Nexus of Crime and Terrorism: The Case of The Abu Sayyaf Group

Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2016-12
Nexus of crime and terrorism: the case of the

Abu Sayyaf Group
Salem, Allan Jones A.

Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/51611
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun

NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
THESIS
NEXUS OF CRIME AND TERRORISM:

THE CASE OF THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP
by
Allan Jones A. Salem
December 2016
Thesis Advisor: Carolyn C. Halladay

Second Reader: Tristan J. Mabry
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB
No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
(Leave blank) December 2016 Master’s thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
NEXUS OF CRIME AND TERRORISM: THE CASE OF THE ABU SAYYAF
GROUP
6. AUTHOR(S) Allan Jones A. Salem
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING
Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING /
ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY
N/A REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
The purpose of this study is to provide a clear understanding of the nexus of crime and terrorism,
using the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) as a case study. This terrorist group in the southern part of the
Philippines has evolved as a hybrid organization, combining terrorist and criminal activities to achieve its
objectives. Moreover, as a terrorist organization, ASG effectively employs criminal tactics for its survival.
This group draws its strength and resilience from collusion with various lawless elements and other
criminal groups in Mindanao.
This paper examines the theoretical framework of Makarenko’s Crime-Terror (CT) Continuum to
provide compelling explanations of the interaction and interoperability of crime and terrorism in the case
of the ASG. It also highlights the Philippine CT strategy and approach to counter terrorism and discusses
some notable gaps and problems, particularly its failure to recognize the ASG as a hybrid organization.
This thesis concludes that the current Philippine counterterrorism strategy, although effective and in good
shape, seems inadequate against hybrid organizations. Thus, this paper proposes that the Philippines re-
examine its current CT strategy to be more appropriate, effective, and responsive against hybrid terrorist
organizations.
14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF

Abu Sayyaf, terrorism, crime, Philippines PAGES
157
16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION
CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF OF ABSTRACT
REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
i
ii
NEXUS OF CRIME AND TERRORISM:

THE CASE OF THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP
Allan Jones A. Salem

Lieutenant Colonel, Philippine Army
B.S., Philippine Military Academy, 1998
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES

(COMBATING TERRORISM: POLICY AND STRATEGY)
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

December 2016
Approved by: Carolyn C. Halladay

Thesis Advisor
Tristan J. Mabry
Second Reader
Mohammed Hafez
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs
iii
iv
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to provide a clear understanding of the nexus of crime
and terrorism, using the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) as a case study. This terrorist group in
the southern part of the Philippines has evolved as a hybrid organization, combining
terrorist and criminal activities to achieve its objectives. Moreover, as a terrorist
organization, ASG effectively employs criminal tactics for its survival. This group draws
its strength and resilience from collusion with various lawless elements and other
criminal groups in Mindanao.
This paper examines the theoretical framework of Makarenko’s Crime-Terror

(CT) Continuum to provide compelling explanations of the interaction and
interoperability of crime and terrorism in the case of the ASG. It also highlights the
Philippine CT strategy and approach to counter terrorism and discusses some notable
gaps and problems, particularly its failure to recognize the ASG as a hybrid organization.
This thesis concludes that the current Philippine counterterrorism strategy, although
effective and in good shape, seems inadequate against hybrid organizations. Thus, this
paper proposes that the Philippines re-examine its current CT strategy to be more
appropriate, effective, and responsive against hybrid terrorist organizations.
v
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION..........................................................1
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION...........................2
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................3
1. Definition of Terrorism .................................................................4
2. Terrorism and Crime ....................................................................7
3. Financing Terror and Responses ................................................13
4. Approaches to Counterterrorism ...............................................18
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES .....................25
E. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................25
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE .............26
II. CASE STUDY: THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP .................................................29

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ABU SAYYAF
GROUP .....................................................................................................31
B. STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES ......................................................36
C. IDEOLOGY, OBJECTIVES, AND LEADERSHIP ............................37
D. EVOLUTION OF THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP FROM
TERRORISM TO ORGANIZED CRIME ............................................41
E. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................42
III. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP’S PLACE ON THE CRIME-TERROR

CONTINUUM ......................................................................................................43
A. ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM: A COMPARISON .......44
B. MAKARENKO’S CRIME-TERROR CONTINUUM .........................48
1. Alliance Formation ......................................................................48
2. Operational Motivations .............................................................50
3. Convergence .................................................................................52
4. The “Black Hole” Thesis .............................................................55
C. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP’S PLACE ON THE CRIME-
TERROR CONTINUUM ........................................................................56
1. Terrorism-Crime Period of the Abu Sayyaf Group .................56
2. Period of Alliance with Lawless Elements and Other
Threat Groups ..............................................................................59
3. Operational Tool Period ..............................................................60
D. SOURCES OF RESILIENCE ................................................................61
E. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................63
vii
IV. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP’S KIDNAPPING ACTIVITIES ......................65
A. ANALYSIS OF THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP’S KIDNAPPING
TRENDS ...................................................................................................65
B. MOTIVATIONS, RANSOM SCHEME, AND MODUS
OPERANDI ..............................................................................................74
C. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO KIDNAPPINGS ....................76
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................78
V. THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH TO

COUNTERTERRORISM ...................................................................................81
A. NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AND
POLICY ....................................................................................................82
B. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION ...........86
C. LEGISLATIVE MEASURES .................................................................88
D. INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION .......92
E. FOCUSED MILITARY OPERATIONS ...............................................96
F. PROBLEMS AND GAPS IDENTIFIED ...............................................98
G. NOTABLE PROBLEMS THAT LED TO RELENTLESS
KIDNAPPINGS......................................................................................102
H. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................105
VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................107

A. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES ..........................................110
1. Address the Socio-Economic and Ideological Aspects of
Terrorism ....................................................................................111
2. Engage and Empower Local Government Units ....................112
3. Pursue an Intelligence-Driven Counterterrorism
Operation ....................................................................................113
4. Enhance and Upgrade the Capabilities of the Military
and Police ....................................................................................114
5. Pursue Stronger Bilateral, Regional, and International
Cooperation for Terrorism and Crime ....................................115
B. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS TO PREEMPT AND
PREVENT KIDNAPPINGS .................................................................116
1. Strict Implementation of the “No Negotiation and No
Ransom” Policies ........................................................................117
2. Formulation of a National Strategy against Kidnapping .......118
3. Enhancement of Border Cooperation ......................................118
4. Pursue an Effective Counter-Radicalization Program ...........118
5. Promotion of Multi-Sectoral Information Advocacy..............120
viii
6. Empower the Communities and Encourage Citizen’s
Active Participation ...................................................................120
7. Effective Law Enforcement Operations...................................121
8. Intensify Information Sharing ..................................................122
C. FINAL THOUGHTS .............................................................................123
LIST OF REFERENCES ..............................................................................................125
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................137
ix
x
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. The Crime-Terror Continuum. .....................................................................8
Figure 2. Ballina’s Three Dimensional Model. .........................................................12
Figure 3. ASG Organization Envisioned by Abdurajak Janjalani.............................39
Figure 4. The Crime-Terror Continuum. ...................................................................50
Figure 5. The Converging Threats. ...........................................................................52
Figure 6. ASG Kidnapping Incidents 1991−1999. ....................................................66
Figure 7. ASG Kidnapping Incidents 2000−2014. ....................................................67
Figure 8. ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2000−2001). .....................................68
Figure 10. ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2008). ...............................................70
Figure 12. ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2012). ...............................................71
Figure 14. ASG Estimated Ransom Amount (Period Covered 2010–2014). ..............73
xi
xii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Number of Kidnap Victims by Threat Groups (Period Covered:

2010−2011). ...............................................................................................74
xiii
xiv
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

AHAI Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
ATC Anti-Terrorism Council
CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CTC Crime-Terror Continuum
ETA Basque Homeland and the Shining Path Freedom Movement

(Spanish: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna)
FARC The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Spanish: Fuerzas

Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
GCTF Global Counter-terrorism Forum
HSA Human Security Act

HVI High-Value Individual
IED Improvised Explosive Device

IIRO International Islamic Relief Organization
IPSP Internal Peace and Security Plan
IRA Internal Revenue Allotment
JAPIC Joint AFP-PNP Intelligence Committee

JI Jemaah Islamiyah
KFR Kidnap for Ransom

KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
LGU Local Government Unit
MCFF Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters

MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
NATS National Anti-Terrorism Strategy

NBI National Bureau of Investigation
xv
NICA National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
NSA National Security Adviser
NSP National Security Policy
PKK The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên

Kurdistanê)
PNP−AKG Philippine National Police−Anti-Kidnapping Group
POC Peace and Order Council
UN United Nations
xvi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to thank our Merciful and Loving Father for the
guidance and good health that allowed me to complete this paper.
To my wife, Vicky, and my children, Alexandra, Andrea, and Arthur, this thesis
would not have been possible without your support, patience, and utmost understanding,
and for that, I say thank you!
I am very thankful to Professor Carolyn Halladay, my thesis advisor, for her

patience, wisdom, and guidance during the formulation and writing of this paper. The
valuable guidance and time spent by my thesis advisor in editing and revising my drafts
helped me a lot to accomplish this feat.
I am also very thankful to Professor Tristan Mabry, my second reader, for sharing
his invaluable time and kind insights on the subject.
And to all people who helped me accomplish this deed and overcome many
challenges, I offer my sincere gratitude.
xvii
xviii
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades, abductions in Mindanao, the second-largest and

southernmost island in the Philippines, have created an impression of the region as the
kidnapping capital of the Philippines. Terrorist organizations and other lawless elements
partner in criminal activities in this region. Although kidnapping for ransom seems to be
the most favored activity, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, extortion, and assassinations
round out the regular activities of these organizations. These problems persist due to the
weak rule of law, the lack of good governance, illiteracy, unemployment, widespread
poverty, and the sense of injustice among Muslims in Mindanao, all of which exacerbate
the state of lawlessness, particularly in some Muslim areas in Mindanao.
Significantly, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has been the dominant group in terms
of kidnapping in Mindanao. It has perpetrated a number of high-profile and sensational
kidnapping incidents, especially following the death of its founding leader, Abdul Razak
Abubakar Janjalani, in December 1998. Janjalani’s death resulted in the temporary
cessation of support from foreign terrorist organizations. Because of the collective efforts
of various nations to combat terrorism and dismantle their global networks, support from
foreign terrorist organizations has been reduced. These factors further drove the ASG to
turn to criminal activities, particularly kidnapping for ransom, as a source of income
either in support of the organization or for personal gain.
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION
This thesis will focus on the criminal and terroristic activities of the ASG. The
ASG provides a good example of how crime and terrorism intersect. The criminal
activities of the ASG have been lucrative.1 The funds obtained from these activities have
become the backbone of the group’s operational capability. Thus, this thesis asks, has the
ASG's embrace of organized crime methods made it a more lethal terrorist group? Also,
1 McKenzie O’Brien, “Fluctuations Between Crime and Terror: The Case of Abu Sayyaf’s Kidnapping
Activities,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 2 (2012): 326, DOI:10.1080/09546553.2011.648679.
1
how can the Philippine counterterrorism (CT) strategy benefit from understanding ASG
as an organized crime organization?
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION
Despite the neutralization of key leaders, the ASG remains a major threat to the
peace and order of the country. The Philippine government’s responses seem to be
ineffective in dismantling a small terrorist organization and thwarting its criminal
activities. This fluctuation from terrorism to criminal behavior creates confusion about
the appropriate approach and strategy to combat these threat groups.
According to Chris Dishman, it is important to be aware of the transformation of

terrorist groups’ motivations and political objectives because a profound involvement in
criminal activity tends to change the aims and motivations of leaders. 2 He claims that if a
terrorist organization realizes that its cause has become pointless or unpopular, it may
resort to criminal activities employing its terrorist skills and assets and continue to use its
political justification.3 Hybrid organizations pose more challenges and require a different
strategy and approach, however. Rommel Banlaoi claims that it is not an easy job to
confront a terrorist group that is politically and ideologically motivated, collaborating
with lawless elements, and getting involved in criminal activities.4 He writes that the
ASG pulls “tremendous strength from its superb ability” to collude with various armed
groups in Mindanao.5 When the ASG embarks on a series of criminal activities,
especially kidnappings, huge financial gains corrupt its leaders, and they tend to focus on
the financial gains of these operations.
Some counterterrorism experts in the Philippines believe that the problem with
the ASG should be handled by the police, and they must enforce the law. The ASG,
2 Chris Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24, no. 1
(August 2010): 56, DOI: 10.1080/10576100118878.
3 Ibid.
4 Rommel Banlaoi, “Current Terrorist Groups and Emerging Extremist Armed Movements in the
Southern Philippines: Threats to Philippine National Security,” National Defense College of the
Philippines, accessed May 16, 2016, http://www.ndcp.edu.ph/nsr.php.
5 Ibid.
2
however, operates in mountainous and far-flung areas of Basilan and Sulu, where the
police could be ineffective. The local police are not adequately equipped and trained in
jungle warfare or in counterterrorism operations. In most cases, the ASG is better
equipped than the local police in terms of firearms and equipment. The Philippine
government may benefit from thinking of terrorism and crime as two different things;
thus, it may require two distinct approaches to combat the threat. Zack Fellman claims
that there are instances when the ASG still engages in acts of violence such as bombings
and assassinations, which make them more difficult to comprehend and confront.6
Mckenzie O’Brien argues that despite its small numbers, the ASG will continue to
pose a threat to the Philippines because of the ASG’s ability to recruit young and
aggressive fighters through financial rewards.7 Potential members are enticed to join
because of monetary reasons and not by their Islamic beliefs.8 Criminal activities have
become a common tactic among the terrorists because crime is a lucrative way of
generating funds for the group’s operational capability.9 Most terrorist groups realize that
embracing organized crime methods would make them more effective, stronger, and
more lethal.10 Despite their rampant criminal activities—or more accurately, because of
their embrace of crime—some terrorist organizations remain an active threat, capable of
executing bombings and other violence.11
C. LITERATURE REVIEW
To address the major research questions, this literature review will critically
analyze, evaluate, and compare prior research studies and other scholarly sources related
to the thesis’s main theme. First, this review will provide a critical analysis of the
definition of terrorism and who terrorists are. Second, it presents a theoretical framework
6 Zack Fellman, “Abu Sayyaf Group,” Center for Strategic Studies and International Studies, case
study no. 5 (November 2011): 5−6.
7 O’Brien, “Fluctuations Between Crime and Terror,” 326.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
3
that explains the nexus of crime and terrorism. Third, it provides basic knowledge about
the ASG as the main focus of this paper. Finally, this review will present a preliminary
discussion of a comprehensive and holistic approach to counter-terrorism by examining
the responses of other countries.
1. Definition of Terrorism
Although experts and scholars have different definitions of terrorism, all of them
broadly agree that it is a “kind of activity involving the threat or application of
violence.”12 Leonard Weinberg states that “terrorism is the calculated use of violence or
threat to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of political, ideological,
and religious ends.”13 He defines terrorism as a “politically motivated tactic,”14 which
involves the use of threats or violence to achieve widespread publicity. Harmonie Toros
and Luca Mavelli agree that, among more than 100 definitions of terrorism, one common
characteristic that emerges is the political nature of the acts.15
This special political charge of the violence is reflected in the legal frameworks
that address terrorism and countering terrorism. Weinberg claims that most countries,
especially democracies, have made terrorism a crime in their domestic law. He claims
that such countries as the United States and the United Kingdom have made an effort to
broaden the definition of terrorism “to criminalize a wider range of behaviors.” 16 This
effort led to the legislation of a more expansive terrorism law and having a clear legal
definition of terrorism both in the United States and the United Kingdom. According to
James Beckman, the Patriot Act supersedes “hundreds of provisions and amended many
federal statutes” regarding anti-terrorism.17 He claims that the main goal of the law is to
12 Weinberg, Democracy and Terrorism, 11. See also, Alexander Aguirre, “The Philippine Response
to Terrorism,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence, and Counter-Terrorism 4, no. 1 (August 2011): 10,
DOI:10.1080/18335300.2009.9686923.
13 Ibid., 47.
14 Ibid., 10.
15 Harmonie Toros and Luca Mavelli, “Terrorism, Organized Crime and the Biopolitics of Violence,”
Critical Studies on Terrorism 6, no. 1 (April 5, 2013): 73−74, DOI:10.1080/17539153.2013.765701.
16 Ibid., 11.
17 James Beckman, Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-Terrorism
(Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 27.
4
enhance the ability of federal law enforcement to counter terrorism. Beckman writes that
the Patriot Act widens the definition of terrorism by including domestic terrorism as
“prior to 2001, the U.S. law only defines acts of international terrorism.”18
The Philippine anti-terrorism law, the Republic Act 9372, otherwise known as the
Human Security Act of 2007, defines terrorism by stating that anyone “sowing and
creating a condition of widespread extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in
order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the
crime of terrorism.”19 It outlines how terrorism is punishable under Philippine law,
specifying that those convicted “shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of
imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.”20
Violations under the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code, Republic
Acts and Presidential Decrees, constitute crimes of terrorism:
a) Piracy and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters (Art. 122)
b) Rebellion or insurrection (Art. 134)
c) Coup d’etat, including acts committed by private persons (Art.134-a)
d) Murder (Article 248)
e) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention (Article 267)
f) Crimes involving destruction (Article 324)
g) Law on arson (PD 1613)
h) Toxic substances and hazardous nuclear waste (RA 6969)
i) Atomic energy regulation and liability (RA 5207)
j) Anti-hijacking law (RA 6235)
k) Anti-piracy and anti-highway robbery law (PD 532)
l) Laws on illegal and unlawful possession, acquisition, manufacture,
dealing, or disposition of firearms, ammunition or explosives (PD
1866)21
Chester Cabalza, a professor at the National Defense College of the Philippines,
argues that there is no clear definition of terrorism in the Human Security Act of 2007.
18 Beckman, Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-Terrorism, 27.

19 “Human Security Act of 2007,” Congress of the Philippines, accessed August 15, 2016,
https://www.senate.gov.ph/republic_acts/ra%209372.pdf.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
5
The legal definition as embodied in the law is vague and highly prone to abuse. 22 He
claims that the Human Security Act “is one of the most incoherent, disorganized, and
disjointed laws the Philippine congress has ever passed.”23 He argues that the law has no
clear standard objectives that will guide law enforcers; thus, it allows the law enforcers to
have their own preference and interpretation of who are “engaged in terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism.”24 Moreover, he notes, the crimes enumerated by the
Human Security Act are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines.
On the other hand, creating normal criminal categories for terrorist activity has
some real advantages in the Philippines, as elsewhere. According to Pauline E. Eadie,
“practically and legally it is extremely difficult to differentiate between rebels, bandits,
insurgents and kidnappers on the one hand and terrorists on the other. Consequently it
may be pragmatic for the Philippines to prosecute offenders as criminals as opposed to
terrorists.”25
While it can be useful to prosecute terrorist acts as crime, still terrorism should be
understood as distinct. Paul Wilkinson argues that terrorism can be a “weapons system”26
used effectively by various non-state groups, regimes, and governments.27 Wilkinson
emphasizes the idea that historically some governments and regimes used terror in a more
brutal manner than non-state groups. States have more power and resources to implement
their policies of terror to oppress and influence people for political ends.
Wilkinson claims that it is incorrect to say that terrorism is synonymous with

insurgency or guerilla warfare, and there is no compelling pattern to suggest that
22 Chester B. Cabalza, “Deconstructing Human Security in the Philippines,” Academia, 4−5, accessed
April 17, 2016, https://www.academia.edu/2137055/Deconstructing_Human_Security_in_the_Philippines.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Pauline E. Eadie, “Legislating for Terrorism: The Philippines’ Human Security Act 2007,” Journal
of Terrorism Research 2, no. 3 (November 11, 2011): 30, http://jtr.st-
andrews.ac.uk/articles/10.15664/jtr.226/#.
26 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (Portland, OR: Frank
Cass, 2001), 15.
27 Ibid.
6
insurgency will evolve into a terrorist organization.28 He argues that terrorism is a
“special method” of armed struggle and that it is possible to use terror or violence against
civilians or non-combatants without engaging in a full-blown insurgency.29 Most
insurgents believe that terrorism is just an auxiliary weapon, and any insurgency that
relies solely on its effectiveness may ultimately prove counterproductive.30
However, Alexander Aguirre points out that to achieve political ends, terror can
be used as a tactic in combination with guerilla and conventional warfare.31 He argues
that terrorism can be compatible with political movements, especially if these movements
employ violence and terror as their main strategy or method to achieve their goals. 32
When this violence occurs, the international community can “tag rebels or insurgents as
terrorists and criminals,” who must be condemned, confronted, and eradicated under the
rules of law of civilized society.33
2. Terrorism and Crime
Tamara Makarenko illustrates the interaction—and interoperability—of crime and

terror on a continuum in which, theoretically, crime and terror would converge at a
central point.34 The author argues that it is hard to distinguish between profit- and
ideology-based organizations because they exist on the same plane in which collaboration
between criminals and terrorists can occur easily.35 Thus, the line that distinguishes
politically and criminally motivated violence is becoming more blurred and complicated
for policy makers and law enforcers alike to understand.
28 Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, 7.

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 7−8.
31 Alexander Aguirre, “The Philippine Response to Terrorism,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence, and
Counter-Terrorism 4, no. 1 (August 3, 2011): 48, DOI:10.1080/18335300.2009.9686923.
32 Ibid., 48.
33 Ibid.
34 Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay Between Transnational
Organized Crime and Terrorism,” Global Crime 6, no. 1 (September 8, 2010): 130,
DOI.10.1080/1744057042000297025.
35 Ibid.
7
According to Makarenko, there are four distinct points on the continuum of crime
and terror. The first point of cooperation between organized crime and terrorism is the
alliance. In this point, criminals and terrorists collaborate to acquire crucial skills,
knowledge, and support critical to each group’s operational capabilities.36 This
relationship may exist for the short or long term as long as both of them mutually benefit
from such collaboration.37 (See Figure 1.)
Figure 1. The Crime-Terror Continuum.38
On the second point, Makarenko asserts that the capacity of criminal and terrorist
groups to employ both criminal and terror tactics for their operations constitutes the
second component of the continuum.39 Organized crime groups use terror tactics against
rival groups, and they engage in terrorism to force the government into negotiation and
compromise.40 In the absence of foreign support, terrorist organizations tend to engage in
illegal activities to support their operations and perhaps even the survival of the
organization.41 Significantly, organized crime and terrorist groups often revert to their
traditional organization and structure, rather than cooperating with each other to avoid
36 Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum,” 131−132.

37 Ibid., 130.
38 Source: Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum,” 131
39 Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum,” 133−134.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
8
inherent problems of security and other threats of close alliances. 42 Because members of
criminal organizations are only motivated primarily by greed and personal gain, they tend
to be weak and can be easily recruited by state security forces.
Convergence is the next point on the continuum. Makarenko’s “convergent

thesis” has both organized crime and terrorist groups becoming a unified entity, though
they have the capacity to transform themselves into the opposite end of the continuum.43
At this level, criminal and terrorist groups can be classified as “hybrids” with the capacity
to shift into criminal or terroristic activities and forego their original aims and
motivations.44
The fourth and final point is the “black hole.”45 This level thrives in weak or
failed states in which criminal and terrorist organizations have converged, a safe
environment for them to conduct unrestricted operations.46 Two situations emerge amid
the “black hole”47 syndrome: first, primary motivations focus on criminal objectives; and
second, a “black hole state”48 emerges in which political and criminal hybrid
organizations gain substantial political and economic control over a part of a territory or
an entire country.49
Similarly, Helena Carrapico, Daniela Irrena, and Bill Tupman argue that terrorists
and criminals tend to cooperate to enhance their capabilities and learn important skills
from each other.50 They assert that there are two debatable issues within academia with
regard to the nexus of crime and terrorism. The first issue relates to the nature of “the
42 Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum,” 135.

43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., 138−139.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 138.
48 Ibid., 139.
49 Ibid.
50 Helena Carrapico, Daniela Irrena, and Bill Tupman, “Transnational Organized Crime and
Terrorism: Different Peas, Same Pod?” Global Crime 15, no. 3−4 (August 11, 2014): 213−215,
DOI:10.1080/17440572.2014.939882.
9
crime-terror nexus.”51 The authors claim that it is best explained by the concept of
Makarenko’s crime-terror continuum. The second issue concerns the situation that allows
proliferation of terror and crime alliances.52 They argue that the existence of political and
economic instability, armed conflict, and weak institutions provide a conducive
environment for the terrorists and criminals to thrive and maintain strong strategic
alliances.
Toros and Mavelli claim that there is an increased interest in understanding

organized crime and how these illicit activities should be approached. 53 They point out
that, like terrorism, organized crime is essentially difficult to define because most
scholars rest on the “I know it when I see it” approach. 54 They support the argument that
“terrorism is political violence” while organized crime is motivated by financial gains or
lucrative aims.55
To understand terrorism and crime fully, Steven Hutchinson and Pat O’Malley
provide a compelling discussion about the links between terror and crime. 56 They argue
that there are some “predictors” regarding the types of criminal activity a terrorist group
would engage in. Because of the terrorists’ political or ideological motivations, it is
improbable that “organized crime and terrorist groups will foster a symbiotic
cooperation.”57 Although cooperation between terrorist and organized crime groups can
be beneficial for both parties, this will not last in the long term because both
organizations still want to maintain their respective operational security. Hutchinson and
51 Carrapico, Irrena, and Tupman, “Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: Different Peas,
Same Pod?” 213−215.
52 Ibid.
53 Toros and Mavelli, “Terrorism, Organized Crime and the Biopolitics of Violence,” 73−74.
54 Ibid., 73.
55 Ibid., 74.
56 Steven Hutchinson and Pat O’Malley, “A Crime-Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links
between Terrorism and Criminality,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 12 (October 26, 2007):
1096, DOI: 10.1080/10576100701670870.
57 Ibid.
10
O’Malley claim that terrorist groups aim for publicity, which is totally opposite to some
organized crime groups.58
Where does the ASG fall on the continuum? Santiago Ballina, in his article “The
Crime-Terror Continuum Revisited: A Model for the Study of Hybrid Criminal
Organizations,” applies Makarenko’s continuum to two case studies: La Familia
Michoacana and the ASG.59 Ballina claims that in the case of the evolution of the ASG,
the key factor is internal in origin, tracing back to the cultural and social nature of the
organization.60
To understand the ASG, Ballina suggests a careful analysis of the group’s social
and cultural background, which encompasses the broader context of the Tausug tribe and
other ethnic minorities in the southern Philippines.61 According to Ballina, the strange
characteristics of the ASG—“hybridity, fluid network configurations, and even the drive
towards criminality”62—have been the result of the ASG’s unique cultural and social
environment. With this, the author proposes that a three-dimensional model should be
used because this model is a comprehensive analysis of clandestine organizations,
comprised of ideology, profit, and social/cultural dimensions, which overlap with each
other.63 See Figure 2.
58 Hutchinson and O’Malley, “A Crime-Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between
Terrorism and Criminality,” 1100.
59 Santiago Ballina, “The Crime-Terror Continuum Revisited: A Model for the Study of Hybrid
Criminal Organisations,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 6, no. 2 (October 2011):
129−130, DOI: 10.1080/18335330.2011.605200.
60 Ballina, “The Crime-Terror Continuum Revisited,” 129−130.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 129.
63 Ibid., 129−130.
11
Figure 2. Ballina’s Three Dimensional Model.64
Sam Mullins also argues that “terrorists and organized criminals share the same”
or comparable systems of influence and organization, demonstrate the same type of
behavior, and behave and interact with each other similarly.65 In addition, Mullins claims
that terrorists and criminals have performed the same activities to achieve their
objectives; as such, criminal skills are essential for a terrorist to survive and perform his
tasks successfully.66 Mullins points out that crime and terrorism can be analyzed in three
main dimensions: methods, motives, and profiles.67 Using these dimensions, Mullins
explicitly compares some similarities and differences in crime and terrorism. Mullins and
Makarenko share the same idea about the methodological similarities between organized
crime and terrorism. They argue that both crime and terrorism have used similar tactics
and capabilities in terms of intelligence, counterintelligence, targeting techniques,
employment of networks, and adopting a cellular-type structure.68
64 Source: Ballina, “The Crime-Terror Continuum Revisited,” 131.

65 Sam Mullins, “Parallels Between Crime and Terrorism: A Social Psychological Perspective,”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 9 (August 27, 2009): 816, DOI: 10.1080/10576100903109776.
66 Ibid., 814.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
12
Although O’Brien’s work focuses on one case study, and specifically on
kidnapping, he provides a decent explanation of the historical fluctuations between
terrorism and criminal activities.69 He shows that the ASG provides a glimpse of how
crime and terrorism intersect. O’Brien also supplies other frames of analysis to clearly
understand these connections.70
3. Financing Terror and Responses
Any threat or nefarious organization around the world will not survive without
money or sources of financing. Jennifer Hesterman claims that money and the source of
financing are two crucial factors for any type of terrorist organization.71 The
uninterrupted flow of funds is critically important for the operations and other critical
requirements of the organization.72 Terrorist groups may use various methods to generate
funds and acquire a steady flow of cash depending on the environment or country in
which they operate. Groups can rely on the support of other states or engage in criminal
activities domestically or through transnational crimes. In some cases, terrorist groups
mask their financing by employing charitable organizations as conduits to receive
donations from wealthy individuals sympathetic to their cause. This section highlights the
arguments of Michael Freeman, Aurel Croissant, Daniel Barlow, and McKenzie O’Brien
about financing terror. Freeman writes that every source of terrorist financing has its own
distinct characteristics and is best explained by various criteria, while Croissant and
Barlow argue about popular sources of financing terror and claim that every terror group
has its own peculiarity when it comes to financing activities. On the other hand, O’Brien
argues about the preferred methods of some terrorist organizations.
69 O'Brien, “Fluctuations Between Crime and Terror,” 332.

70 Ibid.
71 Jennifer L. Hesterman, The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels,
Organized Crime, and Terror Groups (Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis, 2013), 4.
72 Samuel A Smith, “Financing Terror, Part III: Kidnapping for Ransom in the Philippines,” Strife
(blog), January 26, 2015, https://strifeblog.org/2015/01/26/financing-terror-part-iii-kidnapping-for-ransom-
in-the-philippines/.
13
According to O’Brien, kidnapping has become one of the preferred methods of
terrorist groups around the world.73 He points out that some rebel groups and other
similar types of actors have engaged in this kind of criminal act to finance their
organizational capabilities and operations. O’Brien’s argument about kidnapping is based
on one case study, which is the ASG. Other studies about financing sources also claim
that kidnapping seems to be popular among terrorist groups, especially those who employ
criminal methods to acquire funds for the organization.74 Although Freeman does not
specifically mention which method is most feasible for any terrorist organization, his
theory of financing sources can provide a decent explanation why kidnapping has been
one of the preferred means of financing terrorists.
Croissant and Barlow provide a “comparative study of ten nations in Southeast

Asia” to show how financing of terror is being done by terrorist groups in the region, and
they examine responses of these nations to combat terrorism financing. 75 They claim that
financing activities of terrorist groups in the region have distinct identities from each
other because each country has its own differences in terms of “nature, organization,
motivations, and opportunities.”76 Based on the analysis of Croissant and Barlow, there
are three most popular sources of financing terror in Southeast Asia: criminal activities,
charities, and commercial activities. Freeman writes that these sources of financing can
be categorized into four: “state sponsorship, illegal activities, legal activities, and popular
support.”77 The general categories endorsed by Freeman are similar to the sources of
terrorism financing claimed by Croissant and Barlow. They believe that criminal or
illegal activities remain one of the critical sources of funds for a terrorist group.
Basically, Freeman, Croissant, and Barlow have the same argument regarding the sources
73 O'Brien, “Fluctuations Between Crime and Terror,” 320.

74 Daljit Singh, “Trends in Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” in Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia in
the Coming Decade, ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in association with
Macmillan, 2009), 102–103.
75 Aurel Croissant and Daniel Barlow, “Following the Money Trail: Terrorist Financing and
Government Responses in Southeast Asia,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 2 (February 24,
2007): 135, DOI: 10.1080/10576100600959721.
76 Ibid.
77 Michael Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism 34, no. 6 (May 20, 2011): 465, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2011.571193.
14
of terrorism financing, but Croissant and Barlow provide more detailed discussion about
state responses to counter terrorism financing. They argue that to counter terrorism
financing, Southeast Asian countries’ responses fall under four different dimensions:
“legal framework, administrative framework, variety of approaches, and evidence of
enforcement.”78
In “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” Freeman argues

that every terrorist organization has its own distinct method of financing sources; thus, he
asserts that no single strategy can be applied to address the sources of financing.79 All
countermeasures must be tailored to fit against a specific group and its method of
financing.80 He claims that terrorists can always adapt to any kind of situation, and they
can innovate and find other ways of financing. Freeman explores the primary reasons
why terrorists have varying preferences about the sources of their financing. 81 He argues
that from the terrorist organization’s perspective, “there is no perfect source; each has
advantages and disadvantages across the following six criteria: quantity, legitimacy,
security, reliability, control, and simplicity.”82 He points out that although much has been
written about terrorist financing, most research only focuses on some specific case
studies of terrorist organizations or just discusses viable solutions to disrupt their
financing. None of these studies address the critical question of why terrorist groups’
preferences vary as much as they do. Additionally, how do these organizations decide
and consider which source of financing seems more feasible and attractive than others?
Freeman explains the “six criteria” that can be used “across a typology of four
previously mentioned primary types of terrorist financing: state sponsorship, illegal
activity, legal activity, and popular support.”83 He explains that the first criterion is
quantity, which simply means that a particular terrorist group becomes more effective
78 Croissant and Barlow, “Following the Money Trail: Terrorist Financing and Government Responses
in Southeast Asia,” 139.
79 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 463.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
15
and stronger as it gains more resources. Terrorists always choose an option that brings
more money for the organization. With more funds, they have more flexibility to conduct
attacks, recruit more members, and protect themselves against state security forces.
Additionally, these groups also use some of their funds to help the communities where
they operate, while in return receiving protection and crucial intelligence from the
populace.84
The second criterion is legitimacy, which is very important for a terrorist group.
This criterion must be established and justified from the very start in order for the
terrorist organization to sustain its existence, win the support of the people, and attract
more members to join the struggle.85 Legitimacy of the terrorist group’s strategies and
tactics are equally important to gain popular support. Freeman claims that there are
several ways in which tactical decisions about financial sources affect the legitimacy of
the group.86 He mentions that one of these is avoiding illegitimate methods of acquiring
funds, which can be counterproductive for the whole organization. Funds coming from a
“broad support base” have been a good indicator of legitimacy. If members of the
terrorist groups are utilizing funds for personal gains or engaging in corruption, it would
undermine their legitimacy. In some cases, terrorists must seek financing sources that
demonstrate and support their legitimacy, and they depart from corrupt practices within
the organization.87
Security, as the third criterion, pertains to the capacity of any terrorist

organization to operate clandestinely and avoid efforts of state security forces to acquire
crucial information and infiltrate the organization. Thus, a terrorist group has to choose a
source of financing that will not compromise the security of the organization.
Collaborating with organized crime groups not only draws unwanted attention from law
enforcers and other counterterrorism units, it also creates a weak point where state forces

85 Ibid., 463−465.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
16
can infiltrate a terrorist organization.88 Most members of criminal organizations are
easily turned because they have no strong convictions or ideology and are motivated by
their personal interest and greed for money.89
Reliability of financing sources is also important for the terrorist organization and
is the fifth criterion. It means that the sources of financing are foreseeable and steady.
Freeman claims that these features of financing “often depend on factors of geography
and demographics.”90 For instance, in the case of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), in
order to have a steady and reliable flow of revenue from drug trafficking, the group must
be strategically situated near the trafficking route, or they must have access to the
majority of the population who are drug users. This concept also applies to the FARC and
the Taliban in connection with their drug smuggling activities.91
The sixth criterion is control. Sources of financing can have an influence on the
way a terrorist organization controls its members and operations. As Freeman argues,
“money is often associated with influence and power.”92 He points out that if cell leaders
of small units are allowed to make decisions regarding their own financing sources,
senior leaders lose their command and control of the lower units. Thus, decentralization
of fund management in an organization may result in less control over lower units, and
lower units may commit acts not in line with the organization’s objectives. Some terrorist
groups do not want to be indebted from the support of other states or private sponsors
because these sponsors tend to influence their operations and influence them to do acts
that are counterproductive or totally irrelevant to their cause.93 The last criterion is
simplicity. It means that it is valuable to do something as simple as possible in terms of
financing sources. Terrorist groups choose to employ methods that require
unsophisticated skills and little effort but may result in gaining a steady flow of funds. It
88 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 463−465.

89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., 465.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
17
is also important that the methods must incur lesser cost and be more desirable than other
means.94 Freeman asserts that although terrorist groups have proven flexible and can find
new ways of financing terror, several sources of financing have inherent weaknesses.95
One of the countermeasures that he suggests is enhancement of states’ police and
intelligence agencies’ capabilities and an active legal approach to put more pressure on
terrorist groups.
4. Approaches to Counterterrorism
A multicultural study of various approaches to counter-terrorism provides

significant lessons from each country’s successes and failures. The problem is that
terrorism is multi-faceted and complex; thus, it also requires a multi-pronged approach.
According to Maria Ressa, to address the root causes of the problems, all agencies and
their leaders must depart from destructive behavior of internal rivalries and patronage
politics of the organizations and institutions they belong to. 96 The following sub-section
will examine the various approaches and responses to counter terrorism in the United
States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Southeast Asian countries. Their respective
experiences provide a model that integrates several approaches to combat international or
domestic terrorist groups, of which some fluctuate from terrorism to organized crime to
sustain their operations.
a. The U.S. Approach
The U.S. approach is to continue working in collaboration with other countries in

order to counter terrorism globally. The main emphasis is to use force to destroy and
disrupt Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Regimes that sponsor terrorists or provide safe-haven,
such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, will be compelled to cease sponsoring terrorism or
will be toppled if they persist in being uncooperative.97 This effort will leverage the

95 Ibid.
96 Maria Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations
in Southeast Asia (New York: Free Press Simon and Schuster Inc., 2003), 26.
97 Dan Byman, “Fighting the War on Terrorism: A Better Approach,” in How to Make America Safe:
New Policies for National Security, ed. Stephen Van Evera (Cambridge, MA: The Tobin Project, 2006), 69.
18
common understanding and goals to enhance each other’s capabilities and work together
to have an integrated approach to counterterrorism.
The United States assists its allies to improve and expand governance and
collaborate with other partners to degrade the capabilities of terrorist organizations
locally and globally.98 The National Strategy for Counterterrorism of 2011 has four
important principles that guide the U.S. approach to terrorism and the Global War on
Terror. These are “adhering to U.S. Core Values,” “building security partnerships,”
“applying CT tools and capabilities appropriately,” and “building a culture of
resilience.”99 The United States upholds these core values because they enhance the
security of the nation and protect citizens against acts of terror. Additionally, these core
values aim to achieve the following: “respect human rights, foster good governance,
respect privacy and civil liberties, commit to security and transparency, and uphold the
rules of law.”100 This strategy promotes strong and lasting collaborative partnerships with
allied countries to eliminate and dismantle terrorist organizations and actively engage in
counterterrorist activities that include intelligence sharing and joint training and
operations. It also adopts active cooperation to counter violent extremism through
appropriate community-based resilience programs.101
Daniel Byman claims that the military approach is crucial to counterterrorism.102

He argues that the primary role of the military is to defeat the enemies by force and to
provide counterinsurgency or counterterrorism training to the allies. Dunn and Hassan
criticize Bush’s counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan, asserting that it lacked
“political context” and was naïve.103 This strategy focuses on a model of traditional
98 “The National Strategy for Counterterrorism,” 6−9, The White House,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Daniel Byman, The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad (New Jersey: John
Wiley & Sons, 2008), 3.
103 David Hastings Dunn and Oz Hassan, “Strategic Confusion: America’s Conflicting Strategies and
the War on Terrorism,” in International Terrorism Post 9/11: Comparative Dynamics and Responses, ed.
Asaf Siniver (NY: Routledge, 2012), 62.
19
counterterrorism response, which is employing a military approach to change the existing
regime in Afghanistan.104 According to these authors, the United States did not address
or identify the root causes of the problems. Either way, the military approach in
Afghanistan appears to be ineffective. Focused military operations destroyed the capacity
of the Taliban regime to sponsor terrorism and to be used as training ground of Al Qaeda.
b. The British Approach
Some countries use a holistic and comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism in

which their response to the threat is through various measures and integration of all
efforts of government institutions and agencies. David Bonner describes the United
Kingdom’s holistic and comprehensive approach to counterterrorism by adopting
appropriate measures to combat the threat particularly with respect to legal, economic,
and political aspects.105 The response of the United Kingdom also involved strengthening
bilateral and multi-lateral engagements with other nations, especially with the United
States and the Republic of Ireland.106 Enhancement of the military and police intelligence
and security of vital government installations were initiated as part of the military and
police measures.107
Byman writes that intelligence is one of the five fronts in counterterrorism, and he
emphasizes the significance of close collaboration and cooperation with allies and other
partners.108 Benjamin Netanyahu claims that one of the central problems in
counterterrorism is the reluctance of the security services of one country to share
information with other foreign services.109 The British approach also adopts the
effectiveness to counterterrorism of enhanced intelligence cooperation and collaboration.
104 Dunn and Hassan, “Strategic Confusion: America’s Conflicting Strategies and the War on
Terrorism,” 60.
105 David Bonner, “United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism,” Terrorism and
Political Violence 4, no. 4 (December 21, 2007): 179−191, DOI: 10.1080/09546559208427180.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Byman, The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad, 3.
109 Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat the International
Terrorist Network (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux Press, 2001), 138.
20
Establishing relationships and working closely with domestic and foreign counterparts
helps “to predict, prevent, deter, and suppress acts of terrorism” and neutralize the threat
groups.110 Cooperation and collaboration unite all efforts of those who are involved in
the fight against terrorism. Enhancing bilateral and multi-lateral engagement strengthens
border controls and sharing of intelligence.111 It helps in securing quality and essential
information through regular intelligence exchange and conference between countries.112
Since World War II, British military intelligence has been conducting joint
intelligence operations among the tri-service. Several branches make up the British
military intelligence. The British Army is the only service with an Intelligence Corps.113
The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force also have their own intelligence capabilities and
assets to support the requirements of the British Army.114 In addition to this, military
intelligence works closely with other secret services such as the Security Service (MI5),
the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), and the Signal Intelligence Service.115 In terms of
counterterrorism, the military has only a supporting role in which they provide crucial
intelligence to support other law enforcement agencies. In the British case, the
collaboration of various government agencies is how they synchronized their efforts in
line with their main strategy of “the four Ps: pursue, prevent, protect, and prepare.”116
c. The Israeli Approach
The Israeli approach relies on a war-fighting model that assumes “terrorism is an

act of war.”117 As such, its approach responds aggressively through intelligence-driven
110 Aguirre, “The Philippine Response to Terrorism,” 54−55.

111 Andrew T.H. Tan, “Counter-Terrorism in Southeast Asia Post-9/11,” in International Terrorism
Post 9/11: Comparative Dynamics and Responses, ed. Asaf Siniver (NY: Routledge, 2012), 216.
112 Ibid.
113 Graham Messervy-Whiting, “British Armed Forces and European Union Perspectives on
Countering Terrorism,” in International Terrorism Post 9/11: Comparative Dynamics and Responses, ed.
Asaf Siniver (NY: Routledge, 2012), 101.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid., 102.
116 Ibid., 106.
117 Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, “The Consequences of Counterterrorist Policies in Israel,” in The
Consequences of Counterterrorism, ed. Martha Crenshaw (Russel Sage Foundation: 2010), 338.
21
military operations.118 Clive Jones argues that Israel adopted a war-fighting model of
counterterrorism against the threat posed by the al-Aqsa Intifada, which led to the
resurgence of terrorist attacks. This outbreak resulted in the deaths of hundreds of
innocent Israeli civilians.119 From 2000 to 2005, around 1,030 Israelis were killed by this
violence related to the al-Aqsa Intifada.120 The Israeli government responded with a type
of excessive military force, which they believed was most efficient and effective: the
targeted killing operations.121 This method employed the accurate launching of missiles
from fighter jets and helicopter gunships, use of explosive devices, or use of snipers.122
Notably, targeted killings, as a military approach, led to the killing of senior

leaders and other key personalities. Although this method has moral concerns and could
instigate harsh retaliation from the terrorists, it disrupted the enemy’s plan and damaged
their capability to conduct further attacks.123 Despite the brutality of this method, it
received “wide public support in Israel.”124
In “A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism,” Daniel

Byman argues that the Israeli Intelligence Service has been admired for their “efficiency,
skill, and seeming omniscience.”125 Although there are cases of bungled intelligence
operations, they still did an impressive job of recruiting reliable informants and acquiring
quality information against their target organizations. They also value the importance of
sharing information and collaboration with other agencies, especially with the police and
Israeli Defense Force (IDF).126
118 Pedahzur and Perliger, “The Consequences of Counterterrorist Policies in Israel,” 338.
119 Clive Jones, “Israel and the Al-Aqsa Intifada: The Conceptzia of Terror,” in International
Terrorism Post 9/11: Comparative Dynamics and Responses, ed. Asaf Siniver (NY: Routledge, 2012), 126.
120 Jones, “Israel and the Al-Aqsa Intifada: The Conceptzia of Terror,” 129.
121 Ibid., 133.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid., 134.
124 Ibid.
125 Daniel Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (NY: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 370−371.
126 Ibid.
22
Just like any country with serious concerns about terrorism, Byman claims, Israel
is also affected by terrorism’s psychological power.127 Many Israelis alter the basic
pattern of their daily lives, which may mean not using the bus or going out to eat or
shopping at malls.128 Terror attacks, especially against innocent civilians, undermine the
credibility and capacity of the government to ensure peace and security and to protect its
citizens. Despite widespread terrorist attacks, Israelis remain confident in the capabilities
of their government to counter the threat of terrorism.129 With this kind of popular
support, the Israeli government involves the people in active and passive measures and
encourages active participation of the community to join the fight in order to conquer
their fear.130
d. The Southeast Asian Approach
Andrew Tan claims that Southeast Asian countries adopted holistic and
comprehensive approaches and strategies to counterterrorism because the threat of
terrorism in this region was multifaceted and emerged from a long history of self-
determination.131 He claims that Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the
Philippines reap the benefits of bilateral and multilateral cooperation to strengthen
political, economic, and security cooperation.132 For instance, after the 9/11 attacks,
ASEAN countries issued a joint resolution in support of the UNSC Resolutions
condemning terrorism and enhanced security and economic cooperation to combat the
threat.133 Countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines signed a counter-
terrorism treaty to strengthen border security and sharing of vital information in terms of
border controls.134
127 Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism, 372−373.
128 Ibid., 370−371.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Tan, “Counter-Terrorism in Southeast Asia Post-9/11,” 207.
132 Ibid., 216.
133 Ibid., 215.
134 Ibid., 216.
23
In his book, The British War on Terror, Steve Hewitt claims that there are short-
and long-term solutions to any violence posed by terrorism.135 He points out that long-
term solutions require bigger involvement of the government to provide comprehensive
solutions to the root causes of the problem.136 Some Southeast Asian countries have
employed the military approach, but they complement it with a comprehensive strategy,
which involves political, economic, and social instruments to win the hearts and minds of
the people.137
According to Alexander Aguirre, the Philippine approach to terrorism is both

offensive and defensive.138 He claims that to confront the threat posed by the terrorist
groups, it is imperative to engage concerned agencies in order to address the political and
socio-economic problems of affected areas where terrorism thrives. He suggests that a
comprehensive response to terrorism should be an integration of efforts from all
government agencies and institutions, and it must strengthen bilateral and multi-lateral
cooperation with other countries to effectively address the underlying causes that breed
terrorism and radical ideas. He claims that this response has the following features:
 The strategy adopted is holistic or comprehensive, that is, to fight the
armed component of terrorism, as well as address the underlying
conditions that breed it;
 All departments and agencies, including local government units, have

been tasked and given a role in fighting terrorism, within their respective
areas of competence;
 The response covers all the phases of the development of terrorist acts
(before the attack, during the attack and after the attack), with the
corresponding countermeasures, namely: the proactive phase (prediction,
prevention, and preparation), the reactive phase (counter-terrorism
actions), and the post conflict or consequence management phase;
135 Steve Hewitt, The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism on the Home Front
Since 9/11 (London: Continuum International, 2008), 120.
136 Ibid., 123.
138 Aguirre, “The Philippine Response to Terrorism,” 51.
24
 The response also includes close coordination and cooperation with the
international community in fighting terrorism.139
According to Eusaquito Manalo, the Philippine response to terrorism “remains
reactive, rather than decisive and strategic.”140 He argues that terrorism should not be
confronted by a military solution alone or employ a war-fighting model to counter the
threat posed by the terrorist groups. Manalo asserts that the problem of terrorism in the
Philippines requires effective police measures since basically it is a problem of law and
order.141 He points out that the successful linkages and alliances between local and
foreign terrorist organizations and other lawless elements in Mindanao can be the results
of the government’s incomplete strategy and lack of complete understanding of the root
causes of the problems.
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES
Using Makarenko’s crime-terror continuum, I argue that the ASG is a hybrid

organization that has the ability to transform either into a criminal or terrorist group.
Criminal methods are very crucial for the group’s survival and operational capabilities.
On the other hand, terrorist tactics are important for ASG’s criminal activities. I also
hypothesize that this group’s criminal activities, especially kidnapping, transformed it
into an organized crime group whose main motivation is financial gain. As a hybrid
organization, the ASG will show characteristics of crime and terrorism. When this group
shifts temporarily into criminal organization, its focus will be on crime at the expense of
ideology or religion. The ASG’s transition to criminality could end its terrorism.
E. RESEARCH DESIGN
This paper presents a single case study of the ASG’s terrorist and criminal
activities in the southern part of the Philippines, though some of the group’s terrorism

140 Eusaquito P. Manalo, “Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group” (master’s
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2004), 73−74,
http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/1218.
141 Ibid.
25
and illicit activities in central Mindanao will be also addressed to support the analysis of
its networks and capabilities.
I will investigate how the ASG evolved from an ethno-religious or ethno-

nationalist organization with terroristic tactics into an organized crime group. I will
explore the compelling reasons why the ASG seems to be effective despite intense
government military effort to defeat them. Finally, this study will analyze the implication
and impact of downgrading this group into an organized crime group with regard to the
Philippines’ current counterterrorism strategy as embodied in the AFP’s Internal Peace
and Security Plan “Bayanihan.”
This thesis aims to incorporate a broad mix of scholarly articles, as well as

relevant documents from the Department of National Defense and Armed Forces of the
Philippines. Some significant studies and reports about the ASG’s terroristic and criminal
activities will be used as sources of accurate data regarding the trend and extent of their
violence and crimes. Some online sources will also be used since this medium provides
informative reports and documents about the criminal activities of the ASG.
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE
The first chapter of this thesis provides a brief background, including the
definitions of terrorism, the crime-terror continuum, the ASG, and the holistic and
comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism. This chapter will consist of the following
sub-topics: major research questions, literature review, significance and goal of the study,
potential explanations and hypothesis, research design and sources, and thesis overview.
Chapter II presents the history and relevant background of the ASG. This chapter
explains the ideology and leadership of the group. It also discusses the strength and
capabilities of the group and explores the compelling factors why they evolved from an
Islamic movement in the early 1990s into a terrorist group and then became a bandit
group.
Chapter III explains one by one the various points of Makarenko’s CTC and plots
the ASG on the continuum. It will discuss definitions of organized crime and its
26
similarities and differences with terrorism. This chapter also presents an analysis of the
ASG’s resilience.
Chapter IV discusses the kidnapping activities of the ASG. Although this group
has also been engaging in other criminal activities, the kidnap-for-ransom scheme is the
most prominent and preferred method to amass millions of pesos. These illicit activities
enable the group to procure powerful weapons and other essential equipment that boost
its operational capabilities to confront government forces in the area. It will examine
ASG’s motivations and factors that contributed to the relentless kidnappings in
Zamboanga peninsula and provinces of Basilan and Sulu.
Chapter V highlights the Philippine government’s strategy and approach in

counter-terrorism. This chapter will examine the past and current counter-terrorism
policy, inter-agency coordination, and joint intelligence cooperation in the Philippine
bureaucracy. It is also important to consider the significant role played by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to counter terrorism.
Finally, Chapter VI presents a conclusion and recommended solutions to combat

the nexus of terrorism and crime—the hybrid organization.
27
28
II. CASE STUDY: THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP
On September 21, 2015, three foreign nationals and one Filipino were abducted
from Samal Island, an island resort in Davao del Norte in the eastern part of Mindanao.
The kidnap victims were John Ridsdel and Robert Hall, both Canadian; Kjartan
Sekkingstad, a Norwegian; and Marites Flor, a Filipina.142 The four were staying at the
Holiday Oceanview Samal Resort, where armed men abducted them using two motorized
boats. After six months, the ASG posted a video clip on the Internet, showing the four
kidnap victims pleading for their lives with armed men standing in the background.143
According to the statement of John Ridsdel in a video clip posted in November

2015, the ASG wanted US$21 million for each of the abductees as ransom.144 Around the
first week of April, the ASG demanded a ransom of PHP300 million (US$6.3 million) for
each kidnap victim to be paid on April 25—and threatened to kill the victims if no
payment was made.145 On April 25, 2016, the ASG beheaded John Ridsdel; his severed
head was recovered along the street of the municipality of Jolo, Sulu. Around the second
week of June, Robert Hall was beheaded by the ASG, while Kjartan Sekkingstad was
freed last September. A certain Abu Ramie, an alleged ASG spokesperson, claimed that
they released Sekkingstad in exchange for a PHP30 million ransom payment.146 On June
142 “3 Foreigners, Filipina Kidnapped on Samal Island.” CNN Philippines, September 25, 2015,
http://cnnphilippines.com/regional/2015/09/22/3-foreigners-Filipina-kidnapped-Samal-Davao-del-
Norte.html.
143 “Hostages Plead for Their Lives in Abu Sayyaf Ransom Video,” Daily Mail, November 1, 2016,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/video/news/video-1220989/Hostages-plead-lives-Abu-Sayyaf-ransom-
video.html.
144 “‘They Will Execute Us’; Kidnapped Canadians Held by Philippine Militants Appeal for Help,”
LFP Press, March 10, 2016, http://www.lfpress.com/2016/03/10/they-will-execute-us-kidnapped-
canadians-held-by-philippine-militants-appeal-for-help.
145 Julie Alipala, “Head of ‘Abu Sayyaf Captive’ Dumped on Sulu Street – Police,” Philippine Daily
Inquirer, April 25, 2016, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/138928/head-of-abu-sayyaf-captive-dumped-on-
sulu-street-police#ixzz478SrHGGn.
146 Julie Alipala, “Abu Sayyaf Releases Norwegian Hostage,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, September
17, 2016, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/145010/abu-sayyaf-releases-norwegian-hostage.
29
24, 2016, Marites Flor was released by the ASG. She was left in front of the residence of
Sulu Governor Abdusakur Tan II.147
Even more recently, a series of kidnapping incidents occurred along the border in
the south between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. On March 29, 2016, 10
Indonesian sailors were abducted in the waters off the southern Philippines.148 The ASG
demanded a PHP50 million ransom for the release of these hostages.149 On May 1, 2016,
the 10 Indonesian sailors were freed in Jolo, Sulu, dropped by unidentified men in front
of the house of Sulu Governor Abdusakur Tan, Jr. The Indonesian employer of these
tugboat crews allegedly paid a PHP50 million ransom to the ASG.150
Similarly, on April 1, 2016, four Malaysian sailors were snatched along the
territorial waters of Sempornah, Sabah, Malaysia.151 The ASG demanded RM30 Million
(US$10 million) as ransom for the release of the sailors.152 On June 8, 2016, the captives
were released by the ASG, but there was no confirmation from either the Philippine or
the Malaysian government that any ransom was paid for their release.153
The funds obtained from the ASG’s illicit activities were used for the
procurement of powerful weapons and other essential equipment, which enhanced its
operational capabilities. It is also important to note that this group had intensified
kidnapping activities by operating beyond its traditional area of operations and staged
daring and successful cross-border kidnappings. Ransoming hostages is significantly
important for the ASG as a source of financing.
147 Elmor P. Santos, “Freed ASG Hostage Marites Flor: We Were Treated Like Dogs,” CNN
Philippines, June 25, 2016, http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/06/24/Abu-Sayyaf-hostage-Marites-Flor-
recounts-captivity.html.
148 Alipala, “Abu Sayyaf Releases Norwegian Hostage,” Philippine Daily Inquirer.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Roel Pareno, “4 Indonesian Crew Members Kidnapped,” The Philippine Star, April 16, 2016,
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/04/16/1573493/4-indonesian-crew-members-kidnapped.
152 “4 Malaysians Released by Abu Sayyaf: Philippine Military,” Channel News Asia, June 8, 2016,
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/4-malaysians-released-by/2854376.html.
153 “Abu Sayyaf Frees 4 Malaysian Sailors It Kidnapped in April: Philippine Military,” The Star
Online, June 8, 2016, http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/06/08/philippine-military-confirms-
sarawakians-released/.
30
This chapter highlights the historical background of the ASG to include its
ideology, leadership, organization, strength, and capabilities. It also explains the ASG’s
employment of terrorism and crime to attain its objectives. This chapter argues that the
ASG has become a hybrid organization that is fluctuating between terrorism and crime,
depending on the prevailing situation on the ground. Although this group has been
officially labeled as a terrorist organization in the Philippines and listed as a foreign
terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State, it has been shifting from terrorism
to organized crime because of the personal interests of its sub-commanders and members.
Furthermore, it has become a stronger and more lethal terrorist organization by
employing criminal tactics for its terroristic activities.
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP
In the middle-1970s, Islamic fundamentalism started to grow in the Philippines.

Through scholarship grants from groups in the Middle East—particularly in Libya, Iraq,
and Saudi Arabia—this idea spread to Filipino Muslims. Several clerics in Central and
Western Mindanao availed themselves of these grants. After years of studies, they
returned to the Philippines and organized a group aimed at propagating radical Islam.154
Two such students—the late Ustadz Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani and Wahab
Akbar—earned their master’s degrees in Egypt and Syria, respectively. When they
returned to the Philippines, the two joined the Muslim fundamentalist movement, Al
Islamic Tabligh, which had been active in their home province of Basilan.155 Although
there was no concrete evidence to substantiate Janjalani’s activities and movements in the
Middle East, many believed that he travelled to different Muslim countries and met
influential Muslim scholars and Imams, which greatly influenced him about radical
Islamic teachings and thought. In 1988, he “went to Pakistan, where he studied the
154 “Handout on the Abu Sayyaf Group,” Combat Arms School, Training and Doctrine Command,
Philippine Army, 2007.
155 Manalo, “Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group,” 31.
31
Islamic revolution in Iran.”156 While in Pakistan, “he reportedly met and befriended
Osama Bin Laden,” who helped him organize the ASG.157
Janjalani, a former mujahideen in the Afghanistan war, founded the ASG in the
early 1990s. Janjalani was greatly influenced by the teachings of Adbul Rasul Sayyaf, an
Afghan resistance leader and Islamic professor, about Wahhabi theology. This knowledge
led Janjalani to the concept of an Islamic state; thus, he formed an Islamic movement
whose aim was to form an Islamic state in Mindanao.158 This movement grew in
popularity and became known as the Abu Sayyaf Group, so named to honor his mentor.
Many scholars mistranslated ASG to mean “Bearer of the Sword,” but “Abu Sayyaf”
really means in Arabic, “Father of the Swordsman.”159
To get financial support from other terrorist groups in the Middle East, Janjalani
temporarily renamed the group as Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah160 (AHAI) in 1994 to
emphasize the group’s original vision, which is to establish a “highly organized,
systematic, and disciplined” organization of Islamic fighters.161 It is also believed that the
International Islamic Relief Organization162 (IIRO) had provided financial support to the
AHAI.163 The ASG established associations with Al Qaeda in the 1990s when Janjalani
156 Rommel Banlaoi, Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group, 3rd ed. (Quezon
City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research, 2012), 52−53.
157 Ibid.
158 Banlaoi, Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah, 15.
159 Garret Atkinson, “ASG: The Father of the Swordsman,” American Security Project, March 2012,
1, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Abu-Sayyaf-The-Father-of-the-
Swordsman.pdf.
160 Al Harakatul Al Islamiyah−Founded by Abdurajak Janjalani in 1993 as an Islamic Movement
when he and his other followers officially decided to break away from the Moro National Liberation Front
and became a new group of Mujahideen.
162 This organization was created in 1978 by the Muslim World League and is currently based in
Saudi Arabia. It collects “donations, zakat, and sadaqah” to provide socio-economic assistance to
“Muslims in war-torn and disaster-affected areas.” In 2006, the U.S. Department of the Treasury tagged
IIRO branches in the Philippines and Indonesia as terrorist front organizations. Source: Berkeley Center for
Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/organizations/international-
islamic-relief-organization.
32
met Bin Laden while in Peshawar, Pakistan. Janjalani also established links and became
closely associated with Ramzi Yousef of Al Qaeda.164
The Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF) was the origin of the
ASG.165 Banlaoi claims that this response is a reaction to the alleged atrocities committed
against Muslims in the Philippines.166 This group attracted several members in the
provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and some parts of the Zamboanga peninsula.167
In 1991, the ASG split from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) because of the
latter’s failure to advance the group’s main goal of having “a separate and independent
Islamic State in the southern Philippines.”168
The ASG believes that peace talk and political settlement with the Philippine
government are not the solution for the apparent oppression, economic marginalization,
and injustices against the Filipino Muslims.169 For the ASG, the peace agreement
between the MNLF and the Philippine government was a “betrayal of four centuries of
struggle of the Bangsamoro170 people.”171 Abuza claims that in the early years of
separation, the ASG attempted to sabotage the ongoing talks between the MNLF and the
Philippine government.172 The group was tagged as a terrorist organization when it
bombed M/V Doulos, a Christian missionary ship, docked at the Zamboanga City port.173
164 Zachary Abuza, “Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the ASG,” accessed July 10, 2016, 2,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=625.
165 Atkinson, “ASG: The Father of the Swordsman,” 3.
167 Ibid.
168 Zack Fellman, “Abu Sayyaf Group,” Center for Strategic Studies and International Studies, case
study no. 5 (November 2011): 2.
169 Ibid.
170 The term pertains to the description of the national identity of Muslims in Mindanao, Philippines.
Bangsamoro people refers “to those at the time of conquest and colonization were considered natives or
inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago and its adjacent islands including Palawan, and their
descendants, whether or mixed or of full blood, shall have the right to identify themselves as Bangsamoro
by ascription or self-ascription.” Source: “Bangsamoro Basic Law Document,”
http://www.gov.ph/2014/09/10/document-the-draft-bangsamoro-basic-law/.
172 Abuza, “Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the ASG,” 3.
33
Then, from 1993 to 1995, the ASG began abducting locals and foreign nationals to
include an American missionary and 11 Filipino tourists.174
Although the ASG had been involved in several kidnapping activities, it remains
and continues to be an Islamic terrorist organization. Banlaoi argues that this is an
offshoot of the 9/11 attacks when the United States tagged the ASG as a foreign terrorist
organization.175 He claims that the designation of the ASG is also a viable justification
for the deployment of U.S. troops in Mindanao to assist and train the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in counterterrorism.176 Arguably, the United States intends to protect its
interests and maintain its influence in the Philippines. Khadafy Janjalani tried to revive
the ASG by returning it to its roots as a genuine Islamic movement and employing
terrorism and other forms of violence as its political weapon. 177 When Galib Andang, an
ASG sub-commander in Sulu, was captured in 2004, the ASG began its series of
bombing attacks and disregarded for a while its KFR activities.178
Zack Fellman argues that the death of Andang allowed Janjalani, with the support
of other radical sub-commanders, to control the entire organization and redirect its efforts
to the main political goal of the group—to form an Islamic State in Mindanao.179 He
claims that two key bomb experts of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Umar Patek and Dulmatin,
went to the southern Philippines and linked with the ASG. While seeking refuge with the
ASG, Patek and Dulmatin trained several ASG members in bomb-making techniques.180
These linkages of the ASG and JI led to a series of terrorist attacks in the
Philippines: the bombing of the Davao International Airport in 2003, the bombing of
Super Ferry 14 in 2004, and the bus bombing during Valentine’s Day in 2005. More than
174 Luke M. Gerdes, Kristine Ringler, and Barbara Autin, “Assessing the Abu Sayyaf Group’s
Strategic and Learning Capacities,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37, no. 3 (2014): 268, DOI:
10.1080/1057610X.2014.872021.
176 Ibid.
177 Rommel Banlaoi, “The ASG Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism,” Southeast Asian
Affairs (2006): 256, DOI: 10.1353/saa.2006.0001.
178 Ibid.
179 Fellman, “Abu Sayyaf Group,” 3.
180 Ibid., 4.
34
150 persons were killed in these incidents and hundreds more were wounded.181 These
terrorist attacks demonstrated that the ASG as a genuine terrorist group, motivated by its
political and religious agenda, which has the capability of conducting terrorist attacks
outside of its traditional area of operations.
While the ASG’s strength has been diminished drastically—to not more than 400
combatants this year—it can still conduct violent attacks because of its capacity to arouse
strong local support from the Muslim population.182 According to Gracia Burnham and
Dean Merrill, a former ASG hostage and author of In the Presence of My Enemies, the
ASG had several supporters from different villages in far-flung and mountainous areas of
Sulu, which made it harder for the AFP to conduct pursuit operations.183 Zachary Abuza
claims that the ASG has emerged as “a serious security threat to the Philippines” and
arguably a threat for peace and security in the region.184 It is one of the smallest and
arguably the most radical and dangerous terrorist group in the Philippines, and is known
to have strong Al Qaeda and JI links. The ASG forged alliances with some MILF
members and became a critical partner for JI.185 This group had also linked with Misuari
Group members or armed men loyal to MNLF leader Nur Misuari, who oftentimes act as
mercenaries or provide sanctuary for the group in exchange for payment.186 Ferdinand
Napuli claims that the ASG offered high-powered firearms and monetary rewards for
potential young recruits to build up its ranks.187
181 Banlaoi, Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah, 39−40.

182 Ferdinand B. Napuli, “Keeping on the Right Track: An Assessment on the Effectiveness of AFP
Responses to ASG Threat” (master’s thesis, National Defense College of the Philippines, Quezon City,
2015), 4.
183 Gracia Burnham and Dean Merrill, In the Presence of My Enemies (Wheaton, Illinois: Tyndale
House, 2003), 40.
184 Abuza, “Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the ASG,” 44.
185 Ibid.
186 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, OG2, Special Report on the ASG Kidnapping
Activities (Taguig City: Production Branch, 2014), 2.
187 Napuli, “Keeping on the Right Track: An Assessment on the Effectiveness of AFP Responses to
ASG Threat,” 25.
35
B. STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES
The various sub-groups of ASG or other lawless elements can still forge tactical
alliances during the conduct of operations and criminal activities.188 However, it is not a
tactical concern for the ASG if they operate as one big group or independently; this group
has the capability of staging small-unit and “high-impact terrorist attacks” not only in
Zamboanga Peninsula, Basilan, and Sulu but also in other parts of the country.189
The ASG is also capable of employing guerilla tactics. The ASG can pin down a
unit up to company size, typically when troops are ambushed in a pre-designated killing
zone.190 According to Banlaoi, “one important strength of the ASG, despite its small
number, is its superb ability to solicit local support.”191 He also claims that one purpose
of the ASG’s kidnapping activities and other criminal acts is to acquire a huge amount of
money in order “to build up its manpower and help the local communities.” In return,
these communities will provide protection and serve as safe haven for the terrorists.192
These ASG-controlled communities also provide crucial logistical support—firearms,
explosives, and ammunitions.193
When the ASG is engaged in its area of operation, it has a “superb capability” to
support besieged members in a short period of time.194 The ASG is extremely effective in
its traditional areas of operation, particularly in Basilan and Sulu Provinces, because of
its mastery of the terrain and crucial support from other armed elements operating within
the area.195 More reinforcements are expected when the engagement area is near Muslim
villages or Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front

189 Ibid.
190 Intelligence and Security Group, Special Report: Assessing ASG’s Capabilities and
Vulnerabilities,” (Taguig City, May 4, 2016), 5.
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid., 54.
195 Ibid., 54−55.
36
(MILF) camps.196 Although the ASG has no direct links with other armed groups or
secessionist movements, most members of the group have relatives either in the MILF or
MNLF.197 Because of tribal, religious, and cultural factors, they may help each other and
fight one common enemy. Banlaoi argues that these alliances can be established by
examining the fact that some ASG members are disgruntled members of either the MNLF
or MILF.198
According to former Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Criminal

Investigation and Detection Group, Police Chief Superintendent Rodolfo Mendoza, “the
alliance between ASG and the MNLF were formed years ago.”199 With regard to the
ASG linkages with the MILF, Thomas McKenna argues that it is probable that some
disgruntled MILF fighters had joined the ASG, and he asserts that “the ASG may be best
viewed as a direct challenge to both the MILF and MNLF, not as an adjunct.” 200 While it
may or may not be true that these groups have direct links with each other, there are some
enterprising Muslims residing near or within the engagement area who have joined and
will join the firefight “purposely to acquire firearms and ammunitions left by government
troops’ casualties.”201
C. IDEOLOGY, OBJECTIVES, AND LEADERSHIP
Contrary to popular belief and some media reports, “the ASG is not a
homogenous organization.”202 This organization is a “highly factionalized group of

197 Ibid., 40−41.
198 Ibid., 40.
199 Rodolfo Mendoza, quoted in Rommel Banlaoi, Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah: Essays on the Abu
Sayyaf Group, 3rd ed. (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research,
2012), 40.
200 Thomas M. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the
Southern Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), quoted in Rommel Banlaoi, Al-
Harakatul Al-Islamiyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group, 3rd ed. (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for
Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research, 2012), 41.
Activities (Taguig City: Production Branch, 2014).
202 De Castro, “Abstract of Counter-Insurgency in the Philippines and the Global War on Terror.
Examining the Dynamics of the Twenty-first Century Long Wars,” 144.
37
radical Muslim terrorists.”203 More exactly, the ASG adopts and operates in semi-
autonomous sub-groups, with the bulk of its forces based in Sulu and Basilan provinces,
and to a lesser extent, in Zamboanga City and Tawi-Tawi province.204 In this kind of
organizational set-up, sub-leaders have full command and control over their respective
operations, particularly in the conduct of atrocities and in the formation of new and
smaller sub-groups.205
The vision of Abdurajak Janjalani when he formed the ASG was to establish a
“highly organized, systematized, and disciplined organization.”206 To achieve his vision,
he recruited young, passionate, and “highly educated Muslim leaders who had studied
Islamic theology in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan, and Egypt.”207 Janjalani’s vision of a
truly organized Islamic resistance movement has an Islamic Executive Council (IEC) that
serves as the main planning and execution body of the ASG. This council is composed of
15 Amirs.208 Under the IEC are two special committees.
In 1998, combined forces of the military and the police killed Abdurajak
Janjalani. This event caused a crumbling of the ASG’s organization and created a
leadership vacuum. The original organizational structure envisioned by Janjalani was
short-lived.209 With no overall leader that would steer and control the organization,
discontent grew among its original members, and it “became [a] mere network of various
armed groups with their own respective Amirs leading and controlling their own loyal
followers.”210 See Figure 3.
203 De Castro, “Abstract of Counter-Insurgency in the Philippines and the Global War on Terror.
Examining the Dynamics of the Twenty-first Century Long Wars,” 144.
205 Ibid., 38.
206 Ibid., 34.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
208 Ibid., 34−35.
209 Rommel Banlaoi, Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They?
(Yuchengco Center, De La Salle University, Manila, 2009), 50.
210 Ibid.
38
Figure 3. ASG Organization Envisioned by Abdurajak Janjalani.211
The death of Abdurajak Janjalani in 1998 further “aggravated the factionalization

of the ASG.”212 The appointment of Khadafy Janjalani, Abdurajak’s younger brother, as
the next supreme leader of the ASG did not entirely resolve the problem of disunity
within the group because “the young Janjalani did not have the ideological zeal and
leadership charisma of his older brother.”213
The main goal of the ASG is to establish an “independent Islamic Theocratic

State of Mindanao,” where Muslims would “follow Islam in its purest and strictest
form.”214 De Castro claims that this group has tried to combine ethno-religious and
ethno-nationalistic ideology with its rampant KFR (Kidnap-for-Ransom) activities.
According to Garrett Atkinson, the primary reason for the formation of the ASG is to
seek justice for all oppressed Muslims in Mindanao.215 Atkinson claims that Janjalani
was immensely motivated by Wahhabi Islam because of his religious education and
211 Source: Banlaoi, Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah, 35.

212 Banlaoi, Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia, 50.
213 Zachary Abuza, “The Philippines: Internal and External Security Challenges,” Australian Strategic
and Policy Institute, special report no. 45 (February 29, 2012): 13,
https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/special-report-issue-45-the-philippines-internal-and-external-security-
challenges.
214 Renato Cruz De Castro, “Abstract of Counter-Insurgency in the Philippines and the Global War on
Terror. Examining the Dynamics of the Twenty-first Century Long Wars,” European Journal of East Asian
Studies 9 (2010): 144, DOI: 10.1163/156805810X517706.
39
radicalization in the Middle East. This primary goal implies a radical view that an Islamic
caliphate in Mindanao can only be achieved through armed struggle. The ASG aimed to
form a social and political system similar to the Islamic Republic of Iran that is free from
infidels or non-believers in Islam.216 To achieve this goal, each member of the ASG must
attain the highest level of religious and political commitment through a rigid process of
radicalization.217
Banlaoi claims, “The ASG has two major factions operating autonomously in
Basilan and Sulu provinces of southern Mindanao.”218 It is important to note that “the
Basilan and Sulu factions of the ASG are also factionalized.”219 It has no devoted leader
on whom its members could rely for their survival.220 Different sub-groups of the ASG
“have mixed objectives, from Islamic fundamentalism to plain banditry.”221
Some ASG sub-commanders are more interested in money through kidnapping

activities, rather than the “idea of a separate Islamic state.”222 Because of the huge
financial gains from KFR operations, some lawless elements in the southern Philippines
want to have an alliance with the ASG for prestige and financial reasons.223 Luke Gerdes,
Kristine Ringler, and Barbara Autin claim that the ASG can be a true extremist
movement and continue to be a strategic threat in Southeast Asia.224 They also stress that
this group has become a group of criminals with no strategic goals and ideology other

217 Ibid.
220 Ibid.
221 Ibid., 91.
222 Ibid., 92.
224 Gerdes, Ringler, and Autin, “Assessing the Abu Sayyaf Group’s Strategic and Learning
Capacities,” 268.
40
than creating an environment of fear and insecurity in the region through various forms of
banditry and other forms of criminal activities.225
D. EVOLUTION OF THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP FROM TERRORISM TO

ORGANIZED CRIME
From an Islamic Movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ASG became
known in the Philippines as a bandit group because of its immense involvement in
criminal activities, particularly in kidnapping and extortions activities. During this period,
it also perpetrated several bombings and other violent attacks targeting innocent civilians
and government troops. When financial support from Al Qaeda was cut off due to the
discovery of the clandestine operations of Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, the brother in law
of Osama Bin Laden, in the Philippines, the ASG resorted to KFR as a primary means of
acquiring crucial resources for the survival of the organization. Since then, the ASG has
actively engaged in KFR as its major source of funds because support from international
terrorist organizations has been limited due to extensive counterterrorism measures of the
Philippine government in collaboration with its regional partners and other allies.
In 2006, the ASG again fluctuated between terrorism and crime and adopted
criminal methods to pursue its objectives. The Philippine government’s successful
counterterrorism measures coupled with focused military operations led to the arrest and
neutralization of key ASG leaders and members.226 Notable in this effort was the
neutralization of its Amir, Khadafy Janjalani. Another key sub-commander in Sulu, Jainal
Antel Sali, was killed through intelligence-driven military operations. This setback led to
the drastic weakening of the ASG in terms of strength and capability to conduct terrorist
attacks. The death of Khadafy Janjalani created an internal rift that further worsened
relationship among its sub-commanders. The ASG cleverly recovered from this setback,
however, when it unleashed a series of KFR activities from 2008 until 2011. The ASG
amassed millions of dollars from these operations, which lured young Muslims to join the
group.
Capacities,” 268.
41
E. CONCLUSION
Despite its small size and mostly operating in southern Mindanao, the ASG
remains the most brutal terrorist organization in the Philippines. In the absence of foreign
funding from foreign terrorist organizations, the ASG has been changing its strategies
and tactics and becoming more resilient. The ASG’s employment of combined terrorist
and criminal methods makes this group more resilient. It also enjoys a robust support
network, alliances with other lawless elements and threat groups, and collaboration with
foreign terrorists. Through its aggressive and effective criminal activities, principally
kidnap for ransom, the ASG successfully generates funds for its sustenance as well as its
terrorist and criminal operations. Although the military approach may decimate this
group, it seems ineffective to prevent further terrorist attacks or more specifically curb its
KFR operations. Facing a hybrid organization, the Philippine government must consider
as well a hybrid response that comprises a balanced application of criminal and military
approaches. It is important, however, that comprehensive political and socio-economic
measures must be instituted to deter others from joining the ASG and to prevent future
acts of terrorism and crime.
42
III. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP’S PLACE ON THE CRIME-
TERROR CONTINUUM
In 2004, according to Kofi Annan, a former UN Secretary-General, organized

crime groups have evolved and are continuously adapting in “today’s globalized
economy and sophisticated technology,” but the integrated efforts—intelligence sharing
and joint law enforcement operations—of democracies remain “fragmented” and current
measures are almost obsolete.227 Mitchel Roth and Murat Sever have long agreed that
terrorist organizations have used criminal methods and relentlessly engage in various
criminal activities.228 Roth and Sever pose one important question, however: “When does
a criminal enterprise become a terrorist group or vice versa?”229 They claim that various
government officials and police organizations have been dodging the issue about the
definition and label of terrorism and organized crime.230 Many security experts
characterize these groups based on one particular criterion, namely whether they are
driven by their political or economic goals.231
Knowing and understanding the definitions of terrorism and organized crime can
be helpful and crucial for the Philippine government to come up with effective
approaches and responses against a hybrid organization—the ASG. As Banlaoi points
out, the ASG has mutated into a “hybrid violent group.”232 It is incorrect to view this
organization as an ordinary criminal group or genuine terrorist group because it has
227 “United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto,”
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed August 15, 2016,
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf.
228 Mitchel P. Roth and Murat Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate:
Funding Terrorism Through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 10
(August 20, 2007): 901, DOI: 10.1080/10576100701558620.
229 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate,” 901.
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid.
232 Rommel Banlaoi, “Duterte’s Challenges: Terror, Crime and the ASG,” Rappler Philippines, May
13, 2016, http://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/132875-duterte-challenges-terror-crime-abu-sayyaf.
43
shifted into a “dubious multiple character” that demonstrates the attitude of a brutal
criminal group and dangerous behavior of a terrorist organization.233
This chapter argues that the ASG has reached the first three phases—Alliances,
Operational Motivations, Convergence—of Makarenko’s CTC model. This CTC model
illustrates the interaction—and interoperability—of crime and terror on a continuum,
which theoretically explains the convergence of crime and terror at a central point.234
This chapter is organized as follows: First, it highlights various definitions of organized
crime and some significant similarities and differences as compared with terrorism, but
this section deals more on organized crime since several definitions of terrorism have
been discussed in Chapter I. Second, it outlines and explains one by one the four points of
the continuum—Alliances, Operational Motivations, Convergence, and the “Black Hole.”
Third, it discusses the case of the ASG and considers its position on the Crime-Terror
Continuum. Finally, this chapter highlights some significant sources of the ASG’s
resilience.
A. ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM: A COMPARISON
Defining exactly what organized crime is, like terrorism, arouses debate among
security experts and lawmakers alike.235 Jay Albanese defines organized crime as a
“continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illegal activities [and
whose] continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats, monopoly
control, and/or the corruption of public officials.”236 For the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), organized crime is defined as follows:
Any group having some manner of a formalized structure and whose

primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such
groups maintain their position through the use of actual or threatened
233 Banlaoi, “Duterte’s Challenges: Terror, Crime and the ASG.”

235 Megan Warshawsky, “Re-Examining the Crime-Terror Continuum: Understanding the Interplay
Between Criminals and Terrorists” (master’s thesis, University of North Carolina, 2013), 9,
https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/record/uuid:dc286d0a-bf56-46c7-9aa3-b87b00eb48dc.
236 Jay S. Albanese, “Causes of Organized Crime: Do Criminals Organize Around Opportunities for
Crime or Do Criminal Opportunities Create New Offenders?” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice
16, no. 4 (November 2000): 411, DOI: 10.1177/1043986200016004004.
44
violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or extortion, and generally have a
significant impact on the people in their locales, region, or the country as a
whole.237
The European Union’s criminal intelligence agency defines organized crime as

“having as its central goal, the pursuit of profit and/or power.”238 This definition suggests
that power is an independent and separate goal from profit, which clearly demonstrates
that the distinction between terrorism and organized crime critically rests on how scholars
understand the nature of politics.239
Annan argues that organized crime is a global challenge and criminal

organizations have taken advantage of “globalized economy and the technology that goes
with it.”240 Each member state of the UN must exploit the same factors—“openness and
opportunities of globalization”—being used by these criminal organizations to conduct
crimes and other violent activities, which explicitly and gravely violate human rights.241
Annan points out that “if crime crosses borders, so must law enforcement.”242 He claims
that if criminal organizations mock the laws of civilized nations, then those “who defend
it cannot limit themselves to purely national means.”243 In December 2000, the UN
ratified “United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the
Protocols Thereto” as a tool and augmentation in combating transnational crime. This
Protocol defined organized crime as:
A structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time

and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious
crimes or offences [an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of
237 “Organized Crime,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed July 15, 2016,
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/organizedcrime/glossary.
238 Harmonie Toros and Luca Mavelli, “Terrorism, Organized Crime and the Biopolitics of Violence,”
Critical Studies on Terrorism, 6, no. 1 (April 05, 2013): 77, DOI: 10.1080/17539153.2013.765701.
239 Toros and Mavelli, “Terrorism, Organized Crime and the Biopolitics of Violence,” 78.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, iii.
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid.
45
liberty of at least four years or more serious penalty]…in order to obtain,
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.244
As articulated in this Protocol, organized crime can be classified as transnational

if four conditions are met:
It is committed in more than one state; in one state but a substantial part of
its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another state;
in one state but involves an organized criminal group that engages in
criminal activities in more than one state; or in one state but has
substantial effects in another state.245
Jennifer Hesterman asserts that the UN Protocol, also known as the “Palermo
Convention,” provided a universally accepted binding document that address
transnational organized crime, and it proposes globally accepted definition of debatable
term such as “trafficking, confiscation, and organized crime.”246
On the other hand, Howard Abadinsky suggests another contentious issue about
the definition of organized crime. He argues that conventional crime is different from
organized crime, and one variable that distinguish them from each other is the
“perpetuity.”247 To illustrate this point, Abadinsky compares Jesse James with the Al
Capone case: both of them, criminal gangs. The Jesse Games Gang, which is considered
a conventional crime group, ended in 1882 when its leader died, while Al Capone’s
imprisonment and death did not keep the organized crime group to which he belonged—
the U.S. mafia—from surviving into the 21st century. Abadinsky suggests eight attributes
that constitute organized crime: “1) has no political goals; 2) is hierarchical; 3) has a
limited or exclusive membership; 4) constitutes a unique subculture; 5) perpetuates
themselves; 6) exhibits a willingness to use illegal violence; 7) is monopolistic; 8) is
governed by explicit rules and regulations.”248
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 5.
245 Ibid., 6.
246 Jennifer L. Hesterman, The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels,
Organized Crime, and Terror Groups (Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis, 2013), 25.
247 Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime, 10th ed. (CA: Wadsworth, 2012), 2.
248 Ibid., 3.
46
Both terrorism and crime employ and benefit from illegal activities, and they tend
to have similar structures that make them more effective and efficient as an organization.
Significantly, organized crime has been a global concern that requires a collective
response of various nations. Criminal organizations cross borders and take advantage of
the concept of “open borders and free markets” among democracies.249 Criminals have
no political objectives; they use intimidation and violence for money, which they, like
any terrorist organization, must have in order to survive.
Hesterman writes that “the lifeblood of any nefarious organization”—criminals or

terrorists—is money.250 Freeman claims that “terrorism costs money,” and without
financial mechanisms, a terrorist organization cannot conduct and sustain its violent
activities, recruit, and survive as a group.251 Terrorists are expert and well experienced in
employing violent means to intimidate or coerce the populace, but just like any
organization, they need money for their operational expenses.252 Kjell Hausken and
Dipak Gupta claim that to attain continuous and steady sources of funds, terrorist groups
must employ criminal methods, which, as a result, attract members who have no
ideological motivations.253 These groups get extensively involved in criminal activities;
thus, in the end, they lose their “ideological orientation” and “political support base.”254
On the other hand, organized crime may opt to use terror tactics to coerce or intimidate
the populace, but it is done to “achieve financial gains.”255
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, iii.
250 Hesterman, The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, Organized
Crime, and Terror Groups, 4.
251 Michael Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism 34, no. 6 (May 20, 2011): 461, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2011.571193.
252 Ibid.
253 Kjell Hausken and Dipak K. Gupta, “Government Protection Against Terrorism and Crime,”
Global Crime 16, no. 2 (March 26, 2015): 60, DOI: 10.1080/17440572.2015.1019612.
254 Ibid.
255 Toros and Mavelli, “Terrorism, Organized Crime and the Biopolitics of Violence,” 77.
47
B. MAKARENKO’S CRIME-TERROR CONTINUUM
This section illustrates the interaction and interoperability of terrorism and crime
using Makarenko’s CTC. This continuum has four distinct phases, which can explain
collaboration and alliance between terrorists and criminals, and it supports the hypothesis
that the ASG has evolved into a hybrid organization.
1. Alliance Formation
The first phase in the continuum plane is alliance, which basically pertains to the
collaboration between organized crime and terrorism. But organized crime and terrorist
organizations have realized the inherent organizational and security problems present in
alliances. These problems emanate from differences over “priorities and strategies,
distrust, danger of defections, and possible competitions over turf and money.” 256 To
survive and continuously exist, a terrorist organization must always follow its “guiding
principle” and must maintain its operational security by maintaining utmost secrecy in
recruitment, preempting infiltration, and punishing disloyalty among its ranks.257 Thus,
despite obvious advantages of alliances between crime and terrorist groups, this mutual
relationship is only temporary and both organizations still intend to cut off any
connection between them.258
The alliance as the first relationship between organized crime and terrorism as
illustrated in the Makarenko’s CTC is also called the “basic level of cooperation.”259 This
kind of relationship may exist for a short or long period of time, depending on the mutual
cooperation between criminal and terrorist groups.260 At this point of the continuum, the
association between terrorists and criminals are growing stronger in order to learn and
acquire certain skills from each other. Both of them intend to seek “expert knowledge”
256 Makarenko, “Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime,” 175.

257 Brian Michael Jenkins, “New Age of Terrorism,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006,
123, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1215.html.
259 Ulas Yildiz, “Combating Commercial Terrorists: The PKK Case” (master’s thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2015), 27,
260 Ibid.
48
such as “smuggling, money laundering, counterfeiting, or bomb-making techniques.”261
Also, these alliances can occur to get “operational support” such as access to smuggling
routes, procurement of firearms and explosives, and other important logistical
supplies.262
One good example of this kind of alliance is the case of the Albanian Mafia263
and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The Albanian Mafia has been known as a
notorious organized crime organization in terms of producing and trafficking drugs. This
group has also been involved in other illegal and criminal activities such as “human
trafficking, arms trading, contract killing, kidnapping, etc.”264 The terrorist perspective of
the Albanian Mafia is best explained through an alliance with the KLA, a terrorist group
that fought for the liberation of Kosovo from Serbia. To protect its organization and
continuously survive as an organized crime organization, it must create an atmosphere of
social and political instability, which further explains why it needs to maintain an alliance
with a terrorist group.265
As Makarenko claims, it is critical for any terrorist organization to achieve

political unrest because this kind of unstable environment destroys the credibility and
legitimacy of the central government in the eyes of the people it tries to protect and gain
support from.266 See Figure 4.
261 Tamara Makarenko, “Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime,” 174.

262 Ibid.
263 The Albanian Mafia (AM) or Albanian Organized Crime (AOC) is an organization composed of
various “ethnic Albanian family clans,” whose criminal activities and influence span an area covering three
continents. This group is widely involved in drug trafficking and arms smuggling. Notably, this group has
been active in the United States and the European Union (EU). Source: University of California Press Blog,
http://www.ucpress.edu/blog/18856/decoding-albanian-organized-crime/.
264 Warshawsky, “Re-Examining the Crime-Terror Continuum,” 21.
265 Ibid.
49
Figure 4. The Crime-Terror Continuum.267
2. Operational Motivations
The second component of the CTC—operational motivations—highlights how

criminal groups employ terrorism as an operational tool, and in the same manner, how
terrorist groups use criminal activities as an operational tool.268 It was only at the
beginning of the 1990s that terrorist groups significantly employed criminal methods as
the main source of financing for future operations.269 As Makarenko claims, the post-
Cold War era greatly affected the operational environment of several criminal and
terrorist groups, and drove them to shift their operational priorities and focus.270 Megan
Warshawsky writes that the collapse of the former USSR resulted in the creation of
several failed states, and this incident was exploited by criminals and terrorists alike to
their advantage.271 Organized crime and terrorist groups have been using weak or failing
states as their safe haven and base of operations.272 This condition led organized crime
groups to change the operational environment in some weak states, and since terrorist
groups had lost financial support from their state sponsors, they began to engage actively
in criminal activities.273
267 Adapted from Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum,” 131.

270 Ibid.
272 Ibid.
50
Although organized crime groups have employed terror to achieve their objectives
and apparently engaged the political dimension, notably the main purpose for such
actions was merely “to secure their operational environment.”274 Sustaining their illegal
activities to maximize financial gains remains the primary motivation for these groups
resorting to terror tactics. The series of car-bomb attacks carried out by the Italian Mafia
in the 1990s is a good example of how criminal groups influence their operational
environment. Although these terror attacks seem to give the lie to studies that hold that
organized crime seeks to remain unnoticed by the public, the Italian Mafia, as one
example, has realized the effectiveness of reaching a wider audience—through terroristic
acts.275 Thus, after a series of attacks, terrorism as an operational tool “forced the
[Italian] government into negotiation and compromise.”276
On the other hand, many terrorist groups have opted to maximize the use of
criminal methods as an operational tool to secure crucial funds for its future operations.
The FARC277 is a terrorist organization that extensively engaged in the illegal drug trade.
Other terrorist groups such as “Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey, and Sendero Luminoso in Peru” are all
involved in various criminal activities.278 The ASG has relentlessly engaged in
kidnapping, and these criminal activities have become its main source of funds.
It is also important, however, to note that these above-mentioned terrorist groups

still retain their political objectives, and criminal methods are only used to secure funds
in order to achieve their political ends.279 From the 1990s to the present, many organized
crime and terrorist groups have been observed to have “lost sight of their original

276 Ibid.
277 The biggest irregular army in Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC) “operates in various regions of the country in search of
resources to fund their 50-year-old war against the government.” This organization employs various
criminal activities—drug trade, kidnapping, and extortion—to support its political and military operations
against the Colombian government. Source: InSightCrime, “Organized Crime Groups,”
http://www.insightcrime.org/component/tags/tag/139-organized-crime-groups?limit=10&start=40.
279 Ibid.
51
motivations and aims.”280 These groups have evolved into a hybrid organization in which
their “motivations, organization, and operations” have converged. As Makarenko points
out, this convergence makes it “analytically difficult” to distinguish where is the thin line
that divides organized crime and terrorism.281
3. Convergence
The final point of the crime-terror continuum is the “convergence thesis.” At this
level, both organized crime and terrorist groups have converged into a single entity, but
they are still capable of transforming themselves into an entity that can be seen at the
opposite end of the continuum.282 See Figure 5.
Figure 5. The Converging Threats.283
At the “convergence thesis,” both criminal and terrorist groups have reached the
category of “hybrid organizations” and acquire some hybrid characteristics.284 Thus, both
criminal and terrorist groups have now the capacity to transform into crime or terrorism,
and totally change their “aims and motivations” as an organization. In this case, both

283 Source: Makarenko, “Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime,” 179.
52
criminal and terrorist groups have departed from their original identity of political or
criminal entities.285
In “New Age of Terrorism,” Brian Michael Jenkins argues that terrorists are not
“monolithic,” which means that their actions are shaped by “culture, ideology, and
politics.”286 He claims that terrorist groups are capable of innovating tactics, exploiting
the latest technology, and learning from other organizations’ successes.287 As Makarenko
asserts, terrorist groups can shift their operations to crime because of financial gains,
while organized crime groups can turn themselves into terrorists to gain “political
leverage” and disrupt the judicial and legislative process of the government.288 With this,
Makarenko offers two independent components of the convergence thesis: political crime
and commercial terrorism. Although both of them are independent variables, they are still
related to each other as explained below:
a. Political Crime
Political crime pertains to a particular organized crime group that seeks political
objectives, and at the same time has been motivated by the financial or material gains of
its actions. This category is further sub-divided into two parts.289 First, it encompasses
criminal groups who employ terror tactics to further their political objectives by gearing
their terroristic activities toward the disruption of the political or judicial processes of the
country. These criminal groups exert much effort “to block anti-crime legislation” and
gain political control through direct intervention in the political arena and activities of
some government institutions.290
The second category under the first component pertains to the capacity of a
criminal organization to employ terror tactics to attain control or monopoly over

286 Brian Michael Jenkins, “New Age of Terrorism,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1215.html.
287 Ibid.
290 Ibid., 136.
53
economic sectors and financial institutions of the state. In this case, however, the ultimate
objective of a criminal organization is still “to gain political control over the states.” As
Makarenko argues, in a modern era of free market and capitalist economy, economic
strength is one of the crucial components of having a strong political power. The
convergence of crime and terrorism in Albania is one good example of this political
crime. Since the Albanian Mafia had been linked to “Pan-Albanian ideals, politics,
military activities, and terrorism,” it procured arms and military equipment for the
KLA.291 Additionally, members of the Albanian criminal and terrorist groups have dual
and interchangeable membership, and they share the same recruitment base to beef up
their strength.292
b. Commercial Terrorism
The second component of the convergence thesis pertains to the active

engagement of terrorist groups in criminal activities. In this category, terrorist
organizations are no longer motivated by their political agenda, but they focus more on
the financial rewards that they can get from various criminal activities.293 In commercial
terrorism, terrorist groups still use their political rhetoric and ideologies to mask and
justify their criminal activities from the public. A terrorist organization may not survive
without the crucial support of the people, particularly those who are within their area of
operations or controlled territories. This public support is critically important to
manipulate and maintain terrorist support networks to enhance operational capabilities of
the organization. For this reason those hybrids—falling under the complex identity of
crime and terrorism—continue to exploit political grievances and portray plausible
justifications for their purely criminal deeds.294
Despite involvement in criminal activities, however, commercial terrorists still

recognize the crucial role of using terrorism as a tool for two major reasons. First,

292 Ibid.
293 Ibid.
294 Ibid., 137.
54
terrorism sways the government and law enforcement units to focus their investigation on
the political aspects, rather than initiating criminal investigations after the attacks.
Second, terror tactics serve as leverage against the threat posed by rival criminal
groups.295 Some terrorist organizations demonstrate this kind of convergence in which
they have evolved primarily as criminal groups; examples include the FARC, the ASG,
and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. These organizations are mostly involved in the
drug trade, kidnapping, smuggling of arms and goods, and other illegal activities.296
4. The “Black Hole” Thesis
At this phase, both terrorists and criminals have successfully destabilized the
political situation of a particular country and sway the popular support against the
government. The final phase of Makarenko’s CTC model refers to a specific situation
wherein weak or failed states become a suitable environment for the convergence of
organized crime and terrorism. At this point in the continuum, an ideal and safe
environment has been achieved by both criminals and terrorists for their violent, illegal,
or unrestricted operations.297 As Makarenko argues, the “black hole” is the biggest threat
to international security because at this level, political crime and commercial terrorism
have reached a point wherein both organized crime and terrorist organizations “gained
economic and political control over a state.”298 When this situation emerges, two types of
situation will prevail. First, the “black hole” syndrome can trigger chaos, display
characteristics of anarchy, and show signs of political instability that can lead and
develop into failed states such as the case of Afghanistan.299
Second, the “black hole” can create a “criminal state” such as North Korea. To
protect the regime and secure their control and power, these nations extensively use terror

297 Ibid., 138.
299 Ibid.
55
tactics. A sector of elite government officials arguably uses their power and position to
maximize profits from various illegal and criminal activities.300
C. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP’S PLACE ON THE CRIME-TERROR

CONTINUUM
According to Antonio Maria Costa, former Executive Director of the United

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Organized crime has globalized and
turned into one of the world’s foremost economic and armed powers.”301 UNODC also
claims that, globally, organized crime and terrorism have been converging. 302 Terrorist
and criminal organizations are taking advantage of their “specialized skills and assets.”303
This convergence paves the way for the emergence of hybrid organizations that
demonstrate a remarkable relationship between criminals and terrorists. The ASG
demonstrates this kind of mutation: from its roots as a mere Islamic Movement it evolved
into a genuine terrorist organization, which has connections and support from some
foreign terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and the regional terror group—Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) of Southeast Asia. Now, the ASG had been extensively involved in
criminal activities, particularly in kidnapping, in collaboration and alliance with various
criminal and lawless elements in the Southern Philippines. This section will discuss the
mutation of the ASG that will be highlighted in the first three phases—Alliance,
Operational Motivations, and Convergence—of Makarenko’s CTC model.
1. Terrorism-Crime Period of the Abu Sayyaf Group
The main goal of the ASG is to create an Islamic state in Mindanao, and this
group realized that armed struggle and linkages with other foreign terrorist organizations

301 “Organized Crime Has Globalized and Turned into a Security Threat,” United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime, accessed October 10, 2016,
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2010/June/organized-crime-has-globalized-and-turned-
into-a-security-threat.html.
302 Steven D’Alfonso, “Why Organized Crime and Terror Groups Are Converging,” Security
Intelligence, accessed October 27, 2016, https://securityintelligence.com/why-organized-crime-and-terror-
groups-are-converging/.
303 Ibid.
56
are crucial to this goal.304 The M/V Doulos incident marked the beginning of the ASG as
one of the terrorist groups in Mindanao. This terrorist attack was publicly acknowledged
by the ASG, and its popularity immediately spread in the Southern Philippines.305 Soon
after the 9/11 attack in the United States, the ASG was listed as a foreign terrorist
organization by the U.S. State Department.306 This designation led to a stronger
cooperation and collaboration between the United States and the Philippines to combat
terrorism, particularly the threat from the ASG. According to Linda Robinson, Patrick B.
Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak, to defeat the ASG and its local and foreign affiliates, the
Philippines must enhance its military capability in terms of intelligence gathering,
training, and more-capable special units.307
In this period of pure terrorism, the ASG perpetrated numerous notable terrorist
attacks such as bombings, assassinations, mass executions, beheadings, and kidnappings.
Atkinson claims that the most prominent signature of these atrocities was its “extreme
ruthlessness and wanton disregard for life, especially those of Christians.”308
The period of 1991 to 1995 was the initial terror campaign perpetrated by the
ASG in which several high-profile terrorist attacks—mass killings, bombings,
beheadings, and kidnappings—were executed as a way of introducing themselves as a
“full-fledged terrorist group.”309 The “Ipil Massacre” was one of the worst attacks
perpetrated by this group in collusion with some members of the MILF in 1995. In this
incident, the ASG raided the municipality of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay Province, killing
306 Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the
Philippines, 2001–2014,” RAND Corporation, accessed September 16, 2016, xxii,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1236.html.
307 Ibid.
308 Garret Atkinson, “ASG: The Father of the Swordsman,” American Security Project, March 2012,
5, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Abu-Sayyaf-The-Father-of-the-
Swordsman.pdf.
309 Ibid., 6.
57
80–100 innocent civilians, looting millions of pesos from commercial banks, and burning
the center of the town.310
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the ASG’s “bold and publicity-driven attacks” surged

during its early years of formation, and the period 1995−2001 can be correctly
categorized as a “period of banditry.”311 Although there were some notable terrorist
attacks against innocent civilians during this period, the ASG changed its focus to
kidnapping activities for monetary purposes.312 According to Banlaoi, some of the high-
profile kidnapping activities of the ASG can be categorized as “serious maritime terrorist
attacks.”313 This group pronounced some explicit political objectives to justify its
criminal activities. The ASG issued various demands such as “to recognize the
establishment of the independent Islamic State in the Southern Philippines, to recognize
alleged human rights violations against Filipino Muslims, and to protect the ancestral
fishing areas in Mindanao.”314 For the period of 1991 to 2000, the ASG was credited
with 378 terrorist attacks, which killed 288 people. This group also perpetrated 640
incidents of kidnapping that involved 2,076 hostages.315 The ASG, however, also
perpetrated several major terrorist attacks from 2001 to 2009 as enumerated below:
 Pearl Farm Beach Resort kidnapping on 22 May 2001, involving 20
hostages
 Jehovah’s Witnesses kidnapping in August 2002 involving six members.

Two of them were beheaded.
 Zamboanga City Bombing in October 2002, killing an American soldier
 Davao International Airport Bombing on 5 March 2003, killing 21 people

and injuring 148 others
310 Stephen Cohn, “Countering the Lingering Threat of the Abu Sayyaf Group” (master’s thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September 2007), 20,
312 Ibid.
314 Ibid.
58
 Superferry 14 bombing on 24 February 2004, killing 116 people and
injuring 300 others. This incident was regarded as the worst man-made
disaster in Philippine waters since 9/11 and the worst terrorist attack in
Asia since the 2002 Bali Bombing.
 Valentine’s Day bombings on 14 February 2005 in Makati City, Davao

City and General Santos City. These bombings resulted in the death of 11
people and injury of 93 others.
 The kidnapping of TV journalist Ces Drilon and her crew on 23

September 2008
 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Kidnapping on 15

January 2009, involving three personnel, and Sri Lankan Peace Worker
Kidnapping on 13 February 2009316
2. Period of Alliance with Lawless Elements and Other Threat Groups
In the mid-1990s, the Philippines discovered that Al Qaeda was providing

financial support to the ASG through the clandestine activities of Osama Bin Laden’s
brother in law—Mohammed Jamal Khalifa.317 When the support of foreign terrorist
organization stopped in the late 1990s, the ASG began its series of kidnapping
operations. During this period, the ASG executed the daring kidnapping operations in
Sipadan Island Resort of Sabah, Malaysia and the Dos Palmas Resort in Palawan. In
2000, the ASG also perpetrated the highly publicized kidnapping of public elementary
school teachers in Basilan.
According to Professor Octavio Dinampo of Mindanao State University, who has

the traumatic experience of having been an ASG hostage, the ASG’s main advantage is
its “wider network of external groups.”318 He points out that this robust network with
other lawless elements helped the ASG to successfully conduct kidnappings and evade
pursuing government troops.319 From the ASG’s perspective, establishing an alliance
with different criminal elements proved to be the best option, particularly at the tactical

318 Aya Lowe, “Kidnapping Cases Could Rise Amid Philippine Election Season: Police,” Channel
News Asia, February 20, 2016, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/kidnapping-cases-
could/2533198.html.
319 Ibid.
59
level. This kind of alliance enhances each other’s operational capabilities, proficiencies,
and skills in terms of conducting terrorist and criminal activities. When lawless elements
successfully abducted its victim, this group will immediately transfer the hostages to the
ASG, and in this case, the ASG will just send a team to pick up the hostages along the
pre-designated point, which is normally somewhere along the coastline of Zamboanga
Peninsula.320
As Mayola claims, the ASG utilizes various cells of lawless elements as

“workhorses,” and these criminal elements conduct surveillance and casing of
prospective targets, to act as a take down or “snatch team,” to hide the hostages, to act as
negotiators, and other essential tasks in kidnapping operations.321 In some cases of
kidnapping, the ASG is allegedly involved in alliances with rogue elements of the MILF
because of “familial or personal ties” between the members of the ASG and MILF.322
3. Operational Tool Period
According to Makarenko, history reveals that organized crime groups employ

terror tactics in order to achieve their organizational objectives and goals. 323 She claims
that these criminal organizations, whether domestic or transnational groups, had
extensively used terror tactics to further their ultimate aims.324 Regarding the case of
some criminal elements operating in the area where the presence and strong influence of
the ASG are known, these groups do not seem to be directly involved in terrorism or
known to use terror tactics to harm innocent civilians. These criminal elements are not
perpetrating bombing or mass killings of innocent civilians but, in a certain way, they are
indirect accomplices to the terrorist attacks and other violent activities of the ASG.325
320 Based on the assessment of the author from one of his Development Reports as Field Station
Commander, 9th ISU, ISG, PA. The area of responsibility of 9th ISU covers the whole Zamboanga
Peninsula, Basilan, and Sulu Provinces.
321 Mayola, “Crime and Terror Nexus in Terrorist Financing Philippines.”
322 Ibid.
324 Ibid.
325 Alvarez, “A Case Study on ASG Group Kidnapping for Ransom,” 82.
60
Because these groups’ principal motivation is money, they are more ardent in
various illegal activities such as kidnapping, arms and drug trafficking, extortion, and
gun-for-hire. These criminal organizations, however, could be tapped to procure firearms
and explosives for the ASG. Since these lawless elements can easily blend in and roam
around and have the mastery of urban operations, they are more efficient and effective in
providing safe haven and logistical support for the ASG.
On the other hand, the ASG benefits from this alliance with various criminal
elements through sharing of knowledge, expertise, and techniques in conducting
kidnapping operations. Criminal groups and lost commands of the MILF and MNLF
seem to have perfected the conduct of illegal activities in Western Mindanao. Despite the
presence of numerous military and police checkpoints coupled with a naval blockade off
the waters of Zamboanga Peninsula, abduction continuous as a major concern and has
failed to stop. Lawless elements are known to be good in this method of kidnapping
wealthy Filipinos or foreigners in Zamboanga Peninsula. In the absence of foreign
funding since the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the ASG has relied on criminal
activities as its operational tool to acquire funds.326 Aside from this kidnapping spree,
this group has also been involved in extortion in the form of zakat (a religious tax), arms
smuggling, “counterfeiting of goods, illegal drug sales or serving as bodyguards for local
politicians.”327
D. SOURCES OF RESILIENCE
The ASG’s operational resilience as a terrorist organization has largely been

attributed to its robust support network, linkages with other threat groups for criminal
activities, and protection from corrupt politicians.328 Furthermore, this group has a superb
ability to recruit young Muslim fighters from sympathetic villages in Basilan, Sulu, and
Tawi-Tawi Provinces through material incentives.329 Banlaoi claims that in the Sulu

327 Ibid.
328 Ibid., 91−92.
329 Ibid.
61
Province alone, “46% or 115 of its total 251 villages are affected by the ASG, in Basilan,
25% of its 187 villages are affected by ASG.”330 Moreover, he mentioned that ASG
leaders have also “mastered the skills” of colluding with various lawless elements to
conduct kidnappings and other criminal activities.331 He argues that the problems
emanating from the ASG are an offshoot of long decades of conflict in the Southern
Philippines. These “complex tensions” sprouted the collaboration of “criminal, political,
and militant groups” with shared common objectives and goals for the betterment of
Mindanao.332
Some local politicians in Western Mindanao reportedly protected some leaders

and members of the ASG because some of these politicians are also benefiting from the
criminal and other illegal activities of the ASG.333 Based on the records and assessment
of the PNP, prior to a national or local election, kidnapping incidents increased in
Western Mindanao.334 Some local politicians allegedly financed kidnapping operations in
collusion with the ASG to generate funds for their political ambition.335 These politicians
also employed some members of the ASG as “part of their private militias.”336
Although the ASG remains as a terrorist organization, however, some of its

members have realized that it is far better to do kidnapping operations because of the
utmost rewards that come with it, which are money and power.337 According to Banlaoi,
some of its sub-commanders have become more interested or motivated in doing
kidnapping operations than the promise of establishing a separate and independent
Islamic state in Mindanao.338 The collusion and collaboration of the ASG with various
lawless elements and some crooked politicians not only perpetuate the tensions and

331 Ibid.
332 Ibid., 87.
333 Ibid., 92.
334 Lowe, “Kidnapping Cases Could Rise Amid Philippine Election Season.”
336 Ibid.
337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
62
violence in the southern part of Mindanao, but it has also become the primary source of
resiliency of this terrorist organization.339
E. CONCLUSION
Although organized crime and terrorist organizations demonstrate some

similarities and differences, it is hard to distinguish their unique characteristics in terms
of crime and terrorism because in most cases, they are fused at various levels. As
Makarenko concludes, most terrorist groups today do not always behave in a rational
way; in some cases, their actions and behaviors can be unpredictable.340 As criminal and
terrorist organizations operating in the southern part of Mindanao have mutated into a
single entity or are known as “hybrid organizations,” the Philippine government must
anticipate its strategy and be flexible and responsive to the changing security situation on
the ground.341
Makarenko’s CTC model is a good theoretical framework, which provides a

better understanding of the complex relationship between organized crime and terrorist
organizations. The ASG will continue to use criminal methods, particularly kidnapping,
because it is the most practical avenue to secure funds for its operations and continuous
survival. The alliance formed by the ASG with various lawless elements has proven
crucial for its survival, and it will be a long-term relationship. Lawless elements and other
criminal groups in the southern part of Mindanao provide not only additional armed
members, but also expertise and critical operational support for future terrorist
operations.
Without money as the life blood of any organization and cessation of foreign
funding from other international terrorist organizations, the ASG will remain a “hybrid
organization” and will not forego strong alliances with lawless elements and other
criminal groups in the Western part of Mindanao. Criminal activities will remain a potent
weapon or operational tool of this group. The ASG had acquired millions of pesos from

340 Makarenko, “Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime,” 184−185.
63
its kidnapping activities; thus, abandoning these criminal acts may just create opposition
and conflict among its sub-commanders and members. If money is the lifeblood of any
organization, it can also be the root of internal conflict and jealousy among and between
its members.
64
IV. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP’S KIDNAPPING ACTIVITIES
James J.F. Forest claims that getting the exact data about kidnapping incidents
globally is quite impossible to achieve because of the complexities of how governments
and families of kidnap victims respond or handle the hostage situations. 342 In most cases,
details of the negotiations and ransom payments remain secret because in most countries,
it is the prerogative of the victim’s families to seek or not seek the help of the authorities
to resolve the situation. In most countries and as part of their counterterrorism measures,
it is a state policy of no negotiation or concessions to any terrorist organization. In some
cases, however, the government policy of no concession or no ransom payment may put
the lives of the kidnap victims at risk.
To clearly understand the main source of financing of the ASG, specifically the
Kidnap-for-Ransom (KFR) operations, this chapter highlights and provides an in-depth
analysis of the ASG’s kidnapping activities and trends from 2000 to 2014. It also outlines
and explains the motivations and modus operandi of the group. Some of the factors that
contribute to the relentless kidnappings are also discussed in this chapter. The period
covered is sub-divided into six distinct periods and highlights some notable factors and
explanations about the decline or surge of kidnapping incidents in Mindanao, especially
in Zamboanga Peninsula, Basilan, and the Sulu Archipelago. Additionally, this section
discusses the ASG’s motivations, ransom scheme, modus operandi, and significant
factors that contribute to the relentless kidnappings in the southern part of Mindanao.
A. ANALYSIS OF THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP’S KIDNAPPING TRENDS
Because of the ASG’s desire to gain the attention of international terrorist

organizations and other extremist groups and personalities, it embarked on a series of
kidnappings, which explains the prevalence of kidnapping incidents from 1991 to
1999.343 This period also explains why the majority of the victims were non-Muslims.
342 James J.F. Forest, “Global Trends in Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups,” Global Change, Peace &
Security 24, no. 3 (October 8, 2012): 313-314, DOI: 10.1080/14781158.2012.714766.
343 Philip Alvarez, “A Case Study on ASG Group Kidnapping for Ransom: Okonek-Dielen
Kidnapping” (master’s thesis, Ateneo De Manila University, January 2016), 2.
65
During this period, kidnapping activities served as the main source of funds of the ASG
and its continued existence. In the same manner, the kidnappings allowed the group to
project itself as a dedicated and genuine Islamic movement in the southern Philippines.344
See Figure 6.
Figure 6. ASG Kidnapping Incidents 1991−1999.345
From 2000 to 2014, an upsurge in ASG’s KFR activities led to a total of 225
recorded incidents, with 623 kidnap victims. The group carried out both high-impact and
small-scale kidnappings during this period, targeting locals as well as foreign nationals
within and outside the group’s traditional areas of operations. See Figure 7.

345 Source: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, OJ2, ASG Kidnapping for Ransom
Activities (Quezon City: IRAD, 2014).
66
Legend: KIDNAPPING – Pertains to the number of incidents or cases of abduction
perpetrated by the ASG. NR OF KVs – Number of Kidnap Victims of the ASG.
Figure 7. ASG Kidnapping Incidents 2000−2014.346
For 2000 to 2001, there was an increase in kidnapping incidents, which can be
attributed to the death of the previous Amir, ASG founder Abdurajak Janjalani. Based on
the assessment of the AFP, during this period, the international terrorist organizations,
specifically Al Qaeda, cut their financial support to the ASG amid the death of the
group’s founder.347 Also, this period was characterized by instability for the leadership of
the ASG because some sub-commanders were aspiring to become Amir.348
In this period, the ASG was heavily involved in kidnapping activities. In year
2000−2001 alone, there were 142 incidents of kidnapping that resulted in the death of 16
victims; all of them were attributed to the ASG.349 From 2000 to 2001, the ASG gained its
notoriety in the conduct of kidnapping due to its involvement in the series of high-profile
kidnapping activities in the towns of Sumisip and Lamitan, both of Basilan Province; Dos
Palmas Beach Resort, Puerto Princesa, Palawan; and Sipadan Island, Sabah, Malaysia. In the
town of Sumisip, Basilan, 60 public school teachers and children were abducted and used as
348 Ibid.
67
human shields by the ASG when they entered the town of Lamitan.350 In 2001, they
embarked on a cross-border kidnapping where 21 tourists were abducted in Sipadan Island,
Malaysia. Then later that year, despite intense military operations, the Philippine government
was caught off-guard when the ASG abducted three Americans and 20 other tourists at the
Dos Palmas Beach Resort in Palawan.351 See Figure 8.
Figure 8. ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2000−2001).352
For 2002 to 2007, a drastic decline of kidnapping incidents was noted. This
decline of kidnapping incidents was primarily attributed to the arrest and neutralization of
some key personalities of the ASG. The intense military operations conducted by the
AFP drove its key leaders and other sub-commanders to seek temporary protection and
relief in central Mindanao.353 Also, during this period, the resurgence of bombing
operations of the ASG was noted. During this period, the ASG was preoccupied with
bombing operations, which was also a factor in the decline of kidnapping incidents.354
ASG’s support teams in urban areas became preoccupied with procuring IED

351 Ibid.
68
components and casing their possible targets for bombing operations. These bombing
operations were believed to be conducted in collaboration with other threat groups—JI,
Rajah Solaiman Movement, MILF-Special Operations Group—and other lawless
elements operating in the southern Philippines.355 See Figure 9.
In 2008, however, resurgence in ASG-perpetrated KFR activities was noted. The

sudden spike in kidnappings on that year may be attributed to the death of its key leaders,
Khadaffy Janjalani and Jainal Antel Sali, in 2006 and 2007, respectively. The ensuing
power vacuum caused the loss of a central leadership, which gave ASG sub-leaders a free
hand to manage their operations. Consequently, small-scale kidnappings and “express
kidnappings,”357 targeting local ordinary workers became rampant, especially in the
group’s traditional areas of operation. The only high-profile kidnapping incident recorded
Capacities,” 269.
357 Cases wherein the ASG does not conduct planning and surveillance and simply seizes the victim
when the opportunity arises. They will ask for a small amount of ransom payment so the families or
relatives of the victim(s) can produce the money in the soonest possible time. Thus, the ASG has no burden
of keeping its hostages for a long time or engaging in long negotiations.
69
that year was the kidnapping of ABS-CBN correspondent Ces Drilon and two of her crew
in Sulu on June 2008.358 See Figure 10.
Figure 10. ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2008).359
For 2009 to 2011, kidnappings continued to be the trend, but this time, more
affluent individuals and foreign nationals were the preferred targets of the ASG. Also,
this period shows that the ASG was slowly improving its operational capabilities and
support network in terms of conducting kidnapping operations.360 See Figure 11.
70
For 2012, this period recorded a decrease of ASG kidnapping, which can be
attributed to the extended detention of several kidnap victims who were abducted in 2010
and 2011. See Figure 12.
Figure 12. ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2012).362
For 2013 to 2014, the ASG engaged in both small-scale and high-profile
kidnappings. Based on the data obtained, some kidnapping incidents are not reported or
362 Ibid.
71
recorded because some kidnap victims were released even before it came to the attention
of the police. Sometimes relatives of the kidnap victims opted to stay silent and negotiate
with the kidnappers without any help from the authorities. Small-scale kidnappings
became the most favored scheme among the ASG and other lawless elements because
negotiation would only last from a matter of hours to a few days. The ransom payment
from this scheme ranges from a minimum of PHP5,000 to hundreds of thousands of
pesos (US$150 to US$2,000).
Based on the study conducted by Alvarez, this incidence of small-scale

kidnappings was observed to be a rampant or “almost daily event” in 2014.363 He claims
that there were at least 90 incidents of small-scale kidnappings in 2014 alone that were
not reported to the law enforcement authorities. See Figure 13.
With regard to the ransom amount, the Philippine government vehemently denied
that ransom had been paid for the release of some of the kidnap victims. The military
insisted that full-scale military operations had pressured the ASG to free some of the
hostages. There was one video clip uploaded to the Internet, however, which showed a
crisp stash of PHP 1,000-peso bills allegedly paid by the German couple who were
72
abducted last 2015 between the waters off Sabah, Malaysia and Palawan, Philippines.
Nevertheless, it is general knowledge in Mindanao that most kidnap victims paid a
certain amount for their freedom. In most cases, the Philippine government is not privy to
the ransom payment between the abductors and relatives of the kidnap victims. Caren
Gwen Mayola claims that in 2010, the ASG earned around US$704,000 in ransom
payments.365
As already noted, there are instances when relatives of kidnap victims opted to
negotiate directly with the abductors utilizing reliable contacts or middlemen who could
establish reliable communication lines between the families and the kidnappers. Because
of the limited information about the ransom payment, the only data that can be obtained
is from 2010 to 2014. This data is only an estimated ransom amount paid to the ASG
during the said period. See Figure 14.
Figure 14. ASG Estimated Ransom Amount (Period Covered 2010–2014).366
Table 1 shows the number of kidnap victims, to include their nationalities, who
are still in captivity of several threat groups in Mindanao. At present, the ASG is still
holding 31 kidnap victims. Some of these victims had been in captivity since 2010 and
2011.

366 Source: Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, OG2, Special Report on the ASG
Kidnapping Activities (Taguig City: Production Branch, 2014).
73
Table 1. Number of Kidnap Victims by Threat Groups (Period
Covered: 2010−2011).367
Number of Kidnap Victims held captive by Threat Group

Total
(Period Covered: 2010−2015)
Nationality
Lawless Unidentified
ASG MNLF MILF
Elements Groups
Japanese 1 1
Chinese 2 2
Dutch 1 1
Arab 1 1
Filipino 11 1 5 5 33 55
Canadian 2 2
Indonesian 10 10
Malaysian 4 4
TOTAL 31 1 5 5 34 77
B. MOTIVATIONS, RANSOM SCHEME, AND MODUS OPERANDI
In her book, 10 Days, 10 Years: From Bin Laden to Facebook, Maria Ressa
argues that the core motivation of the ASG is relatively hard to comprehend as compared
with the motivation of Al Qaeda, which is simple and universal in nature. 368 She claims
that the terrorism problem in the Philippines is not ideological because “the root causes of
the problems” stem from the unaddressed grievances of the Muslim population such as
rampant corruption and a bad political system in which only the elite have control and
influence over resources and little is being shared with the people.369
Forest claims that terrorist organizations resort to kidnap for ransom “to achieve
two kinds of goals: political or financial.”370 He also writes that terrorist groups are
motivated to get involved in kidnappings because of vengeance, protection of their
organizational secrets, or to create an environment of fear to coerce and control the local
367 Adapted from Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, OG2, Special Report on the
ASG Kidnapping Activities (Taguig City: Production Branch, 2014).
368 Maria Ressa, 10 Days, 10 Years: From Bin Laden to Facebook (Mandaluyong City: Anvil, 2012),
9.
369 Ibid.
370 Forest, “Global Trends in Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups,” Global Change, Peace & Security,
322.
74
populace.371 Forest asserts that some terrorist groups’ motivation is also to seek publicity
or attention.372 As Phil Williams observed about the phenomenon of kidnapping
activities in Iraq, most terrorist groups use kidnappings as a way of getting much
attention because it provides a sense of statement and importance for the organization.373
Cindy Combs’ argument about hostage taking and kidnapping is similar to Williams’
claim.374 She argues that because audience and public attention are crucial to any terrorist
attacks, this tactic has been proven effective.375 Thus, it is appealing to the terrorists
because they can control both the length of the incident and media coverage.376
Based on recent information obtained from various field reports, there are three
main reasons why the ASG resorts to kidnapping. First is economics; the lack of access to
personal advancement prompts the locals to engage in kidnapping or to join the ASG in
this criminal activity.377 Second is the socio-cultural reason; the funds that the ASG
obtains through its kidnapping activities also help the communities and in some way
alleviate poverty in those areas by providing financial assistance to the poor families.378
Thus, the people would continue to support the ASG, and this group may win the hearts
and minds of the populace within its area of operation and influence. Finally, although
ransom money is being divided among its members for personal sustenance, it is also
crucial for the group’s operational capabilities.379 Funds obtained from these criminal
activities go to the procurement of firearms, ammunition, explosives, speed boats,
371 Forest, “Global Trends in Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups,” Global Change, Peace & Security,
322.
372 Ibid.
373 Phil Williams, Criminals, Militias and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq (Carlisle, PA: US
Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 111, quoted in James J.F. Forest, “Global Trends in
Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups,” Global Change, Peace & Security, 24, no. 3 (October 8, 2012): 322,
DOI: 10.1080/14781158.2012.714766.
374 Cindy C. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2006), 144.
375 Ibid.
376 Ibid.
378 Ibid.
379 Ibid.
75
vehicles, and other operational requirements either for the next kidnapping activities or
bombing attacks.380
C. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO KIDNAPPINGS
The security situation in Mindanao, particularly in Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi,

has been persistently cited as the usual destination or hiding place for kidnap victims;
reportedly, the security situation in those areas is extremely dangerous; travelling to the
southern part of the Philippines is discouraged or must be done with extreme caution.381
In an April 21, 2016 travel warning, the U.S. Department of State says that “U.S. citizens
to avoid all non-essential travel to the Sulu Archipelago and through the southern Sulu
Sea, and to exercise extreme caution when traveling to the island of Mindanao, due to
continued terrorist threats, insurgent activities and kidnappings.”382 Because of this
adverse presentation of Mindanao and unexplained occurrences of bombings and
abductions, there are frequent unfavorable travel advisories from foreign countries not to
visit Mindanao every time there is a terrorist attack or kidnapping incident.383 The
situation is rather more complicated than media portrayals suggest, including several
salient contributing factors.
First, the Philippine government has failed to implement strictly the “no
negotiation with terrorists” and no-ransom policies. Some local politicians are requested
by the families of the kidnap victims to facilitate the negotiations and the eventual
payment of ransom.384 Caren Gwen Mayola claims that local politicians are the most
preferred hostage negotiators because of their connections with the ASG.385 One good
example of this situation was when a local politician was utilized as hostage negotiator on
381 “Philippines Travel Warning,” U.S. State Department, accessed June 30, 2016,
https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/philippines-travel-warning.html.
382 Ibid.
383 Ibid.
76
behalf of Warren Rodwell, an Australian citizen who was abducted in his residence at the
municipality of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay Province in 2012.386 Such politicians can
effectively facilitate the negotiation because they know exactly who can be employed as
negotiators who can effectively communicate with the ASG.387
Kinship plays an important role in this kind of situation because it is an inherent

custom and tradition among Muslims in the Philippines.388 Although it is a clear
violation of state policy about negotiation and ransom payment, some local politicians get
involved in the negotiation, whose sole objective is the safety and release of the kidnap
victims.389 But it is a general perception in Mindanao that some unscrupulous politicians
get a cut from ransom payment. Although it has been a problem, especially in Basilan
and Sulu provinces, it is hard to validate or find credible witnesses to press charges
against those unscrupulous government officials.390
Second, the PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group (AKG), particularly its sub-units in

Mindanao, seems unable to accomplish its mandate to curb or dismantle lawless elements
who are involved in relentless kidnapping activities in the area.391 In most cases, it, too,
engages in the negotiation for the release of kidnap victims.392 This kind of
ineffectiveness and unclear function of the PNP-AKG further undermines the efforts and
capability of the government to preempt kidnap for ransom activities. The PNP-AKG is a
well-organized unit of the police. Although it is not well-equipped in terms of state of the
art technology, it has extensive experience and is properly trained in hostage situations.
Confronting a hybrid organization, however, like in the case of the ASG, is a different
386 Geoff Chambers, “Freed Hostage Warren Rodwell Kidnapped After Love Took Him to Philippine
Region of Mindanao,” New Corps Australia Network, accessed June 30, 2016,
http://www.news.com.au/national/freed-hostage-warren-rodwell-kidnapped-after-love-took-him-to-
philippine-region-of-mindanao/story-fncynjr2-1226609494451.
Activities (Taguig City: Production Branch, 2014), 6−7.
388 Ibid.
389 Ibid.
390 Ibid.
391 Ibid.
392 Ibid.
77
matter as compared to some small-time kidnapping syndicates in other parts of the
country. Confronting a terrorist organization that employ criminal methods and
collaborating with other lawless elements have been a daunting task for the PNP-
AKG.393 The ASG has emplaced a network of support agents and has learned a lot in
KFR activities in collaboration with other lawless elements.394
Finally, the Philippines’ extensive coastlines and porous border, as well as the
inadequate maritime patrol and law enforcement capabilities, make the country more
vulnerable to cross-border kidnapping. This kind of geographical situation is the primary
reason why the ASG brazenly abducts someone within the territory of Sabah, Malaysia
and within the territorial waters of Indonesia. The coastlines of Zamboanga peninsula
alone seem to be an enormous job for maritime units of the police, Philippine Coast
Guard, and Philippine Navy. Most kidnapping incidents led to the recovery of burned
vehicles near the coastline in which the abductors transferred the kidnap victims into a
motorized boat then sped away, going to Basilan or Sulu.395
D. CONCLUSION
The ASG’s evolution into a hybrid organization and combined use of terrorism
and crime as a tool made it a more challenging threat for the government, particularly the
relentless KFR activities in Mindanao. These illicit activities have greatly affected the
economy and tourism industry of the southern Philippines as well as the international
reputation and image of the country. The ASG attempted to politicize its cause by
justifying kidnapping as part of its ideological and political struggle “to establish an
independent Islamic state”396 in Mindanao. Actual motivation remains fund generation
and the personal gain of its members. Funds derived from ransom payments are used for
personal sustenance and to procure logistics, firearms, watercrafts and other war materiel.
394 Ibid.
395 Ibid.
396 Fellman, “Abu Sayyaf Group,” 2.
78
The ASG remains the most serious threat and is continuously the primary concern
with regard to peace and security of the country as a whole. The fusion of terrorism and
crime enable the ASG to survive and remain a formidable foe, and this group would
continue to evolve and adapt to the counterterrorism measures and strategy. Joint and
integrated efforts of all stakeholders are crucial in this aspect and present efforts must be
readjusted to confront and effectively address this concern.
79
80
V. THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH TO
COUNTERTERRORISM
Daljit Singh claims that some Southeast Asian countries, particularly the
Philippines, have a long history of political violence in which insurgent groups employ
terrorism as a tactic to achieve their objectives.397 He points out that because of
continuous violence and threats of terrorism, Southeast Asian countries’ economies,
foreign investment, and international reputations are heavily affected.398 Rommel
Banlaoi asserts that, based on the 2013 Country Reports on Terrorism published by the
U.S. Department of State, terrorism remains the most pressing security concern of the
Philippines. Specifically, the country remains vulnerable to threats and other acts of
terrorism emanating from non-state actors who are “involved in insurgency, banditry, and
other violent activities.”399 The Philippines’ war against terrorism has been waged for
almost five decades. This internal conflict has drained the country’s resources, and it has
burdened the country’s economy and law and order.
This chapter discusses the evolution and salient points of the Philippine
counterterrorism strategy and examines the four critical approaches—inter-agency
cooperation, legislation, intelligence collaboration, and military operations. Although it
seems that the current CT strategy and approaches are doing well against the ASG, they
have innate weaknesses and need further restudy to be more responsive in recognizing
the ASG as a hybrid organization. This chapter contends that to implement effectively the
national strategy for counterterrorism as embodied in the National Security Policy (NSP)
of 2011−2016, the Philippine government must rectify its errors and inherent weaknesses
on these four approaches to counterterrorism.
The chapter is organized in six parts: the first part highlights the Philippine
counterterrorism strategy and policy. The second part examines the inter-agency
397 Daljit Singh, “Responses to Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and
Counter Terrorism 4, no. 1 (2009): 15, DOI: 10.1080/18335300.2009.9686921.
398 Ibid.
399 Banlaoi, “Current Terrorist Groups and Emerging Extremist Armed Movements in the Southern
Philippines,” 164.
81
coordination and integration and how it functions and supports the fight against terrorism.
The third part discusses the legislative measures focusing on the anti-terrorism law that
was enacted to combat terrorism. The fourth part outlines the intelligence approach and
measures and how other government agencies contribute to strengthen gathering and
sharing of information. The fifth part explains the military approach in which the Armed
Forces of the Philippines lead the role. The sixth and seventh parts outline some of the
significant problems or gaps identified in relation with the CT strategy and approach.
Lastly, the chapter concludes and analyzes how the Philippine counterterrorism strategy
can assist in understanding the ASG as a hybrid organization.
A. NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AND POLICY
As stated in the Philippine National Anti-Terrorism Strategy, undoubtedly

terrorism is a multi-faceted and complex challenge that needs a comprehensive strategy,
which can address all aspects of the underlying causes of the problems.400 The goal of
such a strategy is to “create a seamless web of activities” aimed at mitigating the impact
of contemporary terrorism while ensuring that the rule of law prevails.401 Furthermore,
Allan Behm and Michael Palmer argue that an effective strategy should be proactive,
rather than reactive.402 According to Manalo, however, the Philippine approach to
counterterrorism “remains reactive, rather than decisive and strategic,” and it has failed to
provide a long term solution to the problems.403
The Philippine government’s response to terrorism has been implemented in

various approaches and forms. Notable is the Republic Act 9372 or the Human Security
Act (HSA) of 2007; this law was enacted by the Philippine Congress to guide all
government efforts in the fight against terrorism. Chester Cabalza mentions that this law
provides a legal framework for counterterrorism strategy and security policies to ensure
400 National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, The National Anti-Terrorism Strategy, Anti-Terrorism
Council (Quezon City: ATC Secretariat, 2009).
401 Ibid.
402 Allan J. Behm and Michael J. Palmer, “Coordinating Counterterrorism: A Strategic Approach to a
Changing Threat,” Terrorism 14, no. 3 (2008): 175, DOI: 10.1080/10576109108435874.
82
that all actions are done within the bounds of the law. 404 As stated in Section 2,
Paragraph 1 of the HSA of 2007, “it is the policy of the state to protect life, liberty, and
property from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the
national security of the country and to the welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a
crime against the Filipino people, against humanity, and against the law of nations.”405
Aguirre writes that as a member of the United Nations, the Philippines actively
adhere to international conventions as well as to some bilateral and multi-lateral treaties
that would “prevent, suppress and counter all forms of terrorism.”406 With this
commitment, he claims that the Philippines became an “active proponent and signatory to
the ASEAN and APEC Declarations” to combat terrorism and actively cooperate and
collaborate with its regional neighbors and other allies.407 The Philippines ratified and
signed the UN Security Council Resolution Numbers 1373, 1267, and 1390 on terrorism.
Manalo asserts that to enhance cooperation and to effectively combat terrorism, the
Philippine government must engage its regional partners and other allies, particularly the
ASEAN, and the United States.408
In 2001, the Philippine government declared its national policy on

counterterrorism through the “Fourteen Pillars of Policy and Action against Terrorism.”
This policy was articulated in the Presidential Memorandum Order 37 (2001), and the
key principles are the following:
1. Supervision and implementation of policies and actions of the government
against terrorism
2. Intelligence coordination
3. Internal focus against terrorism
4. Accountability of public and private corporations and personalities
404 Cabalza, “Deconstructing Human Security in the Philippines,” 2.

407 Ibid.
408 Manalo, “Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group,” 10−11.
83
5. Synchronizing internal efforts with global outlook
6. Legal measures
7. Promotion of Christian and Muslim solidarity
8. Vigilance against the movement of terrorists and their supporters,
equipment, weapons and funds
9. Contingency plans
10. Comprehensive security plans for critical infrastructure
11. Support of overseas Filipino workers
12. Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police
13. Media support
14. Political, social and economic measures409
In June 2009, the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) approved the National Anti-
Terrorism Strategy (NATS). The goal of this strategy is to effectively counter terrorism
and to achieve a “physically and psychologically secure environment conducive for peace
and socio-economic development.”410 It has the following objectives:
1. To protect life, liberty and property from acts of terrorism
2. To condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national security
of the country and to the welfare of the Filipino people
3. To make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people, against humanity
and against the law of nations411
Several concepts guide the implementation of the strategy. First, it must be a
comprehensive approach that considers the terrorist threat as hindrance to economic
409 “Fourteen Pillars of Policy and Action Against Terrorism,” Official Gazette of the Republic of the
Philippines, accessed May 18, 2016, http://dict.gov.ph/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/MO37_s2001_CriticalInfra.pdf.
410 National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, The National Anti-Terrorism Strategy, Anti-Terrorism
Council (Quezon City: ATC Secretariat, 2009).
411 Ibid.
84
stability peace and security.412 As stated in the National Security Policy (NSP) of 2011–
2016, counterterrorism requires a comprehensive approach that takes into consideration
the political, economic, diplomatic, military, and legal aspects to fully understand and
properly address the root causes of the problems.413 Second, it is collaborative in the
sense that it involves the entire government machinery and is in partnership with the
private sector and local communities in developing and delivering an adaptable anti-
terrorism strategy.414 Public awareness of the threat, understanding of the government
measures, and active support and cooperation with law enforcers are crucial to the
success of the strategy.415 Through the national anti-terrorism strategy, the Philippine
government may be able to achieve a secure and peaceful environment conducive to
progress and sustainable development.416
Moreover, the NSP of 2011–2016, “Securing the Gains of Democracy,” which

was promulgated by President Benigno Aquino, complements the HSA of 2007. As
stated in the National Crisis Management Core Manual, the NSP “is a statement of
principles that guide national decision-making and determine courses of action to be
taken to attain the state or condition wherein the national interest, the well-being of the
people and institutions, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity are protected and
enhanced.”417 In relation to combating terrorism, the NSP “emphasizes a multi-level and
multi-disciplinary approach and the enlisting of support from domestic and international
allies.”418
Generally, the NSP outlines a three-tiered defense system that comprises the
“enhancement of the intelligence capabilities, protection and security of vulnerable
412 “Securing the Gains of Democracy: National Security Policy 2011−2016,” Official Gazette of the
Republic of the Philippines, accessed May 10, 2016, http://www.nsc.gov.ph/index.php/national-security-
policy-2011-2016.
413 Ibid.
414 Ibid.
415 Ibid.
416 National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, The National Anti-Terrorism Strategy.
Republic of the Philippines.
418 Ibid.
85
targets, and enhancement of readiness and preparedness in the event of a successful
terrorist attack.”419 According to this document, to achieve all of these, the Philippine
government must enhance its security counter-measures, apply effective legislative and
legal measures, and employ effective mechanisms to prevent or preempt terrorist attacks
and prevent individuals from resorting to acts of terror.420 Ananda Devi Domingo-
Almase claims that the NSP provides a strategic guidance “to strengthen public
institutions, protect the environment, combat terrorism, engage in regional cooperation,
and modernize the armed forces.”421
B. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION
Coordination is critically important in the implementation of the national strategy

and policy to combat terrorism. It pertains to the “effective and efficient integration of all
efforts and responses of the government” to address terrorism and root causes of the
problems.422 According to Lynn Davis, Gregory F. Treverton, Daniel Byman, Sara A.
Daly, and William Rosenau, “coordination is a word more used than understood in
government.”423 They claim that it is prone to mistakes and other organizational concerns
if individual departments will operate separately and decide for themselves without
proper coordination.424 To attain and ensure the unity of efforts requires inter-agency
coordination among different departments and agencies of the government. To integrate
all efforts against terrorism, it is crucial that various government agencies and
departments work closely and establish links with each other.
Republic of the Philippines.
420 Ibid.
421 Ananda Devi Domingo-Almase, “What the Subject of Security Really Means: A Look Into the
Content and Context of the 2011–2016 National Security Policy in the Philippines,” National Defense
College of the Philippines, 88, http://www.ndcp.edu.ph/nsr.php.
423 Lynn E. Davis, Gregory F. Treverton, Daniel Byman, Sara A. Daly and William Rosenau,
“Coordinating the War on Terrorism,” RAND, March 2004, 2,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP110.html.
424 Ibid.
86
Davis et al. claim that the policy makers in the United States realized that “the
instruments of counterterrorism,” such as “hostage negotiations, intelligence cooperation,
and international legal regimes” are connected; thus, it requires close coordination
between the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, and the CIA.425
Inter-agency coordination can effectively address the root causes of the problem.
With regard to terrorism, it is essential to address the underlying reasons that drive
certain individuals to become a terrorist or commit acts of violence and understand the
socio-cultural aspect of the environment in which they thrive and operate.426 Zachary
Abuza argues that the majority of Southeast Asian countries have “weak political
institutions, decentralized politics, poor resources,” and are marred by rampant
corruption. Weak institutions and lack of government control make them more attractive
to terrorist groups.427 He claims that corruption has been prominent in weak states; as
such, rivalries between state security forces over jurisdiction and illegal activities have
been a common problem. To clearly understand the terrorism problem, there must be an
in-depth analysis of the situation and consideration of various underlying factors, which
in this case, requires an effective and active inter-agency cooperation and coordination.
Integration of efforts allows maximum synchronization of all activities and prevents
jeopardizing the strategic approach of the government. Additionally, when inter-agency
mechanisms have been set up, they provide effective monitoring, feedback, and
assessment of all concerned agencies, which ensures that all efforts are appropriate,
suitable, and relevant.
Command and coordination structures, which are coherent and responsive, have
proven critical in any counterterrorism approach. Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-
Taw emphasize one of the elements that is important in counterterrorism: “an effective
425 Davis, Treverton, Byman, Daly, and Rosenau, “Coordinating the War on Terrorism,” 3.
426 State Department and Department of Defense, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide
(Washington, D.C.: Department of State, January 2009), Preface.
427 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, Crucible of Terror (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne
Rienner Publishers Inc., 2003), 18.
87
overall command and coordination.”428 They claim that prior to any attack or
disturbance, the government should have established a functioning command and
coordination structure. This is important to prevent confusion, competition among
agencies, duplication of efforts, and inefficient gathering and dissemination of
information.429 The Philippines has its share of bad experiences with ineffective inter-
agency coordination. Two examples are the incompetence in handling the Sipadan
kidnapping on April 23, 2000 and the Dos Palmas Resort kidnapping incident on May 28,
2001.
To defeat the ASG and other lawless elements in Mindanao requires active
participation and cooperation of all government agencies and institutions. Terrorism
posed by the ASG, particularly its relentless KFR activities, is not only a concern of the
state security forces, but it is the problem of the nation as a whole. Thus, the government
must direct all agencies to participate and work together to defeat the ASG and other
lawless elements in Mindanao. A command and coordination structure that is properly
organized and coherent will lead to an effective integration and sharing of intelligence
among different agencies.430 This structure allows utmost synchronization of efforts in
which all actions and programs of concerned agencies are in line with the national
strategy on counterterrorism.
C. LEGISLATIVE MEASURES
The Philippine government has adopted several legislative and legal measures to
address the threat of terrorism and crime perpetrated by various terrorist groups. After the
9/11 attacks, the Philippine government entered into several international agreements.
The intent was to collectively contribute to the government’s anti-terrorism program and
strengthen global cooperation to fight international terrorism. As a member of the UN,
the Philippine government demonstrates its sincere commitment “to prevent, suppress,
428 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw, “A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism,”
in European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation,
ed. Fernando Reinares (Aldershot, UK; Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 2000), 9.
429 Hoffman and Morrison-Taw, “A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism,” 9.
430 Ibid., 16.
88
and counter all forms of terrorist acts in accordance with the UN Charter and UN
Resolutions or declarations,” particularly with UN Security Council Resolutions 1267,
1373, and 1390, UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and other relevant international
laws.431 These international commitments and agreements also include law enforcement-
focused arrangements that support the anti-terrorism program, including mutual legal
assistance treaties and other international relationships, such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and other multi-
lateral engagements.432
The Philippine government, through the legislative branch, has responded

promptly to the security arrangements with the international or world organizations, such
as the United Nations Organization, APEC, ARF, and the U.S. Global War on Terror, in
the passage of anti-terrorism laws—specifically, the Human Security Act of 2007. Under
this law, anti-terrorism efforts encompass some defensive measures to preempt and
prevent terrorist attacks and strengthen the basic foundation to effectively counter
terrorism and any form of violent activities.433 This law, however, does not prevent the
Philippine government from employing some offensive measures, which should be taken
to preempt, prevent, deter and actively respond to any acts of terrorism.434 For instance,
one of the tenets of the AFP to combat terrorism is “to destroy the terrorist organization
through the employment of every tool available to dismantle their capacity to commit
acts of terror.”435 Pauline Eadie writes that the Philippine HSA of 2007 was a response to
the Global War on Terror of the United States after the 9/11 attacks. 436 Bobby Tuazon
431 National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, The National Anti-Terrorism Strategy.

434 Ibid.
435 GHQ, AFP Operational Directive 09−2004 (Combating Terrorism), 2, March 31, 2004.
436 Pauline E. Eadie, “Legislating for Terrorism: The Philippines’ Human Security Act 2007,” Journal
of Terrorism Research 2, no. 3 (November 11, 2011): 28, http://jtr.st-
andrews.ac.uk/articles/10.15664/jtr.226/#.
89
claims that “the beginnings of the HSA can be traced to 9/11 and the U.S. Patriot Act,”437
but Juan Ponce Enrile, a Philippine senator and one of the co-sponsors of this law,
vehemently denied that the Philippine HSA was copied from the U.S. Patriot Act.438
The Philippine anti-terrorism law, the Human Security Act of 2007, states that
anyone “sowing and creating a condition of widespread extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand
shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism.”439 It outlines how terrorism is punishable under
the Philippine law, specifying that those convicted “shall suffer the penalty of forty (40)
years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.”440
Alexander Aguirre points out that the Philippine government enacted the Human
Security Act of 2007, which defines terrorism as a crime and provides penalties for such
acts.441 He claims that in order to be used for law enforcement operations this definition
was formulated without appropriate legislative policy on terrorism. This terrorism law
further states that the State recognizes that counterterrorism requires a comprehensive
approach that includes political, diplomatic, economic, military, legislative and other
factors.442 According to Aguirre, however, this approach should take into consideration
what the root causes of the problems are without recognizing them as a justification to
conduct terrorist acts and other forms of violence.443 It should be noted, however, that the
law in itself is not a strategy to combat terrorism.444
437 Bobby Tuazon interview July 31, 2008, quoted in Pauline E. Eadie, “Legislating for Terrorism:
The Philippines’ Human Security Act 2007,” Journal of Terrorism Research 2, no. 3 (November 11, 2011):
28, http://jtr.st-andrews.ac.uk/articles/10.15664/jtr.226/#.
438 Eadie, “Legislating for Terrorism: The Philippines’ Human Security Act 2007,” 28.
439 “Human Security Act of 2007,” Congress of the Philippines.
440 Ibid.
442 Ibid.
443 Ibid.
444 Ibid.
90
To suppress terrorism financing, the Philippine government ratified some laws
and executive orders to cut the flow of funds and freeze the assets of the local and foreign
terrorist groups. Rommel Banlaoi asserts that in 2001, the Philippine congress approved
the Anti-Money Laundering Act as one of the countermeasures for this purpose.445 To
further bolster the legislative approach against terrorist financing, President Benigno
Aquino approved the Republic Act Number 10168, otherwise known as the “Terrorism
Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012.”446 This law is the response of the
Philippine government to its commitment to the “International Conventions for the
Suppression of the Financing [of] Terrorism and other binding terrorism-related
resolutions of the UN Security Council.”447 This law requires banks and financial
institutions to report dubious transactions involving funds that have possible links to
terrorists, and to freeze properties, funds, and related accounts of suspected terrorist
groups and individuals who are associated with Al Qaeda.448
The enactment of HSA of 2007 and other related laws to combat terrorism in the
Philippines has resulted in the apprehension of several terrorist personalities, particularly
members of the ASG. Although there are some criticisms about the Philippine anti-
terrorism law, it serves as deterrence for an individual to commit acts of terror or any
forms of violence.
Cabalza argues that the Philippine anti-terrorism law is too broad and only
reinstates the crimes listed in the Revised Penal Code of 1932 or Republic Act No. 3815,
which is an 84-year-old law now.449 He claims that the crimes that are listed in the HSA
of 2007 are deemed punishable under the Revised Penal Code in which there must be
clear parameters in converting common crimes into terrorism. The HSA of 2007 is the
only Philippine law that strictly penalizes torture and imposes stiff penalties and fines on
445 Banlaoi, Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They? 78.
446 “The Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012,” Congress of the Philippines,
accessed August 18, 2016, http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/?d=ra_results&ra_title=terrorism.
447 Ibid.
448 “Philippine Experience in Combating Terrorism” (lecture, Training and Doctrine Command,
Philippine Army, February 20, 2013).
91
law enforcers.450 Although it is a benchmark for the Philippine law to prosecute
terrorists, it needs some legal amendments to synchronize its provisions and make some
logical connections between its sub-sections. This law is a combination of 62 sections
and 22 provisions without “discernable structure, no headings or sub-headings, and no
groupings of sections.”451 Cabalza asserts that this law “authorizes preventive detention,
expands the power of warrantless arrest, and allows for unchecked invasion of privacy,
liberty and other basic rights.”452
D. INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION
To counter terrorism effectively, it is crucial to strengthen and enhance the

intelligence capabilities of all concerned agencies and various state security forces, but on
the other hand, it is also imperative that an effective and efficient mechanism has been set
up for collaboration among domestic and foreign intelligence agencies. Thomas Bruneau
and Florina Cristiana Matei argue that terrorist attacks in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Spain led all these states to prioritize their intelligence capabilities and
effectiveness.453 They point out that these nations not only focus on reforming some
“norms of intelligence”—budgets, resources, doctrines, and regulations—but they also
enhance “interagency cooperation and coordination.”454
Singh argues that each state must fight its terrorism concern within its national
jurisdiction employing its full capacity and resources to defeat and destroy any terrorist
organization.455 He asserts that this national effort must be reinforced with sound and
effective intelligence cooperation with other countries because of the transnational nature

451 Ibid., 4.
452 Ibid., 17.
453 Thomas Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, “Intelligence in the Developing Democracies: The
Quest for Transparency and Effectiveness,” in The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, ed.
Loch K. Johnson (Oxford: University Press, 2010), 769−770.
454 Ibid.
455 Daljit Singh, Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia in the Coming Decade (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies in association with Macmillan, 2009), xix.
92
of the threat.456 Bilateral cooperation has been proven effective in terms of strengthening
intelligence cooperation and collaboration between states. In the case of Southeast Asia
countries, regional organizations—ASEAN and ARF—declared strong “collective
positions” against terrorism, and these organizations facilitated a wide range of capacity
building measures in collaboration with “advanced outside countries.”457
According to Manalo, collaboration and cooperation of all intelligence units are

crucial to successfully combat the threat of terrorism.458 He points out that all
intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Philippine National
Police (PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and the National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency (NICA) should enhance their linkages and sharing of
information.459 The availability of timely and accurate intelligence tends to identify,
monitor, and locate high-value individuals, and most importantly, it allows security
forces to predict the terrorists’ plans and intentions. Knowing this information from the
outset, the government can implement appropriate preemptive measures to mitigate or
avoid loss of life or damage to property.
Additionally, collaboration and relations among regional partners and other allies
are crucial in counterterrorism strategy. Intelligence sharing is one of the critical
advantages of this endeavor because cooperation and collaboration unite all efforts of all
countries to combat international terrorism. It establishes good relationships to work
closely with domestic and foreign counterparts “to predict, prevent, deter, and suppress
acts of terrorism.”460 To strengthen border controls and sharing of intelligence, it is
important that concerned countries have strong and regular bilateral and multi-lateral
engagements.461 These kinds of activities enhance cooperation and sharing of critical
456 Singh, Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia in the Coming Decade, xix.
457 Ibid.
459 Ibid.
460 Aguirre, “The Philippine Response to Terrorism,” 54−55.
93
information through regular intelligence exchange and conference between countries.462
Tan notes that after the 9/11 attacks, ASEAN countries issued a joint declaration and
agreed to cooperation to combat domestic and international terrorism.463 He points out
that these nations agreed to strengthen national mechanisms and sharing of intelligence,
and to support all actions and initiatives of the UN. One good example of this is the
regular intelligence exchange between the U.S. Pacific Command and Southeast Asian
countries. Also, notable in this endeavor are the Global Counter-terrorism Forum (GCTF)
and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Experts Working Group on Counter-
terrorism.
Moreover, sharing of information among agencies and intelligence units is also

one of the pressing concerns of the Philippines. Although there are some mechanisms that
are emplaced to solve this matter, some intelligence units are still reluctant to share their
information. Netanyahu claims that because of professional rivalry and jealousy among
intelligence agencies and in order to protect the source, critical intelligence reports are
not being shared among and between regional partners and even among various agencies
within the same country.464 At the national and regional level, different intelligence
agencies and units meet regularly through their respective area intelligence coordinating
committees. Although this arrangement of intelligence coordination and integration has
been helpful and resolved certain issues, some intelligence agencies seem to be hesitating
to share information. This problem is aggravated by inter-agency rivalries, policies, laws,
and sometimes because of turf protection.465 Nathan White claims that law enforcement
agencies and various intelligence units usually do not trust each other because of the
independent nature of some police officials who are reluctant to share information within
or outside of their organization.466

463 Ibid., 215.
464 Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat the International Terrorist
Network, 138−139.
466 Nathan White, Defending the Homeland: Domestic Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security
(CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2004), 17.
94
According to Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw, unified and coordinated
structure against terrorism is vital to share and disseminate valuable intelligence among
various security forces.467 Obvious rivalry among security forces has been one of the
reasons why the Philippine government efforts against terrorism are not gaining much
momentum. Although several significant accomplishments have been achieved and led to
the capture or neutralization of high-value targets, they have not been enough to totally
defeat the enemy and the attacks persist. Iztok Prezelj claims that in the United States, the
CIA and FBI also experienced some concerns on intelligence sharing because of their
“institutional culture,” “ways of thinking,” and interests.468 He points out that these
differences also resulted in “competition for cases and budgets.”469
The threat posed by the ASG as a hybrid organization requires not just efficient
and effective means of recruiting reliable informants and collecting quality information,
but importantly, this information is being shared among other intelligence agencies and
units. Arguably, sharing of intelligence has been one of the weaknesses and perennial
problems of the Philippines in its fight to destroy the ASG. Daniel Byman claims that
“Israel’s intelligence services are fabled around the world for their efficiency, skill, and
seeming omniscience.”470 He points out that the successes of Israel in counterterrorism
depend on its efficient and constant sharing of information at all levels and closely
integrating intelligence in all military operations.471 Relentless KFR activities can be
preempted or prevented if all intelligence agencies have quality informants who have
good access and placement on the ASG and other criminal organizations. David Bonner
claims that intelligence operatives and informants are critical factors in a successful
counterterrorism approach, and their cover must be protected at all times.472 Hoffman
468 Iztok Prezelj, “Improving Inter-Organizational Cooperation in Counterterrorism: Based on a
Quantitative SWOT Assessment,” Public Management Review 17, no. 2 (May 17, 2013): 211, DOI:
10.1080/14719037.2013.792384.
469 Ibid.
470 Daniel Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (NY: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 369.
471 Ibid., 370−371.
472 Bonner, “United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism,” 192.
95
and Morrison-Taw argue that proper use of information is critically important to any
counterterrorism campaign.473 They point out that the most important tasks in this aspect
are the coordination and dissemination of intelligence, which can only be done through a
centralized intelligence organization that can effectively relay information to the tactical
units.
E. FOCUSED MILITARY OPERATIONS
According to Condoleezza Rice, “true victory will not come merely when the
terrorists are defeated by force, but when the ideology of death and hatred is overcome by
the appeal of life and hope, and when lies are replaced by truth.” 474 As Benjamin
Netanyahu argues, “while military measures should not be the first option, they should
never be excluded from the roster of possibilities.”475 On the other hand, terrorist
organizations, whether state or non-state actors, must feel that the likelihood of extreme
military retaliation is expected if they would resort to violence. 476 Along that line, Israel
responded with massive military operations and a series of targeted killings of suspected
terrorists. Clive Jones claims that this military approach led to the arrest or killing of
senior leaders and destroyed the military infrastructure of Hamas. 477 Despite the brutality
of this method, it received “wide public support in Israel.”478 Decapitation of the terrorist
organization by targeted killings may not end terrorism or stop violence, but it served as
deterrence and saved hundreds of innocent lives.479 This war-fighting strategy adopted by
Israel disrupted the enemy’s plan and damaged their capabilities to conduct further
attacks.
474 Daniel Byman, The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad (Hoboken, New Jersey:
John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 180.
475 Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat the International Terrorist
Network, 134.
476 Ibid.
477 Jones, “Israel and the Al-Aqsa Intifada: The Conceptzia of Terror,” 127.
478 Ibid.
479 Ibid., 128.
96
When former President Gloria Arroyo declared her “Fourteen Pillars of Policy
and Action” to combat terrorism, the Philippine government enacted General Order
Number 2 “directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in
Mindanao.”480 The AFP is specifically mandated to strengthen and develop its
counterterrorism capabilities and to conduct sustained and focused military operations
against the ASG and other terrorist groups. On the other hand, the PNP is directed to
strengthen its security measures and police visibility to protect vital installations. They
are also mandated to develop and strengthen their police counterterrorism capabilities,
particularly in urban fighting and hostage situations.
In “Keeping on the Right Track: An Assessment on the Effectiveness of AFP

Responses to ASG Threat,” Ferdinand B. Napuli argues that the only solution to defeat
the ASG is to neutralize its key leaders and isolate the group from its mass base
support.481 He points out, however, that the ASG has been adored by the communities
within its area of influence because this group has been providing funds out of the
ransom money from its KFR activities. This kind of support helps to improve the
standard of living of the marginalized tribes, especially in Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi
provinces, that the government has failed to do. Thus, focused military operation will not
totally defeat the ASG because it has the critical support of the people that would impede
the conduct of intense military operations.482 The AFP may engage various agencies and
civil society organizations and encourage their active participation in delivering the
public goods to the marginalized communities in Mindanao. These organizations can
easily adapt to the communities’ dialect and culture, and they can freely ask the people
about their problems. Thus, the military may treat these organizations as important
partners to achieve peace.

481 Napuli, “Keeping on the Right Track: An Assessment on the Effectiveness of AFP Responses to
ASG Threat,” 74.
482 Ibid.
97
Nevertheless, the main thrust of the Philippine government against the ASG is
through focused military operations. The end state of the AFP’s focused military
operations is to downgrade internal armed threats so that “they can no longer threaten the
stability of the state and civil authorities can ensure the safety and well-being of the
Filipino people.”483 Even if the AFP destroys completely the ASG, however, terrorism
and crime will persist as the main security challenges for the Philippines if the political
and socio-economic condition in Mindanao remains the same. To complement this
approach, the military has been instituting some measures to undermine ASG’s popular
support from the communities under its influence.484 Santiago Ballina claims that with
the help of the United States, the Philippines adopted a whole-nation approach through
various socio-economic measures to reduce poverty and provide essential public goods
for the poor communities where the ASG thrives.485 He claims, however, that this
strategy still heavily focuses on military operations and does not adequately address the
broader and root problems in Mindanao such as marginalization and weak institutions.
The military approach will not completely eradicate the threat, but other approaches will
be futile without taking into consideration the role of the military. On the other hand, the
government should take strong measures and feasible strategies to address political,
social, and economic issues.
F. PROBLEMS AND GAPS IDENTIFIED
 The current Philippine CT strategy and approach has failed to recognize

the criminal aspect of the ASG.
Nothing has changed with regard to the approach of the Philippines against the
threat posed by the ASG. The Philippine government remains reactive, rather than
proactive, in terms of eradicating terrorism and organized crime activities by this group
and other lawless elements in Mindanao. Several security experts and law enforcement
483 “Internal Peace and Security Plan Bayanihan,” Scribd, accessed July 30, 2016,
https://www.scribd.com/document/46302366/AFP-Internal-Peace-and-Security-Plan-IPSP-BAYANIHAN.
484 Peter Chalk, Angel Rabasa, William Rosenau, and Leanne Piggott, The Evolving Terrorist Threat
to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 133,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG846.html.
485 Ballina, “The Crime-Terror Continuum Revisited,” 132.
98
officials claim that the ASG has become a bunch of criminals, but there is no compelling
countermeasures have been introduced to fight this so-called nexus of terrorism and
crime. The approach remains the same of employing a war model to counterterrorism
without completely understanding the underlying root causes of the problems and
knowing the precise category of the ASG as a threat group. Terrorist and criminal
organizations are two different entities; thus, they may require different approaches to
defeat and deter their violent and criminal activities.
 Lack of strong political will to implement the comprehensive strategy and
approach to counter terrorism.
To effectively eradicate the ASG and other lawless elements in Mindanao, the
current administration may consider exerting strong political will to implement the most
comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, a strategy that deals with both the terrorism and
criminal nature of the ASG. Strong political will may encompass prosecuting some
unscrupulous local politicians and government officials, particularly members of the
military and police, who are supporting and colluding with the ASG. The current political
leadership must push and exert strong pressure on all concerned departments, agencies,
and LGUs to do their mandated tasks and responsibilities to completely defeat and
eradicate the ASG’s terrorist and criminal activities. Implementation and enforcement of
important laws and executive directives for different departments, agencies, and LGUs
also require strong political will. No matter how good the security policies of the national
government are, if some concerned actors are not doing their jobs the effort may
inevitably fail.
 The Philippines has a weak legislation and criminal justice system to
combat the nexus of crime and terrorism.
The anti-terrorism campaign of the Philippine government is anchored on the
HSA of 2007 or the Philippines’ main anti-terrorism law. Arguably, this law seems
ineffective to protect the people and the state against terrorism. The current anti-terrorism
law needs some critical amendments to address certain issues and gaps in order to be
more effective. As part of the legislative approach to combat terrorism, this law should be
a potent tool of law enforcement agencies to effectively prosecute suspected terrorists and
their associates. On the other hand, this law has a vague definition of the term terrorism,
99
and terrorism offenses are merely copied from the old version of the Revise Penal Code.
This law treats criminal offenses under the old Revised Penal Code as terrorism, thereby
creating “a condition of widespread fear and panic among the populace.”486 Some of the
provisions of the law are contrary to the protection of human rights and privacy. In
addition, it does not explicitly define the tolerable or acceptable penalties and damages.
Notably, as of now, this law has never been used in court to prosecute suspected
terrorists—directly or indirectly involved in terrorist activities—because some legal
experts argue that this law is legally and basically hard to use.
 Intelligence politicization and competition among intelligence units of
different government agencies hampered the effectiveness of the current
counterterrorism strategy.
Politicization has been one of the challenges of the intelligence agencies. As
Robert Gates claims, “the problem of politicization is as old as the intelligence
business.”487 Mark Lowenthal argues that the problem of politicization is like “two
spheres of government activity separated by a semipermeable membrane.”488 He explains
that policymakers are free to offer assessments of intelligence while intelligence officers
are not allowed to influence policymaking.489 Politicization may destroy the credibility of
the intelligence organization in terms of providing inaccurate analysis and assessment.
Accurate and timely intelligence are important for policymakers to help them in their
decision-making process, and the intelligence community can provide these
requirements. Intelligence’s main role is only to support, and it cannot cross the line to
influence the jobs of policymakers. In some cases, policymakers offer input on or accept
only intelligence that is advantageous to their political interests and personal gains.490
Eduardo Estévez claims that politicization of the Argentinian military intelligence led to
486 Eadie, “Legislating for Terrorism: The Philippines’ Human Security Act 2007,” 30.
487 Robert Gates, “Guarding Against Politicization – Central Intelligence Agency,” CIA, March 1992,
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/volume-36-number-
1/html/v36i1a01p_0001.htm.
488 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 6th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2014),
6.
489 Ibid.
490 Cristiana Matei, “Overview and Functions of Intelligence in a Democracy.”
100
the South Atlantic Conflict, in which the intelligence services provided inaccurate
interpretation of the collected information.491
Although the national and regional intelligence coordinating committees have

been created, inherent cultural and competency differences of various intelligence units
hamper the level of coordination and sharing of critical information. Some crucial
changes in terms of institutional policies to improve coordination and enhance
interoperability during law enforcement operations must be adapted from top to bottom.
Additionally, there is no central database that collects and collates essential information
against the enemy. In most cases, a particular intelligence or case officer keeps and
carries their own files; thus, this practice prevents the transfer of crucial intelligence and
knowledge within the intelligence community. Competition and rivalry in terms of
capturing prominent personalities or high-value targets have been a common problem
among intelligence agencies, and in some cases have led to a misunderstanding between
state security forces.
 Some government agencies, departments, LGUs, and non-government
organizations have failed to do their parts to eradicate the ASG and its
criminal activities.
To effectively implement the whole-nation approach, all stakeholders be must be
taken into consideration and do their part. Public and private partnership is also crucial in
this endeavor. It may also be seen as a challenge for all stakeholders, and the solution is
only possible if all these stakeholders act in unison. The counterterrorism strategy of the
Philippines intends to involve various government agencies and departments, LGUs, non-
government organizations, and other concerned stakeholders to defeat terrorism and win
the hearts and minds of the people. Inter-agency coordination has not really been
functioning as what was written on paper. Coordination among different departments and
agencies only works perfectly when a tragic incident or terrorist attack has occurred,
rather than integrating their efforts to address the root causes of the problems and prevent
491 Eduardo Estévez, “Intelligence Community Reforms: The Case of Argentina,” in Intelligence
Elsewhere. Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere, eds. Philip H.J. Davies and Kristian C.
Gustafson (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 222.
101
the attacks. The whole-nation approach will not work if one of the actors is not doing
their mandated tasks.
 Some politicians down to the local level have been suspected of coddling
and supporting the ASG, particularly in the kidnapping operations.
Source of funds is important to any organization, and the ASG’s main source of
financing is KFR operations. Reportedly, some local politicians in Mindanao are not only
coddling this group, but some of them are also financing this criminal activity. Even
though it is common knowledge that some corrupt politicians have been conniving with
the ASG, no one has been convicted or sanctioned for this misdemeanor.492 Additionally,
some members of the ASG who are employed as private armed groups or militias of
some local politicians contribute to the problem.
G. NOTABLE PROBLEMS THAT LED TO RELENTLESS KIDNAPPINGS
 Most of the kidnap victims are negotiating and paying the ransom for their
safety and freedom.
According to the Special Report on this subject conducted by the Philippine
Army, there are cases wherein a kidnap victim’s family paid in full or through installment
basis prior to the release of the hostage.493 The ASG provides proof of life photos or
video clips posted on the Internet or sent directly to the families of the victims prior to
receiving a portion of the total ransom payment.494 In some cases, the ASG uses the “pay
now or be kidnapped later” scheme in which the target is threatened with kidnapping,
forcing the victim to pay to avoid being abducted by the group. The ransom is less than
that of abducted victims due to minimal operational expenses; the group refers to this
money as a board and lodging fee. The ASG also conducts checkpoints, targeting local
residents and temporarily holds the victim for a couple of hours until a certain amount of
money is paid in exchange for their release.495
492 Based on the experience of the author as Field Station Commander of 9 th ISU, Intelligence and
Security Group, Philippine Army based in Zamboanga Peninsula.
494 Ibid.
495 Ibid.
102
The ASG seems to favor direct negotiation with the victim’s family or relatives
due to the prospect of higher and actual ransom payment.496 In some cases, however, the
ASG also uses mediators or third-party negotiators, especially if the group is unable to
directly communicate with the victim’s relatives.497 One example is the kidnapping
incident of Randelle Talania of Titay Town, Zamboanga Sibugay Province in 2011. He
was just a nine-year-old boy that time when armed men took him in front of the Titay
Elementary School.498 The ASG utilized one village chieftain from Basilan to
communicate with the families of the kidnap victim. This man, who acted as mediator,
informed the families about the ransom demand and other requirements of the child.499
The knowledge and expertise of the negotiator is crucial during the negotiation
process. According to Peter Dobbs, “the nominated negotiator needs to be fluent in the
kidnappers’ language and preferably have some knowledge of the region.”500 He claims
that a good negotiator must immediately establish rapport with the kidnappers, ask for
proof of life, and make sure that demands are clearly stated before making any offer for
the release of the victim.501 In addition, some local politicians and prominent individuals
also facilitate the negotiation for the release of some kidnap victims.502
 Some ASG sympathizers—Muslim and Christians—act as tipster or
spotter for the terrorist group in exchange of monetary rewards or a share
of the ransom.
The spotter plays an important role in kidnap for ransom activities as he or she is
often tasked to come up with a list of possible targets who are either capable of paying
497 Ibid.
498 “Gunmen Free Abducted Boy in Zamboanga,” Philippine Star, accessed June 30, 2016,
http://www.philstar.com/breaking-news/727137/gunmen-free-abducted-boy-zamboanga.
499 Based on the experience of the author as Field Station Commander of 9 th Intelligence and Security
Unit, ISG, PA during the conduct of operations to rescue kidnap victim Randelle Talania.
500 Peter Dobbs, “Kidnap and Ransom Today,” Catlin Group Limited, October 2012, 18,
http://www.catlin.com/flipbook/kidnap-and-ransom-today/files/inc/342692550.pdf.
501 Ibid.
103
the ransom demand or are connected to personalities or entities that are capable of
paying.503 While the ASG is currently constricted in some areas of Basilan and Sulu,
some of its members are residing in urban areas and are being utilized as spotters for
possible targets.504 When the target is chosen, casing and surveillance follow
immediately. There are also cases where the ASG does not conduct planning and
surveillance and simply seizes the victim when the opportunity arises, however.505
 The military and police have failed to dismantle various lawless elements
and private armed groups that provide operational and logistical support to
the ASG.
In the execution of kidnapping activities, especially outside the traditional areas of
operation, the ASG taps local criminal groups and other lawless elements to kidnap the
target in return for a share of the projected ransom payment.506 In some cases, criminal
elements conduct the kidnapping themselves and then transfer the victim to the ASG. To
get a higher ransom payment, the ASG engages in the negotiation because it has already
established a brutal reputation of beheading its victims if demands are not met on time.507
In this case, the lawless elements would either be paid for their expenses or wait until the
ransom is paid.508
The ASG also utilizes proven and tested tactics and possible routes to transfer the
kidnap victims to Basilan or Sulu. Lawless elements and the ASG excel in both the
planning and the execution of their kidnapping operations.509 In fact, despite naval
blockades along the waters off Zamboanga peninsula and the Sulu Archipelago, the ASG
has successfully evaded government forces and gotten away by utilizing only small
motorized boats.510 The presence of several military detachments and other checkpoints
503 Abuza, “Militant Islam,” 249.

504 Ibid.
506 Ibid.
507 Ibid.
508 Ibid.
509 Ibid.
510 Ibid.
104
in various places and strategic choke points in Zamboanga peninsula appear to be
ineffective.511
One good example was the kidnapping of Rodney Rodwell, an Australian citizen
who is married to a Filipina and residing near the center of the municipality of Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibuga Province.512 The ASG executed a daring kidnapping operation by
boldly abducting Rodwell from his residence despite the presence of various military and
police outposts in the area. These security measures do not preempt the ASG from
abducting someone in the middle of the city or town center.513
The collaboration and coordination between criminal organizations and the ASG
in conducting joint criminal activities seem to be very effective and efficient.514 The
group takes advantage of small islets and mangrove areas for hiding and evading
pursuing government forces prior to being transferred to the group’s temporary
encampments.515 Notably, the geography of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi is a key factor
in the conduct of ASG kidnappings as the different islands provide ideal escape routes
and safe havens.516
H. CONCLUSION
One of the challenges for the Philippine government with regard to terrorism is
the ASG. The ASG has been fluctuating between terrorism and crime, and has become a
serious security concern that poses a tremendous threat to the internal peace and security
of the Philippines. To come up with an appropriate counterterrorism strategy or approach,
it is imperative to grasp this nexus of crime and terrorism. Although the Philippine
512 Julie Alipala, “Australian Kidnapped in Philippines−Military,” December 5, 2011, Philippine
Daily Inquirer, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/20281/australian-kidnapped-in-
philippines%E2%80%94military.
514 O'Brien, “Fluctuations Between Crime and Terror,” 326−327.
516 Ibid., 4−5.
105
government’s counterterrorism strategy and approach has successfully apprehended or
neutralized several ASG personalities, the ASG remains a capable and resilient
organization. The case of the ASG as a hybrid organization requires some changes on the
current strategy, and intense military operations alone will not work. Since KFR is the
main source of financing of this group, the response must be coupled with a
comprehensive national strategy to stop KFR activities and dismantle its network and
support system.
The Philippine government should develop a comprehensive counterterrorism

approach that takes into consideration the inherent vulnerabilities and mistakes in terms
of inter-agency coordination, legislation, and intelligence sharing and collaboration
between regional and international partners. Any countermeasures must be
complemented on the ground by focused and intelligence-driven joint military and police
operations. One of the measures to combat terrorism is through legislation, but pertinent
laws should always build on good public relations and concern about fundamental rights
of individuals. It is crucial that appropriate and strong anti-terrorism laws should be
enacted to effectively prosecute ASG members and their affiliates, and they must be
meaningful and coherent laws that recognize the crucial support of the public.
Additionally, intelligence is an important factor for any counterterrorism strategy; thus,
collaboration of all intelligence agencies is critically important. Finally, any military and
police counterterrorism operation should be intelligence driven, and it should be followed
by political, social, and economic measures through the engagement of all concerned
LGUs and government agencies in the area in order to address the root causes of the
problems.
106
VI. CONCLUSION
The nexus of crime and terrorism—as exemplified by the ASG—has been one of
the challenges in Mindanao. Most terrorist organizations have learned to adapt to the
current security environment in order to survive and be more operationally capable in
terms of conducting attacks and securing a steady flow of funds. Although the ASG had
been involved in other criminal activities, this paper examines the ASG’s kidnapping
operations because it is one of the major concerns and made the current CT strategy seem
ineffective or possibly inadequate in eradicating terrorism and crime in the southern part
of Mindanao. Additionally, the ASG’s Kidnap-for-Ransom (KFR) operations, as a case
study, provide a good window into how the fusion of terrorism and crime can be clearly
understood and analyzed. This can help policymakers and state security forces to come
up with a comprehensive set of countermeasures. Knowing and understanding precisely
the ASG’s place in the Crime-Terror Continuum model will help policymakers to come
up with comprehensive policies and approaches against these security concerns.
Additionally, understanding the ASG as a hybrid organization will help lawmakers to
enact appropriate laws that will effectively prosecute terrorists who employ criminal
methods as a tool. The ASG’s strength or influence might be reduced, but if the root
causes of the problems are not properly addressed, then the terrorist organization will
continue to survive and will persist as a perpetual threat.
The following is the summary of findings generated by this research:
1. The ASG has evolved into a hybrid organization.

The ASG is an excellent example of the nexus of crime and terrorism. Despite its
rampant involvement in kidnapping activities and other criminal activities, the ASG
remains an Islamic terrorist organization. This group explicitly employs criminal methods
to further its terrorist activities. According to Banlaoi, “Countering the threat posed by
the ASG is a formidable challenge for law enforcement and other government
agencies.”517 Because of its superb skills at linking and maintaining strong alliances with
107
numerous armed groups in Mindanao that are engaged in various terroristic and criminal
activities, the ASG has become a more formidable and resilient organization.518
2. The Philippine CT strategy remains focused on a military model approach
to confront the ASG.
The threat posed by the ASG is not just a military and police problem. The
problem of terrorism and crime posed by the ASG and other lawless elements in
Mindanao requires a whole-government approach. This approach pertains to collective
efforts and shared responsibilities of different government agencies, departments, NGOs,
and other private sectors and stakeholders.
Although the Philippines’ current CT strategy and approach have resulted in some
notable accomplishments, particularly the arrest and neutralization of notorious key
personalities of the ASG, the threat of terrorism and other violent activities, especially the
rampant kidnapping activities in Mindanao, persists. This concern greatly affects the
peace and security situation of the country. One of the objectives of inter-agency
cooperation and collaboration is fusion and synchronization of efforts to destroy the ASG
and its criminal activities. An effective oversight council, along with appropriate
mechanisms, is crucial to engage and unite the efforts of other actors in national
government agencies and civil society.
3. The current anti-terrorism law of the Philippines (Human Security Act of
2007) proved to be incoherent and ineffective as a legislative measure to
deter or prevent terrorism.
The Philippine anti-terrorism law is too broad, and it just reinstates the crimes
listed in the Revised Penal Code of 1932, which is an 84-year-old law as of this
writing.519 The criminal offenses that are listed in this law are deemed punishable under
the Revised Penal Code, in which there must be clear parameters in converting common
crimes into terrorism.520 As discussed in Chapter I, anyone that commits a felony as
enumerated by this anti-terrorism law shall be prosecuted as a terrorist. For instance,
520 Ibid.
108
anyone who commits murder can be prosecuted as a terrorist. This violates our universal
definition of terrorism because it must be politically or religiously motivated.
The HSA of 2007 has no exact definition of murder or how it is different from
other acts of killing innocent people. This law defines terrorism vaguely or not at all. The
law does not even provide an exact or accurate categorization of the terms terrorism,
mass murder, or hate crime. This law has failed to provide a clear distinction between
terrorist and criminal acts; thus, any violation of felonies as enumerated in this anti-
terrorism law shall be categorized as terrorist acts.
4. The support of some local politicians and the populace within its area of
operations has made the ASG more resilient and effective against the
intensive counterterrorism efforts of the government.
As long as some local communities in Mindanao remain sympathetic to the ASG,
even the best CT strategy and approach will appear ineffective. Undeniably, popular
support is critically important in any war or conflict and winning the hearts and minds of
the people serves as a potent weapon of the ASG. Sympathetic communities in far-flung
areas of Basilan and Sulu provide crucial support that renders intensive military and law
enforcement operations futile. The support coming from corrupt local politicians down to
the community level to the ASG has been also one of the concerns in those areas. This is
one of the reasons why the ASG can evade strategically emplaced military and police
checkpoints and even naval blockades off the waters of Zamboanga, Basilan, and Sulu. In
addition, it can continuously conduct successful domestic and cross-border kidnapping
operations.
5. The cross-border operations will persist because they are strategically and
tactically important for the ASG.
At the tactical level, trans-border kidnapping operations undeniably improved the
group’s capabilities and reinforced their resolve to conduct more high-impact kidnapping
cases due to their tested schemes and perceived high returns in terms of monetary
rewards. Strategically, successful kidnapping operations within the territorial waters of
Indonesia and Malaysia have made the current CT countermeasures and efforts of the
Philippine government ineffective or inappropriate to stop this menace.
109
These kinds of violent activities have put the Philippines in a bad situation and
marred the country’s reputation among its neighboring countries and regional partners.
From a bigger perspective, shifting of the ASG’s activities from terrorism to crime is just
an offshoot of its drive for money and power. But it could be possible that kidnappings—
as a criminal tactic—have been employed as a tool to generate funds in the absence of
foreign support and strict implementation of laws against terrorist financing.
6. The lack of good governance, law enforcement, and sense of security also
prevent the people from resisting ASG’s criminal acts.
Although some local communities or tribes in Zamboanga Peninsula, Basilan, and
Sulu Archipelago have been against ASG’s violent and criminal activities, they opt to
neither take any appropriate action nor cooperate with the military and police because of
possible repercussions if they do so. In some cases, there is no government presence or
semblance of control and governance in those far-flung areas, which makes it favorable
and advantageous for terrorist or criminal organizations. For these communities,
supporting or helping the ASG has been more beneficial than cooperating with
government authorities because in some cases, the ASG has been providing financial
support to poor and unfortunate villages. These areas are tactically important for the ASG
in that they must be controlled and influenced for safe haven, logistical support, and
recruitment bases. This is one of the compelling reasons why this group has been
supported and protected by some Muslim communities, particularly in Basilan and Sulu
Provinces.
A. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS FOR COUNTERTERRORISM

STRATEGIES
Despite the complex identity of the ASG as both a terrorist and a criminal
organization, the response of the Philippine government has not changed. As a result, the
government’s efforts have been less than successful. Although intense military operations
are crucial in any counterterrorism strategy, the military approach alone has proved
inadequate to defeat the ASG. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has ordered the
110
Armed Forces of the Philippines to intensify operations against the ASG.521 In response
to this, the Philippine military deployed more combat troops in Basilan and Sulu
provinces. The success of military operations in addressing the ASG, particularly its
criminal activities, cannot be measured by the traditional military parameters alone. In
fact, when the AFP takes the lead role to eliminate the ASG, the probability of success is
considerably low.522 The presence of several military forces in Basilan and Sulu
supported by some units from the PNP Special Action Force has failed to stop the ASG
from conducting kidnapping activities. Recently, a South Korean cargo ship captain and
one Filipino crewmember were abducted in the southern Philippines.523 The ASG
cleverly executed this KFR operation and successfully evaded naval blockades off the
waters of Basilan and Sulu.
Much has been written on how to defeat terrorism in the Philippines, but which
method is the most effective approach to eliminate the ASG can be a subject for debate
and depends on existing variables. Therefore, this thesis offers significant
recommendations to effectively combat the nexus of terrorism and crime, particularly in
the case of the ASG, as enumerated below:
1. Address the Socio-Economic and Ideological Aspects of Terrorism
The Philippine government must undertake an in-depth study of the root causes of
terrorism and determine appropriate responses to resolve, eliminate, or prevent the same
causes from coming back. The Philippine government should address the
marginalization, injustices, political oppression, and other grievances of Filipino Muslims
because these issues provide inspiration for others to commit violence. 524 The strength
and resilience of the ASG lies in the weakness of the government to adequately address
521 Trefor Mos, “Philippines’ Duterte Ramps Up Fight With Islamic State-Linked Militants,” The Wall
Street Journal, accessed November 3, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/philippines-duterte-turns-his-
attention-to-abu-sayyaf-extremists-1472539403.
522 “Internal Peace and Security Plan Bayanihan,” Scribd, accessed July 30, 2016,
https://www.scribd.com/document/46302366/AFP-Internal-Peace-and-Security-Plan-IPSP-BAYANIHAN.
523 “Korean Abducted in First Philippines Cargo Ship Raid,” Rappler Philippines, accessed November
3, 2016, http://www.rappler.com/nation/149945-south-korea-ship-captain-kidnapping-philippines.
111
these socio-economic and political issues. Thus, it is important that the Philippine
government take the issues into consideration and act accordingly to address the
“fundamental political, economic, and social grievances” of Muslim Mindanao. 525 To
address the socio-economic and political roots of terrorism is crucial for an effective
counterterrorism strategy because terrorism proves to be politically and ideologically
motivated.
The AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan “Bayanihan” focuses on winning the
peace and not just defeating the enemy. As such, its main objective is supporting
community-based peace and development efforts, especially in conflict-affected areas.
This campaign plan aims to promote the culture of peace. Thus, the AFP supports
counter-radicalization and peace building initiatives, especially in Mindanao. For
instance, the AFP facilitates the conduct of the Bishops-Ulama Forum. This forum is one
way of engaging religious leaders from the Muslim and Christian faiths to enter into a
dialogue in promoting the culture of peace and non-violence. It also serves as a platform
to know the issues and other concerns to enhance further the implementation of peace
education in the madrasah educational system.
2. Engage and Empower Local Government Units
The role of Local Government Units (LGUs) has proven to be crucial in counter-
insurgency, particularly in the case of the Philippines where internal conflict has been one
of the perennial concerns. The prevalence of extreme poverty, social and cultural
marginalization, ethnic discrimination, lack of efficient politics and the increasing
economic difficulties in the Southern Philippines are some of the factors that drive
Filipino Muslims to engage in violent extremism or crimes.526 This kind of political and
socio-economic situation tends to be a good opportunity for the ASG to entice Muslim
youths to join its organization. Empowering the LGUs can be instrumental in averting
these outcomes, particularly at the local level. Empowering the LGUs pertains not only to
526 “Assessing ASG’s Capabilities and Vulnerabilities,” Special Report, Intelligence and Security
Group, Philippine Army, May 4, 2016.
112
more financial support from the central government, but also encompasses effective
mechanisms on how they can participate in a forum that will help other government
agencies and institutions eliminate various threat groups.
One of the measures initiated by the Philippine government is the creation of the
Peace and Order Council (POC) at the regional and municipal level. The POC is a
convergence mechanism wherein LGUs are encouraged and influenced to take the lead in
addressing the underlying causes of insurgency and terrorism. The AFP conducts regular
consultations and meetings with leaders of local government units. Since some of the
POC members are political leaders elected by the people, they can influence or task
community leaders to support the fight against terrorism and crime. The military and
police can coordinate with LGUs on how to enhance intelligence networks, particularly
in some far-flung areas that are frequently visited or under the influence of the enemy.
3. Pursue an Intelligence-Driven Counterterrorism Operation
Recognizing that intelligence is one important weapon in combating terrorism,

AFP intelligence operations are geared towards identifying, monitoring and locating
terrorists and other High-Value Individuals (HVIs). As William Fox Jr. argues, there is a
“blurred line” between intelligence and combat operations, but in any type of
counterterrorism operations, the intelligence organization has always been at the
forefront.527 Both timely intelligence and accurate analysis are important, whether the
Philippine government understands counterterrorism as a military or a criminal approach.
Accurate and sound information is crucial in uncovering and subsequently preempting
terrorists’ plans and intentions. Appropriate intelligence support is extended to the
various Task Forces and Joint Task Forces that were created to address terrorism,
kidnapping, and other forms of organized crime, particularly in Mindanao. Accurate and
timely intelligence is not enough, however, without a proper mechanism for sharing and
collaboration of efforts of various intelligence agencies. Intelligence fusion centers must
be effective in consolidating and integrating all information necessary for analysis.
527 William F. Fox Jr., “Legal Aspects of Terrorism,” Terrorism 12, no. 4 (January 8, 2008): 302,
DOI: 10.1080/10576108908435790.
113
The military and police should employ all-source intelligence, which means
fusing multi-source intelligence data into a single correlated picture. To promote
intelligence fusion, the Joint AFP-PNP Intelligence Committee (JAPIC) was created at
the national level and simulated down to the provincial level. Intelligence efforts are
coordinated and controlled through the different Joint Intelligence Committees at all
levels of the AFP hierarchy. Operations and intelligence fusion centers were also
established in the military area commands. Moreover, the AFP coordinates with other
government agencies and departments that are involved in combating terrorism.
To augment the collection of intelligence on HVIs, the rewards system was

instituted to provide informants the incentive to report the presence of these persons in
their localities. The implementation of the rewards system has been effective in
neutralizing terrorists. Since 2001, governments of the Philippines and the United States
have paid informants a total of US$14M for providing vital information that led to the
neutralization of ASG personalities and their cohorts.528 Thus, this paper highly
recommends enhancing and continuing the rewards for justice program to entice quality
informants who are crucial in intelligence operations.
4. Enhance and Upgrade the Capabilities of the Military and Police
Enhance and upgrade the current capabilities of the military and police to meet
the current demand and challenges of the overall anti-terrorism effort of the government.
Technological advances could help a lot in this effort. The Philippine government must
pursue and continue the AFP Modernization Program. Although these upgrades are
primarily intended for territorial defense, the acquisition of the latest military hardware
and equipment can also be crucial in counterterrorism operations. Delfin Lorenzana, the
secretary of the Department of National Defense, points out that he will continue
modernizing the AFP through acquisition of aircraft, sea craft, and other essential
equipment to enhance the capabilities of the military.529 Additionally, the DND has been
528 “Philippine Experience in Combating Terrorism” (AFP Presentation, February 2013).

529 “New Defense Chief Lays Out Plans for DND, AFP,” GMA News, July 23, 2016,
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/574836/news/nation/new-defense-chief-lays-out-plans-for-dnd-
afp.
114
expediting the procurement of mission-essential equipment primarily intended to enhance
the internal security operational capabilities of the AFP.530 The 15-year modernization
program includes the acquisition of the following:
Hamilton-class cutters, multipurpose assault craft, Armored Personnel

Carriers, brand-new C-295 medium lift aircraft, C-130 heavy transports,
FA-50PH light-interim fighter aircraft, naval/attack versions of the Agusta
Westland AW-109 helicopters, landing craft heavies, and two strategic
sealift vessels, and some other essential hardware and equipment.531
In terms of gathering information against the terrorists, Human Intelligence

(HUMINT) should be complemented by other important intelligence disciplines—Signal
Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). Although the AFP has this
kind of equipment, it needs to upgrade and to procure the latest equipment and
technology in the market. On the other hand, the Philippine Navy and Maritime Unit of
the PNP have been exerting efforts in securing the maritime borders of Sulu to prevent
the ASG from bringing kidnap victims from other Zamboanga Peninsula. To successfully
accomplish this mission; it needs the latest and appropriate watercraft to establish
checkpoints around critical island provinces and to flag down suspicious high speed
motorboats along these waters.
5. Pursue Stronger Bilateral, Regional, and International Cooperation

for Terrorism and Crime
Cooperation with regional partners is crucial to a long-term solution to defeat the

transnational nature of terrorism and organized crime. Thus, the Philippines must
strengthen its collaboration with regional and international partners to combat terrorism
and crime. The Philippines as an archipelagic country can benefit a lot from this regional
bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Porous borders in the south between Malaysia and
Indonesia serve as an ideal transit route for the terrorists and criminals.
530 “New Defense Chief Lays Out Plans for DND, AFP,” GMA News, July 23, 2016,
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/574836/news/nation/new-defense-chief-lays-out-plans-for-dnd-
afp.
531 “AFP Modernization ‘Will Continue as Scheduled’ Under Duterte Admin,” Update Philippines,
July 2, 2016, http://www.update.ph/2016/07/afp-modernization-will-continue-as-scheduled-under-duterte-
admin/6925.
115
These territorial borders proved to be a huge challenge to secure because the AFP
and Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) lack adequate equipment and tools to continuously
conduct security patrols and effectively secure the country’s territorial waters. In
addition, these weaknesses can be offset through multilateral and bilateral cooperation
and collaboration with other Asian neighbors. Abuza points out, “ASEAN is the
appropriate organization to take the lead on counterterrorism, as the mechanisms and
processes are already in place such as the annual meetings of heads of state, foreign
ministers, military chiefs, intelligence chiefs, and police chiefs.”532 The AFP cooperates
with neighboring countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, with whom the Philippines has
existing border patrol and border crossing arrangements. These arrangements help in
securing the tri-border area in the Sulu and Celebes seas and restricting the travel of ASG
and other terrorists to and from these countries.
B. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS TO PREEMPT AND PREVENT

KIDNAPPINGS
A traditional military approach is only part of the solution against the kidnapping
operations of the ASG. According to Alvarez, “ASG kidnap for ransom is a simple
problem complicated by several intangible factors, which requires a complex solution. It
necessitates the cooperation of all stakeholders and a sincere desire to end the
problem.”533 The Philippine government should adopt a comprehensive strategy that
integrates all concerned government agencies and institutions. Moreover, this paper
provides policymakers a logical and ground-based understanding of the kidnapping
operations of the ASG. The following recommendations are inter-dependent parts of the
solution to reduce cases of kidnapping in the southern part of Mindanao:
532 Abuza, “Militant Islam,” 249, quoted in Eusaquito P. Manalo, “Philippine Response to Terrorism:
The Abu Sayyaf Group” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December
2004), 75−76, http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/1218.
533 Alvarez, “A Case Study on ASG Group Kidnapping for Ransom: Okenek-Dielen Kidnapping,” 93.
116
1. Strict Implementation of the “No Negotiation and No Ransom”
Policies
A strong political will is necessary for the strict implementation of the no

negotiations with the terrorists and no ransom policies of the government, and a strong
hand needs to strictly implement these policies. Legislative measures to preempt
kidnapping incidents include passing a law that would punish those who acted as
negotiators during kidnapping incident, and those who would pay ransom. Doing this
may discourage concerned individuals who have vested interests to act as negotiators.
Without any ransom payment, the kidnappers may be discouraged from abducting
someone because of the risk, effort, and financial considerations of such operations.
Additionally, good governance must be initiated and taken seriously by the national
government. If the national government will not address the problems of corruption and
governance at the local level, kidnappings will remain a major concern.
Corruption must be stopped at the level of the local government units, and those
who are involved in the said malfeasance must be investigated and sanctioned if found
guilty. To get rid of corruption and malfeasance within the ranks of local government
executives, in the police, and in the military, strong political will is also a key factor.
Although the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), a revenue share of the local government
units from the Philippine national government, undoubtedly plays a major role in political
activities, this is often not enough to finance political ambitions. As such, some
politicians would resort to other sources of funds, such as kidnapping activities in
collusion with the ASG.
In this context, good governance depends on the sincerity of the national

government down to the local government units, especially the local chief executives, in
delivering and providing public services and creating infrastructure to gain the trust and
support of the community. Moreover, equally important in this endeavor is the
establishment of a local defense system that will protect significant infrastructure projects
and other high impact government projects to alleviate poverty of concerned
communities. Enhancement of community defense is also crucial in reinforcing security
in the community against violence and coercion from different threat groups.
117
2. Formulation of a National Strategy against Kidnapping
The formulation of a national strategy against kidnapping, which includes the

creation of an agency or an inter-agency task force to coordinate efforts in countering
kidnapping activities of the ASG and other lawless elements in Mindanao, should be
initiated by a legislative body. This may include placing AFP and other law enforcement
units under one command or agency. Although it is easy to say, this is very hard to
realize and even harder to implement on the ground. Without the strong political will of
those who would be heading this inter-agency task force, then this is just another viable
solution in writing and a waste of efforts and resources.
3. Enhancement of Border Cooperation
The Philippines must strengthen its border crossing and border patrol
arrangements with its neighboring countries in the south, particularly Indonesia and
Malaysia. To control movement of terrorists and criminals along the borders in the south,
it requires responsive and appropriate border procedures and countermeasures. Joint and
coordinated border security patrols with regional partners along with sharing of
information are crucial to prevent movement of both individuals and funds that have links
with terrorist and criminal activities. There should be more responsive and regular
exchanges at the operational level, and those more extensive linkages should be
developed among multilateral agencies of each country operating in the border areas.
Doing these measures would mitigate the lack of or inadequate operational data
concerning terror organizations, plans, regional associates and sympathizers, and among
others.
4. Pursue an Effective Counter-Radicalization Program
This can be done effectively through a multi-sectoral approach, primarily

composed of the religious sectors, communities and LGUs supported by the military and
the police. According to Hedieh Mirahmadi and Mehreen Farooq, while several ways
lead to radicalization, “an undeniable driving force is the propagation of radical
118
ideologies.”534 They assert that the government needs “to look beyond the traditional law
enforcement approaches in which authorities intervene just before or after an act of
terrorism.”535 Counter radicalization programs and initiatives must be one of the key
programs of the government “to deter individuals from radicalizing or becoming
radicalized.”536 The Philippine government should appropriate funds in various
community-led initiatives of moderate Muslims.
In countering radicalization, the Philippine government must invest in social and

community research to better understand the threat of radicalization. Funding for such a
program may come from the government as well as from private corporations or from the
international community. Additionally, law enforcement agencies must establish rapport
and create good partnerships with moderate Muslims who will lead the struggle against
radicalization in the communities. Filipino Muslims need to be empowered to counter
radical ideology and discourage KFR activities. In addition, some activities inside the
mosques must also be monitored to ensure that these religious institutions are not being
used to propagate radical ideology.
Moreover, Mirahmadi and Farooq argue, “Counter-radicalization efforts of local

mosque communities should be publicly recognized by government officials in their
speeches, dinner receptions and awards ceremonies.”537 Underlining the contribution of
Muslim leaders who promote and work for peace will serve as a good example for
Muslim youths to follow.538 Also important, the Philippine government, through the
National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF) as well as other Muslim groups in
the country, should intensify the information campaign against radicalization. Finally,
radicalization and ASG propaganda online must be confronted. The Internet has
534 Hedieh Mirahmadi and Mehreen Farooq, “A Community Approach to Countering Radicalization:
A Partnership for America,” The World Organization for Resource Development and Education
(WORDE), v, accessed November 7, 2016, http://www.worde.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/WORDE-
Counter-Radicalization-Report-Final.pdf.
535 Ibid.
536 Ibid.
537 Ibid., iv.
538 Ibid.
119
increasingly become a significant medium for radicalizing Muslims and for the ASG to
recruit potential followers by posting radical statements and articles. Integrated and
coordinated efforts should be undertaken to counter ASG propaganda and radicalization
online.
5. Promotion of Multi-Sectoral Information Advocacy
The aim of this advocacy is to target religious schools, particularly Islamic

schools or madrasas, focusing on the ills of KFR activities. Aside from this advocacy
campaign, the government, particularly the Department of Education, with the support of
the NCMF, must continuously monitor madrasa education in the country to ensure that
these institutions do not become breeding grounds of terrorist activity and the spread of
radical ideas. It is important to note that madrasas are scattered all over the Philippines,
with the majority found in Central and Western Mindanao.539
It is estimated that there are between 600 and 1,000 madrasas in Mindanao, with
a total student population of between 60,000 and 100,000.540 This advocacy represents a
major step in upgrading madrasah education in the country and in developing young
Muslims to become progressive, peace-loving, and responsible members of the
community, which in turn will help lure them away from joining the ASG and engaging
in KFR activities.
6. Empower the Communities and Encourage Citizen’s Active

Participation
The community must be engaged and encouraged to increase their commitment

and vigilance to report suspicious activities leading to kidnapping. In addition, support
the authorities with evidence to clarify and prosecute said crime, using community
organizations, foundations, Non-Government Organizations, and private companies to
539 Syarif Hidayat, “The Madrasah Islamic Education in the Philippines,” Mi’raj Islamic News
Agency, accessed October 11, 2016, http://www.mirajnews.com/the-madrasah-islamic-education-inthe-
philippines/59697.
540 Ibid.
120
support this cause. It is crucial for the people to know their true strength, which comes
from their unity to fight the threat and stop the relentless kidnapping in Mindanao.
In one study conducted by Alvarez, he points out that one notable characteristic of
the Tausug tribe is its deep sense of familial ties.541 The bond that unites these Tausug
tribe members became their strongest weapon against the ASG. The elders of this tribe
inculcate an old tradition and culture of closeness and alliances between family members
and relatives by blood or intermarriages. Tausug know very well that strong alliances
stem from the basic social formation—the family.542 These alliances are what make the
entire Tausug tribe very strong. Alvarez cites the case of one place in Sulu—Barangay
Bungkaung543—where a strong family bond evolved into “multi-family alliances.”544
Residents of this barangay strongly opposed the influence of the ASG and its kidnapping
business, which shows that power lies in the unity of the families in the said area.545 This
kind of alliance among Tausug families can be a good model for other Muslim tribes to
emulate in order to resist the threat and influence from the ASG.
7. Effective Law Enforcement Operations
These measures would work successfully if coupled with adequate police

visibility in affected areas, as well as the establishment of a local defense system in the
community, which will deny criminal elements the opportunity to execute planned
atrocities. Likewise, strengthening the functions and mandate of the PNP-AKG in the
region would preempt and prevent the prevalence of kidnapping. With regard to the
experience of Britain against the IRA, Richardson argues that a weak and “highly
fragmented” police organization, in which each police force in England and Wales has its
own special branch, makes coordination difficult and results in a perennial problem of
542 Ibid., 95.
543 One of the Barangays of the Municipality of Patikul, Sulu, Philippines.
545 Ibid.
121
rivalry among security forces.546 He also points out that lack of enough police personnel
is one of the factors why the police in England and Wales failed to preempt or prevent
terrorism in its area of responsibilities.
Traditionally, counterterrorism in the Philippines has been the responsibility of

the military; without the support of the local government units coupled with weak
governance, however, the military forces cannot effectively defeat the terrorists and
totally dismantle their organization and support system. Scott N. McKay and David A.
Webb claim that “since 2010, the Philippine government has made an effort to pass the
domestic counterterrorism mission from the military to the national police, but the
transition has been slow and beleaguered by distrust and competition between the two
organizations.”547
8. Intensify Information Sharing
According to Louise Richardson, “the most important weapon in any campaign

against terrorism is intelligence.”548 He claims that even the British government
encountered the perennial problem of intelligence coordination between the police and
the military in terms of gathering and sharing of critical information. Intelligence
cooperation and active collaboration between and among local intelligence agencies in
the area are crucial to effectively monitor the plans and activities of the ASG, particularly
its criminal activities. Information exchange, particularly with Malaysian counterparts on
the issue of kidnapping, must likewise be pursued. Notably, Malaysia believes that some
‘water villages’549 in Sabah, particularly in Semporna, serve as hideouts for Philippine
kidnappers and also as a safe haven for kidnap victims prior to their transit to the
546 Louise Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the
Past, ed. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2007), 77.
547 Scott N. McKay and David A. Webb, “Comparing Counterterrorism in Indonesia and the
Philippines,” Counter Terrorism Center, February 27, 2015, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/comparing-
counterterrorism-in-indonesia-and-the-philippines.
548 Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 82.
549 “Water villages are settlements that are usually built on the water. Houses often float on the water
or are located on stilts and rarely on small islands.” Source: http://hiddenunseen.blogspot.com/2012/03/top-
10-water-villages-in-world.html.
122
Philippines. Some residents of these water villages are also believed to act as spotters of
potential kidnap victims in Sabah.
The British intelligence approach in Northern Ireland is one good example of how
effective collaboration among intelligence units of the military and police could be
crucial in any counterterrorism operations. Despite several sub-units that are operating
against one specific terrorist organization in Northern Ireland, a clear guideline outlines
how intelligence collection and operations will be conducted. Thus, serious lapses and
problems have been avoided with regard to coordination between the military and the
police.550
C. FINAL THOUGHTS
As terrorism has been evolving and becoming a global concern, various nations
have tried different strategies and approaches to combat terrorism. Although the current
Philippine CT strategy and approach have been successful in decimating the ASG, it
needs further restudy to be more responsive and proactive. Terrorism and crime remain
one of the security concerns in Mindanao, particularly the relentless kidnappings of the
ASG. A strategy and approach must be perfected that is appropriate against hybrid
organizations such as the ASG. Moreover, this perpetual concern of terrorism requires an
in-depth assessment and analysis to come up with a rational and comprehensive set of
countermeasures and responses.
The current deployment of more troops in Basilan and Sulu provinces clearly
suggests that the Philippines heavily relies on fighting terrorism with a military model
approach, and massive deployment of troops and intense military operations do not really
deter or prevent terrorism and crime in Mindanao. Although this approach—as stated in
IPSP “Bayanihan”—intends to involve and encourage the active participation of various
stakeholders, still it seems inadequate and weak in terms of getting the complete support
and cooperation of various concerned government and private agencies and institutions.
550 Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 82.
123
The Philippine government remains reactive to the terroristic and criminal
activities emanating from the ASG; the countermeasures and approaches that have been
developed and employed do not really deter or prevent terrorism and crime in Mindanao.
Due to the multifarious socio-economic, political and cultural factors that contribute to
the prevalence of kidnapping in Mindanao, the solution to the problem would necessitate
a whole-nation and integrated approach. Various terrorist groups, particularly the ASG,
will continue to pose huge challenges to the Philippine government in the next few years.
The ASG will still see kidnapping as a lucrative undertaking as this has largely sustained
the group and part of the communities where it operates. It is expected that the ASG will
continue with abductions, both within and outside its traditional bases. IED attacks and
other forms of violence will also continue against the military and police and to the
innocent civilians.
124
LIST OF REFERENCES
“Assessing ASG’s Capabilities and Vulnerabilities.” Special Report. Intelligence and

Security Group, Philippine Army. May 4, 2016.
Abuza, Zachary. Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, Crucible of Terror. Boulder, Colorado:
Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2003.
Abuza, Zachary. U.S. War College. “Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the ASG.”
Accessed April 22, 2016.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=625.
Acharya, Arabinda. “Terrorist Financing in Southeast Asia.” In Terrorism in South and

Southeast Asia in the Coming Decade, edited by Daljit Singh, 92−114. Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in association with Macmillan, 2009.
Aguirre, Alexander. “The Philippine Response to Terrorism.” Journal of Policing,

Intelligence, and Counter-Terrorism 4, no. 1 (August 3, 2011): 47−63. DOI:
10.1080/18335300.2009.9686923.
Albanese, Jay S. “Causes of Organized Crime: Do Criminals Organize Around

Opportunities for Crime or Do Criminal Opportunities Create New Offenders?”
Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 16, no. 4 (November 2000): 409−423.
DOI: 10.1177/1043986200016004004.
Alipala, Julie. “Abu Sayyaf Releases Norwegian Hostage.” Philippine Daily Inquirer,
September 17, 2016. http://globalnation.inquirer.net/145010/abu-sayyaf-releases-
norwegian-hostage.
Alipala, Julie. “Australian Kidnapped in Philippines−Military.” December 5, 2011.

Philippine Daily Inquirer. http://globalnation.inquirer.net/20281/australian-
kidnapped-in-philippines%E2%80%94military.
Alipala, Julie. “Head of ‘Abu Sayyaf Captive’ Dumped on Sulu Street – Police.”
Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 25, 2016.
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/138928/head-of-abu-sayyaf-captive-dumped-on-
sulu-street-police#ixzz478SrHGGn.
Alvarez, Philip. “A Case Study on ASG Group Kidnapping for Ransom: Okonek-Dielen
Kidnapping.” Master’s thesis, Ateneo De Manila University, January 2016.
Atkinson, Garret. “ASG: The Father of the Swordsman.” American Security Project.
March 2012. https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/Abu-Sayyaf-The-Father-of-the-Swordsman.pdf.
125
Ballina, Santiago. “The Crime-Terror Continuum Revisited: A Model for the Study of
Hybrid Criminal Organisations.” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter
Terrorism 6, no. 2 (October 2011): 121–136. DOI:
10.1080/18335330.2011.605200.
Banlaoi, Rommel. “Current Terrorist Groups and Emerging Extremist Armed

Movements in the Southern Philippines: Threats to Philippine National Security.”
National Defense College of the Philippines. Accessed May 16, 2016.
http://www.ndcp.edu.ph/nsr.php.
Banlaoi, Rommel. “Duterte’s Challenges: Terror, Crime and the ASG.” Rappler
Philippines, May 13, 2016. http://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/132875-
duterte-challenges-terror-crime-abu-sayyaf.
Banlaoi, Rommel. Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group, 3rd ed.
Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research,
2012.
Banlaoi, Rommel. Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are
They? Yuchengco Center, De La Salle University, Manila, 2009.
Beckman, James. Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-

Terrorism. Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2007.
Behm, Allan J. and Michael J. Palmer. “Coordinating Counterterrorism: A Strategic

Approach to a Changing Threat.” Terrorism 14, no. 3 (2008): 171−193. DOI:
10.1080/10576109108435874.
Bonner, David. “United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism.”

Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 4 (December 21, 2007): 179−191. DOI:
10.1080/09546559208427180.
Boumghar, Mouloud, Frédéric Ceuppens, and Nabeel Rajab. “Terrorism and Human
Rights in the Philippines: Fighting Terror or Terrorizing?” International
Federation for Human Rights, 1−48. https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/ph493a.pdf.
Bures, Oldrich. “EU’s Fight Against Terrorist Finances: Internal Shortcomings and
Unsuitable External Models.” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 3 (June 8,
2010): 418−437. DOI: 10.1080/09546550903463434.
Burnham, Gracia, and Dean Merrill. In the Presence of My Enemies. Wheaton, Illinois:
Tyndale House, 2003.
Byman, Dan. “Fighting the War on Terrorism: A Better Approach.” In How to Make
America Safe: New Policies for National Security, edited by Stephen Van Evera.
Cambridge, MA: The Tobin Project, 2006.
126
Byman, Daniel. A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism.
NY: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Byman, Daniel. The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad. Hoboken,
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2008.
Cabalza, Chester B. “Deconstructing Human Security in the Philippines.” Academia.

Accessed April 17, 2016.
https://www.academia.edu/2137055/Deconstructing_Human_Security_in_the_Phi
lippines.
Carrapico, Helena, Daniela Irrena, and Bill Tupman, “Transnational Organized Crime
and Terrorism: Different Peas, Same Pod?” Global Crime 15 no. 3−4 (August 11,
2014): 213−218. DOI: 10.1080/17440572.2014.939882.
Chalk, Peter, Angel Rabasa, William Rosenau, and Leanne Piggott. The Evolving
Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment. Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2009.
Chambers, Geoff. “Freed Hostage Warren Rodwell Kidnapped After Love Took Him to
Philippine Region of Mindanao.” News Corps Australia Network. Accessed June
30, 2016. http://www.news.com.au/national/freed-hostage-warren-rodwell-
kidnapped-after-love-took-him-to-philippine-region-of-mindanao/story-fncynjr2-
1226609494451.
Channel News Asia. “4 Malaysians Released by Abu Sayyaf: Philippine Military.” June
8, 2016. http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/4-malaysians-
released-by/2854376.html.
CNN Philippines. “3 Foreigners, Filipina Kidnapped on Samal Island.” September 25,

2015. http://cnnphilippines.com/regional/2015/09/22/3-foreigners-Filipina-
kidnapped-Samal-Davao-del-Norte.html.
Combs, Cindy C. Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2006.
Congress of the Philippines. “Human Security Act of 2007.” Accessed August 15, 2016.
Congress of the Philippines. “The Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act
of 2012.” Accessed August 18, 2016.
http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/?d=ra_results&ra_title=terrorism.
Croissant, Aurel, and Daniel Barlow. “Following the Money Trail: Terrorist Financing
and Government Responses in Southeast Asia.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
30, no. 2 (February 24, 2007): 131−156. DOI: 10.1080/10576100600959721.
127
D’Alfonso, Steven. “Why Organized Crime and Terror Groups Are Converging.”
Security Intelligence. Accessed October 27, 2016.
https://securityintelligence.com/why-organized-crime-and-terror-groups-are-
converging/.
Daily Mail. “Hostages Plead for Their Lives in Abu Sayyaf Ransom Video.” November
1, 2016. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/video/news/video-1220989/Hostages-plead-
lives-Abu-Sayyaf-ransom-video.html.
Davis, Lynn E., Gregory F. Treverton, Daniel Byman, Sara A. Daly and William
Rosenau. “Coordinating the War on Terrorism.” RAND Corporation, March
2004. http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP110.html.
De Castro, Renato Cruz. “Abstract of Counter-Insurgency in the Philippines and the

Global War on Terror. Examining the Dynamics of the Twenty-first Century
Long Wars.” European Journal of East Asian Studies 9 (2010): 135−160. DOI:
10.1163/156805810X517706.
Dishman, Chris. “Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation.” Studies in Conflict &

Terrorism 24, no. 1 (August 6, 2010): 43−58. DOI: 10.1080/10576100118878.
Domingo-Almase, Ananda Devi. “What the Subject of Security Really Means: A Look
Into the Content and Context of the 2011−2016 National Security Policy in the
Philippines.” National Defense College of the Philippines, 84−106.
http://www.ndcp.edu.ph/nsr.php.
Dunn, David Hastings, and Oz Hassan. “Strategic Confusion: America’s Conflicting

Strategies and the War on Terrorism.” In International Terrorism Post 9/11:
Comparative Dynamics and Responses, edited by Asaf Siniver, 57−82. NY:
Routledge, 2012.
Eadie, Pauline E. “Legislating for Terrorism: The Philippines’ Human Security Act
2007.” Journal of Terrorism Research 2, no. 3 (November 11, 2011): 24−33.
http://jtr.st-andrews.ac.uk/articles/10.15664/jtr.226/#.
Estévez, Eduardo. “Intelligence Community Reforms: The Case of Argentina.” In

Intelligence Elsewhere. Spies and Espionage outside the Anglosphere, edited by
Philip H. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson, 219−238. Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 2013.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Organized Crime.” Accessed July 15, 2016.

https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/organizedcrime/glossary.
Fellman, Zack. “Abu Sayyaf Group.” Center for Strategic Studies and International
Studies, case study no. 5 (November 2011): 1−10.
128
Forest, James J.F. “Global Trends in Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups.” Global Change,
Peace & Security 24, no. 3 (October 8, 2012): 311−330. DOI:
10.1080/14781158.2012.714766.
Fox, William F. Jr. “Legal Aspects of Terrorism.” Terrorism 12, no. 4 (January 9, 2008):
297−315. DOI: 10.1080/10576108908435790.
Freeman, Michael. “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology.” Studies
in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 6 (May 20, 2011): 461−475. DOI:
10.1080/1057610X.2011.571193.
French, Erik. “Kidnapping Risk on the Rise in the Philippines.” Global Risk Insights,
April 9, 2016. http://globalriskinsights.com/2016/04/kidnapping-risk-philippines/.
Gait, Shalom. “Israel.” In Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries, edited by

Yohan Alexander, 227−259. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002.
Gerdes, Luke M., Kristine Ringler, and Barbara Autin. “Assessing the Abu Sayyaf
Group’s Strategic and Learning Capacities.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37,
no. 3 (2014): 267−293. DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2014.872021.
GMA News. “New Defense Chief Lays Out Plans for DND, AFP.” July 23, 2016.
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/574836/news/nation/new-defense-chief-
lays-out-plans-for-dnd-afp.
Gonzales, Jovencio Ferrer. “Towards a Joint Interagency Approach in Combating

Terrorism.” Master’s thesis, AFP Command & General Staff College, 2010.
Goodall, Catherine. “Defining Terrorism.” E-International Relations. Accessed January

15, 2016. http://www.e-ir.info/2013/07/28/defining-terrorism/.
Hausken, Kjell, and Dipak K. Gupta. “Government Protection Against Terrorism and
Crime.” Global Crime 16, no. 2 (March 26, 2015): 59−80. DOI:
10.1080/17440572.2015.1019612.
Hesterman, Jennifer L. The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug

Cartels, Organized Crime, and Terror Groups. Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis,
2013.
Hewitt, Steve. The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism on the
Home Front Since 9/11. London: Continuum International, 2008.
Hidayat, Syarif. “The Madrasah Islamic Education in the Philippines.” Mi’raj Islamic
News Agency. Accessed October 11, 2016. http://www.mirajnews.com/the-
madrasah-islamic-education-inthe-philippines/59697.
129
Hoffman, Bruce, and Jennifer Morrison-Taw. “A Strategic Framework for Countering
Terrorism.” In European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies
and Intergovernmental Cooperation, edited by Fernando Reinares, 1−29.
Aldershot, UK; Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 2000.
House of Representatives of the Philippines. “Republic Act 9372: An Act to Secure the
State and Protect Our People from Terrorism.” Accessed August 10, 2016.
http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ra_13/RA09372.pdf.
Hutchinson, Steven, and Pat O’Malley. “A Crime–Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of

the Links between Terrorism and Criminality.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism
30, no. 12 (October 26, 2007): 1095−1107. DOI: 10.1080/10576100701670870.
Jones, Clive. “Israel and the Al-Aqsa Intifada: The Conceptzia of Terror.” In
International Terrorism Post 9/11: Comparative Dynamics and Responses, edited
by Asaf Siniver, 126−143. NY: Routledge, 2012.
Lefkowitz, Josh. “The Crime-Terror Nexus.” NY State Office of Homeland Security.

March 13, 2013, 1−11. https://info.publicintelligence.net/NY-
CrimeTerrorNexus.pdf.
LFP Press. “‘They Will Execute Us’; Kidnapped Canadians Held by Philippine
Militants Appeal for Help.” March 10, 2016.
http://www.lfpress.com/2016/03/10/they-will-execute-us-kidnapped-canadians-
held-by-philippine-militants-appeal-for-help.
Lowe, Aya. “Kidnapping Cases Could Rise Amid Philippine Election Season: Police.”
Channel NewsAsia, February 20, 2016.
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/kidnapping-cases-
could/2533198.html.
Lowenthal, Mark. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 6th ed. Washington, DC: CQ
Press, 2014.
Makarenko, Tamara. “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay Between

Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism.” Global Crime 6, no. 1
(September 8, 2010): 129−145. DOI: 10.1080/1744057042000297025.
Manalo, Eusaquito P. “Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group.”

Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December
2004. http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/1218.
Matei, Cristiana. “Overview and Functions of Intelligence in a Democracy” (lecture,

Naval Postgraduate School, July 19, 2016).
McKay, Scott N., and David A. Webb, “Comparing Counterterrorism in Indonesia and
the Philippines.” Counter Terrorism Center. February 27, 2015.
130
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/comparing-counterterrorism-in-indonesia-and-
the-philippines.
Messervy-Whiting, Graham. “British Armed Forces and European Union Perspectives on

Countering Terrorism.” In International Terrorism Post 9/11: Comparative
Dynamics and Responses, edited by Asaf Siniver, 101−114. NY: Routledge,
2012.
Mirahmadi, Hedieh, and Mehreen Farooq. “A Community Approach to Countering

Radicalization: A Partnership for America.” The World Organization for
Resource Development and Education (WORDE). Accessed November 7, 2016.
http://www.worde.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/WORDE-Counter-
Radicalization-Report-Final.pdf.
Mos, Trefor. “Philippines’ Duterte Ramps Up Fight With Islamic State-Linked

Militants.” The Wall Street Journal. Accessed November 3, 2016,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/philippines-duterte-turns-his-attention-to-abu-sayyaf-
extremists-1472539403.
Mullins, Sam. “Parallels Between Crime and Terrorism: A Social Psychological

Perspective.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 9 (August 27, 2009):
811−830. DOI: 10.1080/10576100903109776.
Napuli, Ferdinand B. “Keeping on the Right Track: An Assessment on the Effectiveness

of AFP Responses to ASG Threat.” Master’s thesis, National Defense College of
the Philippines, Quezon City, 2015.
Netanyahu, Benjamin. Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat the

International Terrorist Network. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux Press,
2001.
O’Brien, Mckenzie. “Fluctuations Between Crime and Terror: The Case of Abu Sayyaf’s
Kidnapping Activities.” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 2 (2012):
320−336. DOI:10.1080/09546553.2011.648679.
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, OG2. Special Report on the ASG
Kidnapping Activities. Taguig City: Production Branch, 2014.
Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. “Fourteen Pillars of Policy and Action
Against Terrorism.” Accessed May 18, 2016. http://dict.gov.ph/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/MO37_s2001_CriticalInfra.pdf.
Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. “National Security Policy 2011−2016:
Securing the Gains of Democracy.” Accessed May 10, 2016.
http://www.gov.ph/2011/08/18/national-security-policy-2011-2016/.
131
Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. “The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines–Preamble.” Accessed September 10, 2016.
http://www.gov.ph/constitutions/the-1987-constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-
philippines/the-1987-constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines-preamble/.
Olterman, Philip. “Islamists in Philippines Threaten to Kill German Hostages.” The

Guardian, September 24, 2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/24/islamists-philippines-threaten-
kill-german-hostages-isis.
Pareno, Roel. “4 Indonesian Crew Members Kidnapped.” The Philippine Star, April 16,
2016. http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/04/16/1573493/4-indonesian-crew-
members-kidnapped.
Pedahzur, Ami, and Arie Perliger. “The Consequences of Counterterrorist Policies in

Israel.” In The Consequences of Counterterrorism, edited by Martha Crenshaw,
335–366. Russel Sage Foundation: 2010.
Philippine Star. “Gunmen Free Abducted Boy in Zamboanga.” Accessed June 30, 2016.
http://www.philstar.com/breaking-news/727137/gunmen-free-abducted-boy-
zamboanga.
Prezelj, Iztok. “Improving Inter-Organizational Cooperation in Counterterrorism: Based

on a Quantitative SWOT Assessment.” Public Management Review 17, no. 2
(May 17, 2013): 209−235. DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2013.792384.
Raphaeli, Nimrod. “Financing of Terrorism: Sources, Methods, and Channels.”

Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 4 (June 4, 2010): 59−82. DOI:
10.1080/09546550390449881.
Rappler Philippines. “Korean Abducted in First Philippines Cargo Ship Raid.” Accessed
November 3, 2016. http://www.rappler.com/nation/149945-south-korea-ship-
captain-kidnapping-philippines.
Ressa, Maria. 10 Days, 10 Years: From Bin Laden to Facebook. Mandaluyong City:
Anvil, 2012.
Ressa, Maria. Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al Qaeda’s Newest Center of

Operations in Southeast Asia. New York: Free Press Simon and Schuster Inc.,
2003.
Richardson, Louise. “Britain and the IRA.” In Democracy and Counterterrorism:

Lessons from the Past, edited by Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, 63−104.
Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2007.
132
Robinson, Linda, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak. “U.S. Special Operations
Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014.” RAND Corporation. Accessed September
16, 2016. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1236.html.
Roth, Mitchel P., and Murat Sever. “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal
Syndicate: Funding Terrorism Through Organized Crime, A Case Study.” Studies
in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 10 (August 20, 2007): 901−920. DOI:
10.1080/10576100701558620.
Santos, Elmor P. “Freed ASG Hostage Marites Flor: We Were Treated Like Dogs.” CNN
Philippines, June 25, 2016. http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/06/24/Abu-
Sayyaf-hostage-Marites-Flor-recounts-captivity.html.
Schmid, Alex P., and Garry F. Hindle, eds. After the War on Terror: Regional and
Multilateral Perspectives on Counter-Terrorism Strategy. London: RUSI, 2009.
Scribd. “Internal Peace and Security Plan Bayanihan.” Accessed July 30, 2016.
https://www.scribd.com/document/46302366/AFP-Internal-Peace-and-Security-
Plan-IPSP-BAYANIHAN.
Sha, Alizah. “Locals Helping Abu Sayyaf.” Yahoo News. Accessed November 29, 2015.
https://sg.news.yahoo.com/locals-helping-abu-sayyaf-030319057.html.
Singh, Daljit and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Terrorism in South and Southeast
Asia in the Coming Decade. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in
association with Macmillan, 2009.
Singh, Daljit. “Responses to Terrorism in Southeast Asia.” Journal of Policing,

Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 4, no. 1 (2009): 15−28. DOI:
10.1080/18335300.2009.9686921.
Siniver, Asaf. International Terrorism Post 9/11: Comparative Dynamics and Responses.
NY: Routledge, 2012.
Smith, Samuel A. “Financing Terror, Part III: Kidnapping for Ransom in the
Philippines.” Strife (blog). January 26, 2015.
https://strifeblog.org/2015/01/26/financing-terror-part-iii-kidnapping-for-ransom-
in-the-philippines/.
Star Online. “Abu Sayyaf Frees 4 Malaysian Sailors It Kidnapped in April: Philippine
Military.” June 8, 2016.
http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/06/08/philippine-military-confirms-
sarawakians-released/.
State Department and Department of Defense, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency

Guide. Washington, D.C.: Department of State, January 2009.
133
Tan, Andrew T.H. “Counter-Terrorism in Southeast Asia Post-9/11.” In International
Terrorism Post 9/11: Comparative Dynamics and Responses, edited by Asaf
Siniver, 207−229. NY: Routledge, 2012.
The White House. “The National Strategy for Counter-Terrorism.” Accessed August 10,
2016.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf.
Toros, Harmonie, and Luca Mavelli. “Terrorism, Organized Crime and the Biopolitics of
Violence.” Critical Studies on Terrorism 6, no. 1 (April 5, 2013): 73−91. DOI:
10.1080/17539153.2013.765701.
U.S. State Department. “Philippines Travel Warning.” Accessed June 30, 2016.
https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/philippines-travel-
warning.html.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Organized Crime Has Globalized and
Turned into a Security Threat.” Accessed October 21, 2016.
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2010/June/organized-crime-has-
globalized-and-turned-into-a-security-threat.html.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto.” Accessed August 15,
2016.
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Conve
ntion/TOCebook-e.pdf.
Update Philippines. “AFP Modernization ‘Will Continue As Scheduled’ Under Duterte

Admin.” July 2, 2016. http://www.update.ph/2016/07/afp-modernization-will-
continue-as-scheduled-under-duterte-admin/6925.
Wang, Peng. “The Crime-Terror Nexus: Transformation, Alliance, Convergence.” Asian

Social Science. June 6, 2010.
http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ass/article/view/6218/4894.
Warshawsky, Megan. “Re-Examining the Crime-Terror Continuum: Understanding the

Interplay Between Criminals and Terrorists.” Master’s thesis, University of North
Carolina, 2013. https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/record/uuid:dc286d0a-bf56-46c7-9aa3-
b87b00eb48dc.
Weinberg, Leonard. Democracy and Terrorism: Friend or Foe. NY: Routledge, 2013.
Wilkinson, Paul. Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. Portland,
OR: Frank Cass, 2001.
134
Yildiz, Ulas. “Combating Commercial Terrorists: The PKK Case.” Master’s thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2015.
135
136
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Defense Technical Information Center

Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
137

Nexus of Crime and Terrorism: The Case of The Abu Sayyaf Group

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Nexus of Crime and Terrorism: The Case of The Abu Sayyaf Group

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Nexus of Crime and Terrorism: The Case of The Abu Sayyaf Group

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive

Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

Nexus of crime and terrorism: the case of the

Salem, Allan Jones A.

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun

NEXUS OF CRIME AND TERRORISM:

Allan Jones A. Salem

Thesis Advisor: Carolyn C. Halladay

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF

NEXUS OF CRIME AND TERRORISM:

Allan Jones A. Salem

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Approved by: Carolyn C. Halladay

This paper examines the theoretical framework of Makarenko’s Crime-Terror

II. CASE STUDY: THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP .................................................29

III. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP’S PLACE ON THE CRIME-TERROR

V. THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH TO

VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................107

LIST OF REFERENCES ..............................................................................................125

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................137

Figure 1. The Crime-Terror Continuum. .....................................................................8

Figure 2. Ballina’s Three Dimensional Model. .........................................................12

Figure 3. ASG Organization Envisioned by Abdurajak Janjalani.............................39

Figure 4. The Crime-Terror Continuum. ...................................................................50

Figure 5. The Converging Threats. ...........................................................................52

Figure 6. ASG Kidnapping Incidents 1991−1999. ....................................................66

Figure 7. ASG Kidnapping Incidents 2000−2014. ....................................................67

Figure 8. ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2000−2001). .....................................68

Figure 9. ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2002−2007). .....................................69

Figure 10. ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2008). ...............................................70

Figure 11. ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2009−2011). .....................................71

Figure 12. ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2012). ...............................................71

Figure 13. ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2013−2014). .....................................72

Table 1. Number of Kidnap Victims by Threat Groups (Period Covered:

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

ETA Basque Homeland and the Shining Path Freedom Movement

FARC The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Spanish: Fuerzas

GCTF Global Counter-terrorism Forum

HSA Human Security Act

IED Improvised Explosive Device

JAPIC Joint AFP-PNP Intelligence Committee

KFR Kidnap for Ransom

LGU Local Government Unit

MCFF Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters

NATS National Anti-Terrorism Strategy

PKK The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên

I am very thankful to Professor Carolyn Halladay, my thesis advisor, for her

In the past two decades, abductions in Mindanao, the second-largest and

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

According to Chris Dishman, it is important to be aware of the transformation of

18 Beckman, Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-Terrorism, 27.

Wilkinson claims that it is incorrect to say that terrorism is synonymous with

2. Terrorism and Crime

Tamara Makarenko illustrates the interaction—and interoperability—of crime and