7).
Socrates goes on to claim that we comp
and that this counts as a bonafide case of re
of the form before we started to use our
before birth; therefore the soul must hav
A number of commentators have interpr
of the forms accounts for concept forma
and particulars.16 In attempting to rep
16 It is now time to unmask some of the adh
from N. Gulley, 'Plato's Theory of Recollect
Knowledge (London, 1962), 31ff; J. L. Ackrill,
Exegesis and Argument, Phronesis, suppl., vo
Bostock, Plato's Phaedo (Oxford, 1986), 66f
Knowledge (London, 1935), 108.
I have said that K interprets anamnesis as explai
by 'concept formation' varies depending on h
versions of K think is to be explained by anamne
who argues that recollection accounts for our o
words, such as 'equal', of which there are no p
it should also be pointed out that Bostock give
commentators by talking about 'meanings of te
Gulley (CQ 4 [1954], 198 n. 2) thinks that the for
an unlimited range of forms. This approach is
where Plato is thought to be talking of the use
restriction whatever (see below, n. 44).
Despite the differences between versions of K
because I am refuting interpretations which re
conceptual apparatus, however limited the ran
Another point that should be clarified is that
354 DOMINIC SCOTT
distinguish two assumptions that

in turn. The first, (A), is that the
formation, the second, (B), that w
As far as (B) is concerned, it is th
should ask, whatever the range of
that we have all formed general
everyday judgements. There is n
discusses how we originally classif
we understand the term 'equal' in
he takes all this for granted and
'equal' and the fact that we compa
cognitive achievements, which pr
are quite distinct from and go bey
(A), however, is not merely abse
difficulties - difficulties that have
problem that Ackrill19 puts his
conditions for recollection listed a
reminded of a by g, then we mu
knowledge of a, otherwise the abs
thinking of a, and so recollection
recollection to explain concept for
form equal in order to recognize th
in order to recognize the equal sti
so we cannot then go on to recol
recollected the form, then, accor
concept use that anamnesis is meant t

it attempts to show how we came to for
the meaning of certain terms; inasmu
for their use it contributes to an acco
not concerned with the issue of conce
we have already formed correctly to o
17 One might think that at 74a9-b3 S
a humdrum knowledge of equality,
in 74a9-12 jars with this: 'We say that
or a stick to a stick...' The contrast is
the equality of the sticks and stones; i
if filled out, would run: '... I don't m
it is precisely in such statements as, '
of the concepts and meanings is man
argument. So these lines cannot be u
mysteries surrounding our ordinary g
11 Gulley (CQ 4 [1954] 197-8) paints
envisaged is an immediate transition f
relying on a contrast between sens
apparently saying that the fact that w
in sense-experience constitutes recolle
74c that in being reminded of the form
that the immediate transition referr
knowledge of the forms, but, as he go
that we employ concepts to describe w
or in itself any reliable pointer.'
19 Ackrill, op. cit. (n. 16), 183: 'There
if recollection is to explain concept-fo
or something akin to it?'
an equal stick, and so, in the absence of an

stimulus for recollection. Either way, recolle
will be impossible. In fact, we find ourselve
the paradox in Meno 80e, which is a cruel iro
problem that anamnesis was meant to solve
If, however, we do not say that remindin
tion all these problems disappear. Of cour
formation of a very special kind, viz. our
the formation of those concepts that we use
that we need to say, 'these sticks are equal' a
has not as yet come into the picture.
One feature of the whole argument that mi
why is Plato so interested here in empirical
of the forms and knowledge, he is highly dis
only interested in judgements that combin
but he even says that we get our knowledge
what he says elsewhere in the dialogue,20 we
on our hands. One way out is to say that P
of philosophical knowledge, but the way in w
terms in ordinary use of concepts. D has
instead ?21
The first task is to remove the contradiction
that use of the senses is a sufficient conditi
then he is indeed contradicting himself. But th
be saying more than that use of the sens
knowledge, i.e. that to start the process off
sensible stimuli.22
In fact, Plato has very good reasons for being interested for once in the role that
the senses play in the attainment of philosophical knowledge. The argument is seeking
to show that learning is recollection. Whereas the Meno puts stress on the innateness
of our knowledge, and then quickly goes on to deduce that learning is recollecton,23
the Phaedo makes much more noise about recollection, not merely innateness. We have
already seen how Plato carefully lays down the conditions for recollection at the
beginning of his argument. He makes no attempt at all to differentiate between
ordinary recollection and the philosophical variety, and we can see why: the closer
the two are, the easier it is to see why the soul must have existed before embodiment.
The more specific Plato can be about the nature of the relation between forms and
particulars, the better his chances of assimilating recollection of forms to ordinary
recollection. Thus when he says that this relation is one of similarity, he can appeal
to normal assumptions about recollection to interpret a special case of being caused
to think of one thing by something similar. Plato is interested in sense-perception here
because it clarifies the notion of the stimulus for recollection, and so enhances his thesis
that learning is recollection and that the soul existed before birth.
Once we reject (A) as an unwarranted intrusion on the text, we are already half-way
to D: there are two cognitive storehouses, one of which is a priori and can be opened
20 65d 11 ff. and 82d9 ff. It is particularly at 75e3 ff. that Plato seems to contradict these other
passages.
21 For a statement of this problem, see D. Gallop, Plato's Phaedo (Oxford, 1975), 121.
22 Socrates is perhaps referring to the necessary role of sense-perception at 83a6-7.
23 This has been discussed by T. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford, 1977), 315 n. 13.
356 DOMINIC SCOTT
up by recollection; the other is stoc

further than this: it holds that it i
and difficult to uncover the real me
To say that this is the story that th
of the 'we' that appears throughou
leads us to consider (B), the claim t
Let us start by assuming that 'we' ap
is that K has us all engaging in. N
universals, the alternative looks ve
to admit that Socrates is neither sa
etc., nor restricting himself to the
certain contexts, not equal. He is tak
these equals to another which is ne
form before our mind. Now to make
it is not merely false, but trivially
sticks and stones fall short of bein
can avoid trivializing Plato's argum
much the better; and D allows us to
everyone refers sensibles to forms,
he attacks the qLAo0OEd4LovEg he ch
itself and for being unable to recog
My second objection to (B) is that
reference of'we' seems unclear, ther
circle, notably at 75d1-5 when he r
and at 76d8 when he says that we a
we try to do justice to this and hol
veer without any warning betwe
unsignalled shifts in reference. Tr
quite acceptable on D's terms. The i
contrasted with 'those who learn' in
know, i.e. the 'we' of the previous
of his argument,25 to say that if so
24 The absurdity of the claim that all

equal itself undermines Bostock's (op. ci
limits those who recollect to philosophe
then one of the leading premises of the
whereas on his view, the argument is su
understand the meaning of the word 'e
cognitive achievements that Plato is all
treats 74d4 ff. in a separate section, dea
contrast between forms and particu
achievement is being referred to there.
25 Gallop (op. cit. (n. 21), 120) assume
a few, then the entire theory is likewis
of his argument: 'Recollection is not a p
for human beings generally.' But how d
for everyone? He takes one slave boy, s
if he can recollect, so can everyone. H
hardly expects us to respond 'What a cl
do this.' Exactly the same strategy is f
depended upon the true opinions that
certainty that these had not already bee
the Platonists' knowledge of the equal a
is no reason why everyone cannot have th

several good reasons why not everyone re
in the emphatic contrast of subjects in 76
As well as requiring an unsignalled shift
the verb 'know' undergo an alarming chan
74b2-3, it is affirmed with some enthusia
Simmias agrees that it is far from true tha
apparent contradiction has exercised th
would say that at 74b2 'know' means the
76cl-2 it means proper philosophic knowle
with the interpretation of 76cl-2, but h
familiarity with the form to be able to pa
referred to at 75d3.
Now, Bostock (op. cit. (n. 16), 67) claims that if we accept (B) we can resolve this
contradiction much more easily. In fact, the boot would appear to be on the other foot.
Having argued that in the later passage 'knowledge' has changed sense to mean the
precise knowledge to give an account, whereas before it just meant the humdrum
knowledge involved in the grasp of certain meanings, Bostock says that if we restrict
those who recollect to Platonists, 'there must actually be three levels of knowledge
in play': proper philosophic knowledge, humdrum grasp of meanings, and a third
intermediate kind which is the prerogative of philosophers, but falls short of precise
grasp of the definition (p. 68). His interpretation is preferable, he claims, because it
is more economical.
It is, however, false to say that on D there will be three kinds of knowledge in play
there will 'actually' be three, but only two of them will be 'in play', i.e. feature in
the passage, as, according to D, the argument makes no use of our humdrum
knowledge whatsoever. So the argument from economy bows out, while another one
this time favouring D, takes the stage in its place: the shift of meaning that is mad
on D is much smaller than the one Bostock proposes, and since there is no signal in
the text that 'know' has changed sense, this is a mark in D's favour, because on this
interpretation we shift from knowledge needed to conduct a dialectical question
and-answer session to knowledge needed to conduct one with total success. So in this
case, unlike (B), where the shift is from the knowledge we all have in usage of concepts
to the ability to give a logos, we do not move from one sphere of intellectual activity
to another that is very different.
On D, however, we can do away with a shift in meaning of the word 'know'
altogether, and so dissolve the problem completely:27 when Simmias admits that he
knows the equal, he means that he, like other Platonists, can give an account of a
perception. In both dialogues these premises are used jointly to prove recollection for one o
a small number of cases, from which Socrates then makes a tacit generalization. (Of course, if
in the Meno, Socrates made use of an argument to the effect that since someone of such humbl
origins can recollect so can everyone, then there would be a considerable difference in strategy
between the two dialogues. But nowhere in the Meno does he appeal to such considerations
What he does make use of is the fact that because the slave boy has always been in Meno's
household, they know that he cannot have already learnt geometry (83e3-5). It is not so much
that he is a slave boy but that he is Meno's slave boy that matters, as it is this that ensures tha
the experiment is a controlled one.)
26 See, for example, 83d4 ff.
27 I am following Hackforth here (R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo [Cambridge, 1955], 76).
Gallop (op. cit. (n. 21), 133) objects to this view because 'moral and mathematical forms are
expressly said to be on a par' (75c10-d2), but the only way in which all the forms are put on
a par at 75c10 is by being objects of dialectical argument, not of knowledge.
358 DOMINIC SCOTT
mathematical form, but does not con

argument is broadened to include al
Simmias has knowledge of all of th
question-and-answer sessions about
needed to argue for recollection, just
the slave boy has true beliefs (as op
recollection is best introduced by ci
activity.
But if we are by now in favour of D, we are in for a shock at 76c:

'You don't think then that everyone knows those objects?'
'By no means.'
'Are they then being reminded of what they once learnt?'29
'They must be.'
Does this not clear away any speculation that only a limited number of men actually
recollect?
A closer look at the logic of the argument, however, will show that these lines cannot
be used as evidence against D. It has already been decided that all men have knowledge
of the forms before they are born, and the argument is concerned with the choice
between (i) 'We do not forget at birth' and (ii) 'We do forget', i.e. a pair of
contradictories, P and - P. At 75d7-11 Socrates says that a necessary consequence
of - P is that we know the forms throughout our lives (R). At 75e2-7 we seem to
have the same done on P, i.e. a necessary consequence of P is that what we call learning
is recollection (S). Socrates goes on to ask Simmias to choose between R and S, and
uses an application of the law of the excluded middle. Thus:
-P-- R
P-- S
but - R
therefore S.
On closer inspection, 75e2-7 turns out not to parallel the previous paragraph, because
whereas R is the implication of -P alone, S is the implication of P and another
premise, viz. that we later regain the knowledge that we once had. Now, in the next
paragraph, this is preserved exactly, but the second premise is incorporated into the
consequent. Thus P and - P are as before (as is R), but S is 'those who learn recollect',
and 'those' is contrasted with the TadvrTE of R. Now there seems little room for doubt
that the argument is an application of the excluded middle, as the &pa of 76c4 testifies,
but if this is so the conclusion is not that all people recollect, but that those who learn
recollect. If the argument is to be valid, therefore, the sentence at 76c4 must be
consistent with the D thesis, and cannot be used as evidence for K. Plato has simply
been careless in his language (as he is at 76a9-b2), and if this conclusion is the price
we have to pay to vindicate Plato's logic, it is a small one.30
28 Meno 85c6-7.
29 I am translating dva?LpuvquKovra7t here as 'being reminded' rather than 'are reminded' as
the latter would create a needless contradiction with an earlier passage. If Socrates and Simmias
are now concluding that all men recollect, they are contradicting what they have just decided,
viz. that not all men know the forms: at 75e5-6 it has been stated that to recollect is to regain
knowledge, so if all men recollect, all men know, and this is just what has been denied.
30 Interestingly enough, Hackforth (op. cit. (n. 27), 72) translates 76c4 as 'Can they then
recollect what they once learnt?'.
Two more objections have yet to be answered

more general consequences of accepting D. On
of 74a ff. as attempting to convince the common
on my interpretation it assumes them right f
preaching to the converted, is not much of th
Socrates is to some extent preaching to the co
interlocutors have already accepted the existence
exist avb'T KaO' a7'6. They have also agreed t
by sense-perception, but must only be approac
the argument of 74a ff. goes on to do is to
ramifications of what Simmias and Cebes have
them an explanation as to why these forms are
is, we could never have derived our knowledge
equal sticks and stones.
The second objection is this: even if we gran
not have much textual backing and in fact le
we not, in replacing it with D, chosen a highly
that all the concepts by which we classify our
while our grasp of the forms, the a priori con
accumulated sense experience. What is so puzzl
we have these two distinct sources, how is it t
recollected ones are of 'equal'? There must be
There is, but it is not between the two cogni
D from degenerating into an absurd chain o
middle-period ontology. For Plato, there ar
particular objects of sense-perception, and the
coincidence that there is a form of equal and
latter participate in the former. Thus the re
mirrored by the resemblance between our a
judgements. D, in fact, goes hand in hand wi
(3) The Phaedrus 248ff.31
The passage that concerns us most comes at
8Ei yap v5pwoIroVv avvLvaL Ka' tSOq AEy61LEvov, '

avvaLpolJLEvov- TTO?ro 8' E(TLV daviLv77aL9 EIELVWV
OEC Kai V7TrEpLSOvaa & vV Ev' val v aLEv, Kat 'vaK

Though there are a number of difficulties abo
have provoked attempts to alter the text, mos
K. Hackforth,32 for instance, interprets the li
31 In what follows I shall be using the Phaedrus

the same way as I used the other two dialogues. T
so it may be objected that the text requires differe
forwardly' as evidence for a particular interpretati
my specific purpose is to reject K, which means arguin
myth as evidence. I shall therefore be giving K the
be claiming in effect that if one were to use the my
that emerged as the most convincing interpretation
32 R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge, 19
360 DOMINIC SCOTT
Plato is careful to insist that the soul o

reverse transmigration has preceded (2
at 248d 1, but the reason for it is now g
in the supra-celestial procession can posse
man. If it were possible to imagine a
thinking when it passed into a man's b
Hackforth is joined in this interpret

it seems churlish to disagree. K m
so we should be reluctant to interf
end the story here we would have
point in Platonic anamnesis, sinc
conceptual thought. This would, of
rush headlong into accepting it we
than K.
My interpretation, however, appears to make a much less satisfying argument out
of 249b-c than K. The crucial sentence now claims that a man must understand (i.e.
have knowledge) by recollecting. It does not say that men do understand, but that
they need to recollect if they are to understand. So far so good; but the argument now
proves much less than it did on K's interpretation: it only says that a man who is
actually going to become a successful philosopher needs to have seen the forms, and
so, surely, souls which have never seen the vision could become human as long as they
do not join the Academy. But can there be any doubt that the argument of the passage
is supposed to apply to all men?
If D fails because it cannot make the argument work, let us stay with K until 250c6.
The next stage in the account comes at 249c4: 'Therefore it is right that only the soul
of the philosopher should grow its wings for it is always dwelling upon those things
as best it can...' This needs some clarification. According to K, all human souls
recollect, i.e. they find unities in the plurality of sense-perceptions, but the philosopher
does this to a much more intense degree than everyone else. He is always using his
knowledge of the forms to the best of his ability and so is taking a process that we
all engage in to its fulfilment. Strictly speaking, when the text says at 249cl-2 'This
is anamnesis...', we should read 'This is the first stage of anamnesis...'. When the
philosopher goes on to complete the process that we all begin he becomes an outcast,
and is considered out of his mind. So far there seems nothing awkward about following
K; we simply have to fill out the text.
But problems arise when we come to 249e4 ff.: 'For as we have said, every human
soul has by nature seen the things that are, otherwise it would not have entered that
animal. But it is not easy for every soul to be reminded of [the things that are] by
those [sc. likenesses].' Socrates is obviously recapitulating 249b5-8, and qualifying it.
Some people, he points out, only had a very brief glimpse of the vision, others have
consorted with the wrong types since their fall and have forgotten the vision. Few are
left with adequate memory.
This passage is uncomfortable for K. When Socrates talks of those who have
33 W. D. Thompson, The Phaedrus of Plato (London, 1868), 55, for instance, says 'It is a
law of human understanding that it can only act by way of generic notions... sensibles are per
se unintelligible'. One scholar who does not follow this line, remarkably enough, is Gulley, who,
despite his reading of the Phaedo, takes the Phaedrus passage to refer only to the philosopher:
'Thus whereas the Phaedo argued that the presence of [the possibility of reasoning from sensation
to conceptual apprehension] was explicable as recollection of forms, the Phaedrus can be
consistently interpreted only as a description of a process of inductive reasoning from a number
of instances of sense-perception.' (CQ 4 [1954], 201). See also T. Irwin, op. cit. (n. 23), 173.
forgotten by falling into the wrong comp

remember anything at all. But even Plato'
well as the next man. The knowledge tha
the wherewithal for human intelligence in g
is surely that some people have forgotten
This line of thinking pervades Plato's u
Phaedrus. The claim is that when some p
see it as a likeness of the original at all, an
however, uses the b7roTopv7LaTa correctly,3
the vision, not as objects of desire in thems
interpretation at 250e ff.: when the real lo
provoked by the divine associations of the
by this, resulting in his appearing to ever
however, experiences none of this, but ac
seen the form. Now there is nothing to say
what he does not do is recognize it as a cop
conjure up the associations of his previous
of the real lover. Recollection involves the
it necessarily carries with it an emotional
non-lover. According to K, however, one s
the emotional overtones of the lover's exp
classification.
The upshot of all this is, I think, that the Phaedrus in fact supplies us with some
of the best evidence for D37 - were it not for the sentence at 249b. K's account of
this, initially attractive though it is, presents us with an anomaly, an excrescence in
the context of the whole passage. If we can find an alternative reading, one which
accords with D, so much the better. Let us try a more detailed analysis.
This sentence is in fact teeming with problems of translation - unusual phrases and
ambiguity in the syntax. As a preliminary I shall do some parsing. The difficulties are
such that the editors have felt compelled to emend the text in three places, despite
the consensus of MSS.
(1) AEy6bLEvov on its own has been deemed impossible without either r6 before, or
TL after.38
(2) t6v has been objected to because it is surely the man, not the form, which goes
to the one. Hence the change to tLOr'.39 Accepting both these emendations, Hackforth
translates :40
... seeing that man must needs understand the language of Forms, passing from a plurality of
perceptions to a unity gathered together by reasoning.
Verdenius,41 however, argues that we can make sense of the text as it stands without
either emendation: AEy6YLEvov = A6yog, and, in this usage, no article is needed and
it is quite admissible to talk of the A6yos (= the man) going to the form.
(3) ovvaLpobp)Evov has been changed to uuvaLpovvv wov by those who argue that
it is not the form that is collected together, but the sense-perceptions. We can avoid
this change either if we take the word as middle, agreeing with the A6yos, or as passive,
meaning not collected together literally, but 'comprehended', and to say that the
34 249c7. 35 251a ff. 36 250e4.
37 Though see n. 14 above. " Heindorf inserts rT.
39 Badham, followed by Thompson, op. cit. (n. 33), 55. Jo Plato's Phaedrus 86 n. 1.
41 W. J. Verdenius, 'Notes on Plato's Phaedrus', Mnemosvne (Series IV), 8 (1955), 280.
362 DOMINIC SCOTT
form is grasped by reasoning is qu

can now translate the sentence as follows:
For a man must understand an account according to a form, which passes from many perceptions
to a one comprehended by reasoning.
So far little of this seems to affect our issue. But what is implied by 'understand'
(avvt~vat)? This can either mean 'understand something said' in a casual sense (hence
the point about generic terms which are indeed essential to language and rational
thought), or we can take it as understanding (i.e. gaining knowledge of) an account
according to a Platonic form, not just an innocent generic term. So far there seems
to be nothing to push us either way - the language leaves it open.
Things begin to tilt in favour of D in the second half of the sentence. To begin with,
AoyLta/cj is a word that means 'calculation' (often in a mathematical sense), implying
a deliberate, perhaps laborious, activity, whereas the generalizing processes that K
has the text refer to are surely automatic. Second, we are told that the AEy6,/LEvOV (or
the man) goes (16v) to the one from many sense-perceptions, which K takes as moving
from raw sense-data to the generic terms by which we understand them. According
to D, we move away from sensible appearances in this world, leaving them behind,
and go on to contemplate the form on its own. From what has emerged from our
analysis of the overall context, this is clearly the message of 250ff. What K is
sponsoring, however, is not a departure from one to the other, but a synthesis of the
two, necessary to generate empirical understanding.
Interestingly enough, Hackforth refers us to Republic 476a for a parallel usage of
this language of' going to the form'. Yet if we look at that passage we do indeed find
a parallel, but not one which helps the orthodox interpretation. At 476b10-11,
Socrates says that those who would be able to go (lIva) to the beautiful itself would
be few, and he says this to contrast the philosophers with the lovers of sights and
sounds who do not acknowledge the form at all. At 476a4-7 he has just stated in no
uncertain terms the one/many distinction, where the many are also called appearances.
This seems an excellent parallel for the Phaedrus passage, according to D at least: in
both cases the philosopher moves away from the many objects of sense-perception to
the one form, apprehended by reasoning.
So far I have attempted to show that what is said after the sentence is inconsistent
with K, and that the sentence itself internally reads better on D's terms. We have yet
to show how this fits with the preceding argument (249b) - and it was this passage
that originally ruled out D. The order of argument that seemed so attractive was this:
the possible transmigrations include only the movement from man to animal, or
animal back to man. A soul which has never seen the truth will not enter a man because
he must understand in generic terms etc. K reads the 'must' as meaning 'It is a fact
of human nature that we have rational thought'. All men do in fact understand; all
men do not in fact become philosophers, so we dismiss D. The 8EL thus has a declarative
force. But this is not the only possible meaning - a more natural translation would
be that man ought to understand etc., whether he actually does or not: it is his
epistemological (and hence moral) duty.43 Man, that is, unlike animals has the
42 I am resisting the temptation to read 'collection' into this passage (contra Gulley, op. cit.
(n. 33), 200-1). This new turn in Plato's dialectic has yet to be announced (265d). Furthermore,
avvatptw is not part of Plato's terminology for this procedure - it is not in fact used anywhere
else in his works.
43 SEZ is used of our epistemological duty to inquire after what we do not know at Meno
86b7.
obligation to become a philosopher, and on

do this.
The point here is that the sense that K giv

it reads in 249b, although possible, is no
allows - the language is quite open to D, an
this reading. Thus the grounds for making
and it is at this point that I want to claim tha
is decisively in favour of D. The Phaedrus
recollection much as the Phaedo does, tying
and model that is one strand in the middle-
(4) Plato on the inadequacy of the senses
I wish to round off my examination of an

pointing out that, as was the case with the
of anamnesis to overcome the difficulties wit
with a thesis about cognitive development,
about the relation between sense-perception
until the Theaetetus. According to K Plat
objects are equal' or perhaps even 'Those obj
things, the notions of equality and hors
perception cannot give us these common
elsewhere. But where does he state that this
alone explain why it should be?
When we considered some later innatist theories that are concerned with the sine
qua non of thought,45 we saw that behind them lay certain specific anxieties about
sense-perception. In Descartes' case it was the purely mechanical nature of perception
that led him to innate ideas; there were also worries about relational ideas (e.g. the
notion of similarity involves a mental process of comparison, and so cannot be derived
purely empirically). Now two things are involved in these philosophical positions:
first, an analysis of discursive thought (about empirical objects) into a conceptual
component and a sensible one, and then reasons why the former could not be derived
from the operations of the mind upon our sense-perceptions, without the mind itself
contributing some, if not all, of the content.
44 A further problem that some versions of K would have to tackle is that of the range of forms.
If the Phaedrus is meant to explain the use of universals in language, then we do not need only
forms produced by an argument from opposites, but also forms corresponding to all universal
terms - hair, mud and dirt included. One advantage of embracing D is that we avoid tying
anamnesis down to this particular crux. We should note that the only parallel text that K could
appeal to for its range of forms in the Phaedrus is the notorious, but ambiguous, sentence at
Republic 596a6-8: [o3AEL oviv Ev8~VE a6p5%o'EOa E'7TLUKo7TOiVTEs, K T~ EUlOvas ILE080sov; Etaso
yip i?ro6 0v EIKaUrov ELOa1LEV TL'EUOaL TEpL' E KacYra d' iroAAi, otq rav'Tv "volta ELrEpoLEv.
S0ot pavOvuELS; J. A. Smith ('General Relative Clauses in Greek', CR 31 [1917], 69-71) points
out two linguistic difficulties involved in taking this sentence as advocating forms of all universal
terms. In the first place, the relative clause that ends the sentence is very unlikely to be a general
relative clause: this would have a subjunctive or an optative, or, if an indicative, ootLs for oLq
(see W. W. Goodwin, Syntax of Greek Moods and Tenses [London, 1889], ?? 532, 534). Second,
the TabTr'v is ambiguous, meaning particulars having the same name as each other or having
the same name as the form. Smith suggests that KOLVOV 6votia would be a much more natural
expression for the former possibility. More work needs to be done on these problems, but as
they stand they are sufficient to cast considerable doubt upon the usual claims made for this
sentence.
45 See above, pp. 346f.
364 DOMINIC SCOTT
Plato does tackle the first of these i

recollection but much later on, in his an
he makes a distinction between wha
perceives by means
h of the senses, and
are the prerogative of certain individu
some other forms are perceived by th
analysis of thoughts such as 'This X is
which Plato concludes that at least one
of the mind on its own, and has noth
the senses are unreliable, but that the
properties. Other philosophers46 have
of qualities, and have concluded that t
not a part of Plato's programme in th
This passage in the Theaetetus is cri
it represents a rejection of a view of
period,47 a view that is an essential p
senses are given a more extensive role
as deceivers, i.e. not as dumb witness
is especially clear in two passages of th
the senses are said to be reliable when it
they do not indicate the contrary, wher
do. So, in the case of the judgement
a richness that he was to withdraw i
of the inadequacy of perception he doe
is large, but that it tells us that it is bo
it does have at its disposal, as it were,
in allowing the senses to make confused
to them. Their inadequacy consists in
cognitively sterile. In the passage in B
the confused judgements of sense-perce
hygienic calculations to another, a div
In the Phaedo, no less than in the Re
deceiving the mind, so they must hav
Now one place in the Phaedo where P
differentiates between the mind invest
The terminology, however, is the sam
to undermine my attempt to align the
on this issue. Some clarification is needed.
Despite the similarities of language, there are crucial differences which underline
the point I am making. When the Theaetetus makes the distinction it does so for cases
of ordinary empirical judgements so that in the same sentence there could be a sensible
and mental component. In the Phaedo, however, the distinction parallels the division
between the physical world and the forms, so that when the mind investigates on its
own it has left the world of changing objects behind: the parallel is strengthened by
46 The Cambridge Platonist Cudworth (op. cit. (n. 2), 100), in the course of arguing for innate
ideas, praises Theaet. 184ff. as an accurate assessment of the limitations of sense-perception.
47 Plato's volte-face on this issue has been discussed by M. F. Burnyeat in 'Plato on the
Grammar of Perceiving', CQ 26 (1976), 29-52.
48 Phaedo 65a9-66a10, 79a, 83a-b.
49 83bl-2: ...'TL Iv voIcr atr' KaO' a7 O 'rv ab7' KaO aO70a TCV OV7WV.
the fact that KaO' ab7r is applied both to th

In the Theaetetus such a departure is not n
in the Phaedo Plato is pejorative about the u
are no such overtones. This helps to align
Phaedrus, and any remaining doubts abou
dispelled by this sentence at 83d4-6: 'Becaus
to the body with a sort of rivet, pins it the
be true whatever the body says.'
In recanting his generosity towards sense-
the ability to provide unreliable inform
considerations similar to those that K is im
anachronism, however, because anamnesis is
and epistemology. Moreover, this anachroni
tabula that is informed quite independently
bringing out something that is only implic
the Theaetetus that the use of everyday con
and as long as it had not been considered p
given to it. D, on the other hand, was for
made an issue out of concept formation, and
of those considering it from that perspecti
explicit as D is unreasonable, and indeed co
Plato's theory of recollection emerged from

one in the Phaedrus. After Plato, a numbe
developed, one of them by Epicurus, who in
refer to a general notion which could se
judgements, and as a criterion of truth to wh
this was taken over by the Stoics, who pr
find moral prolipseis turned innate by Ep
terminology to describe anamnesis.52 Thus t
theories was renewed, it was influenced by
one of the hardest empiricists philosophy has
spread even beyond antiquity: in the post
Platonists talking of prolipseis, anticipation
But this Hellenistic influence ran to much m
strands in the theory of prolipsis penetrate
theories. First, there was the important
Epicurean, namely that it develops autom
intellectual labour, and as far as the Stoics
prolipseis that reason itself develops. Secon
sine qua non of conceptual thought. A third,
the bases of inquiry, axioms upon which
knowledge can develop from them as if fro
50 Diogenes Laertius 10.33; Cic. De Natura Deo
51 For the Stoics on prolepsis, see SVF II 83. There
in innate moral prolepseis, and whether Epictetu
this point, but I shall not attempt to tackle that
52 The Anonymous Commentator on the Thea
articulating 'common notions' (47.1-48.11, 53).
53 See Patrides, op. cit. (n. 2), 132 n. 21, and Y
Leibniz included the Stoics
54 in the innatist
Plutarch, Comm.tradit
Not
13 OCQ
366 DOMINIC SCOTT
Now make these prolipseis innate a

many of the post-renaissance innatist
thought and automatically formed with
which form the basis of morality and
everyone. You will also have a theory
as I have been interpreting it.
The intriguing historical tale that eme
of all innatist theories has remained
infected by the considerations which
philosophical world. The final twist in t
of which Hellenistic prolipsis was one
what lurks behind the efforts of so
recollection from its splendid isolatio
seen that horrendous problems are cau
of concept formation, yet commentat
a programme. This remarkable fact be
that any theory of learning should expl
and it is this expectation that has mad
and scope of Platonic anamnesis.55
Clare College, Cambridge DOMINIC SCOTT
5. I have profited greatly from discussions with Gail Fine

comments of the editors, as well as from the reserved ag
unreserved disagreement of M. M. Mackenzie. My greates
powers of Myles Burnyeat.

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Platonic Anamnesis Revisited

Author(s): Dominic Scott

PLATONIC ANAMNESIS REVISITED

The belief in innate knowledge has a history almost as long as th

See An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. I.

occasion to form these ideas by means of an innat

3 Descartes, Notes Directed against a Certain Programme, tr. E. S. Haldane & G. R. T.

How, then, does Platonic anamnesis

7 Meno 81d4-5. 8 Phaedo 74e ff.

the recollection that we all engage in m

My claims need both explication and supp

aLt ETLUT-7LaL, KpJ7TTOvTraL Tot TW av

But if recollection is not operative d

dialogue, and so more determinate position

(1) The Meno 80ff.

In the famous examination of the slave boy

Now watch him recollecting sequentially, as one should recollect.

(iii) It is in the final stage that knowledge is acquired, as Socrates goes on to sa

instance? Do we also, under the

problem of how the slave boy got the ri

(2) The Phaedo 72e3-76e7

distinguish two assumptions that

concept use that anamnesis is meant t

an equal stick, and so, in the absence of an

up by recollection; the other is stoc

24 The absurdity of the claim that all

is no reason why everyone cannot have th

mathematical form, but does not con

But if we are by now in favour of D, we are in for a shock at 76c:

Two more objections have yet to be answered

(3) The Phaedrus 248ff.31

The passage that concerns us most comes at

8Ei yap v5pwoIroVv avvLvaL Ka' tSOq AEy61LEvov, '

OEC Kai V7TrEpLSOvaa & vV Ev' val v aLEv, Kat 'vaK

31 In what follows I shall be using the Phaedrus

Plato is careful to insist that the soul o

Hackforth is joined in this interpret

forgotten by falling into the wrong comp

form is grasped by reasoning is qu

obligation to become a philosopher, and on

The point here is that the sense that K giv

(4) Plato on the inadequacy of the senses

I wish to round off my examination of an

Plato does tackle the first of these i

the fact that KaO' ab7r is applied both to th

Plato's theory of recollection emerged from

Now make these prolipseis innate a

Clare College, Cambridge DOMINIC SCOTT

5. I have profited greatly from discussions with Gail Fine

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