1

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VOLUME II

(b) Autonomous Region of Krajina (―ARK‖)

i. Municipal level

(A) Banja Luka

(1) Charges

1366. In relation to Banja Luka municipality, the Prosecution has limited the allegations in
the Indictment to crimes associated with the Manjaĉa camp (―Manjaĉa‖). 4707

1367. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity,
was committed in Banja Luka as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims
and/or Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.4708 Acts of persecution alleged to have been
committed by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs in Banja Luka
include killings related to Manjaĉa, as well as killings committed during, and deaths resulting
from, cruel and inhumane treatment at that facility.4709 The Prosecution also characterises these
killings as extermination, a crime against humanity, under Count 4; murder, a crime against
humanity, under Count 5; and murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war, under Count
6.4710

1368. Other acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Banja Luka by Serb Forces
and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include (i) torture, beatings, and physical
and psychological abuse in Manjaĉa as cruel or inhumane treatment,4711 (ii) the establishment and
perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in Manjaĉa, including the failure to provide adequate
accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic sanitation facilities, as cruel or

4707
Indictment, fn. 1; Prosecution Rule 73 bis Submission, fn. 14; Pre-Trial Conference, T. 467 (6 October 2009); Rule 73 bis Decision, para. 6; Decision on
Fourth Adjudicated Facts Motion, para. 28.
4708
Indictment, paras. 48–49.
4709
Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). See Scheduled Incidents B.1.1, B.1.2, B.1.3, B.1.4; Scheduled Detention Facility C.1.2.
4710
Indictment, para. 63(b).
4711
Indictment, para. 60(b). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.1.2.
 2

inhumane treatment;4712 iii) unlawful detention in Manjaĉa;4713 as well as iv) forced labour at the
frontline and the use of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as human shields.4714

(2) Lead-up

1369. Banja Luka is the largest municipality in BiH and is located to the east of Prijedor and
Sanski Most and to the south of Bosanska Gradiška.4715 According to the 1991 census, Banja
Luka municipality had 195,139 inhabitants, of whom about 55% were Bosnian Serbs, 15% were
Bosnian Muslims, and 15% were Bosnian Croats.4716 (The rest were the Serbs calling
themselves Yugoslavs, which meant that the participation of the Serbs was close to 70%. In
any case, if supposed that all the Muslims and Croats in Banja Luka were against
Yugoslavia, certainly the rest of 70% were for the staying in Yugoslavia!)

1370. In the multi-party elections of November 1990, the SDS won 64 seats of the 130 seats in
the Municipal Assembly while the SDA secured 13 seats only.4717 Predrag Radić, a member of the
SDS Main Board, was appointed as the President of Banja Luka Municipal Assembly.4718 Rajko
Kasagić was appointed as the President of the Executive Board.4719 In 1991, Ţupljanin was
appointed the Chief of Banja Luka CSB.4720

1371. On 22 January 1992, the Banja Luka SDS established a Crisis Staff.4721 (Finally, the
Chamber sees the difference between the Party CS and a municipality CS.)

1372. The Banja Luka Crisis Staff was established in May 1992 and Radić was appointed as the
the Accused of the Crisis Staff.4722 (This post is always “ex oficio”) By 15 May 1992, the Serbian
Defence Forces (―SOS‖) and at least three other Serb armed formations led by Nikodin Ĉavić,
Vlado Jotanović, and Brane Palaĉković respectively operated in Banja Luka.4723 (#Contrary to
Presidential orders#! All of them against the reccomendations of the central authorities and
the President. And all of them because of a great suspicion in the JNA and it’s impartiality,
and capability to protect the people, see D11585, of 3 April 1992, just after the crisis in
Bijeljina. The letter had been directed to the SDS, not to the President, since at that moment
there was no president, and the BiH authorities were in charge:

4712
Indictment, para. 60(d). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.1.2.
4713
Indictment, para. 60(g). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.1.2.
4714
Indictment, para. 60(h). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.1.2. The Chamber notes that the Prosecution does not allege criminal responsibility for rape
and other acts of sexual violence; forcible transfer or deportation; or appropriation or plunder of property in Banja Luka. Indictment, fn. 5, 6, 8.
4715
P6135 (Map of BiH); D287 (SDA decision on proclamation of municipality Banja Luka–Stari Grad, September 1991).
4716
D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), pp. 1–2; P5449 (Report of the MUP, Banja Luka RDB, February 1995), p. 2; P783 (Ethnic
map of BiH). But see P4994 (Addendum to Ewa Tabeau‘s expert report entitled ―Ethnic Composition in Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27
Municipalities of BiH 1991 to 1997‖, 3 February 2009), pp. 21, 23–24, 29, 32, 35, 38 (reporting that in 1991, Banja Luka had 165,140 inhabitants).
4717
D4110 (Article from Bosanska Krajina entitled ―Second Round on 9 December‖, 27 November 1990), p. 1; D4259 (Witness statement of Duško Jakšić
dated 25 January 2014), para. 10 (stating that the SDS won 62 of 130 seats).
4718
D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 3; Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7364, 7373; D4036
(Report on Situation in the ARK and Banja Luka, 15 May 1992), p. 2.
4719
P6523 (Excerpt of Minutes of the 69th Banja Luka Executive Board Session, 8 May 1992), p. 1; D4064 (Excerpt of minutes of the 2 nd Banja Luka Municipal
Assembly session, 31 January 1992), pp. 3, 9; D4036 (Report on Situation in the ARK and Banja Luka, 15 May 1992), p. 1.
4720
Christian Nielsen, T. 16301 (7 July 2011); P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), para. 11 (under seal); P1097 (CSB Banja Luka
dispatch to SerBiH MUP, 20 July 1992); P2746 (Dispatch of Banja Luka CSB, 10 April 1992); D4071 (Summary of 15 th session of ARK Assembly, 4
March 1992), p. 2; D4036 (Report on Situation in the ARK and Banja Luka, 15 May 1992), p. 1.
4721
P2553 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovan Ĉizmović, 22 January 1992), p. 7.
4722
Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7379, 7384; P6524 (Excerpt of Minutes of the 19th Banja Luka Municipal Assembly
Session, 23 June 1992), p. 1; D4077 (Witness statement of AnĊelko Grahovac dated 23 November 2013), para. 8; D4086 (Witness statement of Nikola
Erceg dated 24 November 2013), para. 2.
4723
D4036 (Report on Situation in the ARK and Banja Luka, 15 May 1992), pp. 1–2. See also Adjudicated Fact 2223.
 3

(#LAWFUL AND OBLIGATORY#! #Due to the Law of All-people’s defence#, the TO took
task to defend, but not confident in the JNA as a part of previous system!)

1373. During the republican referendum on independence on 29 February and 1 March 1992, the
SOS blockaded the municipality building.4724 (#Illegal, anti-constitutional#! It wouldn’t
damage the truth if mentioned that this referendum was an illegal and anti-constitutional,
since the Serbs as a constituent people didn’t give their consent for it. The Serb position was
that the Muslim/Croat alliance could make a plebiscite as the Serbs did in November 1991,
but without any obligation to the others!) The SOS in Banja Luka was under the command of
Nenad Stevandić and included many well-known criminals from Banja Luka.4725 On 3 April
1992, they erected check-points around town and issued a press statement calling on the president
of the municipality to establish a crisis staff in order to pursue several goals of the SOS, including
the dismissal of JNA Banja Luka Corps officers and public utility managers who voted ―against
Yugoslavia‖.4726 The demands of the SOS were adopted by the SDS.4727 (#Incorrect#! This is
not a correct assertion. It wasn’t the SDS, but the municipal Crisis Staff. But the cited
exhibit contains everything, from the correct quoting the institutions to the reasons why the
SOS had been formed, let us see P06522:

As it is clear, these men were the reservists returning from Western Slavonija, where they
fought agains the destruction of Yugoslavia, and had seen many atrocities against civilians,
and inability of the JNA to protect them.

All of that had been done without any knowledge of the central authorities, but on the basis
of the rights of local authorities functioning in an emergency situation! Terrified by a
statements of the BiH Minister for Defence Jerko Doko (a Croat) that these who obeyed the

4724
See Adjudicated Fact 2224.
4725
P2855 (VRS Main Staff report on paramilitary formations, 28 July 1992), p. 4. See also Adjudicated Fact 2223.
4726
See Adjudicated Fact 2225.
4727
P6522 (Article from Glas entitled ―SOS is not an illegal organisation‖, 4 April 1992), p. 1. See also Adjudicated Fact 2226.
 4

JNA call for mobilisation will be put “out of law”, they announced that they were capable of
protecting themselves!)

For this we do have an additional document, #lately disclosed!!!!!!!!!!!#!

1374. Upon the establishment of a municipal Serb Crisis Staff in the spring of 1992, Radić
announced several measures, including that CSB employees had to pledge loyalty to the SerBiH or
lose their jobs; the presidency of the SFRY would be requested to reinforce the JNA Banja Luka
Corps and dismiss or transfer JNA officers who had not voted ―for Yugoslavia‖; and the directors
of several public enterprises who pursued ―an anti-Serbian policy‖ would be dismissed.4728
Employers in Banja Luka were told to evict non-Serbs from employer-owned apartments in order
to make space for families of fallen Serb soldiers.4729 Those who attempted to protect non-Serbs
in Banja Luka were reprimanded or even replaced.4730 To enforce compliance with these orders,
mixed patrols of the police, the TO, and the JNA were to take-over control of the roads from the
SOS.4731 (That was a purpose for a temporary acceptance of the SOS demands, to compel the
JNA to do it’s own job and protect the country, which was it’s constitutional obligation. It
has to be taken into account what was happening in the neighboring Croatia, and the local
authorities were obliged to preserve the peace. But, what is the purpose of those AFs, if this
wasn’t in the Indictment? And what all of it has to do with the President? #No Karad`i}’s
liability#! )

(3)Scheduled Detention Facility C.1.2

1375. The Indictment refers to the use of Manjaĉa as a detention facility in Banja Luka
municipality between 21 April and 18 December 1992.4732

a. Establishment and control

1376. Manjaĉa was located approximately 35 kilometres to the southwest of the town of Banja
Luka and about 15 to 20 kilometres to the east of Kljuĉ.4733 Manjaĉa was part of a large JNA
installation called Mika Bosnić Barracks and had previously served as a military exercise field.4734
Manjaĉa consisted of farmland, six large stables, called ―pavilions‖ by the guards, and a number of
warehouses.4735 There were mines, a fence, and several guard towers around Manjaĉa.4736 (All of
4728
Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7379, 7384; P6524 (Excerpt of Minutes of the 19th Banja Luka Municipal Assembly
Session, 23 June 1992), p. 1; D4077 (Witness statement of AnĊelko Grahovac dated 23 November 2013), para. 8; D4086 (Witness statement of Nikola
Erceg dated 24 November 2013), para. 2; Adjudicated Fact 2226.
4729
Adjudicated Fact 2228.
4730
Adjudicated Fact 2228.
4731
Adjudicated Fact 2226.
4732
In its Final Brief, the Prosecution notes that the evidence led in relation to Manjaĉa shows that it operated as a detention facility from 15 May 1992 until
December 1992. See Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, p. 2, fn. 23.
4733
KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5258–5260, 5333–5334; P3729 (Pictures and routes of Manjaĉa camp); P3639
(Map entitled ―Betornika-Manjaĉa‖). See also Adjudicated Fact 562.
4734
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 100; KDZ026, T. 10392 (17 January 2011) (closed session); P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet
Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 107; D1846 (Order of the 5th Corps, 13 September 1991), p. 1.
4735
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 100; P3499 (Drawing of Manjaĉa); P3729 (Pictures and routes of Manjaĉa camp); P3730 (Excerpt
of video footage of Manjaĉa camp); P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 7; KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5261−5262; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 107.
4736
Charles McLeod, P712 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7314; Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7081; KDZ163,
P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5258, 5261–5263, 5332; P3499 (Drawing of Manjaĉa); P3488 (Witness statement of Atif
Dţafić undated), paras. 100, 103; Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6184–6185; P3549 (Report of the Commission for
Inspecting Collection Centres and Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992), p. 5; D1846 (Order of the 5th Corps, 13 September 1991), p. 1;
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 7; D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 2; P718
(Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 107; P3755 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps, 9 November 1992), p. 1
(under seal).
 5

it established #far before the Republic of Srpska# was established, i.e. the JNA adjusted it’s
own facilities for the new situation of the war in Slovenija and Croatia. It had nothing to do
with the President! #No liability#!)

1377. Around 15 September 1991, the Command of the 5th Corps of the JNA began using
Manjaĉa as a camp to hold POWs from the conflict in Croatia.4737 In mid-May 1992, the
1st Krajina Corps assumed control of Manjaĉa and from this point until its closure, Manjaĉa
remained under VRS control.4738 In June 1992, the Command of 1st Krajina Corps was entrusted
with the task of establishing a POW camp and assessing the needs for prisoner exchanges. 4739 In
July 1992, Colonel Boţidar Popović was appointed as commander of Manjaĉa.4740 Predrag
Kovaĉević, nicknamed Špaga, was Popović‘s personal assistant; Kovaĉević was also in charge of
the prison guards.4741 Generally, military policemen guarded the detainees inside the camp
whereas members of the MUP protected the external boundaries of the camp.4742 However, the
1st Krajina Corps Commander and the Kljuĉ and Sanski Most SJBs also agreed that members of
the MUP be sent inside Manjaĉa for short periods to assist.4743 MUP members who were in
Manjaĉa were placed under the command of Popović.4744

1378. The authorities in Manjaĉa drafted reports for the superior command on a weekly basis or
more frequently when necessary.4745

1379. The number of detainees held at Manjaĉa ranged from approximately 140 to 3,600 at a
given time.4746 In total, 4,403 detainees passed through the camp.4747 The majority of the
4737
P534 (ECMM Report, 3 September 1992), p. 5; KDZ026, T. 10392 (17 January 2011) (closed session); KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5257, 5264; D1846 (Order of the 5th Corps, 13 September 1991), p. 1; D1847 (Order of the 5th Corps, 7 January 1992), p. 2; D4204
(Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 1.
4738
P534 (ECMM Report, 3 September 1992), p. 5; Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7614; KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5350; Edward Vulliamy, P3777 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 8084–8085; Petar Skrbić, P4523
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Popović et al.), T. 15584; Dragomir Keserović, T. 40993 (8 July 2013); KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3375, 3461 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 562.
4739
D1848 (Order of the 1st Krajina Corps, 15 June 1992), pp. 1–3.
4740
KDZ024, P713 (Transcripts from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 30084 (under seal); P3491 (Excerpt of Tode Gajić‘s diary), p. 1; P5472 (Daily Report of
Manjaĉa Camp Operational Team, 18–20 August 1992), p. 1; D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 2; P3724
(Manjaĉa camp report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 8 August 1992), p. 2; KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5261, 5264–
5266; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), p. 26; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8144; P534
(ECMM Report, 3 September 1992), p. 1; D4077 (Witness statement of AnĊelko Grahovac dated 23 November 2013), para. 39. See also Adjudicated Fact
564.
4741
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6188; KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2386–2388; P711
(Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994 and 16 May 2001), p. 10; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 10;
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), p. 31; D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 11;
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4798.
4742
KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5265; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), p. 32;
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7081–7082; KDZ492, P3596 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 3878 (under
seal); KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 30085 (under seal).
4743
P3734 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB, 24 June 1992); KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5267; KDZ163, P3716 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5274 (under seal). These civilian police officers would spend two or three days at Manjaĉa and then return to
their SJBs. KDZ163, P3716 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5274 (under seal). [REDACTED]. Likewise, Radomir Radinković
stated that the civilian police was not allowed inside the camp. However, Radinković, later in his statement, conceded that members of civilian police
interrogated the detainees in the camp. See D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), pp. 2, 4. The Chamber notes the
reliable documentary evidence which indicates that inspectors from Kljuĉ SJB and Sanski Most SJB were sent to Manjaĉa in order to ―process‖ the
detainees. #Investigations#! Certainly, the investigating activities were their obligation, and a basis to release, exchange
or indict a detainee, which shows that there was no arbitrariness. And this could have happened under the
authorisation of the camp authorities See P3734 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB, 24 June 1992); P3736 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina
Corps, 27 June 1992) (under seal); D3912 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to 1st Krajina Corps, 2 July 1992); D4170 (Witness statement of Mile Dobrijević
dated 2 December 2013), para. 14. The Chamber also notes that according to a report compiled by the authorities in Manjaĉa, Radenko Kaurin, who was a
policeman, slapped two detainees because they had taken bread from the bread baskets which they had been forced to carry. See P3754 (Manjaĉa camp
daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 1 November 1992) (under seal). Given this evidence and in light of the inconsistencies displayed by [REDACTED] and
Radinković during their respective testimonies, the Chamber rejects their assertion that the civilian police only entered the camp in situations of emergency.
4744
[REDACTED].
4745
D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 3.
4746
P534 (ECMM Report, 3 September 1992), p. 2; KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3374; Radomir Radinković, T. 45312
(18 December 2013); P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), pp. 6–8, 10; P3735 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina
Corps, 26 June 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3736 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps, 27 June 1992) (under seal); P3737 (Manjaĉa camp daily
report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 1 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3746 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 22 July 1992), p. 2 (under seal);
 6

detainees at Manjaĉa were Bosnian Muslims, though some Bosnian Croats and very few Bosnian
Serbs were also held there.4748 For the most part, the detainees were aged between 18 and 60, but
there were also a number of minors and elderly individuals.4749 On several occasions, those in
charge of the security and intelligence at the camp proposed that individuals under 18 and over 60
as well as the seriously ill be released; these proposals, however, were largely ignored.4750 Several
Imams as well as a Catholic priest were also detained in Manjaĉa.4751

1380. During mop-up operations in Bosnian Muslim villages, VRS detained the male population
and handed them over to the Serb civilian authorities; the majority of such detainees were later
brought to Manjaĉa by Serb policemen.4752 In some instances detainees were brought to the camp
by the MP.4753 Often, detainees were taken and held at Manjaĉa without any reason for their
detention having been recorded.4754 (#Combatants only#! That pertained to a late or lack of a
temporaneus documentation, which didn’t mean that there was no reason. For thise without
reason for detention, as resolved in Omarska through the investigation, there was no the
reason to send them to Manjaca too, and it was 59% of investigated persons. The entire
assertion about “the majority of such detainees” brought to Manjaca, is not correct. For
instance, from Omarska, the majority (59%) was released and let to go home, while they
have chosen to go to Trnopolje. There was no any arbitrariness in deciding who was to be
transported to Manjaca. This was a result of a long and thorough investigations made by
professionals in the state agencies. The most frequent reason was a direct participation in the
armed rebellion, i.e. combatants. Although the detainees weren’t a declared army, they acted
clandestinely in a depth of the Serb territory, and thus should be treated as terrorists, but
the Serb authorities treated them as a prisoners of war. For this category there is no need or
possibility to have any documentation, except for those who commited crimes. For the
ordinary combatants there was envisaged an exchange fr the Serb prisoners in the
Muslim/Croat prisons. The second large group was detained for instigation, aid and abet the

P3751 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 10 August 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3755 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps,
9 November 1992) (under seal); P3725 (ICRC Communication to the Press, 14 November 1992); P3723 (Manjaĉa camp report to 1 st Krajina Corps, 14
November 1992), p. 2 (under seal); P3726 (List of detainees at Manjaĉa, 23 November 1992); P3727 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to 1st Krajina Corps, 14
December 1992), e-court p. 2; see Adjudicated Fact 2229.
4747
KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5345, 5353; KDZ163, T. 20748 (1 November 2011), T. 20769 (2 November
2011).
4748
P534 (ECMM Report, 3 September 1992), para. 21; D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), para. 22; P3755 (Manjaĉa
camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 9 November 1992), p. 1 (under seal); see Adjudicated Facts 563, 566.
4749
Radomir Radinković, T. 45317–45319 (18 December 2013); P3750 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 7 August 1992), p. 2 (under seal);
P3549 (Report of the Commission for Inspecting Collection Centres and Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992), p. 5; KDZ163, P3717
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5282, 5289, 5298, 5357, 5387; KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7761,
7808 (under seal). P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 116; P3733 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps,
22 June 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3737 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps, 1 July 1992), p. 2 (under seal); P3739 (Manjaĉa camp daily
report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 5 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal).
4750
P3740 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 8 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3739 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 5 July
1992) (under seal); P3733 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 22 June 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3737 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st
Krajina Corps, 1 July 1992), p. 2 (under seal); KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5289, 5291; P3738 (Manjaĉa camp
daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 4 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3751 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps, 10 August 1992) (under
seal); D1852 (Report of Manjaĉa camp sent to 1st Krajina Corps, 12 August 1992) (under seal); D1862 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to 1st Krajina Corps, 3
July 1992) (under seal).
4751
Radomir Radinković, T. 45329 (18 December 2013); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1905 (under seal); KDZ163, P3717
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5360; P3738 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps, 4 July 1992) (under seal); P3751
(Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 10 August 1992), p. 1 (under seal).
4752
KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5275; D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013),
p. 7; KW545, T. 46955–46957 (12 February 2014) (closed session); KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3377–3378,
3386, 3388, 3392–3393 (under seal).
4753
KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5335; D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013),
p. 7.
4754
KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5276, 5311, 5354; KDZ163, T. 20737–20738 (1 November 2011) (private
session); P3723 (Manjaĉa camp report to 1st Krajina Corps, 14 November 1992), p. 2 (under seal); Christian Nielsen, T. 16285 (7 July 2011). Colonel
Stevilović, a military police officer at Manjaĉa, attempted to stop the influx of undocumented detainees from Kljuĉ. [REDACTED]. On 19 August 1992,
Ţupljanin ordered SJBs to create a file on every individual that had been transferred to Manjaĉa by the police. D1864 (Order of Banja Luka CSB, 19 August
1992). On 23 August 1992, the Chief of the Prijedor SJB reported that the documentation for the detainees transferred from Omarska to Manjaĉa had been
forwarded to the commander of Manjaĉa . D1866 (Prijedor SJB dispatch to Banja Luka CSB, 23 August 1992). On 27 August 1992, the Chief of the Sanski
Most SJB sent to Manjaĉa a list of detainees as well as official notes in relation to some of them. D1867 (Sanski Most SJB dispatch, 27 August 1992).
 7

criminal activities of the armed attacks on the state personnel and facilities and civilians, and
they had been treated as any other combatant, and fisible for exchanges! The third group
was detained for financing those illegal activities. All of them were treated as a prisoners of
war, i.e. participants in combats, although could be treated as terrorists, which would be
worse for them.

But, as known to the Chamber, the central authorities didn’t know anything about that, and
even if they knew, they couldn’t do anything, being unable to protect the people. Always it
has to be kept in mind the domestic laws on the All-peoples defence, the Armed people, the
rights to selforganize and selfdefend. Any objection should be directed to Tito, not to this
President.. The camp authorities distributed old JNA uniforms to some of the detainees.4755
While both the VRS and the Bosnian Serb civilian authorities described Manjaĉa as a camp for
POWs,4756 documents sent from Manjaĉa to the Command of 1st Krajina Corps do not refer to the
detainees as combatants.4757 (#EXCULPATORY!##Next level#! The exhibit (P03747) quatted
in this foot note is the first class proof that there was no any systemic attitude towards
capturing and detaining the people without reasons. Certainly, the detainees will not easily
admit their misdeeds, but also certainly, somebody on the terrain could make a mistake, but
a very next level would rectify it. Had the Serb authorities been adopted an attitude as
alleged in the indictment, this rectification by the superiors wouldn’t happen. Throughout
the Indictment, and unfortunately the Judgment also, the evidence of the proper conduct of
a different levels of the authorities are taken as a proofs of the Serb guilts, while it should be
seen as a mistake, that had been observed and rectified. The superiors who corrected
ommissions of their subordinates are also the Serb officials, while the Prosecution/Chamber
see only mistakable subordinates as a Serb officials, and superiors as non-Serb
authorities!#Official GOOD documents CONTRA. officials!#)

1381. In mid-1992, detention facilities such as Omarska were closed and the detainees were sent to
Manjaĉa.4758 It hadn’t been closed just like that, it had been closed after accomplishing the
investigative phase, and a selection (triage) of the captured people, which resulted in 59% of
the captured to be released. And this was a serious work of the professionals, and not an
arbitrary arrests.

1382. Sometime during the first week of June 1992, members of the Sanski Most SJB and
around ten SOS members transported a group of approximately 140 male detainees from Hasan
Kikić sports hall, in Sanski Most municipality, to Manjaĉa.4759 On or about 7 June 1992, Serb
members of the reserve police took approximately 400 detainees from Sitnica School, in Kljuĉ
municipality, to Manjaĉa on foot.4760 Sometime before 13 June 1992, the VRS transferred about

4755
KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5318–5319; P3500 (Photograph of detainees at Manjaĉa); P3488 (Witness
statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 113; P3756 (Excerpt from video clip from Banja Luka TV, with transcript), p. 1. Dţafić who had been detained in
Manjaĉa, stated that the distribution of old JNA uniforms was a ploy by the camp authorities to make the detainees look as if they had been Bosnian Muslim
soldiers. P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 113.
4756
Edward Vulliamy, P3777 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7923; KDZ474, T. 19335 (21 September 2011) (closed session); P534 (ECMM Report,
3 September 1992), p. 1; Dragomir Keserović, T. 42158 (29 July 2013); D4077 (Witness statement of AnĊelko Grahovac dated 23 November 2013), para.
39; KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin) T. 26203 (under seal).
4757
P3747 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 23 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3741 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps, 9
July 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3740 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps, 8 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3746 (Manjaĉa camp daily report
to the 1st Krajina Corps, 22 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3753 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 22 August 1992), p. 1 (under seal).
4758
Christian Nielsen, T. 16285 (7 July 2011); Atif Dţafić, T. 19747 (30 September 2011).
4759
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6164, 6252–6253; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), pp.
5–6; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8105, 8122–8123, 8131–8132; P3327 (Order of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 6 June 1992);
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5537; Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7095; D4363
(Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8 February 2014), para. 39; Dušan Mudrinić, T. 47393 (19 February 2014); D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report
concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 8, 16. See also Adjudicated Fact 583. See para. 2003.
4760
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 95–96; KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10354–10355; KDZ163,
P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5259, 5333–5334. It took the detainees seven or eight hours to reach Manjaĉa from Sitnica
school. P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 96–101.
 8

900 individuals, most of them Bosnian Muslims, from a prison in Stara Gradiška, in Croatia, to
Manjaĉa.4761 On or about 25 June 1992, Bosnian Serb policemen from Kljuĉ, took a number of
detainees from Kljuĉ SJB to Manjaĉa.4762 (#Wrong presentation#! This paragraph is an
exemplary how it shouldn’t be depicted. What does it mean “detainees” in a civil war?
Without an information about the fights that the Muslim side started on 22 May in
Prijedor (Hambarine) and on 27 May simultaneously on many spots in Kljuc and Sanski
Most, as well as in Bosanski Novi, all in the Sana River Valley, this looks like the Serb
police and SOS have arrested innocent civilians and made them to be “detainees”. That is
far from correct presentation! The Serbs in SAO Krajina made a huge efforts to preserve
the peace and find a political solution, offering the Muslim side to form their own
municipalities and organise their authorities which wouldn’t concern the Serbs and the
Serb municipalities. This is well documented. #Two municipalities – peace#! But, the
Muslim central authorities stopped all the talks, see: D3904, General S. Halilovic to his
authorities:

So, the genuine Serb population, after the Kelts and Japods the oldest population in
Krajina, was treated as “aggressors” and forbidden to negotiate with, “while the war was
raging in all of the RBH”. The Chamber n eglected this Muslim document, which can not
be discounted as a Serb “strictly confidential” documents, as if it was aimed to public? Is it
now clear that the Serb side wanted negotiations, and the Muslim side a war? Thus a
conflict broke out, and those captured in the skirmishes become a POWs, and none of them
before 27. may 92. while the civilians captured in the zone of combats had been recently
released. If there existed any Joint Criminal Enterprise, why the Srbs would wait for two
months, why they didn’t capture as many Muslims as wanted much earlier, and expelled
them? In front of this argument all the Prosecution allegations pertaining to the
#“Municipalities” are falling apart#.

1383. On 7 July 1992, under the escort of the civilian police from Sanski Most, a convoy of
trucks with approximately 500 detainees from Betonirka factory garage, Krings Hall, and Hasan
Kikić sports hall, arrived at Manjaĉa.4763

1384. On 6 August 1992, the 1st Krajina Corps received reports that up to 1,000 detainees were
going to be transferred from Omarska, in Prijedor municipality, to Manjaĉa and that they were
expected to arrive in the afternoon.4764 That same day, at around 10 p.m., about 20 Autoprevoz
buses, transporting approximately 1,300 detainees arrived at the gates of Manjaĉa; they were
4761
KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5279; P3718 (1st Krajina Corps combat report, 13 June 1992), p. 2; Asim Egrlić,
P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4795–4796.
4762
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9158, 9162–9163, 9216 (under seal); KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S.
Milošević), T. 30084–30085 (under seal).
4763
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7096; Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5537; Mirzet
Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6175; P3747 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps, 23 July 1992), p. 1 (under
seal); P3740 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 8 July 1992) (under seal); KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić &
Ţupljanin), T. 5293–5294; P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), para. 28 (under seal); Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2999, 3019; P692 (Witness statements of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7; Ahmet Zulić, T. 1030 (13 April 2010);
KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin) T. 26130 (under seal); D4170 (Witness statement of Mile Dobrijević dated 2
December 2013), para. 14. [REDACTED].
4764
P3757 (Official note from the Security Centre in Banja Luka, 10 August 1992), p. 1 (under seal).
 9

escorted by two armoured personnel carriers.4765 (#Majority released#! And it was out of
approximately 3,000 captured during the fights in Prijedor, which makes around 43% of all
the captured. During their transportation from Omarska to Manjaĉa, the prisoners had been
guarded by members of the intervention squad from Prijedor SJB.4766 However, Popović did not
allow the detainees to enter the camp and instead ordered that they stay on the buses for the
night.4767 That same day, Lieutenant Colonel Stevan Bogojević, the Chief of Intelligence and
Security at Manjaĉa, complained that a great number of the detainees from Omarska could not be
characterised as ―prisoners of war‖ (#Combatants, terrorists#! This is the first class evidence
that the detainees had to be a POWs! Because a number of them didn’t look like a POW-s –
didn’t mean that they didn’t participate in a terrorist actions in the region of Prijedor, since
they had been underwent a professional selection. The documentation was late, but it came,
and only after that it could have been assessed whether they are detaine justifiably!) and
requested that such individuals be selected and eventually released.4768 (#Next level
RECTIFIED#! Again, the document (P03720) shows that there were different levels, and
that the next level of responsibility rectified mistakes of the lower leves officials. Had it been
a system, there wouldn’t be any correction of such a mistakes, but rather the mistaken
officials would be commended. As a matter of fact, there was a certain delay in sending the
documents, because all of the POWs in Prijedor had been investigated and recorded by the
professionals!) In the morning of 7 August 1992, the detainees from Omarska were taken from
the buses, and made to sit in a nearby field.4769 Subsequently a roll call of the detainees was made
and they were taken inside Manjaĉa and registered.4770 Two weeks later, between 170 and 180
additional individuals were transferred from Omarska to Manjaĉa.4771

1385. On or about 28 August 1992, policemen in blue uniforms transferred 13 detainees from the
SJB building and prison in Sanski Most and 36 detainees from Krings Hall to Manjaĉa.4772

1386. Apart from these instances, detainees continued to be brought to Manjaĉa from detention
facilities in Sanski Most and Kljuĉ; detainees were also brought to Manjaĉa from detention

4765
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2749–2750 (under seal); KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3370, 3376,
3500; KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9218 (under seal); KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2340–2341;
P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994 and 16 May 2001), p. 9; P3757 (Official note from the Security Centre in Banja Luka, 10
August 1992), p. 1 (under seal); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1839, 1928, 1940 (under seal); KDZ026, T. 10323, 10391,
10393, 10421 (17 January 2011) (closed session); P3719 (1st Krajina Corps combat report, 7 August 1992), p. 2; P2 (Predrag Radić's interview with OTP, 16
July 2001), p. 28; D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 6; P3502 (Photograph of Manjaĉa's main entrance);
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20496 (27 October 2011); P636 (ECMM Report, 3 September 1992), p. 2; KW609, D4246 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić
& Ţupljanin), T. 16770–16771; D4086 (Witness statement of Nikola Erceg dated 24 November 2013), para. 90; Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44216, 44259, 44273,
44281 (29 November 2013). See also Adjudicated Fact 2489.
4766
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3370; KDZ026, T. 10322, 10329 (17 January 2011) (closed session); KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5309; D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 12. For further detail on
the intervention squad, see para. 1587.
4767
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3373; P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994 and 16 May 2001), p. 9;
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1932 (under seal); KDZ026, T. 10322–10323 (17 January 2011) (closed session).
4768
P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), para. 27 (under seal); P3720 (1st Krajina Corps report re selection of war prisoners in
Manjaĉa camp, 6 August 1992); KDZ163, T. 20737, 20739–20740 (1 November 2011) (private session). On 17 August 1992, the Chief of Prijedor SJB
forwarded the personal details of 402 detainees and promised that the details of the remaining detainees would be sent to Manjaĉa within a week. See P3752
(Report of Prijedor SJB, 17 August 1992).
4769
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1932, 1940 (under seal).
4770
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3498; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1932 (under seal); D4204
(Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 7.
4771
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3371; P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994 and 16 May 2001), p. 10;
KDZ026, T. 10421 (17 January 2011) (closed session); Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44281–44282 (29 November 2013). But see KDZ163‘s assertion that after
7 August 1992, no more detainees were transferred from Omarska to Manjaĉa. KDZ163, T. 20736 (1 November 2011).
4772
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6182–6183, 6258; Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
5536; Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7077–7081; KDZ492, P3596 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 3858
(under seal).
 10

facilities in Bosanska Dubica, Doboj, Derventa, Glamoĉ, Kotor Varoš, and Jajce.4773 (As a matter
of rule, les that a half of the arrested, after the initial investigation ended to Manjaca!)

b. Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

1387. The food provided to the detainees in Manjaĉa was insufficient and consisted for the most
part of a thin broth and a slice of bread twice a day.4774 As a result, many detainees lost a
substantial amount of weight.4775 Some became so thin that they were unable to walk or even
stand.4776 Some detainees resorted to eating grass.4777 With assistance from the ICRC and
Merhamet, a local Bosnian Muslim humanitarian organisation, the food and the general situation
improved slightly sometime after August 1992.4778

1388. There was also insufficient potable water at Manjaĉa.4779 During July and August 1992,
twice each day, cups of water were provided; however, four detainees would have to divide one
cup among themselves.4780 There was no water for the purposes of personal hygiene.4781 If they

4773
D3911 (Report on the work of Sanski Most SJB, July 1992), p. 7; P3507 (List of Kljuĉ SJB of persons being sent to Manjaĉa, 22 July 1992); Radomir
Radinković, T. 45312–45313 (18 December 2013); P3753 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps, 22 August 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3749
(Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 29 July 1992), p. 2 (under seal); P3740 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps, 8 July
1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3739 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps, 5 July 1992) (under seal); P3736 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st
Krajina Corps, 27 June 1992) (under seal); P3732 (List of detainees from Kljuĉ Municipality, 19 June 1992); P3735 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st
Krajina Corps, 26 June 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3737 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps, 1 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3549 (Report of
the Commission for Inspecting Collection Centres and Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992), p. 5; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8138; D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 28; KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5279; P3718 (1st Krajina Corps combat report, 13 June 1992), p. 2; P4258 (Map of ARK); P722 (Third book of
Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 18; D1868 (Report of Kotor Varoš Military Post to Manjaĉa camp, 10 December 1992); P3723 (Manjaĉa camp report to 1 st Krajina
Corps, 14 November 1992), p. 2 (under seal); D1861 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to 1 st Krajina Corps, 24 June 1992), p. 2; D1863 (List of persons sent to the
Manjaĉa camp, 20 July 1992); Dragomir Keserović, T. 42015 (25 July 2013). See also Adjudicated Fact 565.
4774
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9166 (under seal); P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 102; P3758 (Letter
from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Đerić, attaching an ICRC report, 7 August 1992), e-court p. 5; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
BrĎanin), T. 8142; P692 (Witness statements of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7; Ahmet Zulić, T. 1032 (13 April 2010); KDZ163, P3717
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5400, 5402; D1858 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to 1 st Krajina Corps, 18 June 1992), p. 2; Faik
Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7084–7086; Dragomir Keserović, T. 42015 (25 July 2013); see Adjudicated Fact 569. But see
Radinković‘s claim that adequate food was provided to the detainees. D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), pp. 7,
10, 11; Radomir Radinković, T. 45316 (18 December 2013).
4775
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9166, 9169 (under seal); P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 123; P3758
(Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Đerić, attaching an ICRC report, 7 August 1992), e-court p. 6; (This document, P03758, is another
proof that the #authorities did their best# to react and improve the situation. Bear in mind that the Serb side was
under a total sanctions, without food for the population, and particularly for the Army and POWs.) ) Sakib Muhić, P700
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8144; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), pp. 8–9; KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5400; P3695 (Excerpt from video clip of Manjaĉa camp and interview with Radovan Karadţić); see Adjudicated
Fact 569. One detainee lost approximately 50 kilograms. Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8144; P701 (Witness statement of
Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), pp. 8–9. On 23 September 1992, the ICRC reported that in Manjaĉa there were 300 detainees whose body mass index
was below 17. D1874 (ICRC Work Report, 23 September 1992), p. 3.
4776
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6186.
4777
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 9; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), p. 32; P722 (Third
book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), pp. 6, 10; see Adjudicated Fact 569. According to a report drawn up by the authorities in Manjaĉa, a prisoner suffered from
mushroom poisoning. P3755 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 9 November 1992) (under seal).
4778
Charles McLeod, P712 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7316; Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6189;
KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5346, 5350; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8141;
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7083–7084; Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7615;
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9166 (under seal). On several occasions, Merhamet delivered meat to the camp but the guards
took the meat home. Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7085. If the camp guards at Manjaĉa wanted to demonstrate to a
delegation that the detainees were well-fed, they would slaughter calves and present them as meals for the detainees; however, the detainees would not
actually receive such meals, which would instead be served to the command staff. Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8143.
4779
P692 (Witness statements of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7; P721 (Second book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 8; P722 (Third book of Ahmet
Zulić‘s diary), p. 9; Dragomir Keserović, T. 42015 (25 July 2013). But see D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p.
7. Given the large body of accepted evidence to the contrary, the Chamber rejects Radinković‘s assertion that ―sufficient quantities of drinking water were
provided‖ to the detainees.
4780
Ahmet Zulić, T. 1032 (13 April 2010); P692 (Witness statements of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7; P721 (Second book of Ahmet Zulić‘s
diary), p. 8; P722 (Third book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 9; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), p. 30; P3488 (Witness
statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 102.
4781
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 102; Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6186; P692 (Witness
statements of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7.
 11

tried to collect rain water, the camp guards would beat them.4782 At one point, camp authorities
refused to provide diesel for trucks that pumped water and transported it to the camp.4783
(#General shortage OF EVERYTHING#! This is not correct, nor the Report (D1876) sais
that. The problem didn’t depend of a good will of the camp authorities, but of a real shortage
of oil, because of the sanctions. Wrong inference. As a matter of fact, the ICRC refused to
give more fuel, see D01876

It sais that the objective problems, such as embargo, produced many troubles, contrary to
the good intentions of the camp authorities, see:

From this point on, the only available water originated from a nearby lake, and its poor quality
caused intestinal and stomach problems among the detainees.4784

1389. Initially, there were a number of barrels in each stable which served as toilets; later,
however, the detainees dug holes outside and used them as toilets.4785

1390. Faik Bišĉević who was a dentist and three detainees who were doctors by profession,
namely, Emir Kapetanović, Enis Šabanović and Mehmed Derviškadić, as well as a Serb nurse,
staffed a medical clinic; this clinic, however, suffered from a severe shortage of medicine and
supplies and could not provide adequate medical care to the detainees.4786 At times, the guards
refused to allow the sick detainees to go to the clinic for up to a week.4787 (#Contrary to
reports#! Why this wasn’t reported to the ICRC? Because it wasn’t true. And the witnesses
continued to wage their war against the Serbs through such a statements. Looking to the
ICRC reports, it is obvious that the situation was difficult, but not as an intention of the
authorities, but because of the war and sanctions. But, somehow the testimonies of the
resentful POW-s worth morebefore this Court than the ICRC reports, although the ICRC
didn’t exercise to much of sensitivity for the Serb cause.) Some detainees did not receive any
medical treatment for their pre-existing conditions or the injuries they sustained from the

4782
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6187; P692 (Witness statements of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7.
(#Contrary to official reports of the UN, ICRC armies#!Those testimonies are not supported by the ICRC reports,
(see: D1876) and all of those witnesses were resentful and not objective. Simply, a shortage of water or food wasn’t
something coming out of a bad will of the authorities, but an objective problem.
4783
D1876 (ICRC Work Report, 5–18 November 1992), p. 1. (#Contrary to reports#!)This is not correct, the Report didn’t say that.

4784
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4799; D1876 (ICRC Work Report, 5–18 November 1992), p. 1
(#General
shortage#!) The ICRC report (D01876) depicts this problem not as a bad will of the camp authorities, but as an
objective problem, a shortage of the fuel, and so on, while the witnesses are resentful towards the authorities, which
could be understood, but the Chamber should also discount this aspect of their tesiomonies, and rely upon the ICRC
reports. Or the Chamber defends the Zuli}’s “right” to posess an illegal machine-gun and stolen 40 kg. of explosive,
while he admitted the machine-gun before the Chamber???). ; P722 (Third book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), pp. 8, 16; D4204 (Witness
statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 11; Radomir Radinković, T. 45316–45317 (18 December 2013); Faik Bišĉević, P135
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7086–7087. See Adjudicated Facts 570, 571. Diarrhoea and constipation were rife in the camp. P722 (Third
book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), pp. 8, 16. On 27 July 1992, the 1st Krajina Corps Assistant Commander for Logistics was informed that the bacteriological
tests of water in Manjaĉa had shown unsatisfactory results and that repairs needed to be conducted. P3748 (Request of 1 st Krajina Corps, 27 July 1992).
4785
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 102.
4786
P534 (ECMM Report, 3 September 1992), p. 3; KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9163, 9167 (under seal); P3488 (Witness
statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 104; Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4826; Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6184; D1874 (ICRC Work Report, 23 September 1992), p. 4; KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić &
Ţupljanin), T. 5276–5277; P3758 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Đerić, attaching an ICRC report, 7 August 1992), e-court p. 7; D4204 (Witness
statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 7; Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7087–7088; see
Adjudicated Fact 572.
4787
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 105.
 12

beatings.4788 The P00534 doesn’t say what is alleged in this para. On the contrary, this official
report of the ICRC, should not be taken verbatim (see:

What else is needed to interpret this report as the autors wanted it: to be seen as an
emotional, not as a legal document?)

1391. Initially, the detainees were unable to contact their families; later however, the ICRC
facilitated the sending and receiving of messages between the detainees and their family
members.4789

1392. The detainees were kept in large, crowded stables meant for livestock, where they sat or
laid down for most of the day.4790 Generally, detainees could not leave the stables freely, and the
stable doors were kept closed.4791 (#Contrary to reports#! This is a matter of security, and a
two hours periods of fresh air was obtained, see the ICRC reports, as much as it is provided
to the UN detainees here!)

1393. During the initial period after the establishment of the camp, there were not enough
blankets in the stables for all of the detainees and some had to sleep on concrete; however, ICRC
provided everyone with blankets in August 1992.4792 Except for some old JNA uniforms referred
to above, the camp authorities at Manjaĉa did not provide clothing; detainees normally wore the
same clothes they arrived in throughout their detention.4793 Furthermore, Manjaĉa had insufficient
hygiene and was infested with lice.4794 Leaking roofs, wet blankets, and persistent cold became
part of the detainees‘ lives in the later months of 1992.4795 (#General shortage#! Nothing of that
was due to any bad will, but a limitation of possibilities, as said in the OSCE report, P00534.

1394. Detainees were also forced to work.4796 They usually worked for eight to ten hours
daily.4797 (#Contrary to report#! This wasn’t true, let us see what was said in the exhibit
4788
Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8137–8138; P534 (ECMM Report, 3 September 1992), p. 4; KDZ024, P713 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9166 (under seal); P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 105; KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5400; D1862 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to 1st Krajina Corps, 3 July 1992) (under seal); P3758 (Letter from
Radovan Karadţić to Branko Đerić, attaching an ICRC report, 7 August 1992), e-court pp. 6–7; D1869 (Logbook of patients at the Manjaĉa camp, 11 June–
23 August 1992).
4789
D1858 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to 1st Krajina Corps, 18 June 1992), p. 2; P5472 (Daily Report of Manjaĉa Camp Operational Team, 18–20 August
1992), p. 1 (reporting that ICRC delegates were informed that ―in the future we would not allow messages to be received or sent, only when they are
carrying out their regular camp inspection.‖).
4790
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7082–7083; Charles McLeod, P712 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7314,
7317; KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5262; KDZ026, T. 10325 (17 January 2011) (closed session); P3322
(Photograph of interior of Manjaĉa); Radomir Radinković, T. 45313–45314 (18 December 2013); P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para.
129; Atif Dţafić, T. 19743 (30 September 2011); P604 (Photograph of detainees in Manjaĉa); P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April
2000), pp. 7–8; Ahmet Zulić, T. 1031 (13 April 2010); Adjudicated Fact 567.
4791
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 9.
4792
P5472 (Daily Report of Manjaĉa Camp Operational Team, 18-20 August 1992), p. 1; Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
6186, 6259; KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2395; P692 (Witness statements of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7;
Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8169; P3549 (Report of the Commission for Inspecting Collection Centres and Other
Facilities for Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992), p. 5; Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7615. See also Adjudicated Fact
567.
4793
Charles McLeod, P712 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7317, 7335; KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T.
5319, 5400; P3758 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Đerić re ICRC visit, 7 August 1992), e-court p. 6. Between 17 September and 5 October
1992, the ICRC provided socks, shoes, hats, and underwear for all the detainees. D1875 (ICRC Work Report, 6 October 1992), p. 4.
4794
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 106; Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6186; KDZ163, P3717
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5402; P3758 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Đerić, attaching an ICRC report, 7 August
1992), e-court p. 5. See also Adjudicated Fact 568.
4795
D1876 (ICRC Work Report, 5-18 November 1992), p. 1.
4796
P5549 (Request of 1st Krajina Corps for POW‘s from Manjaĉa camp, 24 September 1992); P534 (ECMM Report, 3 September 1992), p. 2; KDZ024, P713
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9167, 9228 (under seal); Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7093; P3488 (Witness
statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 111, 128; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 127; P722 (Third book of
Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), pp. 5–6, 9, 11, 17–18; D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 6; D4205 (Order of 1st Krajina
Corps, 10 October 1992); KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5263−5264, 5305, 5351. On 22 September 1992,
 13

P00534:

in many other POW camps, the detainees wanted to work, because it was a part of the day
they were out and got some benefits such as drink, cigarettes and food. Also, the President
couldn have known anything else but what was said in this document.

1395. On arrival at Manjaĉa, the detainees were ordered to lower their heads and keep their arms
behind their backs with hands clasped, a camp rule that remained in effect throughout their
detention.4798 The detainees were also made to hand in their money, gold, and other valuables.4799
(#Legal and obligatory#! That was a regulation, and not a crime! Similar is in the UN DU, no
detainee is allowed to possess any money. The guards are also searching and fining the
trespassers. The guards searched the stables and detainees frequently, appropriating any valuables
they found while beating the detainees.4800

1396. The detainees were required to stand up whenever Kovaĉević entered the stables; these
visits at times lasted a few hours and caused the weaker detainees to faint and fall to the
ground.4801

1397. During the transfer of approximately 1,300 detainees from Omarska to Manjaĉa on
6 August 1992, some of those detainees were severely beaten and humiliated by the guards who
had accompanied them on the buses.4802 (#Contrary to reports#! The Defence has a firm
reserves toward these statements of the witnesses, unless confirmed by somebody objective,
as the OSCE, and with the physician’s findings, because the witnesses had a motive to
exaggerate!) On one occasion, one of the buses stopped in front of a café at which point a
number of drunken soldiers boarded the bus and beat the detainees inside.4803 The detainees were
forced to sing ―Chetnik songs‖.4804 They were also prevented from opening the windows of the
buses.4805 Due to the intense heat, an elderly detainee died on the way to Manjaĉa.4806 Upon
arriving at Manjaĉa, the detainees were forced to stay on the buses; despite the high temperature
outside, the guards kept the heating on and closed the doors of the buses.4807 During the entire
Colonel Vukelić authorised the daily use of 60 detainees in Manjaĉa for work on a co-operative farm in Banja Luka. See D1873 (Order of the 1st Krajina
Corps to the Manjaĉa camp command, 22 September 1992). Though the Chamber received evidence that the detainees in Manjaĉa were forced to work, this
work is not covered by the Indictment as it was not conducted at the frontlines and did not include the
However, the Chamber noted this in the Judgment, and thus contributing to a bad picture of the
digging of trenches.
Serbs. However, this wasn’t true, see: P00534, an OSCE Report, that could have been checked!
4797
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 127; D4205 (Order of 1 st Krajina Corps, 10 October 1992).
4798
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9163 (under seal); P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 124; KDZ026,
P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1940 (under seal); Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 3000; KDZ163, P3717
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5317–5318; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 97; Charles
McLeod, P712 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7317–7318; P3756 (Excerpt from video clip from Banja Luka TV, with transcript).
4799
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6184–6185.
4800
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7081; P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 101; Mirzet Karabeg, P3303
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6188; KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2387.
4801
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2386–2387.
4802
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2342; P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994 and 16 May 2001), p. 9;
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1930−1931, 1941 (under seal); KDZ026, T. 10323 (17 January 2011) (closed session); P692
(Witness statements of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 8; KDZ026, P2089
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1930−1932 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 574.
4803
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3490.
4804
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2381.
4805
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3375; P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994 and 16 May 2001), p. 9;
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2341.
4806
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3375. This killing is not charged in Schedule B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.
4807
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1932, 1941 (under seal); KDZ026, T. 10322−10324 (17 January 2011) (closed session).
 14

night, the guards called out the names of detainees, took them outside and severely beat them. 4808
The beating of KDZ026 stopped only when Popović, upon hearing KDZ026‘s cries after he was
stabbed in the stomach, came outside and shouted at the guards to stop.4809 (The #“next level”#
represents the state and the VRS, more than a guard, so this and all such a cases shouldn’t
be used against the President, and the RS generally.

1398. On another occasion, an officer from the security service of the 1st Krajina Corps went
outside the camp and saw that policemen were beating two detainees ―sadistically‖.4810 (#Next
level#! The document P3750 exactly indicates that there was a misdeeds of the lower levels,
but the “next level”, as the author of this report did responsible warning and asked for a
correction of this practice. Therefore, this can not be used agains any RS official above the
direct perpetrators, because such a felonies are expected in any war, but no president was
kept liable for such a conduct of the lowerest level of policemen, who by the way, in a high
degree hadn’t been even minimally educated!)

1399. The detainees were forced to run the gauntlet on arrival into the camp.4811 Once inside,
they were regularly beaten by members of the MP and the MUP.4812 (#Next level# The exhibit
D01862 clearly shows that the superiors in the Manjaca camp were opposed to any
irregularity and demanded a personal changes to quit the commission of felonies. This limits
the liability to the perpetrators, not even to their superiors, let alone to the state organs and
the President. What these officials did in stopping and preventing the felonies was in accod
with the President’s orders, and what the perpetrators of the crimes did was in a sharp
contrast to everything what the President ordered this is the only reasonable inference, and
the fact supported by everything the officials knew!) Detainees were beaten with bare hands,
batons, wooden poles, rifle butts, and electric cables.4813 They were regularly interrogated about
their involvement in military matters.4814 During the interrogations, the guards beat the detainees,
sometimes to the point that the detainees could no longer move.4815 During the night, detainees
were called out and beaten; at least five to ten detainees were called out every night.4816 Detainees

4808
P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994 and 16 May 2001), p. 9; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1931,
1941 (under seal); KDZ026, T. 10323−10324, 10329 (17 January 2011) (closed session). According to KDZ163, the members of the MP inside Manjaĉa
were unable to stop the beatings carried out directly outside of Manjaĉa by those who brought the detainees to the camp. KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5300.
4809
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1932 (under seal); KDZ026, T. 10308, 10324, 10405 (17 January 2011) (closed session).
4810
KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5308; P3757 (Official note from the Security Centre in Banja Luka, 10 August
1992) (under seal), p. 2; P3750 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 7 August 1992), p. 1 (under seal).
4811
Radomir Radinković, T. 45331–45332 (18 December 2013).
4812
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9163–9165, 9219–9220, 9222 (under seal); Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
BrĎanin), T. 7091–7092; P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 103, 108–109, 128; Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik), T. 4796; Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6187; D1862 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to 1st Krajina Corps, 3
July 1992) (under seal); P3754 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps, 1 November 1992) (under seal); P3747 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to
the 1st Krajina Corps, 23 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal); KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5300, 5400; P692 (Witness
statements of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras. 123−126; D4204
(Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 3; Dragomir Keserović, T. 42015 (25 July 2013); Radomir Radinković, T. 45331–
45332 (18 December 2013) (testifying that beatings and mistreatments occurred only during the initial period after the establishment of the camp); see
Adjudicated Fact 573.
4813
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras. 123−126; see Adjudicated Fact 576.
4814
P534 (ECMM Report, 3 September 1992), p. 4; P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 103, 107; P692 (Witness statements of Rajif Begić
dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras. 118−119; P3733 (Manjaĉa camp daily report
to the 1st Krajina Corps, 22 June 1992) (under seal); P3735 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 26 June 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3736
(Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 27 June 1992) (under seal); D1855 (Report of Manjaĉa camp sent to 1 st Krajina Corps), p. 1; D1856
(Manjaĉa camp daily report to 1st Krajina Corps, 15 June 1992); D1857 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to 1st Krajina Corps, 16 June 1992); D1859 (Manjaĉa
camp daily report to 1st Krajina Corps, 20 June 1992). [REDACTED]. So what? It would be a crime to keep people just like that, and
not to find out whether a person in question is to be sued, exchanged or released.
4815
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6188; P692 (Witness statements of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7;
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 119. [REDACTED].
4816
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9168 (under seal); P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 104; Sakib Muhić,
P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8139; P721 (Second book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 10; Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor
v. BrĎanin), T. 7090–7091.
 15

were also placed in isolation cells and on one occasion, the ICRC observed the traces of fresh
human blood in one of those cells.4817

1400. Kovaĉević was in charge of the beatings; he was present and many times personally beat
the detainees.4818 He prepared lists of detainees to be beaten—a detainee could not be beaten until
Kovaĉević ordered it.4819 Because of his brutality, both the guards and the detainees feared
Kovaĉević.4820 Popović and Talić were aware of the mistreatment.4821 On one occasion, Popović
came to the scene and angrily dispersed the military policemen who had been beating the
detainees.4822 (#Responsible official conduct#! Mr. Popovic, as a responsible man, a person in
charge, was “President’s man”, he was doing on behalf of the state, not “Kovacevic” and
other that Popovic was after them. Neither Popovic, nor any of the state instances could be
responsible, because there was no any systemic basis for such a conduct!)

1401. On 3 July 1992, the Command of the 1st Krajina Corps was informed that efforts to stamp
out the wilful mistreatment of prisoners at the hands of MP were proving increasingly difficult.4823
(#Responsible official’s conduct#! This relies on the shown D1862, which proves that the
superiors were doing their best to prevent the criminal conduct, and how this could be used
to prove an allegedly criminal plan on the side of state, and this President?) On 11 July 1992,
during a meeting with senior MUP officials, Stojan Ţupljanin, Chief of Banja Luka CSB, stated
that the conditions in Manjaĉa were bad and that something had to be done.4824 (#Official good
deeds against officials#! Again, one of the officials claimed towards an improvement of the
conditions. Again another proof that the troubles the detainees met weren’t a plan of the
state, but a result of the civil war, an uniquitous poverty, embargo, a high number of POWs,
all of which was a result of a “vice mayeure”) On 16 July 1992, one of the camp authorities
complained to the 1st Krajina Corps Command that the MP and the security commander, Staff
Sergeant Mesar, ―just don‘t understand that the prisoners are humans and that they are protected
by international regulations while in the camp‖.4825 In a separate report filed a week later, the
same individual warned the VRS MP commander that Manjaĉa was ―not a torture house but a
camp of war prisoners‖.4826 (#Next level#! Exactly! A criminal conduct was not a part of
policy, but a matter of individual aberrations that had been fought by the superiors!)
Furthermore, the ICRC reported that the beating of two detainees by the guards during a visit by
the ICRC on 16 July 1992 resulted in the ICRC prematurely terminating its visit to the camp and
that there were ―frequent and widespread traces of recent and often severe beatings‖.4827 In the
same report, the ICRC criticised the living conditions in Manjaĉa and recommended that Manjaĉa
be closed down.4828 This report was provided to the Accused on 25 July 1992.4829 On 7 August
1992, the Accused forwarded to Branko Đerić, the RS Prime Minister at the time, a copy of the
ICRC‘s report; the Accused also requested that Đerić take prompt action with a view to improving
the living conditions in prisons on RS held territory.4830 (#Proper official’s conduct#! And that
was the only what the President could have done, to initiate the Government and other
4817
P3744 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 16 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3745 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 16 July 1992), p. 1.
4818
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 10; P692 (Witness statements of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court, 16 April 1995), e-court
p. 21.
4819
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 10.
4820
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2386; P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994 and 16 May 2001), p. 10.
4821
See Adjudicated Facts 578–580.
4822
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9221 (under seal).
4823
D1862 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to 1st Krajina Corps, 3 July 1992) (under seal).
4824
Ĉedomir Kljajić, T. 42212−42213 (30 July 2013).
4825
P3744 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 16 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal).
4826
P3747 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 23 July 1992), pp. 1–2 (under seal).
4827
P3758 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Đerić, attaching an ICRC report, 7 August 1992), e-court p. 5.
4828
P3758 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Đerić, attaching an ICRC report, 7 August 1992), e-court pp. 5–6.
4829
P3758 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Đerić, attaching an ICRC report, 7 August 1992), e-court p. 4.
4830
P3758 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Đerić, attaching an ICRC report, 7 August 1992), e-court p. 1.
 16

agencies to improve the matter in question. Nothing else he could have done, since he didn’t
have any service apart from the Government and it’s ministries.)

c. Visits to Manjaĉa and transfer of detainees

1402. On 18 June 1992, representatives from Merhamet, the VRS and the MUP as well as SDS
officials from Banja Luka visited Manjaĉa.4831 (#Distortion#! This is an unacceptable shifting of
facts. Some of them may have been SDS officials, but they had been keeping a state positions,
and visited Manjaca in this capacity, not as the SDS officials!) Omer Filipović, a Bosnian
Muslim detainee, told the visitors that the detainees had been taken from their homes and
described the poor living conditions in the camp.4832 (Мr. Filipovic was very known for his
subversive activity and preparation of a pogrom against the Serbs in Kljuc! Therefore, it
means nothing whether he was arrested at home or on a battlefield!) On 24 June 1992,
representatives of Merhamet delivered food and medical supplies to Manjaĉa but were barred from
having contact with the detainees.4833 On 6 July 1992, the Accused‘s of municipal, district and
military courts in Banja Luka, together with prosecutors and the Military Legal Officer of the
1st Krajina Corps visited Manjaĉa and discussed the possibility of instituting judicial proceedings
against the detainees.4834 In response to a written request to the command of the 1st Krajina Corps
by Merhamet, approximately 100 minors, elderly, and sick detainees were released around 10 July
1992.4835 (All of that happened without ant participation of the President, which confirms
that it was in the competence of the 1st Krajina Corps! #No liability#!)

1403. In mid-July 1992, representatives from the ICRC, accompanied by medical personnel,
visited Manjaĉa.4836 All of the detainees were registered and weighed by the ICRC.4837 The
process lasted a number of days.4838 At the end of July 1992, Vojo Kuprešanin, the President of
the ARK Assembly, visited Manjaĉa and promised the detainees that the majority of them would
be released promptly; this did not materialise and it caused unrest and anxiety amongst the
detainees.4839 Sometime at the end of July or in early August, Ţupljanin and a number of other
Serb officials visited Manjaĉa and went to the stables, where they talked with some of the
detainees.4840 (#Proper conduct# in the President’s name! it had been heard in the court
room that Kupresanin was helping the non-Serbs on behalf of this President, as his special
representative!)

1404. The ICRC representatives again visited Manjaĉa on 28 July 1992; during this visit, they
distributed mail and cigarettes to the detainees and conducted a number of interviews.4841 In early
August, the ICRC once again visited Manjaĉa and this time demanded that more water be

4831
D1858 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to 1st Krajina Corps, 18 June 1992).
4832
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 112.
4833
D1861 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to 1st Krajina Corps, 24 June 1992), p. 1; D1870 (Record of medical supplies and medicines received at the Manjaĉa camp, 24 June 1992);
D1871 (Logbook of patients at the Manjaĉa camp, 23 August 1992).
4834
P3740 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 8 July 1992), p. 2 (under seal).
4835
P3743 (List of detainees to be released from the Manjaĉa camp, 10 July 1992); P3741 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 9 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3742
(1st Krajina Corps combat report, 10 July 1992), p. 1; KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5297–5298; see Adjudicated Fact 582.
4836
P3758 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Đerić, attaching an ICRC report, 7 August 1992), e-court p. 4; P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 113; P718
(Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras. 121−122; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 8; KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5299, 5306; P3744 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 16 July 1992), pp. 1–2 (under seal); P3745 (Report of 1st
Krajina Corps, 16 July 1992), p. 1; KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9221 (under seal).
4837
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 118; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 8; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated
22 February 2010), para. 121; P3746 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 22 July 1992), p. 2 (under seal).
4838
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 8.
4839
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 125; Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4806; P3724 (Manjaĉa camp report to 1st Krajina
Corps, 8 August 1992), p. 2; KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5310; KDZ163, T. 20740–20741 (1 November 2011); P3751 (Manjaĉa
camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 10 August 1992), p. 1 (under seal); D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 10; Dragomir
Keserović, T. 40992–40994 (8 July 2013).
4840
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 121–124.
4841
P3749 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 29 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal).
 17

provided to the detainees.4842 Prior to this visit, pursuant to an order issued by Mladić on 3 August
1992, Major General Talić had ordered the authorities in Manjaĉa to, inter alia (i) ensure
cleanliness and medical care for the detainees; (ii) prepare accurate records of the detainees‘
arrival and release as well as records of deaths and findings on their causes; and (iii) select a
number of prisoner representatives.4843 (#Proper conduct#! Also a good move in a good
direction!) On 8 August 1992, journalists, including members of foreign news agencies, were
allowed to visit Manjaĉa.4844 During this visit, the journalists requested to see the detainees who
had arrived from Omarska two days prior but were not allowed to see them.4845 On 12 and
19 August 1992, foreign journalists again visited Manjaĉa.4846 On 22 August 1992, the Prijedor
SJB reported the transfer of a number of individuals from Manjaĉa to Trnopolje.4847 (That meant
a release, since Trnopolje was a reception centre!) On 24 August 1992, Milovanović ordered
the authorities in Manjaĉa to provide a list of the detainees and their places of residence so that
such information could be forwarded to the ICRC.4848 On 31 August, a delegation from CSCE
visited the camp and the ICRC brought food from Zagreb.4849 On the same day, a group of RS
government representatives who had approval from Đerić took a tour of the camp in order to
compile a report.4850 In late August 1992, representatives from the Bosanska Dubica, Kljuĉ, Banja
Luka, Prijedor, and Mrkonjić Grad CSBs came to Manjaĉa in order to discuss ―tasks and
instructions for joint work‖.4851 In August and September 1992, more minors and elderly were
released.4852

1405. On or about 1 September 1992, the ECMM visited Manjaĉa.4853 During this visit, Popović
insisted that the camp authorities adhered to all provisions of the Geneva Conventions while the
detainees told the visitors that they were entirely civilians and that all soldiers had already been
shot.4854 (#Uncorroborated#! Where this shots happened? When? There is no evidence that
anybody was executed out of the fights, and everything what the detainees (the Muslims)
coul have said to the internationals should be checked and corroborated by an objective
documents. None of the detainees would admit that they took part in the armed rebellion
and killing the Serb civilians, or the JNA soldiers prior to that. In early September 1992, RS
civilian and military officials and ICRC representatives discussed the steps needed for the
exchange of the detainees and the closure of Manjaĉa.4855 On 11 September 1992, the President
issued a decree, ―granting amnesty from criminal prosecution‖ to 69 detainees at Manjaĉa and
Trnopolje.4856 (#COMMENDABLE#! and EXCULPATORY!!! The only side that made
4842
P692 (Witness statements of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7; P5460 (Order of 1st Krajina Corps, 3 August 1992), p. 1.
4843
P5461 (VRS Main Staff Order, 3 August 1992); P5460 (Order of 1st Krajina Corps, 3 August 1992), p. 1; KDZ163, T. 20735–20736 (1 November 2011).
4844
P3724 (Manjaĉa camp report to 1st Krajina Corps, 8 August 1992); D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 8; P3488
(Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 127.
4845
P3724 (Manjaĉa camp report to 1st Krajina Corps, 8 August 1992), p. 2.
4846
D1852 (Report of Manjaĉa camp sent to 1st Krajina Corps, 12 August 1992) (under seal); D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8
December 2013), p. 8; P5472 (Daily Report of Manjaĉa Camp Operational Team, 18–20 August 1992), pp. 2–3; P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić
undated), para. 127.
4847
D1865 (Prijedor SJB dispatch to Banja Luka CSB, 22 August 1992).
4848
D1853 (Request for information on prisons from Manojlo Milovanović, 24 August 1992). The requested list was forwarded to the VRS Main Staff the
following day. See D1854 (1st Krajina Corps dispatch, 25 August 1992).
4849
P5577 (Note to RS MUP and Radovan Karadţić, 31 August 1992); P722 (Third book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 14.
4850
D1852 (Report of Manjaĉa camp sent to 1st Krajina Corps, 12 August 1992) (under seal). On one occasion, KDZ026 saw the Chief of Prijedor SJB, Simo
Drljaĉa, in Manjaĉa. KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2047 (under seal).
4851
P5472 (Daily Report of Manjaĉa Camp Operational Team, 18-20 August 1992), p. 4.
4852
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7080; Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6259; P718
(Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 133; P534 (ECMM Report, 3 September 1992), p. 4; see Adjudicated Fact 582. In late
August 1992, camp authorities compiled a list of 92 ill or underage detainees whose imprisonment they believed was attracting attention from the media and
humanitarian organisations. P3491 (Excerpt of Tode Gajić‘s diary); Radomir Radinković, T. 45328 (18 December 2013).
4853
P634 (ECMM Report, 1 September 1992), p. 1; P635 (ECMM Report, 1 September 1992), p. 1; P636 (ECMM Report, 3 September 1992), p. 1; P534
(ECMM Report, 3 September 1992), p. 1.
4854
Charles McLeod, P712 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7316; P534 (ECMM Report, 3 September 1992), p. 7.
4855
D1872 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 2 September 1992).
4856
P3721 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps re decision by Radovan Karadţić, 11 September 1992); D456 (Transcript of 20 th session of RS Assembly, 14−15
September 1992), p. 55; KDZ163, T. 20741–20742 (1 November 2011) (private session).
 18

amnesty even several times was the Serb side and the President!) On 16 September 1992, the
ICRC visited Manjaĉa for the seventh time; during this visit, Popović stated that the camp
administration had taken steps to guarantee the mental and physical integrity of the detainees.4857
ICRC representatives, however, were of the view that Manjaĉa should be closed as soon as
possible, its civilian detainees released (#Wrong!#This is a trespassing of competences, since
the ICRC couldn’t establish that anyone was civilian!) and the imprisoned soldiers transferred
to suitable prisons.4858 On 19 September 1992, detainees were taken out of Manjaĉa and
exchanged.4859 Additional visits by the ICRC took place on 23 September and 30 September
1992.4860 (#ICRC#! As it can be seen, the ICRC had more influence and dealt more with the
Manjaca camp than the President. The ICRC had an unhindered access to the Camp, and
only in September 1992 the ICRC had at least four successful visits to Manjaca. All of their
recommendations had been accepted and realised!)

1406. On 1 October 1992, Kuprešanin wrote to the RS Presidency, requesting the pardon and
release of 13 detainees held at Manjaĉa.4861 And was this request met by the Presidency?
Certainly it was, but why it is not mentioned here? On 3 and 4 October 1992, the ICRC visited
Manjaĉa and brought letters for the detainees, and visited again on 7 October in order to obtain a
list of sick detainees.4862 On 12 October 1992, the ICRC arrived with a list of sick persons; these
detainees were released and taken abroad for treatment.4863 On 30 October 1992, the ICRC started
working in the camp every day.4864 In addition to the ICRC, other organisations and renowned
individuals such as Bernard Kouchner and Elie Wiesel visited the detainees.4865

1407. On 31 October 1992, about 60 detainees were exchanged.4866 Starting in November,

preparatory measures were taken for the release and eventual transfer of all the detainees to third
countries.4867 On 13 November, the President ordered the release of approximately 700
individuals from Manjaĉa.4868 In the early hours of 14 November 1992, minors, elderly detainees,
as well as those who were not considered to be ―extremists‖ or ―war criminals‖ by the camp
authorities, were lined up; (#Distortion#, a drastic one! What “minors” and “elderlies”? the
minors of age of 14 were mobilised, as well as many elderlies. The main concern of the Serb
military authorities whether these same POWs will appear on the front line a day after
released or not, and this concern was legitimate. Only an exchange for the captured Serbs, or
handing them to the UNHCR was an acceptable solution, although the Serb side unilaterally
released many of the capturem Muslims! But, how the Chamber could have afforded itself
to put a “minors” in this Judgment, withut any evidence, any name? )) these detainees were
told to sign a document which barred them from the territory of BiH and placed them under the

4857
D1874 (ICRC Work Report, 23 September 1992), p. 1.
4858
D1874 (ICRC Work Report, 23 September 1992), p. 2. ICRC reiterated its position again on 6 October 1992. See D1875 (ICRC Work Report, 6 October
1992), p. 3.
4859
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2750, 2766 (under seal).
4860
D1875 (ICRC Work Report, 6 October 1992), p. 1.
4861
P3722 (Request sent from Vojo Kuprešanin to Radovan Karadţić, 1 October 1992); D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December
2013), p. 10.
4862
P722 (Third book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), pp. 15–17; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 135.
4863
P722 (Third book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), pp. 17–18; D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 9; Radomir
Radinković, T. 45318 (18 December 2013).
4864
P722 (Third book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 18.
4865
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 127; KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7766 (under seal); P722 (Third
book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 10; D1877 (Manjaĉa camp report to 1st Krajina Corps, 29 November 1992), p. 1; D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir
Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 8.
4866
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6260; Mirzet Karabeg, T. 18700 (13 September 2011).
4867
KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5316, 5362; P3723 (Manjaĉa camp report to 1st Krajina Corps, 14 November
1992), p. 1 (under seal). According to KDZ163, many detainees relocated to Belgium and Germany. KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor
v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5362. See also P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court, 16 April 1996), e-court p. 21 (stating that he was
resettled in Germany).
4868
D956 (RS President‘s Decision on Amnesty, 13 November 1992) (under seal); D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013),
p. 9.
 19

authority of UNHCR for the purpose of their relocation to a Western European country.4869 Prior
to this, Popović told the detainees that if they were ever captured in the territory of BiH, they
would be killed instantly.4870 (#Uncorroborated#! Without a document, this kind of assertions
shouldn’t be trusted by a serious chamber. Certainly, one of the conditions was that ssuch a
unilaterally released detainees do not appear as a re-mobilised and re-recruited to fight
against the Serbs, and that condition was completely legitimate. Anyway, the Muslim/Croat
military coalition was already as twice more numerous as the Serb forces!) With the
assistance of the ICRC, these detainees were released and taken to Karlovac in Croatia.4871

1408. On 4 December 1992, the President indicated that he would order the release of all
detainees held in Manjaĉa provided that they be transferred to third countries.4872 (#Military
necessity#! This is the condition, otherwise the VRS would have to capture them again in a
new battlefields. And no president would be entitled to do such a thing to his own army.

1409. On 13 December 1992, a group of 532 detainees was transferred from Manjaĉa to
Batković camp.4873 From Batković camp, some of these detainees were transferred to Kula
Prison.4874 (#Distorted#! A serious chamber would find out and notify the purpose of moving
the prisoners to Kula, which was a regular prison in Sarajevo. It was for the purpose of
exchange of those who preferred to be exchanged in Sarajevo! Such an incomplete assertion
leaves a space for an inaccurate impression!) On 14 December 1992, a number of local
journalists visited Manjaĉa.4875 However, the detainees had been warned not to speak to the
visitors for their own safety.4876 The remainder of the detainees in Manjaĉa, after signing
documents which required them to leave for third countries, were released on 14, 16, or 18
December 1992 and taken to Karlovac.4877 Manjaĉa was then closed down.4878

d. Conclusion

1410. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that during the period between 15 May and
18 December 1992, Serb Forces detained a large number of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat
men, including minors, sick, and elderly, at Manjaĉa and regularly subjected them to beatings and
mistreatment. The Chamber further finds that the detainees were held in poor conditions. These
included lack of food and water, insufficient sanitary facilities and inadequate medical care.
(#Inference on inference, on inference#!This kind of summarising and making inferences
afterward is not correct, and shouldn’t be allowed. What does it mean “Serb Forces” did so
4869
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3377; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1934–1935, 1951 (under seal);
KDZ026, T. 10392–10393 (17 January 2011) (closed session); KDZ163, T. 2074420745 (1 November 2011) (closed session).
4870
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2343; Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5539–5540.
4871
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3376–3378; D1876 (ICRC Work Report, 5–18 November 1992), p. 1; Faik Bišĉević, P122
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5539–5540; Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7004, 7093–7094; KDZ024, P713
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 30084–30085 (under seal); KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9165, 9169–9170
(under seal); Charles McLeod, P712 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7334; P3726 (List of detainees at Manjaĉa, 23 November 1992).
4872
D1851 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Daniel Shiffer, 4 December 1992).
4873
P3727 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to 1st Krajina Corps, 14 December 1992), e-court p. 3; KDZ163, T. 20749 (1 November 2011); D4204 (Witness statement of
Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 9; Asim Egrlić, T. 19980 (5 October 2011); Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik),
T. 4796; Dragomir Keserović, T. 42026 (25 July 2013).
4874
Dragomir Keserović, T. 42026 (25 July 2013).
4875
P3727 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 14 December 1992), e-court p. 1.
4876
P722 (Third book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 11; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 131.
4877
The ICRC assisted detainees in transferring from Manjaĉa to Karlovac, Croatia, where they were handed over to UNHCR officials. P3725 (ICRC
Communication to the Press, 14 November 1992); P692 (Witness statements of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 8; Ahmet Zulić, T. 1035–1036
(13 April 2010); KDZ026, T. 10329 (17 January 2011) (closed session); KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5362;
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 3001; P3727 (Manjaĉa camp report to 1st Krajina Corps, 14 December 1992), e-court pp. 1–
2; KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2343, 2371, 2396; Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 3000–3001;
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 128; P3931 (Report of 1 st Krajina Corps, 16 December 1992), p. 1; Dragomir Keserović, T. 42026
(25 July 2013); P5468 (ICRC press release, 18 December 1992).
4878
P3914 (Ewan Brown‘s expert report entitled ―Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992‖, 27 November 2002), p. 109; KDZ048, P678
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3374; P5468 (ICRC press release, 18 December 1992); see Adjudicated Fact 582.
 20

and so? We saw from all the documents cited in this part of the Judgment that there were
individuals commiting felonies, but it was condemned and fought against by the very #next
level of superiors#! All up to the President, thgough Djeric, Kupresanin, Popovic, and others
from the 1st Krajina Corps Command did their best to improve the conditions. The
Chamber can not take for granted what the Muslim extremists were saying, because those
who were transferred to Manjaca had already passed the first round of investigations, after
which from 41 to 59% of the detained had been released. Those who had been transferred to
Manjaca certainly were involved in the rebellion and killings of the Serb soldiers and
civilians. Beside, both, the Chamber and the Prosecurtion didn’t submit any evidence that
those capturings weren’t justified from a security standpoint. For instance, why there was no
any detainee from Mrkonjic Grad, Gradiska, Srbac, Celinac, Laktasi, all the neighboring
municipalities. While the Muslim Army initiated a synchronised attack on many points, (22
May in Hambarine, Prijedor, 27 May in many places in Sanski Most, Kljuc, Bosanski
Novi…, as it can be seen from the exhibit D3904, a document of the Commander of the ABiH
Sefer Halilovic. The Chamber had more than sufficient evidence that many Muslims hadn’t
any problem, even in Prijedor, Sanski Most and Kljuc, and that there was a crucial
difference in their conduct: those who participated in the armed rebellion had been
captured, and those who didn’t fight, didn’t have any problem, and many remained in the
Serb areas to the very end of the war.)

e. Scheduled Incident B.1.1

1411. The Indictment refers to the killing of at least six men in front of Manjaĉa after their
transportation from Hasan Kikić Elementary School in Sanski Most on or about 3 June 1992.4879

1412. As mentioned earlier, sometime in the first week of June 1992, members of Sanski Most
SJB and SOS loaded approximately 140 non-Serb detainees held at Hasan Kikić School, in Sanski
Most municipality, onto two trucks and departed for Manjaĉa. The trucks were extremely
crowded with approximately 70 detainees standing in each truck.4880

1413. Approximately six to seven hours later, the trucks stopped on the road next to the entrance
gate of Manjaĉa but the detainees were not allowed to exit.4881 After waiting for 30 to 60 minutes
standing beneath tarpaulins, the detainees were ordered to exit the trucks one by one.4882 A group
of 20 armed men in mixed and camouflage military uniforms, including Daniluško Kajtez, waited
outside the trucks as the detainees exited.4883 (#A renegade#! Kajtez had been recognized by the
witness G. Stojic as a criminal who intercepted him and several Croats The armed men beat
the detainees with batons, wooden handles of shovels, and wooden planks as they exited the
truck.4884 Six of the detainees, all Bosnian Muslim men, were subsequently separated from the

4879
Indictment, Scheduled Incident B.1.1. In Annex B to its Final Trial Brief, p. 1, the Prosecution refers to 6 June 1992 as the date of Scheduled Incident B.1.1.
4880
Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8122–8123; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 6; see
Adjudicated Fact 583.
4881
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 6.
4882
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 6; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8124.
4883
Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8127–8128, 8130; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 7.
Daniluško Kajtez was a member of the SOS. Members of the SOS, including Daniluško Kajtez, were later integrated into the 6th Krajina Brigade. See
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated) (under seal), pp. 20–22, 27, 30; KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T.
3315–3317 (under seal); P3519 (Indictment of the 1st Krajina Corps Military Prosecutor‘s Office, 2 June 1993), p. 1; P6542 (Report of Sanski Most SDS
Municipal Board, 10 September 1993); P3520 (Decision of Banja Luka Military Court, 9 July 1993), p. 1. In a letter to Vlado Vrkeš, the President of Sanski
Most SDS, Kajtez admitted to killing 12 individuals from Manjaĉa on two separate occasions. See P6556 (Letter from Daniluško Kajtez to ―Vlado‖), p. 1.
4884
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 6.
 21

rest.4885 Two of these six detainees were handcuffed and taken near a small truck.4886 The other
four detainees were taken to different points approximately 15 metres away.4887 Subsequently,
three to five armed men surrounded each of the detainees and beat them for approximately 20
minutes with multiple objects; all six detainees were killed.4888 The six bodies were then thrown
into the small truck, and the rest of the detainees were taken to Manjaĉa.4889 (#Renegades#!
Certainly, a war crime, but the responsibility must stay with those who did it. We already
know that Danilusko Kajtez had his small, but very mean group of criminal, they had been
expelled from the 6th Sana Brigade and did several crimes as renegades. Eventualy Kajtez
had been arrested, but the crucial witnesses weren’t available until the war ended! B. Stoji}
was in the USA!)

1414. The Chamber received forensic evidence which identifies six bodies as related to this
incident.4890

1415. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that on 6 June 1992, Serb Forces killed six Bosnian
Muslim men in front of the gates of Manjaĉa. (#Abuse of “The Serb Forces” obviously were
several criminals#, who later had been processed. At that time there was no possibility to
disarm and arrest the paramilitaries, since we the VRS was regulated as of 15 June, when
the President signed an order of formation and organization of the VRS. Two days prior to
this Order, on 13 June, the #President issued an Order on maintaining the Geneve
Conventions and other international provisions in the VRS#, see D434, and to disband and
arrest all the paramilitaries, whom the President disowned, see D93, and therefore couldn’t
be liable for their illegal conduct. That can not be neglected, and the RS civilian and military
authorities can not be kept liable for a misdeeds of criminals so early, just after the forming
of the Army.

f. Scheduled Incident B.1.2

1416. The Indictment refers to the deaths of a number of prisoners who suffocated in trucks while
being transported from Betonirka detention facility in Sanski Most to Manjaĉa on 7 July 1992.

1417. In the morning of 7 July 1992, Serb policemen took approximately 64 detainees, most of
them Bosnian Muslims, from the Betonirka factory garage, in Sanski Most municipality, and
loaded them into a truck with tarpaulin cover.4891 The detainees were crammed.4892 The Serb
policemen then pulled down and locked the tarpaulin cover, hermetically sealing the back of the
truck.4893 Under escort of the Sanski Most civilian police, the truck joined a convoy of trucks

4885
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), pp. 6–7; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8124, 8126.
According to Muhić, the six detainees were: Ermin Bahtić, Jasmin Jeleĉević, Medin Hadţiahmetović (a.k.a. Hapaĉ), Neron Mehadţić, Haris Bišĉević, and
Fajko Pašić. P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), pp. 6–7; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8125–
8126.
4886
Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8125–8126; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 7.
4887
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 7; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8129.
4888
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), pp. 5, 7; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8125, 8127;
KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3408–3409 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 584.
4889
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), pp. 7–8; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8125, 8136.
4890
These individuals were exhumed from the mass grave at Striĉići-Manj, in Banja Luka municipality on 23 May 2007. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report
of Amor Mašović), p. 73.
4891
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5537–5538; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras. 86–
88, 96; P721 (Second book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 5; KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5294; KW545, D4328
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin) T. 26131 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 585. [REDACTED].
4892
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 88; P721 (Second book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 5; KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5294; see Adjudicated Fact 587.
4893
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 88.
 22

transporting several hundred detainees from Krings Hall and Hasan Kikić sports hall, and together
they headed for Manjaĉa.4894

1418. The journey to Manjaĉa lasted approximately 10 or 11 hours.4895 It was very hot that day,
and there was no ventilation for the detainees beneath the sealed canvas tarpaulin of the truck from
Betonirka factory garage.4896 During the journey, fumes from the exhaust pipe of the truck flowed
in, making it difficult for the detainees to breathe.4897 Then, the tarpaulin wasn’t sealed! The
detainees squeezed their shoes in between the tarpaulin and the truck frame in order to allow air in,
but the policemen hit the shoes back inside the truck at the check-points.4898 By the time the truck
stopped a second time at a check-point in Vrhpolje, the detainees had finished the six litres of
water given to them at the beginning of the journey, and the guards refused to provide them
additional water.4899 A detainee resorted to drinking his own urine.4900 As the journey continued,
a number of detainees began to faint and die.4901 When the truck finally reached Manjaĉa around
sunset, the detainees were called out one by one by name.4902 Of the detainees, 24 did not respond
and remained lying on the floor of the truck.4903 As the camp officials refused to take the dead and
unwell detainees, they were taken back to Sanski Most along with Edin Bišĉević, a detained
Bosnian Muslim doctor who had volunteered to resuscitate those who were unwell.4904 Edin

4894
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7096; Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5537; Mirzet
Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6175; P3747 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 23 July 1992), p. 1 (under
seal); P3740 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 8 July 1992) (under seal); KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić &
Ţupljanin), T. 5293–5294; P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), para. 28 (under seal); Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2999, 3019; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7; Ahmet Zulić, T. 1030 (13 April 2010);
KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin) T. 26130 (under seal); D4170 (Witness statement of Mile Dobrijević dated 2
December 2013), para. 14. [REDACTED].
4895
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5538; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7; Ahmet
Zulić, T. 1030–1031 (13 April 2010) (testifying that the journey from Betonirka to Manjaĉa should normally last two hours).
4896
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 118 (under seal); P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras. 87–88; P721
(Second book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 5; KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5294; Radomir Radinković, T. 45334
(18 December 2013); KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3419 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 587.
4897
Ahmet Zulić, T. 1031 (13 April 2010).
4898
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras. 88–91; see KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin),
T. 5294.
4899
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5538; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 89; P721
(Second book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 5. See also Adjudicated Fact 587. An unknown woman tried to give the detainees water, but the guards prevented
her from doing so. P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 89.
4900
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 92.
4901
P721 (Second book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 6; Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5538; Dragomir Keserović, T. 41999
(25 July 2013).
4902
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 3000; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 94; P721
(Second book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 6.
4903
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 3000; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 94; P721
(Second book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 6; P3740 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 8 July 1992), pp. 1–2 (under seal); P3744 (Manjaĉa
camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 16 July 1992), p. 2 (under seal); KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5294,
5336–5337; D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 5; Radomir Radinković, T. 45334 (18 December 2013); P3773
(Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), para. 28 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 588. According to a report compiled by two
Bosnian Serb doctors, 20 detainees died from asphyxia during the transfer from Betonirka to Manjaĉa. P724 (List of civilians killed during transport to
Manjaĉa), pp. 1–2. In light of this evidence, the Chamber finds that four of the detainees did not suffocate in the tarpaulin covered truck and were taken
back to Sanski Most alive. The Indictment limits the victims of Scheduled Incident B.1.2 to ―prisoners who suffocated in trucks while being transported
from Betornika detention facility to Manjaĉa‖.
4904
KDZ492, P3596 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 3861 (under seal); D4214 (Witness statement of Vinko Nikolić dated 13 January 2014), para.
23; P3740 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 8 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3741 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps, 9
July 1992), p. 1 (under seal); KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5293–5295; P724 (List of civilians killed during
transport to Manjaĉa); P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras. 94–105; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić dated 15
March 2000), e-court p. 7; D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 5; Radomir Radinković, T. 45334
(18 December 2013); P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 118 (under seal); P6466 (Article from Sanski Most Online entitled ―Nedim
Caressed the Bones of His Twin Brother Edin‖, 20 April 2007); KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin) T. 26287 (under seal);
D4170 (Witness statement of Mile Dobrijević dated 2 December 2013), para. 14; KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T.
3418–3419 (under seal); Dragomir Keserović, T. 41996–41999 (25 July 2013); D4387 (Witness statement of Dušan Mudrinić dated 15 February 2014),
para. 20. According to a report compiled by two Bosnian Serb doctors, the detainees who died from asphyxia during the transfer from Betonirka to Manjaĉa
were Sevdaga Hukanović, Josip Mlinar, Vinko Matanović, Hivzo Hodţić, Ismet Memić, Fadil Kamić, Mirsad Halimović, Kemo Talić, Nedţad Muhić,
Dţevad Muhić, Ibro Mušić, Mustafa Hodţić, Mirhad Delić, Ramo Jusić, Atif Kerić, Nenad Ĉorak, Ivan Tutić, Ismet Hidţić, Muharem Pršić, and Zijad
Mujadţić. P724 (List of civilians killed during transport to Manjaĉa), pp. 1–2. [REDACTED].
 23

Bišĉević and the unwell detainees who were taken back to Sanski Most have never been seen alive
again.4905

1419. The Chamber received forensic evidence which identifies a number of bodies as being
related to this incident.4906 Furthermore, the Manjaĉa authorities reported to the 1st Krajina Corps
Command on 8 and 9 July 1992 that 24 individuals had died during transportation to Manjaĉa.4907
(#No cover up#! Therefore, no cover-up! There was not established any intent!)

1420. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that on 7 July 1992, Serb Forces forced a number
of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat men detained at Betonirka factory garage to board a
tarpaulin covered truck which was bound for Manjaĉa and that due to the lack of sufficient
ventilation, 20 detainees suffocated during transportation. (#No criminal intent#! Nothing to say!
It was really pity and dreadful, but sure we see no intent to kill, but rather a negligeance and
an inhuman treatment. However, what the President has to do with it all, since neither he
knew what was going on in this municipality, nor he could influence the coure of events in
any sence. The report of the Manjaca officers to their superiors meant that nobody intended
to cover up this case.

g. Scheduled Incident B.1.3

1421. The Indictment refers to the killings of a number of men in front of Manjaĉa upon their
arrival from Omarska camp on or about 6 August 1992.

1422. As mentioned earlier, on the night of 6 August 1992, approximately 1,300 detainees were
brought to the gates of Manjaĉa from Omarska and made to spend the night in the buses in which
they had travelled.4908 At one point, members of the Prijedor SJB‘s intervention squad took out a
number of detainees, including Dedo Crnalić and Jasko Alisić, from the buses, took them behind
some agricultural machines nearby and slit their throats.4909 One of the guards who killed Crnalić
wiped his bloody knife on Crnalić‘s shirt.4910 The next day, during the roll call of the detainees,
Dedo Crnalić‘s name was called first.4911 Members of the intervention squad who at that time
were standing next to the bus began laughing and said: ―There he is on top of that pile.‖4912 Later,
the detainees heard that in addition to Crnalić and Alisić, the members of the intervention squad
had killed six or seven detainees in front of the gates of Manjaĉa, including Nezir Krak, Nihad

4905
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5538; Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7098. As noted
above, the Indictment limits the scope of Scheduled Incident B.1.2 to ―prisoners who suffocated in trucks while being transported from Betornika detention
facility to Manjaĉa‖.
4906
According to Mašović, the remains of 21 victims of Scheduled Incident B.1.2 have been identified. These victims are Jasmin Bajrektarević, Adam Delić,
Mirsad Halimović, Hivzo Hodţić, Ismet Hodţić, Sevdaga Hukanović, Adem Jakupović, Ramo Jusić, Fadil Kamić, Vinko Matanović, Izet Mehić, Josip
Mlinar, Dţevad Muhić, Nedţad Muhić, Zijad Mujadţić, Kelo Talić, Edin Bišćević, Enver Burnić, Mirhad Delić, Ibrahim Mušić, and Ivica Tutić. The first
16 victims were exhumed from the Ušće Dabra mass grave, in Sanski Most municipality, on 17 July 2001 whereas the last five victims were exhumed from
the Dragoraj mass grave, in Mrkonjić Grad municipality on 19 April 2000. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 48, 73. See also
P6690 (Addendum to Nicolas Sébire‘s report, 16 May 2003), pp. 71–73; P6689 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August
2002), e-court p. 206; P4408 (Death certificate for Zijad Mujadţić); P6466 (Article from Sanski Most Online entitled ―Nedim Caressed the Bones of His
Twin Brother Edin‖, 20 April 2007). The Chamber, however, notes that from the 21 victims referred to by Mašović, only 15 are included in P724 (List of
civilians killed during transport to Manjaĉa). These individuals are Sevdaga Hukanović, Josip Mlinar, Vinko Matanović, Hivzo Hodţić, Fadil Kamić,
Mirsad Halimović, Kemo Talić, Nedţad Muhić, Dţevad Muhić, Ibrahim Mušić, Mirhad Delić, Ramo Jusić, Ivica Tutić, Ismet Hodţić, and Zijad Mujadţić.
4907
P3740 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 8 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal); P3741 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1 st Krajina Corps, 9 July
1992), p. 1 (under seal).
4908
See para. 1384.
4909
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3375; KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9169, 9218 (under seal);
KDZ074, P708 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2385 (under seal); P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994 and 16 May
2001), p. 10; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1933 (under seal).
4910
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3373–3374.
4911
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1932 (under seal).
4912
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1932, 1944 (under seal).
 24

Basić, and a man by the name Djuzin.4913 After Popović refused to accept the dead bodies into the
camp, members of the Prijedor SJB loaded them on the buses and drove off in the direction of
Banja Luka.4914

1423. The Chamber has received forensic evidence which identifies a number of bodies as related
to this incident.4915

1424. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that on 6 August 1992, Serb Forces separated at
least eight or nine Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from the group of detainees who had
arrived at the gates of Manjaĉa from Omarska and killed them. (#Abuse of the “Serb Forces”
term#! Again, the “Serb Forces” this was the beginning of the war, and those weren’t the
Serb Forces, but the “armed people” as Tito wanted it, and there was no efficient control
over everyone armed! #Armed people#!)

h. Scheduled Incident B.1.4

1425. The Indictment refers to the killings of at least 10 men in Manjaĉa between 1 June and
18 December 1992.

1426. On 10 July 1992, the guards at Manjaĉa beat Emir Mulalić to death.4916 The guards then
called in a detainee who was also a doctor.4917 Since Popović had ordered that the cause of death
of the detainees who died from beatings be falsified, the doctor confirmed Mulalić‘s death but
reported that he had died from a heart attack.4918 (This is all dubious, and impossible for the
Defence to check and challenge, and anyway it doesn’t have anything to do with this
President. #No Karad`i}’s liability#! )

1427. On 24 June 1992, Zlatan Miškić was taken to Manjaĉa and died some hours later.4919 On
the night of 29 July 1992, Ţeljko Bulatović called out Omer Filipović and Esad Bender to the

4913
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1932, 1944 (under seal); KDZ163, T. 20738–20739 (1 November 2011) (private session); D4204
(Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), pp. 6, 8–9, 12; Radomir Radinković, T. 45334, 45339 (18 December 2013); P711
(Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994 and 16 May 2001), p. 10 (stating that approximately 15 persons were killed on the night of
6 August 1992 in front of Manjaĉa). See also P3719 (1st Krajina Corps combat report, 7 August 1992), p. 2 (reporting that ―there were deaths during
transport to the camp‖); P3757 (Official note from the Security Centre in Banja Luka, 10 August 1992), p. 2 (under seal) (reporting that eight prisoners had
died during transportation to Manjaĉa and that four of those prisoners ―were probably killed in a cruel and inhumane manner‖) (#Individuals, not
force units#!) The said document (P03757) indicates that there was an illegal and unlawful conduct of some of the
Prijedor “Interventni vod”, which was composed of some reservists and certainly not educated policemen, later
known as the perpetrators of the Koricanske stijene killings. But, what we see is that the Commander of Manjaca and
his subordinates, certainly a higher officials than the perpetrators, tried to stop and prevent such a conduct, partialy
succeeding, and reporting further, which undoubtedly indicates that there was no any attempt to allowe or cover up
the incident. So, this can not be put on the account of the RS authorities, let alone of this Accused.; P3750 (Manjaĉa camp
daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 7 August 1992), p. 1 (under seal) (reporting that a total of eight prisoners died on the way to Manjaĉa and that three of
them had most probably been killed because they displayed visible signs of violence).
4914
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3374; D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 7; KDZ024,
P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9169 (under seal).
4915
According to Mašović and Sébire, six victims of Scheduled Incident B.1.3 have been identified. These victims who were exhumed from the mass grave
Novo Groblje, in Banja Luka municipality, on 4 July 2002, are Said Babić, Dedo Crnalić, Nezir Krak, Nihad Bašić, Kemal Jakupović, and Zvonko
Tokmadţić. P4853, (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 73; P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality,
28 August 2002) (under seal), pp. 79, 94. See also P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), para. 111, Annex A, pp. 1–2; P4869
(Record of identification for Kemal Jakupović and Nezir Krak, 29 July 2003); P4873 (Letter from BiH Commission for Missing Persons to the OTP re
exhumations at Novo Groblje, 11 September 2006); P4874 (Bihać Cantonal Court record of Novo Groblje exhumation, 4 October 2002); P4875 (Autopsy
reports of persons exhumed at Novo Groblje, 22 July 2002).
4916
P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 118.
4917
P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7.
4918
P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 7; see Adjudicated Fact 593.
4919
D1861 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to 1st Krajina Corps, 24 June 1992), p. 3. The Chamber has not received sufficient evidence as to the circumstances of
the death of Zlatan Miškić to make a finding in relation thereto.
 25

isolation rooms where they were severely beaten.4920 Filipović died as a result of the beatings that
night, but Bender was brought back around midnight. He crawled into the stable, bleeding and
crying for help; no one assisted him out of fear of the guards.4921 Around 7 a.m. the next morning,
Dr. Eniz Šabanović checked Bender‘s pulse and confirmed he was dead.4922 Later that morning,
the bodies of Filipović and Bender were wrapped in blankets and loaded into a vehicle with a JNA
license plate.4923 The guards called out at least eleven other detainees, including a minor, at night
and beat them to death.4924 (#Uncorroborated#! All of it is dubious and uncorroborated by
any other proof. It is contrary to the official report of the Manjaca authorities, that there
were only five (5) casualties, three of a natural causes and two after beatings, Filipovic and
Bender. Why the official reports of a professionals is not trusted, and the statements of those
willing to revenge to the Serbs are accepted?)

1428. Around 10 p.m. on 3 August 1992, guards began beating a detainee named Stipo.4925 Stipo
fought back and Bulatović subsequently shot him dead.4926

1429. The Chamber took judicial notice between June and November 1992, at least 10 detainees
died inside Manjaĉa as a result of beatings or of sporadic killings.4927 The Chamber also took
judicial notice of the fact that Popović ordered that death certificates, giving a false account of the
cause of death of detainees who were killed as a result of beatings inside Manjaĉa, be issued.4928
(#Contradicted#! How possibly a witness, a Muslim could have known this? Had the
Commander decided to do this forgery and a cover up, he certainly wouldn’t chose a Muslim
doctor to do it for him. This is a pattern of the false testimonies that were “successful” in this
Court!) In addition, the Chamber received forensic evidence which identifies two bodies as
related to this incident.4929 (#Not established#! It is very easy, but not fair, to assert that, since
there is no any possibility to check it. The Prosecution thus has an advantage over the
Defence, obtained by the Rules established by the Court, which makes this trial unfair. A
witness KDZ163 identified only five deaths in Manjaca, out of which three were of a natural
causes, and two after beating (Filipovic, Bender) which also, though a crime, may not be
intended to kill, but resulted in deaths.

4920
P3749 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 29 July 1992) (under seal); Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
4800; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), pp. 8–10; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8139; P718
(Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), pp. 31–32; D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), pp. 6,
12; D4235 (Witness statement of Jevto Janković dated 24 January 2014), para. 7. The camp officials considered Filipovic to be the leader of SDA in Kljuĉ
and an organiser of ―armed rebellion‖. See D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 5.
4921
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 126; Asim Egrlić, T. 19969 (5 October 2011); Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik), T. 4800; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8139–8140, 8168; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11
April 2000), p. 9; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), p. 32; Ahmet Zulić, T. 1034 (13 April 2010); KDZ163, P3717
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5348; D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8 December 2013), p. 12; D4235
(Witness statement of Jevto Janković dated 24 January 2014), para. 7.
4922
Atif Dţafić, T. 19698 (30 September 2011); P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 126; Asim Egrlić, T. 19968–19969 (5 October 2011);
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 9; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8168; P718 (Witness
statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), p. 32; Ahmet Zulić, T. 1034 (13 April 2010); D4204 (Witness statement of Radomir Radinković dated 8
December 2013), p. 12; D4235 (Witness statement of Jevto Janković dated 24 January 2014), para. 7.
4923
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), pp. 9–10; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8169.
4924
According to Zulić and Muhić, these detainees were Zijo Avdić, Fadil Kamić, Hukanović, Adem Jakupović, Ivo Mlinar, Milić, Mirso Hlimović, Zikrija
Talić, Senad, Supuk, and Ruski. P721 (Second book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 10; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8139–
8140, 8168. However, this witness had 40 kilos of explosive and a machine gun. On p. 4 of this document (P00721) he
described how the killings had been “justified” by those who killed people during the transport, that it was during an
attempt to escape. Even this detail shows that the perpetrators have hidden the real cause of those deaths, which
further indicates that it was not acceptable to the Serb authorities.
4925
P722 (Third book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 1.
4926
P722 (Third book of Ahmet Zulić‘s diary), p. 1.
4927
See Adjudicated Fact 592. But see KDZ163‘s claim that only five detainees died in Manjaĉa and that of these deaths, only two were caused by violence.
KDZ163, P3717 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 5348, 5353.
4928
See Adjudicated Fact 593.
4929
P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 73; P533 (Autopsy reports for Esad Bender and Omer Filipović); P4872 (Kljuĉ Municipal
Court‘s record of exhumation of Kazaferija cemetery, 17 November 1998); P6690 (Addendum to Nicolas Sébire‘s report, 16 May 2003), pp. 41–42; Nicolas
Sébire, P694 (Transcripts from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 16718–16719.
 26

1430. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that between 1 June and 18 December 1992, Serb
Forces killed at minimum 15 Bosnian Muslim men detained in Manjaĉa.

(B)Bosanski Novi

(1)Charges

1431. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity, was
committed in Bosanski Novi as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims
and/or Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.4930

1432. Acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Bosanski Novi by Serb Forces and
Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include (i) torture, beatings, and physical and
psychological abuse, during and after the take-over as well as in the Mlakve football stadium, as
cruel or inhumane treatment;4931 (ii) the establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living
conditions in the Mlakve football stadium, including the failure to provide adequate
accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic sanitation facilities, as cruel or
inhumane treatment;4932 (iii) forcible transfer or deportation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats from their homes;4933 (iv) unlawful detention in the Mlakve football stadium;4934 (v) the
appropriation or plunder of property, during and after the take-over in Bosanski Novi, during
arrests and detention, and in the course of or following acts of deportation or forcible transfer;4935
(vi) the wanton destruction of private property, including homes and business premises, and public
property, including cultural monuments and sacred sites;4936 and (vii) the imposition and
maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.4937

1433. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible
transfer), respectively, as crimes against humanity.4938 In this regard, the Prosecution alleges that
by the end of 1992, Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs had forcibly
displaced Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Bosanski Novi in which they had
been lawfully present.4939 It is alleged that from March 1992, restrictive and discriminatory
measures, arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, killing, destruction of houses, cultural
monuments and sacred sites, as well as the threat of further such acts caused Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats to flee in fear, while others were physically driven out.4940

(2)Lead-up

1434. Bosanski Novi is a municipality in northwest BiH bordered by the municipalities of

Bosanski Krupa, Sanski Most, Prijedor, and Bosanski Dubica.4941 The Una River runs along the

4930
Indictment, paras. 48–49.
4931
Indictment, para. 60(b). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.4.1
4932
Indictment, para. 60(d). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.4.1.
4933
Indictment, para. 60(f).
4934
Indictment, para. 60(g). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.4.1.
4935
Indictment, para. 60(i).
4936
Indictment, para. 60(j). See Scheduled Incident D.4.
4937
Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement; the removal from positions of
authority; the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or the denial of
equal access to public services. The Chamber notes that the Prosecution does not allege criminal responsibility for rape and other acts of sexual violence or
for forced labour at the frontlines in Bosanski Novi. Indictment, fns. 5, 7.
4938
Indictment, paras. 68–75.
4939
Indictment, paras. 69, 72.
4940
Indictment, para. 71.
4941
D484 (Map of BiH).
 27

northwestern edge of the municipality, also forming part of the border between BiH and
Croatia.4942 In 1991, the population of Bosanski Novi was approximately 42,000, consisting of
33.7% Muslims, 60.2% Serbs, and approximately 6% other ethnicities.4943 The Japra valley area
in particular, including Suhaĉa and Blagaj, was inhabited predominantly by Bosnian Muslims,
while the villages of Maslovare, Gvozdeni, Vitasovci, and Radomirovac had large Serb
populations, and the village of Jošava was exclusively a Serb village.4944 The village of Blagaj is
divided by the Sana River into Blagaj Japra and Blagaj Rijeka.4945

1435. Following the multi-party elections in 1990, the SDS won the majority of seats in Bosanski
4946
Novi. Gavro Bogić was elected as President of the SDS and Radomir Pašić was elected as
President of the Municipal Assembly.4947

1436. Prior to the 1990 elections and the start of the war in Croatia, inter-ethnic relations between
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims in Bosanski Novi were generally good.4948 However,
following the start of the war in Croatia, there were increasing inter-ethnic tensions between
them.4949 When the war broke out in Croatia, border points were closed in Bosanski Novi, among
other areas, and movement was restricted.4950 (#No Serbs in BiH liable#! This had nothing to do
with the Serb local authorities, since it was a war between the SFRY and the two secessionist
republics, Croatia and Slovenia. The tensions were increasing because the Muslim leadership
supported the secessions and instructed their followers to sabotage the JNA mobilisations,
while the Serbs were obliged to respond to these mobilisations.)

1437. As early as 1991 and at the beginning of 1992, Bosnian Muslims began to be dismissed
from their employment.4951 (#Distorted#! This was not true, since such a case would be widely
publicised and used in the interethnic quarrels, except if there was an alocations of the posts
among the parties, or if the Yugoslav federal security had some reasons to be cautious about
some persons. Another reason could have been, i.e. if the Muslims didn’t respect the inter-
party agreement in another municipality, which was a pair with the B. Novi, then the
authorities in B. Novi would be entitled to do the same. However, the Muslims themselves
sabotaged the functioning of the common organs, such as the Executive board, as is noted in
P02632:

. In
mid-April 1992, the newly appointed Serb police chief dismissed all Muslim police officers in
Bosanski Novi because they refused to sign an oath of loyalty to the Serb authorities; however,

4942
D484 (Map of BiH).
4943
P4994 (Addendum to Ewa Tabeau‘s expert report entitled ―Ethnic Composition in Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27 Municipalities of BiH
1991 to 1997‖, 3 February 2009), pp. 23, 104 (citing to the 1991 RS Population Census). See also P5449 (Report of the MUP, Banja Luka RDB, February
1995), pp. 8–9 (referring to Bosanski Novi as Novi Grad); D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 6. But see D1913
(Intelligence report re review of security in Bosanski Novi municipality, undated), p. 1. The Chamber shall rely on the statistics for the ethnic composition
of Bosanski Novi in 1991 from Tabeau‘s report which are based on the 1991 RS Population Census.
4944
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13959; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 9; P687
(Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 18; P3802 (Map of Bosanski Novi with photographs).
4945
See Adjudicated Fact 657.
4946
D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), p. 2.
4947
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 9; D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), pp. 2–3.
4948
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 9; KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13959.
4949
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13959; KDZ011, T. 21214 (10 November 2011).
4950
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 10; KDZ011, T. 21199–21201 (10 November 2011). See also D1911 (Report of
Banja Luka CSB, 11 July 1991).
4951
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13961. See also KDZ011, T. 21215–21216 (10 November 2011).
 28

even the Muslims who signed this paper were fired and sent home as well.4952 The remaining
police officers were issued with a new camouflage uniform with a Serb flag on the epaulette.4953
Bosnian Muslims who worked in companies, administrative organs, and institutions in Bosanski
Novi were required to sign an oath and were also dismissed from their jobs.4954 (#Due to the
ICFY#! It does fall in the subject of the oath segment. But, there was proclaimed the RS, on
the basis of the results of the ICFY in the Hague in 1991, and the Lisbon Agreement. Even if
there was no such an agreements, the Serbs were entitled to self-organize in an opposition to
the unilateral and unlawfull secession of the BiH. Since the RS was proclaimed and enacted,
an oath was an obligation for all the state officials with an authorisation. Anyway, as with all
other events in the ARK, this President didn’t have any leverage, not even knowledge. #No
Karad`i}’s liability#! .

1438. In April 1992, check-points manned by Bosnian Serb soldiers wearing JNA uniforms were
established, including between Hozići and Donji Agići and between Suhaĉa and Jošava.4955
(#Before VRS#! This is wrong assertion and any inference originating from it is wrong,
because at that time there was the JNA, no matter from where were it’s soldiers. Up until 20
May there was no the Bosnian Serb army. At that time the JNA was withdrawing from
Croatia, and had a lot of troubles with security, and that was why it established the check-
points and restricted movement.) Movement was also restricted.4956 The soldiers at these
specific check-points only checked the papers of Bosnian Muslims.4957 (And how the JNA
soldiers recognised who was a Muslim, and how they differentiated the Croats and Serbs
from the Muslims? By a race? By a skin colour? That is how this AF or 92bis can work
without any challenge.)

1439. Pašić received the Variant A/B Instructions from the SDS Main Board,4958 pursuant to
which the SDS formed the Bosanski Novi Crisis Staff in April 1992.4959 Bosanski Novi was a
Variant A municipality as Bosnian Serbs were the majority in the municipality.4960 After receiving
the RS government instructions on the work of the Crisis Staffs, the Bosanski Novi Crisis Staff re-
organised itself on 20 May 1992 to ―take over the prerogatives and functions‖ of the Municipal
Assembly.4961 As a result, Pašić, who was President of the Bosanski Novi Municipal Assembly,
became President of the Bosanski Novi Crisis Staff.4962 (#Legal, legitimate, necessary# So what?
This was a usual move in a crisis. An alternative would be to let the Muslim extremist
butcher the Serb people and join the Croatian Army.)

4952
Adjudicated Fact 2279; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court pp. 9–10. See also P3804 (Witness statement of Charles
Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 50. (#Deadly combination#! Impossible to comment or oppose to those “evidences”
4953
Adjudicated Fact 2279. (#Deadly combination#! An allegations, derived from an AF or 92bis.
4954
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13961, 14025; P2632 (Report of Bosanski Novi's Crisis Staff, undated), pp. 3–4. See
Adjudicated Fact 2279. The Chamber received contrary evidence from Radomir Pašić that Muslims were not dismissed from employment and that such
ultimatum did not occur and that moreover, it was still relatively peaceful in April 1992. He also testified that Bosnian Muslims ―refused to work at the
police station, although we asked them to‖. D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), p. 20; Radomir Pašić, T. 41020 (9 July 2013).
However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber considered that Pašić‘s evidence in this regard
was marked with contradictions. Now, it is clear: first AF, then 92bis, then discredit the only witness who knew that, and the
Defence may only graze a grass. Because it is treated as a donkey.
4955
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13961–13962, 13966; KDZ011, T. 21200 (10 November 2011).
4956
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13961–13962, 13966; KDZ011, T. 21200 (10 November 2011).
4957
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13962.
4958
Radomir Pašić, T. 41011–41014 (9 July 2013).
4959
Radomir Pašić, T. 41014 (9 July 2013); P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 9; KDZ011, T. 21202 (10 November
2011). See also P2632 (Report of Bosanski Novi's Crisis Staff, undated), p. 1.
4960
Radomir Pašić, T. 41014 (9 July 2013).
4961
P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992); P2632 (Report of Bosanski Novi‘s Crisis Staff, undated), p. 7.
4962
Radomir Pašić, T. 41021–41023 (9 July 2013); P2632 (Report of Bosanski Novi's Crisis Staff, undated), p. 7.
 29

1440. In the Muslim village of Suhaĉa, in particular, discussions with SDS representatives from
the village of Jošava about the handover of Muslim weapons began in late March 1992.4963
(#Before VRS, before RS#! This is a lie, because at that time the only legal armed force was
the JNA, and it was legitimate to disarm all the unlawfully armed individuals and groups.
Had the SDS done it in March, there would be a big crisis and publicity!) At the end of April
1992, the SDA President in Suhaĉa informed the villagers that he had reached an agreement with
the SDS members in Bosanski Novi, including Ranko Balaban, President of the SDS in Jošava,
that if they surrendered their weapons to the Serbs, they would be allowed to go on living as
before.4964 The next day, the Bosnian Muslims of Suhaĉa surrendered their weapons to the Serb
MP at a check-point between Suhaĉa and Jošava.4965 (#Before VRS#! However, if it was some
MP, it must have been the JNA MP, because at that times there was no the Bosnian Serb
army, and therefore no the Serb MPs either.) Following the surrender of weapons, the villagers
were instructed to go to a field in Jošava while they waited for all of the houses in Suhaĉa to be
searched by Serb soldiers, accompanied by two Bosnian Muslim civilians.4966

1441. On 4 May 1992, the SDS in Bosanski Novi held talks with representatives from the SDA in
an attempt to find a compromise that would compel all citizens, Serbs, Muslims, and Croats, in
Bosanski Novi to hand in illegally held weapons to the TO or to the Bosanski Novi SJB; on the
same day, the ARK government issued an order for mobilisation, instructing the surrender of
weapons by 11 May 1992, and imposed a curfew for all citizens in the ARK.4967 (“For all citizens
in the ARK” is meant #regardless of their ethnic or other affiliation#. What was wrong with
this? Certainly, this was aimed to preserve the peace and order. Whatever, the President
didn’t know anything about this, and couldn’t influence in any terms. In the areas reachable
to the President, there was no any curfew at all, but the local authorities were entitled to
secure a peace the way they considered suitable!) In line with this order, on or around 9 May
1992, the Bosanski Novi Crisis Staff under Radomir Pašić issued an ultimatum over Bosanski
Novi radio for Bosnian Muslims in the municipality to hand in their weapons within 24 hours.4968
However, according to Pašić, a number of citizens ignored these orders and refused to turn in
weapons and military equipment.4969

4963
See Adjudicated Fact 2280.
4964
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13962–13964.
4965
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13962–13966; see Adjudicated Fact 2281. Sifet Barjaktarević organised the surrender of
weapons in Suhaĉa, which included approximately 300 weapons in total and were primarily hunting rifles, and pistols. KDZ011, T. 21228–21229 (10
November 2011). See also P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 61; P3817 (Memo re 5,000 Muslims from
Bosanski Novi, 5 June 1992), p. 1.
4966
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13967–13968, 14025–14026; KDZ011, T. 21239–21240 (10 November 2011); see Adjudicated
Fact 2281. See also P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 61; P3817 (Memo re 5,000 Muslims from Bosanski
Novi, 5 June 1992), p. 1.
4967
D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), pp. 4–5, 19; P2818 (Decision of ARK Regional Secretariat for National Defence, 4 May
1992). See also P2819 (Dispatch from Banja Luka CSB to all SJBs, 4 May 1992); P2632 (Report of Bosanski Novi's Crisis Staff, undated), pp. 3–5; Ewan
Brown, T. 21598–21599 (18 November 2011); D1921 (Report of Bosanski Novi SJB, 15 August 1992), p. 1.
4968
D1921 (Report of Bosanski Novi SJB, 15 August 1992), p. 1; Milorad Sajić, T. 44134–44135 (27 November 2013); Adjudicated Fact 2283. See also P687
(Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 11.
4969
D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), p. 6. See also P3819 (UNPROFOR Memo, 29 May 1992), p. 4; D1921 (Report of Bosanski
Novi SJB, 15 August 1992), pp. 1, 5.
 30

(3)Attacks against Bosnian Muslim villages

(a)Blagaj village

1442. After the deadline for the surrender of weapons expired on 11 May 1992, conflict started in
the Blagaj area.4970 At 1 a.m. on 14 May 1992, pursuant to orders from Pašić, Serb soldiers fired
13 shells on Blagaj from Izba, a hill overlooking Bosanski Novi.4971 Shells were fired into the
village for two days, wounding civilians.4972 The shelling caused damage to houses of Bosnian
Muslims but did not kill anyone.4973 (#Before VRS#! In his testimony, Pasic denied any
ingerence and authority over the Army, and he was right at least up until 20 May. No
civilian authority would be tolerated to interfere in a military matters while the JNA was
there. In the same report, (P02632) Pasic described the chaos that abrupted meanwhile,
mainly under the influence of the fights in neighboring municipalities B. Krupa and
Prijedor. Anyway, B. Novi was so close to the Croatian border, so that could be expected to
be unrest because of the war in Croatia, a Croatiaan shells falling at the Serb settlements in
BiH and a great number of the Serb refugees from Croatia.

1443. On 14 May 1992, a Bosnian Muslim delegation went to speak with Drago Ninić, the SDS
president of the neighbouring village of Petkovac, to tell the Bosnian Serbs that Bosnian Muslims

4970
(#Linguistic troubles#! , in this document (P02632) ther is a
P2632 (Report of Bosanski Novi's Crisis Staff, undated), pp. 4–5.
sentence that is incorrectly translated in English. Here is this sentence is the Serbian:

And the critical sentence is “SDS I SDA na kojoj su prihvaceni stavovi…” however, in English it sais:

First, it was not that “The Crisis staff acknowledged the stands of SO SDS…” but “taken note of the stands…” The
municipal Crisis Staff was above the party board. Second, aand the most important: “Excepted” should mean “excluded”
which is contrary to what was really said. Therefore, the SDS and SDA had been discussing and agreeing the issues of
removal of the population in an organized manner. To the other aspects, this document doesn’t say what was explicated
in the Judgment. Namely, it was explicitly said that a battalion of the soldiers originating from the B. Novi returned from
Jasenovac, and put the Serb flag on the municipal buildings, contrary to the municipal authority’s attitude, shows that
there still was the JNA. Namely, Jasenovac is in Croatia, and there could not be any units of the Bosnian Serb TO, let
alone of the VRS. Neglecting this fact, probably for a lack of knowledge, leads to a conclusion that Pasic wasn’t frank and
sincere. Since there was a constant tension between the civil authorities and the JNA, this intercept accusing Pasic for
the order on attack on Blagaj should not be accepted without a reserve.
See also P3819 (UNPROFOR Memo, 29 May 1992), p. 4; P6440 (Banja Luka CSB report, 12 May 1992), p. 2.
4971
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 11; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 19;
P6436 (Summary of intercepted conversation, 11 May 1992); D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), pp. 20–21; Radomir Pašić, T.
41031–41038 (9 July 2013); see Adjudicated Facts 658, 2284. Despite an intercepted conversation between Major Ţeljaja and Colonel Dević stating that
Pašić ordered the attack on Blagaj, Pašić denied that the attack on Blagaj was carried out pursuant to his orders; according to Pašić, as the President of the
Municipal Assembly and the President of the Crisis Staff, he did not have the authority to issue such orders or to activate anything in a military sense.
Radomir Pašić, T. 41038–41043 (9 July 2013). See P6436 (Summary of intercepted conversation, 11 May 1992). However, the Chamber does not find
Pašić‘s evidence on this issue to be reliable. In reaching this conclusion, the Chamber considered that Pašić‘s evidence in this regard was contradictory and
concluded that he was evasive and lacked sincerity.
4972
See Adjudicated Fact 2284.
4973
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 11; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 19;
P2632 (Report of Bosanski Novi's Crisis Staff, undated), pp. 4–5. See also Adjudicated Fact 2290.
 31

in Blagaj did not have weapons.4974 The meeting with Ninić also included Bogić, Bosanski Novi
SDS President.4975 The Serbs did not want to speak to this delegation and demanded that three
Bosnian Muslim men in particular be brought to them because they had weapons.4976 These men
went to talk to the Bosnian Serbs again, when they were also told that ―Serbs and Muslims could
not live together any longer‖.4977 They reached an agreement that the Bosnian Muslims would
gather all of the weapons into the school.4978

1444. However, the shelling of Blagaj resumed at around 2 p.m., hours before the delegation had
even returned from Petkovac.4979 The shells originated from Huzeirovica Brda.4980 That evening,
a group of 500 villagers, including women and children, formed a column walking to a house of a
Bosnian Serb, who had previously been on good terms with Bosnian Muslims, in Maslovare.4981
They were stopped on the road by a group of 50 armed men led by Mićo Karlica; these armed men
wore green camouflage uniforms with badges showing the four ―S‖ insignia, and cockades on their
hats.4982 (#Insignias#! Certainly, not under the Serbian authorities, since the RS didn’t allowe
any cockardes, which were the chetnik insignias from the WWII, and would mean a new
ideological division of the Serbs.) The villagers were told, at gun point, to surrender all weapons;
they handed over all of their hunting weapons and were then allowed to continue to the house.4983
(#Armed civilians#! How come, they did have some weapons with themselves, while seeking
shelter in a Serb home?) Later, the same soldiers who confiscated their weapons came to the
house and shot at the villagers; one Bosnian Muslim man was wounded, and another was shot
dead.4984 (#Deadly combination# #Defence helpless#! Many of the inferences above, from fn.
4976 to 4995, are based on a 92bis statements, and few on an Adjudicated Facts, which leaves
this Defence and this President without a word, and without any possibility to clarify what
happened and who was responsible. And this is one of the major vices of this trial.)

1445. The next day, 15 May 1992, Captain Bogdan Grab, wearing camouflage and a red beret,
arrived in Maslovare with a group of approximately 20 soldiers, and started insulting the
villagers.4985 Later, Grab‘s soldiers took 15 Bosnian Muslim men and made them walk in front of
the Serbs to ―clear‖ the village of Blagaj but did not find anything.4986 There, the Bosnian Serbs
placed flags depicting the four Cyrillic ―S‖ symbols around the village.4987 On the same day, the
villagers were allowed to return to the village.4988 (#Before VRS#! Obviously, this was a sort of
search that was announced, but the conduct of those soldiers wasn’t proper, and there still
was the JNA in the region, #no liability# of the Serb local authorities, let alone the central
one. The shooting continued all around Blagaj and the villagers were surrounded and could not
leave.4989 On the same day, the mosque and houses of Bosnian Muslims were set on fire.4990

4974
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 11.
4975
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 19.
4976
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 11.
4977
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 11.
4978
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 11.
4979
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 11; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 19.
4980
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 19.
4981
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 11; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 19.
4982
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 11.
4983
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court pp. 10–12.
4984
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 12. The Chamber notes that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules A
or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.
4985
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 12. See also P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 29 April 2003), e-court
p. 6.
4986
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 12. The Chamber notes that forced labour, including the use of Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats as human shields, is not charged in Bosanski Novi pursuant to the Indictment. See Indictment, para. 60(h), fn. 7.
4987
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 12.
4988
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 12.
4989
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 12.
 32

1446. According to Alić, after 15 May 1992, Bosnian Muslims from Blagaj Japra were ―taken
away in droves for questioning‖ in Bosanski Novi by MP wearing red berets.4991 (#Deadly
combination#! All the inferences and findings are founded on the 92bis and AFs, (except
KDZ011) which leaves the President helpless. This is another proof that this was not a fair
trial!)

1447. On 24 May 1992, Bosnian Serb soldiers took valuables and money from Bosnian
Muslims in Blagaj Rijeka and Blagaj Japra, and houses in Blagaj Rijeka were looted and set on
fire.4992 (An Adjudicated Fact!!?? What to say? Is it fair to put it as a fact in the case where
it wasn’t established?)

(b)Suhaĉa village

1448. Three days after the villagers surrendered their weapons in May 1992, Suhaĉa was shelled
beginning at 6:30 a.m. and continued for the next seven days.4993 The shells were fired from the
hills surrounding Suhaĉa, from the direction of the villages of Jošava and Krslje, both Serb
villages, mainly targeting areas of the village where the mosques were located.4994 During the
shelling of Suhaĉa, its inhabitants took shelter in the basements of houses.4995 (#Local count
down#! It was obviously a local count down, since there was no units deployed in the area. It
is a miracle that the Chamber realised that KDZ011 was not frank. Had it tested other AFs
and 92bis, it would have seen how many of it shouldn’t be trusted. Those witnesses continued
their war against the Serbs through this court!)

1449. One day when there was no shelling, soldiers came to Suhaĉa and told the villagers that
the town would be attacked and that they could not protect the villagers.4996 They were therefore
told to leave and retreat towards Bosanski Novi where it would be decided where they would
go.4997 After the shelling of Suhaĉa, Bosnian Serb soldiers entered the village and looted the
houses.4998 (#Uncorroborated#! But this was the testimony of the same KDZ011. Why he

4990
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 12.
4991
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 20.
4992
Adjudicated Fact 658.
4993
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13967–13969; KDZ011, T. 21186–21187 (10 November 2011); Adjudicated Fact 660.
4994
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13959, 13968–13969; KDZ011, T. 21187, 21240 (10 November 2011).
4995
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13969. The Chamber notes that KDZ011 gave evidence in the BrĎanin case that houses close
to the mosques in Suhaĉa were damaged during the shelling of the village; see KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13969.
However, on cross-examination in this case, KDZ011 confirmed his testimony in the Krajišnik case, stating that houses in Suhaĉa remained intact after the
shelling, except for abandoned houses on the hills around the village. KDZ011, T. 21241 (10 November 2011). Based on KDZ011‘s conflicting evidence
on this issue, the Chamber is not satisfied that houses in Suhaĉa were damaged during the shelling of the village.
4996
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13969–13970. See also Adjudicated Fact 668.
4997
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13970. See also Adjudicated Fact 668.
4998
See Adjudicated Fact 660. See also P2632 (Report of Bosanski Novi's Crisis Staff, undated), pp. 8–9. According to Pašić, there were no orders to do so
from the official authorities and it was difficult to monitor ―uncontrolled groups‖ who entered towns and Muslim houses for their own enrichment. D3849
(Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), pp. 23–24. However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that
conclusion, the Chamber observed that Pašić‘s evidence was marked with contradictions and concluded that he was not a reliable witness. How come,
the Chamber did not find the Pasic’s evidence reliable, in spite of the fact that the report, (P02632) was a
contemporaneous document, in which was exactly established that the locat TO staffs did the things “on their own”
 33

would be trusted anyway? Should it have been checked through a documents, or

corroborated otherwise?)

(c)Other villages in the Japra valley

1450. The Chamber took judicial notice that on 11 May 1992, Bosnian Serb forces shelled the
Bosnian Muslim village of Gornji Agići.4999 (”#Before VRS#! #No “Bosnian Serb forces”
existed on 11 May 1992!!! It was either the JNA, or a local unit of the Territorial defence,
without any command and control by the central authorities! Everything depended on their
assumption of jeopardy, and they did have the right to defend themselves, since the state
didng secure their survival!#Legal#! #Defence necessity#! ) On 23 May 1992, Muslim villages
in the Japra valley, including Gornji Agići and Donji Agići, were attacked and houses were set
alight; in Donji Agići, Bosnian Muslim property was looted and set on fire by Serb Forces.5000

(4)Scheduled Incident D.4

#No Serb officials liable#! .

Certainly, no a felony should be justified, but Mr. Pasic should be trusted in a several aspects: first, the civilian authorities
didn’t and couldn’t influence any military happening while the JNA was there; second, the authorities could possibly
influence the development in the town itself, but in the distant villages nobody could influence anything at that stage
of the war. The local people acted in accordance with their own sense of security for their lives and lives their families.
Not to forgent what was happening in Croatia, or what had happened in B. Brod on 25 and 27 March, or I Bijeljina
31 March and 1 to 3 April this year. If the municipal (let alone central) authorities were not able to guarantee the
security fot the people in those villages, they had every right to secure it for themselves. Now, the Chamber is
discrediting every evidence ttah proves what was the authority’s attitude towards the events and particularly towards
the crimes. Not even the municipal authorities were responsible for what happened in a distanced villages, let alone
the central authorities and this Accused. . And no chamber is entitled to discredit everything that the Defence expose,
particularly if a testimony is in accordance with a contemporaneous document. Or this is not a court, and in this case
we do have every right to alarm the entire world on that. So, an honest report of the president of municipality is used
against the civil authorities of the Serb side, just because the Chamber doesn’t care about the reality and the context.
4999
See Adjudicated Fact 661.
5000
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 61; P3817 (Memo re 5,000 Muslims from Bosanski Novi, 5 June 1992), p. 2;
Adjudicated Facts 661, 2285. See also D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court p. 17; P2632 (Report of Bosanski
Novi's Crisis Staff, undated), pp. 8–9. Pašić maintains that there was no shelling of these villages ―to his knowledge‖ with heavy weaponry and that only
searches for illegal weapons occurred; furthermore, Pašić testified that the authorities did not order or give instructions to destroy or burn property ―just
because it is Muslim‖. D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), pp. 6, 22–23; Radomir Pašić, T. 41043–41046 (9 July 2013).
However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable based on the Chamber‘s observations about his contradictory evidence and low credibility.
(#Impressions#! Does the Chamber have any evidence contrary to Pasic’s evidence, or is relying only on it’s
impression of a low credibility. This is all a psychological matter, nothing objective. And this must not be that way!!!
 34

1451. The Indictment refers to the destruction of nine mosques in Bosanski Novi which occurred
at least between March and June 1992.5001

1452. In May 1992, the old wooden mosque in Blagaj Rijeka and the mosque in Blagaj Japra
were shelled and set on fire by soldiers, destroying their minarets.5002 During the shelling of
Suhaĉa, the two mosques in the village, the Stara Suhaĉa and the Suhaĉa mosques, were also badly
damaged.5003

1453. In early May or June 1992, the town mosque in Bosanski Novi, Gradska Dţamija, was
shelled, set on fire by Bosnian Serb soldiers, and destroyed.5004 The walls were badly damaged
but the minaret remained standing.5005 Heavy machinery was brought from Prijedor in order to
knock down the minaret.5006 When the mosque was destroyed, trucks arrived to remove the rubble
from the mosque and the site was then flattened and used as a parking lot; the tombs of the
cemetery were also removed.5007 The Vidorije mosque was burned down in May 1992 and its
minaret was destroyed.5008 The mosques in Prekosanje, Urije, and Gornji Agići were also
destroyed during the summer months of 1992.5009 (The only what misses is a proof that those
minarets hadn’t been abused by snipers, which regularly happened in all the cases!)

1454. The Chamber has considered the evidence it has received which identified Serb Forces as
responsible for the destruction of mosques in Bosanski Novi in May and June 1992.5010 It also had
regard to the fact that almost all mosques in the municipality sustained heavy damage or were
completely destroyed after Serb Forces took over the municipality. Having weighed these factors,
the Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Serb Forces were responsible for the attacks
on and destruction of mosques in Bosanski Novi. (Still, the Prosecution didn’t prove that it was
done by the legal and regular “Serb Forces”. The Chamber didn’t receive any evidence to
that respect! But, this is a process against the President. How about his responsibility? No
evidence whatsoever! Even if it was as the Chamber found, what does it have to do with the

5001
The Indictment refers to the following nine mosques: Stara Suhaĉa mosque, the Suhaĉa mosque, the mosque in Blagaj Japra, the mosques in Prekosanje,
Urije, and Gornji Agići, the old wooden mosque in Blagaj Rijeka, the town mosque in Bosanski Novi (Gradska Dţamija), and the Vidorije mosque.
Indictment, Schedule D.4.
5002
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court pp. 11–12, 16; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court
p. 20 (testifying further that on 15 May 1992, two men, including Veljko Lazarević from Blagaj Japra, first fired bullets at the mosque in Blagaj Japra and
then set fire to it, including the wood minaret); KDZ011, T. 21195–21196 (10 November 2011). See Adjudicated Facts 662, 663, 2290. See also P4070
(Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted
records), pp. 35–36, 44–46; P4069 (Cultural destruction database), records 58–59. See also paras. 1444–1445.
5003
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14012–14013; KDZ011, T. 21187–21188, 21196 (10 November 2011). See Adjudicated Fact
664. See also P3803 (Photograph of destroyed mosque in Suhaĉa); P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of
Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted records), pp. 31–34; P4069 (Cultural destruction database), records 74–75. See also
paras. 1448–1449.
5004
See Adjudicated Fact 666. As KDZ011 was leaving Bosanski Novi from Mlavke stadium in an open truck, he saw that both mosques in Bosanski Novi, the
Gradska Dţamija and Vidorije mosques, were destroyed; however he saw that an Orthodox church in Bosanski Novi was still standing. KDZ011, T. 21196,
21214 (10 November 2011); KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14018. See also P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of
András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted records), pp. 47–51; P4069 (Cultural
destruction database), record 64.
5005
Adjudicated Fact 666.
5006
Adjudicated Fact 666.
5007
See Adjudicated Fact 666.
5008
KDZ011, T. 21196 (10 November 2011); KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14018; Adjudicated Fact 667. See also P4070
(Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted
records), pp. 52–56; P4069 (Cultural destruction database), record 63.
5009
Adjudicated Fact 665. KDZ011 also testified he saw that the minarets of the mosques in Prekosanje and Urije had been destroyed when he passed the towns
on the train heading to Mlavke stadium in June 1992. KDZ011, T. 21195 (10 November 2011). See also P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András
J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted records), pp. 37–43; P4069 (Cultural destruction
database), records 71, 73, 76.
5010
See paras. 1444–1445, 1448–1449. In his final brief, the Accused argues that there is no evidence that official authorities in Bosanski Novi ordered or
otherwise participated in the destruction of the mosques there. See Defence Final Brief, para. 1503. Furthermore, according to Pašić, there was no
organised destruction of mosques and all mosques were set on fire by paramilitaries, or ―unknown perpetrators‖. D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir
Pašić dated 5 July 2013), pp. 18, 27. However, the Chamber has considered the evidence before it and given its findings on the destructions of mosques in
Bosanski Novi as well as its assessment of Pašić‘s credibility, the Chamber does not find his evidence to be reliable in this regard. See fn. 4971.
 35

President, who issued all the necessary orders to prevent such a development? #No
Karad`i}’s liability#! )

1455. The Chamber therefore finds that nine mosques in Bosanski Novi municipality were
destroyed or heavily damaged by Serb Forces in May and June 1992.

1103. Movement of the population within and from Bosanski Novi

1456. On 20 May 1992, the SDS Municipal Board adopted three decisions regarding the
situation in Bosanski Novi: (i) all citizens who wanted to leave Bosanski Novi were ―enabled to do
so peacefully‖; (#EXCULPATORY!) (ii) all measures and activities that could be aimed at
driving out residents were strictly prohibited; (#EXCULPATORY!) and (iii) all citizens who
wanted to remain were required to be loyal to RS.5011 In line with these decisions, Pašić began to
look for solutions, including negotiating with UNPROFOR and other representatives, ―to enable
Muslims who wished to leave Bosanski Novi‖.5012 (#COMMENDABLE#! Here it should be
mentioned that prior to that, there was an accord between the SDS and SDA, as it is written
in P02632, (accepted, not excepted) and that was a basis for the Pasic’s action.)

1457. On 24 May 1992, between 8,000 and 10,000 Bosnian Muslim men, women, and children
from various villages in the Japra valley, including 1,200 Bosnian Muslims from Suhaĉa, left the
valley in a convoy of cars, tractors, and horse-drawn carts.5013 They headed to Blagaj Japra.5014

1458. Meanwhile, SDA President and representative of Suhaĉa, Sifet Barjaktarević, negotiated with
Bosanski Novi municipal authorities regarding the safe passage of this convoy to Croatia.5015 An MP
patrol sent the convoy towards Bosanski Novi, accompanied by two military trucks with Bosnian
Serb soldiers.5016 Bosnian Serb soldiers wearing JNA uniforms intercepted the convoy at Blagaj
Japra bridge5017 and demanded that they leave their property and board a train headed towards Banja
Luka.5018 When they refused, the convoy was forced to return to Blagaj where it remained guarded
by armed Bosnian Serb soldiers until 9 June 1992.5019 Freedom of movement was limited and special
permission was required to leave the village, making it feel ―like a prison camp‖.5020 (#Feelings,
believes#! As a matter of fact, the “Bosnian Serb soldiers” whoever they be, indicated that the
population was expected to go to Banjaluka, meaning deeper in the RS, rather than to Croatia.
And relocating any population within the same territory is not criminal, but a lawful obligation
of the warring sides. However, the Muslim population preferred to go to Croatia, and further
to Europe, and it was an obvious reason for stopping them by the “Bosnian Serb soldiers”.
5011
D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), pp. 7–8.
5012
D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), pp. 8–9.
5013
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13971–13972; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 21;
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 61; P3817 (Memo re 5,000 Muslims from Bosanski Novi, 5 June 1992), p. 2.
See also KDZ011, T. 21204, 21207 (10 November 2011); P2632 (Report of Bosanski Novi's Crisis Staff, undated), pp. 8–9; Adjudicated Facts 669, 2286.
5014
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13971–13972; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 21. See
also Adjudicated Fact 659.
5015
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13972, 13975–13976; see Adjudicated Fact 669. See also D3849 (Witness statement of
Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), p. 21.
5016
See Adjudicated Fact 669.
5017
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13973. According to Kirudja, the soldiers were ―persons in Serbian military uniforms and Serb
paramilitary groups‖ and from the symbols on their uniforms, ―it was deduced they were under the control of the SDS and Mayor Pasić‖. P3804 (Witness
statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 61.
5018
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13973; P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 61;
P3817 (Memo re 5,000 Muslims from Bosanski Novi, 5 June 1992), p. 2. See Adjudicated Facts 669, 2286.
5019
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13973–13975; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 13;
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 21; P3817 (Memo re 5,000 Muslims from Bosanski Novi, 5 June 1992), p. 2. See
Adjudicated Fact 669.
5020
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 13; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 21.
 36

However, the Chamber constantly neglects the very crucial facts deriving from the Tito’s
doctrine of the armed people, and the Territorial Defence, which existed in every single village,
and if there was no JNA in a region, this units were independent in acting. It acted in
accordance with a local assessments about jeopardy for their population, and since the JNA
withdrew almost suddenly, there was needed several months to put it under the control of the
VRS, which was in a status of forming. This is visible from the exhibit P2632, Pasic’s report,
#for a unique command. #COMMENDABLE#!

And this position of the local Serb official was exactly what the central Serb authorities and the
President himself ordered!)

1459. On 26 May 1992, Charles Kirudja, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer and Civil Affairs Co-
ordinator for UNPROFOR in UN Protected Area Sector North, a UN protected area in Croatia
adjacent to the northwestern boarder of BiH, met with Jugoslav Borojević, Mayor of Dvor in
Croatia.5021 Borojević told Kirudja that Pašić had requested the passage of 5,000 Bosnian
Muslims from Bosanski Novi who were leaving the municipality ―voluntarily‖ and would travel
through Krajina to Austria and Slovenia.5022 Kirudja asked how Serb authorities could speak
about the desires of a group of Muslims without a single Bosnian Muslim representative being
present, but he was only told to speak with Pašić on the phone, which he refused to do.5023 (This is
irrelevant, since the Muslim representatives had agreed the arrangement with Pasic himself,
and this move of Kirudja was irresponsible! Had he called, he would have known!)

1460. The next day, a delegation from Bosanski Novi, including Pašić, arrived unannounced at
Kirudja‘s office to discuss the request.5024 Pašić admitted to Kirudja that Bosnian Muslims in
Bosanski Novi had been put under pressure from ―armed Serbian irregulars‖ to leave the area after
refusing to sign loyalty oaths to the new SerBiH government or to disarm.5025 (#Loyalty,
Disarming, safety!# That was a legal demand, “to be loyal, or to disarm”, because no armed
force could stand another disloyal armed group behind their backs. Nothing is unlawful in
it!) According to Pašić, the 5,000 Muslims had asked the authorities in Bosanski Novi for
protection and conveyed their desire to travel in a convoy to Austria and Germany where they had
relatives.5026 Given that the Bosnian Muslims had refused to go to other parts of BiH because they
were afraid of #being mobilised,# Pašić informed Kirudja that the Bosanski Novi authorities
―wanted to do everything possible to accommodate their wishes‖ and to provide a peaceful and
secure departure for the Muslim population from Bosanski Novi.5027 Determining that the Bosnian

5021
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 2, 40.
5022
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 40–42; Charles Kirudja, T. 21259–21260, 21278–21280 (11 November
2011) (testifying further that when asked why a mayor in Croatia was speaking on behalf of the mayor of Bosanski Novi, Borojević told Kirudja that
Bosanski Novi was now part of a ―new reality‖, or the new reality of the ―Serbian Republic of BiH‖, and the Bosnian Muslims did not want to accept this
new Serb authority in Bosanski Novi). See also P3815 (UNPROFOR Memo, 8 June 1992), p. 2.
5023
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 43; Charles Kirudja, T. 21260–21262 (11 November 2011). See also P3816
(UNPROFOR Memo, 26 May 1992).
5024
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 45; D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), p. 9. See
also P3815 (UNPROFOR Memo, 8 June 1992), pp. 2–3.
5025
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 46–48, 50–51; Charles Kirudja, T. 21280–21281, 21283–21284 (11
November 2011); D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), p. 9; Radomir Pašić, T. 41047 (9 July 2013). See also P3815
(UNPROFOR Memo, 8 June 1992), p. 3; P3818 (UNPROFOR daily report, 11 May 1992).
5026
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 45, 49. See also P3819 (UNPROFOR Memo, 29 May 1992), pp. 3–4;
Charles Kirudja, T. 21292–21294 (11 November 2011). Pašić also informed Kirudja that two Muslim spokespersons from Bosanski Novi had been
identified, Barjaktarević and Fikret Hamzagić, a member of the SDA and member of the Bosanski Novi municipal government, respectively; Kirudja later
received information that they had been imprisoned in a school in Blagaj. P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras.
46, 61; P3817 (Memo re 5,000 Muslims from Bosanski Novi, 5 June 1992), p. 2.
5027
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 45; D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), p. 9;
P2918 (Order of Bosanski Novi's Crisis Staff, 8 June 1992). See also D1916 (Conclusion of Bosanski Novi Municipal Assembly, 18 June 1992) (referring
 37

Muslims were not leaving Bosanski Novi voluntarily, Kirudja refused to provide UN assistance
―to make refugees out of people still in their own homes‖.5028

1461. In the beginning of June 1992, there were many rounds of negotiations between Muslim
representatives, the Serb municipal authorities, and international representatives, to discuss the
departure of Croats and Muslims in a convoy from Bosanski Novi.5029 The negotiations took place
in Pašić‘s office, in Dvor, in Emin Purić‘s house, (A Muslim official!) and on the bridge over the
Una River.5030 There was no discussion regarding the possibility for people to return.5031
(#Return guaranteed#! The return was guaranteed by the central authorities, which
accepted every single proposal, and even made many own proposals towards securing this
right to return! In this case, it was obvious that the wish of the Muslims not to be loyal to the
new authorities and not to disarm, but to leave towards the safe and rich European countries
was crucial and was met by Pasic. #COMMENDABLE!#)

1462. On 8 June 1992, the villagers in Blagaj were told by Bosnian Serbs to move out of the
5032
village. (This is #not correct interpretation#: those weren’t the “Blagaj villagers”, but the
villagers from several villages that had been returned after refusing to board a train for
Banjaluka (see fn 5024). So, a correct interpretation would be that these were the villagers
waiting to be allowed to leave out of the country! #Contrary to Chambers findings#, see fn: !)
On the morning of 9 June 1992, a bus full of Bosnian Serb soldiers, a truck, and a tank drove
through Blagaj from the direction of Svodna.5033 In Troske village, the soldiers got off the bus and
the tank turned around and stopped 500 metres from Blagaj, and pointed its cannon toward the
village.5034 The soldiers began firing infantry weapons at civilians in the village and there were
explosions from houses and houses were shot at and burned.5035 But no casualties were
reported? As it is visible from the exhibit P02632, it was fired as a warning fire in air. As
said in the P02632, p. 5, after the military police was fired at!

Th
e attack lasted about two hours, and those staying in the village fled towards the bridge in the
direction of Blagaj Rijeka in order to escape.5036 However, at the bridge, the Bosnian Muslim
men, women, and children were stopped by masked Bosnian Serb soldiers from neighbouring
villages, some of whom wore civilian clothing while the rest were wearing green camouflage
uniforms.5037 The soldiers instructed them to hand over all of their personal belongings, including

inter alia to the decisions adopted by the SDS Municipal Board on 20 May 1992 referred to in paragraph 1456); D1917 (Bosanski Novi Red Cross
announcement, 7 June 1992); Radomir Pašić, T. 41048–41050, 41057–41058, 41073–41076, 41090–41092 (9 July 2013) (testifying further that Bosnian
Muslims wanted to leave voluntarily and the Serb authorities did not threaten anyone or forcibly remove anyone from their homes, nor did they have an
objective to do so).
5028
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 52; Charles Kirudja, T. 21282–21283, 21298–21299 (11 November 2011);
P3819 (UNPROFOR Memo, 29 May 1992), p. 5; P3815 (UNPROFOR Memo, 8 June 1992), p. 3. See also KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik), T. 6789–6791 (under seal); D1918 (Letter to Radomir Pašić, 20 June 1992).
5029
See Adjudicated Fact 2291. See also D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), pp. 24–25.
5030
See Adjudicated Fact 2291. See also D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), pp. 24–25.
5031
Adjudicated Fact 2291.
5032
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 13; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 21.
5033
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13976; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 13.
5034
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13976–13977; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 13.
5035
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13977; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), p. 13; P687 (Witness
statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 21.
5036
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13977–13978.
5037
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 13. See also KDZ011, T. 21209 (10 November 2011).
 38

money, gold, jewellery, identification cards, photographs, and papers and keys for cars.5038 The
soldiers threatened to kill anyone if they were later found with money or gold.5039 (#Masks and
insignias, not Serb forces#! There is no any chance that they were “the Srb soldiers”, since
any mask was forbidden. As it is said in the sentence, they may have been the Serbs “from
neighbouring vilalges”, but certainly not under any control and command of the official
authorities. And why the President would be liable for everything that happened during the
civil war, particularly since he himself predicted this chaos and asked the Parliament of BiH
not to lead the society towards a war? Also, why so many assertions and findings are
founded on the “imported” evidence” a Rule 92bis evidence, out of any possibility that the
Defence coult challenge it? #Deadly combination#!)

1463. A man named ―Zoran‖, nicknamed ―Red Beret‖, wearing a JNA uniform, arrived and
started separating the men from the women before they crossed the bridge.5040 Soldiers wearing
JNA uniforms waited on the other side of the bridge and searched the Bosnian Muslims again and
separated some of the men from the group, while women and children were sent inside the Japra
Company compound, which was surrounded by barbed wire.5041 (#Distorted#! Certainly, it
wasn’t surrounded by barbed wire because of the people, but because of the Company, to
protect it’s property. Otherwise, how long it would need to establish a fence had it been
aimed as is suggested in this sentence. Anyway, is it so difficult for the Chamber to see that
the KDZ011 sometimes lied, sometimes exaggerated?)

1464. A group of the Bosnian Muslim men was instructed by soldiers to lie down in the road in
two rows 50 metres away from the tank pointing at them and their pockets were searched
again.5042 A Bosnian Serb from Jošava, nicknamed ―Trnka‖, ordered Alić‘s brother and two other
men to leave the formation, and led them a way and shot them.5043 As always in such a cases, this
crime is #solely individual#, and was not based on a religion, but strictly personal. Nobody
can justify this, but nobody shouls address it to the officials. While the remaining men were
lying on the road, the tank was ordered to drive over them by a bearded man called ―Vojvoda‖.5044
The tank began driving towards them but was stopped by an officer who came from the direction
of the bridge and ordered that the people be removed from the road, stating that no one should be
killed that way.5045 (#Next level rectify#! This one was a Serb official, and as ever, the
superiors prevented crimes and rectified misdoings of subordinated or independent
individuals! And this is #EXCULPATORY#, because this reflected the official policy of the
Serb authorities!) The men lying on the road were taken to the Japra Company compound.5046
Later, the Bosnian Serbs soldiers called five men to step forward; however, only three of the five
men were still alive and stepped forward.5047 The remaining men were loaded onto train cars
waiting at the compound by the soldiers.5048

5038
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13978; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 13; P687
(Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 21.
5039
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 21.
5040
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13978–13980.
5041
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13980–13981. See also KDZ011, T. 21209 (10 November 2011); Adjudicated Fact 631.
5042
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 13.
5043
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court pp. 13–14; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court pp.
21–22.
5044
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 14.
5045
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 14; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 22.
5046
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 14.
5047
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 14 (stating that the five men called to step forward were Husein Ekić, Hasan Ekić,
Saim Šumić, Kemal Alić, and Ismet Selimagić; however, Kemal Alić and Ismet Selimagić had already been killed by this point); P687 (Witness statement of
Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 22; KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13994–13995.
5048
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13994–13995; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 14;
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 23. The Chamber notes that the above killings are not charged pursuant to
Schedules A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.
 39

1465. In total, approximately 4,000 to 8,000 Bosnian Muslims were loaded onto 22 train cars,
used to transport cattle, at Blagaj Japra by members of the Municipal TO Staff and the MP.5049
Women and children were loaded onto the train cars first and the men were loaded on after; the
cars were tightly packed with people with no space left.5050 Alić was one of the last ones to board
and witnessed two individuals taken off the train and shot by a Bosnian Serb man.5051 (#”Some
killed some”#! All impossible to challenge!) Guarded by the members of the Bosanski Novi SJB,
the train left in the direction of Banja Luka and stopped in Ostruzna, a village near Doboj, the next
morning.5052 In Ostruzna, the men were separated from the women and children by a soldier,
nicknamed ―Jovo‖ or ―Joja‖.5053 The women, children, and men above 60 years old were put in
the front part of the train and the remaining carriages were filled with men between 15 and 60
years old.5054 The carriages were separated and the women and children were taken to Doboj,
(Also in the Republic of Srpska, therefore, #“internaly displaced” not expelled#!) while the
men, numbering approximately 700 to 750, were loaded onto four train cars and sent to Banja
Luka.5055 (Also, in the Republic of Srpska!)

1466. The men spent the night on the train in Banja Luka, where they were mistreated and cursed
at by Bosnian Serb soldiers.5056 On the morning of 11 June 1992, the train continued to Bosanski
Novi, stopping once in Blagaj where men on the train had water for the first time in two days.5057
While in Blagaj, Alić saw Bosnian Serbs taking possessions from their houses.5058 The men were
then loaded back into the train cars and taken to Mlakve Football Stadium.5059 No food was given
to them during the entire period spent in the railway carriages and there were no hygienic facilities
aboard.5060 There are somewhere in the file an evidence that the Muslims refused to be
accommodated in Banjaluka, or the Doboj region, and demanded to be brought back, and
that was why they had been transported back. See what is said in P02632, p. 9 about the
Banjaluka possibility:

5049
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13995–13996; KDZ011, T. 21209–21212 (10 November 2011); P687 (Witness statement of
Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 14; Ewan Brown, T. 21599–21600 (18 November 2011); D1921 (Report of Bosanski Novi SJB, 15 August
1992), pp. 2–3. See also D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court p. 10; Adjudicated Fact 631.
5050
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13995–13997; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 14.
See Adjudicated Facts 632, 633.
5051
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 14. The Chamber notes that these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedules
A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.
5052
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13991, 13994–13995, 14031; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999),
e-court p. 14; D1921 (Report of Bosanski Novi SJB, 15 August 1992), p. 3. See also Adjudicated Fact 633; KDZ011, T. 21209–21210 (10 November
2011).
5053
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13995; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court pp. 14–15;
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 23.
5054
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13995–13997; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court pp. 14–
15; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 23.
5055
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13997; KDZ011, T. 21210–21212 (10 November 2011); Ewan Brown, T. 21599–21600 (18
November 2011); P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court pp. 14–15; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July
1998), e-court p. 23. See Adjudicated Fact 633; D1921 (Report of Bosanski Novi SJB, 15 August 1992), pp. 3–4. See also D3849 (Witness statement of
Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), p. 22 (stating that there was a convoy of Bosnian Muslims travelling by train from Blagaj to Prijedor, Banja Luka, and
Doboj, but that the number of people in the convoy was between 400–600).
5056
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13997–13998, 14032; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court
p. 15. See Adjudicated Fact 633.
5057
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13998; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 15.
5058
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 15.
5059
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 15; KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13998–13999.
The Chamber notes that it will deal with the detention of people at Mlakve Football Stadium at the end of this section of the judgement.
5060
See Adjudicated Facts 634, 635.
 40

And about the Mlakve stadium, P02632, p.9:

So, a #“security reasons#” are under the competences of the MP, and it may not be accurate,
but if it was assessed that there were some security risks, the MP would undertake an
adequate measures. What the President has to do with it? Anyway, the vast majority of this
segment is based on 92bis and AF-s, i.e. #Deadly combination#! Within this, a data about
casualties are unconvincing, but even such, it indicates that it was a kind of personal
revenge, and #not an official policy#! The entire document P2632, here used against the Serb
civilians, is highly #EXCULPATORY AND COMMENDABLE#!

1467. At the end of June or beginning of July 1992, the Bosanski Novi Crisis Staff issued
instructions regulating the conditions for people to be allowed to leave the municipality.5061 On
6 July 1992, Pašić sent a letter to Kirudja repeating his claim that Bosnian Muslims from Bosanski
Novi were leaving the municipality voluntarily, and stating that Bosnian Serb authorities had
offered to provide buses and security for them.5062 Between 7 and 10 July 1992, Kirudja met with
officials from Dvor and Bosanski Novi and they informed Kirudja that Bosnian Muslims leaving
Bosanski Novi were required to sign a statement indicating that they left voluntarily, and to prove
that they had either sold, exchanged, or donated their houses and all other immovable property.5063
(There was #no any appropriation# whatsoever! There was only a register of what had been
left behind!) Persons who did not own property had to obtain an official document from the
municipal land registry office certifying this and those who owned property were required to draft
a contract either leaving the property to the Serbs or the Serb state, or simply renouncing it.5064
Persons wishing to leave also had to provide a list of all the members of the household, obtain a
certificate showing that they had no previous convictions, obtain a certificate showing that all
utility bills were paid; obtain documentation from the municipal secretariat for national defence
stating that they had completed military service; and obtain a document from the SJB allowing
them to leave.5065 (#Obstacles to leave#! All of this was rather an obstacle to leaving than an
incentive to do so!) All documents had to state that the action taken was on a voluntary basis.5066

5061
Adjudicated Fact 2292. See also D1916 (Conclusion of Bosanski Novi Municipal Assembly, 18 June 1992); P3835 (Letter from Bosanski Novi Crisis Staff,
6 July 1992).
5062
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 77–78; P3835 (Letter from Bosanski Novi Crisis Staff, 6 July 1992). See
also P3836 (Order of Dvor na Uni Municipal Crisis Staff, 8 July 1992). However, according to Pašić, a number of Muslims who did not possess the
requisite documentation also left the municipality. D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), pp. 25–26; Radomir Pašić, T. 41079–
41082 (9 July 2013).
5063
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 83–85; P3840 (Fax re Bosanski Novi: Dvor Issue and Refugee Flood, 12
July 1992), pp. 2–3; P3837 (UNPROFOR Memo, 9 July 1992); P3838 (UNPROFOR Memo, 8 July 1992), p. 1. See P6439 (Official record of Bosanski
Novi Secretariat for Administrative and Social Affairs, 9 July 1992); P3841 (UNPROFOR Memo, 13 July 1992), p. 2; P3842 (UNPROFOR Memo, 13 July
1992), pp. 2–3. See also para. 1481.
5064
Adjudicated Fact 2292. See also KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7008–7009 (under seal).
5065
Adjudicated Fact 2292.
5066
Adjudicated Fact 2292. According to Pašić, Bosnian Muslims leaving Bosanski Novi were allowed to make their own decisions regarding their property,
including that they could take all of their personal property, including vehicles, with them. With regard to real estate, they were allowed to sell it, swap it,
give it for safekeeping, or cede it to other refugees, and made decisions in this regard without any duress and influence from the municipal authorities.
Moreover, according to Pašić, a majority of the property referred to in the certificates was ―completely legally replaced‖ with Serbian assets from Croatia
and the contracts signed by Muslims were only ―temporary‖ until the situation calmed down. D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July
2013), pp. 10–11, 25–26; Radomir Pašić, T. 41079–41086 (9 July 2013). However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that
conclusion, the Chamber considered the significant body of evidence supporting that Bosnian Muslims were forced to sign over their property and finds that
Pašić gave inconsistent and evasive evidence in this regard. This is #wrong inference#, for a several reasons: first, had the Muslims
want not to leave, they could simply not obtain any of so many papers required, and also could not sign the property
papir, as happened with those Muslims who continued to live in B. Novi. Second, there was no a single example of
appropriation or any kind of lost of property. All of that was regulated by the laws, with the guarantees of the
authorities on the central level. So, no #“permanent removal”#, no appropriation, all of that is crap and garbage.
 41

But, this amount of documents required to be allowed to leave certainly could be obtained
only on a voluntary basis. What would happen if somebody didn’t suibmit all that was
required? Who didn’t want to leave could simply not submit any paper, and wouldn’t be
allowed to leave. So, no possibility to eat a cake and to have it. Nothing forceful was in it,
except the civil war by itself. All the allegations about “handing over” property is null and
vain, since this President issued such an order on 19 August. Anyway, there was no such
demands from the authorities to give up property, but only to register what was left, and to
allow the municipal authorities to use it temporarily, which was a regulation according to the
law. There was no a single case of appropriation of private property by the authorities
anywhere in te RS. A several issues, like the right to return, the property issue and the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the international documents accepted by the former
Yugoslavia, continued to be respected by the RS, and didn’t depend of what some locas may
be saying or wishing. There are many cases of an inferring of the President’s standpoint
from what somebody said somewhere. All of this examples have to be rebuted and disclosed
to the Appeal Chamber.

1468. The Bosanski Novi authorities informed Kirudja that they had processed applications from
3,000 to 5,000 people who fulfilled the criteria.5067 On the basis of this information, Kirudja
concluded that the Bosnian Muslims were not leaving Bosanski Novi voluntarily and he informed
the Serb authorities that UNPROFOR did not wish their departure if they did not want to leave.5068
(#Feelings, opinions, conclusions#! As a man, as a conclusion! Moreover, Kirudja concluded
that there was a strategy to ethnically cleanse the area by the Serb authorities and they were using
the UN Protected Area in Sector North as an exit point.5069 (#How possibly his personal
conclusions may become a judicial matter? And in a case it does not matter, why then it is in
the Judgment? Where the Chamber/Prosecution so desperate with the evidence? This way
anybody could express his own opinion and influence this process, since the facts,
particularly introduced by a Serb or any Defence witness do not matter.

1469. However, between 20 and 21 July 1992, Kirudja and other international authorities became
increasingly concerned about the safety of the convoy and ultimately, the Croatian authorities
agreed to accept the Bosnian Muslims and UNHCR agreed to organise the transportation with
UNPROFOR‘s assistance, stating they ―preferred 4,000 more refugees than 4,000 more
bodies‖.5070 (Is such a nasty remark allowed in such a serious document as this Judgment is?
One should expect that the Trial Chamber dealth only with the facts. This should be
reported to the Appeal Chamber as an unfair attitude. Why it was understood that Kirudja
became concerned about the safety, and not understood that Pasic was concerned about it
too? UNTIL THAT DATE #NOTHING HAPPENED TO JUSTIFY THIS DRASTIC
BIASE!#)

1470. Although originally intended to be 4,000 people, on 23 July 1992, a convoy of between
9,000 and 11,000 Bosnian Muslims and some Bosnian Croats, including between 600 and 700
detainees from Mlakve Football Stadium and a large number from Prijedor, Bosanska Kostajnica,
and Bosanska Dubica, were ultimately transported to Karlovac, and later to third countries.5071

5067
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 84.
5068
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 80, 83.
5069
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 80. See also KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
6789–6791 (under seal).
5070
[REDACTED]; P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 94–98; P3847 (UNPROFOR Memo, 21 July 1992), pp. 2–3.
See also P2940 (Reuters report, 27 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal); Adjudicated Fact 673.
5071
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 99 (testifying that although the original number of Bosnian Muslims to be
transported was 4,000, the actual number exceeded 9,000, and as a result, the transportation took the entire day); KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 6785–6787 (under seal); P2951 (Press release of Republic of Croatia Ministry of Information, 24 July 1992) (under seal); P2940
 42

1471. The Bosanski Novi SJB reported that by 23 July 1992, it had ―de-registered‖ 5,629
Muslims who had applied to leave the municipality ―voluntarily‖.5072 (This quotation marks are
also a nasty thing. It is not up to the Chamber to make such a remarks. And there shouldn’t
be any doubt about “voluntary leave”, because it was not an easy thing to get an approval to
leave, as we could see, how many papers one had to submit for that. #Obstacles to leave#!)
Of the approximately 14,000 Bosnian Muslims living in Bosanski Novi prior to the conflict,
roughly 1,000 Muslims remained behind following the departure of the convoy to Karlovac on
23 July 1992.5073 (Why they didn’t leave?) In sum, by the end of 1992, the majority of Bosnian
Muslims had left Bosanski Novi.5074 According to KDZ011, not a single Bosnian Muslim
remained in the town of Suhaĉa by the end of 1992.5075 When Alić returned to Blagaj after the
war, he found Bosnian Serbs living in his house, after being given permission by authorities.5076
He observed that there were only 64 houses still in good condition after the war and they were all
occupied by Bosnian Serbs.5077 (In a refuge themselves, because a domestic population was
not allowed to use abandoned property!)

1472. Having considered the totality of the evidence and assessed the circumstances in which
departures occurred, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims were forced to leave Bosanski Novi.
(#Wrong as devil#! This “finding” is completely wrong, for the several reasons. Had not
there been fights initiated by the Muslims, attacking the MP while the JNA was there,
see:P02632, there wouldn’t be so…

What else do we need to add to this contemporaneous document, stating all the problems of a
small area surrounded by a fearce war in the neighbouring villages, municipalities and even
republics (Croatia). Everything is in this document: irregulars, attack on the MP by the
Muslims, a warning fire that was reported as a fire against civilians, see fn. 5040. However,
the municipal authorities officially distanced themselves from those groups, see P2632:

(Reuters report, 27 July 1992), p. 1 (under seal). See Adjudicated Fact 671. See also P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court
p. 16; KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14018. See also para. 1482.
5072
D1921 (Report of Bosanski Novi SJB, 15 August 1992), p. 4. See also Adjudicated Fact 2293.
5073
See Adjudicated Fact 672. In August 1992, Kirudja and other international authorities were pressed by Serb authorities to assist in the evacuation of
thousands more refugees, primarily Bosnian Muslims, from Sanski Most, Prijedor, Bosanska Krupa, and Bosanska Kostajnica through Sector North,
claiming that if they did not assist, ―the Muslims will suffer‖. Pašić warned Kirudja that ―[i]f we are left to resolve the matter by ourselves, we will resolve
it very quickly‖. However, the international authorities responded that they would not succumb to further ―blackmail‖ and refused to assist in any further
―evacuations‖ of non-Serbs out of BiH. P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 101–118; P2941 (Article from The
Associated Press, 11 August 1992) (under seal); P3856 (UNPROFOR report, 5 September 1992), pp. 3–5.
5074
In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber noted that by 1997, very few Bosnian Muslims had returned to Bosanski Novi. In 1991, approximately 33.7% of
the population of Bosanski Novi was Muslim and in 1995, 4.8% of the population was Muslim and in 1997, Muslims only comprised 2.7% of the
population. P4994 (Addendum to Ewa Tabeau‘s expert report entitled ―Ethnic Composition in Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27
Municipalities of BiH 1991 to 1997‖, 3 February 2009), pp. 23–24, 104. See also P10 (Report of the MUP, Banja Luka SNB, May 1993), p. 2 (referring to
Bosanski Novi as Novi Grad); P5449 (Report of the MUP, Banja Luka RDB, February 1995), pp. 8–9 (referring to Bosanski Novi as Novi Grad); D4002
(Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 7 (estimating that 500 non-Serbs remained in Bosanski Novi in 1995).
5075
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14018.
5076
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 16.
5077
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 16.
 43

and thus distanced the RS authorities as well, and exposed those groups to the military
organs and MP to settle the things down, see the same P2632.

(6)Scheduled Detention Facility C.4.1

1473. The Indictment refers to a detention facility at the Mlakve football stadium which operated
at least between May and July 1992.

1474. On 2 June 1992, members of the Bosanski Novi TO and MP brought between 300 and 350
non-Serbs to the Mlakve football stadium (―Mlakve Football Stadium‖) and detained them there
for four days.5078 On 6 June 1992, Kirudja was informed by members of the Danish UNPROFOR
team in Sector North that they had seen 350 men gathered at the stadium; they were then seen
being loaded onto buses and driven off to an unknown destination in BiH.5079 The observers also
saw that approximately 100 women and children, with their heads covered in clothes and carrying
plastic bags, had been brought into the stadium with ten armed guards; Kirudja later learned that
the women and children had likely been delivering provisions to the men held in the stadium.5080

1475. On 11 June 1992, the train coming from Banja Luka arrived at the stadium, where soldiers
with machine guns ordered the men off the train and instructed them to go inside the empty
stadium.5081 From early June until the end of August 1992, at least 700 Bosnian Muslim civilian
men, some elderly, from Bosanski Novi municipality were confined at the Mlakve Football
Stadium; some of these men were transferred from the Omarska, Trnopolje, and Keraterm
camps.5082 (#Reception centre, not detention#! If released from Omarska and Keraterm, it
means that they had been released from any charges and prepared for an exchange, release
to other parts of the RS or BiH, but as we know, they preferred Croatia and European
countries. But, the proper information is that they didn’t want to go to Banja Luka, nor to
Doboj, both within the Republic of Srpska, nor in the Muslim controlled territory because of
fear from mobilisation, but decided to wait for the passage to Croatia. That was why they
had ben “confined” at the Stadium.)

1476. The detainees at Mlakve Football Stadium were guarded by Bosnian Serb soldiers, as well
as reservists, including Ranko Balaban, former SDS President in Jošava, and Momĉilo Kenjalo.5083
Once a week on Wednesdays, the guards would change shifts.5084

5078
D1921 (Report of Bosanski Novi SJB, 15 August 1992), pp. 1–2.
5079
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 55–57, 59. See also P3821 (UNPROFOR Memo, 6 June 1992), p. 2; P3815
(UNPROFOR Memo, 8 June 1992), p. 3; P3823 (UNPROFOR report, 20 July 1992), p. 7.
5080
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 58–59; P3822 (Fax from UNPROFOR, 6 June 1992); P3815 (UNPROFOR
Memo, 8 June 1992), p. 2. See also P3823 (UNPROFOR report, 20 July 1992), p. 7.
5081
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13998–13999; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 15.
See Adjudicated Fact 634. See also paras. 1465–1466.
5082
See Adjudicated Facts 628, 629. According to Pašić, Mlakve Football Stadium was not a ―camp‖, but a reception centre where ―some non-Serbs, who
possessed weapons and military equipment, were processed‖. D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), pp. 15, 27. However, the
Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable based upon its consideration that Pašić provided insincere and ultimately unsatisfactory evidence.
5083
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 15; KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13999, 14004–
14005, 14013. See Adjudicated Fact 630.
5084
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 15; KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13999.
 44

1477. For the duration of their detention, the stadium was fenced in and the detainees were not
allowed to leave.5085 Although no detainees were killed during their detention at the stadium,5086
beatings did take place,5087 and this included beatings when drunk Bosnian Serb soldiers returned
from the front.5088 (#Not official policy#! Certainly, as an incident of a drunk people, and not
as a part of the official policy. As many other charges and evidence, this is concerning a civil
war as such, and not this President!) As a result of the beating inflicted by a Bosnian Serb
soldier, a detainee was blinded in one eye.5089 (No name, no checking!)Detainees were also
verbally mistreated; the guards cursed, taunted and threatened the detainees with death, and
subjected them to ethnic slurs.5090 A Bosnian Serb soldier with a gun forced detainees to graze
grass like animals, for the purposes of humiliating them.5091 (#Somebody did something to
somebody#!)

1478. The quantity of food was not sufficient and detainees received at most two small meals a
day; access to water was also limited to twice a day.5092 Detainees lost considerable weight—Alić
lost 18 kilograms and KDZ011 lost 11 kilograms—during their detention.5093

(#Obvious lie#! In 50 days, Ali} lost 18 kilograms?!? How this lie can stand together with the
fact that the families had been seen bringing in food and other stuff in plastic bags? The
KDZ011 had already been cought by the Chamber in lies.

1479. The detainees were confined to one part of the stadium, as a result there was a shortage of
space for approximately 700 men.5094 They slept on the floor with no blankets.5095 Although the
detainees could wash themselves, they did not have any facilities to wash clothes.5096 Toilet
facilities were also inadequate.5097 Some of the detainees were ill and were not provided with
medical care at any point; one man died of asthma while detained.5098 Detainees were not allowed
to move around the stadium but they had to perform labour to smooth the path around the
stadium.5099 Later, visits to the stadium were not permitted, letters and parcels were not allowed to
5085
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13999–14000; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 15.
5086
KDZ011, T. 21212 (10 November 2011).
5087
See Adjudicated Fact 636. While KDZ011 and Alić testified that there were no beatings and that they were not physically mistreated or beaten while
detained at Mlakve Football Stadium, in light of the conditions at the stadium as described by these witnesses, including verbal and psychological abuse, as
well as the fact that hundreds of other detainees were held there, the Chamber is of the view that the evidence of KDZ011 and Alić does not rebut the
presumption created by Adjudicated Facts 636, 637, and 638. See also para. 1481; KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14016–
14017; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court pp. 15–16).
5088
Adjudicated Fact 638.
5089
Adjudicated Fact 637.
5090
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14002; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 24; see
Adjudicated Fact 639.
5091
(#Not official policy!# Adjudicated fact?! There may have been some mistreatment by a drunk
See Adjudicated Fact 640.
soldiers returning from the front, but this kind of Adjudicated facts couldn’t be checked or challenged by this
Defence! Certainly, if something happened, it was contrary to what this Accused meant, wanted and ordered. This is
shameless to accuse a person on this position for everything that a “low level” persons may have done. When asked
who may initiate a war, the President said: “somebody from the lowest stratum of society.”
5092
KDZ011, T. 21192 (10 November 2011); P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 24; see Adjudicated Fact 644 According
to Pašić, detainees at Mlakve Football Stadium received three meals per day and that it was the same food given to the military and TO staff. D3849
(Witness statement of Radomir Pašić dated 5 July 2013), pp. 26–27. However, the Chamber does not find Pašić‘s evidence in this regard to be reliable given
that his evidence was marked with contradictions and insincerity.
5093
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 24; KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13999–14000. See
also Adjudicated Fact 644.
5094
Adjudicated Fact 642.
5095
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 13999; see Adjudicated Fact 643.
5096
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14002; Adjudicated Fact 645.
5097
Adjudicated Fact 645.
5098
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14000; see Adjudicated Fact 646. The Chamber notes that killings resulting from cruel and
inhumane treatment at Mlakve Football Stadium are not charged pursuant to Schedule C of the Indictment. See Indictment, para. 60(a), fn. 4. See also fn.
13 of this Judgement.
5099
KDZ011, T. 21192 (10 November 2011); KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14000–14002. The Chamber notes that forced labour
at the frontlines, including the use of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as human shields, is not charged in Bosanski Novi pursuant to the Indictment.
See Indictment, para. 60(h), fn. 7.
 45

be sent or received, and the detainees were not allowed to notify anyone of their location or
detention.5100 (Then, how possibly the families knew where to bring the food and other
necessities, as notified in the para 1474 of this Judgement? Where was a limit to the lies?)

1480. From one side of the stadium, the detainees could see UNPROFOR vehicles across the Una
River on the Croatian side and tried to signal for help with white flags; the UNPROFOR soldiers
noticed them, however, the guards at Mlakve Football Stadium realised and forbade the detainees
from further use of that section of the stadium.5101 During their detention, the soldiers called out
names of the detainees and brought them to the police station, the fire department, or Hotel Una
for interrogation.5102 (#Interrogations#! This meant that they hadn’t been detained
arbitrarily. Otherwise, why the investigators would bother with the interrogations? And a
mere interrogation was not a crime?

1481. On or around 22 July 1992, after approximately 45 days of detention, the detainees at the
Mlakve Football Stadium were told by members of the Bosnian Serb MP that they would be
released.5103 For approximately 80 detainees who had family in the town of Bosanski Novi, close
to the stadium, their family members could sign certificates to release them earlier than the other
detainees.5104 The remaining detainees were forced to sign certificates to be released, confirming
that they would voluntarily surrender all of their movable and immovable property to the RS in
Bosanski Novi.5105 (#No appropriation#! Since there was no any document corroborating this
allegation, it shouldn’t be taken seriously. There is nobody who can prove that anyone’s
immovable property had been appropriated. After the certificates were signed, 15 detainees,
all members of the SDA party, were singled out of the group and taken to the ―fire house‖, where
they were beaten.5106 According to Alić, about nine men were killed.5107 (#Somebody,
something#! That is how this goes in this court: Alic, obviously a Muslim extremist “said”
something, no names, no proves, and this is mentioned in the Judgment, the most important
for the future of the Serb people. It was completely free to lie in this court. Anyway, why the
President would have known anyting about that, since in 92 there was no possibility to
communicate?

1482. On 23 July 1992, the detainees at Mlakve Football Stadium were released pursuant to an
order by the Bosanski Novi Municipal Executive Board.5108 An UNPROFOR vehicle arrived at
the stadium; all of the detainees were then loaded onto buses and trucks and taken across the
bridge to Dvor, Croatia.5109 During this process, there were no soldiers around the detainees and
they were guarded by UNPROFOR soldiers.5110 (#Security reasons#! Anyway, why the
detainees had been kept on the stadium is something that was in the competence of the locals,
5100
KDZ011, T. 21191 (10 November 2011); P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 24.
5101
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14003; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 15; P3804
(Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 71. See also P3829 (UNPROFOR Memo, 22 June 1992), p. 2; P3830 (UNPROFOR
Memo, 22 June 1992), p. 3; Charles Kirudja, T. 21344–21348 (11 November 2011).
5102
See Adjudicated Fact 2287.
5103
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14014; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 15; P687
(Witness statement of Hasan Alić to AID, 9 July 1998), e-court p. 24. See Adjudicated Fact 641 (stating that detainees were held at Mlakve Football
Stadium for about 45 days).
5104
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14014.
5105
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14014–14016; KDZ011, T. 21194 (10 November 2011); P687 (Witness statement of Hasan
Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 15.
5106
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14016–14017; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court pp. 15–
16.
5107
P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 16. The Chamber received evidence that nine detainees died in the Mlakve
Football Stadium; however, the Chamber notes that killings at Mlakve Football Stadium are not charged pursuant to Schedule B of the Indictment, nor
resulting from cruel and inhumane treatment pursuant to Schedule C of the Indictment. See Indictment, para. 60(a), fn. 4. See also fn. 13 of this Judgement.
5108
D1921 (Report of Bosanski Novi SJB, 15 August 1992), p. 2 (stating that Mlakve Football Stadium was closed after the detainees were released).
5109
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14014, 14017–14018; KDZ011, T. 21194 (10 November 2011); P687 (Witness statement of
Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 16.
5110
KDZ011, P3800 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 14017; P687 (Witness statement of Hasan Alić dated 21 August 1999), e-court p. 16.
 46

and if they, wrongfully or rightfully, assessed that the detained had been jeopardizing the
peace and lives in the region, nobody could interfere. There is no evidence that the central
authorities had been informed, let alone approved or ordered any unloawful move. During
the entire critical period Vojo Kupresanin was authorised by the President to do everything
he could, on behalf of the President and the RS, to ease the situation of the civilians, and
there is some documents confirming this. However, why it was forgotten that the same
people rejected to be housed in Banja Luka or Doboj? Because they wanted to reach Croatia
and further, the European countries. That was the only reason why they had been at the
stadium, where the local authorities had a burden to obtain two to three thousands meals a
day. Why would the authorities do this, whyle in a shortage of everything?#General
shortage#!)

1483. The Chamber therefore finds that during the period between 2 June and 23 July 1992,
members of the Serb Forces detained Bosnian Muslim men at the Mlakve Football Stadium, and
subjected them to beatings and verbal mistreatment, including threats and ethnic slurs. The
Chamber also finds that detainees held at Mlakve Football Stadium were not provided with
adequate food or water, resulting in malnutrition, and that there was no medical care available to
the detainees during this period. (#Deadly combination#! And those assertions are based on an
Adjudicated facts and testimonies of the Muslim extremists as KDZ011, Alic and others.
Thus this court is enabling those extremists to continue to wage a war against the Serbs. This
is not correct, and there should be an investigation and an insight in the then collected
investigation materials. But the most irregular was that the Chamber prevented the Defence
to depict what the Muslim side was doing, which is an inherent part of the entire picture!) .

(C)Kljuĉ

(1)Charges

1484. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity, was
committed in Kljuĉ as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and/or
Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.5111 Under Count 1, the Prosecution further alleges that in
certain municipalities, including Kljuĉ, this persecutory campaign included or escalated to include
conduct that manifested an intent to destroy in part the national, ethnical, and/or religious groups
of Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats as such.5112

1485. Acts alleged to have been committed in Kljuĉ by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political
and Governmental Organs include killings during and after the take-over;5113 killings related to
detention facilities;5114 and killings committed during, and deaths resulting from, cruel and
inhumane treatment at scheduled detention facilities.5115 The Prosecution characterises these acts
as killing, an underlying act of genocide, under Count 1; persecution, a crime against humanity,
under Count 3; extermination, a crime against humanity, under Count 4; murder, a crime against
humanity, under Count 5; and murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war, under Count
6.5116

5111
Indictment, paras. 48–49.
5112
Indictment, para. 38.
5113
Indictment, para. 60(a)(i). See Scheduled Incidents A.7.1, A.7.2, A.7.3.
5114
Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). Scheduled Incident B.10.
5115
Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). Scheduled Detention Facilities C.15.1, C.15.2, C.15.3.
5116
Indictment, paras. 40(a), 60(a), 63(a), 63(b).
 47

1486. Other acts alleged to have been committed in Kljuĉ by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb
Political and Governmental Organs include torture, beatings, and physical and psychological
abuse, rape and other acts of sexual violence, during and after the take-over and in scheduled
detention facilities, as well as the establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in
detention facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment, an act of persecution under Count 3.5117 In
relation to Count 1, the Prosecution alleges that in scheduled detention facilities in Kljuĉ
thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were subjected to cruel or inhumane treatment,
including torture, physical and psychological abuse, rape, other acts of sexual violence, and
beatings by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs; the Prosecution
characterises this inhumane treatment as causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups, an underlying act of genocide.5118 In addition, under
Count 1, the Prosecution alleges that members of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups
were detained under conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, namely
through cruel and inhumane treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, rape,
other acts of sexual violence, inhumane living conditions, forced labour and the failure to provide
adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care or hygienic sanitation facilities.5119

1487. Under Count 3, other acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Kljuĉ by Serb
Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include: (i) forcible transfer or
deportation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their homes;5120 (ii) unlawful detention
in scheduled detention facilities;5121 (iii) forced labour at the frontline and the use of Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats as human shields;5122 (iv) appropriation or plunder of property during
and after the take-over, during arrests and detention, and in the course of or following acts of
deportation or forcible transfer;5123 (v) the wanton destruction of private property including homes
and business premises and public property including cultural monuments and sacred sites;5124 and
(vi) the imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.5125

1488. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible
transfer), respectively, as crimes against humanity.5126 In this regard, the Prosecution alleges that
by the end of 1992, Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs had forcibly
displaced Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Kljuĉ in which they had been
lawfully present.5127 It is alleged that from March 1992, restrictive and discriminatory measures,
arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence, killings,
destruction of houses, cultural monuments, and sacred sites, as well as the threat of further such
acts caused Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to flee in fear, while others were physically
driven out.5128

(2)Lead-up

5117
Indictment, para. 60(b), 60(c), 60(d) (specifying that the conditions included the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical
care, or hygienic sanitation facilities). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.15.1, C.15.2, C.15.3.
5118
Indictment, para. 40(b).
5119
Indictment, para. 40(c). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.15.1, C.15.2, C.15.3.
5120
Indictment, para. 60(f).
5121
Indictment, para. 60(g).
5122
Indictment, para. 60(h).
5123
Indictment, para. 60(i).
5124
Indictment, para. 60(j). See Scheduled Incident D.13.
5125
Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement, the removal from positions of
authority in local government institutions and the police and the general dismissal from employment, the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of
homes, unlawful arrest and/or denial of the right to judicial process, and/or the denial of equal access to public services.
5126
Indictment, paras. 68–75.
5127
Indictment, paras. 69, 72.
5128
Indictment, para. 71.
 48

1489. The municipality of Kljuĉ lies within northwestern BiH south of Sanski Most and
southwest of Banja Luka.5129 In 1991, the municipality included eight villages that were then
inhabited primarily by non-Serbs: Velagići, Krasulje, Biljani, Prhovo, Crljeni, Pudin Han, Ramići,
and Sanica, which each contained several hamlets.5130 The population of Kljuĉ numbered
approximately 37,300 people in 1991, among which 49.6% were Serb, 47.3% were Muslim, and
0.9% were Croat.5131 (The remaining 2,2% were Yugoslavs, i.e. Serbs!)

1490. Ethnic relations in Kljuĉ were ―quite harmonious‖ before the war.5132 In November 1990,
the SDS achieved a majority by winning 50.8% of the votes in the Kljuĉ municipal elections,
while the SDA won 32.8%.5133 In accordance with the principle of ―equal representation‖,
positions within the municipal administration were allocated according to an agreement between
the SDS, the SDA, and the MBO.5134 Jovo Banjac of the SDS was appointed President of the
Municipality; while Omer Filipović, the leader of the Kljuĉ MBO, was made Vice President of the
Municipal Assembly as well as Banjac‘s deputy; Asim Egrlić, the President of the Kljuĉ SDA, and
Tihomir Dakić of the SDS became Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Executive Board of the
Kljuĉ Municipal Assembly, respectively.5135 The rest of the municipal executive positions were
evenly distributed to both SDA and SDS members.5136 Vinko Kondić of the SDS became Chief of
the SJB, while Atif Dţafić, who was nominated by the SDA but was not affiliated with any party,
became acting commander of the police.5137

1491. Once the war in Croatia began during the summer of 1991, the Kljuĉ Secretariat for
People‘s Defence began to issue mobilisation orders to Kljuĉ‘s male population.5138 However,
both local and national leaders of the SDA and MBO discouraged Bosnian Muslims from
responding.5139 (Which was an #illegal and anti-constitutional act#, and finally not fair
towards the Serbs who responded to this mobilisation. Thay way the Muslim/Croat able
bodied men were free and at home, organized in the Patriotic League and the Green Berets,
while the Serbs were far away, warring what may happen to their families!)Thus, Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats generally did not respond to mobilisation into the JNA and for the
frontline in Croatia, whereas Bosnian Serbs did.5140 The lack of Bosnian Muslim response to the
mobilisation led to the composition of the JNA becoming primarily Bosnian Serb.5141 (#Before

5129
Asim Egrlić, T. 19926–19927, 19940 (5 October 2011); P3574 (Map of BiH, highlighted); D1729 (Map of BiH marked by KDZ192); P3855 (Map of
Croatia and BiH marked by Charles Kirudja); P3492 (Map of ethnic composition of Kljuĉ); D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja Luka CSB, July 1992), p.
1; D1738 (Report of the Assistant Commander for Civilian Affairs of the Military Post 7286, 16 February 1993), p. 2.
5130
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 7–8; Atif Dţafić, T. 19657–19658 (30 September 2011); D1738 (Report of the Assistant
Commander for Civilian Affairs of the Military Post 7286, 16 February 1993), p. 2. See also P3575 (Map of Kljuĉ).
5131
D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja Luka CSB, July 1992), p. 1; P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 7; P3492 (Map of ethnic
composition of Kljuĉ); D1738 (Report of the Assistant Commander for Civilian Affairs of the Military Post 7286, 16 February 1993), p. 2. See also P1476
(Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 30 December 1991–14 February 1992), e-court pp. 64–65.
5132
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4638; Asim Egrlić, T. 19938 (5 October 2011); D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko
Kalabić dated 1 December 2013), para. 5; KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9100–9101 (under seal).
5133
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 4, 10; Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4637; KDZ192, T. 19430
(22 September 2011) (closed session). See also D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1 December 2013), para. 4.
5134
KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11658 (under seal); KDZ192, T. 19430–19431, 19433 (22 September 2011) (closed session).
5135
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 4, 10, 11; Atif Dţafić, T. 19673–19674 (30 September 2011); Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4635, 4637, 4638, 4681–4682; Asim Egrlić, T. 19939 (5 October 2011); D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated
1 December 2013), para. 4; KDZ192, T. 19431 (22 September 2011) (closed session).
5136
D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1 December 2013), paras. 4–5; P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 10–11.
5137
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 4–5 (differentiating but not explaining the difference between the positions of SJB chief and police
commander), 10; D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1 December 2013), para. 4. See also Adjudicated Fact 933.
5138
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 38; Atif Dţafić, T. 19694 (30 September 2011); Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik), T. 4646; Asim Egrlić, T. 19954–19955 (5 October 2011); P3422 (Minutes of the 2nd session of Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 20
September 1991), p. 1; P3424 (Minutes of the 3rd session of Kljuĉ Municipal Board Executive Board, 2 October 1991), pp. 1–2.
5139
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4936–4942; Asim Egrlić, T. 19956–19957 (5 October 2011); P3488 (Witness statement of
Atif Dţafić undated), para. 38; P3576 (Announcement of Kljuĉ's MBO Municipal Board, 21 September 1991), p. 1.
5140
KDZ192, T. 19437 (22 September 2011) (closed session); Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4638, 4846; Asim Egrlić, T.
19955, 19957–19958, 19961 (5 October 2011); P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 39. See e.g. P3422 (Minutes of the 2nd session of
Kljuĉ Municipal Board Executive Board, 20 September 1991), p. 1; KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11368 (under seal).
5141
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4641, 4844; KDZ192, T. 19439 (22 September 2011) (closed session).
 49

VRS#! Not correct, not Bosnian Serb, but the segment of the JNA was composed mainly
from the Bosnian Serbs, while others from the rest of Yugoslavia were of all ethnicities.

1492. The Bosnian Serb population of Kljuĉ obtained arms through this mobilisation process, as
those returning from the frontline in Croatia retained possession of their weapons.5142 (That was a
case always, far before the war: reservists brought with them ecquipment till a new
exercise!) The SDS was also involved in distributing weapons to Bosnian Serbs in Kljuĉ.5143 The
SDS Executive Board discussed the distribution of weapons multiple times between October 1991
and March 1992,5144 when Veljko Kondić remarked that ―we will undertake to get additional
weapons‖.5145 Thereafter, the SDS Executive Board established record-keeping reflecting the
weapons kept.5146 Just look at the domestic laws, particularly the #Law on All-peoples
defence#. The fact that there existed a record-keeping shows that it was a legal distribution
of weapons to those who would be obedient to the JNA. A more problematic would be
weapons out of any record.

1493. Between late 1991 and the spring of 1992, soldiers returning from the frontlines in Croatia
often became inebriated and committed drive-by shootings, firing at local mosques in Kljuĉ.5147
While the SDS discussed these problems and made statements denouncing the use of firearms in
public,5148 Vinko Kondić ultimately returned weapons that had been seized from soldiers
―engag[ing] in illegal acts‖.5149 (And this was stated by the Kontic’s direct opponents, rather
as a gossip, which this President and his defence can not check. Anyway, what does it have to
do with the President?) Additionally, during the latter half of 1991, Serb Forces established
check-points at the various entrances to Kljuĉ.5150 (This is false, because had this happened,
there would be a big crisis. Only the JNA was entitled to control transport of a war material,
because of the war in Croatia!) Ethnic relations in Kljuĉ deteriorated, compromising both the
functioning of municipal organs as well as security in general.5151 (#Seciurity reasons#! The local

5142
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4641–4642, 4663–4664; Atif Dţafić, T. 19688 (30 September 2011); KDZ024, P713
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9109 (under seal). Members of the reserve police force, who had been mobilised at the same time as the TO,
were also issued weapons. P3493 (List of Kljuĉ SJB of persons who were issued weapons, undated); Atif Dţafić, P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić
undated), para. 37. Several witnesses also testified that they had heard that weapons were delivered via military helicopter. KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4956–4957; KDZ075, T. 19015–19016 (16 September 2011). See also P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated),
para. 36; Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4663–4664; KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9109,
9200 (under seal); P3580 (Official Statement of Kljuĉ's MBO Municipal Board, 21 September 1991), p. 1.
5143
See KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11489 (under seal).
5144
P3424 (Minutes of the 3rd session of Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 2 October 1991), pp. 1–2; P3428 (Minutes of 6th Session of Kljuĉ SDS
Municipal Board Executive Board, 23 December 1991), pp. 3–4 (reflecting that Jovan Kevac and Boško Bajić suggested to the ―Crisis Staff‖ that Bosnian
Serbs acquire arms).
5145
P3435 (Minutes of the 9th session of Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 12 March 1992). See also P3433 (Minutes of the 8th session of Kljuĉ
SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 6 March 1992), p. 1 (recording that Ljuban Bajić had suggested that a training should be held).
5146
P3436 (Minutes of the 10th session of Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 23 March 1992), p. 1; P3493 (List of Kljuĉ SJB of persons who were
issued weapons, undated). The Chamber thus does not accept the testimony of Rajko Kalabić, who testified that the procurement of weapons was done by
individuals rather than by the SDS. D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1 December 2013), para. 14. For a discussion of the armament of
Bosnian Muslims, see para. 1508.
5147
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 40–41; Atif Dţafić, T. 19687–19688 (30 September 2011). See also Asim Egrlić, P6586
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4641–4642, 4661–4662, 4700; KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4956; KDZ075,
T. 19035, 19037, 19039 (16 September 2011); P3584 (Joint Official Announcement of Kljuĉ's MBO Municipal Board and SDA Town Board, 24 December
1991), p. 1.
5148
P3431 (Handwritten diary of KDZ192) (under seal), pp. 7–8; KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11461 (under seal). See also
P3580 (Official Statement of Kljuĉ's MBO Municipal Board, 21 September 1991), pp. 1–2 (stating its opposition to ―uncontrolled arming‖and proposing
inter-party talks).
5149
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 41; Atif Dţafić, T. 19688 (30 September 2011). When asked about what action might be taken to
curb such excesses, Vinko Kondić told Dţafić that he was too busy and had ―bigger fish to fry‘‖. P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para.
41.
5150
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 32–33; Atif Dţafić, T. 19687 (30 September 2011). See also Atif Dţafić, T. 19687–19688 (30
September 2011) (acknowledging that known arms smuggling routes, as well as routes taken by army deserters and sabotage groups transversed Kljuĉ).
Additionally, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim officers began to prefer working with members of their own ethnicity rather than with mixed patrols and
with mixed personnel at check-points. P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 28; Atif Dţafić, T. 19690–19691 (30 September 2011).
5151
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4641, 4701, 4703; P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 35; Atif
Dţafić, T. 19692–19693 (30 September 2011). See also P3422 (Minutes of the 2nd session of Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 20 September
1991), p. 1; KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4955.
 50

reservists of JNA (the Serbs) have taken a precautionary measures caused by the Muslim-
Croat hostile attitude towards the common state, Yugoslavia and its Army, as can be seen,
with a very good reason. That was their own right, to secure themselves under the auspice of
JNA against possible hostile acts of those who were enemies of Yugoslavia against those who
were faitful to the same Yugoslavia! What does it have to do with the President?)

1494. Throughout the fall of 1991, the SDA and MBO opposed the growing signs of
regionalisation in Kljuĉ. In late September, the SDA released a public statement rejecting the
proclamation of the ARK as a ―para-state‖ successor organisation to the ZOBK and warning that if
―such an illegal decision‖ were implemented, the SDA would organise a referendum to establish a
―separate Muslim commune‖.5152 (#Two municipalities – peace#! They were entitled to form a
separate Muslim commune, and even now there are two separate municipalities, the Serb
and Muslim, while the Serb is called Ribnik.)

5152
P3577 (Public Statement of Kljuĉ‘s SDA Town Board, 21 September 1991), pp. 1–2. See also P3578 (Information of Kljuĉ's MBO Municipal Board, 17
September 1991) (negatively characterising the proclamation of the ARK by the SDS). The Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board had already voted to join the
ZOBK at the beginning of 1991, but the matter had not been put to a vote at the Kljuĉ Municipal Assembly. Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4654–4655; P3577 (Public Statement of Kljuĉ's SDA Town Board, 21 September 1991), p. 2; P3579 (Decision of Kljuĉ
Municipal Assembly, undated) (referring to a decision taken on 10 April 1991 to remain within the ―Banja Luka Community of Municipalities‖); D1889
(Decision of Skender Vakuf Municipal Assembly, 12 April 1991) (listing Kljuĉ as a member of the ‗Bosanska Krajina‘ Association of Municipalities).
 51

1495. At the end of October 1991, the Kljuĉ SDS received a telex message from Radoslav
BrĊanin which contained an ―Order of the SDS Sarajevo‖ and outlined a number of instructions
which had been subsequently adopted by the ARK government.5153 These instructions included
directions to, inter alia, (i) form a command of the town and establish round-the-clock duty; (ii)
fully mobilise the TO; (iii) reassign all men under the age of 40 from Civilian Protection to the
TO; (iv) re-subordinate the TO to ―the Corps‖; (v) take over management in public enterprises,
including the banks, judiciary, and media; (vi) proclaim a wartime programme schedule on radio
stations; (vii) ban the employment of able-bodied persons from war regions and fire any such
persons employed at the date of the order‘s issuance; (viii) collect all weapons and equipment
from deserters; and (ix) disband all existing paramilitary formations and reassign them to the
TO.5154 The SDA and MBO released a joint statement publicising and denouncing the above
order.5155 When Asim Egrlić, who was then the president of the Kljuĉ Executive Board and had
erroneously received the telex, asked Jovo Banjac about the propriety of such instructions, Banjac
minimised their importance and suggested that BrĊanin ―was mad‖.5156 Nevertheless, Egrlić
observed that most of these items were eventually implemented.5157 (That was some dramatic
move of the ARK leaders. However, it is not proven that the SDS ever suggested such an
action even to the party structures, let alone to the state-municipal organs! The only duty of
the Party organs was “round-the-clock duty, but it was ordered to all municipal boards, in
order to inform about developments!)

1496. When the decision to join the ARK was confirmed by the SDS delegates of the Kljuĉ
Municipal Assembly on 26 December 1991,5158 the SDA representatives at the Municipal
Assembly walked out rather than vote on the issue.5159 Sometime in January or February 1992,
Bosnian Muslim leaders formed a separate Assembly of Bosnian Kljuĉ, headed by Omer
Filipović.5160 (Had the Muslims got stick to this solution, there wouldn’t be a war in Kljuc!
Throughout the war there were two municipalities, and so now!)

1497. Meanwhile, the Kljuĉ SDS received the Variant A/B Instructions from the SDS Main
5161
Board. On 23 December 1991, the Kljuĉ SDS Executive Board established a Crisis Staff.5162

5153
P2548 (Telex entitled "The Sarajevo SDS Order", 29 October 1991); Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4668, 4943–4944.

P2548 (Telex entitled "The Sarajevo SDS Order", 29 October 1991). This is a forged document, this had never been
5154

concluded, nor recommended by the President or any other Party instance. Nor had it been sent to any other
municipality of the SDS organ.
5155
P3582 (Joint Statement of Kljuĉ MBO and SDA, 31 October 1991), p. 1 (strongly objecting that the telex contained instructions to ―organise life in the
conditions of war‖).
5156
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4668, 4943–4944.
5157
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4668–4669, 4877.
5158
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4655; Asim Egrlić, T. 19947 (5 October 2011); P3430 (Decision of Kljuĉ Municipal
Assembly, 16 January 1992) (referring to the decision taken on 26 December 1991); P3579 (Decision of Kljuĉ Municipal Assembly, undated).
5159
Asim Egrlić, T. 19962 (5 October 2011); KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11664–11665 (under seal); KDZ192, T. 19464 (27
September 2011) (closed session). The MBO and SDA also objected to the plebiscite held by the SerBiH Assembly on 9 and 10 November 1991,
contending that it was ―tantamount to breaking up the common State‖, which violated the Constitution of BiH. P3419 (Handwritten diary), p. 12 (under
seal); KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11398 (under seal); Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
4695–4696; P3583 (Joint Official Announcement of Kljuĉ's MBO Municipal Board and SDA Town Board, 7 November 1991).
5160
P3458 (Announcement of Bosanski Kljuĉ Municipal Assembly, 31 January 1992); KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11406–
11407 (under seal). See also D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja Luka CSB, July 1992), p. 3 (referring to the declaration of a Bosnian Muslim
municipality in December 1991); P1476 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 30 December 1991–14 February 1992), e-court p. 66 (referring to intense work on
forming a Bosnian Muslim municipality).
5161
P3428 (Minutes of 6th Session of the Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 23 December 1991) (recording that Veljko Kondić advised the attendees
on the Instructions for the organisation and activities of the Serbian people in BiH). But see KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
11416 (under seal) [REDACTED]. Moreover, the Chamber notes that Kljuĉ SDS members took action pursuant to instructions 3 and 4 of the ―first stage‖
of Option A within four days of the dissemination of the Variant A/B Instructions. P3470 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian
People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 2–3 (calling for the SDS Municipal Board to immediately establish a ―Crisis Staff of the Serbian People‖ and to
proclaim an ―Assembly of the Serbian people‖ in the municipality).
5162
P2592 (Minutes of 6th Session of the Executive Board of the Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board, 23 December 1991), p. 1; P2643 (Kljuĉ Crisis Staff Report, 15
May - 29 July 1992), p. 2; KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11671–11672 (under seal). At the same meeting, Milan Joviĉić
 52

Jovo Banjac became President of the Crisis Staff; other original members included the Chief of the
Kljuĉ SJB, Vinko Kondić; the Secretary of the National Defence Secretariat, Slobodan Jurišić; the
TO Staff Commander, Boško Lukić; the President of the SDS Municipal Board, Veljko Kondić;
the Deputy in the SerBiH Assembly, Rajko Kalabić; the Vice President of the Executive Board of
the Municipal Assembly, Tihomir Dakić; Ljuban Bajić; and Dragan Smiljanić.5163 In mid-May
1992, the Crisis Staff was expanded to include a number of new members and was transformed
into a Crisis Staff of the Kljuĉ Municipal Assembly.5164 (And only then it became the municipal
CS, with the competence of the authorities.)

1498. The frequency of mobilisation calls became constant at the beginning of 1992, increasing
the number of soldiers present in the municipality.5165 Some paramilitaries, including the Red
Berets, arrived in Kljuĉ around November 1991, while other groups such as the White Eagles
arrived in Kljuĉ around February 1992.5166 During the same month, over the objection of SDA
representatives to the National Defence Council,5167 JNA units withdrawing from Knin were
stationed in a compound in Lanište.5168 (#Legal and obligatory#! On what basis any political
party could object any legal action of the JNA? No basis for that, and that was an unlawful
and hostile action against the federal Army, as if the Confederal parties objected deployment
of the Lincoln’s army.) The JNA‘s arrival at Lanište led to an increase in anxiety amongst the
Bosnian Muslim population of Kljuĉ,5169 and, along with the arming of the Bosnian Serb
population, contributed to the perception that a ―war policy‖ was escalating in Kljuĉ.5170 (#Illegal
and criminal#! That could be a case only if the Muslims in Kljuc had a plans that differ from
the JNA plans, which was to preserve the common state of Yugoslavia. The Chamber noticed
that the Muslims in Kljuc mourned over the “common state” of BiH, and it’s Constitution,
while the Serbs thought that the priority belonged to the “common state of Yugoslavia,” and
it’s Constitution. In such a case, there certainly must have been an ethnic tensions, but the
Muslims were liable, since they wanted something that would change the whole life of others,
while the Serbs wanted only to preserve the legal “status quo”!)

1499. In February 1992, a special reserve unit of the Kljuĉ police called the ―Manoeuvring
Unit‖ was sent to Manjaĉa camp for special training.5171 There only the Bosnian Serb members of

proposed that the Assembly of the Serbian Municipality of Kljuĉ be proclaimed at the assembly session. P3428 (Minutes of 6th Session of the Executive
Board of the Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 23 December 1991), p. 2.
5163
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 4, 10, 54; Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4637, 4681–4682;
D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1 December 2013), para. 4; KDZ192, T. 19431 (22 September 2011) (closed session); P3428 (Minutes of
6th Session of the Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 23 December 1991), pp. 1–2; P3419 (Handwritten diary), p. 17 (under seal). See also
Adjudicated Fact 2192.
5164
P2643 (Kljuĉ Crisis Staff Report, 15 May - 29 July 1992), p. 2.
5165
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4738.
5166
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4888–4889; P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 52–53 (stating that
the Red Berets were well trained and assisted in conducting regular police activities); Atif Dţafić, T. 19722 (30 September 2011). Atif Dţafić was told that
one ―Dragan‖ was the commander of the Red Berets, and inferred that the Red Berets were under the control of the TO or had been summoned by the
commander of the TO because they were regularly on duty at the TO premises. P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 51, 53. See also
Adjudicated Fact 2426. The Chamber notes that although Marko Adamović denied that any paramilitary units, including the White Eagles, operated in the
Kljuĉ territory, Adamović did not state the basis for his knowledge. D4165 (Witness statement of Marko Adamović dated 1 December 2013), para. 24.
Furthermore, as set out in more detail in fn. 5274, the Chamber is of the view that Adamović was often less than forthright with the Chamber and shall only
rely on his evidence where it is corroborated by other reliable evidence.
5167
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4736; Asim Egrlić, T. 20009–20010 (6 October 2011); P3432 (Minutes of the 6th session
of Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board, 18 February 1992), p. 3; KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11458–11460 (under seal); P3431
(Handwritten diary of KDZ192), p. 6 (under seal).
5168
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4733, 4736–4737; Asim Egrlić, T. 20009 (6 October 2011). See also KDZ024, P713
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9202 (under seal); KDZ075, T. 19035–19036 (16 September 2011).
5169
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4738.
5170
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4733.
5171
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 64. Manoeuvring units were usually used to prevent large scale disturbances of law and order, and
thus their usual training covered crowd control techniques, riot control, and the use of chemical agents and firearms. P3488 (Witness statement of Atif
Dţafić undated), para. 64.
 53

the unit received training on the use of mortars, Zoljas, heavy machine guns, hand to hand combat,
mines, and cannons. This training had never previously been offered to the Manoeuvring Unit.5172
(#Before VRS#! That was a new situation, with the Muslim/Croat sabotage of the defence of
country, and none of them would accept any JNA training. Anyway, all of these activities
had been in the competence of the JNA. Let us see what was said in the P03436:

As known, General Talic was a JNAE commander of the Corps. There is no doubt that it
was the JNA activity, #legal, legitimate and obligatory# to the local authorities. In early
March 1992, in order to prevent Bosnian Muslims from accessing TO weapons,5173 the TO
armoury was transferred to the Kula military depot in Mrkonjić Grad.5174 The weapons were later
used to arm the Kljuĉ Battalion.5175

1500. The violence in the villages surrounding Kljuĉ town intensified during March and April
5176
1992. Inebriated Bosnian Serb soldiers who had returned from the Croatian front continued to
fire rifles in Bosnian Muslim villages.5177 Bosnian Muslim settlements began to form ―loose
defence night patrols‖ at the entrance and exit to the villages to guard against the occurrence of
violent incidents,5178 and Bosnian Serbs demanded that mixed ethnicity patrols be conducted in the
mixed ethnicity villages.5179 (#EXCULPATORY!) This was done for one or two nights, before
conflicts arose and the process was halted.5180 One day during March or April 1992, several
buildings in Pudin Han burst into flames.5181 (By whom??? There are so many arguments
against a civil war, and none against the President!) Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims began
to leave Kljuĉ due to the escalating tensions.5182 (As in all other municipalities: there was #no
“expelling”# by authorities, but a mutual fear and mistrust “ordered” citizens of both
communities to leave!)

3. Take-over

5172
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 65. When Atif Dţafić visited the training in late February 1992, a Bosnian Muslim officer told
Dţafić that at night, the Bosnian Serb officers had been drunk and had sung Serbian nationalistic songs while sharpening their knives, firing from their rifles,
and making derogatory remarks about Bosnian Muslims. P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 66.
5173
KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11499–11500 (under seal); P3494 (Report of Miloš Group, 24 April 1992).
5174
P3433 (Minutes of the 8th session of Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 6 March 1992), p. 1; P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated),
paras. 48–49; Atif Dţafić, T. 19719 (30 September 2011); P3436 (Minutes of the 10th session of Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 23 March
1992), p. 1 (reflecting that the transfer of weapons was complete and that only ‗a small amount was left for [the SDS‘s] needs‘); P3437 (Minutes of the 11th
session of Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 30 March 1992), p. 1; KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11499 (under
seal); KDZ192, T. 19461 (27 September 2011) (closed session).
5175
See fn. 5237.
5176
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 71.
5177
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 71.
5178
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 71–72; Atif Dţafić, T. 19729 (30 September 2011); Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4784; Asim Egrlić, T. 19971 (5 October 2011).
5179
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 71.
5180
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 71. See also KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9102, 9198–9199 (under
seal).
5181
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 72 (referring to stables, garages, and a house). Although one person was arrested afterward, Dţafić
was suspicious that one person could have started all of the fires in such a short time. P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 72.
Additionally, the police had information that shots were fired into the spires of mosques and at the homes of veterans, but investigations were not carried
out. Atif Dţafić, T. 19729 (30 September 2011).
5182
KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11538 (under seal); KDZ192, T. 19474 (27 September 2011) (closed session). See also Asim
Egrlić, T. 20000 (5 October 2011) (conceding that individuals of all ethnicities left the municipality before the war broke out); D4165 (Witness statement of
Marko Adamović dated 1 December 2013), para. 3 (stating that 2,500 Bosnian Muslims moved away from Velagići prior to the outbreak of the conflict).
 54

1501. By 29 April 1992, Bosnian Serbs had consolidated power within the municipality.5183 (The
war in Sarajevo and along the Drina River and the Neretva River Valley already lasted for
three weeks!) That day, the SDS Municipal Board adopted a conclusion to ―first prepare
everything and coordinate with the army and, when everything is prepared, implement the change
in insignia/loyalty of the police‖.5184 In accordance with a decision of the ARK government taken
on 4 May,5185 on the following day the President of the Kljuĉ National Defence Council, Jovo
Banjac, imposed a curfew in Kljuĉ municipality.5186 Throughout May, the Kljuĉ Crisis Staff
announced deadlines for citizens to surrender unlicensed weapons or face arrest.5187 “For
citizens”, which obviously meant for all of them, #regardless of the fate and ethnicity#.
Beside that, all of it was in his competence, i.e. in the competence of the president of
municipality, who at the same time was a president of the National Defence council ―Ex
officio‖. IS IT DIFFERENT IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY?) Meanwhile, on 7 May 1992, units
from the JNA 9th Corps based at Lanište and the 5th Corps (comprised of a battalion of the 6th
Partisan Brigade and the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Partisan Brigade) secured the town before
responsibility for security was taken over by the Serb TO and the reserve police.5188 Serb Forces
completed the military take-over swiftly, between 7 and 10 May, and without sustaining any
losses,5189 and the Serbian flag was hoisted on the municipal building and the local police
station.5190

a. Expulsion of Bosnian Muslims from police, administrative organs and work force

1. On 7 May, Vinko Kondić called a meeting of all non-Serb officers in the SJB building, where the
officers were asked to sign an oath of loyalty to the RS government as required by the law on internal
affairs.5191 They were also asked to accept changes incorporating Serbian insignia into their
uniforms.5192 None of the non-Serb officers wished to sign the oath.5193 After consulting with two

5183
P3438 (Minutes of the 8th session of Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 29 April 1992) pp. 1–2. See also P3592 (Handwritten notes re
organisation of Kljuĉ Civil Defence), e-court pp. 9–10; Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4792–4793 (identifying the
handwriting in P3592 as Vinko Kondić‘s and explaining his familiarity with the same).
5184
P3438 (Minutes of the 8th session of Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 29 April 1992) p. 4 (emphasis added).
5185
P2818 (Decision of ARK Regional Secretariat for National Defence, 4 May 1992).
5186
P3460 (Order of President of the Council for National Defence of Kljuĉ Municipal Assembly, 5 May 1992) (providing an exception to the curfew for
persons with official authorisation from the police, military police, or TO). See also Adjudicated Fact 2427. See also Slobodan Jurišić, D4363 (Witness
statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8 February 2014), para. 33; Slobodan Jurišić, T. 47093–47094 (14 February 2014).
5187
[REDACTED]; D3901 (Public announcement of Kljuĉ Crisis Staff, 9 May 1992), p. 2; P3439 (Minutes of meeting of Kljuĉ Crisis Staff, 13–14 May 1992),
pp. 1–2.
5188
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4756–4757 (testifying that in addition to securing the roads, the JNA units had already
established control over strategic positions and institutions in town). See also P3586 (Order of the 6th Partisan Brigade, 18 May 1992); P3488 (Witness
statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 76; P3590 (Minutes of meeting of presidents of municipalities in the zone of responsibility of the 1 st Partisan
Brigade, 14 May 1992), p. 2; P3663 (Report on the 6th Brigade in the period between 8 October 1991 and 28 August 1992), p. 5. When the JNA withdrew
from the territory of BiH, the 6th Partisan Brigade was integrated into the VRS as part of the 1 st Krajina Corps. P3663 (Report on the 6th Brigade in the
period between 8 October 1991 and 28 August 1992), p. 5; P3660 (Handwritten ―War Record‖ of the 6 th Krajina Infantry Brigade, undated), p. 3. See also
Adjudicated Fact 2428.
5189
P3663 (Report on the 6th Brigade in the period between 8 October 1991 and 28 August 1992), p. 5.
5190
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 76; D1724 (Public announcement of Kljuĉ Crisis Staff, 8 May 1992), p. 1. See Adjudicated Fact
2428.
5191
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 74, 75, 78 (testifying inter alia that P3498 is an example of such an oath); P3498 (Solemn
declaration of SerBiH official, 6 April 1992); P3468 (Excerpt from SerBiH's Official Gazette, 23 March 1992); KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11714 (under seal); KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9102–9103 (under seal). See also Adjudicated
Fact 2429. After returning from a meeting in Banja Luka in March 1992, Vinko Kondić had warned his staff that he had signed a pledge of allegiance to the
CSB in Banja Luka and that they too would soon have to pledge loyalty to the ―Serbian authorities and the Serbian Republic‖. P3488 (Witness statement of
Atif Dţafić undated), para. 63; Atif Dţafić, T. 19724 (30 September 2011) (stating that after signing the oath, Vinko Kondić had stopped carrying out orders
from Sarajevo and began acting on orders from Banja Luka instead). The Chamber understands Kondić‘s reference to the ―Serbian authorities‖ to refer to
the authorities of the SerBiH.
5192
P3497 (Public Announcement of Kljuĉ Crisis Staff) (informing citizens of changes made to police uniforms on 7 May 1992); P3438 (Minutes of the 8th
session of Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 29 April 1992), p. 3.
5193
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 75; Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4745–4746; KDZ024, P713
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9102, 9199, 9251 (under seal).
 55

Bosnian Serb inspectors from the Banja Luka CSB who were also present,5194 Kondić told the non-
Serb officers to go on leave and to ―think carefully‖ about their decision.5195 The non-Serb officers
were recalled to the SJB building approximately two weeks later, but since none of them had changed
their minds about signing the oath, they were immediately relieved of their duties.5196 Although the
Kljuĉ Crisis Staff publicly announced that the change in insignia would ―not threaten the livelihood of
those workers who did not sign the solemn oath […] because attempts will be made to create conditions
for their further work‖,5197 these words were not honoured.5198 (#Lergal and obligatory#! The oath
was necessary only for the officials with special authorisation, to arrest, investigate and so on!
Without the oath they could work in MUPO, but not with the special power! Was there a
sufficient time to see whether it would be honoured or not? If their and a conduct of other
Muslim extremists went towards a violence, there couldn’t be any time. It is obvious that the
specialy authorised public officers had to give an outh, and since it was announced that there will
be another jobs within the MUP, it meant that they could have been working on a posts that
didn’t require the outh.)

1502. Between late 1991 and early March 1992, the SDS had formed a personnel committee which
was tasked with carrying out an analysis of the personnel structures in the municipality area.5199
(#Legal#! What was wrong with that? Every single party has a Cadre Committee, or
Personnel Commision, which analyses the achievments of the cadres posted by the Party to
some posts, proposes continuation or replacements. Not a “federal case”!) At an SDS
Executive Board meeting on 6 March 1992, the structure of the Public Auditing Service (―SDK‖)
in Kljuĉ was characterised as ―unfavourable‖, which referred to the fact that a Bosnian Muslim
was employed there.5200 Let us see what really had been said in this document (P03433) at this
meeting:

(#All legal#! The decentralisation of BiH was on the table, and it was a way to avoid a war,
and the Serb community in Klju~ was ready for that! The Municipal board of the Party was
informed about the ongoing conference on BiH, including “cantonisation” (not
“canonisation”) and decentralisation of funds. In this context it was mentioned an
“unfavourable structure” of the employed in the SDK, not specified whether it was due to
their professionalism, ethnic structure or something else. Even if it was an ethnic structure, it
should be balanced anyway. But, the Chamber decided to suggest tha there shouldn’t be any
Muslim employed, which is not correct. If this disbalance in the structure would influence
the future decentralisation, than it was worthwile to be considered, no matter who occupied

5194
Several weeks earlier, on 8 April 1992, Stojan Ţupljanin, as Chief of the Banja Luka CSB, had held a press conference in which he stated that all MUP
employees were required to sign a loyalty oath by 15 April 1992; if they did not, their employment would be terminated. KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11715 (under seal); P3469 (News bulletin, 8 April 1992).
5195
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 74–76, 78, 81. See also Atif Dţafić, T. 19691–19692 (30 September 2011).
5196
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 78, 79, 81; Atif Dţafić, T. 19691–19692, 19730, 19749 (30 September 2011); KDZ024, P713
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9102, 9199 (under seal); P3489 (Report of Banja Luka CSB, 28 May 1992) (order to all SJB Chiefs in the Banja
Luka CSB stating that all SJB employees who had not signed the loyalty oath were considered dismissed as of 15 April 1992 and that their insurance and
entitlements should be cancelled).
5197
D1724 (Public announcement of Kljuĉ Crisis Staff, 8 May 1992), p. 1; KDZ192, T. 19471 (27 September 2011) (closed session) (interpreting the
announcement to mean that even those who did not sign the loyalty oath would be able to retain employment with the MUP).
5198
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4761; KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9102, 9199 (under seal).
5199
KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11433–11435, 11693 (under seal); P3419 (Handwritten diary), p. 22 (under seal); P3436
(Minutes of the 10th session of Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 23 March 1992), p. 2 (including discussion of the activities of the Personnel
Commission).
5200
P3433 (Minutes of the 8th session of Kljuĉ SDS Municipal Board Executive Board, 6 March 1992), p. 1; KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
BrĎanin), T. 11463 (under seal).
 56

what position.) In the weeks preceding 7 May 1992, a Bosnian Muslim member of the SDK and
the Bosnian Muslim editor-in-chief of the radio station were replaced by members of the SDS.5201
Both men were told that ―since there had been a take-over in Kljuĉ, they had to be replaced by
individuals from the SDS‖.5202 (#Deadly combination#! Rule 92bis, no cross examination on
this circumstance! But, if the previous editor-in-chief was sabotageing the peaceful Lisbon
Conference on decentralisation, he could have been replaced for pursuing a private views on
a public media!)

1503. By the end of May 1992, most Bosnian Muslims in Kljuĉ had lost or would soon lose their
jobs.5203 On 7 May 1992, Bosnian Muslim municipal employees had been told to leave the
municipality building with the proviso that they would be called back if needed.5204 Between mid-
May and early June, the Kljuĉ Crisis Staff concluded that ―all management positions in enterprises
must be filled by people absolutely loyal to‖ the SerBiH and that the replacement of all non- Serbs
who were then employed in posts which encompassed the ―protection of properties‖ was to be
carried out by 1 June 1992.5205 These principles were later recorded in the 21 July 1992 decision
of the Kljuĉ Crisis Staff, which had since been renamed the War Presidency,5206 when it held that,
in accordance with a prior decision of the ARK Crisis Staff,5207 only Bosnian Serb officials could
occupy managerial posts, posts that could provide access to information or involve the protection
of public property, and posts that were important for the functioning of the economy.5208 (#Legal
and obligatory#!Not kind, but it was obviously associated with the oath issue. Since at that
times there was a war proclaimed by the Muslim-Croat Government against the Serbs, the
assessment and feeling of security of the local authorities probably dictated this kind of
measure. What would do any other country in such a case of war? Would they risk to be
sabotaged and damaged in security? Those who didn’t accept the new organisation and the
existence of the RS, certainly would be loyal to those who declared the war against the Serbs!
But, what does it have to do with the President? The locals acted in accordance with the laws
and due to their assessment of jeopardy. There was no president or any other authority who
woul be able to deny them this rights, since the state couldn’t protect them!) On the same
day, the Kljuĉ War Presidency also issued a decision terminating the employment of ―all
employees who ha[d] failed to respond to the general mobilisation‖.5209 (#Legal#! In any country
this would be a very grave felony. Remember Muhamed Ali! Thus, the Chamber concludes
that the war was illegal when the Serbs defended themselves, while it was legal when the
Muslims initiated, started and prolonged the same war!!!) Following these decisions, the War
Presidency ordered the dismissal of several non-Serbs from municipal positions, including the
positions of president and vice president of the executive board of the municipality.5210 (#Two
municipalities – peace#! These persons opted for their Muslim (Bosnian) Municipality of
Kljuc, and therefore couldn’t occupy a post in the Serb municipality. But, again, what does it

5201
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4738, 4756; Asim Egrlić, T. 19994 (5 October 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2430.
5202
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4756.
5203
Asim Egrlić, T. 19935 (5 October 2011); Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4756, 4762, 4765, 4885–4886; P3587 (List of
employees of Kljuĉ Municipal Assembly, 26 June 1992).
5204
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4744, 4756; Asim Egrlić, T. 19965 (5 October 2011)
5205
P2606 (Minutes from sessions of Kljuĉ's Crisis Staff, 27 May-10 July 1992), pp. 2, 15 (referring to the conclusions of the ARK Crisis Staff), 18 (referring to
a working group reviewing the managerial vacancies left by Bosnian Muslims); P3431 (Handwritten diary of KDZ192), p. 26 (under seal). As a result,
several Bosnian Muslim members of the National Defence Council were suspended immediately and SDS members were tasked with identifying suitable
replacements to fill the vacancies created. P2606 (Minutes from sessions of Kljuĉ's Crisis Staff, 27 May - 10 July 1992), p. 3; KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11555 (under seal) (identifying two Bosnian Muslims listed on p. 3 of P2606).
5206
P2643 (Kljuĉ Crisis Staff Report, 15 May - 29 July 1992), p. 2.
5207
P7 (Decision of ARK Crisis Staff, 22 June 1992); KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11734 (under seal) (conceding that the
wording ARK Crisis Staff‘s decision was similar to that used by the Kljuĉ War Presidency in their decision taken in July).
5208
P3464 (Decision of Kljuĉ War Presidency, 21 July 1992); Asim Egrlić, T. 19921–19922 (5 October 2011) (describing P3514 as ―retroactively‖ covering
―what had already been effected‖); P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 76, 79; Atif Dţafić, T. 19662–19663, 19749 (30 September
2011).
5209
P3514 (Decision of Kljuĉ War Presidency, 21 July 1992).
5210
Adjudicated Fact 2431.
 57

have to do with the President?) By 31 July, Vinko Kondić reported that only Serb workers were
employed in business enterprises.5211

1504. Rajko Kalabić testified that Bosnian Muslims reported to their jobs without interference until
late May 1992 and asserted that this timing suggested that they left their jobs of their own free will
rather than under duress.5212 However, while Asim Egrlić acknowledged that his employer had
been entitled to terminate his employment after he failed to report to work for five days, he
explained that the same persons who terminated his employment for failing to report to work also
imprisoned him in a camp, and that this termination occurred long after he ceased reporting for
work as a result of the security conditions in Kljuĉ.5213 (#Security reasons#! Right, not because
of the religion, but because of the security reason. An assessment of a security risks may
have been exaggerated, but still it presented a reality. Irrational fears are as strong as real, if
not stronger. And what it has to do with this President?) In light of the security situation
prevailing in Kljuĉ at the time, as well as the retroactive Crisis Staff decisions, the Chamber finds
that, contrary to Kalabić‘s assertion, Bosnian Muslims were dismissed from their jobs on account
of their ethnicity. (Not at all, but on account of their refusal to accept the authorities and give
an oath. And this kind of inferring is wrong, because it suggests that there was an unfounded
animosity on a religious basis, while there was a strong #security# “insecurity,” no matter
real, or irrational, and as such, it has to be de-criminalised.)

b. Outbreak of armed conflict in Kljuĉ

1506. After 7 May 1992, Bosnian Muslims‘ freedom of movement was restricted both
temporally and geographically, and Bosnian Muslims were required to identify themselves and to
explain their movements at check-points.5214 On 25 May 1992, Banjac, as President of the Kljuĉ
Crisis Staff, issued an order to bring the TO units in Kljuĉ municipality up to strength and to set up
civilian protection units in all local communes, including Bosnian Muslim ones.5215
(#EXCULPATORY#! Why not in the Muslim villages as well? The civilian protection was
even more needed in the Muslim communes, since the Muslim secret army, Patriotic League
and the Green Berets, initiated many skirmishes, and then escaped, leaving their civilians.
The Civilian protection was not a combat unit, but a unit for helping people in needs!)

1507. Armed operations in Kljuĉ began with several incidents between Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Serbs on 27 May 1992.5216 Around 11 a.m., while responding to a report that a barricade
had been erected on the road near Krasulje, the Assistant Commander of the Kljuĉ SJB, Dušan

5211
P5411 (Minutes of the 13th session of the Kljuĉ Municipal Assembly, 31 July 1992). See also KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
11696–11697 (under seal) [REDACTED]. The Chamber notes that although in his witness statement, Slobodan Jurišić claimed that all individuals left their
jobs of their own free will, he later admitted that he had heard that disloyal individuals had been removed from executive positions pursuant to an ARK
order. D4363 (Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8 February 2014), para. 35; Slobodan Jurišić, T. 47071 (13 February 2014). The Chamber
therefore will not place weight on that part of Jurišić‘s witness statement.
5212
D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1 December 2013), para. 7.
5213
Asim Egrlić, T. 19936–19938 (5 October 2011); P3588 (Ruling of Kljuĉ War Presidency, 21 July 1992) (terminating Egrlić‘s services as chairman of the
Executive Board); D1348 (Decision of Kljuĉ War Presidency, 21 July 1992) (same); D1349 (Decision of Kljuĉ War Presidency, 21 July 1992) (terminating
the duties of Omer Filipović as Vice President of the Municipal Assembly). See also P3572 (Decision on termination of employment by Veledprodaja
enterprise in Kljuĉ, 28 October 1992); Asim Egrlić, T. 19922, 19935 (5 October 2011) (testifying that P3572 reflected a decision that had already been taken
in May or June).
5214
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4761; KDZ075, P3358 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik) T. 4961 (under seal)
(stating that after the establishment of the check-point between Sanica and Biljani, the residents of Biljani could no longer reach Kljuĉ or Sanica). See also
Adjudicated Fact 2432.
5215
D1726 (Order of Kljuĉ Crisis Staff, 25 May 1992).
5216
Asim Egrlić, T. 19938 (5 October 2011); D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja Luka CSB, July 1992), p. 6; KDZ192, T. 19476 (27 September 2011)
(closed session). During the days preceding 27 May, Bosnian Muslims destroyed a television relay station near Krasulje. P3594 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB, 25
September 1992), p. 1; KDZ192, T. 19477 (27 September 2011) (closed session); KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11525–
11526 (under seal); D4363 (Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8 February 2014), para. 11; Slobodan Jurišić, T. 47075 (13 February 2014); D4268
(Witness statement of Jovo Kevac dated 25 January 2014), para. 5.
 58

Stojaković, was fatally wounded during an ―armed clash‖ with Bosnian Muslims;5217 a military
and a regular policeman were also wounded during the incident.5218 (#Who started skirmishes#!
This was not just “an incident”, that was a planned and simultaneous attack of the Muslim
forces against the local Serbs as well as the JNA which was leaving Knin and only passing
through Kljuc!) Around 2 p.m. on the same day, a bus carrying members of the JNA who were
returning from Knin to Banja Luka came under fire near Pudin Han, resulting in the deaths of four
or five individuals.5219 Not simply “individuals” but soldiers, who were retreating unarrmed,
and didn’t represent any threat. What army would allow this kind of conduct? And what
was the aim of those Muslim armed groups for doing this? During the course of the day, a
check-point at the intersection of the Kljuĉ-Sanica road came under fire, and in the evening, a
―squa[d] of extremists‖ attempted to blow up a road above Velagići.5220 (A Muslim extremists,
why not to say it? When the Muslims do something, the Chamber names them as
“extremists” without affiliation, and when the Serb extremists and renegades do something,
they are named as the “Serb Forces”, although they had been arrested by the real Serb
forces!) In addition to the incidents that occurred that day, the Kljuĉ SJB discovered that seven
members of Serb Forces had been captured in Crljeni two days before.5221 (But, let us see what
the main commander of the Muslim Army Sefer Halilovic said about the situation in the
Sana River Valley, see D3904, sent to the Una-Sana Operations Group, which indicates how
strong those forces were:

sent on 10 September 1992. It should be clear to everyone that the Muslim side waged the
war against both the JNA and the Serbs in Bosnia, with a respectable forces and after a long
preparations for war!)

1508. The Chamber received conflicting evidence regarding the establishment and level of
organisation of a Bosnian Muslim TO, as well as its involvement in the events of 27 May 1992.
(That could be a “conflicting evidence” only compared to the stereotipes established by the
Prosecution and international media? Those are a genuine contemporaneous documents
indicating that the #Muslim side planned, organised and initiated the turmoil and finally a
war against the Serbs in the area.#) According to a Kljuĉ SJB dispatch dated 25 September
1992, Bosnian Muslim forces began to obtain weapons through individual purchases in early 1992,
and established a ―Bosanski Kljuĉ TO‖ in April 1992.5222 Asim Egrlić acknowledged that guards
5217
See Adjudicated Fact 2433; D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja Luka CSB, July 1992), p. 6; D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1
December 2013), paras. 6, 17; D4165 (Witness statement of Marko Adamović dated 1 December 2013), paras. 3, 7a–b; D4268 (Witness statement of Jovo
Kevac dated 25 January 2014), para. 6; D4363 (Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8 February 2014), para. 12.
5218
KDZ192, T. 19476, 19480 (27 September 2011) (closed session); D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja Luka CSB, July 1992), pp. 6–7; Asim Egrlić, P6586
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4857; Asim Egrlić, T. 19989–19990 (5 October 2011); D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1
December 2013), paras. 6, 17; D4165 (Witness statement of Marko Adamović dated 1 December 2013), paras. 3, 7a; D4268 (Witness statement of Jovo
Kevac dated 25 January 2014), para. 6; D4363 (Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8 February 2014), para. 12; KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9206–9207 (under seal).
5219
D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja Luka CSB, July 1992), p. 7; KDZ192, T. 19476 (27 September 2011) (closed session); D4268 (Witness statement of
Jovo Kevac dated 25 January 2014), para. 7; D4363 (Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8 February 2014), para. 12.
5220
D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja Luka CSB, July 1992), p. 7. After the incidents, the ―commander of these Muslim formations‖ surrendered at the
invitation of Colonel Galić and was taken to the military remand prison in Banja Luka. D4363 (Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8 February
2014), para. 15.
5221
D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja Luka CSB, July 1992), p. 7; P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 90; Asim Egrlić, P6586
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4787, 4862; D4268 (Witness statement of Jovo Kevac dated 25 January 2014), para. 4; D4165 (Witness
statement of Marko Adamović dated 1 December 2013), para. 3.
5222
P3594 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB, 25 September 1992), p. 1. This document shows exactly what happened, and have in mind that this
was a strictly confidential document. See also D1731 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB, 3 June 1992), p. 1 (referring to the establishment of a Bosnian
 59

had been assigned to various Bosnian Muslim settlements located north of Kljuĉ since early 1992,
but suggested that they lacked any military organisation.5223 (#Who started#! Still, these forces
were capable of killing Mr. Stojakovic and several other policemen of the Serb ethnicity, as
well as several unarmed JNA soldiers helplessly closed in a bus!) Although he initially denied
that a Bosnian Muslim TO existed and suggested that Bosnian Serbs considered the entire Bosnian
Muslim population to be members of the TO, Egrlić later conceded (i) that after Bosnian Muslim
representatives were expelled from the Kljuĉ Municipal Assembly around 10 May, they had
established an office in Pudin Han in order to communicate with the population, and (ii) that Omer
Filipović was appointed TO Commander.5224 Even when shown an SJB report from July 1992
which estimated the numerical strength of Muslim forces in Kljuĉ at the outbreak of the conflict as
being approximately 1,300 to 1,500 men,5225 and an official note of the 2nd Krajina Corps
Command‘s Intelligence Department dated 11 July 1992 which described a fully-functioning
staff,5226 Egrlić maintained that the Bosnian Muslim TO staff had not had time to set up any
units.5227 However, the Chamber finds that, in light of contemporaneous documents of the Banja
Luka CSB and the Kljuĉ SJB, the events of 27 May 1992 were carried out by Bosnian Muslim
forces.5228 (#Who started#! This is the same Asim Egrlic, whose assertions should be taken
with a great reserve. The same is with the other members of the Muslim warring faction, and
the Court shouldn’t be a facilitator of the continuation of this war by a judicial means!)

1509. Beginning at 8 a.m. on 28 May 1992 and continuing throughout the day, the Kljuĉ Crisis
Staff and the Kljuĉ Defence Command5229 issued orders to Bosnian Muslims to hand in their
weapons and to hand over Stojaković‘s body, as well as those responsible for firing on the JNA
convoy on the previous day.5230 At 4 p.m., the Kljuĉ Defence Command accepted Omer
Filipović‘s request for an extension of the deadline to surrender weapons until 10 a.m. the
following day in exchange for handing over the seven captured soldiers and Stojaković‘s body by

Muslim TO following the issuance of an order by Izetbegović)

(#Who started#! This document, (D1731) numbers several hundreds
of the leaders of the armed rebellion with the criminal activities, mbushing and killing the policemen and soldiers.
Among them there were all the former officials of the Kljuc municipal authorities. That is why their dismissal was
justified.; D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja Luka CSB, July 1992), p. 11 (referring to SJB employees acquiring and distributing arms to Bosnian
Muslims).
5223
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4784; Asim Egrlić, T. 19971 (5 October 2011). But see D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to
Banja Luka CSB, July 1992), p. 5 (referring to an efficient system of command and control).
5224
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4784–4786, 4866–4867; Asim Egrlić, T. 19965–19967, 19970–19971 (5 October 2011).
Other members of the Bosnian Muslim TO included Amir Avdić and Mevzad Đerić as field co-ordinators, and Egrlić as responsible for political affairs.
D1350 (Lists of Muslim people in Kljuĉ, 10 June 1992); P3594 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB, 25 September 1992); Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor
v. Krajišnik), T. 4790 (confirming that D1350 contains an accurate list of the Bosnian Muslim TO staff) and 4808 (confirming that he was a member of the
TO); Asim Egrlić, T. 19967 (5 October 2011). See also D1730 (Official note of Kljuĉ SJB, 31 May 1992), p. 1. By contrast, the Bosnian Muslim ―Crisis
Staff‖ described in D1350 was never established because it was never confirmed by the deputies who were members of the Kljuĉ Municipal Assembly.
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4790.
5225
D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja Luka CSB, July 1992), pp. 9–10. See also Jovo Kevac, T. 46273 (30 January 2014) (testifying that a Bosnian Muslim
TO of approximately 2,000 men was formed in 1992).
5226
D1748 (Official note of 2nd Krajina Corps Command, 11 July 1992).
5227
Asim Egrlić, T. 19964–19967, 19970–19972 (5 October 2011); Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4784–4786, 4819, 4855–
4856, 4866–4867. See also Asim Egrlić, T. 19973–19974 (5 October 2011) (observed that the statements comprising D1748 had been obtained from
persons detained in Manjaĉa who may have been under duress); D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja Luka CSB, July 1992), pp. 5–6 (describing a TO that
was ―primarily organised for defence operations‖).
5228
D1731 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB, 3 June 1992), p. 2; D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja Luka CSB, July 1992), p. 6 (suggesting that despite being primarily
organised for defence purposes, a decision was taken to ―change the concept from defensive to offensive operations‖).
5229
On 31 May 1992, Colonel Stanislav Galić, the Commander of the 30th Partisan Division, issued an order forming the ―Kljuĉ Defence Command‖, which was
to consist, inter alia, of the Commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Partisan Brigade, the Commander of the newly-formed 4th Battalion of the 1st Partisan
Brigade, the Commander of the Kljuĉ Territorial Defence Staff, the Chief of the Kljuĉ SJB, the President of Kljuĉ Municipality and two or three members of
the Kljuĉ Crisis Staff. P3445 (Order of the 30th Partisan Division, 31 May 1992), p. 1; P3914 (Ewan Brown's expert report entitled ―Military Developments
in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992‖, 27 November 2002), para. 2.46; D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1 December 2013), para. 9. The
primary task of the Kljuĉ Defence Command was ―the protection of the Serbian people in the greater area of the municipality‖ by, inter alia, deploying ―in
the areas where combat activities were conducted until recently (the areas populated by the [Bosnian] Muslims)‖, controlling the routes of approach and
points of entrance to the municipality, establishing the SerBiH Army on the entirety of the territory, and facilitating the functioning of the municipal
authorities. P3445 (Order of the 30th Partisan Division, 31 May 1992), p. 1.
5230
P3444 (Order of Kljuĉ Crisis Staff, 28 May 1992); KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11666–11667 (under seal). Anyone who
did not comply would face ―thorough measures […] to disarm them‖, which the Crisis Staff warned could have ―disastrous consequences for their personal
security and that of their property‖. P3444 (Order of Kljuĉ Crisis Staff, 28 May 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact 919.
 60

5 p.m. on 28 May 1992.5231 Filipović was also taken into custody.5232 However, after the 4 p.m.
announcement, the Kljuĉ Defence Command issued a further statement at 8 p.m. ordering the
residents of Pudin Han and Velagići to surrender their weapons by 9 p.m. that evening.5233 Failure
to comply with the provisions of the statement would result in a state of armed conflict.5234

1510. As a result of this ―new security situation‖,5235 Banjac, as President of the Kljuĉ Crisis
Staff, issued an order prohibiting citizens from moving from one area to another within the
municipality without special permission from the Kljuĉ SJB.5236 Additionally, the Kljuĉ
Battalion5237 was deployed to ―mop up‖ the town and surrounding settlements by disarming ―all
paramilitary formations in the direction of the attacks and to arrest members of these
formations‖,5238 while the 1st Brigade of the 30th Partisan Division was also deployed in the
area.5239

1511. At the same time, beginning on 27 May, the Serb Forces attacked Bosnian Muslim areas of
Kljuĉ, including Pudin Han. 5240 (#Who started# Context#! This is not said correctly, since out
of a context, that would mean that the Serbs attacked first. However, the day, 27 May was a
day of a sinchronized attack of the Muslim forces throughout the Sana River Valley. The
entire area surrounding Kljuc was militarized in a few weeks before 27 May, when they
started their synchronised actions, and obviously under the pressure of the Main
Headquarter of the ABiH and it’s Commander General Halilovic, see D3904!) As these
operations ensued, members of Serb Forces collected weapons from Bosnian Muslim villages
including Pudin Han, Velagići, Krasulje, Biljani, Sanica, and Kamiĉak.5241 Bosnian Serbs were
not required to turn in their weapons.5242 (Obviously, not those who joined the regular forces!)
In the morning of 30 May 1992, members of the Serb Forces, including the White Eagles,5243
(#Not “Serb Forces”#! The “White Eagles” were not a part of the regular Serb forces! There

5231
D1728 (Order of Kljuĉ Defence Command, 28 May 1992); P3591 (Order of Kljuĉ Crisis Staff, 28 May 1992); D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja Luka
CSB, July 1992), p. 7.
5232
KDZ192, T. 19484 (27 September 2011) (closed session) [REDACTED]; KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11725–11727 (under
seal) [REDACTED]. See also D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1 December 2013), para. 8 (describing talks between Galić and Filipović
and suggesting that, at the latter‘s request, Filipović was ―escorted‖ to Kljuĉ by the Chief of the SJB). See also para. 1508 (discussing the Bosnian Muslim
TO in Kljuĉ).
5233
D4678 (Statement from the Kljuĉ Defence Command, 28 May 1992). The deadline for residents of Krasulje and Gorni Ramići to surrender their weapons
was also brought forward to 7 a.m. on 29 May. D4678 (Statement from the Kljuĉ Defence Command, 28 May 1992).
5234
D4678 (Statement from the Kljuĉ Defence Command, 28 May 1992).
5235
KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11557–11558 (under seal); KDZ192, T. 19479–19480 (27 September 2011) (closed session).
5236
P3443 (Order of Kljuĉ Crisis Staff, 27 May 1992).
5237
The Kljuĉ Battalion had been formed at the end of April 1992 and was integrated into the 1 st Light Infantry Brigade of the 1st Krajina Corps as its 3rd Infantry
Battalion, quartered in Sitnica. (#Before VRS, JNA#! But, when formed, at the end of April, this was a unit of the JNA, since
the 1st Krajina Corps was formed after the VRS was forme,d i.e after 20 May 92! P6543 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps,
2 November 1993), p. 2. See also D4363 (Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8 February 2014), paras. 6–7; Slobodan Jurišić, T. 47125 (14
February 2014). Branko Ribić and Marko Adamović were appointed commander and deputy commander, repectively. P6543 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps,
2 November 1993), p. 2. After the 4th Infantry Battalion of the 1st Light Infantry Brigade was created on or around 1 June 1992, the Kljuĉ Battalion joined
the 17th Light Infantry Brigade, which was a unit of the 2nd Krajina Corps. P6543 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 2 November 1993), p. 3; P3914 (Ewan
Brown's expert report entitled "Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina - 1992", 27 November 2002), para. 1.99.
5238
P6543 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 2 November 1993), p. 3; P2606 (Minutes from sessions of Kljuĉ's Crisis Staff, 27 May - 10 July 1992), p. 2.
5239
P1171 (1st Krajina Corps combat report, 28 May 1992), p. 1; D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1 December 2013), para. 8 (stating that
―Galić‘s unit‖ from Mrkonjić Grad arrived in Kljuĉ and set up check-points on the routes leading to Kljuĉ); Stanislav Galić, T. 37154 (15 April 2013)
(testifying that he was the commander of the 30 th Infantry Division at Mrkonjić Grad). See also D4363 (Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated
8 February 2014), para. 14 (stating that a company was brought from the direction of Petrovac to control the Kljuĉ-Petrovac road).
5240
KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11559–11560, 11667, 11725–11727, 11729 (under seal); D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja
Luka CSB, July 1992), p. 7; P6543 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 2 November 1993), p. 3.
5241
D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1 December 2013), para. 10. Zgon, Veleĉovo, and Duboĉani, were not subjected to weapons collection.
D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1 December 2013), para. 10; KDZ024, P713 (Transcripts from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 9105–9106
(under seal); KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 30069–30071, 30074–30075 (under seal); KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4957; D4363 (Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8 February 2014), para. 15.
5242
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9107 (under seal). ).
5243
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4960, 4985. On 28 May 1992, the White Eagles had been ordered to place themselves under
the command of the ―Kljuĉ operations group‖. P3444 (Order of Kljuĉ Crisis Staff, 28 May 1992), p. 2; D4363 (Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated
8 February 2014), para. 37 (commenting that every individual and group had to be part of either the VRS or the civilian police). See also Adjudicated Fact
2434. The Chamber therefore finds that the White Eagles were acting under the direction of the Kljuĉ Defence Command as of 28 May 1992.
 61

had been other JNA volunteers remained after the JNA withdrew!) went from village to
village, instructing villagers to hang white sheets from the houses to signal their loyalty and
forcing military-aged men to walk in front of the Serb Forces to shield them from fire until the
Serb Forces reached the next village.5244 From there, the men were allowed to return home and the
process was repeated with the men from that village.5245 In Biljani, where Serb Forces searched
the houses for weapons, their search yielded none.5246

c. Destruction of houses and looting of movable property

1512. Beginning while the combat operations were underway and continuing throughout 1992
some 3,500 houses in Bosnian Muslim villages including Pudin Han, Velagići, Biljani, and Prhovo
were razed to the ground and burned.5247 Furthermore, during the same period, members of the
Serb Forces ―illegally appropriat[ed]‖ Bosnian Muslims‘ movable property, such as cattle, housing
materials, and vehicles.5248 (This assertion about #“members of the Serb Forces’’#, is also
general and not supported. There could be anyone to do that. Once the fights start and
people move, there may follow a plunder. A local authorities could do nothing to protect the
abandoned property, since they couldn’t protect themselves and their families, and were in a
constant expectations of an attack or firing.) Although the Kljuĉ Crisis Staff explained to
Bosnian Serb citizens in June 1992 that property was considered ―inviolable [and] should be
protected from the wilfulness of individuals‖,5249 and the Kljuĉ Executive Board passed a decision
on 29 September 1992 transferring the ownership of movable and immovable property from those
who had left the municipality to the state,5250 a later military report stated that ―illegal acts of

5244
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4958–4961.
5245
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4958–4961.
5246
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4961. See also Adjudicated Fact 2435.
5247
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4820; D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja Luka CSB, July 1992), p. 11; see Adjudicated
Facts 948, 949, 2448. See also P3662 (1st Krajina Corps report, 31 May 1992), p. 2; P2972 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB, 28 September 1992), p. 1.
5248
D1738 (Report of the Assistant Commander for Civilian Affairs of the Military Post 7286, 16 February 1993), p. 2 (attributing such actions to military
personnel as well as police and local Serbs); D1352 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB to Banja Luka CSB, July 1992), p. 11; P2972 (Report of Kljuĉ SJB, 28 September
1992), p. 1. See also Adjudicated Fact 950; KDZ192, T. 19514 (27 September 2011) (closed session) (attributing the looting to ―paramilitary individuals‖).
But see D4363 (Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8 February 2014), para. 16 (attributing the looting to ―renegade individuals‖ who were not
under the control of the army and police).
5249
KDZ192, T. 19514–19515 (27 September 2011) (closed session) [REDACTED]. See also D1739 (Decisions of Kljuĉ Crisis Staff, 30 June 1992), p. 1
(calling on all persons who had appropriated cars or valuables to return them to the army within a five day grace period or risk sanction); P3452 (Extract
from Minutes of Kljuĉ War Presidency, 10 July 1992), p. 1 (forming a commission to take in ―war booty); KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
BrĎanin), T. 11634–11635 (under seal) (stating that ―war booty‖ referred to movable property that had been taken from Bosnian Muslims although some
had stayed in Kljuĉ without their property being disturbed).
5250
(#No criminal intent#!
D1738 (Report of the Assistant Commander for Civilian Affairs of the Military Post 7286, 16 February 1993), pp. 2–3.
However, this document is a genuine evidence that nothing what happened wasn’t an intention of the local authorities,
but a “viss maieour” – a chaos that occurred after the war broke out. In this document there are proofs on many
aspects: there was no sufficient food for the inhabitants; a lack of discipline and safety for the sitizens; #General
shortage#!)

Anyway, this genuine document shows contrary to what is suggested in the Judgment, namely, that there were many
weaknesses in exercising the rule of law and to make the municipal organs functioning, but exactly this document
shows that it wasn’t because of any plan or an intention of the local, or central authorities. So, for how many times the
Chamber accepted the Prosecution’s tricks to use against the Serbs all the Serb endevours to make the things better?
This is an absurd! Further, there was a full awareness of what was going on, and this was criticised and attempted to
cease the unloawfulness, as we can see:
 62

appropriation of state property continued […] [and] nothing was done to prevent further acts of
unlawful appropriation‖.5251 The 1st Krajina Assistant Corps Commander for Civilian Affairs
reported that as late as 1 February 1993, such acts were occurring in ―full co-ordinated action and
co-operation of the Military and civilian police‖.5252 The Chamber is therefore satisfied that such
crimes continued to be perpetrated by members of Serb Forces even after the measures taken by
the Kljuĉ Crisis Staff and Kljuĉ Executive Board in June and September 1992. (#No liability#!
#Individuals, not “Forces#! But, who would be liable for these felonies? The Serb
authorities? It is clear from the very document that there was no any plan or any approval of
the authorities for the perpetrators, had they been “members” of the Serb Forces, but
certainly doing felonies out of the sight of commands, or civilians, in spite of the measures of
the municipal authorities. Again, a document confirming the authority’s rightful endevours
are used against this President, although the real officials, such as 1st Krajina Corps
Commander for Civilian Affairs and the authorities of Kljuc were a real “Serb Forces”,
while nobody could confirm that the perpetrators had been a legal Serb forces!)

1104. Killings on or around 1 June 1992

a. Scheduled Incident A.7.1

1513. The Indictment refers to the killing of ―a number‖ of people in Pudin Han on or about
28 May 1992.

1514. As the Chamber has previously noted, a Bosnian Muslim TO was headquartered in Pudin
Han.5253 At the time, Pudin Han was almost exclusively a Bosnian Muslim village located
approximately three kilometres north of Kljuĉ town.5254 Even as the Kljuĉ Crisis Staff issued its

Had it been a goal of the authorities, there wouldn’t be any objection and attempt to rectify the misdoings. In addition
to all the troubles the local authorities had also a very wide territory and couldn’t easily communicate, let alone
control the processes and events, see the same document:

The entire document is genuine and frank, and can only confirm the local authorities tries to make the things better.
5251
D1738 (Report of the Assistant Commander for Civilian Affairs of the Military Post 7286, 16 February 1993), p. 3 (describing the appropriation of
livestock, as well as any usable building materials that remained in Bosnian Muslim villages, by people who were ―armed and dressed in military
uniforms‖).
5252
D1738 (Report of the Assistant Commander for Civilian Affairs of the Military Post 7286, 16 February 1993), p. 3.
5253
See para. 1508.
5254
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4767. See Adjudicated Fact 918. See also P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić
undated), para. 8; Atif Dţafić, T. 19657–19658 (30 September 2011) (describing Pudin Han as one of eight villages in Kljuĉ municipality which was
populated predominantly by non-Serbs).
 63

ultimatum on 28 May 1992,5255 Pudin Han had already begun to be shelled from locations
controlled by Serb Forces on the previous day.5256 (#Before VRS#! However, depicted as it is
here, it looks as if the Serb units attacked a peaceful place before the ultimatum expired.
First of all, these units had been formed by the JNA, in April 92. Second, as evident from the
P06543, this was an inevitable action against the paramilitary groups which already started
to ambush and kill both, the JNA, the VRS, the police and civilians, see what was the task of
these units, P06543, p.3

Many people were hit by the shells as they tried to flee.5257 While at his house on 28 May,
KDZ024 could see smoke coming from the houses in Pudin Han.5258 During the attack on Pudin
Han, the mosque in Pudin Han was blown up and leveled.5259 KDZ024 visited Pudin Han after it
was shelled, and found everything burned, destroyed, and in ruins.5260 Electricity poles had fallen
down, and dead livestock littered the roads.5261 (However, in spite of fact that there was a well
armed Muslim unit and their Headquarters, the Chamber missed to establish #who started#
the fights. We already know that the Muslim side started the war in Kljuc a day earlier, on
27 May, by a simultaneous attack on many spots. This contemporaneous document of the
Prosecution is clear: the Serbs had been attacked from Pudin Han and it’s hamlets!)

1515. The Chamber notes that the Prosecution alleges that ―a number‖ of people were killed in
Pudin Han on or about 28 May 1992.5262 The Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that, at a
minimum, three civilians from Pudin Han died as a consequence of the shelling.5263 Additionally,
KDZ024 testified that on 30 May 1992, [REDACTED] found and buried the bodies of more than
ten people, including children, who had been killed by the shelling.5264 The bodies of eight
Bosnian Muslims killed during the shelling of Pudin Han were exhumed from graves in Velagići
in 1996,5265 but the Chamber notes that five of those eight were last reported alive on 1 June
5255
See para.1509. During a meeting at the youth centre in Pudin Han, the vast majority of inhabitants of Pudin Han were in favour of surrendering their
weapons, and those who disagreed left for Bihać. Adjudicated Fact 920.
5256
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9117, 9209 (under seal); P6543 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 2 November 1993), p. 3. See also
para. 1511; Adjudicated Fact 921; P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 82. KDZ192 gave conflicting evidence as to whether Pudin Han
was fired upon in order to induce the leader of the Bosnian Muslim TO to surrender. KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11559–
11560, 11726–11727, 11729 (under seal); KDZ192 T. 19484 (27 September 2011) (closed session) (acknowledging that Bosnian Muslims maintained that
Filipović had surrendered prior to the commencement of fire but testifying that the Serb Forces only fired to induce Filipović to surrender). See also P3450
(Video footage of TV Banja Luka depicting events in Kljuĉ), at 00:02:27–00:06:41 (showing Vinko Kondić stating that Bosnian Muslim ―extremists‖ in
Pudin Han had refused to surrender their weapons). The Chamber notes that the Accused concedes that Pudin Han was shelled even prior to the expiration
of the Crisis Staff‘s ultimatum, and that at least three civilians died, but suggests that the shelling was not carried out by Serb Forces, who ―had no interest in
shelling since they had information that the Bosnian Muslim extremists who remained armed had left for Bihać‖. Defence Final Brief, para. 1517.
However, the Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, as stated in the main text above, the shelling was carried out by Serb Forces, not by any
other armed group.
5257
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9117 (under seal).
5258
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9117 (under seal); Adjudicated Fact 2451.
5259
Adjudicated Fact 2451; KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9117 (under seal). See also paras. 1557–1558.
5260
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9118 (under seal).
5261
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9118 (under seal).
5262
Indictment, Scheduled Incident A.7.1. See also Confidential Appendix B to Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief [Scheduled Incident A7.1] (listing 11 persons).
5263
Adjudicated Fact 921. See also KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11725 (under seal) (testifying that Bosnian Muslims had made
statements that five or six civilians had been killed in Pudin Han).
5264
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9118–9119 (under seal).
5265
P6690 (Addendum to Nicolas Sébire‘s report, 16 May 2003), e-court pp. 74–75 (naming eight persons listed in Scheduled Incident A.7.1 of Appendix G to
the Prosecution‘s Final Trial Brief as having been exhumed from a grave in Velagići that was linked to the Pudin Han incident in 1996); P4878 (List of mass
graves and bodies exhumed in Kljuĉ Municipality, 1996), p. 10 (listing the same eight); P4880 (Kljuĉ Court record of autopsy and identification of victims
exhumed from graves in Velagići and Kljuĉ, 10–11 November 1996), pp. 5, 8–14 (giving details regarding the clothing found on and injuries sustained by
the persons listed in P4878); P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 6–7 (identifying these eight persons as Bosnian Muslims). The
bodies of an additional four Bosnian Muslims who went missing from the Pudin Han area on 27 May 1992 were exhumed from graves in the same area, but
the evidence before the Chamber is insufficient to conclude that they were killed by Serb Forces during this attack. P4853, p. 7 (identifying these four
persons as Bosnian Muslims); P4878 (List of mass graves and bodies exhumed in Kljuĉ Municipality, 1996), pp. 10–11 (listing the additional four); P4880
(Kljuĉ Court record of autopsy and identification of victims exhumed from graves in Velagići and Kljuĉ, 10–11 November 1996), pp. 8–9, 18.
 64

1992.5266 Accordingly, the Chamber concludes that, at a minimum, three civilians were killed by
Serb Forces during the attack in Pudin Han and that the village—including the mosque5267—was
destroyed on or about 28 May 1992. (#Legal, military necessities#! However, the Chamber
takes it as if this was an unprovoked attack on a civil settlement, regardless of the
international provisions that guarantee the right to defend! It was a usual practice of the
Muslim forces to deploy their heavy artillery in the settled areas and fire against the Serbs.
Neither the Chamber established whether there was a military necessity on the Serb side,
nor whether the mosque had been used as a military object. Presenting as if the Serbs
attacked a peaceful settlement, and preventing the Defence to depict the other side’s conduct
makes any defence inpossible and any trial unfair! Aside from all of that, there is a crucial
question unanswered: what does it have to do with the President? All ot those “wars” were a
#municipal wars#, because started in a different times and because of different causes and
incentives! #Nobody could unilaterally influence an attacked side#!)

b. Scheduled Incident A.7.2

1516. The Indictment refers to the killing of at least 38 people in Prhovo village and further on
the road to Peći on or about 1 June 1992.

1517. Around 1 June 1992, approximately 100 members of the Serb Forces armed with automatic
weapons arrived in Prhovo,5268 (#Masks and insignias#! The masked civilians within this group
weren’t the Serb soldiers, nor the Serb Forces, but somebody who did some revenge and
didn’t want to be recognised and “awarded” by the Serb authorities. This can not be any
responsibility of the Serb authorities!) a village located northeast of Kljuĉ town and southeast of
the village of Peći which was then inhabited primarily by Bosnian Muslims.5269

1518. The Serb Forces ordered approximately 40 unarmed male residents of Prhovo, as well as a
number of unarmed women and children, to line up facing the wall of Karanfil Osmanović‘s
house, and then began to beat some of them.5270 #Adjudicated Fact! Four Bosnian Muslim men
were called out by name, told to run away, and then shot dead.5271 Adjudicated Fact#!

1519. The Serb Forces ordered the approximately 30 remaining Bosnian Muslim men from
Prhovo to form a column and walk to the nearby village of Peći.5272 Adjudicated Fact#! On the
way to Peći, three Bosnian Muslim men from the column were killed after they failed to drag a
military vehicle out of the mud.5273 Adjudicated Fact#! The commander of the unit, Marko
Adamović,5274 ordered that the village be set on fire and the women and children be killed.5275
KDZ056 then heard shooting and an explosion from the village.5276

5266
P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 6–7.
5267
See paras. 1556–1558.
5268
See Adjudicated Facts 2437, 922. Some of the Bosnian Serbs wore JNA camouflage uniforms, but there were also masked armed civilians. Adjudicated
Fact 922.
5269
P645 (Map of Prhovo marked by KDZ056); KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10334 (8 October 2002) (stating that Prhovo
contained approximately 60 houses that were home to about 200 villagers); see Adjudicated Fact 2437.
5270
Adjudicated Fact 2437; KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10341–10342. See also Adjudicated Fact 923.
5271
Adjudicated Fact 923; KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10341–10342. See also Adjudicated Facts 924, 2437.
5272
Adjudicated Fact 925; KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10343–10344.
5273
See Adjudicated Fact 925; KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10344. The group left the bodies of the three dead men behind while
the rest of the men continued the walk toward Peći. KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10344.
5274
While testifying in this case, Marko Adamović denied that he was the commander of the operation in Prhovo and claimed that he only learned what took
place there when a military officer who was crying arrived at the Crisis Staff meeting on the same day. D4165 (Witness statement of Marko Adamović
dated 1 December 2013), para. 23; Marko Adamović, T. 44458–44459, 44464–44466, 44470 (4 December 2013). The Chamber notes that at the time of his
testimony, Adamović was awaiting judgement in the re-trial of his case in BiH, which related to the events in Prhovo. Marko Adamović, T. 44457–44458
 65

1520. Only 12 men from the column survived the trek to Peći.5277 Adjudicated Fact! Sulejman
Medanović, having survived the walk, died during the following night as a result of beatings he
sustained while the group was detained overnight in a co-operative centre called ―Dom‖.5278
(#Deadly combination#! Adjudicated Fact! 92bis!!! In the morning, the 11 survivors were
taken to the Nikola Maĉkić Elementary School, arriving around 11:00 a.m.5279 92bis

1521. A total of 51 bodies identified as those of Bosnian Muslims who were killed in Prhovo on
or around 1 June 1992 by Serb Forces were exhumed from two mass graves located in Prhovo.5280
92bis! The Chamber also received forensic evidence that Sulejman Medanović died as a result of
injuries consistent with the beatings he received while the group was detained en route to the
Nikola Maĉkić School,5281 bringing the total number of bodies linked to the attack on Prhovo to
52.5282

1522. The Chamber therefore finds that Serb Forces killed 52 Bosnian Muslims in Prhovo and on
the road to Peći on or about 1 June 1992. (#Deadly combination#! All of that is based on many

(4 December 2013). The Chamber thus considers that Adamović had an incentive to be less than forthcoming about his role in those events. Moreover,
Adamović was evasive throughout his testimony, particularly when questioned about how he had come to know about what had happened in Prhovo.
D4165 (Witness statement of Marko Adamović dated 1 December 2013), para. 23; Marko Adamović, T. 44459–44464, 44467–44473, 44478–44479,
44485–44487, 44489 (4 December 2013) (denying involvement but conceding that the minutes of the Crisis Staff meeting did not reflect that he was
present); P2606 (Minutes from sessions of Kljuĉ's Crisis Staff, 27 May–10 July 1992), pp. 7–8. The Chamber therefore shall not rely on Adamović‘s
evidence in relation to this incident. Although Rajko Kalabić corroborated Adamović‘s testimony that a tearful military officer informed the Crisis Staff
about the events in Prhovo on 1 June 1992, Kalabić, who was himself evasive throughout his testimony, was inconsistent regarding Adamović‘s presence at
the meeting. Compare Rajko Kalabić, T. 44578–44580 (5 December 2013) (explaining that he had only disclosed that Adamović was present at the Crisis
Staff meeting during the appellate phase of a case in BiH and not before because the Prosecutor had not asked about Adamović‘s presence during the trial)
with Rajko Kalabić, T. 44582–44583 (5 December 2013) (accepting the possibility that the Crisis Staff had actually only learned about the events in Prhovo
two or three days later, as Kalabić had testified in the BrĎanin case). Accordingly, the Chamber finds that Adamović was present and in command of the
Serb Forces in Prhovo. (#Deadly combination#! So, the Chamber is deciding on a “negative basis”, i.e. no evidence that he
wasn’t there, therefor, he was there! And this way discredited several Defence witnesses.
5275
Adjudicated Fact 2438; KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10346 (testifying that the commander ordered that no one be left alive in
the village). Adjudicated fact!
5276
KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10346. 92bis! KDZ056 later learned that the Serb Forces in the village had killed the people
who had remained behind. KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10346.
5277
See Adjudicated Fact 926. The Serb Forces killed two or three more Bosnian Muslim men when the group reached the crossroad junction for Sokolovo and
Peći, and, after having ordered the remaining men to take off their shoes and clothing from the waist up, opened fire on them in a field, leaving only 12
survivors. KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10349–10351 (testifying that although 14 men originally survived, the soldiers shot
the two youngest survivors after stating that 14 survivors were two too many for the soldiers to be able to exact ―[their] revenge‖). But see D4165 (Witness
statement of Marko Adamović dated 1 December 2013), para. 8b (stating that he heard that Bosnian Muslims had opened fire on the Bosnian Serb unit from
a small forest and that the unit had reacted by firing randomly in the direction of the forest). In light of the fact that the Bosnian Serb unit‘s acts could bear
on Adamović‘s culpability in relation to this incident, the Chamber declines to rely on Adamović‘s evidence in this regard.
5278
KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10352–10353; P6690 (Addendum to Nicolas Sébire‘s report, 16 May 2003), pp. 79–80 (stating
that a post mortem examination of Medanović‘s body revealed that the cause of death was force trauma to the head and chest, including brain injury). See
also Adjudicated Fact 927. The Serb Forces tied the surviving men‘s hands with wires and strings, beat them, and ordered them to lie down near an
electricity pole, where the survivors were held overnight without access to food or water, and told them that they would all be killed in the morning.
KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10352–10353.
5279
KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10353. See also Scheduled Detention Facility C.15.2.
5280
KDZ056 testified that the 27 persons listed in P531 were killed in Prhovo village, as well as on the road and in the field on the way to Peći. P531 (List of
persons captured/killed in Prhovo), p. 1; KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10346, 10357–10359. Autopsy reports and exhumation
reports demonstrate that the bodies of these 27 persons, as well as the bodies of 24 others, were exhumed from two graves associated with the Serb Forces‘
attack on Prhovo on 1 June 1992; all of these persons died as a result of gunshot injuries to the head, thoracic cavity, and/or limbs. P622 (Record of
autopsies of bodies from Prhovo, 13 May 1997) (recording the autopsy results for 36 persons killed by Serb Forces in Prhovo on 1 June 1992 who were
wearing civilian clothing and who died of gunshot injuries to the head, thoracic cavity, and/or spine); P4882 (Bihać Cantonal Court record of Prhovo
exhumation, 7 May 1997) (relating to the autopsies compiled in P622); P623 (Record of autopsies of bodies from Prhovo, 25 September 1999) (recording
the exhumation of 15 bodies from a mass grave at Ciganska Dolina, 13 of whom were listed in P531). In light of the similarity in the causes of death and
having cross-referenced P531 with P22 and P623, the Chamber concludes that all 51 persons included in P622 and P623 were killed by Serb Forces in
Prhovo on or around 1 June 1992. See also P6690 (Addendum to Nicolas Sébire‘s report, 16 May 2003), pp. 76–79; Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4810–4812 (testifying that he attended the exhumation of a Prhovo gravesite); Adjudicated Fact 928. In addition to the
exhumations of the 51 persons mentioned above, Amor Mašović recorded the exhumation of the body of one additional person who went missing from
Prhovo on 1 June 1992 from the Ciganska Dolina grave. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 7–8; P4850 (Witness statement of
Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), Annex A, p. 5. However, this individual is not listed in P623 and no evidence in the record provides either an
explanation for this omission or forensic information regarding the death. Accordingly, the Chamber cannot be satisfied that this person was killed by Serb
Forces in Prhovo on or around 1 June 1992.
5281
See para. 1520, fn. 5278.
5282
The Chamber notes that the Accused concedes that the local authorities were informed that ―a number of civilians‖ were killed during fighting in Prhovo.
Defence Final Brief, para. 1518 (citing the witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić). Jurišić testified that the Crisis Staff was informed on 1 June 1992 that ―a
number of Muslim civilians‖ were killed in Prhovo, although he did not mention any fighting. D4363 (Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8
February 2014), para. 23.
 66

Adjudicated facts and evidence due to Rule 92bis, although some of it rebutted by the
Defence witnesses, which, according to the Tribunal’s Statute, should be sufficient to rebut
it. Again, the Chamber didn’t establish how many of those casualties had been a combat
casualties, how many combat casualties had the Serb side, and left it to be interpreted as one
like it. Finnaly, no answer how does it involve the President, who didn’t have any
communication with Kljuc for a long period? And if he had, how would he prevent the
attacked Serbs to secure their safety? Of course, if “forgotten” that the Muslim side
lounched a sinchronised attack on 27 May, an impression that the evil Serbs did their attacks
without any reason!)

1105. Arrests, detentions, and killings associated with detention facilities

a. Scheduled Detention Facility C.15.3 and Scheduled Incident B.10.1

1523. The Indictment refers to the use of the Velagići School as a detention facility at least
between 30 May and June 1992,5283 and to the killing of at least 77 men at the school on or about
1 June 1992.5284

1524. On the evening of 1 June 1992, approximately 100 unarmed Bosnian Muslim men who had
surrendered to members of Serb Forces at the check-point in Velagići, a majority Bosnian Muslim
village,5285 arrived at the Velagići School,5286 which was guarded by soldiers.5287 The men‘s
names and dates of birth were recorded.5288 Two soldiers ordered the group to line up, raise their
hands, and empty their pockets, and collected any documents or money that had been discarded in
the process.5289 (#Combatants, not civilians#! The Chamber missed to establish whether those
“who had surrendered” had been in combat prior to the surrender! Certainly they had been,
otherwise they would be at their homes! All other was a part of a prescribed procedure, the
same as in any prison!)

1525. The two soldiers then ordered the group of Bosnian Muslim men to enter a small room on
the first floor, where they were crowded in so tightly that they ―literally had to sit in each other‘s
laps‖.5290 The Bosnian Muslim men were cursed and told to ―bow down. You‘ll never again have
the opportunity.‖5291 At one point, the Bosnian Muslim men heard several men who were being
held downstairs being told to stand up, and when they could not, the Bosnian Muslim men upstairs

5283
Indictment, Scheduled Detention Facility C.15.3. In Appendix B to the Prosecution Final Brief, however, the Prosecution only refers to men being detained
at the school on 1 June 1992.
5284
Indictment, Scheduled Incident B.10.1. The Chamber also notes that the Accused appears to characterise this event as two separate killing incidents, but
observes that the evidence he cites, which the Chamber has analysed below, does not support this theory. Defence Final Brief, paras. 1519–1520.
5285
KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11368 (under seal).
5286
P1170 (Map of Velagići marked by KDZ024) (showing the location of the school marked with an ―S‖); KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
BrĎanin), T. 9127, 9146 (under seal). Some 80 persons who remained at the check-point were placed in an abandoned, windowless schoolhouse. See also
P1155 (Excerpts from Banja Luka Military Court file), e-court p. 4.
5287
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9121, 9125–9126 (under seal); P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 138
(stating that he heard from a fellow inmate at Manjaĉa that approximately 100 men were detained by Serb Forces, including the police and army, at Velagići
school). See also Adjudicated Fact 946; Slobodan Jurišić, D4363 (Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8 February 2014), para. 16 (suggesting that
civilians were brought to the school to give statements in connection with the possession of weapons); Rajko Kalabić, T. 44585 (5 December 2013)
(suggesting that ―paramilitary members‖ in Pudin Han and Velagići had been ―invited‖ to the school to surrender their weapons). On their way to the
school, the group had encountered Ţeljko Radojicić as well as one or two soldiers wearing olive grey uniforms, and Radojicić had told the soldiers: ―Kill
them all. They‘re not going to form a dţamahirija here‖. KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9123 (under seal). Radojicić went
from one man to the next, swearing at them and cursing their mothers. KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9123 (under seal).
5288
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9123–9125 (under seal); KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 30077–
30078 (under seal).
5289
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9123–9124, 9125 (under seal); KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T.
30077 (under seal).
5290
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9123–9126, 9128 (under seal).
5291
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9128 (under seal).
 67

heard three to four bursts of fire and the men crying out.5292 (#Heard, not seen#! Again,
something heard, nothing seen, and all together based on adjudicated facts or 92bis evidence,
not corroborated with any document. Such a way, with many aspects unresolved and
unestablished, the Judgement is building a skyscraper of illusion of the Serb
misdoings!#Deadly combination#!)

1526. The Bosnian Muslim men remained in the classroom at the Velagići School while the
soldiers cursed and maltreated them, until approximately 11:30 p.m.5293 At that point, the soldiers
ordered the detainees to stand and line up in a single file; as they exited the school, they were
ordered to form a column, two by two.5294 Once the entire column had exited and lined up against
the building, two soldiers who had been crouching in the nearby grass and pointing their automatic
rifles began to fire at the column.5295 When the shooting stopped, the soldiers approached the
fallen detainees and shot any apparent survivors,5296 [REDACTED].5297 The soldiers began to
drink rakija and sing ―Chetnik songs about Draza Mihajlović and about the establishment of an
empire‖.5298 (#Deadly combination#! All founded on the 92bis evidence and adjudicated
facts. The exculpatory or mitigating evidence is only mentioned in the footnotes, such as the
data that there was an attempt to escape prior to the shooting. Had it been premeditated and
planned to execute this gropu of POWs, this certainly wouldn’t be done in front of the
school, but on another place! Again, what does it have to do with the President, who
undertook all the necessary measures agains any unlawful conduct?)

1527. An excavator and lorries from the army base at Lanište were used to bury the bodies at
Lanište, where they were discovered in 1998.5299 On 3 June 1992, an investigating judge from the
Kljuĉ Municipal Court went to the Velagići School to conduct an on-site investigation.5300 On
5 June 1992, a criminal report was filed by the Banja Luka Military Prosecutor‘s Office against 12
members of the MP and intervention platoons affiliated with the VRS engineering unit based at
Lanište.5301 However, the soldiers were never fully investigated and were only in custody for a
month.5302 (So, what this President has to do with it? The judicial system, although still in

5292
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9128 (under seal). See also P1155 (Excerpts from Banja Luka Military Court file), e-court p. 7.
5293
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9128–9129 (under seal). When one man repeatedly asked for a telephone in order to ―phone
Vinko‖, a soldier put a rifle barrel in the man‘s mouth, and the man became covered in blood. KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
9128 (under seal).
5294
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9129, 9138 (under seal); KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 30078
(under seal).
5295
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9129 (under seal); P1155 (Excerpts from Banja Luka Military Court file), e-court pp. 7–8. See
also Adjudicated Fact 947.
5296
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9129 (under seal); P1155 (Excerpts from Banja Luka Military Court file), e-court p. 9. The
Chamber received evidence suggesting that the soldiers had only opened fire when some of the detainees attempted to escape. See P3614 (Handwritten
letter of complaint to Lanište-Kljuĉ Military Post, 12 June 1992), pp. 2–3 (suggesting that the soldiers had only opened fire when some of the detainees
started to escape); P3513 (Request for investigation by the 1st Krajina Corps Military Prosecutor's Office, 8 March 1993 (requesting an investigation into the
suspects named in P1155); P1155 (Excerpts from Banja Luka Military Court file), e-court p. 5; D4165 (Witness statement of Marko Adamović dated
1 December 2013), para. 11.
5297
[REDACTED]. See also para. 1526.
5298
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9130 (under seal).
5299
KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9130, 9146 (under seal); P1155 (Excerpts from Banja Luka Military Court file), p. 6; D1751
(Official record of Banja Luka's Military Post 4627, Military Police Official, 3 June 1992) (stating that the traces of removal by an engineering machine
were found and that it was determined that bodies of the victims were transported by trucks five kilometres away from the crime scene in the direction of
Gorni Budelj, and buried by an engineering machine); P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 138; Atif Dţafić, T. 19745 (30 September
2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2446.
5300
D1751 (Official record of Banja Luka's Military Post 4627, Military Police Official, 3 June 1992); Adjudicated Fact 2447.
5301
P1155 (Excerpts from Banja Luka Military Court file), e-court p. 4; KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9215–9216 (under seal);
Adjudicated Fact 2447.
5302
P3614 (Handwritten letter of complaint to Lanište-Kljuĉ Military Post, 12 June 1992) (in which 11 of the 12 suspects stated that they had been in custody
since 1 June 1992 and threatened to go on hunger strike if not released immediately); P3513 (Request for investigation by the 1st Krajina Corps Military
Prosecutor's Office, 8 March 1993 (requesting an investigation into the suspects named in P1155); P3616 (Proposal of the Military Prosecutor's Office
attached to the 1st Krajina Corps, 29 July 1993) (suggesting that two suspects then in custody be released due to the inability to bring the remainder into
custody and because both the deputy prime minister of the RS and the chairman of the Kljuĉ Executive Board had recommended halting the proceedings);
P6143 (Excerpt from ruling of Banja Luka Military Court, 29 July 1993) pp. 1–2 (stating that two of the suspects were released pursuant to the suggestion of
the prosecutor contained in P3616); Asim Egrlić, T. 19991–19992 (5 October 2011) (testifying that although Bosnian Serb investigating bodies had carried
 68

cradle and undeveloped, took the notice of it and started the process. The President didn’t
have any further competence over this, and nobody, except the judicial system could do
anything else. The main point is that the local authorities reacted and didn’t even try to
cover up the crime. This is senseless to bring it and charge the President for this crime. If the
Chamber collects an evidence about how a civil war is horrible, the President would agree,
and that was why he opposed the war by all of his abilities, see: D1833! #No Karad`i}’s
liability#! )

1528. Seventy seven bodies linked to the killings at Velagići School on 1 June 1992 were
exhumed from the Lanište II ―Babina Dolina‖ mass grave in Kljuĉ in the autumn of 1996.5303
Although three of the bodies were so skeletonised as to preclude the establishment of a cause of
death, the remainder all bore signs of fatal gunshot wounds, mostly to the head or trunk, and all
were found in civilian clothing.5304

1529. The Chamber therefore finds that Bosnian Muslim men were detained, subjected to verbal
and mental abuse, and that 77 Bosnian Muslim men were ultimately killed at Velagići School by
Serb Forces on 1 June 1992.

b. Scheduled Detention Facility C.15.1

1530. The Indictment refers to the use of the Kljuĉ SJB Building as a detention facility at least
between May and August 1992.5305

1531. On the morning of 28 May 1992, Asim Egrlić was arrested at a check-point just outside
Kljuĉ; he was then escorted to the SJB building in Kljuĉ,5306 which was staffed and operated by
the Bosnian Serb police.5307 While detained at the SJB building, Egrlić was beaten and sustained
extensive injuries to his head and body before being transferred to the hospital, where he remained
for approximately one hour.5308 While in the hospital, Veljko Kondić and Tihomir Dakić came to
see Egrlić.5309 (Not to forget, it happened the next day after the multiple and simultaneous

out an investigation in relation to the incident, the suspects were held in prison for 18 days and then released); Adjudicated Fact 2447. But see D4363
(Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8 February 2014), para. 17; Slobodan Jurišić, T. 47080 (14 February 2014).
5303
P3512 (Report on Lanište II mass grave, 4 October 1996) (describing the autopsies performed on 77 Bosnian Muslim males exhumed from Lanište II, 71 of
whom were identified); P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), para. 108 (describing P3512 as a court record which includes
autopsy and exhumation reports). [REDACTED]; P618 (Photograph of Velagići cemetery). See also P4878 (List of mass graves and bodies exhumed in
Kljuĉ Municipality, 1996) (listing 70 Bosnian Muslim males who had been exhumed from Lanište II, in addition to seven who were not identified, all of
whom were found upon examination to have been civilians who had been shot at point-blank range), pp. 11–13; P3637 (Report of BiH Federal Ministry of
the Interior, 22 October 1996) (same); P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 7, 84–86 (showing that 77 Bosnian Muslim males who
were reported missing from Velagići on or around 1 June 1992 were found in the Lanište II grave); P6690 (Addendum to Nicolas Sébire‘s report, 16 May
2003), p. 83; Adjudicated Facts 2446, 947.
5304
P3512 (Report on Lanište II mass grave, 4 October 1996) (describing the autopsies performed on 77 individuals exhumed from Lanište II, 71 of whom were
identified); P4881 (Autopsy reports for victims exhumed at Lanište II, 6 October 1996). See also Adjudicated Fact 2447.
5305
Indictment, Scheduled Detention Facility C.15.1. In Appendix B to the Prosecution‘s Final Brief, however, the Prosecution only referred to the period
―following attacks in May and June [19]92‖. The Chamber received evidence referring to the building housing the Kljuĉ SJB as the ―SJB building‖, the
―SUP building‖, and the ―police station‖. For clarity, the Chamber will use the term ―SJB building‖ throughout this section to denote this building.
5306
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4789, 4795, 4945; Asim Egrlić, T. 19985 (5 October 2011); KDZ192, T. 19493–19494 (27
September 2011) (closed session); D1737 (Official note of Kljuĉ War Department, 16 February 1993), pp. 1–2. See also Adjudicated Fact 2440. The
Chamber received evidence suggesting that Egrlić was wounded during the attack on the JNA convoy discussed above. See para. 1509. D1748 (Official
note of 2nd Krajina Corps Command, 11 July 1992), p. 3 (naming Egrlić as one of the attackers); D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1
December 2013), paras. 6, 20. Egrlić contested the veracity of the narrative contained in D1748, suggesting that the statements on which it was based were
obtained from persons detained in Manjaĉa who may have been under duress and that he had actually wounded himself by shooting himself in the foot.
Asim Egrlić, T. 19971–19974 (5 October 2011); Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4788–4789, 4795, 4945. Although the
Chamber considers Egrlić‘s account of his wounding implausible, the Chamber does not consider that Egrlić‘s involvement in this event, if any, would have
any impact on the credibility of his testimony regarding the treatment he received during his subsequent detention.
5307
See Adjudicated Fact 933. The Accused acknowledges that the Kljuĉ SJB building was staffed and operated by Bosnian Serb police, who, along with local
civilians subjected detainees to beatings and verbal abuse. Defence Final Brief, para. 1523. See also Adjudicated Fact 932 (stating that the SJB building
was located in the town of Kljuĉ).
5308
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4795, 4945, 4949–4950; Asim Egrlić, T. 19985 (5 October 2011) (stating that he was
admitted to the Kljuĉ hospital). See also Adjudicated Fact 2440; D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1 December 2013), para. 6 (stating that
Egrlić was administered first aid at the Kljuĉ Health Centre but transferred to Banja Luka for further treatment).
5309
Asim Egrlić, T. 19985 (5 October 2011). [REDACTED].
 69

attacks by the Muslim forces! So, these two Serb officials had nothing to do with the
mistreatment of Egrlic!) On the same day, Muhamed Filipović, a Bosnian Muslim member of the
Kljuĉ Municipal Assembly,5310 was arrested by two Bosnian Serbs in military uniforms and taken
to the SJB building, where he was subjected to beatings by Bosnian Serb soldiers.5311 At the time,
at least 22 other Bosnian Muslims were held at the SJB building.5312 (#Legal#! Had the arrested
been suspected for a military attacks that happened a day earlier, the police had to detaine
them somewhere, and usually a small detention space is located at the police station! There
must have been a high rage against those who initiated armed conflict after seven weeks of
endevours to preserve peace!)

1532. Those arrested were beaten in a gauntlet at the steps of the entrance to the SJB building
with feet, fists, batons, rifle-butts and chair legs, and were subjected to ethnic slurs.5313 They were
then beaten inside the SJB building, including during interrogations.5314 The perpetrators of these
beatings were Bosnian Serb police officers and local civilians.5315 (#No Karad`i}’s liability!#! Is
the Chamber of an opinion that this President wanted, o ordered those local Serbs to beat
those local Muslims? This was a civil war, the local Serbs and Muslims maintained the peace
for seven weeks after the war erupted throughout the BiH. Then, the Muslims had been
ordered by the SDA and the Muslim state organs to stop negotiating with the “agressors”
and to start the war against the Serbs, see D3904, Halilovic!)

1533. A prominent Bosnian Muslim was thrown down the stairs, and was carried into the SJB
building unconscious, whilst another suffered a cut lip and broken ribs.5316 As a result of the
severity of the beatings, the former suffered a serious, lasting injury with continuing effects to
date.5317

1534. [REDACTED].5318 [REDACTED].5319 [REDACTED].5320 [REDACTED].5321

5322
[REDACTED]. [REDACTED].5323 [REDACTED].5324 [REDACTED].5325
5326
[REDACTED].

1535. Other detainees, including Egrlić and Filipović, were later taken to the prison in Stara
Gradiška and subsequently to Manjaĉa.5327

1536. The Chamber finds that during the period between late May and late June 1992, members
of Serb Forces detained Bosnian Muslim men at the Kljuĉ SJB building and subjected them to

5310
D1350 (Lists of Muslim people in Kljuĉ, 10 June 1992), p. 2.
5311
See Adjudicated Fact 2441.
5312
See Adjudicated Fact 2441.
5313
See Adjudicated Fact 935.
5314
See Adjudicated Fact 937. Vinko Kondić and ‗Todo‘ Gajić, a police investigator, participated in the interrogations at the SJB building. See Adjudicated
Fact 934. (So what? This was their obligation, to implement a legal procedure, because nobody shouls be detained
without a deed!)
5315
Adjudicated Fact 937.
5316
See Adjudicated Fact 936.
5317
See Adjudicated Fact 936.
5318
[REDACTED].
5319
[REDACTED].
5320
[REDACTED].
5321
[REDACTED].
5322
[REDACTED].
5323
[REDACTED].
5324
[REDACTED].
5325
[REDACTED].
5326
[REDACTED].
5327
Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4795–4796 (stating that he was taken from the hospital via the SJB building and was
beaten until unconscious and bloody while en route to the Stara Gradiška prison); Adjudicated Fact 2442.
 70

ethnic slurs as well as beatings with fists, batons, rifle-butts and chair legs, which were sufficiently
severe as to cause permanent injury. (#Who started#! Who wanted the war? The Chamber
should also find that there was seven weeks of peace and negotiations, and all of a sudden,
those who were detained and mistreated caused a rebellion and killings of the Serb soldiers,
policemen and civilians. And the Chamber should take into account that it was all among the
local Muslims and Serbs, and that any irregularity that happened was #against all the
President’s orders#! Particularly should be noticed that the President didn’t have any
contact with this part of the country.

c. Scheduled Detention Facility C.15.2

1537. The Indictment refers to the use of the Nikola Maĉkić Elementary School as a detention
facility at least between 1 May and July 1992.5328

1538. From 2 June 1992,5329 approximately 300 Muslim men were detained and guarded by
Bosnian Serb regular and reserve civilian police in the Nikola Maĉkić Elementary School in
Kljuĉ.5330 When the detainees arrived at the Nikola Maĉkić Elementary School, they were forced
to run through a gauntlet of Bosnian Serb civilians armed with cables, bats, clubs, and other
objects, while being beaten, spat on, and verbally degraded.5331 Before entering the gym, all
detainees were searched by Bosnian Serbs, who seized the detainees‘ valuables and documents. 5332
Some detainees were also interrogated about whether they had weapons and whether they were
combatants.5333 (#Deadly combination#! All founded on the Rule 92bis evidence and
“adjudicated facts”. A procedures for the arrested people were provided for in the law, all
other possible deviant conduct couldn’t be justified, but could be understood since it
happened in the middle of an armed rebellion of the Muslim paramilitaries, with killings and
sufferings! No evidence of the President’s involvement! #No President liable#!)

1539. Two Bosnian Serb police officers stood in the corridor, beating the detainees at random as
they entered the gym, where approximately 100 civilian men of all ages were sitting on the floor
with their hands behind their backs,5334 facing the walls, which were stained with blood.5335
(#Combatants, not civilians#! Obviously, either 200 had been released after an
interrogations, or there wasn’t 300 of them. An exaggeration is so common in those
statements and testimonies, so that any chamber should be cautious of it! And what is
particularly dubious is the characterisation of the detained as civilians! On what basis? This
was a civil war literally, civilians fought civilians, as General Abdel Razek testified. There
was no a professional armies and uniforms!) Some detainees were crying, while others were
bleeding and injured from the beatings.5336 Detainees were forced to extend the three fingers in
the Serbian salute.5337 One detainee was forced to lick his own blood off the floor after having

5328
Indictment, Scheduled Detention Facility C.15.2. In Appendix B to the Prosecution Final Brief, however, the Prosecution only refers to the period ―from 27
and during early Jun[e 19]92‖.
5329
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 87, 139; KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10353.
5330
See Adjudicated Facts 2444, 938; Slobodan Jurišić, D4363 (Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8 February 2014), para. 25 (testifying that the
school was guarded by civilian police). The Accused concedes that the Nikola Maĉkić School was staffed by civilian police, who, along with Bosnian Serb
civilians, took part in the beatings that occurred at the school. Defence Final Brief, para. 1524.
5331
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 87; see Adjudicated Fact 939.
5332
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 87.
5333
KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10353.
5334
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 88.
5335
KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10354.
5336
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 88.
5337
Adjudicated Fact 943.
 71

been beaten severely.5338 Beatings took place both during and outside interrogations, including the
beating of a boy who was 16 and still attending high school, despite the fact that his age was
known to the interrogators.5339

1540. Former Bosnian Muslim police officers were the object of particularly severe physical
abuse and humiliation.5340 Atif Dţafić was taken from the gym to a classroom,5341 where he was
interrogated by a Bosnian Serb police officer, Nedeljko Vasić.5342 Dţafić was then returned to the
gym and ―put on display‖ in the middle of the gym floor with his hands behind his back, where his
former subordinates beat him.5343 (So, his “former subordinates” didn’t respect him at all,
particularly after he abandoned his professional duties and initiated the armed crushes
against his “former subordinates”, capturing and killing, among others, “his subordinate”,
as a matter of fact, his deputy Dusan Stojakovic. #What the President has to do with it?#)
After one hour, Dţafić was again taken to the corridor by two masked policemen wearing
camouflage uniforms. These policemen beat him and took him for further interrogation by Duško
Miliĉević, who was an inspector from the Banja Luka CSB and dressed in the uniform of a
military captain, and another military captain. Miliĉević and the other military captain beat Dţafić
with desk legs, cables, and bats.5344 The other military captain asked Dţafić what Dţafić knew
about who had killed Dušan Stojaković and why Dţafić had not signed the SJB loyalty oath.5345
Dţafić denied involvement in Stojaković‘s death,5346 but was given a piece of paper and asked to
―write everything down‖ before being returned to the gym, where he was again placed in the
middle of the floor.5347 (#Interrogation#! How serious suspicions were associated with this
witness, can be seen from the fact that the military investigators came from Banja Luka to
investigate and interrogate him!)

1541. The municipal authorities were aware that Bosnian Muslims were beaten by Bosnian Serbs
in the Nikola Maĉkić School.5348 (#AF rebuted#! Adjudicated fact! Rebuted by the witness
Jurisic, but seems to be in vain, as anything the Defence had done! Since the military
investigators run the interrogations, and a rebellion was a military matter, the army had a
priority, and no matter what the #“municipal authorities knew, they could do nothing!@).

1542. The detainees were held at the Nikola Maĉkić School until at least 7 p.m. on 2 June 1992
without being given any food or water.5349 (#Exagerated#! So, the detainees had been brought

5338
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 94.
5339
Adjudicated Fact 940.
5340
Adjudicated Fact 941. Atif Dţafić recognised two or three of his former police colleagues among the detainees in civilian clothes. P3488 (Witness
statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 88.
5341
While en route to and from this classroom, Dţafić was beaten with school desk legs and cables. P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 88.
5342
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 88.
5343
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 88.
5344
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 89. See also Adjudicated Fact 941. Miliĉević beat another Bosnian Muslim police officer, Atif
Dedić. P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 89. See also Adjudicated Fact 941.
5345
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 91; Atif Dţafić, T. 19741 (30 September 2011).
5346
Dţafić asserted that there was ―no reason to arrest him‖, but suggested that the interrogators might have thought that as police commander, he would have
known more and therefore focused their investigations on him. Atif Dţafić, T. 19743 (30 September 2011).
5347
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), paras. 91, 93, 94; Atif Dţafić, T. 19741 (30 September 2011).
5348
Adjudicated Fact 944. Slobodan Jurišić testified that he did not know or hear that Muslims were being beaten at Nikola Mačkić School, nor was
this discussed at the Crisis(to see a real meaning!!! Staff. D4363 (Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8 February 2014), para. 26. Considering,
however, that Jurišić was a member of the Crisis Staff, and that whether the Crisis Staff was informed of the beatings at the Nikola Maĉkić‘s school could
bear on Jurišić‘s responsibility in relation to those events, the Chamber shall not rely on Jurišić‘s evidence on this point. The Chamber notes that the
Accused relied on Jovo Kevac‘s evidence to support his assertion that ―all reported incidents of abuse were dealt with‖ by the Kljuĉ authorities. Defence
Final Brief, para. 1524. However, Kevac merely stated his belief that the Crisis Staff was not aware of the beatings, and even admitted a lack of knowledge
in this regard. D4268 (Witness statement of Jovo Kevac dated 25 January 2014), para. 33. The Chamber will therefore not rely on Kevac‘s opinion.
(#Deadly combination#! If this criterion is taken without any selectivity, none of the Muslim witnesses, particularly
those who took part in the fights, either as an organizers or combatants, shouldn’t be trusted at all. This “carnage” of
the Defence witnesses is without a precedent.
5349
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 95; KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10354.
 72

in the School on 2 June 1992, see para 1538, and released the same day, “without being given
any food or water”?!?)

1543. On 5 June 1992, other detainees were transferred directly from the Nikola Maĉkić School
to Manjaĉa.5350 On approximately 7 June 1992, the detainees in Sitnica were also transferred to
Manjaĉa.5351

1544. The Chamber therefore finds that during the period between 2 and 5 June 1992, members
of Serb Forces detained Bosnian Muslim men at the Nikola Maĉkić School, and subjected them to
severe beatings with such objects as cables, bats, and clubs, as well as verbal abuse and other
forms of humiliation.

1106. Killings after June 1992: Scheduled Incident A.7.3

1545. The Indictment refers to the killing of at least 144 people in Biljani on or about
10 July 1992.

1546. Around 6:15 a.m. on 10 July 1992, all men in Biljani between the ages of 18 and 60 were
told to gather at a field near the village5352 while the women and children were allowed to remain
at home.5353 Approximately 20 or 30 soldiers were visible on the elevations surrounding the
village, which was consequently completely surrounded and cut off.5354 Between 50 and 70 men
arrived at the field, where they found Marko Samardţija, a captain in the reserve forces,5355
waiting with Mladjo Tesić and ten other soldiers.5356 The soldiers ordered the men to line up so
they could be questioned.5357 The Bosnian Muslim men remained there for approximately one
hour while the village was being searched; What was the result of the search? they were then
marched in a column to the Biljani Primary School, approximately one kilometre away.5358

1547. When the men arrived at the Biljani Primary School, a van was parked under a tree with
about ten military policemen from Kljuĉ wearing white belts.5359 Many soldiers stood around the
school and approximately ten were in front of a shop, guarding women and children brought from

5350
See Adjudicated Fact 2445.
5351
P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 95; KDZ056, P686 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 10354. See also para. 1382.
5352
The village of Biljani is located north-west of the town of Kljuĉ between Krasulje and Sanica, and contained the hamlets of Brkići, Dţaferagići, Botonići
and Jakubovac, which were almost exclusively inhabited by Bosnian Muslims. P3365 (Map of area around Biljani); Adjudicated Fact 929. See also P3488
(Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 140; KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4954 (commenting on P3365);
KDZ075, T. 19033 (16 September 2011).
5353
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4965–4966.
5354
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4966.
5355
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4967–4968. KDZ075 knew Samardţija because he had been KDZ075‘s primary school
teacher in Biljani. KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4967.
5356
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4966.
5357
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4966–4967. The soldiers told them not to be afraid, that nothing would happen to them, that
they had a list of people who should be questioned, while those who were not on the list would be ―sent back‖. KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4966.
5358
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4966. See also P3360 (List of detainees from Biljani). The Chamber shall not rely on Rajko
Kalabić‘s testimony that those detained at Biljani were not detained on account of their ethnicity or age, but because they were suspected of being members
of paramilitary forces or of possessing illegal weapons, as Kalabić later denied knowing anything about the incident in Biljani, and ultimately admitted that
he had previously testified that he had heard that a ―massacre‖ had occurred there on 10 July 1992. D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1
December 2013), para. 19; Rajko Kalabić, T. 44588–44589 (5 December 2013). See also P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 141
(noting that he had talked to Bosnian Muslim survivors of the Biljani incident and that they were all civilians).(#Combatants, not civilians#! The
Chamber did not understand the domestic circumstances. What does it mean “they were civilians”? As if civilians
couldn’t fight and kill! At least to the end of 1992 more that 80% of the Muslim combatants fought in a civilian
cloats!)
5359
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4967, 4968; KDZ075, T. 19017 (16 September 2011). See also P3366 (Official note of Kljuĉ
SJB, 10 July 1992); KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4969 (testifying that this was consistent with what he saw in the Biljani
school gym). See also Adjudicated Facts 930, 939; P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić undated), para. 140; Atif Dţafić, T. 19740 (30 September
2011) (testifying that he later learned that Bosnian Serb military and civilian police had attacked Biljani on the morning of 10 July and had rounded up the
entire village population and taken them to the elementary school).
 73

another hamlet.5360 Samardţija greeted Mile Tomić, a police commander in Sanica,5361 and his
deputy, Mihić, along with several other men before the detained men were told to enter the
school.5362 Soldiers were arriving from all directions, bringing people from the seven or eight
hamlets in the village.5363

1548. Between 120 and 150 men were confined in two classrooms inside the Biljani Primary
School.5364 Before entering the classrooms, the group of men from KDZ075‘s hamlet, were made
to empty their pockets and their documents in the corridor.5365 Mihić and another reserve
policeman spent approximately 45 minutes writing down the detainees‘ names before leaving the
classroom.5366

1549. After 20 to 30 minutes, Mihić returned and began to call out ten names, and one by one, the
men left the classroom and the detainees heard a burst of fire each time.5367 (#“Heard, not
seen#”! already a stereotype!) After another five or ten minutes, the men began to be called out
in groups of five.5368 When the first group exited, the shooting and screams of men outside
intensified.5369 The policemen guarding the detainees told them that the Green Berets were
attacking and that the guards would drive them away.5370 When one detainee remarked that they
were all going to be killed, panic ensued.5371 A soldier told the men to calm down and that they
would all ―be going‖, but that the elderly men should gather on one side of the classroom because
only the younger men would be travelling.5372 (#Deadly combination#! ALL THE 92bis AND
ADJUDICATED FACTS!!!

1550. After leaving the classroom, the groups of five detainees were lined up in the corridor and
let out of the building one by one.5373 Some were beaten while passing through a line of 20 to 30
Bosnian Serb soldiers on the way to two buses parked near the school,5374 while others were taken
5360
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4968.
5361
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4967 (testifying that he knew Tomić personally).
5362
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4967–4968.
5363
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4968. When shown P3367, an order of Kljuĉ Military Post dated 9 July 1992 which described
the assignment of the 2nd Battalion of the 17th Light Infantry Brigade, a reconnaissance platoon, a military police squad, and a police platoon to block,
search, and mop up the Donji Biljani, Domazeti, Botonjići, Jabukovac, Osmanovići, and Brkići sectors on 10 July 1992, KDZ075 confirmed that this was
consistent with what transpired on 10 July 1992, as various different units had brought the residents of Botonjići, Jabukovac Polje, and Domezeti to the
school. KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4971 (commenting on P3367).
5364
See Adjudicated Fact 930.
5365
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4968.
5366
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4969, 4972; KDZ075, T. 19019 (16 September 2011) (private session); P3361 (List of 76
persons). See also KDZ075, T. 19018 (16 September 2011).
5367
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4972; KDZ075, T. 19069 (19 September 2011). When KDZ075‘s relative was called out but
tried to return for his jacket, which he had forgotten, a policeman told the relative to leave the jacket because he would not need it anymore. KDZ075,
P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4972–4973; KDZ075, P3358 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4979–4980 (under seal).
After KDZ075‘s relative left, the men remaining in the gym heard a burst of fire. (#DISTORTION#! THE DETAINEES HAD BEEN TOLD
THAT THE GREEN BERETS WERE ATTACKING. HOW MANY REASONS COULD BE LISTED FOR “A
BURTS OF FIRE” IN A CIVIL WAR? THE LAST WOULD BE AN EXECUTION!) KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4973; KDZ075, P3358 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4979–4980 (under seal). [REDACTED]. See also P3362
(List of persons detained in Biljani Elementary School); KDZ075, T. 19025–19026 (16 September 2011) (private session).
5368
Adjudicated Fact 930; KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4973.
5369
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4973.
5370
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4973. The detainees did not believe this because ―not a single bullet was fired from [the
Bosnian Muslim] side in Biljani‖ and because most of the Bosnian Muslim men had already been brought to the school building. KDZ075, T. 19023 (16
September 2011). See also KDZ075, T. 19054–19055, 19057–19058 (private session) (19 September 2011); T. 19067–19068 (19 September 2011)
(asserting that Bosnian Muslims had been surrendered, that there were no Bosnian Muslim soldiers in Biljani in 1992, and that there was no combat in
Biljani in 1992). The detainees only later realised that the individuals who were being taken out were being killed. KDZ075, T. 19023 (16 September 2011).
5371
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4973.
5372
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4973–4975.
5373
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4974.
5374
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4973–4974. Dragan Cvijić, a special purpose policeman, was standing at the bottom of the
steps, and kicked KDZ075 in the stomach as the latter passed by. KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4974. Once on board the
bus, KDZ075 heard soldiers say, in relations to detainees who fell down while en route to the bus, ―take him away. This man is good for nothing. Kill him.‖
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4975. KDZ075 also recalled a specific instance when ―another man came along who worked
in Kljuĉ, and he said ‗give this one to me. This one is not getting on the bus.‘‖ KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4975.
 74

away to the road below.5375 Detainees continued to be loaded onto the buses until they were
packed with approximately 70 people.5376 When the buses were full, the detainees who had not
yet boarded the buses were shot.5377 (A #dubious and uncorroborated#!)

1551. As the bus departed, four men were taken off the bus and killed.5378 After the bus had gone
approximately 100 metres, an additional five men, including KDZ075, Fikret Balagić, Alija Avdić,
Besim Avdić, and a man whose first name was Rufad were also removed from the bus by military
policemen wearing camouflage uniforms and white belts.5379

1552. The men were led to a ditch behind a house, where KDZ075 saw the other men who had
been taken off the bus earlier lying dead.5380 When KDZ075 and two of the men with him tried to
escape, the soldiers called after them, ―stop, fuck your balija mothers!‖5381 KDZ075 heard a burst
of fire, and one of the men fell to the ground with ―two or three huge holes in his back‖.5382 When
a soldier indicated that a third man was still alive, another soldier fired a burst of fire at the third
man.5383 Soldiers from the bus yelled at the shooters to hurry up, but the shooters waited for the
men to stop breathing before eventually running back to the buses.5384

1. After the bus left, KDZ075 fled and hid in the cornfields nearby.5385 From there, he could hear trucks
and bulldozers coming to collect the bodies and houses being set on fire.5386 The collection of bodies
continued into the night of 10 July 1992.5387

2. The bodies of 184 Bosnian Muslims, most of whom had been shot in the head, were exhumed from
graves associated with the events at Biljani Primary School on 10 July 1992.5388 The bodies of 15
additional Bosnian Muslims, the majority of whom bore signs of fatal gunshot wounds to the head,

5375
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4973–4974.
5376
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4975; KDZ075, T. 19058 (private session) (19 September 2011).
5377
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4975; KDZ075, T. 19069 (19 September 2011) (recalling that one man who appeared to be in
charge yelled ‗we don‘t need the rest of them, kill them all‘).
5378
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4975–4976; KDZ075, T. 19064 (19 September 2011).
5379
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4976, 4984; KDZ075, T. 19060 (19 September 2011).
5380
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4976.
5381
KDZ075, T. 19061–19062 (19 September 2011); KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4977.
5382
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4977; KDZ075, T. 19062 (19 September 2011).
5383
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4977.
5384
KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4977. See also KDZ075, T. 19063 (19 September 2011). The Chamber notes that while Jovo
Kevac attributed responsibility for these killings to criminal groups that ―broke free of control and burst into the area at some point‖, he could not
definitively state that such groups had been present at Biljani school. Jovo Kevac, T. 46230–46231 (30 January 2014). Kevac also suggested that the
perpetrators had been apprehended and proceedings conducted against them, but could not recall any names or produce documents associated with the
alleged investigation. D4268 (Witness statement of Jovo Kevac dated 25 January 2014), para. 9; Jovo Kevac, T. 46233, 46235 (30 January 2014).
(#Deadly combination#! Why a Defence witness should be expected to submit any document? The OTP was obliged to
obtain every single evidence, including these pertaining to a legal procedure agains any perpetrator whose misdeeds
are charged against this Accused. Since the witness wasn’t trusted, is the Defence now entitled to obtain a possible
document that he couldn’t submit?
5385
KDZ075, T. 19025 (16 September 2011). After the shooting, KDZ075 lay where he had fallen for approximately 1.5 hours, after which he fled to the woods
and then to a cornfield nearby. KDZ075, T. 19025 (16 September 2011); KDZ075, T. 19065 (19 September 2011).
5386
KDZ075, T. 19025, 19034 (16 September 2011).
5387
KDZ075, T. 19035 (16 September 2011).
5388
KDZ075 testified that P3361 and P3362 contained the names of persons detained in the classroom with him at the Biljani primary school. KDZ075, T.
19019–19020, 19026 (16 September 2011); P3361 (List of 76 persons); P3362 (List of persons detained in Biljani Elementary School). The bodies of the
vast majority of the persons listed in P3361 and P3362 were exhumed from the Lanište I and Crvena Zemlja mass graves in 1996. P3363 (Report on Lanište
I mass grave, 3 October 1996) (containing the autopsies of persons listed in P3361 and P3362); P4879 (Kljuĉ Court record of Crvena Zemlja II exhumation,
4–15 November 1996) (containing the autopsies of persons listed in P3361 and P3362); P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 8–13;
P6690 (Addendum to Nicolas Sébire‘s report, 16 May 2003), pp. 84, 90–93. See also P4878 (List of mass graves and bodies exhumed in Kljuĉ
Municipality, 1996), pp. 2–5 (containing a partial list of persons exhumed from Lanište I); P3637 (Report of BiH Federal Ministry of the Interior, 22
October 1996), pp. 9–10 (containing a partial list of persons exhumed from Lanište I); Adjudicated Fact 930; P3488 (Witness statement of Atif Dţafić
undated), para. 140. (WHAT WOULD PREVENT THE MUSLIM SERVICES TO PREPARE THE WITNESSES AND
TO OBTAIN TO THEM A LIST WITH THE EXHUMED COMBATANTS TO BE PUT ON A LISTS OF THEIR
“REMEMBRANCE” AS A DETAINED? IN THE BALKANS JUDICIAL SYSTEM AN INVESTIGATING JUDGE
WOULD CLARIFY THAT IN A PRE-TRIAL PHASE!)
 75

were exhumed from graves located in and around Biljani and were identified as containing the remains
of persons killed by Serb Forces on or around 10 July 1992.5389

3. The Chamber therefore finds that 199 Bosnian Muslims were killed by Serb Forces on or around 10
July 1992 in Biljani. (#Combatants, civilians#! None of them combatants, none of them combat
casualties???)

(1) Scheduled Incident D.13

4. The Indictment refers to the destruction of eight mosques and a Catholic church between at least May
and August 1992.5390

1557. Eight mosques in Kljuĉ municipality were destroyed during the period between May 1992
and August 1992.5391 With regard to the destruction of specific sites and the identities of those
responsible, the Chamber received evidence indicating that the Velagići-Pudin Han mosque was
blown up by Serb Forces during the attack on Pudin Han on 28 May 1992,5392 and that the Biljani
Mosque was set on fire in the morning of 10 July 1992 when the village was attacked by Serb
Forces.5393 (#Armed stronghold#! The Chamber trusted the KDZ075, Dzafic and others when
stated that there was no soldiers in Biljani, but there wouldn’t be any attack had that been
so. Biljani was a stronghold as any other numerous Muslim settlement!) The Kljuĉ mosque
was blown up at approximately 3:05 a.m. on 30 July 1992.5394 According to a report issued the
following day, although the perpetrators were unknown, an investigation was underway to uncover
their identities.5395 The Chamber also took judicial notice of the fact that following the Crisis
Staff‘s order, at least four Muslim monuments in Kljuĉ municipality, including the Atik mosque in
the town of Kljuĉ, were either completely destroyed or heavily damaged by fire and explosives set
by Serb Forces during 1992.5396 (If the state organs undertook an investigating process, what
the President has to do with it, since there was no evidence that he was against this process,
and was strongly opposed to this kind of conduct.)

1558. In light of the evidence described above and noting the pattern of destruction of the
mosques in Kljuĉ municipality, particularly the temporal proximity of the destruction of the
Velagići-Pudin Han Mosque and the Biljani Mosque to the attacks by Serb Forces on those
villages,5397 the Chamber finds that eight mosques in Kljuĉ municipality were destroyed by Serb
Forces between May and August 1992. (#Ad absurdum#!This is only another absurd, that this
President may be liable for what was happening in the civil war, one of many in the course of
time. It was well known that the President condemned any such felony, and ordered the

5389
P4877 (Kljuĉ Court record in relation to Biljani exhumation, 14 October 1996); P4878 (List of mass graves and bodies exhumed in Kljuĉ Municipality,
1996), pp. 6–7; P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 13; P6690 (Addendum to Nicolas Sébire‘s report, 16 May 2003), pp. 84–89.
5390
The religious sites identified in Scheduled Incident D.13 are the Kljuĉ Town mosque, Biljani–Dţaferagići mosque, Pudin Han–Velagići mosque, Donji
Budelj mosque, Humići mosque, Krasulje mosque, Sanica mosque, Tićevići mosque,and the Town Catholic church. See also Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief,
Confidential Appendix A, p. 32 (asserting that Pudin Han mosque and Velagići mosque are one and the same). The Chamber has treated them accordingly.
5391
P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted
records), pp. 149–172 (including photographic evidence of destruction). See also KDZ075, T. 19025 (16 September 2011) (recalling that he observed an
attempt to blow up a mosque in late July or early August). According to Riedlmayer‘s report, the Catholic church in Kljuĉ was destroyed in January or
February 1993. P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić
case, formatted records), pp. 173–175. The destruction of the church thus falls outside the time period specified in Scheduled Incident D.13.
5392
See Adjudicated Fact 2451. See also KDZ024, P713 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 9117 (under seal).
5393
See Adjudicated Fact 952. The Chamber notes that Slobodan Jurišić testified that the municipal authorities‘ position was to ―do everything to preserve these
buildings‖, and suggested that the fact that the explosives were set ―unprofessionally‖ suggested that they were perpetrated by ―riotous groups‖. Slobodan
Jurišić, T. 47113, 47117 (14 February 2014).
5394
D1735 (Investigation report of Kljuĉ Lower Court, 30 July 1992); D1736 (Journalist report regarding Kljuĉ SJB, undated), p. 1. See also Adjudicated Fact
951.
5395
KDZ192, T. 19507–19508 (27 September 2011) (closed session); D1736 (Journalist report regarding Kljuĉ SJB, undated), pp. 1–2.
5396
See Adjudicated Fact 2450.
5397
Asim Egrlić testified that the Bosnian Serb assertion that ―extremists‖ were located in mosques was merely a pretext. Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4820; P3450 (Video footage of TV Banja Luka depicting events in Kljuĉ), at 00:07:02–00:07:25.
 76

investigation, and never changed this attitude. Also, there was a regular feature that the
Muslim combatants used mosques as a sniper nests or for other military purposes. The
Chember never established which of the mosques had been damaged without a #military
necessity#!)

(1) Movement of the population from Kljuĉ

1559. At a meeting on 20 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff adopted several conclusions which were
later endorsed in Kljuĉ,5398 including that there was ―no reason for the population of any
nationality to move out of the territory of the [ARK]‖.5399 (#EXCULPATORY!!!#) However, one
week later, the Kljuĉ Crisis Staff established an Agency for the Reception and Removal of
Refugees, (That was a two way process, “reception and departure”, meant that there was a
#fluctuation of population!#) adopted a Decision on the Organisation of Departure from the Area
of the Municipality, and decided that the National Defence Council would be responsible for
organising departures from the municipality.5400 Over the next several days, during its meetings,
the Kljuĉ Crisis Staff considered the resettlement of the Bosnian Muslim population.5401
(#Superiors rectify#! The P03431 is an excellent evidence of the authority’s endeavour to
rectify all illegal matters that may happen in the municipality. Let us see: 2 June meeting:

Now, let us see what had been an attitude of the municipal authorities next day:

Just for the allegatins that the POWs didn’t receive enough food. Nobody received sufficient
food. But, let us see the agenda pertaining to the movement of the population:

This wasn’t aimed to the public, but had been the directives to the municipal services and
departments. It is visible that the authorities had been aware of a problems, but neither the
authorities ordered and managed this irregularities, nor remained blind! #Responsible
conduct of officials#!)

5398
[REDACTED].
5399
D1309 (Conclusions of the ARK Crisis Staff, 20 May 1992).
5400
P2606 (Minutes from sessions of Kljuĉ's Crisis Staff, 27 May-10 July 1992), p. 3 (inter alia prohibiting the return of families who departed ―without
appropriate reasons‖); Adjudicated Fact 2452.
5401
[REDACTED]; P2606 (Minutes from sessions of Kljuĉ's Crisis Staff, 27 May–10 July 1992), p. 10 (recording ―the question of the removal of the
population‖ as an agenda item on 3 June); [REDACTED]. See also D4165 (Witness statement of Marko Adamović dated 1 December 2013), para. 12.
 77

1560. On the morning of 29 May, the Kljuĉ Defence Command and Crisis Staff jointly issued an
order for ―all citizens of Muslim ethnicity, women, children, and men loyal to the Serbian
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina‖ to gather at various points in Kljuĉ, including the football
grounds in Kljuĉ, the Social Centre in Šehići, the factory grounds in Hanlovsko Vrelo, and the
ŠIPAD warehouse in Kljuĉ, by 11 a.m. that day.5402 (#Who started#! The Chamber didn’t
explicate what was it’s position towards this document (P3473), but it should be noticed that
it was issued two days after the start of the attacks of the Muslim forces on Kljuc, 27 may.

1561. The Kljuĉ War Presidency adopted a decision pursuant to which ―all citizens‖, regardless of
ethnicity, would be allowed to leave the municipality if they gave a statement to the relevant organ
that they wished to do so.5403 People who wished to move out of the municipality were required to
obtain permission to do so from the municipal authorities.5404 (#Obstacles to leave#! From this so
far it is clear that it was a voluntary, since on the side of a person wanting to leave there was
an obligation to do some moves in order to be allowed to leave!) Anyone who wished to leave
was required to state that their departure was voluntary as well as permanent.5405 (#No permanent
removal possible#! A “permanent” was illegal, and the President had already issued his
decision that the refugees and abandoned property are temporary issues!) Moreover, those
who owned real property were required to make a declaration renouncing that property by either
exchanging it or placing it at the disposal of the municipality.5406 (#Legal and obligatory#! To
put this aspect in the Judgment of this President is senseless. First, in a war conditions any
municipality authorities were entitled to mobilize and require any property needed for the
defence. Second, this President, once after learning about this kind of provisions of the local
authorities had issued an order forbidding this kind of provisions and announcing all such a
documents null and void, see: D101

T
his Order of the President of 19 August 1992 was carried out, and never and nowhere
happened that somebody lost his #property#, or was #forbidden to return#!) For at least a
month, such housing was reassigned to Bosnian Serb refugees.5407 While these declarations were
ostensibly made voluntarily, Asim Egrlić testified that they were made under duress and that the
people decided to relinquish their property in order to save their lives, irrespective of the words
contained therein.5408 (#Ad absurdum#! That could have been the refugee’s assumption, but
5402
P3473 (Order of Kljuĉ Defence Command and Crisis Staff, 29 May 1992); [REDACTED].
5403
P3472 (Report re Kljuĉ War Presidency, undated). In accordance with the decision of the ARK Crisis Staff on 29 May, departure would be permanent. See
P3461 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 29 May 1992).
5404
KDZ075, T. 19047–19048 (19 September 2011); P3462 (Decision of Kljuĉ War Presidency, 30 July 1992) (permitting persons who had given a statement to
the Commission for Collecting Data on Moving Away to leave the territory voluntarily and permanently); P3472 (Report re Kljuĉ War Presidency, undated).
See also Adjudicated Facts 953, 954, 2452; Slobodan Jurišić, T. 47095 (14 February 2014). For an example of such a statement, see e.g. P3463 (Record of
the Commission for Gathering Information Relating to the Departure of Population from Kljuĉ, 31 July 1992). The Chamber notes that although in their
statements, Marko Adamović and Rajko Kalabić denied that permits were required in order to leave the municipality, see D4165 (Witness statement of
Marko Adamović dated 1 December 2013), para. 15 (suggesting that people were not required to obtain permits); D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko
Kalabić dated 1 December 2013), para. 23 (denying that any permits were required in order to leave the municipality), the Accused conceded that those
leaving were required to make statements. Defence Final Brief, para. 1514.
5405
P3462 (Decision of Kljuĉ War Presidency, 30 July 1992); P3573 (Record of declaration of individuals leaving Kljuĉ, 10 August 1992), pp. 2–10; Asim
Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4766; Asim Egrlić, T. 19933–19935 (5 October 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2453.
5406
P3462 (Decision of Kljuĉ War Presidency, 30 July 1992), p. 1; P3472 (Report re Kljuĉ War Presidency, undated); [REDACTED]. See e.g. P3573 (Record
of declaration of individuals leaving Kljuĉ, 10 August 1992), pp. 2–10; Asim Egrlić, P6586 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4766; Asim Egrlić,
T. 19933–19935 (5 October 2011). But see Slobodan Jurišić, T. 47095–47098 (14 February 2014); D4363 (Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8
February 2014), paras. 18, 43 (denying that people were required to sign such documents).
5407
[REDACTED]; P3472 (Report re Kljuĉ War Presidency, undated). But see P3463 (Record of the Commission for Gathering Information Relating to the
Departure of Population from Kljuĉ, 31 July 1992) (which does not mention the abandonment of property to the municipality); [REDACTED]. See further
P3453 (Decision of Kljuĉ War Presidency, 13 July 1992) (deciding to ―stop further flat allotment on any basis until criteria for allotment at the regional level
[could be] created‖).
5408
Asim Egrlić, T. 19925, 19930 (5 October 2011) (commenting on P3573); P3573 (Record of declaration of individuals leaving Kljuĉ, 10 August 1992).
Egrlić further explained that despite what was stated on such declarations, in practice, property was forcefully confiscated before being disposed of by the
administrative organ of Bosnian Serb Kljuĉ municipality. Asim Egrlić, T. 19933 (5 October 2011).
 78

there was no any theat o matter what Egrlic said, the provision wasn’t effective, ever or
anywhere. Full stop. In accordance with the ARK decision of 4 August 1992, individuals leaving
the ARK could take with them no more than 300 German marks.5409 (Lawful#! It had already
been proven (in the case of Vlasenica) that there was a federal limitation for carring a cash,
while the legally possessed money issued with the banking documentation was not limited.
This practice is usual in many countries, in peace as well as in war.

1562. The Accused contends that the renunciations and reassignments only pertained to temporary
use, and not to ownership of such property.5410 (That was corroborated by a several orders of
the President, as well as by the practice!) The Chamber received evidence that the municipal
authorities did not pass any decision which would have collectively converted abandoned
properties into state property, and that no changes were made to the land registry books such as
would indicate a permanent change in property ownership.5411 However, the Chamber notes that
on 19 June, the ARK Crisis Staff took a decision that all ―abandoned‖ property would be
proclaimed property of the state and placed at the disposal of the municipal assemblies.5412 The
Chamber is therefore satisfied that such real property was effectively seized by the Bosnian Serb
Political and Governmental Organs on a permanent basis. This is completely wrong inference!
“A presumption of guilt.” To have some property “at the disposal of the municipal
assemblies” was regulated by the domestic laws pertaining to the National defence, even if an
owner was not in refuge, and this never pertained to any owner’s rights. Any abandoned
property had to be maintained and given to use to the municipal authorities, which could
give it further on a strictly temporary basis, and with the obligations to maintain it and
return it in the same state. But, no matter what the ARK institution issued, the D101
annulled all of it on 19 August 92.

1563. Mass departures began to take place as of 1 June 1992.5413 (#Context#! To put this into a context,
just note that it happened more than eight weeks after the war started (in Bijeljina, B. Brod,
Kupres and seven weeks after the war broke out in Sarajevo) but the civil peace couldn’t survive
the Muslim attacks commencing 27 May. Without the context it looks different, but the context is
crucial. Why it didn’t happen before the Muslim rebellion on 27 May? Because the Serbs didn’t
intend to wage a war, and in particular, didn’t intend to expel anyone, or in any way spoil the
lawful order. It is of a crusial importance to always have in mind that at the end of the war there
were many Muslims in every single Serbian settlement where they have lived prior to the war.
The difference between those who remained to live in the Serb surrounding and those who left is
important, and didn’t concern the Serbs, but those who wanted to leave. On 4 June, the President
of the Kljuĉ Crisis Staff made a statement indicating that all citizens who wished to leave Kljuĉ
permanently would be allowed to do so in an organised manner, assisted by international humanitarian
organisations and the competent organs of the Kljuĉ Municipal Assembly.5414 Those who wished to
leave were to report to the Civilian Protection Department of the Municipal Assembly or to the local
committees in local communes.5415 (#Obstacles to leave#! The authorities only facilitated leaving,
but those who didn’t want, didn’t have to report snd apply, therefore, they hadn’t been expelled
by the authorities, but by the events of the civil war. And every family whch had their members
in the Muslim Army have rather chosen to leave to the Muslim controlled territory!)

5409
Adjudicated Fact 2454.
5410
Defence Final Brief, confidential, para. 1514.
5411
[REDACTED]; Slobodan Jurišić, T. 47127 (14 February 2014).
5412
P3451 (Decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff, June 1992), p. 13; [REDACTED]. See also Asim Egrlić, T. 19930–19931, 19935 (5 October 2011) (conceding
that such declarations pertained to use and that no property ownership changes were effected but equating the declarations coupled with departure as
permanent relinquishment under the circumstances).
5413
Asim Egrlić, T. 20000 (5 October 2011).
5414
P3448 (Statement of Kljuĉ Crisis Staff, 4 June 1992). See also D4169 (Witness statement of Rajko Kalabić dated 1 December 2013), para. 22; D4363
(Witness statement of Slobodan Jurišić dated 8 February 2014), para. 18.
5415
P3448 (Statement of Kljuĉ Crisis Staff, 4 June 1992).
 79

1564. A number of convoys of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were first organised by the
police prior to a convoy of approximately 1,000 people, the majority of whom included Bosnian
Muslim women and children, leaving Kljuĉ for Travnik in late July 1992.5416 Very few able-
bodied men left in this convoy.5417
1565. On 11 September 1992, approximately 500 Bosnian Muslims were transported to
Travnik.5418 At least two other Travnik-bound convoys left in September, including one in which
an over-crowded convoy transported 1,000 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, whose names
were called prior to their boarding from a list of people who had paid a fare.5419 At a meeting in
September 1992, Jovo Banjac informed Mladić that only 5,000 Bosnian Muslims remained in
Kljuĉ as of the date of their meeting, and that another 1,500 left on the same day.5420
(#Voluntary leave#! This is another proof of the voluntary nature of leaving. So, having in
mind that some of the Muslims had every opportunity to stay, or leave in an organised and
satisfactory manner, and some had suffered arrests, detentions, mistreating and even killing,
brings us to the question: what was a difference between the two groups? The later was
composed of the people that participated in the hostile acts, while the Muslims who didn’t,
didn’t have problems!)

1566. Approximately 2,500 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, the majority of whom were
women, children and elderly, were also transported from Kljuĉ towards Travnik on
1 October 1992.5421 Bosnian Serb local police and the Bosnian Serb army were at the departure
point with a list of those who had paid what was asked of them and signed over their roperty.5422
Bosnian Serbs escorted the convoy to a location 25 kilometres away from Travnik, whereupon they
demanded money and valuables from the passengers, who then walked to Travnik.5423

1567. Numerous Defence witnesses testified that many Bosnian Muslims remained in the
municipality throughout the war.5416 However, other evidence indicates that between May 1992
and January 1993, 4,154 of the 4,200 residents of Sanica, 3,429 of the 3,649 residents of Velagići,
2,655 of the 2,815 residents of Peći, 1,250 of the 1,732 residents of Humići, all of the 778
residents of Sokolovo, and all 24 residents of Gornji Ribnik left Kljuĉ municipality.5417 (All of
those remote settlements were a real #armed strongholds# of the Muslim secret army, which
started conflicts in the surroundings, and that is why the population felt insecure!) By 1995,
only about 1,200 of Kljuĉ‘s original 17,000 Bosnian Muslims remained.5418

1568. Having considered the totality of the evidence and assessed the circumstances in which
departures occurred, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were forced to
leave Kljuĉ. (#Ad absurdum#! By whom? Why the Muslims wanting to leave made meetings
and a waiting lists, and payed a fee for transport? If they had been forced by circumstances,
#no liability of the Serb officials#, if it was “somebody” , the Chamber should have
addressed the responsibility, who or what forced them. If they had been forced by the events
and the war, that is one thing, and if the authorities were responsible, it had to be proven,
which was not!

5416
D4165 (Witness statement of Marko Adamović dated 1 December 2013), para. 6; Marko Adamović, T. 44491 (4 December 2013) (referring to 3,500
Bosnian Muslims who remained and stating that only those who were ―arrested, disarmed, and responsible for some offences‖ were expelled); D4268
(Witness statement of Jovo Kevac dated 25 January 2014), para. 13 (stating that ―a number‖ of Bosnian Muslims remained in Kljuĉ during 1992 and 1993
and were not mistreated and that some voluntarily joined the VRS and the police); Slobodan Jurišić, T. 47101–47102 (14 February 2014) (testifying that
some ―particularly prominent‖ Bosnian Muslims remained in Kljuĉ throughout the war and even into 1995). See also KDZ192, T. 19498 (27 September
2011) (closed session).
5417
D1738 (Report of the Assistant Commander for Civilian Affairs of the Military Post 7286, 16 February 1993), pp. 4–5. See also KDZ075, P3359 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4984–4985; Adjudicated Fact 2457; para. 1489.
5418
P5449 (Report of the MUP, Banja Luka RDB, February 1995), pp. 12–13. See also P10 (Report of the MUP, Banja Luka SNB, May 1993); P1481 (Ratko
Mladić‘s notebook, 5 October–27 December 1992), pp. 123–124.
 80

(A) Prijedor

(1) Charges

1569. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity, was
committed in Prijedor as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and/or
Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.5419 Under Count 1, the Prosecution further alleges that in
certain municipalities, including Prijedor, this persecutory campaign included or escalated to
include conduct that manifested an intent to destroy in part the national, ethnical and/or religious
groups of Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats as such.5420

1570. Acts alleged to have been committed in Prijedor by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and
Governmental Organs include killings during and after the take-over;5421 killings related to detention
facilities;5422 and killings committed during, and deaths resulting from, cruel and inhumane treatment at
scheduled detention facilities.5423 The Prosecution characterises these acts as killing, an underlying act
of genocide, under Count 1; persecution, a crime against humanity, under Count 3; extermination, a
crime against humanity, under Count 4; murder, a crime against humanity, under Count 5; and murder,
a violation of the laws or customs of war, under Count 6.5424

1571. Other acts alleged to have been committed in Prijedor by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political
and Governmental Organs include torture, beatings, physical and psychological abuse, rape and other
acts of sexual violence during and after the take-over and in scheduled detention facilities, as well as
the establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in detention facilities, as cruel or
inhumane treatment, an act of persecution under Count 3.5425 In relation to Count 1, the Prosecution
alleges that in scheduled detention facilities in Prijedor, thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats were subjected to cruel or inhumane treatment, including torture, physical and psychological
abuse, rape, other acts of sexual violence, and beatings by the Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political
and Governmental Organs; the Prosecution characterises this inhumane treatment as causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups, an underlying act
of genocide.5426 In addition, under Count 1, the Prosecution alleges that members of the Bosnian
Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups were detained under conditions of life calculated to bring about
physical destruction, namely through cruel and inhumane treatment, including torture, physical and
psychological abuse, rape, other acts of sexual violence, inhumane living conditions, forced labour, and
the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic
sanitation facilities.5427

1572. Under Count 3, other acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Prijedor by Serb Forces
and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs, include (i) forcible transfer or deportation of
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their homes within Prijedor;5428 (ii) unlawful detention in
scheduled detention facilities;5429 (iii) forced labour at the frontline and the use of Bosnian Muslims and

5419
Indictment, paras. 48–49.
5420
Indictment, paras. 37–38.
5421
Indictment, para. 60(a)(i). See Scheduled Incidents A.10.1; A.10.2; A.10.3; A.10.4; A.10.5; A.10.6; A.10.7; A.10.8; A.10.9.
5422
Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). See Scheduled Incidents B.15.1; B.15.2; B.15.3; B.15.4; B.15.5; B.15.6.
5423
Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.1; C.20.2; C.20.3; C.20.4; C.20.5; C.20.6; C.20.7.
5424
Indictment, paras. 40(a), 60(a), 63(a), 63(b).
5425
Indictment, para. 60(b), 60(c), 60(d) (specifying that the conditions included the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical
care, or hygienic sanitation facilities). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.1; C.20.2; C.20.4; C.20.5; C.20.6; C.20.7.
5426
Indictment, para. 40(b).
5427
Indictment, paras. 40(c). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.1; C.20.2; C.20.3; C.20.4; C.20.5; C.20.6; C.20.7.
5428
Indictment, para. 60(f).
5429
Indictment, para. 60(g). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.1; C.20.2; C.20.3; C.20.4; C.20.5; C.20.6; C.20.7.
 81

Bosnian Croats as human shields;5430 (iv) the appropriation or plunder of property during and after the
take-over, during arrests and detention, and in the course of or following acts of deportation or forcible
transfer;5431 (v) the wanton destruction of private property, including homes and business premises, and
public property, including cultural monuments and sacred sites;5432 and (v) the imposition and
maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.5433

1573. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer),
respectively, as crimes against humanity.5434 In this regard, the Prosecution alleges that by the end of
1992, Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs had forcibly displaced Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Prijedor in which they had been lawfully present.5435 It is
alleged that from March 1992, restrictive and discriminatory measures, arbitrary arrest and detention,
harassment, torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence, killings, destruction of houses, cultural
monuments and sacred sites, as well as the threat of further such acts caused Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats to flee in fear, while others were physically driven out.5436

RECAPITULATION OF PRIJEDOR

ALL IN THIS RECAPITULATION IS FIRMLY PROVEN BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE

FILE

1. Prijedor had over 112,000 inhabitants, closely balanced between the Serbs (+
Yugoslavs) and Muslims;

2. The area of Prijedor (Mt. Kozara and several cities and towns around it) had a heavy
history in WWII. Many helpless civilians of the Serb ethnicity had been killed in the
nearby concentration camp Jasenova, Gradi{ka and all over the area;

3. The interethnic relations and reconciliation had been managed by the Comunist
authorities, since the majority of the Serbs and a substantial number of Muslims had
been in the Tito’s Army;

4. The relation drastically deteriorated already in 1990, before the first multiparty
elections, partly because the SDA legitimized as a fundamentalist party, and partly
because of the secessionist policy in Slovenia and Croatia. Still, the SDA kept
claiming to be pro-yugoslav until one month after the elections. Already in January
1991 the SDA turned towards the secession, and immediately started to prepare for a
war.

5. Dr. Mirsad Mujad`i} said in an interview with the Muslim media that the first efforts
to establish a secret army (The Patriotic League) had been undertaken in January
1991, see: D1834 below!

6. This made the functioning of the common municipal authorities impossible, because
the SDA – Muslim side didn’t respect any agreement about ethnic-party distribution

5430
Indictment, para. 60(h).
5431
Indictment, para. 60(i).
5432
Indictment, para. 60(j). See Scheduled Incident D.17.
5433
Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement; the removal from positions of
authority; the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or the denial of
equal access to public services.
5434
Indictment, paras. 68–75.
5435
Indictment, paras. 69, 72.
5436
Indictment, para. 71.
 82

of the posts, particulary the sensitive ones, connected to security, smuggling of

weaponry, illegal gatherings and organization of the secret armed groups;

7. This tricky and dishonest arrangement in the authority dramatically deteriorated as

of September 1991, when the Patriotic League had been established in 98
municipalities and nine regions. While the Serbs (lawfully and obligatorily)
responded to the JNA mobilisation calls, the Muslim side boycotted it and continued
to strenten the secret Army of Patriotic League, which additionally frightened the
Serb population, which remained without any protection;

8. Still, there had been some peace and order all until 30th April 1992. The Serb side
proposed an internal reorganisation of Prijedor, due to the Brussels model, i.e.
formation of the two municipalities, one for each community. The SDA (Muslim side)
initially accepted it, but reneged on it due to pressure of authorities from Sarajevo.
On 30th April 1992, an order of the rump Presidency of BiH and the Muslim Minister
of Interior, to the Muslim policemen and the Patriotic League in Prijedor to
massively attack the JNA and the Serbs in Prijedor. Although there was a fierce war
in Sarajevo, the Drina River Valley, the Neretva River Valley, Kupres, along Sava
River, in Prijedor and surrounding municipalities there was a peace preserved, the
hopes in peaceful solution disappeared after this telegram, and the Serb side enacted
the Serb municipality of Prijedor, suggesting the Muslim side to do the same.

9. The Muslim-Croat side started to form their municipality, but soon gave it up, and
opted for a war;

10. Because of a high mutual distrust, many concentrated settlements, both the Serb and
Muslim, established the check-points at the outskirce of their neighbourhoods, but it
was mutually tolerated, because it was a defensive, precautionary measure;

11. On 22nd May 92, on such a check point in Hambarine the Muslim crew fired at the
car with six JNA reservists, three Serb and two Croats, killing two, heavily wounding
two, and slitely wounding two;

12. The Army and Police came and demanded that the perpetrators surrender to the
authorities, and the skirmishes developed in Hambarine, and soon after that, in
Kozarac, another military stronghold of the Muslim extremists.

13. It had been a short lull untol 30th May, when the Patriotic League and Green Berrets
attacked Prijedor in five columns, and such the war started in Prijedor; During all
the period of combats, all the Muslim civilians took refuge in Prijedor, under the Serb
control;

14. The Muslim (and partly Croat) sides lost the battle, retreated to the surrounding hills
and forests, digging the doug-outs for a long residing, or lived in the Muslim villages,
organizing a terrorist actions on a daily basis, killing both the civilians, soldiers,
policemen and a Serb officials;

15. Thus there appeared an urgent need for a larger detention unit, and the investigating
centres had been formed in Keraterm and Omarska;

16. All together, there was brought in about 3,000 combatants and civilians cought in the
zone of battles; The investigations had been conveyed every day, by the highest
professionals available, which resulted in the release of 59% of the brought in, while
 83

41% had been found responsible for the armed rebellion and the consequent
casualties, and sent to Manja~a, a regular POW prizon, being treated as a POWs,
although they could have been treated as a terrorists, which they had been indeed;

17. All of this “triage” was accomplished by early August 92. Out of around 50,000
Muslims in Prijedor, there had been suspected and brought in only 3,000 or around
5,5%, while only 1,400 of them had really been imprisoned as a POWs, which makes
around 2,8% of the non-Serb population. All of it is well documented, and can not be
any discriminatin, let alone mass crimes, or a genocide;

18. Therefore, there is no a single attack on a village that wasn’t militarised. The
municipality of Prijedor has 9 Croat villages and 39 Muslim cillages. Why all of those
non-Serb villages were not attacked?

(1) Background

1574. Prijedor is a municipality in northwest BiH in the ARK and is surrounded by Bosanski
Novi, Bosanska Dubica, Bosanski Gradiška, Banja Luka, and Sanski Most.5437 In 1991, the
population of Prijedor was approximately 112,543, among whom 43.9% were Bosnian Muslims,
42.3% were Bosnian Serbs, and 5.6% were Bosnian Croats.5438 This is also a false fact “sui
generis”: the rest of 8,2% were mainly the Serbs declared as Yugoslavs, and as such, voted
for the leftist parties. In any case, they certainly were against the secession from Yugoslavia.

(a) Division of municipal structures and establishment of Bosnian Serb institutions

1575. Inter-ethnic relations in Prijedor were good before the 1990 election campaign; however,
the events in Croatia and at the republican level in BiH began to influence the relationships
between the groups.5439 Relations started to change and people stopped trusting each other and
socialising.5440 (#No Serb responsibility#! Nothing of that was caused by the B. Serb leaders.
On the contrary, the solidarity of the Muslim-Croat leadership with the secessionist
Republics, Slovenia, and particularly Croatia, where there already started the rhetoric of
WWII and killings, and the plans of the same moves of BiH – aggravated the relationship!)

1. In 1990, multi-party elections were held in Prijedor, resulting in the SDA taking 30 of the 90 seats in
the Municipal Assembly, the SDS taking 28 seats, the HDZ taking two seats, and the remaining seats
going to smaller parties.5441 Subsequently, and on the basis of a prior agreement between the national
parties concerning the division of powers, it was agreed amongst the elected Assembly members that
the SDA should nominate the president of the municipality and the SDS would nominate the vice
president.5442 The SDS would also nominate the president of the Executive Board and the SDA would
nominate the vice president.5443

2. As a result, Muhamed Ĉehajić was nominated as President of the Prijedor Municipal Assembly,
Milomir Stakić was nominated as the Vice President, and Milan Kovaĉević was nominated as

5437
P569 (Map of Prijedor municipality); P4258 (Map of ARK). See Adjudicated Fact 1002.
5438
P6684 (Excerpt from census records of 1991), p. 2; P3701 (Map of Prijedor from 1991 census); D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July
1995), p. 15; Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20613 (28 October 2011); Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3580. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1006.
5439
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7719.
5440
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5544–5545, 5549.
5441
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1815 (under seal). See also Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20455 (27 October 2011); Adjudicated
Fact 1005.
5442
Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3595.
5443
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1816 (under seal). See also Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20455 (27 October 2011).
 84

President of the Executive Board.5444 There was disagreement between the SDS, SDA, and HDZ
over other appointments to public office in Prijedor.5445 (#Not correct#, #not sufficient# the
whole 1991 went out in a massive abuses of the common life and institutions. The SDA didn’t
respect any of the inter-party agreements, particularly those important for the matters of
security. In 1991, SDS representatives proposed to other parties and local politicians that Prijedor
be divided into two municipalities and that the municipal institutions be divided along ethnic
lines.5446 (#Incorrect, #time shifting#! Presented as it is, it seems that the Serbs in Prijedor
initiated a new conditions and worsened the relations, and this is not allowed. See how early
the SDA leaders started with formation of a secret army (The Patriotic League) already in
January 1991, a month after the coalition Government had been formed: D1834:

See more below, at paragraph 1584! That is not the “whole truth” that the SDS proposed
division of Prijedor in two municipalities, because that was proposed as a compromise over
the independence, which was pursued by the SDA-HDZ (Muslim/Croat) coalition, and in
order to avoid a war, the Serbs searched for a solution!) In September 1991, the President
intervened to replace the local SDS President in Prijedor, Srdo Srdić, with Simo Mišković, who
promised to follow the policies of the SDS Main Board.5447 S. Srdic already was the president
for over a year, and at the same time he was the president of the locar Red Cross, which was
incompatible, and he had to relinquish one of the posts!. In December 1991, Mišković received
the Variant A/B Instructions at a meeting of the SDS Main Board, over which the President
presided.5448 No matter who created this document, it was not distributed during the meeting
“presided by the President” but in some breaks. Mišković then conveyed the Variant A/B
Instructions to the Prijedor SDS leadership.5449 On 7 January 1992, the SDS members left the
Prijedor Municipal Assembly and formed their own assembly, proclaimed as the Assembly of the
Serbian People of the Municipality of Prijedor (―Prijedor Serb Assembly‖); Milomir Stakić was
appointed as its President, and Milan Kovaĉević was appointed as President of the Executive
Board.5450 (Missing the #context# is detrimental for the Defence position: already as of 19
December 1991 the situation in BiH was not regular, since the common rump Government
illegally applied for the independence, in spite of the Serb opposition to that anti-
constitutional move! The Conference in the Hague (ICFY) has already taken position that the
ethnic communities in BiH will have a high degree of autonomy, and a sub-conference on
Bosnia (Cutileiro-Carrington) was going on to this direction! # Due to the ICFY#!) A Crisis

5444
Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3596; D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 2
(stating further that between 11 September 1991 and 7 January 1992, he was also Vice Chairman of the SDS Municipal Board); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1816–1817 (under seal).
5445
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2375; Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20529–20531 (28 October 2011); Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3594–3595, 3599–3602, 3618–3624 (testifying further that in February 1992, the SDA sent its proposal to the
SDS regarding the division of power in Prijedor between the SDS, SDA, and HDZ, including the division of appointments to significant positions in public
office). See P3704 (Letter from Prijedor SDA Executive Board to Prijedor SDS, 16 February 1992).
5446
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20457–20459 (27 October 2011).
5447
P3706 (Minutes of meeting of Prijedor Municipal Assembly, 11 September 1991), pp. 3–4; P2571 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Radovan
Karadţić and Radomir Nešković; (ii) Radovan Karadţić and Mišković; and (iii) Radovan Karadţić and Srdo Srdić, 20 December 1991), pp. 4–15; Mirsad
Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3599–3601. See P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February
1992), p. 18; Simo Mišković, T. 45351–45361 (18 December 2013).
5448
D4206 (Witness statement of Simo Mišković dated 6 December 2013), para. 10; Milomir Stakić, T. 45227–45228 (17 December 2013). See P5 (SDS
Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 6–7; Simo Mišković, T. 45363 (18 December 2013).
5449
P2595 (Minutes of meeting of Prijedor SDS Municipal Board, 27 December 1991), p. 1; P5517 (Summary of meeting of the Representatives of the Prijedor
Municipality Sector for Military Matters, undated), p. 1; P6610 (Excerpt of book of minutes of Prijedor's SDS Municipal Board meetings, 1991), p. 1. See
Simo Mišković, T. 45363 (18 December 2013); P6587 (Excerpts from Simo Mišković‘s testimony from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 15178. See
also Adjudicated Fact 1007.
5450
Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3634, 3641; Simo Mišković, T. 45365 (18 December 2013); Milomir Stakić, T. 45227–
45228 (17 December 2013); D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), paras. 2, 11; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1820 (under seal); P2099 (Article from Kozarski Vjesnik entitled ―Serbs Live in This Municipality As Well‖, 31 January 1992);
P6581 (Article from Kozarski Vjesnik entitled ―How Dr. Milomir Stakic…saw events of 30th April…‖, 28 April 1994), p. 1. See Adjudicated Fact 1008.
 85

Staff, later renamed the War Presidency,5451 was also formed by the SDS Municipal Board in line
with the Variant A/B Instructions, to act as a 24 hour information and communication centre.5452
(Certainly, “information and communication” while the common organs continued to work!)
@@@ there is a correction by the expert@.

1576. On 17 January 1992, the Prijedor Serb Assembly unanimously voted to join the ARK.5453
Stakić, Mišković, Drljaĉa, and Kovaĉević were elected as ARK Assembly representatives on
26 March 1992.5454 In February 1992, Mišković attended another meeting with the President in
Sarajevo; at the meeting, the President ordered the implementation of stage two of the Variant A/B
Instructions.5455 (#Due to ICFY#! That was done in the context of the Cutileiro-Carrington
conference, since on 13 February it had finally been agreed that BiH will be transformed
unto three member-states!) Mišković later passed this instruction on to the SDS Municipal
Board.5456

1577. On 16 April 1992, the Prijedor Serb Assembly elected individuals to different positions
amongst whom were Boško Mandić, elected Deputy Chairman of the Executive Board, and
Drljaĉa, elected Chief of the SJB.5457 Drljaĉa only assumed the position on 30 April 1992 once
Prijedor was taken over.5458 On 23 April 1992, the SDS Municipal Board decided, inter alia, to
reinforce the Crisis Staff, to subordinate ―all units and staff in management posts‖ to the Crisis
Staff, and ―to immediately start working on the takeover, the co-ordination with JNA
notwithstanding‖.5459 Regardless of the absence of the President’s signature, (which means
that we do not know whether the President Miskovic agreed with the wording of the record,
let us se what was the letter and spirit of this document of 23 April 92: the first issue was
whethter the JNA will protect the people: D1830

The next was a threat to the JNA to withdraw the conscripts and reservists of the Serbian
ethnicity, since the Muslims and Croats anyway didn’t join the JNA, and the Serb people
would be exposed to a great danger:

(#Defense necessity#! So, it is misinterpreted: the Prijedor SDS was concerned for a defence,
5451
P2104 (Video footage of interview with Milomir Stakić and Vladimir Arsić), p. 2; P2608 (Report of the SDS Executive Board on the formation of war
presidencies, 31 May 1992), p. 1; P2607 (SerBiH Presidency decision on constituting war presidencies in municipalities at a time of imminent threat of war
or state of war, 31 May 1992); D411 (Minutes of 17th session of Government of the SerBiH, 31 May 1992), p. 2; P11 (Article from Kozarski Vjesnik,
entitled ―Krajina Representatives in Prijedor‖, 17 July 1992), p. 3; D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 2. See
Adjudicated Fact 1032.
5452
D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 11; P6610 (Excerpt of book of minutes of Prijedor's SDS Municipal Board
meetings, 1991), p. 1; P2630 (Transcript of broadcast of Radio Prijedor), p. 7; Slavko Budimir, D4463 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 12971. See
Simo Mišković, T. 45365–45366 (18 December 2013); Dragan Kezunović, T. 14943–14946 (20 June 2011); P2744 (Excerpt from SJB Prijedor‘s log book);
Dusan Janković, T, 47340–47341 (18 February 2014). See also P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19
December 1991), pp. 6–7.
5453
P3728 (Decision of Prijedor Municipal Assembly, 17 January 1992); D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 13. See
also Adjudicated Fact 1009.
5454
P5566 (Minutes of the 4th session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Prijedor Municipality, 26 March 1992).
5455
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), pp. 5–7; P5516 (Minutes of Meeting of SDS Prijedor Municipal
Board, 17 February 1992), p. 1. See P6588 (Receipt of Holiday Inn Hotel, 14–15 February 1992); Adjudicated Fact 1010.
5456
P5516 (Minutes of Meeting of SDS Prijedor Municipal Board, 17 February 1992), p. 1; see Simo Mišković, T. 45373–45375 (18 December 2013).
5457
P2097 (Article from Kozarski Vjesnik, entitled ―Government of the Serbian Municipality Elected‖, 24 April 1992), p. 1; P2630 (Transcript of broadcast of
Radio Prijedor), p. 7; Dušan Janković, T. 47269 (18 February 2014). See also Adjudicated Fact 1011. At the time Drljaĉa was elected, a member of the
SDA, Hasan Talundţić, held the position of Chief of the SJB in Prijedor. See Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3595,
3619–3624; Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6558–6559; Dušan Janković, T. 47269 (18 February 2014).
5458
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20540 (28 October 2011); Dušan Janković, T. 47269 (18 February 2014); P2630 (Transcript of broadcast of Radio Prijedor), p. 7
(stating that Drljaĉa informed Kovaĉević on 30 April 1992 that all the individuals appointed on 16 April assumed their posts and were functioning from that
moment forward); Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6559. See also para. 1597. Drljaĉa was formally appointed as Chief of
the SJB on 30 July 1992. P6379 (Decision of SerBiH MUP, 25 April 1992; Request of Banja Luka CSB, 4 May 1992; Decision of Banja Luka CSB, 30 July
1992; Decision of Banja Luka CSB, 13 June 1992), e-court pp. 5–6.
5459
D1830 (Minutes of session of Prijedor SDS Municipal Board, 23 April 1992), p. 1. See also Adjudicated Fact 1012.
 86

and had taken a precautionary measures, clarifying whether the JNA was to protect the
people, or the people had to do by themselves. Since the municipal organs, in an absence of
the state army, were sovereign in self-defence, all the decisions pertaining to the Territorial
Defence were legal: the President of municipality was “ex oficio” president of the Defence
Board and the supreme commander of the TO!#Legal and obligatory#!) Up until 30 April
1992, the SDA and HDZ continued to engage in talks with the SDS.5460 On 30 April 1992, Stakić
was appointed President of the Prijedor Municipality.5461 At this time, the Prijedor SDS was
regularly receiving instructions from the central SDS and the Prijedor Crisis Staff received and
implemented decisions from the Bosnian Serb Assembly.5462 (This is not entirely correct.
Several of those documents allegedly received in the Prijedor SDS were forged, some of them
had been sent to Prijedor before the war abrupted, and it was completely known that there
was no a satisfactory connection between the Republican leadership and Prijedor. Not to
forget that on 30 April the Muslim MUP sent an order to the Muslims in Prijedor to take
over the municipality, and the Serbs intercepted it!)

1578. On 20 May 1992, the Prijedor Serb Assembly formally adopted a Prijedor Crisis Staff
decision of 1 May 1992, which implemented the 26 April 1992 Instructions issued by the Bosnian
Serb Government, reorganising the Prijedor Crisis Staff, and creating a unified command of Crisis
Staff, TO, police, and military.5463 (#All legal and obligatory#!On the same day, the Prijedor
Serb Assembly also appointed Stakić as President of the Crisis Staff and Dragan Savanović as
Vice President; other members appointed to the Crisis Staff included Kovaĉević, Slobodan
Kuruzović, Boško Mandić, Drljaĉa, and Slavko Budimir.5464

(a) Propaga
nda and militarisation of Prijedor

1579. When the conflict in Croatia began in 1991, the residents of Prijedor began to feel
insecure.5465 (That was so only because the SDA and the Muslim leadership supported the
unlawful secessions of Slovenija amd Croatia, while the Muslim volunteers went to Croatia
to fight and to train for fighting aganst the Serbs in Bosnia, see: D1518 of 8 July 1991:

5460
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20465 (27 October 2011).
5461
D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 2.
5462
P2560 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to presidents of municipalities, 23 March 1992); (#FORGERY#! but, this date is before the war
started. ANYWAY, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NOTHING ILLEGAL, IT MUST BE NOTED THAT THIS
DOCUMENT WAS FORGED. NO NUMBER, LANGUAGE DIFFERENT (THERE WERE NO "AO" BUT SAO,
etc. P3536 (Decisions and orders of Prijedor Municipal Assembly and Prijedor Crisis Staff, published in Prijedor Official Gazette on 25 June 1992), pp. 49,
80–81; D4468 (Confirmation of decisions adopted by Crisis Staff by Prijedor Municipal Assembly, 24 July 1992), e-court p. 2; P956 (Transcript of 16th
session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), pp. 53–54. See also P5414 (Letter from SDS President‘s Office, 20 April 1992). This document
(P05414) was forged, and it was not clear how this document was filed. No such a document was issued from the
President’s office.
5463
P2605 (Decision of Prijedor Assembly on the organisation and work of Prijedor Crisis Staff, May 1992), pp. 2–5; P3536 (Decisions and orders of Prijedor
Municipal Assembly and Prijedor Crisis Staff, published in Prijedor Official Gazette on 25 June 1992), pp. 1–9; D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir
Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 20; Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3677–3679; P3529 (Minutes of 4th meeting of
Prijedor‘s Council for National Defence, 15 May 1992), p. 2; D4468 (Confirmation of decisions adopted by Crisis Staff by Prijedor Municipal Assembly, 24
July 1992), e-court p. 2. See also P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992); P2966 (Order of SerBiH MUP, 15 May 1992),
pp. 1–2; Adjudicated Fact 1026. See paras. 142–144.
5464
P3536 (Decisions and orders of Prijedor Municipal Assembly and Prijedor Crisis Staff, published in Prijedor Official Gazette on 25 June 1992), pp. 7–9.
See Adjudicated Fact 1027.
5465
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1817–1818 (under seal); KDZ026, T. 10363 (17 January 2011) (closed session).
 87

So, as early as 8 July 1991 the SDA sent almost 500 members to be educated and trained in
Croatia, in a war circumstances, preparing their war against the Serbs in Bosnia!#Who
started#! ) When the mobilisation of conscripts to be sent to Croatia with the JNA started, many
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats chose not to respond to the call-up; this lack of response by
non-Serbs resulted in Bosnian Serbs constituting the majority of JNA conscripts who went to fight
in Croatia.5466 At the same time there was a rise in propaganda designed to instil fear among the
population.5467 (#Illegal and criminal# to a void and sabotage mobilisation! Having in mind
the past of the area, this was an inevitable parallel to the WWII events. Not only the events
in Croatia were the same, but the division among the population was the same as in WWII:
the Muslims and Croats on one side, against Yugoslavia, and the Serbs on the other, pro
Yugoslavia.) In late 1991 or early 1992, the SDS obtained a ―repeater‖ at Mrkovica, from which
only Serb programmes were emitted.5468 In February 1992, the JNA took over the TV relay at the
Kozara mountain, blocking TV broadcasts from Croatia and Sarajevo and only permitting
broadcasts from Belgrade and Banja Luka.5469 (#Legal and obligatory#! The JNA had been
engaghed by the illegal Croatian armies, and couldn’t stand an adversary’s propaganda! It

5466
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1818 (under seal); Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7719. See
also Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5658.
5467
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1819 (under seal).
5468
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5550.
5469
P5633 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Nenad Stanić, 5 November 1991), p. 6; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor
v. Stakić), T. 7058.
 88

was the same “repeator” - not two separate actions. The reason was in an illegal act of the
official BiH TV, excluding the Yugoslav channels, and using the most dreadful anti-Serb
propaganda. The Croatian and Sarajevo programs were available through other
transmiters.#Far before VRS, the Serb authorities had nothing to do with this JNA legal
move#! ) Radio and TV broadcasts relayed propaganda and used derogatory names for non-
Serbs.5470 Announcements were made on Radio Prijedor that Bosnian Muslim doctors were trying
to reduce the birth rate among Serbs in that part of BiH, either by sterilising Serb women or giving
pregnant Serb women injections so that they could only give birth to female children; these
allegations caused great fear among the Serb population of Prijedor, and negatively impacted inter-
ethnic relations in the municipality.5471 Propaganda was also used to encourage Serbs to accept a
policy of discrimination against non-Serbs; those Serbs who refused to comply with this policy of
discrimination against non-Serbs were branded ―traitors‖.5472 (#Deadly combination#! This is a
shameless AF. Not true at all! All other only shows a state of mind in public, and this was
created first in Sarajevo, by the Muslim Government! Particularly important: neither the
Prosecution nor the Chamber felt any obligation to specify as whom they keep responsible
for this propaganda! The Serb authorities?!?)

1580. Starting in 1991 and lasting until spring 1992, weapons were distributed in Prijedor from
JNA storage facilities to Prijedor TO units and then to local communes.5473 (As it is said in this
para, it was a JNA regular and legitimate job, because the JNA expected an attack as in
Croatia.) Check-points were also established throughout the Prijedor area during this time.5474
(#Muslim criminal conduct#! Against JNA. Not specified by whom! That was done by the
Muslim extremists, aimed to make obstacles to the JNA movement. Even Mr. Cehajic, the
president of the Municipality, participated in this criminal activity!) By late 1991, Prijedor
contained the largest concentration of former JNA weapons.5475 The weapons given to Bosnian
Muslim communes were antiquated and were matched with the wrong type of ammunition,
whereas Bosnian Serb communes were given more weapons which did not have these
problems.5476 (#Legal and obligatory#! The Serb TO got the JNA armament not because of
being Serbs, but because of being the JNA reserve. Why the JNA would arm it’s potential, or
already declared enemies?) By late 1991, JNA military helicopters landed several times a day in
Serb areas of Prijedor distributing weapons.5477 (#Deadly combination#! All the “adjudicated
facts” from other cases. Had it been so, then the leadership of the Serb municipality of
Prijedor wouldn’t in April 92 wonder whether the JNA will defend the Serbs or not! But,
this Defence didn’t have a chance to challenge this and other hilarious “facts”!) ) In early
1992, the SDA Municipal Board received reports from people who saw JNA lorries with JNA
soldiers distributing weapons in Serb villages, as well as reports of training groups run by the JNA

5470
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6618.
5471
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5550–5551; KDZ523, T. 23349–23350 (19 January 2012) (closed session) (testifying that
information was released that Esad Sadiković, a prominent Bosnian Muslim physician who had worked for UNHCR, was working on sterilisation of Serb
women so that less Serbs would be born). See Adjudicated Fact 1188. Sadiković was later taken to Omarska and was killed. See paras. 1766, 1776–1778.
5472
See Adjudicated Fact 1094.
5473
D2265 (SrĊo Srdić's interview with OTP), p. 26; Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3605–3606; Mevludin Sejmenović, T.
20459–20460 (27 October 2011) (testifying that he witnessed the arming of Serbs in Prijedor and heard about it, including through reports of army
helicopters transporting weapons to Serbs in certain villages); Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7719–7720; KDZ392, P707
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2617 (under seal).
5474
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2296–2297, 2360; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1832 (under seal);
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5878 (under seal); P4101 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 6;
P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994), e-court p. 6. See also KDZ092, P703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3917.
5475
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6770; Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3605–3607.
5476
Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3605–3607; Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6779–6780
(testifying further that the Croatian villages in Ljubija were very poorly armed and that the Bosnian Muslims and Croats of Prijedor ―stood no chance‖ as
any weapons they had received or collected were ―very meager‖).
5477
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2328–2331, 2367, 2381; P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994), e-court
p. 8; P4101 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court pp. 5–6; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7059.
 89

for Serbs.5478 (All of that, even if true, was in the #JNA competence#, and was no a
responsibility of the local Serbs. Why the JNA preferred the Serb villages? Simply, only the
Serbs were friendly towards the JNA, and the JNA didn’t expect this weapons to be pointed
agains it’s soldiers, but rather counted on the reservists of the Serb ethnicity to respond to
it’s calls!)

1584. In August 1991, 300 to 400 Serbs from Prijedor and the Krajina region were sent to Podgradci
for a secret, advanced police training course by instructors from Serbia under Captain Dragan.5479
Radoslav BrĊanin, Stojan Ţupljanin, and Drljaĉa visited the course.5480 (Let us see what made the
JNA and the Krajina Serbs to have a trainings: alredy in January 1991, the very same
month the common Government had been appointed, the SDA started preparations for a
war against the JNA and Serbs in BiH! See what Dr. Mirsad Mujad`i} said in an interview in
the Muslim media, D1834:

Until that moment, many of the Muslims, in an arrangement of the SDA had already
accomplished their illegal training in Croatia, started already in June 91. The Serb training
was no illegal, while the Muslim training in the Croatian secessionist armed forces was an
illegal, see D1518 above!)

1585. By the end of April 1992, a number of clandestine Serb police stations were created in
Prijedor and more than 1,500 Serb policemen were mobilised.5481 (#Context#, Time shifting#!
What “clandestine Serb police stations”? The document quoted here is P05518, a report of
the SJB Prijedor on 30 April 92. But, it can not and must not be skipped to point out that

5478
Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3608–3610. See P4262 (Request of Municipal Assembly Executive Board of Banja
Luka, 19 August 1994), p. 1; P4263 (Video footage of award ceremony of the Red Berets, with transcript), e-court pp. 2–3 (stating that 26 training camps for
special police units of the RS and RSK were established in 1991 or 1992).
5479
[REDACTED]. The instructors all wore traditional military camouflage uniforms with a ―militia of Krajina‖ insignia on their sleeves. See P3813 (Insignia
of Krajina Police ―Wolves‖ group). See also P4258 (Map of ARK).
5480
KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21061–21062, 21065 (under seal).
5481
P5518 (Report of Prijedor SJB to Banja Luka CSB, 30 April 1992). See P5528 (Report of Prijedor SJB, June 1992), p. 2 (describing the creation of shadow
police stations); Adjudicated Fact 1013.
 90

this happened after the Serbs in the police stations intercepted the dispatch from the Muslim
Ministry of interior ordering the Muslim policemen to start the war against the JNA and the
Serbs. How possibly this can be missed? This was the crucial event in Prijedor, which caused
further mistrust among the communities. There is no a similar example, to pick up a fact out
ot context and present it as an illegal and unjustified act.)

1586. In early May 1992, the Prijedor Serb Assembly ordered mobilisation pursuant to orders from the
ARK and the RS Defence Ministry, requiring all men liable for military service in the ARK to mobilise
for the TO.5482 (How this is unlawful?#Legal and obligatory#! Did this Chamber knew that there
was the war started even in March 92, but generally throuout the BiH on 6 April 92?) On 22
May, the Crisis Staff ordered a further mobilisation pursuant to the 20 May 1992 SerBiH Presidency
order, requiring conscripts to report to their war unit, and only Serbs were mobilised.5483 (Wrong and
mean!# However, these documents (P03537, and P3919, the Karad`i}’s order) didn’t say what is
alleged in this paragraph! No mentioning of the ethnicity. Apart from that fact, the Serb
authorities weren’t specifying the ethnicity for an obvious reason: the war had the inter-ethnic
nature, and they never forced the Muslims or Croats to respond to mobilisations, although
accepting all who responded. So, in the Prijedor area there was many Croats joining the VRS,
while much fewer Muslims, contrary to a neighbouring municipalities of Srbac, Derventa etc,
where the Muslims joined the VRS massively!#Regardless of ethnicity!#. The JNA withdrew from
BiH around 20 May 1992, a few days before the (the Muslim ATTACK! #OBSCURE#!Left like
that, it is aimed to produce an impression that the Serbs attacked! ) attack on Hambarine; however,
according to Sejmenović, the JNA did not really withdraw, rather ―[t]hey just changed their name‖ and
―[t]he officers started calling themselves the Serb army‖.5484 In fact, the number of troops increased in
the Prijedor area after the JNA pulled out of BiH.5485 Radmilo Ţeljaja, commander of the 43rd
Motorised Brigade, which was later called the 343rd Motorised Brigade, fully co-operated with Drljaĉa
and the SJB during this period.5486 (So what? From where the Muslim Army (ABiH) and it’s
officers came? Also from the JNA! And much earlier than Zeljaja and others became the “Serb
army”, the JNA Muslim officers formed a secret Muslim Army. A very few officers that hadn’t
been born in BiH remained in BiH, all others, 98% were the Bosnian Serbs, as same is in the
ABiH.)

1587. A civilian police unit—later called the ―intervention squad‖—was formed in Prijedor in June 1992
by conscripting members of the civilian police in Prijedor; Captain Jović, head of the MP in Prijedor,
placed Milutin ĈaĊo in charge of its establishment.5487 The intervention squad was established by order
of the Prijedor Crisis Staff.5488 It was headed by Miroslav Paras and was comprised of two squads; one
of the squads was headed by Pero Ĉivĉić and the other was headed by Dragoljub Gligić.5489 The duties
of the intervention squad included the prevention and deterrence of crime, arresting and detaining
individuals from Bosnian Muslim groups who were allegedly involved in the ―attacks on Prijedor‖

5482
P2818 (Decision of ARK Regional Secretariat for National Defence, 4 May 1992), pp. 1–2; P3535 (Minutes of 2nd session of Prijedor's Council for National
Defence, 5 May 1992), pp. 1–2; P3530 (Minutes of Prijedor SDS Municipal Board, 9 May 1992), p. 2.
5483
P3537 (Decision of Prijedor Crisis Staff, 22 May 1992), pp. 1–2; P3919 (Radovan Karadţić's Decision, 20 May 1992); P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim
Mešanović, undated), pp. 7–8.
5484
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20478–20749 (27 October 2011).
5485
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20479 (27 October 2011). See also Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20588–20590 (28 October 2011).
5486
KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21070, 21073–21074 (under seal); Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić),
T. 6559 (testifying that at this time it was not possible to be Chief of the SJB without approval from Stakić).
5487
KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21067–21068, 21070, 21073 (under seal); KDZ523, T. 23345–23346, 23376–23377
(19 January 2012) (closed session). See also Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6625.
5488
D2039 (Prijedor Crisis Staff Order, 17 June 1992). See P2637 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 1 July 1992), p. 2. See also Adjudicated Facts 1256, 2487.
Although the intervention squad was established by the order of the Prijedor Crisis Staff, Stakić maintained that he never learned of its establishment;
furthermore, although Drljaĉa, as head of the Prijedor SJB, reported directly to the Crisis Staff on the implementation of a number of Crisis Staff decisions,
including the establishment of the intervention squad, Stakić stated that Drljaĉa did not inform the Crisis Staff as to everything he was doing and moreover,
that ―what he wrote was one thing and his actions were different‖. Milomir Stakić, T. 45244–45248 (17 December 2013).
5489
KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21071 (under seal).
 91

from 30 May 1992, and ―[normalising] life in Prijedor town and in the whole of the municipality‖.5490
(It has to be kept in mind that this squad had been forme only after the Muslim terrorists
attacked Prijedor from the five directions, on 30 May 92. What was criminal in a precautionary
measure like forming new squads of police, after such a bloody attack? Composed of many non-
professionals, it was disbanded after commited crimes!) Furthermore, the intervention squad was
ordered by its commanders to arrest certain Bosnian Muslims based on lists compiled by the
commanders; these lists included prominent Bosnian Muslims, such as doctors, lawyers, professors,
and religious leaders, and Bosnian Muslims linked to World War II through their predecessors.5491
During operations against Bosnian Muslims, the intervention squad co-operated with and was under the
command of the military.5492

(1) Take-over of Prijedor town

1588. Prijedor town is located in the centre of Prijedor municipality.5493 The town of Prijedor itself had a
mixed population, although the Stari Grad area in the centre of the town was a predominantly Bosnian
Muslim neighbourhood.5494 There was an old mosque in the centre of Stari Grad, surrounded by a
Muslim cemetery called Mezar.5495 The Municipal Assembly, the seat of the local government in
Prijedor municipality, was located in the centre of town, as was the Executive Council and other
executive bodies.5496

1589. In the beginning of April 1992, there was an increase in the number of armed Serbs in the streets
and cafes in the town of Prijedor;5497 many of them wore JNA uniforms and insignia while others wore
police uniforms.5498 (#Before VRS# JNA competence#! No doubt, this was the JNA, and the rest
was the police. No wonder the JNA was present, since it evacuated Croatia in accordance with
the Vance Plan for Croatia, but still was under a fierce attacks by the Croatian ZNG and Army.

1590. On 29 April 1992, the Prijedor SDS received a fax, which appeared to be from Alija
Delimustafić and the BiH Presidency, ordering police stations in BiH to ―commence operations‖
and secure the surrender of the JNA.5499 On 29 April, Mirsad Mujadţić, President of the SDA
Municipal Board, was invited to meet with Colonel Arsić, of the 5th Corps of the JNA, and
Mišković at the Prijedor barracks at Urije, where he was shown the fax; Mujadţić immediately
believed it to be forged and conveyed this belief to Colonel Arsić and Mišković.5500 At dinner that

5490
P2637 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 1 July 1992), p. 2; KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21072 (under seal).
5491
KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21120–21122 (under seal); KDZ523, T. 23352–23353 (19 January 2012) (closed session).
This is dubious, since there was no any corroborations by documents. A Serb witness wouldn’t be trusted in such a
case.
5492
KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21072–21073 (under seal).
5493
P569 (Map of Prijedor municipality). See Adjudicated Fact 1003; P2096 (Map of Prijedor town).
5494
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1794–1795, 1801 (under seal).
5495
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1802 (under seal).
5496
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1795 (under seal); P2096 (Map of Prijedor town).
5497
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5551, 5553.
5498
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5551, 5553, 5554 (testifying further that one of the armed Serbs in Prijedor told him
during this time that they only wanted to defend Yugoslavia and for all Serbs to live in one state, and that they would never allow that ―part of [BiH]
to become Croatian, Ustasha soil, or a dzemaharija‖, a derogatory name for a state in which Muslims would live and be in power). #Not
correct!# It was clear that under a jamahiria everyone meant the Izetbegovic’s “Islamic Declaration” as a
constitutional basis for such a new state. But, what is a purpose of such a mitigating qualifications?
5499
D400 (BiH MUP Order, 29 April 1992); Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3665–3666; P6587 (Excerpts from
Simo Mišković‘s testimony from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 15223.
5500
Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3662–3667 (testifying further that it was later established that the document had
probably been sent by the counterintelligence service of the JNA in order to provide the army with a ―pretext‖ for the intervention). Mujadţić also
served as President of the SDA in Banja Luka during the conflict, and as deputy of the BiH Parliament. Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3575–3576, 3578. Is it possible that the Chamber takes into account this kind of manoeuvre,
while it was a very known fact, confirmed by everyone, even the Muslim leadership, that it was genuine? Some
 92

evening, Mujadţić repeated to Arsić and Mišković that the SDA had no intentions to attack the
SDS or Bosnian Serbs in Prijedor.5501 (What would he be expected to say? Was he in a
“conflicting situation” that maked him to be cunning, or the Muslim witnesses are trusted no
matter what? Let us see what was the content of the BH Presidency decision, D399, as
resumed in the MUP explicite order to start an overall combats: D400:

This was a declaration of war, second after the Order for readiness of 12 April, against the
JNA in withdrawal, and the Serbs in BiH! Could it be more clear? Had not the JNA and the
Serb part of authorities took control over the Serb parts of Prijedor, already next morning
there would be a carnage. Still, after this “decralation of war’ the Serb side recommended to
the Muslim side to organise their municipality, see Stakic’s interview, P## )

Defence witnesses have testified that on 23 April 1992, at a meeting of the Prijedor SDS Municipal
Board, the SDS was still not certain how it would act in the event of a conflict, and that the take-over of
Prijedor was an unplanned response to the fax from Alija Delimustafić.5502 (#EXCULPATORY#! No
criminal plan!#) The Chamber has considered the following evidence which confirms that the take-
over of Prijedor was planned in advance of receiving the 29 April fax: (i) according to Mandić, the
Prijedor SDS had organised themselves well in advance of receiving the fax on 29 April; (Organised,
for what? For a defence, which can be seen from the D1830 held on 23 April 92.:

….
which confirmed that the main concern of the Serbs was whether the JNA would propect the
Serb population or not. Is there any evidence that the SDS was preparing for a “take-over”?
NO!) (ii) Kovaĉević stated on Radio Prijedor that well before 30 April, ―it was all neatly prepared and
done and we waited for the moment which we had set and then on [29 April 1992] at 0400 hrs […] we
did it‖ and that ―it really went the way we had planned‖; (iii) according to Sejmenović, the Prijedor
SDS in fact ―had well-laid plans‖ by 23 April; (#Defense necessities#! #Legal and obligatory#! How
come the precautionary defensive measures are a crime? Was the Serb population supposed to
wait and sustain a new genocide, as in WWII? The main issue was not whether the Serbs had the
plan “just in case”, the main issue was what the Muslim side intended to do. And the telegram-
fax of 29 April have shown what was going on! #Legal and obligatory#: in 98 out of 109 BH
municipalities there was formed and well oprganized a secret army Patriotic league and many

of the Muslim leaders said publicly how was he surprised when the next morning this telegram was on the
Karadzic’s table, and published in media. (to find)
5501
Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3667–3668.
5502
See D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 16; D4229 (Witness statement of Boško Mandić dated 18 January 2014),
para. 23; D4228 (Witness statement of Zdravko Torbica dated 18 January 2014), para. 9; D400 (BiH MUP Order, 29 April 1992), p. 1. The Accused also
presented his case on this issue during his cross-examination of Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20588 (28 October 2011).
 93

other groups. Certainly, Prijedor was one of the best organized. In all of these municipalities the
Serb community, sometimes a huge majority, had been aware of these preparations! It was
inevitable, necessary, legal and obligatory to prepare for a defense!) (iv) Mišković considered the
take-over of Prijedor town on 30 April 1992 to be part of the implementation of Variant B and that
―preparations had to be made […] in order to take over power‖; and finally, (v) Dušan Janković
testified that a decision was made on 16 April to install Drljaĉa as Chief of the SJB on 30 April.5503
(#Serb parts only#! #Two municipalities – peace#! Dr. Staki} said publicly that the Muslims are
free to form their own municipality, which had been accepted and initiated, but interrupted by
the Central SDA! So what? Why it would be equal as a plan to take the power? Before that,
there was a flagrant violation of the inter-party Agreement on distribution of power, and both
the chief of the SJB and the commander of the police were Muslims, which must not be? The
Chamber also took judicial notice of the fact that the forcible take-over of the municipal authorities in
Prijedor was prepared well in advance of 1 May 1992 and that a transmission by BiH leaders was used
as a pre-text for the take-over of Prijedor municipality.5504 So, is it a presumption of the Chamber
that the take-over would be carried out even if there was no such a dispatch by the BiH
Presidency? Certainly, a war plans are always prepared “just in case” and that kind of planning
was a lawful obligation, as Kapetina testified, and as it is prescribed in the law and sub-law
documents. Would the Chamber appreciate the Serbs had they been naïve and not prepared, and
therefore killed and butchered? No President would be entitled, or finally obeyed, if ordered
something else. The Chamber therefore finds that the take-over of Prijedor was planned well in
advance of 30 April 1992, and was not an unplanned act in response to threats to Bosnian Serbs in
Prijedor. (This is wrong conclusion. Even after the “take over” the Serbs counted only on the Serb
part of Prijedor, offering the Muslim side to form their own municipality, which was accepted
and started to realise. If it was not so, how the Muslims could erect so many barricades? No a
Serb controlled Hambarine, Kozarac, Ljubija, “old town” and other predominantly Muslim or
Croat settlements. According to the domestic Law on all-peoples Defence, as Kapetina testified
(seeT41257-58: A. First of all, I authored this manual, and as chief republic inspector, it was my
duty to inspect together with other inspectors contingency plans, and through this manual I tried to
help those who made such contingency plans in Bosnia-Herzegovina to make them more easily. And
those who made such plans was everybody from local authorities, local communes, businesses,
socio-political organisations, even associations of citizens. Each one had the obligation to develop a
contingency plan, and I wanted this manual to facilitate their work and to teach them how to make
these plans. On this page I tried to define contingencies using, of course, the provisions of the Law
on All People's Defence A. Yes, it was their legal obligation. All those who made contingency plans
were legally obliged to do so in keeping with the Law on All People's Defence. Everybody had to
develop a contingency plan for contingencies such as aggression, military aggression, or internal
conflicts that involved the use of weapons. Q. When you said a moment ago socio-political
organisations were also an entity in the defence system, can you translate that into normal
language? What are socio-political organisations? A. I'll try. In the previous system it was the
League of Communists, The Socialist Alliance of Working People, The Socialist Alliance of Youth,
and in the multi-party system it was the political partie. T41267 A. The plan for contingencies at
municipal level contains an assessment of the political security situation in the municipality, then
tasks, measures, and procedures, organisation, forces, and resources for the elimination of
contingencies and measures of readiness.:s.. So, every single socio-political organisation was
obliged to have it’s own “war plans.” So, to have a war plan was an obligation, not a felony. Who
can say with any integrity that there would be a take-over had the Muslim side hadn’t planned to

5503
See Boško Mandić, T. 45757–45758 (21 January 2014); P2630 (Transcript of broadcast of Radio Prijedor), p. 7; Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20588 (28
October 2011); Simo Mišković, T. 45381, 45408 (18 December 2013); P6587 (Excerpts from Simo Mišković's testimony from Prosecutor v. Stanišić &
Ţupljanin), T. 15223; Dušan Janković, T. 47268–47270 (18 February 2014). See also P2968 (Report of Prijedor SJB, January 1993), p. 2; P5528 (Report of
Prijedor SJB, June 1992), p. 2; D1830 (Minutes of session of Prijedor SDS Municipal Board, 23 April 1992), p. 1; Zdravo Torbica, T. 45732–45733
(21 January 2014). See para. 1580.
5504
See Adjudicated Facts 1015, 1020.
 94

take over and capture the JNA? Nobody! And any inference of this Chamber towards a Serb
felony is wrong, and would be as if the Chamber, and the laws, demand from the Serb politicians
and military commanders to be disobedient to the laws, irresponsible to their people, and finally
stupid above all limits. Nobody has any right to presume that kind of conduct in a situation of a
war against the federal state, which was primarily defined by the ethnicities, and the war in other
parts of BiH, with a high sufferings of the Serbs! Finally, all the Ptosecution’s allegations about a
criminal meaning of Variant A/B was definitely rebuted by Mr. Kapetina, a long period official of
the Ministry for Defense!)

1591. On 30 April 1992, a take-over of the town of Prijedor was organised by the Prijedor Serb Assembly
and the Prijedor SDS and executed by JNA forces, including the 5th Kozara Brigade, and members of
the Prijedor SJB and other clandestine Serb police stations.5505 Those “clandestine” police stations
were called in this report (P02968) as a shadow stations:

And it was said why and in what circumstances it had been done:

Therefore, there was an imminent attack of the Cazin Krajina forces, (which was in an accord
with the testimony of M. Mujadzic in this case, saying that their “strategic objective” was to take
at least everything western of the Sana River, see T20659 Q. I have to go back to the interview
again. Is it true that you very early on concluded that it -- it would be very hard to defend Prijedor
and that your strategy was to defend the left bank of the Sana river in which a lot of Sanski Most and
Bosanski Novi would not be part of the territory you would defend? A. That's correct. With a
slight correction here, Mr. Karadzic. That was not my personal plan. That was a plan proposed by
people who knew something about strategic defence preparations, who were experts in the area. I,
as a political figure, accepted the reality of the situation given the fact that the potential ratio of
forces was absolutely negative at our expense -- or, rather, in favour of the other so I accepted that to
be the reality, although many in Prijedor and Kozarac did not come to terms with that very easily.
But that was the reality.) and the Presidency of BiH Order to attack the JNA was a momentum to
prevent a carnage, and it had been achieved without any firing. Of course, those who planned it
and didn’t succeed, like Sejmenovic, Mujadzic and other extremists, didn’t like it, and testified in
their interests, but the Chamber didn’t notice their interest to lie. During the night between 29 and
30 April 1992, members of the SJB and reserve police stations, some of whom were wearing military
uniforms, gathered in Ĉirkin Polje, an area of Prijedor town.5506 Between 1 and 5 a.m., Serb Forces set-
up patrols, sniper nests, machine-gun nests, sandbags, and check-points throughout Prijedor town in
several locations; there was no resistance from the non-Serb population.5507 And there was no firing
and casualties either.

5505
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20465–20466 (27 October 2011), T. 20589 (28 October 2011); Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T.
6568; D4219 (Witness statement of Miroslav Kvoĉka dated 17 January 2014), para. 12; P2968 (Report of Prijedor SJB, January 1993), p. 2; D4195 (Witness
statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 16; Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3668–3669; P3528
(Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 15; P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p. 3 (under seal); Nusreta
Sivac, T. 20387 (26 October 2011); Edward Vulliamy, T. 21079 (9 November 2011); P2630 (Transcript of broadcast of Radio Prijedor), pp. 1–6 (describing
preparations for the take-over and the events on 30 April 1992); D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 6, 32;
P5518 (Report of Prijedor SJB to Banja Luka CSB, 30 April 1992); D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), pp. 15–16. See D1838
(Regular Combat Report from JNA 5th Corps Command to 2nd Military District Command, 1 May 1992), p. 1. See also Adjudicated Facts 1014, 1015, 1016;
P6611 (Bulletin of the 4th Tactical Group, May 1994), pp. 1–2.
5506
P2968 (Report of Prijedor SJB, January 1993), p. 2; see Adjudicated Fact 1016.
5507
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20465–20466 (27 October 2011); Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6568; D4219 (Witness statement
of Miroslav Kvoĉka dated 17 January 2014), para. 12; Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3668–3669; Idriz Merdţanić,
 95

1592. By the morning of 30 April, soldiers occupied all of the most important institutions and buildings in
Prijedor, such as the Municipal Assembly building, the police station, medical centre, court building,
bank, post office, and radio station.5508 (No doubt, it was a precautionary #measure of the JNA#
because of the dispatch from the Ministry of Interior to attack the JNA and force it to surrender.
Later that day, flags on municipal buildings in Prijedor town were also changed to Serb flags with the
four Cyrillic letter ―Cs‖.5509

1593. A declaration on the take-over prepared by the SDS was read out on Radio Prijedor the day
after the take-over and was repeated throughout the day.5510 That morning, a group of armed
soldiers surrounded the Radio Prijedor building.5511 Stakić came to Radio Prijedor and was
introduced to employees as the President of the Serb municipality of Prijedor.5512 (#Two
municipalities – peace#! In all the cases where there was this “Serb municipality” it was
understood that there will be the Muslim municipality too. That is why Banja Luka,
Bijeljina and other municipalities without conditions to have more municipalities didn’t have
this prefix “Serb municipality”.) A press release was read out on-air, and Stakić was
interviewed.5513 During that interview, Stakić stated that he represented the Serb municipality of
Prijedor, as its President, and that the leadership of the Serb municipality could no longer wait for
an agreement with the SDA, which was the reason for the take-over of territory which rightly
belonged to them. When Stakić was asked what would happen with the Bosnian Muslim residents
of Prijedor, he stated: ―We have nothing to do with them. On their portion of the municipal
territory, they are free to organise themselves as they please, as they see fit and best for their
interests.‖5514 Stakić mentioned several areas of the municipality that were considered to be
Muslim, including Kozarac, Brdo, and the Stari Grad neighbourhood of Prijedor town.5515 (#No
“Take-over”, Serb territory only#! Then, how could it be concluded that the Serbs “took-
over” the Prijedor municipality??? It couldn’t be more blatant and clear that the Serbs took
control over the #Serb parts# of municipality only, leaving the Muslims as same opportunity,
including the participation in the urban core of Prijedor: Stari Grad was a very core of the
town, from the Turkish times, and in all such a cases there was envisaged that both
ethnicities would have a part of the urban core, and a belonging villages with their majority.
It is so common throuout the world. Why the Serbs wanted that? Because, even in a peace
time, before the war, the Muslim side abused the common state institutions to subjugate the
Serbs and to be able to arm their followers without a Serb insight, see P5528

P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7720; P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 15; P3691 (Witness statement of
Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p. 3 (under seal); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1823 (under seal); P2630 (Transcript of
broadcast of Radio Prijedor), pp. 1–6. See also Adjudicated Facts 1014, 1017.
5508
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1822–1823, 1828 (under seal); P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October
2011), p. 3 (under seal); Nusreta Sivac, T. 20387 (26 October 2011). See Adjudicated Facts 1016, 1017, 1018, 1019.
5509
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1823 (under seal); Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5553.
5510
Adjudicated Fact 1022.
5511
[REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 1018.
5512
[REDACTED].
5513
[REDACTED]. See D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 16.
5514
[REDACTED]; Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6568–6570.
5515
[REDACTED].
 96

But, this interview is opposing to everything what the Prosecution alleges against the Serbs.
It was clear that the Serbs in Prijedor wanted only to protect themselves by introducing their
own municipal authorities, recommended the same to the Prijedor Muslims. How can be
meditated any “ethnic cleansing”, while both communities would have their own municipal
authorities, their own police, schools, economy, security? And the same was in all the
municipalities where there was an incrise of misunderstandings and ethnic tensions.

1594. After the take-over, movement outside of Prijedor municipality was initially prohibited for both
Serbs and non-Serbs, and later movement towards Prijedor town from non-Serb areas inside the
municipality was also prohibited.5516 (#Ad absurdum#! But, during the fights in Hambarine and
Kozarac, the Muslim population from those settlements had been allowed to take shelter in the
Serb controlled parts of the Prijedor urban area!)

(a) Expulsion of non-Serbs from police, administrative and judicial organs, and work force

1595. On 30 April, non-Serbs were refused entrance into their work places and other institutions and
were dismissed from management positions.5517 (#Wrong, out of context#! That was the most
critical day in Prijedor, with a complete insecurity, and this measure probably was necessary,
particularly for the Muslim extremists! All the Muslim policemen were welcome, provided
they accept the Serb municipality, otherwise, they were to work in the Muslim police station!)
Nusreta Sivac, a Bosnian Muslim municipal court judge in Prijedor town, went to work on 30 April
and found armed Serb military and paramilitary units at the court building.5518 She tried to enter the
building and one of the soldiers asked her name and informed her that she no longer worked
there.5519 The majority of Bosnian Muslim judges, prosecutors, and public attorneys were similarly
dismissed in the first few days after the take-over and were replaced by Serbs.5520 Nusreta Sivac
identified several Bosnian Muslim court officials who were dismissed and taken to Omarska camp
where they were singled out as Bosnian Muslim intellectuals.5521 (#Wrong in fact#! This is not
true and didn’t happen before the 30th May and attack on Prijedor, because prior to this
massive attack there was no any detention facilities in Omarska, see P02640, which
undoubtedly defines the date of the establishment of Omarska as a detention-investigation unit
on 31 May, 1992:
5516
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20468 (27 October 2011).
5517
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20468–20469 (27 October 2011); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1835–1836 (under seal). See also
P3694 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff sent to municipality presidents, 11 May 1992), p. 1; Adjudicated Fact 1096.
5518
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 2–3 (under seal).
5519
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p. 3 (under seal). See also Nusreta Sivac, T. 20387 (26 October 2011).
5520
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 3–4 (under seal).
5521
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 3–4 (under seal). See P3553 (Decision of Prijedor Executive Board, 4 May 1992).
See also paras. 1749, 1766.
 97

Such a unilateral information is invalid, since we already know that there was no any
arbitrary arrest or dismissals. The list of the final number of about 3,000 people arrested, 59%
of them had been released, and about 1,400 kept as responsible for the attack and conveyed to
Manjaca. So, out of 49,500 Muslims in Prijedor 1,400 were conveyed to Manjaca, which makes
2,28% of the Muslim population, and added the Croatian population it was even less. Does
anybody asserts that there was no 2,3% of the Muslim extremists, while only those who
attacked Prijedor throuout the war was more that 5,000? Only in the Kozarac area prior to
the attack on Prijedor 30 May 92 there was a big unit of the “Green berets” up to 2,000, as can
be seen from D1743:……………………….

An the results of this skirmish was as notified in the same D1743, only on the VRS side, i.e.
without the police casualties:…………………………………..

And this kind of situation so deep in the Serb territory is unbearable and could be detrimental.
Those 1,500 that are captured were characterised by the Sivac group of witnesses as a
civilians. Already at the beginning of May, a few days after 30 April, the Muslim extremists
killed a Serb reserve policeman from behind, just like that, and a relative of the killed took
revenge killing four Muslims just like that! What the authorities could have done about this
development? “Milos” reported on this event, D1832:

1596. Non-Serb members of the police were disarmed and dismissed or forced to sign a statement of
loyalty if they wanted to stay employed.5522 This is not true, because, as seen from the Stakic
interview, the Muslim community was advised to make their own municipality and all the
structures, and a police stations as well, see…. Also, it is not true that anyone was “forced” to
sign a statement of loyalty, it was completely free, and even there was a deadline postponed
several times, and it pertained the Serbs also, see

5522
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20467–20468 (27 October 2011).
 98

P02968:……………………………………….:……

But, to 30 May majority of the Muslim policemen joined the rebels and fought against the Serb
civilians, the VRS and the Serb police, see P02968

….
: Non-Serb commanders in the police were replaced with Serbs—Drljaĉa assumed the position of
Chief of the (the Serb, not common SJB) Prijedor SJB to which he was elected two weeks prior,
Dušan Janković became Commander of the Prijedor Police Station, and Ţeljko Mejakić became
squad commander of the police.5523 A few days after the take-over, most non-Serb teachers were
also dismissed from schools.5524 (This is not correct, since there is a confusion about 30 April,
when the Serbs took control over the Serb municipality only, and 30 May, when the
Muslim/Croat forces attacked Prijedor with more than 5,000 combatants! After this attack,
everything changed!)

1597. Also on 30 April, KDZ094 (92bis, who was KDZ094?) found that the vehicle he drove for
work had been moved from the depot to the Urije headquarters of the company, where the main
gate was closed, and an armed Serb guard in a green military uniform tried to search him for
weapons, but he refused; KDZ094 then went home and did not return to work again, and neither
did other non-Serbs who worked for the company.5525

1598. After the take-over, Atlija went to work at the Ljubija mines and his manager told him that the
SDS had taken power in Prijedor and that he should go home; Atlija returned to his home town of
Briševo.5526 He was told later that a Serb had moved into his apartment in Prijedor.5527
Furthermore, one day after the take-over, KDZ611 was stopped on his way to work at a check-
point manned by armed Serbs in JNA uniforms; they forced all of the non-Serbs to get off the bus
KDZ611 was on and told him that he should no longer report for work.5528 (Again, Rule 92bis,
not cross-examinned)

1599. For several days following the take-over, employees at Radio Prijedor were given several
announcements to read out, such as one concerning a curfew imposed by the Serb authorities in
Prijedor.5529 On one of these days, two Bosnian Muslim men, one of whom was Bećir

5523
D4219 (Witness statement of Miroslav Kvoĉka dated 17 January 2014), para. 6. See Adjudicated Fact 1023; para. 1580.
5524
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20468 (27 October 2011).
5525
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5875–5878, 5982 (under seal).
5526
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5553–5555.
5527
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5554–5555, 5659–5660.
5528
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5814–5815 (under seal); KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12452–
12453 (under seal); P4101 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 6.
5529
[REDACTED].
 99

Medunjanin, a local SDA leader, came to the radio station asking that an announcement be made
that the people of Kozarac wished to live in peace and that there was no threat or danger coming
from them.5530 However, soldiers inside the studio building prevented this announcement from
being made on air, stating that police permission was required. When the men returned to the
studio an hour later, they said that they had been denied permission by a police officer for the
announcement to be made.5531 Employees at Radio Prijedor were later fired pursuant to a decision
of the ARK Crisis Staff.5532 . (#A Muslim extremists#! What Medunjanin could have said,
since the police knew for the preparations of the Kozarac SDA for war? Becir Medunjanin
was a very extreme in his anti-Serb actions, (seeD1833, a Muslim document, which contains
an evidence and names of all those “prominent” Muslim citizens as a prominent organizers
of the rebellion! He prepared the entire rebellion and fights in Prijedor.

1600. On 22 June 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff issued a decision stating that all posts important for
the functioning of the economy may only be held by ―personnel of Serbian ethnicity‖;5533 this was
then forwarded by Ţupljanin to all SJBs for its immediate implementation within the ARK.5534
.5535 However, this was an obligation due to the #Law of Defence#. Remember Muhamed Ali
of USA, how he was treated after the refusal to participate in a war thousands miles away
from USA. Let us see what was said in a military document, P05405

So, #regardless of ethnicity#, those who avoided to fulfil their obligations towards the
defence of the country, couldn’t keep a posts from which they could damage the interests of
the country pertaining defence and security. And the Serbs who didn’t fulfil their obligation
were called “Serbian degenerates”. Not to justify or oppose, but simply this was the practice
envisaged by the laws. #In no case it was the President’s liability#!) In July 1992, the Prijedor
Crisis Staff and the Prijedor SJB reported that the ARK Crisis Staff decision was implemented in
the municipality.5536 (This had nothing to do with the President, and was #in contrast to all
the presidential orders# and all what he was stating and advocating. But, by that time there
was many armed skirmishes between the Muslim irregulars and the police and VRS. As we
can see from the next documents, the police had many casualties: D04414

5530
[REDACTED].
5531
[REDACTED].
5532
[REDACTED].
5533
P7 (Decision of ARK Crisis Staff, 22 June 1992).
5534
P6533 (Decision of ARK Crisis Staff forwarded by Banja Luka CSB, 1 July 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact 534. See para. 2061.
5535
P6533 (Decision of ARK Crisis Staff forwarded by Banja Luka CSB, 1 July 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact 534. See
para. 2061.
5536
P9 (Prijedor Municipal Assembly Report, 13 July 1992), p. 2; P2637 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 1 July 1992). See, e.g., P3709 (Decision of Prijedor Executive
Board, 7 May 1992).
 100

And the very next report, D04415

So, within these two days the Police in Prijedor sustained a number of casualties, although
being far from the confrontation line, and deep in the Serb territory. At the same time, the
police in Prijedor investigated and charged a Serb for blackmailing a Muslim, see D01925
 101

(a) House searches and surrender of weapons

1602. Following the take-over, there was a military presence on the streets of Prijedor town.5537
(#Legal and obligatory#! Shouldn’t it be? There was a number of the groups of terrorists
killing those people. According to our domestic laws, the police and the Army had to be on
the streets, but our enemies objected it in front of this court, and obviously got a support for
it’s terrorism! The war was going on in the entire Bosnia, and finally came to Prijedor, what
else could be expected but to protect the population?) On 8 May 1992, Vahid Cerić, who
worked for the TO, was arrested.5538 In accordance with a decision of the ARK government on 4
May 1992,5539 there were announcements on the radio that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
had to hand in their weapons by a certain deadline, and that white flags should be hung from the
front of houses as a sign of loyalty to the authorities.5540 (#EXCULPATORY#! A GB journalist
Ed Wulliamy, certainly not pro-Serb, reported about it on 6 August 92, see D100:

This was the Prosecution’s witness, but (inadvertently or not, mayby professionally) he gave
a crucial evidence that rebut all the allegations about any discrimination on a religious basis!
Also, he reported that the Muslim women and children had felt free to take shelter in
Prijedor under the Serb control, while their men were a captured rebels, se the same D100:

(And
further, the same D100:

And, also the same document discloses the real reason for the “detention of civilians”:

Prominent non-Serbs in the community, amongst whom were Dr. Esad Sadiković and Dedo
Crnalić, went around to houses of non-Serbs encouraging them to hand in any weapons that they
had in order to avoid conflict.5541 The Serb residents of Prijedor town were allowed to keep

5537
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1832 (under seal).
5538
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1833 (under seal) (testifying further that he later saw Vahic Cerić in Manjaĉa).
5539
P2818 (Decision of ARK Regional Secretariat for National Defence, 4 May 1992).
5540
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1833 (under seal); P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 5–6
(under seal); Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6576; D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated),
e-court p. 27. See also KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21119–21120 (under seal); Adjudicated Fact 1021.
5541
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1837–1838 (under seal).
 102

weapons and local Serbs were given weapons.5542 (#The JNA competence#! All about the
weapons was a JNA concern until 20 May 1992. Crnalic and Sadikovic were very famous for
their extremism, and this is an afterwards (post festum) “make-up” by another Muslim
extremist!)
1603. In addition, houses of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were frequently searched and
looted.5543 On 12 May 1992, two men from the CSB came to see Nusret Sivac, a journalist for
Sarajevo TV, at his apartment and informed him they had orders to bring him to the CSB to meet
with the chief, Ranko Mijić.5544 Mijić told Nusret Sivac that he had orders from the ―new Serb
authorities‖ and the Crisis Staff to seize all of his camera equipment.5545 They confiscated all of
his equipment, including a large van equipped with cameras and his private tapes.5546 Nusret
Sivac was held at the CSB for a while longer and then was allowed to go home after Mijić warned
him not to leave Prijedor in case they needed to ask him further questions.5547 (#Legal police
work#! We already know that Mr. Sivac was a suspect for a while, on the basis of what his
followers said about him, but he wasn’t arrested immediately, on the first information about
his conduct. When, later, after many Muslims mentioned him as an organizer of the armed
rebellion, he was brought in and detained. But, let us see why the police in Prijedor was
cautious about the activities of the Muslim extremists, see D01816, of 18 May 92

And this was the situation in May, after the take-over of the Serb parts of municipality, and
an offer to the Muslims to form their own municipality, which they iniciated, but prolonged,
expecting to take the whole municipality through the attack that took place on 30 May. In
this situation, knowing only a bit of the organization and armament of the Muslim terrorist
groups, ( see the last para above) the Chamber presumes that the police didn’t have rights to
search for the illegal armament!!! This is a unique example in history, and nobody has any
right to do that.

1604. During May 1992, continuous references were made by Serbs on the police radio about
destroying mosques and everything that belonged to the ―balijas‖, as well as the need to destroy
the ―balijas‖ themselves.5548 (Is this serious? What Adjudicated fact? When was it
adjudicated? Was there any corroboration. Somebody may say anything allegedly being said
on the “police radio” while nobody can check it. There is a big doubt about that, and apart
from the factual matter, what does it have to do with the President what some may be
irresponsibly chatting of the police radios? And how any Muslim adversary could have
heard the police radios? However, many mosques had been #abused for a military
5542
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1854–1855 (under seal).
5543
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1834 (under seal); P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p. 6
(under seal). See Adjudicated Fact 1097.
5544
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6570.
5545
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6570–6571.
5546
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6571–6572.
5547
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6571.
5548
See Adjudicated Fact 1024.
 103

purposes#. See what Mirsad Mujad`i} said in an interview in a Muslim journal, D1834:

So, mosques and Mesdzids are a pure religious facilities!)

(a) Clashes in Prijedor town

1605. On 30 May 1992, a group of around 20 Bosnian Muslims led by Slavko Ećimović attacked
Prijedor town.5549 (#Wrong in fact# Who said it was only 20 Bosnian Muslims? There were
many of them, in a five columns, up to several hundreds of combatants, see evidence in the
file, who were promised that the local Muslims, already in the town, would join them, see:
evidence!) Announcements were made on the radio that Ećimović, a Bosnian Muslim who had
been the target of threats by Serb police officers following the SDS take-over, was attacking
Prijedor town in an attempt to ―liberate‖ it.5550 (S. Ecimovic wasn’t a Muslim, but a Croat, who
organised the Muslims and some Croats. He wasn’t any target of the Serbs, otherwise he
would be taken in prior to this attack. He was simply hunting a glory, and probably was on
line with the Croatian secret service, while the majority of the Prijedor Croats joined the
VRS. Let us see what a Muslim, Dr. Mujadzic said about it, D1834:

5549
Nusret Sivac, T. 19585, 19598–19599 (28 September 2011); Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6572–6573; KDZ026, P2089
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1846–1847, 2012–2014 (under seal); KDZ026, T. 10376 (17 January 2011) (closed session). See also KDZ523,
P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21067 (under seal) (testifying that Prijedor town was attacked by Bosnian Muslim paramilitaries). Stakić
testified that early in the morning on 30 May 1992, gun-fire and shooting could be heard in Prijedor town and explosions around the MUP building.
Milomir Stakić, T. 45232 (17 December 2013).
5550
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6572–6573. See also P2630 (Transcript of broadcast of Radio Prijedor), p. 6. According to
Nusreta Sivac, allegations on the radio stated that the small armed group of non-Serbs did not agree with Prijedor becoming a Serb town. Nusreta Sivac, T.
20398 (26 October 2011).
 104

So, in front of a substantial presence of the Serb community in Prijedor, Slavko E}imovi}
formed another illegal armed unit and trained it in a school, and the Serb “police officers”
knew that, and were after him, not because he was a Croat, but for being a criminal! Many
Croats joined the VRS, as well as many secular Muslims!) According to Nusreta Sivac,
however, the group was too small to successfully take-over the buildings belonging to the radio
station, MUP, or other important institutions.5551 (In spite of “beign too small” this group
made a casualties on the side of the Serb police, but it wasn’t so small as alleged by these
biased witnesses. Anyway, it doesn’t change the fact that they made an attack aimed to take
control over the entire municipality, including the Serb parts, while the Serbs didn’t make
such a move to take control over the Muslim/Croat parts of Prijedor.)

1606. Around 9 a.m., a Serb tank and troops moved from the area around the Municipal Assembly
Building towards the Stari Grad neighbourhood of Prijedor town.5552 Radical ―Chetnik‖ songs also
played on the radio calling for the killing of ―Turks and other non-Serb people‖ and radio
announcements called on all armed Serbs to defend the town and destroy the extremists.5553 (And this
witness, Mr. N. Sivac, #known as an extremist#, is credible so that his allegations are taken for
granted? What the soldiers were singing is irrelevant to the fact that this morning there were five
columns of attackers on the Serb controlled parts of Prijedor! This kind of schifting the attention
from the crucial facts to what had been sang is ridiculous!) Sometime that day, there was a
confrontation between Ećimović and his group on one side and the Serb Forces on the other;
Ećimović‘s group ultimately retreated towards the Sana River, but Ećimović was captured.5554 After
Ećimović‘s group retreated, Serb Forces, with APCs, heavy artillery weapons, and tanks, encircled
Prijedor town, section by section.5555 From the morning until the late afternoon, a tank and several
grenade launchers fired at the old town of Prijedor from the bank of the Bereg, setting parts of the area
ablaze for several hours.5556 At around 6 p.m. that day, Serb Forces set fire to the main mosque in the
centre of Prijedor town, called the Ĉaršijska mosque.5557 The Zagrad mosque in Prijedor town was also
burned and destroyed.5558 The majority of Stari Grad was destroyed or left in ruins during the attack;
the mosque in Stari Grad was torn down by Serb Forces using tanks.5559 (#Abuses of civilian objects

5551
Nusreta Sivac, T. 20398–20399 (26 October 2011).
5552
Milomir Stakić, T. 45232 (17 December 2013).
5553
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6572–6573.
5554
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6574; Nusret Sivac, T. 19593 (28 September 2011). Ećimović was later taken to Omarska
and killed; furthermore, his whole family was killed and his godfather was singled out and beaten at Omarska once their relationship was discovered. See
Nusret Sivac, T. 19593 (28 September 2011); Ivo Atlija, T. 20349 (26 October 2011); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1878
(under seal); Ţeljko Mejakić T. 44255–44256, (29 November 2013). See also para. 1766.
5555
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6574.
5556
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6575.
5557
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6575–6576, 6606–6607 (testifying further that later in August 1992, the Catholic Church in
Prijedor town and the mosque in the Puharska neighbourhood were destroyed); Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7800–
7801. The individuals involved in setting fire to the mosque were Milenko Milić, a member of Milan Andzić‘s paramilitary group, as well as his
commander, Momĉilo Radanović, and Milorad Vokić, a police officer and personal bodyguard to Drljaĉa. See also Adjudicated Facts 1282, 1284, 1285;
P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case,
formatted records), pp. 222–224.
5558
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6575. See also Adjudicated Fact 1283; P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J.
Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted records), pp. 225–226. See para. 1887.
5559
P3536 (Decisions and orders of Prijedor Municipal Assembly and Prijedor Crisis Staff, published in Prijedor Official Gazette on 25 June 1992), pp. 24–29,
40–41, 44–45, 61–62; P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 78–81; D4468 (Confirmation of decisions adopted by Crisis Staff by
Prijedor Municipal Assembly, 24 July 1992), e-court pp. 5, 7, 9; Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6604, 6692–6693; Milomir
Stakić, T. 45232 (17 December 2013). See also Adjudicated Fact 1268. Serb soldiers came back to Stari Grad in June 1992 and cleared the rubble from 30
May with tanks and cranes, tearing down the remains of the Stari Grad mosque first. P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 81;
 105

and settlements#! Old town was known as a stronghold for lounching attacks on Prijedor,
mosques as a storages and sniper nests! #Military necessity#! Did anyone establish whether it was
a military necessity, or not? Why the Serbs didn’t destroy the said mosques before the 30 May
attack? We remember that the organisers of the attack promised to their combatants that they
will be met by the “fifth column” in the city! From where these “fifth comuln” combatants could
join them? From the Old Town (Stari Grad) and the mosques and other facilities where the Serbs
didn’t control anything for the sake of decency!)

1607. Throughout the day on 30 May, soldiers wearing red berets with red straps, and various
different insignia, searched apartments, including that of Nusret Sivac, for weapons and alcohol
and removed what they wanted.5560 Serb Forces also escorted columns of people, amongst whom
were elderly people and children with white armbands; each column was led by a man carrying a
white flag to different locations in Prijedor town, where buses arrived to take them to Trnopolje,
Omarska, and Keraterm camps.5561 Non-Serbs who remained outside the detention facilities were
required to wear white armbands to distinguish themselves and were subjected to harassment and
beatings.5562 (#Contrary to evidence#! This is so nasty and so dishonest assertion. Gen. Talic
ordered both, the Serb soldiers and the civilians out of combats, to mark themselves, so that
they wouldn’t be mixed up with the combatants, see fn. 5644, see…@… How it is possible
that the Chamber didn’t notice this evidence? What kind of charge is this assertion that the
police searched a town that was attacked from five directions?)

1608. There was no large-scale fighting the following day, but there was intermittent shooting
and explosions.5563 Serb Forces continued to loot the homes of non-Serbs in the days after the
attack.5564(5571) Furthermore, soldiers wearing olive-green colour uniforms with the Serbian four
―S‖ insignia and ―kokarda‖ caps, formerly worn by the JNA, (#Insignias#! The JNA as a
successor of the Tito’s partizans would be the last one to wore cokardes, and the VRS also
had been forbidden to have any ideological insignia, such as communict pentagram and
royalist cocarda! Therefore, a lie, or a group out of the Serb authorities control!) stormed into
houses and arrested people; non-Serbs in Prijedor town lived in fear of being attacked or taken
away to Omarska and other camps.5565 The movement of non-Serbs was restricted by means of a
curfew and check-points; (There was no any curfew on an ethnic basis! Since there was an
armed rebellion with casualties, too far from any frontline, in any country in the world it
would be considered as terrorism, and adequate measures would include a check-points and
a curfew. There was no ethnic control, all the people in movement were controlled, but
equally treated, and equally let pass if there was no weapons or explosives, see the evidence
in file!) registers in apartment buildings were also used to record their movements.5566 The same
as the above. There was no any visible difference between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims, so
that it would be possible to notice who was who, see the evidence in file!#Regardless of
ethnicity#!)

Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6607–6608. See also P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer,
entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted records), pp. 213–215.
5560
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6576.
5561
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6574–6575.
5562
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6576; P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p. 5 (under seal).
See Adjudicated Fact 1092.
5563
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p. 6 (under seal); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1847
(under seal).
5564
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p. 6 (under seal).
5565
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p. 5 (under seal); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1853–1854
(under seal).
5566
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6576; P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 5–6 (under
seal). See Adjudicated Facts 1097, 1100.
 106

1609. In the days after the 30 May attack, Radio Prijedor broadcast reports stating that Serbs had
taken over Prijedor town and were ―controlling all power and authority‖ there.5567 Propaganda
against non-Serbs later intensified on the radio, including appeals to Serbs to ―lynch‖ all non-
Serbs.5568 (#Military necessity# to “control Prijedor after the Muslim attack! Legal and
obligatory#! But, about calls for “lynch” - this would be recorded and broadcasted
throughout the world, had it been true. Those are horrible lies, nobody ever reported such a
thing, and the courtroom had been turned into a theatre stage for the Muslim extremists to
continue their war against the Serbs. How come the Chamber didn’t even mentioned that
those assertions require further corroborations, as it did when the Serb witnesses were
testifying? Second, this paragraph is in contrast to all the prior assertions of the
Prosecution/Chamber that the Serbs took control over Prijedor on 30 April. The Defence
position is that on 30 April the Serbs took control only over the Serb parts of municipality,
offering the Muslim-Croat coalition to form their own municipality, see P5528, quoted in
para 1594 of the Judgement! ―When Stakić was asked what would happen with the Bosnian
Muslim residents of Prijedor, he stated: ―We have nothing to do with them. On their portion of
the municipal territory, they are free to organise themselves as they please, as they see fit and
best for their interests.‖
1610. From 10 June 1992 on, Prijedor town was in a terrible state; there was no electricity or water
and soldiers frequently searched apartments and evicted people from them.5569 (#Regardless of
ethnicity#!) All of it pertained to the Serbs too. No ethnic electricity. The homes of non-Serbs
were searched by the police and military, allegedly looking for weapons; however during those
searches, valuables were taken.5570 Non-Serbs were evicted from their houses and apartments and
Serbs moved in.5571 Serb families were protected and lived a normal life; they went to work,
shopped, and walked around town.5572 Non-Serbs were taken away ―in an unknown direction‖ and
rumours started spreading about the existence of ―concentration camps‖ in Prijedor
municipality.5573 (It is miraculous how the witness being in prison have seen all of this that
she testified? But, why it wasn’t implemented to all Muslims? Why only 2,3% of the Muslim
population in Prijedor were of the interest of the security services? Or, if we discount the
minors, (some 22% those below 16,) the percent would be slightly higher, but still
significantly lower than if it was, as alleged, an ethnic discrimination.)

(4)Attacks on surrounding villages

1611. Prior to the 30 May attack on Prijedor town, Serb Forces had launched attacks on other
villages and areas in Prijedor municipality, starting with the villages of Hambarine and Ljubija on
23 May, Kozarac on 24 May, and Kamiĉani on 26 May 1992.5574 (#Who attacked#! This is
highly wrong! There is an overwhelming evidence that the Muslim side initiated all the
attacks in Prijedor. It started with the Muslim ambush in Hambarine, where they had been
keeping their barricades tolerated by the Serbs. On 22 May the group of Muslims on this
barricade fired to a car with six reservists, killing two abnd badly wounding two of them. A
Muslim policemen (Aliskovic) organised and participated in this killing, and in later denial
to give the bodied of the killed soldiers, resisting the police search for the perpetrators. If this
kind of shifting the facts is allowed, there will be no any justice in the future! Let us again
5567
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p. 6 (under seal).
5568
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6618.
5569
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6617. See Adjudicated Fact 1098.
5570
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6603.
5571
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p. 6 (under seal).
5572
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p. 6 (under seal); Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6603.
See also Nusreta Sivac, T. 20387–20388 (26 October 2011).
5573
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p. 5 (under seal).
5574
P2968 (Report of Prijedor SJB, January 1993), p. 4 (stating that combat operations commenced in Prijedor municipality on 22 May 1992); D470 (CSB
Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 28–29. See also Adjudicated Fact 1034.
 107

see what is said in this document (P02968, and also P05405)

Therefore, the other side was preparing an armed attack on Prijedor, with the aim to merge it
with the Cazinska Krajina area. No doubt, the JNA intelligence found it out, and
strengthened those who they could rely on, i.e. the Serb reservists and police. Let us see
further, when and how the armed skirmishes started!. In the Judgment it was sais as is in
para 4, and presented as if the Serbs lounched attacks against those villages, but in the
document it is different:

Let us see the names of the killed Serb policemen

The killed and wounded 36 policemen, in the town that was far from the frontline, while the
Prijedor conscripts and reservists were on the front, is nothing but a terrorism. Which
country and police would tolerate this? But see how the combat commenced:

So, this had nothing to do with the alleged Serb attacks on the “surrounding villages.” It is
well known that the skirmishes had been initiated by the Muslim extremists, attacking the
conscripits and convoys, just as S. Halilovic demanded, (see: D3904, p.1

…
) and as the BiH Presidency ordered on 29 April. No evidence that the Serbs wanted or
initiated the armed conflict. The Chamber shouldn’t mix it up and change the causes and
consequences. Also, a Serb preparations for defence must not be treated as preparation for
ofensives and “taking over” of the non-Serb territories and settlements! But, let us see the
 108

Army report about those two days of fights in the “surrounding villages”, D1743:

There is no person with a military education that would not understand the #security
necessity# of quitting such a huge presence of an armed enemies deep in the territory under
the control of the regular army!)

(a) Kozarac area

1612. The area of Kozarac is located approximately 12 kilometres to the east of Prijedor town, with
Kozarac town lying on the main road from Prijedor to Banja Luka, beneath Mount Kozara.5575 Before
the events of 1992, Kozarac town and the surrounding villages were inhabited by Bosnian Serbs and
Bosnian Muslims alike; however some of the villages in the area were almost entirely inhabited by
Bosnian Muslims (such as Garibi, Kamiĉani, Kevljani, Babići, and Hrnići), and other villages had a
majority Bosnian Serb population (such as Vidovići, Balte, Lamovita, Omarska, Jelicka, Maricka,
Tomašica, Jaruge, Orlovći, and Garevći).5576 As of 1991, 27,000 people lived in the whole area and in
Kozarac town alone, over 90% of the population was Bosnian Muslim; Bosnian Serbs comprised 3% of
the population and there were very few Croats.5577

1613. Beginning in March 1992, tensions increased among the population in the Kozarac area and
military troops and equipment were brought in by the JNA.5578 (Kozarac was full of the Muslim
extremists, armed up to 1,500 long barrels and 3,000 combatants, and it was well known to the
Chamber!

5575
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3314; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1796 (under seal); P569 (Map of
Prijedor municipality); P621 (Map and photographs of Kozarac). See also P3891 (Map of Kozarac and Omarska); Adjudicated Fact 1003.
5576
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3315; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7055–7056; KDZ611, P698
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12454 (under seal); P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 6 (under seal);
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7722. See also KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2611, 2639–
2640 (under seal); Adjudicated Fact 1034.
5577
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2639–2640 (under seal); Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6764;
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7722. See also Adjudicated Fact 1041.
5578
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2617–2618 (under seal); Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7056–
7059.
 109

Local Serbs in Kozarac began openly carrying weapons, which they had brought home from fighting in
Croatia.5579 As a result of these tensions, in April 1992 in various locations in Kozarac, some joint
check-points were supplemented with, and eventually replaced by, Serb check-points.5580 (#Who
started#! It is already well known that the Muslim side made their check-points around all of
their settlements. One of this check-points caused the first skirmish, in Hambarine on 22 May,
when the Muslim policemen Aliskovic with the other members of the Green Berets fired agains a
car killing at least two, heavily wounding two and lightely wounding additional two conscripts.
Such a unilaterally depicted events suggest the Serb responsibility, which is not correct.) By early
May 1992, there was a Serb check-point at the main entrance to Kozarac and a tank was posted
there.5581

1614. In October 1991, the President of the local board of the SDA of Kozarac mobilised around 120 men
for the TO in Kozarac.5582 Beginning in the period before the take-over of Prijedor,5583 members of the
TO, the Green Berets, and other armed Bosnian Muslim groups were active in the Kozarac area.5584
(#The Muslim paramilitaries#! That was not “before the take over of Prijedor”, this happened a
half of a year before April 92, and seven months before the “take over”. All of this activities and
preparations for the war against their Serb neighbours was entirely known to the secret services,
and even to the ordinary people! Would the Serbs be expected not to take any precautionary
measure? This secret and dangerous acitivi was led by the common state institutions, turned to
be a private SDA services!)

1615. Immediately following the take-over of Prijedor, there were also efforts on the part of the
local non-Serb population to organise themselves to defend their homes from the attacks they
anticipated, but they were poorly armed and equipped with no artillery or heavy equipment.5585
Members of the TO patrolled Kozarac on night duty.5586 Other local Bosnian Muslims set up
armed guard posts at various places around Kozarac.5587 In Javori, five to ten Bosnian Muslims,
including Sead Ĉirkin, a former JNA officer, participated in guard duty to protect the outer border
of Kozarac; they were armed with hunting rifles.5588 This is a #“post-festum” explanation#.
They didn’t have any need to form their secret units, what they did even in Ocrober 1991,
but it was a task of Sefer Halilovic, to organize the Units in every single settlement, and
which Halolovic achieved until September 91. However, this did have a detrimental impact
on the common life. At the same time there was the war in Croatia, the Muslims went the
same way and participated on the Croatian side against the common state of Yugoslavia and
the Serbs. The forming of a massive secret Muslim army warned and scared the Serbs, and
that was why they insisted to have the sensitive posts in the governments, police and other
distributed as agreed, because the entire state apparatus was abused by the Muslims. But, if
the Chamber found what it said in this para, then why it didn’t see the entire development in
the light of those facts? Accepting those facts, everything looks like an axiomatic

5579
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7057–7059, 7063.
5580
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7720–7722; see Adjudicated Fact 1041.
5581
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7720–7722; D1922 (Witness statement of Idriz Merdţanić dated 28 August 2000), e-court
p. 2.
5582
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2614–2619, 2641 (under seal).
5583
See Section IV.A.1.b.i.D.3: Take-over of Prijedor.
5584
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3323–3325, 3456–3459; KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2614–2619,
2641 (under seal); D1743 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps Command, 27 May 1992) (stating that the total strength of the Green Berets was 1,500 to 2,000 men
in the area and that they did not have heavy weapons and furthemore that between 25 and 27 May, 80 to 100 Green Berets were killed, and approximately
1,500 more were captured, in Kozarac town and the surrounding villages); P5405 (Report of 1 st Krajina Corps, 26 May 1992), p. 1; D4138 (Witness
statement of Ţeljko Mejakić dated 26 November 2013), para. 3. See also Ewan Brown, T. 21585–21586 (18 November 2011).
5585
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7070–7071; KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3326–3328; KDZ392,
P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2615–2617 (under seal).
5586
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2618–2619, 2641 (under seal).
5587
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7070–7071, 7129–7131. See Adjudicated Fact 1041.
5588
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7070–7073, 7118–7119.
 110

development towards a civil war, and not as a Serb criminal plan #No Serb officials
responsible#!.

1616. After the take-over in Prijedor, the town of Kozarac was cut off.5589 On 22 May 1992, the
telephone lines were disconnected and entry to and exit from the area, as well as medical supplies, were
controlled.5590 (Again, a #shifting in the sequence of events#: this what is described here happened
only after the Muslims killed the reservists in the vicinity of Kozarac, in Hambarine. If it is not
said, then there is created a false picture, as if the Serbs took some measures without any reason.
Why the Serbs didn’t do that immediately after the war started, or at least on 6 April? No, all
what happened – happened #after the Muslim attacks# and their activation of the secret units
about which the Serbs, and particularly the JNA knew everything. This instilled a feeling of
insecurity in the local residents.5591 The local radio and television stations broadcast announcements
that the local population and members of the police and TO should sign an oath of loyalty to the SDS
(This is a #simple forger#y, nobody was expected to sign an oath of loyalty to the SDS, but obly to
the authorities, as in any country!) and the authorities in Prijedor, including to Drljaĉa, Ţeljaja, and
Kovaĉević, and only upon such signature would members of the police and TO be allowed to keep their
jobs.5592 That is why the Defence insisted that the translation of a document about the oath was
wrong: it wasn’t any oath to the SDS, but to the Republika Srpska, and all the authorised public
officials, regardless of the ethnicity, had to accept the Constitution and laws of the RS. See in
D02968 that the Serbs too had been given some time to make up their mind whether they will
continue their employment in the police, or go another way:

:. The
majority of the population of Kozarac, however, refused to sign the oath.5593 Local non-Serb leaders,
Ĉirkin and Medunjanin, sought to negotiate with the new SDS authorities in Prijedor, amongst whom
was Ţupljanin, and to reassure them that the population had no intention of attacking them.5594 (Why
would the Serb authorities trust them, since they had been forming a secret army already well in
advance, and finally attacked the Serbs? It was too late to trust them, or if they really didn’t
intend to attack, why they didn’t surrender their weapons? What kind of responsibility would it
be if a state authorities “trusted” potential enemies that they wouldn’t attack, if they could do it?
It is always essential that the enemy is not able to attack, not to depend on his good will, and a
Center of Security Services (CSB) would make an unforgivable mistake to trust and armed
group!) (The population was not asked to sign the outh, but only the state officials, even not all of
them, but only those with the special authorisation. Remember, the Muslims/Croats could have

5589
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3321–3322; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7724; see
Adjudicated Fact 1042.
5590
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3321–3322; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7724; see
Adjudicated Fact 1042.
5591
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3321–3322.
5592
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7065–7066; KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3323; Idriz Merdţanić,
P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7722; Idriz Merdţanić, T. 21430–21431 (16 November 2011); D2265 (SrĊo Srdić's interview with OTP), p.
28. See also Adjudicated Fact 1043.
5593
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7067–7068; D1922 (Witness statement of Idriz Merdţanić
dated 28 August 2000), e-court p. 2.
5594
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7067–7068; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7722; D1922 (Witness statement of Idriz Merdţanić dated 28 August 2000), e-court p. 2.
 111

continued to work in MUP without any outh, but not with a special authorisation to arrest, or
shoot!) The local TO and police of Kozarac were ordered to surrender all of their weapons and if they
did not, Kozarac would be attacked; the TO and police did not obey and the attack on Kozarac began
shortly after the ultimatum expired.5595 (#After the Muslim attack only#! Not to forget that the
ultimatum had been issued both by the police and VRS, but only after the attack of the Kozarac
secret brigade on the VRS, the police and civilians, see D01743, see P05405 of 26 May 92, which
explains everything:……………………………………………:

(#Peaceful municipalities, two third of them!# Please notice that in Mrkonjic Grad “enemy forces
not even attempting any hostile action”. As we all know, nothing bad happerned to the Muslims
and Croats in Mrkonjic Grad. Now, it is a time to aks whether the Chamber denies that there
was a civil war, and that it had been wanted by the Muslim side and the Serb side didn’t, and
that the Muslim side first attacked in every single Krajina municipality. If the Chamber denies
this fact, then we have to find another court which wouldn’t be blind for a blatant facts. Let us
see what the same document (P05405) said about the neighboring municipalities:

Any
reasonable chamber would see all of it in a wider context, including the geography, and find out
why nothing happened in those municipalities? As a Muslim witness said, the Serbs didn’t bother
the Muslims in the areas and municipalities where they had been in majority, see Dr. Mujad`i}’s
testimony, T.29664 Q: Now, it will be difficult for me to identify the page, but perhaps 220 of
Exhibit 3517, but I'm not absolutely certain. Now, on this page you talk about when happened in
Prijedor. You provide some examples to point out that there were other places where these things
did not happen. [As read] "[In English] At the same time, if you compare these with some other
localities in Bosnian Krajina such as Sipovo which had a clear Serb majority and were only -- and
were there only about 20 per cent of Bosniak, we see that there were almost no crimes committed in
the area with the exception of several individual killings. The similar situation can be found in some
other areas of Bosnian Krajina, that is the areas which had a Bosniak minority such as the town of
Bosanska Dubica and some others.‖ [Interpretation] Would you agree that to this we could add also
Gradiska, Srbac, Laktasi, even Prnjavor, and that in these municipalities other than the
opportunistic killings there were no major problems? A. Yes, that's correct. That's what I
said.":…. That inevitably leads us to a conclusion that there was no any plan of eviction of the
non-Serbs from the Serb areas. What would be easier than to evict them from the areas where
they had been minority? Why it didn’t happen? At the same time, in those municipalities
numbered in this document, including Mrkonjic Grad, the presidents of municipal Assemblies
were at the same time the members of the SDS Main Board. Had the SDS had a plan that is
alleged in the Indictment and accepted by the Chamber, such an alleged plan would be carried

5595
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6765; KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2620 (under seal); Idriz
Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7722; D4219 (Witness statement of Miroslav Kvoĉka dated 17 January 2014), para. 19; D4138
(Witness statement of Ţeljko Mejakić dated 26 November 2013), para. 3; D2265 (SrĊo Srdić's interview with OTP), pp. 27–28. See Adjudicated Facts 1035,
1043.
 112

out firstly and thoroughly in those municipalities with the Muslim minority, and in all the Serb
64 municipalities. Why it wasn’t a case? THERE WAS NO ANY CRIMINAL PLAN!)

(iii) Scheduled Incident A.10.1

1617. The Prosecution alleges that a number of people were killed in Kozarac and the surrounding areas
between 24 May and June 1992.

1618. On 24 May 1992, Kozarac was attacked.5596 (This is an example how the events must not
be presented! Kozarac would never be attacked, if there was no the Muslim attack in the
neighbouring Hambarine on 22 May 1002, after which the perpetrators withdrew to
Kozarac, and the leadership of Kozarac refused to hand them to the police, but instead
reorganized and started to shoot to the police patrol.) Around 12 p.m., shells were fired from
the direction of Mount Kozara in the north.5597 A column of military vehicles, mounted with
heavy machine guns and anti-aircraft guns, advanced on Kozarac from the directions of Prijedor
and Banja Luka.5598 The column was followed by infantry soldiers who fired towards the civilian
areas in Kozarac, including on houses and religious buildings, as well as at the Bosnian Muslim
manned check-points.5599 They were supported by artillery fire and shelling from the surrounding
hills.5600 After the shelling started, the population of Kozarac town and the surrounding villages
retreated towards the centre of Kozarac.5601 (Is it a Prosecution position, or the Chamber
accepted it?)

1619. Also on 24 May 1992, after inhabitants had been told to hand over their weapons, several
shells were fired at the Bosnian Muslim inhabited hamlet of Garibi; Garibi was in Trnopolje,
seven kilometres from Kozarac.5602 At least four Bosnian Muslims from Garibi, including two
women and an invalid elderly man, were killed during the attack.5603 (#Contrary to docments#!
However, the VRS report on 26 May doesn’t say that, see: P5405

It doesn’t seem that there was any civilian casualty, while there were a “heavy casualties on
the enemy” as said in this para. Nor the Croatian intercept mentioned anything, but the

5596
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3322; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7070; Idriz Merdţanić,
P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7724, 7729–7732; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5815 (under seal); Mevludin
Sejmenović, T. 20479 (27 October 2011); D4219 (Witness statement of Miroslav Kvoĉka dated 17 January 2014), para. 19; D4138 (Witness statement of
Ţeljko Mejakić dated 26 November 2013), para. 3; P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 6. See also KDZ026, P2089
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1846 (under seal); Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4600–4601; Adjudicated Fact
1044.
5597
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7728–7732 (testifying that the attack started at 12 p.m. on 24 May and continued for two
days with brief lulls). Cf. Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7071–7073 (testifying that fire was opened on Kozarac from
Orlovći for about ten minutes, and then nothing further happened until the following morning when the shelling continued for 48 hours).
5598
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3328–3331; see Adjudicated Fact 1045.
5599
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3329–3331; Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20480 (27 October 2011). See Adjudicated Facts 1036,
1045.
5600
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3329, 3331–3333.
5601
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7073–7074.
5602
[REDACTED].
5603
[REDACTED].
 113

HVO forces around Kozarac, see: D02221

But let us see what “Milos”, a very critical and responsible high official of the State Security
Service, reported about this events, D04421, of 29 May 92:

So, only in Kozarac there was 1,000 long-barrelled weapons and several Muslim officers that
deserted the JNA in order to organise the rebellion. But, let us look at what “Milos”
reported to the authorities, without any hesitation and with a certainty founded on his
insight in the events in the terrain: D4421:
 114

(#Officials vs. crimes#! So, there was a crimes, but it was completely out of the control of the
legal forces. The police had a data about a very heinous crimes against the non-Muslim
citizens too, see D04220

and there was to be expected that there may be a personal revenges of the people who were
armed and acted independently in a certain occasions. Let us see what the police did on this
subject, P02968:

(#Officials vs. crimes# There was no any cover up. A rate of killed: Serbs vs. Muslims: 8 :
39.) The local inhabitants of Garibi fled towards Sivći, Huskići, and other nearby villages.5604 In
the evening, the other Muslim villages in the area, including Huskići, Kevljani, Hadţići,
Jakupovići, Kamiĉani, Softići, Brdjani, Kozaruša, and Mujkanovići, were shelled.5605 #Abuse of
civil settlements#! The village of Kozaruša was destroyed and only Serb houses remained, for the
most part, untouched.5606 (Because nobody fired from the Serb houses towards the Serb Army!
Since there was no any possibility to differentiate houses by ethnicity of owners, it is the only
reasonable inference that the Serb Army fired only to the houses from which the Army was
fired at! But, let us see what was the situation in those settlements on 18 May, prior to the
Muslim attack on Hambarine, D1816:

As confessed, it was not a complete information, while we know that there was up to 3,000
armed people only in Kozarac, and up to 5,000 of the #Muslim irregulars attacked#!
Prijedor on 30 May 92!)
1620. The units involved in the attack on Kozarac and the operation following the attack included
units of the 1st Krajina Corps, such as the Banja Luka Corps, the 343rd Motorised Brigade, and the
6th Krajina Brigade,5607 as well as units of the Prijedor TO, Serb paramilitaries, and members of

5604
[REDACTED].
5605
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5815 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 1279.
5606
See Adjudicated Fact 1279.
5607
D1743 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps Command, 27 May 1992) (stating that components of the 343 rd Motorised Brigade, supported by two 105mm howitzer
batteries and one M-84 tank squadron, participated in the attack); P3660 (Handwritten ―War Record‖ of the 6 th Krajina Infantry Brigade, undated), p. 3;
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20481–20482 (27 October 2011). See Adjudicated Facts 1050, 1056, 1057 (stating inter alia that Lieutenant-General Talić was
 115

the Prijedor SJB.5608 The commander of all of the units involved in this attack, including the
paramilitary units, was Ţeljaja.5609 There is an overwhelming evidence that those villages had
been a #Muslim armed strongholds#, and some of them remained as it until the very end of
the war. Since the Muslim armed forces weren’t legal and legitimate, they could have been
treated as terrorists, but they hadn’t been. Any crime that happened was out of sight of the
very immediate superiors. Many Muslims remained living in the center of Prijedor, without
any problem. We have heard Mr. Akashi testifying that in 1994 there was so many Muslims
in Prijedor, that the President was asked to allow up to 80 buses and tracks a day to
transport the Prijedor Muslims to Croatia. Therefore, there can not be any talk about
persecution on an ethnic basis, and everything depended on the Muslims and their will and
conduct. The neighboring municipalities, as well as the Muslims remainins to live in all and
every municipality in the RS are the first class evidence about that.
As far as it is concerned with Kozarac, see P05405, the military report depicting the action
and reasons, as well as disarmament of 320 and capturing 300 Green Berets members. Even
if accepted that the firing lasted for two or three days, a question “why” appears, and a
response would be: the number of armed people was over three hundred, and they fought
against the VRS. Which army in the world would be indifferent to a fact of having such a
powerful group of terrorists behind it’s backs?

1621. The Shelling and firing lasted for two to three days and caused panic amongst the local
population.5610 Houses and buildings in Kozarac and the surrounding villages were damaged by the
shelling and shooting, and some were destroyed.5611 The Serb infantry soldiers also set houses on fire;
in some areas, such as Jakupovići and Konĉari, entire villages were ―razed‖.5612 Sejmenović witnessed
the Serb infantry set fire to houses with people still inside; those who were able to escape said that
special bombs were used to set the houses on fire in a second.5613 (As it is well known, Sejmenovic
was one of the leaders of rebellion, and therefore had every motive to lie and exaggerate! In
contrast to his testimony, there are a “strictly confidential” reports of the VRS commanders.
Also, “Milos” clearly differentiated the perpetrators of crimes from the legal forces, see: D: 4421

#Serb officials vs. crime#!) Organised looting also occurred; looted property, including refrigerators
and stoves, was collected in a large truck and every three or four days, the truck would take it all away
to Kozarac and then come back for more.5614 (However, a Prosecution witness, known as a very
anti-Serb journalist Eduard Vulliamy, brought to us a different picture, see: P3788, p.6

the Commander of the Banja Luka Corps), 1059; P5405 (Report of 1 st Krajina Corps, 26 May 1992), p. 1. See also Ewan Brown, T. 21585–21586 (18
November 2011); P3914 (Ewan Brown's expert report entitled ―Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992‖, 27 November 2002), paras. 2.45,
2.74, fn. 391; P5407 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 1 June 1992); P3317 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 29 May 1992).
5608
P2968 (Report of Prijedor SJB, January 1993), p. 4; Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6764–6765. See Mevludin Sejmenović,
T. 20481–20482 (27 October 2011). See also P3914 (Ewan Brown's expert report entitled ―Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992‖, 27
November 2002), paras. 2.5, fn. 240, 2.42–2.45, 2.71–2.72; D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 6, 32.
5609
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6765. See Adjudicated Fact 1058.
5610
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7073; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7734–7735;
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3329–3331; Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20479 (27 October 2011); P684 (Witness statement of
KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 6; Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5558–5559; Ivo Atlija, T. 20341–20343 (26
October 2011). See Adjudicated Facts 1036, 1044.
5611
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7073; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7728–7732, 7741;
P3890 (Photograph of clinic in Kozarac); P3892 (Photograph of clinic in Kozarac); Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20479 (27 October 2011); Ivo Atlija, P3672
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5558–5559; Ivo Atlija, T. 20341–20343 (26 October 2011). See Adjudicated Fact 1046.
5612
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3329–3334. See also Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5558–5559; Ivo
Atlija, T. 20341–20343 (26 October 2011). See Adjudicated Facts 1037, 1045.
5613
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20479–20480 (27 October 2011).
5614
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20483–20484 (27 October 2011); Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7079; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7741. See also Adjudicated Fact 1271.
 116

Therefore, all the Prosecutor’s allegations about the Serb attacks on a non-Serb villages are
rebutted by this article published on 7 August 1992. The only condition was: not to fire against
the Serb civilians, the Police and the Army, and everyone could have lived peacefully! How
possibly this evidence could skipped and neglected?)

1622. The majority of the Bosnian Muslim employees of the Kozarac police station were killed during the
take-over of Kozarac; a small number was taken to Omarska and Keraterm.5615 (The Muslim
policemen from Kozarac were the main organisers and combatants of the rebel units, and all of
those killed had been a combat casualties, while those captured alive were the POWs. No
executions had been registered or reported!) However, the Chamber does not have sufficient
evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the deaths of these policemen to make a finding on these
killings.

1623. Arifagić was on guard duty in Javori during the attack and he saw six men killed as a result of the
shelling.5616 At least three individuals were killed in Duraĉci, a village outside of Trnopolje in the
Kozarac area.5617 However, the Chamber does not have sufficient evidence as to the circumstances
surrounding the deaths of these three individuals, or as to their status at the time of their deaths, to
make a finding on these killings.

1624. During the shelling, Idriz Merdţanić, a doctor in charge of the local outpatient clinic in Kozarac
town, treated women, children, and other individuals who were injured during the shelling.5618 Patients
at the clinic died there as a result of shelling wounds and other injuries when the clinic was shelled.5619
One civilian was brought into the clinic dead.5620 The Chamber, however, does not have sufficient
evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the death of this individual to make a finding on this
killing.

1625. On 25 May 1992, Merdţanić decided to move the clinic to a location more accessible to the
population on the outskirts of the town.5621 When he tried to negotiate through a police radio in order
to obtain the safe passage of the wounded, including two children, one of whom had her legs
completely shattered, he was told over the radio: ―Let all of you balija […] die there. We‘ll kill you all
anyway‖.5622 (#An uncorroborated lie#! Who said that? Did he ask a contact with the
commander? However, he anyway was enabled to move his clinic to Trnopolje. The Chamber
didn’t have sufficient evidence as to who said that nasty words too!)

5615
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6764. See Adjudicated Fact 1049.
5616
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7070–7073. Arifagić testified further that the men at his guard post fired shots as well. Jusuf
Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7128, 7146–7147. See also KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3333–3334
(testifying that there may have been some firing on the part of the Kozarac inhabitants towards the attacking forces).
5617
[REDACTED]; P569 (Map of Prijedor municipality).
5618
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7716–7717, 7733–7734.
5619
See Adjudicated Fact 1047.
5620
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7734.
5621
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7734–7735.
5622
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7735–7738. See also Adjudicated Fact 1047.
 117

1626. On the morning of 26 May 1992, the terms of surrender for the population of Kozarac were agreed
upon, after which the shelling stopped.5623 (#Wrong, nobody demanded surrender of the
population, but only of the armed formation that intermingled with the population. A convoy
was organised to leave the town.5624 The wounded were allowed to leave first, followed by police
officers, and then the remaining civilian population.5625 (It would be fair and would complete the
truth if noticed that the wounded Muslim combatants had been housed in the Prijedor Medical
Centre, under the Serb control. There is a book of admittance, depicting many Muslim patients!)
A convoy of primarily Bosnian Muslim villagers formed and moved towards Kozarac town.5626 They
travelled through Kozarac town, which was completely destroyed, and by the time they reached the
intersection at the main Prijedor-Banja Luka road, their group had been augmented by many others
moving in the same direction.5627

1627. KDZ048 (92bis) and his family had travelled in the convoy in their car and at the intersection, they
encountered a tank and a lot of troops in various uniforms, who first told them to leave their vehicles
behind, but then permitted them to continue on their way towards Prijedor town.5628 (Although the
town of Prijedor was in the Serb hands, the refugees and the Muslim population had been allowed
to take refuge in it. Had the attack been directed towards the civil population, the authorities
wouldn’t allow them to gather so massively in the town. This fact must be kept in mind in every
inference pertaining to Prijedor. Let us see what Eduard Vulliamy wrote about the fights and the
Serb attitude towards the Muslim civilians, P3788, p. 5.

What do we see here? The #Muslim irregulars in Prijedor mobilised a 13 years old boys# and put
them in the first line. When such a boy is captures, it is depicted in the Prosecution arrangement
as a civilian boy detained by the Serbs. But this boy escaped to the Serbs in order to reach
Trnopolje! And the autor, Mr. Vulliamy would be the last one in the world to mitigate a picture of
the Serbs!) At the intersection, KDZ048 also saw at least ten dead bodies in police uniforms, one of
whom he recognised as a local Bosnian Muslim police officer.5629 However, the Chamber does not have
sufficient evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the deaths of these ten individuals during the
attack on Kozarac to make a finding on these killings.

1628. At the same intersection, the men were separated from the women and children by Serb soldiers;
the men were taken to Keraterm and Omarska primarily, though some were sent to Trnopolje, and the
women and children were put on separate buses and taken to Trnopolje.5630

5623
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7738. See also KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3334–3335.
5624
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7738. See Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20480 (27 October 2011).
5625
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7738.
5626
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3329–3331, 3336–3341 (testifying that they were told to leave the area and go towards Prijedor
town, so that the Serbs could ―mop up the terrain‖); KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5815–5818 (under seal); KDZ611, P698
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12458, 12460–12461 (under seal); P4101 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999 and 28
February 1999), e-court p. 7. See Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20480 (27 October 2011).
5627
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3338–3341; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12459 (under seal);
P4101 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 7. See Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7074–
7075.
5628
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3341.
5629
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3342–3343.
5630
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3345–3347; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5817–5818 (under seal);
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12460–12461 (under seal); P4101 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-
court p. 7; Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20480 (27 October 2011); Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7074–7075. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1103.
 118

1629. After the convoy set off, Merdţanić and the other staff members of the clinic went back to the
original location of the clinic to check if there were any wounded.5631 When they arrived they were
captured by Serb soldiers wearing camouflage uniforms, red berets, and armbands.5632 (#Security
reasons#! The armbands were ordered by the Command as security against a friendly fire, and
both the Muslim and Serb civilians were recommended the same, while there is an intention to
compare these bands with the Nazi bands for Jews, which is shameless!) After a few minutes, a
JNA truck arrived and the soldiers loaded it with all the medical supplies of the clinic and the truck left;
Merdţanić and the other staff were taken to the centre of Kozarac.5633 While in the centre, Merdţanić
saw one of the soldiers single out Nihad Bahonjić, the ambulance driver from the Kozarac clinic, and
take him away; it was confirmed later that Bahonjić was killed.5634 (How, where and when he was
killed? Could he have been eschanged or released, and killed during combats?) Shortly after, the
group was forced to enter a jeep and taken in the direction of Prijedor, where they were put on to a bus
full of women and children and were transferred to Trnopolje.5635

1630. By 26 May 1992, most of the population of Kozarac had surrendered; however, those who had not
surrendered, amongst whom were armed members of the Bosnian Muslim TO and SDA leaders,
retreated to Mount Kozara.5636 See also D2221:
……………………..

One
group, which included Arifagić, came under fire at a place called Zeciji Kamen and a fight ensued.5637
(Therefore, Arifagic was a combatant!)

1631. Another group of approximately 100 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from the Kevljani area
was arrested by armed Bosnian Serbs wearing different kinds of uniforms; one man was shot dead after
they found a Croatian passport on him.5638 (It is pity, but the Croatian Secret service was alleged to
be involved in the rebellion organisation. This group was taken to the Benkovac training grounds,
which had been used for military purposes before the conflict, but had been turned into a detention
camp run by the military.5639 At the Benkovac training grounds, the detained group was ordered to line
up in front of a building, and a Bosnian Serb soldier with the last name of Romanić singled out four
individuals.5640 They were taken to one of the rooms inside the building and shot dead.5641 The
―hodţa‖ was also beaten to death by the soldiers.5642 In the course of the day, 60 individuals were
taken to the woods in groups, from where bursts of gunfire could be heard; all of these individuals were
killed.5643 (#Heard, not seen#! Those only “heard” and not seen shouldn’t even be mentioned in
5631
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7738–7739.
5632
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7739–7740.
5633
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7739–7746; see P3893 (Sketch drawn by Idriz Merdţanić of Kozarac).
5634
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7743–7746; Idriz Merdţanić, T. 21446, 21449 (16 November 2011). See also P646
(Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002) (under seal), p. 15.
5635
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7744–7748.
5636
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7074, 7078; KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2621–2623 (under
seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 1053; D4138 (Witness statement of Ţeljko Mejakić dated 26 November 2013), para. 3; D4229 (Witness statement of Boško
Mandić dated 18 January 2014), pp. 4–6.
5637
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7079, 7137.
5638
See Adjudicated Fact 1053.
5639
See Adjudicated Fact 1054. See also Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7078, 7137.
5640
See Adjudicated Fact 1055.
5641
See Adjudicated Fact 1055.
5642
See Adjudicated Fact 1055.
5643
See Adjudicated Fact 1055.
 119

the Judgement, not even in the Indictment, since the Prosecution has an obligation to bring about
the truth! If any of this was true, it would be unlawful, but what it has to do with this President?
This is an argument against any civil war, not against this President! Have we forgotten that this
President did everything to “avoid a war under any cost” see D1833, confirmed by the highest
authority involved on behalf of the UN, US and Europe?)

1632. Arifagić was not captured with the group taken to Benkovac, but he stayed in the forest with a
group of people who then made contact with Ĉirkin and Medunjanin.5644 (#Muslim extremists#!
Cirkin and Medunjanin were the main organisers of the rebellion, but in the Indictment and
unfortunately in the Judgement they had been mentioned as a civilians and conciliatory Muslim
leaders!)

1633. Another group of approximately 35 to 40 people left Kozarac after the attack and moved towards
Kozaraĉki Kamen to reach the Sava River in order to cross over to Croatia.5645 After the group passed
Kozaraĉki Kamen, they were noticed by ―uniformed reconnaissance men‖ who opened fire on them
and a member of the group was killed.5646 The Chamber, however, does not have sufficient evidence as
to the circumstances surrounding the death of this individual, or regarding his status at the time, to
make a finding about this killing. The remainder of the group fled and returned to a suburb of Kozarac;
they were later captured and brought to the Prijedor barracks on or around 9 June 1992.5647

1634. On 14 June 1992, Arifagić was captured by Serb soldiers at Mujkanovići, a village close to
Trnopolje, where he had gone in the hope of seeing his mother.5648 He was in a group of about 40 men,
who had all been captured at the same time and were ordered to march towards Kamiĉani.5649
(#Terrorist# It should be said that Mr Arifagic had been captured as a combatant, or a member
of “diversant-terrorist group – DTG, which had been active in the region. Let us see what the
Prosecution exhibit P3665 sais about that, on 17 June 1992:.

The
refore, the diversant-terrorist groups had been present there, and the VRS units vere entitled and
obliged to neutralise them. The Serb soldiers were after them, not after civilians!) The men in the
group were beaten and forced to sing ―Serbian songs‖ along the way. Upon arriving at a check-point in
Kamiĉani, they were further beaten and mistreated.5650 This group of men was then put on a bus from
the ―Prijedor Autotransport‖ company and they were taken to Omarska, and then on to Keraterm.5651

5644
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7078, 7137–7138 (testifying that Ĉirkin and Medunjanin were in a group of 750 people with
whom he met up and they decided to split into three groups—one group wanted to cross over into Croatia while the other two groups wanted to return to
Kozarac; conflict ensued between these two groups and ―Serb troops‖ in the centre of Kozarac and ultimately several men were killed and they withdrew).
5645
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2622–2623 (under seal) [REDACTED].
5646
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2623–2624 (under seal); see P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 23.
See also P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002), pp. 174, 238 (under seal).
5647
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2624–2628 (under seal).
5648
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7078–7079.
5649
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7080.
5650
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7080–7081 (testifying further that they were then taken to a nearby house where they were
told to unload household appliances from a truck).
5651
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7081.
 120

1635. While the Chamber took judicial notice of two adjudicated facts which state that as a result of the
shelling of Kozarac on 24 May 1992, over 800 of its inhabitants were killed,5652 the Chamber cannot be
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the precise circumstances surrounding these deaths, nor about
the status of these individuals in light of the other evidence before it. The Chamber is therefore unable
to include these deaths in its findings on the killings for this Scheduled Incident. (Had it been so, the
VRS “strictly confidential” report would mention it. However, the report, see: D1743, mentioned
only 80 killed members of the Green Berets, and captured 1,500 combatants and probable
suspects!)

1636. The Chamber also took judicial notice of the fact that at least 80 Bosnian Muslim civilians were
killed when Bosnian Serb soldiers and police entered the villages of the Kozarac area.5653 The
Chamber has made findings above in respect of approximately 80 individuals who were killed during
the attack on Kozarac and the surrounding areas.5654 In addition, the Chamber received forensic
evidence to support the deaths of some identified individuals from Kozarac and the surrounding areas
between 24 May and June 1992.5655 (#Combatants, not civilians#! It is highly unlikely that this
Adjudicated fact can survive. First of all, the first class evidence of the D1743, a
contemporaneous and “strictly confidential report of the VRS 1st Krajina Corps, depicted exactly
“80 to 100 Green Berets casualties”, see: D1743 once again:

Even due to the Tribunal Statute, this Adjudicated fact is not valid after admittance of this
document. Had the Prosacution obtained the names of those “civilians”, the Defence would be
able to compare this list with the ABiH record of combat casualties. Even if some civilians died,
all of it happened during the military action against the terrorists and illegal armed forces that
had been hiding behind the civilians. Also, almost all of the terrorists were in a civil cloathings.

5652
See Adjudicated Facts 1046 (stating inter alia that as a result of the shelling in Kozarac, over 800 of its inhabitants were killed and that the remainder,
including those from surrounding Muslim villages, were expelled), 1057 (stating that: ―On 27 May 1992 senior military officers met to be briefed on the
attack on Kozarac: Lieutenant-General Talić, as Commander of the Banja Luka Corps, the 5 th Corps of the old JNA, was informed that 800 people had been
killed in the attack on Kozarac and an additional 1,200 had been captured; casualties on the part of the units of the Corps were four soldiers killed and fifteen
injured.‖).
5653
See Adjudicated Fact 1048.
5654
See paras. 1619, 1623–1624, 1629, 1631. See also D1743 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps Command, 27 May 1992) (reporting that between 25 and 27 May
1992, 80 to 100 Green Berets were killed and approximately 1,500 more were captured in Kozarac town and the surrounding villages).
5655
P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 15–16, 20, 23 (confirming the deaths of 11 identified individuals from Kozarac and the
surrounding areas who were exhumed from graves in Trnopolje-Redţi, Huskići, Jakarina Kosa, Dera-Bešići, and Kamiĉani in 2000, 2001, 2003, 2006, 2007,
2009); P4888 (Bihać Cantonal Court record of Huskići-Kamiĉani and Prijedor exhumations, 16 June 2000), p. 3 (confirming the exhumation of two of the
same individuals identified by Mašović, Enver Huskić and Šerif Huskić, in June 2000). The Chamber notes that there is a discrepancy between the forensic
reports regarding the name of one of the victims of this Scheduled Incident. More specifically, Mašović contains a reference to Edhem Huskić, son of
Sulejman born on 15 August 1929, while the Bihać Cantonal Court record contains a reference to Šerif Huskić, son of Sulejman born on 15 August 1929.
The Chamber considers this inconsistency to be minor. Accordingly, the Chamber concludes that this is in fact the same individual. See also P4850
(Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), Annex A, p. 8; P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality,
28 August 2002), pp. 16, 19, 84, 113–114, 238 (under seal) (confirming the deaths of nine identified individuals, including eight of the same individuals
identified by Mašović, as having been killed in Kozarac and the surrounding areas in May and June 1992).
 121

So, none of those deaths was intentional, but rather collateral. And the full responsibility is on the
Muslim illegal forces.)

1637. In light of the above, the Chamber is therefore satisfied that at least 80 Bosnian Muslims, including
civilians, (#how many civilians, how the Chamber knew that?) were killed by Serb Forces in
Kozarac and the surrounding areas between 24 May and June 1992. (#Combat casualties#! For the
above reasons, and for a high and absolutely unjustified confidence of the Chamber in the
Prosecution, this deliberation is invalid and wrong!)

(iii) Aftermath of the attack

1638. By 28 May 1992, 50% of Kozarac was destroyed, with the remaining damage occurring
between June and August 1992.5656 By the end of summer 1992, the area of Kozarac was desolate;
many of the buildings which had survived the attack undamaged were subsequently looted and
destroyed.5657 (#No officials responsible#! Neither the Prosecution alleged, nor submitted any
evidence that the local Serb authorities were responsible for these lootings. On the contrary,
we have seen the “Milos’s report”” on this issue, D:4421:

#N
o officials responsible#! Therefore, a looting after a fights was not tolerated or ordered by
the authorities, but in such a situation, the legal forces were unable (impotent) to maintain
the law and order!) During the attack on Kozarac, however, care was taken to try to avoid
damage to Serb houses and property.5658 (However, another, #more reasonable inference# is
that from the Serb houses and properties nobody fired against the Army, while the terrorists
had been deployed in the Muslim houses and properties. It is well known that the local
commanders of the JNA, and later of the VRS asked the inhabitants to mark their house
windows by a white textile as a sign that they are not participating in the skirmish, so to be
safe, see D3788, (Vulliamy) quoted in para 1621 above). After the take-over, Kozarac was
occupied by Serb Forces under the control of the Serb authorities.5659

1639. In early June 1992, KDZ392 saw that the Mutnik mosque in Kozarac was burnt; it was later
destroyed.5660 Unlike the mosque, the Serbian Orthodox church in Kozarac was not damaged during
the attack.5661 (#Abuse of religious objects#! The same inference, nobody fired towards the VRS
from the Church, but usually a mosque minarets were used to deploy snipers, or machineguns, or
even reccoiless cannons.) When KDZ048 returned to Kozarac in 1997, none of the 16 mosques that
had previously been there remained intact.5662

1640. During his journey on 5 August, Edward Vulliamy, a British journalist covering the conflict in BiH
in 1992, was escorted by Major Milutinović, who told Vulliamy that the only remaining inhabitants

5656
See Adjudicated Fact 1270.
5657
Edward Vulliamy, P3777 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7911. See Adjudicated Fact 1274.
5658
See Adjudicated Facts 1272, 1273.
5659
P3483 (Video clip of interviews in Prijedor, including with Milomir Stakić, with transcript), pp. 7–8. See also D4219 (Witness statement of Miroslav
Kvoĉka dated 17 January 2014), para. 19; Adjudicated Fact 1046.
5660
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2621 (under seal); KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3333, 3406; P548
(Photograph of Mutnik mosque in Kozarac). See also Adjudicated Facts 1272, 1287; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T.
7836; P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case,
formatted records), pp. 248–250.
5661
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2621 (under seal); P621 (Map and photographs of Kozarac); P550 (Photograph of orthodox
church in Kozarac); see Adjudicated Fact 1272.
5662
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3382, 3405–3407. See P549 (Photograph of Kalata mosque in Kozarac). See also para.1888.
 122

were the local Serbs and that ―some 40,000 Muslims‖ had left the area by this time.5663 (However, this
assertion with such a drastic data hadn’t been present in the only Vulliamy’s report from
Prijedor, see: P3788. This had been written in afterwards, since we know that even in 1994 there
were thousands of Muslims in Prijedor, for whose transfere to the third countries Mr. Akashi
and many others intervened with the President to allow them to go. Even at the end of war in
November 1995 there was about 2,000 non-Serbs, according to the Muslim sources, D4002. Why
it was so easy to lie before this Chamber???) When KDZ048 returned in 1997, he found Serb
refugees from Croatia living in his house.5664 (Therefore, it was not ruined, because probably he
was not there to fire from his hause! Had he used own house as a trench, it would be hit and
ruined!)

(iii) Scheduled Incident A.10.3

1641. The Prosecution alleges that a number of people were killed in Kamiĉani on or about
26 May 1992.

1642. Kamiĉani is a village located approximately two kilometres to the southeast of Kozarac; in
1992, Kamiĉani was predominantly Bosnian Muslim with 2,000 to 3,000 inhabitants.5665

1643. Between 24 and 26 May 1992, Kamiĉani was shelled by Serb Forces.5666 Houses in Kamiĉani
were damaged by the shelling.5667 Additionally, the mosque in Kamiĉani was set alight by Serb
Forces.5668 During the attack, at least eight Bosnian Muslims took refuge [REDACTED]5669 in
Kamiĉani.5670 (Unclear why it was redacted!!! This way the public can not rectify possible
lies!)

1644. [REDACTED].5671 [REDACTED].5672 [REDACTED].5673 [REDACTED].5674

1645. [REDACTED].5675 [REDACTED].5676

1646. [REDACTED].5677 [REDACTED].5678 [REDACTED].5679 [REDACTED].5680

1647. [REDACTED] .5681 [REDACTED] .5682 [REDACTED].5683

5663
Edward Vulliamy, P3777 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7910–7912. See Section IV.A.1.b.i.D.7: Movement of the population from Prijedor and
appropriation of property.
5664
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3379–3382.
5665
KDZ054, P682 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6208–6209; P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 6; P3891 (Map
of Kozarac and Omarska); P569 (Map of Prijedor municipality).
5666
P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 6; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5815 (under seal);
P4101 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court pp. 6–7. See para.1888. See also Adjudicated Facts 1034, 1063.
5667
P4101 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 7.
5668
KDZ054, P682 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6248–6249; P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 8; KDZ392,
P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2624 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 1288; P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J.
Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted records), pp. 246–247.
5669
[REDACTED].
5670
[REDACTED]. See also Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7739; Adjudicated Fact 1063.
5671
[REDACTED].
5672
[REDACTED].
5673
[REDACTED].
5674
[REDACTED].
5675
[REDACTED].
5676
[REDACTED].
5677
[REDACTED].
5678
[REDACTED].
5679
[REDACTED].
5680
[REDACTED].
 123

1648. [REDACTED].5684 [REDACTED].5685 [REDACTED].5686

1649. Based on the above, the Chamber therefore finds that at least nine Bosnian Muslim men
and women were killed by Serb Forces in the village of Kamiĉani on or about 26 May 1992.
(#Combat casualties# Kami~ani was a #militarised settlement#, see the documents! But the
Prosecution, and consequently the Chamber owe to us an evidence of the illegal and unlawful
nature of this killings. It is undoubtably established that in these days there was a fighting
initiated by the Muslim extremists deployed in those villages. Therefore, there is no a single
attack on a village that wasn’t militarised. The municipality of Prijedor has 9 Croat villages
and 39 Muslim cillages. Why all of those non-Serb villages were not attacked? Without an
answer on this question there is no valid inference in the Judgment so far. There was no
attacks on the villages as a civil settlements, because in such a case all of the villages, or at
least majority, would be attacked! It was also known that Kamicani, although small
settlement, had a very prominent organiset of the rebellion, see: D1826, (Milos)

(#Abuse of settlements#! Also see P2968, pertaining to the combat activities in those villages,
among others in Kamicani too:

(#Deadly combination# Why a 92bis evidence and adjudicated facts are more powerful and
credible before this Court than the contemporaneous genuine documents? Who can say what
happened in this house, was it in the context of combat, or was it a crime? Certainly, there
were combats, and those villages had been the #Muslim armed strongholds#!)

(iii) Scheduled Incident A.10.4

1650. The Prosecution alleges that a number of men were killed in the village of Jaskići on or about
14 June 1992.

1651. Jaskići is a Bosnian Muslim village located to the south of Kozarac, near Trnopolje.5687 During the
attack on Kozarac, Bosnian Muslim refugees from all over, including from Brdjani, Jakupovići,
Kamiĉani, Kozaruša, and Bešići, travelled to Jaskići to seek shelter.5688

1652. On 14 June 1992, soldiers arrived in Jaskići between 2 and 3 p.m.5689 Senija Elkasović, a Bosnian
Muslim woman, heard shots behind her house, two soldiers then came to the entrance of her house,
pointed rifles through the front door, and ordered the women and children to step back and for the men

5681
[REDACTED].
5682
[REDACTED].
5683
[REDACTED].
5684
[REDACTED].
5685
[REDACTED].
5686
[REDACTED].
5687
P3891 (Map of Kozarac and Omarska); P569 (Map of Prijedor municipality); Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4601.
5688
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4601.
5689
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4602, 4623.
 124

to step forward.5690 Elkasović‘s husband, brother, and brother-in-law were taken from the house while
one of the soldiers ordered Elkasović and eight other family members, all women and children, to lie
down in the kitchen.5691 Before lying down, she saw Duško Tadić, wearing a multi-coloured
camouflage military uniform, standing in her yard.5692 The soldier who remained in the house searched
the house for money and jewellery, as well as for anyone hiding; he opened closets, emptied drawers,
shouted threats and cursed their mothers and insulted them, saying that they would be sent to
Turkey.5693 Elkasović heard voices and shouts coming from outside and then she heard shots.5694 The
soldier left her house and Elkasović looked out of the window to see soldiers leaving towards
Kozarac.5695

1653. Elkasović then left her house and saw two dead men in her vegetable garden who she later
identified; both men had been shot in the back of the head.5696 She continued alongside a hedge
towards the house of her father-in-law, and found two more dead men from her village; one had been
shot in the back of the head and the other had been shot in the forehead.5697 According to Elkasović,
only three elderly men, including her father-in-law, were left in Jaskići after the soldiers left that
day.5698

1654. Three days later, Elkasović, her father-in-law, and another man, Huse Jaskić, went to Trnopolje
camp to ask permission to bury the bodies of the men killed in Jaskići.5699 They were told by soldiers
guarding the camp to speak to Kuruzović; he then gave them permission.5700 They returned and buried
the bodies in a common grave.5701 Thereafter, soldiers came through Jaskići, and into Elkasović‘s
home, on a daily basis, as they searched for cars, tractors, fuel, livestock, brandy, and other items.5702

1655. After 14 June 1992, only a small number of families and Huse Jaskić remained in Jaskići.5703
Elkasović stayed in Jaskići for another month and then she and her children were forced to leave
by members of the police and were taken to Trnopolje camp.5704 (#Military necessity# why
would the police bring civilians, guard and feed them without any reason? Is it a fair trial
that this President deal with this case, without knowing that this village even existed, let
alone he could check the facts and cross-examine the witnesses? This paragraphs are
founded on 19 footnotes and one adjudicated fact from a previous case, whithout any
possibility that this Defence check or challenge any of data! It has nothing to do with this
President, cause he banned this kind of conduct!)

1656. Elkasović confirmed the names of the four men whose bodies she found outside of her house,
as well as that of one additional Bosnian Muslim man who was killed on 14 June 1992. 5705 (Since
Ms. Elkasovic saw Dusko Tadic, this couldn’t be “soldiers” because he wasn’t a soldier, but
policeman!) In addition, Elkasović never saw or heard from her husband, brother, or her brother-
5690
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4602–4605, 4623. See P561 (Photograph of Senija Elkasović‘s house); P559 (Photographs
of Jaskići).
5691
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4605, 4623. See P561 (Photograph of Senija Elkasović‘s house).
5692
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4597–4599, 4605–4608, 4609–4610, 4624–4625.
5693
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4608–4610.
5694
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4610.
5695
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4610–4611.
5696
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4612–4613.
5697
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4612–4613.
5698
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4613–4615.
5699
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4615–4616.
5700
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4616.
5701
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4616–4617.
5702
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4617–4618.
5703
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4618.
5704
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4618–4619.
5705
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4614–4615. See P573 (List of men killed or taken from Jaskići on 14 June 1992) (under
seal) (referring to the names of Elkasović‘s husband, brother, and her brother-in-law as missing on 14 June 1992).
 125

in-law after they were taken out of her house by soldiers on 14 June 1992.5706 The Chamber has
also received forensic evidence to support the deaths of the five men identified by Elkasović as
having been killed and of her husband, brother, and her brother-in-law who went missing from
Jaskići on 14 June 1992.5707 Further, the Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that at least eight
Bosnian Muslim men were shot and killed when Bosnian Serb soldiers entered the village of
Jaskići on 14 June 1992.5708 (#Combat activity# No names, no reports, “some killed some”!)

1657. In light of the above evidence, the Chamber is satisfied that at least eight Bosnian Muslim
men were killed by Serb Forces in the village of Jaskići on or about 14 June 1992. (#Combat
activity#! Just not to forget that the Kozarac SDA proclaimed (secretly) a total mobilisation
of Muslims on 2 May 92, as can be seen from D01831:

Therefore, the fighting included all the area belonging to Kozarac!)

(a) Brdo area

1658. The area of Brdo is located to the southwest and west of Prijedor town and comprises the villages
of Bišćani, Rizvanovići, Rakovćani, Hambarine, Ĉarakovo, and Zecovi.5709 In 1992, the village of
Hambarine was inhabited solely by Bosnian Muslims and was the highest elevation point in Brdo.5710
The village of Bišćani itself had a number of hamlets, namely Mrkalji, Hegići, Ravine, Sredići,
Duratovići, and Kadići.5711 Prior to the conflict, Ĉarakovo was a predominantly Bosnian Muslim
village with about 800 to 900 houses and Rizvanovići was a Bosnian Muslim village with one
Croat.5712 The Brdo area was surrounded by predominantly Serb villages.5713

1659. After the take-over of Prijedor, the village of Bišćani was cut off; all of the Bosnian Muslims there
were dismissed from their jobs, and they could not go into Prijedor town because of the check-points
that had been set-up.5714

1660. There was a check-point manned by Serb soldiers in camouflage uniforms in the village of
Gomjenica, (Just to remind: Gomjenica was entirely Serbian settlement, and the ckech-point was
aimed to control who was to enter the village, as same as in front of the Muslim settlements,
which was never objected until the Muslim attacked in Hambarine on 22 May 92.) and another on
the main road between Prijedor town and Sanski Most, in Tukovi.5715 After 30 April 1992, Bosnian

5706
Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4622.
5707
P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 15–16, 18, 21, 23, 32 (confirming that the eight individuals identified by Elkasović as having
been killed or taken away from Jaskići on 14 June 1992, as well as five additional bodies, were exhumed from individual or mass graves in the area). See
also P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002), pp. 16, 18–19 (under seal).
5708
See Adjudicated Fact 1064.
5709
P562 (Map of the Brdo region in Prijedor); P569 (Map of Prijedor municipality); KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6854–6855,
6857; KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5720. See also Adjudicated Fact 1065.
5710
KDZ074, P708 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2292 (under seal); KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2498; KDZ038,
P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6854–6855, 6857; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1795 (under seal).
5711
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5879 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 1072.
5712
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5720. See also Adjudicated Facts 1066, 1280.
5713
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6857.
5714
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6853. Non-Serbs living in Hambarine, and in Prijedor municipality generally, lost their jobs on or
around 23 May 1992. KDZ092, P703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3917.
5715
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5721–5722; KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12538.
 126

Muslims also established check-points at the entrance to the villages of Hambarine and Rizvanovići.5716
(#Muslim armed strongholds#! See: D1835:

This is a document admitted, an interview of M. Mujadzic pertaining to Rizvanovici, where the

Muslims have chasen him out, because they estimated that he was doing very bad job,
confronting the Muslims with the Serbs, who didn’t touch the Muslims during the entire WWII.
Here is a translation: ―Once in the Brdo area I was driving a car with Hilmo Hopovas and Emin
and another man. Four of us had been stopped in Rizvanovi}i. I vas somewhere at the end of April.
So, we had been stopped by a group of people, we went out and asked what was a problem. Then they
said: ―Are you Mirza Mujad`i}?‖ – ―Yes, that‘s me.‖ ―What do you want, why you are wondering
around, what do you want, what are your intentions?‖ NO: Had it happened in Rizvanovi}i?
MUJAD`I]: Yes, in Rizvanovi}i. by the end of April, in a hamlet of Dedi}i. I responded: ―Why, guys?
We are trying to achieve something, some organisation, some defense.‖ He said: ‖Listen to me,
nobody touched us here during the World War Two, nobody will touch us now. We don‘t need you,
nor anyone from the SDA to defend us and to organize us. With such your activities and doings you
are going to cause a war only, and the most clever would be not to come here ever. Both you and we
will be more secure (and calm)‖ So, the Chamber never submitted any credible evidence that the
Serbs ever attacked any non-Serb village without military reason. Out of 39 Muslim villages in
Prijedor, only several had the fights and they initiated it). Nermin Karagić, a Bosnian Muslim 17
year old boy from Rizvanovići, participated in guarding the Rizvanovići check-point with about nine

5716
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6853–6854; KDZ074, P708 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2297 (under seal); KDZ050,
P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2497–2498; Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5205.
 127

other local men; between them, they only had one M48 rifle.5717 (This rifle kills too, a 7,9 calibre,
and a very precise! Therefore, he was a combatant!)

1661. Bosnian Muslims in Bišćani set up a crisis staff there, which operated starting at the end of April
1992 until 22 May 1992 before the attack on Hambarine.5718 (#Who attacked#? This kind of a fake
evidence was possible only because there was no cross examination. There was no any “attack on
Hambarine”, there was a Muslim attack IN Hambarine!) In Ĉarakovo, villagers had no electricity
starting on at least 7 May 1992 while the surrounding Serb villages across the Sana River, as well as
Prijedor town, continued to have electricity.5719 Sometime in May it became necessary to obtain a
permit from the MUP to be allowed to go to Prijedor.5720 (So what? The war in Prijedor had already
started, and a regular Muslim citizens were able to go to the city centre, provided they had been
checked, as in any war zone!)

1662. Prior to the beginning of the conflict, Bosnian Muslim paramilitary groups were active in the
Prijedor area and the TO had a presence in Hambarine, although they had no anti-armour weapons.5721
Some weapons had been brought to Hambarine and were stored in the community centre for use in case
of an attack; however, these weapons were very old and not functional.5722

1663. On 22 May 1992, there was a shooting incident involving five to six Serb soldiers at a
Bosnian Muslim check-point near Hambarine.5723 Later that day, Serb soldiers arrived in
Hambarine in a tank and presented an ultimatum to the villagers, namely that Aziz Ališković and
Ferid Sikirić, the Bosnian Muslim policemen believed to have been involved in the incident at the
Hambarine check-point, should surrender, or the village would be attacked.5724 The tank fired four
shells at the village that night.5725 (#Wrong presentation#! This is neither satisfactory nor an

5717
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5205, 5209–5210.
5718
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6969–6973.
5719
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5765.
5720
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5719, 5721–5722, 5753, 5759, 5765.
5721
D4229 (Witness statement of Boško Mandić dated 18 January 2014), para. 14; Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3718;
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12685–12686. See also P3483 (Video clip of interviews in Prijedor, including with
Milomir Stakić, with transcript).
5722
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 4054–4055 (under seal).
5723
Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3696–3701 (testifying that at 7 p.m. on 22 May, he heard shooting at the Hambarine
check-point, 300 metres from his parents‘ house, and ran to the scene, where eyewitnesses and individuals involved in the incident on both sides told him
that a vehicle with men wearing the White Eagles uniform started shooting at the TO members manning the check-point after their shift commander, Aziz
Ališković, stopped the vehicle and asked the men to turn in their weapons; the incident ended when a TO member who was passing by grabbed a gun and
shot at the Serbs, killing two and injuring at least two); (EVEN IF SO, HOW POSSIBLY A GROUP OF IRREGULARS DARED
TO STOP THE REGULAR ARMY RESERVISTS TRYING TO DISARM THEM? FURTHER, WHO WILL
BELIEVE THAT THE SOLDIERS CLOSED IN A CAR DARED TO FIRE AGAINST A GROUP THAT
SURROUNDED THAT CAR? FINALLY, HOW MANY MUSLIMS HAD BEEN KILLED OR WOUNDED? NONE!
NO A REASONABLE CHAMBER WOULD LEAVE THIS AMBIGUITY IN DEPICTING THE CRUCIAL
EVENT!) KDZ074, P708 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2298 (under seal); P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994),
e-court p. 10; KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2497–2498; Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
12686; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 2; KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 4035–
4038 (under seal); Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5204, 5289–5290; KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stakić), T. 6854; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1842 (under seal). Cf. D4269 (Witness statement of Ratko Milojica dated 27
January 2014), paras. 3–4 (testifying that he and four other VRS soldiers were stopped at the Hambarine check-point and all of a sudden, Bosnian Muslims
manning the check-point opened fire at his vehicle with machine guns for over five minutes, killing two of the soldiers); D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report
concerning collection centres, undated), e-court p. 28; D4882 (Witness statement of Dušan Ɖenadija undated), para. 7; D4195 (Witness statement of
Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 18; Dusan Jankovic, T. 47271–47272 (18 February 2014). See also Adjudicated Fact 1060; Ivo Atlija,
P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5555–5556; KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2497–2498; D4219 (Witness
statement of Miroslav Kvoĉka dated 17 January 2014), para. 17; Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20478 (27 October 2011); D4222 (Report of Prijedor SJB to
Banja Luka CSB, 5 July 1992), p. 1; D4010 (Report of Prijedor SJB, September 1993), p. 2; D4230 (Witness statement of Ĉedo Šipovac dated 18 January
2014), para. 11; P3483 (Video clip of interviews in Prijedor, including with Milomir Stakić, with transcript); D4228 (Witness statement of Zdravko Torbica
dated 18 January 2014), para. 5.
5724
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2298–2299, 2347–2350, 2358–2359, 2361; P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23
September 1994), e-court p. 10; KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2497; Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stakić), T. 5290; Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5556; Ivo Atlija, T. 20339–20341 (26 October 2011).
5725
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2299. See also KDZ092, P703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3918; KDZ092, P702
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12648 (under seal).
 128

accurate presentation of this crucial event! There was a check-point in Hambarine for a
quite some time, but nobody objected, because it was conceived as a precautionary and
defensive measure. However, on 22 May the Muslims at the check-point acted by shooting at
a car with the six reservists, four Serbs and two Croats, killing two, and heavily wounding
two and lightly two. Aliskovic as a policeman prepared and carried out this crime together
with others. And that was a beginning of the war in Prijedor. The Army was only after the
perpetrators, as any army would be.)

(iii) Scheduled Incident A.10.2

1664. The Prosecution alleges that a number of people were killed in the Hambarine and Ljubija
area between 23 May and 1 July 1992.

1665. On 23 May 1992, a broadcast was issued over Radio Prijedor calling for a number of
identified people, including Aziz Alisković, to surrender and warning that all weapons in the
possession of non-Serbs should be handed in to the authorities or Hambarine would be
attacked.5726 (#Legal and obligatory#! Certainly, in the context of the killing of the soldiers
on 22 May. The most proper move was to demand the perpetrators to surrender in order to
be processed!)

1666. Around noon that day, Hambarine was shelled from different directions for several hours.5727 Ivo
Atlija witnessed the attack on Hambarine from Briševo and saw two or three tanks firing at the town;
he later saw smoke, houses burning, and a large number of soldiers moving around the village.5728 All
of the houses in Hambarine were shelled and the old mosque in Hambarine was targeted and
shelled.5729 (#Muslim military stronghold# in the middle of the Serb territory! Neither the
Prosecution, nor the Chamber even mentioned whether somebody from Hambarine fired against
the “Serb Forces”, since we see in the next para that they had a quite amount of weapons. For
instance, there somebody fired from the mosque! This is not a valid presentation of facts!)

1667. After several hours of artillery shelling, armed Serb Forces entered the area supported by one
or two tanks.5730 After a brief period of intermittent fighting, local Bosnian Muslim leaders
collected any remaining weapons from villagers and surrendered these, as well as most of the
weapons that had belonged to the TO and the local police force, to the Serb Forces.5731

5726
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5556; Ivo Atlija, T. 20339–20341 (26 October 2011); KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 4037, 4043, 4051 (under seal); KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6855–6856, 6977–6978; KDZ026, P2089
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1842–1843 (under seal); Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12686; P3485 (Article
from Kozarski Vjesnik, entitled ―Public Statements‖, 29 May 1992), pp. 1–3; D4219 (Witness statement of Miroslav Kvoĉka dated 17 January 2014), para.
18. See Adjudicated Facts 1035, 1060. See also P3483 (Video clip of interviews in Prijedor, including with Milomir Stakić, with transcript).
5727
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2299; KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3322; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12455; KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2497; KDZ092, P703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stakić), T. 3918–3919; Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5290; KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T.
6856–6857; Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3718; KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12648–
12649 (under seal); Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12686–12687. See also Adjudicated Facts 1034, 1060, 1061.
5728
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5555–5557; Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3718 (stating
that the entire area of Brdo and especially Hambarine came under shelling from mortars and other artillery before being joined by two or three tanks). See
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20478 (27 October 2011). See also Ivo Atlija, T. 20340–20341 (26 October 2011); Adjudicated Facts 1036, 1061; P3914 (Ewan
Brown's expert report entitled ―Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992‖, 27 November 2002), para. 2.5 (stating that tanks, howitzers, and
anti-armour artillery were deployed to the 43rd Motorised Brigade prior to the attack on Hambarine in spring 1992).
5729
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2303; Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12687. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1286; P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the
Karadţić case, formatted records), pp. 219–221.
5730
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12688; Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5557; Mirsad
Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3718–3719. See Adjudicated Fact 1062.
5731
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5557; Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12688; Mirsad
Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3718–3719; D4222 (Report of Prijedor SJB to Banja Luka CSB, 5 July 1992), p. 1. See
Adjudicated Fact 1062. In his final brief, the Accused argues that Serbian forces were met with ―strong resistance‖ in Hambarine when they attempted to
dismantle the check-point there. See Defence Final Brief, para. 1547. However, the Chamber has received credible and mutually corroborative evidence
that the fighting in Hambarine on 23 May 1992 was brief, and that the armament on the Bosnian Muslim side was poor. See Adjudicated Facts 1035, 1038,
 129

(“intermittent fighting” a “remaining weapons surrendered”, there is no dilemma: the

willage was #militarised# and reluctant to pacify. Many villages handed over only weapons
out of order or very old, while they maintained the new one, and continued to act as
terrorists. See D4257, of 27 May:

Then follows a long list of weapons and “owners of it, among whome was one of Elkasovic’s,
we remember a withes Elkasovic:……………………………….

And that was the result of searching houses and basements!)

1668. The units that took part in the 23 May attack on Hambarine included units of the 1st Krajina
Corps, including the 6th Krajina Brigade and the 43rd Motorised Brigade,5732 the Prijedor SJB,
including the intervention squad, joined by members of Bosnian Serb paramilitary groups.5733
(#Incorrect#: the Intervention squad was not formed before 17 June 1992, and this may
happen if the Prosecutor’s witnesses are trusted unreserved, see: D2039:

Number: 02-111-215/92
Date: 17 June 1992

PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 3 and 7 of the Decision on the organisation and work of

the Crisis Staff of the Municipality of Prijedor, the Crisis Staff of the Municipality of Prijedor at
its session on 17 June 1992, and in connection with the Report on the security situation in the
area of the municipality, adopted the following
ORDER

1. The Prijedor Public Security Station and the Prijedor Regional Command are ordered to
form a joint intervention platoon, to be made up of 20 members from each, with the basic task
of preventing looting and other criminal activities in the area of the municipality and the
movement of all unregistered vehicles and vehicles driven by members of the army and police
without regularly approved travel orders.

1062, 1294; KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2303, 2305; Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12687;
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2017–2018 (under seal).
5732
P5405 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 26 May 1992), p. 1; P3656 (1st Krajina Corps report, 1 June 1992) pp. 1–2; P6611 (Bulletin of the 4th Tactical Group,
May 1994), p. 2. See also P3660 (Handwritten ―War Record‖ of the 6th Krajina Infantry Brigade, undated), p. 3; D4226 (Witness statement of Dragan
Radetić dated 17 January 2014), para. 17; P3914 (Ewan Brown's expert report entitled ―Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992‖,
27 November 2002), paras. 2.5, 2.71–2.72.
5733
P5555 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 29 September 1992), p. 3; P2968 (Report of Prijedor SJB, January 1993), p. 4; D4219 (Witness statement of Miroslav
Kvoĉka dated 17 January 2014), para. 18; D4226 (Witness statement of Dragan Radetić dated 17 January 2014), para. 17; KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21081–21082 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Facts 1034, 1061.
 130

1669. During the attack, villagers fled south to the Kurevo woods;5734 some were pursued by tanks,
which opened fire towards the woods.5735 KDZ092 testified that as she fled her home, she saw a
lot of soldiers in multi-coloured uniforms, armed with automatic rifles, passing by and shooting at
the villagers, accompanied by tanks firing at the houses.5736 She saw houses burning as a
result.5737 In addition, at least 50 houses along the Hambarine-Prijedor road were damaged or
destroyed by Serb Forces.5738 ( #Deadly combination#! Rule 92 bis evidence!How to deal with
this kind of evidence? A lady withess saw a battle, without knowing who the fighting side
were, who fired at whom, and it is understood that only the Serbs fired. Why would the
Serbs fire if there was no another, adversary armed force? Any living Serb is considered as a
“Serb Force”.)

1670. No one in the group she was with was returning fire, although she conceded that some people
had pistols.5739 KDZ092 also saw the dead body of a woman she knew lying at the entrance to her
house with her head severed from her body, and the dead body of another woman she knew who
was lying in the entrance to her house with blood surrounding her body.5740 KDZ092 further
testified that her best friend‘s husband and son were killed in Rizvanovići after having fled
Hambarine during the attack.5741 Her son‘s throat was slit and her husband was shot and killed as
he ran out of the house to his son; his wife buried both men in a shallow grave in Rizvanovići.5742
(The entire content pertaining to the armed conflict in the Brdo area is based on a Rule 92bis
and adjudicated facts, without any established connection between these events and the
President, and without a cross examination! This issues demand an independent
investigation, or at least a cross examination of such a detailed witness statements and
testimonies! Doesn’t look like a fair trial!)

1671. Also on 23 May, about 400 refugees from the Hambarine area, mostly women, children, and
elderly men, but also some young men, went to Briševo.5743 (#False# Those who went to Brisevo
were willing to fight, while many others went to the Prijedor City center, under the Serb
control, which is a first class evidence that the Serbs were only against the armed Muslim
combatants, not against the civilians!)

1672. On 24 May, KDZ092 and her family went to Ljubija, where they stayed until it was
attacked.5744 During this period, Serb soldiers came and took some people away from Ljubija,
including a former police officer who KDZ092 knew.5745 One day, very early in the morning,
soldiers in camouflage uniforms came to the house where KDZ092 was staying and told the
38 occupants, all Bosnian Muslim men, women, and children, to go outside.5746 The men were
separated from the women and children and the men were then taken away to the Ljubija

5734
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2302; KDZ092, P703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3919; Elvedin Nasić, P696
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12688; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 2; KDZ050, P680
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2498. See also Adjudicated Facts 1036, 1294.
5735
KDZ092, P703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3927.
5736
KDZ092, P703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3919–3920. See also Adjudicated Fact 1036.
5737
KDZ092, P703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3920; [REDACTED]; P551 (Photograph of Hambarine); P552 (Photograph of Hambarine).
5738
See Adjudicated Fact 1281.
5739
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 4024–4025, 4053–4054 (under seal); Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stakić), T. 3720.
5740
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3920–3921, 3925–3926 (under seal); KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
12648–12649 (under seal); P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 32. See also P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor
municipality, 28 August 2000), pp. 18, 126 (under seal); Adjudicated Fact 1061.
5741
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 4008–4009 (under seal).
5742
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 4008–4009 (under seal).
5743
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5558, 5660–5661. See Scheduled Incident A.10.9.
5744
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3927–3928, 4056–4057 (under seal); P522 (Sketch drawn by KDZ092) (under seal).
5745
KDZ092, P703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3928.
5746
KDZ092, P703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3929–3930; KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), 3991–3993 (under seal).
 131

stadium.5747 However, one of the men, [REDACTED], had a kidney condition and his family
called an ambulance to take him to the hospital to receive treatment; a military ambulance with
two soldiers took him and on the way home, the soldiers took him out of the ambulance and killed
him.5748 The women and children were returned to the cellar, verbally abused, and robbed of their
valuables.5749 (What any defence could do with such an assertion, with no any opportunity to
challenge it? Nothing! There is no any document to corroborate this assertions!)

1673. During May and June 1992, announcements calling for weapons to be turned in and for
certain individuals to surrender were made on Radio Prijedor.5750 In particular, the local
population of Bišćani was instructed to hand in their weapons and any uniforms they had from
previous reserve service in the army.5751 They did as instructed.5752 During the attacks on the
villages in the Brdo area, Radio Prijedor broadcast that ―an Ustasha fundamentalist stronghold‖
had fallen, and that it had been a great success of the Serb army.5753 (#Armed stronghold#,
abuse of civil settlements#! Wasn’t the local authority entitled to disarm peacefully all that
had been illegaly armed? If there was no a complete disarmament, the fights were inevitable!
To the end of the war there were dug-outs of the groups of Muslim terrorists that used to kill
civilians, and occasionalyto attack the Serb Army! There is a sufficient evidence on that!)

1674. During June 1992, Serb soldiers came to Ĉarakovo, demanding fuel, vehicles, and livestock,
and looking for local men.5754 KDZ014 was aware that some of the local leaders in Ĉarakovo had
a meeting with Serb officials around this time, but that they had not been able to agree on anything
except that the Bosnian Muslims should put up white sheets or flags on their houses.5755 This they
did.5756 (Again the Rule 92bis evidence, with no possibility for the cross examination! The
white sheet on the houses was a voluntary signe that the VRS and the police may pass freely,
because from this building there wass not going to be firing against them. So, the main issue
was whether the inhabitants will fire, or not. The OTP witness E. Wulliamy wrote about it,
that he had seen the whole Muslim villages with those sheets, the people were freely working
their agriculture, see D3788:

And that was a minimum of security that the “Serb Forces” required: not to be fired at, and
the citizens could have “a relatively quiet life”!) After the (Muslim) attack on Hambarine, life
in the area, including in Bišćani, was difficult, as the Brdo area remained isolated. (#And who
attacked in Hambarine#? Well known, the Muslim extremists, including some policemen!#

5747
KDZ092, P703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3930; KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12650 (under seal).
5748
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3991–3992 (under seal).
5749
KDZ092, P703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3929–3931.
5750
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5723–5725.
5751
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6857–6858.
5752
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6858.
5753
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5559.
5754
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5724–5725.
5755
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12541–12543.
5756
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12541–12543.
 132

After the Muslim extremists had been defeated, many of them escaped in the Brdo area, as it
is said in the Muslim documents!)

1675. On 9 June 1992, soldiers wearing drab olive uniforms and helmets arrived at a shop and café in
Hambarine, which they looted and subsequently set on fire.5757 On 11 June 1992, KDZ074 took shelter
in his cousin‘s garage nearby, along with members of his family, who were all unarmed civilians.5758
(Why KDZ074 had to hide, while many thousands of other Muslim males didn’t have to? Were
the policemen or the soldiers looking for him? He then departed with two male relatives, and
subsequently was told by his mother that one of his brothers had been shot and killed in the garage by
four Serb police officers; KDZ074‘s wife was also shot in the leg and wounded.5759 After the survivors
escaped, the garage was then set on fire by one of the Serb police officers.5760 (#Deadly combination#!
Again, no possibility to challenge it. The main source of the Chamber is 92bis and A(djudicated)
F(acts). Then, why to have any process after the first one, which may obtain 92 bis and
Adjudicated facts? But, the Chamber didn’t even mentioned any of a huge number of evidence,
given by the Muslims, about the strength of the Muslim forces only in Prijedor. Let us see what
had been said in D04417, a statement of the Muslim activist Sabahudin Jakupovic:

Note 3,000 combatants deep in the Serb territory. Any common sense, let alone a military expert,
would recognize this as a formidable terrorist force deep into the rear of the Serb forces. The
Defence didn’t assume it would be contested, the Chamber didn’t allow the Defense to present it,
and neither the Prosecution, nor the Chamber had a personnel with military education and
experience!) In addition to the deaths of the six individuals confirmed by witnesses above,5761 the
Chamber also received forensic evidence to support the deaths of at least six additional victims who
were killed in the areas of Hambarine and Ljubija between 23 May and 1 July 1992.5762 However, the
Chamber does not have sufficient evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the deaths of these six
latter individuals to make a finding in this regard.

1676. Based on the above, the Chamber therefore finds that at least six Bosnian Muslims were killed by
Serb Forces in the areas of Hambarine and Ljubija between 23 May and 1 July 1992.

5757
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2306; P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994), e-court pp. 10–11.
5758
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2308–2310; P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994), e-court p. 11.
5759
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2309–2310, 2323–2327; P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994), e-court
p. 11. See also P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002), p. 18.
5760
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2323–2327; P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994), e-court p. 11.
5761
See paras. 1670, 1672, 1675.
5762
P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 32 (confirming that the bodies of seven identified individuals, including Mevla Ĉaušević, were
exhumed from individual and mass graves in Hambarine and other areas of Prijedor in 1998, 2000, and 2001); P4892 (BiH State Commission for Tracing
Missing Persons list of exhumed persons from Prijedor, Ĉelinac, Bosanski Novi, 29 October 2002), p. 4 (confirming that the body of one of the same
individuals identified by Mašović was exhumed from a mass grave in Hrnići, Prijedor in 2001). See also P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated
23 March 2012), Annex A, p. 9; P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002), pp. 18, 240 (under seal) (confirming
that the bodies of five of the same individuals identified by Mašović were exhumed from graves in Hambarine and other areas of Prijedor with injuries
indicating that they died from gunshot wounds).
 133

(#Combatants, or civilians#! But neither for those six the Chamber had a sufficient evidence
about how and why they had been killed. As of 22 May, after the Muslim attack on the car
with reservists, there was a real war in Hambarine, Kozarac and surrounding settlements!
There is no reliable evidence that these casualties were anything but the combat casualties.
And if somebody had been hiding and when found tried to escape, there was an obvious
reason to warn him, then to shoot, because there were the Muslim terrorist dug outs all
around, all to the end of war!)

(iii) Scheduled Incident A.10.5

1677. The Prosecution alleges that a number of people were killed in the villages of the Brdo area
between 1 and 23 July 1992.

1678. Beginning on 20 July 1992, Serb Forces, including units of the 1st Krajina Corps, such as the 6th
Krajina Brigade, as well as the Reconnaissance and Sabotage Company and members of the
intervention squad, attacked villages around the entire region of Brdo.5763 (the Brdo area and all of
the villages had been a #military stronghold#, which is evident btoh from the Muslim anmd Serb
documents! Why these attacks happened? How any chamber could leave this question without
answer? It is the crucial element, to differentiate whether the attacks had been illegal and
criminal, or militarily justified. Left as that, and in the light of the media campaign and
denigration of the Serbs, unknown to the human history so fa, it is to be understood that the
attacks had been illegal and criminal!)

1679. On 21 and 22 July 1992, the villages of Rakovćani and Rizvanovići were also attacked.5764 Karagić
saw an APC open fire towards Rizvanovići.5765 Soldiers patrolled the village and some of the villagers
took shelter in the basement of one of the houses there.5766 The next day, Karagić saw soldiers wearing
olive-grey military uniforms throwing hand grenades and shooting; he ran to a vantage point from
where he could see the whole area and saw these soldiers taking up positions around the village.5767
After the attack on Rizvanovići, Karagić saw houses on fire in the area.5768 During this attack, homes
were destroyed and personal belongings were looted.5769 (#Abuse of civil settlements#! Karagic may
have seen a skirmish, but he was not obliged to depict the conduct of the other side, and certainly
he couldn’t see “personal belongings looted” from such a distance. Also, the Karagic family was
known as an extreme family, and certainly he was hiding and fighting occasionally! Again, no
answer to the question whether this attack was legal and necessary, or a criminal one! Or any
Serb action, be it political or military, is understood to be criminal!)

1680. Karagić also saw a tank fire about 20 shells towards the mosque in Hambarine.5770 The mosque in
Rajkovac was also shelled.5771 According to Nasić, three young men were taken away from
Rizvanovići in late July 1992; they were never seen again.5772

5763
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6858; Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5291; P697 (Witness
statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 2; KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2344; P5437 (Report of 1st
Krajina Corps, 22 August 1992); D1817 (Order of 6th Partisan Brigade, 18 June 1992), pp. 1–3. [REDACTED]; Adjudicated Facts 1068, 1073, 1295.
5764
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12689; Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5206–5207.
5765
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5206–5207.
5766
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5209–5210.
5767
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5291–5292.
5768
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5270.
5769
See Adjudicated Fact 1280.
5770
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5207. The Chamber notes that the Hambarine mosque had already been shelled and
damaged during the attack on Hambarine in May 1992 by Serb Forces. See paras. 1666–1668. See also para. 1889.
5771
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5207.
5772
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12724. However, the Chamber does not have sufficient evidence as to the circumstances
surrounding these events to make a finding that these three individuals were killed in relation to this Scheduled Incident.
 134

1682. The village of Ĉarakovo was attacked on 23 July 1992, after several demands that
residents should hand in their weapons.5773 According to KDZ014, all rifles, pistols, and other
weapons in Ĉarakovo were handed in by residents to Serb Forces by June 1992.5774 Based on the
evidence before it, the Chamber finds that the TO and other Bosnian Muslim units were not active
in Ĉarakovo at this time and that there was no armed resistance to the attack on the village by Serb
Forces on 23 July. . (#Absurdity#! What does it mean? If the terrorists took a lull, it doesn’t
mean the regular security forces, Army and Police, should let them recover! But meantime?
We know that the Muslim terrorists who escaped from Hambarine, Kozarac and other
strongholds escaped to Brdo and it’s villages, turning the houses into fortified objects, and
making dug-outs for a long term, and this way presented a constant jeopardy to the Serb
civilians, Army and police. See D04417,

The “Barahovo” in the second line is “Carakovo. There is no a reasonable and responsible
authority which would neglect a 3,000 of enemies hidden in woods and dug-outs of Brdo and
other hills around Prijedor! …But, even if not active this very day, their mere existence deep
into the Serbian territory, so far from the front line, was not acceptable, and it was
completely legitimate to issu an ultimatum, and if rejected, to destroy the units. Let us see
what is in the regular combat report of the 1st Krajina Corps of 28 July 92, D3094:

This is what was going on, and no attacks against civilian settlements. The Prosecution
obtained this document, and the Chamber saw it and admitted it. Why it was not evaluated?)

1683. That day, KDZ014 was hiding in a corn field, trying to get to her children in her house,
when she heard the sounds of tanks and shooting and women and children screaming.5775 She saw
houses burning and soldiers in camouflage uniforms moving through the woods nearby.5776
During the attack, Ĉarakovo suffered extensive damage and destruction and houses were
looted.5777

5773
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5727, 5730; KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12543–12545. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1069; KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21087–21090 (under seal). In his final brief, the Accused concedes
that following several demands for disarmament of the village, Bosnian Serb tanks attacked Ĉarakovo on 23 July 1992. See Defence Final Brief, para. 1550.
5774
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5724.
5775
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5727–5729; KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12543.
5776
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5729.
5777
See Adjudicated Fact 1278; KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5739–5740.
 135

1684. The mosque in Ĉarakovo, including the minaret, was destroyed by Serb soldiers on
23 July 1992, and 17 people, including the ―hodţa‖, were killed outside.5778

1685. After the initial attack on Ĉarakovo, soldiers mistreated and killed some of the villagers.5779
(#Deadly combination# it is unbelievable that a serious chamber relies on such a “deadly
combination, 92bis evidence, transcripts from other cases – see this footnote - and no cross
examination, no number or names of victims, no perpetrators, no circumstances, only “some
Serbs killed some Muslims”! What does it have to do with the President, since the Muslim
side decided to wage the war against the Serbs in Prijedor, far from any front line? #Appart
from the allegations about the fate of mosque, such a laconic and by-pass assertion about 17
men killed, without any specificity in terms of “combatants – civilians” is not fair, and
should be dismissed immediately!) For instance, on or around 23 July 1992, Besim Musić was
approached by Serb soldiers while he was shredding corn; they took him into a car, beat him, and
then threw him out on the road.5780 The soldiers also shot around Musić, causing the bullets to rip
skin on his head, arms, and legs, while not actually hitting him.5781 Another villager told KDZ014
that Musić‘s wife had been killed, along with another man, by soldiers who questioned them about
the whereabouts of hideouts used by the Green Berets.5782 (First, it is obvious that the Serb
soldiers weren’t after civilians, but after #the Green Berets.# Second, no any investigation
stands behind those assertions, only 92bis and AFs, and “somebody said to somebody about
something”, which is unprecendented in the criminal practice. The Muslims who testified
had every reason and motive to lie and invent the stories. Hoever, there is a document of the
1st KK pertaining to the treatment of the enemies: D04234, 7 June 92:
…………………………..

Which was perfectly in accord with many orders issued by the President! The same day the SJB
Prijedor filed the criminal report against 39 leaders of the armed Muslim terrorists, whose last
names unbelievably resemble the last namer of several “key” witnesses in this case. See D04419

5778
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12547. See also KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21090 (under
seal); P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case,
formatted records), pp. 216–218. See para. 1889.
5779
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5740–5741.
5780
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5740.
5781
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5740–5741 (testifying that she took Musić to a hospital in Prijedor on 25 July 1992, after she had
taken care of him for a day or two in her house).
5782
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5741. See also P6689 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August
2002), p. 25 (confirming that Badema Musić was officially declared dead by Sanski Most municipal court and given a date of death of 23 July 1992).
 136

(Instead a “somebody something to somebody about something”, the Chamber had a

contemporaneous and strictly confidential documents, obtained by the Prosecution. Why the
Chamber payed more attention and credit to “hear-say” evidence, than to the first class
documented evidence?)

1686. Also in Ĉarakovo, KDZ014 saw the dead bodies of Rubija Redţić, a local Bosnian Muslim
woman, Fehim Karupović, a local Bosnian Muslim man, and her neighbour, Adem Hopovac.
They were all unarmed, wearing civilian clothes, and had been shot.5783 (The families of
Karupovic and Hopovac were very prominent in the rebellion, in all the relevant documents
it was mentioned! But it didn’t mean they hadn’t an armament, but no army leave weaponry
with a killed adversaries. It would be as if the wining army helps it’s adversaries in arming.
For being in civilian cloathes, and not in a proper uniforms, only made them terrorists,
provided they participated in any way in the rebellion!) In the swampy area known as Bare,
between Zecovi and Ĉarakovo, KDZ014 also saw eight dead bodies of Bosnian Muslims in
civilian clothes.5784 (How she knew they were Muslims? No racial or cultural differences in
cloathing! No evidence which would exclude the Serb ethnicity of victims! Cloathes doesn’t
make one civilian!) She and her brothers then collected and buried these bodies.5785 KDZ014
also assisted in burying the bodies of two Bosnian Muslim men found in a field on 24 July
1992.5786 On 27 July 1992, she saw the body of another Bosnian Muslim man as it was buried by
his son.5787 (As we can see from D04234, the Command of the 1st KK ordered to be allowed
to burry the bodies of the enemies. Had the Serbs been after the civilians, there wouldn’t be
such an activities of civilians!)

1687. In the days following the attack, (#Unestablished, who attacked#! Neither the
Prosecution, nor the Chamber ever established whose attack it was? Such a general and
unprecise use of the term “attack” leaves an impression, certainly wanted by the
Prosecution, that all of those skirmishes were the Serb “attacks”! The Chamber’s treatment
of these activities, exactly as the Prosecution wanted it to be, skipped a “whole truth” and is
not fair to the Serbs, and particularly to the President, who was both physically and
operationally too far to be responsible fot that! The most significant is the fact that the “Serb
Forces” posed an ultimatum for a disarmament, and handing over perpetrators of crimes!)
KDZ014 and the other local residents sometimes slept in the woods and returned to their homes in
the mornings to collect food; they were afraid that if they were found they would be killed.5788
(Why so many thousands of the Muslim civilians lived without any hiding, but only 1,400
had been conveyed to Manja~a and their related people had to hide? The three thousands
brought in, 1,700 released and 1,400 detained at Manja~a hadn’t been killed! Those who had
hiden had their own presumption, but they could have been killed only if found in a close

5783
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5732–5734; KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12544–12545. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1069 (stating that during the raid of Ĉarakovo, at least 16 civilians were killed and that three of them were shot dead in front of their
houses).
5784
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5735–5737; KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12545–12546 (identifying
the bodies she found in Bare as Asim Redţić, Huse Hopovac, Suad Hopovac, Fadil Malovcić, Velid Hopovac, Nijaz Hopovac, Mirhad Hopovac, and Nijaz
Redţić); P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 34, 36 (confirming that the bodies of Asim Redţić, Huse Hopovac, and Suad
Hopovac were exhumed from graves in Ĉarakovo-Baćuša in 1998 and 1999). See also P6689 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor
municipality, 28 August 2002), pp. 21–22 (confirming that the bodies of Huse Hopovac, Nijaz Hopovac, and Asim Redţić were exhumed from mass graves
in Ĉarakovo, Baćuša and Zecovi-Kosa in October 1998 and August 1998, respectively, and that Huse Hopovac and Asim Redţić had been killed by gun shot
wounds). Al of those names are found on the lists of the extremists who initiated conflict and commited crimes, as it is
visible from D04421, D04417, D04419, P05528
5785
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5738.
5786
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5741–5742 (identifying the bodies as Ermin Sijacić and Huse Salihović); P4853 (Updated Table 2
to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 34–36 (confirming that the body of Huse Salihović was exhumed from a grave in Brdo in 1998). See also Adjudicated
Fact 1069.
5787
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5742–5743 (identifying the body of Nasif Dizdarević and testifying that his son told her that he
had found his father‘s body with numerous bullet holes in the kitchen of his house).
5788
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5743; KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12547–12548.
 137

vicinity of a men who fired against the VRS or police.) We have seen that the Muslim
civilians from Hambarine and the Kozarac region didn’t feel any fear to take shelter in the
urban area of Prijedor, under the Serb conltor, or even the jungsters forcefully mobilized in
the Muslim units didn’t have any fear to run to the Serb side, see: P3788, p. 5, E. Wullianmy:
…………………………………...

Having the whole picture in mind, it must be clear that these witnesses that hadn’t been
cross examined could say whatever they wanted in the other cases, in which the Defences
even didn’t feel any need to rebut something that is not damaging for their defendants. And
this is not a fair trial!) The Serb soldiers stole vehicles, farm machinery, money, and gold from
the local residents in Ĉarakovo; household items were also stolen and loaded on to vehicles.5789
92bis!!!, no chance to do anything. No names, no cross. KDZ014 also saw men, women, and
children from the area being forced on to buses by Serb soldiers and driven away. Other groups of
villagers left on foot in the days after the attack; KDZ014 did not know where buses or groups of
villagers were going.5790

1. In late July 1992, KDZ014 decided to leave Ĉarakovo; she and approximately 100 other people,
primarily women, children, and elderly, assembled and went to the village ―dom‖ carrying a white flag;
they were kept there for three hours and verbally abused by Serb soldiers.5791 They were then escorted
by the Serb soldiers to an area of Ĉarakovo known as Ţeger, where the road to Ĉarakovo meets the
main road from Prijedor to Sanski Most.5792 (Look at that now: all of a sudden the white flag,
legitimising the large group of Muslims as a non-combatant, led them to security and safety!)

1689. Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat men were stopped and killed at a bridge in Ţeger.5793
KDZ092 testified that she saw buses from Prijedor with men from Ĉarakovo stop and unload the
men at Ţeger Bridge.5794 KDZ014 also testified that she saw men stripped down to their waists
and detained at Ţeger Bridge.5795 Soldiers in camouflage uniforms, with white ribbons on the
shoulders, and camouflage caps shot the men who were dressed in civilian clothes at the bridge
and threw their bodies into the Sana River.5796 Other Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat men

5789
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5729, 5740, 5769; KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12544, 12547–
12548.
5790
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5729–5730; KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12544, 12547–12548.
See also KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21076, 21090 (under seal).
5791
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5745–5746.
5792
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5746–5747; KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12537. See also
KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21076–21077 (under seal); Adjudicated Fact 1070.
5793
KDZ092, P703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3947–3949; KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3950–3954, 3656 (under
seal); KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5746–5747. See also Adjudicated Fact 1070. The Chamber notes the discrepancy
surrounding the date of the killings at Ţeger Bridge. Adjudicated Fact 1070 states that the date of the killings was 23 July 1992. This adjudicated fact is
based on KDZ092‘s evidence in the Stakić case, as admitted in the BrĎanin case, and KDZ092 confirmed in the Stakić case that this incident occurred on the
same day as the attack on the village of Ĉarakovo, which was 23 July. However, KDZ014 testified that she saw men at Ţeger Bridge on 28 July 1992, the
day on which she left Ĉarakovo. Based on the evidence before it, the Chamber considers that the killings at Ţeger Bridge occurred on or around 23 July
1992 following, and as a part of, the attack on Ĉarakovo and thus finds that they occurred within the period of the Indictment for this incident.
(#Combatants, or civilians#! And also within the fighting in Carakovo. However, being killed on the bridge is not
indicating that they had first been captured and then killed. It could have happened during the fights, if they found
themselves on the bridge and noticed by the Serb soldiers. No names, nothing, and this is not sufficient in a criminal
case. Apart of it, what it has to do with the President? They attacked each other always when they had an
opportunity, in any civil war, how anyone could have expected this time it wouldn’t happen?
5794
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3950–3954, 3656 (under seal).
5795
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5743, 5747.
5796
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3951–3955, 3994 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 1070.
 138

were put on to buses at Ţeger Bridge and taken away.5797 (Again, ribbons! When the Serbs
wore it, no problem, when given to the Muslims, it was presented as a discriminatory
measure) that was exclusively a measure against a “friendly fire”, there is many evidence to
that respect!)

1690. At Ţeger Bridge, women, children, and elderly, including KDZ014, were loaded onto
―Autotransport Prijedor‖ buses driven by Serb soldiers.5798 She saw one of her neighbours, Hasib
Simbegović, try to board one of the buses, but he was prevented from doing so by Dragan Tintar, a
local Serb from Tukovi wearing a camouflage uniform, who then shot him in the head.5799 After
they were loaded onto the buses, the women, children, and elderly were driven to Trnopolje, where
they spent one night before being transported by trucks and buses to Vlasić.5800 At Vlasić, they
got off of the buses and were told to walk to ―their country‖ and were received by Bosnian Muslim
soldiers, who took them to Travnik.5801
1691. The Chamber took judicial notice that a large number of killings of Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats occurred in the Brdo area around 20 July 1992 as a result of the campaign
conducted by Bosnian Serb forces.5802 (A #legal action#! No a reasonable chamber would make
that kind of deliberation, without even taking into account the legal action of the Serb
military and police against the Muslim terrorists, “accommodated” in the villages, woods
and dug-outs, as seen from the evidence. Also, no any inquiery into the question which
killings were illegal and criminal, which not. If there was a civil war, initiated by the
Muslims, and procrastinated by the Muslims, there must be established what was a crime!)
In addition, the Chamber has received forensic evidence to support the deaths of some identified
individuals who were killed in the Brdo region between 1 and 23 July 1992.5803

1692. Based on the above, the Chamber therefore finds that a number of Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats, including civilians, were killed by Serb Forces in the Brdo area on or around
23 July 1992. ((#Including civilians#! How many civilians? How come civilians were among
the Muslim combatants?) #After the Muslim attack#! The Chamber neglected the fact that it
happened two months after the first attack of those terrorists in Hambarine, and that there
is a plethora of evidence that after the fights at the end of May and couple of weeks in June,
the Muslim/Croat extremists withdrew to Brdo, ^arakovo, Kozara and other surrounding
woods, reorganizing, digging the combat shelters and getting out to kill the Serb civilians
and military. The Chamber didn’t succeed to differentiate who was killed in fights and who
in an illegal manner. Since there is no doubt that there were the fights, there must have been
casualties on both sides. This paragraph brings a little light saying: “including civilians”,
which means that the Chamber was aware that the main issue was fight against those that
are not “including civilians”!)

(iii) Scheduled Incident A.10.6

5797
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3937, 3947, 3950, 3956, 3994 (under seal); KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
BrĎanin), T. 12655 (under seal). [REDACTED].
5798
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5747–5748. See also KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21076–21077
(under seal).
5799
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5748, 5771.
5800
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5749–5750.
5801
KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5749–5750; Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4620–4622.
[REDACTED]. See paras. 1834, 1837.
5802
See Adjudicated Fact 1068.
5803
P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 34–36 (confirming that at least 16 bodies were exhumed from graves in Ĉarakovo, Baćuša,
Pašinac, Kosa and Brdo in 1998, 1999, and 2000). See also P6689 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002), pp. 21–
26, 46, 253, 254 (confirming that the bodies of Huse Hopovac, Nijaz Hopovac, Asim Redţić, Hamdija Hopovac, Aziz Behlić, Naila Redţić, Namir Redţić,
and Vahid Redţić were exhumed from mass graves in Ĉarakovo, Baćuša and Zecovi-Kosa in 1998 and 2000); see fn. 5791.
 139

1693. The Prosecution alleges that a number of men were killed in the village of Bišćani and in
the surrounding hamlets of Hegići, Mrkalji, Ravine, Duratovići, Kadići, Lagići, and Ĉemernica on
or about 20 July 1992. (#Abuse of civil settlements#! All the settlements known as a “reserve
position” of the terrorists, occupied after the failure of the 30th May attack on Prijedor. All
of those settlements are registered in the regular reports!@)

1694. On 20 July 1992, the village of Bisćani and the surrounding hamlets were attacked by Serb
Forces, including the 6th Krajina Brigade and members of the police and the intervention squad.5804

1695. Starting around 10 a.m. on 20 July, the village of Bišćani was attacked by Serb Forces from
the direction of Tukovi.5805

1696. On 20 July 1992, Bosnian Muslim males in Bišćani as young as 16 years old were told to
gather at various collection points manned by Serb soldiers throughout the village; the women
stayed in their homes and were eventually taken away to Trnopolje or other places.5806 Several
people were beaten and killed at these collection points in Bišćani.5807 All 92bis!!! For instance,
one of the collection points was a coffee bar; at that location, a uniformed soldier instructed two
men, Mirhad Mrkalj and Ferid Sabanović, to carry the dead body of Hamdija Fikić behind a
house.5808 KDZ038 saw the soldier fire ―into‖ Mrkalj and Sabanović and they did not come
back.5809 Additionally, KDZ038 saw three other men killed at the coffee bar collection point—
Mirsad Medić and another colleague who worked with Medić at the petrol station, as well a former
policeman, Saša Karagić.5810 The Chamber is therefore satisfied that in total six men were killed
by Bosnian Serb soldiers at the coffee bar collection point on 20 July 1992. (#Deadly
combination#! All based on Rule 92bis evidence and adjudicated facts, both without an
opportunity to cross-examine! Let us see what the MUP RS established on 11 July 92 about
the terrorist activities in Prijedor, D447:

It happened that already until 11 July there had been killed 43 policemen and wounded 65
policemen, in five weeks of the terrorist aktivities, which started on 30 May 92. See the

5804
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5881–5882 (under seal); KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11849 (under
seal); P5437 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 22 August 1992), p. 2; D1817 (Order of 6th Partisan Brigade, 18 June 1992); [REDACTED]. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1073. [REDACTED].
5805
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6859; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 3 (stating that
when he went into Bišćani some time after the attack he found the entire village empty and all the villagers were gone).
5806
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6859–6861 (testifying that the soldiers he saw throughout Bišćani on and after 20 July wore
different uniforms—olive drab in colour, camouflage, as well as police uniforms). See also Adjudicated Fact 1074.
5807
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6861; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 2; Elvedin
Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12715 (testifying that his brother told him that his father, who was unarmed, was killed by an
armed soldier in front of his brother on the day Bišćani was attacked). See also Adjudicated Fact 1074.
5808
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6861–6862.
5809
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6861–6862. See para. 1708. See also P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor
municipality, 28 August 2002), pp. 22–23, 177 (under seal).
5810
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6862–6863. See also Adjudicated Fact 1074.
 140

settlements named as a #strongholds# of the terrorists: D447, p. 6:

Therefore, there was no action of the Serb Army or Police that was aimed to anything else
but to quitting the existence and actions of these terrorist formations!#Legal anti-terrorist
actions#!)

1697. A while later, a ―Prijedor Autotransport‖ bus arrived at the coffee bar collection point and soldiers
instructed some of the men in the group, including KDZ038, to get on the bus, while other men were
instructed to stay behind.5811 In Prijedor town, they stopped and changed to another Autotransport bus,
which drove them on the main Prijedor-Banja Luka road and stopped near Keraterm for awhile.5812
They then went to Omarska, where the bus waited outside, before continuing on to Trnopolje.5813

1698. Sometime later in the afternoon on 20 July, a second bus arrived at Trnopolje with the other group
of men who had stayed behind at the coffee bar collection point; however, KDZ038 noticed that a
number of men who had been in this second group were not in the group that arrived at Trnopolje.5814
KDZ038 later heard from a survivor that the whole second group of men had been put on to a bus but
that, at a sand pit along the road towards Prijedor, some of the men were taken off the bus, lined up,
and shot with an automatic rifle by a soldier wearing an olive drab uniform and helmet. 5815 When the
remaining villagers from Bišćani were later taken to Trnopolje along that road, they saw the bodies of
these men.5816 (All unproven, uncorroborated, all a third class evidence, without cross
examination and documents!#Deadly combination#!)

1699. Two of the brothers of KDZ074 were also killed on 20 July 1992, while taking shelter in the
basement of a house in Bišćani with their families.5817 They were taken from the basement along with
other men by Serb police officers wearing blue uniforms, led to the yard of another house nearby, shot,

5811
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6865.
5812
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6866.
5813
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6866–6867.
5814
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6868, 6870 (identifying the names of seven men, Nurija Kekić, Halid Kekić, Sabahudin Kekić,
Asmir Kekić, Muhamed Tedić, Ferid Risvanović, and Elvir Vojniković, who KDZ038 had seen at the coffee bar collection point and who did not ultimately
arrive at Trnopolje); see P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 37 (confirming that the body of Elvir Vojniković was exhumed from a
grave in Rizvanovići in 2005).
5815
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6864, 6868–6869, 6872; KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5950 (under
seal) (testifying that he retrieved 15 to 25 bodies from the side of the road near the Sredicko Polje sand pits and was told later that these people had been on
a bus and that half of the occupants of the bus had been killed in that spot).
5816
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6871.
5817
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2344.
 141

and killed with automatic rifles; all of the men were unarmed and in civilian clothes.5818 Their bodies
were later collected.5819

1700. On 20 July, the hamlet of Duratovići was attacked; it was one of the first hamlets in the area
around Bišćani targeted and there were few survivors.5820 Karagić later heard that there were 20 to
30 dead bodies outside a shop in Duratovići and a number of dead bodies lying across the street
from the shop.5821 Two of Karagić‘s uncles were killed in Duratovići.5822 (#Combat, or civil
casualties#Not specified whether they had been killed in fights, or out of the fight. Let us see
what is in the Prosecution exhibit P03487, on 23 July 92, pertaining to a several critical days
in the zone:

(#Legitimate# Having these documents at it’s disposal, the Chamber was able to differentiate
a legitimate fights and casualties during the fights, and not to rely upon the testimonies of the
relatives of the Muslim extremists!)

1702. Between 2 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. on 20 July, Hegići was attacked by Serb Forces.5823
Hegići was on a hill about 300 to 350 metres in a straight line from Mrkalji, which was
also on a hill.5824 A group of villagers from Hegići watched what was happening in
Mrkalji and heard screams from women and children there.5825 Approximately 30 to 40
men from Mrkalji, including 12 and 13 year old boys and elderly men between 60 and 65
years old, dressed in civilian clothes and unarmed, were surrounded by APCs and about
20 to 30 soldiers in military camouflage uniforms at a clay pit; they were lined up, told to
run, and then shot and killed.5826 The mosque in Mrkalji was also on fire.5827 (There is no
a single document, nowhere, in the VRS or the police, confirming that there were
those fights, let alone the incidents described in those obscure testimonies admitted as
92bis. If any of this happened, such a great operation would have to be notified in the
intern documents at least, but in media too! That would be a mere execution of
civilians, and even the Muslim propaganda never claimed that this happened! Let us
see what was the attitude of the Serbs toward the Prijedor Muslims, D1928, 13 July

5818
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2310, 2344–2345.
5819
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2345; P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994), e-court pp. 13–14.
5820
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5293–5294.
5821
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5294; KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11851 (under seal). See
para. 1708.
5822
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5294.
5823
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5881–5882, 5912–5913 (under seal) [REDACTED]; KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor
v. BrĎanin), T. 11849 (under seal).
5824
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5882–5883 (under seal).
5825
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5882 (under seal); KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11849 (under seal).
5826
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5882, 5885, 5887, 5890–5893 (under seal); KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
BrĎanin), T. 11849 (under seal). See P1164 (Photograph of Hegići hamlet in Bišćani marked by KDZ094); P583 (Photograph of Mrkalji hamlet in Bišćani);
P1162 (Photograph of house of Smail Mrkalj in Bišćani marked by KDZ094). See also Adjudicated Fact 1075; para. 1705.
5827
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5882 (under seal). See also KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21090
(under seal).
 142

92:
 143

1703. The hamlet of Ĉermernica was also attacked on 20 July 1992.5828 Soldiers in blue
uniforms, along with a few others in green and olive-grey camouflage uniforms, arrived on foot in
Ĉemernica, followed by military vehicles and APCs.5829 Around 35 to 40 residents of Ĉemernica
assembled at the village cemetery and were lined up by the soldiers.5830 Two soldiers approached
one of the men, Muhamed Hazdić, and asked him his name; when he responded, one of the
soldiers said ―are you a pejgamber?‖, referring to a Muslim word about God, and then shot and
killed him.5831 KDZ094 noticed that elderly people in the line had been beaten and their clothes
were cut; [REDACTED].5832 Two other soldiers arrived, Rade Bilbija and Miodrag Glusac, also
known as ―Tosa‖, dressed in camouflage uniforms; Bilbija, seemed to be in charge and upon his
instructions, the soldiers then left.5833 KDZ094 buried Muhamed Hazdić the next morning.5834
(#Deadly combination#, no possibility to check! If true at all, the #“next level”# rectified a
subordinate’s misconduct! No a command, but strictly individual responsibility!)

1704. Around 20 July 1992, 12 persons were lined up in an orchard in Hegići and shot dead.5835
Also on or around 20 July, between 20 to 30 people were killed at a bus stop at a crossroads
between Alagići, Ĉemernica, and Jugovći; an elderly woman, went looking for her three sons who
had gone missing and saw heaps of bodies at this location.5836 (#Deadly combination#! Had it
beejn so, the Prosecution would bring such a useful witness to this process too! Were those
Chambers that adjudicated this allegations so blind and uncritical of those facts? And this is
not serious from the Prosecution to bring such a drastic allegations into such a serious case,
without any possibility to cross-examine and challenge the veracity!)

1705. On 21 July, soldiers returned to Ĉemernica in small groups and stole television sets,
valuables, and gold items.5837 They took away several of the villagers to collect the bodies of
people who had been killed in the area, and two of those men, Husnija Hadzić and Hare Pelak,
never returned.5838 (#Deadly combination#! All under the Rule 92bis, no cross examination!)
1706. Serb soldiers continued to take away several villagers from Ĉemernica each day to collect
bodies and load them into trucks in the surrounding villages.5839 On 23 July around 8 or 9 a.m.,
two Serbs in camouflage uniforms, Ranko Došen and Slavko Petrović, arrived in Ĉemernica in
green military trucks and instructed KDZ094 to go with eight to ten other Bosnian Muslim men to
collect bodies from the Bišćani area and load them onto trucks.5840 They were accompanied by
armed escorts, Serb soldiers in green, olive-grey military uniforms with rifles.5841 They first went
to Hegići, where they found the badly decomposing bodies of Salih Hegić and Esef Avdić, both
with gunshot wounds, and loaded them into the truck using blankets which they collected from

5828
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5897, 5906 (under seal) (testifying that he saw that ―everything had burned‖ in Ĉemernica and that
―everyone had been killed‖).
5829
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5906 (under seal); KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11850 (under seal).
5830
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5893, 5906–5907 (under seal); KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11850
(under seal).
5831
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5906–5907 (under seal); KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11850 (under
seal).
5832
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5907 (under seal).
5833
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5908–5910 (under seal).
5834
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5910 (under seal).
5835
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5922 (under seal); KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11851 (under seal);
P576 (Photograph of orchard in Bišćani). See also Adjudicated Fact 1076.
5836
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5925 (under seal); KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11851–11852
(under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 1077.
5837
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5910–5911 (under seal); KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11850 (under
seal).
5838
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5911–5912 (under seal); KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11850–11851
(under seal).
5839
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5911–5915 (under seal).
5840
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5913–5915 (under seal).
5841
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5916–5917 (under seal).
 144

nearby houses.5842 KDZ094 then went to the clay pit in Mrkalji and saw a number of bodies lying
face down, which had been shot in the back.5843 (#Legal and obligatory#! The operation
described by this witness was a usual “sanitation” of the battlefield. Since there was no any
cover up or a clandestine removal of the corps, it is clear that those killed had been
combatants, not civilians. Why KDZ094 and other Muslim civilians who were engaged in the
sanitation hadn’t been killed? Because the Serbs had nothing against civilians! And finally,
how was it possible that the Chamber relied upon such an important witness, and not calling
him to be cross-examinned in this case? Either they should call him, rejecting the 92 bis
offer, or exclude his testimonies admitted in such a peculiar way!)

1707. After Mrkalji, KDZ094 and the other men with the truck went to the neighbouring hamlet
of Kadići, where they picked up the bodies of Sead and Kemal Kadić, which had gunshot wounds
in the chest.5844 They then went towards Ravine, and KDZ094 observed that the Bišćani mosque
no longer had a roof or munara and had been damaged by fire, as had nearby houses.5845 He stated
that he had last seen part of the munara on 23 July 1992, from his house, before it was burned.5846
The Chamber received evidence that throughout the whole area of Bišćani, Rizvanovići, and
Rakovĉani, ―all the mosques were burned and looted‖.5847 These mosques had been intact in April
1992.5848 The mosque in Bišćani was destroyed on 20 July 1992 and the Rizvanovići mosque and
other mosques in the area were destroyed in the summer months, and by August 1992.5849 (#Legal
combat activities#! Why the Serbs didn’t destroy those mosques in April, or May, or June
92? Because there was no fightings in those villages during those months! Or, why the
mosques in other villages where there was no fights hadn’t been damaged? An answer is so
simple, and the only reasonable inference would be that in a combat zones the mosques had
been damaged!)

1708. At some point on 23 July, KDZ094 was ordered by Došen to drive a second truck and they
continued to Ravine; they collected a few more bodies along the road and then five or six more in
a field about 50 metres from the turn-off to Ravine, all of which had gunshot injuries.5850 In a
forest in Ravine, they picked up another 25 to 30 bodies near the woods and outside of houses;
[REDACTED].5851 One of the bodies was a young female [REDACTED] found naked, lying on a
couch inside a house with a bullet hole in her head. 5852 (#Deadly combination#! For this
incident he had to be called to testify live! Anyway, it seems that the KDZ094 was a favourite
of both, the Serbs and the Prosecution! Nothing happened to him!)

1709. Near a place called Bijela Zemlja, KDZ094 picked up the body of Mirhad Mrkalj and a
few other unidentified people.5853 Further along, they picked up another 15 to 20 bodies close to
the main road between Ravine and Bišćani.5854 Near the ―Diskont‖ shop in Bijela Zemlja, an area

5842
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5917–5920, 5922 (under seal); P1164 (Photograph of Hegići hamlet in Bišćani marked by
KDZ094). See also P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002), pp. 20, 22, 24 (under seal).
5843
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5923 (under seal). See para. 1701.
5844
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5927 (under seal).
5845
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5927–5929 (under seal); P574 (Photograph of mosque in Bišćani); P575 (Photograph of mosque in
Bišćani); P590 (Photograph of interior of mosque in Bišćani).
5846
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5882, 5928–5929 (under seal).
5847
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5929 (under seal).
5848
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5929–5930 (under seal).
5849
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5928–5930 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 1289; KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21090 (under seal); P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in
BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted records), pp. 227–228, 233–235. See para. 1889.
5850
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5930, 5932–5933 (under seal); P592 (Photograph of orchard in Bišćani).
5851
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5882, 5936–5939 (under seal) [REDACTED]; see P593 (Photograph of a path).
5852
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5938–5939 (under seal).
5853
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5942 (under seal); KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6862; see para. 1696.
5854
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5943 (under seal).
 145

near the hamlet of Duratovići, they found the largest number of bodies and spent some time there
collecting them.5855 (It looks like a #sanitation# action after the battle. Had it been an
execution, the bodies wouldn’t be all around, in woods and different places. So, at least
equally reasonable inference would be that there was a fierce fightings, and a sanitation
afterwards! Supposedly, any execution would have elements of a clandestine action, which
was not the case!).

1710. The group continued on towards Tukovi, and at the coffee production plant near the
junction leading to Sredice, they picked up another 10 to 15 bodies.5856 Further along the road, at
the Sredicko Polje sand pit, they retrieved another 15 to 25 bodies from the right hand side of the
road, also with gunshot wounds.5857 Close to the turnpike at Tukovi, they found another two
groups of bodies with gunshot wounds, including some women and children, who were 12, 13, and
14 years old.5858 (What kind of truck was it? How many bodies could it contain?)

1711. At the check-point in Tukovi, KDZ094 parked the truck and got out, and some soldiers
drove two of the three trucks, which were full of bodies, off in the direction of Sanski Most;
KDZ094 heard Došen and Petrović complaining that they did not want to drive much further and
that they would go somewhere ―closer‖, which he interpreted to mean that they did not want to
drive all the way to Tomašica, but would rather find somewhere closer to take the bodies.5859 (So,
KDZ094 was competent and allowed to “interpret” what some soldiers meant? How come
the Chamber accepted such an improvisation?) The third truck was used to return the other
Bosnian Muslim villagers, and the two armed Serbs, to the Hegići area.5860 (#Combat casualties,
sanitation#! Why those “Bosnian Muslim villagers” hadn’t been killed? If all others, whose
bodies had been collected, had been killed in an unlawful manner, why those hadn’t been
killed, as a dangerous witnesses? Because this was a sanitation of the battlefield, and the
Serb soldiers didn’t hide anything!)

1711. On 24 July, six to eight young men who had been captured were brought to the check-point in
Tukovi to help KDZ094 collect bodies; they went to the area of Sredicko Polje to resume
collecting bodies.5861

1712. KDZ094 estimated that in two days, he collected between 300 to 350 bodies, all of which
were Bosnian Muslims, as well as a few Bosnian Croats, who had been unarmed and wearing
civilian clothes.5862 (#Ad absurdum#! How KDZ094 could have known that they had been
unarmed? If they got killed out of his site, he couldn’t know anything but that the bodies had
been in a civil cloathing. As known, the Muslim terrorists in the Prijedor and Sanski Most
area wore only civil cloathing. And no a warring faction would leave an armament with a
body of killed enemy, but would take it not only as a trophy, but as a usable mean!) While
many were from the Brdo area, there were also others who had been displaced from other areas

5855
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5944–5948 (under seal) [REDACTED]. See P1166 (Photograph of Diskont store marked by
KDZ094); P1169 (Photograph of Diskont store marked by KDZ094). See para. 1700.
5856
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5948 (under seal) [REDACTED].
5857
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5948–5951 (under seal); see para. 1698. See also KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stakić), T. 6864, 6868–6869, 6872.
5858
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5951–5952 (under seal).
5859
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5934–5935, 5953–5956 (under seal); KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
11854 (under seal) (further testifying that he noticed a ―trip order‖ in the truck which indicated the start point of the trip as the Zarko Zgonjanin barracks and
the destination to be the area of Brdo and Tomašica).
5860
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5959 (under seal).
5861
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5959–5961 (under seal).
5862
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11850–11852, 11864 (under seal); KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T.
5968–5972 (under seal) (providing a list with the names of 34 people who he recognised as among those whose bodies he collected); P587 (List of persons
from Bišćani killed around 20 July 1992, identified by KDZ094). See also Adjudicated Fact 1071.
 146

and had taken shelter there.5863 The women, children, and elderly people who had remained in
Bišćani and other villages went to Tukovi and were then transported to Travnik.5864
1713. The Chamber considers that while it does not have specific evidence about the
circumstances of each of the deaths of the 300 to 350 individuals whose bodies KDZ094 collected
on 23 and 24 July 1992 in Bišćani and the surrounding villages,5865 the evidence before it
establishes a pattern of killings on or around 20 July throughout this area. Furthermore, the
Chamber finds that there was no armed activity in the area of Bišćani during this period.5866
(#Contrary to documents#! However, there is a plethora of evidence that there was a two months of
everyday fights, as it was said in the Prosecution exhibit P03482, on 17 July:

(#Muslim terrorists, Serb victims#! So, sustaining a lost of 43 soldiers deep into the Serbian territory
is a horrible and wouldn’t be acceptable to any army all over the world!) Accordingly, the Chamber
finds beyond reasonable doubt that most of these 300 to 350 individuals were non-Serb civilians
who were deliberately killed by Serb Forces after the attack on the village of Bisćani and the
surrounding hamlets. (#Contrary to documents#! However, the Prosecution exhibit P03487 sais
otherwise, #document said otherwise#! :

(#abuse of the sacral objects#! This was a report in Kozarski Vjesnik for 24 July, pertaining
to several previous days. Wrong inference on a wrong assumption.

5863
KDZ094, P706 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5966 (under seal).
5864
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2345.
5865
See paras. 1700, 1703, 1706–1709.
5866
See KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21076, 21081–21082 (under seal).
 147

1714. The Chamber also received forensic evidence to support the deaths of some identified
individuals who were killed in the village of Bišćani and in the surrounding hamlets on or about
20 July 1992.5867 (Combat or civil casualties#!)

1715. Based on the above, the Chamber therefore finds that at least 300 non-Serbs, including
civilians, were killed by Serb Forces in the village of Bišćani and in the surrounding hamlets of
Hegići, Mrkalji, Ravine, Duratovići, Kadići, Lagići, and Ĉemernica on or about 20 July 1992. (1).
This is completely wrong inference, based only on the testimonies of the Muslim extremists,
or their relatives.

(2).The mere formulation “including civilians” compromises this kind of deliberation:

including unknown number of civilians clearly shows that there were the Muslim
combatants as a target of the action, not civilians!

(3).The VRS wouldn’t skip to brag and mention such a high number of casualties on the
enemy’s side, the police too. No such a reports.

(4) However, from the reports available, we see that the rest of the Muslim terrorists from
Kozarac, Hambarine and other places in and around Prijedor, after the defeat in May and
June 92, withdrew to the Brdo area, and to neighboring villages and hamlets, livig ni a dug-
outs and acting as terrorist to the end of the war on the entire area between Prijedor and
Sanski Most. SeeD4415, of 2 June 92:

D3916 of 3 June 92:

D4681, of 3 June 92:

5867
P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 19, 22, 34, 36–37 (confirming the bodies of 34 men, and one body of an unknown gender,
were exhumed from graves in Šurakovac, Ĉarakovo-BrĊani, Bišćani, Rizvanovići, Redak-Ljubija, Sredice-Garaţa, and Jakarina Kosa in 1998, 2000, 2001,
and 2005); P4892 (BiH State Commission for Tracing Missing Persons list of exhumed persons from Prijedor, Ĉelinac, Bosanski Novi, 29 October 2002), p.
2. See also P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), Annex A, p. 9; P6689 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor
municipality, 28 August 2002), e-court pp. 20–24, 61, 72, 104, 108–111, 130–131, 139, 150, 152, 154, 157–158, 163, 166, 175–177, 189, 243–246, 249,
253; P6690 (Addendum to Nicolas Sébire‘s report, 16 May 2003), e-court p. 31 (identifying bodies exhumed from Jakarina Kosa in 2009).
 148

Nota bene: “about ten minors!!! Nota bene: family Sivac! Some of these “distinguished
citizens of the Muslim ethnicity had even been the OTP witnesses, presenting themselves as a
victims, civilians and innocente! See D1826 of 4 June 92:
 149

In this document, obtained by the Prosecutor, there are the names of the main organizers of
the armed rebellion in the Prijedor area and the main civilian settlements abused for the
combat activities. Both the Prosecution and the Chamber shouldn’t admit any allegations
and testimonies that were in contras to these evidences. See further: D4203, of June 5, 92:

Remember, the Chamber treated this as a Serb attack on Stari grad. See further, D4419 of 7
June 92, a Criminal report to the prosecutor in Prijedor against the main organizers of the
armed rebellion in Prijedor:
 150

Also a very helpful document, disclosing the most important names, localities and misdeeds
of the Muslim secret organisation in Prijedor! See further: D1809, of 10 June 92.:

D1741, of 22 June 92, another Criminal charge against organisers of the armed rebellion in
Prijerod:

Again, all the relevant names of organizers and settlements abused for a military purposes!
See further: D4223, of 22 June 92, a list of the Serb soldiers killed in Prijedor and it’s
 151

localities and villages between 30 April and 20 June 92: May and 92:
 152

SO, IN THOSE #VILLAGES, ALLEGEDLY A CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS,

ALLEGEDLY ATTACKED BY THE “SERB FORCES” 48 SERB SOLDIERS HAD BEEN
KILLED#. FAR FROM THE FRONTLINE, DEEP IN THE SERB TERRITORY, THE
“ANURMED” MUSLIM CIVILIANS KILLED SO MANY SOLDIERS! NOTHING OF
THAT HAD BEEN NOTICED BY THE CHAMBER!?!?!? See further, D1979, of 23 June
92:

That is the answer on all the matters of ruined sacral objects: these objects could have been
hit only if #abused for a military purposes#! See further, all to the midd of July 92, so intense
terrorist activities deep into the Serb territory, D1942, of 14 July 92

During all this period, many Muslim and Croat settlements and villages didn’t have any
problem with the “Serb Forces” i.e. VRS and Police, see what E. Wulliamy wrote on 7
August 92, D100:

No a reasonable chamber would neglect these contemporaneous genuine documents, nor

would make any decision about Prijedor as it is in this Judgment!
 153

(5). Further, why the witnesses hadn’t been killed? How come the Serb soldiers employed the
Muslim civilians in the sanitation job? Hadn’t it be a legal job and a combat casualties, it
wouldn’t be entrusted to the Muslim civilians to collect bodies.

(6). The Chamber accepted every single allegation and testimony of the Muslims, regardless
of their interest in denigrating the Serbs, and the basis for those inferences were a general
assertions without any objective corroboration.

(7). The Chamber accepted a general allegations about ruining the buildings and properties,
but there was an order to clear up all the buildings damaged during the combats, that
couldn’t be repaired: see P03484:

(
This is followed by the list of 166 objects to be cleared, because the damages that occurred
during the fights couldn’t be repaired. This also did cost the municipal authorities a lot, and
nobody can say that it was a deliberate damaging of anybody’s property! No reasonable
chamber would allow this kind of mess!)

(a) Briševo

1716. Briševo is a village in the local commune of Ljubija and is located to the south of Prijedor
town.5868 Prior to the conflict, Briševo was inhabited mainly by Bosnian Croats.5869 The villages
in the Ljubija commune were primarily comprised of Bosnian Croats, while within the town of
Ljubija itself, Gornji Ljubija was almost purely Croat, and the other part, Donja Ljubija, was
predominantly Bosnian Muslim.5870
1717. Briševo was first shelled on 27 May 1992 from the direction of the Serb villages of Rasavci
and Oštra Luka; the shelling lasted the entire day but there was no physical damage to the village
during this attack.5871 (#Obviously, the Serbs didn’t aim the village itself, but the surrounding
woods where the Muslim terrorists spread and hide after defeated in Hambarine and
Kozarac!) After the attack, Atlija, together with other men in the village, decided to send a
delegation of five men to Rasavci and Oštra Luka to ask why they were being attacked.5872 When
the delegation returned, they informed the villagers that the Serbs had issued an ultimatum
requesting them to surrender their arms, and that if they failed to do so, the Serbs would search
their houses.5873 The residents of Briševo only had five or six hunting rifles and a few pistols

5868
P569 (Map of Prijedor municipality); Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5547 (testifying that according to the 1991 census, Briševo
was comprised of 120 houses). See also Adjudicated Fact 1086.
5869
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5546–5547. See also Adjudicated Fact 1086.
5870
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5544–5547.
5871
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5559–5561; Ivo Atlija, T. 20310 (20 October 2011), 20347 (26 October 2011). See also
Adjudicated Fact 1087.
5872
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5561–5562.
5873
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5562; Ivo Atlija, T. 20347 (26 October 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 1087.
 154

among them which they handed over to the Serbs; however, the Serb representatives demanded
more weapons and said that houses would be searched and people would be killed.5874

1718. No one came to search houses in Briševo following the hand-over and the following weeks
were relatively peaceful, although the village was completely blocked by Serb-manned check-
points and no one could enter or leave for food or medicine.5875
1719. On 24 June 1992, a police van from Ljubija came to Briševo and three or four police
officers took at least six male villagers from Briševo to be interviewed at the police station in
Ljubija.5876 These men never returned to Briševo and Atlija later found out that they had been
questioned and beaten in Ljubija, taken to Keraterm camp, then to Omarska, and finally to
Manjaĉa.5877 (#Legal#! So, those six male villagers were not among those 59% released from
Omarska. It is obvious that they hadn’t been arrested and brought in arbitrarily, because to
Manjaca were directed only those who were to be exchanged!)

(i) Scheduled Incident A.10.9

1720. The Prosecution alleges that at least 68 people were killed in the village of Briševo
between 23 July and 26 July 1992.

1721. On 23 July 1992, a Serb from Oštra Luka told Atlija and his cousin to leave Briševo
because it would be ―cleansed‖ the following day.5878 However, they chose not to leave and Atlija
was awoken by explosions at around 3:30 a.m. on 24 July 1992; Atlija ran to hide in a neighbours‘
cellar.5879 Infantry fire increased during the early hours; some people were killed, and the shelling
continued until the evening of 25 July.5880 That evening, Bosnian Serb infantry entered the
village.5881 The soldiers wore JNA uniforms with red ribbons around their arms and some had red
ribbons tied around their helmets.5882 (Note the #“ribbons#”! not discriminatory, but very
useful, to differentiate the friends from the enemies. The same was with the civilians, and the
civil homes.) They identified themselves as ―Serb soldiers‖ and told some of the inhabitants that if
they went to their homes, nothing would happen to them.5883 As a result, Atlija and the others who
were hiding in the cellar dispersed.5884 (#Insignias#! That was the VRS, but after them, there
were irregulars with “Subara” cap.)

1722. After 10 minutes, Atlija heard shouts from the Dimaĉ house and ran towards it, seeing two
soldiers engaged in discussion with Pero Dimaĉ, a 65 year old man, and Atlija‘s mother.5885 The
soldiers wore JNA uniforms, as well as ―Subara‖ hats with cockades, and carried different hunting

5874
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5562–5565. See also Ivo Atlija, T. 20345–20346 (26 October 2011) (testifying further that all of
the villagers‘ weapons had been handed over to the Serb authorities in Rasavci before the second attack and that ―only when the Serb forces were absolutely
sure that there‘s not a single rifle, not a single pistol, not a single bullet in our village, that‘s when we were attacked‖); Adjudicated Fact 1087.
5875
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5565–5566, 5659 (testifying that permits were necessary for non-Serbs to move around Prijedor
and movement was very restricted).
5876
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5566–5568.
5877
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5568–5569 (testifying further that, as far as he knew, none of these men were actively involved
in politics or leaders in the village).
5878
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5570–5571.
5879
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5571–5573. See also Ivo Atlija, T. 20310 (20 October 2011).
5880
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5573.
5881
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5573–5574. See also Adjudicated Fact 1089.
5882
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5573–5575. See also Adjudicated Fact 1089.
5883
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5575; Ivo Atlija, T. 20351–20352 (26 October 2011).
5884
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5577.
5885
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5577.
 155

knives than those weapons carried by regular JNA soldiers.5886 (#Insignias#! “Subaras” and
cockardes weren’t the Serb soldier’s cap, not permitted, as well as a “different knives”, and
this must be a paramilitary.) Atlija approached his mother, who was crying and shouting, and
she told him that his father had been killed and that he should leave.5887 Atlija left his mother and
ran to the woods from where he saw several hundreds of soldiers arrive in the village.5888 The
soldiers then locked his mother in the pigsty, threw Dimaĉ to the ground, beat him with a bible
they had found inside his house, shouted ―let the Catholic Jesus help him now‖, and asked ―why
Tudjman wasn‘t helping him‖.5889 They then set fire to the house and made Dimaĉ take off his
clothes and pray ―according to the Catholic ritual‖; they continued to beat and taunt him.5890 The
soldiers eventually forced him to run between them and shot him in the head.5891 (#Against
President orders#! All of that had been strictly and repeatedly prohibited by the President
and all the military commanders: uniforms, insignias, equipment, and particularly conduct,
making the immediate commanders responsible for conduct of his soldiers, which was
entirely accepted by the commanders. The President also disowned all of paramilitaries and
independent groups, ordering their arrest, which happened many times!)

1723. From his hiding position in the woods, Atlija saw houses in the village burning and groups
of soldiers, both JNA soldiers in uniforms with the JNA insignia and ―Chetniks‖, passing by,
shooting, and taking away looted property; over 100 houses in Briševo were destroyed during the
attack.5892 (#Insignias#! “Cetniks” weren’t the VRS members, and they would fall within the
Order of the Banjaluka CSB on 30 July 1992, D1539, p.1:

5886
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5577–5578 (testifying further that he could not tell if they were JNA soldiers, but it was quite
usual for soldiers wearing this type of insignia to be ―Chetniks‖, referring to paramilitary units from World War II). See also Adjudicated Fact 1089.
5887
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5578. See para. 1726.
5888
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5578–5579.
5889
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5579–5580.
5890
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5579–5580. See also Adjudicated Fact 1090.
5891
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5579–5581; Ivo Atlija, T. 20358–20363 (26 October 2011); D1818 (Excerpt of transcript from
testimony of Ivo Atlija in Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11967. See also Adjudicated Fact 1090; P3674 (Sketch drawn by Ivo Atlija) (showing Atlija‘s position
in the woods in relation to Pero Dimaĉ‘s house).
5892
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5582–5583; Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43531–43533 (14 November 2013), T. 43575 (15
November 2013). See also Adjudicated Facts 1275, 1276.
 156

Further in this document follow a set of orders to quit this criminal development. As can be
seen, this document reflected the attitude of the Serbs, both of ordinary people and
authorities, towards this feature. The President could not be kept liable for a conduct of
those outlaws!#No officials responsible#!)

1724. The units involved in the attack on Briševo were units of the 1st Krajina Corps, including the
6th Krajina Brigade5893 and 5th Kozara Brigade, as well as paramilitary units.5894 (#Legal
antiterrorist action#! Certainly, those paramilitary units weren’t responsible to anyone, and
the state wasn’t responsible for them all until the state became able to disband all of them,
arresting many of them. Within the Atlija’s testimony there was a visible difference between
the two kind of soldiers: the first one, the VRS soldiers, told them that if they stay at their
homes, nothing wrong would happen to them. The other group, with “Subaras” acted
completely different, in a criminal manner. D1539 exactly described how these groups used
to come after the legal activities, presenting themselves as a “Serb soldiers”#Insignias#! !)
There were no announcements or warnings made on Radio Prijedor for villagers to surrender, or
do otherwise, before the 24 July attack on Briševo, unlike in Hambarine and other villages.5895
(Another proof that it was not initiated by the authorities!) Furthermore, there were no
military units in Briševo and none of the residents were armed when the village was attacked on
24 July 1992.5896

1725. The majority of the Serb soldiers left Briševo the evening after the attack, taking with them 36
men.5897 Atlija later found out that this group of men was taken to Krings Hall in Sanski Most and
that, after bribing someone, they were released from the camp alive after two months.5898 (More
than 41% of those in Sanski Most had been released, and this remark about the “bribe” is a
speculation, because he couldn’t know that, and they wouldn’t talk about it!)

5893
See para. 1926.
5894
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5584–5587, 5637–5638; D1817 (Order of 6th Partisan Brigade, 18 June 1992), pp. 2–3; P3914
(Ewan Brown's expert report entitled "Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina - 1992", 27 November 2002), paras. 1.100, 2.5; P3660 (Handwritten
―War Record‖ of the 6th Krajina Infantry Brigade, undated), p. 3; D1816 (Prijedor SJB dispatch to Banja Luka CSB, 18 May 1992); P2855 (VRS Main Staff
report on paramilitary formations, 28 July 1992), p. 4. See also P3675 (Sketch drawn by Ivo Atlija); P3688 (Excerpt from video clip of aerial flyover of
Prijedor); Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43532–43533 (14 November 2013). But see Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5643–5644
(stating that Kuprešanin told Atlija after the attack that ―a renegade group had committed‖ the killings in Briševo). The Chamber notes that in his final brief,
the Accused argues that the soldiers involved in the attack on Briševo were not wearing the regular JNA uniforms and that Kuprešanin described the soldiers
as a renegade group of the 6th Sana Brigade, referring to Atlija‘s testimony which repeated Kuprešanin‘s statement in this regard. See Defence Final Brief,
para. 1554, fn. 3528. However, the Chamber finds that members of at least the 6 th Krajina Brigade and the 5th Kozara Brigade took part in the attack on the
village of Briševo. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber has considered the evidence before it. It also considered that the Accused only refers to
evidence from Atlija recounting that Kuprešanin said the soldiers were a renegade group, whereas Kuprešanin in fact testified that the ―army‖ was the
perpetrator of the attack and of the killings in Briševo. See Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43532–43533 (14 November 2013). (THE EVIDENCE SUCH
AS D1539, QUOTED ABOVE, TOGETHER WITH THE ASSERTIONS FROM KUPRESANIN AND ATLIJA
TESTIMONIES CLEARLY CONFIRMED THAT THE LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND REGULAR SOLDIERS
DIDN’T PARTICIPATE IN CRIMES! #No officials responsible#!)
5895
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5587.
5896
Ivo Atlija, T. 20351 (26 October 2011); Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5562 (testifying further that the only weapons in
Briševo were a few hunting rifles for which people had legal permits); Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43575 (15 November 2013). But see D1817 (Order of 6th
Partisan Brigade, 18 June 1992), p. 1. The Chamber notes that the Accused acknowledges in his final brief that in May 1992, ―the Serbs received
misinformation that the village of Briševo was armed‖ and that on 24 July 1992, Serb Forces entered Briševo and 68 people were killed during the attack.
Defence Final Brief, para. 1554.
5897
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5589, 5597.
5898
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5597–5598. See also Defence Final Brief, para. 1554 (conceding that 36 people were taken to
Krings in Sanski Most after the attack on Briševo).
 157

1726. The evening after the attack Atlija found his father‘s body, with three gunshot wounds to his back,
about 15 to 20 metres away from his house.5899 Atlija buried his father and Dimaĉ that evening in
Mustanica.5900

1727. The following day, Atlija returned to the village and found 68 houses, out of 120 houses in the
village, burnt to the ground.5901 In addition, the Catholic church in Briševo was burnt.5902

1728. In the weeks after the attack, Atlija went around Briševo and neighbouring hamlets and found piles
of bodies, including in the Kurevo hills.5903 Atlija testified that, in total, 68 people were killed during
the course of the attack on Briševo, including 14 women, two males under 16 years old, and four
invalids, and that in the days after, their bodies were lying around.5904

1729. Specifically, Atlija first found the remains of Stipo Dimaĉ, an elderly man around 76 or 78 years
old, as well as the bodies of Franjo Marijan and Mara Marijan, in a house in Dimanci.5905 Atlija then
found at least six more bodies in a pile in Mlinari, who he helped bury.5906 Also in Mlinari and nearby
the other pile, Atlija found a grave with at least six more bodies, including an invalid, and another
grave with the body of Mara Mlinar, a 74 year old woman.5907

1730. In Buzuci, Atlija then found at least three more bodies, Milan Buzuk, Mate Buzuk, and Ivica
Buzuk, an invalid, in front of a house.5908 Atlija next found in Jezerce the bodies with bullet wounds of
Srećo Buzuk, Ivo Lovrić, Miroslav Buzuk, and Vlatko Buzuk, an invalid.5909 In Cengije, Atlija found
the body of Marko Buzuk, which was badly burned from the waist down, and another grave with
several bodies, including women.5910

5899
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5598, 5616.
5900
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5598. See P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 40; P3686 (Photograph
of graves) (showing a gravestone with the name of Atlija‘s father).
5901
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5589–5592. Atlija confirmed the damage to the houses in Briševo in a number of photographs
taken by someone else after the attack on the village. See P3677 (Photograph of destroyed house); P3678 (Photograph of destroyed house); P3680
(Photograph of destroyed house); P3682 (Photograph of destroyed house); P3688 (Excerpt from video clip of aerial flyover of Prijedor).
5902
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5589–5591, 5594–5595, 5635, 5638–5639. See P3676 (Photograph of church); P3689 (Video
footage of destroyed buildings and monuments in Prijedor), 4:04–7:10; P3688 (Excerpt from video clip of aerial flyover of Prijedor). See also Adjudicated
Fact 1290; P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić
case, formatted records), e-court pp. 255–258 (reporting also that the interior walls were defaced with Serbian graffiti reading ―Šešelj‖). See para. 1893.
5903
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5597–5599.
5904
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5589, 5597; Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43531–43532, 43575 (14 November 2013) (testifying that
between 63 and 88 people were killed in Briševo). See also Adjudicated Fact 1091. In his final brief, the Accused concedes that 68 people were killed after
Serb Forces entered Briševo on 24 July 1992. See Defence Final Brief, para. 1554.
5905
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5602–5603; P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 39 (confirming that the
bodies of Stipan Dimaĉ, born in 1911, Franjo Marijan, and Mara Marijan were exhumed from a grave in Mlinari in 1998). The Chamber notes that Atlija
refers to an individual named ―Stipo Dimaĉ‖, while Mašovic‘s report identifies a ―Stipan Dimaĉ‖. The Chamber considers this inconsistency to be minor
and concludes that this is in fact the same individual.
5906
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5603–5605 (testifying further that he heard from eyewitnesses that these individuals had been made
to dig their own graves).
5907
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5604–5605, 5611; P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 39 (confirming
that, in total, the bodies of 12 people were exhumed from graves in Mlinari in 1998, including the body of Mara Mlinar).
5908
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5605–5606; Ivo Atlija, T. 20312–20313 (20 October 2011); P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the
Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 39–40, 44 (confirming that the bodies of Milan Buzuk, Mato Buzuk, and Ivo Buzuk were exhumed from graves in Briševo in
1998). The Chamber notes that there are some discrepancies between the forensic evidence and the evidence of Atlija regarding the names of some of the
victims of Scheduled Incident A.10.9. More specifically, Atlija‘s testimony contains references to ―Mate Buzuk‖ and ―Ivica Buzuk‖, whereas Mašovic‘s
report identifies the bodies of ―Mato Buzuk‖ and ―Ivo Buzuk‖. The Chamber considers these inconsistencies to be minor. Accordingly, the Chamber
concludes that these are in fact the same individuals. The Chamber also notes that the report of Amor Mašović confirms that the bodies of two men named
Mato Buzuk, born in different years, were exhumed from graves in Prijedor, one from Briševo in 1998 and one from Stara Rijeka in 1997. Although it is
unclear to which ―Mato Buzuk‖ Atlija is referring as being found in Buzuci, the Chamber is satisfied that the body of one man named Mato Buzuk was
found in Buzuci by Atlija after the attack on Briševo on 24 July 1992.
5909
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5606; Ivo Atlija, T. 20313 (20 October 2011); P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor
Mašović), p. 39 (confirming that the bodies of Srećo Buzuk, Ivo Lovrić, Miroslav Buzuk, and Vlatko Buzuk were exhumed from graves in Mlinari in 1998).
5910
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5606–5607, 5609–5610 (stating that eyewitnesses told him that one woman in Cengije had been
raped and beaten until she died); P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 39 (confirming that the body of Marko Buzuk was exhumed
from a grave in Raljaš in 1998).
 158

1731. In Mustanica, Atlija found and buried the body of Ante Matanović, another invalid, who had a
bullet wound to the back.5911 Also in Mustanica, Atlija saw the body of Jozo Jakara lying near a
church, but Atlja did not go close enough to the body to see how he died; Atlija was later told by an
eyewitness that Jakara‘s throat had been slit with glass.5912 In Ivandići, Atlija next found several graves
and the bodies of ―practically the whole Ivandić family‖ with bullet wounds, including the bodies of
Bato Ivandić, Sreto and Danica Ivandić, an elderly couple, Mara Ivandić, and several more women. 5913
Atlija also testified that several members of the Komljen family were killed in Ivandići, including Luka
Komljen, Ivo Komljen, Kaja Komljen, and another son.5914 On Raljaš Hill, Atlija found two individual
graves, one with the body of Luka Mlinar, a 14 year old boy, and another with the body of Mirsad
Švraka, a 14 or 15 year old boy.5915

1732. Finally, Atlija also saw a pile of 10 to 12 bodies under a tree in Stara Rijeka, all of whom seemed to
be men around 20 years old.5916 The bodies appeared to have bullet holes in them.5917

1733. Atlija was able to bury some of the bodies he found in Briševo and the surrounding area after the
attack with the help of other villagers who survived.5918

1734. The Chamber also received forensic evidence to support the deaths of at least 57 identified
individuals who were killed in the village of Briševo and the surrounding areas between 24 and 26 July
1992.5919

1735. Based on the above, the Chamber therefore finds that at least 68 people were killed by Serb
Forces in the village of Briševo between 24 and 26 July 1992. (However, the Chamber had the
opportunity to see what was the #official attitude# towards those features, crimes and other
unlawful acts. The official position was even harsher than this one of the Prosecution and the
Chamber. But, both the Prosecution and the Chamber allocate all the crimes and other
anomies and unlawfulnesses to the state organs, without any evidence and on the basis of the
testimonies of the Serb enemies. However, the Chamber completely neglected the Police
contemporaneous document (D01539) that explains all the situation, particularly pertaining
to the crimes: D01539:……………………….

5911
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5607–5608; Ivo Atlija, T. 20313–20314 (20 October 2011); P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the
Report of Amor Mašović), p. 40 (confirming that the body of Ante Matanović was exhumed from a grave in Begine Glavice in 1998).
5912
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5608; P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 40 (confirming that the body
of Jozo Jakara was exhumed from a grave in Briševo in 1998).
5913
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5609; Ivo Atlija, T. 20315–20316 (20 October 2011); P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of
Amor Mašović), p. 40 (confirming that the bodies of Srećko Ivandić, Danica Ivandić, and Mara Ivandić were exhumed from graves in Prijedor and Zecovi in
1998). The Chamber notes that Atlija refers to an individual named ―Sreto Ivandić‖ who he found in Ivandići, while Mašovic‘s report identifies a ―Srećko
Ivandić‖. The Chamber considers this inconsistency to be minor and concludes that this is in fact the same individual.
5914
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5610; Ivo Atlija, T. 20316–20317 (20 October 2011), T. 20363 (26 October 2011); P4853
(Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 40 (confirming that the bodies of Luka Komljen, Ivo Komljen, Kata Komljen, and Ante Komljen were
exhumed from graves in Zecovi and Rasavci in 1998). The Chamber notes that Atlija did not refer to the second Komljen son by name, while Mašovic‘s
report identifies ―Ante Komljen‖, who was born in 1956. The Chamber is satisfied that Ante Komljen is the second Komljen son listed by Atlija. The
Chamber also notes that Atlija refers to ―Kaja Komljen‖ as being killed in Ivandići, while Mašovic‘s report identifies a ―Kata Komljen‖. The Chamber
considers this inconsistency to be minor and concludes that this is in fact the same individual.
5915
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5610–5611; P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 39–40 (confirming
that the bodies of Luka Mlinar and Mirsad Švraka were exhumed from graves in Raljaš and Briševo in 1998). See Ivo Atlija, T. 20311 (20 October 2011);
P3685 (Photograph of graves) (showing graves of Briševo victims buried at the Raljaš Catholic Church).
5916
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5601 (testifying that shortly after the attack on Briševo, Atlija heard from other villagers that a
group of about 12 Bosnian Muslims passed through Briševo, and later Stara Rijeka, in the direction of Stari Majdan); P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report
of Amor Mašović), p. 44 (confirming that the bodies of nine men between the ages of 16 and 46 years old were exhumed from a grave in Stara Rijeka in
1997).
5917
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5601–5602.
5918
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5598–5599.
5919
P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 39–40, 44 (confirming that 57 bodies of Bosnian Croat men and women from Briševo were
exhumed from individual and mass graves in the areas of Briševo, Mlinari, Gravorac, Raljaš, Begine Glavice, Gornji Rasavci, Buzuci, Zecovi, Stara Rijeka,
and Stari Majdan in 1997 and 1998); P3673 (Exhumation Report of Stari Majdan-Stara Rijeka mass graves, 16 June 1997), pp. 1–18 (confirming that the 16
bodies of individuals from Stara Rijeka and Moštanica were exhumed from several mass graves in Stari Majdan and Stara Rijeka and identified in 1997).
 159

That pertained to the Muslim terrorist activities, but the following is the review of the
“Serb” misdeeds against which the police and other state organs fought #Officials vs.
crime#:

and further, also on the misdeeds of the Serb “forces” #Officials vs. crime#:
………………..

Now
, we see what was the #official position of the chief of the Center in BL#:
 160

(#Renegades#! And this was followed by other orders to the police stations, with the most
rigorous warnings and obligations. After these moves of the Banja Luka CSB there was a
chain of measures: disbanding the Special police unit, conflicts with a disobedient reserve,
and even professional policemen, attacks of the disobedient groups on the police stations, a
forceful releasing captured trespassers and other measures. So, the #Chamber avoided to see
who was behind certain misdeeds, and who were those who intruded the areas after the
fights# “when army units leave an area, groups and individuals come in…” and do whatever
they wanted, being very cruel against everyone who opposed them. Having this document in
the file of the case, and having the evidence that after his Order there were a very harsh
measures against renegades, the Chamber should have differentiated what was done by the
“Serb Forces” and what was done by those that couldn’t be a Serb Forces in any case,
because the state organs fought against them. And this is the essence of the Prosecution’s
victory in promoting everyone in the “Serb Forces”.
The President #disowned all of such forces at the beginning of the war#, on 13 June 92. How
come this doesn’t fly? Disowning them, and ordering their persecution, the President
disowned everything they may be doing. Thus these “forces” had been put out of law,
persecuted and arrested!)

(iii) Visit of ARK authorities to Stara Rijeka

1736. At the beginning of August 1992, representatives of the authorities of the ARK, including
Kuprešanin and Nedeljko Rašula, President of the Sanski Most Municipal Assembly, visited Stara
Rijeka accompanied by a bishop, Bishop Komarica, (this was a Catholic Church Bishop, who was
respected by the Serb authorities!) to attend an open meeting with several hundred villagers from the
village of Stara Rijeka and surrounding villages, including Atlija.5920 Kuprešanin said that he had
come, at the request of Bishop Komarica, to find out about the situation in the Sanski Most and Prijedor
areas.5921 Kuprešanin stated that he had heard about some incidents in the area, but before that, he did
not know that Croats lived in the area; furthermore, he said that everything was going to be fine as soon
as they established a ―Serb state‖ in BiH.5922 When Atlija challenged him during the meeting,
informing him about what happened in Briševo, Kuprešanin replied that ―such things occurred in
wars‖, and that unfortunately the attack on Briševo and all of the killings had been carried out by a
renegade group from the 6th Brigade and were not directed against the Croats in the area, but rather
against the Muslims in the area.5923 Bishop Komarica promised the villagers that they would receive
humanitarian aid and encouraged them to stay in their villages.5924

1737. One month later, Atlija had another meeting at the Ljubija church with Bishop Komarica and
Kuprešanin.5925 Kuprešanin asked him if the situation in Briševo had improved and asked him to
present the issues to Milomir Stakić.5926 Thus, a couple of days later, Atlija and two others went to
5920
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5641–5642, 5646–5647; Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43531–43533 (14 November 2013), T. 43575
(15 November 2013).
5921
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5643. The Chamber notes that Atlija was interpreted as saying ―Sanska‖ during his testimony,
but this most likely refers to ―Sanski Most‖.
5922
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5643.
5923
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5643–5644. But see Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43532–43533 (14 November 2013) (testifying that
the perpetrator of the mass killings in Briševo was the ―army‖). See also para. 1724.
5924
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5644–5646, 5648–5649, 5662.
5925
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5647.
5926
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5647–5648.
 161

Prijedor town and met with Stakić, and asked him for his help to leave the area.5927 Stakić
suggested that people from Briševo should move to abandoned houses in Bišćani but that he could
not help them to leave the area because ―they were being President of ethnic cleansing already at
that point‖.5928 Atlija informed him they were not inclined to accept his offer and would continue
to try to leave the area.5929 (#Official proper attitude# So, the Serb official Stakic opposed their
attitude to leave the area. From one side – irregulars, from the other side the war-caused
insecurity, from the third side – a good conditions in the European receptive countries. No
ethnic cleansing as an act of the authorities, but the interethnic war produced what this
President predicted in the BH Assembly in October 91!)

(1) Detention facilities in Prijedor

1738. From about 24 May 1992 until at least the end of September 1992, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats were detained at the Prijedor SJB Building, Omarska camp (―Omarska‖), (Omarska was
founded on May 31, 92, after the Muslim attack on Prijedor, so the allegation that somebody was
detained after the take-over, April 30, was not true, see P02640!) Keraterm camp (―Keraterm‖),
Trnopolje camp (―Trnopolje‖), the Miška Glava community centre or ―Dom‖ (―Miška Glava Dom‖),
the Ljubija football stadium (―Ljubija Football Stadium‖), and the Prijedor JNA barracks (―Prijedor
Barracks‖).5930 The detention facilities in Prijedor were established by the Prijedor Crisis Staff, which
was presided over by Stakić.5931 There was co-ordinated co-operation between the Crisis Staff and
members of the Serb Forces in operating the detention facilities.5932 The Crisis Staff participated in
overseeing security at the facilities, took decisions on the continuing detention of non-Serbs in Prijedor,
provided transport, as well as the necessary fuel, for the transfer of detainees between the various
detention facilities, and co-ordinated the provision of food for detainees.5933 The Crisis Staff also
prohibited the release of detainees from the detention facilities and prevented them from returning to
their homes in Prijedor.5934

(a) Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.1

5927
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5649–5651, 5653, 5664–5666.
5928
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5651–5652.
5929
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5653.
5930
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.1, C.20.2, C.20.3, C.20.4, C.20.5, C.20.6, C.20.7. See also Adjudicated Facts 553, 1102.
5931
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.1, C.20.2, C.20.3, C.20.4, C.20.5, C.20.6, C.20.7. See also Adjudicated Fact 1105. Defence witnesses Milomir
Stakić and Slavko Budimir testified that the Crisis Staff did not participate in the establishment of Omarska, Keraterm, or Trnopolje and had no authority
over the facility. D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), paras. 22–23, 48–49; Milomir Stakić, T. 45238–45240, 45242–
45246, 45254 (17 December 2013); Slavko Budimir, D4463 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 12947–12958, 12964. However, the Chamber does
not find this evidence to be convincing based on the credible evidence before the Chamber to the contrary which confirms that the Prijedor Crisis Staff was
involved in the establishment of these detention facilities and in their operations. (#Legal and obligatory#! If the police and investigating
judges requested the authorities to facilitate an object for a detention, the authorities had to do that. Otherwise, what
to do with such a high number of unexpectedly capruted people? To kill them?
5932
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.1, C.20.2, C.20.3, C.20.4, C.20.5, C.20.6, C.20.7. See also Adjudicated Facts 553, 1106. Stakić also testified that
the Crisis Staff did not co-operate with members of the police and army in operating the camps; rather the police was in charge of Omarska and Keraterm,
and the army was in charge of Tronopolje. Furthermore, Stakić stated that the police and army ―turned to the [C]risis [S]taff for aid in food and medicines,
just like the Red Cross‖. D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 49. See also Slavko Budimir, D4463 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 12947–12958, 12964. However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be convincing based on the credible evidence
before the Chamber to the contrary which confirms that the Prijedor Crisis Staff was involved in the operations of the detention facilities in the municipality.
It could have be involved only as a logistics, since everything else was in the hands of the investigating institutions,
which were the only to decide who was for Manjaca, who was for a prosecutor, and who was to be released. How
easlily the Chamber rejected so obvious facts!!!
5933
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.1, C.20.2, C.20.3, C.20.4, C.20.5, C.20.6, C.20.7; see Adjudicated Fact 1107.
5934
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.1, C.20.2, C.20.3, C.20.4, C.20.5, C.20.6, C.20.7; see Adjudicated Fact 1108.
 162

1739. The Indictment refers to the use of the Prijedor SJB Building as a detention facility in Prijedor
municipality between 24 May and September 1992.5935

(iii) Arrival of detainees and control over the detention facility

1740. Located in the town of Prijedor, the Prijedor SJB Building was used as a detention facility
beginning on or around 26 May 1992 until approximately 24 June 1992.5936 (#Wrong#! This is not
correct: the Prijedor SJB Building had always a detention unit, but during the peace times there
was no need for a bigger detention space. Had it been large enough, there wouldn’t be any
Omarska and Keraterm!) During this period, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, including many
prominent men of the Prijedor community, as well as two women and a 13 or 14 year old boy, were
detained there.5937 (#All legal and obligatory#! Pertaining to a minor of “13 or 14 years”, see D100,
the Wulliamy’s report, mentioning 13 year old boy, who confirmed to be mobilized as a
combatant! The “prominent men of the Prijedor community” were leaders of the armed
rebellion. Many prominent men hadn’t been even questioned, but some were proven guilty for
participating in the bloodshed, and their names are on the lists in official reports submitted and
depicted above! For instance, Dr. Beglerovic was also a prominent man in Prijedor, and was also
taken in, but immediately after established that he wasn’t responsible for any crime, he was
pardonned and released, see
D01745…

1741. The Prijedor SJB Building had two wings; two floors were on one side and three floors on the
other, and a courtyard was at the back of the building.5938 The detention cell where detainees were held
was located in an auxiliary building across the courtyard from the main building.5939

5935
In its Final Brief, the Prosecution notes that the evidence led in relation to the Prijedor SJB Building shows that it operated as a detention facility from
approximately 26 May 1992 until around the end of June 1992. See Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, p. 38, fn. 548.
5936
P2095 (Map and photographs of Prijedor); Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6619–6620, 6721; Nusret Sivac, T. 19610
(28 September 2011); KDZ026, T. 10313–10314 (17 January 2011) (closed session); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1799–1800,
1847–1848 (under seal); P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 23–25; Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20491–20492 (27 October 2011);
KW609, D4246 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 16726–16727.
5937
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6619–6620, 6623, 6723; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1849
(under seal); P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 4–5, 24; Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20454–20455, 20491–20492 (27 October
2011); KW609, D4246 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 16727; P5528 (Report of Prijedor SJB, June 1992), p. 6. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1109. However, Defence witnesses Dušan Janković and Zdravko Torbica testified that women and minors were never taken into custody
at the Prijedor SJB Building. D4228 (Witness statement of Zdravko Torbica dated 18 January 2014), para. 11; Dušan Janković, T. 47283–47284 (18
February 2014). The Chamber, however, does not rely on their evidence on this issue. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber considers that Janković and
Torbica contradicted themselves on several occasions. The Chamber further considers the body of credible evidence before it which demonstrates that
women and a minor were detained at the Prijedor SJB Building.
5938
Nusret Sivac, T. 19609 (28 September 2011); P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 14. See also P2090 (Photograph of Prijedor SJB
Building).
5939
KW609, D4246 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 16727; P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 14; KDZ026,
P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1848–1849 (under seal). Before its use as a detention facility, the detention cell was used by the SJB to
hold prisoners before they attended misdemeanour court, as there was no prison in Prijedor. Nusret Sivac, T. 19610 (28 September 2011); Slavko Budimir,
D4463 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 12947.
 163

1742. Before being brought to the Prijedor SJB Building, detainees were arrested by members of the
Prijedor SJB, including Ranko ―Bato‖ Kovaĉević.5940 Once there, they were held in the detention cell
and guarded by members of the intervention squad.5941

(iii) Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

1743. The cell in which detainees were held was small, and there were no windows; the only source of
light was a tiny hole in the wall.5942 In that cell, there was a bed frame and a couple of blankets.5943
There were no toilet facilities; there was only a bag which was used in place of a toilet.5944

1744. Detainees were generally held at the Prijedor SJB Building for a short period and were mistreated
during their detention.5945 Nusret Sivac was arrested on 20 June 1992 and taken to the Prijedor SJB
Building.5946 He and a group of other detainees, including two women, a 13 or 14 year old boy and a
prominent Muslim doctor, Osman Mahmuljin, were forced to gather in the courtyard.5947 (#Contra the
President orders#! This was highly irregular and prohibited by the orders of the President and
all the superiors, including the Minister for Interior, and the army commanders. But, the
suggestion that a 13 or 14 years boy was civilian is not proven. Just see what Eduard Vulliamy
wrote, P3788:

If this boy didn’t escape to the Serb side, he would be captured with weapon and detained as
combatant, rightfully! As far as it is concerned with the “prominent doctor”, it was evident that
these “prominent” Muslims organised and financed the rebellion! Those who had been proven
innocent, as dr. Beglerovic, they had ben pardoned and released!) Members of the intervention
squad, including Rade Strika, ordered the detainees to remove their belts and the laces from their
shoes.5948 (#A regular# and usual procedure, because somebody could commit suicide.) The
detainees were then forced to run a gauntlet formed by members of the intervention squad who
proceeded to savagely beat the detainees with metal rods.5949 Following these beatings, the detainees

5940
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6619; KDZ026, T. 10313 (17 January 2011) (closed session); P3528 (Witness statement of
Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 23. According to KW609, these arrests were for the purpose of interrogating people suspected of illegally procuring fire-
arms, in order to prevent large-scale disturbances to law and order. KW609, D4246 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 16726–16727.
However, Nusret Sivac testified that while he was held at the Prijedor SJB Building, no interviews were conducted or statements taken from detainees;
moreover, according to him, people were just arrested in the street if they ran into a Serb patrol or were recognised as Muslim. Nusret Sivac, T. 19640
(30 September 2011).
5941
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1849–1850 (under seal).
5942
Nusret Sivac, T. 19610 (28 September 2011); Kerim Mešanović, T. 19837 (4 October 2011); KDZ026, T. 10385 (17 January 2011) (closed session).
5943
Kerim Mešanović, T. 19837 (4 October 2011); KDZ026, T. 10385 (17 January 2011) (closed session).
5944
Kerim Mešanović, T. 19837 (4 October 2011); KDZ026, T. 10385 (17 January 2011) (closed session).
5945
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6619–6621, 6626, 6721–6723; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T.
1847–1848, 1850–1851 (under seal); KDZ026, T. 10314–10315 (17 January 2011) (closed session); P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović,
undated), pp. 24–26; Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20492 (27 October 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 1110.
5946
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6619, 6721; Nusret Sivac, T. 19610 (28 September 2011). Sivac was first arrested on 10
June 1992 and taken to Omarska due to an administrative error because, in fact, his sister, Nusreta Sivac‘s, name was on the list instead of his. When the
mistake was discovered, he was transported back to the Prijedor SJB Building and he returned home. Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stakić), T. 6608–6609, 6614, 6721; Nusret Sivac, T. 19610 (28 September 2011). Nusreta Sivac turned herself in to the Prijedor SJB Building after being
told to report there, but she never entered the building and was transported to Omarska the same day. Nusreta Sivac, T. 20401–20402 (26 October 2011);
Nusreta Sivac, T. 20405 (26 October 2011) (private session).
5947
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6619–6620, 6623, 6626 (further explaining that Mahmuljin had been falsely accused of
trying to kill a patient on Radio Prijedor prior to his arrest).
5948
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6620.
5949
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6620. The members of the intervention squad included Darko MrĊa and Zoran Babić.
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6620. See also Adjudicated Facts 1110, 1113. However, Defence witness Dušan Janković
testified that there was no gauntlet at the Prijedor SJB Building. Dušan Janković, T. 47286–47287 (18 February 2014). The Chamber does not find this
evidence to be convincing. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber considers that Janković contradicted himself and evaded questions on several
 164

were locked in the detention cell until they heard members of the intervention squad shout: ―The doctor
didn‘t get enough‖.5950 Members of the intervention squad then rushed into the cell and again beat the
detainees.5951 One of the detainees was struck on the head with a metal rod.5952 Members of the
intervention squad threatened to kill Mahmuljin and they beat him the worst.5953 At one point, he
fainted and later it was confirmed that his left arm had been fractured in several places.5954 That
evening, the detainees were forced to board a police van and were taken to Omarska.5955 Sivac and two
other detainees had to drag Mahmuljin into the vehicle as he could not move after the beatings.5956

1745. Kerim Mešanović was arrested on the morning of 24 June 1992 and held in the detention cell with
seven other detainees.5957 Later that day, one of the detainees, Nihad Basić, was taken out by the
intervention squad, subjected to ethnic slurs, and beaten.5958 When he returned, he was covered in
blood.5959 In the evening, the detainees were removed from the cell and lined up against the wall
outside where they were searched again and forced to make a three-finger salute.5960 The detainees
were then ordered to run a gauntlet formed by the intervention squad towards the police van.5961
Members of the intervention squad yelled ethnic slurs and beat the detainees as they ran.5962
Mešanović fell and was kicked in the head, losing four teeth from the blows.5963 Once the detainees
were seated in the van, they were so afraid that they held hands.5964 This group of detainees was then
transferred to Omarska on 24 June 1992 around 10 p.m.5965

1746. All of the non-Serb male detainees held at the Prijedor SJB Building were transferred either to
Omarska or Keraterm camps.5966

(iii) Conclusion

1747. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that non-Serb civilians, including women and a minor, were
detained at the Prijedor SJB Building by Bosnian Serb Forces between around 26 May and
24 June 1992. Detainees were held in a small cell for up to two days in poor conditions before being

occasions and that there is significant evidence before the Chamber which confirms that detainees were forced to run a gauntlet while held at the Prijedor
SJB Building.
5950
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6620–6621.
5951
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6620–6621.
5952
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6621.
5953
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6621 (testifying that they threatened to kill Mahmuljin so that he would ―never get a chance
to kill Serb children again‖).
5954
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6621 (testifying that Mahmuljin‘s arm fracture was confirmed later by Dr. Sadiković when
Sivac and Mahmuljin met him at Omarska).
5955
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6621. See also Adjudicated Fact 1112.
5956
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6621.
5957
P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 14, 23–26; KDZ026, T. 10313–10315 (17 January 2011) (closed session); KDZ026, P2089
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1847–1849, 1851–1852 (under seal).
5958
KDZ026, T. 10314 (17 January 2011) (closed session); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1850–1851 (under seal). However,
Mešanović stated that no one was touched or called out of the cell until the evening. P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 24. See
also Defence Final Brief, confidential, para. 1556. [REDACTED].
5959
KDZ026, T. 10314 (17 January 2011) (closed session); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1850–1851 (under seal).
5960
P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 24–25; KDZ026, T. 10314–10315 (17 January 2011) (closed session); KDZ026, P2089
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1851 (under seal).
5961
KDZ026, T. 10314–10315 (17 January 2011) (closed session); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1851 (under seal); P3528
(Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 25.
5962
P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 25; KDZ026, T. 10315 (17 January 2011) (closed session); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1851 (under seal).
5963
P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 25; KDZ026, T. 10315 (17 January 2011) (closed session); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1851 (under seal).
5964
KDZ026, T. 10315 (17 January 2011) (closed session); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1851–1852 (under seal).
5965
P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 26; KDZ026, T. 10314–10315 (17 January 2011) (closed session); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1852 (under seal).
5966
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6608–6609 (testifying that on his first arrest, he was brought to the Prijedor SJB Building
courtyard and then was transported to the Keraterm administration building); Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20491–20492 (27 October 2011); KW609, D4246
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 16727–16728 [REDACTED]. See Adjudicated Facts 1111, 1112.
 165

transferred to Omarska or Keraterm camps. The Chamber also finds that detainees were subjected to
severe beatings by Bosnian Serb Forces. (#Combatants, not civilians#! At that time the police
detenten could have lasted for 72 hours, now for 48 hours. That meant that the investigation
wasn’t completed, and they had been moved to other investigative centres. Being civilians doesn’t
mean being innocent. Since they had been detained by the police, (not the army) there must have
been some suspicion about some crime, and that is why people are brought in in all countries.)

(a) Schedul
ed Detention Facility C.20.2 and Scheduled
Incident B.15.2

1748. The Indictment refers to the use of Omarska as a detention facility in Prijedor municipality between
15 May and 21 August 1992. The Prosecution alleges that a number of people were killed at Omarska
and at various places after they were taken from the camp between 27 May and 21 August 1992.

(iii) Arrival of detainees and control over detention facility

1749. The village of Omarska is located to the southeast of Prijedor town, on the train line to Banja
Luka.5967 Omarska was located at the Ljubija iron-ore mine, about two kilometres to the south of
Omarska village.5968 Omarska operated as a detention facility from 25 May 1992 until
21 August 1992,5969 holding as many as 3,000 detainees at one time, primarily Bosnian Muslim
and Bosnian Croat men.5970 Boys as young as 15 were detained at Omarska, as well as some
elderly and physically and/or mentally impaired individuals.5971 (#Legal and obligatory#! When
mopping up people in a combat area there is no possibility to differentiate those people, but
we know and have seen the evidence that such a people hadn’t been kept longer than till
establishing whether they participated in the attack or crimes. But, Omarska was an
investigation centre, as it was clearly written in D470:

:Here is said that Trnopolje was a reception centre for those who strived for a shelter and
protection, (confirmed by the Wulliamy’s report, P3788) while Keraterm and Omarska
served for a processing of the POWs. See P3788:

5967
P569 (Map of Prijedor municipality).
5968
See Adjudicated Fact 1116; KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3355; P536 (Photograph of model of Omarska); P543 (Aerial
photograph of Omarska).
5969
D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 4, 30; P6585 (SRNA press release, 22 August 1992); see Adjudicated
Facts 1116, 1124.
5970
D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 4, 30–31 (reporting that between 27 May and 16 August 1992, a total of
3,334 people were brought to Omarska); P5528 (Report of Prijedor SJB, June 1992), p. 5; Nusreta Sivac, T. 20406 (26 October 2011); KDZ026, P2089
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1897, 1902, 1904 (under seal); KDZ026, T. 10378 (17 January 2011) (closed session). See Adjudicated Facts
1117, 1118 (stating that the only Serb prisoners held at Omarska were said to have been there because they were ―on the side of the Muslims‖); KW609,
D4246 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 16751. But see Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44280 (29 November 2013) (testifying that the total
number of people held at Omarska was 3,400, but that there was never a time when it held 3,000 people at one time).
5971
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6630–6633; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1904, 1908 (under
seal). See also Adjudicated Facts 1119, 1122, 1182.
 166

In addition, approximately 40 women were held at Omarska; they were kept in the canteen during
the day to help with the preparation of the food.5972 (#Civilians and combatants#! However,
there was a number of women involved in the very core leadership of the armed rebellion, as
can be seen from D4421:
………………………………………………………………

Ve
lida Mahmuljin is a woman. Further
……………………………………………….

As
can be seen, those leaders made a pressure and threats to those who were in favour of peace.
Further, the same D4421:
…….……………………………………………………………………...

5972
Nusreta Sivac, T. 20406 (26 October 2011); see Adjudicated Facts 1117, 1119, 1167; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1899–1900
(under seal); KDZ026, T. 10319 (17 January 2011) (closed session). See also Miroslav Kvoĉka, T. 45601–45602 (20 January 2014); KW609, D4246
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 16920.
 167

:Prominent members Prominent members of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat local
communities, including women involved in local affairs, were detained at Omarska.5973 (As can
be seen, these prominent Muslims and Croats decisively participated in the rebellion which
brought deaths so far from any frontline! A civilians participated in rebellion too!)

1750. Detainees at Omarska were either transferred from other camps, such as Trnopolje or Keraterm, or
were arrested in different areas of Prijedor municipality.5974 Various buildings in the mine complex
were used to house detainees, including a hangar, the largest of four buildings at the camp, the
administration building, and two smaller structures, known as the ―white house‖ and the ―red house‖,
which was at the edge of the compound.5975 To the north of the hangar and separated by an open
concrete area, known as the ―pista‖, was the administration building, which contained a kitchen, an
eating area, as well as sleeping quarters for female detainees, and offices upstairs used, inter alia, for
interrogation.5976 There was also a small garage to the far north of the administration building and a
grassy area to the west of the hangar.5977

1751. Omarska was established by the Prijedor Crisis Staff through a written order issued by Drljaĉa on
31 May 1992. 5978 As Chief of the SJB in Prijedor, Drljaĉa ordered that security at the camp be
provided by the Omarska SJB under the command of Omarska SJB commander Mejakić.5979 Dušan

5973
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1903–1905 (under seal); P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 40–41.
See Adjudicated Facts 1119, 1120, 1121, 1188. Prominent Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats detained at Omarska included political leaders, such as
Professor Muhamed Ĉehajić, the mayor of Prijedor prior to the take-over, members of the police, doctors, lawyers and judges, professors, and businessmen.
(But, the very same Muhamed Cehajic, as a president of all the citizens of Prijedor clandestinely organized the
blockade of the JNA in and around Prijedor, see…@. and such introduced an additional tensions. It has to be kept in
mind that those who lost somebody must have been very angry with him.) KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić),
T. 1903–1905, 1909–1921 (under seal); Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6630, 6633–6634, 6680, 6684–6687; P3691 (Witness
statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 38–39, 57–58 (under seal); P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 31;
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3365–3370; Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3736–3737.
5974
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p. 9 (under seal); KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2648
(under seal); Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20492–20493 (27 October 2011); KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2316; P711 (Witness
statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994), e-court p. 12; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1848–1852 (under seal).
5975
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3410–3412; P543 (Aerial photograph of Omarska); P2091 (Video footage of Omarska and the
white house); KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6232; KDZ026, T. 10315–10317 (17 January 2011) (closed session); P2101
(Excerpt of documentary re Prijedor, with transcript) (under seal); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1926–1928 (under seal);
P6593 (Aerial photograph of Omarska marked by Miroslav Kvoĉka); Miroslav Kvoĉka, T. 45603–45605 (20 January 2014). See Adjudicated Facts 1159,
1160.
5976
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3410; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1876–1877 (under seal); P543
(Aerial photograph of Omarska); D4413 (Diagram of administration building in Omarska); KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6201,
6206–6208 (stating that female detainees were detained on the first floor of the ―restaurant building‖ in the former offices). (The former offices
couldn’t be so uncomfortable? Before and after housing the detainees, the same facilities housed the Serb refugees
and VRS soldiers without any reconstruction of the space!) See P611 (Plan of first floor of restaurant building in Omarska marked by
KDZ093) (on which KDZ093 marked with a ―U‖ the room in which she slept in the restaurant building); Adjudicated Facts 1161, 1162 1163, 1166.
5977
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3410; P543 (Aerial photograph of Omarska); see Adjudicated Facts 1163, 1166.
5978
P2640 (Prijedor SJB report, 31 May 1992); D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 3–4, 29, 32; P2637 (Report
of Prijedor SJB, 1 July 1992); D4138 (Witness statement of Ţeljko Mejakić dated 26 November 2013), pp. 3, 4; D4219 (Witness statement of Miroslav
Kvoĉka dated 17 January 2014), para. 38; see Adjudicated Facts 1105, 1115, 1124, 1126, 1131. [REDACTED].
5979
P2640 (Prijedor SJB report, 31 May 1992), pp. 1–2; D4138 (Witness statement of Ţeljko Mejakić dated 26 November 2013), pp. 1, 6; D4219 (Witness
statement of Miroslav Kvoĉka dated 17 January 2014), paras. 6, 9, 38; KW609, D4246 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 16730–
 168

Janković was Mejakić‘s superior and was directly subordinated to Drljaĉa and supervised the
implementation of Drljaĉa‘s 31 May 1992 order in Omarska.5980 Miroslav Kvoĉka, patrol sector leader
in the Omarska SJB, was delegated the authority to activate the reserve police force in order to serve as
guards in the camps.5981 Members of the VRS formed an external security ring around Omarska and
members of the TO staffed posts in a second ring and were tasked with preventing unauthorised
persons from entering the camp and ensuring that detainees did not escape.5982

1752. Drljaĉa further ordered mixed teams of investigators, comprised of representatives from civilian
public security, state security, and military security, to interrogate and categorise detainees at
Omarska.5983 Mejakić and the heads of the interrogation teams reported to Drljaĉa every day pursuant
to his order.5984

1753. Following interrogation, detainees were grouped into three categories.5985 The first category was to
be comprised of individuals who were suspected of ―the gravest crimes‖ and who had directly
organised or participated in ―armed rebellion‖.5986 However in practice, the first category also included
intellectuals and political leaders from the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat communities.5987
(#Distorted#! This is an invalid chategorisation, since they weren’t detained because of being
“intellectuals” but because of being a leading persons in the armed rebellion.) The second
category included individuals who had supported or assisted detainees in the first category in the armed
rebellion, while the third category encompassed detainees who were of ―no security interest‖, or the
―least guilty‖, including women and children, and who were to be eventually released.5988 (What
“children”? why it was so difficult to be accurate?)

(iii) Conditions of detention

16731; Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6616–6617; P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p.
10 (under seal); D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 4, 29–30, 32; see Adjudicated Facts 1115, 1125, 1128,
1129, 1132, 1133. See also Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44215, 44232–44233 (29 November 2013); P5520 (List of individuals providing security at Omarska, 21
June 1992).
5980
D4219 (Witness statement of Miroslav Kvoĉka dated 17 January 2014), paras. 6, 9; Miroslav Kvoĉka, T. 45580 (20 January 2014); Dušan Janković, T.
47280–47282 (18 February 2014); KW609, D4246 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 16745–16746. See also Adjudicated Fact 1130
(stating that Janković‘s duties in regard to implementing Drljaĉa‘s order were to be carried out ―in collaboration with the Banja Luka [CSB]‖), 1131, 1132.
But see Dušan Janković, T. 47275–47278 (18 February 2014) (testifying that the security of Omarska could not have been overseen by the police station in
Omarska because there was no such police station, only a reserve police station; moreover, the administration at Omarska could only receive orders from the
Crisis Staff or someone higher up than Drljaĉa; and finally that he never visited Omarska personally and did not have any connection to Drljaĉa‘s order).
However, the Chamber does not find Janković‘s evidence on this issue to be reliable, in light of the accepted testimony of Kvoĉka, who was stationed at
Omarska during the relevant period. In reaching this conclusion, the Chamber also considered that Janković‘s evidence in this regard was contradictory; he
was also evasive and lacked sincerity.
5981
D4219 (Witness statement of Miroslav Kvoĉka dated 17 January 2014), para. 9; see Adjudicated Facts 1133, 1134. See also D4219 (Witness statement of
Miroslav Kvoĉka dated 17 January 2014), paras. 21–26.
5982
Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44232 (29 November 2013); D4219 (Witness statement of Miroslav Kvoĉka dated 17 January 2014), para. 38; see Adjudicated Fact
1137.
5983
P2640 (Prijedor SJB report, 31 May 1992), p. 1; see Adjudicated Facts 1126, 1128, 1162; D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres,
undated), e-court pp. 3, 6, 29, 32. See also KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2049 (under seal); KDZ026, T. 10386 (17 January
2011) (closed session). Drljaĉa‘s order assigned responsibility to co-ordinate the work of the investigators to Ranko Mijić, Mirko Ješić, and Lieutenant
Colonel Majstorović. P2640 (Prijedor SJB report, 31 May 1992), p. 1; see Adjudicated Fact 1127.
5984
D4138 (Witness statement of Ţeljko Mejakić dated 26 November 2013), paras. 18–19; Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44231–44232 (29 November 2013); see P2640
(Prijedor SJB report, 31 May 1992), p. 3.
5985
D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 4, 30; P3549 (Report of the Commission for Inspecting Collection
Centres and Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992), p. 4; see Adjudicated Fact 1120; Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44229 (29 November 2013);
KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21106–21109 (under seal).
5986
D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 4, 30; P3549 (Report of the Commission for Inspecting Collection
Centres and Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992), p. 4; [REDACTED].
5987
P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 40–41, 54; Kerim Mešanović, T. 19852 (4 October 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 1120;
D4251 (List of persons detained at Omarska, 23 July 1992).
5988
D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 4, 30; P3549 (Report of the Commission for Inspecting Collection
Centres and Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992), p. 4; P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 40–41;
[REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 1120; KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21107, 21119 (under seal).
 169

1754. Conditions at Omarska were appalling. The food was grossly insufficient, the medical care
was inadequate, and the hygiene facilities were poor.5989 Some days, the detainees received no
food at all.5990 Groups of about 30 men at a time were taken to the canteen to receive their daily
meal, and had to eat in under two minutes to avoid being beaten.5991 Nevertheless, detainees were
often beaten in the canteen, to the point they could not walk and had to be carried.5992 Detainees
often chose to skip meals in order to avoid the beatings that accompanied them.5993 Sejmenović
recounted how the arms of a 13 year old boy were broken so badly that he had to be carried into
the canteen and fed by other detainees.5994 However, there was a number of youngsters who
participated in the armed rebellion from the very preparations, as can be seen from P3788,
or D04681:
…………………………………………………………………………

In between is a list od more than a hundred leaders of the Patriotic League, and finally
“about ten children aged 16-17” so we had seen both women and yougsters among the rebels.

Many detainees lost between 20 to 30 kilograms during their detention, others lost considerably
more.5995 (#Fake#: nobody spent so much time to have lost so many kilograms! The families
were allowed to bring in a food, and did it, see D4234 bellow!) Serb nationalist songs were
loudly and continuously played over speakers.5996 Detainees were denied drinking water for long
periods and when water was provided, it was not potable.5997 This caused the detainees intestinal
problems.5998 (It is not specified whether it was a willing and intentional deprivation of water,
or a “vice majeure”? “For long periods” is not sufficient, because we know that nobody
could live without water.)

5989
P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 27, 49–50, 70–71; Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20494–20495 (27 October 2011); KDZ074, P709
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2338–2339; KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3370. See also Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44223–
44224 (29 November 2013); Miroslav Kvoĉka, T. 45586, 45613–45614 (20 January 2014); D4138 (Witness statement of Ţeljko Mejakić dated
26 November 2013), para. 14; D3645 (Witness statement of Nenad Kecmanović dated 27 May 2013), para. 54. But see Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44285–44286
(29 November 2013) (testifying that some medical care was offered at Omarska by one of the detainees, as well as another doctor who visited Omarska
every day); D4388 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Gruban dated 31 January 2014), para. 23 (stating that medical staff came to Omarska in order to disinfect
detainees‘ rooms); Momĉilo Gruban, T. 47486 (20 February 2014) (testifying that there was a physician and nurse available at Omarska and medical
assistance was provided when people requested it).
5990
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2338–2339; Edward Vulliamy, P3777 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7940; see
Adjudicated Fact 1143.
5991
P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 27, 49–50, 70–71; KDZ026, T. 10317–10318, 10378–10380 (17 January 2011) (closed
session); P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 60–61 (under seal); Nusreta Sivac, T. 20429 (27 October 2011); P3779
(Excerpt from ITN video clip of canteen at Omarska); P3543 (Excerpt from video clip of visits to Omarska and Trnopolje, with transcript); see Adjudicated
Facts 1141, 1142; Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6680–6681.
5992
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20495 (27 October 2011).
5993
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1897 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 1144.
5994
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20495 (27 October 2011).
5995
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3370; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1881 (under seal); KDZ392,
P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2750 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 1145.
5996
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20495 (27 October 2011).
5997
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6642; P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p. 58 (under seal).
See also Adjudicated Facts 1146, 1147.
5998
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6642. See also Adjudicated Fact 1147.
 170

1755. The detainees had only occasional access to water for washing, and were given no soap or
toothpaste, or any change of clothing.5999 (Who could provide so many underwear and other
needs? The conflict abrupted suddenly, and nobody was prepared for such a great number
of detainees. Not to forget that the RS was under the sanctions!) Their access to toilet
facilities was also limited, depending on which room they were held in; detainees had to wait
hours before being allowed to use them, and sometimes risked being beaten if they asked.6000
Detainees were often forced to excrete and urinate in their rooms.6001 Skin diseases were prevalent
as well as acute cases of diarrhoea and dysentery.6002 Some detainees were able to receive
personal items from their families outside the camp, through individual guards, but these cases
were rare.6003 But we have seen the document which confirmed that the VRS ordered to
facilitate the detainees to get their needs from their homes and families. See D04234, as early
as of 7 June 92:

Having in mind that in Omarska there were the investigators, working from 9 to 5 pm. And
the detainees could have objected those conditions, therefore, these are #exaggerations# :

1756. The rooms at Omarska were extremely crowded; sometimes 200 to 300 detainees were
confined in rooms that were too small.6004 Around 29 May 1992, 120 detainees were transferred
to the camp from the Benkovac military barracks and crammed into a garage for several days; two
young men suffocated to death as a result.6005 (#Deadly combination#! When it was
adjudicated? How this Defence is to check it? What were the names of those that
suffocated?) Detainees were also crowded together in the lavatories where they were packed one
on top of the other and often had to lie in the midst of excrement.6006 The crowded and
overflowing rooms at Omarska were stifling in the summer heat and guards often refused to open
windows or demanded that detainees pay them with one of their possessions in exchange for
opening a window or obtaining a glass of water.6007 (#Dealdy combination#! Here is very easy
to allege anything, since this Defence can not do anything about that. As we have seen in
D4234, the VRS envisaged and ordered a regular procedure. The Defence witnesses testified
that the conditions were as it could be, and that in the same facilities there were

5999
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1886 (under seal); KDZ026, T. 10318 (17 January 2011) (closed session).
6000
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1877, 1886 (under seal); P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 27, 70;
Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44223, 44230 (29 November 2013); Miroslav Kvoĉka, T. 45586, (20 January 2014); see Adjudicated Fact 1148.
6001
Adjudicated Fact 1148.
6002
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6642. See Adjudicated Fact 1149.
6003
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1886 (under seal).
6004
P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 26; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1875–1877 (under seal); see
Adjudicated Fact 1139.
6005
See Adjudicated Fact 1172.
6006
See Adjudicated Fact 1139.
6007
See Adjudicated Fact 1140. However, Momĉilo Gruban testified that (i) the conditions at Omarska were humane under the circumstances; (ii) the detainees
had access to water, toilets, and showers; (iii) they received sufficient food, including the same food eaten by the guards; and (iv) detainees did not fear ill-
treatment. D4388 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Gruban dated 31 January 2014), paras. 8, 16–23. The Chamber does not find Gruban‘s evidence to be
credible in this regard. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber considers that he was not forthright with the Chamber on several occasions and that due to
his involvement at Omarska, he had an interest in distancing himself from any knowledge of conditions there. (#Deadly combination$! Without
any evidence, this is nothing but a garbage, and the Chamber shouldnt expose the Defence to an impossible task to
deal with so general assertions.
 171

accommodated the Serb refugees and the Serb army before and after the detainees. What
this President has to do else?)

(iv) Treatment of detainees

Beatings and killings

1757. Upon arriving at Omarska in buses, the guards on duty approached the detainees,
demanded all of their belongings, verbally abused them, and then beat them, sometimes to
death.6008 (Who died that way? If there is no an objective evidence, why the Chamber
accepted such a #general assertions#?) On one occasion, the guards who escorted one of the
arriving buses formed a gauntlet through which the detainees had to pass while being beaten and
forced to sing nationalist songs.6009 The detainees were then escorted to the ―pista‖, to rooms in
the hangar, or in the majority of cases, to the white house, and were often beaten on the way.6010
Kvoĉka, Drago Prcać, Mladen Radić, or ―Krkan‖, a shift commander at Omarska, and Milojica
Kos, or ―Krle‖, a shift leader, were often present during these beatings.6011 They did nothing to
prevent them.6012 (#Deadly combination#! Without any evidence, this is nothing by a garbage,
and the Chamber shouildnt expose the Defence to an impossible task to deal with so general
assertions.)

1758. Several non-Serb detainees arrived at Omarska after being held in the same cell at the
Prijedor SJB Building earlier that day. When they arrived, they were made to line up against a
wall, where they were beaten and insulted.6013 They were then taken to the white house and put in
a small room, which was already crowded with about 60 to 70 men.6014 All the men were
extremely frightened and were not allowed to speak.6015 (#Deadly combination#! Looking at the
sources, this is really not correct to have this kind of unproven assertions, based mainly on
92bis and Adjudicated Facts.)

1759. Other detainees were immediately brought to an office in the administration building and
interrogated upon arrival.6016 For example, upon Sejmenović‘s arrival at Omarska from Trnopolje,
an inspector from the Prijedor SJB, Dragan Radaković, interrogated him.6017 On the third day of
questioning, two inspectors from Banja Luka arrived and questioned him for about an hour.6018
When Nusreta Sivac arrived at Omarska, she was immediately taken to the reception office of the

6008
P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 51–52; P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 37–40 (under
seal); Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20492–20493 (27 October 2011); KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6201. See also Nusret Sivac,
P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6612–6614; Miroslav Kvoĉka, T. 45584–45585 (20 January 2014); Adjudicated Fact 1138.
6009
P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 51–52; D4219 (Witness statement of Miroslav Kvoĉka dated 17 January 2014), para. 64
(stating that it was members of the MP who accompanied the detainees on the buses and later formed the gauntlet); see Adjudicated Fact 1156 (stating that
Krkan in fact organised the gauntlet of guards who beat detainees on one occasion).
6010
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 37–38 (under seal); P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp.
51–52; KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2649–2651, 2653, 2655 (under seal).
6011
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 37–39, 43 (under seal); P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p.
51. See also Adjudicated Fact 1156.
6012
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 37–39, 43 (under seal); P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p.
51. See also Adjudicated Fact 1156.
6013
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1869 (under seal).
6014
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1869–1870, 1875 (under seal). See also KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić),
T. 2316; P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994), e-court p. 12.
6015
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1870 (under seal).
6016
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 9–10 (under seal). See also Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stakić), T. 6612, 6614.
6017
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20492–20494 (27 October 2011).
6018
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20493 (27 October 2011).
 172

administration building where Mejakić, Kvoĉka, Krle, and others were waiting.6019 She was then
interrogated by Nenad Babić and Nenad Tomĉić about her involvement in implementing the
referendum for a sovereign BiH.6020 (#Justified detention#! This is the first class evidence that
the reason for their detention was not their religion or ethnicity, but it was a suspicion about
their involvement in the skirmishes caused by the illegal referendum and implementation of
it in a such sensitive multi-ethnic municipality!)

1760. While in detention, beatings of detainees were frequent.6021 It was commonplace for
detainees to be called out during the night by the guards.6022 Indeed, it was the nights that were
most feared by the detainees for this reason.6023 In addition, detainees were beaten constantly by
the guards, at the slightest perceived provocation, and some were beaten to death.6024 (#No
names#! The Defence can not take it seriously without the names and times. This is really
unbelievable, to charge a distant person, who even didn’t know abour Omarska with such a
general statements and assertions!) what does it have to do with the President? If it was a
part of any of his plans, why it didn’t happen prior to the attacks of the Muslims?) KDZ392
was beaten on numerous occasions during his detention at Omarska.6025 At one point, KDZ392
and his father were beaten two days in a row by Dušan Kneţević, a.k.a ―Duca‖, and Zoran Ţigić.
Zigic was noticed as a trespasser and there was an official note, see: D1440:
.……………………………………………………………..

:Zigic was reported to the prosecutor by S. Drljaca, see the criminal report. And the
prosecutor accepted the criminal report, see P06597, and he was arrested, see D1926.
#Officials vs. crimes#!) Afterwards, his father was singled out and beaten more severely.6026
KDZ392‘s father was left deformed and in severe pain and as a result of the beatings, he died the
next morning.6027 His body was taken away in a dark blue police van.6028 (92bis, should be cross-
6019
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 9–10, 26 (under seal).
6020
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 32–33 (under seal).
6021
P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 27–28; KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2657–2663, 2744–2749
(under seal); Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6680–6682; KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6201–
6203; P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 28–30, 32 (under seal); Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44225–44226, 44240–44241
(29 November 2013). See also Adjudicated Facts 1150, 1151, 1154, 1155.
6022
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1873 (under seal); KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2744–2749 (under
seal).
6023
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1887–1888, 1906 (under seal); P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 27–
28.
6024
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1883–1884 (under seal). See also KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T.
2728–2729, 2744–2749 (under seal); Adjudicated Fact 1155 (stating that on religious holidays or if the relative of a guard was killed in the battlefield,
beatings intensified).
6025
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2657–2663, 2744–2749 (under seal).
6026
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2661–2663, 2730–2737, 2744–2751, 2761–2764, 2770–2771 (under seal) (testifying that both
Kneţević and Zigić wore camouflage ―military‖ uniforms).
6027
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2737–2740 (under seal).
6028
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2740–2741 (under seal).
 173

examined!!! #Not investigated#! The Defence doesn’t exclude such a possibility, but that
must be investigated, and established what was the #official’s attitude# towards that!
Certainly we can find many #“next level#” examples, where the chiefs of shifts prevented
those misdeeds!)

1761. One room in the white house was reserved for brutal assaults on prisoners, who were often
stripped, beaten, kicked, and otherwise abused; many detainees died as a result of these repeated
assaults on them in the white house.6029 (#”Many died”!!! in which court this sentence may
have any consequence? Did anyone challenge this allegation? And how to challenge this
“many”?

1754. Between 600 and 700 detainees at a time were held outside in the ―pista‖ area of Omarska for
prolonged periods.6030 The detainees had to sit, and sometimes lie, on the ground, with machine-
guns pointed at them.6031 While on the ―pista‖, KDZ026 witnessed the guards forcing a young
mentally handicapped detainee by the name of Crnalić to drink motor oil. He then heard gunfire
and the young man was not seen again.6032 (#Heard, not seen#! A famous sentence, suggested in
the same workshop. How possibly the Chamber could be “satisfied” since nobody have seen
it, just heard? How many other inferences could have been drawn? The “young man” could
have been exchanged, released on somebody’ guarantee or moved to another detention!)
The Chamber is satisfied that this detainee was killed in this incident. On 10 June 1992, Nusreta
Sivac saw Ţigić call out the names of three male detainees on the ―pista‖; when these three men
finally returned, they were swollen, covered in bruises, and their ―faces were completely
distorted‖.6033

1755. Detainees were also severely beaten during interrogations.6034 Detainees brought to the red
house for interrogation were often killed.6035 (#Some maybe killed some#! How many, who,
when, by whom? Without a credible evidence, no a serious chamber should even mention
this. This is rather a sort of an anti-war propaganda than a serious criminal case.) KDZ093
(Who was he/she?) testified that in July 1992, she saw men, including a Muslim or Croat doctor
and a Muslim teacher she recognised, being called out from an area in the restaurant building in
Omarska called the ―glass house‖.6036 They were taken to the red house and later that night,
KDZ093 heard gunfire and guards cursing, using the words ―Ustashas‖ and ―balijas‖. 6037
(#Heard, not seen#! Does it mean that somebody got killed? Is it enough? The two features,
somebody taken to the red house and “later that night” gunfire heard, may not be in any
connection. Was it so unexpected to hear a gunfire in a civil war?#Deadly combination#!)

1756. After their interrogation, detainees were often made to sign false statements regarding their
involvement in acts against Serbs.6038 (This is not true, since the authorities (CS Prijedor) as
early as 2 June ordered that all that had been detained by mistake be released immediately,
see: P2741:……………………………………………………….

6029
Adjudicated Facts 1175, 1176.
6030
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1876–1877 (under seal). See Adjudicated Facts 1164, 1165.
6031
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1876–1877, 1885 (under seal). See Adjudicated Facts 1164, 1165.
6032
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1908 (under seal).
6033
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 52–53 (under seal).
6034
P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 35–36; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1883, 1917–1918 (under
seal); KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2661–2662 (under seal); KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3356–
3357; Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44224–44225 (29 November 2013). See Adjudicated Facts 1150, 1151. See also P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated
22 October 2011), pp. 31–32, 38 (under seal); KDZ523, T. 23358–23359 (19 January 2012) (closed session); D4219 (Witness statement of Miroslav Kvoĉka
dated 17 January 2014), paras. 62–63.
6035
See Adjudicated Fact 1179.
6036
KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6230–6232.
6037
KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6232.
6038
See Adjudicated Fact 1152.
 174

T
han, it was numbered several categories that were to be released, and finally the next:

It
was regardless of ethnicity, as well as the next:

So,
since there was so many that had evidently been responsible, the Omarska authorities didn’t
need to force anyone, and since there was 59% of the released, that means that there was no
any successful “persuading” to admit any felony! Finally, the investigations had been
conveyed by the best professionals available !) Detainees were also ordered to beat other
detainees.6039 They were humiliated in front of other detainees, forced to sing Serbian nationalist
songs, make the three fingered Serbian sign, and were subjected to ethnic slurs by the camp
guards.6040 On one occasion, on a Serb holiday, guards at the camp got drunk, set fire to rubber
tires, and threw Smail Duratović, a well-known Bosnian Muslim athlete, into the fire, along with
at least nine other detainees.6041 Detainees, including female detainees, were regularly threatened
with death.6042 At one point during his detention in Omarska, KDZ026 was told by two guards
that his name was on a list of detainees to be ―liquidated‖, but that he would be saved if he gave
them money.6043

1757. The beatings were administered by camp guards at Omarska, including Milutin Popović, a.k.a.
―Pop‖, and Ţarko Marmat,6044 as well as by individuals from outside the camp who were permitted to
enter and mistreat detainees, including Ţigić and Kneţević.6045 Detainees feared these outside

6039
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2733, 2771 (under seal).
6040
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2737 (under seal) (testifying that after being beaten, his father was forced to lick his own blood);
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6640–6641, 6644; P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp.
11, 19–21, 30 (under seal); Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44224–44225 (29 November 2013). See also Adjudicated Facts 1135, 1169, 1171, 1182. But see Milorad
Sajić, T. 44162–44164 (27 November 2013) (testifying that Radić told him that detainees at Omarska raised three fingers and sang songs about Serbia
during a delegation visit at the camp, but that the detainees did these things spontaneously and he was not told that they were forced to do so); D4114
(Witness statement of Milorad Sajić dated 24 November 2013), para. 57.
6041
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6682–6683 (testifying that Duratović managed to escape the fire, but was badly burned);
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3357–3359 (testifying that one man who was thrown into the fire was never seen after this
incident).
6042
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p. 30 (under seal); KDZ026, T. 10320–10321 (17 January 2011) (closed session). See
also Adjudicated Fact 1170.
6043
KDZ026, T. 10320–10321 (17 January 2011) (closed session) (testifying that the guards demanded 10,000 German marks but when KDZ026 protested that
he did not have access to that amount of money, they suggested the sum of 3,000 marks and KDZ026 managed to send letters to his wife asking her to try to
get the money; however, she was unable to raise enough money). See also P2094 (KDZ026‘s letters from Omarska) (under seal).
6044
P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 34–35, 49–52; P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 28,
38–40 (under seal); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1883–1884 (under seal). See Adjudicated Fact 1154.
6045
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2728–2729, 2731–2737 (under seal); P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22
October 2011), pp. 40–41, 52–53 (under seal); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1885 (under seal); D4138 (Witness statement of
Ţeljko Mejakić dated 26 November 2013), para. 15; Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44233–44235 (29 November 2013); D4219 (Witness statement of Miroslav Kvoĉka
dated 17 January 2014), para. 57. See Adjudicated Facts 1153, 1157, 1158, 1173. But see D4388 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Gruban dated 31 January
2014, paras. 25, 31 (stating that although no such beatings occurred in his presence, there were some cases of individual armed groups from the outside
getting in to the camp and mistreating the detainees; however, these groups were armed and the guards at Omarska were not able to resist them because of
low numbers). We saw that Zigic was reported for an extortion of money, and for the intrusion in Keraterm with the aim
 175

individuals even more than the camp guards, as the beatings were worse when they appeared; the
detainees were beaten with a variety of sticks, iron bars, and lengths of heavy electric cable, sometimes
with nails embedded in them to pierce the detainees‘ skin.6046 They were also attacked with knives.6047
Members of the intervention squad also mistreated detainees at Omarska.6048

1758. Prominent Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat political leaders, including SDA officials and
members, as well as doctors, professionals, and police, were among the individuals most often
mistreated and killed at Omarska.6049 (#So arbitrary#, so unofficial, like a gossip, but certainly not
like a criminal case material! What kind of argument is this. This is a sort of political and
propaganda statement. In a criminal case either you do not mention it, or you prove it!) Detainees
frequently saw dead bodies on the lawn in front of or near the white house.6050 The detainees witnessed
bodies being taken away by truck and they could also hear the sounds of earth-moving equipment in the
vicinity of the camp.6051 Detainees were required to clean the white house and the red house and they
often found hair, teeth, skin, blood, clothes, footwear and empty pistol cartridges.6052 Camp guards also
forced detainees to load onto trucks dead bodies of detainees who had been killed in the white and red
houses.6053 As a result, the detainees constantly lived in fear of being killed at any time.6054

1766. Detainees were also taken from Omarska and killed outside the camp.6055 In
late July 1992, 46 detainees, including two female detainees, were taken out of Omarska, put on a
bus, and told that they would be exchanged in the direction of Bosanska Krupa.6056 They were

to beat somebody. But the authorities were strongly opposed to it, and how anyone from the authorities, let alone the
President, could be convicted for such a cases? #No official responsible!#)
6046
See Adjudicated Facts 1153, 1173.
6047
See Adjudicated Fact 1173.
6048
D4139 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 13 June 1992); D4138 (Witness statement of Ţeljko Mejakić dated 26 November 2013), para. 15; Ţeljko Mejakić, T.
44218–44220 (29 November 2013). See also Adjudicated Fact 2487.
6049
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1909–1915, 1917–1921 (under seal); Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić),
T. 6629–6630; P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 24–25 (under seal) (stating that Prcać and other guards called
people, usually high-ranking members of the SDA or HDZ, out from lists and they were never seen again); P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović,
undated), pp. 40–41, 54; Kerim Mešanović, T. 19852 (4 October 2011); KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3365–3368. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1120. On 27 July 1992, Professor Muhamed Cehajić, an SDA official and the former mayor and president of the Prijedor Municipal
Assembly, was humiliated, mistreated, and disappeared. Zlatan Besirević, the director of the Bosna Montaza company in Prijedor, was called out one day
and never returned; Dr. Sadiković was also called out one night and taken away by bus with detainees who had been held in Keraterm, none of whom were
seen again. Fikret Mujidzić and Camil Pezo were severely beaten and both subsequently died from their injuries. Similarly, Idriz Jakupović was severely
beaten and then taken out and disappeared one night. Mustafa Crnalić, Burhurudin Kapetanović, Abdulah Puskar, Ziko Crnalić and his son, Zijad
Mahmuljin, Osman Mahmuljin, Alessanda Komsić, Esref Crnkić, Nedzad Serić, Omere Kerenović, Esad Mehmedagić, Mustafa Tadzić, Mehmedalija
Kapetanović, Asaf Kapetanović, Rufat Suljanović, Ibrahim Okanović, Bajram Zgog, Senad Mujkanović, Kadir Mujkaonović, Fikret Mujakić, Islam
Bahonjić, Meho Tursić, Hamdija Balić, and Huseain Crnkić were called out at night and never returned. [REDACTED]. (#”Never returned”
doesn’t mean necessarily they got killed, and this sentence is repeated in all statements of the Muslim witnesses. But,
all of those last and some of the first names are on the lists of proven perpetrators of crimes. (…)Only on that basis
KDZ026 should be discredited, because this is a horrible lie. As well as the testimonies of others. All together, Prijedor
did have about 500 non-Serb casualties throughout the entire war, and the Serbs had even more. The names in the
above fn. 6061 are very famous names. For instance, Muhamed Cehajic was a president of the municipal Assembly,
but he was acting as an enemy of Yugoslavia and the Serbs from a very powerful position in the common authorities.
He organized the blocade of the JNA and encouraged and orchestrated the Muslim organization and armament.
Many people have loste their dearest and kept him responsible. The state had only one interest, to organize a trial for
him and others, but pitifully he was killed. Certainly, this was against the state interests. All other names are very
known as a Muslim extremists, who initiated fights and prepared a hell to the people in Prijedor.)
6050
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 41–42 (under seal); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1902
(under seal); KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6204–6205. See P610 (Photograph of model of Omarska marked by KDZ093) (on
which KDZ093 marked the areas where she saw the bodies outside of the white house); Adjudicated Fact 1178.
6051
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 42–43 (under seal); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1902
(under seal); KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6232–6233; KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3370–3371.
6052
See Adjudicated Facts 1176, 1180.
6053
See Adjudicated Facts 1178, 1181.
6054
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1905 (under seal).
6055
[REDACTED].
6056
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2741, 2743–2744 (under seal); P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October
2011), pp. 46–47 (under seal) (stating that two female detainees, Edna Dautović and Sadeta Medunjanin, were called out one day by Mejakić and informed
that they were going to be exchanged; they boarded a bus with other people which said ―Šešelj Private Driving School‖ and had Bihać plates, and were
 176

never seen again.6057 The Chamber finds that these 46 detainees were killed after being taken out
of Omarska in late July 1992. (#Some killed some#! In any other country, any chamber would
require at least the names of deceased, and the names of a suspected perpetrators, and other
relevant data. Could be used only as an argument against civil wars, not against this
President!)

1767. In addition, the Chamber received forensic evidence to support the deaths of some
identified individuals who were detained at Omarska between 25 May 1992 and
21 August 1992.6058 (#Unproven#! How possibly we may have known that they didn’t join the
ABiH and died in combats? Had we had their names, there could be done checking in the
lists of victims! #Released, re-joined ABiH, died in combat#!)

Sexual violence

1769. At Omarska, there were frequent incidents of female detainees who were called out of their
rooms by different guards, as well as the camp commander, and were raped or sexually
assaulted.6059 (But, the witness N. S. lied in the New York Court about her being raped. There
would be more hard evidence to put this in the Judgment. How come the Chamber was so
easily satisfied with such a testimonies? As if they needed anything, in order to convict the
President.) On one occasion, Krkan called a female detainee into his office and told her that he
knew high-ranking military officials and could help her if she had sexual intercourse with him.6060
Nedeljko Grabovac, a.k.a. ―Kapitan‖, who stayed at Omarska for only a short period and wore an
olive uniform similar to the former JNA uniform, also sexually assaulted female detainees.6061

1770. KDZ093 testified that several times during her detention at Omarska, she was called out at
night and during the day, by the same guard, and taken to another room in the restaurant building

never seen again until their bodies were exhumed in 2000 from a mass grave in Bosanska Krupa municipality); Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44257–44258 (29
November 2013) (confirming that he was present when 44 men and two women were called out from a list brought to the camp by Drljaĉa‘s driver and put
on a bus and that the bodies of all of these detainees were exhumed from a mass grave in Jama Lisac in Bosanska Krupa). See also Adjudicated Fact 1186.
6057
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2741, 2743–2744 (under seal); P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October
2011), pp. 46–47 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 1186.
6058
P4410 (Death certificates from Prijedor) (confirming the deaths of 21 identified individuals at Omarska between 3 June and 20 August 1992); P4853
(Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 14–15, 18–20, 22–32, 37–41; P5909 (Bihać MUP identification reports concerning Stari Kevljani
mass grave, 30 June 2005), pp. 5, 7, 10–18, 20, 22–24, 29–36, 38–42, 45, 47–57, 59, 61–67 (confirming that 73 identified individuals who went missing
from Omarska were exhumed from the Stari Kevljani mass grave); P4892 (BiH State Commission for Tracing Missing Persons list of exhumed persons
from Prijedor, Ĉelinac, Bosanski Novi, 29 October 2002) (confirming two individuals who went missing from Omarska and were exhumed from Jakarina
Kosa mass grave). How others recovered from Jakarina Kosa died, when and where? Was it a mass grave where only
those allegedly “went missing” from Omarska were buried? If there was many others that died somewhere else, it is
clear that they had been combat casualties all together! #Released, re-joined ABiH, died in combat#!! See also P4850
(Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), Annex A, pp. 8–9; P4893 (Bihać MUP report on Stari Kevljani exhumation, 18 January 2004);
P4890 (BiH State Commission for Tracing Missing Persons report on Jama Lisac exhumation, 20–28 June 2000); P4891 (Bihać Cantonal Court record of
exhumation at Jama Lisac, 11 July 2000); P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002), pp. 34–43 (under seal);
Nicolas Sébire, P694 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7370–7371; Nicolas Sébire, P694 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 16699;
Adjudicated Fact 1186 (stating that during the exhumation in Jama Lisac, 56 bodies were found and most of them died from gunshot injuries; DNA analysis
allowed the investigators to identify the bodies of Sureta Medunjanin, the wife of Bećir Medunjanin, and Ekrem Alić and Smail Alić, who were last seen in
Omarska). The Chamber notes that Adjudicated Fact 1186, which is based on Sébire‘s testimony in the Stakić case, refers to the name ―Sureta‖ Medunjanin
as the wife of Bećir Medunjanin and one of the individuals who was exhumed in Jama Lisac; however based on the other evidence before it, including
Sébire‘s subsequent testimony in the BrĎanin case, the Chamber considers that this was an error and is satisfied that the individual‘s name is ―Sadeta‖
Medunjanin. See Nicolas Sébire, P694 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 16699; P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor
municipality, 28 August 2002), p. 37 (under seal).
6059
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 34, 47–51 (under seal); KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T.
6226, 6228–6230. See also Adjudicated Fact 1168. But see D4388 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Gruban dated 31 January 2014), para. 29 (stating that
there were no such cases of rape or sexual assault of female detainees during his shifts and he did not hear that such things took place during other shifts).
The Chamber does not find Gruban‘s evidence to be credible in this regard. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber refers to its earlier assessment in fn.
6014 regarding the credibility of Gruban. (Why Gruban should be trusted, after all he was a Serb!)
6060
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 34, 47–49 (under seal).
6061
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 49–51 (under seal).
 177

where she was raped by this guard; afterwards, several other men entered the room and raped her
repeatedly.6062 (And she never reported this to any superior in Omarska?)

1771. Guards at Omarska also attempted to force a male detainee to rape another female
detainee.6063 On the night of 26 June 1992, a detainee heard some guards laughing, the voice of a
young woman crying, and a man he recognised as Mehmedalija Sarajlić pleading with the
guards.6064 Sarajlić was told by the guards to rape the young woman and when he refused he was
beaten.6065 The next morning, the detainee saw Sarajlić‘s body lying outside, not far from the
white house.6066 (The Muslim witnesses were totally free to lie and tell stories without any
possibility to check it?

1772. Female detainees were also physically assaulted at Omarska. On one occasion, a man,
wearing a camouflage uniform and a cap with a cockade symbol on it, entered the restaurant and
started shouting and hitting a Bosnian Muslim female prisoner sitting at a table; he then carved a
cross on her cheek and she started to bleed.6067 (Certainly, not a regular soldier, cockarde was
not allowed! #Insignias#!) On another occasion, a guard approached a female detainee in the
restaurant, uncovered her breast and took out a knife and went over her breast with it for several
minutes, while other guards watched laughing.6068 (#No evidence#! If this horror really
happened, there should be a strong evidence, heard and seen in the courtroom. Therefore,
the Defence has every reason to doubt it, apart from the unavoidable fact that the President
had nothing to do with that crime. The President prevented it by a general order of 13 June
92, Djeric did it even in April 92, Mladic in May 92. And the President repeated it many
times, through the orders that went to the services, and had been published, so that everyone
knew what must not been done ever, under the threat of punishment. Would any president
be liable for such an exceptional event, not approved, not tolerated and prohibited the
strictest way and repeatedly, nominating the most immediate commanders responsible for a
conduct of subordinates? Or, would any president be liable for misdeeds of a renegades that
he banned and disowned, and ordered their arrest and prosecution?)

1773. Female detainees were made to work in the canteen at Omarska.6069 On one occasion,
Milorad Tadić, a.k.a. ―Brk‖, Mejakić‘s driver and bodyguard, entered the kitchen and shouted at
the women for giving prisoners more bread than permitted; he ordered them to face the wall with
their hands up for 40 minutes, then laughed, and said it was a ―warning‖ and he would shoot them
if they gave out too much bread again.6070 After completing their work duty during the day, the
women would clean the interrogation rooms in the evening; they found blood on the floors and
walls, traces of torn clothing, and various devices, such as batons, with traces of blood as well.6071
(#Uncorroborated and unbelievable#, since all the interrogations had been made by the
highest professionals from Banja Luka. They worked every day, from 9 to 5, in order to scan
all 3,000 detainees. As a result of their work, 59% of those brought in had been released!)
Conclusion on conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

6062
KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6226, 6228–6229 (testifying that she did not know the name of the guard); see P611 (Plan of first
floor of restaurant building in Omarska marked by KDZ093) (on which KDZ093 marked with a ―U‖ the room in which she was raped at night, number B1).
6063
[REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 1183.
6064
[REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 1183.
6065
[REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 1183.
6066
[REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 1183.
6067
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 40–41 (under seal); Nusreta Sivac, T. 20413–20414 (26 October 2011) (private
session).
6068
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), p. 41 (under seal).
6069
Nusreta Sivac, T. 20429 (27 October 2011).
6070
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 30–31 (under seal).
6071
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 31–32 (under seal).
 178

1774. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that non-Serbs, including civilians, were
transferred to and detained at Omarska by Serb Forces between 25 May 1992 and 21 August 1992.
(Here is why these inferences and findings are wrong:
(1). All that had been detained in Omarska were #cought in the combat zone# after the
Hambarine (22 May) and Kozarac (24 May) attacks of the Muslim forces;

(2). Immediately after establishing that somebody was civilian without participation in the
attacks, these persons had been pardoned and released. What was the meaning of these
releases, and why all of them hadn’t been released?;

(3). #Being civilian doesn’t mean not to be perpetrator of a crime#!;

(4). All of them formally had been civilians, because they had been a secret, clandestine part of
the ABiH, not formed and declared as an army unit, therefore they had been in a status of
terrorists; The detainees were held in poor conditions characterised by lack of space, poor
sanitary conditions, inadequate medical care, and insufficient food.

(5). Nobody expected such a huge rebellion, with the participation of thousands of perpetrators,
so the poor conditions wasn’t any wilful determination of the authorities, but there was no
other possibility;

6. In the same facilities there were the Serb refugees, and then the Serb army soldiers before
and after the detainees, without any improvement of the facilities; The Chamber finds that the
male detainees at Omarska were subjected to severe beatings by Serb Forces.

(7). The evidence of beatings is very weak and unconvincing, particularly since throut the
working hours there vere a highly professional investigators, whom a mistreated detainees
could report, and beside that, we did see an evidence that the officials endeavoured to protect
the detainees from the intruders and outsiders, who did some misdeeds. The Chamber also
finds that a number of Bosnian Muslim women detained at Omarska were subjected to acts of
sexual violence by Serb Forces and were forced to work.6072

(8). There had been an evidence that some women worked in the cantine, but we do not have a
convincing evidence that they had been forced to work. We do not have any convincing
evidence about a sexual violence. Nusreta Sivac was lying in the New York court, while in
this court she denied any sexual assault, which makes her uncredible witness. (if we are
disabled to obtain the evidence of that, it still doesn’t change the substance) Finally, the
Chamber finds that a large number of non-Serbs were killed by Serb Forces at Omarska, or after
they were taken from the camp, between 25 May 1992 and 21 August 1992.6073

(9). This is also too general, unspecified assertion, not corroborated by a hard evidence as it
would be required in a criminal case. We have seen an evidence that 59% of the detained
persons was released. If they joined the ABiH and got killed, and recovered from some
grave, it is not a sufficient proof that they had been killed while in Omarska. A “large
number” is not enough, it should be specified by their names and circumstances of their
deaths, as well as about the shifts and the chiefs if it, and finally of a perpetrators. Certainly,
there is a degree of the command responsibility of the commander of the detention, but it is
limited strictly to him and his knowledge and abilities to prevent or punish.

6072
However, the Chamber notes that this type of forced labour is not charged in the Indictment, which only covers forced labour at the frontlines.
6073
This finding does not include the persons alleged to have been killed in Scheduled Incidents B.15.3 and B.15.4, which are discussed below.
 179

(10). Anyway, whatever happened, it was in a sharp contradiction with everything what the
President ordered in many occasions!(# In contrast with presidential orders#!)

(iii) Scheduled Incident B.15.3

1775.
The Indictment refers to the killing of a number of men and women taken from Omarska in
the area called Hrastova Glavica on or about 5 August 1992.6074 (#Some killed some!# Who was
killed by whom, wneh and where?)
1776. On 5 August 1992, two bus loads of approximately 120 detainees from Keraterm were
brought to Omarska.6075 Dr. Esad Sadiković, who was regarded by other detainees as a ―moral and
spiritual authority‖ at the camp, was called out by Prcać that night and he was made to board one
of the buses along with the other detainees from Keraterm already on the buses; they left Omarska
in the direction of Sanski Most.6076 (But in the Serb community Dr. Sadikovic had a terrible
reputation. The rumors about his activities against the fertility of the Serb women may have
been exaggeration, and probably it was an exaggeration, but still it indicates a bad
reputation. So, beloved by the Muslims and demonised by the Serbs, he must have been a bit
more than “moral and spiritual authority”, regrettably.)

1777. The Chamber took judicial notice that on the way to Sanski Most, unidentified Bosnian
Serbs shot dead a number of the detainees being transported on the buses.6077 (#Somebodi
unknown#! How do we know that it wasn’t a Muslim ambush shooting at the Serb bus, or
some of many groups of theMuslim terrorists operating in the zone, see the documents
pasted above! And is this President responsible for misdeeds of these unidentified Serbs, or
others?) The bodies of 126 individuals were later found in an area called Hrastova Glavica and
46 individuals were identified.6078 (#Identified, as who?# the same way would be identified all
the combat casualties, buried druging the sanitation process after a battle! What happened
to the others? A combat casualties? How come that one third of the remains were found to
be illegally killed, and for the two third the causes and manner of death unestablished?
Wouldn’t it be the most reasonable to infer that all of them were combat casualties, and that
those who once were in Omarska had been exchanged, then joined the BH Army and got
killed in skirmishes? For 121 of the 126 bodies, the forensic experts determined that the cause of
death was a gunshot wound.6079 (No wonder, taking into account a permanent armed
skirmishes. How the Chamber differentiated who were a combat casualties from those
allegedly killed. The Chamber had an evidence from May 28, 1992, signed by “Milos”
(P06685) stating that there were a hundreds of casualties in the combats, even before the
attack on Prijedor on 30 May 92, see P06685:

6074
See Indictment, Scheduled Incident B.15.3, fn. 5 (wherein the Prosecution alleges that detainees from Keraterm were among the victims of Scheduled
Incident B.15.3).
6075
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2522–2523, 2527, 2531–2532; P1949 (Excerpt from KDZ050‘s witness statement dated 19
November 2000) (providing a list of about 60 names of men he knew who were taken from Keraterm on two buses and stating that he heard from other
detainees that these men were first taken to Omarska); Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44258 (29 November 2013) (confirming that two busloads of detainees from
Keraterm were brought to Omarska on the afternoon of 5 August 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact 1220.
6076
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6686–6687; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1837–1838 (under
seal); KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2522; Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44258 (29 November 2013). See also Adjudicated Facts 1188,
1220; fn. 6056.
6077
See Adjudicated Fact 1220. See also P4887 (Bihać Cantonal Court record of Hrastova Glavica exhumation, 7 December 1998), p. 2.
6078
P4887 (Bihać Cantonal Court record of Hrastova Glavica exhumation, 7 December 1998), pp. 2, 8–9; P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in
Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002), pp. 32–33 (under seal); P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), Annex A, pp. 7–8;
P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 42–44; P4414 (Death certificate for Ismet Avdić). KDZ050 subsequently identified the bodies
of some of the 120 men who were taken away in the two buses on 5 August 1992, which were recovered from Hrastova Glavica in Sanski Most. KDZ050,
P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2522–2523, 2527–2528, 2531–2532; P1949 (Excerpt from KDZ050‘s witness statement dated
19 November 2000). See also Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44258–44259 (29 November 2013); Adjudicated Facts 1220, 1221.
6079
P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002), pp. 32–33 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 1222.
 180

(
1) First, we see that the civilians were a big burden to the local authorities, because there was
no sufficient space for accommodation, there was no food, and so on, which explicitly depicts
that a “detaining” of civilians was not an objective of the authorities, but a taking care of
them in the combat zone!

(2) What happened with those #“several hundred” combat casualties#? Had they been buried?
When exhumed, how this combat casualties were characterised? As a civilians? They had to
be buried, and eventually exhumed after the war. How many times the Muslim commission
for missing persons reported that there were a combar casualties? Never, they presented all
of them as a civilian victims of an unlawful killing. And this court is to help them in forging
the history of this conflict, or the Chamber will be so easy to be deceived? #Combat
casualties as civilian#!)

1778. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that approximately 120 non-Serb civilians taken
from Keraterm and Omarska were killed by Serb Forces on or about 5 August 1992 in the area of
Hrastova Glavica. (Again, an #abuse of a “Serb Forces”# although it was an “unidentified
Bosnian Serb”, although the “Serb Forces” had about 215,000 soldiers, and about 2,150
professional and several hundred reserve policemen, and nobody out of this official forces
was a member of the “Serb Forces”. So, this is deeply unfair to allocate every single crime in
a civil war to the official “forces”. Nobody denied that some outsiders sometimes succeeded
to intrude in the Investigation Center, but were prevented whenever it was possible, see
D3488.

i. Scheduled Incident B.15.4

1779. The Indictment refers to the execution of over 150 men from the Brdo region of Prijedor at
Omarska on or about 20 July 1992.

1780. On 16 July 1992, a group of about 200 people from the Brdo area, including Hambarine,
were brought to Omarska in buses and detained in the white house.6080 In the middle of the night,
KDZ048 heard gunshots and saw a number of dead and wounded people lying in front of the white
house.6081 He then saw camp guards, including Zivko Marmat, firing one additional shot into the
heads of each of these people.6082 A truck arrived, and detainees held in the hangar were given the
6080
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3359–3361; P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 56; Nusret Sivac, T.
19529–19530 (28 September 2011). See also Adjudicated Facts 1185, 1191.
6081
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3360–3361. See also Adjudicated Fact 1185.
6082
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3360. See also Adjudicated Fact 1185.
 181

task of loading the bodies on to the truck, which was then driven away.6083 The truck returned
several times to be re-loaded and KDZ048 estimated that there were about 180 bodies in total.6084
(#Dealdy combination#! How possibly any reasonable chamber could accept this “esteem”
from a phantom like KDZ048, 92bis, not cross examined or tested in any way in this case?)
All of the detainees held in the white house were killed that night and it was empty the following
day.6085 (#Impossible#! It would be impossible to have such a mass execution in a facilities
full of detainees and guards, close to many settled places, and not to have a general
knowledge about that. If the white house “was empty the following day”, there are many
possible inferences, more probable than executions!)

1781. Based on the totality of the evidence before it, the Chamber therefore finds that at least 150
non-Serb detainees from the Brdo region were killed by Serb Forces on or around 20 July 1992 at
Omarska. (#Muslim strongholds#! The Brdo region was full of the combatants, there were
certain fights, but it was visible (Atlija) that there were a two kinds of “soldiers”, a regular
one, and another kind, with the insignias not characteristic for the VRS, and their conduct
was not a typical one. We saw how the authorities characterized this conduct, in the Drljaca
and Zupljanin, and Milos documents, see it pasted!)

(vi) Visits to Omarska and transfer of detainees

1782. On or around 15 July 1992, a high-ranking delegation from Banja Luka and Prijedor,
including BrĊanin, Kuprešanin, Ţupljanin, Stakić, Radoslav Vujić, Predrag Radić, and Talić,
visited Omarska and were received by Drljaĉa and Mejakić.6086 Nusreta Sivac and other women
watched the delegation arrive through the glass walls of the canteen at Omarska; a choir of
detainees—―living skeletons‖—had been lined up outside the canteen and they sang Chetnik songs
and gave the three finger Serbian salute as the delegation passed by.6087

1783. According to Mejakić, Drljaĉa then met with the delegation in the administration building
without Mejakić present, where Ţupljanin denounced the camp and asked that it be dismantled
immediately.6088 However, the camp was not closed immediately after this visit and, in fact, on
20 July 1992, Ţupljanin sought the view of RS officials regarding the status of detainees of no
security interest being held in ARK detention facilities and recommended that they be treated as

6083
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3360–3362; P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 55–56. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1185.
6084
KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3362; P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 56. See also Adjudicated Fact
1185.
6085
P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 56. However, Mejakić gave evidence that crimes in Prijedor were ―fabricated and attributed to
Serbs under RS leadership‖. According to him, this includes the killing of 3,500 civilians at Omarska and, in particular, the killing of a group of 250
detainees brought in from the Brdo area; he stated that this incident was fabricated and is not supported by evidence. D4138 (Witness statement of Ţeljko
Mejakić dated 26 November 2013), pp. 3–4. However, the Chamber does not find Mejakić‘s evidence to be reliable on this issue in light of the other
evidence before the Chamber regarding this incident. This is totally unacceptable, to discredit Mejakic, and to trust KDZ048, on
such a drastic allegation. There is no chance that such a thing happened and not to be seen by many, many witnesses.
Any sanitation of the battlefield, any combat casualties could have been, and had been presented as a civilian
casualties of some Serb bestialities. But, anyway, the Chamber doesn’t have a credible evidence that those witnesses
told the truth.
6086
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 10–22 (under seal); Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T.
6639–6641; D4138 (Witness statement of Ţeljko Mejakić dated 26 November 2013), p. 10; Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
7437–7438; [REDACTED]. See also P6465 (Photograph of model of Omarska marked by Nusreta Sivac); P11 (Article from Kozarski Vjesnik, entitled
―Krajina Representatives in Prijedor‖, 17 July 1992), p. 1; P3482 (Article from Kozarski Vjesnik, entitled ―It's Difficult for Everyone‖, 17 July 1992);
Adjudicated Fact 1135.
6087
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 10–11, 12–21 (under seal); Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stakić), T. 6640–6641; Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7437–7438 (testifying that it amounted to pyschological abuse to
force the detainees to sing these kind of songs). See P6465 (Photograph of model of Omarska marked by Nusreta Sivac); Adjudicated Fact 1135.
6088
D4138 (Witness statement of Ţeljko Mejakić dated 26 November 2013), p. 10. See Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44264–44267 (29 November 2013).
 182

―hostages‖ to exchange for Serb detainees.6089 Furthermore, following the visit, BrĊanin publicly
stated that: ―What we have seen in Prijedor is an example of a job well done‖.6090 According to
Kuprešanin, following the delegation visit, the President called Kuprešanin to suggest that he
influence the municipal authorities in Prijedor to close the ―investigation centres‖ in the
municipality.6091 (#EXCULPATORY!#) Kuprešanin subsequently asked the authorities of
Omarska and Keraterm to close the facilities and to improve the living conditions for the detainees
until their disbandment.6092

1784. As mentioned above, pursuant to an order issued by Mladić on 3 August 1992, Talić
ordered the authorities at Omarska, Trnopolje, and Manjaĉa to urgently prepare for visits by the
ICRC and teams of reporters.6093

1785. In early August 1992, the majority of detainees remaining at Omarska were transferred to
either Trnopolje or Manjaĉa camps.6094 (#This is incorrect#: the majority had been released
and went elsewhere, or to Trnopolje for their own safety, see P:3788, p.5 ,Edward
Vulliamy’s report

1786. On 5 August 1992, Dragoljub Prcać came to the restaurant building at Omarska and read
out a list of women‘s names, including the names of KDZ093 and Nusreta Sivac.6095 Although
Prćac said they were ―going home‖, that day a bus came to pick up this group of women and took
them to Trnopolje.6096 (As already clear: Trnopolje was a #reception centre# for securing
people in jeopardy!)

1786. On 5 August 1992, Vulliamy and two television reporting teams from ITN, including
Penny Marshall and Ian Williams, visited Omarska and met with Drljaĉa, Stakić, Kovaĉević, and
an interpreter, Nada Balaban, upon their arrival.6097 The journalists interviewed detainees;
however, the detainees were told not to complain about the conditions of detention.6098
(#Adversary testimony#! This witness was an organizer of the rebellion, and was not entirely
credible while testifying about his adversaries!) The journalists were not allowed to see
anything beyond the cafeteria, despite informing Drljaĉa and Mejakić that they had approval from
the President to visit the whole camp.6099 On or around 12 August 1992, representatives from the

6089
P1097 (Banja Luka CSB dispatch to SerBiH MUP, 20 July 1992).
6090
P11 (Article from Kozarski Vjesnik, entitled ―Krajina Representatives in Prijedor‖, 17 July 1992), p. 2.
6091
D4011 (Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), para. 46; Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43530, 43543–43545 (14 November 2013).
See also P6510 (Excerpt of Vojo Kuprešanin's interview with OTP), e-court p. 11.
6092
D4011 (Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), para. 46; Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43543–43545 (14 November 2013).
6093
P5461 (VRS Main Staff Order, 3 August 1992); P5460 (Order of 1st Krajina Corps, 3 August 1992). See para. 1404. See also 1849.
6094
KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6211–6213; Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44280–44281 (29 November 2013); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1928 (under seal); KDZ026, T. 10391 (17 January 2011) (closed session); KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Kvočka), T. 2749–2750, 2766 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 2489.
6095
KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6211–6212; P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 53–54
(under seal).
6096
KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6211–6213; Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44281 (29 November 2013) (confirming that on 3 August 1992, a
group of approximately 140 or 150 detainees were transferred to Trnopolje).
6097
Edward Vulliamy, P3777 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7937–7946, 7948–7953. See Adjudicated Facts 1136, 2488.
6098
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20499–20501 (27 October 2011); see Adjudicated Fact 2488.
6099
Edward Vulliamy, P3777 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7939–7946, 7948–7953; Edward Vulliamy, T. 21043–21048 (9 November 2011); P3543
(Excerpt from video clip of visits to Omarska and Trnopolje, with transcript); P3797 (Excerpt of ITN video clip of journalist visit to Omarska and
Trnopolje); P3785 (Excerpt of ITN video clip of journalist visits to Omarska and Trnopolje, with transcript); D4138 (Witness statement of Ţeljko Mejakić
dated 26 November 2013), p. 10; Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44271–44273 (29 November 2013).
 183

ICRC, as well as international and Serbian journalists, visited Omarska.6100 The ICRC delegation
was given access to visit the whole camp.6101 (#The President is criticized by all# Being kept
responsible and guilty before the locals in Prijedor, but also before this Tribunal. He invited
the journalists, brought them in his (governmental) plane and have given them all freedom
to visit anything in the RS. The Chamber should at least notice and mention this in the
Judgment.)

1787. Sejmenović was present when international journalists arrived at Omarska and was brought
out to speak to them; however they did not interview him.6102 He had been interviewed by Serbian
journalists earlier, but he did not tell the truth; rather he answered in the manner he was told in
order to save his life.6103 The day after the international journalists visited Omarska, Sejmenović
met with Kuprešanin who informed him that he would be leaving Omarska for Banja Luka that
day.6104 Later Sejmenović learned Kuprešanin‘s intentions for taking him out of Omarska when he
overheard a phone conversation between Kuprešanin and the President.6105 Kuprešanin ―received
instructions‖ and responded that he was planning to get a suit for Sejmenović and allow him time
to recuperate, and then he was planning round-table discussions for Sejmenović to speak publicly
about the situation in Bosnian Krajina.6106 At his own request, Sejmenović was then taken to his
sister‘s house in Vrbanja, where Kuprešanin visited him three times.6107 On the third visit,
Kuprešanin informed Sejmenović he was going to Banja Luka to meet with the President and
others.6108 Sejmenović was brought by Kuprešanin as one of the two official SDA functionaries to
meet with the President, Vance, and Owen.6109 Following the meeting, Sejmenović confirmed
Vance‘s public statement that Vance did not agree with the President that ―no ethnic cleansing was
taking place‖ in BiH, and stated that this was consistent with his own observations of what was
occurring in the region.6110 Sejmenović left Vrbanja on 15 January 1993 after obtaining the proper
documents to present to international agencies and officials to be able to leave.6111 Kuprešanin
wrote an accompanying letter, confirming Sejmenović‘s identity, which referred to the fact that he
was released from Omarska at the request of the President.6112
1788. On 6 August 1992, around 600 of the Omarska detainees were called out as being ―not
dangerous‖ and were sent to Trnopolje.6113 (#Investigation results#! But, behind this decision
there was a long way of investigation. So, nothing had been arbitrary, the professionals were
working all the times, every day, in clarifying who was responsible and dangerous for the
peace and order, and who was not. As it is presented here, with the quotation marks, looks
bad and not correct. Let us see what Drljaca reported about the ending of the investigating
process: P02772 on 5 August 1992:

6100
D4138 (Witness statement of Ţeljko Mejakić dated 26 November 2013), p. 10; Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44274 (29 November 2013).
6101
D4138 (Witness statement of Ţeljko Mejakić dated 26 November 2013), p. 10.
6102
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20498–20499 (27 October 2011).
6103
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20499–20501 (27 October 2011). See P3696 (Video footage of Mevludin Sejmenović in Omarska).
6104
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20503–20504 (27 October 2011).
6105
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20504–20505 (27 October 2011), T. 20578–20579, 20586 (28 October 2011) (testifying that he learned that Kuprešanin wanted
Sejmenović to ―fatten up‖ and get better for upcoming public appearances). Sejmenović recognised the Accused‘s voice, which was ―very familiar‖ to him,
on the phone and later Kuprešanin confirmed it was the Accused. See also Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43546–43547 (14 November 2013). Sejmenović further
confirmed that communication by telephone, ―certainly […] between Prijedor and Banja Luka‖ was possible in August 1992, despite the Accused
suggesting that communication was restored only in September 1992. Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20586–20587 (28 October 2011). See D1357 (Report of
Prijedor SDS Municipal Board, 11 September 1991–26 December 1992), p. 6.
6106
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20504–20505 (27 October 2011). See also Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43546–43547 (14 November 2013).
6107
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20506–20507 (27 October 2011).
6108
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20507 (27 October 2011).
6109
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20507–20510 (27 October 2011), testifying about P3698 (STV video footage of interview with Radovan Karadţić).
6110
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20511–20512 (27 October 2011), testifying about P3699 (Video of NTV news re Vance‘s statements in Banja Luka).
6111
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20512 (27 October 2011).
6112
P3700 (Letter from Vojislav Kuprešanin to Banja Luka CSB, 12 January 1993). The Chamber notes that the letter is dated 12 January 1992; however given
Sejmenović‘s evidence regarding when he left Vrbanja and the context of the surrounding evidence, the Chamber considers that this is a typographical error
and the letter should in fact be dated 12 January 1993.
6113
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1928 (under seal).
 184

:And further: .

(#Innocent released#! So, behind the entire job after the capture of the suspects had been
entrusted to the highest officials from Banja Luka, who investigated and gave the
conclusions. As in any other country. The 59% of detainees had been released! The
investigating documentation had been taken away by the SFOR! But the release happened
all the time, immediately after established innocence, see a certificate of 24 July 92, D4714:

! On the same day, a second group of approximately 1,300 detainees, including KDZ026, were
taken to Manjaĉa.6114 The men in this second group were put on to buses by members of the
intervention squad and the buses departed Omarska; there were approximately 100 to 120 men on
KDZ026‘s bus.6115 Between 170 and 180 detainees remained at Omarska after these transfers.6116

1789. That evening, approximately 200 military beds were delivered to Omarska and thereafter,
detainees received two meals a day and conditions improved.6117 A delegation of ICRC
representatives and journalists visited the camp again a week later, on or around
12 August 1992.6118 By mid-August 1992, a total of 1,773 detainees were transferred from
Omarska to Trnopolje.6119 On 21 August 1992, the last group of detainees was transferred to
Manjaĉa, on buses escorted by Mejakić, and Omarska was closed.6120 (#No killed at all, look at
figures#! So, without the last group, (unknown number) there was all together 3239
transferred detainees. How many had been killed? We can see from the evidence in the file
that all together there was some above 3,000 detainees. Taking into account that behind

6114
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1928 (under seal); KDZ026, T. 10391 (17 January 2011) (closed session); KDZ392, P707
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2749–2750, 2766 (under seal). See Adjudicated Fact 2489.
6115
KDZ026, T. 10322 (17 January 2011) (closed session).
6116
Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44273, 44280 (29 November 2013); P3549 (Report of the Commission for Inspecting Collection Centres and Other Facilities for
Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992), p. 4.
6117
Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44273–44274, 44280 (29 November 2013).
6118
Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44273–44274, 44280 (29 November 2013); P3543 (Excerpt from video clip of visits to Omarska and Trnopolje, with transcript).
6119
See Adjudicated Fact 2489; Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44280–44281 (29 November 2013). But see Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44281 (29 November 2013) (testifying that
transfers of detainees to Trnopolje started in early June 1992 and that the total number of detainees transferred there was much lower than 1,700).
6120
Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44281–44282 (29 November 2013); P6585 (SRNA press release, 22 August 1992) (reporting that Omarska had been closed down in the
course of the day and that authority over Trnopolje had been handed over to the Red Cross). See also Milomir Stakić, T. 45278–45281 (17 December 2013)
(testifying that once Manjaĉa camp opened, there was no longer a reason to keep Omarska and Keraterm open and those who were ―found to be guilty of
war crimes‖ were transferred to Manjaĉa).
 185

those 3,073 some 170 to 180 remained in Omarska, where are data about those #“huge
number” of detainees killed in Omarska#? The overall count doesn’t leave any possibility to
even meditate about so many detainees killed in Omarska: 1,466 conveyed to Manjaca +
1,773 transferred to Trnopolje + 170 – 180 remanied in Omarska, all together = 3,414 with
known outcome, not killed in Omarska! There is no any evidence that there was more than
this 3,414 detainees in Omarska!#A Big Lie disclosed#! )

a. Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.3

1790. The Indictment refers to the use of Keraterm as a detention facility in Prijedor municipality
between 15 May and 6 August 1992.

i. Establishment of camp and arrival of detainees

1791. A former ceramic tile factory located on the eastern outskirts of Prijedor, Keraterm
operated as a detention facility between 24 May and 21 August 1992.6121 Keraterm was clearly
visible from the main road from Prijedor to Banja Luka.6122

1792. Keraterm was established by the Prijedor Crisis Staff.6123 The camp operated under camp
commander, Duško Sikirica, and security at the camp was provided by members of the Prijedor
SJB and MP.6124

1793. Approximately 4,000 detainees, primarily Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat men, were
held at Keraterm throughout its operation as a camp.6125 Some of the detainees brought to
Keraterm were originally detained at the Prijedor SJB Building, but were brought to Keraterm
when the SJB was unable to accommodate the increased number of detainees.6126

6121
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2312; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7081–7083; P541
(Photograph of Keraterm); P542 (Photograph of Keraterm); P3549 (Report of the Commission for Inspecting Collection Centres and Other Facilities for
Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992), p. 4; P2968 (Report of Prijedor SJB January 1993), p. 5; P5555 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 29 September 1992), p. 4.
See Adjudicated Facts 1102, 1103, 1192, 1196.
6122
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7083. See also P6594 (Aerial photograph of Keraterm marked by Dragan Radetić); D4254
(Aerial photograph of Keraterm marked by KW609); D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court p. 3.
6123
See Adjudicated Facts 1105, 1193; D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 2–3, 6, 11, 29, 32. See also P2741
(Decision of Prijedor Crisis Staff, 2 June 1992); P2637 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 1 July 1992). Defence witnesses Milomir Stakić and Slavko Budimir
testified that the Crisis Staff did not participate in the formation of Keraterm and had no authority over the facility; rather that only the police was in charge
of the facility. D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013) paras. 23, 48–49; Milomir Stakić, T. 45242–45246, 45254
(17 December 2013); Slavko Budimir, D4463 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 12947–12958, 12964. However, the Chamber does not find this
evidence to be credible based on the accepted evidence before the Chamber to the contrary which confirms that the Prijedor Crisis Staff was involved in the
establishment of Keraterm and in its operations. Again, this is not correct, because this is another thing to allow the police to use
some facilities, and another thing is an operational governing of an institution established that way. The same kind of
confusion is shown when the operational command of the VRS is in question. Once again we have to state that the
Chamber was very keen to discredit a Defence argument no matter what.
6124
See Adjudicated Facts 1193, 1194; D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 3, 6, 11, 29, 32. See also P2915
(Summary of conclusions of Prijedor's Executive Board, 29 April–17 August 1992), p. 3; P2741 (Decision of Prijedor Crisis Staff, 2 June 1992); P2637
(Report of Prijedor SJB, 1 July 1992). Damir Došen, a.k.a ―Kajin‖, was one of the shift commanders at Keraterm. See Adjudicated Fact 1195.
6125
P3549 (Report of the Commission for Inspecting Collection Centres and Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992), p. 4. See Adjudicated
Fact 1197 (stating that ―[t]here were a couple of Albanians, and a Bosnian Serb accused of not being a loyal Serb‖ detained at Keraterm). This is #not
correct interpretation#, since it was not about loyalty, but about doings of unlawfulness. Beside that, this Commission
had been formed and tasked by the very same Accused, in the realm of his efforts to introduce the rule of law. How
this could be used against him? #Good deeds#!
6126
KW609, D4246 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 16727–16728. See also Dušan Janković, T. 47285 (18 February 2014) (stating that
people held at the Prijedor SJB who were under investigation or interrogation were taken to the Keraterm or Omarska detention facilities).
 186

1794. Keraterm held up to as many as 1,500 prisoners at one time, crowded into a number of
large rooms or halls.6127 Between 200 and 500 Bosnian Muslim and Croat men, between the ages
of 17 and 55, were detained in Room 2 at Keraterm.6128 There were other rooms used to house
detainees, known as Rooms 1, 3, and 4.6129 Between 250 and 270 men were initially held in Room
3 but later two more groups arrived and the number grew to 570.6130 There were machine guns
placed near the entrance to the camp.6131

1795. Interrogation teams were sent to Keraterm to interview and investigate detainees there;6132
the teams were comprised of representatives from civilian public security, state security, and
military security.6133 Dragan Radetić, a Serb military prosecutor appointed as a member of one of
the commissions investigating detainees at Keraterm, testified that over a period of 15 days, his
commission interviewed 50 detainees, all adult men who denied having been involved in the
conflict or with the armed forces.6134

ii. Conditions of detention

1796. Conditions in Keraterm were atrocious.6135 Detainees were crowded into unlit, windowless
rooms, with barely enough space to lie down on concrete floors.6136 In Room 3, the floor was wet
and the walls were stained.6137 The rooms in Keraterm were intensely hot in the summer with no
ventilation and the detainees were kept locked in these rooms for days on end, crowded
together.6138

1797. There were few toilet facilities and the detainees were allowed to go to the toilet only once
a day, five men at a time, and escorted by guards.6139 Initially, one lavatory was available for all
of the detainees but it became blocked and barrels were supplied instead which leaked, causing an

6127
See Adjudicated Fact 1196. See also P572 (Sketches of Keraterm drawn by Jusuf Arifagić).
6128
Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3757–3758 (stating that approximately 500 men were being held in Room 2 when he arrived).
Cf. Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7086–7087 (estimating that there were approximately 200 to 300 people in Room 2 when
he arrived); KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2315; P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994), p. 8 (stating
that about 200 other Bosnian Muslim male prisoners were being held in Room 2).
6129
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7106–7108; P572 (Sketches of Keraterm drawn by Jusuf Arifagić).
6130
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2503; see Adjudicated Fact 1198. However, Dragan Radetić testified that (i) the number of
Bosnian Muslims held at Keraterm was much lower than 4,000, and he had never heard of any Serbs or Albanians being held there; (ii) Keraterm camp
could not have possibly held 1,500 prisoners at once; (iii) the number of 570 being detainees held in Room 3 is exaggerated. D4226 (Witness statement of
Dragan Radetić dated 17 January 2014), paras. 36–38. The Chamber does not find Radetić‘s evidence to be credible in this regard. In reaching that
conclusion, the Chamber considers that he was not forthright with the Chamber on several occasions and that due to his involvement in interrogating
detainees at Keraterm, he had an interest in distancing himself from any knowledge of conditions there. But why Radetic would be distancing
himself from a knowledge of the number or conditions, since he was not responsible for the number, nor he brought
anyone in? This shows haw low threshold for discrediting the Defence witnesses had the Chamber! This was a
completely neutral issue, particularly from the standpoint of Radetic! #Easy discrediting Defense witnesses!#!
6131
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7084–7086, 7108; see P572 (Sketches of Keraterm drawn by Jusuf Arifagić).
6132
Defence witnesses testified that Keraterm was used as an investigation centre for those individuals who refused to mobilise and were considered armed and
dangerous, or for those who had participated in armed rebellion, such as members of the Green Berets. D4882 (Witness statement of Dušan Ɖenadija
undated), para. 6; Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43454–43455 (14 November 2013); D4010 (Report of Prijedor SJB, September 1993), p. 2.
6133
D4226 (Witness statement of Dragan Radetić dated 17 January 2014), paras. 28, 30, 35; Dragan Radetić, T. 45677 (20 January 2014); KW609, D4246
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 16911–16913; D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp.
3, 6, 29, 32. See Adjudicated Fact 1207 (stating that interrogators at Keraterm ―consisted of members of the Banja Luka CSB and of the Banja Luka
Corps‖). See also Adjudicated Fact 1204 (stating that ―most of the detainees in Keraterm were interrogated in an attempt to identify opponents of the new
Serb regime‖); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1840–1841 (under seal).
6134
D4226 (Witness statement of Dragan Radetić dated 17 January 2014), paras. 28, 30, 31, 35. See also KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stakić), T. 1840–1841 (under seal); KDZ026, T. 10308, 10381–10382 (17 January 2011) (closed session).
6135
Adjudicated Fact 1198; P3661 (UNPROFOR Memo, 4 July 1992), p. 2 (reporting that ―100–200 Muslims believed to be [held at Keraterm] under extremely
bad conditions‖). See also D3645 (Witness statement of Nenad Kecmanović dated 27 May 2013), para. 54.
6136
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2502–2503; see Adjudicated Facts 1198, 1199.
6137
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2502–2503.
6138
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2503, 2505; see Adjudicated Fact 1199.
6139
See Adjudicated Fact 1200.
 187

overpowering stench.6140 Detainees were not able to bathe, but they could occasionally wash a
little.6141 The detainees received no soap or toothpaste.6142 Infestations of lice appeared.6143
Dysentery was rife and there was no medical care.6144

1798. At Keraterm, both the quality and quantity of food provided to the detainees were totally
inadequate, and they suffered from malnutrition and, in some instances, starvation.6145 The
detainees received two pieces of bread that they had to eat very quickly or they would be
beaten.6146 Furthermore, the food was not delivered regularly and sometimes there was no food
provided at all.6147 To supplement the meagre camp provisions, detainees were sometimes
allowed to receive food brought to the camp by their families, although these occasional
supplements were not sufficient to alleviate their hunger and malnutrition.6148

iii. Treatment of detainees

1799. Detainees were beaten upon arrival at Keraterm.6149 Jusuf Arifagić was brought to
Keraterm on 14 June 1992, by bus, along with a group of about 40 other men captured with him in
Mujkanovići.6150 When his group arrived at the camp, two ―Serb soldiers‖ entered the bus,
ordered the men to get off in small groups, and began beating and kicking them as they lay on the
ground.6151 Safet Taĉi, a young Bosnian Muslim man who resided in Kozarac with his family
until 1992, was also taken to Keraterm by ―Serb forces‖ in mid-June 1992.6152 Arifagić and Taĉi
were put in Room 2, where other men from villages in the Prijedor region, who had also been
physically mistreated, were being held.6153 On the evening of their arrival, Arifagić and the men
who had been brought in with him were ordered to leave Room 2 and to lie down on the ground
outside, where they were severely beaten and told to confess to being members of the Green

6140
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2505–2506; see Adjudicated Fact 1199. KDZ050 testified that in the first two days at Keraterm,
they were not allowed to leave Room 3 for any reason, including to use the toilet, and they had to use a blue plastic barrel which had been placed inside the
room. KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2505–2506.
6141
See Adjudicated Fact 1200. In addition, Radetić testified that the lack of hygienic care at Keraterm was due to a general shortage of water, and that the
guards also suffered from this shortage. D4226 (Witness statement of Dragan Radetić dated 17 January 2014), para. 39 (referring to D4227 (Notification re
water supply in Prijedor, 29 September 2000), p. 1).
6142
Adjudicated Fact 1200.
6143
Adjudicated Fact 1200.
6144
Adjudicated Fact 1201. But see D4226 (Witness statement of Dragan Radetić dated 17 January 2014), para. 40 (stating that he ―did not know there were
problems like this‖ at Keraterm). The Chamber does not find Radetić‘s evidence to be credible in this regard. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber
refers to its earlier assessment in fn. 6137 regarding the credibility of Radetić.
6145
See Adjudicated Facts 1200, 1202. KDZ050 testified that he was given no food or water for two days after arriving at Keraterm. KDZ050, P680 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2505.
6146
Adjudicated Fact 1202.
6147
Adjudicated Fact 1202.
6148
See Adjudicated Fact 1203. KDZ093 visited her husband in Keraterm for the first time in mid-June 1992 and brought him food and clothes, but a guard took
the bag at the gate and said he would give it to him; she saw her husband from far away and he looked very thin and exhausted. KDZ093 visited him a
second time around the end of June 1992 and as she approached the gate, Zoran Ţigić recognised her and brought her husband to the fence and said to her:
―Here. Take a good look at your husband. He‘s going to fall first for the freedom of this town.‖ Her husband was very thin and exhausted; he did not say
anything to her at the fence, but tears ran down his face. KDZ093 never saw her husband again after that day; she heard later from more than a hundred
witnesses that her husband was beaten and killed in broad daylight in Omarska camp. KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6191–
6194, 6236, 6244. But see D4226 (Witness statement of Dragan Radetić dated 17 January 2014), para. 41 (stating that the guards also suffered from
malnutrition due to wartime shortages of food). ). (#General shortage#! Certainly, this fact shouldn’t be in a fn. Because
throughout the Judgment there is a parade with such a statements and “findings”, as if it was a policy to starv the
detainees, but it was not.
6149
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7084, 7089; KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2314–2315; P711
(Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994), p. 8; KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2501–2502. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1205.
6150
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7080, 7083–7084. KDZ093 testified that her husband was detained by ―Serb forces‖ in mid-
June 1992 and taken to Keraterm. KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6189, 6191.
6151
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7084.
6152
Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3755–3756.
6153
Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3755–3757; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7084–7086, 7107;
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2315. See also P572 (Sketches of Keraterm drawn by Jusuf Arifagić).
 188

Berets.6154 (#Deadly combination#! All of it based only on the Rule 92bis and adjudicated
facts, without possibility of the Defence to challenge it!)

1800. KDZ074 was captured in the woods between Ĉarakovo and Hambarine by armed men in
camouflage uniforms and taken to Keraterm on 8 July 1992.6155 Upon his arrival, he was
interrogated and beaten, and then taken to Room 2.6156 (#Combatant#! What was he doing in
the woods in a combat zone? Was he climbing, or he was a combatant? Only, a way he had
been captured confirms more certainly that the witness wasn’t an unarmed civilian arrested
for no reason.)

1801. While in detention, beatings were very frequent at Keraterm.6157 The guards called out the
names of detainees, often at night, and they were taken outside and beaten.6158 Those who
returned were bloody and bruised all over; some died of their injuries.6159 Some detainees who
were called out never returned, and the other detainees assumed that they had died as a result of
the beatings.6160 (#Assumption that they died#! But, how many reasonable assumptions could
be made? Could they be released? Or moved to another room or building? Or exchanged?
The Prosecution and witnesses may say such a things, but the Chamber shouldn’t spoil the
Judgment text with such a “possibilities” that are not proven - assumptions of detainees.)
Arifagić testified that the bodies of the men who died after being taken out at night were deposited
in a part of the camp referred to as the ―garbage dump‖.6161 (No other evidence of such an
“obvious” event??? So, Arifagi}’s testimony is a type of: “give me anything”!)

1802. Detainees were beaten with bars and batons, and made to beat each other.6162 Detainees
were often beaten and humiliated in front of other detainees.6163 Two former Bosnian Muslim
policemen were severely beaten with chains and metal rods, one of whom died as a consequence
of this beating.6164 Detainees were also beaten during interrogations at Keraterm.6165 The beatings
were administered by the guards at Keraterm, in particular by Nenad Banović, a.k.a. ―Ĉupo‖, and
Zoran Ţigić,6166 as well as by people from outside the camp allowed in by the guards, such as
6154
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7087–7090 (further stating that he sustained a number of injuries as a consequence and the
next day was taken to a hospital in a van, along with some other detainees, accompanied by Ţigić, where his wounds were dressed, and then he was returned
to Keraterm). One of the detainees who was with Arifagić—Emsud Bahonjić—later died as a result of his injuries and Arifagić assisted in carrying his body
to the guards‘ cabin in the camp. Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7090. Dušan Janković testified that members of the Green
Berets were captured during the attack on the Prijedor municipal building on 30 May 1992 and were taken to the Keraterm and Omarska detention facilities
to be investigated. Dušan Janković, T. 47272, 47274 (18 February 2014).
6155
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2304–2305, 2312 (stating that he was unarmed and in civilian clothes at the time of his capture).
6156
KDZ074, P709 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 2314–2315; P711 (Witness statement of KDZ074 dated 23 September 1994), p. 8.
6157
See Adjudicated Fact 1208.
6158
See Adjudicated Facts 1208, 1209; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7090–7091; KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor
v. Sikirica), T. 2506–2507; Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3758.
6159
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7090–7091; KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2506–2507; see
Adjudicated Fact 1209.
6160
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7090–7091; KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2506–2507; see
Adjudicated Fact 1209. [REDACTED].
6161
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7091.
6162
See Adjudicated Fact 1208.
6163
See Adjudicated Fact 1212.
6164
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7093–7094 (stating that the two men were wearing police uniforms when they arrived at
Keraterm and said that although they had signed the oath of loyalty and had continued to work as policemen, they had nonetheless been disarmed and
brought to the camp). See also Adjudicated Fact 1210.
6165
See Adjudicated Fact 1206.
6166
See Adjudicated Facts 1195, 1211; KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2501–2502, 2507, 2520–2521, 2536–2538 (stating that when
―Ĉupo Banović‘s shift was on duty, they took out people‖ to be beaten more often, and that he sometimes visited the camp when he was not on duty in order
to ―torture‖ the detainees); Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7089, 7091; Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Kvočka), T. 3758–3763 (stating that Ţigić wore a camouflage uniform, often wore sunglasses, and always had a bandage on his hand, and that he was often
involved in beatings and the detainees were all in fear of him; on one occasion, he was beaten by Ţigić as he returned to Room 2 from the toilet); KDZ093,
P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6192–6194, 6244 (stating that she knew Ţigić well from attending elementary school together and that he
was wearing a military uniform and a red ―beret‖ when she saw him at Keraterm at the end of June 1992); Dragan Radetić, T. 45681–45684 (20 January
2014), T. 45689–45691 (21 January 2014) (stating that Ţigić was a member of the civilian police). However, the Chamber also received evidence that Ţigić
was an ―armed uniformed person‖ who entered the camp in the evenings and beat detainees, despite warnings from officials of the camp not to enter,
suggesting that Ţigić was not a guard at Keraterm. D4140 (Official note of Prijedor SJB, 4 July 1992).
 189

Duško Kneţević.6167 (#Officials vs. crime#! However, we saw the documents that it wasn’t so,
and that the guards and in particular Sikirica, reported Zigic to the Army, since he wasn’t in
the police competence, see D04140
………………………………

…. See D01926

(#Officials vs. crimes#!So, the position of the Serb officials was the same as the one of the
Prosecution and the Chamber. In the first year of the war there were many groups and
individuals with armament, with an unknown affiliation. Those were the forces which the
President disowned 13 June 92, ordering their legal persecution.)Additionally, some prisoners
were questioned about money and taken to their homes and were made to search for money, which
was handed over to the guards if found.6168

1803. Women detained in Keraterm were also raped.6169 KDZ093, a Bosnian Muslim woman
from Prijedor, was arrested with others from her apartment building on 14 July 1992 by ―Serb
forces‖ wearing police uniforms—light blue shirts and grey-blue trousers—and brought to
Keraterm.6170 They were immediately brought to a room and Sikirica, who introduced himself as
the commander of the camp, ordered them to take off their jewellery and everything they had

6167
See Adjudicated Fact 1211; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7089; D4140 (Official note of Prijedor SJB, 4 July 1992). See
also Dragan Radetić, T. 45681–45684 (20 January 2014), T. 45689–45690 (21 January 2014). Stakić also testified that at Keraterm, ―people would be taken
away by armed individuals‖, but he did not know who these individuals were. Milomir Stakić, T. 45250–45251 (17 December 2013).
6168
See Adjudicated Fact 1214. See also D1925 (Prijedor SJB criminal report, 2 July 1992) (stating that Zoran Ţigić was under suspicion of having received a
bribe from Esad Marošlić, a detainee held at Keraterm, on 9 June 1992); D1926 (Order of Banja Luka CSB, 1 July 1992) (ordering that Ţigić be detained for
three days for accepting the bribe from Marošlić). However, Radetić stated that (i) he never noticed that the persons he interviewed had any signs of
physical abuse; (ii) beatings did not occur during interrogations while he worked at Keraterm; (iii) beatings never occurred in his presence; (iv) ―Muslim
members of the security structures, including the police, were not kept together with the civilians held at Keraterm‖ and he believed they were interviewed
separately; and (v) he never heard of any cases of detainees being made to search for money in their homes by guards and he is convinced it was not done by
anyone participating in the commissions interviewing detainees. D4226 (Witness statement of Dragan Radetić dated 17 January 2014), paras. 32, 43–46, 48;
Dragan Radetić, T. 45680 (20 January 2014). However, Radetić also admitted that he received information and was aware that Ţigić, Kneţević, and others
beat prisoners at Keraterm, after which the detainees died. Dragan Radetić, T. 45681–45684 (20 January 2014), T. 45689–45690 (21 January 2014). See
also D4140 (Official note of Prijedor SJB, 4 July 1992). Based on these internal inconsistencies in Radetić‘s evidence, as well as the Chamber‘s observation
that he was not forthright on several occasions, the Chamber does not find Radetić‘s evidence that beatings did not occur at Keraterm to be reliable. The
Chamber also notes that during his testimony, as demonstrated by these statements, Radetić attempted to distance himself from any knowledge of
mistreatment of detainees or conditions of detention.
6169
See Adjudicated Fact 1213.
6170
KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6194–6195.
 190

on.6171 That night, NeĊeljko Timarac took KDZ093 and another Muslim woman who was her
neighbour, to two separate offices inside the Keraterm building.6172 KDZ093 was then repeatedly
raped by Timarac and ―other men‖ throughout the night on a table.6173 A guard found her in the
morning in a pool of blood and ordered her to wash up and brought her out to the yard where she
sat for two to three hours in bloodstained clothes.6174 The same guard brought KDZ093‘s
neighbour out that morning; she looked frightened and was crying.6175 That afternoon, KDZ093,
her neighbour, and a group of six or seven men were taken to Omarska camp in a ―police van‖.6176
(It is not believable that Sikirica had to do anything with this Timarac, since he reported one
Timarac (FN unclear in the original) further, the prompt removal to Omarska was
motivated by an attempt to spare the women. #Officials vs. crimes#!)

1804. Detainees at Keraterm were eventually transferred to Omarska or Trnopolje.6177 Arifagić

was transferred by bus from Keraterm to Trnopolje on 1 August 1992, along with many others.6178
On 5 August 1992, a soldier read out a list of names of detainees, numbering about 120 men in
total, and they were put on to two buses and drove away.6179 After those two buses were driven
away, new buses arrived and the remaining detainees in Keraterm, including KDZ050, were put on
these buses and taken to Trnopolje.6180

(iv)Conclusion on conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

1805. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that non-Serb civilians from multiple locations
were brought to and detained at Keraterm by Serb Forces from 24 May 1992 until at least
5 August 1992. (#Distorted and fake#!T his finding can not survive, since the term
“civilians” is not corroborated with any proof. There was an armed rebellion, the uprisal of
the terrorists who weren’t either declared or marked as an army, and certainly having a civil
cloathings. How come so many Serb soldiers and policemen got killed? Why the Serb Army
and Police would detaine so many civilians, while so many contemporaneous documents
confirmed arrest and capture a couple of thousands of the Muslim terrorists who made this
armed rebellion and killed so many Serbs? Every civilian without participation in this
criminal act had been released immediately! So, only after the first triage, a separation of
those that had been detained by mistake from those that were responsible for the
bloodshead, one could mention civilians, but only as released.) The detainees were held in
poor conditions which included lack of space, inadequate bedding, poor sanitary conditions, lack
6171
KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6196.
6172
KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6197–6198 (further stating that she knew NeĊeljko Timarac well from primary school; he wore a
military uniform with a grey military ―cap‖).
6173
KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6198–6199. See also Adjudicated Fact 1213.
6174
KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6199–6200. See also Adjudicated Fact 1213.
6175
KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6200. Radetić stated there was no mention of such cases of rape during the time he was at
Keraterm. D4226 (Witness statement of Dragan Radetić dated 17 January 2014), para. 47. The Chamber does not find Radetić‘s evidence in this regard to
be credible given his attempt to distance himself from any knowledge of mistreatment of detainees at Keraterm. How possibly a military
prosecutor would be responsible for what was happening in a detention unit after a working hours? Why would he
distant himself? He simply testified that this was not known at the time, otherwise he would have it in his investigating
evidence. Why would he hesitate to react, whyle Sikirica, as the commander, filed a criminal report? If the Chamber
didn’t trust another lawyer, a military prosecutor, whom it would trust? The Chamber really didn’t think twice.
6176
KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6200–6201.
6177
Adjudicated Fact 1197.
6178
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7105.
6179
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2522. KDZ050 provided a list of about 60 men, who he stated were ―men who were taken away
before, who were killed. That is, people that I used to know personally. And this shows also people who were taken out before and those men who were put
on those two buses‖. KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2523; P1949 (Excerpt from KDZ050‘s witness statement dated 19
November 2000). KDZ050 subsequently identified the bodies of some of the 120 men who were taken away in the first two buses on 5 August 1992, which
were recovered from Hrastova Glavica in Sanski Most; though he confirmed that he had heard from other detainees that these men were first taken to
Omarska. KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2527, 2531–2532. See Schedule Incident B.15.3. See also Indictment, Scheduled
Incident B.15.3, fn. 5 (wherein the Prosecution alleges that detainees from Keraterm were among the victims of Scheduled Incident B.15.3).
6180
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2524.
 191

of food, and inadequate medical care. (Still, it doesn’t prove an official intention to be that way,
but only a conditions and capability of the authorities to find out a solution for a sudden
event that wasn’t expected in such an extent!) The Chamber finds that detainees were subjected
to regular beatings by Serb Forces at Keraterm. The Chamber finds that at least one detainee died
as a result of beatings.6181 (#Abuse of the “Serb Forces# term#! The “Serb Forces” was Zigic,
for whom Sikirica didn’t know to what formation he belonged, and made a criminal report
against him, demanding the prosecution!) The Chamber also finds that a number of Bosnian
Muslim women were raped by Serb Forces at Keraterm. (The Defence wasn’t in a position to
challenge the rapes allegations.

(v) Scheduled Incident B.15.1

1806. The Indictment refers to the killing of approximately 150 people in Room 3 at Keraterm on
or about 24 and 25 July 1992.

1807. On 20 or 21 July 1992, the detainees held in Room 3 were relocated to Rooms 2 and 4.6182
Room 3 was then filled with groups of Bosnian Muslim men who arrived in buses from the Brdo
area.6183 A few days later, on or around 24 July 1992, the detainees held in Room 3 were allowed
to leave the room to lie on the grass outside for two or three hours.6184 On that day, there was a
noticeable increase in activity at the camp, with more vehicles and more ―soldiers‖ present, who
were singing.6185 Early that evening, the detainees were brought back to Room 3, and the door
was locked.6186 The detainees in Room 2 were also told to go into their room early, just before
nightfall, face the wall, and stay calm.6187

1808. Later that night, around 9 or 10 p.m., the detainees heard a lot of commotion outside,
including trucks and members of the army entering the camp.6188 A table was set up opposite
Room 3, with a chair beside it and the area was lit up with strong lights; later, a heavy machine
gun was placed on the table, pointed towards Room 3.6189

1809. At around 11 p.m. or midnight, there was a short burst of gunfire towards the window of
Room 3, and later pebbles were thrown at the windows and on the roof.6190 The detainees inside
began to behave strangely, their eyes stinging, and KDZ050, who was at the back of the room,
began to feel faint.6191 He concluded that some kind of tear gas or other poisonous gas must have
been thrown in the room.6192 (#“He concluded”#??? He may have said it, but the Chamber
6181
This finding does not include the persons alleged to have been killed in Scheduled Incident B.15.1, which is discussed below.
6182
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7095; Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3766. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1215.
6183
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2498–2503 (testifying that he surrendered to ―Serb troops‖ on 23 July 1992 at a check-point in
the hamlet of Brkić and was transported to Keraterm camp in two buses with approximately 120 to 130 other Bosnian Muslim men who had surrendered or
been captured in the Brdo area); Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7096–7097 (testifying that he saw their documents being
taken away from them upon their arrival in the camp and after their arrival, this group of people were not permitted to leave Room 3 or to mix with the other
detainees); Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3766. See also Adjudicated Fact 1215. Upon arriving at the camp, the men on the
buses were searched, their valuables and personal documents taken, and their names recorded. They were then made to lie on the grass, and some of them
were beaten; an hour or so later, they were moved into Room 3. KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2501–2502.
6184
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2507–2508.
6185
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2509, 2535; Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3764–3765; P572
(Sketches of Keraterm drawn by Jusuf Arifagić).
6186
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2510.
6187
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7097. See also Adjudicated Fact 1216.
6188
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7097. See also Adjudicated Fact 1217.
6189
Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3764–3766; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7097, 7101. See
also Adjudicated Fact 1217.
6190
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2510.
6191
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2511.
6192
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2511. See also Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3780 (testifying that
he subsequently learned from a survivor from Room 3 that some kind of poisonous gas had been thrown into the room, which meant the occupants could not
breathe and had to try to break out of the room); [REDACTED].
 192

shouldn’t take it for granted!) The detainees began to push against one another, and then broke
the door down in an effort to escape, at which point KDZ050 heard the first burst of machine-gun
fire from outside.6193 The shooting lasted for four or five minutes, and then there was a lull, before
it started again.6194 KDZ050 passed out briefly, but counted three such bursts of machine-gun fire
in total.6195 He heard men crying out for help, as well as the sound of the soldiers outside trying to
prevent people from escaping.6196 Afterwards, he also heard infantry weapons being fired outside
a couple of times.6197 (#Distorted#! There is a clear indication of a riot among the detainees.
To guess the reasons is not a recommendable, and it should have been established by
professionals. It is pity that no live witnesses of this incident was heard in the courtroom, but
such a general assertions are not acceptable in a criminal case! One fact is beyond a
reasonable doubt: there was an attempt to escape, and since the detainees had been captured
in the Brdo area, that could have been a desperate attempt to escape, since they were aware
of their own responsibility for so many victins of their rebellion!)

1810. Detainees in Room 2 heard a burst of gunfire from automatic rifles, the sounds of metal
and glass breaking, and men crying out from Room 3.6198 One of the detainees in Room 2 heard
one of the ―Serb soldiers‖ swearing and saying: ―Don‘t come out or we‘ll shoot. There they are.
They‘re fleeing‖ and then the sound of gunfire.6199 (Another evidence in favour of an escape
attempt.)

1811. The next morning, KDZ050 saw blood all over the inside of Room 3, as well as the bodies
of injured and killed men lying around.6200 He estimated that there were around 200 dead bodies
piled inside and outside the room.6201 (His #“esteem”# is not a judicial fact, there should be an
exact evidence. Not to forget that he was in the opposite Army, or rather a terrorist group
affiliated to this Army, a group that had bean defeated, and therefore he was interested in
lying!) The survivors were then told to come outside, where they stayed on the grass for three or
four hours. 6202 Also that morning, a large truck arrived in the camp and was parked in front of
Room 3.6203 All the detainees were told to come out of their rooms, and those who looked
strongest, including Taĉi and Arifagić, were directed to load bodies from Room 3 into the
truck.6204 It took about an hour to load all of the bodies, and then the truck drove away.6205 In
addition, those who had survived but were injured were also taken away in the truck.6206 Blood
dripped from the truck as it left.6207 A fire engine, or some type of truck equipped with water and
6193
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2511, 2531. See also Adjudicated Fact 1217.
6194
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2512–2514; Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3767; Jusuf Arifagić,
P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7098 (stating that the shooting lasted for about half an hour in total, or even an hour).
6195
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2512–2514.
6196
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2512. See also Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3766–3767.
6197
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2516. See also Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3767.
6198
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7097–7098; Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3766–3767. See
also Adjudicated Fact 1217.
6199
Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3767.
6200
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2516. See also Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7098–7099;
Adjudicated Fact 1218.
6201
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2516–2517. See also Adjudicated Fact 1218
6202
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2516–2517.
6203
Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3768–3769; KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2517. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1218; KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3974 (under seal).
6204
Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3768–3769; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7098–7099 (stating
that the guards were looking for volunteers who ―were not afraid of the dead‖); KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2517–2518. See
Edward Vulliamy, P3777 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7947 (testifying that a detainee told him that he had to clear the bodies from a hangar in
Keraterm after about 200 people had been killed in one night); Edward Vulliamy, T. 21050–21051 (9 November 2011). See also KDZ092, P702 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3974 (under seal).
6205
Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3770; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7098–7099; KDZ050,
P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2517–2518.
6206
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2517–2518; Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3769. See also
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3974, 4066 [REDACTED].
6207
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7098–7099. See also Adjudicated Fact 1218.
 193

a hose, arrived and was used to wash the blood from the ground of Room 3 and the surrounding
area.6208 (#Exaggeration#! Had this witness been at a disposal to the Defence, there would be
established a real number of bodies, particularly taking into account of the time consumed to
load them on the track, since 30 seconds wouldn’t be enough to board one body. Anyway,
this exaggeration about 200 of killed is not important, as is important to establish wtehter it
was an attempt to break out and escape, or a mere murder without necessity! There is
sufficient evidence that it was an attempt to break through and escape!)

1812. Those who survived were returned to Room 3 after it was cleaned.6209 The following night,
Arifagić heard shooting again from Room 3, although it did not last as long as the first time.6210
At one point he heard someone shouting: ―What are we going to do? There are survivors here‖,
and he then heard about 40 individual shots.6211 Once again, the next morning, a truck arrived and
bodies were loaded on to it.6212 In addition, the occupants of Rooms 1, 2, and 4 were ordered to go
outside, and those who had injuries were told to board the truck, as were the six men who had been
involved in loading the bodies, and it drove away.6213 A day or two after the shootings, Arifagić
saw Simo Drljaĉa in the camp, near Room 1.6214 Some of the detainees approached him, and he
said that ―this‖ should not have happened and they had his assurances that they would not be
harmed again.6215 (#Official vs. crime#! So, the most important official distanced himself from
the incident, seems to be sorry and promised to undertake a security measures not to have it
repeated. Certainly, the incident was not a part of any policy of the RS!)

1813. Defence witnesses testified that the killing incident which occurred in Room 3 at Keraterm
(i) resulted from a rebellion or an escape attempt by the detainees;6216 or (ii) were spontaneous
killings by local battalions or reservists, committed in revenge for Serbian soldiers killed at the
frontline.6217 The Chamber considers that these claims are speculative and hearsay; therefore, the
Chamber does not find the evidence of these witnesses to be reliable. (#Not intended#! But,
certainly, the Chamber didn’t have any evidence that it was a premeditated move within the
state policy, and that is the most important from the standpoint of this Defence. Once it is
excluded, all other reasons and inferences are irrelevant from the standpoint of this
President.)

1814. The Chamber took judicial notice that a minimum of 190 persons were killed in Room 3 at
Keraterm.6218 Furthermore, in assessing the overall number of persons killed during this incident,
the Chamber has considered witness testimony that (i) there were approximately 200 dead bodies
piled inside and outside of Room 3 the morning after the killings there;6219 and (ii) out of
6208
Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3770; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7099. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1219.
6209
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2518 (testifying that out of approximately 570 Bosnian Muslim men who were detained in Room
3, about half of them survived the killings in Room 3).
6210
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7100.
6211
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7100.
6212
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7100.
6213
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7100.
6214
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7104.
6215
Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7104.
6216
D4242 (Witness statement of Draško Vujić dated 24 January 2014), para. 8 (stating that he received information that there had been a ―rebellion‖ of
detainees at Keraterm and that firearms were used and many people killed as a result); Dušan Janković, T. 47282–47283 (18 February 2014) (testifying that
he heard there was a mutiny by the detainees at Keraterm and in the process, the mutineers were killed); D4226 (Witness statement of Dragan Radetić dated
17 January 2014), para. 49 (stating that he heard that some of the detainees attempted to escape from Keraterm and that some of them were killed as a
result).
6217
D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 24; Milomir Stakić, T. 45286 (17 December 2013) (testifying that according
to his intelligence at the time, as well as information from Drljaĉa, after several Serbian soldiers were killed at the frontline, members of their unit ―raided
Keraterm and killed several dozens of prisoners out of revenge‖).
6218
See Adjudicated Fact 1219.
6219
See KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2516. [REDACTED]. See also P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p.
26 [REDACTED]; P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002, pp. 173, 266 (under seal) [REDACTED].
 194

approximately 570 Bosnian Muslim men who were detained in Room 3, about half of them
survived the killings in Room 3 on or around 24 July 1992.6220 In addition, the Chamber received
forensic evidence to support the deaths of some identified individuals at Keraterm in connection
with the killings in Room 3 on or around 24 July 1992.6221
1815. In weighing the totality of the evidence before it, the Chamber is therefore satisfied that at
least 190 Bosnian Muslim men were killed in Room 3 at Keraterm by Serb Forces on or about
24 and 25 July 1992. (#Not intended, but incident#! Let it be even much less, this is a horrible
crime only if it wasn’t caused by an attempt to break through and escape. Otherwise, it
would be a tragedy of a civil war among neighbours. Had it been an attempt of escape, there
must be taken into account that the guards are also scared and facing a possibility of their
deaths every day. However, what happened in this incident was in a #sharp contrast to
everything what this President had ordered or banned#. Also, there are elements which
indicate that there was really an attempt of an escape, and this can not be dismissed so easy,
since several Muslim witnesses testified that had heard such a noises. In any case, this
incident wasn’t proven to be a premeditated even by the local authorities, let alone the
central one, or the President himself. This can only be a strong evidence against a civil war,
not against this President.)

D04675, Milos about the Muslim forces around Prijedor, 23 May 92 (by mistake 93)

It is very well documented that the area of Prijedor was a battlefield with a very intense armed
skirmishes, with the fear on all the sides, with many combat casualties, and without any
insight into the situation by the central authorities, let alone any possibility to help, influence
or intervene! Let us see how was in at the end of July 92, D3827:
………………………………………

6220
See KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2518 .
6221
See P4409 (Death certificates from Prijedor), e-court pp. 1–14, 17–24, 27–32, 35–38, 41–46, 58–63 (confirming the deaths of 22 identified individuals at
Keraterm camp between 23 July and 28 July 1992); P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 16–20, 23–31, 34, 41 (wherein Mašović
identifies the names of 76 identified individuals who went missing from Keraterm on or around 24 July 1992 and who were later exhumed from various
mass graves, including the Stari Kevljani mass grave, who he links to the killings in Room 3); P5909 (Bihać MUP identification reports concerning Stari
Kevljani mass grave, 30 June 2005), pp. 1, 3–4, 8–12, 16, 19–20, 22–23, 31, 35–36, 43, 49–51, 57–58 (confirming that 21 identified individuals who went
missing from Keraterm, and were linked to the killings in Room 3, were exhumed from the Stari Kevljani mass grave). See also P4850 (Witness statement
of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), Annex A, pp. 8–10; P4893 (Bihać MUP report on Stari Kevljani exhumation, 18 January 2004); [REDACTED];
P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002), pp. 29–30, 259–268 (under seal) (stating that, at the time of the
creation of his report, none of the bodies of the victims of the incident in Room 3 at Keraterm had been exhumed, but finding that 69 identified individuals
died during the incident based on witness testimony and court rulings declaring individuals as officially dead in connection with this incident); Nicolas
Sébire, P694 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7358–7359.
 195

(#Combat casualties as civilian# POW-s as civilians#! What happened with those captured
during these two months combats? They had to be detained somewhere. How the casualties
had been depicted? In these fake testimonies, none of the combat casualties were mentioned,
all had been depicted as a different killings in detention facilities! How the President could
have been liable for such a development which depended exclusively on the conduct of the
local sides, particularly the Muslim one?)

(d)Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.4 and Scheduled Incident B.15.5

1816. The Indictment refers to the use of Trnopolje as a detention facility in Prijedor municipality
between at least 15 May and 30 September 1992. The Prosecution alleges that a number of people
were killed at Trnopolje and at various places after they were taken from the camp between 28
May and October 1992.

i. Arrival of detainees and control over detention facility

1817. Trnopolje is located in the village of Trnopolje, which lies to the southeast of Prijedor town
and on the train line from Prijedor to Banja Luka.6222 The camp was established in a former
elementary school and its surrounding buildings, which included a gymnasium, shop, the former
municipal centre, and an attached theatre, known as the ―dom‖.6223 (Trnopolje was a
predominantly Muslim settlement, 2,677 Muslims and 583 Serbs, and the Muslim refugees
were in a position to get out in the villages and collect food, which they did!)

1818. Trnopolje became operational on or around 24 May 1992 during the attacks on Hambarine
and Kozarac when residents of those areas who had been displaced from their homes were brought
there.6224 (This is an #incorrect interpretation#, since it implies that somebody displaced the
residents of those areas. There is a sufficient evidence that the population escaped from the
fights which appeared after the Muslim attacks on the reservists in Hambarine, and on 24
May, an attack from Kozarac. At the first moment the population was gathering in the
Prijedor town, which was under the Serb control. After the City core was full and without
sufficient place, the population was redirected to Trnopolje. There is a sufficient evidence
that it was so. Even Wulliamy wrote in his interview with two Muslims that Trnopolje was
what the Defence sais, a reception centre, see P3788!) Initially, primarily Bosnian Muslim and

6222
P569 (Map of Prijedor municipality). See Adjudicated Fact 1223.
6223
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6867, 6873; KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3407–3409; P535 (Aerial
photograph of Trnopolje); P537 (Photograph of Trnopolje school); P538 (Photograph of Trnopolje); P539 (Photograph of Trnopolje); P540 (Photograph of
Trnopolje); Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7747–7748; P3894 (Sketch drawn by Idriz Merdţanić of Trnopolje); Idriz
Merdţanić, T. 21455–21457 (16 November 2011); D1924 (Aerial photo of Trnopolje camp annotated by Idriz Merdţanić); P3528 (Witness statement of
Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 65–68; P3543 (Excerpt from video clip of visits to Omarska and Trnopolje, with transcript); KDZ054, P682 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6222–6223. See Adjudicated Fact 1226; D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court p. 2.
6224
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7755, 7759 (testifying that he arrived at Trnopolje on 26 May 1992); P684 (Witness
statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 8; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7105; KDZ038, P676 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6867, 6873–6874; Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6688–6690; D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report
concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 2–3, 28; P2968 (Report of Prijedor SJB, January 1993), p. 5; D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir
Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 22; Milomir Stakić, T. 45239 (17 December 2013). See also KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić),
T. 3997 (under seal); Adjudicated Facts 1102, 1224, 1225; P3898 (Photograph of detainees at Trnopolje); P3899 (Photograph of detainees at Trnopolje);
P3900 (Photograph of detainees at Trnopolje).
 196

Bosnian Croat women, children, and elderly were brought to Trnopolje; however, later Bosnian
Muslim and Bosnian Croat men of military age were transferred there from Keraterm and
Omarska.6225 (Only those that hadn’t been found responsible for the rebellion, and there was
1,773 of them, many more than those sent to Manjaca!)

1819. The President presented evidence that Trnopolje was an ―open reception centre‖ where
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat refugees went voluntarily and stayed for their own protection
and shelter during the conflict.6226 The President argues that due to its ―civilian nature‖, Trnopolje
was only partially enclosed by a fence.6227 The Chamber considers that although Trnopolje was
not entirely fenced in, a barbed wire fence surrounded parts of the compound.6228 (But, in this
compound there was no any people, the compound was a storage of the construction tools,
and this is not disputable!) Further, the Chamber considers that despite Trnopolje being ―open‖
in certain areas, detainees were not allowed to leave unless under certain circumstances.6229 For
instance, some people were allowed to leave the camp to collect food from nearby villages, as long
as they left their identification documents at the camp or were escorted by guards.6230 (There was
a war zone out of the Trnopolje reception centre, who would be responsible if something
happened to the refugees? It seems that whatever the Serbs did, no matter how noble, they
are guilty!) Others could leave only if they were authorised for release by Drljaĉa or the camp
commander, Slobodan Kuruzović, or if they were transferred to another camp.6231 Furthermore,
Trnopolje was otherwise surrounded on all sides by guards, machine-gun nests, and armed posts
pointing guns towards the camp.6232 (This was a lie, without any corroboration!) Idriz
6225
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7756, 7787–7788; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12468–
12469 (under seal); KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6876–6877; P4101 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999),
e-court pp. 8, 12–13; KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5748–5750; P5555 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 29 September 1992), p. 4; P2968
(Report of Prijedor SJB, January 1993), p. 5; P3785 (Excerpt of ITN video clip of journalist visits to Omarska and Trnopolje, with transcript), pp. 7–15;
P3780 (Excerpt from ITN video clip of men at Trnopolje). See also Adjudicated Facts 1103, 1225, 1296; D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning
collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 2–4, 28–29.
6226
D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 2–3, 28–29 (describing Trnopolje as an ―Open Reception Centre‖
established to house citizens who did not want to participate in the fighting, to ensure their safety and protect them from attacks by ―extremists‖); P3549
(Report of the Commission for Inspecting Collection Centres and Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992), p. 3; D4195 (Witness
statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 22; D4008 (Witness statement of Slavko Puhalić dated 11 November 2013), paras. 6–7, 18–19;
Slavko Puhalić, T. 43397–43399, 43402–43405 (13 November 2013), T. 43452, 43454–43455 (14 November 2013); D4009 (Video footage of Trnopolje);
D3968 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 9 August 1992); P3784 (Video clip of interview with Radovan Karadţić) (in which the Accused states that Trnopolje is a
―place for people who have no place to stay‖). See also D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 38; D4230 (Witness
statement of Ĉedo Šipovac dated 18 January 2014), para. 16; Charles McLeod, P712 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7326–7327; P636 (ECMM
Report, 3 September 1992), pp. 1–2. Mevlujdin Sejmenović testified that he entered Trnopolje twice unobserved. Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20487–20488
(27 October 2011).
6227
See Defence Final Brief, paras. 1596–1597. The Accused further submits that Penny Marshall and her team of journalists chose to set up her camera and
interview detainees inside the tool shed area at Trnopolje which was surrounded by barbed wire, but in fact all of the people they filmed were ―free‖. See
Accused Opening Statement, T. 845–847 (1 March 2010).
6228
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7750–7751, 7838–7851 (testifying that a barbed wire fence was erected when Keraterm
and Omarska were disbanded to contain the detainees transferred to Trnopolje from those camps and that Penny Marshall filmed detainees behind the fence
surrounding the shop building at Trnopolje, but that this was not the same fence erected temporarily to contain the detainees transferred from Keraterm and
Omarska); P3909 (Sketch of Trnopolje marked by Idriz Merdţanić); P3910 (Excerpt of video clip of Trnopolje); Edward Vulliamy, P3777 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7946, 7963, 8141–8144 (testifying that on 5 August 1992, he and Penny Marshall interviewed detainees at Trnopolje who had been
transferred from Keraterm and Omarska and were detained behind a barbed wire fence and in a ―serious state of decay‖, but there seemed to be two barbed
wire fences at Trnopolje—one that was older and one newer); P3780 (Excerpt from ITN video clip of men at Trnopolje); P3781 (Excerpt from ITN video
clip of men at Trnopolje); P3697 (Video footage of visit of foreign journalists to Trnopolje); Edward Vulliamy, T. 21051 (9 November 2011); Mevludin
Sejmenović, T. 20491 (27 October 2011), T. 20581 (28 October 2011) (testifying that there was a fenced-in area used for agricultural equipment, but also
that detainees transferred from Keraterm were specifically placed inside a wired area, called the ―quarantine‖ by camp authorities, and were strictly
prohibited from leaving the area); KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6983–6984; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
BrĎanin), T. 12464–12465 (under seal); KDZ054, P682 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6306–6309. See also Adjudicated Fact 1230.
6229
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7748, 7750–7751; KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3350–3352;
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12464–12465 (under seal); KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3997
(under seal); Milomir Stakić, T. 45239 (17 December 2013); Charles McLeod, P712 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7326–7327. See P2637
(Report of Prijedor SJB, 1 July 1992); P2741 (Decision of Prijedor Crisis Staff, 2 June 1992); P2915 (Summary of conclusions of Prijedor's Executive
Board, 29 April–17 August 1992), p. 3; [REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 1230 .
6230
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6875; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7757–7758; Mevludin
Sejmenović, T. 20489–20490 (27 October 2011), T. 20580 (28 October 2011).
6231
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6875, 6984; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7750; Nusret Sivac,
P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6691; P2741 (Decision of Prijedor Crisis Staff, 2 June 1992); [REDACTED].
6232
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7751–7755; P3909 (Sketch of Trnopolje marked by Idriz Merdţanić); Mevludin
Sejmenović, T. 20491 (27 October 2011), T. 20581–20582 (28 October 2011); KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3351–3352;
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12464–12465 (under seal); Charles McLeod, P712 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
 197

Merdţanić, a physician brought to Trnopolje, testified that ―apart from the checkpoints and the
guards, even if only a simple line had been drawn on the ground, nobody would dare cross that
line‖.6233 Stakić further testified that people were not brought to Trnopolje, or held there,
voluntarily.6234 The Chamber considers that in light of evidence of the security conditions
surrounding the camp, the poor conditions and mistreatment which occurred there, and the
testimony of witnesses who were held there,6235 it finds that Trnopolje was a detention facility for
the duration of its existence. (This is #not correct# finding. Probably there was some shortages
in food and other needed stuff, but it was the same with all population and the army. Also,
there may have happened some rude expressions and conduct, but generaly, it was a chelter.
Ed Vulliamy should be trusted, since he was really an anti-Serb reporter!)

1820. Trnopolje was established by the Prijedor Crisis Staff.6236 The camp commander was
Slobodan Kuruzović, a former TO commander and member of the Prijedor Crisis Staff; he was
referred to in the camp as ―Major‖.6237 Kuruzović and all of the camp guards at Trnopolje wore
military uniforms.6238 Kuruzović stayed in a house on the camp premises and was often seen by
the detainees with his body guards, the Balaban twin brothers.6239 Slavko Puhalić assisted
Kuruzović in the operation of the camp early on.6240

7327. See also Adjudicated Fact 1230. However, Puhalić testified that Trnopolje was not surrounded by soldiers, nor were there machine-gun nests or
armed positions with guns pointed at the camp. D4008 (Witness statement of Slavko Puhalić dated 11 November 2013), para. 21. The Chamber does not
find Puhalić‘s evidence to be credible in this regard. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber considers that he was not forthright with the Chamber on
several occasions and that due to his involvement at Trnopolje, he had an interest in distancing himself from knowledge of conditions there. Puhalic was
not his superior, but vice versa, and he would have an interest to see that his superior is accused of something, and
there was no his interest to distant himself. This is already seen, a Serb witness doesn’t have any chance. However,
there was no any new fenses, but only a partial and already existing fense. The barrels hadn’t been pointed towards
the camp, no evidence except Merdzanic, who was interested in denigrating the Serbs..
6233
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7751. See also KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12464–12465
(under seal) (stating that he did not feel free to leave Trnopolje at any time and people did not leave the camp); KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor
v. Stakić), T. 3997 (under seal) (testifying that ―[i]t was not a place for refugees. It was a camp. There was no freedom there at all‖); KDZ048, P678
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3351–3352 (testifying that he felt imprisoned and was not there of his own free will).
6234
Milomir Stakić, T. 45239 (17 December 2013). The Accused argues that people came to Trnopolje voluntarily and that Stakić did not suggest that they were
brought in forcibly. See Accused Closing Argument, T. 47881–47882 (1 October 2014). The Chamber considers Stakić to be clear that everyone did not go
to Trnopolje voluntarily.
6235
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7751; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12464–12465 (under
seal); KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3997 (under seal); KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3351–3352.
See also Edward Vulliamy, T. 21114–21116 (9 November 2011); Charles McLeod, P712 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7326–7327.
6236
D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 2, 28–29; P2772 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 5 August 1992); D4468
(Confirmation of decisions adopted by Crisis Staff by Prijedor Municipal Assembly, 24 July 1992), e-court p. 6. See Adjudicated Fact 1105. However,
Stakić stated that Trnopolje was not established by the Crisis Staff. D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), paras. 22, 48;
Milomir Stakić, T. 45238–45240 (17 December 2013). The Chamber does not find this evidence to be credible based on the accepted evidence before the
Chamber to the contrary which confirms that the Prijedor Crisis Staff was involved in the establishment of Trnopolje.
6237
P3710 (Decision of Prijedor Crisis Staff, 29 May 1992) (in which Stakić orders that Kuruzović be placed under the ―Regional Command‖); Milomir Stakić,
T. 45239 (17 December 2013) (testifying that Kuruzović was appointed as commander on behalf of the ―army‖); D4008 (Witness statement of Slavko
Puhalić dated 11 November 2013), para. 3; D4468 (Confirmation of decisions adopted by Crisis Staff by Prijedor Municipal Assembly, 24 July 1992), e-
court p. 6 (assigning the duty of providing security for Trnopolje to the ―Regional Command‖); P3536 (Decisions and orders of Prijedor Municipal
Assembly and Prijedor Crisis Staff, published in Prijedor Official Gazette on 25 June 1992), p. 8; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stakić), T. 7759–7760; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5823 (under seal); KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
BrĎanin), T. 12513–12515 (under seal); P4101 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 8; KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3352; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7105; KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić),
T. 3959 (under seal); KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6874–6875; KDZ054, P682 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6224.
See also Adjudicated Fact 1227.
6238
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12513–12515 (under seal); KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3352;
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3998 (under seal); D3968 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 9 August 1992) (reporting that Trnopolje was
secured by the SerBiH Army). See also Adjudicated Facts 1227, 1228.
6239
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6874–6875; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7830–7832; D4008
(Witness statement of Slavko Puhalić dated 11 November 2013), para. 3; P4101 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 8;
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3959–3960 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 1229 (stating that the Balaban brothers were
―well known for their brutality‖).
6240
D4008 (Witness statement of Slavko Puhalić dated 11 November 2013), paras. 3–4; Slavko Puhalić, T. 43409 (13 November 2013) (testifying that he was at
Trnopolje until 11 June 1992 and then went for a spa treatment until 17 July 1992, after which he returned to Trnopolje until around 15 August 1992).
 198

1821. Trnopolje was officially closed at the end of September 1992 but some people remained
there until December 1992.6241 (The Muslim civilians re-opened it several times, and
voluntarily remained there, which is a firm evidence that this wasn’t any “detention” facility.
How anyone can say that there was any enforcement?)

i. Conditions of detention

1822. Detainees were held in poor conditions at Trnopolje.6242 (The whole country was in a
“poor conditions”, it wasn’t only Trnopolje. The country was in the war, and under the
sanctions and without any contact with the world, particularly economic, except with FRY,
which itself was under the sanctions too.) Early on, the buildings at Trnopolje could not house
all of the detainees, so detainees were forced to sleep outdoors in makeshift shelters of plastic
bags, sticks, and blankets.6243 (Nobody forced them, there was no alternative. It is #not fair# to
leave that question this way, as if the Serb authorities had a room, but didn’t give it!) Only
after the majority of the women and children were transferred out of Trnopolje were male
detainees able to sleep inside in the sports hall of the school or elsewhere. 6244 Even then, there
was little space to sleep, no beds or blankets, and detainees had to sleep on the floor.6245 (Nothing
of that was due to a bad will ot the authorities!)

1823. Little or no food was supplied to the detainees by the camp authorities;6246 detainees
received some food which was brought to them by relatives or local residents in the area, but it
was insufficient.6247 Detainees who had money were able to buy bread, but the remaining
detainees had to rely upon others sharing food with them.6248 There was almost no potable water
at Trnopolje, as only one pump existed for the whole camp.6249 There was no running water and
only limited lavatory facilities.6250 Furthermore, there were no facilities to wash and the heat and

6241
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7800; D3110 (ICRC press release, 2 October 1992); P6504 (Report of Prijedor Red Cross,
30 September 1992), pp. 9–10; P2948 (Report of humanitarian organisation, 8 October 1992) (under seal), p. 2; P2968 (Report of Prijedor SJB, January
1993) (stating that Trnopolje remained in operation until November 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact 1224. The Chamber will address the date on which
Trnopolje closed in further details below in this section.
6242
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7756–7760; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12462 (under
seal); Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6783–6784; KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6875–6878;
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3958–3960 (under seal); P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 65–68;
P3543 (Excerpt from video clip of visits to Omarska and Trnopolje, with transcript); P3797 (Excerpt of ITN video clip of journalist visit to Omarska and
Trnopolje); P6503 (Video footage of Penny Marshall's visit to Trnopolje). See also Slavko Puhalić, T. 43403–43404 (13 November 2013).
6243
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6877–6878; KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5749; KDZ014, P674
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12556; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7756–7757; Nusret Sivac, P3478
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6783–6784; P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 8; KDZ054, P682 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6223–6224; Charles McLeod, P712 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7327; P3797 (Excerpt of ITN video clip of
journalist visit to Omarska and Trnopolje). See also D4008 (Witness statement of Slavko Puhalić dated 11 November 2013), para. 11; Slavko Puhalić, T.
43418 (13 November 2013); see Adjudicated Facts 1231, 1236.
6244
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6877–6878.
6245
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7757; KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6877–6878; P684
(Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 8; P3885 (Photographs at Trnopolje). See also Adjudicated Fact 1236.
6246
P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 8; KDZ054, P682 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6249, 6309–6311;
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12462 (under seal); P4101 (Statement of KDZ611 to investigators dated 26 June 1995), e-court
p. 30; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7757–7758. See Adjudicated Fact 1234; P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054
dated 13 June 2002), e-court p. 3.
6247
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7757–7758; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12462 (under
seal); KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6875–6876; KDZ054, P682 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6311–6312;
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20489–20490 (27 October 2011); P3797 (Excerpt of ITN video clip of journalist visit to Omarska and Trnopolje); D4008 (Witness
statement of Slavko Puhalić dated 11 November 2013), para. 11.
6248
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6876; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12462 (under seal); Idriz
Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7757–7758; KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5749; KDZ014, P674
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12556.
6249
Adjudicated Fact 1233.
6250
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6876; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7759; P684 (Witness
statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 8; KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3959–3960 (under seal). See
Adjudicated Fact 1232.
 199

flies made the situation unbearable.6251 Due to the lack of food and unsanitary conditions, lice and
scabies were rampant, and the majority of detainees suffered from dysentery.6252 There was no
organised medical care at Trnopolje but some medical assistance was provided by non-Serb
detainees held in the camp, including Merdţanić and Azra Blazević, a veterinarian.6253 They
worked out of a clinic at the camp but were not provided with any medical supplies by the camp
authorities until the International Red Cross arrived.6254 (The same was with the medical
institutions in Prijedor, which depended on the ICRC, and also the authorities appealed to
other humanitarian organisations to help. So, nothing was induced by the authority’s
resentment or negligeance. See what the Medical Center in Prijedor wrote to the Muslim
humanitarian organisation Merhamet: D1928

Why it was so difficult to understand in what kind of troubles was the country in a war and
under a sanctions? The Chamber is #selectively collecting# and #distorting# evidence, so tu
fit to the Prosecution needs!)

i. Treatment of detainees

Beatings and killings

1824. Although the scale of abuse at Trnopolje was less than that at Omarska, mistreatment was
common there.6255 Camp guards cut male detainees with knives and beat them with baseball bats,

6251
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6876.
6252
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7759, 7778; P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 8;
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3959 (under seal); P3797 (Excerpt of ITN video clip of journalist visit to Omarska and Trnopolje);
P3903 (Photograph of a detainee at Trnopolje); P3904 (Photograph of a detainee at Trnopolje); see Adjudicated Fact 1235 (stating that as many as 95% of
the detainees at Trnopolje suffered from dysentery). Detainees also noted that the condition of people who arrived at Trnopolje from the Omarska and
Keraterm camps was much worse. They had all lost a lot of weight, were dirty, unshaven, had dysentery, and many of them had been severely beaten and
could not even walk. KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12468 (under seal). But see D4008 (Witness statement of Slavko Puhalić
dated 11 November 2013), para. 23 (stating that he did not witness these issues and given that he sat with the ―people in the camp […] he would have caught
these diseases as well‖ if they had existed there).
6253
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7730–7731, 7747–7748; Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20489 (27 October 2011); P3528
(Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), p. 66; P3797 (Excerpt of ITN video clip of journalist visit to Omarska and Trnopolje); P684 (Witness
statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 8; KDZ054, P682 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6249–6252. See also D4008 (Witness
statement of Slavko Puhalić dated 11 November 2013), para. 11.
6254
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7747–7748, 7785–7786; Idriz Merdţanić, T. 21473–21474 (17 November 2011); P3797
(Excerpt of ITN video clip of journalist visit to Omarska and Trnopolje); KDZ054, P682 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6249–6250.
 200

iron bars, rifle butts, or whatever they had at their disposal.6256 Detainees who were taken out for
questioning would often return badly beaten and covered with blood.6257
1825. A laboratory inside the clinic at Trnopolje was used for interrogations and beatings.6258
Merdţanić could hear the sounds of camp guards beating and verbally abusing the detainees
there.6259 Merdţanić treated some of the detainees after they were beaten there and photographed
them without anyone knowing.6260 Beatings also occurred outside and in a boiler room in the
school building.6261 On one occasion, Ţigić beat and kicked one of the detainees who had arrived
from Keraterm and no one tried to stop him.6262 (#Arrested, criminally reported#! Obviously,
this happened before Zigic was arrested. All the above described misconduct could have
been reported to Kuruzovic, and he would find a remedy. However, the Defence is of an
opinion that there is too many #exaggerations#, encouraged by a permissive attitude of the
Chamber! Namely, there was no remedy for a lying witnesses!)

1826. Detainees, including female detainees, at Trnopolje were verbally abused, insulted with
ethnic slurs, and threatened with death.6263 Detainees were forced to fight each other in the
camp.6264 Detainees were selected to bury dead bodies in nearby villages and in the camp.6265
They were also taken out to perform forced labour.6266 (#All uncorroborated lies#! How
possibly these inmates from Trnopolje could have been “forced” to a frontline, while the
closest frontline was distant from Trnopolje a hundred and more kilometres? However,
burring a bodies was an obligation for all the citizens, as well as other works, not related to
fights. Namely, according to the law, all able bodied people had to have either military, or
working compulsory obligation. Since the Muslims and Croats hadn’t been under the
compulsory combat duties, the working obligation remained!)
1827. Detainees at Trnopolje were killed inside and outside the camp.6267 A number of detainees
died as a result of the beatings by the guards during interrogations.6268 At least two detainees died
in Trnopolje as a result of lack of medical care.6269 Others were killed by camp guards or other

6255
See Adjudicated Fact 1237.
6256
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7766–7768; P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 9;
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3958 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 1237.
6257
KDZ054, P682 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6250; P4101 (Statement of KDZ611 to investigators dated 26 June 1995), e-court p. 30; P684
(Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 9. See also Adjudicated Fact 1237. Further, Puhalić stated that there were some individual
incidents of mistreatment at Trnopolje in the beginning before military security was introduced there; however, Puhalić reported these incidents to
Kuruzović who went to the police and asked that these incidents be investigated. According to him, after military security was introduced, these incidents
no longer occurred. D4008 (Witness statement of Slavko Puhalić dated 11 November 2013), para. 25.
6258
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7766, 7780–7785; P3905 (Sketch drawn by Idriz Merdţanić of clinic in Trnopolje); P3906
(Photograph of interrogation room in Trnopolje) (showing blood stains on the walls from the beatings); P3907 (Photograph of interrogation room in
Trnopolje); Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20491 (27 October 2011).
6259
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7766, 7780–7785.
6260
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7766–7767, 7769–7774, 7780–7785; P3896 (Photograph of a detainee at Trnopolje);
P3897 (Photograph of a detainee at Trnopolje).
6261
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7768.
6262
Safet Taĉi, P693 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 3770–3773; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7768–7769.
6263
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3995–3997 (under seal); Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7760–
7761; P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 9.
6264
P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 9.
6265
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12466 (under seal); P4101 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p.
9; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7786–7787; P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 9;
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20489 (27 October 2011).
6266
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7786–7787, 7838. However, the Chamber notes that the Indictment only covers forced
labour at the frontlines.
6267
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7785–7787, 7804; P4101 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-
court p. 9; P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 9; KDZ054, P682 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6253–6254;
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2524–2525, 2532; KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6870–6873; P3908
(Excerpt of video clip of Trnopolje, with transcript), p. 2. See also P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002)
(under seal), p. 313; see Adjudicated Fact 1242.
6268
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7773–7774, 7785; P3908 (Excerpt of video clip of Trnopolje, with transcript), p. 2. See
also Adjudicated Fact 1242.
6269
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7785–7786; P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 8;
P3908 (Excerpt of video clip of Trnopolje, with transcript), p. 2.
 201

soldiers who entered the camp.6270 For instance, on the first night of KDZ038‘s detention in the
shop building at Trnopolje, a uniformed Serb he knew took out an elderly man, Sulejman Kekić,
and beat him.6271 Later that night, the same man was taken away, KDZ038 heard two shots, and
the man did not return.6272 (#Some killed some#! #Heard, not seen#! #Didn’t return#! What
else could have happened with him? Only killing? Did anyone see his body or buried him? In
any case, even if that happened, this would be an individual crime, not a crime of the system,
for which this President would be liable!) The Chamber is satisfied that this individual was
killed. (Would any court in the countries of origin of the Honourable Judges be satisfied with
this kind of evidence?) KDZ054 recalled one night during his detention when soldiers from a
reserve unit came into the camp and called out six detainees from the Forić family. 6273 They took
them behind the corner of the building and about 10 to 20 minutes later, KDZ054 heard
shooting.6274 Later, the detainees who were selected to bury the bodies confirmed that the six
detainees who had been taken out earlier were shot dead.6275 (All and every single example
indicates a sort of #personal revenge#, which is still a crime, but certainly not induced by the
authorities, which can be liable for a negligeance, incompetence and other ommisions. This
has nothing to do with the President!

1828. Shortly after KDZ038 arrived at Trnopolje on 20 July 1992, a group of men from Bišćani
arrived at the camp on a bus; KDZ038 saw that 12 of the men were called out and sent back to the
bus, which drove them away.6276 Later, he was told by people who had walked some of the way
from the Brdo area to Trnopolje that they had seen the dead bodies of these men in an area called
Kratalj.6277 (How those being in Brdo could have known who were those taken out of
Trnopolje, and how they could have recognized them as bodies?) KDZ038 later spoke to a
man who had been in this group of 12, who told him that the bus drove them back towards
Bišćani, but that it stopped along the way and the men were lined up and shot with some kind of
automatic rifle.6278 He and one other man survived the incident.6279 (A third and fourth hand
evidence! why the survivors didn’t come to testify?)

1829. Furthermore, on or around 8 September 1992, KDZ050 saw some of the detainees taken
out to a nearby fish pond.6280 Shortly afterwards, KDZ050 heard rounds of fire from that
direction, and those detainees never returned.6281 The Chamber is satisfied that these individuals
were killed in this incident. (#Heard, not seen#! #Never returned#! Why would they return,
since the Trnopolje reception centre was on the way to be disbanded and closed, and the
detainees transferred to the Central Bosnia or elsewhere? Not necessarily all shootings were
a criminal events, or executions. There was always some shooting to be heard in a civil war.
This can not be taken for granted, as it is so far: nobody had seen, many “had heard”!)

6270
KDZ092, P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3998–3999 (under seal); KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6880; P684
(Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 9; KDZ054, P682 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6253–6254. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1242. But it is entirely unbelievable for everyone who knew Kuruzovic. And had it been so, it would be
known widely.
6271
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6867, 6880 (testifying that he was in a group of men taken by bus from Bišćani to Trnopolje on 20
July 1992, and put into a shop building at Trnopolje).
6272
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6880.
6273
P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 9; KDZ054, P682 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6253–6254; P4101
(Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 9; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7786, 7804;
Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20488–20489 (27 October 2011).
6274
P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 9; KDZ054, P682 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6253–6254.
6275
P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 9; KDZ054, P682 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6253–6254.
6276
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6870.
6277
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6871.
6278
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6872–6873.
6279
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6871–6873.
6280
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2524–2525, 2532.
6281
KDZ050, P680 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Sikirica), T. 2524–2525.
 202

Sexual violence

1830. There were many incidents of rape at Trnopolje between May and October 1992.6282
During one of these incidents, the perpetrator told the victim: ―Muslim women should give birth to
Serb children‖, and he also told her earlier that ―Muslims were not human beings‖.6283
[REDACTED].6284 [REDACTED].6285 [REDACTED].6286 [REDACTED].6287
[REDACTED].6288 [REDACTED].6289 [REDACTED].6290 [REDACTED].6291
6292 6293
[REDACTED]. [REDACTED]. (Such a protected witness, admitted here due to Rule
92bis, could have lied as much as he wanted!)

1831. Camp guards at Trnopolje allowed men from outside the camp, including Serb soldiers and
other Serbs, to enter the camp and rape women and girls.6294 Detainees assigned to work in the
clinic at Trnopolje, including Merdţanić and Vasif Gutić, treated and counselled many victims of
rape there, including a 12 year old girl.6295 The incidents of rape at Trnopolje caused terrible fear
and mental trauma among all of the detainees.6296 (#Lies, not reported by ICRC#! There was
nothing to prevent the alleged victims of rapes to report it to the ICRC, but there was no
such a reports, because there would be an immediate investigation!)
(iv) Conclusion on conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

1832. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that non-Serbs, including women and children,
were transferred to and detained at Trnopolje by Serb Forces beginning on or around 24 May 1992
until at least 30 September 1992. The detainees were held in poor conditions, including lack of
space, poor sanitary conditions, inadequate medical care, and insufficient food. The Chamber
finds that male detainees at Trnopolje were subjected to beatings by Serb Forces and were forced
to work.6297 The Chamber also finds that a number of women detained at Trnopolje were raped by
Serb Forces, including by the camp commander, Kuruzović. Finally, the Chamber finds that a
number of non-Serbs were killed by Serb Forces in Trnopolje and at various places after they were
taken from the camp between 28 May 1992 and approximately 8 September 1992.6298 (#Deadly
combination#! The “findings” are completely based on 92bis evidence, on adjudicated facts,
6282
P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), p. 8; Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20490 (27 October 2011) (testifying that he heard from other
detainees that rapes of women, including younger women and children, were taking place in the former cinema in the camp); Idriz Merdţanić, P3881
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7759–7764; Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6690. See also Adjudicated Fact
1238. Puhalić also testified that he was aware of rapes committed at Trnopolje in the beginning before the military guard was established by ―unknown
people who were outside any control‖ who broke into the camp. He stated that he reported the incidents to Kuruzović and some of the individuals who
committed the rapes were arrested by the military police, but he did not know if any of them were prosecuted. However, Puhalić stated that it was not true
that people were allowed to visit the camp from the outside. D4008 (Witness statement of Slavko Puhalić dated 11 November 2013), paras. 18, 26; Slavko
Puhalić, T. 43408, 43421–43423 (13 November 2013)
6283
[REDACTED].
6284
[REDACTED].
6285
[REDACTED].
6286
[REDACTED].
6287
[REDACTED].
6288
[REDACTED].
6289
[REDACTED].
6290
[REDACTED].
6291
[REDACTED].
6292
[REDACTED].
6293
[REDACTED].
6294
P684 (Witness statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), p. 8; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7761–7764. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1238. However, on one occasion, on 3 August 1992, Ţigić came to Trnopolje and a guard at the entrance of a room where women from
Omarska were being held ordered the women to lie down because ―Ţigić is coming‖. Ţigić asked the guard where the women were, but the guard cocked
his weapon at Ţigić and told him that there were no women there and forbid him to enter the room. P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22
October 2011), pp. 54–55 (under seal); KDZ093, P705 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 6234–6236.
6295
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7760–7764; see Adjudicated Fact 1239.
6296
See Adjudicated Fact 1241.
6297
However, as noted above, the Chamber notes that the Indictment only covers forced labour at the frontlines.
6298
This finding does not include the persons alleged to have been killed in Scheduled Incident B.15.6 which is discussed below.
 203

and on a several testimonies of a very extreme Muslim adversaries of their Serb neighbours
in Prijedor! Even if some cases really happened, it could only have been an individual crime
committed clandestinely by a disobedient individuum, and nothing in the system enabled this
kind of conduct!)

i. Scheduled Incident B.15.6

1833. The Indictment refers to the killing on or about 21 August 1992 of approximately 200 men
taken from Trnopolje to Vlašić mountain in Skender Vakuf.

1834. On 21 August 1992, a convoy of four buses marked ―Autotransport Prijedor‖, organised by
the Prijedor Crisis Staff and the Prijedor Red Cross to transport people out of Prijedor into
Muslim-held territory, arrived at Trnopolje.6299 Primarily male detainees, including witnesses
KDZ038 and KDZ611, as well as some women and children, were loaded onto them.6300
Kuruzović and members of the intervention squad were present as the detainees boarded the
buses.6301 When the buses were full, they left in the direction of Kozarac, accompanied by
members of the intervention squad and escorted by police and military vehicles.6302 Near Kozarac,
the convoy stopped and was joined by four other buses and eight trucks, which had been loaded in
Tukovi with Bosnian Muslim men, women, and children under orders from intervention squad
commander, Miroslav Paraš.6303 Paraš and Kuruzović spoke to each other during this stop.6304 At
this point, the convoy included eight buses and eight trucks, accompanied by a number of police
vehicles.6305 The convoy continued through Banja Luka and on to Skender Vakuf, moving
towards their final destination, which was the line of separation between Serb and Muslim
controlled territory near Travnik.6306

1835. The convoy stopped a number of additional times on the way.6307 At one stop, one of the
guards on the bus ordered KDZ038 to collect money and valuables from the men on his bus.6308
Members of the intervention squad also collected money and other valuables from the detainees

6299
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6883; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5823–5824 (under seal);
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12472 (under seal); P4101 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court pp.
13–14; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7789–7790; Dušan Janković, T. 47299–47301 (18 February 2014). See also
Adjudicated Fact 1243; [REDACTED]; P4259 (Photograph of Autotransport Prijedor Bus).
6300
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6883; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5823–5824 (under seal);
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12473 (under seal) (testifying that the drivers of the bus were regular civilian drivers and that the
bus he was on also carried two armed men in former JNA uniforms); P4101 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court pp. 13–14;
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7829; Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4619–4620. See
also Adjudicated Fact 1243.
6301
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6884; P4101 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 14. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1243.
6302
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6887; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12473 (under seal) (testifying
that the convoy escorts included men in camouflaged blue police unforms); P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court pp. 14–
15 (under seal); Dušan Janković, T. 47300–47301 (18 February 2014); P2969 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 15 September 1992). See also Adjudicated Facts
1243, 1244; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 6; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 March
2000), e-court p. 10.
6303
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6887, 6896; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12472–12473 (under
seal); P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 15 (under seal); [REDACTED]; Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12711–12713; Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4619–4620. See also Adjudicated Fact 1243.
6304
[REDACTED].
6305
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6896.
6306
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6897; P599 (Map of Trnopolje-Vlašić route); KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
BrĎanin), T. 12473–12474 (under seal); P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court pp. 15–16 (under seal); P4101 (Statement of
KDZ611 to investigators dated 26 June 1995), e-court pp. 30–31, 49; Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4619–4620. See also
Adjudicated Fact 1245.
6307
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6898; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12474 (under seal).
6308
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6898.
 204

and placed them in plastic bags.6309 At another stop, soldiers in olive drab uniforms boarded the
buses and remained for the rest of the journey.6310

1836. Shortly after Skender Vakuf, the convoy stopped again near a stream; young men of
military age were then pulled out of the convoy by members of the intervention squad at Paraš‘s
orders and loaded into two empty buses.6311 The men on KDZ038‘s bus were ordered to line up
outside of the bus.6312 They were then told to board one of two empty buses and to lie on the
floor.6313 KDZ038 estimated that there were 100 men packed on to the first bus.6314

1837. The men of military age on the bus of KDZ611 were separated and loaded into the other
empty bus; some women and older men were allowed to stay on one of the original buses.6315
KDZ611 estimated that there were ―well over 100 people‖ on his bus, which proceeded, behind
the first bus while the rest of the convoy carried on ahead of them, towards Travnik.6316

1838. The buses continued for another 10 to 15 minutes before stopping again on a road flanked
on one side by a steep cliff and on the other by a deep gorge; an area referred to as Korićanske
Stijene.6317 Members of the intervention squad directed the detainees on the bus KDZ038 was on
to disembark, form a column two by two, and walk down the road.6318 After they walked for about
100 metres, the men were ordered to stop, turn left, take three steps forward, and kneel down
facing the abyss.6319 KDZ038 heard a man in police uniform in charge say: ―Here we exchange
the dead for the dead and the living for the living‖ and then shots were fired towards the line of
men at the edge of the gorge.6320 KDZ038 saw people falling down and shouted at his father to
throw himself into the abyss; his father then pushed him into the gorge.6321 KDZ038 then found
himself at the bottom, his ankle broken, and his foot hanging by a tendon.6322 Two men came

6309
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12713; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 6;
P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 18 (under seal); [REDACTED]; KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stakić), T. 6903; Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4619–4620.
6310
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6899–6900; P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 16 (under
seal). KDZ611 noticed a man in an olive-grey uniform with a red beret on his head, carrying a walkie-talkie. KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Kvočka), T. 5826–5827 (under seal); KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12474 (under seal).
6311
[REDACTED]; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12475–12476 (under seal); P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27
February 1999), e-court pp. 17–18 (under seal); P699 (Statement of KDZ611 to investigators dated 26 June 1995), e-court p. 50 (under seal); KDZ038, P676
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6900–6901. See also Adjudicated Fact 1246.
6312
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6900. See also Adjudicated Fact 1246.
6313
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6900–6901. See also Adjudicated Facts 1248, 1249.
6314
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6902. See also Adjudicated Fact 1248.
6315
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12475–12476 (under seal); P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-
court p. 17 (under seal); P699 (Statement of KDZ611 to investigators dated 26 June 1995), e-court p. 50 (under seal). See Adjudicated Fact 1247 (stating
that a truck appeared and the women and children were told to board it; another truck arrived and departed with more detainees but left behind a number of
people who had been at Trnopolje and some residents of Kozarac).
6316
P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court pp. 17–18 (under seal); see KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin),
T. 12475–12476 (under seal) (testifying that there were ―around 150‖ men on his bus). Nasić testified that he was on this convoy but when it stopped and
some of the men were told to get off, he stayed on it. At a place near Vlašić, the convoy stopped again and the remaining people were told to disembark and
they walked from there to Travnik. According to Nasić, about 150 to 200 men who started out on the convoy did not make it to Travnik. Elvedin Nasić,
P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12714. See also Senija Elkasović, P690 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tadić), T. 4620–4622 (testifying
that after leaving on one of the organised buses from Trnopolje, her bus stopped at a big stone barricade and the passengers were told to get off and walk;
she walked 40 or 50 kilometres to a school in Travnik while others who could not walk remained on the road and somehow were transported to Travnik).
6317
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6903–6905; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5829, 5836 (under seal);
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12479–12480 (under seal); P564 (Photograph of road at Mount Vlašić); P565 (Photograph of
road at Mount Vlašić); P566 (Photograph of road at Mount Vlašić); P567 (Photograph of Mount Vlašić); P568 (Photograph of Mount Vlašić). See also
Adjudicated Facts 1250, 1251.
6318
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6904–6905; KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21142 (under seal). See
also Adjudicated Fact 1252.
6319
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6905; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12481 (under seal); P699
(Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 19 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 1252.
6320
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6905–6906; [REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 1253.
6321
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6906. See also Adjudicated Fact 1255.
6322
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6907.
 205

down into the abyss and shot anyone who tried to escape in the head; KDZ038 pretended to be
dead.6323 He then heard more shooting and saw dead bodies around him.6324

1839. Once the second bus stopped, the men on board, including KDZ611, were told to
disembark by a soldier in a red beret.6325 KDZ611 saw the other bus parked ten metres away.6326
They were ordered to form a column two abreast and to walk for several minutes until they
reached a wooded area with a steep slope on one side of the road and a steep drop on the other
side.6327 The men were ordered to face the drop, to step forward to the edge, and to kneel down, at
which point gunfire was directed at them by members of the intervention squad.6328 KDZ611 was
pushed by the man beside him down the slope.6329 He fell to the bottom uninjured, and continued
to hear the sounds of gunfire for a number of minutes.6330 He saw many other men falling down
the slope to the bottom.6331 Individuals who did not fall into the abyss were pushed into it by the
men shooting at them.6332 Grenades were also thrown into the gorge.6333

1840. When night fell, KDZ038 crawled to the river at the bottom of the gorge and spent the
night there. He roughly bandaged his foot and the next day began to crawl along the river until he
came to a derelict mill where he took shelter.6334 He was later found by some soldiers who took
him to Skender Vakuf, where he was given medical attention and a statement was taken from him
about the killings at Korićanske Stijene; he was then taken by ambulance to a hospital in Banja
Luka.6335 (#Real “Serb Forces”#! So, he was rescued by the real “Serb Forces”# – and those
were the legal Serb Forces under the President’s Army and Ministry of Interior, while
criminals, renegades, paramilitaries weren’t the “Serb Forces”. The similar case was with
Grgo Stojic: once he got in touch with the Serb Forces, from an ordinary Serb peasant
through police, to MD-s, he was saved!)

1841. KDZ611 and another man who had survived the shooting6336 remained hidden in the
woods for two or three days, after which they surrendered to a group of Serb soldiers at a place
called Galica.6337 They were then taken to Skender Vakuf and held with three other wounded
survivors of the incident, and interrogated about what had happened at Korićanske Stijene by both

6323
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6907–6909.
6324
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6908–6909.
6325
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12479–12480 (under seal).
6326
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12480 (under seal); P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 18
(under seal).
6327
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5829 (under seal); KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12480–12481
(under seal); [REDACTED].
6328
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12490 (under seal); P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 20
(under seal); [REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 1256 (stating that the primary perpetrators of the killings at Korićanske Stijene were members of the
Prijedor intervention squad).
6329
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12490 (under seal); P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 20
(under seal).
6330
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12490–12491 (under seal); P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-
court p. 20 (under seal).
6331
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12490 (under seal); P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court p. 20
(under seal).
6332
[REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 1255.
6333
[REDACTED]; KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6908. See also Adjudicated Fact 1255.
6334
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6910–6913.
6335
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6913–6918.
6336
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5833 (under seal); P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court pp. 20–
21 (under seal) (stating that at one point the other survivor he was with, Bahrija Jakupović, went back for a look and told KDZ611 that people from the other
bus were being killed in small groups, rather than lining them up all at once). So, aunt said to uncle, and he back to another aunt. The
family Jakupovic has a prominent place on the lists of criminal reports, and a reputation of a very extreme and
militant people, see D4257; D1743; D4681; D4414, and there is more!).
6337
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5833–5834 (under seal). See P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-
court p. 21 (under seal).
 206

an army officer and the police.6338 They were then transferred to a hospital in Banja Luka.6339
(#EXCULPATOR#Y! Again, the real “Serb Forces”, acting properly!) Why would several
criminals and renegades, who didn’t respect the strictest orders from the President and their
Minister for Interior, be considered as a “Serb Force” while the vast majority of the officials
involved in this case wouldn’t be considered the “Serb Forces” that acted in accordance with
the President’s orders?)

1842. In the hospital, KDZ038, KDZ611, and other survivors were beaten and mistreated by
other patients and by local civilians, police, and soldiers, with the permission of the guards who
were watching them.6340 Later, they were transferred to another hospital at Paprikovac, near Banja
Luka, where they and other non-Serbs were also mistreated.6341 Following his release from the
hospital, and after being interviewed by a judge in Banja Luka about the incident at Korićanske
Stijene, KDZ611 was housed by a Muslim charity in Banja Luka called Merhamet.6342 Later, an
international organisation took him back to Trnopolje to get the necessary papers to permit him to
leave RS, and then on to Karlovac, from where he travelled to a third country.6343 KDZ038
remained in the Paprikovac hospital until 15 October 1992, when he was told that he was free to
leave and, with the assistance of Merhamet, he went to stay at the mosque.6344 The wound on
KDZ038‘s ankle festered badly and his foot was finally amputated.6345 (#Deadly combination#!
#All of this is a massive lie#, simply unbelievable and impossible, since the doctors would
never allow this, and the Red Cross and the Muslim Charitable Society Merhamet were
included in rescuing the survivors! It was so easy to check it, the Chamber missed the
opportunity to do that, which would discredit so many fake witnesses!)
1843. On 22 August 1992, a meeting was held with Paraš, Ţupljanin, Bogdan Subotić, Drljaĉa,
and other high level officials at the Prijedor SJB to discuss the incident at Korićanske Stijene.6346
That day, members of the intervention squad who had been told to go into hiding after the incident
returned to Prijedor and resumed their duties.6347 (6354) Even far before this incident the Minister
for Interior was dissatisfied with such a units within the police, and therefore ordered to
disband them, see: D1534:

As a poorely controlled and sufficiently incompetent, these units had been disbanded by the
Minister Stanisic, which is closely related to this incident!) On 23 or 24 August 1992, members

6338
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12501–12503 (under seal); P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-
court p. 21 (under seal) (providing the names of the other survivors: Midhet Mujkanović, Mehmed Sivac, and Sulejman Kahrimanović and noting that they
also gave a statement to a judge in Banja Luka after they had been released from the hospital).
6339
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5835 (under seal).
6340
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6920; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12503–12504 (under seal).
6341
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6922–6924; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12503–12505 (under
seal); KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5835 (under seal) (testifying that there they also met another survivor of the incident at
Korićanske Stijene, Sanimir Kljajić).
6342
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12509 (under seal). See D4236 (Report of Banja Luka Lower Court, 24 September 1992);
D2044 (Report of Banja Luka Public Prosecutor's Office, 14 September 1992).
6343
KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5835–5836 (under seal); KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12510
(under seal); P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 11 September 1995), e-court p. 37 (under seal).
6344
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6923.
6345
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6922–6924, 6956, 6959 (testifying that during his time in Paprikovac, he met other survivors of
the killings at Korićanske Stijene and gave a statement to the ICRC which he said was not a true statement; he stated that he was constantly watched by
guards when he gave it and they told him not to tell the truth).
6346
[REDACTED]; Dušan Janković, T. 47302–47303 (18 February 2014). See also [REDACTED]; D2041 (1st Krajina Corps combat report, 22 August 1992),
p. 2 (wherein the 1st Krajina Corps Command reported to the VRS Main Staff about the Mount Vlašić incident, including that ―a massacre against
civilians—Muslim men—was committed on 21 August between 1830 and 1900 hours […] by a group of policemen escorting a convoy of refugees to
Travnik‖).
6347
[REDACTED].
 207

of the intervention squad were taken back to Korićanske Stijene to attempt to recover bodies from
the abyss; Drljaĉa and Ţupljanin were both present.6348 Approximately 150 to 200 dead bodies
were seen at Korićanske Stijene after the incident.6349 The attempt to extract the bodies failed as
they did not have the heavy machinery required for such an operation.6350 A second attempt was
made to extract the bodies with a crane but it also failed, as did their attempt to burn the bodies.6351
During the second attempt, some of the bodies were destroyed; members of the intervention squad
then tried to cover the remaining bodies with stones and branches, under the supervision of
Drljaĉa, Paraš, and two other commanders.6352 (There may have been some members of the
Intervention squad, but not the same those who perpetrated the crime.)

1844. Shortly after the incident, the intervention squad was disbanded and its 40 members were sent
on a combat mission to Han Pijesak.6353 (This is #not correct interpretation#. They hadn’t been
sent, they escaped, The squad went hiding in the Kozara mount)
:. On 3 September 1992, the 1st Krajina Corps reported to the VRS Main Staff that Drljaĉa was
responsible for the incident at Korićanske Stijene and that it had caused indignation among
citizens and members of the 1st Krajina Corps, creating a ―dark stain‖, but that it was fortunate that
the ―international community did not find out about it in more detail‖.6354

1845. On 14 September 1992, in response to a request by Mićo Stanišić to initiate an

investigation into the incident,6355 Drljaĉa stated that an investigation could not be carried out
because the officers who had participated in the convoy and incident were currently deployed in
the battlefield.6356 Although an investigation into the incident was initiated,6357 none of the
policemen involved in the incident were held accountable for their involvement.6358 Furthermore,
in November 1993 and June 1994, members of the intervention squad, as well as high officials
involved in the incident, such as Drljaĉa, Paraš, Milutin ĈaĊo, and others in the Prijedor SJB, were
promoted and awarded medals of bravery by the President.6359 (Knowing the technology of
promoting and awarding, this shouldn’t be treated that way. The proposals for awarding a
6348
[REDACTED].
6349
Nenad Krejić, P3760 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 14037–14039; P3767 (Aerial photograph marked by Nenad Krejić); P3768
(Witness statement of Milan Komljenović dated 28 October 2011), pp. 6–7; [REDACTED].
6350
[REDACTED]. See also D4379 (Witness statement of Vladimir Glamoĉić dated 10 February 2014), paras. 19–24.
6351
[REDACTED]; Vladimir Glamoĉić, T. 47240–47241 (17 February 2014); P6673 (Video footage re Korićanske Stijene). See also D4379 (Witness statement
of Vladimir Glamoĉić dated 10 February 2014), para. 33.
6352
Nenad Krejić, P3760 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 14049–14050, 14055; Milan Komljenović, T. 20916–20919 (3 November
2011); P3768 (Witness statement of Milan Komljenović dated 28 October 2011), pp. 9–10, 21–22, 24–25; [REDACTED]. See P3929 (Report of 1st Krajina
Corps, 3 September 1992), p. 4.
6353
Dušan Janković, T. 47303–47304 (18 February 2014) (testifying that disbanding the unit and sending them to the frontline was a compromise as if Drljaĉa
had arrested them, they would have resisted and ―it could not be done without bloodshed‖); [REDACTED]. See D1882 (Letter from Simo Drljaĉa,
14 September 1992); D1885 (Dispatch from Simo Drljaĉa to Stojan Ţupljanin, 13 October 1992).
6354
P3929 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 3 September 1992), p. 4.
6355
P3763 (Order of Banja Luka CSB forwarding order of RS MUP, 11 September 1992); Mićo Stanišić, T. 46411–46413 (4 February 2014).
6356
D1882 (Letter from Simo Drljaĉa, 14 September 1992); D1885 (Dispatch from Simo Drljaĉa to Stojan Ţupljanin, 13 October 1992). See also Adjudicated
Fact 2492.
6357
D2040 (Special report of the 22nd Light Infantry Brigade, 21 August 1992); D2042 (Miloš‘s report re Korićanske Stijene incident, 22 August 1992); D2043
(Record of forensic examination at Korićanske Stijene, 31 August 1992); D2044 (Report of Banja Luka Public Prosecutor's Office, 14 September 1992);
D4236 (Report of Banja Luka Lower Court, 24 September 1992); D1883 (Letter from Banja Luka Prosecutor's Office to Banja Luka CJB, 30 September
1992); P6644 (Letter from Banja Luka CJB to Banja Luka Prosecutor's Office, 1999); Mićo Stanišić, T. 46411–46413 (4 February 2014), T. 46542–46548
(5 February 2014); D4235 (Witness statement of Jevto Janković dated 24 January 2014), paras. 9–10, 12. See P3768 (Witness statement of Milan
Komljenović dated 28 October 2011), para. 4; D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 30.
6358
[REDACTED]; P3768 (Witness statement of Milan Komljenović dated 28 October 2011), pp. 6–7. See also P2958 (Christian Nielsen's expert report
entitled ―The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992‖, 19 May 2011), paras. 327–328.
6359
[REDACTED]; P4261 (Article in the Kozarski Vesnik entitled ―Shoulder to Shoulder with the Army‖, 26 November 1993); P4265 (Compilation of video
footage from various Serbian TV stations, undated, with transcript). The Chamber will discuss in further detail the Accused‘s knowledge of this incident
and subsequent actions in Section IV.A.3.a.v: Accused‘s knowledge of crimes and measures he took to prevent them. See paras. 3346, 3418, 3432.
Furthermore, rather than being treated as a ―rogue police chief‖, as alleged by the Accused during his case, Drljaĉa was rewarded as a hero for his actions in
Prijedor and given more appointments in Banja Luka and Prijedor over the subsequent years. For instance, Drljaĉa was appointed as assistant Chief of the
Banja Luka CSB on 17 January 1994, and later, he was again appointed as Chief of the Prijedor SJB on 27 April 1994. P6638 (Decisions of RS MUP, 17
January 1994 and 27 April 1994); Mićo Stanišić, T. 46517–46518 (5 February 2014); Miroslav Kvoĉka, T. 45631 (20 January 2014); P4261 (Article in the
Kozarski Vesnik entitled ―Shoulder to Shoulder with the Army‖, 26 November 1993); P4265 (Compilation of video footage from various Serbian TV
stations, undated, with transcript); [REDACTED].
 208

number of the members of police and the VRS came, as always, from the grassroots, and the
only that could prevent it was a judicial record of a fine for crimes! There were several
instances to decide before it reached the President.)
1846. The Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that on 21 August 1992, approximately 200
men travelling in a convoy over Mount Vlašić were killed by Serb armed men at Korićanske
Stijene.6360 Furthermore, in assessing the overall number of persons killed during this incident, the
Chamber has considered witness testimony that there were two buses with approximately 100 men
or more on each bus.6361 In addition, the Chamber received forensic evidence to support the deaths
of some identified individuals in connection with the killings at Korićanske Stijene.6362 (This is
not accurate data, nor a reasonable inference: there were many busses and tracks, up to
2,000 people, and there were disembarked about 140 and killed the way it is depicted in the
Judgement. There is no a Serb that can stay calm before this data, and this is a moral stain
and moral responsibility of all the Serbs. But, the criminal responsibility belongs only to
those who commited the crime, because it was clear that there was no any plan, that there
was no any military, or political, or ethnical reason, since the people were moving to the
Muslim controlled zone. But, there is a very persuasive evidence that the robbery and
private criminal interests were present and had been crucial, because all the valuables taken
from the people had ended in the dormitory of the perpetrators!)

1847. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that approximately 200 non-Serb men, some of
whom were taken from Trnopolje, were killed on 21 August 1992 by Serb Forces at Korićanske
Stijene. (The crime was commited by a small group of the police unit, but all the other #Serb
officials acted the most adequate# way, saving and healing the survivors. The Judgement
didn’t mention that at that time the President was in London for the Conference, and as soon
as the President was notified about the crime, he ordered the strictest investigation and legal
action, as several witnesses testified! Finally, but not the least: another Chamber of this
Court RIGHTFULLY ACQUITTED MR. STANI[I], THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR FOR
THIS INCIDENT! HOW A MORE REMOTE OFFICIAL, AS PRESIDENT WAS, COULD
HAVE BEEN KEPT LIABLE FOR THAT SAME INCIDENT!

Another question was: how come the main perpetrator, almost the only one, but certainly a
chief of this “heroic endeavour” got a “guilt plea” status and protective measures??? )

6360
See Adjudicated Fact 1254.
6361
See paras. 1836–1837.
6362
P4437 (Death certificates for 16 individuals reported missing on Mount Vlašić) (under seal); P4421 (Death certificate for Bećir Bešić) (under seal); P4422
(Death certificate for Rasim Bašić) (under seal); P4423 (Death certificate for Almir Fazlić) (under seal); P4424 (Death certificate for Nedţad Ĉaušević)
(under seal); P4425 (Death certificate for Samir Garibović) (under seal); P4426 (Death certificate for Šefik Garibović) (under seal); P4427 (Death certificate
for Zijad Huskanović) (under seal); P4428 (Death certificate for Fehret Jaskić) (under seal); P4429 (Death certificate for Hasan Kararić) (under seal); P4430
(Death certificate for Fahrudin Mujkanović) (under seal); P4431 (Death certificate for Sejad Avdić) (under seal); P4432 (Death certificate for Zijad Tadţić)
(under seal); P4433 (Death certificate for Suad Zulić) (under seal); P4434 (Death certificate for Mesud Zulić) (under seal); P4435 (Death certificate for
Sejad Kadirić) (under seal); P4438 (Death certificate for Midhet Hodţić) (under seal); P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 91–93
(wherein Mašović identifies the names of 55 identified individuals who went missing Korićanske Stijene on 21 August 1992 and who were later exhumed
from Korićanske Stijene); P4640 (DNA reports of persons exhumed from Korićanske Stijene on 3 October 2003); P5911 (DNA reports of persons exhumed
from Korićanske Stijene on 21 July–26 August 2006); P5912 (DNA reports of persons exhumed from Korićanske Stijene on 15–21 May 2003). KDZ611
identified Jasim Fazlić, his brother, eight neighbours with the last name Garibović, Kadir Kararić, and Elvir Kararić as individuals who were with him on the
convoy and were killed at Korićanske Stijene). KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 5830 (under seal); KDZ611, P698 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12511 (under seal); P699 (Witness statement of KDZ611 dated 27 February 1999), e-court pp. 14–15, 19 (under seal). See
also P4851 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), Confidential Appendix B, pp. 16–19 (under seal); P646 (Excerpts from report on
exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002), pp. 63, 68–69, 72–73, 76–78, 84, 86, 95–96, 113–116, 123–124, 142, 148, 169, 176, 181–184, 201,
204–206, 210–213 (under seal).
 209

i. Transfer of detainees out of Trnopolje

1848. Women and children were taken away in convoys from Trnopolje early on until there were
primarily only men left in the camp.6363

1849. As mentioned above, pursuant to an order issued by Mladić on 3 August 1992, Talić
ordered the authorities at Omarska, Trnopolje, and Manjaĉa to urgently prepare for visits by the
ICRC and teams of reporters.6364

1850. When journalists and foreign delegations visited Trnopolje, camp officials would take
down the barbed wire fence and sometimes a sign would be put up saying that it was a ―collection
centre‖.6365 (This is a #MEAN AND MALICIOUS LIE#, uncorroborated by any document.
That would be widely known it that happened! The area was never fenced, and the barb wire
was all the time only around a compound-storage for a construction tools!) On 18 August
1992, ICRC representatives were denied access to Trnopolje for a week.6366 In that week, officials
prepared the camp for subsequent visits by journalists and ICRC representatives by organising
numerous convoys, including the convoy to Mount Vlasić on 21 August 1992, to transfer Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats out of Trnopolje in order to empty the camp.6367 (#Distorted#! The
objective was not “to empty the camp”, but to comply with the three-party agreement on a
unilateral release of civilians, signed in London, as it is confirmed in the ICRC document,
see: D3110:

So, a noble and charitable agreement and it’s realisation is depicted as a cunning move
aimed to deceive somebody. Again, #testimonies of the Muslim adversaries contra ICRC
documents# are more powerful than a genuine contemporaneous documents!?) The convoys
transferring detainees out of Trnopolje were organised and secured by the Prijedor Crisis Staff,
Prijedor SJB, Banja Luka SJB, and the VRS.6368 ICRC re-gained access to Trnopolje on 26
August 1992 and began registering detainees for the first time.6369 Let us see P807, p. 3
…………………………………………………

(NOTA BENE: “”…to enter these camps again!” Therefore, that was not for the first time
they visited the camps! This is not correct assertion in the Judgment. The ICRC had been

6363
KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6876–6877 (testifying that he watched the convoys of buses and trucks leaving from the camp,
carrying women and children, and sometimes tried to get on board, but was unable to board).
6364
P5461 (VRS Main Staff Order, 3 August 1992); P5460 (Order of 1st Krajina Corps, 3 August 1992). See also paras. 1404, 1784.
6365
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7793; KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6879.
6366
P807 (Address by ICRC President at the London Conference, 26 August 1992), p. 3.
6367
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7789–7791; Idriz Merdţanić, T. 21395–21398 (16 November 2011); P3901 (Photograph
of detainees at Trnopolje); P3902 (Photograph of detainees waiting to board a truck at Trnopolje); KDZ014, P674 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T.
5748–5750; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12517–12518 (under seal); Dušan Janković, T. 47301 (18 February 2014). See also
Adjudicated Fact 1296.
6368
P5503 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 18 July 1992); KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6881–6882 (testifying that an intervention squad
known as ―Sarenci‖ would come to Trnopolje whenever one of the convoys was leaving to guard the convoys as the people were being loaded on to the
buses and trucks and describing that the unit wore a police combat uniform of blue and yellow camouflage with the word ―Milicija‖ in Cyrillic);
[REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 1296.
6369
P807 (Address by ICRC President at the London Conference, 26 August 1992), p. 3; KDZ038, P676 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6882–6883;
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7799. See D4253 (Video footage of interviews at Omarska, with transcript), p. 9. See
also P6585 (SRNA press release, 22 August 1992) (reporting that authority over Trnopolje had been handed over to the Red Cross in the course of the day
pursuant to a decision by the RS President).
 210

allowed and even encouraged by the President personally, repeatedly, many times, to access
every single place under the Serb control. These documents are already known: P03505

See: D00101

See D01853:

See D01874, p.1 of 23 September 92

So, as early as 6 June 92 the President authorised his Minister for Health to commit to the
agreement, which served as a basis for the engagement of the ICRC throuout the entire
period of war. And the Manjaca camp administration, and the Commander himself,
deserved the official thanks for being cooperative and well minded.
See: D01872; See D01875, See D00103, see D04740, see D01876, see D04821, see: D01850 see
D03110, p. 1 of 2 October 92:
 211

So, this #contemporaneous and genuine document# from an international organisation that
hadn’t been understanding the Serb position and problems, is in contrast to everything that
the Prosecution, and now the Chamber find about Trnopolje.
Therefore, there had been the only one week of a standstill of the regular visits, certainly
without and against the President’s orders.
 212

1851. Trnopolje was officially closed at the end of September 1992, but some detainees stayed
there longer so that they could be registered and leave.6370 (This is an evidence that the people
decided by themselves to be in Trnopolje, because nobody would register them while in their
homes.) A large convoy from Trnopolje was organised by the ICRC on 1 October 1992; 1,560
people were transferred from Trnopolje to a reception centre in Karlovac.6371 All of the detainees
transferred in this convoy were required to sign documents relinquishing their property rights in
Prijedor to Serbs.6372 (And this is another #horrible lie#, which disqualifies withness
Merdzanic and many others. First, had it happened, it would be recorded in the ICRC
document (D03110) Second, the President had already annulled any such a statement
pertaining to the property matters. Third, even the Chamber accepted that there was no any
transference of private property whatsoever!) It was only after signing these documents that
they were permitted to leave.6373 (No ends of the false testimonies: on one hand, there are the
accusations for an “ethnic cleansing”, on the other hand the assertions that the local
authorities made many obstacles to those who wanted to leave, including many papers, and
finally a demand to hand over properties! Why would anybody collect so many papers and
documents, , if didn’t want to leave? And even and allegedly to give up properties?)
According to the Prijedor Red Cross, over 23,000 people had been ―housed‖ at Trnopolje by the
end of September 1992.6374

1852. Some detainees remained at Trnopolje until the end of 1992.6375 (They remained there
#by their own will#, as those coming to the Center from the beginning!) On 2 December 1992,
Kirudja co-ordinated a convoy of 600 to 800 people out of Trnopolje to Dvor, in Croatia.6376

a. Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.5

1853. The Indictment refers to the use of the Miška Glava Dom as a detention facility in Prijedor
municipality between 21 and 25 July 1992.

i. Arrival of detainees and control over the detention facility

1854. Located in the village of Miška Glava, the Miška Glava Dom was used as a detention
facility in Prijedor from around 21 to 25 July 1992.6377 Miška Glava Dom was a cultural club
which had been transformed into a command post staffed and guarded by members of the Miška
Glava TO.6378

6370
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7791, 7800; D3110 (ICRC press release, 2 October 1992); P6504 (Report of Prijedor Red
Cross, 30 September 1992), pp. 9–10; P2948 (Report of humanitarian organisation, 8 October 1992) (under seal), p. 2. See also Adjudicated Fact 1224.
6371
D3110 (ICRC press release, 2 October 1992); Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7791, 7800, 7834–7835; P684 (Witness
statement of KDZ054 dated 14 March 2000), e-court p. 9; P6504 (Report of Prijedor Red Cross, 30 September 1992), pp. 9–10. See P786 (Third notebook
of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 13.
6372
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7800, 7834–7835; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7106,
7133–7134.
6373
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7800, 7834–7835; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7106.
6374
P6504 (Report of Prijedor Red Cross, 30 September 1992), p. 9.
6375
P2968 (Report of Prijedor SJB, January 1993), p. 5 (stating that Trnopolje remained in operation until November 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact 1224. In
a meeting with international representatives on 3 October 1992, it was brought to the attention of Okun and other ICFY representatives that more than 1,000
people entered Trnopolje ―voluntarily‖ after it ―had been emptied‖ a few days prior with the departure of the large convoy on 1 October. P786 (Third
notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 20.
6376
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 74, fn. 187; P3833 (UNPROFOR Memo, 8 December 1992).
6377
P598 (Map of Prijedor area); Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5215, 5217–5218, 5226; Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12693–12695, 12698; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 3. See also Adjudicated
Fact 1102.
6378
P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 3; Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5219–
5220. See also Adjudicated Facts 1257, 1258. The secretary of the local commune had his office at Miška Glava Dom and local commune meetings were
held there. Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5215, 5217, 5219.
 213

1855. Around 21 July 1992, a group of approximately 114 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were
captured by Serb soldiers and transported in buses to Miška Glava Dom.6379 This group had been
part of a column of between 200 and 300 men and boys walking in the direction of Bihać.6380 The
column was attacked by Serb soldiers in the Kalejevo woods and it broke apart.6381 A group from
the column, including Nermin Karagić and Elvedin Nasić, ran into the woods near Miška Glava
and were surrounded by about 20 soldiers dressed in olive-grey JNA uniforms and blue reserve
police uniforms.6382 The group was lined up in four columns, searched, and ordered to throw all of
their possessions in a pile on the ground.6383 They were then led to the road, where a van was
brought to take them in groups to Miška Glava Dom.6384 Three men tried to escape on the way to
the van, one of whom was shot.6385

1856. When they arrived at Miška Glava Dom, the detainees were locked in a room that had
served as a café.6386 Their names were recorded by an officer.6387

ii. Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

1857. Detainees were held in the café at Miška Glava Dom for between three to five days.6388
The room was small and so overcrowded that detainees had to sit in a crouching position, with
their knees to their chests and their arms around their legs.6389 It was stiflingly hot.6390 While at
Miška Glava Dom, detainees received little to no food and they had to ―earn‖ drinking water by
singing songs about Greater Serbia.6391 (#Deadly combination#! There is no any evidence
except these 92bis! So, the Muslim extremists (because those who hadn’t been extreme,
continued to live in Prijedor until 94 and 95.) are free to lie as much as they wanted!)

1858. Detainees were regularly called out of the café to a smaller room to be interrogated and
were beaten by soldiers with their fists and rifle butts.6392 They suffered concussions, bleeding,
and heavy bruising.6393 Karagić heard the moaning of his father as he was being beaten and when
his father returned, he was covered in bruises.6394 Karagić also saw a man named Islam Hopovac

6379
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5213–5215, 5223; Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12691,
12693. See also Adjudicated Fact 1259.
6380
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5211–5212 (testifying that the column consisted of adult men and boys his age (17 years
old)); Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12690, 12723.
6381
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5213; Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12690; P697
(Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 3.
6382
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12690–12691; Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5213–
5214, 5219–5220; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 3.
6383
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5214; Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12691; P697
(Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 3.
6384
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5214–5215; Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12691.
6385
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5215 (testifying further that he heard later that the other two men were killed in Sanski
Most); Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12691, 12700; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995),
e-court p. 3. The Chamber notes these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedule A or Schedule B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.
6386
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12693; Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5215, 5218; P697
(Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 3.
6387
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5218; Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12693; P697
(Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 3. See also Adjudicated Fact 1259.
6388
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5218; Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12694; P697
(Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 3.
6389
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5220, 5225; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p.
3.
6390
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5220.
6391
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5219–5220 (stating that the detainees were given a single loaf of bread and a packet of
sweets to share amongst all of them); Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12709–12710 (testifying that he was given nothing to
eat during his detention at Miška Glava Dom).
6392
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12694; Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5220–5221; P697
(Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 3. See also Adjudicated Facts 1258, 1259, 1260.
6393
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5220–5221, 5223. See also Adjudicated Fact 1260.
6394
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5220–5221.
 214

beaten until he was ―black and blue‖.6395 Detainees were also beaten when they went outside to go
to the bathroom.6396
1859. At one point, a man whose son was allegedly killed by Muslims in Rizvanovići entered the
room and called out ten men from Rizvanovići, including Ismet Hamulić, and said he would ―do
the same‖ to them; these men were never seen again.6397 In addition, at least three men were taken
out of the room by soldiers and did not return.6398 (#Did not return# how many outcomes and
reasons could have been? This should not be sufficient to conclude that they had been killed,
and beside that, a #personal revenges# can not be allocated as a responsibility of the
authorities, particularly a distanced ones!)

1860. On around 25 July 1992, the remaining detainees were put on to two buses and transferred
to the Ljubija football stadium.6399
(iii) Conclusion

1861. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims, including minors, were
detained at Miška Glava Dom by Serb Forces from around 21 July to 25 July 1992. The Chamber
also finds that detainees were held in poor conditions characterised by lack of space and
insufficient food and were subjected to severe beatings by Serb Forces. (#Deadly combination#!
To keep somebody between three to five days, it looks like the civilians had been housed
while the combats were around. However, the Defence couldn’t check anything, since all
about this incident C.20.5 was based on the Rule 92bis and adjudicated facts, and the
Defence was helpless in this case!)

(f) Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.6 and Scheduled Incident A.10.8

1862. The Indictment refers to the use of the Ljubija Football Stadium as a detention facility in
Prijedor municipality on or about 25 July 1992.6400 The Prosecution alleges that a number of men
were killed at the Ljubija Football Stadium and surrounding areas on or about 25 July 1992.6401
i. Arrival of detainees and control over the detention facility

1863. On or around 25 July 1992 in the afternoon, Bosnian Muslim civilians who had been
detained at Miška Glava Dom were transferred by bus to the Ljubija Football Stadium.6402 Ljubija
Football Stadium was located at the entrance to Gornja Ljubija.6403 On the way to the stadium,
6395
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5223.
6396
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12693.
6397
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5221–5225 (further testifying that he could not recall if the man was wearing a uniform or
civilian clothing); Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12695, 12723–12724; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated
15 January 1995), e-court p. 3. The Chamber notes these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedule B of the Indictment with respect to this detention
facility. See fn. 13.
6398
P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 3; Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12723–
12724 (testifying that three men were taken out of the room by soldiers from Banja Luka and were never seen again); Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5221–5225 (testifying that a man from Cazin and a man from Višegrad were taken from the room and that he heard the
sounds of these two men being killed outside and saw a soldier in an olive-grey uniform take three other detainees from the café one by one, and each time,
the soldier returned to the café alone with blood on his knife and glove). The Chamber notes these killings are not charged pursuant to Schedule B of the
Indictment with respect to this detention facility. See fn. 13. (Because even the Prosecution didng believe that!)
6399
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5225–5226; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p.
3; Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12695. See also Adjudicated Fact 1261; Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.6.
6400
In its Final Brief, the Prosecution notes a typographical error in the Indictment for Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.6, namely that it omitted to allege the
year as 1992. See Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, p. 43, fn. 642.
6401
The Chamber notes that these killings are alleged under Schedule A of the Indictment. However, they are killings related directly to the Ljubija Football
Stadium listed as Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.6 in the Indictment.
6402
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12695–12696; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court
p. 3; Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5226–5227. See also Adjudicated Facts 1102, 1261.
6403
P569 (Map of Prijedor municipality); Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12696–12697; Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5227; P563 (Map of Ljubija-Briševo) (on which Karagić identified the stadium as photograph number 2). See also Ivo Atlija,
P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5634; P3688 (Excerpt from video clip of aerial flyover of Prijedor).
 215

one of the buses stopped at the entrance to an iron ore mine near Gornja Ljubija.6404 (All #92bis
evidence#.) A policeman named ―Simo‖, soldiers wearing dark blue and black camouflage
overalls, and members of a ―Special Forces intervention squad‖ boarded the bus and began to beat
and kick the detainees.6405 The bus then continued on to the stadium, and the detainees were
ordered off. 6406 (#Deadly combination! All 92bis evidence.#)

1864. Upon arriving at the stadium, children were separated from the other detainees and held in
a building that served as a changing room for athletes.6407

1865. Ljubija Football Stadium was guarded by Bosnian Serb policemen, members of the
military, and members of the intervention squad who accompanied the buses.6408 A guard in
civilian clothes, who was called ―vojvoda‖, was also present at the stadium.6409
i. Treatment of detainees

1866. As they exited the bus, the detainees were beaten by civilians who had assembled at the
stadium, as well as by soldiers and members of the intervention squad and police, with metal rods,
rifle butts, baseball bats, and other implements.6410
1867. Some detainees were ordered to bend forward against a brick wall surrounding the
stadium and were kicked until there was a stream of blood running along the wall.6411 Karagić
was kicked in the face and from behind; he sustained a broken nose and hit his head against the
wall.6412 Detainees were made to raise their arms so that their hands were positioned on top of the
wall; the driver of the bus then walked on top of the wall, stepping on their fingers.6413 While
being beaten, the detainees were forced to sing songs about Greater Serbia.6414 (There is no such
a song!) For several hours, the soldiers beat the detainees until some of them died.6415 (#Not
corroborated# by any document, depending only on 92bis evidence!)

1868. A group of men were singled out from the detainees at the wall and taken to a wire fence
surrounding the stadium to be killed.6416 (All #92bis evidence#.) Karagić witnessed at least one

6404
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12695–12697 (testifying that the mine was located at ―Ljubija Zeljezne Rude‖, a different
location than the ―Kipe‖ mine); P569 (Map of Prijedor municipality).
6405
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12695–12696; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court
p. 3; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 9.
6406
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12696.
6407
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5228, 5234, 5236 (testifying that he only heard children had been separated later from the
children themselves and that although he was only 17 years old, he was not sent to the changing room; in addition, one Serb detainee was allowed to go to
the changing room later and survived); P563 (Map of Ljubija-Briševo) (on which Karagić identifies a white two-story building that served as the changing
room in photograph number two).
6408
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12698–12700, 12702 (testifying that he recognised a local reserve policeman called
―Stiven‖ and a soldier named Predrag Vasiljević); P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 4; Nermin Karagić, P651
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5231 (testifying that there was a ―Major‖ in an olive-grey uniform and a military police officer in a camouflage
uniform with a white belt). See also Adjudicated Facts 1078, 1262.
6409
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5231.
6410
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12698–12699 (testifying that there were civilians assembled at the entrance to the stadium
who helped beat the detainees when they arrived); P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 4; Nermin Karagić, P651
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5228, 5230 (testifying that detainees on his bus were ordered to run into the stadium past the bus driver as he beat
them). See also Adjudicated Fact 1263.
6411
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5228, 5230–5231, 5233.
6412
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5233, 5235.
6413
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5235, 5241–5242.
6414
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5235, 5241.
6415
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5236.
6416
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5227, 5233–5234 (testifying that he saw two or three men, including Ismet Avdić and Ferid
Kadirić or Kadić taken to the fence; Karagić could not say how many men were singled out and taken to the fence but estimated that there were ―a lot of
people there‖); P563 (Map of Ljubija-Briševo). See also Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12699; KDZ092, P702
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3930–3931 (under seal) [REDACTED]; Adjudicated Fact 1079.
 216

detainee being shot.6417 Furthermore, Nasić‘s cousin, Irfan Nasić, was singled out, sent to the
fence, and shot by Stiven with a pistol at close range.6418 Nasić saw a guard nicknamed ―Duĉa‖
fire at Muharem Petrovac, splitting his head in two.6419 (All #92bis evidence.#) Nasić also saw a
third man shot and killed.6420 Nasić was then beaten on the head with a metal baton by a soldier
and lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness, he was ordered to move the bodies of
the three men who had been killed.6421 (#Deadly combination# All 92bis evidence. This kind of
allegation should have been presented at the courtroom and exposed to a verification
through the cross examination!)

1869. The surviving detainees were then lined up in columns, with their hands behind their necks,
and forced to board a bus as they were beaten further by soldiers with baseball bats.6422 Some
detainees were ordered to load the dead bodies on to the bus.6423 Karagić thought that one of the
bodies he was made to carry was his father‘s, but he was not sure as the body was missing half of
the skull.6424 As Karagić was carrying the bodies, he saw a pile of between 15 and 20 bodies that
were already in the back of the bus.6425 After loading the dead bodies on to the bus, the detainees
had to sit in the bus with their heads down, while the soldiers shouted ethnic slurs at them. 6426 The
detainees were then transported to the ―Kipe‖ mine.6427 (#Deadly combination! All 92bis
evidence.#)
1870. The Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that at least 15 detainees were killed at
Ljubija Football Stadium.6428 The Chamber also received forensic evidence to support the deaths
of three identified individuals who were detained at Ljubija Football Stadium on or around 25 July
1992.6429 Furthermore in assessing the total number of detainees killed at the stadium, the
Chamber has considered witness testimony that there were between 15 to 20 dead bodies loaded
on to the bus before the detainees were transferred out of the stadium.

i. Conclusion

1871. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that on or around 25 July 1992, Bosnian Muslims,
including minors, were transferred to and detained at Ljubija Football Stadium for several hours
by Serb Forces, and that while held there, the detainees were subjected to severe beatings by Serb
Forces. The Chamber also finds that at least 15 detainees were killed by Serb Forces at Ljubija
Football Stadium on or around 25 July 1992. (#Deadly combination#! Based only on a few 92bis
testimonies? Even if there was a single slap, it is unacceptable, but there is no sufficient

6417
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5233–5235 (testifying that the detainees were ordered to look towards the wall, but Karagić
looked up and saw a member of the military police wearing a multi-coloured uniform and white belt shoot three bullets into one man at the fence). See also
Adjudicated Fact 1079.
6418
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12695, 12698–12699 (testifying that Stiven had asked if any of the men had weapons and
someone said that Irfan Nasić had a ―zolja‖, however Irfan Nasić did not have any weapons); P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January
1995), e-court p. 4. See also Adjudicated Fact 1078.
6419
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12699–12700; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court
p. 4. See also Adjudicated Fact 1078.
6420
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12700; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 4.
6421
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12701; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 4.
6422
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12701–12702.
6423
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5237. See also Adjudicated Fact 1080.
6424
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5238–5239 (testifying that he recognised his father‘s pale blue jumper on the torso, and
that the body had the same build as his father).
6425
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5237.
6426
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5239.
6427
P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 4; Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5244. See
also Adjudicated Fact 1082.
6428
See Adjudicated Fact 1081.
6429
P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 34–35 (confirming that the bodies of Ismet Avdić and Muharem Petrovac were exhumed from
a mass grave in Redak in 2000); Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5247–5249 (testifying that a year and a half later, he
identified his father‘s body at the exhumation in Redak and that a DNA analysis later confirmed that it was his father). See also P646 (Excerpts from report
on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002), pp. 26–29 (under seal); Nicolas Sébire, P694 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7356.
 217

evidence about who were those Muslims, why they had been detained, what did it mean
“minors”, since we saw from Vuliamy’s report that the Muslims mobilised even 13 years old
boy… Also, what does it means, “for several hours” while it was clear that it was the combat
zone, which required removal of the civilians out of this zone? However, there is a regular
combat report of 15 July 1992 confirming the existence and permanent activities of the
Muslim armed groups in Prijedor, see D1942:

All of the #combat casualties# there had been depicted by the Muslim witnesses-members of
the Muslim Army, as a detainees killed while detained. It was impossible to have somebody
killed at a stadium and not to have it public! See what iwas reported on 17 July 92 by the
1.KK intelligence: D1941:

So, not only the military and police forces in Prijedor had to oppose the internal terrorist
groups, hidden in the woods and dug-outs, but they had to face a DTGs from the Bihac
region, which made the #area of Prijedor a constant battlefield#!)

(iv) Scheduled Incident A.10.7

1872. The Indictment refers to the killing of a number of men in the Ljubija iron ore mine Kipe
on or about 25 July 1992.6430

1873. On or around 25 July 1992, at least 50 detainees from Ljubija Football Stadium were put
on a bus, provided by a local public transport company and guarded by numerous armed
soldiers.6431 They were taken to an iron ore mine southwest of Ljubija referred to as ―Kipe‖
(―Kipe mine‖).6432

1874. The bus stopped at Kipe mine between 8 p.m. and 10 p.m. and the soldiers called the
detainees off the bus in groups of three and shot them.6433 The dead bodies were thrown into a
hole in the ground.6434 As Nasić and two other men were getting off the bus, four other detainees
broke a window and tried to escape, distracting the soldiers.6435 In the confusion, Nasić and the
6430
The Chamber notes that these killings are alleged under Schedule A of the Indictment. However, they are killings related to the Ljubija Football Stadium
listed as Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.6 in the Indictment.
6431
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12701–12702; Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5241, 5245
(testifying that the bus was a local ―Autotransport‖ or ―Autoservice‖ bus with approximately 50 seats and all the seats and aisle were full); P697 (Witness
statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 4 (stating that about 90 detainees were put on a ―double bus‖). See also Adjudicated Fact
1082.
6432
P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 4; Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5242–
5245; P563 (Map of Ljubija-Briševo); Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12697. See also Adjudicated Fact 1082; P569 (Map
of Prijedor municipality); Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5592–5594 (noting the location of the mine on a video clip); P3689
(Video footage of destroyed buildings and monuments in Prijedor).
6433
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12702–12703; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court
p. 4; Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5243–5246. See also Adjudicated Fact 1083.
6434
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12703, 12705–12706; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-
court pp. 4–5. See also Adjudicated Fact 1085.
6435
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12703 (testifying further that of the four men who managed to escape the Kipe mine, ―only
two are currently alive‖); P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 4; Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5246.
 218

other two men were not shot, and Nasić hid in the hole between the bodies and pretended to be
dead. 6436 While this was going on, Karagić jumped through the broken bus window.6437 He
managed to run away without being shot because the soldier guarding the bus was changing his
ammunition clip.6438 As he was fleeing, Karagić recognised two other detainees from the bus who
had also managed to escape.6439 (Why he didn’t testify? Looks rather like a movie. And if the
guards fired during this escape, which would be legitimate, this would be an incident in this
Indictment!)

1875. After the commotion, one of the soldiers said that some of the men were still alive so they
illuminated the area with flashlights to ensure that everyone was dead.6440 If they noticed any
survivors or heard moaning, the soldiers shot them again while cursing their ―Muslim
mothers‖.6441 Nasić was still lying in the hole but he was not hit by any bullets.6442 Once the
soldiers were certain that everyone had been killed, they left.6443 Nasić returned to the site a few
days later and the hole had been covered with dirt and he saw blood and pieces of clothing and
shoes.6444

1876. The Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that all of the detainees on the bus, save Nasić
and Karagić, were killed.6445 The Chamber also received forensic evidence to support the deaths
of some identified individuals who were executed at Kipe mine on or around 25 July 1992.6446

1877. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that about 50 non-Serbs were killed by Serb Forces
on or about 25 July 1992 at Kipe mine. (#Some killed some#! This is not a serious presentation
of a case! Neither the story sounds convincing, nor there is mentioning any name of
perpetrators, which would have to be the case since they knew each other very well, nor
there are any document to corroborate this story of the two. This is too serious case, with
references and consequences to the entire future of the region, and there shouldn’t be
anything “easy to sell”, through the Rule 92bis and adjudicated facts! Finally, there is no any
connection with the President!)

a. Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.7

6436
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12703; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court pp. 4–5.
6437
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5246.
6438
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5246. See also Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5614.
6439
Nermin Karagić, P651 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5246–5247 (testifying further that he heard later that other detainees had managed to
escape).
6440
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12703–12706 (stating that the soldiers also used the headlights of a car to illuminate the
area); P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 5.
6441
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12705–12706.
6442
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12705–12706; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court
p. 5.
6443
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12706; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court p. 5.
6444
Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12710; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court pp. 5–6.
Ivo Atlija testified that ―just after the attack on Briševo‖ he came across a heap of bodies, possibly as many as 200, at Kipe mine. He knew about the
killings there because he met Karagić after he escaped. Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5611–5614. See also P3684
(Photograph of mass grave in Redak).
6445
See Adjudicated Fact 1084. The Chamber however notes the evidence before it in this case establishing that there were additional survivors to Nasić and
Karagić in this incident. See para. 1874.
6446
P646 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002), pp. 28–29 (confirming that in 2000, the bodies of 64 individuals
were exhumed from the Kipe mine site and 21 individuals were identified; for 63 of the 64 bodies, the forensic experts determined that the cause of death
was a gunshot wound) (under seal); Nicolas Sébire, P694 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7355–7358; P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of
Amor Mašović), pp. 34–36; P4415 (Death certificate for Sabahudin Kadirić). See also Elvedin Nasić, P696 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
12706–12707; P697 (Witness statement of Elvedin Nasić dated 15 January 1995), e-court pp. 4–5 (testifying that the following men were detained with him
and killed that night: Reuf Fikić; Abdulah (―Dule‖) Muhić; Rasid Medić; Suad Mulalić, Islam Hopovac; Islam Hopovac (mentioned in many
documents, as an extremist); Besim Hegić; and others with the surnames Muhić, Hamulić, Jamastagić, Kadirić, and Kekić); Nermin Karagić, P651
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5247 (testifying further that a year and a half after the executions at Kipe mine, he identified the exhumed body of
Islam Hopovac at the Redak grave).
 219

1878. The Indictment refers to the use of the Prijedor barracks as a detention facility in Prijedor
municipality between at least May and June 1992.

i. Arrival of detainees

1879. Located in Urije, the Prijedor Barracks, also known as the Ţarko Zgonjanin barracks, was
used as a transition detention facility in Prijedor in June 1992.6447 Prijedor Barracks was one of
the locations in Prijedor used by the military and civilian police to investigate and interrogate
suspects.6448 (#Legal and obligatory#! What is wrong with that? There was a terrorist
rebellion causing a horrible consequences so far from the front line, that interrogations were
inevitable, to separate a responsible one from those cought by accident because they had
been present!)

1880. In early June 1992, KDZ026 was arrested and detained at Prijedor Barracks for a few
hours; while there, he recognised another man detained there.6449

1881. Around 9 June 1992, KDZ392 92bis (a #very extreme family#, leading the rebellion!)
and his mother and father were captured in Bešići by soldiers wearing camouflage uniforms.6450
They had been trying to reach the Sava River in order to cross over to Croatia.6451 (#Combatants
only#! A many thousands of the Prijedor Muslims didn’t try to “reach the Sava River”
because didn’t participate in the rebellion. This family did, and this is so obvious from the
documents, and from this escape too!) At the time, the father of KDZ392 had a pistol with him
but KDZ392 and his mother were not armed.6452 After being captured, KDZ392 and his parents
were taken to Prijedor Barracks.6453 On the way, the soldiers captured two other men, a father and
son named Suad and Fehid Trnjanin.6454 En route, KDZ392 also observed traces of burning in all
of the villages inhabited by Bosnian Muslims along the main road leading from Prijedor to Banja
Luka; while the villages approaching Omarska and at the exit of Prijedor inhabited by Serbs were
not burned.6455 (#The only reasonable inference# is that from the Serb houses nobody
attacked the Army. There is missing an unbiased and comprehensive review of what was a
cause for the detention of those people, and what was the difference between them and the
others that hadn’t been detained ever, which is far more than 90% of the Muslim population
in Prijedor!)

(ii) Treatment of detainees

6447
P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 2–4; P3532 (Map of Prijedor with photographs); P3533 (Photograph of barracks in Prijedor);
P3534 (Photograph of barracks in Prijedor); KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2633, 2648 (under seal); P608 (Map of Prijedor
town); KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1840 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Facts 1102, 1264. Defence witnesses testified
that the Prijedor Barracks was not set up as a ―prison‖ and that no civilians were detained there. D4226 (Witness statement of Dragan Radetić dated 17
January 2014), para. 27 (stating further that Prijedor Barracks was only used for holding suspects); Slavko Budimir, D4463 (Transcript from Prosecutor
v. Stakić), T. 12946 (testifying that he did not see any civilians being detained at Prijedor Barracks when he visited from time to time). However, the
Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable based on the evidence before the Chamber to the contrary which suggests that non-Serb civilians were
brought to the Prijedor Barracks and detained there for a short period before being transferred to other detention facilities. In reaching this conclusion, the
Chamber also considered that Radetić was not forthright with the Chamber on several occasions.
6448
KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21108–21109 (under seal).
6449
KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1840 (under seal).
6450
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2628–2629, 2632, 2648 (under seal); P607 (Map of Prijedor).
6451
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2622, 2642 (under seal).
6452
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2627, 2630–2631 (under seal).
6453
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2629–2630, 2632 (under seal).
6454
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2629–2630 (under seal).
6455
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2646–2647 (under seal).
 220

1882. While held at Prijedor Barracks, detainees were interrogated and mistreated by soldiers
and military and civilian police.6456

1883. When KDZ392 and his parents arrived at the barracks, they were hit and made to kneel
down in the field outside of the barracks with their hands behind their heads.6457 KDZ392 was
taken to a building while his mother and father remained in the field.6458 He could hear the
soldiers shouting ethnic slurs outside, and when his father entered the building, he was covered in
blood and one side of his nose had been slit.6459 KDZ392 and his parents were then taken to the
prison building in the barracks.6460 Despite being injured and physically exhausted, they did not
receive medical treatment.6461

1884. Detainees were held at Prijedor Barracks for a short period before being transferred to
Keraterm or Omarska.6462

(iii) Conclusion

1885. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that non-Serb civilians were detained at Prijedor
Barracks by Serb Forces in June 1992. (#Combatants, not civilians#! The Chamber doesn’t
have any basis to conclude that they were “civilians”, since there is a firm evidence that they
had been involved in the armed rebellion, causing the war in Prijedor, in the status of
terrorists, being respobsible for many deaths. The mere fact they escaped towards Croatia
confirms that there was a founded reason to capture and detain them. Also, there is no
connection to the President, since he didn’t decide to start the war in BiH and certainly not
in Prijedor!) To find evidence about Med.392@ The Chamber also finds that detainees at
Prijedor Barracks were subjected to beatings and deprived of medical treatment. (What a
“medical treatment” for such a short period?)

1. Scheduled Incident D.17

1886. The Indictment refers to the destruction of 18 mosques and two Catholic churches in
Prijedor between at least May and December 1992.6463

1887. The Chamber recalls its finding that Serb Forces burned and destroyed the Ĉaršijska
mosque in Prijedor town on 30 May 1992 during the attack.6464 (#Whose attack?# Wasn’t it a
very famous Muslim attack on Prijedor? Wasn’t the Sarsijska mosque usrd as a military
object, as was every single mosque in the combat zones?) As it was damaged beyond repair, in
July 1992, pursuant to orders from the Prijedor Executive Board, Serb engineers and architects
demolished the remainder of the Ĉaršijska mosque, as well as houses in the area, and removed the
rubble.6465 The Chamber recalls that the Zagrad mosque in Prijedor town was also burned and

6456
KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21108–21109 (under seal); KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2633–
2635 (under seal).
6457
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2633–2634 (under seal).
6458
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2634 (under seal).
6459
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2634–2635, 2638–2639, 2645 (under seal) [REDACTED].
6460
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2638 (under seal).
6461
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2625–2627, 2638 (under seal) [REDACTED].
6462
KDZ392, P707 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kvočka), T. 2645, 2647–2648 (under seal) [REDACTED].
6463
The religious sites identified in Schedule D.17 are the (1) Kozaruša mosque, (2) Stari Grad mosque, (3) Ĉarakovo mosque, (4) Hambarine old mosque, (5)
Ĉaršijska mosque in Prijedor town, (6) Zagrad mosque in Prijedor town, (7) Bišćani mosque, (8) Gornja Puharska mosque, (9) Donja Puharska mosque, (10)
Rizvanovići mosque, (11) Breziĉani mosque, (12) Ališići mosque, (13) Zecovi mosque, (14) Ĉejreci mosque, (15) Gomjenica mosque, (16) Kevljani
mosque, (17) Kamiĉani mosque, (18) Kozarac-Mutnik mosque; as well as the Prijedor town Catholic church and the Briševo church. Indictment, Schedule
D.17.
6464
See para. 1606.
6465
P3484 (Decision of Prijedor Executive Board, 21 July 1992), pp. 1–3; Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6692–6694.
 221

destroyed on 30 May by Serb Forces.6466 (#All within the battle, none before the Muslim
attacks.# The main question is: why not other non-Serb civilians? Why so many Croats. And
a bit less Muslims from the Prijedor area were in the VRS throughout the war? Why so
many Muslims stayed in Prijedor until 94, and then asked to be allowed to leave after some
Muslims butchered six Serb policemen? Why some remained in Prijedor the entire time?
Why less than 5% of the Muslim population was subject to the police-army investigations?
What should be expected that some of these 5% would testify, particularly if not cross
examined?)

1888. The Chamber recalls that the Mutnik mosque, as well as other mosques in Kozarac, were
destroyed during the attack on the area by Serb Forces at the end of May and June 1992.6467 The
Chamber further recalls that the mosque in Kamiĉani was set alight by Serb Forces between 24
and 26 May 1992.6468 (All of it after 22 May and the beginning of the armed conflict
instigated by the Muslim extremists in Hambarine, and within the fights! #None before the
Muslim attack#!)
1889. Additionally, the Chamber recalls that the mosque in Hambarine was shelled during the
attack on Hambarine in May 1992, and again during the attack on the village in July 1992, by Serb
Forces.6469 The Chamber also recalls that the Rajkovac mosque was shelled in late July 1992.6470
The Chamber further recalls that the mosque in Bišćani was destroyed on 20 July 1992, and that
the mosque in Rizvanovići was destroyed in the summer months, before August 1992.6471 The
Chamber also recalls that the mosque in Ĉarakovo was destroyed on 23 July 1992 by Serb
soldiers.6472 (#Abuse of religious objects#! The Chamber should also have in mind that
mosques were a very suitable military objects, for firing from it, and also that many mosques
served as military storages. But the main objection is such a general assertion concerning
“Serb Forces”. As we all know very well, in this civil war everyone was armed, but not all of
the armed Serbs were the “Serb soldiers”. In a criminal case Prosecution should be
supposed to be quite specific, and a chamber should establish beyond reasonable doubt that
it was the “Serb soldier”, and not an armed civilian.)

1890. In addition, the Donja Puharska mosque in Prijedor was blown up and destroyed on
28 August 1992 by Serb Forces; the explosion occurred within ten minutes of the explosion that
destroyed the Catholic church in Prijedor town.6473

1891. The Chamber took judicial notice of the facts that within the summer months of 1992, the
mosque in Gornja Puharska was razed to the ground,6474 the minaret of the mosque in Kozaruša

6466
See para. 1606.
6467
See para. 1639.
6468
See para. 1643.
6469
See paras. 1666, 1681.
6470
See para. 1681.
6471
See para. 1706.
6472
See para. 1684.
6473
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6606–6608; P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 81–82; Drasko
Vujić, T. 46079–46080, 46082–46083 (28 January 2014); P3564 (Photograph of destroyed mosque in Prijedor); P3565 (Photograph of destroyed mosque in
Prijedor); P6613 (Photographs of destroyed mosque in Donja Puharska, Prijedor); D4381 (Prijedor Basic Court's on-site investigation report, 29 August
1992). See also P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the
Karadţić case, formatted records), e-court pp. 231–232; Adjudicated Fact 1284.
6474
See Adjudicated Fact 1292. See also P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖
prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted records), e-court pp. 229–230.
 222

was badly damaged,6475 and that the new mosque in Kevljani was completely destroyed by
mines.6476
1892. The Prijedor SJB reported that by September 1993, not a single Bosnian Muslim place of
worship remained in Prijedor.6477 (#No Serb officials liable#! The Prijedor SJB belonged to the
authorities, and certainly wasn’t responsible for what happened to the mosques. As a matter
of fact, the very same document named by the Chamber sais that what happened was out of
the intentions and control of the authorities. This is a document for the internal purpose, and
not for the public, and the Chamber didn’t do it correctly, and have hidden the right sense of
the document: see D04010

The Chief of the SJB was not happy because of that!

……

(#Serb officials vs. crime#!There is no doubt that the Chief of the Prijedor SJB in his “strictly
confidential report# was critical of the features, not jubilant, and we see the reasons for the
irregularities. And this is an official position, against any unlawfulness, crimes and chaos!)

6475
See Adjudicated Fact 1291. See also P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖
prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted records), pp. 211–212 (stating that the minaret of the Kozaruša mosque had been destroyed down to its base by a
blast).
6476
See Adjudicated Fact 1293. See also P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖
prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted records), pp. 244–245
6477
D4010 (Report of Prijedor SJB, September 1993), p. 3. See P586 (Map of destroyed mosques in Prijedor).
 223

1893. In regard to the Catholic churches, the Chamber further recalls that on 29 July 1992, the
Catholic church in Briševo was destroyed.6478 Furthermore, the Catholic church in Prijedor town
was destroyed on 28 August 1992 when Bosnian Serb soldiers broke into it and planted explosives
which later detonated and destroyed the church.6479 (#Officials not liable# The Court in this foot
note was the Serb municipal court, which indicates that the authorities didn’t have any
connection with this destruction. Also, taking into account the extent of destruction, it is
evident that somebody without any knowledge did these explosions, since the houses in the
vicinity of mosque, including the Serb houses, were damaged, see D4381:

There should be noticed that the refugees from Croatia and the Muslim-Croat parts of BiH
had many reasons for revenge, since their churches had been all destroyed. For instance, the
Serb refugees in Eastern Bosnia, coming from the Muslim areas only, and in this region
there was not a single Catholic church damaged!) Serb engineers and architects later toppled
the bell of the Catholic church and used heavy machinery to remove the rubble.6480 (It would be
more, and the only correct to quote the reason for which the bell was toppled, see: D4381:

So, had it not been removed, the public would be jeopardized, for it could have fallen!)

1894. According to Riedlmayer‘s reports, a total of 18 mosques and two Catholic churches in
Prijedor were damaged or destroyed during the war.6481 The Chamber notes that with respect to
one mosque, the Gomjenica mosque, Riedlmayer describes it as ―lightly damaged‖ and that it was
6478
See para. 1727.
6479
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6606–6607; P3528 (Witness statement of Kerim Mešanović, undated), pp. 81–82; Drasko
Vujić, T. 46082 (28 January 2014); P3563 (Photograph of destroyed church in Prijedor); D4381 (Prijedor Basic Court's on-site investigation report, 29
August 1992). See also P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the
Karadţić case, formatted records), e-court pp. 251–254; Adjudicated Fact 1285.
6480
Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6693–6694, 6756–6757.
6481
Riedlmayer identified the level of damage with respect to each of the mosques and Catholic churches listed by name in the Indictment: (i) completely
destroyed: Stari Grad mosque, Ĉaršijska mosque, Zagrad mosque, Donja Puharska mosque, Rizvanovići mosque, Breziĉani mosque, Ališići mosque, and
Prijedor Catholic church; (ii) almost destroyed: Ĉarakovo mosque; (iii) heavily damaged: Kozaruša mosque, Bišćani mosque, Hambarine mosque, Gornja
Puharska mosque, Zecovi mosque, Ĉejreci mosque, Kevljani mosque, Kamiĉani mosque, Kozarac mosque, and Briševo Catholic church; (iv) lightly
damaged: Gomjenica mosque. P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared
for the Karadţić case, formatted records), e-court pp. 211, 213, 216, 219, 222, 225, 227, 229, 231, 233, 236–238, 240, 243–244, 246, 248, 251, 255. See
also P4069 (Cultural destruction database), records 214–215, 217–220, 224, 228, 232, 236–237, 239, 241, 245, 247–249, 251, 256–257.
 224

the only mosque in the Prijedor region that still had a roof at the end of the war. 6482 Riedlmayer
states that all of the remaining 17 mosques and two Catholic churches were heavily damaged,
almost destroyed, or completely destroyed. The Chamber therefore finds that 17 mosques and two
Catholic churches were heavily damaged, almost destroyed, or completely destroyed. (And to
whom the Chamber allocates this crime? To the local authorities? To the President? Such an
absurd doesn’t have any precedents!)

1895. The Chamber has considered the evidence it has received which identified Serb Forces as
responsible for the destruction of mosques in Prijedor between May and December 1992.6483 It
also had regard to the fact that almost all mosques in the municipality sustained heavy damage or
were completely destroyed after Serb Forces took over the municipality. (#Wrong! And
drastically incorrect#! A mere “taking over”of #only the Serb municipality# had nothing to
do with it, but the fights that occurred three weeks later and lasted in an intensive degree till
the end of July caused both detention of combatants – not civilians – and destruction of
properties! Even after the “take over” the Serbs controlled only their settlements, while the
Muslims and Croats were free to form their own municipalities and organise their life, and
this process started, but was interrupted by the Muslim attack in Hambarine, and all the
fights afterward! ONLY A COMPLETE BLINDNESS OR MALICE WOULDN’T
DIFFERENTIATE THE #CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES#!) Having weighed these
factors, the Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Serb Forces were responsible for
the attacks on and destruction of mosques and Catholic churches in Prijedor.
1896. Therefore, the Chamber finds that 17 mosques and two Catholic churches were heavily
damaged, almost destroyed, or completely destroyed by Serb Forces in Prijedor between May and
December 1992. (Incorrect! There is no a single evidence that the official “Serb Fosces” did
any of these crimes. But, the Chamber, just like the Prosecution, equalize the entire Serb
population with the “Serb Forces” as a criminal organisation, just as the biased media did!
#No Serb officials liable#!)

(7) Movement of the population from Prijedor and appropriation of property

D01835: Mujad`i}, plans for transfer of population:

1897. Following the attacks on towns and villages in Prijedor between late May and end of July
1992, the non-Serb population was expelled from the municipality.6484 (#Causes and
consequences#! Who attacked Prijedor? Is the Chamber of the opinion that the Serbs
attacked Prijedor? Had there been a cable from the Muslim MUP to take over Prijedor and

6482
P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case,
formatted records), e-court p. 243.
6483
In his final brief, the Accused argues that some of the cultural sites in Prijedor were destroyed by forces outside the control of the legal authorities in
Prijedor. See Defence Final Brief, para. 1612. However, the Chamber considers that in support of this argument, the Accused only refers to testimony from
Drasko Vujić, who recounted that his soldiers told him that the explosion which destroyed the Donja Puharska mosque was ―a total surprise‖. See D4242
(Witness statement of Draško Vujić dated 24 January 2014), para. 11. The Chamber does not consider that Vujić‘s evidence in this regard contradicts the
evidence which relates to the conduct of Serb Forces in the destruction of the mosques and Catholic churches during the attacks on villages throughout
Prijedor. However, the D04010 is an internal document of the Serb MUP, and it is clear that the official authorities were
against that feature, but were unable to prevent it. #Officials against crimes#!)
6484
KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 6802 (under seal). See Sections IV.A.1.b.i.D.3: Take-over of Prijedor town; IV.A.1.b.i.D.4:
Attacks on surrounding villages.
 225

start fights with the JNA, or not? If had, all that followed was an inevitable consequence,
with the full responsibility of the Muslim side. It is undoubted fact that the Muslim
extremists started skirmishes in Hambarine on 22 May, with the casualties, it is undoubted
fact that the “Green Berets” started arned conflict from Kozarac, and finally, it is a marble
truth that the Muslim-Croat extremists attacked Prijedor on 30 May from five directions.)

1898. At a meeting on 20 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff adopted several conclusions, including
that there was ―no reason for the population of any nationality to move out of the territory of the
[ARK]‖.6485 However, on 29 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff decided that Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats would be allowed to leave Prijedor and other municipalities in the ARK, as part of
an organised resettlement of non-Serbs in central BiH and Serbs in Krajina.6486 On 1 June 1992,
Kuprešanin informed the Civil Affairs Office in Sector North that 15,000 Bosnian Muslim
refugees from municipalities in the ARK, including Prijedor, were moving across the border
towards Dvor, Croatia, and that another 15,000 would likely follow.6487 (#No system, no
expulsion#! But this can not and must not be qualified as an expelling, because there is no
any prerequisite for that. An unease among the general population in the entire BiH was a
consequence of the war. Prijedor left many Serbs and Muslims even before the war, and
particularly after the fights initiated by the Muslim extremists. The evidence supporting this
assertion is numerous, and it is numbered in the final appeal. But, let us post a principle of
comparison:

1) the Chamber can not accept the Prosecution’s exclusion of so many municipalities without
any problem. Had it been a system, there would be the same in all of them.

2) not only there was a significant difference between different municipalities, but even in the
very same municipalities with problems, there was a great difference between a vast
majority of the Muslim-Croats who didn’t have any problem, and much smaller groups,
always less than 10% of the population of this communities that did have a problems. In any
of those municipalities there was a few percent of the minority population being arrested,
detained, questioned, and even fewer that had been found suspect of some crimes and
detained after the investigation. A picture created by the media and the Prosecution is
extremely distorted on the account of the Serbs, while the Muslim/Croat federation (now
FBiH) conducted the total ethnic cleansing and killed many more Serbs, ruining literally
every single settlement of the Serbs!) in such a situation of a lynch there can not be a fair
trials!)

1899. On 7 June 1992, Prijedor municipal authorities decided, along with six other municipalities in
the region, that ―Muslims and Croats should move out to a level at which all the municipalities can
maintain Serbian power on their territories‖.6488 (#Forgery#! his is below any criterion, to accept
such a papir, that is entirely forged, informal, unbelievable, no names of the participants, no
signature, nothing. The Appeal Chamber shoud extract it from the file to save at least a bit
of the face… Neither there existed any “sub-region” organisation, not even in an informal
sense, nor there was such a meeting, but was some on the next day, but without any
conclusions like that. Finally, even if it was a demand towards the ARK organs, and towards
the RS organs, neither of them received it. And even if received, this was not considered, and

6485
D1309 (Conclusions of the ARK Crisis Staff, 20 May 1992); D4086 (Witness statement of Nikola Erceg dated 24 November 2013), para. 95.
6486
P3461 (Conclusions of meeting of ARK Crisis Staff, 29 May 1992), p. 1.
6487
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 53.
6488
P2641 (Conclusions of sub-regional meeting of municipalities sent to ARK Crisis Staff, 7 June 1992), p. 2 (stating that if the leadership of the ARK fails to
solve this issue ―our seven municipalities will take all Muslims and Croats under military escort from our municipalities to the centre of Banja Luka‖).
 226

even if considered, it wasn’t and wouldn’t ever be adopted and carried out. This is a pure
idiotism. Why the Chamber was so easy to be deceived?)

1900. Mass departures from Prijedor began to take place after the attack on Hambarine in late May
1992 and gained momentum through June and July 1992.6489 The Prijedor SJB estimated that
20,000 citizens, primarily non-Serbs, had moved out of Prijedor by mid-1992.6490 (#Who
attacked# Hambarine? Left as that, it is suggested that the Serbs attacked, while it is clear
that the Muslim extremists, including a policeman Aliskovic, started the war by attacking in
Hambarine! Regardless of so many evidence indicating that there was no any “deportation”
but just contrary to that, a reluctance of the local Serb authorities to allow the leave of the
non-Serbs, while these “departed” insisted to be allowed to leave. There were many obstacles
to those who wanted to leave, demanding many papers to be obtained by the migrants, to
deregister themselves, to pay all the taxes, electricity and housing fees, and finally to pay a
ticket for a bus. Those who didn’t want to leave could have simply decided not to obtain
some or any of those requirements, and they wouldn’t be boarded on bus. But, as before the
war both the Serbs and Muslims left Prijedor en mass, so both continued to leave Prijedor,
sharply demanding to be approved. See what the 1st Krajina Corps reported on 2 August 92:
D3833:

The same continued to the very end of the war. For instance, in 1994 there were
international preasures on the President to allow the Muslims and Croats to leave Prijedor!)

1901. The Prijedor Crisis Staff and civilian authorities facilitated the movement of the non-Serb
population of Prijedor out of the municipality through the use of buses, trucks, and other vehicles,
and by negotiating with the ICRC and the Prijedor Red Cross regarding the movement of
convoys.6491 (This is rather #commendable#, because the authorities served the citizens in
their needs! Would it be reccomendable to ban them from leaving the combat area? At the
London Conference on BiH there was adopted an agreement on 22 May, D01603, p.6-11, and
then in mid July, D04710, and September 30, October 1 1992, D01141, that all the sides are
obliged to facilitate a movement of the civilians from the combat zones. Do those documents
mean anything? How possibly it could be skipped and avoided? #Against documents#!)

6489
P3852 (Banja Luka CSB Security Assessment for Prijedor Municipality, 23 October 1992), p. 2 (stating that since the security situation deteriorated in May
1992 Bosnian Muslims and Croats have started a ―mass exodus‖ from Prijedor); Edward Vulliamy, P3777 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7910–
7912 (testifying that approximately ―40,000 Muslims‖ had left the Kozarac area by 5 August 1992). See Scheduled Incidents A.10.1, A.10.2, A.10.5. See
also Section IV.A.1.b.i.D.4.a.ii: Aftermath of the attack. See also Adjudicated Fact 1295 (stating that on 20 July 1992, 20,000 non-Serbs were expelled
from the areas of Hambarine and Ljubija which were under Serb control).
6490
D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court p. 31.
6491
Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7834–7835; D4247 (Letter from Prijedor Municipal Secretariat for the Economy and
Public Services, undated), p. 1 (stating that in the month of July 1992 alone, the Prijedor Crisis Staff rented 31 buses from Autotransport, a bus company
from Prijedor town, which together travelled a total of 1,300 kilometres); P6614 (Record of Autotransport Prijedor, July 1992), pp. 1–3; P3852 (Banja Luka
CSB Security Assessment for Prijedor Municipality, 23 October 1992), p. 2; D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court
p. 31.
 227

1902. The Chamber recalls that thousands of non-Serbs were transferred to, and detained at,
detention facilities in Prijedor municipality in 1992.6492 As detention facilities were closed in
Prijedor, detainees held there were transferred around the municipality as well as to camps outside
of the municipality and ultimately often to third countries.6493 (The “whole truth” would be to
say that there were #1,400 combatants captured# and detained, and conveyed to Manjaca
the POWs camp, treated as POWs, although being terrorists, that there were 1,700
accidentaly captured and released ather the first interrogations as innocent civilians, and
that all the others were not detained, but received in the centers like Trnopolje. No
movement of the people without their own decision and the participation of the ICRC,
Prijedor Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations!)

1903. Non-Serb residents of Prijedor who left the municipality during the conflict had to sign over
their property to the Serb authorities in Prijedor, either to the ARK or to the RS;6494 at first, real
property certificates were issued in order to justify the confiscation, but later on certificates were
no longer issued.6495 In contrast, Bosnian Serb residents did not have their property
confiscated.6496 (This is also #not correct, and against documents#! Those Serbs who left the
RS were even in much worse position than the Muslims or Croats, because they did have a
military obligation, while the Muslims-Croats didn’t. Also, the Chamber is only wasting the
time, because even this Judgment admitted that there was no any such appropriation that
had been carried out. Finally, the President unnulled all such a papers and banned this
practice, see: D101, of 19 August 92:

@The translation is ioncorrect, since it was an Order, it should have been translated as:
“must be prevented” not a conditionally “should be”!@ Why nothing what the President had
done “doesn’t matter at all”?)

1904. Property left behind by non-Serbs was appropriated by the Prijedor Crisis Staff as ―municipal
property‖, and was often redistributed to Bosnian Serbs6497 and, in some cases, to Bosnian
Croats.6498 (#Legal and legitimate#! A temporary use of the abandoned property was possible
6492
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.1, C.20.2, C.20.3, C.20.4, C.20.5, C.20.6, C.20.7.
6493
P2772 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 5 August 1992), p. 1; D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 3–4, 6, 11; D1551
(Order of Banja Luka CSB, 21 August 1992), p. 1; D1864 (Order of Banja Luka CSB, 19 August 1992), p. 1; D1865 (Prijedor SJB dispatch to Banja Luka
CSB, 22 August 1992), p. 1; D4464 (Minutes of Prijedor Municipal Assembly National Defence Council session, 29 September 1992), p. 1; P3757 (Official
note from the Security Centre in Banja Luka, 10 August 1992), pp. 1–2 (under seal); P3753 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st Krajina Corps, 22 August
1992), p. 1 (under seal). See paras. 1746, 1785, 1788–1789, 1804, 1848, 1850–1852, 1860, 1884.
6494
P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October 2011), pp. 56–57 (under seal) (stating that the documents were signed by Budimir); KDZ092,
P702 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 4003 (under seal) [REDACTED]; There was no need to redact the part of this footnote,
saying that N. Sivac refused to leave Prijedor. If she refused, it means that it wasn’t obligatory, and therefore one
didn’t have to. But, the most important is that the Chamber doesn’t pay any attention to the documents signed by the
President or his plenipotentiaries, which are in contrast to all of these assertions. Do the Chamber have any example
in documents corroborating these assertions and findings? #Contrary to documents#!);Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5655; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7800, 7834–7835; Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7106, 7133–7134; KDZ611, P698 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 12510 (under seal); Nusret Sivac, P3478 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 6696. See Adjudicated Fact 1101. See also para. 1851.
6495
See Adjudicated Fact 1101.
6496
Adjudicated Fact 1101.
6497
D4178 (Decision of the ARK Secretariat of National Defence, 5 June 1992), p. 26 (stating that flats left empty for more than 15 days would be used to house
the homeless and particularly participants in the war); P3536 (Decisions and orders of Prijedor Municipal Assembly and Prijedor Crisis Staff, published in
Prijedor Official Gazette on 25 June 1992), pp. 16–17; Bosko Mandić, T. 45775 (21 January 2014); KDZ048, P678 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić),
T. 3379–3382; Idriz Merdţanić, P3881 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7800.
6498
Ivo Atlija, P3672 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 5651–5653 (testifying that he was offered abandoned property in the Bosnian Muslim village of
Bišćani directly from Stakić in late August 1992). See para. 1737.
 228

according to the Law of all-Peoples Defence, and even if not abandoned, a part of it could be
used by the authorities for the purpose of defence. On 19 June 1992 the ARK Crisis Staff
decided that all ―abandoned‖ property would be proclaimed property of the state and placed at the
disposal of the municipal assemblies.6499 (The Chamber keeps this assertion as a drunk sticks
to fences, although it never happened, and the President annulled all of such a papers,
already on 19 August 1992.)

1905. On 16 August 1992, the Prijedor SJB issued termination of residence notices to 13,180
residents, in exchange for the residents receiving permits to leave the municipality.6500 (#Ignorant
of domestic laws#! This is a complete absence of knowledge of the domestic laws. Once
somebody changes a place of residence, it must have been registered, for many reasons: first,
he is not going to be charged of taxes while out of the place, second, the courts were to know
where-abouts of all the citizens in a case they are needed, third, the Ministry for Defence
must have known about where-abouts of the able-bodied men. So, to say “in exchange for the
permits” is not correct, because it was not “in exchange”, but a part of the process of
changing place of temporary (boraviste in Serbian) or permanent (prebivaliste in Serbian)
place of residence!) By the end of September 1992, the Prijedor SJB reported that due to the
―increasing migration of the population, especially of the Muslim and Croat population‖, it had
received and processed 15,280 applications for departure.6501 Those who desired to leave the
municipality were first required to unregister their official residences with the local Serb
authorities as a condition to receive an exit permit.6502 (This is all in vain! It was not important
what the locals may have issued, this matters were defined by the law, and their return was
guaranteed by the central authorities, signing many documents of commitment to this. Now,
we see a duplicity: When the Serbs are President for something that had been commited by
the locals – no matter the central authorities didn’t order or even banned it, the Serbs were
not excused when acting minimally in an ultimate defence… Another word: the Serbs were
indicted for the misdeeds on the terrain, which the officials didn’t oreder, but contrary, have
banned, the Serbs are still not recognised for a good documents issued. So, more strength did
have something the Serbs didn’t order, nor ever happened, than all what the Serb
authorities have ordered in good direction! #Contrary to official orders#!)

1906. On 19 August 1992, representatives from Prijedor, including both Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Serbs, met with UNHCR and the UN Civil Affairs Office to discuss, inter alia, whether
the UN would assist in evacuating thousands of Bosnian Muslim ―applicants‖.6503 (However, the
exhibit D470 brings the data that even before the war abrupted some … Muslims left
Prijedor, see D00470, p. 5

(The document confirms that an unregistration was a law provision! Also, as objected by the
ordinary Muslim people, the first to leave Prijedor were families of those who secretly
prepared the attack and war in Prijedor!)

6499
P3451 (Decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff, June 1992), p. 13.
6500
D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court p. 31. See P3691 (Witness statement of Nusreta Sivac dated 22 October
2011), pp. 56–57 (under seal); P3693 (Decision of SerBiH‘s Ministry of Defence, Prijedor Section, 18 August 1992); Slavko Budimir, D4463 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 13142.
6501
P5555 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 29 September 1992), p. 8. See Jusuf Arifagić, P689 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7133–7134. See also P2958
(Christian Nielsen‘s expert report entitled ―The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990-1992‖, 19
May 2011), para. 325.
6502
D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 6–7, 31.
6503
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 111.
 229

(Again, repeated that it was a #law obligation#, which wasn’t always respected, i.e. one could
leave the municipality without procedure. It is not clear why the Chamber didn’t notice that
the Serbs were leaving Prijedor too?

(Unregistring the residence is a #legal obligation#, which discharges the people from owing
the taxes and other obligations, and this is the same in a peace as in a war times. In this para
it was said that their property wasn’t managed by the municipal authorities. Is anyone in the
court able to read the documents properly, and to see how these documents are standing
within the domestic laws, and how the Prosecutor’s allegations were senseless and the
findings of the Chamber unfounded?)

1907. The Prijedor delegation wanted a convoy to go through Sector North, and the
applicants included 8,000 Bosnian Muslims from Prijedor who, according to the delegation,
wanted to leave the municipality ―voluntarily‖.6504 This was primarily a request of the Muslim
representatives in the mixt delegation. Look what para 113 of the Kirudja’s (P03804)
statement said:

(Islam~evi} is, as his own name sais, a Muslim by ethnicity, and he was speaking on behalf
of his Muslim community. What else is needed to persuade the Chamber that it was the
Muslim’s decision, and that the local authorities didn’t have any misunderstanding with the
ordinary people, not involved in the extreme military activities?) The UNHCR representative
responded that UNHCR would not assist with the removal of people.6505 Kirudja did not believe
that these people wanted to leave voluntarily and furthermore, thought that the detailed lists of
applicants prepared by the delegation demonstrated the ―meticulous‖ system used to remove
people from the area.6506 (This is an #outrageous conduct# of an international official#, which
certainly did cost the region more tensions! What Kirudja “thought” is his private matter,
but a very irresponsible move in an area of a high tensions! Who would force the Muslim
people to prepare so many papers and documents, and plus to pay the transport fees? Why
he didn’t believe Islamcevic and other Muslims in the delegation?)

1907. According to Serb assessments, by October 1992, about 38,000 Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats had left the municipality of Prijedor.6507 Approximately 3,600 of these individuals
left the area with the help of the ICRC and the Prijedor Red Cross.6508 (#Good deeds used against

6504
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 112.
6505
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 115.
6506
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 112, 114.
6507
P3852 (Banja Luka CSB Security Assessment for Prijedor Municipality, 23 October 1992), p. 2. See P2948 (Report of humanitarian organisation, 8 October
1992) (under seal), p. 2.
6508
P3852 (Banja Luka CSB Security Assessment for Prijedor Municipality, 23 October 1992), p. 2; Slavko Budimir, D4463 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stakić), T. 13142. See P6504 (Report of Prijedor Red Cross, 30 September 1992), p. 9.
 230

Serb officials#! This was not a “Serb assessment” but an assessment of the Serb officials in
Banja Luka! This document is another proof that the authorities tried to improve the
situation, but it is, as usually, used against the Serb authorities. In the same document it is
said what is happening, and why the chaos is developing in Prijedor, see: P03852, p. 2:

The document of the Serbian officials, clearly shows who were the perpetrators of these
crimes: “they can be seen drunk every day, breaking and destroying anything… making
threats and harassing citizens…” and those are exactly the groups that this President
“disowned” on 13 June 92 and ordered their legal persecution. This document in no case can
be used to prove the Serb liability for crimes. See further P3852: #No liability#!

Further:

Further:

It is clear that this “Official document, Strictly confidential” is a honest one, and that depict
the chaos in Prijedor as a consequence of the fights, and not as a wanton action of the official
authorities.)

1908. By 1993, the vast majority of non-Serb towns and villages in Prijedor were uninhabited and
destroyed.6509 (It should be pointed out that #only those villages# that did have a terrorist
groups# were damaged, 11 of them heavily, but ten of others with a significant Muslim
population nobody touched. Why? Because they didn’t fight.) In September 1993, the
Prijedor SJB estimated that 80% of Bosnian Muslim houses in Prijedor had been destroyed.6510
(This is again a document of the Serb authorities, and this document clearly states that the
authorities are #against any illegal conduct#! The inference is wrong.) The Chamber also
recalls that by mid-1993, most of the Bosnian Muslim places of worship in Prijedor had been

6509
P3852 (Banja Luka CSB Security Assessment for Prijedor Municipality, 23 October 1992), p. 2 (stating that Ĉarakovo, Zecovi, Hambarine, Rizvanovići,
Bišćani, Rakovĉani, Kozarruša, Kozarac, Kamiĉani, Babići, and Kevljani had been completely destroyed, while Gornji Garevici, Ćela, Ĉejreci, Donja
Puharska, Trnopolje, Donja Ljubija, Gornji and Donja Ravska, Šurkovac, Briševo, Ţune, Gornji Volar, and the old part of Prijedor were partly destroyed).
6510
D4010 (Report of Prijedor SJB, September 1993), p. 3.
 231

almost or completely destroyed.6511 (It is also seen from the official Serb documents. If these
destructive acts had been done by the responsible Serb authorities, why the same authorities
would denounce themselves? The most reasonable move would be to cover it, not to report it,
but since it had been reported with criticism, it is obvious that the authorities were #against
this kind of conduct#!)

1909. In May 1993, the Bosnian Serb MUP estimated that 42,000 Bosnian Muslims and 2,000
Bosnian Croats had moved out of Prijedor, while 14,000 Bosnian Serbs had moved in.6512 Some
of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats who had moved out of Prijedor had been ―deported in
cattle cars‖.6513 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats continued to move out of Prijedor into
1994.6514 (#The Serb refugees#! But, what made these Serbs to come to Prijedor? Did they
leave their homes and their goods elsewhere? Were the Serbs refugees too? No a Serb
authority’s liability for the state in Prijedor at all. Everything that the Chamber knew was
coming from the Serb official documents. Would it be so, if the Serb authorities wanted that
to happen? Why would the Serb authorities criticize themselves in a strictly confidential
documents?#No Serb liability#!)

1910. Slobodan Kuruzović, the commander of Trnopolje, confirmed that the plan of the Serb
authorities was to reduce the number of Bosnian Muslims in Prijedor to 10% or less, and then later
to reduce this to 2% or less.6515 (#Deadly combination#! Such a drastic element is included in
this case as an adjudicated fact!!! When and where he heard it? And how would he and only
he would know what the authorities wanted. Had it been so, it would be on the front pages of
all the world media! What would happen if the Muslims accepted to form their own
municipality and to live together with the Serbs, i.e. what would happen if they didn’t attack
the Serbs in Prijedor? Why nothing similar happened in the neighbouring municipalities, as
Srbac, Gradiska, Prnjavor, ^elinac, Derventa, Mrkonji} Grad, all the municipalities that
didn’t have a war? Why it was so easy to “sell” such a fake assertion, and associate it with a
very decent man as Kuruzovi} was? Was there a war in the “Municipalities” named in the
Indictment, and did there existed the Muslim secret Army, Patriotic League and Green
Berets!)

1911. The President contends that Bosnian Muslims, and to a lesser extent, Bosnian Serbs and
Bosnian Croats, left Prijedor voluntarily and without external pressure, and that non-Serbs were
not forced to sign over their possessions in order to receive permits to leave the municipality.6516
Furthermore, Budimir testified that everyone who applied to him for permission to leave Prijedor
received it, but that many people left on their own in their personal vehicles without approval from
the municipality.6517 (#Obstacles to leave#! But Budimir testify that he didn’t condition them
with the statement pertaining to the property! See P3691, testimony of Nusreta Sivac, who
testified that there was many things to be paied in order to leave Prijedor and cross to a
“free territory”, P3691,p.57:

6511
D4010 (Report of Prijedor SJB, September 1993), p. 3. See Scheduled Incident D.17.
6512
P10 (Report of the MUP, Banja Luka SNB, May 1993), p. 2.
6513
Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7436.
6514
D705 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Radovan Karadţić and Alija Izetbegović, 7 April 1994), pp. 3–4; D1138 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order, 3 April
1994); D4213 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order, 4 July 1994).
6515
See Adjudicated Fact 1093.
6516
Defence Final Brief, paras. 1537, 1539. In support, the Accused refers to the following evidence: D1357 (Report of Prijedor SDS Municipal Board, 11
September 1991–26 December 1992), p. 3; D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), paras. 25–26; D4229 (Witness
statement of Boško Mandić dated 18 January 2014), para. 9; D4226 (Witness statement of Dragan Radetić dated 17 January 2014), para. 6; Slavko Budimir,
D4463 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 13037, 13142.
6517
Slavko Budimir, D4463 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 13144 (testifying further, however, that although some people left voluntarily, ―Muslims
and Croats were worse off than Serbs‖). But see KDZ026, T. 10407 (17 January 2011) (closed session) (testifying that he did not have the money to ―pay
for [his] exit out of that hell‖).
 232

This testimony, which was in accord with all others pertaining to the leaving Serb areas, is in
a #sharp contrast with all the allegations# about a forceful displacement and ethnic
cleansing!@)

1912. However, the Chamber recalls the movement on a mass scale of non-Serbs within and out of
Prijedor and the fact that non-Serbs in Prijedor were forced to sign over their property to Serb
authorities. (#This is a lie!!! No evidence on that#!!! And even if they signed, which they didn’t, the
President cancelled it in August 92, and this was never and nowhere carried out in practice, see
D101. Anyway, according to the domestic Law on Defence, all the private property could have
been used by the local authorities for the war purposes, of course on a temporary basis!) The
Chamber has had regard to the immense pressure put on Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, given
the surrounding circumstances in the municipality, including inter alia: (i) armed attacks against their
towns, villages, and homes; (ii) destruction of religious and cultural property; (iii) forcible arrest and
removal from their homes; (iv) detention in multiple detention facilities; as well as (v) mistreatment and
killings. (#Why not in other municipalities?# Whether the Chamber infers that there was no a
Muslim and Croat terrorists? And why it didn’t happen in any other municipality where there
was no a Muslim/Croat attacks? And what was the number of those arrested and investigated in
comparison with the total Muslim/Croat population? All together no more than 5%, and the
number of those who were found guilty and sent to the POWs prison was less than 2,8%! Only in
Kozarac there was between 2,000 and 3,000 combatants, while those sent to the POW-s camp
Manjaca was only 1,466, see: P2772):

Non-Serbs: Croats: 6,300 + Muslims 49454 + “ostali” others 2,600 = 58354 Serbs
+ Yugoslavs: 47,745 + 6,371 = 54,116 – which makes less than 2,51% of the non-Serb population
of Prijedor )
1913. For these reasons, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were forced
to leave Prijedor. By 1995, the population of Prijedor municipality consisted of approximately
92% Bosnian Serbs, 5% Bosnian Muslims, and 1% Bosnian Croats.6518 (#All wrong inferences#!
We have seen that the President had been under the tremendous pressure in 1994 to allow
some 80 busses and tracks a day for the evacuation of the Muslims from Prijedor. The
Chamber should have noticed this fact, confirmed by Mr. Akashi! Buta several thousands of

6518
P5449 (Report of the MUP, Banja Luka RDB, February 1995), pp. 6–7. See D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 16
(reporting that approximately 2,000 non-Serbs remained in Prijedor in 1995).
 233

the Serb refugees arrived in Prijedor alo influenced thi percentage, and should have been
taken into account!

(But, the most important is the fact that the President didn’t have anything to do with all
what happened in Prijedor and other, particularly those distant municipalities. Both, the
central organs of the SDS and central authorities of the Republic of Srpska undertook all
needed measures to prevent the war, and when the war broke out, all the needed measures to
maintain the peace and respect for the human rights and provisions of the Law of war. Once
the war abrupted, it became a local, municipal matter. There was as many civil wars as
many municipalities being embattled and participated in fights. There was no authority
which was entitled or able to order what kind of of defence respective community would
implement. If the state couldn’t protect the peace and security of the citizens, they had all
ritghts to do so, according to the domestic laws, as well as due to the basic human right for
life.)
 234

(E) Sanski Most

1. Charges

2. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity, was committed in
Sanski Most as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats
from the Municipalities.6519 Under Count 1, the Prosecution further alleges that in certain
municipalities, including Sanski Most, this persecutory campaign included or escalated to include
conduct that manifested an intent to destroy in part the national, ethnical, and/or religious groups of
Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats as such.6520

1915. Acts alleged to have been committed in Sanski Most by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political
and Governmental Organs include killings during and after the take-over,6521 killings related to
one detention facility,6522 as well as killings committed during, and deaths resulting from, cruel
and inhumane treatment at scheduled detention facilities.6523 The Prosecution characterises these
acts as killing, an underlying act of genocide, under Count 1; persecution, a crime against
humanity, under Count 3; extermination, a crime against humanity, under Count 4; murder, a
crime against humanity, under Count 5; and murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war,
under Count 6.6524

1916. Other acts alleged to have been committed in Sanski Most by Serb Forces and Bosnian
Serb Political and Governmental Organs include torture, beatings, and physical and psychological
abuse, rape and other acts of sexual violence, during and after the take-over and in scheduled
detention facilities, as well as the establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in
detention facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment, an act of persecution under Count 3.6525 In
relation to Count 1, the Prosecution alleges that in scheduled detention facilities in Sanski Most
thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were subjected to cruel or inhumane treatment,
including torture, physical and psychological abuse, rape, other acts of sexual violence, and
beatings by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs; the Prosecution
characterises this inhumane treatment as causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups, an underlying act of genocide.6526 In addition, under
Count 1, the Prosecution alleges that members of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups
were detained under conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, namely
through cruel and inhumane treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, rape,
other acts of sexual violence, inhumane living conditions, forced labour and the failure to provide
adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care or hygienic sanitation facilities.6527

1917. Under Count 3, other acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Sanski Most
by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include: (i) forcible transfer
or deportation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their homes;6528 (ii) unlawful
detention in scheduled detention facilities;6529 (iii) forced labour at the frontlines and the use of
6519
Indictment, paras. 48–49.
6520
Indictment, para. 38.
6521
Indictment, para. 60(a)(i). See Scheduled Incidents A.12.1, A.12.2, A.12.3, A.12.4, A.12.5.
6522
Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). See Scheduled Incident B.17.
6523
Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.22.1, C.22.2, C.22., C.22.4, C.22.5.
6524
Indictment, paras. 40(a), 60(a), 63(a), 63(b).
6525
Indictment, para. 60(b), 60(c), 60(d) (specifying that the conditions included the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical
care, or hygienic sanitation facilities). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.22.1, C.22.2, C.22.3, C.22.4.
6526
Indictment, para. 40(b).
6527
Indictment, para. 40(c). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.22.1, C.22.2, C.22.3, C.22.4, C.22.5.
6528
Indictment, para. 60(f).
6529
Indictment, para. 60(g). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.22.1, C.22.2, C.22.3, C.22.4, C.22.5.
 235

Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as human shields;6530 (iv) appropriation or plunder of
property during and after the take-over, during arrests and detention, and in the course of or
following acts of deportation or forcible transfer;6531 (v) the wanton destruction of private property
including homes and business premises and public property including cultural monuments and
sacred sites;6532 and (vi) the imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory
measures.6533

1918. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible
transfer), respectively, as crimes against humanity.6534 In this regard, the Prosecution alleges that
by the end of 1992, Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs had forcibly
displaced Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Sanski Most in which they had been
lawfully present.6535 It is alleged that from March 1992, restrictive and discriminatory measures,
arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence, killings,
destruction of houses, cultural monuments, and sacred sites, as well as the threat of further such
acts caused Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to flee in fear, while others were physically
driven out.6536

1. Lead-up

1919. Sanski Most is a municipality centrally located in the ARK and is surrounded by Bosanski
Novi, Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Petrovac, Prijedor, Banja Luka, and Kljuĉ.6537 In 1991, the
population of Sanski Most was approximately 28,000 Bosnian Muslims, 25,000 Bosnian Serbs,
and 4,000 Bosnian Croats.6538 Villages with a predominantly Bosnian Muslim population
included Vrhopolje, Hrustovo, Sehovći, Begići, and Kenjari.6539 Škrljevita was a village with a
predominantly Bosnian Croat population.6540 (#Only a few villages embattled#! Any reasonable
chamber should be expected to find out what happened and why. Picking up only several out
of 79 villages is not correct, particularly if the Prosecution ambition was to prove an
existence of an Overall Joint Criminal Enterprise, which means – a systemic approach to the
minorities. There were seven (7) almost exclusively Croatian villages, and several other
where the Croats lived with the Serbs, and a fewer where they lived with Muslims. Out of
those 7 Croatian villages, there was only one incident in the vicinity of only one, Skrljevita,
and none of other Croatian villagers sustained any disturbance. There wrer 26 (twenty six)
predominantly Muslim villages, and many villages where the Muslims lived as a minority
with the Serbs and a fewer with the Croats. Finally, there was fourty six (46) predominantly
Serbian vilalges.

6530
Indictment, para. 60(h).
6531
Indictment, para. 60(i).
6532
Indictment, para. 60(j). See Scheduled Incident D.19. The Indictment refers to the Hrustovo-Kukavice mosque as being two different mosques (the old and
new mosque) situated next to each other. Indictment, fn. 17.
6533
Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement; the removal from positions of
authority; the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or the denial of
equal access to public services.
6534
Indictment, paras. 68–75.
6535
Indictment, paras. 69, 72.
6536
Indictment, para. 71.
6537
P3638 (Map of Sanski Most municipality).
6538
P6548 (Conclusions of the Sanski Most Municipal Assembly, 4 October 1993), p. 6; D4452 (Map of ethnic composition of Sanski Most); KW540, D4449
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3302–3303 (under seal). See also P3310 (Map of Sanski Most‘s ethnic composition); Faik
Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5486; P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 3 (under seal); P4994 (Addendum to
Ewa Tabeau‘s expert report entitled ―Ethnic Composition in Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27 Municipalities of BiH 1991 to 1997‖, 3
February 2009), pp. 30, 33, 39 (listing the 1991 population as approximately 22,830 Bosnian Muslims, 21,746 Bosnian Serbs, and 3,688 Bosnian Croats).
6539
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 3 (under seal); P532 (Map of Sanski Most). For locations of these villages, see P3638 (Map of Sanski
Most municipality); P3310 (Map of Sanski Most‘s ethnic composition).
6540
P532 (Map of Sanski Most).
 236

The Chamber doesn’t have any explanation, if accepts the allegation on the Overarching JCE,
for the following:

(1) Why #only five Muslim villages# did have the problems, fights and arrests?

(2) Why none of the Croat villages did have any combat, except for an isolated incidents out of
the Skrljevita village?

(3) Why the Muslims and Croats living in the mixed villages with the Serbs didn’t have any
problem?

(4) Had there existed any Overarching Joint Criminal enterprise to expel the non-Serb
population from the Serb areas, why the Serbs didn’t expel those Muslims that had lived as a
majority in 21 villages, and those who lived as a minority in the predominantly Serb
villages?

(5) Why the Serbs didn’t expel the Croats from any of those 7 villages, or at least from the Serb
villages with the Croatian minority?

But, after a reasonable answer to these questions, there wouldn’t be any Indictment, and any
Judgement, except for a possible direct perpetrators of crimes. WHY IT WAS
IMPOSSIBLE?

WHO NEEDS SUCH A DISASTROUS START OF THE INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE?

 237

1920. The SDS, SDA, and HDZ parties were formed in Sanski Most in 1990.6541 The President
and Krajišnik came to Lušci Palanka, a Bosnian Serb village in Sanski Most, on the occasion of
the formation of the SDS in Sanski Most.6542 As a result of the multi-party elections in
November 1990, the SDS won 23 seats, the SDA won 22 seats, the HDZ won 4 seats, and the
reform party won 11 seats in the 60 seat Municipal Assembly.6543 Nedeljko Rašula, who was then
the president of the Sanski Most SDS, became the president of the Municipal Assembly.6544 Vlado
Vrkeš was the secretary of the Sanski Most SDS and he later became its president.6545 Mirzet
Karabeg, a Bosnian Muslim, was appointed as the president of the Executive Board.6546 (From the
election results it is clear that the census wasn’t accurate, and that the Serbs were majority,
because the Yugoslavs were also the Serbs. Beside that, there was a majority of the Serbs in
the adult stratum of population.)

a. Militarisation of Sanski Most

1921. The arming of the Bosnian Serb population in Sanski Most began in late 1990, with the
distribution of JNA weapons to SDS members.6547 (However, as proven many times, this is a
#distorted fact#! The JNA didn’t make any difference between the national parties, and
didn’t favour the SDS, but only the Serbs were ready to accept mobilisations and to form the
reserve batalions, because there was a civil war with Slovenia and Croatia undergoing.
However, this Court is acting as the majority of the western International Community,
assuming that only Serbs armed themselves, and only Serbs wanted the war, and everything
depended on them. This brings us in front of the main question: why this Court pretends not
to incriminate the crime against peace, and thus avoids to establish truth, meanwhile putting
all the burden on the Serbs, inferring that they must have been responsible since they
“armed themselves” with an aim to make the Greater Serbia. However, the Serbs responded
to the federal mobilisation and were ready to defend the existing status quo, or at least to
prevent an unlawful violent change of it.)

1922. As in other municipalities in BiH, the armed conflict in Croatia led to a mobilisation call
in Sanski Most for volunteers to fight in Croatia with the JNA.6548 (Right!) Those who did not
respond to the call-up were ordered to return their uniforms and weapons and were to be deleted
from the mobilisation lists.6549 (Naturally!!! #Legal aand obligatory#! And that was how the
Serbs kept their weapons. In the light of this fact, the inference in the first paragraph is
wrong.)

6541
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5486–5487. See also D4653 (Certificate of Sanski Most SJB, 7 May 1991).
6542
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5488–5490, 7643–7645; P142 (Photograph of Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik).
6543
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6069; P3304 (Decision of Serb people of Sanski Most, 25 March 1992), p. 3. See also
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5492; D4233 (Witness statement of Branko Davidović dated 20 January 2014), para. 4.
6544
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6070; Mirzet Karabeg, T. 18686, 18690 (13 September 2011); KDZ474, P3395
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7630 (under seal); KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin) T. 26141 (under seal);
KDZ474, T. 19243 (21 September 2011) (closed session). See also Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5487, 5492; Faik
Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7023; P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 5, 18 (under seal); P3396
(Photographs depicting Radovan Karadţić, Ratko Mladić, Biljana Plavšić, Momĉilo Krajišnik and others), p. 1; KDZ474, T. 19243 (21 September 2011)
(closed session).
6545
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5487; KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7642, 7654 (under
seal); KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26302–26303 (under seal); Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor
v. BrĎanin), T. 1797.
6546
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6066; Mirzet Karabeg, T. 18690 (13 September 2011). Karabeg held the position of
president of the Executive Board until 17 April 1992. Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6066.
6547
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 38–42 (under seal); KDZ490, T. 20207 (19 October 2011) (closed session).
6548
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5497.
6549
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5497.
 238

1923. At the end of 1991, Mladić attended a meeting in Sanski Most and, afterwards, JNA
weapons were distributed to Bosnian Serbs in the area.6550 (Again #wrong#! It was preparation
for the war in Croatia, not in BiH. At that period there was the Conference on Bosnia, and
there was a good prospective that there wouldn’t be any war in Bosnia. But still the JNA
needed reservists, and could rely only on the Serb reservists.)

1924. In November 1991, weapons owned by the staff of the TO were transferred to the goods
reserve of the TO.6551 This order came from the 5th corps of the JNA to the local TO staff.6552 In
1992, the weapons were taken by Colonel Branko Basara and distributed to the Bosnian Serbs in
Sanski Most.6553 (#Before VRS#! That was an order of the 5th Corps of the JNA, and can not
be in any way connected to the Serbs in Bosnia. The order that all the TO weapons be
handed over to the JNA had been issued by the federal Presidency of the SFRY even before
the first multiparty elections. Until SFR Yugoslavia existed, and the JNA had been legally
present there, which was until the end of April 1992, there existed an obligation to defend the
country, and those who fulfield this obligation had been entitled to keep the weaponry and
equipment of the JNA! See D5, 7 March 92 belowe.:)

1925. At the end of 1991, the Serbian Defence Forces (―SOS‖) an armed group, was formed.6554
They were commanded by Duško Šaović, a.k.a. Njunja.6555 The SOS received orders from the
SDS in Sanski Most.6556 (This is an #exaggeration#, they didn’t receive orders from anyone.
Their letters of criticism of the SDS are the best prove for that. The SOS were formed in
Banja Luka too, both because of a suspicion that the JNA would defend the Serbs, and it was
done against the President’s recommendation that the Serbs have to rely upon the JNA and
vice versa, which was a very known attitude of the President, confirmed in many intercepts
admitted by the Chamber!) On 28 February 1992, members of the SDS and the SOS broke into
the premises of the Public Auditing Service and tried to physically remove the head of the
institution.6557 Karabeg and the Executive Board condemned this action.6558 (Of course, #a
Muslim extremist# Karabeg condemned this action, because Karabeg sabotaged the
nomination of a Serb to this position, as agreed among the parties. The Muslim side didn’t
respect any agreement, and particularly wanted to continue to keep such a significant posts
as the police commander and the chief of the SJB, which was incompatible, or the Pulic
Auditing Service. All of that was with the aim to arme the Muslims and prevent the Serbs to
get an insight in these illegal actions! And that was a pattern used in many municipalities!
There is sufficient evidence on that in the file!) Soon after, the SOS started targeting buildings
and businesses belonging to Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims and blew them up with
explosives.6559

6550
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 39 (under seal).
6551
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 42 (under seal); P3643 (Order of Sanski Most TO, 6 November 1991).
6552
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 42 (under seal); P3643 (Order of Sanski Most TO, 6 November 1991).
6553
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 43 (under seal).
6554
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 20 (under seal); KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3314–3315
(under seal).
6555
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 20 (under seal). Duško Šaović was also Vrkeš‘s bodyguard. P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490,
undated), p. 20 (under seal); D4387 (Witness statement of Dušan Mudrinić dated 15 February 2014), para. 4; Dušan Mudrinić, T. 47365 (19 February 2014);
see, e.g., KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7829 (under seal).
6556
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 22, 25, 30 (under seal); KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3316–
3317, 3555 (under seal); Vinko Nikolić, T. 45439–45441 (16 January 2014).
6557
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6082–6083; P3309 (Minutes of meeting of Sanski Most's Executive Board, 5 March
1992).
6558
P3309 (Minutes of meeting of Sanski Most's Executive Board, 5 March 1992). See also Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
6083; Mirzet Karabeg, T. 18767–18768 (14 September 2011) (testifying that it was an attempt to channel the taxes from Sanski Most to Banja Luka, instead
of Sarajevo).
6559
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6076–6077; P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 31–32 (under seal);
P3397 (Report of Sanski Most SOS Intervention Platoon, 16 September 1992), p. 2. See also KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
7634–7635 (under seal) (testifying that from late 1991 through the beginning of 1992, businesses in Sanski Most were blown up); see Adjudicated Fact
 239

1926. Soldiers of the JNA‘s 6th Partisan Brigade arrived in Sanski Most in early April 1992.6560
This brigade initially consisted of three battalions but later expanded.6561 It was commanded by
Basara.6562 Rašula invited the SDA leaders to a meeting with Basara where Basara introduced
himself and stated that he had brought the 6th Krajina Brigade to Sanski Most because they were
on leave from fighting in Croatia and that they were ―guarantors of peace‖.6563 The 6th Krajina
Brigade was later subordinated to the 1st Krajina Corps.6564 By the end of May 1992, the 6th
Krajina Brigade was comprised of 3,907 soldiers, making up 11 battalions and artillery units.6565

1927. After the arrival of the 6th Krajina Brigade, check-points were set up throughout the
municipality and soldiers from the 6th Krajina Brigade asked residents to stop and show their
identity cards.6566 A #legal and legitimate# action, since just across the boarder there was the
war going on!)

1928. On 22 April 1992, the Crisis Staff decided to integrate the SOS as a special unit of the
TO.6567 The Crisis Staff also provided financial assistance to the SOS.6568 (That also was a #legal
move#, since the TO was the legal municipal armed force, while the SOS weren’t! How
fragile and arbitrary is the construct called “the Serb Forces” could be seen from several
contemporaneous documents, such as D1806:

2523. Dušan Mudrinić testified that he was not aware of such explosions blowing up buildings and denied that the SOS was involved in these acts. Dušan
Mudrinić, T. 47377–47378, 47385 (19 February 2014). The Chamber does not find his evidence on this point to be reliable. In reaching this conclusion, the
Chamber found that the evidence of Mudrinić was evasive, contradicted on numerous occasions by other accepted evidence, including P3397 (Report of
Sanski Most SOS Intervention Platoon, 16 September 1992), and was overall unconvincing.
6560
P148 (Order of 5th Corps, 1 April 1992); P149 (5th Corps combat report, 2 April 1992); P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 35 (under seal);
P3663 (Report on the 6th Brigade in the period between 8 October 1991 and 28 August 1992), p. 2; P3640 (Document entitled ―Informator of the Serbian
Democratic Party Sanski Most‖, 1992), pp. 38–39 (referring to it as the 6th Krajina Brigade); Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik),
T. 5498–5499; Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6099; P3660 (Handwritten ―War Record‖ of the 6th Krajina Infantry
Brigade, undated), p. 2 (referring to it as the 6th Infantry Brigade); KDZ490, T. 20181–20182 (19 October 2011) (closed session). As seen in the documents
cited above, the 6th Partisan Brigade was also referred to as the 6th Krajina Brigade or another name. For ease of reference, the Chamber will refer to it as the
6th Krajina Brigade throughout this Judgement. KDZ490 stated that later when it grew to 12 battalions, it changed its name to the 6th Sana Brigade but
―[t]his brigade, whether called Partisan/Krajina/Sana brigade was subordinated and under the command of General Momir Talić, Commander of the 5 th JNA
Corps, later the 1st Krajina Corps during 1992‖. P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 34–35 (under seal).
6561
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 34 (under seal).
6562
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 34, 37 (under seal); Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6100; P3663
(Report on the 6th Brigade in the period between 8 October 1991 and 28 August 1992). p. 1; Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
7017; P2614 (Conclusions of Sanski Most‘s Crisis Staff, 30 May 1992).
6563
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7020–7021; Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5499–5500;
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6101–6102.
6564
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated) (under seal), p. 34.
6565
P3663 (Report on the 6th Brigade in the period between 8 October 1991 and 28 August 1992), p. 4. See also P3660 (Handwritten ―War Record‖ of the 6th
Krajina Infantry Brigade, undated). Members of the SOS were later integrated into the 6 th Krajina Brigade. P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490,
undated), pp. 27, 30 (under seal); KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3315–3317 (under seal). See also P6681 (Report
of Sanski Most SOS, 4 September 1992).
6566
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6099; see Adjudicated Fact 2525. See also Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6766–6767.
6567
KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3325–3326 (under seal); D1679 (Conclusions of meeting of Sanski Most Crisis
Staff. 22 April 1992), p. 1. See also Adjudicated Fact 2107.
6568
P6682 (Conclusions of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 18 June 1992), p. 1 (showing that Aniĉić, the TO commander, submitted a report on the work of the SOS
and the Crisis Staff approved giving the SOS financial assistance).
 240

This is an #official attitude towards the paramilitaries#, which the SOS became after
insincere integration in the 6th Brigade of VRS. The document confirms that this order was
founded on the #Order of the Presidency# of Republika Srpska!)

1929. On 28 April 1992, the Crisis Staff decided that Basara would meet with the Crisis Staff
and ―start regulating the relationship‖ between the TO forces and the JNA.6569 (Once a JNA unit
is present, the TO is obliged to subordinate to the JNA!) On 7 May 1992, the Crisis Staff held a
meeting where Mladen Lukić and Mirko Vrućinić were ordered to hold talks with Basara to
involve him in transforming the JNA into the ―Serbian TO‖.6570 (That was just after the SFRY
seased to exist, and it was evident that the JNA will leave BiH. #All legal and
legitimate#.Before VRS# The Sanski Most boys had been in this unit anyway.) The TO was
ordered to set up a MP platoon.6571 All ―able-bodied persons‖ were required to report to the Red
Cross, the list would be forwarded to the TO staff, and those who were not registered would be
―detained and sent to the municipalities of their residence‖.6572 (#Defence necessity#! Now, it is
time to show why the Serbs in Sanski Most were taking these precautionary measures, and
what had been known to the security services. Let us see D5, from 7 March 92:

6569
P3328 (Conclusions of meeting of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 28 April 1992), para. 4.
6570
P3645 (Conclusions of the Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 7 May 1992), p. 1.
6571
P3645 (Conclusions of the Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 7 May 1992), p. 1.
6572
P3645 (Conclusions of the Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 7 May 1992), p. 1.
 241

(#Muslims attacked#! Therefore, the most powerful Muslim officials in the common
institutions had already at the beginning of March been fully dedicated to the future armed
conflict with their Serb neighbours!!! How come this document didn’t deserve any attention
of the Chamber? After this information, the entire self-defence and All-Peoples Defence
mechanisms had to be started. According to the domestic laws, the Serbs were obliged to
undertake all precautionary measures. And, remember those names, and those villages, and
you will see where there the battles took place, and who were those detained. Those the
highest officials of the “common” municipal authorities, at the same time a members of the
complot core, and some of them appeared as the Prosecution witnesses. How “unbiased”
witnesses! And an imminent attack on the Serb village of Suhaca (327 Serbs, 1 Croat)
without any army facilities!)

(b) Establishment of Bosnian Serb institutions

1930. The regionalisation process with the formation of the ZOBK led to increasing
disagreements between members of the SDS, SDA, and HDZ in Sanski Most.6573 Faik Bišĉević,
the president of the SDA, stated that the SDA could not agree with this regionalisation process.6574
(#Legal and constitutional#! What does it mean, they “could not agree with this
regionalisation process”? This was not only a constitutional right of any sovereign people,
but it was a Serb concession and a condition for the BiH to leave Yugoslavia. Does it mean
that the Chamber would justify the Muslim dictate to the Serbs, to obey with the Muslim
decisions to secede and not to secure a safeguards for their freedom, security and legitimate
interests? The whole world knows, all the prominent leaders of the then world knew that this

6573
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5495–5496.
6574
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5496.
 242

kind of butchering a sovereign state of Yugoslavia before securing the legitimate rights of
peoples, would result in a horrifying bloodshead. Why the Serbs would accept the illegal
secession, and the Muslims wouldn’t agree with a legal decentralisation of the country?
Anyway, the Indictment, and unfortunately even the Judgement look like a political
materials of the SDA and the Islamic fundamentalists!)

1931. In February 1992, the SDS encouraged ―all the Serbs of [BiH]‖ to abstain from voting in
the upcoming referendum on the independence of BiH, claiming that it was against the interests of
the ―Serbian people‖.6575 (#Not criminal, not forbidden#, a guaranteed democratic right! Who
was in charge of taking care about the interests of te Serbian people? It sounds like it was a
felony, a nasty conduct of people in some colony. So ignorant of the domestic laws and
constitution, the chambers couldn’t decide otherwise!)

1932. In March 1992, the main issue that the SDS raised for discussions in the Municipal
Assembly was whether Sanski Most should declare itself as ―Serbian Sanski Most‖, (#Two
municipalities – peace#! All distorted: it was under the presumption that the Muslim
community would form their own Muslim municipality, which may not want to join the
ARK.a part of the ARK.6576 (The main villain and responsible for the war in Sanski Most, M.
Karabeg was free to lie! It was never envisaged that the entire municipality would be
proclaimed for a Serb municipality, but only the newly formed Serb municipality!) Sanski
Most was the only municipality (out of the 17 municipalities in the Bosnian Krajina) whose
assembly had not yet decided on this matter.6577 On 25 March 1992, Rašula and Vrkeš signed a
proclamation declaring that all Bosnian Serb territories in Sanski Most were part of the SerBiH,
―as a unique Serb municipality of Sanski Most‖.6578 (Exactly, #only the Serb parts# of Sanski
Most, unified in the Serb municipality, which in no way concerned the Muslim part of the
municipality. Until that moment there was still the valid Lisbon agreement about forming
the three ethnic states in BiH. But, if the Chamber listened only to the Muslim extreme
leaders (Biscevic, Karabeg) that are named in the D5, than there will not be “the whole
truth”!)

1933. On 3 April 1992, Rašula issued a decision on behalf of the ―Serbian People‘s Assembly‖
that the ―Serbian Municipality‖ of Sanski Most would become part of the ARK.6579 This decision
was made by the Sanski Most SDS deputies only.6580 By 6 or 7 April 1992, the Sanski Most
Municipal Assembly stopped meeting altogether.6581 (#Only the Serb municipality#! That
means that the Serbs formed their own municipality. Having in mind exhibit D5, and how
many Muslim officials in the municipal organs had been taking part in the secret
preparations to count down with the Serbs, the formation of the Serb municipality was a
minimal measure. Karabeg was one of the most prominent extremists! To keep in mind that
the war already started elsewhere in BiH!)

6575
P3308 (SDS Leaflet); P3329 (Excerpt from handwritten diary of Nedeljko Rašula), p. 6; Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
6077–6078.
6576
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6095. See also Adjudicated Fact 2514.
6577
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6096–6097.
6578
P3304 (Decision of Serb people of Sanski Most, 25 March 1992) (listing 25 ―local communities and Serb settlement‖ which formed a ―unique Serb
municipality‖ in Sanski Most); Mirzet Karabeg, T. 18688–18689 (13 September 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2515. So what? That was #their
right#, particularly since this witness participated in a secret plan tu attack the Serbs.
6579
P3325 (Decision of Sanski Most Municipal Assembly, 3 April 1992); Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6102. See also
Adjudicated Fact 2516.
6580
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6102–6103.
6581
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6098.
 243

1934. On 14 April 1992, the Crisis Staff of Sanski Most was established at a session of the
Municipal Board of the Sanski Most SDS.6582 Rašula was appointed as president.6583 The Crisis
Staff was the ―centre of power‖ in Sanski Most and had, for instance, authority over the police.6584
(The municipal Crisis Staffs were the substitutes of regular organs of authorities, and it’s
members were ex oficio officials of these regular organs!)

1935. On 16 April 1992, the ―Serbian Municipality‖ of Sanski Most was formed.6585 (And the
Serb Municipality of Sanski Most comprised of #only the Serb parts# local communes and
settlements, see: D1682

And these settlements are numbered in the document from the said session of the Serb
Assembly, see D1804. Therefore, the Muslims in Sanski Most hadn’t been restricted in their
legitimate rights, but we just saw how their tactics was to “procrastinate” agreements and
get stronger, see bellow D1678)

1936. On 17 April 1992, Stojan Ţupljanin, head of the Banja Luka CSB, ordered that all police
employees must sign a statement of loyalty to the Serb Municipality of Sanski Most.6586 The
police then became effectively divided along ethnic lines: all of the Bosnian Serbs signed the
statement, only one Bosnian Croat signed it, and none of the Bosnian Muslims did.6587 Those who
did not sign the loyalty oath left the police.6588 (#Two municipalities accepted#! The principle of
the “whole truth” would require to be presented that the Muslim side accepted to form their
own municipality and municipal organs, including the police station, and those who didn’t
want to work in the Serb police station, obviously decided to cross over to the Muslim police
station!) The chief of the SJB ordered all police members to change the emblems on their caps to
the Serbian tricolour to show loyalty as Serbs.6589 (Of course, a Karabeg’s malicious
interpretation! That was not to “show loyalty as Serbs”, but that was an official amblem of
one of the three states-entities agreed to be formed in BiH. Therefore, #legal, legitimate and
agreed on the ICFY#!) This was done in accordance with the order from Ţupljanin that police
employees should wear new uniforms with sleeve insignias of the word ―milicija‖ written in
Cyrillic and blue berets with the tricolour badge.6590 Rašula enforced this order by stating that all
police members who accepted this would retain their jobs and those who refused would be

6582
P3329 (Excerpt from handwritten diary of Nedeljko Rašula), pp. 19–21.
6583
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 6 (under seal) (stating that the Secretariat of the SDS evolved into the Crisis Staff); P3329 (Excerpt from
handwritten diary of Nedeljko Rašula), p. 20 (listing as other members: Colonel Nedeljko Anĉić, Nemanja Tripković, Boro Savanović, Mirko Vrućinić,
Dragan Majkić, Mladen Lukić, Vlado Vrkeš, and Zvonko Nikolić). See also KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3340–
3342 (under seal). By 30 May 1992, the Crisis Staff of Sanski Most consisted of 12 persons, namely: (1) Rašula, (2) Vrkeš, (3) Mladen Lukić, economic
affairs, (4) Boro Savanović, president of the club of SDS deputies, (5) Boro Tadić, secretary of the People‘s Defence Secretariat, (6) Vrućinić, (7) Aniĉić,
TO commander, (8) Milenko Stojinović, commander of the municipal civilian protection staff, (9) Nenad Davidović, medical services, (10) Basara, (11)
Vinko Nikolić, in charge of vehicles, and (12) Nemanja Tripković, integrating and co-ordinating humanitarian associations. P2614 (Conclusions of Sanski
Most's Crisis Staff, 30 May 1992), p. 1
6584
KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin) T. 26300–26302, 26325–26326, 26330–26331 (under seal); KW540, D4449
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3328, 3342 (under seal). See, e.g., P2613 (Conclusions of Sanski Most's Crisis Staff, 22 May
1992); P2614 (Conclusions of Sanski Most's Crisis Staff, 30 May 1992).
6585
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7652 (under seal).
6586
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7652 (under seal); KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T.
26338 (under seal); KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3311 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 2520.
6587
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7652 (under seal); KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T.
3311 (under seal).
6588
KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3311–3312 (under seal).
6589
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 46–47 (under seal); Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6104.
6590
P3330 (Conclusions of session of Banja Luka CSB Enlarged Centre Council, 6 April 1992), para. 4.
 244

transferred.6591 (Transferred, where? Certainly, to the Muslim police station and the Muslim
municipality of Sanski Most!)
1937. After refusing to sign the loyalty oath, the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat policemen
who had left the police went to the fire brigade building on the other bank of the Sana River to
establish their own police force.6592 (#Two municipalities#! That was understood, because the
Serbs expected the Muslims to form their own municipality, with all the belonging structures
and organs. In such a case, nobody and never would expel anyone from the municipality of
Sanski Most. Karabeg and other Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat leaders then went to the
municipality building in Sanski Most both as a sign of protest and in order to organise their own
administration.6593 In discussions on 18 April 1992, the SDA, SDS, and HDZ agreed that the
municipality should be divided; however, the Executive Board of the SDS later rejected the
agreement.6594 (#SDA reneged on agreement#! However, it seems that the SDA felt “coerced”
and it wasn’t the SDS who rejected the agreement. Obviously, as in all other municipalities
where an agreement was on the way, the central of SDA forced their own members to reject
it, as happened in Vlasenica, Bratunac, Foca and others. Simultaneously, there was a
pressure by General Halilovic, the Commander of the Muslim Army, to stop talking with the
“agresors” and to start the war, see: D3904:

1938. On 30 April 1992, the Crisis Staff appointed Vrućinić as acting chief of the SJB and
Mladen Lukić as president of the Executive Board.6595 Rašula maintained his power as the
president of the Crisis Staff.6596 (All of it #only in the Serb municipality# of Sanski Most,
nothing in the Muslim parts of municipality!)
1. Take-over of Sanski Most

1939. At approximately 9:30 p.m. on 19 April 1992, Rašula issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats inside the municipality building to surrender by 10 p.m. or the Crisis
Staff would not be responsible for the consequences—the 6th Krajina Brigade, which had been in
Sanski Most since early April, was deployed close by.6597 In response, the Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats exited through the back of the municipality building and escaped to Sehovći.6598
6591
KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26338 (under seal).
6592
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7659–7660 (under seal); KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin),
T. 3311–3312 (under seal); Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6106–6107.
6593
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7660–7662 (under seal); Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
6107; P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 47 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 2521.
6594
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7661–7663 (under seal). KDZ474 specifies that the agreement from the SDA was coerced as
the Bosnian Muslims were in a position of weakness. KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7665 (under seal).
6595
P3306 (Conclusions of meeting of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 30 April 1992); P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 10–11, 45 (under seal);
D4347 (Decision of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 1 May 1992). See also P6670 (List of Sanski Most SJB employees for advance on salary for April 1992), p. 3.
Vrućinić was formally appointed as chief of the SJB on 13 June 1992. P6379 (Decision of Banja Luka CSB, 13 June 1992); KW540, D4449 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3410 (under seal).
6596
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7651 (under seal). See also P2614 (Conclusions of Sanski Most's Crisis Staff, 30 May 1992),
p. 1.
6597
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7666–7668, 7671–7677, 7862–7863 (under seal); KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor
v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3312–3313 (under seal); Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6110, 6113–6116; P3634 (Witness
statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 47–48 (under seal); Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7023–7024. See also Adjudicated
Facts 1299, 2521, 2522; Mirzet Karabeg, T. 18692 (13 September 2011); P3305 (5th Corps combat report, 20 April 1992), p. 1. Rašula did not offer any
guarantees of safety for those who surrendered. KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7671 (under seal).
6598
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7672–7673 (under seal); KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin),
T. 3312–3313 (under seal).
 245

The building was subsequently attacked by the 6th Krajina Brigade and members of the SOS and
TO.6599 (#Vice versa#! But it would be more correct to say that the Muslim/Croat group
occupied the municipal building in an attempt to prevent the forming of the Serb
municipality and to take the control over the entire Sanski Most. It is the main question: why
there was an ultimatum, and why the Muslim/Croat group escaped?

1940. The following day, on 20 April 1992, representatives of the SDS, SDA, and HDZ met with
military representatives, including Talić, Commander of the 1st Krajina Corps, and Basara,
Commander of the 6th Krajina Brigade.6600 (#Before VRS#! Wrong data: at that time there was
no any 1st Krajina Corps, there was the 5th Corps of JNA. And the very same JNA was
proclaimed by the Muslim authorities in Sarajevo on 12 April 92 as an enemy, which was
supposed to be annihilated, as the famous order called “The combat readiness: immediate!)
The SDA presented six requests, which the SDS rejected.6601 Talić ended the meeting by

6599
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated) (under seal), pp. 48–49; Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6116–6118;
KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3317, 3322 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Facts 1299, 2523.
6600
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7700 (under seal); KDZ474, T. 19336 (21 September 2011) (closed session). See also P3663
(Report on the 6th Brigade in the period between 8 October 1991 and 28 August 1992); P3929 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 3 September 1992), p. 8.
6601
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7701–7702, 7706 (under seal); KDZ474, T. 19339 (21 September 2011) (closed session). The
requests included: (i) guarantee of the public safety of citizens and their property; (ii) establishment of the organisation and the functioning of the legal
public security service and police station by finding the appropriate facilities and dividing resources; (iii) functioning of the legitimate municipal assembly
and its organs; (iv) functioning of the economy and payment of transactions in keeping with the agreement in Bosanski Novi of 17 April 1992; (v)
establishment of activity by all public institutions and companies with special emphasis on the work of the radio station with parity programming; and (vi)
determination of the sequence of events on 18 and 19 April 1992 through the work of a mixed committee with the presence of European Community
observers and representatives of the regular army. KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7702 (under seal); P3329 (Excerpt from
handwritten diary of Nedeljko Rašula), p. 23. This document was entirely misquoted and misinterpreted in the Judgment. The
document contains a firm evidence about the subversive conduct of the Muslim side. Let us see what had been said on
the meeting with Gen. Talic: P3329, p.17

The JNA was a legal and legitimate force there at the time, and the Muslims opposed it’s arrival.
And it was spied by the highest Muslim official of the municipality, M. Karabeg, a witness in this
case

Colonel Hasagic was a Muslim in the Command of 5th Corps of JNA in BL. Talic wanted them to agree fast.
And only then we see the critical sentence quoted in the Judgment, as if only this sentence was pronounced:
 246

threatening that the SDA should not call anyone for help.6602 On the same day, the Crisis Staff
held a meeting in which it concluded that it only recognised the ―Serbian Municipality‖ of Sanski
Most, including the ―Serbian TO‖ and the ―Serbian SJB‖.6603 The Crisis Staff also declared that
the ―former Municipal Assembly of Sanski Most‖ was illegal and that only the laws of the SerBiH
would be in effect in Sanski Most.6604 (#For the Serbs only#! That was a provision for the Serb
Municipality of Sanski Most, not for the Muslim one! The Chamber is in an obligation to see
and to bring the whole truth, that means that the Serbs in Sanski Most have lost their fate in
their neighbours Muslims, because they had been undertaken many measures to attack the
Serbs, see D5. Instead of attacking them first, the Serbs founded their own municipality,
recommending to the Muslims to do the same, which was initially accepted, but lated the
Muslims wanted to “buy sosme time” and deceive the Serbs, which the Serbs rejected! But,
without any contact with the central organs, the local Serbs did have every rights to secure
themselves against the wide organisation, coordinated with Sarajevo, aimed to destroy the
Serbs. Even if the local Serbs were able to contact the central RS organs, nobody could stop
them to prevent their catastrophy. According to the then laws, they had every single right to
protect themselves.)

1941. On 28 April 1992, the Crisis Staff concluded that all citizens in Sanski Most must
surrender their weapons.6605 (All the citizens, which were not engaged in the JNA, #regardless
of ethnicity!#) Radio Sana then broadcast a message that all citizens in Sanski Most must turn in
their weapons to the SJB or the TO by 3 May 1992 and that their security would be protected.6606
Operations were carried out to disarm the citizens in predominantly Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian
Croat villages.6607 There were never any efforts made to disarm the Bosnian Serb population.6608
(#Within JNA#! Why would the Serbs be disarmed, if they had been within the framework
of the JNA, still legaly present there? Had the Muslim and Croat reservists joined the JNA,
as certain number did in all municipalities, or the TO which was under the JNA, they would
be in the same position as the Serb reservists! Many Muslims and Croats joined the VRS,
defending the secular way of life together with the Serbs, and were treated the same as the
Serbs!)

1942. On 11 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff issued a decision to the presidents of the
municipalities in the ARK that the deadline for the voluntary surrender of ―illegally acquired‖
weapons, as ordered in a decision issued by the ARK government on 4 May 1992,6609 was

But, this sentence has to be seen in the light what Col. Hasagic have said just before Talic: “Horrifying images from
the theatre (of war) Agreements and agreements! We are preventing the transfer of the focus of war here.”
6602
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7708 (under seal).
6603
P3399 (Conclusions of meeting of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 20 April 1992), para. 4.
6604
P3399 (Conclusions of meeting of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 20 April 1992), para. 4. See also Adjudicated Fact 2517.
6605
P3328 (Conclusions of meeting of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 28 April 1992), para. 1; P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 55–56 (under
seal); Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6133–6134. See also KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić &
Ţupljanin), T. 26173 (under seal).
6606
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 55–57 (under seal); Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5507–5508,
5510, 5513; Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7021, 7054; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-
court pp. 5–6; Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2967–2969; KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
8052–8054. See also Adjudicated Fact 1307; Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6768.
6607
P3648 (Report of Sanski Most SJB, 10 July 1992); KW545, T. 46963 (12 February 2014) (closed session).
6608
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated) (under seal), pp. 58–60.
6609
P2818 (Decision of ARK Regional Secretariat for National Defence, 4 May 1992).
 247

extended to ―24:00 on 14 May 1992‖.6610 (All #legal and obligatory# due to the law, and
regardless of ethnicity!)

1943. Beginning on 20 May 1992, the Crisis Staff ordered the disarmament of ―paramilitary
formations‖ in Sanski Most in accordance with the decision from the ARK government.6611 (#All
legal and obligatory due to the law!#)

1944. By 25 May 1992, soldiers from the 6th Krajina Brigade searched the houses of Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats in Sanski Most in order to disarm them.6612 The Sanski Most SJB
reported on the total number of weapons seized from Muslim villages.6613 In Mahala, an
announcement was made on the radio that people should hand over weapons to check-points.6614
In addition, an announcement was made that all Bosnian Muslims who were loyal to the Serbian
state should fly white flags in front of their houses.6615 (The same as described in the Edward
Villiamy’s report, see: P3788, p.6

Therefore, both the white #ribbons# on shoulders and white textile on the houses, served in
prevention of a “friendly fire”. The only what the Muslims and Croats were supposed to do
to be “left alone” was – not to fire!)
1945. On 25 May 1992, the 6th Krajina Brigade attacked the Bosnian Muslim neighbourhoods of
Mahala, Muhići, and Otoka in Sanski Most town.6616 The attack started with shelling, followed by
soldiers entering the area.6617 The soldiers set houses on fire.6618 According to a Sanski Most SJB
report, the attack against Mahala resulted in the ―capture of 2,000 civilians‖ but no significant
amount of weapons was found.6619 Because it was concealed earlier, as was said in the
document P3928 :

6610
P3694 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 11 May 1992), para. 1; Mirzet Karabeg, T. 18801–18802 (14 September 2011); KW540, D4449 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3351 (under seal).
6611
P3647 (Order of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 20 May 1992); P2613 (Conclusions of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 22 May 1992), p. 2; P3402 (Conclusions of
Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 22 May 1992).
6612
D4233 (Witness statement of Branko Davidović dated 20 January 2014), para. 21. The Sanski Most SJB report states that the disarming and surrendering of
weapons was carried out until 25 May 1992. P3928 (Report of Sanski Most SJB, 15 June 1992), p. 1; Mile Dobrijević, T. 44632 (6 December 2013).
6613
P3648 (Report of Sanski Most SJB, 10 July 1992), p. 1 (stating that ―[a] special group was established for these jobs that went to Muslim villages seising
weapons, based on orders from the SJB and that the military police were also engaged in the operations).
6614
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5512–5513.
6615
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5514. Bišĉević stated that it was used as a sign to identify houses belonging to the
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, differentiating them from the Bosnian Serb-owned houses when the houses were destroyed later. Faik
Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5515.
6616
P3928 (Report of Sanski Most SJB, 15 June 1992); Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5513; KW545, D4328 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26198 (under seal); Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8105–8106; KDZ474, T.
19247 (21 September 2011) (closed session). See also Adjudicated Facts 2527, 2528. KDZ490 states that the attack occurred on 26 May 1992. P3634
(Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 69–70 (under seal). Given the volume of consistent and accepted documentary evidence, witness testimony,
and adjudicated facts in this regard, the Chamber finds that the attack occurred on 25 May 1992.
6617
KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3365 (under seal); P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February
2010), para. 31. See also Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8106.
6618
KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3365 (under seal); Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik),
T. 5513 (testifying that 192 houses were set on fire, destroyed, and looted, namely ―the entire Gornji Mahala was destroyed‖). Mihajlo Orlović testified that
he passed through Mahala two or three years later and did not see houses burned. He also refuted the shelling of Mahala. Mihaljo Orlović, T. 46643–46645
(6 February 2014). The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching this conclusion, the Chamber found that Orlović was not completely
forthright with the Chamber and his evidence was contradicted on numerous occasions by other accepted evidence, including P3928 (Report of Sanski Most
SJB, 15 June 1992), witnesses Faik Bišĉević, KW545, Sakib Muhić, KDZ474, and Adjudicated Fact 2528.
6619
P3928 (Report of Sanski Most SJB, 15 June 1992), p. 1.
 248

Why this fact #was skiped#, and the matter presented selectively? But there is an additional
fact: the VRS sustained a significant loses,

So, obviously, this was an #attack on a stronghols# in the middle of the urban core of the
Sanski Most town itself. Which army would tolerate such a stronghold on it’s A(rea) O(f)
R(esponsibility)AOR?

1946. Attacks continued the following day.6620 NeĊeljko Aniĉić ordered ―upon completion of the
task, [to] take the prisoners to the sports hall‖ and ―hand over the war booty‖ to the ―Sanski Most
Serbian TO Staff‖.6621 Other villages in Sanski Most were subsequently attacked, including
Hrustovo, Vrhpolje, Lukavica, and Trnovo.6622 (#Armed strongholds#! This is incorrect,
because it is only four villages out of many Muslim and Croat settlements. It must be kept in
mind that Prijedor was not to far, several tens of km down the River Sana, and that the
Muslim forces started their attacks in Prijedor on 22 May in Hambarine, and then on 24
May from Kozarac. And keeping in mind that the Sana River Valey was a unique space, see
D3904,

(
#A huge Muslim terrorist presence#! Sefer Halilovic, 10 September 1992! Neither the
Prosecution, nor the Chamber even tried to contest that there existed this Una-Sana
Operational Group deep in the Serb territory!) According to a military report, there was a
―comprehensive operation‖ undertaken between 25 May and 4 June 1992 to ―mop up the terrain
and disarm Muslim extremists‖ in Sanski Most.6623 (Since this document, P3663 had been
quoted extremely selectively, let u see what was said in this “strictly confidential” military

6620
P3313 (Order of Sanski Most TO, undated), pp. 1–2; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 31; P3634 (Witness statement
of KDZ490, undated), p. 70 (under seal).
6621
P3313 (Order of Sanski Most TO, undated), p. 3. See Scheduled Detention Facility C.22.3.
6622
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras. 36, 41–42; P3928 (Report of Sanski Most SJB, 15 June 1992), p. 1. See also
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8052–8053; P3318 (Order of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 2 June 1992) (ordering the machinery
and manpower for the burial of persons killed in combat operations in Vrhpolje and Hrustovo); Adjudicated Fact 2529. See, e.g., Scheduled Incidents
A.12.1, A.12.2, A.12.4. KW540 testified that in Vrhpolje, there were approximately 400 Bosnian Muslim men who were ―the best armed and the best
organised‖ by the SDA and this was why the 6th Krajina Brigade attacked Vrhopolje. KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin),
T. 3485–3486 (under seal).
6623
P3663 (Report on the 6th Brigade in the period between 8 October 1991 and 28 August 1992), p. 5.
 249

report: P3663, p. 4:

(#Only strongholds#! All the toponims that later became the battlefields, unlike the rest of 22
Muslim villages, where there was no fights, because the Muslims didn’t decide to attack the
Serbs! See further, pp4-5:

And, finally, the result of the fights against the Muslim extremists, P3663, p.7:

(#Serb loses#! Certainly, those military casualties hadn’t been inflicted by some Muslim
civilians, but by an organized and well equped secret Army. If there was an individual
misconduct, it should be investigated, but the Prosecution – the Chamber alliance theat all
the Serb political or military legal actions as a crime, and therefore all the consequences of
such a legal actions as a criminal deeds! Why this document was taken so selectively?
Depicting the consequences, i.e. the Serb reactions, without depicting the context and causes
is not a fair trial!)

1947. Meetings of the Crisis Staff were to be held daily to discuss a ―long-term solution‖ for the
―problem of refugees from the Mahala area, as well as the Muslims and Croats who are not loyal
to the Constitution and laws of the [SerBiH]‖.6624 The Crisis Staff concluded that all ―those who
have not taken up arms and want to change their municipality‖ should be allowed to move out.6625
(This was #in accord with the Agreement# of the three sides signed in London on 22 May,
which regulated an obligation of the warring sides to facilitate the free movement of
civilians, or a displacement of civilians “if the security of the civilians involved, or imperative
military reasons so demand: see: D1603 p. 9:

6624
P2614 (Conclusions of Sanski Most‘s Crisis Staff, 30 May 1992), p. 1.
6625
P2614 (Conclusions of Sanski Most‘s Crisis Staff, 30 May 1992), p. 1.
 250

That is why no Muslim or Croat was disturbed in any village where there was no fights!
Why the Chamber didn’t consider this Agreement, which served as a basis for several other
similar agrements, comprised under the same exhibit number: Agreement on the release and
transfer of prisoners, of 30 Sept. and 1. Oct. 1992, and also D4710 signed in London on 17
July 92, p. 1:

Why these documents “does not matter?!)

1948. Pursuant to an order from the Crisis Staff, the ―displaced population‖ from the Mahala,
Muhići, and Otoka areas was to be transferred by a Sanatrans bus to the sports hall for ―care and
accommodation‖.6626 (#Legal as illegal#! Exactly as it was #provided by the Geneva
Conventions# and repeated in the document above! However, as usually, the Serb moves are
depicted as illegal, no matter what circumstances demanded!) The following day, the TO
ordered the ―clean up‖ of the terrain in Mahala, Otoka, and Mahići and the search, identification,
and burial of dead bodies.6627 (So what? Remember, the VRS and the police had their own
casualties, in the very urban core of Sanski Most. A sanitation of a battlefield was a #legal
obligation#!)

1949. On 27 May 1992, Bišĉević was arrested, beaten, and taken to Radio Sana, which was by
then controlled by the SDS.6628 He was forced to read a statement on the radio.6629 The statement
announced that the VRS had taken over the municipality and all Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats must unconditionally surrender their weapons in order to prevent the destruction of the
town.6630 After making this statement, Bišĉević was taken to Magarice village.6631 An additional
announcement was broadcast on the radio stating that residents who wished to leave Sanski Most
would be allowed to and those who wished to stay were required to submit a request for a
permanent residence permit.6632 (#All vice versa#! This was due to an ignorance of the laws,
and Vrucinic asked the BL CSB for an interpretation of a law pertaining to the issue, see
P03850, 17 August 92

6626
P3315 (Order of Sanski Most TO Municipal Staff, 26 May 1992) (also ordering that medical treatment shall be provided); Mirzet Karabeg, P3303
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6149–6151; KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3453–3454 (under seal).
Karabeg testified that members of the SDS executive board, Boro Savanović, Tomo Delić, and Nemanja Tripković, visited him in the SJB prison and told
him that Mahala and Otoka had been ―liberated‖ and set on fire. Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6150–6151. See para.
2006.
6627
P3316 (Order of Sanski Most TO Municipal Staff, 27 May 1992); Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6151–6152.
6628
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5520–5524; Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7030–7036.
See also P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated) (under seal), pp. 17, 69; P3644 (Conclusions of the Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 12 May 1992), p. 1;
see Adjudicated Fact 2530.
6629
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5520–5524; Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7030–7036;
P725 (Audio recording of radio announcement); Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6156–6159; Grgo Stojić, P3515
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6770; KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7449–7750 (under seal). See also P3634
(Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 17, 69 (under seal); P3644 (Conclusions of the Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 12 May 1992), p. 1. Mihaljo Orlović
testified that he asked Faik Bišĉević about this radio statement and that Bišĉević had read it out of his own free will and was not coerced. Mihaljo Orlović,
T. 46651–46652 (6 February 2014). The Chamber does not find his evidence to be reliable. In reaching this conclusion, the Chamber found that the
evidence of Orlović was contradicted by other accepted evidence, including that of witnesses KDZ474, Mirzet Karabeg, and Faik Bišĉević, and that he was
not completely forthright with the Chamber.
6630
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5522; Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7037–7038.
6631
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7042. See para. 2021.
6632
Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6771–6772.
 251

(But let us see what the Radio and the News Agency Tanjug reported about the events in
Sanski Most on 27 May, when Biscevic was arrested: D4295:

Therefore, it was not a Serb attack, but contrary, #the Muslim attack,# just as it was
meditated on the meeting of SDA Board ON 16 March 1992, while the Lisbon Agreement
was just been finalised, see: D1678:

Now, knowing that Biscevic was among the most radical and responsible for this attack, it is
clear why he was arrested and brought to the Radio station to call the people to calm down
and stop fighting!)

(4) Events after the take-over of Sanski Most

1950. Following the take-over, Bosnian Serbs were appointed to positions in the municipality of
Sanski Most while Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats employees of the municipality were
removed from their jobs.6633 (All of the Muslim employees in the previous common institutions
had been offered to continue working, provided they accept the Republic of Srpska. Those
who didn’t accept the Republic of Srpska Constitution and laws, had their alternative, to
join the Muslim municipality of Sanski Most which was in the forming process!) This
included judges and employees of the municipal court, directors of public companies, and
employees of the local radio and health centre.6634 Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat political
leaders were arrested.6635 (#Legal and obligatory#! There was #no any arbitrary arrests#!
Those who were arrested were a very famous Muslim extremists who actively participated in
preparations and actions of the rebellion! But, see the fn. 6645, and it is clear that those who
didn’t respect the RS Constitution couldn’t carry out a sensitive duties. And concerning
judges, remember D5 exhibit, and the President of the Court Adil Draganovic was, among
the most prominent people in the conspiracy against the Serbs. There were the Serbs
6633
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5512; P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 49, 53–55, 61–62 (under seal).
See also P2740 (Decision of ARK Crisis Staff, 22 June 1992); P3646 (Conclusion of the Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 20 May 1992); see Adjudicated Fact
2518. Mikan Davidović testified that non-Serbs did not show up for work, rather than being dismissed from employment in May 1992. However, he
confirmed that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in top positions, such as directors and judges, were replaced by Bosnian Serbs. Mikan Davidović, T.
44521-44522 (5 December 2013). Vinko Nikolić testified that all citizens were allowed to maintain their employement if they respected the RS constitution.
Vinko Nikolić, T. 45446–45451 (16 January 2014). However, his testimony was contradicted by evidence showing that Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim
employees were removed from their jobs. The Chamber notes that this was one of many contradictions in his evidence which magnified his lack of
credibility on the stand.
6634
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated) (under seal), pp. 61–62. See Adjudicated Fact 2518.
6635
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7027–7030.
 252

dismissed from the duties in the court too, (but this document wasn’t admitted). See also
P03498 from 6 April 92, a Serb signing the Oath to obey the Constitution and laws:

1951. On 8 June 1992, the TO was dismantled, the 6th Krajina Brigade set up a forward
command post in Sanski Most, and Aniĉić was appointed Commander.6636 All the former TO
units in Sanski Most were integrated into the 6th Krajina Brigade.6637 Throughout June, July, and
August 1992, armed attacks on villages throughout the municipality continued.6638 (#Military
necessity#! There was no attacks “on villages”, but only attacks on the armed formations of
extremists in several villages, after the Muslim/Croat extremists attacked the Serb
settlements and institutions on 27 May, se above D4295! All the contemporaneous documents
confirmed that there were hundreds and hundreds of terrorists in several villages of this
municipality! All the documents are depicted selectively, so there is created an impression as
if the 6th Krajina Brigade was attacking civilians and their settlements. Let us se what the
contemporaneous documents, admitted in this file, say: and depicted evidence, although
the Chamber had at it’s disposal other documents, and we will show that. D4677 of 28 May
92:

6636
P3663 (Report on the 6th Brigade in the period between 8 October 1991 and 28 August 1992), p. 6.
6637
P3663 (Report on the 6th Brigade in the period between 8 October 1991 and 28 August 1992), p. 6.
6638
P3663 (Report on the 6th Brigade in the period between 8 October 1991 and 28 August 1992), pp. 6–7.
 253

There was no shooting or casualties, just disarmament! Let us se further:

Scheduled Incident A.12.1

1952. The Prosecution alleges that about 28 men were killed between Begići and Vrhpolje Bridge
on or about 31 May 1992.

1953. Begići is a hamlet in the village of Kljevci with approximately 80 inhabitants.6639 Begići is
divided into two halves: Gornji Begići and Donji Begići, which were several 100 metres apart.6640
In 1992, the majority of the population in Begići was Bosnian Muslim.6641

1954. On 25 May 1992, soldiers from the 6th Krajina Brigade entered Gornji Begići and Donji
6642
Begići. They damaged property and beat some of the residents.6643 The soldiers then returned
to their check-point near Stojanovići.6644

1955. On 31 May 1992, soldiers from the 6th Krajina Brigade entered Donji Begići and ordered
the residents to come out of their houses and to go towards Gornji Begići.6645 Once they arrived
there, they saw that the men from Gornji Begići had gathered outside.6646 The women and
children were separated from the men and taken away.6647 The soldiers ordered the men,
approximately 20 in the group, to go towards the Vrhpolje Bridge where they were told there

6639
P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 5; Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2962–2963. For
the location of Kljevci and Begići, see P3638 (Map of Sanski Most municipality); P1159 (Map of Hrstovo-Vrhpolje marked by Rajif Begić).
6640
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2971, 2975.
6641
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2963.
6642
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2969–2971; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 6.
92bis Rule!
6643
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2970; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić Sanski Most Court dated 16 April 1995), e-
court p. 13. 92bis Rule!
6644
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2970; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court dated 16 April 1995), e-
court pp. 13–14. 92bis Rule!
6645
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2973–2975; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 6. See
also Adjudicated Fact 1303. 92bis Rule! + Adjudicated Fact#Dealdy combination#!!
6646
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2979. 92bis Rule!
6647
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2979. See also Adjudicated Fact 1303. 92bis Rule! + Adjudicated Fact#Dealdy
combination#!!
 254

would be buses waiting to transport them to Sanski Most.6648 The men walked, two-by-two, in a
column through the fields towards the Vrhpolje Bridge.6649 According to Rajif Begić, there were
20 Bosnian Muslim men in this column, including himself, and they were escorted by eight armed
soldiers.6650

1956. Jadranko Palija, a soldier from the 6th Krajina Brigade, was in charge of leading the column
of men from Begići to the Vrhpolje Bridge.6651 During the walk to the bridge, two of the Bosnian
Muslim men were taken out of the column by Palija, shot, and killed near a slaughterhouse.6652 As
the group continued towards the bridge, Palija shot and killed another man near the crossroads of
the main road connecting Sanski Most and Kljuĉ.6653 Before the group reached the bridge,
approximately 50 metres away, a military van pulled up and Palija got in to speak to the driver.6654
Palija ordered another man, Ismet Kurbegović, from the column to come to the passenger side of
the van, which he did.6655 Palija shot and killed Kurbegović.6656 (Begic and Kurbegovic were on
all and every lists of the #leaders of the criminal conspiracy# to kill the Serbs. Now, one of
them is testifying, and the Defence can not do what is supposed to do, to challenge their
testimony. Where else this practice exists?)

1957. When the remaining men reached the bridge, armed soldiers were waiting for them.6657
The men were ordered to line up along the bridge and told that they would be killed because VRS
soldiers had been killed.6658 They were ordered to take off their clothes and shoes.6659 One of the
men was ordered to jump into the river.6660 He did and as he was swimming in the river, the
soldiers leaned over the bridge, shot, and killed him.6661 The soldiers repeated this with every
man.6662 Begić was the sixth man who was ordered to jump off the bridge.6663 He did so and

6648
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2979. See also Adjudicated Fact 1304 (which states that ―between 20-30 men‖ were in this
group. For the location of the Vrhpolje Bridge, see P1159 (Map of Hrstovo-Vrhpolje marked by Rajif Begić). 92bis Rule! + Adjudicated Fact!
6649
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2980; P1159 (Map of Hrstovo-Vrhpolje marked by Rajif Begić). 92bis Rule!
6650
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2980; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court dated 16 April 1995), e-
court pp. 13, 15; P1159 (Map of Hrstovo-Vrhpolje marked by Rajif Begić). Begić named the 19 other men who were taken with him, namely Miralem
Cerić, Enes Cerić, Midhet Cerić, Hakija Begić, Muharem Begić, Šaćir Begić, Safet Begić, Muhamed Begić, Irfan Begić, Fuad Begić, Elmedin Begić, Najil
Begić, Ismet Kurbegović, Munib Begić, Nedţad Begić, Ismet Dizdarević, Muhamed Dizdarević, Mirsad Dizdarević, and Enes Dizdarević. Rajif Begić,
P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2981, 2984; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court dated 16 April 1995), e-court
p. 16. 92bis Rule!
6651
P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court dated 16 April 1995), e-court pp. 15–16; Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik), T. 2973–2974, 2980. See also Adjudicated Fact 1305; D4387 (Witness statement of Dušan Mudrinić dated 15 February 2014), para. 21.
Mudrinić confirmed that it was Jadranko Palija who was in charge and responsible because ―the incident was investigated and an on-site investigation was
conducted‖. D4387 (Witness statement of Dušan Mudrinić dated 15 February 2014), para. 21. 92bis Rule!
6652
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2982–2983 (Begić identifies these men as Miralem Cerić and Enes Cerić); P692 (Witness
statement of Rajif Begić dated 16 April 1995), e-court p. 16; P1159 (Map of Hrstovo-Vrhpolje marked by Rajif Begić). See also Adjudicated Fact 1306.
92bis Rule! + Adjudicated Fact!
6653
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2983 (Begić identifies this man as Ismet Kurbegović); P692 (Witness statement of Rajif
Begić dated 16 April 1995), e-court p. 16. See also Adjudicated Fact 1306. 92bis Rule! + Adjudicated Fact!
6654
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2984. 92bis Rule!
6655
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2984; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić dated 16 April 1995), e-court pp. 16–17.
92bis Rule!
6656
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2984 (Begić identifies this man as Irfan Begić); P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić
dated 16 April 1995), e-court pp. 16–17. See also Adjudicated Fact 1306. 92bis Rule! + Adjudicated Fact!

6657
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2985–2986; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court dated 16 April
1995), e-court p. 18. See also Adjudicated Fact 1306.
6658
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2986–2987; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court dated 16 April
1995), e-court p. 18.
6659
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2987; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court dated 16 April 1995), e-
court p. 18. See also Adjudicated Fact 1306.
6660
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2987; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court dated 16 April 1995), e-
court p. 18. Begić identifies this man as Midhet Cerić. P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court dated 16 April 1995), e-court p. 18.
6661
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2987; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court dated 16 April 1995), e-
court p. 18.
6662
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2988–2990; P1158 (Photograph of Vrhpolje bridge marked by Rajif Begić); P692 (Witness
statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court dated 16 April 1995), e-court p. 18. Begić identifies other men who were killed as Munib Begić, Mirsad
 255

instead of swimming to the surface, he dived under the water and swam towards the left bank
where he hid under trees and shrubbery.6664 The soldiers continued in this manner with each man
on the bridge.6665 Begić was the only survivor.6666 (How convenient! Is this a screenplay for a
James Bond? There was no a single body recovered from the Sana River or the soil that was
without cloathing, as Rajif Begic testified. Some of them had ID Cards, Pasport, driving
licences, one of them had a big amount of money, see below P557! All of them well dressed,
some of them even with two pairs of trouses, as if none of them died during a warm wether,
i.e. none of them had been captured, see P557

#Combatant# no doubt! Who else confirmed this story? If nobody, and no documents, how
come one serious Chamber put it in the Judgment? However, the document P557 sais
somewhat different story:

So, this Prosecutor’s document sais that there was an #attack of the Muslim extremists#, and
then “an armed conflict with the Serb Army of Sanski Most Municipality” Prety accurate,
since this civil war was not a unique one, but rather many municipal civil wars:

See that!!! The document said that “there were victims whom it was necessary to identify!”
Had those Muslim extremists been captured and then executed as the Muslim extremists
“testified”, (Rajif Begic, as the only one, a member of a very extreme family Begic, brother
of Nedzad and relative of Daut, who died in this skirmish) there would be no any need to
organize the whole team to identify them! The bodies would be naked and without any ID or
money, which was not the case! Further, the same P557

Dizdarević, Enes Dizdarević, and Elmedin Begić. Enes Dizdarević was shot on the bridge before he could jump off. Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2989–2990. See also Adjudicated Facts 1304, 1306; P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 77 (under seal).
6663
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2991; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 6; P692
(Witness statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court dated 16 April 1995), e-court p. 19.
6664
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2991; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court dated 16 April 1995), e-
court p. 18.
6665
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2992. See also Adjudicated Fact 1306. KDZ492 testified that he had heard from soldiers of
the 6th Krajina Brigade that Bosnian Muslim civilians were killed and thrown off the bridge into the Sana River. KDZ492, P3596 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 3861–3862 (under seal).
6666
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2992–2993; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court p. 6;
P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court dated 16 April 1995), e-court p. 19. Begić states that ―more than 20‖ Bosnian Muslims were
killed on 31 May 1992. P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court dated 18 April 1996), e-court p. 11.
 256

As it is obvious, there were only 11 bodies recovered from the river, while others had been
“found in the village of Vrhpolje…” and obviously, it was after the fights in the Vrhpolje
village. See who had been recovered at this site, P557:

Later identified:

Others hadn’t been identified, but those identified belong to the top #elite of the
Muslim rebels#, organizers and commanders. Another argument in favour of the Defence
position: since it was an armed skirmish, were the combat casualties had been depicted, how
many of them, and who? If not, then it is clear that Rajif Begic deceived the Chamber! Let
us see what other evidence sais about this: a Muslim source D01677:

“A group was active in the town itself…” that was why Mahala was “attacked” but it was this
“group of the Green Berets” that had been attacked!
 257

(#Armed strongholds#! This is a Muslim source! Nota bene: these names of persons and
places, because the Indictment alleged that these villages had been a civilian settlements
attacked by the Serbs! Who and why prevented the Chamber of reading this exhibit? So, the
Vrhpolje bridge was a first line, “impenetrable” and we only can imagine how many Serbs
and Muslims died around this bridge. The same Muslim source, document D1677, p. 9-10
describe the critical time:
 258

(Let us see what had been said in the Serb document, D4295 about the Vrhpolje Bridge:

Said – done! The Muslim extremists planned in advance to pose their blockade at the
Vrhpolje Bridge, and there was a skirmish with the VRS, which sustained at least six soldiers
wounded at the first day of fights! Let us see what was said further in the Muslim document,
D1677:

And that was the only Serb crime: to know what the Muslims were preparing as of the
beginning of the 91. This kind of presentation of events by the Prosecution is a crime, and the
Chamber didn’t make a minor effort to protect the truth. Let us see the same Muslim
source D1677, p. 11

(This is the list of those “prominent” citizens of Sanski Most, known to all the Muslim
authors and citizens as the #main organizers# of the arming, preparing, planning and finally
realising the armed attacks on the JNA (later the VRS) and the Serb settlements. Some of
them “testified” in this case, without the cross examination (Rules 92bis or 92ter) as a
“credible” witnesses, not interested to lie!?! Remember, this document is a book of the
Muslim elite in Sanski Most, of which 14 pages had been admitted. And, finally, D1677, p. 12
 259

identifies the area of the battles imposed by the Muslim forces:

(This is a partial list of the Muslim settlements where the Green Berets organised their
secret units and prepared for the war! Remember what the Prosecution alleged, and the
Chamber unfortunately uncriticaly accepted, about the “villages” attacked by the Serb
Forces. Was Mahala attacked without any justifiable reason? See this paragraph! Why, for
what reasons, and under what justification the Chamber neglected this genuine document of
the Muslim provenance? See also D01678, a minutes of the SDA meeting with Osman Brka
from the Central SDA, 12 April 92! In the light of these Muslim documents nothing
concluded about Sanski most can survive!)

1958. Begić identified 19 Bosnian Muslim men who were killed in relation to this incident.6667 The
Chamber also received evidence that in July 1992, the bodies of 13 males were found buried under the
Vrhpolje Bridge on the right bank of the Sana River, the bodies of 11 other males were taken out of the
Sana River, and Irfan Begić was found dead by the road near the bridge.6668 Of the 11 bodies taken out
of the river, five of them match the names of men that were identified as having been with Begić‘s
group.6669 (What this “Begic’s group was doung? Why they grouped? #A combatants?# What
else?!) Further, the Chamber received evidence that in May 1996, the bodies of 28 males were
exhumed from mass graves connected to this incident.6670 Of those 28 males, seven were identified as
having been with Begić‘s group and four were also named in the July 1992 report as bodies taken from
the Sana River.6671 Injuries noted by the forensic report include gunshot wounds and fractured bones,
mainly of the skull and ribs.6672 Some of the bodies in one part of the mass grave were in civilian
clothing and another section of the mass grave contained a large quantity of civilian clothing.6673 The
Chamber also received evidence that the body of Ismet Kurbegović was discovered in a mass grave in
Prijedor.6674 (#Ad absurdum#! Why would the Serbs from Sanski Most, in a shortage of
everything and fuel in particular, transport one body to Prijedor? It is obvious that Ismet
Kurbegovic didn’t die that day in Sanski Most, but some other time, in combats around Prijedor.
Since the Chamber “received” so many “evidence” why the Chamber didn’t check what happened
with the combat casualties? Or this was the only war without a combat casualties? All of the
combat casualties had been depicted as a victims of an alleged execution, and this is responsibility
of the Prosecution and the Muslim witnesses!)

6667
P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić to Sanski Most Court dated 16 April 1995), e-court pp. 15–17.
6668
P557 (Report on bodies found in Vrhpolje, 10 July 1992).
6669
P557 (Report on bodies found in Vrhpolje, 10 July 1992), pp. 3–4.
6670
P4901 (Sanski Most Court record on the investigation and exhumation of mass graves by the Vrhpolje Bridge in Sanski Most, 7 May 1996). See also P4853
(Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 44–45 (listing 22 individuals connected to this scheduled incident); P6690 (Addendum to Nicolas
Sébire‘s report, 16 May 2003), e-court pp. 51–52 (listing 28 bodies exhumed from three gravesites near the Vrhpolje Bridge); P4850 (Witness statement of
Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), Annex A, pp. 12–13. See P4870 (DNA report for Najil Begić, 25 June 2007); P4871 (Record of identification for
Najil Begić, 25 June 2007).
6671
P4901 (Sanski Most Court record on the investigation and exhumation of mass graves by the Vrhpolje Bridge in Sanski Most, 7 May 1996), pp. 20–21
(reporting that only 15 of the 28 bodies were positively identified by relatives). The men who were also identified in P557 (Report on bodies found in
Vrhpolje, 10 July 1992) include Muhamed Dizdarević, Fuad Begić, Irfan Begić, and possibly Mirsad Dizdarević. Adil Draganovic was among the
most prominent persons in the complot for the armed attack on the Serbs in Sanski Most in 92.
6672
P4901 (Sanski Most Court record on the investigation and exhumation of mass graves by the Vrhpolje Bridge, Sanski Most, 7 May 1996), pp. 5–20.
6673
P4901 (Sanski Most Court record on the investigation and exhumation of mass graves by the Vrhpolje Bridge, Sanski Most, 7 May 1996), pp. 3–4.
6674
P6689 (Excerpts from report on exhumations in Prijedor municipality, 28 August 2002), p. 111.
 260

1959. The Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that at least 28 Bosnian Muslim men were
killed in this event.6675
1960. The Chamber therefore finds that approximately 20 men were killed by Serb Forces
between Begići and Vrhpolje Bridge on or about 31 May 1992. (Wrong finding, because of a
negligeance of a crucial document, confirming that the Vrhpolje bridge was the #first line of
the armed conflict#, and because this finding is founded on a 92bis testimonies that hadn’t
been challenged.)

a. Scheduled Incident A.12.2

1961. The Prosecution alleges that a number of people in the village of Hrustovo were killed on
or about 31 May 1992.

1962. Hrustovo is a village in Sanski Most.6676 It has six hamlets: Merdanovići, Keranovići,
Jeleĉevići, Kukavice, Handanovići, and Zukići.6677 In 1992, the population of these hamlets was
primarily Bosnian Muslim.6678

1963. On the morning of 31 May 1992, in Jeleĉevići, approximately 20 to 25 Bosnian Muslim

civilians, mainly women and children, were ordered by soldiers wearing JNA uniforms to go to
Kukavice.6679 The reason given was that the soldiers were going to search houses for weapons and
it would be easier if there were fewer people in the village.6680 (In #accordance with the law of
war#, civilians had to be removed out of the combat zone!) In Kukavice, the group grew to
about 30 individuals who were gathered in the garage of a house.6681 Shortly afterwards, soldiers
came to the garage and opened fire at the garage door.6682 The soldiers yelled for everyone to
come out of the garage.6683 Husein Merdanović went outside and told the soldiers to stop shooting
and that there were only women and children inside the garage.6684 The soldiers shot and killed
him.6685 The soldiers opened fire on the garage a second time.6686 As the civilians panicked, they
came out of the garage and started running away, the soldiers fired at them.6687 Only eight people
survived the attack.6688

6675
See Adjudicated Fact 1306.
6676
KDZ097, P714 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7206 (under seal); P616 (Map of Hrustovo-Vrhpolje marked by KDZ097).
6677
P715 (Witness statement of KDZ097 dated 21 April 2001), e-court p. 4 (under seal).
6678
P715 (Witness statement of KDZ097 dated 21 April 2001), e-court p. 4 (under seal); KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8047.
6679
KDZ097, P714 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7208–7209, 7213, 7222–7223 (under seal); P715 (Witness statement of KDZ097 dated 21 April
2001), e-court pp. 4–6 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Facts 1307, 1308.
6680
KDZ097, P714 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7209 (under seal). Again, 92bis!
6681
P715 (Witness statements\ of KDZ097 dated 21 April 2001), e-court p. 4 (under seal); KDZ097, P714 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7212
(under seal) (testifying that a number of people from Keranovići had joined). Merdanović was the only ―able bodied man‖ in the garage; he was ―50-60‖
years old. The other males in the garage were under the age of 14 years old. Of the 30 people in the garage, the following 22 individuals were identified by
name: Muharema Keranović, Almadina Keranović, Sabina Keranović, Sabra Merdanović, Jasmin Merdanović, Besima Merdanović, Edita Merdanović,
Husein Merdanović (age 4-5 years) (listed twice), Zumra Merdanović, Fatima Zukić, Senija Keranović, Sejida Keranović, Ĉama Jeleĉević, Razija Jeleĉević,
Sead Jeleĉević, Asim Jeleĉević, Elvira Jeleĉević, Edina Jeleĉević, Jasmina Merdanović, Dino Keranović, Ernes Keranović, and Husein Merdanović (age 50-
60 years). [REDACTED]. See also Adjudicated Fact 1308.
6682
P715 (Witness statement of KDZ097 dated 21 April 2001), e-court p. 6 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Facts 1309, 1310.
6683
KDZ097, P714 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7215-7216 (under seal); P715 (Witness statements of KDZ097 dated 21 April 2001 and 11
December 2001), p. 4 (under seal).
6684
P715 (Witness statement of KDZ097 dated 21 April 2001), e-court p. 6 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 1311.
6685
P715 (Witness statement of KDZ097 dated 21 April 2001), e-court p. 6 (under seal); KDZ097, P714 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7214
(under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 1311.
6686
P715 (Witness statement of KDZ097 dated 21 April 2001), e-court p. 6 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 1312.
6687
P715 (Witness statement of KDZ097 dated 21 April 2001), e-court p. 6 (under seal); KDZ097, P714 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7233
(under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 1312.
6688
P715 (Witness statement of KDZ097 dated 21 April 2001), e-court p. 8 (under seal). The survivors were Ĉama Jeleĉević, Edina Jeleĉević, Razija Jeleĉević,
Sead Jeleĉević, Ernes Keranović, Senija Keranović, Dino Keranović, and KDZ097. P715 (Witness statement of KDZ097 dated 21 April 2001), e-court p. 8
(under seal). On cross-examination, Boro Tadić testified that with respect to this scheduled incident, he could not confirm what had happened, nor could he
confirm that a prosecution for those responsible had been conducted. Boro Tadić, T. 44414–44415 (3 December 2013). Mihaljo Orlović testified that he did
not believe this killing incident happened and that it may have been a rumour or propaganda. Mihaljo Orlović, T. 46646 (6 February 2014). The Chamber
 261

1964. The Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that at a minimum, 15 people were killed in
this incident.6689 The Chamber received evidence that bodies were found in a mass grave in
Hrustovo in relation to this incident.6690 (#Deadly combination#! 92.bis testimony, the Defence
is defenceless and helpless in such a cases. This is no a fair trial.)

1965. Accordingly, the Chamber finds that a number of people were killed by Serb Forces in
Hrustovo village on or about 31 May 1992. (#Combats and casualties#! Even this Chamber can
not deny that there was an armed group of several hundred Muslim combatants, and that at
the time there was a battle between them and the VRS. It should be notified, because as it is
presented now, looks as if the Serbs killed “a number of people” out of any other events.
However, nothing in this incident was properly investigated, and can not bear this
qualification! It looks as if there was no any combat casualties on the Muslim side, all of
them are depicted as a victims of the Serb attacks on villages!)

a. Scheduled Incident A.12.3

1966. The Prosecution alleges that about 18 men from Kenjari were killed on or about
27 June 1992 in the hamlet of Blaţevići.
1967. Kenjari is a hamlet located north of Begići.6691 In 1992, the population of Kenjari was
primarily Bosnian Muslim.6692 Around 27 or 28 June 1992, Bosnian Serb soldiers, led by Milorad
Mijatović, entered Kenjari and started searching houses for weapons.6693 The Bosnian Muslims in
the hamlet were ordered to leave their houses and wait outside at the crossroads.6694 After the
soldiers were finished searching the houses, they ordered that all the men be taken elsewhere for
interrogation, while the women and children could return to their homes.6695 KDZ052 testified
that about 18 or 20 men were with him when they were taken to a house to be interrogated.6696
They were kept at the house in Kenjari until the following day when Vrkeš, the president of the
SDS in Sanski Most, came to see the men and told them they would be exchanged for Bosnian
Serbs in eastern BiH.6697 The men were then taken to a house in Blaţevići.6698 While they were in
the house, there was an explosion inside.6699 KDZ052 managed to jump out of the window and
hide.6700 He and others were shot at while they attempted to escape out of the house.6701 The

does not find his evidence on this point to be reliable as it amounted to mere speculation. The Chamber also found that the evidence of Orlović was marked
with numerous contradictions and that he was not completely forthright with the Chamber. (This is a most usual manner in #discrediting the
Defence witnesses.# There was no any reason that Tadic or Orlovic were not completely forthright with the Chamber.
Had this crime happened, everyone would have known about it. But, the Prosecutor’s evidence is due to Rule 92bis,
and under the seal, so neither the Defence could contest it, nor a public could object it!)
6689
See Adjudicated Fact 1313.
6690
P4898 (Sanski Most Municipal Court record of Hrustovo I exhumation, 15 April 1997), pp. 3–20 (listing 30 bodies found in the mass grave Hrustovo I, of
which eight are also named by KDZ097); P3637 (Report of BiH Federal Ministry of the Interior, 22 October 1996), p. 6 (listing 31 bodies found in the mass
grave Hrustovo I, of which seven are also named by KDZ097); P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 45–47 (which names 13
individuals in relation to this scheduled incident); P6690 (Addendum to Nicolas Sébire‘s report, 16 May 2003), e-court pp. 53–54, 56 (which identifies 31
bodies recovered from two mass graves, of which nine were also named by KDZ097). Not a single Serb document!!! If it was with the legal
“Serb Forces” there would be a record!
6691
P532 (Map of Sanski Most); Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2962–2964.
6692
P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2962–2963.
6693
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8054–8058. See also Adjudicated Fact 2531.
6694
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8058.
6695
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8058.
6696
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8059, 8073. See also Adjudicated Fact 2532.
6697
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8059–8060. See also Adjudicated Fact 2532.
6698
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8060–8062; P3377 (Map of Hrustovo-Vrhpolje marked by KDZ052) (under seal). See also
Adjudicated Fact 2532.
6699
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8063. See also Adjudicated Fact 2532.
6700
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8063.
6701
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8063–8064. See also Adjudicated Fact 2532.
 262

bodies of the men who were killed were taken by the soldiers back to the house and the house was
set on fire.6702 KDZ052 survived and made his way to Tomina.6703

1968. The Chamber received evidence that the bodies of 18 men were identified in a mass grave
and linked to this scheduled incident.6704

1969. Based on the evidence presented above, the Chamber finds that approximately 18 men
from Kenjari in the hamlet of Blaţevići were killed by Serb Forces on or about 27 June 1992.
(Even in this Judgment it is indicated that there was an attempt to escape. So, without an
investigation, or an objective document, this can not be treated as an execution, or an
unlawfull killing. But, it is hard to believe how this Chamber accepted to be deceived and
manipulated by the Muslim witnesses and perpetrators of the events scheduled in the
Indictment-Judgment. However, Kenjari was one of the #Muslim armed strongholds#, and
there was a fighting. What happened with the #combat casualties?# Or this was another
battle without a combat casualties, and all the combat casualties are presented as a casualties
of an execution?)

a. Scheduled Incident A.12.4

1970. The Prosecution alleges that a number of people from the hamlet of Budim in Lukavice
village were killed on or about 1 August 1992.
1971. Lukavice is a village in the northwestern region of Sanski Most municipality.6705 The
population of Lukavice was primarily Bosnian Muslim.6706 The Chamber took judicial notice of
the fact that on 1 August 1992, Bosnian Serb Forces attacked Budim and killed 14 members of the
Alibegović family, all of whom were unarmed civilians.6707 The Chamber also took judicial notice
of the fact that the victims were shot from a close distance with automatic weapons.6708 Why there
is no record of the action either in the military, or in the police records?

1972. The Chamber also received evidence that 14 bodies were exhumed in a mass grave in
relation to this incident.6709 These bodies were determined to be Bosnian Muslim male
civilians.6710

6702
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8065–8066. See also Adjudicated Fact 2532.
6703
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8067–8068. See also P3377 (Map of Hrustovo-Vrhpolje marked by KDZ052) (under seal).
6704
P3373 (Excerpt of exhumation report on Hrustovo and Vrhpolje mass grave) (under seal) (stating that charred remains were found in the house and in a
nearby mass grave, and information from KDZ052 and others identified 19 persons who were executed and whose bodies were set on fire); P3376 (Excerpt
of exhumation report on Hrustovo and Vrhpolje mass grave) (under seal) (listing the 18 names as identified by KDZ052); KDZ052, T. 19082–19083 (19
September 2011); KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8075; P3637 (Report of BiH Federal Ministry of the Interior, 22 October
1996), p. 2. See also P6690 (Addendum to Nicolas Sébire‘s report, 16 May 2003), e-court pp. 58–59.
6705
P532 (Map of Sanski Most); P3638 (Map of Sanski Most municipality).
6706
P532 (Map of Sanski Most); P3638 (Map of Sanski Most municipality).
6707
See Adjudicated Fact 1315.
6708
See Adjudicated Fact 1315. In his Final Brief, the Accused acknowledges that ―[o]n 1 August 1992, Serb soldiers attacked Budin[sic] and killed 14 unarmed
members of the Alibegović family‖. However, the Accused also submits that ―KDZ097 testified that large numbers of people roamed his area in uniform‖.
The Accused therefore argues that there was ―no plan to perpetrate killings by official Serb authorities.‖ Defence Final Trial Brief, p. 437 (section on
Persecution), para. 1623. The Accused also submits that the crimes committed in Sanski Most cannot be attributed to him because they were acts committed
without his knowledge, against his policies, and by people outside of his control. He also submits that there was no plan to permanently remove non-Serbs
from Sanski Most. Defence Final Brief, paras. 2894–2900. This submission will be dealt with in Section IV.A.3.iii: Authority over military and police
forces acting in BiH.
6709
P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 47–48; P4899 (Bihać Cantonal Court record of Lukavice postmortem examination, 11 June
1997); P4900 (Bihać Cantonal Court record of Lukavice exhumation, 2 June 1997). See also P6690 (Addendum to Nicolas Sébire‘s report, 16 May 2003),
e-court pp. 60–61.
6710
P4900 (Bihać Cantonal Court record of Lukavice exhumation, 2 June 1997); P4899 (Bihać Cantonal Court record of Lukavice postmortem examination, 11
June 1997).
 263

1973. The Chamber finds that approximately 14 people from the hamlet of Budim in Lukavice
village were killed by Serb Forces on or about 1 August 1992.

a. Scheduled Incident A.12.5

1974. The Prosecution alleges that approximately seven men were killed near the village of
Škrljevita on or about 2 November 1992.

1975. Škrljevita is a village in eastern Sanski Most.6711 In 1992, the majority of the population
in Škrljevita was Bosnian Croat.6712 On 2 November 1992, Grgo Stojić and his cousin were
walking from Sanski Most town to Škrljevita when they encountered two soldiers from the 6th
Krajina Brigade on the road near the Glamošnica forest.6713 The soldiers asked them for
identification.6714 After looking at their identity cards, the soldiers asked Stojić and his cousin to
follow them.6715 They were led through the forest and to the Glamošnica River, where four of
Stojić‘s neighbours were already lined up.6716 A soldier was pointing a machine gun at the four
men.6717 Stojić and his cousin were told to line up next to his neighbours.6718 They were searched,
their personal belongings were taken, and they were questioned.6719 The soldiers declared: ―We
are Šešelj army,‖ and shot Stojić, his cousin, and his neighbours, killing five of them.6720 Stojić
was the only survivor.6721

1976. Stojić was shot in his left arm and hip.6722 He continued heading through the forest
towards Škrljevita.6723 While in the forest, Stojić heard strong bursts of gunfire.6724 He later
learned that this gunfire came from VRS soldiers killing four other men from Škrljevita.6725

6711
P3638 (Map of Sanski Most municipality).
6712
Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6764. See also Adjudicated Fact 1316. There was also a Bosnian Serb minority. Grgo
Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6764.
6713
Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6773–6774. The soldiers were identified as members of the 6 th Krajina Brigade. P3519
(Indictment of the 1st Krajina Corps Military Prosecutor's Office, 2 June 1993); p. 1; P3520 (Decision of Banja Luka Military Court, 9 July 1993, p. 1;
P3521 (Ruling of Banja Luka Military Court, 14 March 1995, p. 1. The name of Stojić‘s cousin was Dragan Tadić. Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6774. See also Adjudicated Fact 1317.
6714
Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6775.
6715
Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6775–6776.
6716
Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6776. See also Adjudicated Fact 1317. The neighbours detained by the armed men were
Ante Tutić, Petar Nikić, Ţarko Nikić, and Josip Banović. Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6776. All of the men detained
were Bosnian Croats. See Adjudicated Fact 1317.
6717
Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6776. Stojić and his cousin met these neighbours earlier that day as they were walking to
Škrljevita, but the neighbours had walked ahead of them. Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6774.
6718
Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6776.
6719
Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6777. In addition to the two armed men Stojić encountered, there were two more armed men
by the river who wore camouflage military uniforms, had light machine guns with the four S‘s carved into the rifle butts, and carried two clips of
ammunition. Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6776–6777. On cross-examination, Stojić stated that the armed men were part
of Šešelj‘s men. Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6797.
6720
Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6777–6778. See also P3518 (Report of Sanski Most's Lower Court Investigating Judge, 9
November 1992), pp. 1–2; P3519 (Indictment of the 1st Krajina Corps Military Prosecutor's Office, 2 June 1993), pp. 1–2. According to Stojić, the victims
killed within his line of sight were Ante Tutić, Petar (Pero) Nikić, Ţarko Nikić, Josip Banović, and Dragan Tadić. Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6778, 6780. See also Adjudicated Facts 1318, 1319.
6721
Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6778. See also P3518 (Report of Sanski Most's Lower Court Investigating Judge, 9
November 1992), pp. 1–2.
6722
Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6777–6778.
6723
Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6779. He reached Škrljevita, where he received assistance and first aid. He was
subsequently brought to the Sanski Most Health Centre, then transferred to Prijedor, and ultimately transported to the Banja Luka Hospital. Grgo Stojić,
P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6780–6781. See also P3516 (Photographs of Grgo Stojić); P3522 (Recommendation for medical
treatment of Grgo Stojić, 14 December 1992); P3527 (Letter of discharge of Grgo Stojić from Banja Luka Clinical Hospital Centre, 2 December 1992).
While recovering in the Banja Luka hospital, Stojic was visited by a VRS soldier who ordered him to raise the three-finger salute and said, ―[n]ow you are a
Serb‖. He was also called ―ustasha‖ by the nurses and other patients. Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6782–6786.
6724
Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6779.
6725
Grgo Stojić, P3515 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6779, 6791. A sister of one of the victims informed Stojić of the killings while he was at the
Banja Luka Hospital. She told him that the victims were Ivo Tutić, Bone Tutić, ―Adlo Tatić [phone], and Josip Fertalac [phone]‖. Grgo Stojić, P3515
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6779.
 264

1977. The Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that seven Bosnian Croats were killed in
relation to this incident.6726 The Chamber received evidence from Stojić, an eye-witness to the
incident that five men were killed and he learned after he escaped that an additional four men were
killed soon after. The Chamber also received evidence that nine bodies were recovered in a mass
grave and in relation to this incident, the identities of which are corroborated by Stojić‘s
evidence.6727
1978. The Chamber finds that nine men were killed by Serb Forces near the village of Škrljevita
on or about 2 November 1992. (Here is all the #absurdity of the term “Serb Forces”#! From
the very same Grgo Stojic we heard that he identified the “two soldiers” as a two criminals,
see T.19756: The witness primarily testified about the killing of a number of men of Croat
ethnicity near the village of Skrljevita in the Sanski Most municipality on or about the 2nd of
November, 1992. He is the sole survivor of this incident. On that day, he and his cousin were
ambushed by the two persons of Serb ethnicity, one of whom he came to know as Danilusko
Kajtez. The two Serbs ordered the witness and his cousin to follow them. They were taken a
short distance to where four Croat neighbours were being detained by another two persons of
Serb ethnicity. That was the Prosecutor’s resume of the Stojic’s testimony as a prosecutor’s
witness. This was an accurate qualification: “the two persons of Serb ethnicity”. The witness
gave his answers in cross examination about the situation in Sanski Most before and after
the Muslim attacks at the end of May: T.19764: Q. So you went on Mondays. And tell me, is
it correct that it was possible to go until the first attack, the first fighting in Sanski Most, until
late May -- in late May? A. Yes, that's right. Q. Thank you. I'm not sure that I put a
precise question. Moving around in the municipality was free and possible until the first attack
in late May, the 25th, the 26th, and the 27th of May; is that right? A. Yes. Q. And then after
the fighting there was a request to hand over weapons; is that right? A.
Yes. The witness confirmed that before the attacks the Serb authorities and the “Serb
Forces” didn’t impose any restrictions to any citizens. Let us see what the Witness Stojic said
further: T.19770: Q. When you were crossing the bridge on the little stream in Harkusa
[phoen] you noticed two criminals behind a bush. Is that what you said? A. Yes. Q.
You described this unfortunate event, and it struck me that these two people identified
themselves to you as member of some kind of paramilitary; is that correct? A. Yes.(…) Q.
They did not -- or, actually, what did they wear? What did they have on their heads? What
insignia did they wear? A. One of them was dressed as a military policeman. He had a
submachine-gun. He had a military cap and a badge. The other one was in civilian clothes. He
had a leather jacket and also a submachine-gun. Q. And one of them had a sort of cockade;
is that correct? A. Yes Q . You immediately realized that those were paramilitaries and
that, by definition, you knew that they were beyond any civilian or military command or
control? A. I didn't realize that those were paramilitaries. But when we were brought to
the four men who had already been captured before me, that's when I realized that Q. Thank
you. But you certainly knew that paramilitaries were under nobody's control, and that is what
you said in the transcript. A. That was clear to me, and that was how it should be in a
normal -- The witness realized himself that there were criminals out of anyone’s control! All
what happened afterwards showed that it had nothing to do with the Serb authorities. All
the Serbs, from a neighbour who first helped him, to the end, behaved properly. And they,
the police, doctors, investigators, Red Cross, were representing the Republika Srpska and
it’s authorities, not Danilusko Kajtaz and another criminal with him. Let us see what Mr.
Stojic said about the Serb policemen tha met him first, T. 19773: Q. Then the police arrived
and took your statement, in which you explained in great detail about what had transpired? A.

6726
See Adjudicated Fact 1319.
6727
P3518 (Report of Sanski Most‘s Lower Court Investigating Judge, 9 November 1992) (listing nine men killed in relation to this scheduled incident). See
also P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 48 (listing eight individuals in relation to this scheduled incident); P6690 (Addendum to
Nicolas Sébire‘s report, 16 May 2003), e-court pp. 64–65 (listing nine bodies exhumed in relation to this scheduled incident).
 265

Yes. Q. In your statements, you say that the policemen were polite and fair and caused no
problems; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. They themselves told you that that was a group that was
operating independently. A. Yes. T.19774: They gave you their ambulance and it took you to
Prijedor. A. Yes, that's correc. Q. And you were escorted by a policeman whilst in the
ambulance. A. Yes. Q. He accompanied you because there could have been extremists on
the road and you would have been safer to have a policeman by your side. A. That's what he
told me. Q. Thank you. You were immediately admitted at Prijedor hospital at 10.00. Risto
Stojanovski examined you and said immediately that he has to make a referral to Banja Luka
because he was not able to treat you. A. Yes. Q. It took you half an hour to reach Banja
Luka, and in the next half-hour you found yourself on the operation table; is that correct? A.
Yes. Q. And between the period when you were wounded until such time that you underwent
surgery, you didn't have any criticism with regard to either doctors or the authorities. However,
the first problems occurred after the surgery; is that correct? A. Yes. Now it looks different
from the Prosecution/Chamber interpretation! We also have learned from the witness Stojic
that his village Skrljevita didn’t have any problem befor or after this incident, a Serb
teacher was coming regularly, the inhabitants, Croats, went to the town regularly. But, let us
see how the Police of the Serb Sanski Most treated this crime: see D4356

This is how the Chief of the SJB Vrucinic reported to his superiors in Banja Luka “over the
past two months”. And Vrucinic was the real “Serb Force”, not those two criminals.
Although, there was no any “attack on Skrljevita”, but it was an ambush set by the two
criminals. Let us see what was the reaction of the authorities of the Serb Municipality of
Sanski Most, D: 4215
 266

A
s already established, the perpetrator was a criminal D. Kajtaz, he was arrested and tried,
but only after the only witness, the survivor, was available! The next session, the civilian
authorities accepted the SJB report (D4356) and concluded further:

t
his at the first place pertained to the Serbs who weren’t engaged in the Army
units!

T
his meant to have a public meetings in the villages inhabited with minoritiesFinally, there
was formed the multi-ethnic Committee for distribution of humanitarian aid:

.
The relation with the Muslim and Croat community was nourished with care. See what
about that said Mr. Vru}ini}, D:3911, 20/7/92

Here is the report of the same official, Mr. Vrucinic, of 30 November 1992:
 267

So,
even during the lulls, there was a permanent danger of breaking through of a #formidable
Muslim-Croat forces# from the Bihac pockit with a catastrophic results!)

1. Detention Facilities in Sanski Most

1979. Detention facilities in Sanski Most were established by the Crisis Staff.6728 After military
operations against Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat villages in Sanski Most, (As it is evident
from the census list, there are many #Muslim and Croat villages that didn’t have any
problem# with the JNA and later with the VRS soldiers. Therefore, it is not correct to say
that there were a “military operations against Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat villages“,
but at least to be more specific “…military operations agains the Muslim/Croat irregulars in
some of their villages”! Only such a formulation would be close to a proper one!) soldiers
collected the able-bodied military-aged men from the village and transferred them by bus to Sanski
Most town.6729 (Prior to any “collecting of the able-bodied” men, there was either an #attack
from those villages, or a resistence to a disarming#. There is no arny all over the world which
could afford itself an armed groups and units, ready to engage immediately after demanded
by the higher enemy’s commands. Remember the Gen. Halilovic’s report about his criticism
of the Una-Sana Operational Group, D3904:

The Chamber never took in account a #military necessity# as a reason for an action. Without
that, there is created an impression as if the Serb Army kept attacking the Muslim/Croat
villages for entertainment and without any justifiable purpose!)
In town, they were handed over to the civilian authorities.6730 An inspector from the SJB and an
inspector from the CSB interrogated the men believed to be ―military prisoners‖.6731 KW540
estimated that 1,600 ―military prisoners‖ were handed over to the civilian authorities in Sanski
Most in 1992.6732 The majority of detainees in Sanski Most were transferred to Manjaĉa camp.6733

6728
KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3453 (under seal); D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres,
undated), e-court pp. 7–8.
6729
KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3377, 3386 (under seal).
6730
KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3377, 3386 (under seal).
6731
KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3377, 3500–3501 (under seal).
6732
KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3392 (under seal).
6733
See paras. 1987, 1990, 2009, 2017.
 268

(Why not all of them? Why some of them, somewhere about #40% had been released# after
the first steps of investigation? Those who had been sent to Manjaca, some more that 800,
had been under a reasonable suspicion for crimes against the peace, Army and the Serb
civilians!) They would be labelled into three categories of ―prisoners‖: (i) politicians, (ii)
nationalist extremists, and (iii) people unwelcome in Sanski Most municipality.6734 The majority
of detainees in Sanski Most were civilians, as will be addressed below. (Who were the #non-
civilian “minority”#? their existence and action justified thes mopping-up, but a
differentiation between those innocent and responsible wasn’t possible at the spot, and all of
them had to be detained and to undergo the investigation! The civilians had been released as
soon as their civil status established!)
a. Scheduled Detention Facility C.22.1

1980. The Indictment refers to the use of the SJB building and prison in Sanski Most as a
detention facility at least between 26 May and August 1992.

i. Establishment and control

1981. The SJB building and prison were located in the centre of Sanski Most town, near the
Betonirka Factory Garage.6735 The prison facility was located behind the SJB police building.6736
The chief of the police station was Vruĉinić.6737 Miladin Paprić was in charge of the SJB prison
until 4 June 1992, when he was dismissed and replaced by Drago Vujanić.6738 (This immediate
detention unit existed in all the SJB!)

1982. Detainees started arriving at the SJB building and prison on 25 May 1992, after the attack
on Sanski Most town.6739 (#Whose “attack”#? the town itself was a Serb majority place, and
the Serbs didn’t initiate any attack on it). The majority of the detainees at the SJB building were
prominent civilians who held important positions in the community.6740 There was one underage
detainee.6741 (All of this #“prominent civilians” prominent terroriets#! who held “important
positions” abused these common positions, the infrastructure of the common authorities to
procure the armament and organize the attack on Suhaca and other Serb villages, see
already recommended documents, such as: P3663, D 5, D557, D1677, D1678 and others. In
all the intelligence reports before the war named exactly those “prominent civilians” as the
instigators and leaders of the war plans against the Serbs!)

6734
P2639 (Conclusions of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 4 June 1992); see Adjudicated Fact 2558. Mile Dobrijević testified that he had no knowledge of the three
categories of detainees and when presented with P2639, he insisted that he made no decisions on categorisation. Mile Dobrijević, T. 44636–44639 (6
December 2013). The Chamber does not accept his evidence on this point given that he was an SJB employee at Betonirka Factory Garage and the Hasan
Kikić school and his claim to be unaware of these categories defy credibility. There is another reasonable inference: there was no such a
document! Since the document doesn’t have any signature and seal, it can not be considered a valuable evidence.
None of the Serb people from Sanski Most ever mentioned such a categorization. This kind of “evidence” is very easy
to “produce” but any chamber would think twice.
6735
P3667 (Map of Sanski Most with photos of various buildings); P3314 (Photograph of Sanski Most police station); D4335 (Map of Sanski Most with
photographs).
6736
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6139–6140; D4339 (Photograph of Sanski Most SJB). See also D4341 (Photograph of
Sanski Most SJB). Karabeg, guilty as charged. He abused the Executive Board to arm his ethnic community.
6737
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6145; P3319 (Report of Sanski Most SJB, 6 June 1992).
6738
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6145, 6162; P2639 (Conclusions of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 4 June 1992); KW545,
D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26104, 26318–26319, 26322 (under seal); Mile Dobrijević, T. 44635–44636 (6 December
2013).
6739
Mirzet Karabeg was arrested on 25 May 1992 and taken to the SJB prison. Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6139–6140.
6740
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5530–5532; KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7768 (under
seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 1321. Faik Biscevic, guilty, one of the top Muslim organizers of the war.
6741
See Adjudicated Fact 1321.
 269

(iii) Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

1983. The detainees were held in small cells in the SJB prison and guarded by the police.6742
Due to the size of the cell, it was not possible for detainees to lie down to sleep and they had to sit
very closely to each other.6743 The cells had a concrete roof, a metal door, and a metal plate with
holes over the window.6744 During the summer months, the strong heat caused the room to be very
hot and damp, with a terrible stench, making it very difficult to breathe.6745 There was no fresh air
until someone removed the metal plate covering the window after approximately 40 days into the
detention.6746 Furthermore, the guards did not permit the cells to be aired out.6747 There were
blankets and an old mat for bedding.6748 (This is another proof that the Serbs in Sanski Most
#didn’t expect a rebellion# of such an extent, and the small detention unit was aimed to
admit a few criminals and trespassers until a judge decide what would be done with them!)
1984. The detainees were not provided with sufficient food and water.6749 (#General shortage#!
Nobody had sufficient food and water!) After the first 15 days, the detainees‘ meals were
reduced from three to two meals per day; these meals were insufficient and resulted in the
detainees suffering substantial weight loss.6750 (It was a miracle that the whole 15 days the
authorities had managed to deliver three meals a day! But, “In early June 1992, detainees in
the SJB prison were transferred to Manjača camp pursuant to an order from the Crisis
Staff”, as is said in fn. 6781! How come, the food was such a problem within several days?)
Meals consisted of a piece of bread, a cup of something to drink and, if available, left-over food
from the soldiers.6751 For water, the detainees were occasionally allowed to fill up bottles, but
only when there was enough water for the toilets in the detention facility.6752 (#General
shortage#! If there was no enough water, how there would be a water for the detainees?
There were no toilets in the cells of the prison.6753 (Many official prisons do not have toilets in
cells. And it was all of a sudden, nobody expected that kind of number of rebels!) The
detainees had access to two toilets but they became blocked.6754 The detainees were allowed five
minutes in the morning and five minutes in the evening to use the toilets.6755 They subsequently
dug a hole behind the building, which they were only permitted to use during lunchtime.6756 Save

6742
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7743 (under seal); Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6139,
6300–6301; D4340 (Photograph of Sanski Most SJB); D4342 (Photograph of Sanski Most SJB). See also Adjudicated Fact 1323.
6743
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7751 (under seal); Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7067.
KW545 admitted that conditions in the prison were inhumane, the facility and rooms did not meet the minimum requirements for holding people for long
periods of time, and it was very difficult to maintain order. KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26114, 26239, 26241–
26243 (under seal).
6744
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7746 (under seal); D4342 (Photograph of Sanski Most SJB); D4343 (Photograph of Sanski
Most SJB); Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6301.
6745
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7753–7754 (under seal); Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
7067–7068; KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26239 (under seal).
6746
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7753 (under seal).
6747
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7753 (under seal).
6748
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7751–7752 (under seal).
6749
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7751 (under seal).
6750
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7751, 7754 (under seal). The lunches contained pork with hair still on it. KDZ474, P3395
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7751 (under seal).
6751
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7068. Bišĉević testified that he lost 32 kilograms while in detention. Faik Bišĉević, P135
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7067–7068.

6752
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7751 (under seal); Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7065.
6753
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7065.
6754
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7752 (under seal); Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7064.
6755
ALL OF THE “EVIDENCE” ORIGINATE FROM THE
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7064–7065.
92bis RULE, AND THIS DEFENCE DIDN’T HAVE ANY CHANCE TO TESTE, LET ALONE CONTEST
ANYTHING. IS THAT AN INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE. THE VILAINS, RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FIGHTS IN
THE MUNICIPALITY, ARE THE CROWN WITNESSES OF THE ACCUSED’S RESPONSIBILITY!
6756
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7752 (under seal).
 270

for a couple of exceptions, it was not possible to shower given the lack of water.6757 (See, “the
lack of water” – #not a bad will# of the authorities. So, who or what was to be blamed for
that? Only the civil war, for which Osman Brka said at the meeting of the SDA in an Islamic
community facilities that was necessary, see D01678, of 12 (or 16) March 92:

“Th
e awakening of the Muslim people” as we remember from the Islamic Declaration and other
program articles of Hasan Cengic, Omer Behmen and others, should be by hitting the
Muslims hard and establishin an Islamic regime under any cost!)

1985. The guards took the detainees out of the cells only for about 20 minutes per day, including
for meals and for work they had to carry out.6758 On leaving the cell for work, the detainees were
frequently beaten and mistreated.6759 (#All, Deadly combination#! Despite these conditions,
Rašula told a detainee at the SJB: ―[y]ou‘re safest where you are. If we release you, you will be
killed either by your people or by mine‖.6760 (This indicates that outside the detention there
were the fights going on. Should the authorities release those detained in the middle of
fights?)

1986. The guards, regular police officers, and VRS soldiers beat the detainees.6761 Sometimes the
guards would hand over the keys to the cells to the VRS soldiers, and according to Bišĉević,
―[a]nyone could come in and beat us if they so pleased‖.6762 Some of the detainees were taken
from their cells to the SJB building and interrogated.6763 During interrogations, regular police
officers and VRS soldiers beat the detainees, using rifle-butts, electric cables, poles, and wooden
planks.6764 Detainees were also beaten in their cells, and some were forced to beat each other.6765
The detainees did not receive any medical treatment for injuries sustained in SJB custody.6766 As a
6757
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7752 (under seal); Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7065.
Bišĉević testified that he was allowed to shower and wash his clothing twice during his 95 days of detention. Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7065–7066.
6758
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7754 (under seal). Work included digging a makeshift toilet behind the building, washing
dishes, and cleaning the SJB complex. KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7752, 7757 (under seal). The Chamber notes that only
forced labour at the frontlines is charged in the Indictment. (There was no frontlines in the Sanski Most municipality!)
6759
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7757 (under seal). In addition to being beaten, one detainee had his hands burned with hot
water. KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7757 (under seal).
6760
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7651, 7761 (under seal). See also P3396 (Photographs depicting Radovan Karadţić, Ratko
Mladić, Biljana Plavšić, Momĉilo Krajišnik and others). Basara, also visited the SJB building and made speeches to VRS soldiers there. See Adjudicated
Fact 1325; KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7899 (under seal).
6761
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7756, 7758 (under seal). See also P3519 (Indictment of the 1st Krajina Corps Military
Prosecutor's Office, 2 June 1993), p. 1; Adjudicated Facts 1328, 1329; Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7064. A soldier
from the 6th Krajina Brigade was known for beating several detainees. KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7758 (under seal);
P3519 (Indictment of the 1st Krajina Corps Military Prosecutor's Office, 2 June 1993), p. 1. Members of the VRS, including the military police, and regular
police ran the SJB prison together. Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6154–6155.
6762
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7073. See also Adjudicated Fact 1329.
6763
See Adjudicated Fact 1321.
6764
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7068–7073; Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6166–
6168; Adjudicated Facts 1326; 1327.
6765
KDZ474, T. 19334 (21 September 2011) (closed session); KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7757 (under seal).
6766
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7759–7760 (under seal); Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7064.
For example, a detainee had two ribs broken during a beating. He was taken to a hospital, where he waited for three hours and then was returned to his cell.
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7754, 7759 (under seal). See also KDZ474, T. 19334 (21 September 2011) (closed session).
 271

result of the severe beatings, Karabeg suffered severe injuries to his body and head and lost all of
his teeth.6767 Two men were beaten at the SJB prison and subsequently killed.6768 (All of this is a
#“one way information”# of those who initiated unrests and fights in Sanski Most, who have
more that one motive to denigrate the Serbs from Sanski Most. This is not just, honest and
fair, to charge this President with something that he couldn’t know and influence, and what
probably didn’t happen as described by the defeated Muslim extreme leaders.)

1987. In early June 1992, detainees in the SJB prison were transferred to Manjaĉa camp pursuant
to an order from the Crisis Staff.6769 (So, they spent only a several days in this SJB prison!)

1988. The frequency of the beatings decreased after a visit from the ICRC in July 1992.6770
Furthermore, visits by family members were allowed after the ICRC visit.6771
1989. By 27 July 1992, the Crisis Staff estimated that some 1,245 people had been questioned in
the SJB.6772 (But not housed in the SJB prison, not later than early June!)

1990. On 28 August 1992, the detainees were called out of their cells and told to take their
belongings.6773 Some of the detainees were placed on a bus for transfer to Manjaĉa camp.6774
Other detainees were transferred to different detention facilities in Sanski Most, including the
Betonirka Factory Garage, the Hasan Kikić School, and a military facility at Magarice.6775

(iii) Conclusion

1991. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that Serb Forces detained non-Serb civilians,
(What did make them “civilians”? The cloathing? But, their long term activities in preparing
the uprisal made them #“non-civilians”# and those who were apprehended in the combat
zones and were really civilians, after the interrogations had been released!) including
prominent political leaders and an underage boy, at the SJB prison from 25 May until August
1992. The Chamber finds that the detainees were held in poor conditions, including lack of
adequate food, accommodation, medical care, and sanitary facilities. The Chamber also finds that
detainees were subjected to interrogations and beatings. (All of it would be reversed in a minute,
once the Chamber, which would do any reasonable chamber, accepted that “civilian” in this
civil war does not mean “innocent” and that “prominent political leaders” didn’t mean
“innocent” but to the contrary, very responsible. There is a sufficient evidence on what those
“prominent” did to this mixed municipality, and how many really innocent victims they did
cost these two communities! As UN General Razek testified, #“civilians fough civilians”#

6767
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6180–6182.
6768
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6182–6183. Karabeg and Bišĉević identifies these two men as Hasib Kamber and Emir
Seferović. Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6182; Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
5535; P146 (Record of identification of Emir Seferović‘s body, 2 June 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact 1330. With respect to the two men who were
beaten and subsequently killed, without more evidence as to their deaths, the Chamber cannot find that they died as a result of the beating they were
subjected to. These killings are therefore not covered by the charges in the Indictment under paragraph 60(a)(ii). Further, the Chamber notes that there is no
Schedule B killing incident charged with respect to this detention facility. This shouldn’t depend on the Prosecution’s attitude, but on
the veracity of event and credibility of witnesses.
6769
P3327 (Order of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 6 June 1992); Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6164, 6252–6253 (Karabeg
estimated that 152 people were transferred from the Hasan Kikić school on 3 June 1992 to Manjaĉa camp and 172 persons were transferred on 6 June 1992
from the SJB prison, the Betonirka Factory Garage, and the sports hall).
6770
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6176–6177, 6256–6257, 6324. See also Adjudicated Fact 1332.
6771
See Adjudicated Fact 1332.
6772
P3657 (Minutes of 9th session of Sanski Most Executive Board, 27 July 1992), p. 3.
6773
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7760 (under seal).
6774
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6176, 6182, 6258; KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7742–
7747, 7760 (under seal); KDZ474, T. 19335 (21 September 2011) (closed session).
6775
See Adjudicated Fact 1331. See also paras. 1995, 2007.
 272

(b)Scheduled Detention Facility C.22.2

1992. The Indictment refers to the use of the Betonirka Factory Garage as a detention facility at
least between 27 May and 7 June 1992.
i. Establishment and control

1993. The Betonirka Factory was located approximately 100 to 150 metres behind the SJB
building in Sanski Most town.6776 The factory had a main building and three garages attached.6777
Each garage was five to six metres long and four metres wide.6778

1994. In May 1992, the Betonirka Factory Garage was set up as a detention centre by the Crisis
6779
Staff. On 25 May 1992, Paprić, who was also in charge of the SJB prison, was appointed as
the head of the detention facility but was later replaced by Vujanić, a member of the police.6780
Vujanić was the warden of both the SJB prison and Betonirka Factory Garage.6781 The guards at
the Betonirka Factory Garage were members of the Bosnian Serb police and reserve soldiers.6782
Rade Martić was the chief of the guards.6783
1995. Approximately 120 detainees, all males, were held at the Betonirka Factory Garage.6784
Members of the core leadership of the SDA were detained at Betonirka.6785 Detainees were held at
Betonirka Factory Garage up to one month.6786 In June and July 1992, the detainees were
transferred to Manjaĉa camp.6787 The first and the only para under b) Scheduled Detention
Facility C22.2 it was said: “at least between 27 May and 7 June 1992.” Couldn’t be shorter,
since all had to be questioned!)

i. Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

1996. The detainees were kept inside the cramped and over-heated garage with little water.6788
The detainees were given two meals per day , which usually were the left-over food from the
staff.6789 (This is an #absurd assertion#! How many staffs were there? And how a “left-over”

6776
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras. 49–50; P726 (Map of Sanski Most town); P3667 (Map of Sanski Most with photos
of various buildings); D4335 (Map of Sanski Most with photographs); KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3397 (under
seal).
6777
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 50; P726 (Map of Sanski Most town); P719 (Photograph of Betonirka Factory
Garage); D4335 (Map of Sanski Most with photographs). See also D4336 (Photograph of Betonirka Factory Garage). The three garages together will be
referred to in the singular as the Betonirka Factory Garage.
6778
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 55; P732 (Photograph of the interior of Betonirka Factory Garage). See also D4336
(Photograph of Betonirka Factory Garage); D4337 (Photograph of Betonirka Factory Garage); D4338 (Photograph of Betonirka Factory Garage); P719
(Photograph of Betonirka Factory Garage).
6779
D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court p. 7; P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 113 (under seal);
see Adjudicated Fact 2537. See also KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3399–3400 (under seal); KW545, D4328
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin) T. 26112 (under seal).
6780
KDZ490, T. 20184 (19 October 2011) (closed session); P3635 (Handwritten diary of Nenad Davidović), e-court p. 4; KW545, D4328 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin) T. 26112 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 1345.
6781
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 66; KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26115,
26323 (under seal); Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6254. See Adjudicated Fact 1344.
6782
See Adjudicated Fact 1344; KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3399–3400 (under seal); P718 (Witness statement of
Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 51.
6783
P2639 (Conclusions of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 4 June 1992); P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 113 (under seal).
6784
See Adjudicated Fact 1333; KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26129–26130 (under seal).
6785
KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3403 (under seal).
6786
See Adjudicated Fact 1334.
6787
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6164, 6175; P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras.
86–87. See also KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26130 (under seal). On 6 or 7 July 1992, all the remaining
detainees at Betonirka were transferred to Manjaĉa camp, except for Karabeg and six others, who were transferred back to the SJB prison. Mirzet Karabeg,
P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6175–6176.
6788
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras. 54, 57–64, 68–71 (Zulić identified some of the men who were held in his cell,
including a Bosnian Croat); P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 113 (under seal); KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić &
Ţupljanin), T. 26119–26120 (under seal); Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6169–6171; P3320 (Photograph of building).
6789
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6169–6170; see Adjudicated Fact 1337.
 273

food after such a few staff could feed 150 detainees? The truth is that they got what the staff
got, no more, no less.) Sometimes family members were allowed to visit the detainees and bring
them food.6790 The sanitary conditions were inadequate as the detainees were only allowed out of
their cells for five minutes in the morning and five minutes in the evening to use the toilet.6791
There were no toilets inside the garage.6792 There was only one small window in each garage that
was open for ventilation, which was inadequate.6793 One of the garages was so overcrowded that
the detainees were forced to sleep standing up.6794 (Those garages seem to be a kind of garages,
not a hotel. What to expect from a garage? Was there such a big prison with all the required
conditions, but the authorities didn’t allow the detainees to be housed there, just for the
purpose of spit? There was #no a bad will or malice# on the Serb authorities side, but only a
#necessity#!)

1997. The detainees were interrogated and beaten regularly.6795 Ahmet Zulić testified that out
of the 21 nights he spent at Betonirka, he was not subjected to beatings on only three of those
nights.6796 The beatings caused serious injuries to the detainees.6797 There were no medical
facilities available onsite.6798

i. Conclusion

1998. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that Serb Forces detained Bosnian Muslim and
Bosnian Croat male civilians, including some political leaders, from Sanski Most in the Betonirka
Factory Garage from May until June 1992. (Let us see what meant “male civilian” in this civil
war, already on 7 March 92, see D5:

(If those weren’t “armed civilians” this wouldn’t be called a Civil war”! How come it didn’t
matter in this court?) The Chamber finds that the detainees were held in poor conditions,
including lack of adequate food and sanitary facilities. The Chamber also finds that the detainees
were subjected to beatings. (This is an #erroneous conclusion#:
1. There was no any detention prior to the Muslim-Croat attacks on the Serb parts of the
town and municipality;
2. There was no detention of the “civilians”, since all of the detained had been captured in
the combat areas;
3. Only after the first interrogations, som 40% of the detained had been released;
4. the others were deeply involved in the armed rebellion, which embattled the municipality
and caused many casualties;

6790
KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26133 (under seal).
6791
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6170; see Adjudicated Fact 1338. See also KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor
v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26119–26121 (under seal).
6792
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6170; see Adjudicated Fact 1338.
6793
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6170–6175; KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T.
26239 (under seal); see Adjudicated Fact 1336; KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3397, 3399 (under seal).
6794
See Adjudicated Fact 1335.
6795
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras. 60–64, 68–71; P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 113 (under
seal); Mirzet Karabeg, T. 18698–18699 (13 September 2011); Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6171–6175; see
Adjudicated Fact 1339. KW545 testified that except for two specific cases, he had no knowledge of regular beatings and that he never heard screams or saw
injuries on detainees. KW545, T. 47003–47004 (13 February 2014) (closed session). KW540 testified that he also found out after the war that detainees at
Betonirka had been beaten. KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3401 (under seal).
6796
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 63.
6797
See Adjudicated Facts 1340, 1341.
6798
See Adjudicated Fact 1343.
 274

5. Even Ahmet Zulic admitted that he had been ambushing the Army with his automatic
machine-gun, while the police found 40 kg of explosive that he had stolen from the mine
where he was imployed;
6. The “some political leaders” could be found in the Muslim documents depicted as an
extreme leadership that armed the Muslims and instigated the war events)

i. Scheduled Incident B.17.1

1999. The Prosecution alleges that approximately 17 men were taken from the Betonirka
Factory Garage to Kriva Cesta near the Partisan cemetery and killed on or about 22 June 1992.
2000. On 22 June 1992, Zulić was taken from the Betonirka Factory Garage, where he had been
detained, and driven to Kriva Cesta.6799 He was taken down to the stream, given a hoe, and
ordered to dig his own grave.6800 He saw 20 to 25 other men there doing the same thing.6801 The
men were being watched by Bosnian Serb soldiers wearing JNA uniforms.6802 Rašula was also
present.6803 During the operation, the soldiers pointed their guns at the men.6804 When the men
had finished digging the holes, they were killed; their throats were either slit or they were shot to
death.6805 Zulić was spared by Rašula, who stated that he should be kept alive in order to tell them
where weapons were being hidden in Pobrijeţje.6806 Zulić was taken back to the Betonirka
Factory Garage.6807 In total, three men survived.6808 (What are the names of the two others?
Why it is founded only on this one testimony, while it was clear that the witness lied about
presence of some people that hadn’t been present, and among them a very high communist
official and general from WWII, who would in no way be there?)

2001. The Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that 17 men were killed in relation to this
incident.6809 The Chamber also received evidence that bodies of civilians were recovered in a
mass grave in relation to this incident.6810 (The Chamber didn’t exclude a possibility that these
were a #combat casualties#? There is no evidence about any Muslim-Croat combat
casualties, since the #fake witnesses#, prepared by the Muslim secret services, depicted all
6799
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras. 75–76; P726 (Map of Sanski Most town). Kriva Cesta is an area near the Partisan
cemetery; P730 (Sketch drawn by Ahmet Zulić). See also Adjudicated Facts 1346, 1347, 2541.
6800
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 77.
6801
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras. 77–78. Zulić identified three men by their surnames only: Cerić, Dţafić, and
Velić. He identified one man as the brother-in-law of Ikan Smailović. The others were Ibro Eminić, ―Lolo or Smail‖ Pašić, and Muhamed Hakić. P718
(Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras. 77–78, 84.
6802
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 79.
6803
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 79; Ahmet Zulić, T. 1029–1030 (13 April 2010), T. 1129 (14 April 2010). See also
Adjudicated Fact 2542.
6804
See Adjudicated Fact 1349.
6805
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 80; Ahmet Zulić, T. 1130 (14 April 2010). See also Adjudicated Fact 1348.
6806
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), paras. 81–83.
6807
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 81.
6808
P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 84. The other survivors were Muhamed Halkić and another man whose surname
was Cerić. P718 (Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 84.
6809
Adjudicated Facts 1347, 1348.
6810
P5442 (Decision of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 23 May 1992) (a decision of the Crisis Staff determining that persons killed at the Greda Muslim cemetery
shall be buried in a common grave); P4896 (Bihać Cantonal Court record of Greda, Kruhari exhumation, 28 May 1997) (describing the location of the Greda
I mass grave and that 36 bodies were recovered from it. No names are included in this report); (How come? There were alleged 17
“executed” and more than a double buried? It is clear that the Decision had nothing to do vith this allegation!) P4897
(Bihać Cantonal Court record of autopsy and identification of victims exhumed from graves in Greda, Kruhari, 9 June 1997) (listing 36 bodies exhumed
from the Greda I-Kruhari mass grave. Eight were unidentified males, seven were females, and 21 were males identified by name. Of the males identified by
name, Ibro Eminić was also named by Zulić). (Why would the bodies of allegedly executed in this incident be found in several
graves?) See also P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 94 (listing three individuals in relation to this scheduled incident); P6690
(Addendum to Nicolas Sébire‘s report, 16 May 2003), e-court pp. 66-70 (listing that at least two bodies exhumed from the mass grave are victims of the
scheduled incident, but recovering 36 bodies total. Of those 36 bodies, there were 29 males and 7 females.). No serious chamber would allow
anione to deceive them so easily. Once the Muslims recovered some bodies, no matter how they died, it was very easy
to allocate it to some “executions” although there is no any firm and credible evidence about it. Zulic named a very
distinguished general from the WWII, and a man who was far from the site several hundred kilometres.
 275

the casualties as a civil victims of an unlawful killings! However, the document mentioned as
a basis for this conclusion, P5442, said something else, let us see:

The “persons killed in the Sanski Most” pertained to the combat casualties, since in Serbian
“poginuli” means killed in combats, see the Serbian version of the Decision, the sixt word
“poginuli”:

while “ubijeni” – verbatim meaning “murdered” – excludes a combat nature and confirmes
a “murderous”, criminal nature of death. And this Decision pertained to all the combat
casualties until that moment! A #linguistic problem#!)
2002. The Chamber finds that approximately 17 men were taken by Serb Forces from the
Betonirka Factory Garage to Kriva Cesta near the Partisan cemetery and killed on or about
22 June 1992. (Zulic named a very distinguished general from the WWII, and a man who
was far from the site several hundred kilometres, and also he mentioned Rasula, who was the
predident of municipality, and would never be on the terrain. It is clear that such a fake
witnesses were free to lie and involve and incriminate persons they didn’t like!)

a. Scheduled Detention Facility C.22.3

2003. The Indictment refers to the use of the ―Hasan Kikić School sports halls‖ as a detention
facility at least between May and July 1992. The Prosecution submits that Hasan Kikić School
and the sports hall are two separate detention facilities.6811 The Prosecution submits that while
civilians were detained in both facilities, it proceeds on the basis that Scheduled Detention Facility
C.22.3 relates only to the sports hall.6812 The Chamber will also proceed on the basis that the
detention facility referred to in Schedule C.22.3 is the sports hall.
i. Establishment and control

2004. The sports hall was located in the northeastern part of Sanski Most town.6813 On
26 May 1992, the Crisis Staff converted the sports hall into a detention centre.6814 The sports hall
was staffed by guards in police and camouflage uniforms, under the command of Martić.6815
Milorad Krunić was appointed as the head of the detention centre.6816 (The Chamber is
presenting it as the authorities (CS) first converted the Sport hall into a detention centre,
and then went out to find and capture detainees. However, if the truth matters, all depended
on the Muslim side, and their initiation of fights. Then, the authorities had to accommodate
them somewhere. That is exactly what is said in the Crisis Staff’s proclamation, @ .

6811
Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, fn. 750. See P3667 (Map of Sanski Most with photos of various buildings).
6812
Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, fn. 750.
6813
P726 (Map of Sanski Most town); P3667 (Map of Sanski Most with photos of various buildings); D4335 (Map of Sanski Most with photographs). The
sports hall was also referred to as the sports complex. The Chamber will use the term ―sports hall‖ to refer to this alleged detention facility.
6814
D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court p. 7; P3315 (Order of Sanski Most TO Municipal Staff, 26 May 1992);
D1813 (Report of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 30 May 1992); P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 75 (under seal). See also D4345 (Photograph
of Hasan Kikić building); KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26112 (under seal); Adjudicated Facts 2537, 2538.
6815
Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8114; see Adjudicated Fact 1351.
6816
KDZ490, T. 20184 (19 October 2011) (closed session). See also P3635 (Handwritten diary of Nenad Davidović), e-court p. 4.
 276

2005. On 27 May 1992, an announcement on the radio ordered all Bosnian Muslims in Sanski
Most town to gather at the training grounds of a driving school.6817 (That was an appeal to the
civilians to avoid the combat zones of the town! That is something commendable and also
provided by the law!) Sakib Muhić went there.6818 He estimated that 1,800 people had gathered
there, including women and children.6819 There were armed soldiers outside the driving school,
and they shouted, ―we will slaughter you all‖ at the people gathered there.6820 (Uncorroborated
and irrelevant from the standpoint of the #President’s liability# – what was possibly said by
an unknown and unidentified individual!) After an hour, the soldiers ordered everyone to go to
the Krkojevći football stadium.6821 Around dusk, approximately 80 soldiers arrived at the stadium
and began ordering people onto buses, which took them to the sports hall—the men left around
midnight after the women and children.6822
2006. The next day at the sports hall women and children were separated from the men and sent
to neighbouring villages.6823 (To shelter them far from the combats!) Approximately 900-1,000
men remained in the sports hall for approximately five days.6824 The detainees included 200 men
brought in from Kljuĉ.6825 People who were detained at the sports hall were also from Mahala,
Muhići, and Otoka.6826 (A #terrorist strongholds#! Mahala, Muhici and Otoka are the
suburbs-strongholds of the Muslim terrorists in the town, see a Muslim document D1677:

No doubt, within the town urban core, apart from five villages, there was an armed
formation. This is the Muslim document. How we already know, the sport hall had been used
to accommodate the civilians from those urban parts, until the army and police finish their
neutralisation of the terrorists. I will find those documents.

2007. The sports hall was guarded by men in both military and police uniforms.6827 After
approximately five days, Muhić and four other men were taken to the SJB and interrogated.6828
Afterwards, they were transported back to the sports hall.6829
i. Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

2008. The conditions in the sports hall were extremely overcrowded and lacked basic
sanitation.6830 The temperature was very hot due to the summer heat wave, which made the

6817
Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8106-8108; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 4; P718
(Witness statement of Ahmet Zulić dated 22 February 2010), para. 32.
6818
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 4; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8106–8107.
6819
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 4; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8111. See P639 (List of
persons captured in Sanski Most municipality), p. 2.
6820
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 4; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8113. See P639 (List of
persons captured in Sanski Most municipality), p. 2.
6821
Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8110–8111; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 5.
6822
Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8113; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 5.
6823
Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8113; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 5.
6824
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 5; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8117; P3634 (Witness
statement of KDZ490, undated) (under seal), p. 115.
6825
See Adjudicated Fact 1350.
6826
KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26135 (under seal). See para. 1945.
6827
Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8114; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 5.
6828
Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8119–8120.
6829
Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8121.
6830
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated) (under seal), p. 114; KDZ490, T. 20280–20281 (20 October 2011) (closed session); see Adjudicated Fact
2544. KW545 testified that the conditions in the sports hall were ―all right‖ and that there were enough bathrooms, running water, and an outdoor area for
walking. KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26162 (under seal). In weighing the totality of the evidence, the
Chamber is not satisfied that it can rely on KW545‘s evidence on this particular point.
 277

conditions worse.6831 Some detainees were not provided with food for a few days but family
members were allowed to visit and bring some food.6832 Obviously, this was a shelter for the
civilians from the embattled areas within the town. There was no bedding available for
sleeping and no medical attention for the sick.6833 Some men were taken to the SJB, interrogated,
and transported back to the sports hall.6834
2009. The detainees were beaten.6835 In particular, on 6 June 1992, detainees were beaten
severely before being forced to board trucks.6836 Two trucks transported approximately 150
detainees to Manjaĉa camp.6837 So, they spent several days in the sport hall!!!

2010. On 8 June 1992, pursuant to an order from the Crisis Staff, detainees at the sports hall were
screened and those who were ―brought in accidentally from other areas, persons from mixed
marriages, persons in poor health, and persons who have fought on the front with the JNA‖ were
to be released.6838 (So, there was some criteria? No arbitrariness!) Again on 18 June 1992,
certain detainees were screened and released.6839 By 1 August 1992, the remaining detainees had
been transferred elsewhere.6840
(iii) Conclusion

2011. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that Serb Forces detained non-Serb civilians in the
sports hall in Sanski Most from May until August 1992. (Not “detained”, but “accommodated”
as seen in the D1813 bellow!) The Chamber finds that some of the detainees were subjected to
beatings. The Chamber further finds that the conditions of detention were poor, including a lack
of adequate food and sanitary facilities. The Chamber should be more reasonable to conclude
that the poor conditions weren’t due to any decision of the authorities, but due to the general
conditions in the country and the entire region. But, let us see what the Sport Hall really
was! See the Crisis Staff document of the Crisis Staff of 30 May 1992, D1813:

So, the civilians were “accommodated” in the sport Hall, not detained, and the relatives had
a free access to them. The para 2. clearly and explicitely that those citizens from other parts
of the town, where there was no combats, are safe. Therefore, the insistence of the
qualification of these taking shelter instead of being accommodated for their own security is
far from any fairness and far from any truth! No serious chamber should accep it! See the
6831
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 114 (under seal).
6832
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 5; Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8119.
6833
P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 5.
6834
Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8120.
6835
Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8121–8122; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), pp. 5–6. See
also Adjudicated Fact 1352; KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26268 (under seal). Sakib Muhic from
Muhici, the armed stronghold.
6836
Adjudicated Fact 1353. See also Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8122.
6837
Sakib Muhić, P700 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8122–8123; P701 (Witness statement of Sakib Muhić dated 11 April 2000), p. 6; Mirzet
Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6164. See also Adjudicated Facts 583, 1353.
6838
P5444 (Conclusions of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 8 June 1992).
6839
D4108 (Order of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 18 June 1992); D4329 (Order of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 18 June 1992).
6840
D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court p. 14. This report notes that 1,655 people were brought to the ―collection
centres‖ (the sports hall, Krings Hall, and Betonirka Factory Garage). It also notes that 1,528 were Bosnian Muslims and 122 were Bosnian Croats. D470
(CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court p. 14.
 278

rest of the same document, D1813:

A complete care about the civilians who were clearly differentiated from the exremists and
combatants, as well as differentiation from the citizens of all the ethnicities in other parts of
the town!)

(d) Scheduled Detention Facility C.22.4

2012. The Indictment refers to the use of Krings Hall as a detention facility at least between
May and July 1992.

i. Establishment and control

2013. Krings Hall is located on the eastern edge of Sanski Most town.6841 It was a large, empty
hall situated next to an office building, that was formerly used to manufacture equipment for the
Famos company.6842 In May 1992, Krings Hall was set up as a detention centre by the Crisis
Staff.6843 Initially, when detainees were brought to Krings Hall, they were guarded by soldiers and
after one week, the soldiers were replaced by the police.6844

2014. In early July 1992, VRS soldiers drove into Tomina and ordered all of the ―refugees‖ who
were hiding in the town to come out of the houses.6845 (“the refugees who were hiding” is a clear
indication that they hadn’t been an ordinary refugees, but a villains who commited crimes in
their own villages!) People from Kamicak and Vrhpolje had fled to Tomina.6846 People came out
of their houses and saw buses lined up on the main street.6847 Approximately 500 to 600
individuals were boarded onto buses and taken to Krings Hall.6848 The women and children spend
one night there and were transferred out the following day to eastern or central BiH.6849 The men
stayed behind in Krings Hall.6850

6841
P3667 (Map of Sanski Most with photos of various buildings); D4335 (Map of Sanski Most with photographs).
6842
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8069; KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26235 (under
seal); P3371 (Photograph of exterior of Krings Hall); P3372 (Photograph of interior Krings Hall); P3375 (Photograph of exterior of Krings Hall); KDZ052,
T. 19078–19079, 19082 (19 September 2011); D4344 (Photograph of Krings); D4335 (Map of Sanski Most with photographs).
6843
D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court p. 7; P3667 (Map of Sanski Most with photos of various buildings); P3634
(Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 115 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 2537.
6844
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8069–8070; KDZ052, T. 19075–19076 (19 September 2011).
6845
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8068; KDZ097, P714 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7227 (under seal); Rajif
Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2997–2998, 3015–3019; P692 (Witness statement of Rajif Begić dated 15 March 2000), e-court
pp. 6–7. See also Adjudicated Fact 2543; KW545, D4328 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 26135 (under seal).
6846
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8068.
6847
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2998.
6848
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8068–8069; Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2998. See also
Adjudicated Fact 2543.
6849
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8068–8069.
6850
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2998. See also P3657 (Minutes of 9th session of Sanski Most Executive Board, 27 July
1992), p. 3.
 279

ii. Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

2015. In the beginning, when the VRS soldiers were guarding the detainees, there were no
beatings or mistreatment.6851 However, when the police took control of Krings Hall, things
changed.6852 The police regularly interrogated and beat the detainees, sometimes with batons and
rifles.6853 While KDZ052 was detained there, he witnessed one man who died as a result of a
beating.6854 (Was there any name of the person? Why it was sufficient to sentence this
President?)

2016. The detention facility had running water and a sink but no working toilets.6855 The
hygiene conditions were extremely poor.6856 There was inadequate bedding for the detainees.6857
In the beginning, relatives of the detainees were allowed to bring food to Krings Hall but later this
was not allowed.6858

2017. In August 1992, the detainees from Krings Hall were transferred to Manjaĉa camp.6859
(All of them,, or some of them? On what basis some of them had been released?)

iii. Conclusion

2018. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that Serb Forces detained Bosnian Muslim and
Bosnian Croat civilians, mainly males, from Sanski Most at Krings Hall from May to August
1992. (What Croats? And what civilians? Nobody was detained because of being a civilian,
but because of doing something illegal. Only in the beginning there were a few Croats, but
later the Croats gave up any idea of the war.) The Chamber further finds that the detainees were
held in poor conditions, including lack of sanitary facilities. The Chamber also finds that the
detainees were subjected to beatings and that one person died as a result of the beatings.
(e) Scheduled Detention Facility C.22.5

2019. The Indictment refers to the use of the ―Magarica military facility‖ as a detention facility
at least between May and June 1992. In its Final Brief, the Prosecution alleges that the ―evidence
led shows Magarice military facility operated as a detention facility‖ in May 1992.6860

6851
Rajif Begić, P691 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 2098–2099; KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8070.
6852
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8070.
6853
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8069–8070. See also Adjudicated Fact 2545.
6854
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8070–8071. And this #92bis# was enough to sentence the President for a
murder of an unknown person??? Bravo!
6855
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8069. See also P3372 (Photograph of interior Krings Hall); KDZ052, T. 19079 (19 September
2011).
6856
See Adjudicated Fact 2544.
6857
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8069.
6858
KDZ052, P3370 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 8069.
6859
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5536, 5539; Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6183;
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7076–7079. Approximately 50 Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat men who were also
detained with Bišĉević at the SJB prison were transported to Manjaĉa camp with him. Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T.
7079–7080. Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6183. Karabeg was placed on a bus with men from the SJB prison and
Krings Hall and they were transported to Manjaĉa camp. Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6183. The Chamber is
treating those #terrorists as a civilians# who were without any responsibility, and any reason for the detention. A
reasonable chamber wouldn’t do that without establishing what was a difference between those who were released
and those who had been transferred to Manjaca.
6860
Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, fn. 761.
 280

2020. Magarice is a village located on the outskirts of Sanski Most town.6861 The Magarice
military facility consisted of a house and a barn in the village of Magarice that was used by Basara
and the 6th Krajina Brigade for operations and the storage of weapons.6862
2021. On 27 May 1992, Bišĉević was arrested at his home and taken to Magarice village.6863
(He wasn’t arrested, but captured, because of the war he started? Why was it irrelevant?
Biscevic was on all the lists of extremists and reports of the intelligence, and why he wouldn’t
be arrested? Also, Mirzet Karabeg, a municipal official who abused the municipal resources
in the preparations for killing his Serb neighbours. See: a Muslim book, exhibit D1677, p. 11

And such a persons, several of them from this list, are trustful witnesses in this Court, which
accepted that they had been arrested and detained as “civilians” as if civilians couldn’t
commit a crime in a civil war! Or, see D5, an intelligence report before the war, how
prominent “civilians” were preparing for the war, D5

Already in March 1992 the illegal army in Sanski Most had 3,000 long barrels, obtained by
the “witnesses” against the President!) He saw Basara there, along with other VRS soldiers.6864
He was taken to an orchard where one of the soldiers cursed at him about his ―balija God‖.6865
Bišĉević was then taken to a meadow where he was handcuffed, searched, and his pockets were
emptied.6866 The soldiers took his money and driving license.6867 They beat him severely with
their truncheons and sticks.6868 He was then taken to the Sanski Most radio station.6869 After
being forced to make a statement on the radio, Bišĉević was brought back to Magarice.6870 (What
statement? What was the message in this statement? Was it in favour of the war or of the
peace? This is not without significance! He was “forced” to make a statement in favour of
ceasing the military activities, which he was not willing to do, and had to be “forced”!)

6861
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7030.
6862
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7030, 7043; Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5527;
KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7749 (under seal).
6863
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7029–7030. See also Adjudicated Fact 2546.
6864
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7031.
6865
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7031.
6866
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7032–7033.
6867
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7033.
6868
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7033–7034. See also KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7748–
7750 (under seal).
6869
See para. 1949.
6870
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7042; see para. 1949.
 281

2022. Bišĉević was detained in the ―curing room, hut‖ in the Magarice military facility for 30
hours.6871 This was a wooden room with pebble stones on the floor and was two metres by two
metres.6872 There was no toilet in the room.6873 He was alone on the first day but two other
Bosnian Muslim men were brought in the following day.6874 They were beaten and their personal
effects were taken from them.6875 (In #accordance with the law#!) During the time Bišĉević was
detained, he was not given any food or water.6876

2023. Bišĉević and the two other men were then taken to the soldiers‘ canteen, given food, and
transferred to the SJB prison.6877
2024. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that Bišĉević and two other Bosnian Muslim men
were detained in a room at the Magarice military facility on or about 27 May 1992. The Chamber
also finds that during their detention, these men were beaten and mistreated by Serb Forces.
(Taking into account that the Serbs knew his role in starting the war, where there was
casualties “at home,” far from the frontline, no wonder some of the police were angry. But
the VRS behaved properly.)

(6) Scheduled Incident D.19

2025. The Indictment refers to the destruction of 17 mosques and one Catholic church in Sanski
Most between at least between May and December 1992.6878
2026. The Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that the mosques in Sanski Most were
subjected to major damage by Bosnian Serb forces.6879 The Chamber also took judicial notice of
the fact that in mid-1992, the SDS ordered the destruction of the Donji Kamengrad mosque and
that Mladen Majkić, a military engineer, was ordered by a member of the SDS to set explosives in
the mosque.6880
2027. Bišĉević testified that there were 26 mosques and four Catholic churches in Sanski Most
municipality, and that all of them were destroyed.6881 KDZ490 testified that by the end of 1992,
all of the mosques in Sanski Most had been destroyed.6882 According to KDZ490, the mosques
were destroyed pursuant to orders from the Crisis Staff and were destroyed so that Bosnian
Muslims would not return.6883

6871
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7042; Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5528; KDZ474,
P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7749 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 2546.
6872
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7042–7043; Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5528.
6873
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5528.
6874
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7042; KDZ474, P3395 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7749 (under seal).
6875
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7042.
6876
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5528. See also Adjudicated Fact 2546.
6877
Faik Bišĉević, P135 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7044; Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5528. See also
Mirzet Karabeg, P3303 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 6158–6159.
6878
The religious sites identified in Scheduled Incident D.19 are the (1) Sanski Most town mosque, (2) Probijeţje mosque, (3) Hrustovo-Kukavice mosque, (4)
Hrustovo-Kerani mosque, (5) Vrhpolje mosque, (6) Šehovci mosque, (7) Trnova mosque, (8) Stari Majdan (Palanka) mosque, (9) Stari Majdan (Utriška)
mosque, (10) Novo Naselje (Dţevar) mosque, (11) Husimovci mosque, (12) Donji Kamengrad mosque, (13) Skucani Vakuf mosque, (14) Lukavice mosque,
(15) Tomina mosque, (16) Ĉaplje mosque, and the Town Catholic church. The Indictment refers to the Hrustovo-Kukavice mosque as being two different
mosques (the old and new mosque) situated next to each other. Indictment, Schedule D.19, fns. 17–19.
6879
See Adjudicated Fact 1358.
6880
Adjudicated Fact 2548.
6881
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5541. He further testified that none of the Serb religious institutions were destroyed. Faik
Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5541. Nobody was firing at the Army from the Serb churches, nor the
Serbs used the churches to store the armament and explosives. Was it so with the Muslim mosques?
6882
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 120 (under seal).
6883
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 120–121, 123–124 (under seal).
 282

2028. By the end of May 1992, the Trnova mosque and the Hrustovo-Kukavice mosque had been
destroyed.6884 In 1992, the mosque in Vrhpolje and the mosque in Stari Majdan were
destroyed.6885 The Pobrijeţje mosque was destroyed in mid-1992.6886 The town mosque in Sanski
Most was destroyed by October 1992.6887 The Šehovci mosque was blown up with explosives.6888
The mosques in Donji Kamengrad, Ĉaplje, Hrustovo, Lukavice, Šehovci, Stari Majdan, and
Tomina were destroyed.6889 The Catholic church in Sanski Most was also damaged.6890 (In all of
those villages #there was fighting#! This makes 14 mosques, while in the Sanski Most
municipality there were 26 predominantly Muslim villages, with at least three mosques
average, plus several tens of villages where the Muslims lived with the Serbs, where there
were several tens of mosques. Why all of those mosques hadn’t been destroyed? Why the
mosques hadn’t been destroyed in other villages, where there was no fights. #Abuse# of the
religious objects#!)

2029. According to Riedlmayer‘s reports, a total of 17 mosques and the town Catholic church in
Sanski Most were damaged or destroyed during the war.6891 However, the Chamber notes that
included in these 17 mosques is the Vrhpolje mosque, which Riedlmayer describes as only ―lightly
damaged‖ and as one of three mosques in Sanski Most that survived the war without structural
damage.6892 The Chamber therefore finds that 16 mosques and the town Catholic church were
heavily damaged, almost destroyed, or completely destroyed. (A reasonable chamber would
clarify whether there had been any armed skirmishes, or not.)

2030. The Chamber has considered the evidence it has received which identified Serb Forces as
responsible for the destruction of mosques in Sanski Most.6893 It also had regard to the fact that

6884
Faik Bišĉević, P122 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5541, 5543; KDZ490, T. 20180 (19 October 2011) (closed session); KDZ097, P714
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7225 (under seal); P715 (Witness statement of KDZ097 dated 21 April 2001), e-court p. 7 (under seal). See also
P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case,
formatted records), e-court pp. 276–280, 289–290 (identifying damage to the old and new Hrustovo-Kukavice mosques and the Trnova mosque); P4069
(Cultural destruction database), records 278–279, 300; P716 (Witness statement of KDZ097 dated 21 April 2001), e-court p. 15. The old Hrustovo-
Kukavice mosque was also referred to as the Hrustovo mosque. P715 (Witness statement of KDZ097 dated 21 April 2001), e-court p. 4 (under seal).
6885
KDZ490, T. 20180 (19 October 2011) (closed session); P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 123 (under seal). There were two mosques in
Hrustovo, one in Kukavice and the other in Karavići. The mosque in Kukavice was the largest mosque and known as the Hrustovo mosque. P715 (Witness
statement of KDZ097 dated 21 April 2001), e-court p. 4 (under seal); KDZ097, P714 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 7206–7207 (under seal);
P616 (Map of Hrustovo-Vrhpolje marked by KDZ097). See also P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of
Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted records), e-court pp. 283–285, 291–294; P4069 (Cultural destruction database), records
297–298, 301.
6886
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 121 (under seal); P3670 (Report on the work of Sanski Most Municipal Civilian Protection Staff, 15
July–15 October 1992), p. 3. See also P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖
prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted records), e-court pp. 273–275; P4069 (Cultural destruction database), record 289.
6887
P3670 (Report on the work of Sanski Most Municipal Civilian Protection Staff, 15 July–15 October 1992); P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated),
p. 121 (under seal). See also P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared
for the Karadţić case, formatted records), e-court pp. 269–272; P4069 (Cultural destruction database), record 290.
6888
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 122 (under seal). See also P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled
―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted records), e-court pp. 286–288; P4069 (Cultural destruction database),
record 294.
6889
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 122–123 (under seal); P692 (Statements to Sanski Most Court, 18 April 1996), e-court p. 12; KDZ490,
T. 20180 (19 October 2011) (closed session). See also P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural
Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted records), e-court pp. 286–288, 291–294, 303–304, 305–307, 308–309; P4069 (Cultural
destruction database), records 270, 273, 284, 294, 297–299; see Adjudicated Fact 1358.
6890
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated) (under seal), p. 123.
6891
Riedlmayer identifies the level of damage with respect to each of the mosques listed by name in the Indictment: Town mosque (completely destroyed),
Pobrijeţje mosque (completely destroyed), Hrustovo-Kukavice new mosque (completely destroyed), Hrustovo-Kukavice old mosque (heavily damaged),
Hrustovo-Kerani mosque (heavily damaged), Vrhpolje mosque (lightly damaged), Šehovci mosque (heavily damaged), Trnova mosque (heavily damaged),
Stari Majdan (Palanka) mosque (completely destroyed), Dţevar mosque (heavily damaged), Husimovci mosque (heavily damaged), Donji Kamengrad new
mosque (almost destroyed), Skucani Vakuf mosque (heavily damaged), Lukavice mosque (heavily damaged), Tomina mosque (almost destroyed), Ĉaplje
mosque (heavily damaged), the town Catholic church (completely destroyed). P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled
―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted records), e-court pp. 269–311. See also P4069 (Cultural destruction
database), records 270, 273, 275, 278–281, 284, 287, 289, 290, 292, 294–295, 297–301; P4068 (András Riedlmayer's expert report on Destruction of
Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1992-1995, 7 May 2009), paras. 40–46; P4071 (Slide images of damaged religious sites in BiH), e-
court pp. 4, 16–17.
6892
P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case,
formatted records), e-court pp. 283–285.
6893
See paras. 2026–2028.
 283

almost all mosques in the municipality sustained heavy damage or were completely destroyed after
Serb Forces took over the municipality. Having weighed these factors, the Chamber is satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that Serb Forces were responsible for the attacks on and destruction of
mosques and the Catholic church in Sanski Most.
2031. Therefore, the Chamber finds that at least 16 mosques and the town Catholic church were
heavily damaged, almost destroyed or completely destroyed by Serb Forces between May and
December 1992.(But, the contemporaneous document D4334 clearly shows that the police of
the Serb Municipality of Sanski Most was not prepared, educated, equipped and capable of
dealing with so many unexpected detainees collected after the combats and the disarmament
actions of the Army, see D4334:

1. Movement of the population from Sanski Most and appropriation of property

2032. Following the attack on Sanski Most on 25 May 1992, the non-Serb population was
expelled from the municipality.6894 (Contrary to a large amount of evidence that it wasn’t so,
the Chamber relies upon a testimony of a witness who had a reason to lie. Only in the town
there was over 12,000 Muslims in 1995, when the ABiH and Croatian Army conquered
Sanski Most. Why they weren’t “expelled”?)

2033. On 2 July 1992, the Crisis Staff adopted a decision on the criteria for voluntary departure
from Sanski Most.6895 (There exist #many documents proving#! that the Serbs demanded that
the Muslim side allow the Serbs captured in the Muslim areas to leave temporarily or
permanently, as they may like.) It ordered that those citizens who wish to permanently leave
Sanski Most must hand over their real property to the Sanski Most municipal authorities.6896
(#Wrong and fake#! Due to the domestic laws, the authorities could have at disposal all the
property for a temporary use in a war, but there was no any change of ownership!) People
were allowed to take their movable property on the condition that they made a list of all of the
property to be verified by an ―authorised municipal administration organ‖.6897 People who wished
to stay were required to sign a loyalty oath and those who refused were threatened and often left
under duress.6898 (This is #not correctly presented#. An oath was needed only for those who
wanted to exercise a specially authorised duties, connected to the constitutional and legal
matters, and everyone had to sign it, because there was a new Constitution and a new state

6894
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 80–81 (under seal). See paras. 1945–1946.
6895
P3307 (Decision of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 2 July 1992); Mirzet Karabeg, T. 18703–18706 (13 September 2011). See also Adjudicated Facts 2550, 2556.
6896
P3307 (Decision of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 2 July 1992). See also Mirzet Karabeg, T. 18701 (13 September 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2556.
6897
P3307 (Decision of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 2 July 1992), p. 1.
6898
Mirzet Karabeg, T. 18701, 18706–18707 (13 September 2011); P3330 (Conclusions of session of Banja Luka CSB Enlarged Centre Council, 6 April 1992),
para. 3; see Adjudicated Fact 2552.
 284

organisation. See: P03498, wrongly titled as an Oath to the SDS. This one was signed by a
Serb, Dragan Stojicic, at the very beginning of the war:

So, there is no even mentioning the SDS, but only the Constitution and laws.)
 285

2034. On 23 June 1992, the Crisis Staff formed a committee to deal with the ―migration‖ of the
population.6899 Vrkeš was appointed as the person responsible for matters relating to the removal
and exchange of the population and prisoners and was to report to Vojo Kuprešanin of the ARK
Crisis Staff.6900
2035. By 27 July 1992, the Crisis Staff estimated that approximately 18,000 Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats remained in Sanski Most and that approximately 6,000 to 7,000 had moved
away.6901 It stated that Bosnian Muslims were requesting to move and noted that it should be
made possible for them to do so by organising their voluntary resettlement.6902 (#All wrong and
fake#! First objection: this wasn’t any Crisis Staff, but the regular Executive council of the
municipality. Second, Mr. Vrucinic, as the chief of the police, expressed his disappointment
in the status of security in municipality, and numbered all the security problems. Had it been
a plan of the authorities, they would celebrate this chaos, but it wasn’t the case. Further, we
see that at the end of July 92 there stil was 18,000 Muslims. To this time the fights ended, the
rest of armed Muslims were not attacking, and there was 18,000 Muslims who didn’t have
any personal problems, except a general insecurity, which concerned the Serbs too. Let us
see what Vrucinic said at this meeting.

(“ #The Muslims are requesting to leav#e…” Some emigrated, some left, not a singe “expelled”!
This document clearly shows that the authorities had a big problem in dealing with many
problems. And except with Banja Luka, they didn’t have any contact with the central
authorities. If there was any need to identify who were these “Serb Forces”, this is an
answer: Vrucinic was a legal and official “Serb Force”, and those forces were taking care of
the minorities as much as they could in this circumstances.)

2036. On 1 August 1992, the SJB reported that 12,000 individuals, mainly Bosnian Muslims but
also some Bosnian Croats, had applied to the SJB to unregister their permanent residences in order
to leave the municipality.6903 (Certainly, the applicants hadn’t been happy about that, but still

6899
P3636 (Order of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 23 June 1992); P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated) (under seal), p. 85. See also Adjudicated Fact
2555.
6900
See Adjudicated Fact 2555. KDZ490 stated that the ARK Crisis Staff had great influence over the municipalities and that the Sanski Most Crisis Staff
implemented decisions from the ARK Crisis Staff. P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 11, 86–87 (under seal). See also P3804 (Witness
statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 111.
6901
P3657 (Minutes of 9th session of Sanski Most Executive Board, 27 July 1992), p. 4. See also P3851 (Conclusion of the Executive Board of Sanski Most
Municipal Assembly, 30 July 1992).
6902
P3657 (Minutes of 9th session of Sanski Most Executive Board, 27 July 1992), pp. 3–4. See also P3851 (Conclusion of the Executive Board, of Sanski
Most's Municipal Assembly, 30 July 1992). Boro Tadić testified that Bosnian Muslims voluntarily wanted to leave Sanski Most and that Vrkeš and others
were trying to make it possible for the Bosnian Muslims to leave safely. Boro Tadić, T. 44424–44425 (4 December 2013). The Chamber does not accept
Tadić‘s evidence. The Chamber found that Tadić‘s testimony was ambiguous, misleading, and often resorted to tu quoque. The Chamber finds that Tadić‘s
reliability was compromised to such an extent that the Chamber could not accept his evidence.
6903
D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court p. 15. See also Adjudicated Fact 2557. By 11 August 1992, it was reported
that 28,000 people, mainly Bosnian Muslims from Bosanski Novi, Sanski Most, Bosanska Kostajnica, and Bosanski Petrovac, were being forced to move
from their homes. P2941 (Article from The Associated Press, 11 August 1992) (under seal).
 286

it was their own will. It was not the authorities who made any pressure on them to leave, it
was a war situation, which was instigated by their own extremists, whose names can be
found in all the intelligence reports before and during the war.)
2037. On 14 August 1992, the Sanski Most Municipal Assembly granted permission to transfer
the ownership of movable and immovable property based on exchange contracts and gift
contracts.6904 It also noted that the first group of 3,000 people would be ―resettled‖ from the
municipality and transported by bus.6905 It was decided that while Bosnian Muslims were
voluntarily going into exile, their property would be taken over for ―safe keeping and use‖.6906
(Let us see what is said in this document P3659, p. 5:

There could be no more genuine interpretation of the #official attitude# of the Serb
authorities concerning the issue of moving from one to another municipality! However, there
is another linguistic problem: “resettling” a people would in Sewrbian mean “naseljavanje”
as an operation of change of a demographic picture, which was not the case here. The Serb
term “preseljenje” should be translated in English as “moving”, which was #provided for by
the law# as an obligation towards the civilian population cought in a zone of battles. See
further: P3659, p. 6

.
The “safe keeping and use” in a war conditions was a legal possibility, even if the owners
were not moved. There was no a single change of the ownership whatsoever, and his
Chamber accepted it in this Judgment!….#@.

2038. On 19 August 1992, Vrkeš and representatives of the Sanki Most Bosnian Muslims and
Croats met with UNHCR and Civil Affairs to discuss, inter alia, whether the UN would assist in
evacuating up to 11,000 Bosnian Muslim ―applicants‖ for evacuation.6907 Vrkeš explained that all
those who wished to leave, should be able to do so.6908 In addition, Vrkeš stated that those who
were leaving would sign a declaration stating they were leaving voluntarily, they had no wish to
turn, and they were leaving their properties to the authorities.6909 The UNHCR representative
responded that UNHCR would not assist with the removal of people.6910 (Kirudja didn’t
uderstand what was “leaving property to the authorities”. It meant to leave it at disposal to
the authorities to be used on a controlled way, and thus be of a help and be saved at the same
time.).
6904
P3659 (Minutes of 11th session of Sanski Most Executive Board, 14 August 1992), p. 12.
6905
P3659 (Minutes of 11th session of Sanski Most Executive Board, 14 August 1992), p. 9; P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 89–90 (under
seal).
6906
P3659 (Minutes of 11th session of Sanski Most Executive Board, 14 August 1992), p. 14.
6907
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 111–112.
6908
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 114.
6909
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 114.
6910
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 115.
 287

2039. The Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were forced to leave Sanski
Most following immense pressure put on them, given the surrounding circumstances in the
municipality, including, inter alia, (i) armed attacks against their villages and homes;
(ii) destruction of religious and cultural property; (iii) forcible arrest and removal from their
homes; how possibly they established that there was a “forcible arrest”, which must always
be forcible, and removal from their homes? Are they normal? Those two issues didn’t have
anything in common. Those who had been arrested weren’t allowed to leave the
municipality, only those who weren’t guilty of any crime, and yet had payed all their duties,
and applied to a list for transport. (iv) detention in multiple detention facilities; as well as (v)
mistreatment and killings. This would conclude only blind people, or a total ignorant, or so
nasty and biased that neither our enemies would do it better.

2040. By February 1995, the population of Sanski Most municipality was approximately 3,350
Bosnian Muslims, 1,050 Bosnian Croats, and 33,600 Bosnian Serbs.6911 (That was an
assessment, not census, but anyway, how come these Muslims and Croats stayed in Sanski
Most the entire war? Why the hednt been expelled? Because neither the previous, who left
before the war and during the war, hadn’t been expelled, but left because of insecurity and
fear!)

a. Regional level

2041. As stated earlier, the Serb-majority community of municipalities called the ZOBK was
transformed into the ARK on 16 September 1991.6912 (And that was done because of the
development: the SDA party reneged the “Historic Serb-Muslim Agreement” created by the
other Muslim secular parties, although Mr. Izetbegovic supported it at the beginning! This
Agreement envisaged that the Serbs standstill the process of regionalisation for the sake of a
new settlement between the Serbs and Muslims. Once the SDA reneged the Agreement, the
Serbs legitimately continued with the regionalisation!) This community of municipalities
included the following municipalities relevant to the Indictment: Banja Luka, Bosanski Novi,
Kljuĉ, Prijedor, and Sanski Most (―ARK Municipalities‖).6913 The ARK was vested with both
executive and legislative powers within its area of jurisdiction and acted as an intermediate level
of authority between the SerBiH and the municipalities.6914 (The same as it is now in the
Muslim-Croat Federation, FBiH, with cantons is case!)

2042. According to the ARK Statute, the ARK was a voluntary association.6915 The statute
provided that other municipalities could join the ARK.6916 In this context, in the municipalities
where the Bosnian Serbs were a majority, the respective decision to join the ARK was in fact
taken only by the Bosnian Serb municipal delegates of these municipalities, with the SDA and the
HDZ delegates either opposed to this idea or unaware that such a decision was being taken.6917
(However, when the Muslim-Croat representatives ruined the Constitution deciding in
favour of independence, the International Community didn’t react! What the Serb
municipalities did was not a violation of the Constitution, because for that move there wasn’t
6911
P5449 (Report of the MUP, Banja Luka RDB, February 1995), p. 8. In terms of percentages, in 1995, the population was 8% Bosnian Muslim, 2% Bosnian
Croat, and 88% Bosnian Serb. P5449 (Report of the MUP, Banja Luka RDB, February 1995), p. 8. That was an assessment, not a census.

6912
See paras. 42, 75. On 16 September 1991, the ZOBK Assembly transformed the ZOBK into the ARK. P2536 (Patrick Treanor‘s expert report entitled ―The
Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992‖, 30 July 2002), para. 136.
6913
P4258 (Map of ARK). See Indictment, para. 48.
6914
See Adjudicated Fact 520.
6915
D4014 (Statute of the ARK, September 1991), Articles 1, 10, 11. See Adjudicated Fact 521.
6916
D4014 (Statute of the ARK, September 1991), Articles 10, 11.
6917
See Adjudicated Fact 521.
 288

envisaged concensus!) In the municipalities where the Bosnian Serbs were in a minority, the
decision by the respective municipalities to join the ARK was taken either only by the Bosnian
Serb delegates in the municipality or by the assemblies of the newly established Bosnian Serb
municipalities.6918 Despite provisions of the ARK Statute which established the ARK as a multi-
ethnic institution,6919 the ARK was in practice a Serb body.6920 Out of the 189 delegates to the
ARK Assembly, only a negligible number were Bosnian Croats or Bosnian Muslims.6921 (This
illustrates their will to have a unitary Bosnia under their only control, and out of Yugoslavia,
which was incompatible, because the Serbs accepted to meditate the independence only if
they get their own state unit in BiH!)

2043. The ARK Assembly had the power to enact decisions in accordance with the constitution
and the law.6922 Upon the creation of the ARK, Vojo Kuprešanin was elected President of the
ARK Assembly, and Radoslav BrĊanin became First Vice President.6923
2044. On 4 March 1992, during its 15th Session, the ARK Assembly adopted a decision to form
the CSB of the ARK; its seat was in Banja Luka and Stojan Ţupljanin was appointed as Chief of
the CSB.6924 (This already was a CSB for the Community of Municipalities of Banja Luka,
and only changed the name, because the Community of Municipalities changed the name
into the ARK!) Furthermore, on 27 April 1992, the ARK Assembly established a ―special
purpose police detachment‖ within the Banja Luka CSB.6925 (But not to skip the fact that the
war already started three weeks prior to that!)
i. Establishment of ARK Crisis Staff

2045. The ARK Crisis Staff was formally established on 5 May 1992 by a decision of the ARK
Executive Council;6926 however, it had been functioning since January 1992.6927 (The
Prosecution-Chamber again mixed the party Crisis Staff, which didn’t have any prerogative
6918
See Adjudicated Fact 521. For example, in Kljuĉ, when the decision to join the ARK was confirmed by the SDS delegates of the Kljuĉ Municipal Assembly
on 26 December 1991, the SDA representatives at the Municipal Assembly walked out and did not vote on the issue. In Prijedor, the Prijedor Serb
Assembly unanimously voted to join the ARK on 17 January 1992. In Sanski Most, Rašula issued a decision on behalf of the ―Serbian People‘s Assembly‖
that Sanski Most would become part of the ARK on 3 April 1992; the decision was only made by the Sanski Most SDS deputies. See paras. 1496, 1579,
1932–1933.
6919
D4014 (Statute of the ARK, September 1991), Article 4 (stating: ―In performing tasks within the jurisdiction of the [ARK], all peoples and nationalities of
the [ARK] shall have equal rights and duties […]‖; Article 5, stating: ―The official language of the [ARK] organs shall be Serbo-Croatian and Croato-
Serbian, using the Cyrillic or Latin alphabets.‖).
6920
See Adjudicated Fact 522.
6921
See Adjudicated Fact 522.
6922
D4014 (Statute of the ARK, September 1991), Article 18; P2536 (Patrick Treanor‘s expert report entitled ―The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990–1992‖, 30
July 2002), para. 142.
6923
D4011 (Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), para. 1; D4034 (Witness statement of Radoslav BrĊanin dated 8 November
2013), para. 1. See also Adjudicated Fact 523; P2536 (Patrick Treanor‘s expert report entitled ―The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990–1992‖, 30 July 2002),
paras. 142–143; D4014 (Statute of the ARK, September 1991), Articles 18, 28, 31. In October 1991, BrĊanin also became a member of the Bosnian Serb
Assembly. See Adjudicated Fact 523. AnĊelko Grahovac was appointed as President of the ZOBK in May 1991 and subsequently was the Prime Minister
of the ARK until January 1992, when he was dismissed from the post because of his desire to establish strong links with the ―Knin Krajina‖. D4077
(Witness statement of AnĊelko Grahovac dated 23 November 2013), paras. 14, 35; AnĊelko Grahovac, T. 44035–44036 (26 November 2013).
6924
D4075 (Excerpt of Minutes of 15th session of ARK Assembly, 4 March 1992); D4071 (Summary of 15 th session of ARK Assembly, 4 March 1992); D4023
(Decision of ARK Assembly, 4 March 1992) (wherein the ARK Assembly also established funds for the ARK). See also Adjudicated Facts 530, 531. See
para. 218.
6925
P5454 (Decision of ARK Assembly, 27 April 1992). See D4086 (Witness statement of Nikola Erceg dated 24 November 2013), para. 59; D4300 (Witness
statement of KW426 dated 31 January 2014), para. 8; D4138 (Witness statement of Ţeljko Mejakić dated 26 November 2013), para. 15; Ţeljko Mejakić, T.
44218–44220 (29 November 2013); D4075 (Excerpt of Minutes of 15th session of ARK Assembly, 4 March 1992); D4306 (Report of Banja Luka CSB, 5
August 1992), p. 1. See also Adjudicated Fact 530. The unit consisted of 140–150 men and while it was formed as a police unit, it had three army platoons
and one police platoon. Members of this unit provided security at Omarska but after ten days, Ţupljanin withdrew the unit from Omarska after he was
informed of ―terrible problems‖ they were causing there. The unit was disbanded in July 1992 pursuant to an order from Mićo Stanišić. D4300 (Witness
statement of KW426 dated 31 January 2014), paras. 9–11; Ţeljko Mejakić, T. 44218–44220 (29 November 2013); D4139 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 13 June
1992); D4273 (Order of RS MUP, 27 July 1992); D4306 (Report of Banja Luka CSB, 5 August 1992), p. 2; P3761 (Payroll of Banja Luka's CSB Special
Police Detachment, August 1992). See KW426, T. 46715–46718, 46732–46737 (6 February 2014).
6926
P6 (Decision on the formation of ARK Crisis Staff, 5 May 1992).
6927
P2553 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovan Ĉizmović, 22 January 1992), p. 7. The Chamber recalls that Ĉizmović was
appointed as the co-ordinator of activities of the executive bodies of the SAOs. See para. 130. See also Patrick Treanor, T. 14033–14035 (1 June 2011);
Adjudicated Fact 524. But see D4011 (Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), para. 53; D4034 (Witness statement of
Radoslav BrĊanin dated 8 November 2013), para. 37; D4114 (Witness statement of Milorad Sajić dated 24 November 2013), para. 63 (all stating that they
had no knowledge of the ARK Crisis Staff being formed in January 1992).
 289

of authority, with the Crisis Staff of a state nature, which temporarily replaced the state
organs, in an absence of possibility to gather and make decisions!) BrĊanin was appointed as
President of the newly created ARK Crisis Staff, which was later renamed the ARK War
Presidency on 9 July 1992.6928 The President supported BrĊanin to lead the ARK.6929 (This is also
a #malicious inference#, because the President supported whatever the locals decided in a
democratic procedure! However, the document frim this fn. P2596 doesn’t give any basis for
this conclusion, see: P2596:

So, the President warned that Brdjanin was already the Vice-Chairman of the ARK
Assembly. Before that the President encouraged the interlocutor to “choose a mature
personality” Further:

The President only suggested the criteria for election an efficient person. See further:

The document confirmes that the President “discouraged” the proposal of Brdjanin, and
have spoken only about the criteria, suggesting what kind of person should be elected! Those
who analised the document on behalf of the Chambed misinformed the Chamber. Finally,
Nikola Erceg was elected! The document never pertained to the ARK War Presidency!)
BrĊanin retained this position until the abolition of the ARK on 15 September 1992.6930 The ARK
War Presidency continued to meet at least until 8 September 1992, one week prior to the adoption
of the SerBiH constitutional amendment that abolished the ARK as a territorial unit of SerBiH.6931

2046. Other members of the ARK Crisis Staff included Milorad Sajić, Secretary of the Regional
Secretariat for National Defence, who was appointed Vice President of the ARK Crisis Staff; Vojo
Kuprešanin, Deputy of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and President of the ARK Assembly; Milovan
Milanović, Deputy of the Bosnian Serb Assembly; Nikola Erceg, President of the ARK Executive
Council; Predrag Radić, President of the Banja Luka Municipal Assembly and Banja Luka Crisis
Staff; Radislav Vukić; Talić; Ţupljanin; and Nenad Stevandić, head of the SOS.6932 (All of them
were the members ex oficio, therefore not elected and not supported by the President)

6928
P6 (Decision on the formation of ARK Crisis Staff, 5 May 1992); D4034 (Witness statement of Radoslav BrĊanin dated 8 November 2013), paras. 1, 12.
See Adjudicated Fact 526.
6929
P2596 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and ―Miroslav‖, 7 January 1992), pp. 3–6. See Milorad Dodik, T. 36885–36886 (9 April
2013).
6930
Adjudicated Fact 526.
6931
See Adjudicated Fact 529; P2536 (Patrick Treanor‘s expert report entitled ―The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990–1992‖, 30 July 2002), paras. 158–161.
6932
P6 (Decision on the formation of ARK Crisis Staff, 5 May 1992); D4011 (Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), para. 1;
Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7364, 7378–7379, 7387–7388; D4114 (Witness statement of Milorad Sajić dated 24
November 2013), paras. 2, 33; D4086 (Witness statement of Nikola Erceg dated 24 November 2013), para. 2. See Adjudicated Facts 527, 528, 531. See
also paras. 75, 179.
 290

2047. The ARK Crisis Staff acted as an intermediary regional body between the republican-
level authorities and the ARK Municipalities by co-ordinating the implementation of instructions
sent by the republic-level authorities in the ARK Municipalities.6933 Municipal Crisis Staff
presidents in the ARK regularly gave reports to the ARK Crisis Staff on events within their area of
responsibility6934 and took actions in response to directives from the ARK Crisis Staff.6935 In some
municipalities, for example in Prijedor, Srdić reported directly to Pale.6936 (Rule 92 quarter, the
witness deceased, not cross examined) When authorities in the ARK Municipalities disobeyed
instructions from Pale, some were replaced immediately, while others were subjected to
disciplinary procedures, or ―ironed‖, and would subsequently change their views.6937 (Rule 92
quarter, the witness deceased, not cross examined. There was no any elected political person
replaced that way. Some of them had been “ironed” because tried to carv up Croatia and
BiH and to create so called “State of Krajina” which would be a “casus belli”, which the
President and the SDS couldn’t afford. Those who wanted to do that had been advised to
form another political party, not to do such a thing under the SDS amblem. There is
plethora of evidence to that regard. Instead to be #commended#, the President is blamed!)

2048. Decisions and conclusions of the ARK Crisis Staff were binding on the ARK
Municipalities and were abided and implemented by the municipal Crisis Staffs.6938 Whenever the
6933
Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7401–7404, 7409–7410, 7419–7421 (testifying further that not all of the instructions
communicated to the municipal Crisis Staffs by the ARK Crisis Staff emanated from the republican authorities; there were maybe one or two instructions
which arrived from the ―very top‖ in Pale); (This is such an important evidence, that shouldn’t be in the footnote, because it is
#EXCULPATORY# for the President!) Branko Ɖerić, T. 28057–28058 (25 April 2012). See P2824 (RS Communication Centre telegram
logbook, June and July 1992), p. 4 (referring to a 5 June 1992 order from the Bosnian Serb Government which was implemented by the ARK Assembly on 6
June 1992); P6532 (Public announcement of ARK Assembly, 6 June 1992). See also P3645 (Conclusions of the Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 7 May 1992), p.
2. However, according to Kuprešanin, Erceg, and Sajić, the ARK operated independently from Pale as a ―state within a state‖. (This is another
important evidence, that shouldn’t be in the footnote, because it is #EXCULPATORY# for this Accused!) D4011
(Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), paras. 37–38; D4086 (Witness statement of Nikola Erceg dated 24 November 2013),
para. 71; D4114 (Witness statement of Milorad Sajić dated 24 November 2013), paras. 51–53. Furthermore, according to BrĊanin, the ARK Crisis Staff was
not supported by the central republican authorities in Pale, primarily due to a rift between the ARK leadership and the RS leadership over what city should
be the capital of the RS, Banja Luka or Pale; in addition, according to BrĊanin, Kuprešanin, Erceg, and Sajić, until a corridor was opened on 28 June 1992,
there was limited communication with the central authorities in Pale and BrĊanin did not receive instructions from Pale or the Accused while the ARK Crisis
Staff existed. (#EXCULPATORY!# Why it is sided ion a footnote?) D4034 (Witness statement of Radoslav BrĊanin dated 8 November
2013), paras. 6–7, 9; Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43553–43554 (14 November 2013); D4086 (Witness statement of Nikola Erceg dated 24 November 2013),
paras. 22–23, 29, 32, 34, 36, 42, 45–46, 57; D4114 (Witness statement of Milorad Sajić dated 24 November 2013), paras. 12, 47–52. See D4088 (Letter
from President of ARK Executive Board, 18 June 1992). See also D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 14. The
Chamber considers that while there may have been limited communication at times between the authorities in Pale and the ARK authorities, the Chamber
finds that instructions were indeed sent from Pale to the ARK and that, as such, the ARK Crisis Staff did not operate entirely independently as a ―state
within a state‖ as alleged by the Accused. (It was not “alleged by the Accused”, but confirmed by the most responsible officials
of the ARK, who would do beter for themselves if stated the opposite!) The Chamber will discuss in further detail the relationship
between the ARK Crisis Staff and the Bosnian Serb leadership and the impact of these lines of communication on the Accused‘s responsibility. See Section
IV.A.3.a.ii.B: Regionalisation and creation of SAOs.
6934
Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7404. See also Adjudicated Fact 2182.
6935
Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7404–7409; P7 (Decision of ARK Crisis Staff, 22 June 1992); P8 (Communication from
Petrovac Municipal Assembly Crisis Staff to ARK Crisis Staff, 25 June 1992).
6936
Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7422–7424.
6937
Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7456–7457.
6938
P5415 (Decision of ARK Crisis Staff, 9 May 1992); Milorad Dodik, T. 36886–36887 (9 April 2013); P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July
1992), e-court p. 54 (in which at a 2 June 1992 meeting with the Accused, BrĊanin stated that ―everything in the ARK is done at [the crisis staff] level‖).
See paras. 2051–2053, 2056, 2058–2061, 2874. See, e.g., P3536 (Decisions and orders of Prijedor Municipal Assembly and Prijedor Crisis Staff, published
in Prijedor Official Gazette on 25 June 1992), pp. 5–6; P3708 (Decision of Prijedor Crisis Staff, 22 May 1992) (stating that in accordance with the decision
of the ARK Crisis Staff, ―permanent operational duty‖ shall be introduced in all municipalities of the ARK); P2606 (Minutes from sessions of Kljuĉ Crisis
Staff, 27 May–10 July 1992), p. 2; P2614 (Conclusions of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 30 May 1992). However, BrĊanin, Kuprešanin, and Grahovac testified
that there was no subordination and hierarchy in the relationship between the ARK Crisis Staff and municipal crisis staffs and they were independent of each
other, in particular because the functioning of the ARK was dependent on funds provided by the municipalities and ultimately, the municipalities stopped
earmarking funds for the ARK. Further, according to BrĊanin, Erceg, Stakić, Mišković, and Sajić, although the ARK Crisis Staff tried to impose its
decisions on the municipal crisis staffs, the ultimate implementation rested with the ARK Municipalities themselves and some chose to implement them
while others did not. D4034 (Witness statement of Radoslav BrĊanin dated 8 November 2013), paras. 20–22; Radoslav BrĊanin, T. 43655–43656 (18
November 2013); D4011 (Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), paras. 40, 49; Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43512–43517 (14
November 2013); D4077 (Witness statement of AnĊelko Grahovac dated 23 November 2013), para. 16; D4086 (Witness statement of Nikola Erceg dated 24
November 2013), paras. 14, 77, 81–82, 84, 86, 94 (stating that some municipalities, such as Prijedor, demonstrated a high degree of independence because
they were economically strong and the ARK was therefore unable to control them); D4206 (Witness statement of Simo Mišković dated 6 December 2013),
para. 12 (stating that Prijedor was independent in relation to ARK policy, as well as independent from the republican authorities in Pale); D4114 (Witness
statement of Milorad Sajić dated 24 November 2013), para. 55 (stating that Banja Luka municipality ignored the conclusions of the ARK Crisis Staff and
considered them invalid); D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 13 (stating that although the municipal authorities
 291

ARK Crisis Staff wanted to implement a decision in the ARK Municipalities, the deputies would
say that the order came from Pale, whether or not it was in fact the truth.6939 (#Not the President
liable!#) Municipal Crisis Staff presidents attended ARK Crisis Staff meetings.6940

2049. On 11 June 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff issued a statement setting forth the composition
of municipal Crisis Staffs/War Presidencies in the ARK, which stated:
The War Presidency, that is the Crisis Staff, shall lead all-people‘s resistance on the territory of
the municipality, ensure unity in implementing the policy of the [...] All People‘s Defence,
repair war damage, coordinate the work of municipal administrative organs, adopt regulations
within the competence of the Municipal Assembly if it is unable to convene and establish
cooperation with the competent organs of other municipalities and the commands of armed
forces units.6941 (All of it is the regular duty of the regular organs of authorities, according
to the domestic law on #“All-Peoples Defence”#. The President of Municipality was the
supreme commander of the Teritorial defence units. Since the War Presidency (or the
Crisis Staff, but not simultaneously) carried out all the duties of the regular municipal
authorities, since both the War Presidencies and the Crisis Staffs were composed of the
officials elected!)

in Prijedor used the ARK for inter-municipal co-operation, they never considered that ARK decisions or documents were binding on the municipal
government in Prijedor); D4057 (Prijedor Crisis Staff conclusions, published in Official Gazette, 23 June 1992) (concluding that the Prijedor Crisis Staff
does not accept, and deems invalid, all decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff adopted before 22 June 1992, but shall ―give effect‖ to all documents of the ARK
Crisis Staff adopted after 22 June 1992); Nikola Erceg, T. 44095 (27 November 2013). See P6437 (Minutes from inter-municipality talks, 14 June 1992), p.
3. However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be convincing in light of other accepted evidence, in particular documentary evidence,
demonstrating that the orders and decisions issued by the ARK Crisis Staff were implemented in the majority, if not all, of the ARK Municipalities. For
example, the Chamber refers to the implementation of the orders related to the (i) disarmament of the non-Serb population; (ii) policy to ―resettle‖ the non-
Serb population; and (iii) dismissals of non-Serbs from management and other positions in the ARK. In addition, the Chamber considers that the evidence
provided by these witnesses was marked with contradictions and evasiveness on this issue; they had a clear incentive to distance themselves from events in
the ARK Municipalities and the Chamber did not find them forthright when they claimed the ARK Municipalities were acting independently and could not
be controlled. The Chamber will therefore not rely on their evidence in this regard.
6939
Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7419–7421, 7428–7431 (testifying further that the deputies, such as BrĊanin or Krajišnik,
would come back from Assembly sessions or government meetings where decisions were made, and would inform the municipality-level authorities what
took place at the republican level of the government).
6940
Radoslav BrĊanin, T. 43649–43651 (18 November 2013); D4114 (Witness statement of Milorad Sajić dated 24 November 2013), para. 37. See P6512
(Excerpt of video from Banja Luka news broadcast, with transcript); P6437 (Minutes from inter-municipality talks, 14 June 1992), p. 2; P6564 (Excerpt of
Miloš Milinĉić‘s testimony from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 18443–18444; Miloš Milinĉić, T. 44987–44988 (11 December 2013). However, according to
Sajić, leaders from Pale never attended any of the ARK Crisis Staff meetings. D4114 (Witness statement of Milorad Sajić dated 24 November 2013), para.
47.
6941
P2620 (Order of ARK Crisis Staff, 11 June 1992).
 292

2050. Republican level ministers from Pale attended an ARK Assembly session on 17 July 1992
to receive reports on the situation in the ARK.6942 Furthermore, General Talić briefed the ARK
Assembly on military operations and, in turn, informed his subordinate officers within the 1st
Krajina Corps of decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff.6943 ARK Crisis Staff members, particularly
BrĊanin, visited the frontlines regularly, where they were briefed by military personnel in order to
gain an understanding of the situation and they, in turn, informed the ARK Crisis Staff about the
military campaign.6944 (#Nothing unusual, nothing unlawful#, all #envisaged by the Law on
“All-Peoplse Defence”#!)
i. ARK Crisis Staff decisions

1. Disarmament of non-Serbs

2051. As discussed above, an imminent threat of war was declared by the SerBiH Presidency on
15 April 1992, and the following day, the mobilisation of the TO was ordered.6945 Minister of
Defence Bogdan Subotić forwarded this decision for implementation to all Serb assemblies,
including in the ARK,6946 and on 29 April 1992, the decision was then forwarded by Erceg to the
President of Banja Luka Municipal Assembly also for implementation.6947 On 4 May 1992, the
decision was implemented by the ARK Regional Secretariat for National Defence in an order
issued by Milorad Sajić, the Secretary of the Regional Secretariat for National Defence, and
forwarded to the ARK Municipalities, providing for the following measures: (i) general
mobilisation of the territory of the ARK; (ii) imposition of a curfew; and (iii) disarmament of
―[a]ll paramilitary formations and individuals who illegally possess weapons‖ by 11 May 1992.6948
(Therefore, #no ethnic diference in disarming process#!) Also on 4 May 1992, Ţupljanin
ordered the SJB chiefs to implement the ARK decision of the same day.6949 In a decision issued
on 11 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff reiterated the same measures as in the 4 May decision and
extended the disarmament deadline to 14 May 1992 at 12 a.m. in response to the request of
citizens to ―return the weapons in a peaceful way and without the intervention of the police‖.6950
2052. On 18 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff further decided that all individuals in the ARK who
were ―not part of the armed forces of the [SerBiH] or its police must hand in their weapons‖.6951
(#No ethnic differentiation!#) In accordance with the 18 May 1992 decision, Ţupljanin ordered
all SJBs to report back to the CSB on the disarmament operations.6952 The municipal SJBs, as
ordered, reported back to the CSB on the operations implemented in their respective areas of
control.6953

6942
P5513 (Extract of Minutes from 18th session of ARK Assembly, 17 July 1992). The following ministers attended the session: Generals Talić and Ninković,
Goran Hadţić, Milan Martić, Minister of Defence Bogdan Subotić, Velibor Ostojić, and Dragan Kalinić. P5513 (Extract of Minutes from 18th session of
ARK Assembly, 17 July 1992), p. 1.
6943
P5513 (Extract of Minutes from 18th session of ARK Assembly, 17 July 1992), p. 1; see Adjudicated Fact 547.
6944
See Adjudicated Fact 548. See also D4034 (Witness statement of Radoslav BrĊanin dated 8 November 2013), para. 38.
6945
P3922 (Decision of SerBiH Presidency, 15 April 1992). See para. 212.
6946
P2412 (Decision of SerBiH Ministry of Defence, 16 April 1992).
6947
P6531 (Information of ARK Executive Council, 29 April 1992). See Nikola Erceg, T. 44080 (27 November 2013).
6948
P2818 (Decision of ARK Regional Secretariat for National Defence, 4 May 1992); D4114 (Witness statement of Milorad Sajić dated 24 November 2013),
paras. 14, 18–20. See Adjudicated Fact 2160.
6949
P2819 (Dispatch from Banja Luka CSB to all SJBs, 4 May 1992). See D4049 (Dispatch of Banja Luka CSB to all SJBs, 14 May 1992); Adjudicated Fact
536.
6950
P3694 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff sent to municipality presidents, 11 May 1992). See P3925 (Report of 5th Corps, 12 May 1992), p. 1 (wherein Talić
reports the extension of the deadline); D4453 (Banja Luka CSB dispatch to all SJBs, 11 May 1992) (wherein Ţupljanin informs the local SJB chiefs of the
extension of the deadline to implement the measures ordered in the 4 May ARK decision). See also D4035 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 14 May 1992)
(reiterating that the CSB of the ARK shall ―consistently carry out‖ the ARK Crisis Staff decision on the disarming of paramilitary units and individuals who
are illegally in possession of weapons and ammunition).
6951
D4038 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 18 May 1992).
6952
Adjudicated Fact 537. See D4456 (Dispatch from Banja Luka CSB to all SJBs, 18 August 1992); Adjudicated Fact 2161.
6953
See, e.g., P3648 (Report of Sanski Most SJB, 10 July 1992). See Adjudicated Fact 537.
 293

2053. The measures ordered in the 4 May 1992 decision were implemented in the ARK
Municipalities through public announcements and ultimatums to hand in illegally owned
weapons.6954 Although the calls for disarmament in the ARK were directed to all ―paramilitary
units and individuals who illegally possess weapons‖, they were selectively enforced against non-
Serbs.6955 (Maybe because the Serbs joined their own Army, or maybe the Serbs didn’t fire
against their own people, although we know that the CSB and Zupljanin disarmed and
arrested some groups of the Serb paramilitaries, which caused a skirmish between them and
the police, see: D1911, p.1, of 11 July 1991:

That was the situation in the Area of Responsibility of the Banja Luka CSB even in July
1991. See further, D1911, p.1

And further, D1911, p.2

6954
See paras. 1441 (Bosanski Novi), 1501, 1509 (Kljuĉ), 1586, 1602, 1616, 1665, 1673, 1682 (Prijedor), 1942–1944, 1949 (Sanski Most). See also
Adjudicated Fact 535.
6955
Adjudicated Fact 538. See fn. 6961. See also Milorad Sajić, T. 44137–44138 (27 November 2013); Adjudicated Facts 539, 540. However, BrĊanin, Erceg,
and Sajić testifed that the ARK Crisis Staff demanded the disarmament of all paramilitary formations, regardless of their nationality, though they were
aimed first at Serb paramilitary units and individuals who possessed weapons illegally; its aim was to ensure the safety of all citizens of the ARK.
Furthermore, they testified that a hierarchical relationship between the municipal authorities, the CSB, and the SJBs did not exist and it was purely upon the
initiative of the municipalities themselves whether to implement these decisions or not. D4034 (Witness statement of Radoslav BrĊanin dated 8 November
2013), paras. 24, 42–47; D4086 (Witness statement of Nikola Erceg dated 24 November 2013), para. 108; D4114 (Witness statement of Milorad Sajić dated
24 November 2013), paras. 40, 65–66; Milorad Sajić, T. 44135–44138 (27 November 2013). However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be
convincing in light of the other accepted evidence before the Chamber demonstrating that the ARK Crisis Staff decision ordering the disarmament of non-
Serbs exclusively was implemented throughout the ARK Municipalities.
 294

And further, D1911, p. 3

See how early Zupljanin met with the self-organisation of the terrified people, pointing out
the Serbs as the most frightened and dissatisfied with the measures undertaken by the
common authorities in BiH. Zupljanin was very critical about that development. See D391,
p1. of 3 April 1992, p 2.

See D1911, p. 3, the same document as the above:

 295

It is easy to see that all the allegations that the Crisis Staff was in command of the SOS (Serbian
Defence Forces) are fake, and that this formation was a result of the self-organisation of the scared
people, to which the pople had a right in an absence of the state measures. How was it possible that
the next document, one of many of the same kind, didn’t influence the judgements on the two authors
and the President, whose officials they were, D474 of 92:

also, see the Zupljanin’s reports and orders pertaining to the Serb paramilitaries: @)

1. Resettlement of non-Serbs and appropriation of property

2054. In the same 11 May 1992 decision discussed above, the ARK Crisis Staff instructed that
the property of all able-bodied men between 18 and 55 years old who failed to return to their
municipalities in response to the mobilisation calls would be confiscated.6956 (That could have

6956
P3694 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff sent to municipality presidents, 11 May 1992). See Adjudicated Fact 2227; D4047 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff,
27 May 1992) (stating that ―[s]pecial records are to be kept‖ on all persons between 18 and 60 who may obtain permission to leave the ARK).
 296

been declared as many times as somebody wanted, but this had #never been a valid
decision#. At the beginning it was aimed to force the able bodied Serb to respond to
mobilisation, and only for the Serbs, since the Republic of Srpska never made the Muslims
and Croats to serve the Army or be a compulsory conscripts or reservists. That was a kind
of a positive discrimination, since the Serbs couldn’t have such a choice – either to serve the
army, or to serve the compulsory labour service! Apart of that, the President ordered that all
such a decisions pertaining to a property matters be annihilated, and that never happened,
as the very same Chamber concluded, see Paragraph…@ ) At a meeting on 20 May 1992, the
ARK Crisis Staff adopted several conclusions, including that there was ―no reason for the
population of any nationality to move out of the territory of the [ARK]‖.6957
(#EXCULPATORY#!!!) However, on 29 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff issued a decision
stating that ―all Muslims and Croats, who so wish, should be able to move out of the area of the
[ARK]‖ and based on a concern that ―several thousand Muslims from Prijedor, Sanski Most and
Bosanski Novi wish to move to Central Bosnia, of their own free will‖, the ARK Crisis Staff
provided for an organised ―resettlement‖ of the population.6958 (#Linguistic problems#!Again,
the term “resettlement” is not correct translation of the Serb term for seljenje (moving out)
and resettlement has another connotation as to a permanent change of place of living. But,
the most important is that between 20 May and 29 May there had been an #Agreement#
concluded among the three sides concluded in Geneva on 22 May, see D1603, p.9:

As it is clear, the civilians could have benn “deprived of their liberty for reasons related to
the #armed conflict#…#military reasons#” se further, D1603 of 22 May 92:

Therefore, both due to the domestic and the international normatives, the civilian population
must be moved out of the region if the #“security of the civilians# involved or imperative
#”military reasons so demand.”# The Prosecution have never proven that the displacements
of the population was without “the security and military reasons”!!! the Prosecution
shouldn’t even mention any displacement in the Indictment unles had the proofs that it was
unnecessary! Therefore, if the ARK Crisis Staff denied the right of the population that
didn’t feel secure to move out or be displaced, that would be a grave violation of the Geneva
Conventions, not vice versa, as the Chamber accepted! Immediately after this first
Agreement there were concluded a several other on the same subject, see D4710 p.1 of 17
July 92, signed by the President and the two other leaders and their plenipotentiaries:
6957
D1309 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 20 May 1992). See D4086 (Witness statement of Nikola Erceg dated 24 November 2013), para. 95.
6958
P3461 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 29 May 1992). See Adjudicated Fact 541. Later on 10 June, the ARK Crisis Staff decided that only women,
children, and the elderly could be moved from the ARK if they so wish, in co-operation with humanitarian organisations. D4046 (Decision of ARK Crisis
Staff, 10 June 1992). See D4034 (Witness statement of Radoslav BrĊanin dated 8 November 2013), para. 23(f) (stating that he does not remember the 10
June decision but that the police would have wanted to check able-bodied male non-Serbs before they left the ARK). Furthermore, the ARK Crisis Staff
provided that there should be ―reciprocity‖ with regard to the relocation of people throughout the SerBiH, including that Serbs should be given the freedom
to choose their place of residence. D4038 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 18 May 1992); D4044 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 28 May 1992), p. 2.
See D4034 (Witness statement of Radoslav BrĊanin dated 8 November 2013), para. 23(b), (d).
 297

Any allegation about a #“permanent removal”# of the non-Serbs are senseless, since the
most authorised official of the Republic of Srpska signed an obligation that everyone #must
be able to return#, and must be allowed to leave some areas under the adversary’s control!
This commitment had been welcome by the President of the UN Security Councel, D 4710, p.
2

How come a Court founded by the same UN SC may neglect these agreements and pay more
attention to some gossips and unofficial remarks? A simmilar provisions were provided in
the document of the London Conference at the end of August 1992, see D1604, p.3

Having in mind those #obligatory commitments# of the President and his official
representatives, there can not survive several corner stones of the Indictment and this
Judgement, such as the Overarching Joint Criminal Enterprise – to permanently remove all
the non-Serbs from the Serb areas, …@in as ;c:
2055. On 3 June 1992, the ARK War Presidency issued a decision stating that individuals leaving
the ARK could take with them no more than 300 German marks;6959 in turn, the Banja Luka CSB
instructed its subordinate SJBs to implement this decision by seizing any larger amount of money
from anyone leaving the ARK.6960 (This limitation of the cash money was prescribed by the
National Bank in Belgrade, and didn’t depend on the local authorities. Such a limitation
about the cash that can be transferred undeclared exist even now in all the sovereign
countries, see @

2056. On June 7 1992, municipal authorities from the ARK Municipalities decided at a sub-
regional meeting that ―Muslims and Croats should move out of our municipalities until a level is
reached where Serbian authority can be maintained and implemented on its own territory in each
of these municipalities‖ and requested that the ARK Crisis Staff provide a corridor for the
resettlement of non-Serbs.6961 (This is an unofficial document, a #furgery#, contested by the
Defence with a very good reasons. This meeting never happened, and this is visible from the
very document. No names of the participants, no an elementary knowledge about the
situation, the alleged demands towards the ARK leadership are senseless, since the Law on
Defence and the Law on the VRS were already published in the Official Gazette on 1 June
1992, - see P2602 and P2603 – and had been adopted much earlier. This was known to every

6959
P3447 (Report of the Banja Luka CJB, undated). See para. 1561. See also Adjudicated Fact 2454.
6960
D1307 (Order of Banja Luka CSB to all ARK SJBs, 31 July 1992). But see Miloš Bojinović, D4176 (Testimony from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 22801–
22802, 22893–22896 (testifying that as Chief of the Agency for Population Movement and Exchange of Material Wealth for the ARK, he never received
any instructions to limit the amount of money people leaving the ARK could take with them and he was not aware of any searches for money or valuables
on the convoys organised by his agency). See para. 2057.
6961
P2641 (Conclusions of sub-regional meeting of municipalities sent to ARK Crisis Staff, 7 June 1992), p. 2 (further stating that if the leadership of the ARK
fails to solve this issue ―our seven municipalities will take all Muslims and Croats under military escort from our municipalities to the centre of Banja
Luka‖). See also para. 1899. According to BrĊanin, the ARK Crisis Staff held a meeting the following day, at which it rejected the request of the municipal
authorities as it was ―contrary to our policy‖. D4034 (Witness statement of Radoslav BrĊanin dated 8 November 2013), para. 23(e). However, the Chamber
considers that based on the events and specific actions taken by the ARK Crisis Staff following the request from the municipal authorities, it does not find
reliable BrĊanin‘s evidence that the ARK Crisis Staff rejected their request outright. See e.g. para. 2057.
 298

single deputy in the Assembly, as well as all the municipal presidents and organs. There is no
any trace of this “meeting” in any other document or intercept, simply this was a primitive
desperate move. Not mentioned in P2918, of 8 June 92, and if it was an official event, it
would be, not mentioned in P5444 of 8 June 92, and it must have been if it was an official
meeting. Finally, the Witness Brdjanin denied that this was accepted, see D4034:

Taking into account these documents, and the entirety of evidence, in particular the
President’s attitude and explicite orders pertaining to the movement of population and the
property rights, including D101 and #annihilation of all possible documents signed, # and
taking into account the fact that the appropriation of a private property had never
happened, this is not understandable why the Chamber payed any attention to this
document! See what the same witness confirmed in his statement about the President’s
position on the issue: D4034: as well as about the respect of the International
Humanitarian Law, D4034:

There is many such a documents in favour of the President, and none contra!)

2057. On 12 June 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff established an Agency for Population Movement
and Exchange of Material Wealth for the ARK (―ARK Agency‖), appointing Miloš Bojinović as
its Chief, to aid in the implementation of the resettlement policy.6962 At the municipal level, other
agencies were established throughout the ARK and, along with other competent institutions, were
charged with establishing the resettlement procedures.6963 (#Linguistic trouble#! “Resettlement”
is not an accurate translation, and “moving” would be more proper!) Departures of non-Serbs
from the ARK had to be authorised by these competent institutions.6964 In order to obtain permits
to leave the territory of the ARK, non-Serbs usually had to ―de-register‖ from their places of
residence and either relinquish their property to the SerBiH or the ARK without compensation
(#No appropriation#! How possibly the Chamber could have repeated this lie, since there is a
sufficient evidence that had never happened, and that there was not a single case of
appropriation of property on that or any other basis. Also, the President have annihilated
this possibility in his order of 19 August 1922, see D1754 or D101 :

6962
P2718 (Decision of ARK Crisis Staff, 12 June 1992); P2719 (Decision of ARK Crisis Staff, 12 June 1992); Miloš Bojinović, D4176 (Testimony from
Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 22765–22768 (testifying that the ARK Agency operated until the end of 1992). See D4034 (Witness statement of Radoslav
BrĊanin dated 8 November 2013), para. 23(g). See also Adjudicated Facts 542, 552.
6963
See Adjudicated Facts 542, 543. See, e.g., paras. 1559 (Kljuĉ), 2034 (Sanski Most).
6964
Adjudicated Fact 543.
 299

But let us see what had been said in the D4034, the statement of Mr. Brdjanin, the most
responsible official in the ARK:

The Chamber should be obliged to find out, and the Prosecution to prove, that some local
decisions were carried out, or were rejected by the higher officials or bodies! Why it wasn’t
done?) or, in other cases, exchange their property for property located outside of the ARK.6965
The ARK Agency organised convoys, on a bi-weekly basis or more often, to transport non-Serbs
to the Muslim or Croat-controlled lines near Travnik and Zagreb; passengers were required to buy
tickets from the ARK Agency in order to leave on the convoys.6966 On 19 June 1992, the ARK
Crisis Staff issued a decision declaring that all abandoned property will be declared state property
and placed at the disposal of the municipal authorities.6967

2058. The municipal Crisis Staffs of the ARK Municipalities implemented this ARK policy.6968
For example, on 30 May 1992, the day following the ARK Crisis Staff decision setting out the
policy, the Sanski Most Crisis Staff concluded that it would liaise with the ARK leadership
regarding the ―implementation of the idea on resettlement of the population‖.6969 (So what, if they
“concluded”? Or somebody said something, in the Assembly session, or in a joky intercepted
conversation? Did it happen? What had been done, and was it illegal? The Chamber takes
some #peripherical opinions and wishes# of the people who had been 40 years disidents to
the communist authorities and were not familiar with the legislation as if it was an official
opinion and as iif it was realised! The only relevan are the final official documents if carried
out! Nobody should be indicted, let alone sentenced for somebody’s ill intentions, if not
accepted and not carried out!) On 4 June 1992, the Kljuĉ Crisis Staff issued a statement
regarding the resettlement of ―all citizens who wish to permanently move out of the [m]unicipality

6965
See Section IV.A.1.b.i.B.5: Movement of the population within and from Bosanski Novi; Section IV.A.1.b.i.C.8: Movement of the population from Kljuĉ;
Section IV.A.1.b.i.D.7: Movement of the population from Prijedor and appropriation of property; Section IV.A.1.b.i.E.7: Movement of the population from
Sanski Most and appropriation of property. See also Miloš Bojinović, D4176 (Testimony from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 22790–22792; Adjudicated Fact
544. However, BrĊanin, Kuprešanin, Sajić, Erceg, and Bojinović testified that the ARK authorities never engaged in forcible displacement and that the
positions of the ARK Crisis Staff in this regard developed depending on the ―situation on the ground‖. The ARK Agency was established to oversee the
exchange of property and departure of people of all ethnicities, including Serbs, and furthermore, at the request of non-Serbs who were interested in having
such services provided to them and was thus aimed at providing a humanitarian way to exchange property and secure transport. Finally, BrĊanin stated that
―had we wanted to expel non-Serbs, we would not have set any requirements and conditions for their leaving the ARK‖. Kuprešanin further stated he was
not aware of the establishment of any agency to implement a policy of resettlement, nor that any such policy was co-ordinated at the regional level by the
ARK. D4034 (Witness statement of Radoslav BrĊanin dated 8 November 2013), paras. 23, 49, 55, 57; Radoslav BrĊanin, T. 43666–43667 (18 November
2013) (testifying further that there was no ―strategic plan ever about forcible relocation‖, instead they ―followed the situation which dictated for people to be
relocated rather than to be killed or to perish‖); D4011 (Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), paras. 56–57, 60–61; D4114
(Witness statement of Milorad Sajić dated 24 November 2013), paras. 54, 67–69; D4086 (Witness statement of Nikola Erceg dated 24 November 2013),
para. 95; Miloš Bojinović, D4176 (Testimony from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 22776–22777, 22783–22784. However, as further expanded upon above in
relation to each of the ARK Municipalities, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be convincing in light of the accepted evidence before the Chamber
demonstrating that the resettlement policy promulgated by the ARK Crisis Staff was in fact implemented in the ARK Municipalities, resulting in the
movement of the majority of the non-Serb population out of the ARK. The Chamber also does not find the evidence of BrĊanin, Kuprešanin, Sajić, Erceg,
and Bojinović to be reliable on this issue based on their close involvement in this policy and its implementation, creating an incentive to distance themselves
from these events. Therefore, the Chamber will not rely on their evidence in this regard.
6966
Miloš Bojinović, D4176 (Testimony from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 22786–22790, 22794–22795 (testifying further that tickets were purchased in dinars—
a ticket cost 14,000 dinars in October 1992—though German marks were also used). See Miloš Bojinović, T. 44710–44716 (9 December 2013).
6967
D4054 (Decision of ARK Crisis Staff, 19 June 1992). See D4034 (Witness statement of Radoslav BrĊanin dated 8 November 2013), para. 29 (stating that
this policy was adopted in order to protect abandoned property from being unlawfully usurped by the influx of refugees); Radoslav BrĊanin, T. 43726 (18
November 2013).
6968
See, e.g., P2614 (Conclusions of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 30 May 1992), p. 1; P3448 (Statement of Kljuĉ Crisis Staff, 4 June 1992); D1921 (Report of
Bosanski Novi SJB, 15 August 1992), p. 4. See also paras. 1467–1471, 1559–1561, 1563 (Kljuĉ), 1898–1901 (Prijedor), 2033-2035 (Sanski Most).
6969
P2614 (Conclusions of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 30 May 1992), p. 1.
 300

of Kljuĉ in an organized manner‖.6970 In August 1992, the Bosanski Novi SJB reported that
following the ARK decision on ―voluntary resettlement‖, it de-registered 5,680 individuals, 5,629
of whom were Bosnian Muslim who had applied to leave the municipality ―voluntarily‖.6971
(#Obstacles to leave#! This quotation marks are not correct, because there is no evidence
that some authorities forced anyone to move out of the RS whatsoever! It had been proven
that the applicants had to apply for moving out of the municipality, to pay for the transport,
to de-register their place of temporary residence – in Serbian: mesto boravista, in contrast to
a permanent residence, in Serbian: mesto prebivalista, which was a legal obligation so that
the authorities could always had been able to contact them, additionally to obtain all the
certificates about taxes and other obligations payed – all together about 10 to 15 different
papers. Those who didn’t want to move out of a municipality, could achieve it easily, simply
– not to apply, not to obtain so many documents, or one of them, and nobody would allow
him to leave! But, in a case of prevention and denial of departure, the side would violate so
many agreements concluded on this issue until 1 November 1992!) Immediately following the
issuance of the decision, the 1st Krajina Corps also reported on the implementation of the policy,
reporting that the ARK had issued a decision to facilitate the departures of the non-Serb population
and that those departing ―will not be allowed to return‖ and referring to ―public statements made in
the media by SDS [ARK] leaders who advocate moving and expelling all Muslims and Croats
from these areas‖.6972 (Here is this paragraph quoted from the P3662 document of the 1st
Krajina Corps:

So, #somebody said something through media#!!! But it is significant that the translation is
incorrect: in the original it was said “neki”, which means “some” and this part of sentence
should be translated as follows: “To this contribute a public appearance in media of some of
the leaders of SDS of AR Bosanska Krajina. “Some” of the leaders – clearly define the
individual nature of this “advocating”. This is a hostile remark of the Army which was in a
conflict with the civil authorities, but “advocating” something in media, on behalf only of
these individuals is too far from any official form! How this irresponsible “bla-bla” could be
used against this President, whose official position on the issue was very known?)

2059. On 1 June 1992, Kirudja was informed that Kuprešanin had called the Civil Affairs Office
in Sector North to report the concerns of mayors from Bosanski Novi, Prijedor, Kljuĉ, Dubica,
Sanski Most, and Banja Luka in relation to the situation of the Bosnian Muslim population in
those areas.6973 (#EXCULPATORY#!!! ALL OF THEM, Mr. Kupresanin and the mayors
were the officials of the Republic of Srpska and members of the SDS. Had their goal been to
harm the Muslim population, they wouldn’t ask for any asistence. Kupresanin himself was a
personal plenipotentiary of the President in assisting the Muslim population and prominent
individuals, such as Mevludin Sejmenovic, as it was confirmed in the Court room!)
Kuprešanin informed the office that 15,000 Bosnian Muslim refugees from these municipalities
were moving across the border towards Dvor, Croatia, and that another 15,000 would likely
follow, appealing to UNPROFOR to ―find a way to protect the civilian Muslim population‖.6974
(#EXCULPATORY!!!)

6970
P3448 (Statement of Kljuĉ Crisis Staff, 4 June 1992).
6971
D1921 (Report of Bosanski Novi SJB, 15 August 1992), p. 4.
6972
P3662 (1st Krajina Corps report, 31 May 1992), p. 2; P3656 (1st Krajina Corps report, 1 June 1992), p. 1. See also P5459 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 2
August 1992), p. 2 (reporting that ―[m]ethods of exercising pressure are increasing, as are organised expulsions of the Muslim and Croat population from the
area of Bosnian Krajina and further afield‖).
6973
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 53.
6974
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 53.
 301

2060. The detention facilities in the ARK were also discussed at ARK Crisis Staff meetings; for
example, representatives from Prijedor, Stakić, Drljaĉa, and Kuruzović, attended one meeting and
reported a shortage of food, clothing, and accommodation in the detention facilities in Prijedor.6975
(#EXCULPATORY!!! Now it is clear that the detainees hadn’t been deprived from food,
clothing and accommodation deliberately!#General shortage#!)

2. Dismissals of non-Serbs

2061. On 8 May 1992, 11 May 1992, and 13 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff issued decisions stating
that all management positions in SerBiH must be filled by ―people who are absolutely loyal‖.6976
Later, in a decision adopted on 22 June 1992 and directed to all municipal Crisis Staff presidents,
the ARK Crisis Staff stated that all posts important for the functioning of the economy may only
be held by ―personnel of Serbian ethnicity‖.6977 The 22 June 1992 decision was forwarded by
Ţupljanin to all SJBs on 1 July 1992 for its immediate implementation within the ARK.6978 In
accordance with this decision, numerous municipalities dismissed non-Serb personnel; by the end
of 1992, the majority of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the ARK had been dismissed
from their jobs and were replaced by Bosnian Serbs.6979 (Neither this Court nor any reasonable
chamber may deny that the #military security reasons# could have been neglected by the
civilian authorities! See this foot note 6989 below!) ARK Crisis Staff member Radić confirmed
that the policy of dismissals of non-Serbs originated in Pale at the republic level.6980 (Who at the
republican level? Did late Radic associated the President with this alleged policy? What was
Radic’s proof? Already deceased, Radic couldn’t have been cross examined, and this is not a
fair trial to use such a general allegation against this President! Pertaining to the President,
Radic testified that he used the President’s name and authority to protect the non-Serb
managers in Banja Luka, see @!)

2. Sarajevo Area

a. Hadţići

6975
D4114 (Witness statement of Milorad Sajić dated 24 November 2013), paras. 56–58; Milorad Sajić, T. 44146–44147 (27 November 2013). However,
BrĊanin and Erceg testified that detention facilities in the ARK were not discussed at meetings of the ARK Crisis Staff and that ARK authorities had nothing
to do with the facilities. D4034 (Witness statement of Radoslav BrĊanin dated 8 November 2013), para. 52; D4086 (Witness statement of Nikola Erceg
dated 24 November 2013), para. 89. The Chamber considers that the evidence given by Sajić regarding the discussion of the detention facilities in the ARK
Municipalities at the ARK Crisis Staff meeting is reliable given the detail he provides regarding at least this one particular meeting. The Chamber shall not
rely on the evidence given by BrĊanin and Erceg in this regard given their potential interest in distancing themselves from any knowledge of conditions at
ARK detention facilities or invoking their lack of recollection of such a discussion at the meetings.
6976
D4043 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 8 May 1992), p. 2; P3694 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff sent to municipality presidents, 11 May 1992); D4041
(Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 13 May 1992), p. 1; P5470 (Excerpts of conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff of 13 May 1992 sent to enterprises, 10 June
1992). See Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20468–20469 (27 October 2011).
6977
P7 (Decision of ARK Crisis Staff, 22 June 1992) (further stating that the personnel were expected to confirm their ―Serbian ethnicity‖ in the plebiscite and
to express their loyalty to the SDS). See also Adjudicated Facts 532, 533.
6978
P6533 (Decision of ARK Crisis Staff forwarded by Banja Luka CSB, 1 July 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact 534.
6979
See paras. 1374 (Banja Luka), 1437 (Bosanski Novi), 1504 (Kljuĉ), 1596–1601 (Prijedor), 1950 (Sanski Most). See Adjudicated Fact 532 (stating that the
replacement of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats personnel by Bosnian Serbs guaranteed ―an overall Bosnian Serb control over public and private
enterprises and institutions throughout the ARK‖). See also P2637 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 1 July 1992) (reporting that the 22 June 1992 ARK Crisis Staff
decision ―has been implemented in this [SJB]‖); Adjudicated Fact 534. However, BrĊanin testified that a leak of sensitive information about the movements
of the 1st Krajina Corps resulted in these measures being ―temporarily‖ adopted by the ARK Crisis Staff and its decision involved the removal of executive
positions of people that could misuse such positions and threaten the security of Krajina. Furthermore, the non-Serbs were not fired, but only removed from
positions considered to be important due to security, and were given different jobs. D4034 (Witness statement of Radoslav BrĊanin dated 8 November
2013), paras. 15–17, 39–41. According to Sajić and Erceg, although the 22 June 1992 decision provided for the dismissals of non-Serbs, it was implemented
to ―some extent‖, but was not put into practice in all cases. Furthermore, Sajić did not believe that BrĊanin personally called for the dismissal of non-Serbs
despite what the decision states. D4114 (Witness statement of Milorad Sajić dated 24 November 2013), para. 41; Milorad Sajić, T. 44139–44142 (27
November 2013); D4086 (Witness statement of Nikola Erceg dated 24 November 2013), paras. 98–101, 107. See Defence Final Brief, paras. 1172–1175
(wherein the Accused submits that he does not dispute that there may have been individual incidents of people being dismissed from their employment, but
―this had nothing to do with alleged persecutions‖). However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be convincing based on the considerable evidence
before the Chamber demonstrating that this policy of dismissals of non-Serb personnel as ordered by the ARK Crisis Staff was, in turn, implemented
throughout the ARK Municipalities. (Neither this Court nor any reasonable chamber may deny that the military security
reasons could have been neglected by the civilian authorities!)
6980
Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7412–7415.
 302

i. Charges

2062. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity, was
committed in Hadţići as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and/or
Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.6981

2063. Acts of persecution alleged to have been committed by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb
Political and Governmental Organs in Hadţići include (i) torture, beatings, and physical and
psychological abuse, during and after the take-over and in scheduled detention facilities, as cruel
or inhumane treatment;6982 (ii) rape and other acts of sexual violence, during and after the take-
over and in the Hadţići Culture and Sport Centre, as cruel and inhumane treatment;6983 (iii) the
establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in scheduled detention facilities,
including the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or
hygienic sanitation facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment;6984 (iv) forcible transfer or
deportation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their homes within Hadţići;6985 (v)
unlawful detention in scheduled detention facilities;6986 (vi) forced labour at the frontline and the
use of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as human shields;6987 (vii) the appropriation or
plunder of property, during and after the take-over of Hadţići, during arrests and detention and in
the course of or following acts of deportation or forcible transfer;6988 and (viii) the imposition and
maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.6989

2064. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible
transfer), respectively, as crimes against humanity.6990 In this regard, the Prosecution alleges that,
by the end of 1992, Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs had forcibly
displaced most Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Hadţići in which they were
lawfully present.6991 It is alleged that from March 1992, restrictive and discriminatory measures,
arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence, killing,
as well as the threat of further such acts caused Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to flee in
fear while others were physically driven out.6992

ii. Lead-up

2065. Hadţići is a municipality in central BiH, located about 12 kilometres southwest of

Sarajevo.6993 The municipality is bordered to the northeast by Ilidţa; to the north by Kiseljak; to

6981
Indictment, paras. 48–49.
6982
Indictment, para. 60(b). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.11.1, C.11.2.
6983
Indictment, para. 60(c). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.11.2.
6984
Indictment, para. 60(d). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.11.1, C.11.2.
6985
Indictment, para. 60(f).
6986
Indictment, para. 60(g). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.11.1, C.11.2.
6987
Indictment, para. 60(h).
6988
Indictment, para. 60(i).
6989
Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement; the removal from positions of
authority; the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or the denial of
equal access to public services. The Chamber notes that the Prosecution does not allege criminal responsibility for wanton destruction of private property in
Hadţići. Indictment, fn. 9.
6990
Indictment, paras. 68–75.
6991
Indictment, paras. 69, 72.
6992
Indictment, para. 71.
6993
D1064 (Map of Sarajevo marked by Tihomir Glavaš) (showing the town of Hadţići and the surrounding Serb-held areas at ―1‖ and the Serb villages in
majority-Muslim territory at ―2‖).
 303

the northwest by Kreševo; to the west and southwest by Konjic; and to the south and southeast by
Trnovo.6994

2066. Before the conflict, the population of Hadţići municipality was about 24,000 inhabitants
with the demographic breakdown of approximately 63.6% Bosnian Muslim, 26.3% Serb, and
3.1% Croat.6995 The town of Hadţići, however, had a Serb majority.6996 Tarĉin,6997 Binjeţevo,
and Pazarić were large settlements within the Hadţići municipality, each of which was composed
of a number of villages.6998

2067. The municipality was strategically important because of its geographical position, as well
as the fact that it contained a large engineering factory run by the JNA, called the TRZ,6999 and a
sizeable weapons depot at Ţunovnica.7000 JNA military barracks were also situated in Ţunovnica,
as well as in Ušivak7001 and Pazarić.7002

2068. Following the 1990 elections, the SDA won 60% of the vote, the SDP won 12.5%, and
the SDS won 11%.7003 The parties came to an agreement whereby the President of the Municipal
Assembly would be a member of the SDA, the President of the Executive Board of the Municipal
Assembly would be a member of the SDS,7004 the head of the police would be a member of the
SDA,7005 and the head of the Secretariat for Peoples Defence would be a member of the SDS.7006

6994
D1087 (Map of Hadţići municipality marked by Tihomir Glavaš). Kiseljak, Kreševo, and Busovaĉa all had predominantly Croat populations. D2915
(Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 22.
6995
P5964 (Census data for BiH by municipality in 1971, 1981, and 1991, April 1995). See also D225 (Ethnic map of BiH based on 1991 census); P41 (Witness
statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 3; P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 22, p. 3; D3062
(Witness statement of Nevenko Samouković dated 26 February 1993), para. 2; D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013),
para. 4.
6996
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 22.
6997
D1087 (Map of Hadţići municipality marked by Tihomir Glavaš). Tarĉin had a majority Croat population. D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka
dated 9 February 2013), para. 12.
6998
Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11818 (14 February 2011). Both Bare in Drozgometva community and Miševići in Binjeţevo community had large Serb populations.
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 3.
6999
P1494 (ABiH map of Sarajevo, 15 June–20 July 1992) (showing the location of the repair and maintenance depot marked as ―TRZ‖ in Hadţići
municipality). The TRZ employed 1,500 workers and held tanks, Pragas, artillery weapons, and mortars. P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24
June 1997), e-court p. 2; P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), pp. 3–4. See also D3062 (Witness statement of Nevenko
Samouković dated 26 February 1993), para. 8.
7000
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 22; P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 2;
D583 (SRK combat report, 31 May 1992), para. 1; Vidomir Banduka, T. 33503 (12 February 2013); D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9
February 2013), para. 32. The Ţunovnica complex‖ held ―extremely large quantities of all sorts of ammunition‖. D317 (TO Hadţići report on combat
readiness, 29 May 1992), p. 1. Prior to the 1990 elections, the Hadţići TO had its own supply of weapons which was controlled by the TO headquarters but
stored in the JNA barracks at Ţunovnica. P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 3. These arms included rifles, automatic
and semi-automatic rifles, sniper rifles, 82 mm mortars, anti-tank rockets, and recoilless guns. P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January
1998), p. 3.
7001
Vidomir Banduka testified that Serbs were the majority in Ušivak and thus these barracks were the only ones in a Serb-majority area. D2915 (Witness
statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 35.
7002
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), pp. 3–4; P2405 (Map of Hadţići marked by Mehmed Musić); D2915 (Witness statement
of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 34. Vidomir Banduka also mentioned army barracks in Krupska Rijeka, where a large quantity of
weapons was stored. D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 33.
7003
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 3; P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 3 (stating that the
SDS was the second party). Of the 50 municipal assemblymen, the SDA had 23, the SDP 12, the SDS had 11, and two smaller parties had two deputies
each. D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 17. The HDZ did not have any assemblymen. D2915 (Witness
statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 17.
7004
SDS member Nevenko Samouković was appointed President of the Executive Board of Hadţići after the multi-party elections. D3062 (Witness statement
of Nevenko Samouković dated 26 February 1993), paras. 3, 3a; D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 18. By
mutual agreement between the parties, the Executive Board of Hadţići was composed of three Serbs and three Muslims. D3062 (Witness statement of
Nevenko Samouković dated 26 February 1993), para. 4; D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 18.
7005
The Chief of the SJB was Bosnian Muslim Fadil Ĉović and the Commander was a Bosnian Serb, Tihomir Glavaš. D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir
Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 18.
7006
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 3. Other positions, such as the President of the Magistrate‘s Court and the Secretary
of the Assembly, were filled by the SDA, while others, such as the Administration for Income and the Land Registration and Real Estate were filled by the
SDS. P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 3.
 304

In accordance with this agreement, SDA member Mustafa Dţelilović, was made President of the
Municipality.7007

1. Militarisation of Hadţići

2069. During the course of 1991, the number of military personnel and the amount of weapons
in the municipality increased. Around mid-1991, tanks appeared in the hills around Hadţići, and
mortar positions were established around the village of Bare.7008 Several tanks were also
positioned in Binjeţevo.7009 During the last week of August and the first week of September,
Bosnian Serb reserve soldiers in JNA uniforms who appeared to be mapping the area arrived at a
barracks located in the village of Blaţuj.7010 Around the same time, Mehmed Musić saw men
unloading boxes of ammunition,7011 and Zijad Okić noticed weapons were taken up to trenches
built on Tinovo Hill.7012 (#Not the Serbs in Bosnia#! It has to be underlined that this event
didn’t have anything to do with the Serbs in Bosnia! Those deployments of the JNA
structures were in connection with the events in Slovenija and Croatia, the war with
Slovenija and the first skirmishes with Croatia. Having a huge military infrastructure in
Hadzici, and having a negative attitude of the Muslim reservists and conscripts towards the
JNA and mobilisation, the JNA had its own interests to secure it’s assets in Hadzici. The
Serbs in BiH didn’t have any influence on that assessments or decisions, and they only
responded to the mobilisations. So, what Mehmed Music and Zijad Okic had seen was a
#regular activity of the JNA# and it’s reservists, who happened to be the Serbs, because the
Muslims didn’t respond on the call.

2070. From its founding until the commencement of the war, the SDS provided Serbs with
weapons taken from the JNA military warehouses in Ţunovnica.7013 Serbs also obtained weapons
from the TRZ, which was controlled by the Serbs.7014 In particular, Marinko Đukanović, who had
been a warehouse clerk at the TO (and thus had access to the weapons),7015 as well as Ratko Radić,
the President of the Hadţići SDS,7016 distributed weapons to the Serb population in Hadţići.7017
(The Serb access to the TRZ and TO was facilitated by the fact that only the Serbs accepted

7007
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 3. D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 11 (stating
that he had been president of the SDA municipal board); D3062 (Witness statement of Nevenko Samouković dated 26 February 1993), para. 3a. Dţelilović
remained in this position until April 1992. See P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 3.
7008
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 2 (further specifying that Pragas and APCs appeared on Tinovo Hill).
7009
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 2.
7010
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 8–9; Mehmed Musić, T. 12840–12841 (3 March 2011) (referring to the
soldiers as unshaven ―Chetniks dressed in JNA uniforms‖ estimating that he saw this happening between 30 August and 6 September 1991); P2405 (Map of
Hadţići marked by Mehmed Musić) (showing the Ćatina Bara barracks located at Point 2 on the map).
7011
Mehmed Musić, T. 12849 (3 March 2011).
7012
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 4.
7013
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 39; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11954 (16 February 2011); P124 (Witness statement of
Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 2. See also P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 5. The Chamber notes that
Vidomir Banduka originally professed that he was unaware that Serbs obtained arms from the JNA, but when presented with his testimony in the Krajišnik
case, wherein he had stated that the Serbs obtained weapons through the mobilisation of the reserve police, as well as the JNA reserves and the TO, Banduka
clarified that reservists had obtained weapons through these channels but maintained that Serb civilians had not. Vidomir Banduka, T. 33499–33500
(12 February 2013). See also D2490 (Witness statement of Radojka Pandurević dated 27 November 2012), para. 62. However, the Chamber observes that
according to a JNA report dated 19 March 1992, by that date, 1,500 ―volunteers‖ who were not part of the JNA or the TO had been armed by the JNA or the
SDS in Hadţići. P979 (Report from JNA 2nd Military District to JNA General Staff, 20 March 1992), pp. 1, 6, 11. The Chamber therefore finds that in
addition to arms provided during the mobilisation process, arms from JNA sources were also provided to Serbs outside the JNA, TO, and police mobilisation
processes.
7014
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 22. In order to consolidate control over these barracks, troops, and equipment,
the SDS—including Ratko Radić—spread rumours that units from Croatia were present in the municipality with the aim of committing crimes against Serbs.
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 4. The TRZ remained under Bosnian Serb control throughout the conflict. Vidomir
Banduka, T 33503 (12 February 2013). See also D312 (SRK analysis of combat readiness of artillery rocket units, July 1994), p. 8.
7015
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 39.
7016
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 3; P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 4; D3062 (Witness
statement of Nevenko Samouković dated 26 February 1993), para. 9; D3063 (Witness statement of Mladen Tolj dated 25 February 2013), para. 17; D2915
(Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 13.
7017
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 27.
 305

their legal obligations towards the Law of Defence and the JNA competences over the
factories and live force, i.e. reservists!)

2071. At the end of September and beginning of October, Croats in western BiH began to
organise militarily, which contributed to incipient instability in Hadţići.7018 During the course of
1991, troops from the JNA engineering unit stationed at the TRZ began to return from Knin and
Slavonia and spoke of having seen JNA units fighting in Croatia wearing Chetnik insignia.
Thereafter, Muslims began to avoid JNA conscription and training.7019 (#Before VRS# This is a
lie, there is a sufficient evidence that this absentism started much earlier, and much earlier
Mr. Izetbegovic admitted that they “may be violating some laws, but everything is so fluid,
there are laws and laws.” The “cetnik insignias” were impossible to be seen on the JNA
soldiers, except for the Nemanjic amblem somewhere on pocket. This is a make up, an alibi
for not responding to the obligation. But the main question was not under what insignias the
JNA soldiers fought, the main question is why they had to fight in their own country?).

2072. In the interim, Bosnian Muslims had obtained arms. (#Time shifting#! It wasn’t “in the
interim” because the decision to form the Patriotic league was made 31 March 1991 and the
PL existed as of 30 April 1991. on June 10 the Muslims formed the famous Council for the
protection of the Muslim security, led by Mr. Izetbegovic. Until September 1991 the PL had
its headquarters in 98 municipalities and the same number of the armed units, and 9
regional headquarters, See: D00298, p.2

As far as it is concerned with Sarajevo, in the same document Halilovic said:

The
JNA certainly knew all of that (see: @ A. Vasiljevic) and behaved in accordance to this
knowledge. On 15 October 1991, pursuant to an order of the SRBiH Presidency,7020 the Hadţići
MUP mobilised 480 members of the reserve police force;7021 (This was the common Presidency
under the Muslim domination, and “this enabled” the armament of the Muslim police
reservists!, see fn. 7032!) this enabled members of the reserve police to obtain arms.7022
Meanwhile, the SDA was distributing weapons in municipalities within the city of Sarajevo,
including Hadţići.7023 Some wealthier Bosnian Muslims bought weapons for themselves.7024

7018
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 4. See also D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013),
para. 22.
7019
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), pp. 3–4. See also D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February
2013), para. 34.
7020
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 4; D2491 (Report of Tarĉin police station, 6 August 1992), p. 3.
7021
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 4; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11815, 11818–11819, 11822–11823 (14 February 2011).
7022
The number of reserve police forces was reduced pursuant to a SRBiH MUP order of 21 December 1991 before being re-mobilised in January 1992. D2491
(Report of Tarĉin police station, 6 August 1992), p. 3. Bosnian Muslims began to obtain arms through this mobilisation of the reserve police force, which
was primarily made up of Bosnian Muslims. D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), paras. 23, 29; D2490 (Witness
statement of Radojka Pandurević dated 27 November 2012), para. 5.
7023
Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11812 (14 February 2011). The police were also aware that SDA leader Hasan Ĉengić had sent Bosnian Muslim policemen to Croatia to
receive training and that he had obtained weapons by forging MUP IDs. Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11814 (14 February 2011). See also D2915 (Witness statement
of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 30. In February 1992, Serb policemen attempted to stop a vehicle carrying weapons from entering
Hadţići municipality but were prevented by Bosnian Muslim police. Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11815 (14 February 2011). The vehicle escaped in the direction of
Mokrin, a predominantly Muslim village in the northern part of the municipality. Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11815 (14 February 2011); D1087 (Map of Hadţići
municipality marked by Tihomir Glavaš) (showing Mokrin as being located northwest of the town of Hadţići, near the border with the Kiseljak
municipality).
 306

2073. By the beginning of February 1992, residents of the Hadţići municipality had begun to
organise nightly patrols and guards in the local areas where each ethnic group was prominent.7025
Around the same time, Bosnian Serbs began to leave the regular and reserve police units,7026 and
the JNA began distributing firearms to the Serb population at night.7027 (The JNA still was the
only #legal armed formation#, and they relied only on the Serbs, and formed the reserve
battalions.)

2074. In late March 1992, the police warehouse in Rakovica, which was full of weapons, was
broken into during a time when Bosnian Muslim officers were on duty.7028 Machine-guns, police
gear, and some transportation devices all went missing.7029 By the end of the month, Bosnian
Muslim formations in Hadţići were ―well-organised and armed‖.7030 (And that happened in
March 92, while the sides negotiated “bona fide” the arrangement which would avoid the
war! The Muslim side didn’t negotiate in a good fate, and the Agreement reached on 18
March had been denounced by the SDA on 25 of March! Meanwhile the Muslims continued
to arm themselves, hoping that the Serbs would trust the fake negotiations!)
1. Division of municipal organs

2075. In the meantime, the work of municipal organs had ground to a halt; shortly after the first
mobilisation of the reserve police in October 1991, the SDS delegates had stopped co-operating in
the joint Hadţići Municipal Assembly and the Municipal Assembly Executive Board.7031 (The
foot note contains all the reasons for such a move, in particular D2917, which have depicted
the whole picture of #abuses of the common institutions# by the SDA officials!)Eventually,
only the Municipal Defence Council remained functional.7032 Beginning in January 1992, at
meetings of the Municipal Defence Council, Ratko Radić called for the establishment of a Serb
assembly in Hadţići, an idea which had already been discussed by the Bosnian Serb Assembly in
December 1991,7033 and which was later reiterated by other SDS delegates at successive meetings
of the Hadţići Municipal Defence Council.7034 (#Two municipalities – peace#! Now, on this
example it could be seen why the Serbs throughout the BiH wanted to have their own
municipal administrations. The Muslim extremists in the SDA abused all and every common
state organ for their own purpose – to kill and expel the Serbs from the entire Bosnia. Had
the Serbs participated in such a common bodies, it would be a participation in a future
7024
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 3.
7025
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 5; P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 13.
7026
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 5. At the same time Bosnian Muslims heard that a separate Serb MUP was
established in the local community of Drozgometva. P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 5.
7027
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 5.
7028
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 59; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11821 (14 February 2011).
7029
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 59; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11821 (14 February 2011). Glavaš, who was
commander of the joint police station at the time, was criticised for having allowed this to happen. P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13
February 2011), para. 59.
7030
D3856 (Witness statement of Dragan Kapetina dated 13 July 2013), para. 30.
7031
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 4. Ostensibly, this lack of co-operation originated when Bosnian Muslims refused to
place the mobilisation of the reserve police on the Municipal Assembly‘s agenda. D3062 (Witness statement of Nevenko Samouković dated 26 February
1993), para. 7; D2490 (Witness statement of Radojka Pandurević dated 27 November 2012), para. 7; Radojka Pandurević, T. 30667–30668
(29 November 2012); D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), paras. 20–21, 24–28. See also D2917 (Statement of Hadţići
SDS Municipal Board, 10 October 1991). According to Radojka Pandurević, the mobilisation of the reserve police sparked a ―fierce argument‖ because the
mobilisation was done without the knowledge of the ―then commander‖, Tihomir Glavaš. D2490 (Witness statement of Radojka Pandurević dated 27
November 2012), paras. 5–6.
7032
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 4. The municipal Defence Council included a representative of the Army, the Police,
the TO, the Administration Services and the Secretary of the Secretariat for People‘s Defence. P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January
1998), p. 4. See also D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 28; Vidomir Banduka, T. 33496–33497 (12 February
2013).
7033
D84 (Shorthand Record of 3rd Session of Assembly of SerBiH, 11 December 1991), pp. 16–17. See also para. 131.
7034
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 4. Radić further stated that the Serb people did not want to be a part of a sovereign
BiH and that Muslims should establish their own bodies of government. P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 4. Finally,
Radić demanded that a Serb be assigned as the director of the primary school in Tarĉin, stating, ―if we cannot do it by goodwill we will do it by force‖.
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 3. The President of the Municipality warned Radić not to make threats, and ultimately a
Bosnian Muslim was assigned as the director of the Tarĉin primary school. P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 3.
 307

crimes against their own people. On the other hand, since the Muslims and Croats would
have the same as the Serbs wanted for themselves, they could abuse only their state organs,
not the Serb’s and common bodies!)

2076. In early to mid-April 1992,7035 the SDS stopped participating in the Municipal Defence
7036
Council, and the Bosnian Serbs attended a meeting of the Municipal Assembly for the last
time.7037 There, Ratko Radić called for the abolition of ―joint policing‖ and the establishment of a
Serb police.7038 (The war was already in the other parts of Sarajevo district and thoughout
the BiH, and the common police had already been widely #abused by the SDA#, see para
2074 of this Judgement!)

2076. On 11 April 1992, citing the ―extremely difficult political and security situation‖,7039 the
SDS held a Serb Assembly session at the Hadţići Culture and Sport Centre,7040 (It had never
been the SDS, because the Assembly had many Serbs in other parties, mainly leftist, but
when it was to form the Serb municipal, as well as the central Assembly, all of the Serbs,
regardless of the party belonging, crossed to the Serb Assembly! It is not correct to interpret
these events as a party endeavour, since it was an endeavour of the Serb community as a
whole!) where the Serb Municipality of Hadţići was proclaimed.7041 At the same session,
Nevenko Samouković was ―given a mandate to form the municipal government‖.7042 The SDS
selected Drago Milošević as President of the Serb Municipality of Hadţići as well as President of
the Hadţići Assembly of the Serbian People,7043 but he was soon replaced by Ratko Radić,7044 who
remained President of the Municipality until the end of the war.7045

2077. The SDS also decided to create a Serb SJB and appointed Tihomir Glavaš as Chief and
Branislav Mijatović as Commander.7046 (This is why it shouldn’t be associated with the SDS,
since Glavas for sure was not in any contact with thje SDS, and maybe Mijatovic too. All of
the Serb deputies run the Serb policy in every municipality!) The Serb police wore the same

7035
Balić testified that this meeting occurred ―about 20 days before the shooting on Hadţići‖. P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p.
3.
7036
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), pp. 4–5.
7037
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 3.
7038
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 3.
7039
The SDS claimed that the proclamation was made ―in order to protect the Serbian people and preserve peace in the Territory of Hadţići municipality‖.
D1066 (Proclamation of the Hadţići Municipal Assembly, undated), p. 1; D2916 (Announcement of Hadţići Municipal Assembly, undated), p. 1; D3856
(Witness statement of Dragan Kapetina dated 13 July 2013), para. 34; D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 37.
According to Vidomir Banduka, Bosnian Muslims‘ refusal to be mobilised into the JNA, combined with the simultaneous mobilisation of Bosnian Muslims
into the reserve police force and the mobilisation of the Bosnian Muslim TO, also informed the SDS decision to establish the Serb Municipality of Hadţići.
D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 36.
7040
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 3 (stating that the proclamation session was held in the ―Dom building‖ about 10 days
before the war); P2298 (Photograph of Hadţići Radniĉki Dom); Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11777–11779 (14 February 2011) (identifying P2298 as the Culture and
Sport Centre).
7041
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 6; D1066 (Proclamation of the Hadţići Municipal Assembly, undated), p. 1;
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 3; D3856 (Witness statement of Dragan Kapetina dated 13 July 2013), para. 31. See also
Adjudicated Fact 2563; P2306 (Report on the work of the Hadţići Municipal Assembly in 1992), p. 1; P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16
January 1998), p. 5. But see D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 37.
7042
D1066 (Proclamation of the Hadţići Municipal Assembly, undated), p. 1; D2916 (Announcement of Hadţići Municipal Assembly, undated), p. 1; Nevenko
Samouković, T. 34600 (1 March 2013).
7043
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 6; D1066 (Proclamation of the Hadţići Municipal Assembly, undated), p. 1;
D2916 (Announcement of Hadţići Municipal Assembly, undated), p. 1.
7044
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 6, 21, 23. Dragan Kapetina and Ratko Gengo were chosen as Vice President
and Secretary of the Assembly, respectively. D1066 (Proclamation of the Hadţići Municipal Assembly, undated), p. 1; D2916 (Announcement of Hadţići
Municipal Assembly, undated), p. 1; D3856 (Witness statement of Dragan Kapetina dated 13 July 2013), para. 31; D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir
Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 39. See also P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 5.
7045
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 25. Radislav Petrić, Vidomir Banduka, and Nevenko Samouković, all
functioned as President of the Executive Board of the Serbian Municipality of Hadţići at different times throughout the war. P2296 (Witness statement of
Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 25; D3063 (Witness statement of Mladen Tolj dated 25 February 2013), para. 17.
7046
D1066 (Proclamation of the Hadţići Municipal Assembly, undated), p. 1; D2916 (Announcement of Hadţići Municipal Assembly, undated), p. 1; D2491
(Report of Tarĉin police station, 6 August 1992), p. 4; P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 6, 21; Tihomir Glavaš,
T. 11830–11831 (14 February 2011); D1068 (List of employees of Hadţići SJB, April 1992), p. 1; D1070 (List of employees of Hadţići SJB, July 1992);
D3063 (Witness statement of Mladen Tolj dated 25 February 2013), para. 6; P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 5.
 308

uniforms as the previous joint police, but replaced the star badge on their caps with a tricolour
Serb badge.7047 (The Serb tricolour badge was without any ideological determination, since
the President was against any ideological rift among the people, as it was during the WWII.
Also, the Muslims and Croats didn’t like the cocardes, and as could be seen from the pre-
war intercepts, the President said to his interlocutors in Herzegovina that regardless of the
respect for the royal army, the Serb neigbours of the Muslim religion didn’t like to see
“Chetniks” marching through the settled places. Therefore, all the #cocardes and all the
insignias# except the Serb tricolour meant the paramilitaries, not the regular Serb forces!
And the President disowned all the paramilitaries as early as on 13 June 1992!) Initially
stationed at the Culture and Sport Centre where the proclamation session was held,7048 the Serb
police later relocated to the ground floor of the Hadţići Municipal Assembly Building.7049 (That
happened after the Muslim extremists shelled the police station and other places of the police
seats, on 10 May 1992!) The SDS further called on Serbs of military age to register in the Serb
TO, which was to be commanded by Mile Bratić,7050 or in the reserve police formation.7051 (This
is also a #distorted interpretation#: it was not a party obligation, it was a #legal obligation
due to the law of Defence#, and all the state organs were separated from the party organs. Of
course, the majority in the Serb assemblies was the SDS, but later it was not, and it was
never a mono-party situation!)

2079. The Serb Municipality of Hadţići covered the parts of Hadţići municipality where the
Serbs were the majority population,7052 and the Serb police confined their public security tasks
within that territory.7053 During the period immediately after the Serb police force was established
in Hadţići, certain small groups of armed ―free agents‖ who committed theft were present in the
municipality.7054 Some members of the Serb police were also involved in crime.7055 The Serb
police carried out mobilisation for the VRS and provided uniforms to ―citizens of Serb
nationality‖,7056 which led to a reduction in ―the number of groups and individuals forming
paramilitary formations‖.7057 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!)
2080. Immediately after the proclamation session, the Hadţići Crisis Staff was established as the
highest organ of authority for the Serb municipality, taking over the functions of the Serb
Municipal Assembly.7058 The members of the Hadţići Crisis Staff included the President of the

7047
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 3.
7048
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 3. The headquarters of the Serbian Assembly were also on the ground floor of the Hadţići
Culture and Sport Centre throughout the period of April through August 1992. Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11778 (14 February 2011). But see D3063 (Witness
statement of Mladen Tolj dated 25 February 2013), para. 6.
7049
Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11779 (14 February 2011).
7050
D1066 (Proclamation of the Hadţići Municipal Assembly, undated), p. 1; D2916 (Announcement of Hadţići Municipal Assembly, undated), p. 1; D2915
(Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 38. See also P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p.
5; D3856 (Witness statement of Dragan Kapetina dated 13 July 2013), para. 33.
7051
D1066 (Proclamation of the Hadţići Municipal Assembly, undated), p. 1; D2916 (Announcement of Hadţići Municipal Assembly, undated), pp. 1–2; D3856
(Witness statement of Dragan Kapetina dated 13 July 2013), para. 33. See also P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 3 (stating
that the TO split into separate Serb and Muslim branches approximately one month before the conflict).
7052
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 22; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11934 (15 February 2011), T. 12038–12039
(16 February 2011); D1087 (Map of Hadţići municipality marked by Tihomir Glavaš) (showing the areas controlled by Serbs marked by an ―S‖); D3856
(Witness statement of Dragan Kapetina dated 13 July 2013), para. 32; D3063 (Witness statement of Mladen Tolj dated 25 February 2013), para. 20; Vidomir
Banduka, T. 33494 (12 February 2013). See also Nevenko Samouković, T. 34615–34616 (1 March 2013).
7053
D3856 (Witness statement of Dragan Kapetina dated 13 July 2013), para. 32.
7054
Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11982–11983 (16 February 2011); D1074 (Correspondence from Hadţići Police Station to Sarajevo CSB, 9 August 1992), pp. 1–2.
Vidomir Banduka testified that the term ―free agent‖ in BCS denotes a person who is not ―part of the system‖. Vidomir Banduka, T. 33524
(12 February 2013).
7055
Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11984 (16 February 2011); D1074 (Correspondence from Hadţići Police Station to Sarajevo CSB, 9 August 1992), p. 2. See also
Vidomir Banduka, T. 33523–33524 (12 February 2013) (stating that the Serb Hadţići municipal authorities ―had problems with such individuals and small
groups‖).
7056
See also P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 2 (stating that the SDS began to distribute JNA uniforms and mobilisation papers
to local Serbs about 15 days before the conflict).
7057
D1074 (Correspondence from Hadţići Police Station to Sarajevo CSB, 9 August 1992), p. 2.
7058
P2306 (Report on the work of the Hadţići Municipal Assembly in 1992), p. 1; P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras.
23, 26, 61; Nevenko Samouković, T. 34602 (1 March 2013); D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 42. See also
Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11780–11781 (14 February 2011); D3062 (Witness statement of Nevenko Samouković dated 26 February 1993), para. 12.
 309

Serb Municipality, the president of the Executive Board of the Serb Municipality, one member of
the military, representatives of the management of the TRZ, and the Chief of the Serb police.7059
The first task of the Crisis Staff was to ―organise the defence of the Serb territory of Hadţići and
to take care of, feed and organise the citizens as much as war circumstances allow‖.7060 (A clear
indication of a #general shortages# of stuffs, food and other needs!) The Crisis Staff authorised
security actions, which were then carried out by the military and/or the police.7061

1. Continued militarisation of Hadţići

2081. From about 10 April, the co-operation between the SDS and the JNA commanders at the
barracks located throughout Hadţići became more overt,7062 (Why this co-operation should be
covered, since it was a legal obligation of all the citizens? The Muslims were obliged to co-
operate too, but they #violated the federal laws#!) and reserve units from Serbia and
Montenegro began to arrive in the municipality to be deployed at the TRZ.7063 Military
preparations also began in the Serb-majority villages of Bare and Miševići.7064

2082. Also in April 1992, Serb soldiers began to capture and occupy significant buildings and
positions in the town of Hadţići.7065 During the proclamation session,7066 an anti-aircraft artillery
weapon was positioned outside of the Culture and Sport Centre and was manned by members of
the Serb TO.7067 Thereafter, the Serb police began arresting ―Muslim terrorists‖ who were
transporting arms.7068 (No quotation marks needed, there was in reality many smugglers of
weaponry, and even the Chamber recognized the teft of the armament from the police depot
in Rakovica, see para 2074 of this Judgement!)

2083. Between the morning of 16 April and the afternoon of 17 April, approximately 2,200
people reported to the SRBiH TO in Hadţići, which had been mobilised during the preceding days
after fighting broke out in Zvornik and Bijeljina.7069 Most of those who reported were non-

7059
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 23; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11780 (14 February 2011); D2915 (Witness statement
of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 43. See also D3062 (Witness statement of Nevenko Samouković dated 26 February 1993), para. 14;
Nevenko Samouković, T. 34616 (1 March 2013. Although as Chief of the police station, Glavaš was technically a member of the Crisis Staff, he rarely
attended the meetings and sent the commander of the police station, Brane Mijatović, as a representative to report back to him on the topics covered. P2296
(Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 23, 61; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11782 (14 February 2011).
7060
P2306 (Report on the work of the Hadţići Municipal Assembly in 1992), p. 1; D3062 (Witness statement of Nevenko Samouković dated 26 February 1993),
para. 13. The Serb Municipal Assembly did not convene again until approximately July 1992. Nevenko Samouković, T. 34621 (1 March 2013). See also
D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 43. The Crisis Staff met every morning in a conference room in the Hadţići
Municipal Assembly building. Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11781 (14 February 2011); P2301 (Photograph of Hadţići municipal building marked by Tihomir
Glavaš).
7061
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 61. Because Radić was both President of the municipality as well as President
of the Crisis Staff, all units in the territory of Hadţići—including those stationed at the TRZ—as well as the regular and reserve police units were under the
control of the Crisis Staff. P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 24. Glavaš explained that the Crisis Staff obtained
intelligence that was of interest for both the security service and the military; depending on the content of the information, decisions related to ―domestic
issues and the rear of the territory‖ would be taken by the Chief of the SJB or otherwise by the army. Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11782–11783 (14 February 2011).
7062
See Adjudicated Fact 2562.
7063
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), pp. 5–6.
7064
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 3; D1087 (Map of Hadţići municipality marked by Tihomir Glavaš) (showing Miševići
located at the northernmost tip of the Hadţići municipality). See also D313 (Excerpt from Igman Brigade‘s analysis of rocket units, undated), p. 1 (stating
that in April 1992 the VRS Igman Brigade formed two howitzer batteries with 122mm and 155mm guns and its first fire-support groups); P2296 (Witness
statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 22 (referring to Serb defence lines being established in the areas of Kasatići, Tinovo Hill, and in
the direction of the TRZ).
7065
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 6. See also Adjudicated Fact 2562.
7066
See para. 2071.
7067
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 3. At the initial Assembly meeting, Ratko Radić had stressed that it was important for the
Serb TO and the army to act together in order to protect the Serb population from ―all possible attacks‖. P2297 (Minutes of meeting of Hadţići Municipal
Assembly, 11 April 1992), p. 2.
7068
D1067 (SRNA news report, 20 April 1992), p. 1. See also D2919 (Report of ABiH 9th Mountain Brigade, 5 January 1993) (stating that before the war a
truck carrying 280 Kalashnikov rifles had been diverted to Ljubovĉići in order to avoid interception by ―Serbian extremists‖ and that these rifles were later
distributed by the SDA in various villages including Pazarić, Tarĉin, and Hadţići).
7069
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 6.
 310

Serbs,7070 thereby rendering the SRBiH TO a de facto Bosnian Muslim organ. Because the
Bosnian Muslim TO lacked arms, however, the leadership sent the men home, telling them that
they would be invited to report again later.7071

ii. Take-over

1. Hadţići town

2084. On 7 May 1992, a group of armed Serb reservists and policemen took over the municipal
building in Hadţići and expelled all the workers.7072 The building was then locked and
guarded.7073 On the following day, ―small hostilities‖ broke out between the Bosnian Serb and
Bosnian Muslim police.7074 After negotiations between the SDS and SDA, the Serbs took control
of the health centre next to the municipal building and took positions in the hills.7075 At about 3
p.m., ―key persons and parties of the Municipality‖ on both sides met to discuss the security
situation.7076 Radić concluded the meeting by stating that if they did not ―finish this work, the
others would come‖ and they ―would have blood […] deep up to the knees‖.7077 Approximately
30 minutes later, the police station came under artillery attack.7078 (Why it is left so
#ambiguous# concerning with the side who lounched the artillery attack on the police
station? In an atmosphere of the demonization of the Serb side, such an ambiguous sentence
leads directly to a conclusion that the Serbs did it. However, since the Serbs controlled the
town areas where they had a significant majority#only Serb areas#!. Therefore, the Muslim
side shelled the police station from that moment and on!)

2085. Meanwhile, the SDS had issued an order demanding that the Muslim members of the
police, TO Headquarters, and other municipal authorities leave Hadţići by 6 p.m. on 8 May.7079
The SDS provided residents with a map and indicated that they should leave in the direction of
Pazarić.7080 That night, between roughly 2,000 and 3,000 Muslim and Croat men, women, and
children withdrew from Hadţići town, leaving only 200 or 300 behind.7081 (#Wrong
presentation#: nobody forced those who left for Pazaric to leave, and nobody forces those
who stayed to stay. Those who felt secure among the Serb majority, they stayed, and vice
versa!) By 9 May, the Serbs had taken control of parts of the municipality of Hadţići and had
encircled the TRZ.7082 (As accepted by the Chamber, the Serbs controlled only about 20% of
the municipal territory, and only those parts #with the Serb majority#, see: paragraph 2079
of this Judgement! However, let us see 65ter 1514, the Ministry for Interior of the RS on 9
May 1992:

7070
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 6.
7071
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 6.
7072
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 4; see Adjudicated Fact 2564.
7073
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 4.
7074
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 3. According to Vidomir Banduka, on 8 May 1992, Bosnian Muslim forces put up a
blockade in front of the entrance to the TRZ. D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), paras. 45, 71.
7075
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 3.
7076
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 6.
7077
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 6.
7078
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 6. See also P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 4;
Adjudicated Fact 2566.
7079
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 6. See also Adjudicated Facts 2565, 2570.
7080
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 6; D1087 (Map of Hadţići municipality marked by Tihomir Glavaš).
7081
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 7 (further testifying that according to official records, 186 of those people were later
listed as missing). See also Adjudicated Fact 2567; D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 46. Bosnian Muslim
forces set up a check-point near the quarry on the road to Pazarić just outside town, which became and remained the frontline until the end of the war. P41
(Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 7.
7082
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 7; P1477 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 14 February–28 May 1992), p. 269. See also
Adjudicated Fact 2566.
 311

: That is what was said about the “daily events” in Hadzici on 8 and 9 May 92. This
document was at disposal in the e-court, but was not tendered, because nobody suspected
that it was contested that the Muslim extremists initiated the war in Hadzici! Even the Serb
good will to help their own population was abused to inflict the loses to the Serb neighbours!)

2086. Over the following few days, Serb reservists began setting up check-points around
Hadţići town, thereby restricting residents‘ movements.7083 (The #war in Hadzici was
postponed# the whole four weeks after it broke out in a nearby Sarajevo. But, after the
Muslim shelling of the Serb parts of town, there must have been a control of the movement,
#for the security reasons#, otherwise the Serb community would sustain a tragic loses! As
confirmed by this Judgement, as of 7 May the Muslim side used artillery against the Serb
municipality of Hadzici, particularly sever on 10 May, see: para 2096 of the Judgement!)
Serb women and children were put on buses headed toward Montenegro,7084 and the Serb Forces
began to arrest, expel, or kill people who remained in the municipality.7085 (Rule 92bis! Not
charged, but why it is here?) The Serb police went around to homes, instructing people to stay
inside.7086 Police officers were placed in front of buildings in Hadţići, thus preventing any
movement by the residents.7087 Many houses were searched.7088 (All of it on the basis of Rule
92bis! But, let us see whether there was a security necessities for that, see D1073, p.1, of 12
May 92. Nota bene the pace of the Muslim agressivness and hostilities against the Serbs:
since 7 May and the shellings, till 11 May there was an intensive military development:

7083
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 4. See also Adjudicated Fact 2568.
7084
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 4. See also Adjudicated Fact 2567.
7085
P41 (Witness statement of Ramiz Dupovac dated 16 January 1998), p. 7. The Chamber notes these killings are not charged pursuant to either Schedule A or
Schedule B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.
7086
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 4; P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities dated 7 February 1993), p. 1.
7087
P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities dated 7 February 1993), p. 1.
7088
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 4; P125 (Zijad Okić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 3 February 1993), p. 1; P161
(Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities dated 7 February 1993), p. 1.
 312

Since Hadzici was a Sarajevo city municipality, this pertained to Hadzici too. This is the
most flagrant immergency situation with the #necessary cautious measures# and searches.
See the same D1073 about Hadzici:

So, the Serb side proposed and implemented the #“two municipalities” policy#, while the
Muslim side shelled the Serb parts of the municipality, and besieged many facilities, decisive
to win over the Serb side, as mentioned in the next paragraph! But, the biase of these
processes are visible from every line. The Judgement is pointing out to the searches by the
“Serb Forces” but didn’t mention a flagrant example of the #Muslim mean orders#
pertaining to the Serb peasants, see D2493:
 313

The Third Reich would be envious for such a condensed order that pertained to “all individuals
of Serbian ethnicity”! If it is not condemned by this court, this would mean that it was not a
crime!)

2087. Between 10 and 12 May 1992, Serb Forces and the Bosnian Muslim TO engaged in a
―heavy exchange of fire‖ in Hadţići.7089 By 12 May, Serb Forces in the Krupaĉka Rijeka area,
near Tinovo Hill, and the JNA complex at Ţunovnica were all surrounded by Bosnian Muslim
forces; however, the Serb Forces maintained control over the situation and the area.7090 Fighting
in and around Hadţići town continued throughout May and into June 1992.7091

2. Attacks against surrounding villages

2088. Meanwhile, villages surrounding Hadţići had also come under attack. On 7 or 8 May
1992, using weapons stationed in front of the Culture and Sport Centre, Serb Forces opened fire on
the village of Kovaĉevići.7092 (And who shelled the Sport Centre since 7 May? From where all
these shellings of the Serb municipality of Hadzici could have come, unless from the villages
in the vicinity of the Hadzici town? What rule have #forbidden the Serb side to respond?#
For that reason it must be said that the trials in this kind of the “ad hoc” courts are missing
all points and create a confusion – if not bringing about “the whole truth”, particularly
pertaining to a context and knowledge of the domestic laws.) this kind of presentation may
be valid in a writing history of this conflict, but not in a criminal cases!) On 8 May 1992, some
Kovaĉevići residents were killed by a Serbian paramilitary group.7093 (If “not charged”, why it is
in the Judgement? To #denigrate the Serb side additionally#? Except this witness’s
testimony, there was no other evidence on that allegation!) During the following two days, a
peace commission was set up to calm the situation.7094 The Serb Forces took control of
Kovaĉevići on 11 May 1992.7095

2089. After the attack on Kovaĉevići, the residents of Musići, a Muslim settlement within the
Serb village of Ušivak,7096 came under fire from the Serb Forces.7097 On 8 May 1992, tanks

7089
D1073 (SerBiH MUP report on daily activities, 12 May 1992), p. 1. At the break of dawn on 11 May, Bosnian Muslim forces attacked locations in Hadţići
town, including the Serb police station. D2921 (RS MUP information, 11 May 1992), p. 1; D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9
February 2013), paras. 46, 47. See also P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court pp. 3–4; D2491 (Report of Tarĉin police
station, 6 August 1992), p. 5; Vidomir Banduka, T 33531, 33529 (13 February 2013). Small arms fire continued after the shelling. P124 (Witness statement
of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 4.
7090
D1073 (SerBiH MUP report on daily activities, 12 May 1992), p. 1; P2790 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 12 May 1992), p. 1. On 25 May 1992, Bosnian
Muslim forces attacked the Serb-held Ţunovnica complex and took control of over half of the storage premises, but Serb Forces had regained control by the
following evening. D317 (TO Hadţići report on combat readiness, 29 May 1992), p. 1; P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated
20 November 2003), p. 8. See also D1211 (Ilidţa Crisis Staff letter, 13 May 1992) (suggesting that the Muslim forces were intent on taking over the TRZ).
7091
D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), paras. 49–51; Vidomir Banduka, T 33531 (13 February 2013). See also D1212
(Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Milosav Gagović, 13 May 1992), p. 2; Mladen Tolj, T. 34649 (1 March 2013). Hadţići
continued to come under heavy fire from the ABiH throughout the remainder of 1992 and into early 1993. D2451 (Witness statement of Velimir Dunjić
dated 12 November 2012), para. 17; D2453 (Report of Igman Brigade, 2 October 1992); D2454 (Report of Igman Brigade, 24 September 1992); D2456
(Report of Igman Brigade, 8 December 1992); D2457 (Report of Igman Brigade, 7 December 1992); D2458 (Report of Igman Brigade, 6 December 1992);
D2459 (Report of Igman Brigade, 4 December 1992); D2460 (Report of Igman Brigade, 27 November 1992); D2461 (Report of Igman Brigade, 23
November 1992); D2462 (Report of Igman Brigade, 21 November 1992); D2463 (Report of Igman Brigade, 18 November 1992); D2468 (Report of Igman
Brigade, 22 December 1992); P4228 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadţić and Alija Izetbegović, 16 February 1993), para. 6.
7092
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 4. The firing only lasted for the day, but the situation was very tense afterwards. P134
(Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 4. The Serb village of Bare began shooting with rifles as well as light and heavy machine guns at
the nearby Muslim village of Grivići. P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 3. See also P2296 (Witness statement of
Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 67 (recalling a weapons seizing operation which occurred in Grivići).
7093
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 19; Mehmed Musić, T. 12831 (3 March 2011). The Chamber notes these
killings are not charged pursuant to either Schedule A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.
7094
P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 4.
7095
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 21.
7096
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 6–7; P2405 (Map of Hadţići marked by Mehmed Musić) (showing Musići at
Point 1).
7097
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 19, 21. The Serb police were ―[one] hundred percent certain‖ that the
residents of Musići settlement had illegal weapons. P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 33, 34, 39. See also
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 15, 25; Mehmed Musić, T. 12830–12831, 12847 (3 March 2011). Glavaš
 314

approached Musići from Tinovo Hill.7098 Realising that they would not be able to ―offer resistance
to the Chetniks‖, the residents of Musići organised buses and had already begun taking the women
and children out of Musići between 7 and 9 May.7099 (#Not expelled#! Right, they started
shelling the Serb municipality on 7 May, and simultaneously removed their women and
children away, while the Serbs appeared to the Muslici settlement only after the shellings!)

2090. Around 15 May, Serb Forces shelled houses and other buildings in Musići from positions
located in Ušivak.7100 After about two days, two Bosnian Serbs came to Musići and called on the
residents to surrender.7101 They refused, so the shelling resumed that evening and continued for
three days.7102 (Therefore, the Musici settlement was not a civilian settlement, but a
militarised zone, which could afford itself not to surrender weapons!#Abuse of civil
settlement#! )

2091. On 20 May, pursuant to a decision of the Crisis Staff,7103 approximately 50 to 60 members

of the Serb Forces entered Musići from all sides, supported by two Praga tanks.7104 The Serb
Forces announced through a loudspeaker that all weapons should be handed over.7105 The soldiers
then went from house to house to conduct searches and seize weapons.7106 (A #legal and
legitimate action#, to put the attacks from Musici off!)

2092. Mehmed Musić was arrested in his home by two members of the Serb MP and was taken
along with 14 other men from Musići to Alija Musić‘s house,7107 where he saw three dead
bodies.7108 Dragan Pušara sent a man to fetch the Musići residents who were still hiding,
threatening to kill all of the 14 men if those in hiding refused to surrender.7109

2093. Eventually, the Serb soldiers led the 14 men away to the primary school in Hadţići,7110
which was guarded by men wearing olive-grey uniforms.7111 Once the men had arrived inside a

acknowledged that the Serb police was aware that some people had permits allowing them to keep weapons, but suggested that the Serb police still sought
out the owners of such weapons because they were being used illegally. P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 67.
7098
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 20.
7099
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 18.
7100
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 23–24. See also Adjudicated Fact 2569.
7101
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 22, 25, 27 (stating that Boro Đukanović told the residents: ‗This is Serb land.
You have nothing to look for here‘ and that Dragan Pušara threatened to burn down the settlement if they did not surrender). The Musići residents had
already been asked to surrender their weapons at the end of April, but they had refused. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February
2011), para. 15. See also P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 4; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11787 (14 February 2011); P2296
(Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 35.
7102
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 22, 26–27, 29–30.
7103
Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11787 (14 February 2011). See also P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 66.
7104
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 31, 33, 36, 39, 40. P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13
February 2011), paras. 37–38, 61. Glavaš himself was not present during the events in Musići but was informed of the events afterwards. Tihomir Glavaš,
T. 11787 (14 February 2011); P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 37, 62, 65.
7105
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 37, 68. Glavaš testified that when the SJB received information that a
settlement was in possession of illegal weapons, the SJB would go to the settlement in an official vehicle and would inform the population over the
loudspeakers that they were to hand over weapons in a certain location. P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 35.
7106
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 68. The Serbs seized illegally owned weapons, including approximately 20 or
30 M-48 rifles, explosives, and machine guns, from the settlement and took them to the police station. P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated
13 February 2011), paras. 37, 40–41, 43. The weapons were then distributed to either the Serb police or the military pursuant to a decision of the Crisis
Staff. P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 40–41; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11787–11788 (14 February 2011).
7107
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 36, 38.
7108
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 38 (identifying the dead as Alija, Derviš, and Fadil Musić). See also P2296
(Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 37, 62 (stating that three Bosnian Muslims were killed during the 20 May 1992
incident in Musići). The Chamber notes these killings are not charged pursuant to either Schedule A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.
7109
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 38. Rade Veselinović also suggested ―liquidat[ing]‖ all 14 of the men lined up
outside of Alija Musić‘s house, but Pušara opposed that. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 38, 40 (describing
Veselinović as singing ―Chetnik‖ songs). See also P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 36, 44 (stating that
Veselinović, who was a member of the reserve police before moving to the military police, was often tasked with disarmament operations and that he took
part in the operation in Musići).
7110
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 41. According to Tihomir Glavaš, the men were arrested because long-
barrelled weapons were found on them. P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 45.
 315

classroom on the first floor, the guards threatened to kill them and began to curse at them, stating,
―there would be no balija state soon‖.7112 (A derogatory name of “balija state” meants the
#Islamic regime# as promised in the Izetbegovic’s Islamic Declaration! Not nice, but since
the Serbs had a ground to believe that all their sufferings had to thank to the Islamic
Declaration, could be understood!) The guards spat on the detainees and told them that they
were finished.7113 After approximately 30 minutes, the detainees were taken out of the school and
marched to the garage of the Municipal Assembly building, which was located approximately 150
metres away.7114 (As it was evident, the garages were the only prison in the Serb part of
Hadzici, while the Sport Centre was a refugee’s reception center!)

(D) Detention facilities in Hadţići

2094. In the meantime, the Hadţići Crisis Staff had decided to arrest and detain all Bosnian
Muslim men of military age from areas in the municipality such as Binjeţevo, Ţunovnica, and
Kuĉice.7115 According to Tihomir Glavaš, this decision was taken because the Serbs had
information that Muslims were arresting military-aged Serbs and were preparing to attack;7116 the
Serbs also claimed to be arresting Bosnian Muslims for possession of illegal weapons.7117 The
arrests were carried out by the Serb police and the Serb TO.7118 (How possibly this may have
any connection with the central authorities? According to our legislation, (#All-Peoples Law
of Defense#!)every settled place was entitled to organize it’s own defence, and all locals did it
according to their sense and feeling of security, as well as the intelligence information. That
is why the D2493 shouldn in no way be neglected, because what is here adjudicated as a Serb
crime – as a matter of fact it was a Muslim crime, see again D2493,

7111
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 42. The school was closed so the detainees were told to climb through a
window and go up to a classroom on the first floor. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 42.
7112
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 42. The guards appeared to Musić to be in some kind of hurry or panic. P2403
(Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 43.
7113
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 43.
7114
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 44. See also Adjudicated Fact 2611; paras. 2095–2100.
7115
Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11784 (14 February 2011); P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 26. The Chamber notes the
testimony of Nevenko Samouković, who stated that, as far as he knew, ―no one in the territory of Hadţići municipality made a decision to designate certain
facilities as camps for detaining Muslims‖. Nevenko Samouković, T. 34614, 34624 (1 March 2013). Samouković also stated that this was consistent with a
report from the Serb police in Hadţići dated 9 August 1992, which asserted that ―in the area of Hadţići municipality, we do not have collection camps used
by the army to bring in the Muslim population without documents on the reasons for detention‖. D1074 (Correspondence from Hadţići Police Station to
Sarajevo CSB, 9 August 1992), p. 5. However, the Chamber observes that Samouković qualified his own testimony by referring to the extent of his own
knowledge, which was itself questionable, and that he acknowledged that both the Culture and Sport Centre and the garage of the Municipal Building had
been used to house ―the remaining Muslim population‖ and as a holding centre, respectively. (What else should be expected from any
witness, except to say what he knew? Since it was not undoubtedly established, nothing depended on Samoukovic’s
absence of knowledge. If there was “no an alleged event, due to his knowledge” then the allegation is empty. Why the
Defence have to prove that the allegations are not correct?) D3062 (Witness statement of Nevenko Samouković dated 26 February
1993), paras. 17, 22. The Chamber further notes that the correspondence from the Hadţići Serb police pertained to the situation in August 1992, several
months after the arrests and detentions in Hadţići began. The Chamber therefore shall not place weight on either Samouković‘s testimony or D1074 in
relation to whether there was a decision to arrest and detain Bosnian Muslim men.
7116
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 26.
7117
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 45; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11784 (14 February 2011). See also D3063 (Witness
statement of Mladen Tolj dated 25 February 2013), para. 14 (suggesting that the records of detention reflected bona fide reasons for taking each person into
custody). According to Tolj, the prevailing security conditions in Hadţići precluded compliance with the requirement that civilians be brought before an
investigative judge within three days of their detention. Mladen Tolj, T. 34647 (1 March 2013). See also para. 305, fn. 935; D2915 (Witness statement of
Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 58 (stating that the Law on Criminal Procedure prevented anyone from being held for more than a month).
According to Banduka, if there was a need to hold someone for a period that exceeded the three days prescribed by law, they were transferred to Kula
prison. D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 58; Vidomir Banduka, T. 33520 (12 February 2013). Banduka also
noted that the transport to Kula Prison would have required permission to transit through the airport, which was held at the time by international forces and
thus would have required their consent. Vidomir Banduka, T. 33520–33521 (12 February 2013).
7118
Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11784 (14 February 2011); P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 47 (stating that he as Chief of
the Serb police was aware that the Serb TO and the Serb police were taking people out of their homes). Defence witnesses Nevenko Samouković and
Vidomir Banduka suggested that Bosnian Muslims had gone voluntarily to the collection centres but when presented with the testimonies of Mehmed
Musić, Adem Balić, and Tihomir Glavaš, all of whom acknowledged that the Serb police and Serb TO had taken people from their houses, Banduka
admitted that he was not in a position to answer whether they were taken voluntarily or not, while Samouković speculated that the police ―probably had
some operative intelligence‖ or that the arrests had been the result of incompetence or abuses of power. Nevenko Samouković, T. 34613–34614
(1 March 2013); Vidomir Banduka, T. 33512–33513 (12 February 2013). The Chamber thus considers the evidence of Samouković and Banduka to be
speculative and shall not rely upon it relation to whether Bosnian Muslims were taken ―voluntarily‖ to detention centres.
 316

This is exactly what happen in a civil wars, particularly this one. And nobody could judge
whether the locals exaggerated in estimating a possible danger, or not. There are the two
armed communities, antagonized throughout centuries, suspecting each other, and what the
President has to do with it, particularly since he fought against the war? And if the Muslim
extremists shelled the Serb municipality of Hadzici from the surrounding Muslim villages,
the only reasonable defence was to neutralise those who shelled!)

1. Scheduled Detention Facility C.11.1

2095. The Indictment refers to the use of the garage of the Hadţići Municipal Assembly
Building as a detention facility from 20 May 1992 until at least June 1992. (No wonder, taking
into account the shelling of the Serb parts of the town as of 7 may, and particularly from 10
May and on, as seen in the next paragraph!)
2096. After the Hadţići SJB building was shelled around 10 May,7119 the Serb police moved into
the Hadţići Municipal Assembly Building.7120 (This is an insufficient and invalid finding,
which contributes to the general confusion on the Serb account! Any ambiguity as this one is
understood that it was the Serb responsibility. Why it was not relevant to specify WHO
SHELLED THE SJB? And this incident was the crucial for the beginning of the civil war in
Hadzici. Since it is clear that the Serbs didn’t shell themselves, an inevitable conclusion is –
the #Muslims shelled the Serb police station#, and thus started the civil war!) From 12 May
until 1 June, Bosnian Muslims were arrested and held in the garage under the building ―for
interrogation‖.7121 (#Nothing before the Muslim attack happened#! Why none of them
hadn’t been arrested before 10 May and the shelling of the police station? Was this shelling
in any way associated with these arrests? The garages replaced a regular detention unit that
exist in any SJB for a short detention and first interrogation (at that time the police
detention could las 72 hours) and it was clarified that the Garages were for those who were
suspected for crimes, and the outcome from the Garages were either to procede to Kula
prison for a processing, or at the Sport Center, which was a reception center, at least for a
part of the inmates.)

7119
See para. 2084, fn. 7096.
7120
D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 57; P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011),
para. 45; P2406 (Photograph of Hadţići municipal building); P2301 (Photograph of Hadţići municipal building marked by Tihomir Glavaš); Tihomir
Glavaš, T. 11789–11790 (14 February 2011).
7121
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 4. P2300 (Photograph of garage underneath Hadţići municipal building); Tihomir
Glavaš, T. 11784, 11788–11789 (14 February 2011); P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 47, 51–52. See also
D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 57; Vidomir Banduka, T. 33538–33539 (13 February 2013) (stating that the
detainees in the garage included Serbs and that all had been brought into custody for having committed crimes).
 317

2097. When the 14 men from Musići arrived on 20 May, one Croat and one Muslim prisoner
were already inside the garage.7122 Mehmed Musić spent six days in the garage with about 47
other men.7123 The detainees were only fed one slice of bread once or twice a day, as well as some
watery soup, and were given only one or two bottles of water for the entire group.7124
2098. One by one, each detainee was called out and taken up into the Hadţići Municipal
Assembly Building to be interrogated by members of the Serb Forces about the supply of weapons
to Bosnian Muslims.7125 (#Few only#! Fourteen men from Musici was interrogated, out of 274
Muslims in Musici, as a part of Usivak and 291 Serb, this is a pure evidence that these 14
men were brought in for some suspicions, not because of their religion! Why none of these
2,000 to 3,000 who left, or those 200 to 300 who stayed in Hadzici was brought in? So many
Muslims all around, but only 50 of them arrested temporarily, and from Musici only 14?)
On their third day in the garage, the group of men from Musići were taken to the weapons storage
facility in Ţunovnica to load ammunition.7126 (Let us see what was a “strictly confidential”
report from the Serb police station in Hadzici, D1074, of 9 Agust 92

7122
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 46. See also Mladen Tolj, T. 34633 (1 March 2013).
7123
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 48; Mladen Tolj, T. 34634–34635 (1 March 2013). See also Adjudicated Fact
2611; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11793 (14 February 2011) (estimating that 30 people, mostly from Muslić, Visasoci, Binjeţevo, and Kuĉiste were detained in the
garage).
7124
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 48; Mehmed Musić, T. 12838 (3 March 2011). Mladen Tolj testified that ―until
1994 there was no water in Hadţići‖. Mladen Tolj, T. 34652 (1 March 2013); D3064 (Report of Hadţići Secretariat for Housing, Public Utilities, Transport
and Communications, 1 December 1992), p. 3 (stating that after the outbreak of the war, the Serb municipality of Hadţići was affected by a water supply
outage, forcing the use of an improvised pipeline to reroute the well located at the TRZ, which enabled the water supply to the immediate centre of Hadţići
to be re-established; however, other parts were supplied via water from cisterns); D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013),
para. 64 (stating that because the water supplies were in territory held by Bosnian Muslims, the water supply was cut at the beginning of the war).
7125
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 47.
7126
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 49; Mehmed Musić, T. 12834 (3 March 2011); P2405 (Map of Hadţići marked
by Mehmed Musić) (showing Ţunovnica at Point 3).
 318

This is the #Serb official attitude# towards the problems that occurred when the war broke
out. Nota bene: the police had to fight #against the Serb criminals and tiefs#, as well as
against the Muslim extremists. See further, D1074:

That was all what the President could have known about events in Hadzici, because this was
a strictly confidential official report from a highly professional chief of the police station in
Hadzici, who had no any connection with the SDS. From this report the President, as well as
the superiors in the Serb MUP, could only conclude that the police in Hadzici was doing
their best! #What President knew# )
2099. On 25 May 1992, all but three of the men from Musići were moved to the Culture and
Sport Centre.7127 The other detainees remained behind in the Municipal Assembly Building
garage until 22 June,7128 when they were transferred to the ―Slaviša Ĉiĉa‖ Barracks in
Lukavica.7129 Those are the two outcomes from the garage. It #wasn’t arbitrary#, it was a
result of an interrogation. Only three men were transferred to Lukavica, obviously found a
reasonably suspected on crimes. Let us see what the chief of the CSB Sarajevo wrote to his
subordinates, D3795:

This is what the #President ordered# to the Serb Ministry for Interior, promptly conveyed to

7127
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 51–52. See also D3063 (Witness statement of Mladen Tolj dated 25 February
2013), para. 13; Mladen Tolj, T. 34635–34636 (1 March 2013) (stating that people on whom no weapons were found were taken to the Culture and Sport
Centre). See para. 2102.
7128
Tihomir Glavaš estimated that by mid-June, approximately 30 Bosnian Muslims were being held in the garage of the Municipal Assembly Building.
Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11793 (14 February 2011) (referring to the number of people being held when he prevented the White Eagles from entering the garage).
See also fn. 7158.
7129
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 65. See also Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.1. The detainees from the
garage smelled badly and told Musić that they had spent 33 days in the garage without being able to bathe. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić
dated 28 February 2011), para. 66; Mehmed Musić, T. 12838 (3 March 2011). See also P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities dated
7 February 1993), p. 1. Around 25 June 1992, a woman and her sister were moved to the garage of the Municipal Assembly Building from the Hadzići civil
defence headquarters. Adjudicated Fact 2613. The Chamber further notes that in early June, Arkan‘s men also removed a man from the Culture and Sport
Centre and took him to the garage of the Municipal Assembly Building, where he was detained for 40 days. P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH
authorities dated 7 February 1993), p. 1. The Chamber therefore concludes that people continued to be detained in the garage even after the group of men
was transferred to the ―Slaviša Ĉiĉa‖ Barracks in Lukavica on 22 June 1992.
 319

the terrain. See further:

After admitting this evidence obtained by the Prosecution, neither the Prosecution nor the
Chamber should meditate the #President’s liabilityy for the Hadzici development# of events.
This pertaines to all the terrain, particularly to those the most remote from the central
authorities! See further:

Having in mind the “entirety of evidence” the Indictment, let alone the Judgement, looks like
an #insult of the President and the entire Serb people#!) .

2100. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that between 20 May and at least late June 1992,
approximately 50 Bosnian Muslims, some of whom were civilians and two of whom were women,
were detained in the garage under the Hadţici Municipal Assembly Building by members of Serb
Forces and that while held there, the detainees were given inadequate food and water and on one
occasion were forced to work. A #reasonable inference# for the detention is that they had been
suspected for crimes, which is obvious from the outcome, all but three released, i.e.
transferred to the Sport Centre. Another reasonable inference for the food is that there was
no sufficient food for anybody, since the municipality was very distant and surrounded by
the hostile territories from three sides. For the forced labour it should be checked whether
they had been asked, or ordered. That the food was a big problem confirmed the statement
of Samoukovic, D03062, para. 21

1. Scheduled Detention Facility C.11.2

 320

2102. The Indictment refers to the use of the Hadţići Culture and Sport Centre as a detention
facility from at least 25 May until September 1992.
a. Establishment and control of detention facility

2103. Sometime prior to 25 May 1992,7130 the Crisis Staff decided to detain military-aged
Bosnian Muslims in the Culture and Sport Centre and to place the facility under military
control.7131 As mentioned above,7132 on 25 May 1992, 12 men from Musići were moved from the
garage of the Municipal Assembly Building to the Culture and Sport Centre.7133 (Out of 14 men
from Musici, #twelve# of them had been moved to the Culture and Sport Centre, i.e. found
#not guilty#!) By that time, about 60 men—as well as a woman7134—were already being detained
in two locker rooms of the Culture and Sport Centre.7135 The facility was first guarded by
members of the Serb TO;7136 although the Serb police began to provide security along with
members of the military after approximately August 1992.7137

a. Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

7130
The Chamber notes that Vidomir Banduka testified that the Crisis Staff only decided that the Culture and Sport Centre would be used as a ―holding centre to
accommodate people‖ after approximately 16 June 1992. D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), paras. 53–54. However,
Banduka conceded that he never visited the Culture and Sport Centre. Vidomir Banduka, T. 33510 (12 February 2013). The Chamber therefore considers
that, even if taken as true, Banduka‘s testimony does not preclude the possibility that the decision to use the Culture and Sport Centre to accommodate
Bosnian Muslims was taken earlier than 16 June 1992, and recalls that Adem Balić testified that Serb Forces had taken him from his home in Hadţići to the
Culture and Sport Centre already on 16 May 1992. P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 4; P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to
BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 1. The Chamber is therefore satisfied that the detention facility at the Culture and Sport Centre was established prior to
25 May 1992.
7131
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 26, 46, 48; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11784 (14 February 2011). See also
Adjudicated Fact 2615. The Chamber notes that Vidomir Banduka and Mladen Tolj both testified that Muslims had chosen to be accommodated in the
Culture and Sport Centre. D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 56; D3063 (Witness statement of Mladen Tolj
dated 25 February 2013), paras. 9, 13. When presented with his testimony in the Krajišnik case, wherein he had conceded that Bosnian Muslims had been
held against their will but stated that such detention ―was for their own protection‖, Banduka denied that he had so testified and suggested that his testimony
had been misinterpreted. Vidomir Banduka, T. 33516 (12 February 2013); P6110 (Excerpt from Vidomir Banduka's testimony in Prosecutor v. Krajišnik),
p. 3. Having reviewed his prior testimony, the Chamber is of the view that the credibility of Banduka‘s testimony in this case on this point is undermined.
The Chamber also observes that Tolj conceded that ―very few went voluntarily‖, stating that ―[m]ost were brought there and kept with the best of intentions
because that‘s where it was the safest for them‖. Mladen Tolj, T. 34636–34637 (1 March 2013). The Chamber further notes that Banduka admitted that the
guards would have had to give prior approval in order for anyone to leave. Vidomir Banduka, T. 33514–33515 (12 February 2013). (So what?!? The
guards had been responsible for the inmates, and if anyone got killed out of the Centre, they would be kept
liable!#Proper conduct#!) The Chamber therefore finds that the people in the Culture and Sport Centre were indeed detained and not accommodated
pursuant to mutual agreement. See further P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 46, 49 (stating that people were
―brought in […] for their safety‖ and that men were detained because the Serbs needed people for exchange) (emphasis added). (However, from the
testimony of the very same Mehmed Music, it was clear that those whom “Serbs needed for exchange” had been
required by the Muslim side, including Music himself, whose family was exchanged only after six failures due to the
Muslim mistakes!)
7132
Scheduled Detention Facility. C.11.2.
7133
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 51–52; P2404 (Photograph of Hadţići Culture and Sport Centre); P2299
(Photograph of Hadţići Culture and Sport Centre).
7134
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 55. See also Adjudicated Fact 2614.
7135
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 56; P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities dated 7 February 1993),
p. 1.
7136
The members of the TO who served as guards included Trifko Ignjatović, Rade Milović, Momo Vujović, Simo Kuzman, Marinko Djokić, Keko Krajišnik,
and Radovan Duka. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 54; P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13
February 2011), para. 50; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11785 (14 February 2011). Momo Vujović and, occasionally, Sretan Krajišnik (a.k.a. Kekan) were in charge
of the facility. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 54.
7137
Mladen Tolj, T. 34637, 34639–34640, 34561 (1 March 2013); D1074 (Correspondence from Hadţići Police Station to Sarajevo CSB, 9 August 1992), p. 2
(stating that between April and July 1992, police officers of the Serb police were ―included in all combat activities‖ but since 1 August 1992 had returned
from the frontlines and were put back on regular MUP activities). Tihomir Glavaš denied that the Culture and Sport Centre was under the control of the
Serb police. P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 48, 50, 51 (suggesting that the Culture and Sport Centre was
under military control). However, the Chamber also observes that Glavaš himself qualified his evidence in this regard, stating, ―at least for as long as I was
in Hadţići‖, and conceded that he never personally visited the Culture and Sport Centre. Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11785 (14 February 2011); P2296 (Witness
statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 53. The Chamber further notes that Glavaš testified that by 9 August 1992 he had already been
transferred to Ilidţa. P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 82. The Chamber is therefore of the view that Glavaš‘s
personal knowledge would therefore necessarily be limited and considers that Glavaš‘s testimony does not conflict with further evidence indicating that the
Serb police were involved in the guarding and organisation of the detention facility at the Culture and Sport Centre from August 1992. See also P1607 (RS
Ministry of Justice report on prisons and camps on the RS territory, 22 October 1992), e-court p. 7 (stating that organisation and security were being
provided by the Hadţići SJB).
 321

2104. Since the men from Musići could not fit in the locker rooms, they were taken to the main
gym area, where they slept on the floor without blankets.7138 The detainees were fed one slice of
bread each day and some rice or soup in the morning and afternoon.7139 Only two toilets were
available to the detainees.7140

2105. While in detention in the Culture and Sport Centre, the detainees were often beaten and
sexually abused by members of paramilitary units.7141 (Certainly not in control of the
authorities! But, such a #general assertions# are not sufficient in such a criminal case,
particularly since this President put the paramilitaries out of law, forbade them and
disowned them 13 June 92! How come nothing the President had done well – don’t matter at
all?) On or before 25 May,7142 three of Arkan‘s men, who were dressed in black uniforms, arrived
and beat and humiliated the prisoners.7143 (Everybody was able to proclaim himself as “Arkan’s
man” or anyones other, such as “Red Berets” and so on. Before the state institution were
capable of differentiating and #arresting paramilitaries#, there were many groups which
could call themselves as they wanted!) On approximately 15 June, Šešelj‘s men arrived at the
Culture and Sport Centre.7144 The men wore gloves with the fingertips cut off, painted their faces
black, wore camouflage uniforms, and carried big knives.7145 A woman with dyed blond hair
named Ljiljia who was with Šešelj‘s men removed one man‘s pants and told another man to ―suck
the first man‘s sexual organ‖.7146 She then removed her own pants and told the second man to lick
her buttocks, threatening to slit the men‘s throats if they did not comply.7147 (All of that, even if
true, could only be an argument against civil wars, not against this President and his
subordinates!)

2105. Šešelj‘s men singled out certain detainees and beat them severely,7148 while forcing other
detainees to fight each other.7149 These beatings took place in the presence of the Serb TO

7138
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 56.
7139
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 56. See also P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February
2011), para. 64 (testifying that at the beginning of their detention, detainees were fed the same as the Serbs but that they were then fed poorly after it was
discovered that Serbs were being mistreated in Tarĉin and Pazarić); P804 (Sky news report re Kula prison, with transcript), 1:20–1:47.
7140
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 56.
7141
See Adjudicated Fact 2616. See also P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 57; P804 (SKY news report re Kula
prison, with transcript), 1:20–1:47.
7142
Adem Balić estimated that Arkan‘s men arrived ―around 1 June 1992‖. P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities dated 7 February 1993), p. 1.
However, Mehmed Musić was told that Arkan‘s men had been present at the Culture and Sport Centre on 25 May 1992 before he arrived from the
Municipal Assembly Building garage. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 63. In light of Musić‘s further
testimony that the second group of paramilitaries arrived on the second day of Bajram, which was 12 June 1992, Balić‘s testimony that the second group
arrived 15 days after the first, and the fact that Musić had not yet been transferred when Arkan‘s men first arrived, the Chamber concludes that Arkan‘s men
came to the Sport and Culture Centre on or before 25 May, and considers that this is not inconsistent with Balić‘s estimate of this date.
7143
P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities dated 7 February 1993), p. 1; P134 (Witness statement of Adem Balić dated 25 June 1997), p. 4 (stating
that the guards revealed that the men were Arkan‘s men). See also D3063 (Witness statement of Mladen Tolj dated 25 February 2013), paras. 9–10.
Arkan‘s men also removed a man from the Culture and Sport Centre and took him to the garage of the Municipal Assembly Building. See fn. 7136.
7144
P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities dated 7 February 1993), p. 1. Mehmed Musić referred to this second group as Arkan‘s men, stating that
one of the men had identified himself and the group as such. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 57. However,
Musić also testified that this group arrived on the second day of Bajram, which was 12 June 1992. Mehmed Musić, T. 12833, 12866 (3 March 2011). Adem
Balić identified the group that arrived 15 days after Arkan‘s men, which would have been around 12 June, as Šešelj‘s men. P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement
to BiH authorities dated 7 February 1993), p. 1. This identification is corroborated by the testimony of Tihomir Glavaš, who testified that he heard that
Šešelj‘s men had sexually abused the detainees in the Culture and Sport Centre. P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011),
paras. 53–54. The Chamber therefore concludes that the paramilitaries in the second group were Šešelj‘s men rather than Arkan‘s men.
7145
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 57.
7146
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 58 (stating that he could identify her because she had taught his daughters at the
technical school in Ilidţa); P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities dated 7 February 1993), p. 2. See also P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir
Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 54; P804 (Sky news report re Kula prison, with transcript), 1:20–1:47. Musić explained that he had not mentioned
this event in past statements because he did not want to embarrass these men, but did so once they passed away. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed
Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 59; Mehmed Musić, T. 12867 (3 March 2011).
7147
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 58–59.
7148
P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities dated 7 February 1993), pp. 1–2. See also P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February
2011), para. 54. Even in February 1993, Balić could still feel pain in his left kidney area from this beating. P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH
authorities dated 7 February 1993), p. 1. Balić‘s brother was beaten with a flagpole and sustained a broken arm and leg. P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to
BiH authorities dated 7 February 1993), p. 2. See also P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 59–60 (recalling how
after sexually abusing two men, Ljiljia then began to jump on a 70 year old man, causing him to cry).
 322

guards.7150 Later that day, when ten or fifteen people from Ţunovnica arrived, Šešelj‘s men forced
one of the arrivals to run around the Culture and Sport Centre and swear at the detainees‘ ―balija
mother‖.7151
a. Transfer and exchange of detainees at the Culture and Sport Centre

2106. By 22 June, 282 people had been detained in the Hadţići Culture and Sport Centre.7152 On
approximately 22 June 1992, ―a rather large group‖ of men, women, and children from Kuĉice, a
settlement located nearby, arrived at the Culture and Sport Centre.7153 Soon thereafter, the guards
told the detainees that they were going to be exchanged.7154 (The civilians from Kucice
“arrived” at the CSC!!! They hadn’t been brought in, #they arrived with the aim to be
secured and to be exchanged#! But let us see how the para 65 looks like: It doesn’t look as if
they had been forced to be exchanged, or to be afraid of the guards, and some had been
“allowed to stay behind, and later to be returned to their village Kucici, which obviously
mean that there was their will respected. It is also obvious that they were waiting for the
“exchange”. We will see from the same witness that the people who didn’t succeed to be
exchanged once or several times, wanted to be returned to the CSC because they had been
closed their households.

(
This was a Prosecution’s witness, the Prosecution took this statement. The Muslim people
were “all very glad” for #being able to go to the Muslim territory#, so that some of them
“started to kiss the guards…” does it look like a terror, or any kind of violence or
inforcement? Also, some of the Muslims “were taken back to Kucice” i.e. to their own
homes, which confirmes that any of them could have chosen either way!) Around 10 p.m. that
evening, in accordance with a decision of the Crisis Staff,7155 the male detainees in the Culture and
Sport Centre were loaded onto several buses.7156 While en route, one bus stopped first in front of
the garage of the Hadţići Municipal Assembly Building,7157 where it picked up detainees before
proceeding to Kula Prison.7158 There, ―Chetniks‖ boarded the bus, beat the detainees with rifle
butts, and extinguished cigarettes on their faces. 7159 Ultimately, the detainees were taken to the
7149
P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities dated 7 February 1993), pp. 1–2; P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011),
paras. 60–62.
7150
P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities dated 7 February 1993), pp. 1–2.
7151
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 61. After leaving the Culture and Sport Centre, Šešelj‘s men tried to go to the
Municipal Assembly Building garage and do the same thing to the detainees there, but were prevented from doing so by Tihomir Glavaš. P2296 (Witness
statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 53–54; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11993 (16 February 2011). See also D2915 (Witness statement of
Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 55 (testifying that in mid-June 1992, the Crisis Staff was made aware that ―a group of hooligans [had]
entered the sports hall where the Muslims were held, [and had] abused and physically molested them‖, and that the Crisis Staff condemned the incident and
asked the Chief of Police to increase security at the facility and to ―remove all those who might be expected to do something of the kind‖).
7152
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 64.
7153
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 64; P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities dated 7 February 1993),
p. 2 (stating that the people from Kuĉice arrived on 20 June); Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), e-court pp. 261–262.
7154
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 65. Mehmed Musić testified that the women, children, and three men were
allowed to remain behind. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 65.
7155
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 50; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11784, 11786 (14 February 2011); P1478 (Ratko
Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), e-court p. 219. Glavaš explained that this group was exchanged in return for the release of Serbs who were in
detention in Tarĉin and Pazarić, and that the authorities had been under ―enormous pressure‖ from Serb citizens to facilitate such an exchange. Tihomir
Glavaš, T. 11785–11786 (14 February 2011). See also Mladen Tolj, T. 34640–34641 (1 March 2013) (referring to a large-scale exchange of prisoners that
had been agreed at the level of state organs between the Muslim and Serb sides).
7156
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 65–69; P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities dated
7 February 1993), p. 2.
7157
See para. 2102.
7158
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.18.1, C.18.2.
7159
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 67–69; P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities dated
7 February 1993), p. 2.
 323

Slaviša Vajner Ĉiĉa Barracks in Lukavica.7160 (Is there any additional evidence about this. Was
it registered when they arrived at the Kula Prison? Anyway, at least the #official guards are
not alleged to being involved# in the mistreatment!)

2107. On the morning of 7 September, approximately 200 Bosnian Muslims from Binjeţevo,
Garovići, Ţunovnica, and Grivići—including men women, children, and elderly who had been
under ―house arrest‖ in Hadţići since the outbreak of armed conflict7161—boarded five buses,
which took them to the check-point at Kobiljaća for an exchange.7162 The group remained at the
check-point until approximately 8 p.m.,7163 but the exchange fell through when the Serbs brought
women and children to the exchange instead of the captured Bosnian Muslim men from Hadţići
and Ilidţa as had been previously agreed.7164 (A house arrest? How many policemen would be
deployed to keep so many people in a hous arrest. It rather looks like they had been told not
to get out while the fighting are going.)

2108. Thus, around 8 p.m., the convoy returned to the Culture and Sport Centre, where the
detainees were placed under the guard of TRZ employees.7165 At 9 a.m. on 8 September, the
detainees were transported back to the check-point at Kobiljaĉa, but again, no exchange took
place.7166 (That happened several times, because, as this witness, Music, testified, only
because the Muslim side wasn’t readi for the exchange!) The convoy, which now numbered
eight buses filled with approximately 500 people, returned to the Culture and Sport Centre by
10:30 p.m. that evening.7167 When the detainees arrived, they were given some food for the
children, who at that point had not eaten for two days.7168 Thereafter, the group spent
approximately 12 days in the Culture and Sport Centre, receiving food every third day.7169 On
about 18 September, the Serb Forces released all the women and children ―to go home‖, leaving

7160
P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities dated 7 February 1993), p. 2; P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras.
65–69. See also paras. 2276–2278; KDZ088, T. 6315–6316 (7 September 2010) (closed session); Adjudicated Fact 2617.
7161
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 5 (further stating that Zoran Gašević and a girl nicknamed ―Beba‖, both of whom
were wearing camouflage uniforms, had arrived at his house and given him, his wife, and their children 30 minutes to dress, gather belongings, and meet in
front of the kindergarden); P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 113 (stating that his father, brother, and brother‘s
family had been among this group and had been given 30 minutes to gather their belongings and assemble near the Municipal Assembly Building). But see
Mladen Tolj, T. 34643, 34649 (1 March 2013) (testifying that in such situations, people already knew in advance that they would be ready, but had only
learned their exact departure time 30 minutes beforehand). See also Vidomir Banduka, T. 33526 (12 February 2013) (testifying that he thought that all
civilians had left the Culture and Sport Centre by August 1992, but later conceding that the centre was used as a ―staging area‖ prior to exchanges of
civilians at Kobiljaća), T. 33539 (13 February 2013).
7162
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 5.
7163
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 5. Each bus was driven by a policeman, and one police guard was aboard each bus.
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 5. While at Kobiljaća the Bosnian Muslims were not provided with food or water.
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 5.
7164
D1075 (Report of Committee for Exchange of POWS, 21 December 1992), p. 1; P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), paras.
33–34. See also P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 114; Mladen Tolj, T. 34643 (1 March 2013).
7165
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 5; P125 (Zijad Okić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 3 February 1993), p. 1.
7166
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 5. As a member of the Missing Persons Institute of BiH, Amor Mašović attended the
exchange which had been scheduled to take place at Kobiljaĉa on 8 September. P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), paras.
33–34. After the failed exchange, Mašović, his deputy, and his bus driver were arrested by Serbs and taken first to the Hadţići Culture and Sport Centre,
then to the Hadţići Serb police station, and then to spend the night at Brane Mijatović‘s house. P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated
23 March 2012), paras. 35–37. On the following day, Mašović, his deputy, and the bus driver were taken to Ratko Radić‘s office, where Mašović promised
Radić that he would organise another exchange once he returned to Sarajevo and said that no one was to blame for the failure of the exchange on the
previous day. P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), para. 37. Thereafter, Mašović and the two others were taken to the Red
Cross premises in Ilidţa and later crossed the confrontation line back into Sarajevo. P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012),
paras. 37–38.
7167
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 117; P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 5.
See also Adjudicated Fact 2618. The Chamber notes that Okić stated that the extra buses joined the convoy on 7 September rather than on 8 September, but
notes that Okić returned to the check-point on the day after the first failed exchange, while Musić, who testified that he was bussed in from Ilidţa on
8 September, did not. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 115–117. The Chamber therefore concludes that the
additional buses joined the convoy on 8 September 1992.
7168
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 5.
7169
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 5; P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 118.
After three days, some women were allowed to go home to get food, and some women from the town also brought food to the Culture and Sport Centre.
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 118; P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court pp.
5–6.
 324

about 100 male detainees out of the original 500.7170 (Now it is undoubtedly clear that the
Centre was a #reception centre# for an accommodation of those who wanted to be
transferred to the Muslim territory, and only a vast minority was for the detention as a
prisoners of war. One can imagine how difficult was it to feed so many people in an overall
#shortage of everything#!)

2109. Between 9 and 23 September, detainees at the Culture and Sport Centre were engaged in
a work platoon that dug trenches near Oštrik and at a mountain pass above the reservoir in
Dupovci.7171 While there, the detainees were exposed to sporadic crossfire.7172 The work platoon
also built ―machine-gun nests‖ in some buildings and ―were taken by a certain Miki Šarenac to
loot houses‖.7173 (Rule 92bis evidence, no cross examination! The only withness alive was
Music, and if the Prosecution was not ready for Hadzici, it should have missed from the
Indictment!)

2110. During his second detention at the Culture and Sport Centre, Mehmed Musić was
interrogated twice by Rade Veselinović.7174 Zijad Okić gave conflicting evidence regarding
whether or not the prisoners were abused, first stating that the detainees were beaten and abused
most by Zoran Gašević, Nemanja Joviĉić, and Rade Veselinović.7175 However, Okić later stated
that the detainees were not beaten or hurt during the 12 days in the Culture and Sport Centre.7176
The Chamber considers this evidence insufficient to establish that the detainees were beaten
during this period.
2111. On 22 October 1992, RS Ministry of Justice representative Slobodan Avlijaš submitted a
report to the RS Minister of Justice, Momĉilo Mandić, stating that at the time, 90 Muslim
―prisoners of war‖ were being held in the Culture and Sport Centre, which was being secured by
the Hadţići SJB.7177 The report also stated that the Hadţići SJB did not have the authority to keep
people in custody for longer than three days, and therefore was acting ―without any authorisation
or justification in law‖.7178 On the same day, Mandić ordered the Serb Municipality of Hadţići to
transfer all of its detainees to the Butmir KPD Investigations Department in Svrake.7179
(#EXCULPATORY#!!! Hadzici was a very distant and isolated municipality, two third of it
surrounded by the adversary’s territory, and once the Minister for Justice have learnt about
irregularities, he #ordered the rectification#! And that is the Serb official, not some
paramilitaries that had been banned by the President!) On the following day, all but 14 of the
remaining men were transferred to Planjo‘s house in Svrake.7180 So, the #“next level”# of the
7170
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 119; P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 6.
7171
P125 (Zijad Okić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 3 February 1993), pp. 1–2; P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para.
121. See also P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 57–58. While Okić described the work platoon as ―voluntary‖,
Musić stated that although some prisoners volunteered to work in exchange for cigarettes, Vujović would come in with a list of names and have the men
escorted out by police in camouflage uniforms. P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 6; P2403 (Witness statement of
Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 121–122. The Chamber therefore finds that at least some men were forced to work.
7172
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 7. See also P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011),
para. 58 (stating that he believed that some detainees were killed and wounded while at the frontline).
7173
P125 (Zijad Okić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 3 February 1993), p. 2.
7174
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 122. Brane Mijatović and Zoran Gašević were present at the second
interrogation. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 122. Musić did not mention any beatings during either
interrogation.
7175
P125 (Zijad Okić‘s statement to the BiH authorities, 3 February 1993), p. 2.
7176
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 6, he states that ―noone [sic] was beaten or hurt during this period‖.
7177
P1607 (RS Ministry of Justice report on prisons and camps on the RS territory, 22 October 1992), e-court pp. 6–7, 28.
7178
P1607 (RS Ministry of Justice report on prisons and camps on the RS territory, 22 October 1992), e-court p. 7.
7179
P1607 (RS Ministry of Justice report on prisons and camps on the RS territory, 22 October 1992), e-court p. 28; P2307 (RS Ministry of Justice order to
Hadţići and Ilidţa municipalities, 22 October 1992).
7180
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 123–125; P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court
p. 6; P125 (Zijad Okić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 3 February 1993), p. 1 (estimating that he was transferred on 23 September but was unsure of the
date). See also Scheduled Detention Faciltiy C.26.1. The Chamber recalls that Mladen Tolj testified that the men who were transferred to Planjo‘s House
had been captured in combat and were not civilians. Mladen Tolj, T. 34652 (1 March 2013). However, the Chamber notes that Tolj did not mention the basis
for his knowledge in this regard, and in light of the extensive evidence of Okić and Musić regarding their prior periods of detention, the Chamber shall not
rely on Tolj‘s testimony in this regard.
 325

authorities corrected ommisions of the lower level. Anyway, how possibly the central organs
could have been liable for everything that happened between those two ethnic communities,
antagonized as everywhere in BiH through centuries. There was no a satisfactory
communication with Pale, as Samoukovic confirmed, D03062, para. 20.

a. Conclusion

2112. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims, including women and
children, were detained at the Hadţići Culture and Sport Centre between at least 25 May and
approximately 18 September 1992. In particular, during a first period lasting from at least 25 May
to approximately 22 June, Bosnian Muslims were subjected to beatings by Arkan‘s men, as well as
to beatings and sexual abuse by Šešelj‘s men, who each visited the premises once during the first
half of June. The Chamber finds that throughout this period, the group was detained in poor
conditions that included a lack of food and water. Additionally, the Chamber finds that between
7 September and approximately 18 September, when the women and children were released,
Bosnian Muslims were held under conditions which included lack of food and poor sanitation and
hygiene. The Chamber finds that after the women and children were released on 18 September,
the men were forced to work by digging trenches near the frontlines. (However, the Chamber
erred not to even mention what was the contribution of the Muslim side to the situation in
the Hadzici Municipality. As usually in this Court, the other boxing fighter is invisible, and
we see only the Serbs taking some measures that look unnecessary and with an aggressive
purpose. For instance, the Chamber completely missed to notice that the Serbs controlled
only about 20% of the territory of municipality, i.e. only the Serb settlements, as well as that
the Muslims were the first one who attacked Hadzici, see D03062, para 9:

as well as the #Serb strategy was only defensive# one, since the confrontation lines never
changed, see D03062, para 19

Also, the rest of about 80% of the municipal territory was dominated and controlled by the
Muslims, (see D03062, para.18 #The Serbs controlled only Serb areas#! .

and the Serbs suffered a #horrible torture in Tarcin and Pazaric#, detained in a small
private facilities, in a tunnel and the most notorius Silos (Silo) in Tarcin. The Chamber
 326

should have known that this conduct of the Muslim side made a powerful impact both on the
Serbs and Muslims in the Serb Municipality of Hadzici! One fact is never contested by
anyone: THE MUSLIMS IN HADZICI MUNICIPALITY STARTED THE WAR AND
CONTINUED WITH THE ATTACKS, WHILE THE #SERBS ONLY DEFENDED#
THEMSELVES! All the evidence must have been analysed within this light! If not, this was
not a fair trial!)

i. Movement of the population from Hadţići and appropriation of property

2113. On 24 May 1992, President of the Hadţići Crisis Staff appointed a commission charged
with listing all abandoned flats and other property within the territory of the Hadţići Serb
Municipality,7181 the ―vast majority‖ of which belonged to Muslims.7182 Radić ordered that the
flats be sealed, registered, and placed at the disposal of the Serb municipality.7183 This was done
immediately upon Radić‘s order.7184 On 19 July 1992, the President sent a memorandum to the
municipality of Hadţići requesting an inventory of all vacant housing facilities following the
―voluntary departure of Muslims‖, (This nuance in the President’s memorandum excluded a
very possibility that the apartments of those who may have been leaving municipality
unvoluntarily, or beeng in the detention, be used for that purpose. Remember that the
apartments were either municipal, or company property, given for use to the tenants, while
the “one-family houses had been a private property!) explaining that vacant homes would be
used to house Serb residents of the Muslim part of Sarajevo, who would soon be leaving the
city.7185
2114. On 15 December 1992, the 4th session of the Serbian Hadţići Municipal Assembly
adopted the ―Statute of the Serbian municipality of Hadţići‖, the ―Rules of Procedure for the
Serbian municipality of Hadţići‖, and the ―Decision on Law and Order‖.7186 At the same meeting,
the Assembly issued the ―Decision to Rescind Rights Obtained on the Basis of Tenancy Rights or
Employment‖, which stated that ―all persons who were formerly resident on the territory of the
Serbian Municipality of Hadţići‖ who had not returned to the municipality and had not provided
an explanation for their absence would be labelled ―displaced persons‖ and would not have the
right to citizenship in the RS.7187 However, the minutes of the session indicate that the decision
did not receive sufficient votes to be adopted.7188 Accordingly, the Chamber cannot conclude that
the aforementioned decision was implemented in Hadţići. (Anyway, such a decisions were
#never and nowhere implemented#, because the President annulled them in his order from
19 August (D01754)

2115. The Chamber recalls that, as described above, a group of male detainees was transferred to
the Slaviša Vajner Ĉiĉa Barracks in Lukavica on approximately 22 June 1992,7189 and that another

7181
D1084 (Hadţići Crisis Staff Decision, 26 May 1992); D3062 (Witness statement of Nevenko Samouković dated 26 February 1993), para. 12 (stating that
this task was delegated to him and that he took an inventory of all abandoned apartments and sealed them in order to prevent subsequent intrusion).
7182
D3062 (Witness statement of Nevenko Samouković dated 26 February 1993), para. 12.
7183
D1084 (Hadţići Crisis Staff Decision, 26 May 1992). Samouković testified that the language referring to ―placing these apartments at the disposal of the
municipality‖ was added in order to lend credence to the idea that the municipal authorities would not permit looting. Nevenko Samouković, T. 34610
(1 March 2013).
7184
Nevenko Samouković, T. 34610–34611 (1 March 2013) (suggesting that the Hadţići commission took action in this regard pursuant to Radić‘s order and not
the Accused‘s order of 19 July 1992 [P739]). But see P6167 (Request of Hadţići Secretariat for Housing and Public Utilities, 27 July 1992) (ordering the
commissioners to inventory all abandoned and vacant dwellings that could be lived in; bearing a signature for Samouković).
7185
P739 (RS Presidency request to various municipalities, 19 July 1992).
7186
D1085 (Minutes of meeting of Hadţići Municipal Assembly, 15 December 1992), pp. 2–3, 5; P2306 (Report on the work of the Hadţići Municipal
Assembly in 1992), p. 2.
7187
D1083 (Decision of Hadţići Municipal Assembly, 15 December 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact 2571. In addition, the displaced persons would forfeit
their property for the defence of the municipality and would no longer be entitled to any rights obtained on the basis of employment. Tihomir Glavaš, T.
12022–12023 (16 February 2011); D1083 (Decision of Hadţići Municipal Assembly, 15 December 1992).
7188
D1085 (Minutes of meeting of Hadţići Municipal Assembly, 15 December 1992), pp. 4–5.
7189
See para. 2106
 327

group was transferred to Planjo‘s house in Svrake on 23 October 1992.7190 Defence witnesses
testified that Bosnian Muslims left these areas of Hadţići of their own volition in order to move to
areas with a Bosnian Muslim majority.7191 As a result, a Bosnian Muslim commission based in
Tarĉin and a Bosnian Serb commission based in Hadţići were formed to visit Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Serbs held in opposing territories and to interview them about their wishes to leave or
stay.7192 Defence witnesses also testified that ―many‖ Bosnian Muslims remained in Hadţići until
the end of the war.7193 Having considered this evidence, however, the Chamber observes that
these assertions do not directly contradict the evidence indicating that the groups described above
were transferred out of the municipality. The Chamber therefore finds that the two groups of male
detainees held at the Hadţići Culture and Sport Centre were forced to leave and transferred out of
the municipality on approximately 22 June 1992 and 23 October 1992, respectively. (It looks as if
the Chamber checked only those allegations of the OTP, without considering what happened
and why it happened. How come some #could stay in Hadzici till the end of war#? Neither of
them had been forced to stay or to leave, they followed their sense of security, particularly if
they had their close relatives in the Muslim Army. The OTP said there were detained people,
and the Chamber said: yes, we could agree. In the meantime the Chamber believes
everything to the Muslim witnesses, as if they weren’t interested in exaggerating and telling
lies to denigrate the opposite side. Also, neither the OTP, nor the Chamber established what
all of that have to do with the President? A centuries long conflict and animosity brake out
every forty to fifty years, and what this President has to do with it? It must have been kept in
mind all the time that the inherited federal legislation gave a very wide competences to the
local authorities pertaining the defence If the Prosecution and the Court in it’s entirety took
care of the “whole truth” they wouldn’t miss to oversee the D317, a “military secret, Highly
confidential report from Hadzici to the Operative Command of the SRK on 29 May 1992:

(A formidable #Serb loses#: killed 15 + missing 9 + 1 + 8 civilians makes 43 killed, plus 25

wounded!!! Taking into account the fact that the “Serb Forces” was not a professional army,
but a people’s army composed of the local people, one can imagine how this “slaughtering”
of civilians could have affected the Serb combatants!)

7190
See para. 2111.
7191
D3062 (Witness statement of Nevenko Samouković dated 26 February 1993), para. 15 (stating that he heard this from their friends and neighbours, as he
―was ill during this period‖), 18; Mladen Tolj, T. 34648–34649 (1 March 2013); D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013),
para. 85. See also Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11926–11929, 11933 (15 February 2011); D1064 (Map of Sarajevo marked by Tihomir Glavaš) (referring to Bosnian
Muslims being evacuated from majority Bosnian Muslim villages—denoted in green— within the circle marked ―1‖). Vidomir Banduka referred to a
decision of the Bosanski Hadţići War Presidency dated 23 October 1993 authorising an exchange of Serb civilians from Pazarić and Tarĉin for ―Muslim
civilians who are currently in the area of Hadţići, on the principle of ―all for all and on a voluntary basis‖. D2920 (Decision of Bosanski Hadţići War
Presidency, 23 October 1993). Banduka opined that this document showed that ―people were moving by themselves to areas where their nation was the
majority‖. D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), paras. 80–81. However, the Chamber observes that this document only
relates to the populations present in the respective territories at that time and as such, is not relevant to any movement of population that occurred in 1992.
7192
D2915 (Witness statement of Vidomir Banduka dated 9 February 2013), para. 85. See also Vidomir Banduka, T. 33541–33542 (13 February 2013); Mladen
Tolj, T. 34648 (1 March 2013).
7193
D3062 (Witness statement of Nevenko Samouković dated 26 February 1993), para. 15; Mladen Tolj, T 34649 (1 March 2013); Vidomir Banduka, T 33542
(13 February 2013). Radojka Pandurević stated that she heard that Bosnian Muslims who stayed in Hadţići eventually left because ―they were afraid about
a Serbian revenge‖. D2490 (Witness statement of Radojka Pandurević dated 27 November 2012), para. 65; Radojka Pandurević, T. 30669
(29 November 2012). See also D3063 (Witness statement of Mladen Tolj dated 25 February 2013), para. 12 (stating that Muslims left because of fear of
reprisals for the abuses in the Silos camp).
 328

a. Ilidţa

i. Charges

2116. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity was
committed in Ilidţa as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and/or
Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.7194 Acts of persecution alleged to have been committed
by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs in Ilidţa include killings
related to the KP Dom Butmir (Kula Prison) (hereinafter referred to as ―Kula Prison‖).7195 The
Prosecution also characterises these killings as extermination, a crime against humanity, under
Count 4; murder, a crime against humanity, under Count 5; and murder, a violation of the laws or
customs or war, under Count 6.7196

2117. Other acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Ilidţa by Serb Forces and
Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include (i) torture, beatings, and physical and
psychological abuse, during and after the take-over as well as in Kula Prison as cruel or inhumane
treatment;7197 (ii) rape and other acts of sexual violence during and after the take-over as well as in
Kula Prison as cruel and inhumane treatment;7198 (iii) the establishment and perpetuation of
inhumane living conditions in Kula Prison, including the failure to provide adequate
accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic sanitation facilities, as cruel or
inhumane treatment;7199 (iv) forcible transfer or deportation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats from their homes within Ilidţa;7200 (v) unlawful detention in Kula Prison;7201 (vi) forced
labour at the frontline and the use of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as human shields;7202
(vii) the appropriation or plunder of property, during and after the take-over, during arrests and
detention, and in the course of or following acts of deportation or forcible transfer;7203 and (viii)
the imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.7204

2118. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible
transfer), respectively, as crimes against humanity.7205 In this regard, the Prosecution alleges that
by the end of 1992, Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs had forcibly
displaced Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Ilidţa in which they had been
lawfully present.7206 It is alleged that from March 1992, restrictive and discriminatory measures,
arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence, killing,

7194
Indictment, paras. 48–49.
7195
Indictment, para. 60(a). See Scheduled Incidents B.13.1, B.13.3.
7196
Indictment, para. 63(a), 63(b).
7197
Indictment, para. 60(b). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.2
7198
Indictment, para. 60(c). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.2
7199
Indictment, para. 60(d). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.2.
7200
Indictment, para. 60(f).
7201
Indictment, para. 60(g). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.2.
7202
Indictment, para. 60(h).
7203
Indictment, para. 60(i).
7204
Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement; the removal from positions of
authority; the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or the denial of
equal access to public services. The Chamber notes that there are no cultural monuments and sacred sites with respect to Vlasenica in Schedule D of the
Indictment. In addition the Prosecution does not allege criminal responsibility for wanton destruction of private property in Ilidţa. Indictment, fn. 9.
7205
Indictment, paras. 68–75.
7206
Indictment, paras. 69, 72.
 329

as well as the threat of further such acts caused Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to flee in
fear, while others were physically driven out.7207

ii. Background

2119. Ilidţa is one of the ten constitutive municipalities of Sarajevo and is located to the west of
Novo Sarajevo, southwest of Novi Grad, and to the northeast of Hadţići.7208 According to the
1991 census, the population of Ilidţa municipality was 43.2% Muslim, 36.8% Serb, 10.2% Croat,
7.6% Yugoslav, and 2.1% identified themselves as other.7209 Prior to the conflict, the populations
of the local communes of Hrasnica, Butmir, Stupsko Brdo, part of Donji Kotorac, and Sokolović
Kolonija were predominantly Muslim and those of Otes, Bare, and Stup were predominantly
Croat. The populations of the other local communes were predominantly Serb.7210

2120. The territory of Ilidţa municipality was strategically important because of its roads and
railway that link Sarajevo town with eastern and central BiH and because the Sarajevo Airport is
located there.7211

2121. After the first multi-party elections held in November 1990, in which the SDA won the
highest number of seats in the municipal assembly, there was an inter-party agreement on the
division of power in Ilidţa.7212 (#Manipulation with the municipal borders#! And that
happened only because of a “gerrymanderism” of the Yugoslav kind: Ilidza as almost
entirely Serb municipality had been “enriched” by adding a predominantly Muslim
neighbouring settlement of Hrasnica, which changed the ethnic proportion. In addition, the
Muslim communists built up another settlement, Sokolovic Kolonija, in the middle of the
Serb territory, and settled it by the Muslims from Sandzak in Serbia! In any multi-ethnic
country that would cause a big commotion, but the communists did it without troubles! The
real ethnic distribution still was in favour of the Serbs, since the Yugoslavs in 1991 could
have been 90% Serbs, because Yugoslavia was not beloved by the others in 1991. The ethnic
picture was as follows:Total: 67438, Croats: 6914, Muslims: 28973, Serbs: 25061, Yugoslavs:
5134, others: 1356. Therefore, there was 30,195 Serbs, or at least those who were against the
secession!) Husein Mahmutović, of the SDA, became the President of the municipality and
Radomir Kezunović, of the SDS, became the President of the Executive Board.7213 Momĉilo
Ĉeklić of the SDS became the Secretary of the Assembly.7214 NeĊeljko Prstojević became the
Secretary for Communal Inspections and the SDS President for Ilidţa municipality.7215 Of a total
of 13 official posts, Bosnian Serbs and Muslims each held six and one post was held by a Bosnian
Croat.7216

7207
Indictment, para. 71.
7208
P973 (Robert Donia‘s expert report entitled ―Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo, 1990–1995‖, January 2010), p. 8; Appendix B, Map 1;
P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), para. 17; Radomir Kezunović, T. 13908 (31 May 2011).
7209
P5964 (Census data for BiH by municipality in 1971, 1981, and 1991, April 1995), p. 2 of original and English versions. See also D3112 (Witness
statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 6.
7210
Radomir Kezunović, T. 13942–13943 (31 May 2011); NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13264–13265 (11 March 2011), T. 13834 (21 March 2011); D1249 (Ethnic
map of Sarajevo).
7211
D1218 (Ilidţa National Security Service report, 17 May 1992), p. 2; P2308 (SJB Ilidţa report, 20 September 1993), p. 2. See also D2479 (Witness statement
of Mile Sladoje dated 25 November 2012), para. 8; Nikola Mijatović, T. 30701 (30 November 2012).
7212
D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 6.
7213
P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), para. 14; D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para.
6.
7214
D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 6.
7215
P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), para. 15.
7216
D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 6.
 330

2122. Inter-ethnic tensions were rising in Ilidţa from at least May 1991; however, Kezunović
and Mahmutović made efforts to work together in the joint-Assembly.7217 Despite these efforts,
each side created separate institutions. The SDA formed a crisis staff for the Muslim part of Ilidţa
in July or August 1991,7218 and starting that autumn, Muslim populations in majority Muslim
settlements were arming themselves and organising military formations.7219

2123. In accordance with the Variant A/B Instructions, the SDS established a Crisis Staff in
Ilidţa on 2 January 1992,7220 and Radomir Kezunović declared the Assembly of the Serb
Municipality of Ildiţa (―Ilidţa Serb Assembly‖) the following day.7221 However, the joint
Assembly of the Municipality of Ilidţa made efforts to work together until the beginning of
April 1992.7222 (All of the Serb restraint is #EXCULPATORY#!!! The Serb side was tryin to
preserve the peace and common life in the municipality! The Muslim side did all the
destructive preparations far in advance, as recognised in the Judgement!)

2124. On 3 January 1992, the Ilidţa Serb Assembly made a proposal to the Bosnian Serb
Assembly to regulate, inter alia, the status of members of TO units and military-aged men as well
as to take measures for the protection of the interests of Serbs in the territory of the Ilidţa
municipality.7223 Starting around the beginning of March 1992, local Serbs organised themselves
and held neighbourhood watches in front of their houses.7224 In March and April 1992, Serb
Forces distributed weapons seized from MUP storage units to Bosnian Serb civilians and members
of the Serb TO.7225 Bosnian Serbs in Ilidţa were also armed with weapons from JNA
warehouses.7226 (Because only the Serbs made the JNA manpower!)

2125. The Ilidţa MUP was divided in March 1992, after Bosnian Muslim police officers were
dismissed from the SJBs; (#Due to the ICFY results#! Not exactly, but after the Conference on
BiH accepted that the constituent units would have their own police. The police station in
Ilidza happened to be in the Serb part of Ilidza, and it was not “dismissal, but a separation in
a good atmosphere.) the Bosnian Serbs stayed in the Ilidţa police station.7227 Edin Mlivić, then
Chief of the Ilidţa SJB, and Tomislav Kovaĉ, then Ilidţa police commander,7228 agreed that the
Bosnian Serb police would function in the parts of Ilidţa that had a Serb majority and the Bosnian
7217
P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), paras. 42, 59, 61. See also Radomir Kezunović, T. 13936–13937, 13960–13963,
13989 (31 May 2011); D1252 (Supplemental Information Sheet for Radomir Kezunović, 29 May 2011), para. 14. See also NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13591
(17 March 2011); D1178 (Minutes of meeting between SDA, SDS, and HDZ in Ilidţa, 23 July 1991), pp 1–2.
7218
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13614 (17 March 2011); D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 13.
7219
D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28 October 2013), paras. 39– 40; D2553 (Witness statement of Svetozar Guzina dated 3 December
2012), paras. 3–5; D2479 (Witness statement of Mile Sladoje dated 25 November 2012), para. 3.
7220
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12942–12943 (3 March 2011), T. 12952–12953 (8 March 2011), T. 13615 (17 March 2011); Momĉilo Ĉeklić, T. 35210–35212
(12 March 2013); D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 11; P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the
Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), p. 3.
7221
P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), paras. 41–44, 48; Radomir Kezunović, T. 13901, 13946 (31 May 2011); Momĉilo
Ĉeklić, T. 35210–35212 (12 March 2013); D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 12; P2408 (Decision on proclaiming
Serb Municipal Assembly of Ilidţa, 3 January 1992), NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12953–12954 (8 March 2011), T. 13628–13629 (17 March 2015), T. 13645
(18 March 2011); P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), p. 4; P2531 (TANJUG news report,
11 January); D1184 (Article from Javnost entitled ―Serbian Municipality Proclaimed,‖ 11 January 1992).
7222
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12957–12359 (8 March 2011), T. 13630 (17 March 2011), T. 13645 (18 March 2011); P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir
Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), paras. 14, 46, 49, 54, 66; Radomir Kezunović, T. 13946, 13965–13966 (31 May 2011); D3112 (Witness statement of
Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), paras. 11–12; Momĉilo Ĉeklić, T. 35210 (12 March 2013).
7223
P2409 (Ilidţa Municipal Assembly proposal of decision, 3 January 1992); NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12956–12957 (8 March 2011).
7224
D2479 (Witness statement of Mile Sladoje dated 25 November 2012), para. 4; D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), paras.
17–18.
7225
P2308 (SJB Ilidţa report, 20 September 1993), p. 2; Momĉilo Ĉeklić, T. 35214 (12 March 2013); D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated
28 October 2013), para. 60. See also P2976 (Ilidţa SJB proposal for decorations, 11 September 1993), p. 3.
7226
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 8; Momĉilo Ĉeklić, T. 35214 (12 March 2013). At the beginning of April 1992,
the procedure for the distribution of weapons was through the SDS (P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), para. 67).
7227
P2308 (SJB Ilidţa report, 20 September 1993), p. 3; D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28 October 2013), para. 49. See also Adjudicated
Fact 2572; Mirsad Kuĉanin, P16 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Galić), T. 4500; Mirsad Kuĉanin, P17 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T.
28935; P2977 (Report of Ilidţa SJB), p. 1.
7228
D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28 October 2013), paras. 4, 48; Radomir Kezunović, T. 13936–13937 (31 May 2011); Tihomir Glavaš,
T. 11825 (14 February 2011).
 331

Muslim police would function in those parts with a Muslim majority.7229 Initially, they continued
to share the same building.7230 On 6 April 1992, the Bosnian Muslims stationed their MUP in
Stup, with Mlivić as its chief, and established their ―War Presidency‖.7231 Kovaĉ was Chief of the
Ilidţa SJB from 1 April to 6 August 1992,7232 when Tihomir Glavaš succeeded him.7233
(Therefore, there was #no any “taking over”# of the municipality, there was an agreement
that there would exist two municipalities of the two ethnic communities on their respective
territories, as was proposed throughout BiH!)

2126. On 5 April 1992, the Ilidţa Serb Assembly declared the Serb Municipality of Ilidţa, to
include the territory of settlements with a majority Serbian population in Ilidţa and parts of Novi
Grad, Kiseljak, and Trnovo.7234 The Serb Municipality of Ilidţa excluded the communities where
Muslims and Croats were a majority.7235 (#Two municipalities#! That was a fair and expected
move, and that was the only way of #“homogenisation of territories”#, not expelling the
people. This was proposed to all the municipalities where the Serbs, Muslims and Croats
could have formed their municipalities through the fair negotiations. The Serb attitude was
not to claim for any settled place that wasn’t predominantly Serb, and that would be advised
to the others!) After 6 April 1992, the Ilidţa Serb Assembly became a War Presidency, pursuant
to an instruction from the Bosnian Serb Assembly.7236 (On April 6 the war started in Sarajevo,
and Ilidza was one of the ten municipalities of the city of Sarajevo!) On 6 April 1992, the
Ilidţa Crisis Staff ordered general mobilisation.7237 (In the context of the war, and due to the
Federal Law of all-peoples Defence, #municipalities were entitled to do so#!) A new Serb
Crisis Staff was established by the Serbian Municipality of Ilidţa and was publicly announced on
10 April 1992.7238 Prstojević became the commander of the Crisis Staff but Kezunović remained
as its President for about 15 to 20 days until he passed over his responsibilities to Prstojević.7239

2127. Until 19 May 1992, when the VRS was formed, the Serb TO staff organised defence in
7240
Ilidţa. At that point, the TO defence units became part of the VRS, first as part of the Ilidţa
Brigade and then as part of the Igman Brigade.7241

iii. Armed conflict in Ilidţa

2128. Around 3 or 4 April 1992, barricades were erected around Ilidţa.7242 From April 1992,
there was an escalation in combat activity,7243 and Ilidţa was constantly under fire.7244 The eastern
7229
D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28 October 2013), para. 49; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11825 (14 February 2011).
7230
P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), para. 62; D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28 October 2013),
para. 49.
7231
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13705 (18 March 2011); D1208 (SerBiH MUP Daily Report, 4 May 1992), p. 3.
7232
D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28 October 2013), para. 4.
7233
Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11804 (14 February 2011); D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 19.
7234
D1190 (Ilidţa Crisis Staff announcement, 11 April 1992); D1191 (SRNA news report, 11 April 1992); D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated
8 March 2013), para. 19. In addition, the Serbian Municipality of Ilidţa incorporated part of Mojmila, Dobrinja, Nedţariće, and Vojniĉko Polje. See also
P973 (Robert Donia‘s expert report entitled ―Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo, 1990–1995‖, January 2010), p. 35; Robert Donia, T. 3134
(1 June 2010).
7235
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13264–13265 (11 March 2011); Radomir Kezunović, T. 13989–13990 (31 May 2011).
7236
P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), para. 68.
7237
D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), paras. 19–20; NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12968 (8 March 2011); D3113 (Ilidţa Crisis Staff
order, 6 April 1992), p. 1; P2410 (Ilidţa Crisis Staff Order on implementation of general mobilisation, 6 April 1992); NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12968
(8 March 2011).
7238
P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), paras. 54, 56; Radomir Kezunović, T. 13901 (31 May 2011); D1193 (Ilidţa Crisis
Staff members, 10 April 1992).
7239
P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), paras. 54, 57–58, 73; Radomir Kezunović, T. 13901 (31 May 2011); NeĊeljko
Prstojević, T. 12961 (8 March 2011); D1193 (Ilidţa Crisis Staff members, 10 April 1992).
7240
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12970–12971 (8 March 2011), T. 13757 (21 March 2011). See also D1218 (Ilidţa National Security Service report, 17 May 1992),
p. 2.
7241
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12975 (8 March 2011), T. 13799 (21 March 2011); Milomir Šoja, P1633 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. D. Milošević), T. 5160,
5162; Milomir Šoja, T. 7206–7207 (30 September 2010). The Ilidţa Brigade was established on 20 May 1992. NeĊeljko Prstojević, T.
13799 (21 March 2011).
 332

and western parts of Ilidţa were controlled by the Serbs but were divided by Muslim held territory
in the middle.7245 The eastern and western parts of Ilidţa were shelled by Bosnian Muslim forces
from Mt. Mojmilo and Mt. Igman, respectively.7246 By the end of April 1992, Bosnian Serbs
shelled various neighbourhoods in Sarajevo, including Butmir and Hrasnica in Ilidţa
municipality.7247 (Muslims shelled not only from Mt. Mojmilo and Mt. Igman, but from all
the Muslim settlements, and there is so many genuine evidence of that! The Serb responses
happened because the Muslim weaponry and heavy artillery was firing from those
settlements!#Abuse of civil settlements#! )

2129. In April 1992, Prstojević issued orders which resulted in various aspects of daily life being
blocked. First, on 14 April, he ordered the suspension of activities of almost all enterprises in
Ilidţa.7248 (Those enterprises were on a front line, under a constant artillery fire while
working, which caused a lot of casualties among the employees. When not working, there
was almost no fire against those enterprises, see@@) Then, on 19 April, he ordered that all
access to roads be blocked, with the exception of emergency medical assistance, local food supply,
water control and electrical power enterprises.7249 (It was also a #defensive activity#. No matter
was it exaggerated caution or not, but the motive was that. And that was completely within
the realm of his obligation and competences, since he was the president of municipality, and
thus the president of the Defence committee! What should have been done while the Serb
settlements had been surrounded by the #Muslim and Croat settlements, totally
militarised#?)

2130. On 22 April 1992, the Bosnian Muslim forces attacked the western and central parts of
Ilidţa.7250 After this attack, a confrontation line was established. Bosnian Serb and Muslim forces
established positions along the roads leading from Sarajevo.7251 Combat activity continued in

7242
P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), para. 66; Radomir Kezunović, T. 13965–13966 (31 May 2011).
7243
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13646–13647, 13665, 13683–13687, 13691–13692, 13699, 13703 (18 March 2011); D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić
dated 8 March 2013), paras. 25–32; Momĉilo Ĉeklić T. 35214––35220 (12 March 2013); P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated
21 May 2011), para. 73; Radomir Kezunović, T. 13965–13966 (31 May 2011); D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28 October 2013),
paras. 50–53; D1196 (Public announcement from Ilidţa Crisis Staff Information Service, 13 April 1992); D1200 (Protocol from meeting between SDS and
SDA in Ilidţa, 23 April 1992); D1201 (Intercept of conversation between Ĉedo Klajić and Tomislav Kovaĉ, 20 April 1992); D1203 (Radovan Karadţić's
announcement, 22 April 1992); D2479 (Witness statement of Mile Sladoje dated 25 November 2012), para. 4; D2553 (Witness statement of Svetozar
Guzina dated 3 December 2012), para. 28; P1996 (Witness statement of Martin Bell dated 8 March 2010), para. 61; P2025 (BBC news report re Ilidţa, with
transcript).
7244
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13660 (18 March 2011); P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), para. 66; Radomir Kezunović, T.
13965–13966 (31 May 2011).
7245
Radomir Kezunović, T. 13915 (31 May 2011); NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13760 (21 March 2011).
7246
Radomir Kezunović, T. 13982–13984 (31 May 2011); D1255 (Ilidţa Wartime Commission Statement, 29 October 1992. See also D2479 (Witness
statement of Mile Sladoje dated 25 November 2012), paras. 9–10; NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13660 (18 March 2011); D1076 (MUP Administration for the
Police Duties and Affairs report, 3 August 1992), p. 5.
7247
See Adjudicated Fact 2573 (stating that the Serb SJB also took part in the attacks). See Section IV.B.1.a: Chronology of events in Sarajevo.
7248
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13666–13667, 13669 (18 March 2011); D1197 (Ilidţa Crisis Staff order, 14 April 1992); D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo
Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 21. See also D1206 (Ilidţa Crisis Staff announcement, 1 May 1992).
7249
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13679–13680 (18 May 2011), T. 13796–13797 (21 March 2011); D1199 (Ilidţa Crisis Staff decision, 19 April 1992); D1238
(Intercept of conversation between Ratko Mladić and NeĊeljko Prstojević, 24 May 1992); Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik),
T. 9003–9004; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4684–4689 (6 July 2010); Momĉilo Mandić, C3 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 9484–9485;
P1147 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and Tomislav Kovaĉ, 20 April 1992), p. 1–2; P5712 (Intercept of conversation between
Momĉilo Mandić and Branko Đerić, 20 April 1992), p. 2.
7250
D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28 October 2013), para. 51–52; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11947–11948, 12005–12006 (16 February 2011);
D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 25; Momĉilo Ĉeklić T. 35215 (12 March 2013); NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13646–
13647, 13683–136884, 13692 (18 March 2011); P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), para. 73; Radomir Kezunović, T.
13965–13966 (31 May 2011); Martin Bell, T. 9818–9819 (14 December 2010); D918 (BBC news report re Sarajevo, with transcript). See also D2538
(Witness statement of Milan Pejić dated 2 December 2012), para. 15; P2308 (SJB Ilidţa report, 20 September 1993, p. 4; Colm Doyle, T. 2775–2778
(26 May 2010); D221 (RS MUP report re attack on Ilidţa, 28 April 1992), p. 2; D1200 (Protocol from meeting between SDS and SDA in Ilidţa,
23 April 1992); D223 (SRNA news report, 23 April 1992); P5713 (Intercept of conversation between Rade Ristić and ―Ilija‖, 20 April 1992), pp. 1–2.
7251
D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28 October 2013), para. 55.
 333

May 1992.7252 By 8 May 1992, Serb Forces were in control of the territories composing the Serb
Municipality of Ilidţa and some areas of life could return to normal.7253

2131. Several armed groups were present in Ilidţa during 1992.7254 Most notably, Brne
Gavrilović and his group of Šešelj‘s men,7255 arrived in Ilidţa on 9 July 1992.7256 On several
occasions in 1992 and 1993, members of Gavrilović‘s group looted and expelled Bosnian Muslims
from their homes.7257 Other armed groups also engaged in looting.7258 When confronted by
security forces, members of these groups sometimes issued threats.7259 However, at times,
members of the MUP tolerated the looting and even participated themselves.7260 Some members
of the MUP could have been involved, but the MUP as the institution wasn’t, and the MUP
fired and processed through the disciplinary procedures many of it’s members. It was a
constant task issued by orders of the first Minister Stanisic, and his successors. Only in the
first year of war, until January 93, more than six thousands of regular and reserve
policemen were fired after the order of Minister Stanisic. See: D00473, a periodic report,
meeting in Trebinje D00473 MUP, p.
13/14

7252
Radomir Kezunović, T. 13967, 13968, 13970 (31 May 2011); NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13677–13678, 13704, 13717, 13724–13728 (18 March 2011); D3112
(Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 33; D1208 (SerBiH MUP Daily Report, 4 May 1992), D1211 (Ilidţa Crisis Staff
information, 13 May 1992); D1212 (Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Milosav Gagović, 13 May 1992), D1213 (Intercept of
conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Tadija, 14 May 1992); ); D1214 (Ilidţa Crisis Staff information, 14 May 1992); D1215 (Intercept of
conversation between Ðogo and NeĊeljko Prstojević, and between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Radivoje Grković, 14 May 1992), pp. 1–2; D1216 (Intercept of
conversation between Ðogo and Mandrić, 14 May 1992), p. 1; D1218 (Ilidţa National Security Service report, 17 May 1992), p. 1; P5667 (Intercept of
conversation between Milosav Gagović and NeĊeljko Prstojević, 15 May 1992). See also D1210 (Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević
and Grandić, 12 May 1992); John Wilson, T. 3918 (21 June 2010); D1214 (Ilidţa Crisis Staff information, 14 May 1992).
7253
D1209 (SerBiH MUP Daily Report, 8 May 1992), p. 2; NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13706–13707 (18 March 2011); P2790 (SerBiH MUP daily report, 12 May
1992), p. 2. See Adjudicated Fact 2574. See also D2773 (Witness statement of Slavko Mijanović dated 19 January 2013), para. 5; D1248 (Intercept of
conversation between unkown male person and Legija, 15 May 1992), p. 4; D1254 (Decision on the Formation of the Serbian Municipality of Ilidţa,
8 May 1992), p. 1; P1103 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and Branko Kvesić/Bruno Stojić/Mićo Stanišić, 5 May 1992), p. 9.
7254
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12976–12980, 12983–12986, 12988 (8 March 2011), T. 13825–13826, 13829–13832 (21 March 2011); Radomir Kezunović, T.
13912–13913 (31 May 2011); P2229 (Intercept of conversation between Mićo Stanišić and Nedjelko Ţugić, 15 May 1992); P2411 (Intercept of conversation
between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Milosav Gagović, 14 May 1992); D1248 (Intercept of conversation between Ţeljko Raţnatović and Legija, 15 May 1992),
pp 4, 12–14; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 12041–12043 (16 February 2011); Ratomir Maksimović, D2667 (Witness statement of Ratomir Maksimović dated 14
December 2012), para. 56; KDZ088, T. 6309–6310 (7 September 2010) (closed session); P1499 (SRK report to VRS Main Staff re Dobrinja, 19 June 1992),
p. 1; D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28 October 2013), paras. 71, 73; P5690 (Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević
and "Đogo", 14 May 1992), p. 2; P133 (Witness statement of Matija Bošković dated 20 November 2003, paras. 35–36, 52; P1107 (SerBiH MUP report to
the Minister of Interior re inspection of Romanija-Biraĉ CSB and SJB, 10 August 1992), pp. 2–3; D541 (SRK combat report, 3 November 1992); P5691
(Intercept of conversation between Legija and Milosav Gagović, 14 May 1992).
7255
D2562 (Witness statement of Vladimir Radojĉić dated 8 December 2012), para. 60; P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para.
74; NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12977–12979 (8 March 2011) (testifying that Šešelj visited the Serbian Municipality of Ilidţa and was received by Prstojević at
the Municipal Assembly Building on one occasion and that on another occasion, he toured Gavrilovć‘s unit); D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj
dated 1 June 2013), paras. 58–61.
7256
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13853–13855 (21 March 2011); Radomir Kezunović, T. 13913–13914 (31 May 2011). See also P2228 (Intercept of conversation
between Vojislav Šešelj and Branislav Gavrilović, April 1992), pp. 1–3. Prstojević gave Gavrilović permission to stay at a motel facility and deserted
summer houses in Gladno Polje to conduct admission and training of volunteer units arriving to the area. See P2302 (Approval of the War Board of
Commissioners of Ilidţa Municipality, 9 July 1992). See also para. 234.
7257
Reports of incidents involving Gavrilović‘s men include D1080 (Ilidţa SJB information, 4 June 1992), p. 3; P2303 (SRK combat report,
18 November 1992), p. 1; D1078 (Romanija–Birĉani CSB report, 23 November 1992; P2304 (Report of the MUP, Sarajevo SNB, 9 January 1993); P2305
(Official note of the Ilidţa War Department of the SNB, 12 February 1993); NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13823–1384 (21 March 2011); P2296 (Witness
statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 74; D1080 (Ilidţa SJB information, 4 June 1992), p. 3. See also D2562 (Witness statement of
Vladimir Radojĉić dated 8 December 2012), para. 60.
7258
P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), para. 74; Radomir Kezunović, T. 13911–13912 (31 May 2011); D3112 (Witness
statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 45. See also P1154 (Witness statement of KDZ088 dated 27–29 April 2010), pp. 131–132 (under
seal).
7259
Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11806 (14 February 2011); P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), paras. 74–75. One example of this
occurred on 20 November 1992. The Ilidţa SJB asked the military police for help to disarm paramilitary groups which had set up an illegal check-point.
When the military police disarmed the group, around 20 armed men showed up and forced the retreat of the military police. D1081 (Ilidţa SJB report, 21
November 1992). See also Momĉilo Ĉeklić, T. 35231–35232 (12 March 2013); KDZ088, T. 6255–6256 (7 September 2010) (closed session).
7260
KDZ088, T. 6260–6262 (7 September 2010) (closed session); P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 388; P1110 (Intercept of
conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and NeĊeljko Prstojević, 2 July 1992), p. 5. See also NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13805 (21 March 2011).
 334

The MUP leaders had been aware of the irregular conduct of some of it’s members, See:
P02761, p. 13 P02761 p. 13

The insufficiently competent reserve policemen were relocated to the VRS, while those who
violated the rules had been dismissed, (#Police purged#! se P02761, p. 18

Finally, the combat activities had a crucial impact on the security situation and ability of the
MUP to maintain law and order, see: D473, p.8.

The report mentioned the municipalities like Hadzici, Ilidza, Ilijas, Vogosca, Novo Sarajevo
as the most problematic just because of the combat activities The same was with the VRS
and the Assembly, permanently seeking for #more law and order#, see: D03484, p. 1
 335

p.2

Nobody should be expected to achieve more than it was possible, and there is a sufficient
evidence that all the #official structures did their best#!)

2132. Prstojević introduced irregular forces into the municipality, and allowed some groups to
loot behind the frontline and expel Bosnian Muslims from their homes.7261 (The Chamber had as
same reasons to discredit this witness on this issue as it discredited some of the Defence
witnesses. And that is because of the constant rivalry between the Police and the Army, and
the Army and civilian authorities in some municipalities, on purely ideological basis
(communists in the Army). However, we do have a document that Prstojevic had nothing to
do with the arrival of Legija and other Arkan’s men, see: D01248, p.9

(#Officials proper conduct#! As it is clearly said by Legija, the Chief of the Serb police in
Ilidza (T. Kovac) didn’t allow any killings of the captured Muslims, saying that these
captured were “their neighbours. Now we will see that Prstojevic didn’t bring the
paramilitaries to Ilidza, that it was sobedy else, see
p.12

7261
KDZ088, T. 6255 (7 September 2010) (closed session); P1154 (Witness statement of KDZ088 dated 27–29 April 2010), pp 134–135, 137, 154–155 (under
seal). See also para. 2159.
 336

p.18.
#Officials proper conduct#! So, neither Prstojevic introduced the paramilitaries, nor they
had been welcome, nor the Chief of the Serb police allowed any of the Muslims, the
neighbours be killed! All very commendable, but used against the President!) In a
conversation with Dragan Despotović regarding combat activity in Kasindolsko Polje on
14 June 1992, Prstojević asked: ―What shall we do? Would it be good if we gave it a thought and
if we organised people from aside/outside to expel them all. Nobody needs to be shot or killed.
Everyone expelled‖. Despotović responded: ―That would be the right move.‖7262 (This still
wasn’t any crime to loudly meditate this possibility, since the Muslims from those
settlements fired all the time, inflicting a great loses to the Serb civilians and military.
Although Prstojevic’s interlocutor said that “that would be the right move”, it #never
happened#, and the Serbs could have easily take these settlements, nor the Muslim
population was expelled!) In June 1992, Tomislav Šipĉić, the then SRK Commander, revoked
Prstojević‘s military command responsibilities; however Prstojević remained as President of the
Crisis Staff and the SDS in Ilidţa.7263 Prstojević subsequently met with the President in Pale and
when he returned to Ilidţa, ―things started to go wrong again.‖7264 (A #nasty suggestion#! The
same would be if it was said that after this visit to the President and return to Ilidza, there
was a “horrible stormy rain”! What does it have to do with his visit to Pale? It is as the
Chamber concluded that immediately after the President’s visit ended, there had been a
severe storm. Is there any evidence that the President was informed and supported eventual
criminal activities in Ilidza? All of the irregular features were sharply in contrast to the
orders, views and intentions of the President. But, it shouldn’t be taken for granted that all
the civilians of other ethnicities in the Serb areas of Sarajevo were harmless and innocent.
There was a continued activity of the Muslim forces to attack the Serb settlements, relying
on some of those civilians that remained in the Serb areas, see: D02854, p. 2

p.3

7262
P1492 (Intercept of conversation between (i) NeĊeljko Prstojević and Radomir and (ii) NeĊeljko Prstojević and Dragan, 14 June 1992), p. 3. The Chamber
notes that Prstojević testified that he did not say that outside groups should be organised to expel people. NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13295–13298
(11 March 2011), T. 13547–13550 (17 March 2011). However, in his interview with the Prosecution, Prstojević stated that by ―outside‖ groups, he was
referring to Arkan‘s, Gavrilović‘s, and Boban‘s groups. P2512 (Excerpt from transcript and video of NeĊeljko Prstojević's interview), pp. 2–3. Having
reviewed the video and transcript of Prstojević‘s interview, the Chamber rejects Prstojević‘s testimony that he was not referring to those groups in the
intercepted conversation.
7263
[REDACTED]. See also P1516 (Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Tomislav Šipĉić, 27 May 1992).
7264
[REDACTED].
 337

That kind of activities never ceased in the zone of Sarajevo, not for a day, and all, the authorities, the
VRS, Police as well as population were at a constant alert!)

2133. From mid-April 1992, there was intense fighting around Dobrinja where the territories
controlled by the Serbs were severed from Lukavica, Pale, and Kotorac on one side and Ilidţa,
Rajlovac, and Vogošća on the other.7265 While the Bosnian Serbs tried to establish a corridor to
connect these neighbourhoods, the Bosnian Muslims sought to link up the old centre of Sarajevo
with neighbourhoods such as Hrasnica and Sokolović Kolonija.7266 In addition, there were
rumours that the SRK wanted to take over Dobrinja because it was predominantly populated by
Serbs.7267 On 21 May 1992, Prstojević had a telephone conversation with Colonel Gagović about
Bosnian Muslims fleeing Dobrinja and Gagović advised him that he had ordered a press centre to
release information that they were only allowing Muslims to leave Dobrinja as entire families
because they did not want the men to be left behind.7268 Around 14 June 1992, the Serb Forces
took Dobrinja 1 and Dobrinja 4 under their control.7269 Prstojević had a meeting with the
President, Mladić, and other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership on 15 June 1992, in which it
was concluded that they would ―clear the Serbian territory‖, starting with Mojmilo and
Dobrinja.7270 (There were a constant #military attacks# from those localities!). Mojmilo anyway was
a hill, dominant to all the Serb areas in the city of Sarajevo, while Dobrinja remained divided till
7271
now. Around 17 June 1992, SRK units took civilians out of Dobrinja to Lukavica barracks. At
Lukavica barracks, the MUP separated and classified them according to their ethnicities and the
Bosnian Muslims were then sent to Kula Prison.7272 (First of all, the #Muslim civilians were housed
in the SRK barracs#, for their safety, since in Dobrinja there were going on a fierce fighting. Second,
The Muslim males who had been transferred to the Kula prison were combatants, not civilians.
Finally, the Commander of the SRK asked that the civilians from the combat areas be housed
somewhere else instead in the Barracks Lukavica, which disturbed the life in the Barracks. See:
D432

”Collecting women, children and old people” was an #obligation according to the domestic
laws# and international standards, because the civilians cought in the battlefield must have

7265
D1196 (Public announcement from Ilidţa Crisis Staff Information Service, 13 April 1992); NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13665 (18 March 2011); D2553 (Witness
statement of Svetozar Guzina dated 3 December 2012), paras. 32–33; Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9377–9378; John
Wilson, T. 3918, 3994 (21 June 2010); KDZ088, T. 6492 (10 September 2010) (closed session). See also D577 (SRK combat report, 6 June 1992); P998
(SRK instructions, 7 June 1992), p. 3; P2019 (BBC news report Dobrinja, with transcript).
7266
D2553 (Witness statement of Svetozar Guzina dated 3 December 2012), para. 32; Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9377–
9378.
7267
P1154 (Witness statement of KDZ088 dated 27–29 April 2010), p. 142 (under seal); Svetozar Guzina, D2553 (Witness statement of Svetozar Guzina dated 3
December 2012), para. 32.
7268
D1236 (Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Milosav Gagović, 21 May 1992), pp. 2–3.
7269
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13561–13562 (17 March 2011).
7270
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), e-court pp 171–172.
7271
[REDACTED]; P991 (SRK combat report re Dobrinja, 17 June 1992), p. 2.
7272
[REDACTED]; P991 (SRK combat report re Dobrinja, 17 June 1992), p. 2. See also Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35185–35186 (11 March 2013); P1126 (SJB
Ilidţa information re KPD Butmir, 20 May 1992), p. 1. But, this was clear both from the testimony and documents that those from
Rogatica had been brought to Kula for the exchange and release to Sarajevo, what was their choice.
 338

been secured out of the combat zone. And this was an additional burden for the Corps
Command! Also envisaged by the #agreements of the warring sides#!)

2134. On 25 June 1992, Prstojević spoke with Rade Ristić, a member of the Crisis Staff, and
gave him permission to transfer Bosnian Muslim apartments in Dobrinja to Serbs who were
involved in the fighting there and advised Ristić that he had printed the requisite forms for such
transfer.72732134 During this conversation, Prstojević learned that Serbs Forces were holding their
ground in the Kasindol area and told Ristić: ―All right. But have them hold on to it tightly and
have them all killed there, please. […] All that is Muslim to be killed, like Alija […] I don‘t want
to see one military aged Muslim alive there‖.7274 (Is there any evidence that Rade Ristic took
Prstojevic seriously and had he executed this “order”? A jokes and unofficial chattings by
telephone are taken more seriously than the official documents! Not to ask: what all of such
a hunted details had to do with the President? That way, not only the President is President,
but the entire Serb people is President! There are many wishes and proposals that had never
been accepted by the officials, and never influenced any event, but are still quoted in the
Indictment/Judgement text! As the Prime Ministed Branko Djeric testified, there was many
extreme opinions and proposals in the Assembly, but it never prevailed!)

2135. From September 1992, there was a confrontation line on the eastern side of Dobrinja,
separating the SRK-controlled areas of Dobrinja 1 and 4 from ABiH-controlled areas of Dobrinja
2 and 3B.7275 There was combat activity in Ilidţa for the duration of the war.7276 Discussions
continued among municipal leaders in Ilidţa as to expanding control over a broader territory.7277
(But the Serb side never made any decision to take the control over these Muslim
settlements, although it would be perfectly legitimate, since the Muslim extremists constantly
fired from these areas, killing both the Serb civilians, mainly children were jeopardized, and
the soldiers! #Abuse of civil settlements#!)
i. Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.2

2136. The Indictment refers to the use of Kula Prison as a detention facility from May 1992 until
at least 28 October 1994.7278

7273
P1515 (Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Radomir Ristić, 25 June 1992), p. 2. See also Adjudicated Fact 2666.
7274
P1515 (Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Radomir Ristić, 25 June 1992), p. 2. See also Adjudicated Fact 2665.
7275
See Adjudicated Fact 91.
7276
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13276–13277 (11 March 2011), T. 13562–13563, 13571–13572, 13578–13582 (17 March 2011), T. 13697, 13714 (18 March 2011),
T. 13800–13801, T. 13820–13822, 13827 (21 March 2011); P5638 (Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Radomir Ristić,
16 June 1995); P2518 (Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Velibor Veselinović, 29 June 1995); D1240 (Ilidţa SJB Daily Situation
Report, 2–3 June 1992), p. 2; D1246 (Ilidţa War Committee Decision, 4 August 1992) , p. 1; Radomir Kezunović, T. 13983–13985 (31 May 2011); D1255
(Ilidţa Wartime Commission Statement, 29 October 1992); D2819 (SRK combat report, 10 July 1993); D564 (SRK combat report, 23 July 1992); D599
(SRK combat report, 24 July 1992); D591 (SRK combat report, 25 July 1992); D597 (SRK combat report, 20 July 1992); P1107 (SerBiH MUP report to the
Minister of Interior re inspection of Romanija-Biraĉ CSB and SJB, 10 August 1992), p. 2; P1006 (SRK Order, 12 September 1992), p. 1; D1255 (Ilidţa
Wartime Commission Statement, 29 October 1992); D534 (Article from AFP entitled ―Fierce Fighting Raging Around Sarajevo‖, 3 December 1992); D536
(Article from AFP entitled ―Serbs Cut Airport Road‖, 8 December 1992); P1435 (UNMO report, 11 December 1992), paras. 13–30; D2452 (Report of Ilidţa
Brigade, 25 December 1992), p. 1; D3405 (SRK combat report, 15 March 1993), p. 1; D3406 (SRK combat report, 18 March 1993); D2820 (SRK combat
report, 16 July 1993); D4631 (Letter from Manojlo Milovanović to UNPROFOR, 2 August 1993); D2821 (SRK combat report, 3 August 1993); D2822
(SRK combat report, 10 August 1993); D2827 (SRK combat report, 19 August 1993); P1017 (SRK combat report, 27 September 1993); D4621 (SRK
Report, 11 December 1993); P2667 (SRK combat report, 20 January 1994), pp. 1–2; D1515 (SRK combat report, 4 February 1994), p. 1; D838 (SRK
combat report, 2 August 1994), pp. 1–2; D2823 (SRK combat report, 6 November 1994); P5132 (VRS Main Staff Report to Radovan Karadţić,
21 July 1995), p. 2.
7277
P1006 (SRK Order, 12 September 1992), p. 1 (ordering, following a meeting in Jahorina with municipal, military, and republican leaders, that it was
necessary to ―liberate and take control of important parts of the city, features close to it (Mojmilo, Stup junction) and estates (Donji Kotorac, Hrasnica,
Butmir, and Sokolović Kolonija); NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13267–13269, 13282 (11 March 2011); P2450 (Ilidţa SDS Declaration for working in wartime,
6 February 1993, p. 2) (reporting that legal authority of the Serbian Municipality of Ilidţa is to be established as soon as possible on, inter alia, Butmir,
Hrasnica, and Sokolović Kolonija); P1483 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), pp. 276–277 (stating that a meeting held on 17 August
1993, Velibor Veselinović, then president of the Ilidţa Serb Assembly, said that their goal was to strike Hrasnica and Sokolović Kolinija when tensions have
lowered).
7278
Indictment, Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.2, fn. 12. The Indictment originally included the KP Dom Butimir detention facility (hereinafter referred to
as ―Kula Prison‖) as being located in Novo Sarajevo municipality; however it was subsequently corrected to include Kula Prison as falling within Ilidţa
municipality. See Indictment, Schedule C, fn. 11.
 339

1. Establishment and control

2137. Kula Prison was located close to the Sarajevo airport,7279 on a compound with other
buildings, including a police station, the Ministry of Justice, and the military prosecutor‘s
office.7280 The compound had a large warehouse for goods and food supplies.7281 It also had its
own farming facilities.7282

2138. Prior to the war, Kula Prison served as a medium security prison for persons serving
sentences of less than six months.7283 On 6 April 1992, all convicts were released on the orders of
the then warden.7284 Kula Prison was under the jurisdiction of the MUP from at least May 1992
until the beginning of August 1992, when it was taken over by the RS Ministry of Justice.7285
Under the Ministry of Justice, it was converted into an investigating unit of the district court of
Sarajevo.7286

2139. As of 1 August 1992, Radoje Lalović was appointed as the first warden of Kula Prison and
Soniboj Škiljević served as the acting warden from 16 December 1992 until 1 January 1994.7287
(Both of them had been professionals far before the war, but the SDS never made any party
differentiation, and rather nominated the professionals, and it was in the hands of the
Ministry for Justice!) The commander of the guards was NeĊo Pandurević.7288 The police chief
at Kula was Milenko Tepavĉević and the police commander was Radenko Vujiĉić.7289

2140. After August 1992, Kula Prison continued to be secured by the MUP, with a police officer
guarding the entrance to the premises.7290 The guards were responsible for the administration of
the premises and were regulated by Tepavĉević.7291 The JNA and later the VRS were present at
Kula Prison, controlling, such matters as bringing and taking detainees, and the military

7279
KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from Prosecutor v Krnojelac), T. 1283. See also KDZ017, P3567 (Transcript from Prosecutor v Krnojelac), T. 2916. Kula
Prison was approximately 200 or 300 metres from the confrontation line between Gornji and Donji Kotorac and 500 or 600 metres from confrontation line in
Dobrinja. KDZ601, T. 18617 (8 September 2011).
7280
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8730–8731, 8876; KDZ601, T. 18578–18579, 18616 (8 September 2011); KDZ017,
P3567 (Transcript from Prosecutor v Krnojelac), T. 2917; P3299 (Record of interview with KDZ601, 18 April 2005), p. 46 (under seal). See also P3300
(Sketch of KPD Kula prepared by KDZ601) (under seal); P3301 (Sketch of KPD Kula prepared by KDZ601) (under seal); D1076 (MUP Administration for
the Police Duties and Affairs report, 3 August 1992), p. 5. The police station was the headquarters for the areas of Dobrinja, Lukavica, and Vojkovići. See
P5698 (Intercept of conversation between Branko Đerić and Mićo Stanišić, 1 May 1992), pp. 3–4.
7281
P3299 (Record of interview with KDZ601, 18 April 2005), p. 46 (under seal); KDZ601, T. 18616 (8 September 2011).
7282
Soniboj Škiljević, T. 36783 (8 April 2013); D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), para. 4; KDZ601, T. 18616
(8 September 2011). See also Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9106.
7283
KDZ601, T. 18614–18615 (8 September 2011). See also KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krnojelac), T. 1283; P3299 (Record of interview
with KDZ601, 18 April 2005), p. 8 (under seal); Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8730–8732, 8876; Slobodan Avlijaš,
D3105 (Witness Statement of Slobodan Avlijaš, dated 9 March 2013), para. 7.
7284
D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), para. 3.
7285
D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 44; D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 8;
D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), para. 5; Adjudicated Fact 2635. See also D3340 (Decision on the forming of KPD
Butmir, 16 June 1992), pp. 8–9; D3333 (Rules on the internal organisation of Butmir KPD); P1089 (Ministry of Justice Report on the Ministry‘s Activities
in May-October 1992 Period, 16 November 1992), p. 2.
7286
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8732, 8876. See also D3105 (Witness Statement of Slobodan Avlijaš, dated 9
March 2013), paras. 3, 9.
7287
D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), paras. 2, 5; D3341 (Decision on appointment of Soniboj Škiljević; 16 December 1992).
See also P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 49.
7288
P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 49.
7289
D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), para. 5.
7290
Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35182–35183 (11 March 2013); KDZ601, T. 18579 (8 September 2011).
7291
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8733, 8749; D3105 (Witness Statement of Slobodan Avlijaš, dated 9 March 2013), para.
16. See also D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), paras. 5–6; D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March
2013), para. 9; D3333 (Rules on the internal organisation of Butmir KPD).
 340

commission for exchanges at the SRK.7292 The military prosecutor‘s office also had jurisdiction
over the prisoners.7293

2141. Detainees began arriving at Kula Prison from May 1992 onwards.7294 Many detainees
were transported from other detention facilities,7295 and others were transported directly from their
homes or conflict zones.7296 The detainees held at Kula Prison included civilians, persons who had
not violated any law, and persons held without official detention orders.7297 Mentally ill
persons7298 and several elderly persons were detained in Kula Prison.7299 Bosnian Muslims,
Bosnian Croats, as well as Bosnian Serbs were detained there.7300

2142. Detainees were brought to Kula by soldiers, members of the police, paramilitary forces, as
well as special purpose units of the JNA.7301 Members of paramilitary units, including the White
Eagles, Arkan‘s men,7302 and Oljaĉa‘s Chetniks ate their meals at Kula Prison.7303

2143. Interrogations were carried out in two small rooms by operatives from all levels of the
MUP, as well as by JNA and VRS soldiers.7304

2144. During the war, the Kula Prison compound also housed civilians from the surrounding
areas while they awaited transfer to Muslim held territory.7305 They stayed in a separate part of the

7292
P3299 (Record of interview with KDZ601, 18 April 2005), p. 46 (under seal); KDZ601, T. 18616, 18579 (8 September 2011); D3105 (Witness Statement of
Slobodan Avlijaš, dated 9 March 2013), para. 16. See also Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8749; D3331 (Witness
statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), paras. 5, 7; D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 9.
7293
D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), para. 7.
7294
See D1243 (Kula's Police Station book of duty transfer, 1 May–29 July 1992), p. 2; P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-court
p. 9.
7295
Approximately 233 detainees from Hadţići were transferred from Lukavica to Kula Prison on 23 June 1992. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić
dated 28 February 2011), paras. 89, 92; Mehmed Musić, T. 12879 (3 March 2011); P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 3;
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 81; D3063 (Witness statement of Mladen Tolj dated 25 February 2013), para.
10; Mladen Tolj, T. 34637–34638 (1 March 2013). See also Adjudicated Fact 2638; para. 2276. Approximately 34 detainees were transferred from the Pale
Gym to Kula Prison on 11 July 1992. P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić dated 13 May 2011), paras. 24, 44. See also para. 2346. In mid-
December 1992, 130 detainees were transferred to Kula Prison from the Manjaĉa camp. D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013),
para. 15. On 22 October 1992 the Ministry of Justice ordered that 90 Bosnian Muslims detained at the Sports Centre in Hadţići and 30 Bosnian Muslims
detained at a school in Ilidţa were to be transferred to Kula Prison. P1607 (RS Ministry of Justice report on prisons and camps on the RS territory,
22 October 1992), e-court pp. 6–7, 28; Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9554. On 5 July 1993, KDZ239 was transferred
from the KP Dom Foĉa to Kula Prison. KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krnojelac), T. 1283. See also KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac), T. 1278 (testifying that detainees from camps in Batković and Rogatica were present at Kula Prison).
7296
P1126 (SJB Ilidţa information re KPD Butmir, 20 May 1992), p. 1 (stating that between 12 and 20 May 1992, the following persons were present at Kula
Prison: (i) 38 persons from the Kasindolska Street area, (ii) 47 persons from the Gornji Kotorac area, (iii) 31 persons from Dobrinja, and (iv) 40 persons
from Nedţarići, Vrace, Lukavica, Vojkovići, and elsewhere in Ilidţa); KDZ239, T. 18922–18924 (15 September 2011) (testifying that a group from
Rogatica which was brought on two or three buses included elderly people, women and about five or six children); Dragomir Obradović, T. 36110–36111
(26 March 2013); P6235 (Statement of Avdija Katica, 3 January 1995), pp. 3–4; D3189 (Sokolac SJB dispatch, 31 October 1994) (stating that on
29 October 1994, 61 Bosnian Muslim civilians were moved out of the village of Vrhbarje, Sokolac municipality through the RS Commission for Exchange
and transported to Kula Prison); D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 30; Momĉilo Ĉeklić, T. 35219–35220
(12 March 2013). See also D2910 (SRK Order, 22 October 1992); Adjudicated Fact 2634.
7297
Mladen Tolj, T. 34637–34638 (1 March 2013); P5544 (Instructions on Detention of the RS Ministry of Justice and Administration, 23 February 1993). See
also P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić dated 13 May 2011), paras. 18, 21, 44, 54; Hajrudin Karić, T. 15348, 15350–15353, 15365 (23 June 2011),
T. 15376 (24 June 2011) (testifying that at the time of his arrest, he was a civilian); KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krnojelac), T. 1188,
1283 (testifying that at the time of his arrest, he was a civilian); KDZ239, P3335 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krnojelac), T. 1195 (under seal); Vitomir
Ţepinić, T. 33609 (13 February 2013); P1152 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and Ninković, 18 June 1992), pp. 3–4.
7298
KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krnojelac), T. 1284.
7299
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 96. See also KDZ239, T. 18922–18924 (15 September 2011).
7300
See D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), paras. 22, 26; D3338 (List of detainees at KP Dom Butmir); D2923 (Witness
statement of Vitomir Ţepinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 75; Vitomir Ţepinić, T. 33609 (13 February 2013); KDZ601, T. 18586–18588, 18619–18620
(8 September 2011); P3299 (Record of interview with KDZ601, 18 April 2005), p. 41 (under seal); P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić dated 13
May 2011), para. 48.
7301
P3299 (Record of interview with KDZ601, 18 April 2005), pp. 13–14 (under seal); KDZ601, T. 18580–18581, 18585–18586 (8 September 2011); D2910
(SRK Order, 22 October 1992).
7302
In May 1992, two members of Arkan‘s group met with Tepavĉević and advised him that they wanted to take over Kula Prison and the SJB. Tepavĉević
refused and sent them to speak with Tomislav Kovaĉ which they did and subsequently did not return to Kula Prison. P3299 (Record of interview with
KDZ601, 18 April 2005), p. 45 (under seal), KDZ601, T. 18593 (8 September 2011), T. 18650 (13 September 2011).
7303
P3299 (Record of interview with KDZ601, 18 April 2005), p. 46 (under seal); KDZ601, T. 18616 (8 September 2011).
7304
P3299 (Record of interview with KDZ601, 18 April 2005), p. 14 (under seal); KDZ601, T. 18581–18582 (8 September 2011), T. 18651
(13 September 2011); ; P3300 (Sketch of KPD Kula prepared by KDZ601) (under seal). See also Mehmed Musić, P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed
Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 97.
 341

prison from the detainees.7306 At least 10,000 Bosnian Muslim civilians were accommodated at
Kula Prison for periods ranging from a few days to several months.7307 The housing of those
civilians, as well as many others that had temporarily been in the part for detainees, were
brought some time to the Barracks for mere housing, see: (Gen. Galic report, asking that
civilians from combat zones be accommodated somewhere else D432:

The Muslim side also insisted in the exchange of the civilians, see: D433, 28 July 1992:

7305
D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), paras. 19, 28; D3335 (Request of Butmir KPD to High Commissioner for Refugees and
Humanitarian Aid, 5 September 1994); D3344 (Request of individual Croats to RS Government, 7 March 1994); D3343 (Report of RS Central Commission
for Exchange, 28 October 1994); Soniboj Škilijević, T. 36782–36783, 36824–36826 (8 April 2013), T. 36932–36934 (10 April 2013); D3105 (Witness
statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 7; P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 49; P1127 (Letter
from Central Commission for Exchange of Detained Persons re KPD Butmir, 28 October 1994); KDZ601, T. 18649 (13 September 2011).
7306
D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), para. 19; Soniboj Škiljević, T. 36783 (8 April 2013); P2839 (Witness statement of
Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), para. 47 (testifying that about 200 women and children from Hadţići were in two other rooms).
7307
P1127 (Letter from Central Commission for Exchange of Detained Persons re KPD Butmir, 28 October 1994); Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8741–8742; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4414–4415 (30 June 2010); P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated
23 March 2012), para. 31. See also Adjudicated Fact 2633. The Prosecution submits that the 10,000 Bosnian Muslim civilians accommodated at Kula
Prison were detained. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, pp. 20–21. Having reviewed all the evidence, the Chamber finds that the evidence is
insufficient to determine whether these civilians were deprived of freedom of movement such that they were detained, as opposed to being merely
accommodated due to the combat activity in the area.
 342

(2)Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

2145. At various times, some rooms in Kula Prison were so crowded that there was barely
enough room for detainees to sit or lie down, and toilet access was so limited that detainees
defecated and urinated in the room; the stench was over-powering.7308 The ground floor was
damp; there was no heating and lice infestation was widespread.7309 Other rooms provided slightly
better accommodation with mattresses on the floor or beds; the detainees also had access to the
toilet at least three times per day, and access to water.7310 (It is obvious that the lack of facilities
wasn’t any deliberate result, but a “viss major@”

2146. The food was insufficient.7311 (#General shortage#! There was no food for the
population, the Army and police too. A lot of contemporaneous documents prove that the
sanctions that had been imposed to the Serbs resulted, among others, in a shortage of food.
Also, nobody even tried to prove that it was an intended, willing deprivation.) Several
detainees were initially kept in crowded cells from which they were not permitted to leave; they
were subsequently moved into more spacious cells and given access to the cafeteria.7312 In the
former scenario they were only given one meal per day, which was brought to that cell.7313
However, in the cafeteria, detainees were given two meals per day.7314 On 20 May 1992,
Tepavĉević wrote to the MUP and Ministry of Justice advising of the inadequate conditions of
accommodation, food, hygiene, and health of 156 detainees who had been present at Kula Prison
since 12 May 1992.7315 (That is the first class proof that it was a necessity, #not deliberate
deprivation!#)

2147. On 7 May 1992, at least five detainees were badly beaten while detained at Kula
Prison.7316 (#Dealdy combination#! If true, all #against the President explicite orders#, but it
is based on a Rule 92bis evidence, i.e. no cross examination!) The Chamber also recalls that it
found that detainees from Hadţići were beaten on a bus in front of Kula when it stopped there on
its way to the Lukavica Barracks.7317 Several detainees testified that they were not beaten or
mistreated during their detention at Kula Prison,7318 however others were beaten.7319 (An

7308
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 94; P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 3.
7309
KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krnojelac), T. 1284.
7310
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 98; P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić dated 13 May 2011), para. 46.
7311
See e.g. P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-court p. 10.
7312
P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 3; P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 98.
7313
P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 3.
7314
P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić dated 13 May 2011), para. 46; P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), pp. 3–4;
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 98; P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), para. 41;
P47 (Statement of Bego Selimović to Ilijaš Municipality Commission for Crime Investigation, 5 April 1993), para. 34. For example, Mušić received tea and
bread in the morning as well as ―some cooked food‖, such as pea soup, in the afternoon. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February
2011), para. 98. The Chamber notes that Defence witnesses testified that detainees received three meals per day, the food served at Kula Prison was normal
for wartime conditions, and the accommodation provided was very good. D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), para. 8;
Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35184 (11 March 2013), (testifying that before August 1992 when Kula Prison was under the jurisdiction of the police, prisoners were
mostly given dry rations in their rooms but after the establishment of Kula Prison, daily meals were provided to prisoners in the dining room); D3105
(Witness Statement of Slobodan Avlijaš, dated 9 March 2013), para. 17. Having considered all the evidence and taken into account the fact that these
Defence witnesses had an incentive to distance themselves from the poor conditions at Kula Prison, and that the witnesses who were detained there were
better placed to report on the conditions in which they were detained, the Chamber does not rely on the evidence of these Defence witnesses in this regard.
[REDACTED]. It is interesting how easily the Chamber found that so many Defense witnesses had a reason not to tell the
truth, while the detained combatants of the opposite Army allegedly didn’t have any interest to aggravate and
denigrate the Serb enemies. However, there is no evidence that any deprivation was a bad will of the officials. The
mentioned Defense witness Soniboj Skiljevic and his chief R. Lalovic were tried in the BiH court and had been
acquitted. The opinion of the witness skiljevic that the conditions were “normal for wartime conditions” had been
approved before the Bosnian court.
7315
P1126 (SJB Ilidţa information re KPD Butmir, 20 May 1992), p. 2.
7316
P43 (Witness statements of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993 and 14 January 1998), e-court pp. 5, 10. See also para. 2154.
7317
See para. 2276.
7318
Mehmed Musić, T. 12880 (3 March 2011); P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić dated 13 May 2011), para. 49; D2923 (Witness statement of
Vitomir Ţepinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 76.
 343

#“Adjudicated fact” against the Prosecutor’s witnesses, who rebutted it#!!!) In addition, local
Serbs and armed groups frequently gathered around the prison compound attempting to gain
access and on occasion made it through.7320 (#EXCULPATORY!!! The officials prevented
these attempts, otherwise they would intrude, for their revengeful or pathology reasons!)

2148. Detainees at Kula Prison were detailed to perform work on the frontlines of the conflict,
including de-mining, transporting material for barricades, digging trenches and retrieving the
bodies of fallen Serb combatants.7321 Several prisoners who were deployed to work were killed or
injured by sniping or shells.7322 Detainees were also engaged in work, such as farm work, around
the prison, close to the confrontation line.7323 Shells frequently landed on the plantation where
detainees were made to work and a few detainees were killed.7324 (If true, these shells must have
fallen on the Serbs too, because the POWs weren’t alone there. There was evidence that
many detainees wanted to go for a work, because they obtained more food, cigarettes and
even drinks, see the next paragraph, but these allegations of the Muslim adversaries were
not explored on veracity, and on whether some or all of them wanted to work at farm or not,
while it is not probable that any wanted to do other dangerous jobs. However, if any of this
felonies were commited, it was against the strictest orders of the President, who had many
other duties! Are the Presidents in other countries liable for violations of their strictest
orders?)

2149. The VRS decided which detainees would perform work outside of Kula Prison.7325 Mandić
was also involved in providing detainees to perform forced labour.7326 The detainees could not
refuse to work,7327 however some were not forced to work if they were unwell.7328 Detainees in
work platoons were provided additional food by the prison staff and were sometimes given food or

7319
See Adjudicated Fact 2636.
7320
D3105 (Witness Statement of Slobodan Avlijaš, dated 9 March 2013), paras. 17–18; KDZ601, T. 18652–18653 (13 September 2011); KDZ601, T. 18654
(13 September 2011); P1154 (Witness statement of KDZ088 dated 27–29 April 2010), p. 142 (under seal). See also Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5241
(15 July 2010).
7321
P3299 (Record of interview with KDZ601, 18 April 2005), pp. 37, 65 (under seal); KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krnojelac), T. 1284–
1285; Hajrudin Karić, T. 15307 (23 June 2011); P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 99–100; Mehmed Musić, T.
12879–12880 (3 March 2011); P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 3; P1938 (Witness Statement of KDZ310 dated
28 November 2010), para. 46; P3267 (Witness statement of Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), para. 49; D2418 (Witness statement of Boţo Tomić dated
5 November 2012), para. 15; Boţo Tomić, T. 30200–30202 (13 November 2012); Dragan Maletić, T. 30866–30867 (4 December 2012); P5987 (Special
report of the 2nd Infantry Battalion re the escape of two prisoners, 21 May 1993), p. 1; P6280 (Worksite list of Kula prison, 24 September 1992 to 2 January
1993); P6281 (Notebook re Kula Prison, 1993); Ţeljko Bambarez, T. 31324–31328 (12 December 2012); P6042 (Statement of Ţeljko Bambarez, undated);
P804 (Sky news report re Kula prison, with transcript); P926 (Witness statement of Aernout Van Lynden dated 26 February 2010), para. 63; D3331
(Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), paras. 51–52; D3351 (Request of SRK Military Post to Kula KPD, 1 February 1993); D3352
(Requests of SRK units to Kula KPD); D3362 (Tables re work assignment of POWs and convicted persons). See also Adjudicated Fact 2640; para. 2267.
7322
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 46; KDZ239, T. 18922 (15 September 2011), 19004 (16 September 2011); P161
(Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 3; D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013); paras. 55–57;
Soniboje Škiljević, T. 36952–36953 (10 April 2013); D3363 (Reports of person on duty at Butmir KPD). See also Adjudicated Fact 2640; P804 (Sky news
report re Kula prison, with transcript), p. 2; P6282 (RS Central Exchange Committee list of persons); P6281 (Notebook re Kula Prison, 1993), pp. 3–4. The
Chamber notes that save for Scheduled Incident B.13.3, killings of detainees who were forced to work were not charged pursuant to Schedule A or B of the
Indictment. See fn. 13.
7323
Hajrudin Karić, T. 15307 (23 June 2011); P3267 (Witness Statement of Šefik Hurko, dated 1 September 2011), para. 49; Šefik Hurko, T. 18245
(2 September 2011). See also D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), para. 50; Soniboj Škilijević, T. 36805 (8 April 2013);
D3362 (Tables re work assignment of POWs and convicted persons); D3363 (Reports of person on duty at Butmir KPD). Hurko described the farm work as
―extremely hard‖ and exhausting. P3267 (Witness Statement of Šefik Hurko, dated 1 September 2011), para. 49).
7324
P3299 (Record of interview with KDZ601, 18 April 2005) (under seal), pp. 46–47 (testifying that a couple of Bosnian Muslim detainees were sent to work
at the plantation where ―shells were landing‖); KDZ239, T. 19004 (16 September 2011) (testifying that he witnessed the fall of one shell). See also D3331
(Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013); paras. 53–54; D3405 (SRK combat report, 15 March 1993), p. 2 (documenting that shells from
the Butmir and Igman directions fell on Kula Prison, killing one Serb detainee and wounding 14 others). The Chamber notes that save for Scheduled
Incident B.13.3, killings of detainees who were forced to work were not charged pursuant to Schedule A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.
7325
D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), paras. 5–7.
7326
P1140 (Order of Ministry of Justice of SerBiH re KPD Butmir, 22 September 1992); P1143 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and
Radivoje Grković, 3 July 1992), pp. 2–5; Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8979–8973, 8983.
7327
Momĉilo Mandiĉ, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9106. See also KDZ239, T. 19004–19005 (16 September 2011). See also P47
(Statement of Bego Selimović to Ilijaš Municipality Commission for Crime Investigation, 5 April 1993), para. 34.
7328
Bego Selimović, P44 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 10905; P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), paras. 39, 45.
 344

cigarettes by soldiers and locals in the locations where they worked.7329 However, they were not
remunerated for their work.7330 (Since there is evidence that “somebody were not forced to
work if they were unwell” and that those who worked had a benefits, then the Prosecution
was obliged to prove who was forced in a manner that can be checked by the Defense.

2150. Detainees were registered with the ICRC.7331 Around 9 August 1992, Karadţić visited
Kula prison with representatives of the media and the ICRC.7332 That day the food was better and
only clean rooms were shown.7333 (Another proof that the President was not privy of the full
information. If true, the on duty officials presumed that the President wouldn’t be satisfied
with food and rooms!#What President knew#! )

2151, On 3 October 1994, Bulajić, President of the State Commission was given permission to
transfer all remaining detainees at Kula Prison to Bosnian Muslim held territory and until at least
the end of October 1994, Kula Prison continued to be used to facilitate exchanges of civilians.7334

(3) Conclusion in relation to conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

2152. Based on the foregoing, the Chamber finds that Serb Forces detained non-Serbs from Ilidţa
and neighbouring municipalities, including civilians, from May 1992 until at least
28 October 1994 in Kula Prison. The Chamber further finds that the detainees were held in poor
conditions characterised by inadequate space, bedding, and sanitary facilities. The Chamber also
finds that detainees were provided insufficient food. The Chamber further finds that male
detainees were subjected to forced labour and beatings while detained at Kula Prison. (The
Chamber would be very reasonable if found that in the war conditions all of it may have
been out of the abilities of the authorities to regulate it. Particularly, the Chamber would be
reasonable if mentioned that there was no evidence that the President contributed to any of
those irregularities, as well as that no state regulations enabled the felonies!)

(4) Scheduled Incident B.13.1

2153. The Indictment refers to the killing of at least two detainees in Kula Prison on or about
7 May 1992.

2154. On 7 May 1992, five detainees who had just arrived at Kula Prison from Grbavica were
beaten so badly that one died immediately and another detainee, Zlatan Salĉinović, died the next

7329
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 99–100; P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993),
p. 3; Hajrudin Karić, T. 15307 (23 June 2011); KDZ239, T. 19004–19005 (16 September 2011); D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated
5 April 2013), para. 7; D2418 (Witness statement of Boţo Tomić dated 5 November 2012), para. 15. See also P6283 (Report on inspection and monitoring
of Butmir KPD, April 1994), p. 4. The Accused argues that detainees requested to work voluntarily to receive cigarettes and pass the time. Defence Final
Brief, para. 1675. In light of all the evidence, the Chamber finds that most detainees assigned to work while detained at Kula Prison, had no choice but to
perform work.
7330
Momĉilo Mandiĉ, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9106.
7331
See e.g. KDZ239, T. 18992 (16 September 2011); P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić dated 13 May 2011), para. 49; P46 (Witness statement of
Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), paras. 42, 44–45; P47 (Statement of Bego Selimović to Ilijaš Municipality Commission for Crime Investigation, 5
April 1993), paras. 32, 35. See also D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), paras. 20, 37. On 13 May 1993, Mladić issued an
order allowing ICRC delegates to interview prisoners in the absence of prison officials on the written approval of the VRS Main Staff. D3345 (VRS Main
Staff Order, 13 May 1993); D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), para. 30.
7332
D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), paras. 13–14; Soniboje Škiljević, T. 36779–36780 (8 April 2013), T. 36932
(10 April 2013); P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić dated 13 May 2011), para. 51. See also P2840 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić's visit to
Kula prison).
7333
P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić dated 13 May 2011), para. 52; Hajrudin Karić, T. 15308 (23 June 2011).
7334
P2684 (VRS order, 3 October 1994); P1127 (Letter from Central Commission for Exchange of Detained Persons re KPD Butmir, 28 October 1994); D3189
(Sokolac SJB dispatch, 31 October 1994).
 345

morning.7335 Mirsad Smajš and at least one other detainee took the bodies of these individuals to a
van after which they were transported elsewhere.7336 The Chamber received forensic evidence that
the body of an individual identified as Zlatan ―Salĉin‖ was discovered in a grave in Sarajevo.7337

2155. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that on or about 7 May 1992 two detainees were beaten
to death at Kula Prison by Serb Forces. (#Before VRS, during JNA#! The “Serb Forces” is
really not enough, since it was found by the Chamber, that paramilitaries as well as locals
tried to reach detainees, see para 2147 of the Judgement. On 7 May there still was the JNA,
and it can not be allocated to this President, since he didn’t have any state post or
competence until 12 May 92, and over the JNA ever. Also, there is no evidence that the
President had been informed of the deaths in Kula Prison, and at the time he couldn’t be
informed as he was not in charge of the armed forces so widely called the Serb Forces,
particularly since the JNA was there! Without several senseless constructs, like “Joint
Criminal Enterprise” and the “Serb Forces”, which comprises all the Serbs, even the JNA
which was never under the President influence, let alone control, or paramilitaries, which
the President publicly and lawfully disowned at the beginning of the war, there wouldn’t be
any indictment. With those constructs, none of the Serbs could be acquitted in such an “ad
hoc” court! The UN should annihilate all the processes, and ban this kind of abuse of the
justice!)

(5) Scheduled Incident B.13.3

2156. The Indictment refers to the killing of three detainees while performing forced labour at
Kula Prison between 23 July and 24 November 1992.

2157. Adem Balić was detained at Kula Prison from 23 June to 24 November 1992.7338 After
approximately a month in detention there, he was detailed to a work platoon and witnessed the
death and wounding of detainees who were forced to work on or near the frontlines.7339 Vahid
Gaĉanović was killed by incoming fire at Ozrenska Street; Ramic Smajić and Zido Nizić were
killed by incoming fire in the Kula Prison agricultural complex.7340 The Chamber also received
forensic evidence that the bodies of Gaĉanović and Smajić were found in a mass grave at Vrangeš,
which was a wartime cemetery located close to Kula Prison.7341

2158. Based on this evidence, the Chamber is satisfied that at least three detainees of Kula
Prison were killed while performing forced labour between 23 July and 24 November 1992.
(#Deadly combination#! This is entirely based on the Rule 92bis, no cross examination. Also,
to recover somebody from a mass grave and allocate his death to the Kula Prison is much
easier, than to explain why this body was in a mass grave, were there were buried only a
combat casualties after the battle, and within the sanitation process! Anyway, if something
like that really happened, it was strictly forbidden by the RS documents and the President’s
orders! How the President could be kept liable for incidents like that?)

7335
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993); P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), p. 3.
7336
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), p. 2.
7337
P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 89 (noting that the body of Zlatan ―Salĉin was discovered in the Miljevići III grave in
Sarajevo).
7338
P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), pp. 3–4.
7339
P161 (Adem Bs statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 3. The Chamber notes that KDZ310 gave evidence that he saw detainees from Kula
Prison working at Ozrenska street and knew of several cases of them being killed by snipers. P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November
2010), para. 46).
7340
P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 3. See also Adjudicated Fact 2640.
7341
P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 90; P4850 (Witness statement of Amor Mašović dated 23 March 2012), Annex A, p. 7; P4886
(Sarajevo Cantonal Court records relating to Vranješ exhumation, 30 August 1999), p. 26
 346

(E) Movement of the population from Ilidţa

2159. There was much movement both into and out of Ilidţa, with the most intense period being
from April to June 1992,7342 when large numbers of Serb refugees arrived in Ilidţa.7343 Bosnian
Muslims left their homes in Ilidţa.7344 Prstojević participated in expelling Bosnian Muslim
civilians from their homes with threats; people were terrified and had no choice but to leave.7345
On 26 May 1992, Tomislav Kovaĉ advised Mandić that he was unable to prevent people from
driving Bosnian Muslims from Ilidţa.7346 On 2 June 1992, Mandić told Prstojević that he was
aware that Prstojević was issuing ultimatums to Bosnian Muslims and evicting them from
settlements.7347 Prstojević did not deny this; rather he stated that he had not given such ultimatums
in public.7348 (#Distorted#! This is not correct interpretation of the Prstojevic’s denial.
Namely, Mandic told him that he learned that he issued a public ultimatum, and Prstojevic
asked Mandic to prove it, where he said it, means where it was published, because Mandic
mentioned the Muslim media?

7342
D2773 (Witness statement of Slavko Mijanović dated 19 January 2013), para. 6.
7343
D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 27; Radomir Kezunović, T. 13968 (31 May 2011); NeĊelko Prstojević, T. 13764–
13767, 13815 (21 March 2011); D2852 (Witness statement of SrĊan Šehovac dated 27 January 2013), para. 47; D2773 (Witness statement of Slavko
Mijanović dated 19 January 2013), para. 6. See also D1226 (Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Jovo Boţić, 27 July 1992), pp. 4–5.
7344
KDZ088, T. 6261–6262 (7 September 2010) (closed session). See also D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), pp. 59–60.
7345
P1154 (Witness statement of KDZ088 dated 27–29 April 2010), pp. 137–140 (under seal); KDZ088, T. 6263 (7 September 2010) (closed session); P1086
(Intercept of conversations between (i) NeĊeljko Prstojević and Milenko LNU and (ii) NeĊeljko Prstojević and FNU Novaković, 14 May 1992), pp 2–3;
P1492 (Intercept of conversation between (i) NeĊeljko Prstojević and Radomir and (ii) NeĊeljko Prstojević and Dragan, 14 June 1992), p. 3. See also fn.
7269, para. 2134; P1515 (Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Radomir Ristić, 25 June 1992), pp 1–2; Momĉilo Mandić, C3
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 9484. At the 17th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, Prstojević said that when the Accused
―visited [them] in Ilidţa and encouraged [them], the Serbs from Sarajevo retained control over the territory, and even extended their territory in some areas,
driving the Muslims out of the territories where they had actually been majority.‖ But, the President didn’t encourage them to do that
what Prstojevic said. They had been encouraged by the President’s visit, since they even didn’t know whether he was
alive or not, as it was said. During this visit the Acused told them (in Ilidza) to take care of the others, i.e. Muslims
and Croats, so that not a hear from their head be lost. This was a possible flatering of Prstojevic, an attempt to show
how the mere visit encouraged them to maintain what they kept, but certainly nothing proves that the Pressident told
them what to do. D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 66. The Chamber notes that Prstojević objected to the
translation of ―driving the Muslims out‖ and said that he did not say that Muslims were expelled, but rather that they were ―pushed back‖. P2513 (Excerpt
from NeĊeljko Prstojević's transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 14664–14665; NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13017–13021 (8 March 2011). The Chamber
notes that the BCS version of the transcript of the 17 th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly uses the word potjerali which means ―to chase away‖. The
Chamber considers this to be synonymous with ―driving away‖. P2513 (Excerpt from NeĊeljko Prstojević's transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
14673. However, Prstojević also denied that he would have used the term ―potjerali‖ and testified that he used a BCS word that means to push back
(potisnuli). P2513 NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13554 (17 March 2011); (Excerpt from NeĊeljko Prstojević's transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 14674.
Given the plain text of the BCS version of the 17 th Session of the SerBiH Assembly, the Chamber rejects his evidence in this regard. The Chamber further
notes that Prstojević stated that he did not mean that civilians were expelled, rather that combatants were pushed back after armed combat, however, he
admitted that the majority of the civilian population left with the combatants gradually. P2513 (Excerpt from NeĊeljko Prstojević's transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 14665–14666. This is #not the only reasonable inference#, there is another, a several times more
reasonable. Namely, Prstojevic was braging and celebrating their heroism, and it is more than reasonable to conclude
that all he said pertained the military activities against the Muslim units, which was going on every day. For a chasing
of civilians there is not needed any encouragement, and nobody normal would brag about that. So, the Chamber is
too inclined to drawing an anti-Serb inferences.
7346
D1239 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and Tomo Kovaĉ, 26 May 1992), p. 2.
7347
P1110 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and NeĊeljko Prstojević, 2 July 1992), pp. 3–4. Prstojević testified that he had not been saying
such things, that no ultimatums were issued, and that Mandić was incorrect. NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13804, 13842 (21 March 2011). The Prosecution
suggested that in the intercepted conversation, Prstojević only denied that he issued such ultimatums in public. See NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13839–13842
(21 March 2011). In his testimony in the Krajišnik proceedings, Prstojević testified that: ―With the exception of Kotorac, we did not have a policy of
expelling civilians in any of the areas except where the circumstances required the population to leave the area because of the combat activities or where the
population wanted to leave on their own inititiative.‖ P2513 (Excerpt from NeĊeljko Prstojević's transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 14649. In light
of this qualification pertaining to Kotorac, the Chamber is satisfied that there was some truth to Mandić‘s comments in the intercepted conversation.
7348
P1110 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and NeĊeljko Prstojević, 2 July 1992), p. 4. The Chamber notes that Prstojević testified that he
had not issued such ultimatums at all and that Mandić was incorrect. NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13804, 13842 (21 March 2011). In his testimony in the
Krajišnik proceedings, Prstojević said that he denied to Mandić that he issued such ultimatums at all and questioned where he said such things. P2513
(Excerpt from NeĊeljko Prstojević's transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 14645–14646. However, the Chamber considers that a plain reading of the
text of the intercepted conversation indicates that Prstojević merely denied giving such ultimatums in public. P1110 (Intercept of conversation between
Momĉilo Mandić and NeĊeljko Prstojević, 2 July 1992), p. 4.
 347

This is more than enough (#contemporaneous document#) to draw another inference, both
pertaining to the policy of the central organs, and the Prstojevic’s response. So, Kovac urged
Mandic, Mandic reacted, but even Tomo Kovac didn’t accuse Prstojevic (the Chief of Crisis
Staff) as can be seen from D01239:

SO MANY #MISINTERPRETATIONS, MISCONCEPTIONS, MISUNDERSTANDINGS,

JUST TO INDULGE THE PROSECUTION’S INTENTION#!?!? If we were to be malicious,
we would have to conclude that it couldn’t be accidental, but intentional. Not even St. Peter
would succeede to defend himself. The Defendant looks to himself like Don Quixote, fighting
against a billion of mosquitos!)

2160. On or about 26 June 1992, approximately 400 Bosnian Muslim women and children from
Dobrinja who were at Kula Prison were transferred to the border between Serb and Muslim
controlled Sarajevo; Mandić assisted in the transfer.7349 (The civilians from all sides preferred
to cross to the territory under the control of their army, and it was not any permanent
removal, but the security reasons were a priority. We can see how it was from the mentioned
intercept P01110:

7349
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8868–8870, 8886–8889; P1101 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Krajišnik
and Momĉilo Mandić, 26 June 1992), p. 3. Mandić and Avlijaš testified that civilians from Dobrinja left on their own accord to flee the fighting. Momĉilo
Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8869–8870, 8886–8889; P1101 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Krajišnik and
Momĉilo Mandić, 26 June 1992), p. 3; Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35193–35194 (11 March 2013). However, in light of the evidence, discussed at paragraph 2133
that the Serb Forces took measures to clear the area, discussed giving Muslim owned apartments to Serbs, and that once the SRK took custody of the
civilians, they separated the Bosnian Muslim civilians from the Serbs and Croats, the Chamber finds that the Bosnian Muslim civilians had no choice but to
leave Dobrinja.
 348

It is obvious from this part of conversation that the Serbs are not allowed to leave Hrasnica
and Sokolovic colony, while the Serbs from Ilidza “allowed … them to take 5000 Muslims”
from Ilidza. This is more complex, and the inference the Chamber have chosen is not the
only one, not even a more probable than other. So, if Mandic assisted transfer of civilians,
the Muslims neither indicted nor convicted him for that! All of the people from the
President’s authorities were acquitted for, as alleged in this Court, immediate perpetrators
of the “crimes” allocated to this President as their superior!)

2161. For the duration of the war, not only Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat prisoners of war
but also refugees and unlawfully detained civilians were transferred to non-Serb controlled
territory from Kula Prison pursuant to agreements reached with UNHCR and the Central
Commission for Exchange of Prisoners and Civilians or pursuant to private agreements.7350
Insofar as these exchanges related to refugees or unlawfully detained civilians, the Chamber finds
that these individuals were forced to leave the municipality. This Chamber’s finding is in
contrast to the principle # “in dubio pro reo”# since we already know that many civilians did
everything they could, including a bribery, to come on the list for exchange of civilians,
“rejoining of families” and similar agreements. The candidates for transfer had to submit
many papers and documents to be put on the list for convoy. They had been “forced” but not
by the authorities, the forcing power was insecurity, every day fighting, coming of the Serb
combat casualties from the front line (for that reason the President forbeid the mass
funerals, in order to prevent an increase of tensions) Since we know all of that, the feature
can not be taken for granted, i.e. the Prosecution had to prove which cases were not wilful,
and which where forceful!)

2162. On 5 June 1992, the Ilidţa Crisis Staff received permission from the Bosnian Serb
Government to assign abandoned houses to persons whose apartments had been destroyed.7351 On
19 July 1992, the President requested that Ilidţa prepare an inventory of housing facilities vacated
by Muslims for temporary use by Bosnian Serb refugees.7352 Also in July 1992, the Wartime
Commission for the municipality founded a commission to implement the temporary distribution
of flats.7353 The commission encountered difficulties in carrying out its work.7354 By the summer

7350
D3331 (Witness statement of Soniboj Škiljević dated 5 April 2013), paras. 12, 15, 18–19, 46–48; Soniboj Škiljević, T. 36782–36783, 36824–36826 36791
(8 April 2013); D3332 (Certificate of KP Dom Butmir, 4 January 1994); D3350 (Notifications of RS Central Commission for Exchange, May 1994–January
1995); D3349 (Notification of RS Central Commission for Exchange, 7 July 1994); D3358 (Notification of RS Central Commission for Exchange, 13 April
1993; List of persons exchanged from Tarĉin on 20 February 1993); Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8894–8900;
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4604 (5 July 2010); P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 96; P3267 (Witness statement of
Šefik Hurko dated 1 September 2011), paras. 49–50; P1151 (Letter from SJB Novi Grad to the Ministry of Justice of SerBiH, 25 May 1992); P1102
(Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Mandić, 1 July 1992); D3350 (Notifications of RS Central Commission for Exchange,
May 1994–January 1995); P2684 (VRS order, 3 October 1994), p. 1; P1127 (Letter from Central Commission for Exchange of Detained Persons re KPD
Butmir, 28 October 1994).
7351
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13806–13807 (21 March 2011); D416 (Letter from Government of SerBiH to Ilidţa Municipal Assembly, 5 June 1992).
[REDACTED].
7352
P739 (RS Presidency request to various municipalities, 19 July 1992).
7353
D2773 (Witness statement of Slavko Mijanović dated 19 January 2013), paras. 6–10.
7354
D2773 (Witness statement of Slavko Mijanović dated 19 January 2013), para. 9.
 349

of 1993, it made over 3,000 decisions to assign temporary flats.7355 The President argues that after
the war, everyone‘s tenancy rights were recognised and people were permitted to buy and sell the
flats in accordance with the law.7356 However, having considered all the evidence before it, the
Chamber finds that the main purpose of the regulation was to facilitate the use of the vacant
property in question by Serbs who had just arrived in the municipality. In turn, this ensured that
those non-Serbs who left Ilidţa would not return. Furthermore, on 4 April 1993, Prstojević issued
a decision forbidding the return of Bosnian Muslims and Croats to the Serb Municipality of Ilidţa
for purported security reasons, unless they had written authorisation from the proper
authorities.7357Let us see how a #prematured return influenced the security# in
municipalities: see D473,p.10

(To “find” that: “In turn, this ensured that those non-Serbs who left Ilidţa would not return
is mere# speculation of the Chamber#, and would be unacceptable in any court of the free
world. The rights to return didn’t depend on any statement or other unofficial document,
but only on the international agreements, some of which had been proposed by the
President, and all of them signed by him. Let us see the P739, quoted in this paragraph:

Why the Chamber speculated, and why the verbatim meaning, and the most probable
meaning of the contemporaneous documents was what was said in them? Second, the
President proposed himself, and signed the other’s agreement about the #property rights,
and this commitment was obligatory#; third, the post-war practice confirms this standpoint.
The Chamber’s allegation about facilitation of the Serbs who had just “arrived” in the
municipality is not fair, since the “just arrived Serbs” didn’t arrive, they were a refugees too,
they were sad and impoverished, angry and they would occupy those apartments anyway, in
a chaotic manner and without obligation to save and preserve the property they occupied.
Let us see how the influx of the Serbian refugees impacted the life in municipalities,
particularly from the standpoint of law and order, see D473:

7355
D2773 (Witness statement of Slavko Mijanović dated 19 January 2013), para.10. See e.g. D1241 (Ilidţa Crisis Staff ruling, 19 July 1992). In addition, the
Chamber notes that on 25 June 1992, Prstojević gave Rade Ristić permission to give Muslim apartments in Dobrinja to Serbs and advised him that they had
already reassigned 30 apartments in Nedţarići. P1515 (Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Radomir Ristić, 25 June 1992), p. 2. See
also Adjudicated Fact 2666.
7356
Defence Final Brief, para. 1666.
7357
D1244 (Ilidţa War Commission Decision, 4 April 1993).
 350

.
2163. According to Bosnian Muslim SDB Chief Nedţad Ugljen, by July 1995, the Serb-held
territory in Ilidţa was almost devoid of non-Serbs.7358 (Anyway this was almost #95% Serb
territory#, since the Serbs controlled only their settlements. But immediately after the
Dayton Agreement all the Serbs from Ugljen’s Sarajevo escaped to the Republic ofa Srpska,
because they were the ethnic hostages in Sarajevo. On the other hand, there was no place in
the RS in July 1996 that didn’t have a significant, although decreased number of the
Muslims, see D4002

And so on. This is a Muslim esteem, and late Ugljen was known for his extremism, and this
assessment is much lower than in reality. However, no matter how many Muslims and
Croats remained in the Serb cities, the main question is: what was the difference between
those who left and those who stayed? Having in mind the confirmed fact that these who left
had to do many things to leave, why the Prosecution didn’t prove that the authorities press
them to leave? The Defence kept asserting that those who had the closest relatives in the
Muslim Army didn’t feel comfortable in the Serb areas, where the killed Serbs had been
brought on a daily basis!)

2164. According to several witnesses, there was no organised campaign for the expulsion of
Bosnian Muslims in Ilidţa by the local authorities.7359 In light of the accepted evidence that the
Ilidţa Crisis Staff led by Prstojević expelled Bosnian Muslim civilians from their homes and
redistributed vacant Bosnian Muslim property to Bosnian Serbs, the Chamber rejects this
evidence. The Chamber also notes that while several witnesses testified that (i) several Bosnian

7358
D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 60.
7359
D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28 October 2013), paras. 57–58; Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
8709; Momĉilo Ĉeklić, D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 27; Momĉilo Ĉeklić, T. 35218 (12 March 2013); Radomir
Kezunović, T. 13972 (31 May 2011); D2773 (Witness statement of Slavko Mijanović dated 19 January 2013), para. 6.
 351

Muslims left voluntarily;7360 (ii) civilians of all ethnicities left Ilidţa due to the conflict;7361 and
(iii) Bosnian Muslims who wanted to stay could do so and that many Bosnian Muslims and Croats
remained in Ilidţa during the conflict,7362 this evidence bears limited weight in light of the
accepted evidence that Serb Forces participated in the expulsion of Bosnian Muslim civilians in
Serb held parts of Ilidţa and prevented their return. (The Prosecution kept claiming that #“some
Muslims”# had been expelled, but it is not sufficient after so many witnesses denying this
assertion! If the Defence had a single name of the Muslim family that had been expelled, it
could have been checked, but with such a fluid charges, no defence could do anything. Is it
possible that courts in the countries that support this Court accept such a fluid, unspecified
and arbitrary assertions such as: #“Some Serbs have expelled some Muslims#”? Or “some
Serbs killed some Muslims”? This case is fool of such a charges, and the chambers accepted
this kind of evidence! Such a conceived “Serb Forces” is deeply incorrect and arbitrary,
since the “Serb Forces” are not differentiated from the legal Serb authorities, which fought
against the parts of the “Serb Forces”, remember the intercept Mandic – Kovac, in which
Kovac said that the Chief of the Criris Staff can not control “them”. “…[I]n light of accepted
evidence that the Serb Forces participated in the expulsion…” could also mean that this
evidence was accepted wrongly and erroneously, and as such caused further damage of the
interests of President, and this is not just and fair trial.)

2165. In light of the foregoing, the Chamber finds that members of the non-Serb population
from the Serb-controlled parts of Ilidţa were forced to leave. (Such a complex subject demands
a more cautious approach and respect for the principle “in dubio pro reo”. Above all of this,
there hadn’t been so many Muslims in the Serb Ilidza, because as accepted by this Chamber,
the Serb Ilidza comprised #only the Serb settlement#s.)

iii Novi Grad

(A) Charges

2166. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity, was
committed in Novi Grad as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and/or
Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.7363 Acts of persecution alleged to have been committed
by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs in Novi Grad include
killings during the take-over of Novi Grad,7364 killings related to a detention facility as well as
killings committed during, and deaths resulting from, cruel and inhumane treatment at this
detention facility.7365 The Prosecution also characterises these killings as extermination, a crime

7360
Ĉeklić maintained that civilians left the eastern parts of Ilidţa around 23 April 1992 on their own accord because weapons were found in their homes.
Momĉilo Ĉeklić, T. 35219–35226 (12 March 2013). According to Kovaĉ, after the attack on Ilidţa of 22 April 1992, civilians, including Serbs, left due to
the proximity of their homes to the front. D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28 October 2013), para. 58.
7361
D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28 October 2013), para. 57; NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13784 (21 March 2011); D1232 (Program for the
return of Serbs from SR Yugoslavia, 21 June 1992) , p. 2; D3112 (Witness statement of Momĉilo Ĉeklić dated 8 March 2013), para. 27; Momĉilo Ĉeklić,
T. 35218, 35226–35227 (12 March 2013); Radomir Kezunović, T. 13972 (31 May 2011) (testifying that he moved his family to Pale to stay in their holiday
house during the war); D2773 (Witness statement of Slavko Mijanović dated 19 January 2013), para. 6.
7362
Momĉilo Ĉeklić, T. 35220 (12 March 2013); Radomir Kezunović, T. 13973–13974 (31 May 2011); D2773 (Witness statement of Slavko Mijanović dated
19 January 2013), para. 6.
7363
Indictment, paras. 48–49.
7364
Indictment, para. 60(a)(i). See Scheduled Incident A.9.1.
7365
Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). See Scheduled Incidents B.12.1, B.12.2.
 352

against humanity, under Count 4; murder, a crime against humanity, under Count 5; and murder, a
violation of the laws or customs of war, under Count 6.7366

2167. Other acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Novi Grad by Serb Forces
and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include (i) torture, beatings, and physical
and psychological abuse, during and after the take-over and in a detention facility, as cruel or
inhumane treatment;7367 (ii) rape and other acts of sexual violence, during and after the take-over
and in a detention facility, as cruel and inhumane treatment;7368 (iii) the establishment and
perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in a detention facility in Novi Grad, including the
failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic
sanitation facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment;7369 (iv) forcible transfer or deportation of
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their homes;7370 (v) unlawful detention in a detention
facility;7371 (vi) forced labour at the frontline and the use of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
as human shields;7372 (vii) the appropriation or plunder of property, during and after the take-over,
during arrests and detention, and in the course of or following acts of deportation or forcible
transfer;7373 (viii) the wanton destruction of private property including homes, business premises,
and public property including cultural monuments and sacred sites;7374 and (ix) the imposition and
maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.7375

2168. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible
transfer), respectively, as crimes against humanity.7376 In this regard, the Prosecution alleges that
by the end of 1992, Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs had forcibly
displaced Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Novi Grad in which they were
lawfully present.7377 It is alleged that from March 1992, restrictive and discriminatory measures,
arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence, killing,
destruction of houses, cultural monuments and sacred sites, as well as the threat of further such
acts caused Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to flee in fear, while others were physically
driven out.7378

(B) Lead-up

(1) The municipality of Novi Grad

2169. The municipality of Novi Grad, one of the ten constitutive municipalities of Sarajevo, is
bordered in the south and in the west by Ilidţa, in the north by Vogošća and Ilijaš, and in the east
by Novo Sarajevo.7379 It was established in 1977, encompassing the areas which had hitherto

7366
Indictment, para. 63(a), 63(b).
7367
Indictment, para. 60(b). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.17.1.
7368
Indictment, para. 60(c).
7369
Indictment, para. 60(d). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.17.1.
7370
Indictment, para. 60(f).
7371
Indictment, para. 60(g). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.17.1.
7372
Indictment, para. 60(h).
7373
Indictment, para. 60(i).
7374
Indictment, para. 60(j). See Scheduled Incident D.15.
7375
Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement; the removal from positions of
authority; the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or the denial of
equal access to public services.
7376
Indictment, paras. 68–75.
7377
Indictment, paras. 69, 72.
7378
Indictment, para. 71.
7379
P973 (Robert Donia‘s expert report entitled ―Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo, 1990–1995‖, January 2010), p. 8; Appendix B, Map 1;
P815 (Map of Sarajevo showing confrontation lines). See also Adjudicated Fact 2.
 353

constituted the western parts of Novo Sarajevo.7380 These areas included, inter alia, the local
commune of Dobroševići which was comprised of the villages of Ahatovići, Bojnik, Dobroševići,
and Mihaljevići, the local commune of Rajlovac, and Dobrinja, a set of large, high-rise residential
complexes which housed around 40.000 people before the war.7381 According to the 1991 census,
Novi Grad‘s population was 136,616 of which 50.8% were Muslim, 27.5% were Serb, and 6.5%
were Croat.7382 (What ethnicity was the rest of 16% of population? Not even the Prosecution
or the Chamber noticed this kind of #deception and manipulation#, so frequent in BiH.
Obviously, this 16% were so called “Yugoslavs”, i.e. the Serbs that disguised themselves,
certainly because it was not so pleasant to be a Serb in Sarajevo!) The village of Ahatovići
was inhabited mainly by Bosnian Muslims, while those living in Rajlovac and Dobroševići were
mostly Bosnian Serbs.7383 Inhabitants of Novi Grad municipality generally lived together
peacefully until the beginning of 1992.7384

2170. Novi Grad was host to a number of important commercial, industrial and military
installations, including the Rajlovac Barracks, the Butile Barracks, and Orao (a military industrial
factory dedicated to the overhaul of aircraft engines).7385

2171. Before the start of the conflict, the president of the Municipal Assembly of Novi Grad
was Ismet Ĉengić, a Bosnian Muslim.7386 Momĉilo Krajišnik, Nikola Stanišić, Jovan Tintor,7387
and Ranko Torbica were prominent SDS leaders in the area.7388 Bakir Alispahić, Hasan Ĉengić,
and Jusuf Pušina were SDA leaders in the municipality.7389

(2) Establishment of Rajlovac municipality7390

7380
Robert Donia, T. 3089 (31 May 2010); P973 (Robert Donia‘s expert report entitled ―Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo, 1990–1995‖,
January 2010), pp. 9–10, 30.
7381
D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court p. 3; P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011),
para. 16; P2343 (Information report of Ramiz Mujkić, 4 July 2004), pp. 1–3 (a number of photographs showing Ahatovići, Dobroševići, the Bojnik area and
the Rajlovac area); Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12138–12139 (17 February 2011), 12425, 12440 (25 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14
February 2011), para. 2 (under seal); D2387 (Witness statement of Stojan Dţino dated 4 November 2012), para. 5; P973 (Robert Donia‘s expert report
entitled ―Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo, 1990–1995‖, January 2010), pp. 33, 35–36; Robert Donia, T. 3134, 3141 (1 June 2010); P2577
(Press release of Novo Sarajevo municipality, 1 April 1992), p. 1; P1866 (Witness statement of Youssef Hajir dated 25 February 2010), para. 8; Youssef
Hajir, T. 8836–8837 (2 November 2010).
7382
P5964 (Census data for BiH by municipality in 1971, 1981, and 1991, April 1995), e-court p. 2; D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July
1995), p. 60. But see P4994 (Addendum to Ewa Tabeau‘s expert report entitled ―Ethnic Composition in Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27
Municipalities of BiH 1991 to 1997‖, 3 February 2009), pp. 21, 30, 33, 36, 39 (indicating that in 1991, Novi Grad had 112,618 inhabitants of whom,
approximately 49.5% were Bosnian Muslims, 28.3% were Bosnian Serbs and 7.1% Bosnian Croats). While the Chamber has found Tabeau‘s evidence to be
generally reliable, for the purpose of determining the population of Novi Grad and the ethnic composition thereof in 1991, it relies on other evidence before
it, such as the direct source document, P5964, which contains the raw data from the 1991 census in BiH.
7383
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 2 (under seal); KDZ041, T. 12130 (17 February 2011); P2314 (Witness statement of
Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), paras. 16, 29; Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12139–12140 (17 February 2011); D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements of
Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court p. 3; D2387 (Witness statement of Stojan Dţino dated 4 November 2012), para. 7.
7384
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 5 (under seal); P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011),
para. 3; D2387 (Witness statement of Stojan Dţino dated 4 November 2012), para. 9.
7385
Robert Donia, T. 3702 (10 June 2010); P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 2; P2343 (Information report of Ramiz
Mujkić, 4 July 2004), p. 4; D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 61.
7386
P2577 (Press release of Novo Sarajevo municipality, 1 April 1992), p. 2; P973 (Robert Donia‘s expert report entitled ―Bosnian Serb Leadership and the
Siege of Sarajevo, 1990–1995‖, January 2010), p. 34.
7387
Jovan Tintor was formally associated with the Vogošća municipality and was officially appointed to the post of the commander of the Vogošća TO Brigade
on 22 May 1992. See P1505 (SRK Order, 22 May 1992), e-court p. 2; P3033 (Reynaud Theunens‘s expert report entitled ―Radovan Karadţić and the
SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)‖), e-court pp. 441–442.
7388
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 2–3 (under seal). Krajišnik was born and owned a family house in ZabrĊe, to the
southeast of Ahatovići, near the Butile Barracks. Momĉilo Krajišnik, T. 43153 (7 November 2013); P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4
February 2011), paras. 60–61; P2327 (Map marked by Ramiz Mujkić), pp. 1–2; P2343 (Information report of Ramiz Mujkić, 4 July 2004), pp. 6–7; Robert
Donia, T. 3132 (1 June 2010).
7389
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 2 (under seal); D2387 (Witness statement of Stojan Dţino dated 4 November 2012),
para. 8.
7390
The Prosecution alleges that in furtherance of the First and Fifth Strategic Goals, the Accused and the Bosnian Serb Leadership established the Serb
municipality of Rajlovac in certain areas of Novi Grad, which included the Muslim village of Ahatovići. Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix A (Novi Grad
section), para. 1.
 354

2172. Near the end of 1991, members of the SDS municipal board from Novi Grad began
contemplating the creation of the Serb municipality of Rajlovac on territory which belonged, in
large parts, to the municipality of Novi Grad, in order to prevent Serbs being outvoted in the Novi
Grad government and the Novi Grad Municipal Assembly.7391 On 26 December 1991, Krajišnik
informed the President that he had been to a Novi Grad Municipal Assembly session in which
voting had been blocked.7392 In addition, on 9 February 1992, Krajišnik informed the President of
the meeting he had recently attended in Reljevo, a village in Novi Grad municipality, and the
discussions he had had about forming the Rajlovac municipality.7393 A few days later, on
11 February, Jovan Tintor told a certain Prodanović that a new municipality called Rajlovac was
being created.7394

2173. On or about 23 February 1992, SDS leaders proclaimed the Serb municipality of Rajlovac
on some of the territories which had hitherto belonged to the municipality of Novi Grad.7395 On
26 March 1992, Dobrinja was incorporated into the Serb municipality of Ilidţa, while remaining
parts of Novi Grad were incorporated in the Serb municipality of Novo Sarajevo.7396 On 11 May
1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted a law according to which the municipality of Rajlovac
included, inter alia, Ahatovići, Bojnik, Dobroševići, Rajlovac, Reljevo-Dvor, ZabrĊe, and Ţuĉ.7397
Jovo Boţić assumed the role of the President of the Rajlovac municipality.7398 Sometime after the
proclamation of Rajlovac as a new municipality, the Rajlovac municipality Crisis Staff was
established and Jovo Boţić was appointed as its President.7399 (#Due to the Constitution and
law#! This is not entirely correct. First of all, the #Rajlovac municipality existed earlier#,
and was predominantly, almost exclusively Serbian. With this Rajlovac municipality there
happened what happened with many Serb municipalities, it was quitted and merged with the
neighbourin municipality with the Muslim majority. Just to number some of the Serb
municipalities that had been qutted: Berkovic near Stolac, Avtovac, near Gacko, Rajlovac,
near Sarajevo, Blazuj, near Hadzici, Priboj, near Bijeljina, Bronzani Majdan, near Banja
Luka, and several others. Immediately after the merging of municipalities, the former Serb
municipality drastically deteriorated economically and socially, and people started to leave
the area. Since the Rajlovac Municipality had the said “Orao” and other enterprises with a
satisfactory incomes, the Novi Grad, newly proclaimed municipality, incorporated the
Rajlovac Municipality, and since then Rajlovac underwent a constant deterioration of
economic and social life. So, The Rajlovac municipality was renewed, not formed for the first
time. All that was mentioned about the parts of Ilidza, Novo Sarajevo and Novi Grad, the
Serb settlements were deliberately allocated into different municipalities, so that the Serbs
nowhere had a majority. This is in the USA known as a “Gerrimanderism”, a manipulation
with the borders of the local communes in order to achieve something what wouldn’t be
achievable in a legal and normal manner. The Serb representatives in the communist era
either didn’t care, or were not sufficiently courageous or honest, and the Serb community in
the BiH deteriorated in every aspect of life, (see; Dusko Jaksic testimony and statement.
7391
D84 (Shorthand Record of 3rd session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 December 1991), pp. 20–22.
7392
P5785 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 26 December 1991), p. 1.
7393
P5753 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, February 1992), p. 1. Also, sometime in February 1992, Krajišnik
informed Nikola Koljević about a meeting he was going to attend in Rajlovac ―in connection with this one municipality.‖ P5758 (Intercept of conversation
between Momĉilo Krajišnik and Nikola Koljević, February 1992), p. 1.
7394
P965 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and FNU Prodanović, 11 February 1992), p. 5.
7395
P973 (Robert Donia‘s expert report entitled ―Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo, 1990–1995‖, January 2010), p. 32; Stojan Dţino, T. 29871
(7 November 2012); P967 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Ljubo Grković, 22 February 1992), pp. 1–2. See also Adjudicated Fact
2580. On 24 March 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly unanimously verified the decision to establish the municipality of Rajlovac along with 34 other Serb
municipalities. P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 23–24.
7396
P2577 (Press release of Novo Sarajevo municipality, 1 April 1992), p. 1; P973 (Robert Donia‘s expert report entitled ―Bosnian Serb Leadership and the
Siege of Sarajevo, 1990–1995‖, January 2010), pp. 31, 35; Robert Donia, T. 3134 (1 June 2010); P966 (Map of Sarajevo marked by Robert Donia).
7397
P2315 (Decree on promulgation of Law on Establishment of Rajlovac Municipality, 11 May 1992), p. 1; Stojan Dţino, T. 29865, 29901 (7 November 2012).
See also Adjudicated Fact 2580.
7398
D2387 (Witness statement of Stojan Dţino dated 4 November 2012), para. 14.
7399
See P2329 (Rajlovac Crisis Staff Order, 9 April 1992); P2628 (Report of Rajlovac‘s Crisis Staff, 28 May 1992).
 355

The so called “take over” of the Novi Grad municipality look the most ridiculous, since the
Serbs controlled only several of the Serb settlements, that made 15% of the Municipality!)

(3) The arming and mobilisation of Bosnian Serbs in Novi Grad

2174. By 14 October 1991, Tintor and Ratko Adţić, who later became the President of the Serb
Municipality of Ilijaš,7400 had already discussed the issue of arming and mobilisation and noted the
inadequate response to the call for mobilisation of Serbs in Novi Grad and surrounding
municipalities. Adţić specifically complained that despite a meeting during which he had
announced that there was a unique opportunity for Serbs to come and take firearms, nobody from
Novi Grad had shown up to collect such weaponry.7401 This is an additional proof that the
#Serbs joined the JNA as reservists#, and thus obtained the armament. It was all legal from
the standpoint of the JNA, and particularly from the interests of local Serbs. The official
Army called for mobilisation, as it was a regular pratice, armed its reserve battalions,
replenish its units and prepared for the coming war against the separatist republics.
Meanwhile the Muslims already had their own secret army, the #Patriotic league and Green
berets# in every municipality. Look how it was in the region of Sarajevo: D298, p 1

As we can see, the Serbs and the JNA were late at least a month behind the Muslims in
Sarajevo. Let see further, D298, p.3

This is how it looks like when one side is prevented to depict the other side’s conduct, which
directly influenced and caused the conduct of the first side. #Selective#! Nobody should mix
it with “tu quoque”, it is simply necessary for understanding of events, and differentiation of
the legal defence preparations from illegal one.

2175. In February 1992, civilian trucks with Serbian and Montenegrin number plates removed
equipment and supplies, including a number of guns, from the Butile Barracks and two of those
trucks were driven to Pale.7402 (#Before VRS, during JNA#! So what? The JNA took care of its
assets. Since the Bosnian Serbs knew what the Patriotic league was doing, the JNA knew
much more, see testimony of Aleksandar Vasiljevic.) In March or April 1992, a MP company,
headed by Nikola Šuput, was relocated from Kiseljak municipality to Butile Barracks, bringing a
number of APCs, anti-aircraft guns, and other weaponry.7403 (So what? Why it is of any interest

7400
P2623 (Ilijaš list of revenues and expenses, 11 May to 30 June 1992), p. 4.
7401
P5844 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and Ratko Adţić, 14 October 1991), pp. 1–3.
7402
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 4.
7403
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), paras. 6–7; D1103 (Supplemental witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 28 April
2000), p. 1.
 356

of the Chamber, since it was a perfectly #legitimane and legal activity of the JNA#, and far
from even knowledge, let alone influence of the President?) From March 1992 onwards, local
Serbs came to the Butile and Rajlovac Barracks in order to be issued uniforms and weapons,
including sniper rifles, and to undergo military training.7404 (A reserve company of the Muslims
from the neighbouring settlement Sokolje came to the Rajlovac Barracks and was equipped
by the JNA, the same as the Serbs, see: the testimony of Mihajlo Vujasin!) Two Bosnian
Serbs employed at the Orao factory, Stevo Petriĉević and Mirko Mirković, established and
maintained connections between local Serbs and the officers in the Rajlovac Barracks, and were
involved in the distribution of arms to the local Serbs.7405 At the same time, reserve troops,
including Serbs from surrounding areas started arriving at the Butile Barracks.7406 They wore
uniforms and were taught by Šuput‘s men how to operate mortars and other types of weapons.7407
In addition, Orao accommodated a Serb ―paramilitary unit‖ which consisted of SDS members
from the surrounding villages.7408 The insignias on the uniforms worn by this unit bore four
Cyrillic ―S‖ symbols and some of its members wore ―kokarda‖ caps.7409 (#Before VRS# In
February 1992 there was the former BiH and it’s authorities, and the JNA, and the
President, or SDS, or the Republic of Srpska had nothing to do with any event there, but it
seems as if this Court doesn’t care for the facts if it helps “the Prosecution’s cause.” The
JNA had a shortage of the manpower and activated their reserve units, which was in
accordance with the law!)

2176. On 3 March 1992, a certain Gvozden informed the President that he had mobilised Serbs
from Pale and would do the same in other municipalities, including Novi Grad.7410 The President
then demanded that efforts be made to show that Muslim mobilisation preceded Serb mobilisation
by a number of hours.7411 (#EXCULPATORY#!!! Let us see what is in the said Prosecutor’s
document, P5604:p. 1

7404
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 8; P2343 (Information report of Ramiz Mujkić, 4 July 2004), p. 4 (photograph
showing the Rajlovac Barracks); D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court p. 2; P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041
dated 14 February 2011), para. 4 (under seal).
7405
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), paras. 12–13; D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-
court p. 2.
7406
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 9.
7407
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 9; D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court
p. 2.
7408
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 4 (under seal).
7409
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 4 (under seal).
7410
P5604 (Intercept of conversation between Gvozden and Radovan Karadţić, 3 March 1992), p. 3.
7411
P5604 (Intercept of conversation between Gvozden and Radovan Karadţić, 3 March 1992), pp. 2, 5.
357
 358

Here is completely clear that the Serb side didn’t want to instigate any conflict, and that the
President didn’t have anyone under his control and command, that he even didn’t know
what should and could be done, nor he knew those who had the big calobres weaponry!)

2177. By March 1992, Bosnian Serbs established a check-point on the bridge across the Bosna
river in the Reljevo settlement and near the Butile Barracks, and gradually blocked the passage of
Bosnian Muslims.7412 (Although the Prosecution/the Chamber had the insight in the previous
document P5604, the Serbs are scotomised as the villains. Nota Bene: of 1 March 1992 there
happened the killing on the weding ceremony in front of the Old Christian Othrodox
Church, which caused the greatest unrest in Sarajevo. The President and his close associates
were in Belgrade. But, both sides erected barricades, and the Muslim side was the first to
mobilise, as seen from the P5604, and also they were “up-to-date” with the barricades, see
7412
Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12427, 12433–12434 (25 February 2011); P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), paras. 17–18; P2327 (Map
marked by Ramiz Mujkić); P2329 (Rajlovac Crisis Staff Order, 9 April 1992); KDZ041, T. 12083–12086 (17 February 2011); D2387 (Witness statement of
Stojan Dţino dated 4 November 2012), para. 12. Mujkić testified that the check-point was erected in January 1992. See Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12427, 12433
(25 February 2011); D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court p. 3. By contrast, Stojan Dţino, testified that it was after
the murder of the wedding guest in Sarajevo in March 1992 that Bosnian Serbs erected the first barricades. See D2387 (Witness statement of Stojan Dţino
dated 4 November 2012), paras. 9, 70. KDZ041 could only recall that the Serb barricades were erected sometime by the end of February or the beginning of
March 1992. See P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 4 (under seal). But see KDZ041, T. 12083 (17 February 2011)
(indicating that the barricades were erected in the period of 20 to 25 May 1992). See paras. 3533–3539.
 359

P5604, p. 5:

On 9 April 1992, the Rajlovac municipality Crisis Staff ordered the ―active observation‖ of the
entire territory of Rajlovac municipality by means of controlling all vehicles and people moving in
the direction of the ―Distribution Centre‖.7413 (Those are #all legal and legitimate activities# of
the local authorities! If the authorities didn’t do that, they would be criminaly responsible
due to the Law on All-People’s Defence!) The Rajlovac municipality Crisis Staff also ordered
that one policeman and two TO members should be present at all times at the check-point towards
the Distribution Centre.7414 (Those are #all legal and legitimate activities# of the local
authorities. The Prosecution was obliged to present the facts in the light of the domestic
legislation, so that the Chamber does not live in an illusion, and thus makes a wrong
deliberations!)

2178. By early May 1992, almost all non-Serb soldiers and officers of the JNA had abandoned
their posts and left the Butile Barracks.7415 (In any country of the free world, they would be
sued as deserters!) However, pursuant to the instructions of Hasan Mujkić who was at the time
the commander of the local Muslim TO, Ramiz Mujkić stayed in his post at the Barracks in order
to monitor the situation and report back to the TO command.7416 (It was an illegal activity, and
he could have been arrested by the JNA and processed as a spy!) On or about 10 May 1992,
the JNA handed over the Rajlovac Barracks and the Rajlovac airport to the Rajlovac TO.7417 (The
Rajlovac TO was an inherent part of the SFRY Armed forces, and thus subordinated to the
JNA!)

2179. Sometime after 20 May 1992, Ramiz Mujkić met a group of Albanian JNA soldiers who
were in charge of the security of the Butile Barracks and who told him that they would help the
Bosnian Muslim TO take over the barracks.7418 (Look at that! Was it legal? Were the Serbs
supposd to just watch it and not do anything to protect themselves? Such a huge treason of
the JNA should have been processed in the martial courts!) Ramiz Mujkić subsequently
informed Hasan Mujkić of this proposal but was shown a written message from Alija
Delimustafić, the Minister of BiH MUP,7419 prohibiting any such take-over.7420 Three or four days
later, Delimustafić reversed his position but the take-over of the Butile Barracks could not be
carried out as a number of White Eagles had arrived there in the meantime.7421

7413
P2329 (Rajlovac Crisis Staff Order, 9 April 1992).
7414
P2329 (Rajlovac Crisis Staff Order, 9 April 1992).
7415
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 14.
7416
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 15; Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12413, 12431 (25 February 2011); D1101 (Excerpts from
witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court p. 5.
7417
D2686 (Witness statement of Mihajlo Vujasin dated 16 December 2012), para. 10; P3033 (Reynaud Theunens‘s expert report entitled ―Radovan Karadţić
and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)‖), e-court p. 441.
7418
Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12415–12416 (25 February 2011); D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court p. 6.
7419
P1117 (Letter from SRBiH Minister of Interior to all MUP administrations, 31 March 1992), p. 2; P1121 (SRBiH Minister of Interior‘s letter to all CSBs,
SJBs, and SUP Sarajevo, 8 April 1992).
7420
Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12416 (25 February 2011); D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court p. 6; Ramiz Mujkić, D1104
(Excerpts from transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9240.
7421
Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12416 (25 February 2011); D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court p. 6; D1104 (Excerpts from
transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9240.
 360

2180. On 22 May 1992, the SRK commander, Tomislav Šipĉić, ordered the formation of the
Rajlovac TO Brigade, thus subordinating the Rajlovac TO to the SRK, and appointed the Rajlovac
Crisis Staff president, who at that time was Jovo Boţić, to the post of the commander of the
Brigade.7422 On 28 May 1992, Boţić reported to the Bosnian Serb government that the ―Serbian
Army of the Serbian Municipality of Rajlovac‖ included 1,280 conscripts.7423 (All of it was
#regular and lawful#!)

2181. In May 1992, during talks between local SDA and SDS representatives in the village of
Ahatovići, the Bosnian Serbs threatened to attack the village if the villagers did not leave.7424 The
Bosnian Muslims refused to comply with the demand and the local crisis staff of the Bosnian
Muslims led by Hasan Mujkić set up barricades,7425 organised village guards, and armed them
with infantry weapons.7426 The Muslim TO numbered some 200 men.7427

2182. By mid-May 1992, all Serbs living in the villages of Dobroševići, Bojnik, Mihaljevići,
and Brod left their houses for locations close to Rajlovac and Butile Barracks.7428 (Let us see why
it happened, see D1240, of 2 June 92,
p.2

And further, what was the situation in the region of Rajlovac-Ahatovici: D1240:

7422
P1505 (SRK Order, 22 May 1992), e-court pp. 1–2; P2628 (Report of Rajlovac‘s Crisis Staff, 28 May 1992).
7423
P2628 (Report of Rajlovac's Crisis Staff, 28 May 1992). Also, on 17 June 1992, during the 122nd Session of the BiH Presidency, Sefer Halilović reported
that in the territory of Novi Grad, the enemy forces numbered 1,200 and had in their possession, inter alia, ten tanks, 26 APCs, 129 Mortars, 12 PEA guns,
eight PEA machineguns, 22 hand-held rocket launchers, nine pieces of 82 mm mortar guns, four pieces of 82 mm recoilless guns, five cannons and several
sniper nests. D192 (Transcript of 17th June 1992 session of the BiH Presidency), p. 4.
7424
KDZ041, T. 12081–12083 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 5 (under seal). See also Adjudicated
Fact 2607. The Chamber is cognisant of the fact that in his statement, Witness KDZ041 referred to the beginning of March 1992 as the period during which
Serbs requested that the inhabitants of Ahatovići leave the area whereas during his testimony, he asserted that the request was in fact made at the end of May
1992, that is, after the outbreak of war in Sarajevo. The Chamber is also mindful that according to Adjudicated Fact 2607, this request was conveyed to the
inhabitants of Ahatovići in March 1992. The Chamber considers, however, that the meeting in question took place around the end of May 1992 as stated by
KDZ041 during his testimony. First, that period roughly coincides with the outbreak of hostilities in Sarajevo, as well as the alleged attack on the village of
Ahatovići. Second, in his statement, Stojan Dţino stated that the last meeting between Muslims from Ahatovići and Serbs took place on 27 May 1992.
D2387 (Witness statement of Stojan Dţino dated 4 November 2012), paras. 12–13. The Chamber notes, however, that this inconsistency in the evidence of
KDZ041 is not so grave that it would affect his overall credibility.
7425
The Chamber notes that during his testimony before the Chamber, KDZ041 denied that there was a crisis staff in Ahatovići and instead referred to the
existence of a group of village elders. See KDZ041, T. 12080, 12087–12089 (17 February 2011). The Chamber, however, does not accept this part of
KDZ041‘s testimony since in his witness statement, he stated that a crisis staff headed by Hasan Mujkić was formed in Ahatovići, and then proceeded to list
its members. P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 10 (under seal). Moreover, Ramiz Mujkić also indirectly confirmed the
existence of the said crisis staff. See P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 32. With respect to the existence of
Muslim‘s barricades, the Chamber notes that in one of his written statements, Ramiz Mujkić stated that Muslims had set up barricades in Dobroševići and
Ahatovići. See D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court p. 5. However, during his testimony, he denied that there
were such barricades. See Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12417–12420, 12432 (25 February 2011). In assessing this inconsistency, the Chamber considered the
following: First, KDZ041 stated that after the Serbs had established barricades, the Muslims erected barricades of their own around Ahatovići. P2310
(Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 6 (under seal). Second, Ramiz Mujkić did in fact concede that the Muslim TO had a number
of permanent positions, such as dugouts, around Ahatovići village. See P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 25. The
Chamber therefore does not rely on Ramiz Mujkić‘s testimony that there were no Muslim barricades in Dobroševići and Ahatovići.
7426
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 10 (under seal); Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12417, 12432, 12436–12437 (25 February 2011);
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), paras. 25, 32. See also Adjudicated Fact 2607.
7427
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 25; D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court
p. 3.
7428
According to KDZ041, the Serbs were ordered to leave their houses so that the paramilitary units could establish their positions. P2310 (Witness statement
of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 8 (under seal); KDZ041, T. 12090 (17 February 2011).
 361

As it can be seen, the entire area with all of the Muslim and Serb villages had been
embattled, and Ahatovici was a very known Muslim armed stronghold, with a significant
production of armament and ammunition. However, it had nothing to do with the President
or anyone from the central Serb authorities. Nobody could, even if wanted, order the local
people not to defend and not to take a precautionary measures! Simply, this shouldn’t be a
subject to this case, and could only be used as an argument against civil wars!): During the
same period, the telephone and electricity lines to Ahatovići were disconnected.7429 By the end of
May, Serbs had set up barricades on all the roads leading from Rajlovac and Bojnik to
Sarajevo.7430 (Taking look of the above document D1240 and having in mind the intensive
combat preparations and activities of the Muslim secret Army (the Patriotic League and
Green Berets, no wonder the local Serbs took all of these precautionary measures. Is the UN
Court of an opinion that the Serbs weren’t entitled to defend themselves? If so, it should be
said, and if not, the Indictment-Judgement are senseless. Patricularly it is senseless to charge
this President for that, since there is no person or official all over the world who was entitled
to order the jeopardized Serbs not to defend. Even if ordered, such an order wouldn’t be
obeyed, rightfully!) The individuals who manned these check-points stopped buses and vehicles
and subjected the Bosnian Muslim passengers to searches, before refusing them passage to
Sarajevo.7431

i. Attack on Ahatovići

2183. On 25 May 1992, the inhabitants of the village of Ahatovići received an ultimatum from
Serb Forces to surrender their men along with their weapons.7432 On 24 or 25 May 1992, women,
children, and the elderly attempted to leave Ahatovići for the nearby municipality of Visoko, but
were prevented from doing so by Bosnian Serbs who fired at them.7433 (In this foot note there is
a reasonable explanation by S. Dzino about the reasons!)

2184. On 27 May 1992, Serbs in both JNA and camouflage uniforms arrived on the hills around
Ahatovići from the direction of Rajlovac with tanks and armoured vehicles.7434 Using
megaphones, they urged the villagers to surrender.7435 They threatened: ―Balijas, surrender, or we
kill your children.‖7436 (#Deadly combination# Adjudicated Fact, unacceptable to the Defence.
It is not serious to manipulate with so many adjudicated facts in such an important case,
against such a highly positioned Serb official!) When the villagers refused, at around 11 p.m.
Serb Forces launched an attack, which was eventually repelled.7437 During this initial attack two
Muslims were killed and ten were wounded.7438 #Nota bene, civilians repelled attack#! How

7429
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 13 (under seal); P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011),
para. 33.
7430
KDZ041, T. 12083 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 6–7 (under seal). The Chamber is mindful
that in his statement, KDZ041 stated that the barricades were erected in March whereas during his testimony he indicated that the barricades were erected
sometime between 20 May 1992 and 25 May 1992. The Chamber considers that KDZ041‘s live testimony is more credible on this particular issue.
7431
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 7 (under seal); KDZ041, T. 12084–12085 (17 February 2011); P2314 (Witness
statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 17; D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court p. 3.
7432
KDZ041, T. 12091–12092 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 11 (under seal).
7433
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 12, 19 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 2608. Stojan Dţino testified that
Hasan Mujkić requested, on 29 May 1992, that Jovo Boţić allow the evacuation of the convoy containing women and children from Ahatovići to Sarajevo
but this was not allowed because the Serbs suspected the evacuation to be a preparatory step for an attack on Bosnian Serb settlements. See D2387 (Witness
statement of Stojan Dţino dated 4 November 2012), para. 14.
7434
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 15 (under seal); KDZ041, T. 12092 (17 February 2011).
7435
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 15 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 2609.
7436
Adjudicated Fact 2609.
7437
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 15 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 2609.
7438
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 16 (under seal). The Chamber notes that these killings are not charged in either
Schedule A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.
 362

come? The attack was repelled by the unarmed civilians? The village of Ahatovici was a
fortified Muslim stronghold from where they attacked and threatened all surounding
Serbian villages. #Abuse of civil settlements# The local Serbs had their own assumption and
their own fears, and their own reasons. It had nothing to do with the central authorities, and
nobody could order them not to defend and not to take a precautionary measures.

2185. On 29 May 1992,7439 a final attack was launched on Ahatovići and Dobroševići, with
heavy artillery.7440 The shells were fired from all directions, including the Butile and Rajlovac
Barracks.7441 At this time, the women, children, and the elderly were moved to basements of
several houses in the centre of the village.7442 On 31 May, pursuant to the instructions of Fikret
Mujkić, a member of the Ahatovići Crisis Staff, a group of villagers left for Bioĉa in order to meet
two TO platoons from Visoko that were sent to facilitate the withdrawal of the villagers.7443 (So,
Ahatovici had a Crisis Staff, not only the Serb settlements? Also, Ahatovici had a help from
Visoko. How many evidence is needed to accept the fact that Ahatovici was a #higly
militarised village#, and that this hadn’t been an attack on civilians?) Ramiz Mujkić was
chosen to be a part of this group but did not manage to meet up with them and instead returned to
Ahatovići on 3 June.7444 The shelling lasted until 1 or 2 June 1992, resulting in destruction of, and
damage to, nearly 130 houses in Ahatovići and the death of 15 to 20 Bosnian Muslims.7445

2186. After the shelling stopped, Tintor as well as the local Serbs and members of paramilitary
groups7446 mounted an infantry attack against Ahatovići.7447 During this infantry attack, about 20
Bosnian Muslim men were killed.7448 Subsequently, about 30 Bosnian Muslim villagers, including
KDZ041, who had run out of ammunition (Sic!!!#Civilians run out of ammunition#! ) decided
to break through enemy lines and escape towards Visoko but were eventually hit by artillery
fire.7449 In that instance, four Bosnian Muslim men were killed whereas a number of others,
including KDZ041, were wounded.7450 (#And the killed had been depicted as civilians,

7439
The Chamber notes that according to KDZ041, the shelling of Ahatovići commenced sometime between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m. whereas according to the
statement of Ramiz Mujkić, it began at 3 p.m.. P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 17 (under seal); P2314 (Witness
statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 26. However, the Chamber finds that this discrepancy is not so serious that it would adversely
affect the credibility and reliability of either witness.
7440
KDZ041, T. 12097 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 17–18 (under seal); Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12438,
12449–12452 (25 February 2011); P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), paras. 26, 33; D1101 (Excerpts from witness
statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court pp. 3, 6. KDZ601 testified that the attack took place in late May and early June 1992 and that forces
participating in the attack included the members of the ―Oljaĉa group of Chetniks‖, members of the Ilidţa Battalion, and the members of the SJB Ilidţa.
KDZ601, T. 18588–18590 (8 September 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2610.
7441
KDZ041, T. 12097 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 17, 20 (under seal); P2314 (Witness
statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 28; D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court pp. 3, 6.
7442
KDZ041, T. 12095 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 12, 19 (under seal); P2314 (Witness
statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 31; D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court p. 3.
7443
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), paras. 32, 35; D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-
court pp. 3, 6.
7444
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), paras. 32, 35–36.
7445
KDZ041, T. 12097 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 18–19 (under seal); Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12452
(25 February 2011); P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 26. See also Adjudicated Fact 2660. The Chamber notes
that these killings are not charged in Schedule A of the Indictment. See fn. 13.
7446
While KDZ041 testified that he saw men in JNA uniforms with white armbands and headbands and that those were members of the White Eagles, KDZ601
testified that the attack involved members of the ―Oljaĉa group of Chetniks‖ and that they were reinforced by VRS and MUP forces. See P2310 (Witness
statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 23 (under seal); KDZ601, T. 18588–18589 (8 September 2011). The Chamber also notes that it has
received other evidence showing the participation of paramilitaries in this attack. For example, on 5 August 1992, the head of Ilidţa Serb SJB lamented that
the commander of the Ilidţa Brigade had excluded ―militia‖ from joint meals even though those forces had partaken in many combat activities such as those
in Hadţići, Rakovica, Ahatovići and Dobrinja. P6639 (SJB Ilidţa information, 5 August 1992), p. 6. On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the Chamber
finds that paramilitaries took part in the attack against Ahatovići.
7447
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 19–20, 23 (under seal); KDZ041, T. 12066–12067, 12108 (17 February 2011); P2314
(Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 26; D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court p. 3.
See also Adjudicated Fact 2610.
7448
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 18, 23 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 2610; D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP
to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 61
7449
KDZ041, T. 12065–12067 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 18–19, 20–21 (under seal).
7450
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 21 (under seal). The Chamber notes that these killings are not charged in either
Schedule A or B of the Indictment.
 363

villagers?!?#) Soon after, Tintor, the local Serbs, and paramilitaries entered Ahatovići with APCs
and tanks.7451 Sometime during the shelling or the infantry attack, Ramiz Mujkić‘s younger sister
and her daughter Elma Bešić who was only 15 years old at the time, were also killed.7452
(Regretable! But, keeping their own civilians within the combat zone was the responsibility
of the Ahatovici leadership!#Abuse of civilians#! ) Subsequently, houses belonging to Bosnian
Muslims were looted and set ablaze.7453 The Serbs captured about 400 women and children and
80 men, in addition to the 150 women and children who had been captured in Dobroševići, Bojnik,
and Mihaljevići prior to the attack on Ahatovići.7454 (See D1240 above, about the Muslim
ultimatum to the Serb villages around Dobrosevici. The Muslims #initiated the attacks, and
had lost!#) Those captured in Ahatovići were subsequently taken in the direction of Rajlovac.7455
The attack was completed and Ahatovići came under Bosnian Serb control by 3 June 1992.7456

2187. On 5 June 1992, Mijatović, from the Rajlovac Municipal Assembly, informed NeĊeljko
Prstojević, the president of the Ilidţa Crisis Staff7457 that Ahatovići was no longer a threat.7458
(Obviously, it was a threat, and that was a reason to demand their disarmament!)
Following a request signed by the President and dated 19 July 1992, houses that were not
destroyed in Ahatovići were provided to the Serb refugees from the Muslim part of Sarajevo.7459
(This is #not correct intervention# of the Chamber, because in the President’s request there
is not mentioned Ahatovici, nor it concerned the combat areas! Why it was necessary?
Because the Chamber’s young associates felt they needed everything against the President,
since what they did have, was nothing!)

2188. In a 1993 report, Tihomir Glavaš, the Chief of the SJB Hadţići referred to the success of
the 1 June 1992 military attack against Ahatovići launched by forces under his command and
stated that as a result of the attack, the territories of Butile and Rajlovac had been unified.7460
(Those were the #military and security reasons#. Let us see what was said in the P2308,
which was the base for this findings: P2308, p.1.

T
his high official of the Serb MUP, in no way associated with the SDS and critical of the
“ethnic” parties, pointed out the obligation of the police stations to protect the inhabitants
from any jeopardy! #Official’s proper conduct#! See further:

7451
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 19–20 (under seal).
7452
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 48. The Chamber notes that these killings are not charged in either Schedule A or
B of the Indictment.
7453
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 23, 63 (under seal); P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February
2011), para. 39.
7454
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 32 (under seal).
7455
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 33 (under seal); P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011),
para. 89; D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 62.
7456
P2333 (SerBiH MUP Report re Romanija–Birĉani CSB, 3 June 1992), p. 1, reports that Ahatovići was ―liberated‖ and placed under the ―Serb Army
control‖.
7457
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12961 (8 March 2011).
7458
P2239 (Intercept of conversation between Mijatović and NeĊeljko Prstojević, 5 June 1992), pp. 1, 3.
7459
P739 (RS Presidency request to various municipalities, 19 July 1992). See also P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para.
39.
7460
P2308 (SJB Ilidţa report, 20 September 1993), p. 5.
 364

This was the consequence of the real “take-over” by the SDA party! Further:

p.4:

And then the first Serb counteroffensives started 6 weeks after the first Muslim offensives, se
the same document P2308, p.5:

Here is the village of #Ahatovici, almost eight weeks after the war broke out#, although the
Serbs have known it as a #Muslim stronghold#, nobody touched them until the Muslim
forces from Doglody issued an ultimatum to the Serb villages in the vicinity of Ahatovici!
How it was possible that the UN Court justified so many illegal, unlawful and anti-
Constitutional acts of the Muslim secessionists, and intend to sanction and punish every
single defence of the Serb side? This is going to be mentioned throughout the time as a
unique example!)

i. Scheduled Incident A.9.1

 365

2189. The Indictment alleges that on or about 29 May 1992 at least 15 men were killed after
they were captured while fleeing from the village of Ahatovići.

2190. After the 30 Bosnian Muslims, who tried to break through enemy lines and escape
towards Visoko, were hit by artillery fire as described above,7461 The Bosnian Muslims
surrendered to Serbs.7462 Among the Serbs were Stevo Petriĉević, Dragan Koprivica, and Bato
Arnautović.7463 After their surrender, 15 of the Bosnian Muslim villagers, mainly those who were
able to walk, were taken to a nearby road and made to sit.7464 Koprivica and Arnautović then
proceeded to shoot the 15 remaining men who were unable to walk, killing them all.7465 At that
point, Tintor, armed with a pistol and an automatic rifle and wearing a JNA uniform, along with a
number of paramilitaries, appeared on the scene.7466 Tintor then ordered that the men be lined up
in pairs and taken to the Butile Barracks.7467 (If true, that would be #EXCULPATORY# for
Tintor himself, and for the official policy of the Serbs in BiH!)

2191. Several days after the incident, Ramiz Mujkić, who was hiding in the forest above
Ahatovići at the time, observed an excavator digging three holes in three different locations in the
village and a number of Serb soldiers throwing bodies in these holes, which were then covered
with soil.7468 (It is clear even to children that those bodies had been the combat casualties. If
it was not so, why the Serbs would wait for several days to bury them. Obviously, when it
was assessed that there was no more Muslim combatantys, the civil protection made the
sanitation of the battlefield!) In 1996, authorities from CSB Sarajevo exhumed the mortal
remains of 25 Bosnian Muslim men and women from three different locations in Ahatovići.7469
KDZ041 identified four of these individuals as victims of the above-described execution.7470
(And how come they had been executed on some other places and buried with the combat

7461
See para. 2186.
7462
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 21.
7463
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 22, 24 (under seal).
7464
KDZ041, T. 12065 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 21 (under seal).
7465
KDZ041, T. 12065 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 22, 24 (under seal). See also Adjudicated
Fact 2610. Those killed included Jusuf Suljić, Nihad Tokmo, Bećir Ţiga, Meho Ţiga, and a man who went by the name ―Kriminalac‖. P2310 (Witness
statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 22, 24 (under seal). Contrary to this evidence, Dţino stated that the 15 Bosnian Muslim men were
combatants who were killed during combat. D2387 (Witness statement of Stojan Dţino dated 4 November 2012). The Chamber, however, does not accept
Dţino‘s evidence for the following reasons. First, KDZ041 gave reliable and detailed evidence of the executions of the 15 captured Bosnian Muslim men
which he witnessed. Second, the Chamber found Dţino‘s evidence to be generally marked with contradictions. (But, how the Chamber would
explain that there was no the Muslim combat casualties whatsoever, not only in Ahatovici, but everywhere? All the
combat casualties had been depicted as a victims of executions, and that was the result of the “preparations of
witnesses by the Muslim secret services, see KDZ065, or 045@@@)
7466
KDZ041, T. 12066, 12108 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 25 (under seal).
7467
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 27 (under seal).
7468
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), paras. 83, 85; P2327 (Map marked by Ramiz Mujkić), pp. 1–2. See also D1105
(Supplemental information sheet for Ramiz Mujkić, 1 November 2004). On 3 June 1992, Ramiz Mujkić returned to Ahatovići and while moving through
the village, was shot at. He escaped to the woods where he met Huso Gaĉanović and the two of them proceeded towards the forest known as Ptiĉija Glava,
where they stayed until they were captured on 6 August 1992. P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), paras. 39–42, 44.
7469
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 64 (under seal); P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011),
paras. 84–86; P2341 (CSB Sarajevo report re exhumations in Ahatovići, 15 October 1996), p. 1; D1105 (Supplemental information sheet for Ramiz Mujkić,
1 November 2004); P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 13–14. These 25 individuals are Elma Bešić (female, 1976), Razija Bešić
(male, 1953), Dţemail Bukalo (male, 1959), Mesud Burić (male, 1965), Admir Ĉaušević (male, 1972), Osman Ĉaušević (male, 1948), Elvedin Ɖedović
(male, 1975), Hamid Divolić (male, 1950), Osman Evendić (male, 1954), Avdo Gaĉanović (male, 1944), Hamid Gaĉanović (male, 1952), Šerifa
Hrustanović (female, 1942), Ramiz Hrvaĉić (male, 1950), Vahid Ligata (male, 1966), Nihad Mešanović (male, 1970), Samir Mujkić (male, 1966), Ajša
Novalija (female, 1951), Šaban Peljto (male, 1969), Meho Rizvanović (male, 1966), Jusuf Suljić (male, 1961), Nijaz Šehović (male, 1962), Nihad Tokmo
(male, 1970), Ahmo Uhota (male, 1951), Bećir Ţiga (male, 1953) and Meho Ţiga (male, 1930). In P4853, the name Šerifa Hrustanović appears twice, once
as the daughter of Meho with 1942 as the year of birth and once as son of Jusuf with 1950 as the year of birth. However, in P4883 (Data on exhumations in
the Sarajevo region in the period of 1996–1998), p. 18, it is stated that Ramiz Hrvaĉić was born in 1950 and that his father‘s first name was Jusuf. Having
had regard to the name of father and the year of birth, the Chamber is satisfied that the second entry in P4853 was intended for Ramiz Hrvaĉić and not Šerifa
Hrustanović. What is more, in P4883, the first name of Nijaz Šehović (male, 1962) is recorded as Nihaz. Nevertheless, the Chamber finds that this
discrepancy is so minor that it does not have a bearing on the Chamber‘s finding with respect to Scheduled Incident A.9.1. Also, in P4883 Dţemail
Bukalo‘s first name is recorded as Dţemal. However, the Chamber finds that this discrepancy is very minor. In P4883 Mesud Burić‘s first name appears as
Mensud. The Chamber finds that this inconsistency is also very minor.
7470
The individuals identified by KDZ041 as victims of Scheduled Incident A.9.1 are Jusuf Suljić, Nihad Tokmo, Bećir Ţiga and Meho Ţiga. P2310 (Witness
statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 13, 26.
 366

casualties, being killed on a quite different places? Who transported them, and for what
purpose? Also, what preventsed the KDZ041 to lie and count the combat casualties into his
“list” of an alleged execution?)

2192. The Prosecution submits, based on Amor Mašović‘s evidence, that in addition to the
above four individuals identified by KDZ041, a number of other individuals out of the 25
exhumed as well as three individuals whose remains were exhumed on 9 December 1994 by
UNPROFOR from a separate place in Ahatovići are also victims of Scheduled Incident A.9.1.7471
However, the Chamber, based on the evidence before it, cannot conclude whether or not each of
these additional individuals is a victim of Scheduled Incident A.9.1.

2193. In light of the foregoing, the Chamber finds that, following the attack on Ahatovići, on or
about 1 June 1992, the Serb Forces executed 15 Bosnian Muslim men who had surrendered.
(#Protected lies#! This had not been proven properly, as a criminal law would demand. This
fact compromises all the unnecessary “protective measures” because the protection enables
endless lies! Thus the Defence do not have any possibility to rebut these kind of an obscure
assertions with the help of the public!)

i. Scheduled Incident D.15

2194. The Indictment refers to the destruction of the Ahatovići mosque on or about
4 June 1992.7472

2195. The Chamber received evidence that a detonation destroyed the Ahatovići mosque,
leaving only the stump of its minaret standing.7473 Stojan Dţino testified that it happened on 4
June 1992, during the combat activities related to the attack on Ahatovići village, and that he
observed the explosion from a distance.7474 Dţino heard rumours that the ammunitions and the
explosives that had been stored in the mosque by Bosnian Muslims had been hit by a heavy-
calibre weapon, thus causing a significant explosion which destroyed the entire mosque.7475
Ramiz Mujkić denied that explosives were stored in the mosque.7476 Mujkić, moreover, testified
that he returned to Ahatovići in the morning of 3 June 1992.7477 According to Mujkić, at that time,
the Muslim houses were being guarded by local Serbs and that for this reason he had to travel
through the village via Serb houses.7478 The Chamber also notes that contrary to Dţino‘s assertion
that combat activities were still ongoing on 4 June 1992, a SerBiH MUP Report indicates that by 3
June 1992, Serb Forces had assumed control of Ahatovići.7479 (Since there is the evidence on the
#abuse of the Islamic community# and Islamic objects# for the purpose of the war, this
moment should have been treated due to rule “in dubio pro reo”. But, stil the main question
7471
These three individuals are Ešref Mujkić (male, 1938), Amir Novalija (male, 1965) and Vejsil Novalija (male, 1936). P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report
of Amor Mašović), pp. 13–14; Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix G (Schedule A.9.1 section).
7472
Indictment, Scheduled Incident D.15.
7473
Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12458–12459 (25 February 2011); P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 45; P2310 (Witness
statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 63 (under seal); András J. Riedlmayer, T. 22532–22533 (8 December 2011); P4069 (Cultural
destruction database), record 332; P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖
prepared for the Karadţić case, formatted records), e-court pp. 201–204; Stojan Dţino, T. 29866–29867, 29888 (7 November 2012). See also Adjudicated
Fact 2662.
7474
Stojan Dţino, T. 29866–29867 (7 November 2012). However, contrary to Dţino‘s assertion that there were combat activities in Ahatovići on 4 June 1992,
the Chamber has received reliable documentary and testimonial evidence that on 3 June 1992, Serb Forces were in control of Ahatovići. See fn. 7484–7486.
7475
Stojan Dţino, T. 29866–29867 (7 November 2012) (referred to in the Defence Final Brief, para. 1712, in support of the Accused‘s submission that if the
mosque had been used for military purposes, it lost the protection given to it by Article 3(d) of the Statute).
7476
Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12458–12459 (25 February 2011).
7477
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 39.
7478
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 40.
7479
P2333 (SerBiH MUP Report re Romanija–Birĉani CSB, 3 June 1992), p. 1.
 367

is: what does it have to do with the President? The local people attacked and defended in
accordance with the assumed jeopardy, and nobody could have influenced it!)

2196. On the basis of the foregoing, the Chamber finds that the mosque in Ahatovići was
destroyed due to a detonation on 4 June 1992 and that Serb Forces were responsible for causing
the detonation which destroyed the mosque. (#Absurdity#! Why the Serbs would bring such an
amount of explosive so far from their barracks, just to use it without any purpose? If it was
so, during the transport they could have been hit by fire, and all the construct is
unbelievable! And what has it to do with the President?)

i. Scheduled Detention Facility C.17.1 and Scheduled Incident B.12.1

2197. The Indictment alleges that cisterns near the Rajlovac Army Barracks were used as a
detention facility in June 1992,7480 and that ―a number‖ of men detained there were killed between
1 June 1992 and 14 June 1992.7481

2198. As noted above,7482 Bosnian Muslim men were captured following the attack on
Ahatovići, after which Tintor ordered that they be transferred to the Butile Barracks. On the way
to the Barracks, the men were subjected to threats as well as physical and verbal abuse.7483 When
they reached a supermarket, some 200 metres from the Butile Barracks, they encountered about
100 well-armed White Eagles mistreating a number of villagers who had been captured from
Dobroševići and other neighbouring villages.7484 (#Not “Bosnian Serb liable#! The White
Eagles weren’t under any of the Bosnian Serbs control and command, but remained after
the #JNA as it’s volunteers#! There is a sufficient evidence that the only legal forces were the
VRS and the Police of the Republic of Srpska!) The White Eagles and some local Serbs then
beat the detained men with iron bars, rifle butts, and wooden batons.7485 At one point, one of the
men was told that Arkan‘s men would soon take custody of the detainees.7486 Soon afterwards, the
Bosnian Muslim detainees were forced to run the gauntlet and board a military bus.7487 On the
bus, they were forced to sing ―Chetnik songs‖7488 and, the Serbs cursed Alija Izetbegović and the
detainees‘ ―balija mothers‖.7489 The bus travelled to the ―army fuel depot‖ in Rajlovac.7490 Once
there, the detainees were ordered to lie down on the grass where they were beaten with sticks and
had a pair of dogs unleashed on them.7491 Some detainees were then put on a truck and taken to
Orao where their wounds were bandaged.7492 (The White Eagles were #not under the
authorities control#, while somebody in Orao took care of the detainees wounds!)
Afterwards, they were taken back to Rajlovac Barracks and placed in a cistern or reservoir, which
by that time housed approximately 90 detainees.7493 Adjoining this cistern was a bigger cistern,

7480
Indictment, Scheduled Detention Facility C.17.1.
7481
Indictment, Scheduled Incident B.12.1.
7482
See para. Error! Reference source not found..
7483
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 27 (under seal).
7484
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 27 (under seal).
7485
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 27–30 (under seal).
7486
KDZ041, T. 12104 (17 February 2011).
7487
KDZ041, T. 12083 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 31 (under seal). A SerBiH MUP report
indicates that after the attack on Ahatovići, some 50 Green Berets and HOS members were captured and sent for interrogation to the Rajlovac Barracks.
P5425 (Report of RS MUP, 3 June 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact 2626.
7488
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 31 (under seal).
7489
See Adjudicated Fact 2626.
7490
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 31; KDZ041, T. 12083 (17 February 2011).
7491
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 31 (under seal).
7492
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 31 (under seal); Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12428 (25 February 2011).
7493
KDZ041, T. 12068 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 31 (under seal).
 368

which housed approximately 130 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Dobroševići,
Mihaljevići, Bojnik, Kobiljska, and Bioĉa.7494

2199. The two cisterns formerly belonged to ―Energopetrol Company‖ and had not been used
since 1985.7495 They housed the male detainees.7496 Near the cisterns were two buildings which
were the premises of ―Tehnogas Company‖ and the Distribution Centre.7497

2200. On the morning of 2 June 1992, Mile Stojanović arrived and introduced himself as the
commander of the ―camp‖.7498 He wore a blue uniform which, although very similar to the police
uniform, did not have any insignia.7499 On that occasion, Stojanović was accompanied by an
individual named Šok and four others.7500 Šok wore the same blue uniform and also had a
Yugoslav flag sewn onto his shirt.7501 Stojanović then asked the detainees for their identification
cards and made a list of their names,7502 while Šok asked them about the weapons they had used
and the nature of their duties.7503 (Just to be clear: “[ok” in Albanian meant “friend” or “drug”
in Serbian. Since the two belonged obviously to the “Orao” Factory, belonging to the JNA,
he may have been an Albanian, but not necessarily!) Šok also inquired whether Hasan Mujkić,
Husein Mujkić, and Meho Novalija, who were SDA political leaders, had been present during the
attack on Ahatovići.7504 After the prisoners were registered, Šok and his four men took two
Bosnian Muslim men out of the cistern and beat them while questioning them about the weapons
they used.7505 When Stojanović returned on the same day, he saw the bruises on the men and
promised that it would not happen again.7506 Stojanović then indicated that there would be two
prisoner exchanges, one involving women and children and the other at Kobilja Glava, involving
the prisoners from the smaller cistern.7507 Despite Stojanović‘s pledge, however, on a nearly daily
basis Šok took two or three prisoners in front of the cisterns and subjected them to beatings.7508
On one occasion, he and his men took out two men, beat them and broke the latter‘s arms.7509

2201. Due to the deposit of rainwater in the cisterns, the detainees were forced to stand for the
entire duration of their detention.7510 They received no food or water during the first three days of
their detention and afterwards received very little food and water.7511 On or about 3 June 1992,
Šok forced a number of prisoners who did not have visible signs of injury to appear before a Serb
television crew and state that they were being treated well.7512 (#Lie ad absurdum#! Not
7494
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 31 (under seal).
7495
KDZ041, T. 12067–12069 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 31, 48 (under seal); P2311
(Photograph of cisterns); P2327 (Map marked by Ramiz Mujkić), pp. 1–2; P2343 (Information report of Ramiz Mujkić, 4 July 2004), pp. 8–10.
7496
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 49; D1105 (Supplemental information sheet for Ramiz Mujkić, 1 November
2004).
7497
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 33 (under seal); P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011),
paras. 46–47; P2327 (Map marked by Ramiz Mujkić), pp. 1–2; P2343 (Information report of Ramiz Mujkić, 4 July 2004), p. 5.
7498
KDZ041, T. 12081 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 34–35 (under seal); D1101 (Excerpts from
witness statements of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court p. 5. See also Adjudicated Fact 2627.
7499
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 34 (under seal). There is evidence that Mile Stojanović held the rank of Sergeant
Major in the MP. See P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), paras. 53–54, 67–68; D1101 (Excerpts from witness statements
of Ramiz Mujkić, undated), e-court pp. 4, 7; D1103 (Supplemental witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 28 April 2000), p. 2; P2325 (Medical
certificate re Ramiz Mujkić, 22 August 1992), p. 1; Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12382 (24 February 2011).
7500
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 34 (under seal).
7501
KDZ041, T. 12105, 12108–12109 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 34 (under seal).
7502
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 34 (under seal).
7503
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 34 (under seal).
7504
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 34 (under seal).
7505
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 36 (under seal).
7506
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 36 (under seal).
7507
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 36 (under seal); KDZ041, T. 12122 (17 February 2011).
7508
KDZ041, T. 12105 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 37 (under seal).
7509
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 37 (under seal).
7510
KDZ041, T. 12069 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 31 (under seal).
7511
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 38 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 2628.
7512
KDZ041, T. 12100 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 39 (under seal).
 369

probable, since nobody would survive in a metal cistern in June for three days without
water! If true about the appearance before the TV crew, it would obviously mean that
Stojanovic as a superior, as well as the Serb public was not allowed to know the real state in
the detention. But, from 1 June to 3 June is not as long period as said in these paragraphs,
which probably was one and a half day!)

2202. During the first week of June 1992, three new prisoners, namely Hajro Delić, his son, and
Dţemail Saĉić were brought to the smaller cistern.7513 A few days into his detention, Delić was
taken away and brought back the following day, severely injured.7514 He told the other prisoners
that he had been severely beaten and abused by Šok on orders from Nikola Stanišić and that during
the questioning, Stanišić had asked for one million German Marks as the price for releasing
him.7515 Soon after that, Delić succumbed to his injuries and died.7516 (A very #weak and loose
evidence#. For such a criminal case, there should be a firm evidence, and in particular
connected to the President, since that was a development among the local Muslims and
Serbs, who knew each other well, and a plethora of motives could have been involved! What
does it have to do with the President?)

2203. On two occasions, a man by the name of Ţuti who was rumoured to be Tintor‘s chauffeur
and a former ―member of the Special Forces of Dragan Vikić‖ came to the smaller cistern, called
out the names of a number of prisoners, indicating that they were to be taken for exchange in
Ilidţa.7517 None of these individuals have since been seen alive and KDZ041 heard that the
remains of some of them were found at the Vlakovo city cemetery.7518 (This level of #“hear-
say”# is not correct and shouldn’t be included in such a case!)

2204. On one occasion, Ţuti approached one of the cisterns and threw in a gas grenade.7519
Immediately after Ţuti had left, one of the guards opened the door to the cistern so that the
prisoners could come out for fresh air.7520 (So, the guard as an official helped the detainees,
while “Zuti” and his capacity is unknown for sure! #Next level#!)

2205. Between 1 and 14 June 1992, Stojanović, Šok, and other members of the special unit
accompanied a man to one of the cisterns; this man then pointed out Enver Ĉelik, alleging that
Ĉelik had abused his sister.7521 Šok and the other men took Ĉelik behind the cisterns, hanged him
by his arms and killed him by hitting him twice in the back with iron bars.7522

2206. On 12 June 1992, the prisoners from the smaller cistern were told that they would be
taken to Kobilja Glava, in order to be exchanged.7523 The next day, Stojanović called the names of
56 individuals and instructed them to board two trucks.7524 The two trucks travelled to a police
station in Sokolac, then to the Koran Barracks, on to Rogatica, and finally to Pale, where they

7513
KDZ041, T. 12069 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 40 (under seal).
7514
KDZ041, T. 12069 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 40 (under seal).
7515
KDZ041, T. 12069–12070, 12106 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 40 (under seal). KDZ041
testified that Stanišić and Delić had an argument even before the war. KDZ041, T. 12069–12070, 12106 (17 February 2011).
7516
After Delić‘s death, his son and an individual by the name of Edin were transferred to the other reservoir in order to be exchanged. KDZ041, T. 12070,
12129 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 40 (under seal).
7517
According to KDZ041, these individuals included Edin Brajlović, Zajko Brajlović, Zijo Brajlović, another person with the last name Brajlović, two persons
with the last name Salkić, a man called Amir who was from Dobroševići, Rusmir Pašić and Kadrija Ramadani. KDZ041, T. 12070–12071, 12124–12125
(17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 41–44 (under seal).
7518
KDZ041, T. 12071 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 42–44 (under seal).
7519
KDZ041, T. 12106–12107 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 41, 43 (under seal).
7520
KDZ041, T. 12106–12107 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 41 (under seal).
7521
KDZ041, T. 12070, 12128–12129 (17 February 2011).
7522
KDZ041, T. 12070, 12128–12129 (17 February 2011). When cross-examined as to why he never mentioned this incident before, KDZ041 testified that he
did mention it but that it was never recorded for some reason.
7523
KDZ041, T. 12122 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 45 (under seal).
7524
KDZ041, T. 12122 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 45 (under seal).
 370

stopped near the Panorama Hotel.7525 At about 6 p.m., the trucks returned to Rajlovac.7526 At that
point, the larger cistern was empty as the people detained there had been exchanged on that day so
the 56 detainees were placed there.7527 On 14 June 1992, Hamo Karić, whose injuries had become
infected, was taken out of the cistern in order to be exchanged.7528

2207. During the course of their respective cross-examinations, Stojan Dţino and Mihajlo
Vujasin both conceded that the civilians from Ahatovići had been taken to the Rajlovac Barracks
and detained.7529 @@@ Vujasin even admitted that a few of the Bosnian Muslims were subjected
to beatings there and that he had risked his life when ensuring that the detainees were not harmed
by ―certain individuals‖.7530 (As usually, “the next level”, i.e the first immediate superior tried
to rectify misdeeds of some individuals. The superiors are the legitimate representatives of
the official policy, not some renegades that neglected the President’s order pertaining to the
treatment of POWs and civilians! But, let us see what Mr. Vujasin said, T.31804 to T.31806,
and how a “cleverness” of the Prosecutor distorted the answers: Q. The Trial Chamber has
also heard evidence that by the end of the war there was only one Muslim family living in
Ahatovici. Does that sound about right to you? A. I just know that the population had fled to
Rajlovac and from Rajlovac into town and then wherever they wanted to go, that is to say in
accordance with their own wishes. As for this family, I cannot say. I don't really know. They
could have returned. Whoever wanted to could return after these unfortunate developments --
Q. All right. You -- A. -- because they had this free will that they could express. However,
the set of circumstances then was very difficult. Would you allow me to explain that? Q. No.
But you can explain it if Mr. Karadzic deems it important in redirect, but let me ask you another
question. Were you aware that as a result of this operation several hundred people from this
settlement were detained in different places in Rajlovac? Were you aware of that? A. That I
do know, and I barely survived, I and Mirko Krajisnik, in terms of these consequences -- may I
proceed? Q. Stop there for a moment and let's just back up. You just said -- I asked about
people being detained, and you said, as I understand it, I do know and I barely survived in terms
of consequences. Are you suggesting you were detained? A. No, not me, taking care that
these people do not get hurt. I'm referring to people who sought shelter in the Rajlovac
barracks, from Mijatovici Brda, Zenica. These people who were expelled from Central Bosnia,
they were all in barracks and officers and soldiers and families and they were all there, whereas
these people had fled to our territory so we saved them and we had to provide for them. We had
nowhere else to put them up so we were taking care of them so they would not be victimised in
any way, and that's what happened. Fire was even opened at Mirko Krajisnik. Q. All right.
So you say that when this attacked happened, you were at a meeting elsewhere, but now I
understand it that you are suggesting that when these people were detained, you had some --
some role in ensuring that they were safe. Is that what we're to understand? A. Saved, yes.
Yes, saving these people who had fled. Q. Sir, the Trial Chamber has heard evidence that a
number of these people were maltreated. They were beaten. They were kept in inhumane
conditions. Were you aware of that? A. I knew that they were not beaten or anything. There
were situations when one individual or two would be beaten up. There was this rage. We had
terrible problems to prevent that, to prevent individuals from doing that. We had terrible
problems to prevent these unfortunate things happening, and these unfortunate things being
done by certain individuals. I mean, people had rifles and how would I know whether they'd
open a burst of gunfire at them or whatever. I mean, it wasn't good. It's not even good to think
about that, about all the things that could have happened but fortunately did not happen. Q.
7525
KDZ041, T. 12122 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 46 (under seal).
7526
KDZ041, T. 12122 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 47 (under seal).
7527
KDZ041, T. 12122–12123 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 47 (under seal).
7528
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 49 (under seal).
7529
Stojan Dţino, T. 29857–29858 (6 November 2012), 29872–29873 (7 November 2012); Mihajlo Vujasin, T. 31805 (20 December 2012).
7530
Mihajlo Vujasin, T. 31805–31806 (20 December 2012).
 371

And these were individuals who were subordinated to you, were they not? A. In the barracks
you cannot say that they were subordinated to me,because this was an open-type barracks.
There wasn't a classical army. That is to say that units came, groups of 10 to 15 men, and then
they joined up to create a brigade. So, That was a sort of trickery, not a search for the truth.
Mr. Vujasin clearly said, as much as he was allowed, that these people had been sheltered
there, rather than “detained”, he also described how many rage was tehe at the people, the
Serbs, who were chasen out of their homes and villages, as well as how the groups of the
armed people weren’t “a classical army”! It is one problem, how the Prosecutor took care of
“squising” confusing and “milking out” the answers he wanted to here from an army officer,
but the most probl;ematic was why the #Chamber accepted this kind of #cunning
conduct#!?!)

2208. Between 9 and 18 June 1997, the remains of nine Bosnian Muslim men were exhumed
from the Vlakovo cemetery in Ilidţa municipality.7531 Out of those, six were identified by
KDZ041 as having been killed during their detention in the cisterns.7532 According to Amor
Mašović, with the exception of Edin Brajlović who was recorded as last seen alive on 17 June
1992 in Ahatovići, all these individuals were last seen alive on 1 or 2 June 1992 in Ahatovići.7533
The forensic evidence establishes the cause of death of seven of the nine victims as either gunshot
to the head, gunshot to the chest cavity or injury to the head.7534 In light of the foregoing
evidence, the Chamber finds that all of these nine individuals were killed, while detained in two
cisterns near the Rajlovac Army Barracks some time during the first half of June 1992. (The
Muslim-witnesses of the Prosecution were #free to lie# as much as they wanted. Vlakovo was
a reglular, official cemetery for the entire City of Sarajevo. It is a several tens of kilometres
far from Sarajevo, and Rajlovac too. There is no a single proof that they hadn’t been killed
during the combats, and everyone could have stated they were executed, while they were not!
Anyway, since there was several days of a fierce fighting in all, the Muslim and Serb villages:
where are depicted the combat casualties? Edin Brajlovic was seen last time on 17 June, how
it happened he was buried with the alleged execution victims from the Rajlovac Barracks?
Why it was so easy to deceive the Chamber?)

2209. Based on the foregoing, the Chamber finds that two reservoirs or cisterns near the
Rajlovac Barracks had been turned into makeshift prisons for the male detainees and that the men
detained there were given very little food and water and were forced to stand for the duration of
their captivity. Further, the Chamber finds that the guards at this makeshift detention facility
routinely subjected the male detainees to interrogations and beatings. (That had not been
established that these were the guards, but some other individuals, rarely and prevented by
the officials!) The Chamber notes that some of the men, including KDZ041, were combatants

7531
These nine individuals are Imer Bajramović (male, 1950), Edin Brajlović (male, 1963), Zajko Brajlović (male, 1939), Zijad Brajlović (male, 1962), Refik
Dţaferović (male, 1955), Dţemal Efendić (male, 1958), Amir Habibović (male, 1955), Rusmir Pašić (male, 1969) and Kadrija Ramadani (male, 1933).
P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 86–87; P4883 (Data on exhumations in the Sarajevo region in the period of 1996–1998), p.
45; P4884 (Sarajevo Cantonal Court records relating to the Vlakovo Exhumation, 17 June 1997), pp. 8–9, 19–20, 41–42; P4850 (Witness statement of Amor
Mašović dated 23 March 2012), Annex A, pp. 5–7; P4885 (Sarajevo Cantonal Court record of post–mortem examination of victims exhumed at Vlakovo, 25
August 1997), pp. 33–39. As regards the death of Edin Brajlović whose date of disappearance is indicated as 17 June 1992 in P4853, the Chamber has given
consideration to the following facts. First, Edin Brajlović‘s cause of death was established as gunshot wound to the head. Second, according to evidence,
Ţuti removed him and a number of individuals from the cisterns and none of these individuals ever returned. Third, the body of Edin Brajlović was
discovered at the same location where the remains of the eight individuals killed by Serb Forces were found, that is, in the mass grave in Vlakovo cemetery
in Ilidţa municipality. Based on these considerations, the Chamber finds that the reference in P4853 to 17 June 1992 as the day Edin Brajlović was last seen
alive must be erroneous.
7532
These six individuals are Edin Brajlović, Zajko Brajlović, Zijo Brajlović, Amir Habibović, Rusmir Pašić and Kadrija Ramadani. P2310 (Witness statement
of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 44 (under seal).
7533
P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 86–87.
7534
P4885 (Sarajevo Cantonal Court record of post–mortem examination of victims exhumed at Vlakovo, 25 August 1997), pp. 33–39. The forensic
documentation does not indicate the cause of death of the remaining victim, namely Zajko Brajlović. In relation to Imer Bajramović, the Chamber notes that
the cause of death was determined to be penetration of the body by harpoon. See P4885 (Sarajevo Cantonal Court record of post–mortem examination of
victims exhumed at Vlakovo, 25 August 1997), pp. 29–30.
 372

prior to their detention.7535 (It would be reasonable to presume that all the able bodied
#Ahatovici men were combatants#!)

2210. The Chamber also finds that sometime during the first week of June 1992, Serb Forces
killed two Bosnian Muslim detainees in or near the cisterns7536 and that sometime during the first
half of June 1992, Serb Forces removed nine Bosnian Muslim men from the cisterns in the
Rajlovac Barracks and subsequently killed them.7537 (Let us first see what really KDZ041 said
on the subject, T. 12070-71: Q. Witness, in your statement, this is at paragraph 44, you state
that on or around the 10th of June, Zuti came to your container and called ten people out. And
you go on to say that you A. Yes. Q. They had never been heard of or seen again. Do you
have any information as to what became of those ten men? A. These men were allegedly taken
out for an exchange. As far as I can remember, it was stated that they were taking them to
Ilidza. However, as far as I can remember, I never heard of them again. I mean, I heard that
they had been killed and some of them were found at Vlakovo, in the city cemetery. (Is that all?
How possibly any chamber could have drawn such an inference from this testimony? If the
Muslims had been “taken out for an exchange” and all other is hear-say, while the same
witness said that some of them had been found in Vlakovo the city cemetery. The most
probable inference would be that they had been exchanged, and some of them died in
combats, and were buried in Vlakovo! Another question is: what kind of the Serb forces
were those from whom Vujasin, as an officer was scared and risked his life to protect the
detainees? But, the main problem with this Judgement is – there is #no evidence that those
men had been killed out of the combats#. How was it possible that so fierce fightings went
without the combat casualties? It was possible, because all of them had been depicted as a
men killed in executions!#Combatants depickted as civilians#!)

i. Scheduled Incident B.12.2

2211. The Indictment alleges that at least 47 men were taken from the cisterns and killed near
Srednje in Ilijaš municipality on or about 14 June 1992.

2212. On 14 June 1992, at about 7 p.m., heavily armed men dressed in black and white
camouflage uniforms, black balaclavas, and red berets whom KDZ041 thought were ―Special
Police Forces‖, arrived at the cisterns and ordered the detainees, including KDZ041, to form a
single line and board a civilian bus as they were to be exchanged in Kobilja Glava.7538 Upon
entering the bus, a guard hit the prisoners and ordered them to lie down on the floor, face down
with their hands behind their heads.7539 As they were many, they had to lie on top of one another
in order to fit into the bus.7540 Ţuti drove the bus while two guards watched the detainees.7541
Four cars containing members of what KDZ041 referred to as ―Special Police Forces‖ were
escorting the bus, two in the front, and two behind the bus.7542 The bus then drove to a barricade
near Srednje where Ţuti asked for directions to the village of Sokolina.7543 By this time, the two

7535
See paras. 2190, 2193.
7536
These two individuals are Hajro Delić and Enver Ĉelik. See paras. 2202, 2205.
7537
These individuals are Imer Bajramović, Edin Brajlović, Zajko Brajlović, Zijad Brajlović, Refik Dţaferović, Dţemal Efendić, Amir Habibović, Rusmir Pašić
and Kadrija Ramadani. See paras. 2203, 2208.
7538
KDZ041, T. 12071–12073, 12109–12110 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 50–51 (under seal).
See also Adjudicated Fact 2629.
7539
KDZ041, T. 12071, 12109–12110 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 51 (under seal).
7540
KDZ041, T. 12071, 12109 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 51 (under seal).
7541
KDZ041, T. 12071–12072, 12110 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 51–52 (under seal).
7542
KDZ041, T. 12072, 12111–12112 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 51 (under seal).
7543
KDZ041, T. 12110–12111 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 52 (under seal).
 373

cars which had been travelling behind the bus had disappeared.7544 Ţuti proceeded to drive the bus
for another ten minutes before stopping near the separation line.7545

2213. At that point, Ţuti informed the detainees that the radiator had overheated and that he
needed to cool it down, while one of the guards told the detainees not to stand up.7546 About 10 to
15 seconds after Ţuti and the guards had left the bus, KDZ041 heard a loud explosion, following
which the bus was fired upon by automatic rifles, machineguns, and Zoljas from all directions for
about 15 minutes, while hand grenades were thrown underneath it.7547 Some of the prisoners
attempted to escape but were shot and killed.7548 Shortly after the shooting stopped, KDZ041
heard the cars in the escort start their engines and drive off.7549 (The escort cars were the Serb,
no doubt about it. But, if the Serbs fired at the bus, why would the Serbs in escort escape?)
After this, two vehicles pulled over alongside the bus, and KDZ041 heard two men discussing
whether to check for survivors, but they did not do so.7550 Afterwards, six of the Bosnian Muslims
who had survived the attack, including KDZ041, managed to get out and walk towards a nearby
forest.7551 However, due to the serious injuries which they had sustained, two of the survivors,
namely Nedţib Gaĉanović and Safet Rizvanović, died shortly after.7552

2214. The four remaining survivors walked all night and eventually made their way to
Vukašovići, a village under the control of Bosnian Muslim TO.7553 The residents of Vukašovići,
along with the Bosnian Muslim TO, then went to the scene in order to pull the dead bodies from
the bus and, while at the scene, discovered another two survivors.7554 In addition, two more
survivors were later found in the village of Palanka.7555 (If so, then this point was #not under the
Serb control#, i.e. on the Serb side of confrontation line. Otherwise the Muslim TO wouldn’t
be there without fighting!)

2215. The dead bodies were eventually removed from the bus, while the burned and damaged
bus was filmed by a certain Ibrahim.7556 Towards the end of the removal, a number of VRS
members, headed by Dragan Ikanović, who was from Srednje and who was allegedly a
commander of Serb police,7557 appeared at the scene accompanied by two trucks in order to tow
the bus.7558 Ikanović and his men were told to leave.7559 (How come, Ikanovic was not killed, if
the Serbs did it? Also unusual and even peculiar: if it was the Muslim TO on the Serb

7544
KDZ041, T. 12111–12112, 12131 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 52 (under seal).
7545
KDZ041, T. 12073, 12113, 12115 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 53 (under seal); P2343
(Information report of Ramiz Mujkić, 4 July 2004), p. 13 (photograph showing both sides of the road). See also Adjudicated Fact 2629.
7546
KDZ041, T. 12073 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 53 (under seal).
7547
KDZ041, T. 12074–12075, 12112, 12120–12121, 12131–12132 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras.
53, 57 (under seal); P2343 (Information report of Ramiz Mujkić, 4 July 2004), p. 15. See also Adjudicated Fact 2629.
7548
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 53 (under seal).
7549
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 53 (under seal).
7550
KDZ041, T. 12074, 12131 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 54 (under seal).
7551
KDZ041, T. 12075 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 55 (under seal); P2314 (Witness statement of
Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 49.
7552
KDZ041, T. 12074–12075, 12114 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 55 (under seal).
7553
KDZ041, T. 12075, 12112, 12115–12116 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 55 (under seal).
7554
KDZ041, T. 12114–12115 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 55–56 (under seal); P2314 (Witness
statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 49.
7555
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 56 (under seal); P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011),
para. 49.
7556
KDZ041, T. 12076–12077, 12116, 12118 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 60 (under seal); P2312
(Video footage of burned bus); P2343 (Information report of Ramiz Mujkić, 4 July 2004), pp. 12–14.
7557
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 50 (under seal); P3629 (Report on the work of the VRS Military Prosecutor's Office
for 1992), p. 9.
7558
KDZ041, T. 12116, 12118 (17 February 2011). The Chamber is mindful that in his witness statement, KDZ041 stated that ―[w]hen the villagers of
[Vukašovići] reached the spot where the massacre had occurred, they found a Chetnik patrol there with two trucks‖. P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041
dated 14 February 2011), para. 55 (under seal). The Chamber however, does not find that this discrepancy is so acute that it would undermine the overall
credibility of KDZ041‘s evidence with respect to Scheduled Incident B.12.2.
7559
P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 55 (under seal).
 374

territory, there would be a skirmish. It seems that there were the Muslim civilians, that the
point where the bus had been probably the Muslim, or “on no man’s land.” It is also peculiar
that the KDZ041 was there after what happened, and was able to see what happened ).
Members of the Bosnian Muslim TO then used tractors to take the bodies to the village of Ravne,
in Ilijaš municipality, and buried them in a mass grave near that village.7560 Before the burial, the
survivors of the attack managed to identify 40 out of the 47 individuals who had been killed on the
bus.7561 A few days later, Ikanović and his men came back and set the bus on fire.7562
(#Absurdity#! How the KDZ041 knew that? And would any of the Muslim combatants so
easily come to the Serb territory to burn the bus? And why they burned the bus? Maybe
because there were evidence that the Muslim side fired against the bus? And why the Serb
soldiers would have come to tow the ruins of the bus? And if it was done by the Serbs, why
the Serbs would destroy their own bus, which was a very valuable asset?)

2216. The remains of 47 Bosnian Muslim men were exhumed from a mass grave in the village
of Ravne on 24–26 June 1996.7563 According to Amor Mašović, each of these 47 individuals was
recorded as last seen in either Ahatovići or Dobroševići on 1 June 1992.7564 (So what? What
does it says about the way they died and whose responsibility was that?)

2217. The President contends that due to conflicting evidence it is impossible to properly
ascertain the identity of the perpetrators who carried out the attack on the bus.7565 He submits that
there is evidence that tends to show, on the one hand, that Boro Radić—a man who frequently
acted without orders and who was psychologically unstable—had organised the attack, and on the
other hand, that the attack had been carried out by Brne‘s group—a paramilitary unit led by

7560
KDZ041, T. 12075, 12077–12078, 12117–12118 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 58 (under seal);
P2313 (Video footage of burial); P2343 (Information report of Ramiz Mujkić, 4 July 2004), p. 16.
7561
KDZ041, T. 12078 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 58–59 (under seal). According to Ramiz
Mujkić, his sister‘s husband and her son who was almost 21 years old were both killed during the attack on the bus on or about 14 June 1992. Ramiz Mujkić
stated, moreover, that 13 individuals with the last name Mujkić were killed in the incident. Mujkić added that Zaim Rizvanović who was the fifth son in his
family survived the bus incident whereas his four brothers died. P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 49.
7562
KDZ041, T. 12116 (17 February 2011).
7563
These 47 individuals are Hamid Adilović (male, 1951), Meho Bašić (male, 1944), Salem Beĉić (male, 1945), Ahmilo Beĉković (male, 1967), Fadil
Beĉković (male, 1968), Nusret Beĉković (male, 1972), Edin Bešić (male, 1971), Šućrija Bešić (male, 1949), Ibrahim Boloban (male, 1929), Amir Duraković
(male, 1960), Jusuf Dţuho (male 1949), Alija Gaĉanović (male, 1949), Ćazim Gaĉanović (male, 1955), Mufid Gaĉanović (male 1968), Mujo Gaĉanović
(male, 1929), Mustafa Gaĉanović (male, 1959), Nedţib Gaĉanović (male, 1952), Samir Hrustanović (male, 1966), Ejub Kalkan (male, 1935), Ale
Mehmedović (male, 1956), Nedţad Mešanović (male, 1970), Midhat Muharemović (male 1958), Armin Mujkić (male, 1968), Eldin Mujkić (male, 1974),
Emir Mujkić (male, 1973), Fikret Mujkić (male, 1956), Hemed Mujkić (male, 1936), Mirsad Mujkić (male, 1958), Muhamed Mujkić (male, 1949), Refik
Mujkić (male, 1952), Salem Mujkić (male, 1952), Šaćir Mujkić (male, 1963), Uzeir Mujkić (male, 1935), Zijad Mujkić (male, 1973), Ramiz Novalija (male,
1946), Ramiz Peljto (male, 1968), Ismet Rizvanović (male, 1958), Izet Rizvanović (male, 1960), Mehmed Rizvanović (male, 1961), Nedţad Rizvanović
(male, 1972), Sulejman Rizvanović (male, 1945), Enes Suljić (male, 1950), Enver Suljić (male, 1952), Muhamed Suljić (male, 1936), Salih Suljić (male,
1934), Suad Suljić (male, 1972), and Ramiz Ušto (male, 1972). P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 87–89; P4883 (Data on
exhumations in the Sarajevo region in the period of 1996–1998), pp. 32–34. In P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), p. 88, reference is
made to Midhat Muharemović, born on 1958 and son of Murat. However, in P4883 (Data on exhumations in the Sarajevo region in the period of 1996–
1998), p. 32, reference is made to Fikret Muharemović, born in 1958 and son of Murat. Having had regard to the name of father and the year of birth, as
well as the fact that KDZ041 mentions the name Midhat Muharemović, the Chamber is satisfied that the correct first name of the victim in question is in fact
Midhat and not Fikret. P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), p. 59 (under seal).
7564
P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 87–89. The Chamber notes that there are some discrepancies between the forensic evidence
and the evidence of KDZ041 as regards the names of some of the victims of Scheduled Incident B.12.2. More specifically, KDZ041‘s witness statement
contains references to Meho Pašić, Salem Bešić, Ahmed Beĉković, Šućro Beĉić, Samir Hrustenmović, Almir Mujkić, Edmir Mujkić, Mehmed Mujkić, Šaćir
Mujić, Ismet Rizvan, Nedţad Rizvan, and Sulejman Rizvan. P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), para. 59 (under seal). By
contrast, in the forensic reports of BiH authorities dealing with exhumation and identification of victims, the names of these individuals are recorded as
Meho Bašić, Salem Beĉić, Ahmilo Beĉković, Šućrija Bešić, Samir Hrustemović, Armin Mujkić, Emir Mujkić, Hemed Mujkić, Šaćir Mujkić, Ismet
Rizvanović, Nedţad Rizvanović and Sulejman Rizvanović. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 88–89; P4883 (Data on
exhumations in the Sarajevo region in the period of 1996–1998), pp. 32–34. However, the Chamber considers these inconsistencies to be minor and
accordingly concludes that these are in fact the same individuals. Further, KDZ041‘s witness statement contains references to four persons who are not
listed in the above-mentioned forensic reports, i.e., Nazif Mujkić, Safet Rizvan, Vahid Rizvan, and Nijaz Tiro. P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated
14 February 2011), para. 59 (under seal). Similarly, the forensic reports refer to 11 individuals who are not mentioned in the witness statement of KDZ041,
i.e., Hamid Adilović, Fadil Beĉković, Nusret Beĉković, Ibrahim Boloban, Jusuf Dţuho, Ale Mehmedović, Nedţad Mešanović, Ramiz Peljto, Izet
Rizvanović, Mehmed Rizvanović, and Ramiz Ušto. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 88–89; P4883 (Data on exhumations in
the Sarajevo region in the period of 1996–1998), pp. 32–34. Having considered these inconsistencies, the Chamber does not consider them to be of
significance, as it is satisfied, as will be seen below, that 47 men indeed died in this incident.
7565
Defence Final Brief, para. 1710.
 375

Branislav Gavrilović, which the Bosnian Serb authorities tried to disband or even liquidate
because of their criminal activities and substance abuse.7566 Finally, the President argues that there
is also evidence which indicates that the attack on the bus was carried out by Bosnian Muslims
who erroneously thought that the bus was filled with Serbs.7567

2218. The Chamber will now identify and analyse the relevant evidence which implicates
Bosnian Serb forces in the attack on the bus and examine whether there are inconsistencies in such
evidence: (i) KDZ041 testified that he heard that the ―main organisers‖ of the attack on the bus
were Boro Radić, Dragan Ikanović, and Ratko Adţić;7568 (How KDZ041 was “reliable witness
“coul be seen from his testimony on T.1266 The second thing I wish to point out is that when
we were taken prisoner, when Joja Tintor came to us, he introduced himself to us and he asked
whether there were any wounded persons there. And from his military bag he took something
out and gave us something to keep us warm. He wore the summer uniform of the JNA. He had
a pistol at the waist. He had a military bag, and on his head, he wore a cap with a five-pointed
red star. (Mr. Tintor would be the last one all over the world to have red star on his cap,
since he comes from the sworen royalist family. In June 92 it is unbelievable that anybody
had the red star on cap.!) (ii) Eset Muraĉević, a Bosnian Muslim who was detained in Vogošća
municipality in the second half of 1992, stated that he had heard from a fellow detainee that a Serb
prison guard by the name Predrag Ţarković, alias Boţur, was ―[a]mong the group of Chetniks‖
who carried out the attack on the bus;7569 and (iii) KDZ601 testified that [REDACTED], he heard
[REDACTED] that Branislav Gavrilović from Vuĉija Luka and his unit had ―hit‖ the bus with
Zoljas.7570

2219. The Chamber, Judge Morrison dissenting, does not consider that the evidence of KDZ041
contradicts the evidence of Muraĉević on this issue because Muraĉević simply stated that Ţarković
was among the group of Chetniks who carried out the attack on the bus; he did not claim that
Ţarković was a main organiser of the attack. (Why the Chamber “forgot” to point out that
Muracevic #only heard# that Zarkovic was there? The Chamber, Judge Morrison dissenting, is
also satisfied that the evidence of KDZ601 is not in conflict with the evidence of KDZ041 on this
question because KDZ601 did not testify that Gavrilović and his men were the main organisers of
the attack. Similarly, the Chamber, Judge Morrison dissenting, is of opinion that the evidence of
KDZ601 does not contradict the evidence of Eset Muraĉević because Muraĉević merely spoke of
one of the participants in the attack. (#He heard!#) In light of the foregoing, the Chamber, Judge
Morrison dissenting, is of the view that there is no conflict in the evidence of these witnesses on
the question of the identity of the perpetrators of the bus attack. (The only that hadn’t been
established properly are the perpetrators! Not to mention what does it have to do with the
President? But, this is the question that should be posed for every single incident!)

2220. The Chamber will now assess the evidence in light of the President‘s argument that the
bus was attacked by Bosnian Muslims who mistakenly thought that it was filled with Serbs.7571
There is indeed evidence that Mirko Krajišnik informed Momĉilo Krajišnik that Muslims had

7566
Defence Final Brief, paras. 1707–1708.
7567
Defence Final Brief, para. 1709.
7568
KDZ041, T. 12075 (17 February 2011); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041 dated 14 February 2011), paras. 50, 61 (under seal). According to KDZ020,
Boro Radić was a common criminal from Vogošća who had the support of the SDS and eventually was integrated into the VRS and given the rank of
colonel. KDZ020, T. 12524 (28 February 2011) (private session).
7569
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 20, 60. On Eset Muraĉević‘s detention, see Scheduled Detention Facilities
C.26.1, C.26.3.
7570
P3299 (Record of interview with KDZ601, 18 April 2005), pp. 38–42 (under seal); KDZ601, T. 18590–18592 (8 September 2011). The Chamber received
evidence that Branislav Gavrilović was known and referred to by the municipal authorities of Ilidţa as the commander of all SAO Romanija volunteer units.
P2302 (Approval of the War Board of Commissioners of Ilidţa Municipality, 9 July 1992); NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12988 (8 March 2011). Witness Velimir
Dunjić stated that the unit of Branislav Gavrilović was in the zone of responsibility of the Igman Brigade and that, after a while, it put itself under the
command of the Igman Brigade. D2451 (Witness statement of Velimir Dunjić dated 12 November 2012), para. 13.
7571
See Defence Final Brief, para. 1709.
 376

intercepted a bus carrying detained Muslims and, mistaking the occupants of the bus for Serbs, had
opened fire on the bus, killing all the detainees and heavily wounding two Serb guards.7572

2221. However, there is also evidence that Momĉilo Krajišnik gave instructions to the Bosnian
Serbs in Rajlovac that nothing should happen to the Bosnian Muslim men detained there. More
specifically, on 8 June 1992, Momĉilo Krajišnik informed a certain Mijatović in Rajlovac that his
brother Mirko had told him ―about problems with these captured men‖, and stated that nothing
should be done which would be wrong or outside of the rules.7573 He also told Mijatović that he
was ready to help find a solution.7574 Krajišnik reiterated his position to another interlocutor in the
same conversation, emphasising that nothing should be done to the men.7575
(#EXCULPATORY#, for Mr. Krajisnik and the other Serb officials! How the Chamber
excluded the possibility that Krajisnik spoke about other difficulties with the detainees, what
Vujasin described as his personal risk? There is no a mere indication that Momcilo
Krajisnik spoke about some future problem with the bus, that may happen after a week,
whyle he couldn’t know about this transport at all!!!)

2222. In this regard, the Chamber notes that Mirko Krajišnik himself was involved in dealing
with the detainees at the Rajlovac Barracks. This was brought out by Ramiz Mujkić, who testified
that, on the morning of 7 August 1992 while he was detained at the Rajlovac Barracks, Mirko
Krajišnik and others visited him in his cell, and enquired about the whereabouts of Hasan Mujkić
and his brother Husein, the witness‘s son Elvir Mujkić, and a person named Junuz Mujkić.7576
Ramiz Mujkić further testified that on 22 August 1992, Stojanović and two other members of the
MP took him from the Ţica Hospital in Blaţuj to Planjo‘s House in Svrake.7577 According to
Ramiz Mujkić, Mirko Krajišnik subsequently intervened in order to have him exchanged.7578 (One
after another, #all exculpatory#, or irrelevant to this case! What does it have to do with the
transfer of the Ramiz Mujkic to Planjo’s hous? Mirko Krajisnik made a noble move to have
exchanged this man!)

2223. The Chamber also notes that on 20 June 1992 in an intercepted conversation, Mirko
Krajišnik informed two individuals with the names Ćamil and Šemso that 284 prisoners from the
cisterns near the Rajlovac Barracks had been exchanged whereas 50 additional prisoners had been
sent home.7579 During the same conversation, Mirko Krajišnik, referring to the group of 50
prisoners, told Šemso that there were people with the last name Gaĉanović amongst them and
added ―[y]ou heard that there were some casualties among them.‖7580

7572
D1088 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Krajišnik and Mirko Krajišnik, 15 June 1992), pp. 1, 5–6.
7573
P2334 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Krajišnik, Mijatović and Ljubiša Vladušić, 8 June 1992), pp. 1–2.
7574
P2334 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Krajišnik, Mijatović and Ljubiša Vladušić, 8 June 1992), p. 1.
7575
P2334 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Krajišnik, Mijatović and Ljubiša Vladušić, 8 June 1992), p. 4.
7576
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkid dated 4 February 2011), para. 59; Ramiz Mujkid, T. 12400–12409 (25 February 2011); D1105 (Supplemental
information sheet for Ramiz Mujkid, 1 November 2004). The Chamber does not accept the Accused’s assertion that since witness Ramiz Mujkid had failed
to mention the visit by Vlasto Apostolski, Nikola Poplašen, and Mirko Krajišnik in his previous statements, his evidence on the same should necessarily be
ignored by this Chamber. The Chamber has received evidence which corroborates Mujkid’s account of the visit by Mirko Krajišnik. On 20 August 1992,
during an intercepted telephone conversation, Bakir Alispahid informed Mirko Krajišnik that a person by the name Nikola had paid a visit to Ramiz Mujkid
and asked whether Krajišnik could arrange for Mujkid’s release. Although Krajišnik did not expressly acknowledge having seen Mujkid, he implied that he
knew that Mujkid had been injured and subsequently told Alispahid that “*w+e agreed for some kind of exchange for him”. P2337 (Intercept of
conversation between Mirko Krajišnik and Bakir Alispahid, 20 August 1992), p. 3.
7577
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), paras. 67–68. On Mujkić‘s detention at Planjo‘s House, see Scheduled Detention
Facility C.26.1.
7578
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 58; D1105 (Supplemental information sheet for Ramiz Mujkić, 1 November
2004).
7579
D1089 (Intercept of conversation between Ćamil and Mirko Krajišnik, 20 June 1992), pp. 1–2.
7580
D1089 (Intercept of conversation between Ćamil and Mirko Krajišnik, 20 June 1992), p. 2. The Chamber notes that the forensic documentation concerning
Scheduled Incident B.12.2 refers to six people with the last name Gaĉanović. See fn. 7570.
 377

2224. An engaging feature about this conversation, in which Mirko Krajišnik told Šemso, a
Bosnian Muslim, that 50 detainees were sent home and that there were some casualties amongst
them, was that at no stage did Mirko Krajišnik mention that Muslims were to blame for the
casualties. The Chamber, Judge Morrison dissenting, is of the view that had Bosnian Muslims in
fact been responsible for the attack on the bus, Mirko Krajišnik would have raised the matter with
Šemso in that conversation which occurred less than a week after the bus attack. (Why would
Mirko Krajisnik start a conversation with Semso on such a sensitive matter? Was Krajisnik
talking about those 50 Muslims, or other one, who tried to break towards Visoko? See what
the KDZ041 said on T.12065 A. When we tried to make a breakthrough to the nearby forest
and head onwards to Visoko, fierce infantry fire was opened from the forest and from the
surrounding area at a group that was in a plum grove. Some ten men were either shot dead or
wounded. I was among the wounded. I was wounded in the leg. Wasn’t it more genuine and
more probable what Mirko said to his brother Momcilo Krajisnik? Why here does not value
the principle: #“In dubio, pro reo”#? Or it is sufficient that there existed Mirko Krajisnik,
who had shown some interest in a humane outcome of the detention, to conclude that the
Serbs are vilaines?)

2225. The evidence described in the foregoing paragraphs, when taken together, leads the
Chamber, Judge Morrison dissenting, to conclude that Mirko Krajišnik deliberately provided
Momĉilo Krajišnik with misinformation on what had become of those Muslim detainees in respect
of whose safety Momĉilo Krajišnik had previously articulated his apprehensions. (Even if so, a
high Serb official as Momcilo Krajisnik had an attitude completely opposite to what
happened, commited by insufficiently identified individuals. Another question would be:
why Mirko Krajisnik would lie to his older brother and thus lead him into an illusion? There
is no logical defence to this assertion and finding of the Chamber!#Official proper attitude#!)

2226. In addition, further analysis of evidence lead the Chamber, Judge Morrison dissenting, to
be convinced that the above attack on the bus was carried out by the Serb Forces. (#This is the
last possible inference#!)

2227. First, KDZ041 stated that just before the attack, the two escort cars behind the bus left the
scene; thereafter, Ţuti claimed that the engine of the bus had overheated, and along with the guards
left the bus. (This is #incorrect use of the facts#: first, it was not Zuti who said that the engine
was overheated, it was the driver, se what KDZ041 responded to the Prosecutor, T. 12073:
Q. Very well. I'll continue. Witness, I want to take you now to the moment when Zuti got off
the bus to put some water into the cooler of the engine. Could you just describe, and keep it
fairly short, what you were able to see or hear just when he -- when you -- when he decided to
get off the bus? A. When we came to this place that was called Sokolina, I heard the driver,
because on the bus there were two men who were escorts, guards, who asked him why he
stopped. He said that the engine was boiling and that he had to add some water into the cooler.
What I heard was the stream, the brook, nearby, when the bus stopped.)And it was a spot
where the road was approaching the brook, because the witness heard the stream, therefore
the bus stopped because of that, not because of some other count!#Had there been any
intention to fire against the bus, there wouldn’t be any question from the guards#!) Merely
10 to 15 seconds after Ţuti and the guards had left the bus, the attack on the bus commenced.7581
The Chamber, Judge Morrison dissenting, is of the view that had the attack been carried out by
Bosnian Muslims, it would have been stretching coincidence past breaking point for them to have
anticipated the precise time that the engine of the bus would have overheated and to have been in
the right place at that exact time so that they could have sprung their ambush.7582 (Again, #wrong
7581
See paras. 2212–2213.
7582
For this reason, the Chamber finds that Ţuti and the guards were involved in the attack on the bus, although it is possible that they were not the main
organisers of the attack as they could have found easier ways to kill the Bosnian Muslim men.
 378

use of the facts#. The very same witness testified different, see T.12073, see above, that it was
determined by the vicinity of the creek. But, if it were the Serbs, destroying the bus is so
irrational and unrealistic, since there was a shortage of everithing, and a bus was of a great
value. This inferrence, together with the insecure identity of the perpetrators is also
available. There is more that #enough doubts#!)

2228. Further, the evidence of KDZ041 is that he was face down in the bus and bodies were on
top of him; he was therefore unable to see anything. KDZ041 testified that shortly after the
shooting had stopped, he heard the engines of the escort cars start up and the cars drive off. He
then heard two vehicles pull alongside the bus and two men discuss whether they should check for
survivors. According to KDZ041, these two men did not enter the bus and instead got into their
vehicles and left the scene.7583 It is clear to the Chamber, Judge Morrison dissenting, that
notwithstanding his inability to see during and immediately after the attack, KDZ041 heard what
was happening around him. The Chamber assessed KDZ041 to be a credible and reliable witness
and accordingly, found no good reason to reject his evidence about the things he said he heard.
(How many times the cars surounding the bus had left the spot? If one count these cars,
would see that it is inconsistant. The two cars behind left the scene before the attack.
Immediately after the shooting the escorting cars left the scene. After that KDZ041 heard
another two cars pull alongside the bus, and the two men discussing. This is too unbelievable.
This witness may be prepared to testify by the Muslim secret service!)

2229. The Chamber also heard from KDZ041 that the residents of the Muslim village of
Vukašovići and the Bosnian Muslim TO went to the scene and removed the bodies from the bus;
that towards the end of the removal process, a number of VRS soldiers headed by Dragan Ikanović
appeared on the scene with two trucks in order to tow the bus away; and that they were told to
leave. The Chamber also heard from KDZ041 that a few days later, Ikanović and his men returned
and set the bus on fire.7584 The Chamber, Judge Morrison dissenting, cannot comprehend the
inordinate interest displayed by Ikanović and the VRS members in that bus, although allegedly it
had been attacked by Muslims, to the extent they were bent on towing it away; and after that
attempt failed, they returned and destroyed it a few days later. (This is only in a case of trusting
the witness who couldn’t know so many things. How possibly KDZ041 could have known the
events after the 14 June? Did he returned to the spot, although he was wounded in leg while
breaking through to Visoko, see: T.12065 …and from the surrounding area at a group that
was in a plum grove. Some ten men were either shot dead or wounded. I was among the
wounded. I was wounded in the leg. (#A protected lies#! In spite of that wound, KDZ041 was
everywhere and saw or heard everything, no wonder why he wanted the protected status!!!
How possibly the Muslim TO had an access to the spot where the bus had been fired at? Had
it been the Serb controlled territory, there must have been a confrontation line. How the
Muslim TO would manage the bodies, how they would bury them? Why they would bury
them in a mas grave, without dignity and ceremony? See T.12077-78: Q. And in the second
part of that video we saw human bodies. Could you tell the Court what you know about those?
A. Those were the bodies of the people who were butchered in the bus. They were pulled out
by members of the TO. And with their assistance, since TO was in the area, and was
commanded by Dzafer Heric, they were brought up there to this location and buried. They were
loaded on two tractors. Q. Now, in your answer a moment ago, where you said that residents
dug a mass grave in which the massacred residents of Ahatovici village were buried, were you
referring to the victims of the attack on Ahatovici or to the victims of the bus massacre? A. I
was referring to the victims of the attack on the bus.? (#A protected lies#! The Muslim

7583
See paras. 2212–2213.
7584
See para. 2215.
 379

territorial defence (TO) behaved as if they had been at their home, which was the truth,
because the Muslim TO wouldn’t be able to do so many operations on the Serb territory!

But, if the bus of the VRS was hit by the Serbs, and the escort dissapeared, which is #not
logical#, it is more than normal to expect somebody to come for the bus and the bodies.
Contrary to the inferrence of the Chamber, it would be unusual that nobody appeared to see
what happened. And since the Muslim villagers were stil there, it must be that the VRS
appeared pretty soon after the incident. The actions of Ikanović and the VRS members impel
the Chamber, Judge Morrison dissenting, to the conclusion that they manifestly sought to destroy
the important evidence of the large killing incident. Their actions would have made no sense if the
attack had been carried out by the Bosnian Muslim forces. (#Not logical#! But, initially they
came to tow the bus away, not to destroy it. If they wanted to destroy the important
evidence, and if the “Serb Forces” did it, they wouldn’t do that sacrifying the bus and
leaving “the important evidence” on the road, but would rather execute the detainees
somewhere else, and save the bus. And if the “Serb Forces” did it, they would resolve the bus
problem without any delay.

2230. Finally, the Chamber must also address the evidence of KDZ601. In the opinion of the
Chamber, KDZ601, [REDACTED], evinced pronounced bias in favour of the Accused during
cross examination.7585 (The page 18597 didn’t contain any of these what is suggested by the
Chamber. The witness confirmed the facts known to all and everybody! There is nothing on
the pages T.18604-18605, except if the Prosecution-Chamber expected the Prosecution’s
witness not to confirm the President questions with the answers known to everyone! Not a
single confirmation of the Chamber suggestions on pages T, 18615-616! There was also
nothing corroborative of the Chamber’s conclusion on the pages T.18634-18635! Therefore,
only if the Prosecutor’s witness was supposed to be anti-Acused, would be credible!#Missing
sense#!) In the throes of this bias, however, he implicated Serb paramilitaries in the attack, leaving
the Chamber, Judge Morrison dissenting, with the abiding impression that he was being forthright
with the Chamber in this respect.

2231. In conclusion, having found (i) that there is no inconsistency in the evidence of witnesses
on the question of the identity of the perpetrators of the bus attack; (No positive identification!)
(ii) that the evidence of KDZ041 is reliable; (Many things KDZ041 couldn’t have known, but
he said it!) (iii) that the initial attempt by Ikanović and the VRS members to tow the bus away and
then their ultimate destruction of the bus is indicative of a determination on their part to destroy
the evidence of the killing; (Illogical, as shown above!) (iv) that Mirko Krajišnik deliberately
misinformed Momĉilo Krajišnik;(How the Chamber knows that? And why would he
misinform his brother?) and (v) that KDZ061 testified (#Contrary to the Camber’s
conclusion#!) The KDZ061 didn’t testify on this subject, but KDZ601 did, but he didn’t say a
bit of what the Chamber suggested! Finally, even if some witnesses implied the
paramilitaries, the President couldn’t be liable for the conduct of a formations that the
President disowned, and the system persecuted!) with forthrightness when he described the
involvement of Serb paramilitaries in the attack on the bus, the Chamber, Judge Morrison
dissenting is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that on 14 June 1992, Serb Forces, including Ţuti,
other guards, and paramilitaries, attacked a bus filled with Bosnian Muslim male detainees with
grenades and automatic weapons, and killed 47 Bosnian Muslim men.

(H) Movement of the population from Novi Grad

7585
See e.g. KDZ601, T. 18597, 18603–18604, 18615–18616, 18634–18635 (8 September 2011).
 380

2232. Bosnian Muslims and Croats left the Novi Grad municipality en masse during the conflict.
During a conversation that took place on 21 May 1992 between Colonel Milosav Gagović, Acting
Commander of the JNA 4th Corps Sarajevo,7586 and NeĊeljko Prstojević, the former informed the latter
that Muslims were fleeing Dobrinja and that he had taken measures to ensure that they knew that only
entire families would be allowed to leave the area.7587 (But, the Serbs controlled only several
percents of the Novi Grad territory, i. e. several Serb setlements, except for Ahatovici and
Dobrosevici (mixed village) That were the two parts of Dobrinja, Nedzarici, Rajlovac. What “take
over” could be talking of? Anyway, the exhibit D1236 is misused for the purpose of this thesis of
the Prosecution-Chamber, let us see:D1236, p. 1

p.2
Prstojevic is informing Colonel Gagovic how the Serb authorities are taking care of the Muslim
minors, for whom Alija (Izetbegovic) doesn’t care! Further: pp.2-3

So, Gagovic, a Colonel of the JNA is informing Prstojevic, a local Serb official, that the Muslims
are “fleeing Dobrinja for no reason”. The JNA Colonel is suspicious why they are doing so, “for
no reason”, and assumes that the Muslim secret army is traying to leave only combatants in
Dorbinja, so to be free to fight against the JNA and the Serb population. Further: p.3

7586
D2738 (Witness statement of Milosav Gagović dated 7 March 2014), para. 2.
7587
D1236 (Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Milosav Gagović, 21 May 1992), pp. 2–3; Robert Donia, T. 3140–3141 (31 May–3 June,
7–10 June 2010).
 381

(#Wrong presentation#! The Chamber, or those interns who assembled this Judgement, didn’t
interpret this document properly. The JNA Colonel Gagovic said they were “fleeing Dobrinja for
no reason”, but it was dropped out of this paragraph, and the rest was misinterpreted, while it
was clear that the Muslim side was preparing an attack, and wanted to remove their minors and
women out of the area! What is a #liability of the President,# or even of Prstojevic in this JNA
#legitimate precautionary measure#s?)

2233. According to KDZ041 and Ramiz Mujkić, during the period 1 to 14 June 1992, about 400
women and children from Ahatovići and the surrounding villages, including Ramiz Mujkić‘s mother,
wife, and sister, were detained at the adjoining premises of Tehnogas Company and the Distribution
Centre.7588 The VRS also temporarily placed the Muslim women and children in the Gavrilo Princip
primary school after the attack on Ahatovići.7589 (#EXCULPATORY#!!! That is how it should be, to
move the civilians out of the combat zone! On the other side, the Muslim extremists used to take
their own civilians as a human shield, firing from the civil zones and exposing the civilians to the
response fire!) Further, a memorandum from the Rajlovac municipality Executive Board, dated 2 June
1992, referring to ―captives from Ahatovići, the women and children‖, reveals an intention on the part of
the Executive Board to confine them in the new part of the Tehnogas-Kiskana building.7590
(Intention?!?!? Knowing that all the Muslim civilians from Ahatovici had been facilitated to enter
the Muslim part of Sarajevo, without any exchange or reciprocal gesture, #the only inference is
that the authorities wanted to secure them# and to have them go to Sarajevo, which was their
preference! Let us see what the document P5484 really said:

This is drastic, but usual and very frequent #abuse and misinterpretation# of the documents. No
“confinement” is even alluded, but only an #“accommodation and food”#, with a permanent
presence of women assigned by the authorities to take care of the Muslim women and children, so

7588
On 13 June 1992, the women, including Ramiz Mujkić‘s wife, sister, and mother, as well as the children who were detained in the Tehnogas Company
premises and the Distribution Centre were exchanged. Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12455 (25 February 2011); P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4
February 2011), paras. 47–48, 89; D1105 (Supplemental information sheet for Ramiz Mujkić, 1 November 2004); P2310 (Witness statement of KDZ041
dated 14 February 2011), paras. 32, 47 (under seal).
7589
P5425 (Report of RS MUP, 3 June 1992).
7590
P5484 (Memorandum of the Rajlovac Municipality Executive Board, 2 June 1992), p. 1.
 382

that a male are not involved in this task, nor anybody would dare to sexually assault the Muslim
women. Instead of being commended, the Rajlovac authorities are blamed, and the President
additionally charged!!!#Officials proper conduct#!)

2234. Moreover, following the attack against Ahatovići, all the surviving Muslims in the village
were either arrested or expelled, together with Serbs and Croats who were married to Muslims.7591
(#Deadly combination#! Such a drastic “finding” based on an Adjudicated Fact,
“adjudicated” in some other process, in which a defence didn’t have any interest to rebut
it!!! Could this kind of deliberation happen in any of the countries that support this Court?)
In a telephone conversation conducted on 25 June 1992, Petko Budiša who was the chief of Ilidţa
SJB from August to 20 September 1992 and who later became Chief of the CSB in Bijeljina,7592
informed Slavko Lazendić from the Rajlovac SJB that he should not allow the entry or exit of any
Bosnian Muslims to and from the area via the Bojnik bridge.7593 “To and from” excludes any
“ethnic cleansing”! But, let us see how this document was used against this President: P2335,
p. 4

p.5

So, some of the Muslims are involved in the Muslim actions, but Budisa advised Lazendic to
continue to work in accordance with the information…In other word, only criminals were of
some interest of the Serb Police!# Proper conduct#!

Since some of the Muslims are “involved in the actions”, the police is taking a precautionary
measures

The translation is wrong. Lazendic said for the Croats: “There are many of them, and they
are legal people” meaning they behave in accordance with the law!

So, the
superior police officer ordered his subordinate to maintain a good relation with the Muslims,
but not to allow them to move around freely, because “some of them are involved in their
actions”! A good relations with the Croats weren’t disputable! #Proper conduct#!) During the

7591
See Adjudicated Fact 2667.
7592
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 9; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para.
101.
7593
P2335 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Miodrag Stupar and Petko Budiša and (ii) Slavko Lazendić and Petko Budiša, 25 June 1992), pp. 4–7.
 383

same conversation, Lazendić claimed that the area had been ―liberated‖ and that it was ―ethnically
clean‖.7594 ( This was a mere bragging, but from the entirety of the document it is clear that it
was not “ethnically clean”, because there was “many” Croats, and obviously the Muslims
too, otherwise the orders and advises would be senseless, and wouldn’t be said anyway! But,
this was a war, and the only reasons were the security reasons. Lazendic clarified whether
the Serb police made any agreement with the Croats pertaining to Stup, would it belong to
Croats,P2335, p. 7

#Three municipalities – peace#! That was the whole idea: that every ethnic community
manages it’s own settlements, without any domination, and no fight was needed! The matter
of return of refugees was regulated on the highest level of negotiations, under the auspice of
the UN and EC, and didn’t depend of anyone’s colloquial remarks, but a premature return
was so risky that shouldn’t be advised! THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT IS EXCULPATORY,
BUT ALSO USEFUL TO IDENTIFY THE SERB POLICY AND INTENTIONS OF
COEGSISTENCE. AND NO “ETHNIC PURITY, NO ETHNIC CLEANSING!#)

2235. According to another report compiled by the Red Cross in Rajlovac, dated 1 October 1993,
there were no Bosnian Muslims present in the Serb municipality of Rajlovac.7595 (No wonder, after so
many skirmishes, and particularly since the Serb municipality of Rajlovac was a small area!)

2236. The Accused claims that after the take-over of Ahatovići, a number of Bosnian Muslim and
Bosnian Croat families wished to be taken to Sarajevo whereas some individuals remained throughout
the entire war and even joined the VRS on a voluntary basis.7596 (The previous document P2335
corroborates what the President claimed for. If the Croats were “legal” there, do not make them
any trouble. Maintain a good relations with the Muslims, but not let them to join their
combatants! What is wrong with that, in a war zone?) The President brought Stojan Dţino and
Mihajlo Vujasin, the deputy commander of the Rajlovac Brigade, to testify that the movement of
population was voluntary.7597 However, the Chamber found both witnesses to be evasive, biased and
partisan. (None of the Prosecutor witnesses would “pass” this test, particularly the Muslim
witnesses, but the internationals too. All of them had been motivated to lie against the Serbs, some
because they were the adversaries, and some, the foreigners, being prejudiced.) The Chamber
notes, as it did earlier,7598 that despite their evasiveness, both Stojan Dţino and Mihajlo Vujasin
conceded that civilians from Ahatovići had been taken to the Rajlovac Barracks and kept there against
their will. (The civilians from Ahatovici tried to escape to Visoko, but there would be too many
civilian casualties. They had to be #removed from the combat zone#, and the Rajlovac Barracks
was the only choice. We saw the document P5484, how the Rajlovac authorities were concerned
and acted responsibly with these civilians!) The Chamber also recalls the evidence of Vujasin about
the beatings of the civilians from Ahatovići and the surrounding areas and the dangers that they were
exposed to.7599 (Vujasin, as an official of the Serb Army, VRS, exposed himself to a risk by
defending the Muslims against some irregulars, and this can not be used against the Serb officials,
but rather to commend them!) The Chamber, further, notes the evidence concerning lootings and
destruction of property.7600 The Chamber also recalls its earlier findings regarding the destruction of the

7594
P2335 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Miodrag Stupar and Petko Budiša and (ii) Slavko Lazendić and Petko Budiša, 25 June 1992), p. 5.
7595
P2340 (Rajlovac Red Cross report, 1 October 1993), p. 1. See also D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 63.
7596
Defence Final Brief, para. 1698.
7597
Stojan Dţino, T. 29854–29856 (6 November 2012); Mihajlo Vujasin, T. 31804 (20 December 2012).
7598
See para. 2207.
7599
See para. 2207.
7600
See paras. 2185–2187.
 384

mosque in Ahatovići,7601 the existence of detention facilities in Novi Grad municipality and the
involuntary confinement of women, children and men therein7602 as well the evidence which indicates
that some civilians detained in such facilities were eventually exchanged for Serbs.7603 (It had been
proven that the vast majority of the Muslim civilians moved out of the Ahatovici battlefield was
released unilaterally to enter Sarajevo, since there was no Serbs who exited Sarajevo instead. The
fourteen days of the detention of the civilians collected in the combat zone is misfortunate, but it
wasn’t really detention stricto sensu!)

2237. Consequently, the Chamber finds that Serb Forces forced the non-Serb population out of the
Serb-controlled parts of Novi Grad. (#Lawful and obligatory#! As it is regulated by the domestic
laws, and the international humanitarian law provisions, as well as the mutual agreements of the
sides to the conflict, concluded under the auspice of the ICRC and other mediators, the most
decisive is: whether there were a military, or a security reasons for moving the civilians out of
some areas, it had to be done. See: D4710 :

Or see D1141:

Only the Serb side secured an organised way of the transfer of population. The provision under c)
pertaining to property rights the President codified in his document D1754 of 19 August 1992.

Or see:D1603, p.9, signed by the three parties in London as early as on 22 May 1992:

7601
See para. 2196.
7602
See paras. 2209, 2234.
7603
See para. 2206.
 385

So, the displacement could have been done legally under these two conditions: the security of this
population, and #“imperative military reasons”#! What was not understandable to the
Prosecution here, in this document? Instead of warning the Prosecution for such an incompetent
charges, and for an absence of any military expert while assembling this Indictment, the Chamber
accepted these claimes as if there was no domestic laws, international norms and mutual
agreements of the sides! #The Chamber neglected laws and agreements#!):

iv. Novo Sarajevo

(A) Charges

2238. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity, was
committed in Novo Sarajevo as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims
and/or Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.7604

2238. Acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Novo Sarajevo by Serb Forces
and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include: (i) torture, beatings, and physical
and psychological abuse, during and after the take-over as well as in the Slaviša Vajner Ĉiĉa
Barracks in Lukavica, as cruel or inhumane treatment;7605 (ii) rape and other acts of sexual
violence during and after the take-over as cruel and inhumane treatment;7606 (iii) the establishment
and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in the Slaviša Vajner Ĉiĉa Barracks , including the
failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic
sanitation facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment;7607 (iv) forcible transfer or deportation of
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their homes;7608 (v) unlawful detention in the Slaviša
Vajner Ĉiĉa Barracks;7609 (vi) forced labour at the frontline and the use of Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats as human shields;7610 (vii) the appropriation or plunder of property, during and
after the take-over, during arrests and detention, and in the course of or following acts of
deportation or forcible transfer;7611 (viii) the wanton destruction of private property, including
homes and business premises, and public property;7612 and (ix) the imposition and maintenance of
restrictive and discriminatory measures.7613

2239. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible
transfer), respectively, as crimes against humanity.7614 In this regard, the Prosecution alleges that
7604
Indictment, paras. 48–49.
7605
Indictment, para. 60(b). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.1.
7606
Indictment, para. 60(c). The Prosecution does not allege criminal responsibility for rape and other acts of sexual violence at Scheduled Detention Facility
C.18.1. Indictment, fn. 5.
7607
Indictment, para. 60(d). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.1.
7608
Indictment, para. 60(f).
7609
Indictment, para. 60(g). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.1.
7610
Indictment, para. 60(h).
7611
Indictment, para. 60(i).
7612
Indictment, para. 60(j). The Chamber notes that there are no cultural monuments and sacred sites with respect to Novo Sarajevo in Schedule D.
7613
Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement; the removal from positions of
authority; the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or the denial of
equal access to public services.
7614
Indictment, paras. 68–75.
 386

by the end of 1992, Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs had forcibly
displaced Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Novo Sarajevo in which they had
been lawfully present.7615 It is alleged that from March 1992, restrictive and discriminatory
measures, arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, rape and other acts of sexual
violence, killing, destruction of houses, as well as the threat of further such acts caused Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats to flee in fear, while others were physically driven out.7616

(B)Lead-up

2240. Novo Sarajevo, one of the ten Sarajevo municipalities, is located in the eastern part of
Sarajevo city between Novi Grad and Ilidţa on one side and Centar, Stari Grad, and Pale on the
other.7617 According to the 1991 census, the population of Novo Sarajevo comprised 95,089
people, among whom 35.7% were Bosnian Muslims, 34.6% were Bosnian Serbs, 15.9% were
―Yugoslavs‖, (At least 15% of the “Yugoslavs” were the Serbs, since Yugoslavia was not
popular among the secessionist ethnics in 1991. So, there was over 50% of the Serbs, which
was reflected in the results of elections!) 9.3% were Bosnian Croats, and 4.6% were ―others and
unknown‖.7618 The municipality included, inter alia, Grbavica, located south of the Miljacka
River; Vraca, located 600 to 800 metres to the southwest of Grbavica; Pofalići in the north part of
the municipality; and Lukavica in the southwest part of the municipality.7619

2241. After the formation of the SDS, SDA, and HDZ, a Novo Sarajevo SDS Steering
Committee was appointed to establish local boards in the local communes and an SDS Municipal
Board of Novo Sarajevo.7620

2242. As a result of the 1990 multi-party elections, the SDS won 24 assembly seats in Novo
Sarajevo, the communist SDP won 23, the Reformist Party won 22, the SDA won 21, the HDZ
won 7, and the Muslim Bosniak Organisation won 2.7621 Ţarko Đurović, from the SDS, was
appointed as president of the Executive Board.7622 Kasim Demirović, from the SDA, was
appointed as president of the municipality.7623 The post of vice president of the municipal
assembly went to the HDZ.7624

7615
Indictment, paras. 69, 72.
7616
Indictment, para. 71.
7617
P815 (Map of Sarajevo showing confrontation lines); P973 (Robert Donia‘s expert report entitled ―Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo,
1990-1995‖, January 2010), p. 8; Appendix B, Map 1. See also Adjudicated Fact 2.
7618
P5964 (Census data for BiH by municipality in 1971, 1981, and 1991, April 1995), p. 2; P973 (Robert Donia‘s expert report entitled ―Bosnian Serb
Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo, 1990-1995‖, January 2010), p. 9. See also Adjudicated Fact 5; P2577 (Press release of Novo Sarajevo municipality, 1
April 1992), p. 2; Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16662–16663, 16676.
7619
KDZ310, T. 9214, 9222, 9227–9229 (29 November 2010); D883 (Map of Sarajevo marked by KDZ310); P926 (Witness statement of Aernout Van Lynden
dated 26 February 2010), para. 92. See also Adjudicated Facts 65, 67, 68.
7620
D2673 (Witness statement of Zdravko Šalipur dated 16 December 2012), para. 2. According to Šalipur, who was a member of the Steering Committee and
the Municipal Board, Novo Sarajevo had about 16 local communes with local SDS boards but only half the boards, those of communes with a Serb majority,
were active. D2673 (Witness statement of Zdravko Šalipur dated 16 December 2012), para. 2. Milivoje Prijić was the president of the SDS Municipal
Board. P2576 (Minutes of 13th session of Novo Sarajevo‘s SDS Municipal Board, 28 February 1992), p. 2; Branko Radan, T. 31092 (6 December 2012).
7621
D2673 (Witness statement of Zdravko Šalipur dated 16 December 2012), para. 3 (further stating that 50% of the Reformists and SDP were Serbs). See also
Branko Radan, T. 31090 (6 December 2012).
7622
D2673 (Witness statement of Zdravko Šalipur dated 16 December 2012), para. 3; Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
16641; Radomir Nešković, T. 14276 (6 June 2011).
7623
D2673 (Witness statement of Zdravko Šalipur dated 16 December 2012), para. 3. Nešković referred to Đurović as, alternatively, ―president of the municipal
government in Novo Sarajevo‖, president of the Executive Board, and ―president of the municipal authorities‖. Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16640–16641, 16652, 16673.
7624
D2673 (Witness statement of Zdravko Šalipur dated 16 December 2012), para. 3.
 387

2244. As in other parts of BiH, already growing tensions between Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, and
Croats further increased with the war in Croatia.7625 The Serbs demanded and established their
own TV channel.7626

1. Creation of separate municipal institutions

2245. The Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff was created in December 1991 in accordance with the
Variant A/B Instructions, and Đurovic was its president.7627 According to Nešković, it was
mandatory for those who received the Variant A/B Instructions to implement the document, and
the recipients were Serb municipal presidents and representatives as well as possibly SDS
municipal board officials.7628 The Crisis Staff included SDS members of the municipal assembly
of Novo Sarajevo.7629 (The Party Crisis Staff had nothing to do with the municipal CS, and
was without any authority, except to inform the Main Board!)

2246. Around February 1992 the President and Krajišnik were involved in resolving an internal
conflict in Novo Sarajevo.7630 The President and Krajišnik attended at least one meeting of the
Novo Sarajevo SDS Municipal Board.7631 The record of the 28 February 1992 meeting of the
Novo Sarajevo SDS Municipal Board also indicates that the President and Krajišnik were to be
notified of the decision taken at the meeting to designate the vice president of the Board to carry
out the work of the president of the Board, from which Prijić had been relieved, until a new
president was elected.7632 (All irrelevant! The President didn’t impose anything, just
mediated in the interparty dispute!)

2247. On 26 March 1992, SDS deputies of Novo Sarajevo, the presidents of SDS town boards,
and deputies of the Sarajevo SDS passed a decision to establish the Serb Municipal Assembly of

7625
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 3. See also D2418 (Witness statement of Boţo Tomić dated 5 November 2012),
para. 4; Boţo Tomić, T. 30154–30157 (13 November 2012).
7626
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 3.
7627
Radomir Nešković, T. 14275–14276 (6 June 2011), T. 14352–14354 (7 June 2011); Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
16660–16662, 16684; P2575 (Excerpt from session of Novo Sarajevo‘s Crisis Staff, 23 December 1991). See also P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of
Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991); P6055 (Minutes of the Crisis Staff meeting, 25 December 1991); P6066 (Minutes from meeting
of SDS Grbavica Local Board, 27 January 1992), p. 1; P2583 (Minutes of Lukavica‘s Crisis Staff meeting, 29 January 1992); Zdravko Šalipur, T. 31627–
31640, 31655 (18 December 2012); D2674 (List of Secretariat of Novo Sarajevo SDS Municipal Board, undated). Nešković attended the meeting of the
SDS Main and Executive Boards on 20 December 1991 where the Variant A/B Instructions were distributed. Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16646–16653. See para. 133.
7628
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16655–16660. In the case of Novo Sarajevo, the document would have gone to
Ţarko Đurović as the president of the executive board. Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16652–16653. As to
whether Novo Sarajevo fell under Variant A or Variant B, Nešković initially thought that Variant B applied to Novo Sarajevo but later stated, based on the
tasks assigned in P2575, that Variant A was implemented in the municipality. Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
16662–16666; Radomir Nešković, T. 14352–14354 (7 June 2011). See P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19
December 1991), pp. 2–5 (outlining tasks numbered between 1 and 11 under Variant A‘s first phase); P2575 (Excerpt from session of Novo Sarajevo‘s
Crisis Staff, 23 December 1991). Some Defence witnesses from Novo Sarajevo stated that they were not familiar with the Variant A/B Instructions. D2651
(Witness statement of Milorad Katić dated 10 December 2012), para. 2; Branko Radan, T. 31104–31105, 31135–31136 (6 December 2012); Dragan Šojić,
T. 31754 (19 December 2012); D2673 (Witness statement of Zdravko Šalipur dated 16 December 2012), para. 5; Zdravko Šalipur, T. 31628–31633
(18 December 2012) (nonetheless testifying that the Novo Sarajevo SDS Municipal Board received extracts of the Variant A/B Instructions). Considering
other reliable evidence to the contrary, including Šalipur‘s admission above, as well as the witnesses‘ evasiveness and lack of forthrightness with respect to
the existence and implementation of the Variant A/B Instructions in Novo Sarajevo, the Chamber does not find their evidence on this point to be reliable.
Nešković testified that no one from the Government came to or contacted Novo Sarajevo to monitor the implementation of the Variant A/B Instructions in
the municipality. Radomir Nešković, T. 14272–14273 (6 June 2011). While the Chamber considers Nešković‘s evidence generally with regard to the
Variant A/B Instructions to be reliable, the Chamber does not consider this testimony to contradict his or other evidence that the Variant A/B Instructions
were carried out in Novo Sarajevo.
7629
P2575 (Excerpt from session of Novo Sarajevo‘s Crisis Staff, 23 December 1991); P2583 (Minutes of Lukavica‘s Crisis Staff meeting, 29 January 1992);
Momir Garić, T. 29653 (5 November 2012).
7630
There was a debate about the role of the SDS Municipal Board versus other municipal institutions, and a conflict emerged between Prijić, the president of
the Municipal Board, and Đurović, the president of the Executive Board. D1276 (Minutes of meeting of Novo Sarajevo SDS local boards, 3 February
1992), pp. 1–3; Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16641, 16672–16679. The Accused and Krajišnik used their
authority to defuse the conflict and Đurović held onto his position as ―president of the municipal authorities‖. Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16641, 16673. See also Zdravko Šalipur, T. 31640 (18 December 2012).
7631
P2576 (Minutes of 13th session of Novo Sarajevo‘s SDS Municipal Board, 28 February 1992), p. 3; Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor
v. Krajišnik), T. 16641, 16675; Zdravko Šalipur, T. 31640, 31657 (18 December 2012); Branko Radan, T. 31092–31093 (6 December 2012).
7632
P2576 (Minutes of 13th session of Novo Sarajevo‘s SDS Municipal Board, 28 February 1992), p. 6.
 388

the Novo Sarajevo Municipality ―as the highest representative and legislative body of the Serbian
people of Novo Sarajevo municipality‖.7633 The Serb Municipality of Novo Sarajevo was
established as part of SAO Romanija around this time.7634 (It is not going to hurt if we remind
ourselves that the SDA and Muslim leadership denounced the already agreed Lisbon
Agrement on the future arrangement of the BiH. Without this fact, the presentation of the
facts and the development of events is invalid and incorrect, as usually, on the Serb account!)

2248. Around 10 April 1992, Radomir Nešković and Mirko Šarović set up a new Crisis
Staff.7635 The Crisis Staff had an executive organ to carry out its decisions.7636 (This one was not
the Party CS, this one was the municipal CS of the Serb Municipality of Novo Sarajevo, as a
condense organ of authority, with the ex oficio members!) Nešković was president of this new
Crisis Staff until 5 June 1992.7637 This Crisis Staff included representatives of the TO.7638 A
5 June 1992 letter reporting on the activities of the Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff, addressed to the
President of the Bosnian Serb Presidency and signed by Nešković, stated: ―The Crisis Staff has
performed the function of Municipal Assembly in war conditions.‖7639 (In an accordance with
the law and constitution!) The letter also indicated that the Crisis Staff co-ordinated and
organised a variety of municipal services, including accommodation for ―all refugees from the
occupied territory and people who were left homeless‖, mobilisation, and accommodation of
fighters from other areas.7640 The letter stated that the Crisis Staff has not dealt with and does not
intend to deal with police or military command-related matters and therefore had no report on
those subjects.7641 The Crisis Staff ceased to exist on 10 June 1992.7642

2249. In July 1992, Branko Radan became the president of the Executive Board of the
municipality, and he was succeeded in March 1993 by Budimir Obradović.7643 In March 1993,
Milorad Katić, a former member of the SDS Municipal Board in Novo Sarajevo, became the
president of the Novo Sarajevo Serb Assembly and the president of the municipality.7644

7633
D2675 (Decision on establishment of the Assembly of Serbian Novo Sarajevo Municipality, 26 March 1992).
7634
P2577 (Press release of Novo Sarajevo municipality, 1 April 1992), p. 1. See also Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
16679–16680; D2673 (Witness statement of Zdravko Šalipur dated 16 December 2012), para. 7; D2683 (Witness statement of Dragan Šojić dated 15
December 2012), para. 7; Dragan Šojić, T. 31736 (19 December 2012). The local communities that were to comprise the municipality were Tilava,
Miljevići, Lukavica, Vraca, Gornji and Donji Kovaĉići, Bane Surbat, Rava Janković, Slobodan Princip Seljo, Ivan Krndelj, Pero Kosorić, Blagoje Parović,
Danilo Djokić, Hrasno Brdo, Nikola Tesla, Avdo Hodţić, Omer Maslić, Bratstvo Jedinstvo, Donji and Gornji Pofalići, and the parts of the local
communities Gornji and Donji Velešići inhabited by Serbs, as well as parts of Novi Grad municipality, namely Otoka, Staro Hrasno, Petar Dokić, a part of
Ivo Lola Ribar, and Odţakovići. P2577 (Press release of Novo Sarajevo municipality, 1 April 1992), p. 1. Nešković stated that although the founding
assembly took place toward the end of March 1992, the Serb Municipality of Novo Sarajevo was set up only by 10 June 1992. Radomir Nešković, P2568
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16680.
7635
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16683–16685, 16706; Radomir Nešković, T. 14282–14283 (6 June 2011); D1278
(Transcript of Radomir Nešković‘s interview with Karadţić‘s legal associate, 8 October 2009), pp. 31–33. See also D885 (Letter from Novo Sarajevo Crisis
Staff to Radovan Karadţić, 5 June 1992), pp. 1, 4. Nešković drafted this letter and submitted it to the Accused in response to his invitation in June 1992 to
the representatives of ―Crisis Staffs Jahorina‖ to report on their work, largely in oral presentations. Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor
v. Krajišnik), T. 16685. The 5 June 1992 letter reported that a Crisis Staff had been set up and included, among others, representatives of the local
communes of Petrovići, Miljevići, Gornji Kovaĉići, Grbavica, Vraca, Hrasno Brdo, Lukavica, and Tilava; army and police representatives; and the
―Chairman of the Executive Board‖. D885 (Letter from Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to Radovan Karadţić, 5 June 1992), p. 1.
7636
D885 (Letter from Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to Radovan Karadţić, 5 June 1992), p. 1.
7637
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16707.
7638
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16707.
7639
D885 (Letter from Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to Radovan Karadţić, 5 June 1992), pp. 1, 4. Nešković testified that the police and TO and later the VRS
were responsible for protecting the territory and defending the population. Radomir Nešković, T. 14277–14278 (6 June 2011).
7640
D885 (Letter from Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to Radovan Karadţić, 5 June 1992), pp. 1–3. See also Radomir Nešković, T. 14288–14290 (6 June 2011).
7641
D885 (Letter from Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to Radovan Karadţić, 5 June 1992), p. 2. The Chamber notes that the Crisis Staff did, however, order and
engage in mobilisation. See paras. 2259–2260.
7642
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16809.
7643
D2549 (Witness statement of Branko Radan dated 3 December 2012), para. 10; Branko Radan, T. 31097, 31100, 31103 (6 December 2012).
7644
D2651 (Witness statement of Milorad Katić dated 10 December 2012), paras. 2, 6, 17–18. The minutes of a session of the Council of the Serb City of
Sarajevo indicate Katić was also president of the Executive Board of the Serb Municipality of Novo Sarajevo. D2652 (Excerpt from minutes of RS City
Council of Sarajevo meeting, 10 July 1993), p. 1.
 389

2250. With respect to police structures, after the outbreak of armed conflict in Sarajevo in
April 1992,7645 Sarajevo‘s ten SJBs were divided between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian
Muslims.7646 The station in Novo Sarajevo was among the four that remained under the control of
Bosnian Muslims.7647 (#Serbs – first victims#! A Serb policeman Petrovic appeared in this
SJB in the evening of 4 April, and he got killed by his Muslim colleagues, but as if thie didn’t
matter, although it had a terrible influence on a general sentiments. This policeman didn’t
have any connection with the SDS, and that was why he reported to his duty!) From around
4 April 1992, the MUP special forces operated at the premises of the BiH MUP school in
Vraca.7648 On 6 April 1992, Serb Forces seized the police station in Novo Sarajevo.7649 (Two days
after a Serb policeman Petrovic got killed there!) Simo Sipĉić was the head of the MP in Novo
Sarajevo.7650 Milenko Jovanović was the head of the Novo Sarajevo SJB.7651

2251. On 21 July 1992, the President as President of the Presidency confirmed the appointment
of the members of the War Commission for the Serb Municipality of Novo Sarajevo.7652 Dragan
Đokanović, as the Republican Commissioner, was to serve as Chairman of the War Commission,
whose members included Nešković, Milorad Katić, Danilo Škrba, and Milorad Šanjević.7653

1. Militarisation of Novo Sarajevo

2252. The distribution of weapons started as the JNA withdrew from Slovenia and parts of
Croatia in September 1991; weapons and ammunition were transported into BiH and delivered to
places under SDS control, including former JNA barracks.7654 (At that time it were not “former”
but actual JNA barracks! And, as known, there was no a single SDS military formation,
because the President opposed any paramilitary organisation and supported the only legal
army, the JNA!@)

2253. On 1 or 2 March 1992, Serbs began to set up barricades at strategic points in Sarajevo and
surrounding municipalities.7655 Those involved in organising the barricades included Serb
employees of the BiH MUP such as then-assistant Minister of Interior Momĉilo Mandić, Milenko
Jovanović, and SDS officials such as Rajko Dukić, Jovan Tintor, and Ratko Adţić.7656 (How come
the main reason for this unrest was not worthwhile to be mentioned? That happened the

7645
See para. 3541.
7646
Mirsad Kuĉanin, P16 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Galić), T. 4499–4500; Mirsad Kuĉanin, P17 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 28934–
28935; P27 (Witness statement of Mirsad Kuĉanin dated 4 September 2000), p. 2.
7647
Mirsad Kuĉanin, P16 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Galić), T. 4500; Mirsad Kuĉanin, P17 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 28934–28935;
P27 (Witness statement of Mirsad Kuĉanin dated 4 September 2000), p. 2. See also P2308 (SJB Ilidţa report, 20 September 1993), pp. 1–2.
7648
D3749 (Witness statement of Milenko Karišik dated 23 June 2013), paras. 19, 23; Branko Radan, T. 31112 (6 December 2012); Boţo Tomić, T. 30158 (13
November 2012); Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16714.
7649
P5743 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and Danilo Veselinović, 6 April 1992), p. 3. See also Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16714.
7650
KDZ310, T. 9273 (29 November 2010).
7651
See Adjudicated Fact 2560; P2575 (Excerpt from session of Novo Sarajevo‘s Crisis Staff, 23 December 1991); Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16668–16669.
7652
P5543 (Decision of Radovan Karadţić appointing a War Commission in Novo Sarajevo, 21 July 1992); Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16592–16593. Nešković stated that he does not know to this day what the purpose of the War Commission was and that at the
time it was set up, ―legally elected municipal bodies‖, i.e., the municipal assembly and municipal executive board, were in existence. Radomir Nešković,
P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16593.
7653
P5543 (Decision of Radovan Karadţić appointing a War Commission in Novo Sarajevo, 21 July 1992); Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16592–16593.
7654
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 10; KDZ310, T. 9201–9202 (29 November 2010). See also P5977 (BiH MUP daily
bulletin, 16 October 1991), pp. 1–4; Predrag Trapara, T. 29915–29918 (7 November 2012).
7655
D3803 (List of SRBiH MUP employees, 13 March 1992), pp. 1, 2; P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), paras. 6, 8, 66; P2444
(Witness statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), para. 4 (under seal). See also Adjudicated Fact 2560. KDZ310 stated that the barricades were
everywhere in Grbavica, so that people were not able to go to work that morning. P1937 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), paras.
6–7 (under seal).
7656
D3803 (List of SRBiH MUP employees, 13 March 1992), pp. 2–3; P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), paras. 6, 8. See also
Adjudicated Fact 2560.
 390

same evening after the Muslim extremists attacked a weding ceremony in front of the oldest
Serb Orthodox Church, killing the Groom’s father. What is said about the Serb officials is
not true, those named here only joined the barricades later, in order to be able to influence
the cours of events. Did the Chamber noticed, or did it needed to know why the barricades
had been errected? Was there any killing of a Serb in wedding ceremony? In the area of
Grbavica, there were barricades at the Vrbanja Bridge and Bratstvo-Jedinstvo Bridge.7657 Men
wearing black masks were manning the barricades, and vehicles without license plates arrived
every half hour with armed men inside.7658 (Were there any Muslim barricades? See: D298, p
3, a confession of Gen. Sefer Halilovic, the chief Commander of the Muslim Army:)

2254. Around the end of March and the beginning of April 1992, an increased number of armed
individuals were present in Vraca and Grbavica; tanks were placed below the MUP school, mines
were laid, and soldiers fired at people who went outside.7659 From 6 April to mid-May 1992, on
several occasions ―JNA units‖ and armed SDS members would go to Grbavica during the night,
stay for a while at the buildings, and return to their original positions before dawn.7660
(#Forgery#! There were no “armed SDS members”, every single armed Serb was in the JNA,
either as a conscripts, or as professionals, or reservists who responded to mobilisation. While
the JNA was there, it was the only legal armed force, the Serbs didn’t have other units, since
the TO was always under the JNA control. Only if the JNA didn’t arrive, the TO were
entitled to act for a defense of the zone it covered! How it was possible that the Prosecution
was so ignorant of the domestic laws, as well as the Law of war?)

2255.At the beginning of April 1992, TO staffs in the Sarajevo municipalities where Serbs lived were
mobilised as the JNA was already ―falling apart‖.7661 A unit of the Serb members of the Novo
Sarajevo TO staff, previously of mixed composition, was organised.7662 (A serious chamber
wouldn’t miss to mention that prior to this event the Muslim leadership fired Gen.
Vukosavljevic as the Commander of the common TO in BiH, and announced formation of a
new Territorial Defence, on 6 April 1992, at the same time marking the JNA and the TO in
the Serb municipalities as their enemies, which was a declaration of war!) The Serb TO set up
a line of defence that ran in front of areas with a mainly Serb population.7663 Momir, a.k.a.
―Momo‖,7664 Garić was the commander of the Serb TO in Grbavica.7665 Armed units—including

7657
P1937 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 6 (under seal).
7658
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), paras. 6–8. KDZ310 saw that Mandić, then Deputy Minister of Interior, was able to walk
through the barricade at Vrbanja Bridge and cross the river. P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 8.
7659
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court p. 4; P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-court p.
9; P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), paras. 11, 13; P2444 (Witness statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), para. 18
(under seal). Mirsad Smajš identified them as Serb soldiers, some wearing ―the former Police uniform‖ and others ―the camouflage uniforms‖. P43
(Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš 14 January 1998), e-court p. 9 (further stating that they called themselves the ―White Eagles‖ and that there was no
insignia on the uniforms but there were white ribbons on the sleeves). Witness KDZ354 stated that military trucks with JNA registration plates and
reservists arrived in Grbavica in April 1992 and that there were armoured cars on patrol and soldiers wearing uniforms of the former JNA. P2444 (Witness
statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), para. 18 (under seal) (further stating that the men on the trucks had longer hair and beards and carried
weapons, including rifles, and that some wore helmets). The vehicles were usually heading toward or coming from the direction of Vrace. P2444 (Witness
statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), paras. 18–19 (under seal).
7660
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), paras. 11, 13.
7661
D2379 (Witness statement of Momir Garić dated 2 November 2012), para. 12.
7662
D2379 (Witness statement of Momir Garić dated 2 November 2012), paras. 13; Momir Garić, T. 29656–29658 (5 November 2012). According to Garić, the
neighbourhoods of Novo Sarajevo where Serbs were organised were Tilava, Lukavica, Vraca, Gornji Kovaĉići, Miljevići, and Petrovići, and these areas
were considered to be inhabited by Serbs only. Momir Garić, T. 29656–29657, 29659–29660 (5 November 2012); D2379 (Witness statement of Momir
Garić dated 2 November 2012), paras. 13, 22.
7663
D2379 (Witness statement of Momir Garić dated 2 November 2012), para. 13 (stating that the area of responsibility of this unit extended from the Slaviša
Vajner Ĉiĉa Barracks in Lukavica ―below Mojmilo hill and Ozrenska street in Vraca and the Sarajevo bypass to the Jewish cemetery and then towards
Zlatište and the road to Trebević‖).
7664
Boţo Tomić confirmed that ―Momo‖ was a nickname for Momir Garić. Boţo Tomić, T. 30163 (13 November 2012).
 391

Gavrilović and Aleksić‘s groups of Šešelj‘s men—were operating in the Sarajevo area in April
1992.7666

2256. Members of the Serb TO, amongst whom were Obradović and Garić, organised local Serbs
and gave them weapons around the time the conflict began in Sarajevo in early April 1992.7667 A
20 March 1992 report of the Command of the 2nd Military District of the JNA indicates that by
then, 2,800 ―volunteer‖ men not from the JNA or the Serb TO had been recruited in Novo
Sarajevo.7668 (Certainly, the JNA recruited them. The JNA was in jeopardy at the first place.
And mobilisation of the municipal brigade of the TO was fully in competence of the
president of municipality and the municipal Defence committee. By keeping “silent” about
the actions of a very numerous Muslim secret army (the Patriotic league and Green Berets)
the Prosecution/Chamber company depicts the Serb side as a lunatic, aggressive, or cautious
without any reason! Such a grandious negligeance of the context and the sequences in
development is not seen so far in a serious courts!) .

2257. Bosnian Muslims also armed themselves and organised militarily in Novo Sarajevo.7669
They started forming units in the first half of 1991.7670 ( Incorrect, because the Muslims
accomplished the entire organisation and arming of the Patriotic League and Green Berets
far before the Serbs organized themselves. See D298 the Report of Gen. Sefer Halilovic:

7665
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13689 (18 March 2011). See also P5958 (Intercept of conversation between Rade Milinković and Momo Garić, 21 April 1992), p. 1;
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May-31 July 1992), pp. 28, 31. Garić, however, did not describe himself as the commander of the TO. According to
Garić, he was merely a member of the TO and later the VRS, which he left in September 1992 to work at the RS Ministry of Defence in Pale. D2379
(Witness statement of Momir Garić dated 2 November 2012), paras. 12–14, 30; Momir Garić, T. 29644–29645 (5 November 2012).
7666
See P2228 (Intercept of conversation between Vojislav Šešelj and Branislav Gavrilović, April 1992); P2523 (Intercept of conversation between Kaća Duĉić
and Branislav Gavrilović, 21 April 1992); NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13853–13855 (21 March 2011); P5707 (Intercept of conversation between Kaća Duĉić
and Radomir Ninković, 21 April 1992); P1148 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and Igor, 21 April 1992); Momĉilo Mandić, C2
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9025–9029; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4644–4645 (5 July 2010); D3197 (Witness statement of Dobrislav Planojević
dated 23 March 2013), para. 29. Witness KDZ354 saw Šešelj in Grbavica standing among ―a large group of soldiers in camouflage uniforms‖ and
accompanied by Aleksić. P2444 (Witness statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), paras. 1, 101 (under seal); KDZ354, T. 13197–13198 (10 March
2011). Aleksić was a member of the SDS Municipal Board of Novo Sarajevo. Zdravko Šalipur, T. 31641–31642, 31644 (18 December 2012). He was a
member of the Serbian Chetnik Movement and a ―Chetnik‖ vojvoda, or military leader, as commander of the Novo Sarajevo Chetnik Detachment. P5035
(Order of Vojislav Šešelj, 13 May 1993), p. 1. See also P6057 (Ilidţa SJB receipt for goods, 15 January 1994).
7667
D2418 (Witness statement of Boţo Tomić dated 5 November 2012), paras. 7–8, 12; Boţo Tomić, T. 30159–30164, 30170–30171 (13 November 2012);
D2379 (Witness statement of Momir Garić dated 2 November 2012), paras. 12–14, 26; Momir Garić, T. 29661 (5 November 2012). Tomić testified that he
and his neighbours in Vrace were given weapons for protecting all of the local population but that he does not know if any Bosnian Muslims went to the
Serb TO to be armed. Boţo Tomić, T. 30159–30160 (13 November 2012). The TO would gather in local communes and discuss matters; one meeting
location was the Pajaco facility across the road from the police station and school in Vrace. Momir Garić, T. 29661 (5 November 2012).
7668
P979 (Report from JNA 2nd Military District to JNA General Staff, 20 March 1992), pp. 6, 11.
7669
D2673 (Witness statement of Zdravko Šalipur dated 16 December 2012), para. 11; D2683 (Witness statement of Dragan Šojić dated 15 December 2012),
para. 12; D2549 (Witness statement of Branko Radan dated 3 December 2012), para. 6; Branko Radan, T. 31103 (6 December 2012).
7670
D2379 (Witness statement of Momir Garić dated 2 November 2012), para. 5; D2549 (Witness statement of Branko Radan dated 3 December 2012), para. 6;
Branko Radan, T. 31103, 31107 (6 December 2012); D2673 (Witness statement of Zdravko Šalipur dated 16 December 2012), paras. 11, 13.
 392

(#Distorted#! How could it be said that “the Bosnian Muslims also armed themselves” when it is
documented how and when they organised a secret army? In these 98 municipalities in which
General Halilovic organised the Patriotic League the Serbs were majority in 47 municipalities, and a
substantial minority it the others. The Serbs were monitoring what their neighbours were preparing,
with a fear and concern for their families. Who was the one who could prevent the Serbs to prepare a
caunter-measures?)

2258. On 4 April 1992, there were clashes between Serb and Muslim police forces at the BiH
MUP school in Vraca.7671 After several hours of fighting Serb Forces placed the school under
their control.7672 (Although the previous day there was an agreement reached within the common
MUP that the seat of the Serb MUP – Ministry of Interior -) will be in school in Vraca. When the
Serb police came, it was ambushed by the Muslim extremists, who killed two Serb policemen. Inside
the school there was 400 the high school pupils and 180 adult educants. #Tricks after the tricks#!)
A few hours after the clashes, in Miljevići village in Vraca, a vehicle arrived from the military
barracks in Lukavica7673 with automatic and semi-automatic weapons, which were distributed to
local members of the TO and other people from the surrounding area.7674 Weapons were also
supplied from Pale.7675 The JNA legaly distributed the weapon to those on whom they
counted for the defence of the JNA personnel and assets. See: D03679

(After this “unauthorised decision” of the BH Presidency, and this Order of the Commander
of 2nd Military District, as well as his Order for the mobilisation, D01386, everithing what
happened before 20 May, or rather 15 June, when the VRS started to exist, was not
responsibility of the President, or the local Serbs. No court has a right to neglect domestic

7671
See Milorad Katić, T. 31400–31401 (13 December 2012); D2418 (Witness statement of Boţo Tomić dated 5 November 2012), para. 6; Boţo Tomić, T.
30158 (13 November 2012). According to Karišik and Dobrislav Planojević, pursuant to an agreement to divide the BiH MUP, the BiH MUP school in
Vraca was to go to the Serbs. D3749 (Witness statement of Milenko Karišik dated 23 June 2013), para. 19; D3197 (Witness statement of Dobrislav
Planojević dated 23 March 2013), para. 15.
7672
D2379 (Witness statement of Momir Garić dated 2 November 2012), para. 9.
7673
See para. 2275.
7674
Milorad Katić, T. 31400–31403 (13 December 2012). Tomić and his neighbours in Vraca were organised around the same time. See para. 2256, fn. 7674.
7675
Milorad Katić, T. 31403–31404 (13 December 2012).
 393

legislation, because the Serbs were acting in accordance to it, not to the Statute of the
Tribunal. Let us look at that document, see what was an obligation of the Serbs who were
reservists, D1386 :

Under para 1. “all war units” were the local reservists of the JNA, of whom only the Serbs
responded, see para 3, “In the event that undividual… fail to respond to call-up by for ethnic
reasons, other v/o are to be called up…”. Under para 3. means that the military territorial
organs were obliged to call up the members of the war units, and all and everyone knew his
deployment far in advance. So, when the Muslims testify that they had seen some activities,
the Chamber must accept and differentiate what of the Serb conduct was legal due to the
domestic laws, and what not, as well as to have in mind the challenges for the security caused
by the Muslim preparations of the war!)

2259. On 22 April 1992, on the basis of an SNB order, the Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff ordered all
able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 60 residing in the area of the Serb Municipality of
Novo Sarajevo to report for mobilisation within 24 hours at Lukavica.7676 (It was still the JNA,

7676
D888 (Order of Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff, 22 April 1992). But see KDZ310, T. 9271–9272 (29 November 2010) (testifying that he did not believe the 22
April 1992 order to be genuine or that it was ever implemented). According to KDZ310, in May 1992, a mobilisation of males from ages 18 up to 60 was
carried out, which applied only to males of Serb ethnic origin, and men from other ethnic groups were not mobilised. P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310
dated 28 November 2010), paras. 16–17. KDZ310 stated that this period was the only time that he knows of ―when Mladić was present in Grbavica for an
inspection of the troops‖. P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 17. See also P1145 (Intercept of conversation between
Momĉilo Krajišnik and Ratko Mladić, 24 May 1992), p. 5 (indicating that Mladić was located ―by Miljacka‖ at that time). KDZ310 heard that Mladić
confirmed that the mobilisation applied only to Serbs ―for the time being‖. P1937 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 17
(under seal).
 394

and the Serb TO was formed a week after the Muslim side expelled the Serb component
from the common TO. So, the SNB only supported replenishing of the menpower of the JNA,
which was obligatory!) The Crisis Staff‘s order also stated that those who did not report for
mobilisation, in violation of the order, would be subject to the Law on Military Obligation and
Military Court and their property would be confiscated.7677 (Obviously, the SNB was late 17 days
after the Kukanjac order, which means that the 2nd MD was not satisfied with the response
to call-up, and the SNB intervened!)

2260. In a report of 5 June 1992, the Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff informed the President of the
Bosnian Serb Presidency that it had mobilised about 900 people over the previous two months,
including about 700 in the Lukavica and Tilava area and about 200 in Grbavica.7678

2261. Pursuant to an order of the SRK Command on 22 May 1992, the Novo Sarajevo TO
comprising locals of Grbavica, Hrasno, Vrace, and Kovaĉići was organised into the SRK.7679
(Exactly, according to the law, since until 20 May the JNA was legally in charge in the BiH!)

i. Take-over

2262. Combat activity increased in late April 1992.7680 The Serb TO was engaged in Grbavica
on 21 April 1992.7681 Garić requested additional men, and Prstojević, from Ilidţa, prepared a
platoon from Kasindol to assist.7682 JNA forces shelled Novo Sarajevo at the end of April
1992.7683 Fighting also took place in May 1992.7684 (#Serb suburb, no take-over#! What “take
over”? Grbavica was over 80% Serbian settlement, and the Serb TO was obliged to protect
the settlement that was the basis for this unit. Until an attack, nobody “engaged” in
Grbavica. There is a complete ignorance of the Prosecution of the domestic laws, as well as
of the reality. From any of those paragraph is visible that the Serbs would be innocent only if
didn’t defend and got killed, as the Serbs in Pofalici, just across the Miljacka River from
Grbavica@!)

7677
D888 (Order of Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff, 22 April 1992).
7678
D885 (Letter from Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to Radovan Karadţić, 5 June 1992), p. 3 (indicating that ―mobilisation was carried out in various ways
(personally and directly, through SDS […] local boards and local communes, with the help of police, etc.)‖).
7679
P1505 (SRK Order, 22 May 1992), p. 1; Boţo Tomić, T. 30163–30164 (13 November 2012). See also D2351 (Witness statement of Stevan Veljović dated
19 October 2012), paras. 12–13. The TO had earlier been incorporated into the JNA. D2379 (Witness statement of Momir Garić dated 2 November 2012),
paras. 14, 22; Momir Garić, T. 29663–29667 (5 November 2012).
7680
P5703 (Intercept of conversation between Momo Garić and ―Velibor‖, 21 April 1992); P5705 (Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and
unidentified male, 21 April 1992); P5706 (Intercept of conversation between Milenko Karišik and Slobodan Škipina, 21 April 1992); P5708 (Intercept of
conversation between Momĉilo Krajišnik and unidentified male, 21 April 1992); P5709 (Intercept of conversation between Radomir Ninković, Milenko
Karišik, Nikola Koljević, and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 21 April 1992); P5710 (Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Krstović, 21 April
1992); D1202 (Intercept of conversation between Momo Garić and NeĊeljko Prstojević, 21 April 1992); P5959 (Intercept of conversation between ―Ranko‖
and Momo Garić, 21 April 1992); D920 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Radovan Pejić, 23 April 1992).
7681
P5705 (Intercept of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and unidentified male, 21 April 1992), pp. 1–2; P5709 (Intercept of conversation between
Radomir Ninković, Milenko Karišik, Nikola Koljević, and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 21 April 1992), p. 2.
7682
P5703 (Intercept of conversation between Momo Garić and ―Velibor‖, 21 April 1992); D1202 (Intercept of conversation between Momo Garić and NeĊeljko
Prstojević, 21 April 1992), p. 3; P5959 (Intercept of conversation between ―Ranko‖ and Momo Garić, 21 April 1992), p. 1; P5705 (Intercept of conversation
between NeĊeljko Prstojević and unidentified male, 21 April 1992), p. 1; NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13687–13690 (18 March 2011). See also P5710 (Intercept
of conversation between NeĊeljko Prstojević and Krstović, 21 April 1992), pp. 1–2.
7683
See Adjudicated Fact 2582. See also P2444 (Witness statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), paras. 12–13 (under seal).
7684
P2240 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Krajišnik, Branko Đerić, and Milenko Karišik, 7 May 1992), pp. 1–2; P2332 (Intercept of conversation
between Ĉedo and Radovan Karadţić, 30 May 1992), pp. 5–6; D2379 (Witness statement of Momir Garić dated 2 November 2012), paras. 21, 23; D2519
(Witness statement of Dragan Maletić dated 9 November 2012), para. 7; Momir Garić, T. 29734–29735 (5 November 2012); Zdravko Šalipur, T. 31642 (18
December 2012). Defence witnesses stated that Muslim forces fired on Grbavica and Lukavica. D2651 (Witness statement of Milorad Katić dated 10
December 2012), para. 5; D2379 (Witness statement of Momir Garić dated 2 November 2012), paras. 14, 17, 20; D2418 (Witness statement of Boţo Tomić
dated 5 November 2012), paras. 9–10, 19; Boţo Tomić, T. 30179–30182, 30227 (13 November 2012); D2519 (Witness statement of Dragan Maletić dated 9
November 2012), paras. 20, 32, 39.
 395

2263. By mid-May, Grbavica was occupied by the Serbs, after an initiative by Serb Forces to
move the confrontation line.7685 (How the Serbs could have #occupied their own settlement#?
Once there was a jeopardy, the Territorial Defence was obliged to protect the settlement,
and if not, it would be punishable before the court!) The line was established on the bank of the
Miljacka River, including by the Bratstvo-Jedinstvo Bridge and Vrbanja Bridge, extending west
toward Hrasno and east toward Skenderija.7686 Serb Forces took Grbavica with little fighting.7687
After the Serb take-over of Grbavica, it became no longer possible to cross over the Miljacka
River.7688 (For whom it was impossible to cross over Miljacka? An average people could do
it, but the Muslim extremists who already started killing the Serb civilians couldn’t. Before
“the mid-May” there was a real terror of the Muslim Forces over the Serbs under their
control, starting by the killing of the Serb Petrovic, a policement in the common police, and
continuing as an every day terror. By mid-May (15 May) the Muslim forces attacked
Pofalici, the Serb settlement in Novo Sarajevo Municipality, on the right bank of the
Miljacka River, and killed up to 250 Serb civilians. Who had any rights to prevent the Serbs
in other parts of the Municipality to prepare for the defence, particularly since the JNA took
away all of the able-bodied Serbs? How come the international community didn’t pay any
attention to this horrifying crime, which influenced the rest of the country throughout the
war?)

1. Searches of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat houses

2264. During the take-over, members of the Serb Forces, including the VRS, the police, and
Šešelj‘s men, searched Bosnian Muslim and Croat houses in Grbavica for weapons.7689 (#Deadly
combination#! All of it is only on the adjudicated facts, or Rule 92bis evidence, or a solitary
statements of the Muslim extremists! There was no “Seselj’s men as a military formation,
but only the JNA with it’s regular (conscripts) and reserve manpower, which was attacked
on a daily basis by the Muslim irregulars, and butchered on 2 and 3 May 92. The police was
obliged to search for the illegal weapons. The VRS was proclaimed only after 20 May 92.
What is the Accuse charged for herein? Because there was a civil war, and the police was
doing it’s regular job!) In one such instance, on 7 May 1992, a group of seven or eight armed

7685
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), paras. 11, 13–15; D2379 (Witness statement of Momir Garić dated 2 November 2012),
para. 16. See also Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8708–8709. KDZ310 identified JNA and VRS forces as taking
Grbavica. P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), paras. 11, 13–14; KDZ310, T. 9228 (29 November 2010). See also P926
(Witness statement of Aernout van Lynden dated 26 February 2010), para. 99; D2379 (Witness statement of Momir Garić dated 2 November 2012), para.
16; Adjudicated Facts 66, 68.
7686
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), paras. 11, 13, 15; D2379 (Witness statement of Momir Garić dated 2 November 2012),
para. 16. See para. 3557.
7687
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 14; Witness KDZ310, T. 9213–9214, 9228 (29 November 2010); D2379 (Witness
statement of Momir Garić dated 2 November 2012), para. 16; Momir Garić, T. 29718–29720 (5 November 2012); P5695 (Intercept of conversation between
Branko Đerić and Milenko Karišik, 7 May 1992), p. 3. In an intercepted conversation on 5 May 1992, Mandić said to Branko Kvesić: ―We came down and
cleaned Grbavica‖. P1103 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and Branko Kvesić/Bruno Stojić/Mićo Stanišić, 5 May 1992), p. 4. Later in
the conversation, Mandić said to Bruno Stojić: ―We oĉistiti /cleansed or mopped up/ Novo Sarajevo.‖ P1103 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo
Mandić and Branko Kvesić/Bruno Stojić/Mićo Stanišić, 5 May 1992), p. 9. Mandić testified that the participants in the conversation knew that it was being
intercepted and that these statements were jokes and did not reflect the actual situation on the ground. Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4609–4611 (5 July 2010).
Considering Mandić‘s interest in minimising the significance of his statements in the intercepted conversation as well as his evasiveness and partiality on
this point, the Chamber does not find Mandić‘s evidence to be reliable in this regard. (Why Mr. Mandic would “minimize the significance”
of his conversation with his Croatian colleague, while he was already acquitted in the Bosnian Court, which is well
known as an anti-Serb court?)
7688
KDZ310, T. 9255 (29 November 2010).
7689
See Adjudicated Fact 2584; P2444 (Witness statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), para. 24 (under seal); P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš
dated 18 December 1993), e-court pp. 4–5; P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-court p. 9. The entire fn. contains
only the materials that couldn’t be challenged. What “take over”? The Serbs controlled only the Serb settlements, but
not all of them, and none of the Muslim settlements.
 396

soldiers came to the house of Smajš, a Bosnian Muslim, in Vrace to search for weapons.7690
Although they did not find any, they ordered Smajš to go with them. 7691 (#Muslim extremist#!
Obviously, weapons was not the only reason for bringing Mr. Smajs in! he was a very known
extremist, and on 5 April 92 the two Serb special policemen had been killed from the back
exactly in this neighbourhood! It is not to justify the conduct of the armed people who
brought him in, just to understand that it was not his religion or ethnicity that determined
them to theat him that way!) Outside, a soldier ordered him to walk, with his head down, toward
the Golf Café, in front of which a group of ten soldiers stood.7692 He was ordered to strip to the
waist and was then beaten with rifle butts, punched, and kicked all over for about 15 to 20
minutes.7693 He was then transported, along with his neighbour Mirsad Dedić, in a military
vehicle to the MUP school at Vrace.7694 During the ride they were both beaten and one of the
soldiers fired his unloaded automatic rifle three times into his temple; they were beaten again at
the MUP school.7695 Smajš, blindfolded and with his hands tied behind his back, was then
transported, along with Dedić, to ―Kula prison‖.7696

2265. Other Bosnian Muslims in Grbavica were frequently subjected to house searches by
members of Serb Forces.7697 All Muslims had been asked to voluntarily surrender their weapons
and a Commander Major Petković had told those who did so that the VRS would not search their
flats.7698 (Therefore, it was not any kind of a persecutory conduct, but exacxtly what had
been said: to neutralise weapons, so to be secure not to lose lives from their back!)

2266. The 5 June 1992 report of the Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff stated, in the section entitled
―[t]reatment of Muslims and Croats‖:

Citizens of all nationalities assemble frequently, especially in Grbavica, and our public attitude is
very correct, we appoint a head of every building who is responsible for the situation in his
building and for all the information about the occupants. Secretly, the police apply the usual
procedure to people who were engaged in military activities against us. We informed the Muslims
that they would be safe if they were militarily neutral to us, and so far the situation has been
good.7699 (This report had been directed to the President from the most competent and
7690
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court p. 4; P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-court
pp. 8–9. Smajš described the armed men who came to his home as wearing camouflage uniforms and stated that outside his house, there were also men ―in
the Police uniforms‖ and men not wearing any uniforms. P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court p. 4; P43 (Witness
statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-court pp. 8–9. Again, no possibility to check anything. Again the Defence is
defenceless and helpless.
7691
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court p. 4.
7692
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court p. 4; P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-court
pp. 8–9.
7693
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court pp. 4; P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-court
pp. 8–9. With respect to the men who beat him, Smajš said that based on their accents they were not from Grbavica and were probably from somewhere in
Serbia. P43 (Witness statements of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court p. 5; P43 (Witness statements of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December
1993 and 14 January 1998), e-court p. 9.
7694
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court pp. 4–5; P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-
court p. 9.
7695
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court p. 5; P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-court p.
9.
7696
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court p. 5; P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-court
pp. 8–9. See Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.2.
7697
P2444 (Witness statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), paras. 1, 24, 39–46 (under seal); KDZ354, T. 13215–13216, 13221 (11 March 2011). One of
the men who came to KDZ354‘s building asked if there were any ―balijas‖ there. Some wore JNA uniforms and others wore ―military uniforms‖ with a
white belt as she had seen military policemen wear. P2444 (Witness statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), paras. 24, 39, 41 (under seal).
7698
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16715. See also Radomir Nešković, T. 14292–14293 (6 June 2011).
7699
D885 (Letter from Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to Radovan Karadţić, 5 June 1992), pp. 3–4. According to Nešković, who signed the report, if ―any
inhabitants‖ noticed, in their building, Muslims who did not surrender their weapons and acted against the VRS, they were required to report the fact to the
civilian police and ―then further police procedures would be implemented‖, including arrest of the individual concerned. Radomir Nešković, P2568
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16715–16716. See also Radomir Nešković, T. 14288, 14292–14293 (6 June 2011). The Chamber accepts
Nešković‘s evidence with respect to his statement that Muslims were arrested. However, considering Nešković‘s interest in casting the report and the
actions of the Crisis Staff in a favourable light, the Chamber does not consider that Nešković was entirely forthright in his explanation of ―the usual
procedure‖, applied ―[s]ecretly‖, to which the report refers. The Chamber will therefore not rely on this portion of Nešković‘s evidence.
 397

responsible official of the Serb authorities in Grbavica. And that was the only what the
President have known and what he should trust, nothing elese, particularly not a Muslim
propaganda! The Neskovic’s report didn’t contain any reason for an additional caution of
the President, nor alarmed him to act in any direction! But, Smajs was an exception,
probably known as an extremist. 5 of April the two Serb policemen were killed from behind
in this neighbourhood, and all of this could have had some relation to it. No justification, but
there must have been some reason, because Smajs wasn’t treated this way only for being a
Muslim, because other Muslims would be treated the same way, which was not the case! And
the UN documents, like D2424 from 1993, see: D2424, p. 1 #UN documents contra Chamber
findings#!:

and p.2

as well as a lately disclosed document from 1994 say the same:“those Muslims and Croats
who are not fighting against the Serbs seem not to have any problems, and do not want to
leave Grbavica”!) So, it was the case in June 1992, see D885 from this fn, it was the same in
1993, see D2424, and in 1994, which is ib the lately disclosed document!)

Other acts

2267. osnian Muslims and Croats were forced to perform labour under the responsibility of VRS
platoon or company commanders in Novo Sarajevo.7700 There were prisoners from Kula Prison in
Ozrenska; there they had to dig trenches between the confrontation lines.7701 Several men were
killed by sniper fire while performing these work duties.7702 Before the winter of 1992, detainees
from Kula Prison were no longer brought to Ozrenska and they were replaced by ―people from
Grbavica‖.7703 ( #Legal and obligatory#! The ordinary able bodied citizens had in a war
condition a legal obligation either to join the Army, or to participate in the working
obligation. Since the Muslims and Croats hadn’t been “drafted” see D2424 above, they had
to work, while many Serbs seeked to be transferred from the military to the working

7700
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 46; P1937 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 18
(under seal). See also P2444 (Witness statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), para. 81 (under seal).
7701
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 46; P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 3. See
para. 2157. KDZ310 stated that he knew they were prisoners from Kula Prison because he asked them. P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28
November 2010), para. 46. See also D2418 (Witness statement of Boţo Tomić dated 5 November 2012), para. 15; Boţo Tomić, T. 30200–30204 (13
November 2012) (stating that a ―work detail‖ composed of Muslim detainees from Kula Prison was engaged to help fortify the confrontation line at Sanaĉ
by digging trenches and covering the trenches). Tomić testified that coming to the area was not safe for members of the VRS but denied that the work detail
was in danger in carrying out the tasks of digging and covering trenches at the line. Boţo Tomić, T. 30201–30205, 30208–30209 (13 November 2012). But
see P5987 (Special report of the 2nd Infantry Battalion, 21 May 1993), pp. 1–2 (reporting to the Kula Prison Administration the escape of two Muslim
detainees who had been building bunkers with nine other detainees and stating that the area where they were working was constantly under enemy fire).
Tomić stated that the area referred to in the report was about 1,500 metres from his position. Boţo Tomić, T. 30205–30207 (13 November 2012).
7702
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 46; P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 3. The
Chamber has already discussed these killings in the Ilidţa Section of this Judgement. See para. 2157.
7703
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 46.
 398

obligation! There is no evidence that the President was informed about any anlawful
“working obligation”!)

2268. Bosnian Muslims and Croats were beaten during the course of searches for weapons.7704
They were sexually assaulted and raped by soldiers wearing former JNA uniforms.7705 Bosnian
Muslims and Croats were also killed.7706 Members of the VRS, including the MP, and of the
civilian police engaged in mass looting from the point the VRS entered Grbavica.7707 While the
looting did not take place pursuant to an order, it went unchecked without the perpetrators being
brought to account.7708 Non-Serbs experienced psychological pressure as they feared being taken
away or beaten.7709 (All of it such a general in the maner “#somebody killed somebody#y for
some reasons”, but this is not sufficient for a serious court and a serious criminal case! All
the sides in conflict wore the former JNA uniforms, it could have been anybody, and
certainly it had not been even alleged, let alone proven that it had anything to do with the
President! Those are arguments only against a civil war, not against this President! That is
why it was unfair to prevent the Defense to depict what was doing the other side, whether the
Serbs had been totally secured, or they had many reasons to control the armament and other
matters that could jeopardise them. The Defense was prevented to tender the 1D2807,
because of the negativism of the KDZ310, and because it was red to the transcript, but se
what was red: KDZ310, T9209 "Regional Staff of the Patriotic League, Sarajevo.

#Formidable Muslim Forces#! "Regional Staff of the Patriotic League and Green Berets for
the Sarajevo region consolidated and connected organisationally and at the same time
subordinated, organised forces of the PO BiH and Green Berets that were formed in all
municipalities of the region. At municipal level, these units, from squad level to company
and detachment level, were subordinated to municipal staffs that guided their activities." So
here is a review for the different municipalities in the city. […] This is the municipality of
Novo Sarajevo: "Composition of Municipal Staff of the TO Staff of Novo Sarajevo on
the 18th of April, 1992. "Twenty-three active and reserve officers." And: "1.730 soldiers."
And the total is 1.753. "Four detachments. "Three independent companies. "Three
independent platoons.” In a suburb with 10,000 to 12,000 inhabitants, this amount of the
secret army members had been a formidable force, and the Serbs had every reason to be
cautious!)

2269. Veselin Vlahović, known as Batko, committed numerous crimes in Novo Sarajevo.7710
He looted in June to July 1992.7711 He targeted Muslims and Croats and ―was involved in all sorts

7704
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993 and 14 January 1998), e-court pp. 4–5, 9; P1937 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28
November 2010), paras. 18–19, 23 (under seal); P2444 (Witness statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), paras. 50, 52–54 (under seal); KDZ354, T.
13223 (11 March 2011).
7705
P2444 (Witness statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), paras. 39–40, 47–60, 74 (under seal); KDZ354, T. 13192–13193 (10 March 2011); P1937
(Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 18 (under seal).
7706
P1937 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 20 (under seal); KDZ310, 9274–9275 (29 November 2010); P43 (Witness statement
of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993 and 14 January 1998), e-court p. 5. The Chamber notes that these killings are not charged in either Schedule A or
B of the Indictment.
7707
KDZ310, T. 9249–9250 (29 November 2010). See also D885 (Letter from Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to Radovan Karadţić, 5 June 1992), p. 3 (reporting
that robberies, especially car thefts, had been rife); P2444 (Witness statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), paras. 7–8 (under seal) (describing car
thefts in Grbavica in April 1992).
7708
KDZ310, T. 9250, 9254, 9265, 9274 (29 November 2010).
7709
P1937 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 23 (under seal).
7710
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16699–16705; Branko Radan, T. 31095–31096 (6 December 2012); P1938 (Witness
statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 19. KDZ354 said that she saw Batko wearing ―an olive-drab uniform‖ and carrying a rifle and, at a
later time, a camouflage uniform with an insignia on his sleeve saying ―The Army of Republika Srpska‖ and showing a flag. KDZ354, T. 13194 (10 March
2011), T. 13225 (11 March 2011); P2444 (Witness statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), para. 65 (under seal) (stating that Batko himself said that
he was a Montenegrin). See also D1278 (Transcript of Radomir Nešković‘s interview with Karadţić‘s legal associate, 8 October 2009), pp. 40–41. Radan
testified that Batko wore an army uniform but that he was not connected to the army. Branko Radan, T. 31097, 31109 (6 December 2012). But see D3197
(Witness statement of Dobrislav Planojević dated 23 March 2013), para. 26 (stating that ―Batko was supposedly a member of the army‖).
7711
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16701–16702, 16704 (stating that Batko would enter people‘s flats at night, steal
property, and commit ―other misdeeds‖ and that there were rumours that he committed murders); D1278 (Transcript of Radomir Nešković‘s interview with
 399

of violence‖.7712 He killed a number of non-Serbs.7713 Batko raped Bosnian Muslim women

during house searches for weapons in June to September 1992.7714 Other non-local Serbs,
including Zoka, mistreated Bosnian Muslims and Croats in the area of Grbavica.7715 (How
possibly a renegade like this could have been connected with the President?)

2270. Municipal authorities were aware of the crimes committed by Batko and others over a period
of months. A note of the Novo Sarajevo SJB and Vraca Reserve Police Station dated 31 May
1992 identified ―Veselin Vlaović‖ as among members of the MP formed as part of the Novo
Sarajevo Battalion who were ―undertaking certain operations on their own without any authority‖,
including carrying out searches of apartments and vehicles and taking ―private and socially-owned
property, securities and gold coins‖.7716 From around July 1992, municipal authorities discussed
the problems caused by these men, did not support them, and, around September 1992, tried to
remove Batko and the others from the municipality.7717 Radan testified that ―something could
have been done earlier‖ to stop Batko‘s crimes, before he was eventually removed from the
municipality.7718 Nešković stated that he informed Šipĉić about Batko and that Batko was arrested
by Šipĉić on several occasions but ―somebody would always release him‖.7719 Batko
―terrorise[d]‖ the population for a period of months; the MP could have arrested him at any time
and the prosecutor‘s office could have tried him.7720 KDZ310 stated that no action was taken
against Batko and that at some point he ―disappeared‖ from Grbavica.7721 (Here is what KDZ310
exactly said in the cross examination: T.9275: Q. And who did that? A. Veselin Blagojevic
[as interpreted], nicknamed Batko. Q. Who is about to be tried in Bosnia; right? A. Correct.
Q. So what do authorities have to do with Veselin Vlahovic, Batko? We are here discussing the
position taken by authorities. There will always exist criminals, and what do authorities have to
do with a man who was expelled and against whom serious measures were about to be taken
when he fled? A. Yes, they wanted to do it, but they never did it. Q. Well, did he just disappear
from Grbavica? A. While I was still there, yes, he disappeared. (So, KDZ310 was aware of the
efforts of authorities to arrest or otherwise eliminate Batko, but he disappeared from
Grbavica, obviously feeling that he will be apprehended. Had he felt himself secure and
protected in Grbavica, he wouldn’t disappear!) KDZ354 testified that she reported crimes
committed by Batko to the Bosnian Serb MP in July 1992 but was not approached at any time by
Bosnian Serb authorities regarding any investigation into the incident she reported.7722 (#Not
reported to the President#! We also have heard that nobody knew how many men are with
Batko, and there were made plans to arrest or even to liquidate him. Certainly, he didn’t

Karadţić‘s legal associate, 8 October 2009), p. 41; P2444 (Witness statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), paras. 61–62 (under seal); KDZ354, T.
13239–13240 (11 March 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2586.
7712
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16704. See also D3197 (Witness statement of Dobrislav Planojević dated 23 March
2013), para. 26.
7713
KDZ310, T. 9274–9275 (29 November 2010). The Chamber notes that these killings are not charged in either Schedule A or B of the Indictment.
7714
See Adjudicated Fact 2585. Radomir Nešković stated that Batko committed rapes in Grbavica. D1278 (Transcript of Radomir Nešković‘s interview with
Karadţić‘s legal associate, 8 October 2009), p. 41.
7715
D2549 (Witness statement of Branko Radan dated 3 December 2012), para. 13; Branko Radan, T. 31095–31096, 31107–31110 (6 December 2012).
Vladimir Lukić stated that there was ―chaos‖ in Grbavica with the outbreak of conflict owing to ―self-appointed individuals‖ like ―Batak‖ mistreating
individuals, regardless of their ethnicity. D3563 (Witness statement of Vladimir Lukić dated 18 May 2013), para. 7. In light of other evidence and
considering the witness‘s lack of candour on this point, the Chamber does not consider as reliable Lukić‘s statement in relation thereto.
7716
P6017 (Official note of Novo Sarajevo SJB, 31 May 1992), p. 2 (further stating that they were armed and in uniform). See also P1938 (Witness statement of
KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 63.
7717
D2549 (Witness statement of Branko Radan dated 3 December 2012), para. 13; Branko Radan, T. 31095–31096, 31109–31111 (6 December 2012).
7718
Branko Radan, T. 31112–31113 (6 December 2012).
7719
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16709–16710; Radomir Nešković, T. 14318–14319 (7 June 2011); D1278
(Transcript of Radomir Nešković‘s interview with Karadţić‘s legal associate, 8 October 2009), p. 41. Nešković‘s report of 5 June 1992 discussed ongoing
looting but did not refer specifically to Batko or other perpetrators. Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16712; D885
(Letter from Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to Radovan Karadţić, 5 June 1992), p. 3.
7720
Radomir Nešković, T. 14309, 14316–14318 (7 June 2011).
7721
KDZ310, T. 9275 (29 November 2010). See also D2651 (Witness statement of Milorad Katić dated 10 December 2012), para. 3. Planojević stated that
Batko disappeared from Grbavica for about ten days but that on his return the army arrested and detained him. D3197 (Witness statement of Dobrislav
Planojević dated 23 March 2013), para. 27.
7722
KDZ354, T. 13192–13193 (10 March 2011).
 400

appear before the Neskovic’s report in June 1992, D885, otherwise, he would be mentioned
in it. But, such a kind of individuals are always present in the chaotic areas. There was no
prosecutors and courts at that time, or were just in the forming. Still, what does it have to do
with the President? The President issued many orders which banned this kind of conduct,
and even didn’t know about individuals!)

2271. Republic-level leaders were also aware of the ongoing crimes by Batko and others.
Vladimir Lukić stated that he spoke about the situation in Grbavica, though not about ―Batak‖
specifically, with Koljević.7723 Nešković also stated that ―the top leadership at Pale was told about
Batko by Biljana Plavsić and it never yielded any results […]‖.7724 (Neskovic couldn’t have
known whether and what Plavsic may said to the other leaders! Plavsic was in charge of the
humanitarian issues, and didn’t have to report to anybody, but could issue a direct warnings
to the officials on the terrain, and probably she did it!) Dobrislav Planojević, who worked in
the MUP from 20 April 1992, stated that he heard about what Batko was doing and the absence of
any reporting or investigation due to fear and that he informed Mićo Stanišić about this.7725 He
also informed Prime Minister Đerić in 1992 about problems with crime in the area and with
Batko.7726 (#Crimes hidden from authorities#! Obviously, after the Planojevic’s and Plavsic’s
intervention, Batko had been arrested, but as Planojevic said, those who detained him didn’t
have a proper criminal reports, “due to fear” he could have been released prematurely, but
the police was after him, and he disappeared from Grbavica! The Prosecution looks like
desperate, trying to attach such a marginal renegade to this President! Nota bene: The
KDZ354 testified that Batko brought her to another apartment clandestinely and in a dark
environment, taking care not to be seen. Even this witness saw that he was doing this on his
own. How the situation was difficult there is visible from the incident when the president of
Executive Board, a very respected Budo Obradovic was killed in his office by a Serb
renegade, although he was a very known and popular official.)

2272. On 20 October 1992, Defence Minister Bogdan Subotić proposed to the President the
introduction of military rule in parts of the territory of RS, including the municipality of Novo
Sarajevo.7727 Subotić set out as the causes for introduction of military rule ―the fact that the
political and security situation in some [RS] municipalities has become more tense due to the
increasingly active paramilitary formations, quasi-state organs and institutions‖, that legal state
organs were not performing their duties in accordance with the Constitution and laws and with
adopted defence goals, and that decisions by the Government and other state organs were not
being respected.7728 (This is another proof that it was not the Government or other state
organs who tolerated, allowed, supported – let alone ordered any crime! This fact is
#EXCULPATORY#!!! Unfortunately, the Military rule could not be introduced in own
territory, but only on the occupied one, while a state of war could be and would have a
similar effects. But the President tried not to militarise the civil life, since the prospective was
that it was to be a long lasting low intensity war! He spoke about it frequently, in the
Assembly sessions!)

7723
D3563 (Witness statement of Vladimir Lukić dated 18 May 2013), paras. 7–8 (stating that he was appointed commissioner of Novo Sarajevo municipality
around this time by a decision of the Accused as President).
7724
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16710.
7725
D3197 (Witness statement of Dobrislav Planojević dated 23 March 2013), paras. 2, 17, 26 (stating that he was chief of the Crime Prevention and Detection
Administration until mid-July 1992, became a National Security Service inspector in September 1992, and was chief of the State Security Centre Sarajevo
from July 1994 to June 1995).
7726
D3197 (Witness statement of Dobrislav Planojević dated 23 March 2013), para. 27. See also P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Đerić dated 5 April
2012), para. 14 (stating that he had received information through ―private channels‖ about problems with a man in Grbavica named ―Batica‖ and issues with
detaining him).
7727
D458 (RS Ministry of Defence letter to Radovan Karadţić, 20 October 1992).
7728
D458 (RS Ministry of Defence letter to Radovan Karadţić, 20 October 1992).
 401

On 15 November 1992, at a meeting of the SRK Command where then-President of Novo Sarajevo
Municipality, Milivoje Prijić, was present, it was noted that among the flaws of the operations was
―genocide on other nations‖.7729 The meeting also noted: ―[t]he understanding and practice of
individuals and groups that they are masters of life and death to every individual of different
ethnicity, resulting in cases of unnecessary mistreatment and killing of members of other
ethnicities, especially Muslims. Such people see the Geneva and other conventions as obsolete
and unnecessary in this war.‖7730 Prijić gave a speech about the situation in Novo Sarajevo in
which he stated: ―A great portion of soldiers is exercising unruly behaviour. Mass removals of
property from the municipality, rape, expulsions from flats are going unpunished, affecting
morale. Military police are consolidating but are still not strong enough.‖7731 (What we can see
for sure is that there was a lot of incompetence, weakness, fear, lack of strength, but not
criminal intent of the officials. But, how this document and this meeting could have been
used against the President?!?! This is an EXCULPATORY fact! This is a perfect example
how the Serb military and civilian officials analised the situation and tried to improve it, and
to prevent any irregularity. The President was not present, nor he was informed about the
conclusions. But, he didn’t have to be, because the present authorities were doing their duties
well and in the right direction. The President should be informed and asked for an assistance
if there was an opposition of the participants to the respect of law and order. Let us see what
had been concluded, and what was the attitude of the present officials towards the noted
irregularities: see P5065: p. 5 - 10. This is how Lt. Col. Marko Lugonja, the chief of the
intelligence-security sector of the SRK summarised the problems and the causes

7729
P5065 (Minutes of SRK Command consultation meeting, 15 November 1992), pp. 1–2, 4.
7730
P5065 (Minutes of SRK Command consultation meeting, 15 November 1992), p. 9. See also Branko Radan, T. 31124 (6 December 2012).
7731
P5065 (Minutes of SRK Command consultation meeting, 15 November 1992), p. 12. According to Radan, municipal leaders wanted to stop the crimes by
VRS soldiers but lacked the capacity to do so and that they would have required co-operation from the army and the civilian and military police. Branko
Radan, T. 31127 (6 December 2012). The Chamber notes Radan‘s interest in distancing himself from responsibility for addressing the crimes and does not
consider his evidence reliable in this regard. The Chamber also considered its broader assessment of the testimony that the witness was witholding
information from the Chamber on certain points. (This is an unacceptable disqualification of a Defence withesses on a fake basis:
both, Radan and Prijic were the SDS officials in the authorities, none of them had ever been mentioned, let alone
indicted for any crime. Why would Radan distance himself, while he as well as Prijic were trying to improve the
situation? Let us see what Branko Radan testified on T.31095-96: Q. Thank you. Can you tell us if you encountered
any security problems in your municipality as of the date when the conflict broke out? A. I said that we had been trying
the whole time to prevent anarchy. That is a normal phenomenon under such circumstances, so we were no
exception. We tried in every possible way, because we lived mostly in the urban part of the city with all three ethnic
communities. We wanted to protect everybody who remained with us. We had a huge problem with a group that came
from outside, meaning that they were not locals. We had problems with them because they were maltreating and
harassing our citizens of Muslim and Croat ethnicity. Therefore, we constantly pointed out to these happenings, and at
our regular meetings that took place at least once a week, the civilian authorities, the police, and the army underlined,
although I was not able to give any tasks to anyone, we made a joint effort to remove those nine persons who were
constantly causing problems. And amongst them was Veselin Vlahovic, aka Batko, who was the worst. Q. Thank you.
These nine persons, did they enjoy any support from the authorities? A. I already said that we could not support these
individuals in any way whatsoever, quite the opposite. We did our best to remove them from our territory and prevent
them from causing problems, and I think that we managed to do that step-by-step, to remove them from our territory.
Taking into account the fact that the Batko’s group #acted clandestinely#, during hights, Radan should be trusted!)
 402

No to much help of the general military knowledge, said Lugonja, because the army officers
were not educated for a civil wars.

The assessment of the position of Muslims loyal to the Serb authorities is consistent with the
UN assessment in D2424, see
above!

Lt. Col. Lugonja depicts the problems that arised from the fall of the previous system.
Therefore, this was a state equal to a revolution. A “diagnosing” the causes was a
#commendable#, because it was followed by the proposal of set of measures to extinguish
crime! Se further: P5065, p. 9
 403

#Authorities – proper conduct#! This is the first class proof that there was a chaos, and that
was not either intention, or negligeance of the authorities. The entire state structure is
making an endeavour to overbridge the gap in regularities. If it was as the Prosecution
alleged, and the Chamber “found” the authorities would jubilant and satisfied how the Joint
Criminal Enterprise had been realised. But it was all the way around, and that is
#EXCULPATORY#! See further: P5065, p.9

The only villain is the civil war, not those officials who are trying to establish the rule of law
 404

and order! Further, P5065, p. 12, the quoted sentence of Mr. Prijic, the then president of
municipality of Novo Sarajevo:

Both, the military and civilian authorities are concurring about the situation and the causes.
It is explicitly said that the “Military police are consolidating but are stil not strong enough!
Batko already disappeared a couple of months prior to this meeting, and the military police
then was even weaker!):.

i. Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.1

2238. The Indictment refers to the use of the Slaviša Vajner Ĉiĉa Barracks in Lukavica as a detention
facility from 22 June 1992 until September 1992.7732

2275. Lukavica, about three kilometres from Kula, was an area held by the SRK.7733 The Slaviša
Vajner Ĉiĉa Barracks in Lukavica served as the Forward Command Post of the SRK.7734

2277 . On 22 June 1992, around 9 p.m., approximately 280 men who had previously been
detained in the garage of the Hadţići Municipal Assembly Building7735 and in the Hadţići Culture
and Sport centre7736 were placed on four buses and transferred to the Slaviša Vajner Ĉiĉa Barracks
in Lukavica.7737 The driver of one of the buses was Milan Aĉimović.7738 The buses first went to
Kula prison, in front of which two Serb individuals in camouflage uniforms got on the buses and
started beating the detainees badly; these beatings resulted in head injuries.7739 One of the soldiers
extinguished a cigarette butt on the face of one of the Bosnian Muslims.7740 The soldiers threw
bullets among the detainees and said, ―[h]ey, balija, you have ammunition!‖; they then used that as
―a pretext‖ to beat the detainees.7741 The detainees were then taken to the Slaviša Vajner Ĉiĉa
Barracks in Lukavica.7742

2277. Upon arrival at the Slaviša Vajner Ĉiĉa Barracks, the detainees exited the buses and were
beaten by Serbs in uniforms as they made their way to the barracks.7743 Inside, the detainees were
beaten with rifles, batons, and various objects when they went to the toilet or to get a drink of
water.7744 Some people chose not to go to the toilet because they did not want to be beaten on the

7732
Indictment, Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.1. However, the Prosecution in its Final Brief refers only to detention around 22 June 1992. Prosecution
Final Brief, Appendix B, p. 29.
7733
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8879. See also Adjudicated Fact 2630.
7734
KDZ088, T. 6277–6278 (7 September 2010) (closed session); P989 (Witness statement of Richard Philipps dated 25 May 2010), pp. 11, 17; Desimir
Šarenac, T. 34922 (6 March 2013). See also John Hamill, P1994 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Galić), T. 6115–6116; Hussein Ali Abdel–Razek, T. 5501
(19 July 2010).
7735
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.11.1.
7736
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.11.2.
7737
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 51, 64–72; Mehmed Musić, T. 12868–12869 (3 March 2011); see Adjudicated
Facts 2617, 2630. See also P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 2 (stating that people were taken from the Sport centre to
Lukavica on the night of 20 June 1992). See paras. 2099, 2106.
7738
P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 2.
7739
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 67–69 (referring to the men as ―Chetniks‖); P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to
BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 2.
7740
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 69; Mehmed Musić, T. 12870 (3 March 2011). See also P161 (Adem Balić‘s
statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 2.
7741
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 69; Mehmed Musić, T. 12870 (3 March 2011).
7742
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 69–72; P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p.
2.
7743
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 72.
7744
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 75–76; P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p.
2. See also Adjudicated Fact 2631.
 405

way.7745 All 280 of them were put in two empty rooms; as a result the rooms were very
crowded.7746 During the first hours of detention, individual detainees were called out and
beaten.7747 All 280 detainees were then taken to one room in another part of the barracks.7748
Subsequently, a man in uniform called out a list of 48 men.7749 Each of these men had to walk
through a corridor with guards lined up on both sides and was beaten with various objects and
kicked.7750 The guards swore at the detainees‘ ―balija‖ mothers.7751 One of the detainees,
Mehmed Musić, saw his brother, covered in blood, lying on the ground and was told to carry
him.7752 Musić carried his brother into the room at the end of the gauntlet as instructed and saw
the other detainees who had been called out, lined up against three walls, and three officers at a
desk in the middle of the room.7753 They asked Musić his name, his father‘s name, and where he
worked and ―swore on [his] balija mother‖, and one of them kicked him.7754 One of the officers
hit him and told him to get out, and as he went through the hallway, he was hit again.7755 Musić
returned to the previous room and has not seen any member of the group of 47 since.7756 Soldiers
later came twice to beat the detainees.7757 They also made the detainees make the sign of the cross
and sing Serb songs.7758 Later ―regular JNA soldiers‖ came in and told the detainees to stop
singing, said no one would touch them anymore, and brought them some food.7759 (It is for sure
that those “regular JNA soldiers” were not the JNA soldiers, because the JNA wasn’t
present in Lukavica after 20 May 92. Those soldiers were the regular soldiers of the VRS,
which means that the felonies that are described hadn’t been commited by the soldiers, but
by some other group!)

7745
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 76. The detainees were also given only a few minutes to go to the toilet or get
water. P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 2.
7746
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 72; Mehmed Musić, T. 12872 (3 March 2011); P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement
to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 2.
7747
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 73–74 (stating that he saw black and blue marks on the individuals when they
returned); P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 2. According to Musić, one of the men called out during this time, Kardaš
Alija, was taken out of the room, those in the room heard him screaming and a shot, and he was not brought back to the room. P2403 (Witness statement of
Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 73. The Chamber notes that there is no killing charged in relation to this detention facility pursuant to either
Schedule B or C of the Indictment. See fn. 13; Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii), fn. 4.
7748
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 77.
7749
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 78–79; P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p.
2. Musić later learned that the man was Vujo Vukotić. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 78; Mehmed Musić,
T. 12873 (3 March 2011).
7750
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 80. See also P161 (Adem Balić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 7 February
1993), p. 2. According to Musić, the men in the corridor who beat him all wore red berets and camouflage uniforms and, based on their speech, seemed to
be from Serbia. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 81–82; Mehmed Musić, T. 12873–12875 (3 March 2011).
See also KDZ216, P69 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Kunarac), T. 3395 (under seal) (stating that there were ―Serbian soldiers‖ at the barracks in Lukavica,
where he stayed for about a month). Musić stated that members of the police were present and described them as Serb, ―SDS police‖, as distinct from ―the
ordinary, regular police‖ and from ―the military police who wore white waist belts‖. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011),
para. 83.
7751
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 80.
7752
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 84.
7753
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 84. Musić said he knew that they were officers because they all wore uniforms
with ranks. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 84.
7754
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 84–85 (also stating that one of the officers wore a cap with the coat of arms
from Lika, Serbia and another ―spoke like he was a Montenegrin‖).
7755
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 85.
7756
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 89. The Chamber notes that there is no killing charged in relation to this
detention facility pursuant to either Schedule B or C of the Indictment. See Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii), fn. 4.
7757
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 85–86; Mehmed Musić, T. 12879 (3 March 2011); P161 (Adem Balić‘s
statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 3. These men carried large knives and wore the same gloves as those who beat Musić and others in the
Sport centre; some wore black uniforms while others wore camouflage uniforms. P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011),
para. 86; Mehmed Musić, T. 12870 (3 March 2011). The look, equipment and behaviour of those who maltreated Music certainly
didn’t belong either to the Serb Army or to the Police.
7758
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 86; Mehmed Musić, T. 12879 (3 March 2011).
7759
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 87–88; Mehmed Musić, T. 12870–12871 (3 March 2011).
 406

2278. The next day, the remaining approximately 233 men went back to the buses and were taken to
Kula Prison.7760

2278. The Chamber took judicial notice of the fact that at the Lukavica barracks, detainees
were forced to perform manual labour such as digging trenches and graves.7761 However, the
Prosecution, for the period charged, did not provide evidence on forced labour at this detention
facility or on detention other than in relation to the 280 non-Serb men for a few days in June 1992
discussed above.7762 The Chamber notes that the Prosecution itself limited its discussion of
Scheduled Incident C.18.1 in the Final Brief to the detention and beatings of men from
22 June 1992.7763 The Chamber concludes that it does not have sufficient evidence on which to
make a finding that detainees were forced to perform labour at the Slaviša Vajner Ĉiĉa Barracks.

2280. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that individuals were detained at the Slaviša
Vajner Ĉiĉa Barracks in Lukavica for a few days in June 1992. The Chamber further finds that
detainees were beaten and that 48 detainees were forced to run through a gauntlet. (The Defence
doubted this, since it was not corroborated by any objectice, unbiased evidence. Had it
happened, there would be some knowledge and record about it within the VRS!) The
Chamber finds that the detainees were held in poor conditions, including a lack of adequate space
and access to sanitation facilities and water. Everyone could agree on that, but it should be of a
decisive significance to establish whether it was a deliberate conduct of the authorities, or the
circumstances determined the conditions. Namely, nobody expected, and therefore nobody
prepared any facility for such a number of the POW-s and detainees. That concerns the food
also. We also see that the “regular” soldiers behaved differently from those who mistreated
the detainees.#General shortage#!).

(Deadly combination#! However, the Chamber took for granted everything that Mehmed
Music said about this mistreatments, and Adem Balic’s 92bis, and a few AF, and the Defence
consider this not to be fair.

Not to justify, but to understand, Grbavica and the entire municipality of Novo Sarajevo had
been on the front line, against the three to four times more numerous enemy, with the
sniping and mortar fire on a daily basis, and everyone able-bodied was obliged to go to the
trancheses, see See: P06643,p.1

The primarily “overall lack or insufficiency of staff” should be taken into account. See: p.2.

7760
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 89, 92; Mehmed Musić, T. 12879 (3 March 2011); P161 (Adem Balić‘s
statement to BiH authorities, 7 February 1993), p. 3. See also Adjudicated Fact 2638. See para. 2141.
7761
See Adjudicated Fact 2632.
7762
The Chamber notes P6282, which identifies a number of detainees who were forced to carry out labour at frontlines, including digging trenches, and were
held in the Lukavica Barracksin 1993. See P6282 (RS Central Exchange Committee list of persons). However, as these events fall outside of the temporal
scope for the Lukavica Barrackscharged in the Indictment, the Chamber will not make a finding of forced labour at the Lukavica Barracksbased thereon.
7763
Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, p. 29.
 407

“…a series of problems encountered in time of war and, predominantly, in zones of combat
operations” was a big problem, and Grbavica and the whole Serb Sarajevo was in the
#combat zone#, aimed and fired at from all the surrounding, almost completely encircled.

See: P02761, p. 8, how the Police, in addition to the “lack or insufficiency of staff” had to
participate in the combat activities:

p. 17

# Officials vs. crimes#, but used against officials#! This is evident that the MUP was aware of
a serious problems, but was limited by many factors. Those reports, as well as the reports
from the Novo Sarajevo authorities are the sources of knowledge of the crimes. How possibly
this can be used against this President? The only reason for not preventing the crimes was
the war and the initial chaos, 2000 km of the front line, lack of institutions in the Republika
Srpska, constant armed attacks by opponents with a possible catastrophic consequences,
their crimes against the Serbs, which motivated many personal revengeful acts, an influx of
the Serb refugees, sanctions and lack of production, lack of food, oil and fuel… All of it was
too far from a real abilities of the society and state organs to cope with it, particularly in
1992. The reports about the efforts of the officials, and their desperate needs for help could
and should not be used as an evidence of their liability, let alone of the liability of the
President!

i. Movement of the population from Novo Sarajevo and appropriation of property

2281. During 1992 Bosnian Muslims and Croats, including nuns, were expelled from their
homes, which were then looted.7764 From the time Grbavica was taken over by Serb Forces,

7764
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), paras. 45, 64; P1937 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 18
(under seal); KDZ310, T. 9179, 9248–9249, 9255–9259 (29 November 2010); P2444 (Witness statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), paras. 82–91
(under seal); Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16698–16701; Radomir Nešković, T. 14294–14295 (6 June 2011); P43
 408

Bosnian Muslims and Croats were expelled and forced to the other side of the Miljacka River.7765
KDZ310 testified that he could see from the expressions of the people moving that they were not
going of their own free will; people were crying and did not want to leave their property behind to
be looted.7766 Serb soldiers were kicking and hitting the Bosnian Croats and Muslims.7767 Both
soldiers and the civilian and MP took part in the expulsion of non-Serbs from Grbavica.7768
(#Protected lies#! As all the “protected witnesses”, enjoying benefits for their services to the
Prosecution, the KDZ310 lied a lot. It had been clarified with this witness that the Muslims
and Croats leaving Grbavica early in morning on 30 September 92 were not leaving by their
joy and happiness, and the sadness was normal and expected. However, the front line went
through the settled zone, sometimes even through the buildings, so a two neighbouring
apartments were belonging to the two warring sides. The people from the testimony of
KDZ310 were living along the front line in the area of Jewish cemetery, and both, the Serb
and Muslim civilians had to leave. While the Serbs went deeper in the Serb territory, the
Muslims rather choose Sarajevo areas under the Muslim control. See: T. 31098 – 31100 Q.
Thank you. In September 1992, was there a significant relocation of the population in Novo
Sarajevo municipality, and if so, can you please tell us? A. Yes. On the 30th of September,
1992, in the early morning hours there are some estimates that about 300 Muslim citizens
crossed over the bridge on the Vrbanja and went to the territory of the federation -- or, rather,
under the control of their forces. Since I wasn't personally present there but I nevertheless
reacted immediately by talking to the police and inquired about this incident, I was told that that
happened with the inhabitants who were living on the front line in Jevrejsko Groblje, Gornja
Kovacici and Donji Kovacici, and on a daily basis there was shooting, fighting, shelling in that
area. The Serbian forces were holding defence positions. They had moved their families
further back in order to provide safety, but the Muslims stayed in their houses and they were
behind the VRS. In order for them to be safer, I don't know who agreed on that or whether they
organised themselves, they decided to cross over to the other side. As far as I know, no pressure
was exerted. Nothing was done under coercion, and people moved across. So I think that it was
an organised move and that it was a satisfactory move, and I have proof in the incident that took
place on the 15th of November when 15 buses of Serbs crossed across -- passed across our
territory and went to Belgrade. So there was some kind of goodwill there, and there was a
response from our side. Q. Thank you. The Muslim civilians living along the confrontation
line, did they have any other alternative to be safe? What could they have done? A. Well, they
could have withdrawn, but believe me, Grbavica was fully packed with refugees. All the vacant
premises were filled by people, flats and all other residential areas. So there was very little
possibility to provide shelter elsewhere for those people living on the front line. Q. Thank you.
Did any Muslims remain at Grbavica, those who weren't living along the confrontation line? A.
Yes. According to some estimates, between 3 -- 1.350 and 1.500 inhabitants remained, and they
enjoyed all the same rights in terms of humanitarian aid, medical assistance and security. We
tried to provide identical conditions for them as the ones accorded to the Serbs and Croats. So
as I said, between 1.350 and 1.500 of them remained. Q. Did they stay there until the end of
the war? A. Yes, until reintegration took place. (#Consistent with UN documents#! That
was what Mr. Radan testified, and his testimony, particularly in the part of number of
Muslims living in Grbavica, and their rights – is consistent with the D2424, the UN report
about status of the Muslims/Croats in Grbavica in 1993. No reason to disqualify this witness
on this or any other occasion! Beside that, it would be impossible to forcefully gather 300

(Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court p. 7. See also P2922 (Witness statements of KDZ079 dated 17 May 2006 and 12
March 1995), e-court pp. 5, 14.
7765
KDZ310, T. 9179, 9255–9256 (29 November 2010); Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16699–16701.
7766
KDZ310, T. 9255–9257 (29 November 2010).
7767
KDZ310, T. 9257 (29 November 2010).
7768
KDZ310, T. 9179 (29 November 2010); P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 64.
 409

people in the early morning, all packed and prepared to cross the confrontation line –
without a dramatic unrest! Obviously, it was appointed with the civilians who left!)

2282. Intimidation and threats were employed to impel people to leave.7769 But, from the
testimony of the very same witness, it was obvious that relatives from the Muslim part of
Sarajevo made many lists of the relatives they wanted to cross the River, as it was with his
father. His father wasn’t on the very front line, and decided not to leave, and remained all
the time in Grbavica, see:KDZ310, T9257-9259: Q: Can you look at this document, please?
You can see here where it says that: "The UNPROFOR forces were rather surprised today
when they came to the Serbian settlement of Grbavica in order to take several Muslim and
Croatian families to be exchanged. These are families of Dervo Pusina, Izet Tanovic, Alija
Talic, Drago Barbar, as well as family Hadzimesic signed the statement they didn't want to leave
Grbavica because they had no reason for such action. To the team of UNPROFOR, they
confirmed that, 'the Serbian authorities treated them correctly and that they enjoyed all the
conditions for normal live, as well as the Serbian people in the settlement.'" Q: They also asked
how their names got on the exchange list in the first place. I am claiming now that after the
lines were established, the only way to cross the line was if this was organised by some
humanitarian organisation and what you saw was that. Are you able to provide some kind of
convincing proof without reading the faces of people that you saw? Do you have proof that
somebody was expelled, and can you explain how was somebody able to cross the lines who was
expelled? A. Simply, they were able to cross the lines. They would tell the people who were at
the lines to let them pass on the other side, and they were expelled, and that's that. Through
Belgrade Street, you would be moving in the direction of Skenderija and Vrbanja, and that
would be that. It was very simple, how this could be done. It can be done very easily if
somebody wants to do that. Q. And you know about these lists? A. I don't know about the
lists, but I know that through the Exchange Bureau, in some cases such exchanges were carried
out, because prisoners were also exchanged through this bureau, and civilians were crossing
either side. I know a Serb woman who crossed over to the Serbian side, she went to Belgrade,
and then she asked to go back again, for example. There are different cases. The quoted
document is #consistent withUN document# D2424! As it is clear, the KDZ310 witness
confirmed something else in the cross examination. There was a Exchange Bureau facilitatin
a possibility to civilians to cross over the confrontation line. Why would wxist such a
“bureau” if there was expelling of the people? Also, even without any criminal act, the
Witness confirmed that the mere matter of the ethnic conflict, the maps and so on, rose an
anxiety among the people finding themselves in the “others territory”, but that was because
of the secession of BiH, see: T9177 - 78 Q. And do you recall that there were also maps in
relation to Sarajevo, and do you recall what was indicated in such maps? A. Yes, I recall that
maps of Sarajevo looked very similar to what the ultimate division according to the Dayton
Agreement was. Q. And these maps and the divisions of territories, did these mapsand the
talks about it have an effect on the population? A. They did have an effect on the population,
of course they did, especially the population that saw itself outside the areas that would belong
to a particular people, say Serbs, who saw themselves outside a possible Serb area, according to
such maps. Well, there was a feeling of anxiety among them. See p. 9118 A. At that time, a lot
of people were saying that there might be a war, but what kind of war it would be, well, people
were quite simply afraid. They were afraid for their families, they were afraid in terms of their
very existence and their survival in that area. You know, that is a terrible thing. Croats and
Muslims were afraid, and Serbs were afraid too, of course. Everybody was afraid.
(#Everybody was afraid#!)

7769
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 64.
 410

KDZ079 stated that in early 1992 Serb soldiers would come, sometimes several times in one day, to
the apartment where she lived with her husband and children, which made her and her family fear
for their lives.7770 After her husband left to obtain food, Serb soldiers repeatedly came to the
apartment asking for him and a photograph of him and his identity card.7771 The soldiers said they
would take the witness and her daughter if her husband did not return.7772 Because Bosnian Croats
and Muslims could not get bread and Serb soldiers were breaking into apartments and taking
private possessions, on 26 May 1992 the witness, with her children, left the apartment and all their
belongings.7773

2283. Soldiers entered buildings and made statements such as, ―[i]n 10 minutes all Ustašas and
Balijas out!‖.7774 In one instance where civilians were being expelled from Grbavica, KDZ310 talked to
a platoon member who agreed to go to the MP headquarters to ask for an explanation for the expulsions
but the member did not receive an answer.7775

2284. The 5 June 1992 report of the Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to the Bosnian Serb Presidency
stated that it had provided as accommodation ―empty and deserted Croatian and Muslim flats‖ to
fighters from other areas who had joined regular units.7776 (#In accordance with the law!#)

2285. On 19 July 1992, the President sent a memorandum to several municipalities, including
Novo Sarajevo, requesting an inventory of all housing facilities ―that are vacant following the
voluntary departure of Muslims‖, explaining that vacant homes would be used to temporarily
house Bosnian Serbs from the Muslim part of Sarajevo.7777 (#In accordance with the law#! The
stress was on the “temporary” as it was said, the issue of refugeese as well as abandoned
property are a war, therefore temporary features! See: D111, introductory paragraph, on
the same subject :
…………………………………

So, the allocation of property for a temporary use was a move towards preserving it against
looting and destruction. Otherwise, refugees would occupy it anyway, but without
obligations to preserve it!)

2286. A UN report from 30 September 1992 reported as confirmed that approximately 300
Bosnian Muslim civilians were expelled by Serbs that day from the area of Grbavica and had
travelled on foot using one of two bridges, Vrbanja Bridge and a bridge behind the Bristol

7770
P2922 (Witness statements of KDZ079 dated 17 May 2006 and 12 March 1995), e-court pp. 5, 14.
7771
P2922 (Witness statements of KDZ079 dated 17 May 2006 and 12 March 1995), e-court pp. 5, 14.
7772
P2922 (Witness statements of KDZ079 dated 17 May 2006 and 12 March 1995), e-court pp. 5, 14.
7773
P2922 (Witness statements of KDZ079 dated 17 May 2006 and 12 March 1995), e-court pp. 5, 14.
7774
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 64.
7775
P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 65. KDZ310 also went to the military police to seek protection for a Muslim civilian
who lived in his building, but the military policeman on duty he found dismissed the request, waving his hand aside. P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310
dated 28 November 2010), para. 65; KDZ310, T. 9265 (29 November 2010).
7776
D885 (Letter from Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to Radovan Karadţić, 5 June 1992), p. 3; Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik), T. 16716–16717 (explaining that this was a way to protect these flats from looting or damage and to provide temporary housing to the fighters).
However, KDZ310 testified that permission to use flats was given to fighters but that they looted the apartments they were issued. KDZ310, T. 9251–9252
(29 November 2010). Considering this testimony, which the Chamber finds credible, and considering Nešković‘s interest in casting the report and the
activities of the Crisis Staff in a favourable light, the Chamber does not accept Nešković‘s explanation that the flats of Croats and Muslims were provided to
prevent looting or damage.
7777
P739 (RS Presidency request to various municipalities, 19 July 1992).
 411

Hotel.7778 People were seen carrying bags and bundles, and armed soldiers, with rifles pointed in
the air, were standing beside them.7779 (How many times the Prosecution exploited this event?
This is the same event elaborated by KDZ310 and by Branko Radan in paragraphs 2281
2282 above!) On 1 October 1992, UNPROFOR Acting Commander, Morillon, conveyed in a
letter to the President that he had received news of ―[the President‘s] forces hav[ing] proceeded
with the forced expulsion of nearly three hundred persons from Grbavica‖.7780 (The same event:
General Morillon “had received news” from the Muslim side, but it was clarified that this
was a #military necessity# to move them either to Lukavica as the Serb families did, or to the
Muslim part of Sarajevo. They were living on the confrontation line, and had been offered
the two ways, and they decided the Muslim part of Sarajevo. There is no any evidence that
they had been expelled, there is evidence that they crossed the confrontation line (and the
Miljacka River) but all other was unknown and in the sphere of “impressions”. How possibly
could it be achieved to have 300 people packed and ready to cros the river gathered at early
morning, without any dramatic development?) The 30 September UN report was brought up by
the UNPROFOR Sarajevo sector commander, Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek, during multiple meetings
with Plavšić.7781

2287. In relation to the movement of population, Defence witnesses testified that: (i) with the
outbreak of war in BiH, some Serbs and non-Serbs moved to where they thought they were
safer;7782 (ii) Serb and non-Serb civilians alike lacked complete freedom of movement, particularly
in Grbavica and Vraca, due to almost continual sniping and shelling from high-rise buildings and
other facilities under the control of Muslim forces;7783 (iii) a significant number of non-Serbs
remained in Novo Sarajevo throughout the war;7784 and (iv) some Bosnian Muslims requested to
leave.7785 (But, the people of all ethnicities had to leave the confrontation line, that was a
#legal obligation# of the authorities! The choice of destination was on the citizens!)

7778
P1266 (UN report re expulsion of civilians from Grbavica, 30 September 1992). See also Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek, T. 5521 (20 July 2010); KDZ310, T.
9286–9287 (29 November 2010); P1938 (Witness statement of KDZ310 dated 28 November 2010), para. 64; P1951 (TV Belgrade news report re
UNPROFOR conference); P2444 (Witness statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), paras. 82–88 (under seal); Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16700–16701 (stating that expulsions increased from around August 1992).
7779
P2444 (Witness statement of KDZ354 dated 5 February 2011), paras. 83–84 (under seal). Branko Radan testified that he heard, though did not personally
observe, that on 30 September 1992, an estimated 300 Muslim citizens crossed over to Muslim-controlled territory over the Vrbanja Bridge. Branko Radan,
T. 31098–31099, 31127–31128, 31131–31135 (6 December 2012). According to Radan, ―no pressure was exerted‖ on the people and they ―decided to cross
over to the other side‖ in an ―organised‖ and ―satisfactory‖ move, in order to be safer. Branko Radan, T. 31098–31099, 31132 (6 December 2012). He
testified that there was daily shooting, fighting, and shelling in the area of the frontlines in Jevrejsko Groblje, Gornja Kovaĉići, and Donji Kovaĉići. Branko
Radan, T. 31098 (6 December 2012). Having considered the totality of the evidence in record, the Chamber rejects Radan‘s testimony that the movement of
the 300 Muslims on 30 September 1992 was voluntary.
7780
P5419 (UNPROFOR letter to Radovan Karadţić, 1 October 1992), p. 1.
7781
Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek, T. 5521 (20 July 2010); P1267 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Biljana Plavšić, 2 October 1992), p. 2.
7782
D2673 (Witness statement of Zdravko Šalipur dated 16 December 2012), para. 30; D2683 (Witness statement of Dragan Šojić dated 15 December 2012),
para. 26; D2418 (Witness statement of Boţo Tomić dated 5 November 2012), paras. 13–14; Boţo Tomić, T. 30193–30194 (13 November 2012); D3563
(Witness statement of Vladimir Lukić dated 18 May 2013), para. 8.
7783
D2673 (Witness statement of Zdravko Šalipur dated 16 December 2012), para. 30; D2683 (Witness statement of Dragan Šojić dated 15 December 2012),
para. 26.
7784
Radomir Nešković, T. 14336 (7 June 2011); D2673 (Witness statement of Zdravko Šalipur dated 16 December 2012), para. 30 (stating that more than 1,200
Muslims and Croats stayed in Novo Sarajevo throughout the war); D2683 (Witness statement of Dragan Šojić dated 15 December 2012), para. 26; Branko
Radan, T. 31099–31100 (6 December 2012) (testifying that, by some estimates, between 1,350 and 1,500 Muslims remained in Grbavica throughout the
war); D2651 (Witness statement of Milorad Katić dated 10 December 2012), para. 13 (stating that 1,500 non-Serbs remained in Grbavica throughout the
war); P1483 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), p. 190 (wherein the President of Novo Sarajevo reported that out of the 30,000 people in
the municipality, there were 1,500 Bosnian Muslims and 200 Croats on 2 June 1993). See also D2424 (Report of Protection Officer‘s visit to Grbavica, 11
March 1993) (stating that there were approximately 1,200 Muslims still in Grbavica and indicating that Muslim males of a certain age were required to
perform work and that the officer had not been able to meet with Muslims who wanted to leave or were displaced within Grbavica, pending clearance by the
army headquarters in Lukavica for such a visit). Radan testified that the Muslims who stayed ―enjoyed all the same rights in terms of humanitarian aid,
medical assistance and security‖ as Serbs and Croats. Branko Radan, T. 31099–31100 (6 December 2012). See also D2673 (Witness statement of Zdravko
Šalipur dated 16 December 2012), para. 30; D2683 (Witness statement of Dragan Šojić dated 15 December 2012), para. 26. Considering Radan‘s interest in
distancing himself from the mistreatment that occurred as well as the lack of candour on this point of all three witnesses, the Chamber rejects the evidence
that Muslims who stayed were provided for and protected equally as Serbs and Croats.
7785
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16700–16701 (stating that before August 1992, there were expulsions of Muslims
but that some Muslims requested to cross over to the other side because they did not feel safe and that ―secret exchanges‖ of Muslims and Serbs also took
place). See also Branko Radan, T. 31101–31102 (6 December 2012) (testifying that non-Serbs from Grbavica seeking reunion with their families and better
living conditions made efforts to cross to the other side with the assistance of ―freelancers‖). However, Radan recognised the possibility that non-Serbs
sought to leave because they were being subjected to harassment. Branko Radan, T. 31126 (6 December 2012).
 412

2288. Having considered the totality of the evidence, however, the Chamber finds that many
Bosnian Muslims and Croats were forced to leave the municipality. The Chamber notes that in
some instances people requested to leave; however, the Chamber finds that this was still
involuntary considering the surrounding circumstances in which the departures occurred.
Consequently, the Chamber is satisfied that Bosnian Muslims and Croats were forced to leave the
Serb-controlled parts of Novo Sarajevo municipality. (Those who requested to leave did it
through the authorities, while we didn’t see any evidence that those who were “expelled”
were forced by the authorities. Some solitary cases could have happened, not on any inciative
or misdoings of the authorities, but rather by the paramilitaries, and it couldn’t be any
group, but rather some solitary cases. The witness KDZ310, and others, testified that there
was a Bureau for Exchange, which wouldn’t exist if these allegations were true! The only
group transfer was on 30 September, as an exception, but it was the people from the front
line along the Jewish cemetery!)

b. Pale

i. Charges

2289. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity, was
committed in Pale as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and/or
Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.7786 Acts of persecution alleged to have been committed
by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs in Pale include killings
related to the ―Former Culture Centre/Dom Culture in Pale (also referred to as a Gym)‖,7787 as well
as killings committed during, and deaths resulting from, cruel and inhumane treatment at that
facility.7788 The Prosecution also characterises these killings as extermination, a crime against
humanity, under Count 4; murder, a crime against humanity, under Count 5; and murder, a
violation of the laws or customs of war, under Count 6.7789

2290. Other acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Pale by Serb Forces and
Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include (i) torture, beatings, and physical and
psychological abuse during and after the take-over and in Pale Gym as cruel or inhumane
treatment;7790 (ii) the establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in Pale Gym,
including the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or
hygienic sanitation facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment;7791 (iii) forcible transfer or
deportation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their homes within Pale;7792 (iv)
unlawful detention in Pale Gym;7793 (v) the wanton destruction of public property, including

7786
Indictment, paras. 48–49.
7787
The Chamber notes that in the Indictment and in the evidence, this detention facility has been referred to by various names. See e.g. Indictment, Scheduled
Incident B.14.1, Scheduled Detention Facility C.19.2 (referring to ―Former Culture Centre‖, ―Dom Culture‖, and ―a Gym‖); P2839 (Witness statement of
Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), para. 18 (referring to ―Pale sports centre‖ and ―old Cultural Centre‖); D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated
10 February 2014), para. 55 (referring to ―sport complex‖). For the sake of clarity, the Chamber will use the term ―Pale Gym‖ to refer to this alleged
detention facility throughout this Judgement.
7788
Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). See Scheduled Incident B.14.1; Scheduled Detention Facility C.19.2.
7789
Indictment, para. 63(b).
7790
Indictment, para. 60(b). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.19.2.
7791
Indictment, paras. 60(d). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.19.2.
7792
Indictment, para. 60(f).
7793
Indictment, para. 60(g). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.19.2.
 413

cultural monuments and sacred sites;7794 and (vi) the imposition and maintenance of restrictive and
discriminatory measures.7795

2291. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible
transfer), respectively, as crimes against humanity.7796 In this regard, the Prosecution alleges that
by the end of 1992, Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs had forcibly
displaced Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Pale in which they had been
lawfully present.7797 It is alleged that from March 1992, restrictive and discriminatory measures,
arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, killing, destruction of cultural monuments and
sacred sites, as well as the threat of further such acts caused some Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats to flee in fear, while others were physically driven out.7798

ii. Background

2292. Pale, one of the ten constitutive municipalities of Sarajevo, is located to the east of Novo
Sarajevo and Stari Grad and to the west of Rogatica.7799 The municipality of Pale includes, inter
alia, the Muslim settlements of Bare, Donja Vinĉa, Praĉa, Podgrab and Renovica, and the largely
Serb inhabited settlements of Krivodoli, Lapišnica, Mokro, and Vrhpraća.7800 According to the
1991 census, Pale municipality had 16,119 inhabitants, of whom about 27% were Bosnian
Muslims and 69% were Bosnian Serbs.7801

2293. There were a number of military installations in Pale, including an army barracks located
in the centre of Renovica, an army depot in Krivodoli, a depot in Jahorinski Potok and a radar
installation at Mt. Jahorina.7802 In late March or April 1992, the Republic Communications Centre
was established in Pale and began providing secure communication links in the territory of
SerBiH.7803

2294. The founding assembly of the SDA Municipal Board was held in July 1990 in
Renovica.7804 In August or September 1990, the SDS Municipal Board in Pale, headed by

7794
Indictment, para. 60(j). See Scheduled Incident D.16.
7795
Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement; the removal from positions of
authority; the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or the denial of
equal access to public services. The Prosecution does not allege criminal responsibility for rape and other acts of sexual violence; forced labour on the
frontlines; the appropriation or plunder of property or the wanton destruction of private property in Pale. Indictment, fn. 5, 7, 8, 9.
7796
Indictment, paras. 68–75.
7797
Indictment, paras. 69, 72.
7798
Indictment, para. 71.
7799
P973 (Robert Donia‘s expert report entitled ―Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo, 1990–1995‖, January 2010), p. 8; Appendix B, Map 1;
Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1209 (15 April 2010). See also Adjudicated Fact 2.
7800
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 19; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1197, 1223 (15 April 2010); D15 (SRNA news
report, 22 June 1992); D29 (Article from Glas Current Affairs entitled ―Agreement with the Muslims in Pale‖, 17 April 1992); Hajrudin Karić, T. 15335 (23
June 2011); D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 16; Zdravko Ĉvoro, T. 30962 (5 December 2012); D4368 (Witness
statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 39; see Adjudicated Fact 2591.
7801
P5964 (Census data for BiH by municipality in 1971, 1981, and 1991, April 1995), e-court p. 2 of BCS version. See also Adjudicated Fact 3. But see P4994
(Addendum to Ewa Tabeau‘s expert report entitled ―Ethnic Composition in Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27 Municipalities of BiH 1991
to 1997‖, 3 February 2009), pp. 30, 33, 36, 39, 73, 75, 77, 79 (indicating that Pale municipality had 12,433 inhabitants, of whom 21.4% were Bosnian
Muslims, 74% were Bosnian Serbs, and 0.9% were Bosnian Croats); D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 56 (indicating that
in 1991, Pale municipality had 15,482 inhabitants of whom, 25.4% were Bosnian Muslims, 68% were Bosnian Serbs and 0.6% were Bosnian Croats). While
the Chamber finds P4994 and D4002 to be generally reliable, for the purpose of determining the population of Pale and the ethnic composition thereof in
1991, it relies on P5964, which is a direct source document and which contains the raw data from the 1991 census in BiH.
7802
D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 16; Jovan Šarac, T. 47151 (14 February 2014); P733 (Witness statement of
Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 20.
7803
P2560 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to presidents of municipalities, 23 March 1992), p. 1; P2794 (Witness statement of Ranko Vuković dated 24 May
2011), para. 2; see Adjudicated Fact 2063.
7804
D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 30.
 414

Svetislav Luĉić, was founded.7805 In April 1991, Jovan Šarac became the President of the Pale
SDS Municipal Board.7806

2295. From April 1992 onwards, Pale served as the seat of the government of the SerBiH and
later of the RS.7807 Between 1992 and 1995, the President used the following three locations in
Pale as his office: the Kikinda building, the Mali Dom building, situated in the Panorama Hotel
complex, and the administrative building of the Famos factory.7808 From April 1992 onwards, the
President and his family resided at a number of locations in Pale.7809 Momĉilo Krajišnik and
Biljana Plavšić stayed in the Panorama Hotel complex.7810

iii. Lead-up

2296. In the multi-party elections, the SDS and SDA respectively obtained 65% and 20% of the
votes for the Pale Municipal Assembly; subsequently, the SDS and SDA formed a coalition and
divided the positions of authority in the municipality between themselves.7811 Slobodan
Kovaĉević became the president of the Municipal Assembly and Malko Koroman was appointed
the Chief of the Pale SJB.7812 Idriz Efendić, a Bosnian Muslim, was appointed as the Commander
of the Pale SJB.7813 Hamed Palo, a Bosnian Muslim, was named as Kovaĉević‘s deputy.7814
Kovaĉević was later replaced by Radislav Starĉević.7815 In January 1992, Zdravko Ĉvoro was
appointed as President of the Executive Board in Pale.7816

2297. In the beginning of 1991, Bosnian Serbs in Pale organised large public rallies at which
they waved Serb flags and shouted nationalist slogans.7817 The criterion of what was a Serb
nationalistic slogan that the Chamber accepted was characterized by S. Crncalo, a Muslim
extremist. For them, as well as for all the communists, anything Serbian was nationalistic.
This comes even from the 3rd Communist International and Stalin. A national sentiment is
not as same as a nationalistic slogans. In response to the increasing national sentiments
amongst Serbs, the Bosnian Muslims in Pale organised night watches in order to guard their
families and homes.7818 Bosnian Muslims in Pale owned hunting rifles and pistols.7819 (At the

7805
D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 7; Tomislav Hršum, T. 32917 (30 January 2013); D4368 (Witness statement of
Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 30.
7806
Jovan Šarac, T. 47141 (14 February 2014).
7807
NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12965 (8 March 2011); D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 21; P820 (Witness statement of
David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 50–51; David Harland, T. 2064–2067 (7 May 2010); P5742 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan
Karadţić and an unidentified male, 6 April 1992), p. 2; D3583 (RTV news report, 14 August 1993); Nebojša Ristić, T. 15388–15389 (24 June 2011);
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5099–5100 (14 July 2010). See also Adjudicated Fact 2052.
7808
Nebojša Ristić, T. 15380, 15384–15387, 15389–5392 (24 June 2011); P2841 (Photographs and sketches marked by Nebojša Ristić), e-court pp. 1–3, 7;
P2842 (Map of Pale marked by Nebojša Ristić); P2794 (Witness statement of Ranko Vuković dated 24 May 2011), para. 14; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4648 (5
July 2010), T. 5011 (13 July 2010); Patrick Rechner, T. 11081 (2 February 2011).
7809
Nebojša Ristić, T. 15380, 15383 (24 June 2011); P2841 (Photographs and sketches marked by Nebojša Ristić), e-court pp. 8–9.
7810
Nebojša Ristić, T. 15382 (24 June 2011).
7811
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 12; D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013),
para. 7; Zdravko Ĉvoro, T. 30937 (4 December 2012); D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 56; D4368 (Witness statement of
Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 33.
7812
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 12; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1252 (15 April 2010); P2839 (Witness statement of
Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), paras. 19, 41; Hajrudin Karić, T. 15347 (23 June 2011); P6089 (BiH MUP report, 24 March 1992), p. 2; P6090 (Pale
SJB record, 8 February 1993), p. 1; P6093 (List of employees of Pale CJB), p. 1; Tomislav Hršum, T. 32938 (30 January 2013); D4368 (Witness statement
of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 44; Jovan Šarac, T. 47143 (14 February 2014); P963 (Interview with Malko Koroman in RS MUP magazine
―Policeman‖, November 1994), p. 1.
7813
D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 6; Tomislav Hršum, T. 32921 (30 January 2013).
7814
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 12; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1194 (15 April 2010).
7815
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), paras. 12, 35; D31 (14 th session of Pale Municipal Assembly, 18 June 1992), e-
court p. 1; D2530 (Witness statement of Zdravko Ĉvoro dated 1 December 2012), para. 6.
7816
D2530 (Witness statement of Zdravko Ĉvoro dated 1 December 2012), para. 1.
7817
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 10; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1189–1191 (15 April 2010).
7818
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), paras. 13–14.
7819
Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1208–1209 (15 April 2010). In 1991, some JNA sergeants and Bosnian Muslims stole weapons, mines, and explosives from the
Renovica Barracks. D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 36.
 415

same time the Muslims had the commander of the police station in Pale, and were
represented proportionally in all the bodies! The witness as an extremist neglected the fact
that the Muslim extremists have organized the secret army and stolen the armament and
explosive from the JNA, see this fn!)

2298. On 8 May 1991, at the initiative of the SDS Regional Board, the municipalities of Pale,
Han Pijesak and Sokolac declared that they would join together in order to create the SAO
Romanija.7820 (#Legal and constitutional#! It was legal and in accordance with the
Constitution, as all other communities of municipalities. Some may not lve it, but it was a
legal decision! Even the common Assembly didn’t ban the formation of SAOs and other
moves towards regionalisation, but only “recommended” it to be postponed!)

2299. In November 1991, Serbs from several army installations began secretly distributing arms
to the local Serb population at night.7821 Stjepan Koroman, a relative of the police chief, was in
charge of distributing weapons to the inhabitants of Vrhpraća and Podgrab.7822 From this point on,
there was an increase in Serbs firing their weapons.7823 (#JNA competence, legal#! As in the
other cases, it was the arming of the JNA reserve, since the war in Croatia was going on, and
the Muslims and Croats didn’t respond to the mobilisations! Mr. Koroman was in charge of
the military affairs as a chief of the Territorial Defence, not because he was “relative” of the
police chief!)

2300. In early 1992, the Bosnian Serb police officers who had been disarmed and expelled from
the Stari Grad SJB, joined the Pale SJB to work on security tasks.7824 In January 1992, the
Bosnian Serb population in Pale was mobilised by means of written call-ups that were issued to
them.7825 (#JNA competence, legal#! The call-ups could be sent only by the “territorial
defense organs”, that were directly under the Federal Ministry of Defence and the
Command of 2nd Military District. So, it had nothing to do with the local authorities, except
the fact that the locals supported all of the JNA demands, as it was a legal obligation, and
according to the document, see: D03679, 4 April 92

And D01386, para 3., of 5 April 92, the Commander of the 2nd MD, it was only in April, not
in January 92.:

(#L
iers vs. documents#! Why the testimony of a Muslim extremist was more convincing than the
genuine contemporaneous documents, obtained by the Prosecution? Taken into account as it
must be, all the “findings” concerning with responsibility of the local Serbs, and almost
everything from the Crncalo’s testimony would be worthless!)

7820
D1267 (Article from Javnost entitled ―Municipalities join together into a community of municipalities‖, 11 May 1991), e-court p. 1; D4368 (Witness
statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 12; D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 56.
7821
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), paras. 19–20. See also P979 (Report from JNA 2nd Military District to JNA General
Staff, 20 March 1992), pp. 6, 11 (indicating that by 20 March 1992, in Pale municipality, 2,000 men who were not part of the JNA or the TO had been
armed by either the JNA or the SDS).
7822
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 19.
7823
Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1196 (15 April 2010); P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 17.
7824
D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 11; Tomislav Hršum, T. 32952–32953, 32955 (30 January 2013); D4368
(Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 50.
7825
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), paras. 21–22, 46, 58.
 416

2301. During this period, paramilitary groups, including a formation commanded by Radomir Kojić,
a special unit commanded by Rajko Kušić as well as Šešelj‘s men began operating in Pale.7826
(Mr. Kojic was a formef active policeman, and at the time described he was a reseve police
officer, while Rajko Ku{ic was an active policeman, and they did only what had been
ordered by the police!) In late April or early May 1992, members of Arkan‘s men, led by a man
nicknamed ―Ĉarli‖, also entered Pale and moved into the Panorama Hotel complex.7827 (#Before
VRS, JNA competence#! “In late April or early May” there was already the war going on,
and only 9 km far from Pale there was 40,000 Muslim soldiers in the city of Sarajevo!)
During May and June 1992, a large amount of military equipment and many military personnel
arrived in Pale.7828 (For that see: D03679, 4 April 92

A
nd see D01386

(#Liers vs. documents#! But, what happens when the Chamber adopts the Muslim extremist
qualifications? The Serbs look very bad. As if the Serbs were violating the Federal law,
which was violated by the Muslims from the top of SDA and the ramp Presidency)

The Radomir Kojic’s unit was a legal unit of TO under the control of the JNA, the Rajko
Kusic’s unit was also mobilised due to the 5 April Order of the Federal Secretary for
Defence, but it could be also due to the Izetbegovic Order of 4 April 92. either way, they
couldn’t stay at home!) In the same period, an additional number of paramilitaries arrived in
7829
Pale. They were mainly young Serbs; they had red ribbons on their arms and heads, and
carried automatic rifles and knives.7830 They came to the #JNA call for volunteers#, not to the
local Serb authorities. All the time to 20 May, all the military affairs were under the JNA
competence. Some of the volunteers later become a paramilitaries, but the President banned
them, disowned them, and ordered their arrest!) They often drove around in Pale and
confiscated the cars and trucks that belonged to non-Serbs.7831

7826
P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), para. 16; Hajrudin Karić, T. 15343 (23 June 2011); D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to
Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 57. The Chamber notes that the individual by the name of Rajko Kušić who is referred to in this section of the Judgement
on Pale is not the same individual as the man also named Rajko Kušić who is referred to in the Rogatica section of this Judgement. See Hajrudin Karić, T.
15343 (23 June 2011).
7827
D1076 (MUP Administration for the Police Duties and Affairs report, 3 August 1992), p. 3; P1107 (SerBiH MUP report to the Minister of Interior re
inspection of Romanija-Biraĉ CSB and SJB, 10 August 1992), p. 3. According to Hršum and Šarac, this group engaged in criminal acts against private and
public property and for this reason, it was eventually disarmed by the Pale SJB and escorted back towards Serbia in June 1992. D2850 (Witness statement
of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 25; D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 45; Jovan Šarac, T. 47158–
47159 (14 February 2014).
7828
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 52. See also Adjudicated Fact 2590.
7829
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), paras. 52, 54.
7830
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), paras. 52, 54; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1159 (14 April 2010), T. 1255 (15 April 2010).
7831
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), paras. 52–53, 55; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1255 (15 April 2010).
 417

2302. In March 1992, subsequent to talks between the Chiefs of Pale and Stari Grad SJBs, police
check-points were created by both sides at Lapišnica.7832 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs
also established check-points on various roads leading in and out of Pale.7833

2303. The Crisis Staff in Pale was established in March or April 1992; its headquarters was
located in Pale SJB.7834 Zdravko Ĉvoro, the President of the Executive Board, was appointed as
the President of the Crisis Staff.7835 The Crisis Staff, which included Šarac and other SDS
members in Pale municipality such as Koroman, and Slobodan Ninković, controlled all municipal
activities.7836 According to Šarac, the Pale Crisis Staff was in essence an expanded version of the
Executive Board.7837 (This was the case with all the Crisis Staffs, because the memberships
were ex oficio, i.e. crisis staffs were not a new bodies, but the existing bodies with an
intensive regime of work!)

2304. The SDS enjoyed ―absolute power‖ in the municipality and the Pale municipal authorities
allocated funds to it.7838 They also allocated premises and material resources and contributed
financially to the Bosnian Serb Press Agency, the SRNA.7839

2305. In early March 1992, the Bosnian Serb municipal authorities called on non-Serbs to hand
in their personal weapons.7840 (All the reservists that didn’t respond to the JNA calls had to
return their weapons, due to the federal Presidency decision. The local Serb authorities had
to execute the federal orders! It was not difficult to establish, had there been any interest of
the Prosecution in the domestic legal system!#JNA legal obligations#! ) Subsequently, in local
communes outside of Pale town, authorities designated special locations for the non-Serb
population to bring in their weapons; the weapons collected in such locations were then brought to
the SJB building in Pale town.7841 (All as it should be!) At the same time, men in camouflage
uniforms who were not from the JNA conducted searches of Bosnian Muslim houses for
weapons.7842 (#Times shifting#! But not in “early March”!!! Such a merging of the events
from two different times creates a false picture, and the witness becames a real creator of fte
facts, not witness! When the war broke out, it was a military necessity to disarm all those
who could attack families while the soldiers are on the front line! This is not a matter of
politics, but of the security!)
7832
D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 14; Tomislav Hršum, T. 32948 (30 January 2013); D4368 (Witness statement
of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 39.
7833
D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 52; D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para.
14; P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 43; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1215–1216 (15 April 2010); P2839 (Witness
statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), para. 7; Hajrudin Karić, T. 15316–15318 (23 June 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2589.
7834
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 42; P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), para. 9;
D2530 (Witness statement of Zdravko Ĉvoro dated 1 December 2012), paras. 2, 11. See also P6089 (BiH MUP report, 24 March 1992), p. 2 (indicating that
the Pale Crisis Staff was functional as of March 1992 and that it ordered the Bosnian Muslim policemen in Pale SJB to hand in their weapons). On 6 April
1992, the 2nd Military District Reserve Command Post reported that it maintained constant contact and co-ordinated its operations with the Pale Crisis Staff.
P5426 (Report of 2nd Military District RKM, 6 April 1992).
7835
D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), paras. 38, 46; Zdravko Ĉvoro, T. 30929, 30933, 30936, 30938 (4 December 2012).
7836
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 42; Jovan Šarac, T. 47141 (14 February 2014). In April 1992, the Crisis Staff
began receiving the daily dividends generated by the various companies that were based in Pale, including the Pale branch of Centrotrans. The Pale Crisis
Staff also took decisions about companies and determined the salaries of their staff. In the same period, the Pale Crisis Staff adopted a number of
regulations concerning the purchase and sale of basic commodities and banned the sale of alcohol. P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13
May 2011), paras. 10–13; Hajrudin Karić, T. 15336 (23 June 2011); D21 (SRNA news report, 24 April 1992); D22 (SRNA news report, 2 May 1992); D26
(SRNA news report, 25 May 1992).
7837
D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 38; Jovan Šarac, T. 47171 (14 February 2014).
7838
P6029 (Decision of Pale Executive Board, 25 May 1992), p. 3; Zdravko Ĉvoro, T. 30937 (4 December 2012).
7839
Zdravko Ĉvoro, T. 30960 (5 December 2012).
7840
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 28. According to Hršum, the reasons for disarming were threefold: (i) in the
area of Renovica, there were armed persons in hitherto unseen military uniforms moving about; (ii) there were constant incursions into and attacks against
Renovica Barracks; and (iii) two individuals who had been linked with an alleged murder dating back to before the start of the war had hidden in the
Renovica area. Tomislav Hršum, T. 32955–32957 (30 January 2013). The Chamber rejects Hršum‘s evidence on this point in light of reliable documentary
evidence originating from the chief of Pale SJB‘s Criminal Investigation Service which indicates that in mid-March, Pale SJB confiscated weapons that were
in the possession of Bosnian Muslims, ―irrespective of whether they had permits for them or not.‖ See P6090 (Pale SJB record, 8 February 1993), p. 1.
7841
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 29.
7842
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 31.
 418

2306. During the night of 3 March 1992, three Bosnian Serb reservists in dark police uniforms
arrested Sulejman Crnĉalo and his neighbour and took them both to the SJB in Pale; at the time of
his arrest, Crnĉalo was guarding his house with a hunting rifle.7843 At a certain point, Koroman
arrived at the SJB and while questioning Crnĉalo, stated that if any of his ―policemen or soldiers‖
were wounded in Crnĉalo‘s neighbourhood, he would completely destroy that neighbourhood.7844
Koroman added that ―[a]s long as there is no Serb policeman in Stari Grad, there is not going to be
one Muslim policeman in Pale.‖7845 (It was a part of the #inter-party Agreement#, which
envisaged a pairs of similar municipalities, so to allocate the posts in the power reciprocally!
Disrespect of this agreement annihilates the same agreement in the pair-municipality, and
the majority party is free to establish authorities without coalition!) In the early morning
hours, Koroman indicated that he was going to escort Crnĉalo and his neighbour back to their
respective homes.7846 When exiting the SJB, Crnĉalo noticed at least a hundred reserve policemen
outside.7847 Near his home, Crnĉalo saw many heavily-armed soldiers and policemen facing the
Bosnian Muslim inhabited parts of Pale.7848 (This is a #lie of an extremist#, because no one
could mobilize the reserve police at that time without the Minister who was a Muslim, Alija
Delimustafic. So, if there was some reserve police, it must be summoned by the Ministry and
the Minister himself! Even et the end of March 92, when the carnage of the Serbs in
Sijekovac near Bosanski Brod happened, not even Deputy Minister, a Serb Zepinic could
activate the reserve police without the Minister’s approval!).

2307. On 23 March 1992, about 35 Bosnian Muslim active-duty and reserve policemen from
Pale SJB met with Koroman at the Praĉa reserve SJB.7849 At the meeting, Koroman stated that
Bosnian Muslim policemen were required to hand in their weapons and equipment.7850 Koroman
added that this was a countermeasure against the move made by Stari Grad SJB and that the
reinstatement of Muslim policemen depended on Serb policemen returning to their jobs in the
Stari Grad SJB.7851 (#Logical, legal and in accordance with inter-party agreement#!) The
Bosnian Muslim policemen complied and handed in their weapons.7852 Later that day, Bosnian
Muslim reserve policemen in the Pale SJB were disarmed in a similar fashion.7853 From this point
on, Pale SJB stayed under Bosnian Serb control.7854 (As well as the neighbouring Stari Grad
SJB without the Serbs and under Bosnian Muslim control entirely!)

2308. Ethnic tensions increased further in April 1992, when a large number of Bosnian Serb
refugees from Sarajevo began to pour into Pale.7855 (The prosecution didn’t indict the Muslim

7843
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), paras. 23–24; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1199 (15 April 2010).
7844
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 24.
7845
Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1252 (15 April 2010); P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 25.
7846
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 26; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1199 (15 April 2010).
7847
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 26.
7848
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 26.
7849
P6089 (BiH MUP report, 24 March 1992), p. 2.
7850
P6089 (BiH MUP report, 24 March 1992), p. 2.
7851
P6089 (BiH MUP report, 24 March 1992), p. 2; D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 50.
7852
P6089 (BiH MUP report, 24 March 1992), p. 2.
7853
P6089 (BiH MUP report, 24 March 1992), p. 2. On 8 February 1993, the Pale SJB reported that due to ―security reasons‖, during mid-March 1992 it had
―disarmed the non-Serb police employees and removed them from service‖. See P6090 (Pale SJB record, 8 February 1993), p. 1. See also Adjudicated Fact
2587. But see Hršum‘s testimony that on 17 March 1992, all Bosnian Muslim policemen of the Pale SJB and most Bosnian Muslim policemen at the Praĉa
SJB branch indicated that they wanted to temporarily stop coming to work because of problems that had arisen in Sarajevo, and accordingly, handed in their
weapons and official badges. Tomislav Hršum, T. 32923–32926 (30 January 2013). In light of its inconsistency with the reliable documentary evidence
contained in P6089 and P6090, the Chamber rejects Hršum‘s assertion.
7854
Mirsad Kuĉanin, P16 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Galić), T. 4500. See also P963 (Interview with Malko Koroman in RS MUP magazine ―Policeman‖,
November 1994), p. 2.
7855
Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1198, 1201–1202 (15 April 2010); D8 (SRNA news report, 10 April 1992); D9 (SRNA news report, 19 May 1992); D11 (SRNA news
report, 17 April 1992); Hajrudin Karić, T. 15337–15338 (23 June 2011); D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 15;
D2530 (Witness statement of Zdravko Ĉvoro dated 1 December 2012), para. 3. In the latter half of May 1992, the number of Bosnian Serb refugees in Pale
reached 15,000, which was nearly as much as Pale‘s original population. D10 (SRNA news report, 20 May 1992); D12 (SRNA news report, 21 May 1992);
Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1257 (15 April 2010).
 419

authorities of Sarajevo for this expulsion!) On 4 April 1992, on the Pale-Sarajevo road, two
Bosnian Serb bus drivers and some of the Bosnian Serb passengers who were travelling with them
were beaten by Bosnian Muslims.7856 In the village of Lapišnica, a Serb was wounded by Muslim
gunfire.7857 Around the same period, certain shops refused to sell products to non-Serbs.7858
(Everyone in Pale have known that this was a lie! There was a general lack of food, not only
for the non-Serbs! #General shortage#!) Eventually, most shops in Pale closed down.7859 By
April 1992, many Bosnian Muslims had been suspended from their jobs.7860 (The Serbs as well,
because all production decreased. This, as well as the “story” about the food discrimination,
is a lie, made possible because of the Chamber’s trust in a single witness, who was an
extremist! No any document or other corroboration!)

2309. On 11 April 1992, the Pale Crisis Staff promised to provide full security to all residents
of Pale regardless of their ethnicity, decided that supplies shall be provided equally to all parts of
the municipality, and proposed to hold discussions with SDA officials about supply and security
issues.7861 On or about 16 April, the Bosnian Muslims in the villages of Bare, Renovica, Praĉa and
Podgrab recognised the ―legal police‖ in the municipality and received guarantees of personal and
material security as well as normal supplies and regular bus transport.7862
(#EXCULPATORY#!!! That was an official attitude throughout the Republic of Srpska,
consistent with D2424 UN document, or P3788, Edward Vulliamy’s report, and all other
documents. Those of the “non-Serbs” who didn’t fight and didn’t fire against the VRS,
police o civilian – enjoyed all the rights that the Serbs enjoyed!)

2310. During late April 1992, paramilitary forces dressed in camouflage uniforms and led by
Zoran Škobo arrested a number of Bosnian Muslim men aged between 20 and 30.7863 These men
were kept in the SJB for a few hours and then released.7864 (A police throughout the world do
that, for their reasons to check some suspects. At the time the police could have keep
detained persons up to 72 hours, nowadays up to 48 hours!) In May 1992, more Bosnian
Muslims were randomly arrested.7865 (Zoran Skobo was acquitted from any charges in the
BIH court.)

2311. In the beginning of May 1992, pursuant to an order issued by the Pale Crisis Staff, the Post
Office in Pale disconnected the telephone lines of Bosnian Muslims.7866 From this point onwards,

7856
D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 39; Hajrudin Karić, T. 15319–15321 (23 June 2011).
7857
D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 39.
7858
Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1230 (15 April 2010).
7859
P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), para. 15; Hajrudin Karić, T. 15338–15339 (23 June 2011).
7860
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 46; P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), paras.
8–9; Hajrudin Karić, T. 15324–15327 (23 June 2011).
7861
D28 (Conclusions of the Crisis Staff of Pale Municipal Assembly, 11 April 1992).
7862
D29 (Article from Glas Current Affairs entitled ―Agreement with the Muslims in Pale‖, 17 April 1992).
7863
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 49.
7864
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 49.
7865
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 49. But see Tomislav Hršum, T. 32968 (30 January 2013) (testifying that
members of Pale SJB never considered ethnicity as a basis for remanding individuals in custody). The Chamber does not accept this evidence given that
Hršum was himself a policeman in Pale and therefore has an interest in denying that employees of Pale SJB arrested individuals on the basis of their
ethnicity. But the said Hrsum had been certified by the Internationals as suitable for the public duties. According to this
criterion, all of the Muslim witnesses were motivated to denigrate the Serbs and their authorities, and the Defense has
a reason to believe that the AID (the Muslim Secret Service) educated majority of their witnesses. Hrsum was
working in the police, and he knew who was arrested and why, and that he was right can be proven since no all the
Muslims had been subject of the police interest.
7866
P734 (Order of Pale Crisis Staff, 7 May 1992); P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), paras. 50–51. Zdravko Ĉvoro
testified that private resources and services were taken over or withheld to defend the territory, that many Serbs and even public institutions also had their
telephone lines cut as there was a shortage of telephone lines, and that the lines which were cut belonged to Bosnian Muslims who had already departed.
See D2530 (Witness statement of Zdravko Ĉvoro dated 1 December 2012), para. 13; Zdravko Ĉvoro, T. 30929–30931 (4 December 2012). The Chamber
rejects Ĉvoro‘s evidence on this point given his lack of candour and evasiveness in his explanation of P734, a document which bears his name (although
signed by someone else) and which orders that the telephone lines of 15 Bosnian Muslims be cut.
 420

Bosnian Muslims went to the Post Office in order to make calls or asked their Serb neighbours to
allow them access to their telephones.7867 (#Security necessities#! There was only about 15
telephones that had been disconnected, and this wasn’t a matter of any civilian policy, but a
matter of security and military matter! It is evident that Pale became a very crowded by the
Republic’s institutions, and the need for the telephone lines suddenly increased, so that the
existing telephone station was insufficient. In the case the Cvoro testimony is not acceptable,
another inference is also possible: at the same time there were shellings of Pale, and
probably that was a reason, i.e. security reason to disconnect only 15 Muslim inhabitants of
Pale. Not to justify, just to understand, but this was a right of the security agencies!)

(D2) Attack against Renovica and other villages (#Distorted, it was vice versa#!)

2312. On 22 May 1992, the Bosnian Muslims in Praĉa, Bogovići, Gornja Vinĉa, and Podgrab
handed over their weapons to Bosnian Serb Forces.7868 Residents of Renovica, however,
refused.7869 (Nota bene!)

2313. On the same day, members of the Pale MUP and the VRS conducted a military operation
against Renovica.7870 (#Opposite# First happened that the Muslims from Renovica ambushed
the police patrol walking by foot to Renovica with the aim to talk about the weapons, and
they got killed in this ambush. It is well known, and can not be bypassed, because that was
an act of war! It was depicted in the court room, by the Prosecution witnesses, who
confirmed that the Chief of the SJB Pale, Mr. Koroman was crying on the TV announcing
that the war came to Pale too, see the next para!) Policemen from Pale SJB detained
approximately 30 Bosnian Muslims and took them to the Pale Gym.7871 On that day, Serb Forces
also attacked and shelled the predominantly Muslim village of Donja Vinĉa, setting houses on fire
and forcing the villagers to leave.7872 SRNA reported on the operation against Renovica, stating
that seven MUP members had been killed or wounded.7873 SRNA also reported that although the
casualty figure in relation to the Bosnian Muslims had not been established yet, it was estimated to
be ―substantially greater‖.7874 Furthermore, SRNA quoted the Pale MUP‘s instruction to Muslims
in Pale to hand over their weapons peacefully in order to prevent more bloodshed.7875 Around the
same period, the Pale SJB also took control of villages that were situated in the direction of
Renovica and Goraţde.7876 (Obviously, in order to contain the armed Muslims from Renovica
and Gorazde. This move, strictly defensive, shows that the Pale police assumed that they and
the town may be attacked and destroyed, and the people killed. The local authority’s
assumption of the security risks was their sovereign right and obligation, and nobody could
intervene!But, let us see what is said in the exhibit D15 of 22 May 92:

7867
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 50.
7868
D15 (SRNA news report, 22 May 1992); Hajrudin Karić, T. 15353 (23 June 2011), T. 15376 (24 June 2011); D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum
dated 27 January 2013), para. 19.
7869
Hajrudin Karić, T. 15353 (23 June 2011); D15 (SRNA news report, 22 May 1992).
7870
Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1217, 1220, 1222, 1225 (15 April 2010); P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), paras. 17–19; Hajrudin
Karić, T. 15342, 15346, 15348, 15350–15351 (23 June 2011), T. 15376 (24 June 2011); D19 (Letter from Serbian villagers of Renovica to Pale Municipal
Assembly, 26 June 1992); D31 (14th session of Pale Municipal Assembly, 18 June 1992), e-court p. 3; D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated
27 January 2013), para. 19; Tomislav Hršum, T. 32925, 32956–32957 (30 January 2013); D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February
2014), para. 43; Jovan Šarac, T. 47149 (14 February 2014); D16 (SRNA news report, 22 May 1992).
7871
P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), paras. 17–19, 24; Hajrudin Karić, T. 15312, 15351, 15364–15365 (23 June 2011) T.
15376 (24 June 2011); D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 19; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1227 (15 April 2010).
7872
See Adjudicated Fact 2591.
7873
D15 (SRNA news report, 22 May 1992).
7874
D15 (SRNA news report, 22 May 1992). The Chamber notes that killings during the course of the attack on Renovica are not charged in the Indictment.
7875
D15 (SRNA news report, 22 May 1992).
7876
P963 (Interview with Malko Koroman in RS MUP magazine ―Policeman‖, November 1994), p. 2.
 421

It is clear that the Pale MUP undertook all the legal and legitimate measures!)

2314. On 23 May 1992, Koroman appeared on television and after announcing that war had
finally come to Pale, issued an ultimatum to all non-Serbs to surrender their weapons to the
SJB.7877 During the days that followed, Bosnian Muslims handed over hundreds of additional
pieces of weaponry to the Pale SJB.7878 Koroman subsequently informed the Pale Crisis Staff of
the attack against Renovica and was advised to transfer the Bosnian Muslims who had been
detained there and who were ―guilty‖ to Kula Prison, in Ilidţa municipality, and to release the
ones that were ―not guilty‖.7879 (Therefore, some of the Renovica Muslims had been guilty of
something? Why the Prosecution-Chamber didn’t clarify for what? They had been guilty for
ambushing a regular and quiet police patrol, killing the policemen and afterward the Serb
civilians too!)

2315. Pale SJB‘s chief of Criminal Investigation Service reported that, amongst other things,
forcible entry into weekend houses was widespread and that SJB operatives, instead of
suppressing such acts, participated and continued to participate in their commission.7880
(#Absurdity# #Officials did properly#! This is a report of the superior in the criminal
department of SJB Pale, which exactly shows that somebody in the authorities worked
properly and did his job. How possibly this sharp and honest report could be used against
the state organs and this President particularly??? Let us see what is the main point in this
report: P06091,p.2

This is an honest review of the weaknesses of the service in a new circumstances for which
nobody was prepared. The main issues are so-called “war profiteering”, teft of cars, robbing
weekend houses, stealing and smuggling. All municipal departments…including the Pale
SJB and its management, were caught of-guard by this phenomena. Therefore, all of the
mistakes hadn’t been planned or supported by the state organs, but were rather a weekness
and insufficiency of a small town founding itself in a big problems.
7877
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 28; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1209, 1216–1217, 1220, 1258 (15 April 2010); D16
(SRNA news report, 22 May 1992); D17 (SRNA news report, 23 May 1992); D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para.
19; Tomislav Hršum, T. 32955–32956 (30 January 2013); D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 43.
7878
Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1258 (15 April 2010); D17 (SRNA news report, 23 May 1992); D18 (SRNA news report, 24 May 1992); D2850 (Witness statement of
Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 19; D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 43.
7879
Jovan Šarac, T. 47153 (14 February 2014).
7880
P6091 (Report of Pale SJB, 31 December 1992), p. 2; P6092 (Report of Pale SJB, 12 May 1993), e-court p. 1.
 422

The impact of the “massive arrival of refugees… bribery and corruption… this certainly
wasn’t a plan of the state organs.

All of it in P6091, quoted only partially! When we take into account that the chief of the SJB
Koroman was replaced by the Minister of Interior Mr. Stanisic for the incompetence and
weakness as early as in May 1992, (unsuccessfull because of riots and resistance, but was
replaced latter) and when we take into account that the author of this report was a superior
of one department of SJB Pale, and therefore represented the state organs more than the
villains, this report can not be used against the state organs, and certainly not against this
President. #Next level# rectified!.

Movement of the population from Pale and appropriation of property

2316. On or about 13 March 1992, policemen and paramilitaries started advising non-Serbs to
leave Pale municipality.7881 For instance, Jovan Škobo and Novica Stanar, who were both
policemen, as well as Kojić, a paramilitary, visited Crnĉalo‘s village and during this visit, Škobo
told the residents that it was better for them to voluntarily go to an area where the Muslims were a
majority now rather than being ―chase[d] through the woods‖ later.7882 In response, Crnĉalo, his
brother and a number of neighbours went to see Starĉević who assured them that if they had not
done anything wrong, they had nothing to worry about.7883 (However, Skobo was tried in the BH
Court, and was acquitted! We should ask for this file to see whether Crncalo testified, and

7881
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), paras. 33–34; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1247–1248, 1250 (15 April 2010). But see
Ĉvoro‘s claim that Serb authorities went to Bosnian Muslim villages and neighbourhoods in Pale in order to persuade the population there to stay. D2530
(Witness statement of Zdravko Ĉvoro dated 1 December 2012), para. 6; Zdravko Ĉvoro, T. 30939 (4 December 2012). The Chamber rejects Ĉvoro‘s
evidence on this point because of his evasiveness and his lack of candour as a witness. For example, Ĉvoro insisted that he had no knowledge about the Pale
SJB‘s involvement in the expulsion of Bosnian Muslims from Pale despite being showing documentary evidence to that effect which bore his signature. See
Zdravko Ĉvoro, T. 30963–30967 (5 December 2012); P6034 (Report of Pale Executive Board, 7 July 1992).
7882
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 34. See also Adjudicated Fact 2588. But see Šarac‘s evidence that the SJB
never applied pressure to Bosnian Muslims of Pale to leave the municipality. D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), paras. 44,
51.
7883
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 35.
 423

what he said there. I do have a hint that his wife hadn’t been killed at Markale in August,
but died somehow else, and I will make an inquire into it @somebody to investigate.

2317. In May 1992, Crnĉalo and his neighbours requested that Koroman organise a meeting at
the SJB building and invite a high-ranking government official so that Bosnian Muslims in the
Pale municipality could be given guarantees about their safety.7884 Shortly after the start of the
meeting, Nikola Koljević arrived and when asked by Bosnian Muslims to give guarantees that they
could stay in Pale, he replied that ―Serbs don‘t want to continue living with you here.‖7885 During
the same meeting and in the presence of Koljević, Koroman told the Muslim delegates that he
could no longer guarantee their safety because he was unable to hold back the Red Berets who had
come from Knin.7886 (This is a cruel lie, Mr. Koljevic was something quite different, and I do
think that we have to obtain some document or a witness to check it. Koljevic was ti initiator
of this meating! @To see whether there was anyone else present, or somebody took
notes???@ )

2318. On 12 June 1992, Starĉević asked the secretary of the Pale SDS to urgently call a meeting
of the Pale SDS Main Board so that the SDS could adopt a general position on the departure of
non-Serbs from the municipality.7887 On 18 June 1992, during a Pale Municipal Assembly
session, the President of the Assembly, Starĉević, and the President of the Executive Board,
Ĉvoro, complained that the Pale SJB had taken measures to move the Bosnian Muslim population
out of the municipality.7888 On 19 June 1992, Pale Municipal Assembly adopted a decision which
required non-Serbs who wished to leave the municipality to obtain permission from the SJB.7889
Pursuant to the same decision, the Pale SJB, in co-ordination with municipal commissions, was to
compile a list of all property owned by non-Serbs who were leaving the municipality.7890 The Pale
Municipal Assembly also entrusted the Pale SJB with the task of organising the departure of non-
Serbs and making sure that they crossed the separation line safely.7891 (#Due to Agreement#! It is
the moment to remind on the Agreement signed on 22 May 92, of 17 July 1992, of 27 August
1992, 30 September 1992 and 1 October 1992. which exactly described the procedure how a
civilian population may and should cross to another territory, with cooperation and escort of
police! See D1603,

7884
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), paras. 36–37; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1164–1165 (14 April 2010), 1260–1261 (15
April 2010).
7885
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 38; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1164 (14 April 2010), T. 1247 (15 April 2010).
7886
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), paras. 39–40; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1164 (14 April 2010). On 2 July 1992, Crnĉalo
saw two soldiers who were wearing red berets near the Panorama Hotel, behind a privately owned house. P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo
dated 1 November 2009), para. 71.
7887
D30 (Letter from Pale Municipal Assembly to Pale SDS President, 12 June 1992); Zdravko Ĉvoro, T. 30936 (4 December 2012).
7888
D31 (14th session of Pale Municipal Assembly, 18 June 1992), e-court p. 4.
7889
P5090 (Decision of the Pale Assembly, 19 June 1992); Tomislav Hršum, T. 32961 (30 January 2013); D2530 (Witness statement of Zdravko Ĉvoro dated 1
December 2012), para. 6; D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 48; Jovan Šarac, T. 47178 (14 February 2014).
7890
D32 (Decision of Pale Municipal Assembly, 18 June 1992); Zdravko Ĉvoro, T. 30951–30952 (4 December 2012).
7891
D32 (Decision of Pale Municipal Assembly, 18 June 1992); D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 22; Tomislav
Hršum, T. 32928 (30 January 2013).
 424

and D4710:

and P1090, of 6 June 92,

(#Due to Laws and Agreements#! The Prosecution-Chamber didn’t pay any attention to the
domestic laws, and to a great number of agreements concluded by the warring sides under
the auspice of the international organisations, UNHCR, ICRC, United Nations, European
Community… That is why the Indictment and Judgment rather looks like a communist
lecture against nationalism, i.e. national and human rights!)

2319. In late June and early July 1992, Bosnian Serb authorities in Pale gave Bosnian Muslim
property-owners contract forms which already contained their data.7892 By virtue of these
contracts, which the Muslims had to sign before they could depart from Pale, Muslim property in
Pale became Serb property in exchange for Serb-owned property in Sarajevo.7893 Those who
refused to sign such contracts were forced to surrender the keys to their houses to the Pale SJB.7894
(There was no a single case like that. Mr. Crncalo had been very well prepared by the
Muslim secret services for this testimony! It had never happened that any property
ownership be changed! Such a lies are enabled in this court, in spite of the oaths and legal
obligations towards truth. This is absolutely incomprehensible and unacceptable, and it
discredits all the idea of the international justice!)

2320. During the same period, Serb authorities in Pale organised a number of convoys for the
transportation of non-Serbs out of the area.7895 Prior to this, written notices were put up, informing
the non-Serb population of the location and time at which they could board the buses.7896 Those
boarding the buses were allowed to take only what they could carry.7897 The first convoy left Pale
on or about 28 June 1992.7898 On 2 July 1992, SerBiH MUP ordered the Pale SJB to grant
permission to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats living in Pale centre to move out of the Pale
municipality ―of their own free will‖ and instructed ―police and military patrols to enable the
unobstructed passage of three buses transporting Muslim civilians‖.7899 The third convoy left Pale
7892
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 61; P735 (List of contracts for exchange of houses).
7893
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), paras. 61–62; P735 (List of contracts for exchange of houses); Sulejman Crnĉalo, T.
1267 (15 April 2010); P5429 (Request for relocation to Pale Municipal Assembly, 22 June 1992); P5524 (Request of Muslim Citizens to Relocate from Pale
to Sarajevo, 22 June 1992); D33 (Contract regarding a house exchange in Pale, 2 July 1992). But see Ĉvoro‘s assertion that many Muslims ―protected their
property by entering into various agreements‖ with their Serb neighbours, including agreements that left Muslim property in Serb hands for the purposes of
―safe-keeping‖. D2530 (Witness statement of Zdravko Ĉvoro dated 1 December 2012), para. 6; Zdravko Ĉvoro, T. 30949–30950 (4 December 2012).
However, the Chamber notes that during the war, Ĉvoro himself had lived in property that belonged to a Bosnian Muslim. See Zdravko Ĉvoro, T. 30982–
30983 (5 December 2012). This leads the Chamber to conclude that there was an obvious underlying self-interest on the part of Ĉvoro for advancing the
claim that Muslims placed their property in Serb hands for safe-keeping. But there are many more undisputable agreements on
temporary or permanent exchange of property. It never meant that a private property was to belong to the state or
municipality. Crncalo lied more than it is acceptable. At least, we should ask the court in Pale to send to us a report
about a possible post-war litigations pertaining the property.
7894
Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1268 (15 April 2010).
7895
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), paras. 64, 71; P736 (Decision of Pale SJB, 2 July 1992); P737 (Decision of Pale
SJB, 6 July 1992); D35 (SJB Pale report on change of residence of Croats and Muslims from Pale, 6 July 1992); Hajrudin Karić, T. 15365–15366 (23 June
2011); D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 48. See also Adjudicated Fact 2671–2672.
7896
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 65. See also Adjudicated Fact 2671.
7897
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 71; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1262 (15 April 2010). See also Adjudicated Fact
2672. But see Ĉvoro‘s and Šarac‘s assertions that Muslims were able to take their private cars as well as all their belongings and documents with them.
D2530 (Witness statement of Zdravko Ĉvoro dated 1 December 2012), para. 6; D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 60.
7898
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 66; D35 (SJB Pale report on change of residence of Croats and Muslims from
Pale, 6 July 1992).
7899
P736 (Decision of Pale SJB, 2 July 1992).
 425

on 2 July 1992 for Hreša, a small hamlet near Sarajevo.7900 From Hreša, non-Serbs from Pale
went to a reception centre for refugees in Vratnik, which was operated by Bosnian Muslim
authorities.7901

2321. On 6 July 1992, the Bosnian Serb MUP issued a decision, granting the request by non-
Serbs living in the inner parts of Pale to move out of the Pale municipality ―of their own free will‖
and ―under the escort of police officers‖ of the Pale SJB, and instructed ―police and military
patrols‖ to enable the unobstructed passage of 420 civilians aboard eight buses bound for Stari
Grad municipality.7902

2322. On the same day, pursuant to the instructions of the SerBiH government, the Executive
Board decided that non-Serb individuals or families must not be allowed to leave the territory of
the municipality until ―a list of their property is made and the property is taken over in accordance
with the regulations in force.‖7903 The Executive Board also requested that the Pale SJB take
immediate measures to protect the property left behind by the non-Serbs until such time that this
property was taken over by an authorised municipal commission.7904 (Here is the document
named in the foot note. However, it is clear that the main point was to protect the property,
and to have the list of property left behind, otherwise the municipal authorities would not be
responsible for the looted or destroyed property. Also, the refugees taking such a property
by themselves were not obliged to return it in the same condition. NO CHANGE OF THE
PROPERTY RIGHTS! #No appropriation#!.

232
3. Also on 6 July 1992, the Pale SJB reported that between 30 June and 3 July 1992, it had
―organised change of the place of residence from the territory of Pale municipality to the territory
of Stari Grad Sarajevo municipality‖ of 1,042 non-Serbs.7905 The SJB continued to organise the
movement of Bosnian Muslims out of Pale municipality for another one or two months.7906
(#Legal obligation#! So what? That was an obligation of the authorities, to secure the safe
passage, an organized convoy, a police escort, and a certainty that the municipality of
destination would accept the civilians, see: D1141:

7900
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), paras. 9, 66, 77; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1238 (15 April 2010); D35 (SJB Pale report
on change of residence of Croats and Muslims from Pale, 6 July 1992).
7901
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 77.
7902
P737 (Decision of Pale MUP, 6 July 1992).
7903
P738 (Conclusions of Pale Executive Board, 6 July 1992); P6031 (SerBiH Decree published in SerBiH's Official Gazette, 8 June 1992); Zdravko Ĉvoro, T.
30953–30954 (4 December 2012).
7904
P738 (Conclusions of Pale Executive Board, 6 July 1992); D2530 (Witness statement of Zdravko Ĉvoro dated 1 December 2012), para. 7; Zdravko Ĉvoro,
T. 30951 (4 December 2012).
7905
P5428 (Report of Pale SJB, 6 July 1992); D35 (SJB Pale report on change of residence of Croats and Muslims from Pale, 6 July 1992).
7906
D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 22.
 426

What is not clear here? All had been regulated under the auspice of the international
agencies and the ICFY, sub-Conference on BiH led by Lord Carrington and Ambassador
Cutileiro, all signed by the three warring parties, all in accordance with the international
documents!) :

2324 . In a letter dated 7 July 1992, the Executive Board informed Plavšić that despite the
Assembly‘s decision of 19 June 1992,7907 there had been ―forced and wilful‖ efforts to move
Bosnian Muslims out of the municipality, resulting in a large number of criminal acts.7908 (This
document is an urgency of the Pale Executive Board Chief, the same Zdravko Cvoro. In the
document he reports to the vice-President of the RS about irregularities with the issue of “
changing the place of residence” (which is in Serbian “mesto boravišta” i.e. temporary being
somewhere,

contrary to “mesto prebivališta” which means a permanent resettlement) of the non-Serbs

from Pale. #Ad absurdum#! So, once again, the Chamber is taking documents of the
governmental institutions complaining about crimes and crying for assistance to rectify
irregularities – against this President!!! The war conditions, the influx of refugees,
insufficient and incompetent police personnel, vicinity of the confrontation line, every day
casualties, all of that caused a chaos and facilitated irregularities at least by some of the
policemen and corrupt officials. But the state organs fought for the regularity and as time
passed and the institutions strengthened, a rate of crimes gradually decreased.

Another question is: why the same Zdravko Cvoro is now credible to the Chamber, but
when talking about what he knew was not credible? Is there any difference between the
Chamber and Prosecution in treating the Defence arguments?)

7907
See para. 2318.
7908
P6034 (Report of Pale Executive Board, 7 July 1992).
 427

2325. On 14 July 1992, the Executive Board noted the theft and unlawful use of abandoned
property in Pale which in its opinion was attributable to the failure of the commissions established
earlier for the purpose of making an inventory of abandoned non-Serb property. The Executive
Board then established a new audit commission to re-examine the situation and file a written
report.7909 (The Serb authorities are taking steps to rectify the failure in an inventory of the
abandoned property! #EXCULPATORY#! THAT WAS SOMETHING
#COMMENDABLE#!)

2326. On 19 July 1992, the President requested that Pale municipal authorities make an
inventory of all housing facilities that were vacant ―following the voluntary departure of
Muslims.‖7910 On 10 August 1992, the Municipal Assembly signed over non-Serb housing
property to Serb refugees for ―temporary use‖.7911 The municipal authorities also concentrated the
movable property left behind by Muslims in the premises of various military and non-military
institutions.7912 (All as it should be. The quotation marks with “temporary use” really
compromises the Chamber as an uncritical “ally” of the Prosecution! There was no a single
litigation after the war about property and owneships, which confirmes this “temporary
nature” of use of other’s property!)

2327. On or about 24 July 1992, the President informed the Bosnian Serb Assembly that the
Bosnian Serb government was giving assurances to Bosnian Muslims in Pale that ―they have
nothing to fear.‖7913 (#EXCULPATORY#!!! Here is this D27, the President’s speech in the
Assembly of the Republic of Srpska:
………………….

7909
D34 (Conclusion by Pale Executive Board, 14 July 1992); D2530 (Witness statement of Zdravko Ĉvoro dated 1 December 2012), para. 8; Zdravko Ĉvoro,
T. 30952, 30955 (4 December 2012).
7910
P739 (RS Presidency request to various municipalities, 19 July 1992).
7911
D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 22; D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para.
48; D4369 (Decision of Pale Municipal Assembly, 10 August 1992).
7912
Zdravko Ĉvoro, T. 30952 (4 December 2012).
7913
D27 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech from 17th session of RS Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), e-court p. 3.
 428

The figure of 7.000 Serbs killed in the genocide in WWII should be 700,000. Also, the
penultimate sentence should be translated as follows: “… and a state that will be
comfortable to all others who live with us”! But, anyway, this is a highly
#EXCULPATORY#, and it was said among the members of Parliament, so that everyone
knew what was the position of the President in the #minority rights#!)

2328. On 20 October 1992, the Executive Board decided to seize all movable property
belonging to persons who had been outside of Pale municipality for more than 30 days.7914 The
Executive Board then noted that temporary allocation of such property to Serb refugees in Pale
may take place on the condition that such allocation is authorised and recorded by a competent
municipal commission.7915 (A #proper decision#, because only in such a case there would be
an obligation to preserve the property!)

2329. Only a small number of Bosnian Muslims remained in Pale municipality during the
war.7916 (Why nobody bothered them? The most probable reason for a discomfort of some
families was the fact that their relatives fought in the Muslim Army. For that reason the
President banned all the mass funerals, because at the beginning of June 92 there was 45
casualties from Pale, killed in an ambush after been guaranteed the free passage. The mass
funeral raised tensions, but a solitary ones also!)

2330. The President argues that (i) through their elected representatives or by filing individual
applications, Bosnian Muslims of Pale requested permission to leave the municipality;7917 (ii) the
Bosnian Muslims of Pale asked to leave because the Bosnian Muslim authorities in Sarajevo had
demanded such departure as part of their preparations for a planned military take-over of Pale;7918
and (iii) in order to prevent the departure of Bosnian Muslims, Serb authorities guaranteed the
civil rights of all people regardless of any ethnic or religious affiliation.7919

2331. Having considered the totality of the evidence and assessed the circumstances in which
the departures occurred, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims were forced to leave. The
Chamber notes that in some instances, Bosnian Muslims requested to leave the municipality;
however, the Chamber finds that even when the Bosnian Muslims did request to leave Pale, they
were driven by the fear caused by all of the surrounding circumstances. Consequently, the
Chamber is satisfied that Bosnian Muslims were forced to leave the Serb-controlled parts of Pale
municipality. (They could have been #forced by the circumstances#, as well as the newly born
problems and inability of the authorities to cope with this problems, and maybe some of
them were “persuaded” by individuals, but the authorities didn’t want them to leave, and
didn’t force them. At least, the main participants in the municipal and Republic organs were
not in favour of their leaving, and fought against the unlawful conduct! Being “forced” by
the civil war atmosphere could be responsibility of the civil war and those who wanted it and
caused it, and the Chamber had a very persuasive evidence that the President was against

7914
D4737 (Conclusion of Pale Executive Board, 21 October 1992).
7915
D4737 (Conclusion of Pale Executive Board, 21 October 1992).
7916
D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 22; D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 57;
P4994 (Addendum to Ewa Tabeau‘s expert report entitled ―Ethnic Composition in Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27 Municipalities of BiH
1991 to 1997‖, 3 February 2009), pp. 21, 30.
7917
Defence Final Brief, para. 1720. Witnesses testified that through their elected representatives and by signing individual requests, the Bosnian Muslims in
Pale sought permission from the municipal authorities to leave the municipality. They testified further that despite the assurances repeatedly given by the
municipal and RS authorities, including those given by Biljana Plavšić in Praĉa, the Bosnian Muslim population of Pale insisted on their demand to leave.
See D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 22; Tomislav Hršum, T. 32960–32962 (30 January 2013); D2530 (Witness
statement of Zdravko Ĉvoro dated 1 December 2012), paras. 5–6; D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 47; Jovan Šarac,
T. 47178–47179 (14 February 2014); D3671 (Witness statement of Dušan Kovaĉević dated 7 June 2013), para. 41.
7918
Defence Final Brief, para. 1720.
7919
Defence Final Brief, para. 1721. See also D2530 (Witness statement of Zdravko Ĉvoro dated 1 December 2012), para. 5; Jovan Šarac, T. 47173–47175,
47177–47179 (14 February 2014).
 429

the war, see D1833:

i. Scheduled Detention Facility C.19.2 and Scheduled Incident

B.14.1

2332. The Indictment refers to the use of Pale Gym as a detention facility at least between May
and August 1992, and alleges that between June and July 1992, a number of men died as a result
of beatings which they sustained in there.

Establishment and control

2333. Pale Gym was a large sports hall situated near the Pale SJB, in Pale Culture Centre.7920
There were windows only on one side of Pale Gym.7921

2333. 10 May 1992, Mirsad Smajš and eight other detainees from the Sarajevo area were
transferred from Kula Prison to Pale Gym; at that point Pale Gym already held approximately 100
detainees, including some Serbs and Croats, and was guarded by SJB members in blue uniforms
with the Serb flag emblazoned on the shoulder.7922 Upon arrival, each detainee was given a
sandwich and a bottle of water.7923

2334. A few days later, a group of about 400 badly beaten Bosnian Muslim men who had
previously been detained at Vuk Karadţić School in Bratunac, were brought to Pale Gym in
several trucks.7924 One by one, the detainees were taken off the trucks, registered and placed in the
gym.7925

2335. As was mentioned earlier, on 22 May, after conducting a military operation in Renovica,
Serb Forces detained about 30 Bosnian Muslim men and took them to Pale Gym.7926

2336. During the last week of May 1992, Hajrudin Karić was arrested by two policemen, who
then took him to Pale Gym.7927 At the time of Karić‘s arrival, Pale Gym was guarded by a number
of policemen, including Predrag Štrbac, a man with the last name Ĉvoro, and NeĊelko
Kovaĉević.7928 Upon entering Pale Gym, Karić saw that it was full of Bosnian Muslims, including
a woman.7929

2337. On 4 June 1992, Azem Omerović and three other men were taken to Pale Gym by Serbs
in camouflage uniforms using police cars.7930 (#Legal and obligatory#! So what? The police was
doing it’s own job, and a suspects had to be brought in and questioned. On June 4 there was
an ambush in which 45 young soldiers from Pale had been killed, in spite of an agreement on
a safe passage!)

Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

2338. The detainees were given sufficient water to drink but insufficient food, only receiving
sandwiches with a little bologna once a day; they became weak from hunger and often fainted.

7920
P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), para. 24; P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 115 (under
seal). P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-court p. 10.
7921
P43 (Witness statements of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-court p. 10.
 430
7931
(#General shortage#! The issue of food is clear, isn’t it? There was noo enough food
anyway!) They slept on the floor and they could only use the toilet after having received
permission from the guards. 7932 (What a horror!?! There is nothing more natural than to
have a permission to get out to toilets!)

2339. The detainees in Pale Gym were constantly subjected to maltreatment.7933 (See under this
fn, how this looks like! If Sarac as a very decent official didn’t receive any information, that
means that the authorities generally didn’t know about such an incident, the President in
particular. With Hrsum is the same: as a decent man, he said that he couldn’t exclude an
entry of some individuals prone to commiting beatings, but he didn’t have any such
information! But he didn’t confirm that it happened! Therefore, the Chamber rather trusted
the #Muslim extremists# that had been brought in, than the Serb professionals! And no
defence could do anything if these criteria were implemented! The Chamber “promoted”
any hint to a possibility, and further to a probability, than to a fact, in spite of the Defence
witnesses rebutting it! But this is not a fair trial!#Possibility-probability-fact#!) The guards
told them that they would be killed unless they were exchanged.7934 The guards also warned them
not to attempt to escape and indicated that guards had been posted near each window.7935 The
detainees were severely beaten with whatever the guards could have put their hands on and had to

7922
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court pp. 5–6; P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-
court pp. 9–11; P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011) (under seal), paras. 116–117. See also Adjudicated Fact 2641. See Scheduled
Detention Facility C.18.2. The Chamber notes that Jovan Šarac denied that anyone other than the prisoners from Bratunac was detained at Pale Gym.
D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 55. The Chamber notes it received reliable evidence to the contrary, that detainees
from the Sarajevo area and from within Pale municipality were in fact brought to Pale Gym. See paras. 2334, 2337.
7923
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court p. 6.
7924
KDZ605, T. 17923 (25 August 2011); P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 108–109, 115, 122 (under seal); P43 (Witness
statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court p. 6; P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-court pp. 10–11;
P3208 (List of men taken from Bratunac to Pale); D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 17; D4368 (Witness
statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 41; Jovan Šarac, T. 47148–47149 (14 February 2014). See also Adjudicated Fact 2642. Some of
the detainees from Bratunac had serious injuries. P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-court pp. 10-11; P733 (Witness
statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 56; P3206 (Video footage re people from Bratunac in Visoko sports hall, with transcript);
Zdravko Ĉvoro, T. 30945–30946 (4 December 2012). The Chamber notes that Jovan Šarac qualified his assertion that the men from Bratunac bore ―no
visible injuries‖ by stating that he had not spent much time in Pale Gym. Jovan Šarac, T. 47149 (14 February 2014). See also D2850 (Witness statement of
Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013), para. 17 (stating that there was ―no record or information‖ that these citizens were mistreated during their stay in
Pale); Tomislav Hršum, T. 32939–32941 (30 January 2013) (asserting that the Pale SJB did not investigate whether the detainees from Bratunac had been
mistreated prior to their arrival and that they had not been mistreated while in Pale).
7925
P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 113 (under seal). Approximately 100 Serb civilians had gathered near the trucks while
the detainees disembarked, and ―a few‖ soldiers wearing camouflage uniforms were also present nearby. P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22
August 2011), para. 115 (under seal). [REDACTED]. See Scheduled Detention Facility C.6.2 and Scheduled Incident B.4.1.
7926
See para. 2313.
7927
Karić did not know the identities of the two officers, but noted that they were wearing regular police uniforms. Karić was later told that he had been detained
because his brother-in-law had participated in fighting in Bukvice village. P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), paras. 21–23;
Hajrudin Karić, T. 15354–15356, 15358–15361, 15363 (23 June 2011).
7928
P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), paras. 26–27.
7929
P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), para. 24; Hajrudin Karić, T. 15366–15367 (23 June 2011).
7930
See Adjudicated Fact 2643. But see P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), para. 25 (asserting that while he was detained in Pale
Gym—that is, between 30 May and 11 July 1992—no more prisoners were brought to the gym). See also D4368 (Witness statement of Jovan Šarac dated
10 February 2014), paras. 41, 58 (stating that no additional ―POWs‖ were brought to Pale Gym after the departure of the Bratunac detainees).
7931
P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 121 (under seal); P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011),
para. 25; Hajrudin Karić, T. 15307–15308 (23 June 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2644.
7932
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-court p. 10. See also Adjudicated Fact 2644.
7933
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court p. 6. See also Adjudicated Fact 2645. Jovan Šarac stated that he had not
received any information about the beatings of the detainees held in Pale Gym. Jovan Šarac, T. 47154–47158 (14 February 2014); D4368 (Witness
statement of Jovan Šarac dated 10 February 2014), para. 57. The Chamber notes that even if accepted as reliable, Šarac‘s testimony does not necessarily
suggest that maltreatment and beatings did not occur at Pale Gym. Hršum stopped short of asserting that no Bosnian Muslims had ever been beaten while in
the custody of the Pale SJB, and accepted that the police guards might have allowed entry to the gym by ―certain individuals‖. Hršum, however, insisted
that the police guards did not undertake any ―repressive measures‖ themselves. Tomislav Hršum, T. 32942 (30 January 2013). The Chamber found that
Hršum worked for SJB Pale and that SJB Pale was involved in the detention of Bosnian Muslims in Pale Gym. D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav
Hršum dated 27 January 2013), paras. 1, 16; Tomislav Hršum, T. 32939–32942 (30 January 2013). These facts, in addition to Hršum‘s general evasiveness
and lack of candour as a witness, lead the Chamber to conclude that Hršum had an incentive to distance himself from the events at the Pale Gym.
Accordingly, the Chamber places no weight on Hršum‘s assertion that the members of the Pale SJB were never involved in beatings of detainees in Pale
Gym.
7934
P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 117–118 (under seal).
7935
P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 118 (under seal).
 431

run the gauntlet when they asked to go to the toilet.7936 Smajš observed a man in a police uniform
use a curved knife to cut off the detainees‘ hair.7937 Was it supported by any other
evidence???NO!#

2340. At one point, a fair-haired man, approximately 40 years old and wearing a police uniform,
entered Pale Gym and introduced himself as a police commander from Pale.7938 He then
proceeded to beat the detainees.7939 At the same time, a soldier entered Pale Gym and announced
that everyone would be killed unless the soldier‘s brother, who had been captured by Bosnian
Muslims, was released.7940 (All private and all contrary to everything what the President
ordered. Even if happened, this was not an official policy! But no document or other
testimonies corroborated this!#Contrary to President orders#!)

2341. Sometime after the Bosnian Muslim men from Bratunac had arrived, the guards had a
disagreement with ―army troops‖ who were at the door and wanted to enter the gym to beat the
detainees.7941 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) The guards installed bars on the windows as well as an
iron door in order to prevent them from entering the gym.7942 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!)
However, later, during Karić‘s detention, the police guards allowed paramilitary members,
including members of Rajko Kušić‘s and SrĊan Kneţević‘s units, to access Pale Gym multiple
times each day and beat the detainees severely with sticks and rifle butts.7943 (Karic knew the
guys personally and had a personal motives to lie. There is #no evidence# that it ever
happened. Kusic was a high sportsman, representing Yugoslavia and winning medals, and he
was an example of decency! But the Muslim extremists had been free to lie as much as they
wanted! Kusic died in a car accident, otherwise he would testify! However, other detainees
after being transferred to Visoko, stated that they hadny been harassed ib Pale! See KW12
testimony, T.44747 – 48 Q. Thank you. And did you understand this as being pardoned or that you
were no longer a suspect? A. I believe that I was pardoned because perhaps he had an unclear
conscience because he probably realised that I wasn't the one who had shot. Nota bene: a crime
required, not religion! Q. Thank you. Was your father joined to the people who weretransported to
Pale? A. Yes, he was. Q. Thank you. And how were you treated in Pale? Did you have access to
water, food, and were you provided with any medical assistance? A. As for Pale and our arrival there,
I can't say anything bad. I can just say good, that I want to thank all the policemen and the hospital. If
these people hadn't jumped immediately and taken me, I would have died. Q. You arrived in a bad
shape; correct? A. I arrived in a bad shape. I was all cut. No one ever put any bandages on me in
Bratunac until I arrived up there. Q. Were you provided with medical care? A. Yes, immediately.
The doctors were there and military police and ordinary police, and no one can say to me that anyone
was beaten in Pale. We had better security than in Bratunac. ) Members of these paramilitary groups
also took detainees out of Pale Gym to be beaten and some of those detainees never returned to the
gym.7944

7936
P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 116, 119 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17924 (25 August 2011); P43 (Witness statement of
Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-court p. 10.
7937
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court p. 6.
7938
P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 120 (under seal).
7939
P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 120 (under seal).
7940
P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 120, 123 (under seal).
7941
P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 117 (under seal).
7942
P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 117 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17924 (25 August 2011).
7943
P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), paras. 28–29, 31. On 6 July 1992, a soldier ordered Karić to help another prisoner,
Fahrudin Sipović, who had been beaten and lay on the ground with a broken arm and covered in blood, to stand up. As Sipović attempted to stand, the
soldier beat him with a piece of wood. P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), para. 36.
7944
P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), paras. 29–30, 42–43. On 28 June 1992, Karić was called out of the main gymnasium by
two relations of Rajko Kušić, who swore at Karić and beat him with a wooden stick until he fainted. After approximately 10 minutes, another Bosnian Serb,
Milomir Tepeš, arrived and said ―it‘s not him‖. The paramilitaries then threw Karić back in the main gym while badly injured. P2839 (Witness statement of
Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), paras. 32–33; Hajrudin Karić, T. 15304–15305, 15367–15368 (23 June 2011), T. 15372 (24 June 2011).
 432

2342. On 15 May 1992, Branko Đerić ordered Sokolac Crisis Staff to provide ―three tow trucks
with canvas cover‖ for transportation of detainees from Pale to Visoko; Nedeljko Lakić requested
that the Ilijaš Crisis Staff approve and provide passage through Ilijaš municipality for a group of
detainees who were at Pale and who were going to be transported to Visoko under the escort of
Pale Crisis Staff. (#Due to Agreements#! The procedure is exactly as it was agreed and signed
on 22 May 1992, with escort and notification of the transit municipalities, and reaffirmed on
30 September 92! See P4859:

Lakić also requested that the approval be destroyed the moment the detainees left Ilijaš.7945 On the
morning of 16 or 17 May, the guards told the detainees from Bratunac that they were going to be
exchanged, took them out of the gym in groups of ten, tied them together, and forced them to sing
Serb songs before loading them onto trucks.7946 The detainees were then transferred under VRS
escort to Visoko where they were exchanged.7947 (All together, the detainees from Bratunac
spent only a week in the Gym in Pale. Too many events described by the witnesses for only
one week?!? No a single corroboration for the alleged “singing” the Serb songs. Since it was
in the center of Pale, somebody would have known it, but all the allegation of the kind are a
part of “education” of the Muslim witnesses by the Muslim secret services!#Extremists
lied#!)

2343. On 18 May, Smajš and 64 other detainees were also called out of Pale Gym.7948 This
group was placed on a military cargo truck and transported to Hreša to be exchanged.7949

2344. On 6 July 1992, approximately five men belonging to Kušić‘s unit entered the gym and
beat three Bosnian Muslim detainees with wooden sticks and brass knuckles until they were
unconscious.7950 Two of the detainees died about thirty minutes after the end of the beatings, and
the third died two days later, without having received any medical care.7951 (There was no a
single lethal case, nor anybody ever reported this event! But Mr. Smajs was a #known
extremist#!)

2345. On 11 July 1992, Hajrudin Karić and 34 other detainees were transferred, under the
escort of reserve police, to Kula Prison.7952

Conclusion

7945
P1604 (Letter from Nedeljko Lakić to Ilijaš Crisis Staff, 15 May 1992); P2619 (SerBiH order, 15 May 1992). Lakić also requested that the approval be
destroyed the moment the detainees left Ilijaš.
7946
P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), para. 122 (under seal); KDZ605, T. 17925 (25 August 2011); P43 (Witness statements of
Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993 and 14 January 1998), e-court pp. 6, 11.
7947
P3205 (Witness statement of KDZ605 dated 22 August 2011), paras. 126–127 (under seal).
7948
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court pp. 6–7; P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-
court p. 11.
7949
P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 18 December 1993), e-court pp. 6–7; P43 (Witness statement of Mirsad Smajš dated 14 January 1998), e-
court p. 11. See also Adjudicated Fact 2641.
7950
P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), paras. 37–38.
7951
P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), paras. 39–41; Hajrudin Karić, T. 15305 (23 June 2011); Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1227 (15
April 2010); P4416 (Death certificate for Selim Pandţić). See also Adjudicated Fact 2647.
7952
P2839 (Witness statement of Hajrudin Karić, dated 13 May 2011), paras. 30, 44–45; D2850 (Witness statement of Tomislav Hršum dated 27 January 2013),
para. 19 (stating that the persons taken into custody after the operation in Renovica were ultimately transported to Kula Prison). See also Adjudicated Fact
2646. See Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.2.
 433

2347. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that Serb Forces brought to and detained non-
Serbs, including at least one woman, at Pale Gym from approximately 10 May to 11 July 1992.
The Chamber further finds that the detainees were held in poor conditions. These included lack of
food and adequate medical care. The Chamber also finds that detainees were regularly subjected
to beatings by Serb Forces at Pale Gym and that at least three detainees died as a result of such
beatings.

Scheduled Incident D.16

2348. The Indictment refers to the destruction of three mosques, namely the mosques at Praĉa,
Podvitez, and Bogovići, between July and September 1992.7953

2349. There were at least three mosques in Pale municipality.7954 Crnĉalo heard that all three
mosques were destroyed between 2 July and September 1992.7955

2350. According to Riedlmayer, the Podvitez mosque and the Bogovići mosque were
―completely destroyed‖ in ―the first year of the war‖ 7956 and the Praĉa mosque was ―completely
destroyed‖ by mining on 10 October 1992.7957

2351. While the Chamber relies on Riedlmayer for the purposes of finding that the mosques in
question were destroyed, and determining the nature and extent of the damage to those sites, it
does not rely on his evidence in order to determine who was responsible for the destruction as such
matters fall outside Riedlmayer‘s expertise and are based on statements which he received from,
amongst others, the Islamic Community of BiH and informants.

2352. Having received no other evidence concerning Scheduled Incident D.16, the Chamber is
not satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that Serb Forces destroyed the Praĉa, Podvitez, and
Bogovići mosques, between July and September 1992.

Vogošća

Charges

2353. Under Count 3, the Prosecution alleges that persecution, a crime against humanity, was
committed in Vogošća as part of the objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and/or
Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities.7958 Acts of persecution alleged to have been committed
by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs in Vogošća include killings
related to detention facilities, as well as killings committed during, and deaths resulting from, cruel
and inhumane treatment at these detention facilities.7959 The Prosecution also characterises these
killings as extermination, a crime against humanity, under Count 4; murder, a crime against

7953
Indictment, Scheduled Incident D.16. In its Final Brief, the Prosecution notes that evidence showed that the Praĉa Mosque was destroyed in October 1992.
See Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, p. 31, fn. 447.
7954
Zdravko Ĉvoro, T. 30958 (5 December 2012).
7955
P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 79.
7956
P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case,
formatted records), e-court pp. 208–210. See also P4069 (Cultural destruction database), records 209, 211.
7957
P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case,
formatted records), e-court pp. 205–207. See also P4069 (Cultural destruction database), record 212.
7958
Indictment, paras. 48–49.
7959
Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). See Scheduled Incident B.19.1; Scheduled Detention Facilities C.26.1, C.26.3.
 434

humanity, under Count 5; and murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war, under Count
6.7960

2354. Other acts of persecution alleged to have been committed in Vogošća by Serb Forces and
Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs include: (i) torture, beatings, and physical and
psychological abuse during and after the take-over and in scheduled detention facilities as cruel or
inhumane treatment;7961 (ii) rape and other acts of sexual violence, during and after the take-over
and in scheduled detention facilities, as cruel and inhumane treatment;7962 (iii) the establishment
and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in scheduled detention facilities, including the
failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic
sanitation facilities, as cruel or inhumane treatment;7963 (iv) forcible transfer or deportation of
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their homes;7964 (v) unlawful detention in scheduled
detention facilities;7965 (vi) forced labour at frontlines and the use of Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats as human shields;7966 (vii) the wanton destruction of private property, including
homes and business premises, and public property, including cultural monuments and sacred
sites;7967 and (viii) the imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.7968

2355. Under Counts 7 and 8, the Prosecution alleges deportation and inhumane acts (forcible
transfer), respectively, as crimes against humanity.7969 In this regard, the Prosecution alleges that
by the end of 1992, Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs forcibly
displaced Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas in Vogošća in which they were
lawfully present.7970 It is alleged that from March 1992, restrictive and discriminatory measures,
arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence, killing,
destruction of houses, cultural monuments, and sacred sites, as well as the threat of further such
acts caused Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to flee in fear, while others were physically
driven out.7971

Lead-up

2356. Vogošća, one of the ten municipalities making up Sarajevo, is located to the north of the
city of Sarajevo, between the municipalities of Novi Grad and Ilijaš.7972 It includes, inter alia, the
largely Muslim inhabited villages or settlements of Barice, Kiše, Tihovići, Svrake, Hotonj, Kobilja
Glava and Ugorsko as well as the mainly Serb inhabited villages of Krivoglavci, Kotorovići,
Blagovac, Paljevo Brdo and Semizovac.7973 According to the 1991 census, Vogošća municipality
7960
Indictment, para. 63(b).
7961
Indictment, para. 60(b). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.26.1, C.26.3.
7962
Indictment, para. 60(c). See Scheduled Detention Facility C.26.3. The Prosecution does not allege criminal responsibility for rape and other acts of sexual
violence at Scheduled Detention Facility C.26.1. Indictment, fn. 5.
7963
Indictment, para. 60(d). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.26.1, C.26.3.
7964
Indictment, para. 60(f).
7965
Indictment, para. 60(g). See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.26.1, C.26.3.
7966
Indictment, para. 60(h).
7967
Indictment, para. 60(j). See Schedule D.21.
7968
Indictment, para. 60(k). The restrictive and discriminatory measures alleged include the denial of freedom of movement; the removal from positions of
authority; the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes; unlawful arrest and/or the denial of the right to judicial process; and/or the denial of
equal access to public services.
7969
Indictment, para. 68–75.
7970
Indictment, paras. 69, 72.
7971
Indictment, para. 71.
7972
P966 (Map of Sarajevo marked by Robert Donia); P2362 (Map of Vogošća municipality with photographs); P973 (Robert Donia‘s expert report entitled
―Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo, 1990–1995‖, January 2010), p. 8; Appendix B, Map 1; Robert Donia, T. 3130 (1 June 2010); P2345
(Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 3. See also Adjudicated Fact 2.
7973
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 34, 61; KDZ020, T. 12608, 12618 (1 March 2011); D4028 (Article from Naš Glas
entitled ―Vogošća has a future‖, 13 June 1992), p. 1; P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 3–4, 99; Eset Muraĉević,
T. 12650, 12672–12673, (1 March 2011); P2402 (Table prepared by Eset Muraĉević), e-court pp. 1–4; Svetozar Stanić, T. 31678–31679 (18 December
2012); Miladin Trifunović, T. 30393 (15 November 2012); D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 55.
 435

had approximately 24,700 inhabitants, of whom 51% were Bosnian Muslims, 36% were Bosnian
Serbs, and 4% were Bosnian Croats.7974 (Then it must be 10% of Yugoslavs, i.e. mainly Serbs.
It should be noted that even before this war there were settlements that were inhabited
“predominantly” by one or the other ethnicity. This was also the same during the Turkish
occupation. So, it was very easy to organise a new municipalities by only administrative
measures.)

2357. Vogošća was one of the most industrialised municipalities in the territory of SFRY,
hosting several large factories, including the Pretis factory which manufactured artillery and
ammunition.7975 There was also a JNA installation called the Semizovac Barracks, which was
used to store weaponry and equipment of the JNA, the Vogošća TO as well as the Ilijaš TO.7976

2358. During the 1990 elections, the SDA won 18 seats in the Municipal Assembly, the SDS 15
seats, and other parties secured 18 seats.7977 Subsequently, the SDA and SDS formed a coalition
and divided the positions of authority in Vogošća amongst themselves.7978 Thus, Bilal Hasanović
from the SDA became the President of the Vogošća Municipal Assembly, and Rajko Koprivica,
who was the President of the SDS in the municipality, became the President of the Executive
Board.7979 Vehid Hodţić, a Bosnian Muslim, became the Chief of the Vogošća SJB.7980

2359. At times, Koprivica and Jovan Tintor, a high-ranking SDS official in Vogošća,7981 met
with Momĉilo Krajišnik in Hotonj.7982 Before the war, the President also visited Vogošća
municipality on one or two occasions.7983

Creation of separate Bosnian Serb institutions

2360. Discussions at the municipal level for the creation of a Serb SJB started in September
1991.7984 In September or October 1991, there were changes in the personnel structure of the
Vogošća SJB; Borislav Maksimović, a Serb, was appointed as Commander, and two high-ranking
Serb officials were replaced by a Bosnian Croat and a Bosnian Muslim.7985 Neither Bosnian
Muslims nor Bosnian Serbs in Vogošća welcomed these changes.7986 Hodţić was warned that the

7974
P5964 (Census data for BiH by municipality in 1971, 1981, and 1991, April 1995), e-court p. 2; P2402 (Table prepared by Eset Muraĉević), e-court p. 5;
D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 55; P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 6; Svetozar
Stanić, T. 31678–31679 (18 December 2012). But see P4994 (Addendum to Ewa Tabeau‘s expert report entitled ―Ethnic Composition in Internally
Displaced Persons and Refugees from 27 Municipalities of BiH 1991 to 1997‖, 3 February 2009), pp. 21, 31, 34, 40, 74, 76, 80 (indicating that in 1991
Vogošća had 19,970 inhabitants of whom, approximately 49% were Bosnian Muslims, 37% were Bosnian Serbs and 4% Bosnian Croats). While the
Chamber has found Tabeau‘s evidence to be generally reliable, for the purpose of determining the population of Vogošća and the ethnic composition thereof
in 1991, it relies on other evidence before it, such as the direct source document, P5964, which contains the raw data from the 1991 census in BiH.
7975
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 5, 34, 43; Svetozar Stanić, T. 31679 (18 December 2012); P2621 (Order of SerBiH
Government, 17 June 1992), p. 1.
7976
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 34, 39, 44; P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011),
para. 9; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12735 (2 March 2011).
7977
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 6; KDZ020, T. 12470–12471 (25 February 2011).
7978
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 7.
7979
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 7–8, 51; KDZ020, T. 12473 (25 February 2011); P2361 (Witness statement of Eset
Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 10; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12697–12698 (1 March 2011).
7980
Eset Muraĉević, T. 12697 (1 March 2011).
7981
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 10; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12750–12751 (2 March 2011). See also Adjudicated
Fact 2593.
7982
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 83.
7983
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 83.
7984
In an intercepted conversation dated 7 September 1991, Tintor told Milan Plakalović that they no longer had a single man in SUP and that a Serb SUP was
therefore going to be established. P2347 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and Milan Plakalović, 7 September 1991), p. 8.
7985
P2344 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 23–24 (under seal); KDZ020, T. 12537, 12542 (28 February 2011) (private session).
7986
P2344 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 25, 27–28, 30–31 (under seal); KDZ020, T. 12539 (28 February 2011) (private
session). In an intercepted conversation with Milan Plakalović, Tintor warned that as a result of the dismissals, Vogošća will ―flare up […] on Monday‖ and
that ―[a]ll the people will go out here, all of them, ten thousand people, to block all the roads!‖ P2347 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and
Milan Plakalović, 7 September 1991), p. 6. On 11 September 1991, during a telephone conversation, Rajko Koprivica and Tintor discussed the outcome of a
meeting Koprivica had with Hodţić, Kemo Šabović, the head of the CSB, and Mićo Stanišić with respect to the reinstatement of Serb officers. In the same
 436

staffing situation could result in demonstrations.7987 As a result, the Vogošća SJB organised
reinforcements at the Pretis gate and the Semizovac flyover.7988

2361. In early 1992, a Serb Crisis Staff was established and Tintor was appointed as its
President.7989

2362. In March 1992, the SDS delegates in the Municipal Assembly, led by Koprivica,
announced at an assembly session that they were going to organise the Serb Municipality of
Vogošća and threatened that those Bosnian Muslims who did not pledge loyalty to this new
municipality would be expelled.7990 (#Protected lies#! Had it been so, there would be this news
in a headlines in media! The “protected witnesses” were free to lie. But, before the war any
such statement of a local official would be a big issue in the political life. What could have
been said is that the municipal officials with the special authorisation, such as police
operatives, could stay in the Serb municipal authorities, provided they accept the law and
constitution of the Serb entity. It must be kept in mind that in March 1992 there was
finalised the Lisbon Agreement on the transformation of BiH, which envisaged a high
autonomies for the three ethnicities. Not to mention that even in 1991, on the Conference in
the Hague Mr. Izetbegovic himself commited to the high autonomy for the Serbs and
Croats! #All in accord with the ICFY results#! ) Koprivica then stated that ―Muslims were
simply going to disappear‖.7991 After making this announcement, the SDS delegates walked out of
the assembly session.7992 On 24 March 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly unanimously verified
the decision to establish the Serb municipality of Vogošća along with 34 other Serb
municipalities.7993 The Serb municipality of Vogošća was proclaimed in March or April 1992.7994
Svetozar Stanić was appointed as its President and he stayed in that position until November
1992.7995 Koprivica was appointed as the President of the Serb Municipal Assembly.7996 (#The
context and time frame# are substantial for an understanmding of events. For instance, on
24 March Mr. Izetbegovic on behalf of the SDA and the Muslim community denounced on
the already agreed Lisbon Agreement and the Cutileiro’s Plan. So, the deceptive plan of the
SDA become visible, and the Serb side continued to realise all what this Plan had envisaged!)

2363. However, in February 1992, even before the adoption of the above decision, there had
already been discussions amongst Serb leaders as to the lay-out of the Serb municipality of

conversation, Koprivica implied that he was unable to proceed further without consulting with Momĉilo Krajišnik first whereas Tintor replied by saying
―[w]e will not go forward until we get a Martić in each municipality.‖ P2348 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and Rajko, 11 September
1991), pp. 2–3. On 12 September 1991, Tintor and Mićo Stanišić discussed the staffing changes that had taken place in Vogošća SJB and Tintor told Mićo
Stanišić that the refusal to reinstate Serbs could entail ―bloodshed‖ in Vogošća and that he would raise 10,000 people against ―this injustice‖. P2219
(Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and Mićo Stanišić, 12 September 1991), p. 4.
7987
P2344 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 33 (under seal); D1107 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 16 August 2007), para.
51 (under seal).
7988
P2344 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 33 (under seal); D1107 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 16 August 2007), para.
51 (under seal).
7989
KDZ020, T. 12473 (25 February 2011) (private session); Eset Muraĉević, T. 12750–12751 (2 March 2011); D2678 (Witness statement of Svetozar Stanić
dated 16 December 2012), para. 8; Svetozar Stanić, T. 31672, 31676 (18 December 2012). See also Adjudicated Fact 2593. But see KDZ020, T. 12491–
12492, 12497, 12510, (28 February 2011), 12634–12635 (1 March 2011); P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 45, 92.
Later, in June 1992, the Vogošća Crisis Staff was disbanded and replaced by the Vogošća War Presidency, which in turn was superseded by the Vogošća
War Commission. D2678 (Witness statement of Svetozar Stanić dated 16 December 2012), para. 10; D4027 (Witness statement of Nikola Poplašen dated
11 November 2013), para. 7; Nikola Poplašen, T. 43583 (15 November 2013). See Section II.B.7: Regional and municipal bodies.
7990
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 59, 63. See also Adjudicated Fact 2592.
7991
P2344 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 59 (under seal).
7992
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 59, 61, 63. See also Adjudicated Fact 2592.
7993
P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 23–24.
7994
D2444 (Witness statement of Miladin Trifunović dated 11 November 2012), para. 5; D2678 (Witness statement of Svetozar Stanić dated 16 December
2012), para. 4; P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 61.
7995
D2678 (Witness statement of Svetozar Stanić dated 16 December 2012), paras. 5, 11; P2373 (Vogošća Executive Board request to SerBiH Ministry of
Finance, 15 July 1992); Svetozar Stanić, T. 31711 (18 December 2012).
7996
Svetozar Stanić, T. 31677 (18 December 2012); D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 12; Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35159
(11 March 2013).
 437

Vogošća. For instance, during a telephone conversation with a certain Prodanović, Tintor stated
that it ―will include everything all the way to Krš‖ but not Barica or Kobilja Glava.7997
(#EXCULPATORY#!!! Barice and Kobilja Glava were settlements with the Muslim
majority, and were envisaged to be ingredients of the Muslim municipality of Vogosca!) On
22 February 1992, the President asked Ljubo Grković, Chef de Cabinet of the SDS Executive
Board,7998 whether the planned Serb municipality of Rajlovac would include the territory of the
Serb municipality of Vogošća and was told that Vogošća would be a separate unit.7999 (As it can
be seen from this example, all about forming of the new municipalities was decided on the
local level in a manner of democracy, in accord with the #Constitution and laws#!)

2364. On 31 March 1992, non-Serb members of the police were invited by Mandić to join the
newly established the Bosnian Serb MUP but were warned that before any such engagement, they
had to declare their loyalty to SerBiH in writing.8000 (#EXCULPATORY#!!! The policemen
with such an authorities to implement laws and protect the order and Constitution, i.e. all
officials that had so high authorisations to arrest, detain, make a criminal reports, and bring
somebody to a court, had to accept this new Constitution and laws created on the basis of a
new constitutional provisions! Therefore, there was no any ethnic obstacle for the Muslims
and Croats (“non-Serb policemen”) to continue to work in the Serb MUP!) In the Vogošća
SJB, all Serb police officers agreed with Mandić‘s demand but non-Serbs did not.8001
Subsequently, a meeting was held and the police officers agreed that until further notice Serbs,
Muslims, and Croats would stay at the station and work together ―in order to prevent
bloodshed‖.8002 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) Despite this agreement, in the Semizovac station, Serb
and non-Serb policemen carried out their duties separately, though they did coalesce for joint
patrols or when there were anti-crime assignments.8003 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!)

2365. In April 1992, a number of meetings between SDS and SDA representatives were held in
Vogošća.8004 During the meetings, Tintor advanced the thesis that Vogošća was Serb land and
therefore had to be governed by Serb authority.8005 Tintor, Koprivica, Slavko Jovanović, Svetozar
Stanić and other local SDS leaders then insisted on dividing Vogošća along ethnic lines.8006 The
division, as envisaged by them, would have left the Serbs with the town centre, all the industry and
all the villages and communes except for Gornje, Donje Ugorsko, Kobilja Glava, and Hotonj.8007
The Bosnian Muslims refused this proposal.8008 (#Distorted#! #Two municipalities – peace#!
Therefore, it was not the “thesis that Vogosca” … was Serb land, but that some of the local
communes with the vast Serb majority were the Serb land and were included in the Serb
Municipality of Vogosca. All other was negotiable between them at the local level, and
nobody from the central authorities interfered)

7997
P965 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and FNU Prodanović, 11 February 1992), p. 5.
7998
P2579 (Minutes of 7th session of SDS Executive Board, 30 December 1991), p. 1.
7999
P967 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Ljubo Grković, 22 February 1992). On the creation of the Serb municipality of Rajlovac,
see paras. 2172–2173.
8000
P1116 (Letter from Momĉilo Mandić to SRBiH MUP re division of MUP, 31 March 1992); P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011),
para. 62; KDZ020, T. 12575–12576 (28 February 2011).
8001
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 62, 64.
8002
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 64; KDZ020, T. 12472 (25 February 2011).
8003
KDZ020, T. 12472 (25 February 2011), T. 12573 (28 February 2011).
8004
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 61, 63; D2678 (Witness statement of Svetozar Stanić dated 16 December 2012), para.
21.
8005
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 63.
8006
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 61, 63. See also Adjudicated Fact 2593.
8007
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 61, 63; KDZ020, T. 12580 (28 February 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2593.
8008
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 61. Svetozar Stanić testified that during these meetings, the Bosnian Serbs proposed
to share power with the Bosnian Muslims and that no agreement was reached because the Muslims insisted on their demand for absolute power over the
entire territory of Vogošća. See D2678 (Witness statement of Svetozar Stanić dated 16 December 2012), para. 21. The Chamber, however, does not
consider his evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching this conclusion, the Chamber noted this his evidence was marked by indicators of bias and
lack of candour.
 438

Militarisation

2366. From 1991 to spring 1992, both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims engaged in the
process of arming and organising themselves in Vogošća.8009

2367. On or about 5 January 1992, there was unusual movement around the Semizovac Barracks;
trucks driven by Serbs in military uniforms towed artillery pieces from there towards Mt. Paljevo,
a location above Krivoglavci, which overlooked the residences of Tintor and Koprivica.8010 On
7 January 1992, heavy artillery fire was opened from Mt. Paljevo.8011 (#JNA competence#! This
is pretty unbelievable, and completely impossible, because it was so far before the war, and
such an incident with the firing would be known in public thrououth the world, and would
cause many discussions. Otherwise, the JNA activity was their own matter, what does it have
to do with the RS or this President? If the JNA drivers were Serbs, that was because the
Muslim and Croat reservists didn’t respond to the mobilisation calls!)

2368. In early March 1992, both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs erected barricades in areas
where they formed a majority.8012 (#In context of killing Serb bridegroom’s father#! Vogosca
was one of the ten Sarajevo municipalities, and those barricades happened within the
dramatic events after killing of the Serb bridegroom’s father. So, it shouldn’t be presented
as if it was something separate!) After the erection of barricades around Svrake, the JNA began
distributing to local Serbs large quantities of weapons, which belonged to the Vogošća TO and had
been stored in the Semizovac Barracks.8013 The JNA also trained local Serbs to use the
weapons.8014 (#JNA competence, legal and obligatory#! Not “local Serbs”, but the JNA
reservists who responded to the mobilisation call. The JNA woul train the Muslim reservists
too, as it happened throughout decades!) (This is unbelievable and inacceptable to have any
Serb charged for a regular activities of the federal army, let alo ne to charge the President fo
that. Let us see what was the Order of the Commander of the 2nd Military District, D3679 on
4 April 92:

#Autonomous JNA activity#!No activity of the JNA was under any influence, let alone
control of the President, or any others. The JNA had an equdistance to all the political
parties, but being aware that the Serb parties werent against the JNA. However, the JNA
took care of all the civilians, regardless of ethnicity! See the next para of this exhibit D3679:

8009
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 35; P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 9,
11; D2444 (Witness statement of Miladin Trifunović dated 11 November 2012), para. 5; D2540 (Witness statement of Goran Sikiraš dated 2 December
2012), paras. 6, 9; P979 (Report from JNA 2nd Military District to JNA General Staff, 20 March 1992), pp. 6, 11 (indicating that by 20 March 1992, in
Vogošća municipality, 1,500 men who were not part of the JNA or the TO had been armed by either the JNA or the SDS).
8010
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 35, 38.
8011
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 38.
8012
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 5, 9; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12689–12690, 12693, 12695, 12703–12705 (1 March
2011); P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 53–54, 84; Berko Zeĉević, T. 12156–15157 (22 February 2011); D2540
(Witness statement of Goran Sikiraš dated 2 December 2012), para. 6.
8013
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 9; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12690 (1 March 2011), T. 12731 (2 March 2011); P2345
(Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 35, 48, 54. On 3 March 1992, a certain Gvozden told the Accused that the Serbs in Vogošća
had mobilised themselves. See P5604 (Intercept of conversation between Gvozden and Radovan Karadţić, 3 March 1992), p. 3. On 30 March 1992, Tintor
and a certain Aco discussed the delivery of light weaponry and ammunition. See P5735 (Intercept of conversation between Aco LNU and Jovan Tintor, 30
March 1992), p. 1. On the same day, Tintor indicated that Serbs had obtained a number of artillery pieces. See P5735 (Intercept of conversation between
Aco LNU and Jovan Tintor, 30 March 1992), p. 3.
8014
Eset Muraĉević, T. 12732 (2 March 2011).
 439

All
the weapons from the Pretis Factory were also brought to the Semizovac Barracks.8015 On 14
May 1992, the Semizovac Barracks were placed under the command of Vogošća Crisis Staff.8016
.8017 (That happened in the eve of the JNA departure from BiH.)

2369. During the spring of 1992, in the predominantly Muslim village of Svrake, the villagers
carried out night watches.8018

Increase in inter-ethnic tensions

2370. From September 1991 onwards, inter-ethnic tensions and criminal acts increased
dramatically.8019 The situation was exacerbated by the arrival of a large group of JNA reservists at
the Semizovac Barracks and their involvement in looting and firing of weapons.8020 Given the dire
security situation and the inability of the police forces to maintain order, Bosnian Muslim
municipal representatives led discussions for the mobilisation of the Vogošća TO but the Bosnian
Serbs opposed any such mobilisation.8021 On 23 September 1991, Koprivica discussed the issue
with the President who made it clear that he fully supported Koprivica‘s opposition to the
mobilisation of the TO.8022 (That would be an #illegal mobilisation of the TO#, which was
subordinated to the JNA, aimed to confront the JNA as a legal armed force! It approved,
there would be a grave crimes committed, and there would be a war much earlier than it
was. The JNA was the only legal and legitimate power force, and any TO couldn’t be
mobilized, even by the BiH Presidency, without or contrary to the JNA orders, if it was
present there, see
D03679

But, what was the actual situation can be seen from the very next paragraph, D03679:

Could such a situation develop in any democratic country, that a local, o provincial

8015
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 9.
8016
P2364 (Vogošća Crisis Staff Order, 14 May 1992); P2635 (Conclusions of Vogošća's Crisis Staff, 16 May 1992).
8017
P2364 (Vogošća Crisis Staff Order, 14 May 1992); P2635 (Conclusions of Vogošća's Crisis Staff, 16 May 1992).
8018
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 12.
8019
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 47–49; D2444 (Witness statement of Miladin Trifunović dated 11 November 2012),
paras. 2–4; D4027 (Witness statement of Nikola Poplašen dated 11 November 2013), paras. 2–3.
8020
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 47.
8021
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 48, 51; KDZ020, T. 12549 (28 February 2011), T. 12639 (1 March 2011) (private
session).
8022
P2360 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Rajko Koprivica, 23 September 1991), pp. 1–2; P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020
dated 17 February 2011), para. 51.
 440

government oppose to a presence of the federal army, so far before the independence was
proclaimed, in September 1991???)

2371. Sometime between 29 February and 1 March 1992, a Bosnian Muslim family was attacked
in the predominantly Serb populated village of Krivoglavci.8023 On that same day, intense
automatic weapon fire was directed at Svrake.8024 (The date is very important, since at that time
there was the #killing at the Serb wedding ceremony#, and this case influenced everything
else in Sarajevo. Why this court doesn’t like contexts, time frames and #cause-consequence
clarification#?)

2372. In early March 1992, there were further acts of violence, including the destruction of
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat property situated in predominantly Serb villages.8025 During
the same period, Tintor, on behalf of the Vogošća Crisis Staff, sent a dispatch to the Vogošća SJB
and Kemo Šabović, prohibiting the SJB from conducting any investigations in Serb villages in
connection with the alleged killing of a young Bosnian Muslim by a Serb.8026 (#Lies vs.
documents#! Why to rely on the witness statement, if this document existed? The OTP
witnesses are all-mighty and protected as the white bears. And since the killings weren’t
charged in the Indictment, why it is in the Judgement? And what all of it has to do with the
President? This can only be an argument agaist civil wars, and a direct perpetrators, not
against the President!)

Take-over

Take-over of Vogošća town

2373. On 3 April 1992, a group of armed Serbs led by Boro Radić attacked the police station in
Vogošća, disarmed the Bosnian Muslim officers, and took away all the weapons there.8027 Radić
and his men then forced everybody out and sprayed the inside of the station with automatic
gunfire.8028

2374. On the day of the attack against the Vogošća SJB, Tintor ordered the deployment of ―[a]ll
available manpower‖ at the check-points in Vogošća.8029 On the same day, Tintor instructed a
certain Pero Radović not to react until ―an agreement is reached‖ and to open fire ―if anybody
enters the police station uninvited‖.8030 Also on 3 April 1992, Momĉilo Krajišnik instructed Tintor
not to start a war.8031 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!)

2375. On 4 April 1992, Tintor informed Momĉilo Krajišnik that Bosnian Muslims from Kobilja
Glava were on their way towards Graovište and Ţuĉ.8032 (#Contrary to facts#! This is exactly
and typically what this Court was doing. This telephone conversation is mentioned here as a
Serb feloni. However, Tintor informed Krajisnik that the Muslims from their stronghold
8023
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 6.
8024
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 6.
8025
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 55, 57; P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para.
8.
8026
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 55, 57–58. The Chamber notes that there are no killings charged in Schedule A of
the Indictment in relation to Vogošća.
8027
P2344 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 68–69 (under seal); KDZ020, T. 12471 (25 February 2011), T. 12524 (private
session), 12576–12577 (28 February 2011); D2678 (Witness statement of Svetozar Stanić dated 16 December 2012), paras. 15, 18.
8028
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 68; KDZ020, T. 12524 (28 February 2011) (private session).
8029
P5737 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor, Mlado LNU and Pero Radović, 3 April 1992), p. 1.
8030
P5737 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor, Mlado LNU and Pero Radović, 3 April 1992), p. 2.
8031
P5736 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 3 April 1992), p. 3. A few days later, Tintor reported that the Accused had
tried to contact him. See P5743 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and Danilo Veselinović, 6 April 1992), p. 4.
8032
P2359 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 4 April 1992), p. 1.
 441

Kobilja Glava started their campaign against the Serb village Graoviste, and Krajisnik
advised Tintor not to panic and to avoid any trouble. See: P02359:

So, the Serbs were not supposed to react on an obvious jeopardy just in the eve of the war.
See further:

(D
epicted that way and in this context, this conversation suggested that it had something to do
with expelling the Muslims, while the case was all the way around – the #Muslims started
their attack # on the Serb village Graoviste. Many Serb civilians had been killed in
Graoviste.#Misinterpreted, abused#!) On the same day, Koprivica told General ĐurĊevac that
hundreds of Muslim reservists who had fled Ilijaš and the police reserve force had mobilised in
order to take over the Vogošća SJB; he then requested intervention by the JNA.8033 However,
ĐurĊevac rejected Koprivica‘s request and advised him to ―[a]ct according to the instructions on
operation in the crisis situation, you have those instructions work‖.8034

2376. Between 4 and 17 April 1992, Serb Forces took over major parts of Vogošća
municipality.8035 The Municipality building was surrounded by members of the TO and Tintor
raised the Serb flag on top of it.8036 (The illegal mobilisation call by the BiH Presidency on 4
April introduced BiH in the civil war, declaring the JNA and the Serbs in BiH as enemies!
What is a meaning of this paragraph: whether the Serbs were not entitled to do so, while
they had been declared war?)

2377. On or about 18 April 1992, a special unit of the BiH MUP under the command of Dragan
Vikić entered a military plant in the Pretis factory and took possession of vehicles and military
equipment, including a truckload of shells, and headed to Sarajevo.8037 The following day at
around noon, Safet Hadţić and other members of the Novi Grad TO also went to the Pretis factory
to take weapons but were intercepted by members of the Vogošća TO and the JNA. 8038 During the
8033
D1109 (Intercept of conversation between Rajko Koprivica and ÐurĊevac, 3 April 1992), p. 2.
8034
D1109 (Intercept of conversation between Rajko Koprivica and ÐurĊevac, 3 April 1992), p. 2.
8035
P5512 (Report of RS MUP regarding Vogošća SJB, 12 November 1992), p. 1.
8036
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 66. In an interview with journalists from Naš Glas and Serbian Radio, published on
13 July 1992, Koprivica boasted that ―we set up a crisis staff and one morning, stormed the Assembly building and took control of it‖. See D4028 (Article
from Naš Glas entitled ―Vogošća has a future‖, 13 June 1992), p. 1.
8037
KDZ020, T. 12613–12614, 12621 (1 March 2011); D2678 (Witness statement of Svetozar Stanić dated 16 December 2012), paras. 7, 22; Svetozar Stanić, T.
31708, 31714 (18 December 2012); D2681 (Report of Vogošća Municipal Secretariat for National Defence, 18 April 1992); P5720 (Intercept of
conversation between Milutin Kukanjac and Radovan Karadţić, 18 April 1992); D2444 (Witness statement of Miladin Trifunović dated 11 November
2012), para. 10; D3068 (Letter from Milutin Kukanjac to Alija Izetbegović, 19 April 1992), e-court p. 1; D3069 (JNA 2nd Military District report, 20 April
1992), p. 1; D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), para. 187; P5721 (Intercept of conversation between Rajko
Koprivica and Momĉilo Mandić, 18 April 1992); P5718 (Intercept of conversation between Milutin Kukanjac and Momĉilo Mandić, 18 April 1992), p. 2;
P2226 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and Vukota Vuković, 18 April 1992).
8038
KDZ020, T. 12640–12641 (1 March 2011); D2444 (Witness statement of Miladin Trifunović dated 11 November 2012), para. 10.
 442

ensuing gunfight, Hadţić and four other members of the Novi Grad TO were killed and others
were wounded.8039 In response to the Pretis attacks, Tintor ordered the mobilisation of the
Vogošća TO.8040

2378. On 18 April 1992, the JNA deployed heavy weapons and tanks inside and around
Vogošća town as well as on the main roads.8041

2379. Two or three weeks after the take-over of Vogošća, non-Serb policemen moved out and set
up separate offices in Donji Hotonj and in Ugorsko, while all Serb reserve staff left the Hotonj
station with their weapons and joined the Serb reserve station in Blagovac.8042 From this point
onwards, the Vogošća SJB remained under the control of Bosnian Serb authorities.8043 (While the
Muslim SJB was under the control of the Muslim police officers, wasn’t it? This was
appointed through the negotiations on the transformation of the MUP far before the war!)

Take-over of Svrake (#A Muslim stronghold#!)

2380. In the evening of 2 May 1992, military formations organised by the SDS, in co-ordination
with the JNA, (All the way around, JNA competence#!) launched an attack against Svrake from
their positions in Krivoglavci, Paljevo, Neboĉaj, and the Semizovac Barracks.8044 During this
attack, which lasted two days, one villager was killed, four were wounded, and 36 houses were
destroyed.8045 (#Abuse of civil settlement#! #militarised stronghold#! #Time frame#!
#Context#! The Chamber missed every single point relevant to understand this event! How
come this “attack” lasted two days??? If it was just a village, and not an armed stronghold of
the Patriotic League and the Green Berets, the “attack” wouldn’t last more than two hours!
Shouldn’t it be of any help to the Chamber to remember that it happened after the known
attack of the Green Berets and Patriotic League on the JNA, which was repeated on 3 May,
in the very centre of Sarajevo, with a horrible carnage? So, the JNA had been decraled a war
by those attacks. In the case of Semizovac Barracks, wherever there was the JNA, up until 20
May, that was their action, and the TO had to follow it! The SDS didn’t have any armed
group!)

2381. On 4 May 1992, using a loudspeaker, local Serbs called on the villagers, announcing that
nothing would happen to them if they left.8046 (#Legal obligation#! An offering to leave, and
even removing a civilians from a combat zone was an obligation according to the law!) as it
was reiterated in the agreements, no presence of civilians should influence military

8039
KDZ020, T. 12621–12622, 12641 (1 March 2011); D3069 (JNA 2nd Military District report, 20 April 1992), p. 1; D3065 (Witness statement of Aleksandar
Vasiljević dated 26 February 2013), para. 187; P5714 (Intercept of conversation between Milenko Karišik and unidentified male, 19 April 1992). The
Chamber notes that these killings are not charged in either Schedule A or B of the Indictment. See fn. 13.
8040
D2444 (Witness statement of Miladin Trifunović dated 11 November 2012), para. 6; P1505 (SRK Order, 22 May 1992), p. 2; P2624 (Vogošća Crisis Staff
Announcement, 11 May 1992), p. 1.
8041
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 10.
8042
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 62, 65; KDZ020, T. 12473 (25 February 2011). However, Eset Muraĉević, the
Bosnian Muslim Secretary of the local commune of Svrake until May 1992, testified that it was after an attack on a police patrol in Krivoglavci in early
March 1992, that the employees of the Vogošća SJB effectively split on an ethnic basis, with Muslim and Croat policemen setting up a station in Svrake as
well as a police check-point on the Sarajevo-Zenica main road. See P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 1, 8; Eset
Muraĉević, T. 12649, 12669, 12705 (1 March 2011). The Chamber finds that the evidence of KDZ020, a police officer in Vogošća at the material time, as
to the timing of the event carries more weight.
8043
Mirsad Kuĉanin, P15 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Galić), T. 4499–4500 (under seal); Mirsad Kuĉanin, P17 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević),
T. 28934–28935.
8044
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 11, 13; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12687, 12702 (1 March 2011), T. 12736 (2 March
2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2601.
8045
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 13; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12740–12741 (2 March 2011). The Chamber notes that
this killing is not charged in Schedule A of the Indictment.
8046
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 15; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12746 (2 March 2011).
 443

development, i.e. no a warring side was allowed to hide behind it’s own civilians! See:
D4710:

There were several such agreements which contained a commitment about the return of
refugees, all of them signed by the President or his plenipotentiaries, and that is #the only
official position#n on this issue. Why would the Chamber consider some jokes told in
telephone conversations, or even some parliamentaries disussions, since the only relevant
was what the President signed! #Jokes against documents#! ) In accordance with an agreement
subsequently reached between local Bosnian Serb and Muslim representatives, most of the Muslim
population which numbered about 1,000 left Svrake in order to go to Breza and the surrounding
areas via Semizovac.8047 Despite the agreement, however, one part of the convoy, which consisted
of 430 Bosnian Muslims, was stopped in Semizovac by a number of local Serbs in former JNA
and camouflage uniforms and eventually taken to the Semizovac Barracks.8048 (#JNA property,
JNA competence#! If they took them, particularly contrary to the agreement, it must be the
JNA, because the local Serbs would not have any competences over the Barracks.)

Developments in Vogošća after the take-over of the municipality

2382. After the take-over of Svrake, Serbs Forces continued to expel non-Serbs from their homes
throughout the municipality, in particular in Svrake and Bioĉa.8049 Non-Serb workers at the
Vogošća Medical Centre were suspended from their jobs.8050 Several Serb paramilitary and
volunteer groups, including Šešelj‘s men headed by Vaske Vidović, a paramilitary group led by
Boro Radić,8051 and the Šoša Detachment under the command of Major Jovo Ostojić8052 took part
in combat activities in Vogošća alongside the Bosnian Serb authorities.8053 Vogošća municipal
authorities allocated resources to paramilitary formations, such as Radić‘s group, and even
remunerated them for their services.8054 (#Legal volunteers#! This means that they had been
recognized the status of volunteers according to the domestic legislation. At the beginning of
the conflict all the volunteers to the JNA were welcome, but later some of them acted
independently and came under the Serb authorities persecution.)

8047
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 15; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12714–12715 (1 March 2011), T. 12747 (2 March
2011).
8048
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 15–16; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12714–12716, 12722–12723 (1 March 2011), T.
12746–12748 (2 March 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2601.
8049
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 14.
8050
P2635 (Conclusions of Vogošća‘s Crisis Staff, 16 May 1992).
8051
Radić had the support of the SDS and he eventually was integrated into the VRS and given a rank. See KDZ020, T. 12524 (28 February 2011) (private
session); P2366 (List of members of special detachment, 25 May 1992).
8052
The Šoša Detachment which consisted of individuals from Sombor, Serbia, arrived in late May or early June 1992, and was immediately placed under the
command of VRS. See D2678 (Witness statement of Svetozar Stanić dated 16 December 2012), para. 14.
8053
P2344 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 72 (under seal); KDZ020, T. 12625–12626 (1 March 2011); P6003 (Article from Naš
Glas entitled ―Elevation 681 has fallen‖, 12 August 1992), p. 1.
8054
P6001 (Request of Vogošća Municipality War Commission, 27 June 1992); P2373 (Vogošća Executive Board request to SerBiH Ministry of Finance, 15
July 1992); P2377 (Vogošća Wartime Commission conclusions, 30 July 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact 2597. But see Miladin Trifunović, T. 30444
(27 November 2012)(testifying that there were many paramilitary units in Vogošća and that they acted independently); D4027 (Witness statement of Nikola
Poplašen dated 11 November 2013), para. 12 (testifying that paramilitary formations refused to be placed under any military command, that they acted
independently, and that Vogošća municipal authorities took the necessary measures with a view to removing them from the territory of Vogošća). The
Chamber finds that the evidence of Trifunović and Poplašen in this regard to be unreliable and that it was marked by clear indicators of bias and partiality.
 444

2383. In May 1992, Šešelj‘s men attacked the village of Tihovići and killed about 20 people,
including a number of Bosnian Muslim reserve policemen.8055 (Obviously, it was an armed
skirmish, otherwise there wouldn’t be any Muslim reserve policemen! This court is
completely neglecting the rights of the local people to defend themselves. Those were a
residents in the neighbouring villages, and very rarely some volunteers! As the ordinary
peasants or a facroty workers, they weren’t interested in any skirmishes, because their
families had been exposed to anm aextreme danger. But, if the next village is full of “reserve
policemen” which meant – of the secret army soldiers, nobody could order them not to
defend and not to take a precautionary measures! This is provided by the domestic
legislation, but also the international covenants and documents do not ban a defence! This is
unique example of a “take it easy” trials. Nothing is established properly!)

2384. On 16 May 1992, the Vogošća Crisis Staff concluded that mopping up operations should
be conducted in Semizovac and indicated that similar operations were already underway in
Svrake.8056 (So what? If the Muslims in Semizovac and Svrake decided to wage a war against
their Serb neighbours, at that moment there is a military logics stepping up, while the
politics is pulling back!#Yet, it was before VRS been formed, and the Crisis Staff was obliged
to follow the JNA#)

2385. Between mid-April and November 1992, police officers engaged in combat operations and
many of them also participated in criminal activities.8057 (How do we know that? Because the
superiors in the same Police investigated and reported. #Next level# acted! Since it was
reported by the Serb authorities, it was clear that it wasn’t tolerated by the MUP officials!!!)
The Minister of Interior Mr. Mico Stanisic hade chasen up to 6,000 reserve and not-enough-
professional policemen from the MUP and sent them to the VRS, i.e. Army, to be deployed
along the confrontation lines! This is a huge fact, and #EXCULPATORY# for the entire
Serb leadership! Had the Serb side made any Joint Criminal Enterprize as alleged, the
Minister of Interior would welcome those incompetent and irresponsible!)

2386. On 14 November 1992, Momĉilo Krajišnik attended the Vogošća Serb Assembly session
during which it was stated that the take-over of the municipality had been a success but that the
area up to the predominantly Muslim village Kobilja Glava still had to be cleaned up.8058
(#Constant Muslim attacks#! There were a constant attacks from Kobilja Glava location,
and it would be a legitimate to neutralise those attacks.)

Scheduled Incident D.21

2387. The Indictment refers to the destruction of the Ugorsko mosque as well as the Semizovac
Catholic church between April and September 1992.8059

8055
P2344 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 72 (under seal). These killings are not charged in either Schedule A or B of the
Indictment.
8056
P2635 (Conclusions of Vogošća‘s Crisis Staff, 16 May 1992).
8057
P5512 (Report of RS MUP regarding Vogošća SJB, 12 November 1992), pp. 2–5. See also Adjudicated Facts 2598, 2599, 2600.
But, this means that
it wasn’t tolerated by the MUP officials!!! It was reported by the officers of the same police, and it was #commendable
and exculpatory#! On the basis of such reports the Minister of Interior (M. Stanisic) had expelled around 6.000
unreliable policemen, redirecting them to the Army!
8058
P5511 (Minutes of the 3rd meeting of the Vogošća Municipal Assembly, 14 November 1992), pp. 2, 9.
8059
Indictment, Scheduled Incident D.21. The Indictment initially also referred to the Karauka-Donja mosque under Scheduled Incident D.21. Subsequently,
however, the Prosecution indicated that the Karauka-Donja mosque should refer to the Karaula mekteb which was located in Ilijaš Municipality. See
Indictment, Scheduled Incident D.21, fn. 21. In its Final Brief, the Prosecution confirmed the exclusion of the Karauka-Donja mosque from the scope of
Scheduled Incident D.21. See Prosecution Final Brief, Appendix B, p. 60, fn. 874.
 445

2388. According to Riedlmayer, the Ugorsko mosque in the southern part of Vogošća was
―heavily damaged‖ by Serb shelling on 1 September 1992, and the Catholic church in Semizovac
was ―completely destroyed‖ by Serb forces after they took control of the area at the beginning of
May 1992.8060 While the Chamber relies on Riedlmayer for the purposes of finding that the
mosque and the church in question were destroyed, and determining the nature and extent of the
damage to those sites, it does not rely on his evidence in order to determine who was responsible
for the destruction as such matters fall outside Riedlmayer‘s expertise and are based on statements
which he received from informants.8061 (Thanks God for this sensitivity of the Chamber, but
the Chamber is right for another, additional reason: the Mosque and the Church had been
along the confrontation line, and the circumstances are not clarified. Certainly, the President
issued all the needed orders for the protection of those temples!#Contra the President
orders#!)

2389. Having received no other evidence concerning Scheduled Incident D.21, the Chamber is
not satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that Serb Forces heavily damaged and completely
destroyed the Ugorsko mosque and the Catholic church in Semizovac between April and
September 1992.

Detention facilities in Vogošća

2390. There were several detention facilities in Vogošća, including a World War II era bunker
known as ―the Bunker‖ and ―Planjo‘s House‖.8062

2391. All detention facilities in Vogošća were run by one reserve police unit under the
command of Branko Vlaĉo.8063 Vlaĉo answered to the Crisis Staff and determined who entered or
exited the Bunker and Planjo‘s House.8064 Nebojša Špirić was Vlaĉo‘s deputy and was formally
appointed as commander of the guards for the Vogošća detention facilities.8065 Špirić later
replaced Vlaĉo and became the warden of all detention facilities in Vogošća.8066

Scheduled Detention Facility C.26.3

2392. The Indictment refers to the use of the Bunker in Vogošća as a detention facility at least
between May and July 1992.

8060
P4070 (Attachment to the expert report of András J. Riedlmayer, entitled ―Destruction of Cultural Heritage in BiH‖ prepared for the Karadţić case,
formatted records), e-court pp. 323–327; P4071 (Slide images of damaged religious sites in BiH), e-court p. 2; András J. Riedlmayer, T. 22531 (8 December
2011). See also P4069 (Cultural destruction database), records 328–329; P2362 (Map of Vogošća municipality with photographs).
8061
The Chamber notes that it received evidence as to the destruction of the mosque in Svrake. See P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24
February 2011), para. 58; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12652 (1 March 2011), T. 12737, 12739 (2 March 2011); P4069 (Cultural destruction database), record 331.
However, this evidence is not relevant to Scheduled Incident D.21.
8062
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 73; P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 17,
19, 21; Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8973–8974; D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013),
para. 12; Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35141–35142 (11 March 2013); P2362 (Map of Vogošća municipality with photographs).
8063
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), paras. 73, 76; P2372 (Vogošća municipality list of prisoners, 5 July 1992); P2361 (Witness
statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 19, 47, 73; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12653 (1 March 2011); P2374 (SerBiH Ministry of Justice
decision, 21 July 1992); P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 74; Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12384 (24 February 2011);
Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35165 (11 March 2013); P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), para. 24; P124 (Witness statement of Zijad
Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court pp. 6–7.
8064
Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35198 (11 March 2013); P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 19, Eset Muraĉević, T. 12653 (1
March 2011).
8065
P2375 (SerBiH Ministry of Justice decision, 21 July 1992); P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 74; Ramiz Mujkić, T.
12384 (24 February 2011); Bego Selimović, P44 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 10932.
8066
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 43, 73; P2393 (List of prisoners in KP Dom Butmir, 19 December 1992), p. 3;
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 7.
 446

Establishment and control

2393. The Bunker was a concrete structure of about 36 square metres that had been built during
World War II.8067 It had concrete floors, one door and a small window with metal bars.8068 It was
situated in close proximity to a river and a local restaurant and motel called ―Kon Tiki‖, also
known as ―Kod Sonja‖.8069 Kod Sonja served as the headquarters of the Vogošća Crisis Staff.8070

2394. On 2 May 1992, Slavko Jovanović, acting on behalf of Tintor, ordered Ţeljka Beganović,
the son of the owner of Kod Sonja, to provide suitable premises to the Vogošća SJB and TO for
the purpose of questioning detained persons.8071 Individuals captured during combat in Vogošća,
Svrake and Semizovac were transferred to the Bunker.8072

2395. There were on average 30 to 70 persons detained in the Bunker.8073 Initially, four women
were held in the Bunker and the adjoining buildings.8074 Later on, more women were also brought
to Kod Sonja.8075 Individuals in the Bunker were detained upon the orders of the Vogošća Crisis
Staff and the VRS.8076 Vlaĉo gave specific instructions to Radić to arrest people and bring them in
for questioning.8077

2396. A guard patrolled at the top of the Bunker and approximately ten guards secured its
surroundings.8078 Some guards at the Bunker and Kod Sonja wore old JNA uniforms,8079 while
soldiers there were seen usually wearing camouflage uniforms and cockades.8080 Some of them
boasted that they were from Serbia or that they were Šešelj‘s men.8081 (This is for the first time
correct, “boasted”! Many boasted and declared themselves as they wanted, in order to
impress the environment and get some respect!)

2397. As found above, on 4 May 1992, after the take-over of Svrake, a large group of Bosnian
Muslim villagers was apprehended by Serb Forces and taken to the Semizovac Barracks.8082
There, the Bosnian Muslim men, women and children were placed in a hangar which had been
previously used for storing tanks.8083 After two days, the women and children were separated

8067
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 73; P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 21;
P2362 (Map of Vogošća municipality with photographs); Eset Muraĉević, T. 12650 (1 March 2011).
8068
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 21.
8069
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 21, 38; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12650 (1 March 2011); P2353 (Photograph of
house); P2354 (Aerial photograph marked by KDZ020); P2344 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 73 (under seal); P2314
(Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 68; P2327 (Map marked by Ramiz Mujkić); D2678 (Witness statement of Svetozar
Stanić dated 16 December 2012), para. 13; Svetozar Stanić, T. 31687, 31721–31722 (18 December 2012); Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35161 (11 March 2013).
The Bunker itself was sometimes called Kon Tiki. See P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 21.
8070
Svetozar Stanić, T. 31686 (18 December 2012).
8071
P2398 (Vogošća Municipal Assembly order, 2 May 1992); Eset Muraĉević, T. 12800 (2 March 2011); Svetozar Stanić, T. 31686, 31721–31722 (18
December 2012). Svetozar Stanić testified that after its requisition, Kod Sonja served as a place where ―prisoners of war‖ were temporarily detained until
they could be transferred to Kula for further processing. See D2678 (Witness statement of Svetozar Stanić dated 16 December 2012), para. 13; Svetozar
Stanić, T. 31686, 31690, 31723 (18 December 2012).
8072
D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 12.
8073
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 23; P2372 (Vogošća municipality list of prisoners, 5 July 1992); P2376
(Vogošća municipality list of prisoners, 26 July 1992).
8074
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 23, 29.
8075
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 29.
8076
Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35161–35162 (11 March 2013).
8077
Many detainees told Muraĉević that they had been arrested by Radić‘s unit. See P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011),
para. 47.
8078
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 21; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12766 (2 March 2011).
8079
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 43.
8080
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 44; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12767 (2 March 2011).
8081
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 44.
8082
See para. 2381.
8083
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 15.
 447

from the men and taken back to Svrake.8084 Approximately 150 able-bodied men were taken to a
place called ―Naka‘s Garage‖ whereas a few individuals, including Muraĉević, were taken to the
Bunker by Predrag Ţarković and Nebojša Lazić, a paramilitary from Serbia.8085 (#Before VRS,
during massacres of the JNA soldiers in Sarajevo# However, it is obvious that the JNA acted
in the light of the two massacres of the JNA column in Sarajevo, that happened on2 and 3
May. Sarajevo was a couple of tens kilometres from Svrake, as a matter of fact all of those
localities were within the City of Sarajevo. Without these #contexts# nothing could be
understood correctly, and the truth will not be seen. However, even Eset Muracevic,
otherwise a combatant who admitted that he smuggled grenades from Sarajevo to his village,
admitted that only nine people out of several hundreds had been detained, the rest were
released immediately after the first checking of involvement! Again, what it has to do with
this President, or the Serbs in Bosnia anyway?)

Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

2398. The roof of the Bunker had holes through which rainwater entered.8086 Inside the Bunker,
it was very dark, cold and, wet.8087 Detainees slept on a dirty concrete floor.8088 On or about
16 May 1992, the guards brought gym mats but these mats became soaked with rainwater.8089 All
the garbage and leftovers from Kod Sonja were thrown downhill and accumulated around the
Bunker.8090

2399. Little food was provided to the detainees and the guards decided who received food and
who did not.8091 At times, the food which was intended for the detainees was given to dogs.8092
The guards sometimes used the same bowls they had used to feed the dogs to distribute food to the
detainees.8093

2400. During the initial period at the Bunker, the guards took the detainees outside so that they
could use the toilet.8094 As the number of detainees increased later on, however, the guards placed
a bucket inside and at times, this bucket was not emptied for days.8095 The Bunker did not have a
water tap and Eset Muraĉević only managed to wash his face for the first time during his detention
in early August.8096 Slobodan Avlijaš who became a member of the SerBiH Commission for the
Inspection of Collection Centres in August 1992,8097 testified that during an official visit to the
Bunker, he observed the detainees‘ conditions and found them to be so inhumane that he was left
―feeling horror‖.8098 (#Next level#! Again, a higher official was critical of the conditions, and

8084
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 17; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12723–12724 (1 March 2011), T. 12748 (2 March
2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2601.
8085
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 17, 20; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12652 (1 March 2011), T. 12748 (2 March 2011);
P2363 (Photograph of garage).
8086
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 38.
8087
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 38.
8088
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 38; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12753 (2 March 2011).
8089
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 38.
8090
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 38.
8091
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 39.
8092
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 39.
8093
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 39.
8094
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 40.
8095
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 40.
8096
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 41.
8097
D466 (Decision of Government of SerBiH on establishment of Commission for Inspection of Collection Centres and other facilities for prisoners, 9 August
1992), p. 2.
8098
Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35158–35161 (11 March 2013).
 448

had it been a deliberate and planned conduct of the state organs, he wouldn’t complain, and
there wouldn’t be any inspection!)

2401. The women detained at the Bunker were subjected to sexual abuse at the Bunker, at its
surrounding buildings, and at Serb frontline positions.8099

2402. During his first day in the Bunker, Muraĉević was forced to run the gauntlet.8100 Later that
same day, he was taken, blindfolded, to a bridge where he was interrogated, threatened, and beaten
by Predrag Jovanović, Lazić, and Ţarković.8101 (A paramilitaries!)

2403. In early May 1992, detainees at the Bunker were taken out on a daily basis for
interrogation, during the course of which beatings occurred.8102 Later, interrogations continued
but they were not always accompanied by beatings.8103 Those involved in the interrogations and
beatings were guards and two inspectors by the names of Mile Renovica and Slaviša Mišić, as well
as Vlaĉo and Ţivko Lazarević, a former inspector at the Vogošća SJB.8104 (It is hard to believe
that Renovica, Misic and Lazarevic, as a high professionals, would be involved in any
unlawful activity. All of it is based on the only one witness statement, Eset Muracevic, an
extremist who fanatically fought agains the Serbs!#Unproven#!)

2404. From the Bunker, detainees were also brought to the Vogošća SJB for questioning.8105
Detainees were also taken out of the Bunker to work on trenches and perform other forms of
labour.8106

2405. The guards threatened the detainees, stole from them, or brought people from the outside
to mistreat them in the absence of Vlaĉo.8107 (Sic!!! “in the absence of Vlaco”, as a superior,
which confirms the fact that the authorities were against any abuse or irregular conditions
and conduct towards the detainees!#Next level# ) The guards as well as members of Šešelj‘s
men threw smoke grenades, tear gas grenades and stink bombs into the Bunker in the presence of
Vlaĉo.8108 (Since Vlaco couldn’t be in Bunker, how Muracevic could have known that Vlaco
was around?)

2406. On one occasion, six members of Šešelj‘s men, in the presence of Vlaĉo and other
guards, took Ahmet Hido and Hasan Abaz, kicked them, and hit them with their fists and rifle
butts.8109 Afterwards, they forced the two Bosnian Muslim men to have oral sex and sexual
intercourse.8110 The Šešelj‘s men then forced Hasan Abaz to jump off a three metre high wall with
his bare chest first several times.8111 Abaz sustained severe injuries from these jumps and

8099
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 29–30; D4002 (Letter from BiH MUP to Vasvija Vidović, 4 July 1995), p. 56.
8100
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 25.
8101
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 25.
8102
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 26–27 (also testifying that during the interrogations, the detainees were
accused of organising the resistance in Svrake and of harbouring the intention to create an Islamic state).
8103
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 28.
8104
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 26–27.
8105
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 28; P2344 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 74
(under seal); P2355 (Aerial photograph marked by KDZ020).
8106
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 34, 49, 54–57.
8107
Eset Muraĉević, T. 12767–12770 (2 March 2011); P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 33, 44.
8108
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 46; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12767–12768 (2 March 2011).
8109
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 45.
8110
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 45; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12787 (2 March 2011).
8111
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 45; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12787 (2 March 2011).
 449

subsequently vomited blood.8112 Similarly, Nijaz Salkić and Taib Kodţaga were forced to jump
off the upper level of the Bunker.8113

2407. On 26 May 1992, the detainees were informed that UNPROFOR would visit the Bunker
the following day. They were ordered to wash themselves with a hose beside Kod Sonja.8114
Muraĉević and four other detainees were selected as spokespersons in case UNPROFOR asked
any questions.8115 The detainees were threatened with severe punishment in the event they
complained.8116 The next day, UNPROFOR personnel came but did not enter the Bunker.8117

2408. Around the end of May 1992, Muraĉević was told that he would be sent back to Svrake in
order to be killed there by Muslims.8118 He was then blindfolded and taken to Naka‘s Garage for
one night where he saw 150 individuals, many of them from Svrake.8119

2409. On 25 May 1992, the Serb municipality of Vogošća Department for Judiciary,
Administration and Regulations proposed the exchange of 15 ―citizens of Muslim ethnicity‖
captured in the residential area of Svrake for a number of Serbs who had been detained in
Visoko.8120 Pursuant to a decision made by the Head of the Department for Judiciary, on 25 May
1992, with the approval of the Vogošća Crisis Staff, 21 ―[c]itizens of Muslim nationality who were
captured in fights in Svrake‖ were to be exchanged in Lješevo for three Serbs who were detained
in prisons in Visoko municipality.8121 (This is a #“cotradictio in adjecto”# – “#citizens
captured in fights in Svrake#” couldn’t be mere “citizens” but rather combatants, as
Muracevic confessed how he was known as a combatant and smuggler of grenades, in
arming his village Svrake!#Witness, extremist, combatant#!)

(c) Conclusion

2410. Based on the foregoing, the Chamber finds that Serb Forces detained non-Serbs from Vogošća
and surrounding areas, including civilian males and females, at the Bunker. The Chamber further
finds that the detainees were held in poor conditions. These included a lack of adequate food,
sanitary facilities and general hygiene. The Chamber also finds that the male detainees were
subjected to beatings and forced labour and that both male and female detainees were subjected to
acts of sexual violence. (For those allegations, which sound as unbelievable and instructed by
the Muslim secret services, there would be essential any corroboration. Such a bizarre
conduct, particularly sexual, couldn’t be kept as a secret, but no a single trace about it in any
of the communications! Muracevic shouldn’t be considered as reliable and unbiased witness,
because he was a combatant, and had a motive to tell lies. A several of the Prosecution
witnesses looks like educated what to tell, and there are always some peculiarities that are
difficult to be checked. Since all of those alleged misdeeds had been strictly forbidden by the
President, these allegations even if true, could not have been used against the President!)

(2) Scheduled Detention Facility C.26.1

8112
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 45.
8113
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 45.
8114
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 31.
8115
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 32.
8116
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 32.
8117
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 33; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12755–12757 (2 March 2011).
8118
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 36.
8119
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 35–36; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12748–12749 (2 March 2011). The Chamber notes
that Naka‘s Garage is not a scheduled detention facility in the Indictment.
8120
P2367 (Decision of Vogošća Department for Judiciary, 25 May 1992), p. 1.
8121
P2356 (Vogošća municipality department for judiciary decision to release prisoners, 25 May 1992).
 450

2411. The Prosecution refers to the use of Planjo‘s House in Svrake as a detention facility from
early July 1992 until at least February 1993.8122

Establishment and control

2412. Planjo‘s House was situated between Svrake and Semizovac, some 200 metres from the
Sarajevo-Zenica road.8123 It had a garage, an attic, and three spacious floors.8124 Planjo‘s House
was originally a private property owned by two Muslims, Almas Planjo and Miralem Planjo.8125

2413. In early July 1992, Avlijaš advised the authorities of the Serb municipality of Vogošća
that Planjo‘s House should replace the Bunker as a detention facility.8126 According to Avlijaš,
Planjo‘s House was chosen for two reasons: (i) it was further away from the frontlines and could
therefore not be shelled by Muslim forces; (ii) it was more suitable to serve as a detention facility
and conformed with the President‘s instructions concerning the treatment of captured persons.8127
On 8 July 1992, the Municipal Secretariat for Town Planning temporarily turned Planjo‘s House
over to the Ministry of Justice, for the needs of the Prison Department of Vogošća.8128

2414. From August 1992, mainly non-Serbs,8129 including women and children, were detained
in Planjo‘s House.8130 On 11 August 1992, Vlaĉo and a few guards transferred Muraĉević and
about 30 of the 40 or so detainees who were left in the Bunker to Planjo‘s House which was at the
time empty.8131 The detainees were placed in the cellar.8132 On 17 August 1992, the Ilijaš SJB
brought 91 Bosnian Muslims who had been detained in Ilijaš.8133 On 22 August 1992, Ramiz
Mujkić who had been detained in the Rajlovac Barracks, in Novi Grad municipality, was also
transferred to Planjo‘s House.8134 In late September or October 1992, about 70 Bosnian Muslim
men who had been detained in the Hadţići Culture and Sport Centre were transferred to Planjo‘s
house.8135 Apart from these instances, detainees were brought from other places around the
8122
Indictment, Scheduled Detention Facility C.26.1. The Indictment originally referred to the period between August 1992 until December 1992. However, by
virtue of the Prosecution Rule 73 bis Submission, Appendix B, p. 92, this period was extended to be from ealry July 1992 until at least February 1993.
8123
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 73; P2352 (Aerial photograph marked by KDZ020); P2361 (Witness statement of Eset
Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 35; P2327 (Map marked by Ramiz Mujkić); P2362 (Map of Vogošća municipality with photographs); P2328
(Photograph of Planjo‘s house); P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 124–125.
8124
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 124–125; P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011),
paras. 70, 72; P2328 (Photograph of Planjo‘s house); P2343 (Information report of Ramiz Mujkić, 4 July 2004), p. 16; Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12462–12463 (25
February 2011); P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), para. 22.
8125
P1605 (Decision of Vogošća Municipal Secretariat, 8 July 1992); P42 (Witness statement of Mustafa Fazlić dated 22 June 1997), p. 4; P2314 (Witness
statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 70; Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12383 (24 February 2011).
8126
D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 13; Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35142, 35198–35199 (11 March 2013).
8127
D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 13; Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35198 (11 March 2013); P1134 (SerBiH Ministry of
Defence Instructions on the Treatment of Captured Persons, 13 June 1992).
8128
P1605 (Decision of Vogošća Municipal Secretariat, 8 July 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact 2650. However, according to Avlijaš, the RS Ministry of
Justice was only responsible for the security and well-being of the prisoners whereas the army was in charge of all other matters, including prisoner
exchanges and prisoner labour. Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35165–35166 (11 March 2013).
8129
One of the male detainees in Planjo‘s House was a Bosnian Serb but he was promptly transferred to Kula. A Bosnian Serb woman who had been married to
a Muslim, and her young son were also detained in Planjo‘s House. See P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 73; Bego
Selimović, P44 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 10927. See also Adjudicated Fact 2652.
8130
Bego Selimović, P44 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 10924, 10926–10927; P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-
court p. 9; P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 81. See also Adjudicated Fact 2652.
8131
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 63–64.
8132
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 64.
8133
P42 (Witness statement of Mustafa Fazlić dated 22 June 1997), p. 4; P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), paras. 20–22; P47
(Statement of Bego Selimović to Ilijaš Municipality Commission for Crime Investigation, 5 April 1993), para. 23; P2379 (Vogošća prison bulletin,
17 August 1992); P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 64. See also Adjudicated Facts 2648, 2649, 2651.
8134
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), paras. 68–69; P2326 (Vogošća municipality prison report re Ramiz Mujkić, 22 August
1992).
8135
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 123; P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 6;
P125 (Zijad Okić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 3 February 1993), p. 2; P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 81;
D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 32; P1607 (RS Ministry of Justice report on prisons and camps on the RS
territory, 22 October 1992), e-court p. 28. During a visit to Hadţići Culture and Sport Centre, Avlijaš recommended the transfer of the detainees to Planjo‘s
House because he was afraid that relatives of Bosnian Serbs held by the Muslim side in Tarĉin would exact revenge on those detainees. See D3105 (Witness
statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 32; Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35143–35144 (11 March 2013).
 451

municipality of Vogošća, such as Visoko, Sokolac, Hadţići, Bioĉa, Doglodi, and Nahorevo.8136 In
December 1992, four girls between the ages of 16 and 22 were brought to Planjo‘s House.8137
(#Deadly combination#! A Rule 92bis evidence, impossible to check and incorrect to charge
this President for such an allegation! No a single trace about it anywhere, except in this one
statement of a Serb adversary!)

2415. From 22 August 1992 until mid October 1992, Planjo‘s House alone housed between 100
and 150 detainees.8138 This number later increased to 200.8139 Women and children were held in
separate quarters.8140

2416. Armed soldiers and policemen who were dressed in camouflage uniforms guarded
Planjo‘s House at all times.8141

2417. Around mid August 1992, Momĉilo Mandić and a Serb journalist visited Planjo‘s
House.8142 When queried by one of the detainees about possible exchanges, Mandić replied that
there was no need for any exchanges as the detainees were at their ―homes‖.8143

2418. At some point, those detained in Naka‘s Garage were allowed to return to Svrake under
the condition that they (i) report on a daily basis to the Serb authorities in order to be assigned and
carry out work and (ii) go back to Planjo‘s House every night in order to spend the night there.8144
However, eventually, these individuals were confined to Planjo‘s House during day-time as
well.8145

2419. On 23 October 1992, ICRC representatives came to Planjo‘s House, registered the
individuals held there. Some of the detainees were exchanged a few days later.8146

(b) Conditions of detention and treatment of detainees

2420. The food served in Planjo‘s House was of poor quality.8147 Some detainees slept in the
beds that were available, others slept on the floor, and a number slept on the stairs.8148 Blankets
were provided.8149 Detainees were allowed to use the bathroom, situated in the basement.8150

8136
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 81, 84.
8137
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 9.
8138
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), paras. 72–73; P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), para. 23;
P2357 (List of prisoners in Vogošća prison, 30 August 1992); P2339 (List of prisoners in Vogošća prison, 3 September 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact
2653.
8139
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 81; P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para.
72.
8140
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 81; Bego Selimović, P44 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 10924;
P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), para. 23; P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 9. See also
Adjudicated Fact 2652.
8141
P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), para. 24; Bego Selimović, P44 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 10928. See
also Adjudicated Fact 2652.
8142
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 62.
8143
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 62.
8144
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 35, 37; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12723–12724 (1 March 2011), T. 12748 (2 March
2011); P2368 (Vogošća Crisis Staff Order, 26 May 1992).
8145
Eset Muraĉević, T. 12724 (1 March 2011); T. 12748 (2 March 2011).
8146
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 82.
8147
P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), para. 25.
8148
P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), para. 25; P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 124.
8149
P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), para. 25.
8150
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), para. 126; P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), para. 25.
Trifunović who was the commander of the Vogošća Brigade at the time, testified that the conditions at Planjo‘s House were generally good, in particular,
that the rooms had large windows with good light and heating, and that there were toilets, showers, and a kitchen available to the detainees. D2444 (Witness
statement of Miladin Trifunović dated 11 November 2012), para. 1; Miladin Trifunović, T. 30373–20374 (15 November 2012). However, the Chamber
 452

2421. Muraĉević stated that although the conditions were slightly better in Planjo‘s House, the
treatment was the same as that in the Bunker, if not worse.8151

2422. In Planjo‘s House, some detainees were placed in a small isolation room.8152 Siniša
ƉurĊić and Nikola Jovanović, Tintor‘s personal driver, beat and abused the detainees and brought
their friends to watch.8153 After one such beating as a result of which one of the detainees was left
unconscious, one of ƉurĊić‘s friends drew out his gun and placed it in the mouths of several
detainees, threatening to kill everybody.8154

2423. One of the guards, Dragan Damjanović, often forced detainees to beat one another with
8155
batons. He also accompanied them to their work duties and physically abused them there.8156
On one occasion, Damjanović forced Bego Selimović and another man to carry the body of
someone who had been killed in the battlefield.8157 While Selimović and the man were carrying
the body, Damjanović repeatedly hit them with a piece of wood, to a point that Selimović‘s back
turned black.8158

2424. On 20 August 1992, Muraĉević and a group of approximately 50 prisoners were taken to
Ravne Hill in order to clear a small forest which had been burnt during fighting the day before.8159
The prisoners spent the entire day working without any food or water. Some fell from exhaustion
and were beaten with rifle butts.8160 On that same day, Muraĉević injured his hand while
working.8161 Due to lack of adequate medical care, the injury eventually became infected.8162

2425. One day, a mentally disabled detainee by the name of Pinjo cursed the Serb guards who
then beat him unconscious.8163 That same afternoon, Vlaĉo came to Planjo‘s House and after
hearing from the guards about what Pinjo had said, hit him with his pistol, causing him to fall.8164

2426. Sometimes during the weekends, intoxicated volunteers from Serbia came to Planjo‘s
House to beat and mistreat the detainees.8165 These individuals were called ―weekend Chetniks‖
by the prison guards.8166 On one occasion, one of these ―weekend Chetniks‖ entered Planjo‘s
House and ordered Mirsad Šehić to eat cigarette butts.8167 Šehić proceeded to chew the cigarette
butts but when he proved unable to swallow them, he was ordered to perform oral sex with another

rejects Trifunović‘s assertions in light of his lack of forthrightness as a witness and because of the consistent and reliable evidence which indicates that
contrary to Trifunović‘s claim, the conditions at Planjo‘s House were poor.
8151
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 65.
8152
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 66.
8153
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 66, 68. Mujkić testified that the guards did not abuse the detainees. Ramiz
Mujkić, T. 12386 (24 February 2011). The Chamber, however, does not find this part of Mujkić‘s testimony to be reliable and notes that Mujkić
contradicted himself on this point on two occasions. In his statement, Mujkić stated that a mentally disabled individual was beaten unconscious by the
guards and that a professor by the name of Zahid Baruĉija was mistreated by a guard who claimed to have been Baruĉija‘s former student. See P2314
(Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 75.
8154
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 66.
8155
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 87; Damjanović sometimes wore a black uniform and other times he wore a
camouflage uniform. He sometimes wore a black hat with a cockade. Bego Selimović, P44 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 10931.
8156
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 87; Bego Selimović, P44 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 10930–
10931.
8157
P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), para. 28.
8158
P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), para. 28.
8159
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 71–72 ; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12764 (2 March 2011).
8160
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 71; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12764 (2 March 2011).
8161
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 71; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12764–12765 (2 March 2011).
8162
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 71; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12765 (2 March 2011).
8163
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 75; Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12384–12385 (24 February 2011).
8164
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 75; Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12385 (24 February 2011).
8165
Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12385 (24 February 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 2654.
8166
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 80; Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12385 (24 February 2011).
8167
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 80.
 453

man in front of his own father.8168 According to Mujkić, in another instance, another ―weekend
Chetnik‖ forced a young detainee in Planjo‘s House to climb up a fence from the balcony and dive
onto the ground, head first.8169 (#Adversaries, free to lie#! All of this peculiar and disgusting
things seem as instructed. If anything like that really happened, there would be some
knowledge about it, there would be rumors, braggings, condemnation, and couldn’t be
hiden. But, how the President could be responsible for such a crimes, taking into account his
strict ban of anything like that?).

2427. On 18 June 1992, a compulsory work obligation was introduced for all citizens in
Vogošća.8170 (According to the #law of Defence#, all the citizens are either to have a military
compulsory obligation, or to have a working obligation! Since the “non-Serbs” hadn’t been
drafted for the military service, they had to work! Many Serbs envied them for that, because
the working obligation was much easier and safer!) On 7 August 1992, Poplašen requested the
approval of the SerBiH Ministry of Justice for ―occasional use of detainees for construction and
other work‖.8171 Three days, later, Mandić gave Poplašen approval.8172

2428. From late August until late January 1993, Serb Forces took non-Serb detainees from
Planjo‘s House to the frontlines and forced them to construct bunkers for Serb soldiers, dig
trenches, carry ammunition, cut wood, search for land mines, carry dead bodies, dig graves, or
serve as human shields.8173 The detainees who worked received more food and cigarettes from the
guards.8174 Dušan Arnaut and a man with the last name Milošević, who were both soldiers, drove
the detainees at Planjo‘s House to work and guarded them while they worked.8175 At times,
Damjanović also took the detainees to work.8176

2429. On 16 July 1992, the War Commission of the Serb municipality of Vogošća ordered the
exchange of a Bosnian Muslim ―prisoner of war‖ for a member of the Koševo Brigade held by the
Muslim side.8177 On 29 July 1992, the War Commission ordered the release of two Muslim

8168
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 80. See also Adjudicated Fact 2654.
8169
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 81; Ramiz Mujkić, T. 12411–12412 (25 February 2011).
8170
D4031 (Decision of Vogošća War Commission, 18 June 1992), p. 1; D4027 (Witness statement of Nikola Poplašen dated 11 November 2013), para. 24.
According to a decision adopted by the Vogošća War Commission on 23 June 1992, individuals who carried out their compulsory work obligation were to
be remunerated. See P2370 (Vogošća Wartime Commissariat Decision, 23 June 1992).
8171
P1606 (Request from Vogošća Municipality to Ministry of Justice of SerBiH, 6 August 1992).
8172
P1142 (Letter from Ministry of Justice of SerBiH to Vogošća War Presidency, 10 August 1992).
8173
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court pp. 6–7; P125 (Zijad Okić‘s statement to BiH authorities, 3 February 1993), p. 3; P2361
(Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 69, 71–72, 74–75, 77, 79, 87; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12763–12765 (2 March 2011);
P2403 (Witness statement of Mehmed Musić dated 28 February 2011), paras. 127, 129; P45 (Vogošća prison report, 29 August 1992); P5999 (Order of
Vogošća Brigade, 18 October 1992); P6000 (Order of Vogošća Brigade, 22 September 1992); P42 (Witness statement of Mustafa Fazlić dated 22 June
1997), pp. 4–6; Bego Selimović, P44 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 10929–10931; P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June
1997), paras. 25–30, 34–35, 37–38; P47 (Statement of Bego Selimović to Ilijaš Municipality Commission for Crime Investigation, 5 April 1993), para. 24;
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), paras. 76–79; P2381 (Vogošća prison report, 26 August 1992); P2382 (Vogošća prison
report, 1 September 1992); P2338 (Request of Rajlovac 1 st Infantry Brigade, 24 August 1992); P2395 (Request of Rajlovac Light Infantry Brigade re
prisoners, 26 December 1992); P2392 (Semizovac Battalion request re prisoners, 25 November 1992); P2386 (Ilijaš police station request re prisoners, 11
September 1992); P2384 (Vogošća SJB request re prisoners, 1 September 1992); P2383 (Semizovac Battalion request re prisoners, 12 September 1992);
P2345 (Witness statement of KDZ020 dated 17 February 2011), para. 77; P2390 (Vogošća War Commission order, 6 November 1992); P2397 (List of
people arrested in Vogošća during 1992–1995), p. 3. See also Adjudicated Fact 2655. But see Trifunović who testified that the detainees in Planjo‘s House
were not used as human shields or trench diggers at the frontlines and that their task was merely to ―fortify the lines‖. Trifunović also asserted that the
detainees who were taken on compulsory work assignments were in no danger because VRS was always there with them. Miladin Trifunović, T. 30398,
30400, 30405–30407, 30412 (15 November 2012). The Chamber, however, does not find this evidence to be reliable for the following reasons. First, the
Chamber found that Trifunović‘s testimony to be marked by indicators of lack of forthrightness. Second, the Chamber is not convinced that the presence of
the VRS alongside the detainees at the frontlines would have assured the latter‘s safety. On the contrary, the Chamber is of the view that such presence
would have further exacerbated the extremely precarious situation in which the detainees were already forced into by Serb Forces. Third, the Chamber
received and found to be reliable the detailed evidence of a number of former detainees who personally experienced being forced to serve as human shields
and who observed others get injured or killed while doing the same thing.
8174
Eset Muraĉević, T. 12763–12764 (2 March 2011); P42 (Witness statement of Mustafa Fazlić dated 22 June 1997), p. 4.
8175
Bego Selimović, P44 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 10930; P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), para. 26; P124
(Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 6.
8176
Bego Selimović, P44 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 10930–10931; P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), para. 26;
P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 8.
8177
P6058 (Order of Vogošća War Staff, 16 July 1992).
 454

―prisoners of war‖.8178 In mid-August 1992, Mirko Krajišnik and a Bosnian Muslim negotiated
the exchange of several other individuals.8179 On 25 October 1992, 53 detainees, including Ramiz
Mujkić and Mustafa Fazlić, were exchanged and later crossed into BiH-controlled territory.8180
On 6 November 1992, the War Presidency of the Serb municipality of Vogošća ordered that 14
Bosnian Muslims be exchanged with 14 Serbs.8181 On 25 December 1992, Špirić handed over 18
Bosnian Muslims from the detention facilities in Vogošća to Hadţići SJB officials so that they
could be exchanged.8182

(c)Conclusion

2430. Based on the foregoing, the Chamber finds that Serb Forces used Planjo‘s House as a
detention facility at least from August 1992 until at least February 1993. (#Not unlawful!) The
Chamber further finds that the detainees were held in poor conditions. (#General shortage#! Not
deliberately, the country under the sanctions!) These included a lack of adequate food, sanitary
facilities, general hygiene and medical care. The Chamber also finds that non-Serbs, including
women and children, were detained in Planjo‘s House and that the guards there routinely subjected
the male detainees to beatings and maltreatment, including acts of a sexual nature. Furthermore,
the Chamber finds that Serb Forces routinely took non-Serb males who were detained in Planjo‘s
House in Svrake to the frontlines and forced them to carry out labour or to serve as human shields.
(All about abuses is not properly proven, neither corroborated by any document, and since
event those allegation pertained to the misdeeds that the President strictly forbade, the
President shouldn’t be even mentioned in connection with it!#Contra Presidential orders#!)

(d)Scheduled Incident B.19.1

2431. The indictment alleges the killing of ―a number of detainees‖ who were taken out from
Planjo‘s House in Svrake between August and September 1992 in order to carry out forced labour
and to serve as human shields.8183

2432. On 29 August 1992, Vlaĉo reported that eight detainees were taken to work at Ţuĉ and
that one of them was ―wounded by an enemy sniper while working‖.8184 In the second half of
September 1992, pursuant to an order issued by Trifunović, 50 detainees, including Mustafa Fazlić
and Bego Selimović, were selected by Vlaĉo, divided in groups, and taken to Ţuĉ in order to look
for mines, dig trenches and serve as human shields.8185 (#Absurdity#! Allegations about “human
shields” is senseless, since there was neither advancement, nor retreat. It was a static trench
fight, and a human shield couldn’t be useful in any sense!) Trifunović ordered that on
26 September 1992, 30 detainees be transported to Ţuĉ by military vehicles in order to carry out
construction work and be given food by the Vogošća Brigade Command.8186 Near the end of
September, detainees were again taken to Ţuĉ and at one point ordered to walk close by a Serb
tank that was, together with a number Serb infantry troops, engaged in combat activities. As a

8178
P6059 (Order of Vogošća War Commission, 29 July 1992).
8179
P5652 (Intercept of conversation between Stojko and Mirko Krajišnik, 12 August 1992).
8180
P2314 (Witness statement of Ramiz Mujkić dated 4 February 2011), para. 82; P42 (Witness statement of Mustafa Fazlić dated 22 June 1997), p. 6.
8181
P2391 (Vogošća War Presidency order, 6 November 1992).
8182
P2394 (List of prisoners in KP Dom Butmir to be exchanged, 25 December 1992).
8183
Indictment, Scheduled Incident B.19.1. The Indictment originally referred to the period between 30 May and December 1992 as the time frame for
Scheduled Incident B.19.1. However, as per the Prosecution Rule 73 bis Submission, Appendix B, p. 92, this time frame was reduced to August and
September 1992.
8184
P45 (Vogošća prison report, 29 August 1992).
8185
P42 (Witness statement of Mustafa Fazlić dated 22 June 1997), pp. 4–5; P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), paras. 28–29;
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 74–75; P2385 (Vogošća Brigade request re prisoners, 17 September 1992);
P1144 (Vogošća municipality prison department bulletin re use of prisoners for manual labour, 19 September 1992).
8186
P6000 (Order of Vogošća Brigade, 22 September 1992).
 455

result, a number of detainees were seriously wounded.8187 At one point, the tank lost control and
slipped down a hill near the Bosnian Muslim positions.8188 Some of the remaining detainees were
made to retrieve the ammunition from the tank.8189 During this operation, several detainees were
killed by Muslim fire.8190 (#No evidence, which must have been#! There is no a single sign in
the military documentation of the SRK about it, which must have been if happened!
Anyway, the President issued all the necessary orders forbidding any declination from the
international norms of humanitarian law, and since he never received any evidence about
this alleged incidents, he can not be liable even if it happened. How this matter is in other
countries: are presidents and other high officials charged for irregularities that happened
#against their orders#?)

2433. At least 16 non-Serbs were killed at Ţuĉ and other locations while carrying out work or
serving as human shields during August and September 1992.8191

2434. Based on the foregoing, the Chamber finds that as a result of the detainees in Planjo‘s
House being forced by Serb Forces to carry out labour at the frontlines or to serve as human
shields, at least 16 detainees were killed and a number were wounded during August and
September 1992.

(G) Movement of the population from Vogošća and appropriation of property

2435. According to Muraĉević, between May 1992 and mid-June 1993, approximately 13,000
individuals, of whom the greater majority were Bosnian Muslims, left the Serb-controlled parts of
the municipality of Vogošća.8192 Muraĉević further stated that almost all the Bosnian Muslim
inhabitants of Svrake and Tihovići left during the same period.8193 On 31 May 1993, the
Executive Board of the Serb municipality of Vogošća established the municipal commission for
the census of the population.8194 According to the census that was subsequently conducted, the
villages of Svrake had not a single Muslim resident, the village of Hotonj had one, whereas
Semizovac had 16.8195 The same census indicates that the population of the 14 villages that were
surveyed in the municipality of Vogošća was 93.5% Bosnian Serb, 1.8% Bosnian Muslim, and
2.6% Bosnian Croat.8196 (#Both populations left#! As Mr. Muracevic said, “ the Muslims
left” the Serb parts of the Vogosca municipality – as well as the Serbs left the Muslim parts

8187
P42 (Witness statement of Mustafa Fazlić dated 22 June 1997), p. 5.
8188
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 67; P42 (Witness statement of Mustafa Fazlić dated 22 June 1997), pp. 5–6.
8189
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 67; P42 (Witness statement of Mustafa Fazlić dated 22 June 1997), p. 6.
8190
P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 67.
8191
P1144 (Vogošća municipality prison department bulletin re use of prisoners for manual labour, 19 September 1992); P2387 (Vogošća prison bulletin,
21 September 1992), P2388 (Vogošća prison bulletin, 24 September 1992), P47 (Statement of Bego Selimović to Ilijaš Municipality Commission for Crime
Investigation, 5 April 1993), paras. 24–27; P42 (Witness statement of Mustafa Fazlić dated 22 June 1997), p. 5; P2361 (Witness statement of Eset
Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), paras. 67, 74–75. See also Miladin Trifunović, T. 30404 (15 November 2012). The Chamber heard additional
evidence on incidents which occurred after September 1992 and which involved the use of human shields as well as forced labour and resulted in casualties.
See P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 7, P46 (Witness statement of Bego Selimović dated 21 June 1997), paras. 34–35,
38, P124 (Witness statement of Zijad Okić dated 24 June 1997), e-court p. 9. The Chamber notes, however, that these incidents are not charged in the
Indictment. The list of the killed and missing civilians in Vogošća, prepared by Muraĉević, refers to 10 individuals who died while performing forced
labour or serving as human shields during September 1992. These individuals are Enver Ĉinara, Azem Durmić, Nail Durmić, Bajro Holujić, Bajro Hujić,
Safet Kruezi, Hamid Rizvo, Hasan Rizvo, Nermin Skando and Avdo Tirić. P2397 (List of people arrested in Vogošća during 1992-1995), pp. 5–6, 10, 14,
21, 23, 25. By contrast, Amor Mašović refers to 16 individuals, namely Azim Ĉović, Bajram Salkić, Avdo Tirić, Azem Durmić, Bajro Hujić, Dţmail Šehić,
Enver Ĉinara, Ferid Šehić, Hamid Rizvo, Mehmed Šehić, Nail Durmić, Nermin Skando, Nusret Selimović, Ramiz Handţić, Rasim Avdukić and Safet
Kruezi, as victims of Scheduled Incident B19.1. P4853 (Updated Table 2 to the Report of Amor Mašović), pp. 97–98. Having considered these
inconsistencies, the Chamber does not consider them to be of relevance, as it is satisfied, that a number of men indeed died in Scheduled Incident B.19.1.
Furthermore, the Chamber notes that there are some discrepancies in evidence as regards the names of some of the victims of Scheduled Incident B.19.1, but
it considers these inconsistencies to be minor. Accordingly, the Chamber concludes that these are in fact the same individuals.
8192
Eset Muraĉević, T. 12676–12678 (1 March 2011); P2402 (Table prepared by Eset Muraĉević), pp. 1–2.
8193
Eset Muraĉević, T. 12677–12678 (1 March 2011).
8194
P2400 (Vogošća Executive Board decision, 31 May 1993).
8195
P2401 (Results of 1993 census re Vogošća), pp. 1–2; Eset Muraĉević, T. 12812 (2 March 2011).
8196
P2401 (Results of 1993 census re Vogošća), p. 3.
 456

of Vogosca. If there hadn’t been a war, there would be formed two, or even three
municipalities, each for one community, but the Muslim side was rather for a war than for a
peaceful settlement. What is the President’s liability for that?#Two municipalities – peace#!)

2436. Bosnian Muslims leaving Vogošća were required to obtain certificates of departure and
were forced to either sign their property over to the municipal authorities or exchange it with Serb
property in other municipalities in BiH.8197 In an interview, published on 13 July 1992, Koprivica
admitted that the distribution to Serb refugees of empty houses in the municipality of Vogošća had
not been carried out appropriately and implied that there had been various cases where individuals
had simply occupied houses without any form of registration whatsoever.8198
(#EXCULPATORY#!!! That is why it was necessary to register the abandoned property, to
be able to control it’s use, and to oblige the temporary users to preserve it and return it in
the same condition!)

2437. By reference to the evidence of Nikola Poplašen, the President argues that (i) the
intention behind the regulation requiring the departing non-Serbs to sign documents transferring
ownership of property to the Bosnian Serb authorities was to preserve it and to prevent its misuse
by organised armed groups,8199 (This is a #grave distortion# of facts, since there never
happened any “transfer of ownership” whatsoever, throughout the war and in any part of
the Republic of Srpska! Even in the President’s document it was written tha bot, refugees
and abandoned property are the war features, and thus temporary! See D101, se also D111,

:
The document was issued on 23 August 1992, and from it there is visible information about
abuse of the abandoned property, as well as that abandoned property is abandoned only
temporarily!) (ii) the enactment of this regulation in itself suggests that there were no expulsions,
because non-Serbs could otherwise not leave the municipality,8200 and (iii) non-Serbs relocated on
their own accord to the areas where they were in the majority and where they thought they would
be safer.8201 The Chamber rejects these arguments. Poplašen himself conceded that the regulation
did not provide for the return of ownership rights to the original owners and that it had to be
annulled before such restoration could take place.8202 (This is an #invalid finding#: the matter is
#regulated by the law#, not by any regulation on how to handle abandoned property, since
the regulation had a limited value, and was far below the law!) Furthermore, it is clear from
the evidence before the Chamber that the main purpose of the regulation was to facilitate the use

8197
P2365 (Vogošća Crisis Staff Order, 20 May 1992); P2361 (Witness statement of Eset Muraĉević dated 24 February 2011), para. 88.
8198
D4028 (Article from Naš Glas entitled ―Vogošća has a future‖, 13 June 1992), p. 2.
8199
Defence Final Brief, para. 1754 (referring to D4027 (Witness statement of Nikola Poplašen dated 11 November 2013), para. 14). In the same vein, the
Accused asserts that the regulation created an inventory of all property which subsequently helped ―immensely‖ in returning them to their rightful owners
upon their return to Vogošća. Defence Final Brief, paras. 1747, 1754. The Chamber is unable to assign any weight to this assertion as there is no evidence
in support of it.
8200
Defence Final Brief, para. 1754.
8201
Defence Final Brief, para. 1745 (referring to D4027 (Witness statement of Nikola Poplašen dated 11 November 2013), para. 4).
8202
See D4027 (Witness statement of Nikola Poplašen dated 11 November 2013), para. 14.
 457

of the vacant property in question by Serbs who had just arrived in the municipality. In turn, this
ensured that those non-Serbs who left Vogošća, due to the circumstances there, would not return.
(This is a flagrant “reading in” and #distortion of facts#, because the abandoned property
could in no way belong to any refugee, as it is evident from the after-the-war development,
which had shown no example of “not return” on that basis! Such a construction by the
Chamber is not acceptable, and must be reconsidered!)

2438. In light of the foregoing, and considering the surrounding circumstances in the municipality,
the Chamber finds that the non-Serb population from the Serb-controlled parts of Vogošća was
forced to leave. (A completely unfounded “finding” even according to the Chamber’s
formulations and wordings!)

2. Legal findings on crimes

a. Chapeau requirements for Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute

2439. In the Municipalities component of the case, in addition to a count of genocide under Article 4
of the Statute, the President is charged with a count of violations of the laws or customs of war
under Article 3 of the Statute, namely murder, as well as with five counts of crimes against
humanity under Article 5 of the Statute, namely persecution, murder, extermination, deportation,
and forcible transfer as an inhumane act.8203 The Prosecution alleges that there was a state of
armed conflict at all times relevant to the Indictment.8204 (This assertion also couldn’t survive a
criticism in many municipalities. The war was between the ethnic communities, Serbs,
Croats and Muslims, all against each other. The communities had been established their
respective territories, a future constituent units, agreed upon before the war. So, there was a
“state of armed conflict” between these territories. What happened within those territories
was not “a state of armed conflict”, it was a terrorism! An armed conflict has it’s criteria,
and a sides to the conflict have their armies, declared, marked by amblems, with a
structured units and known commands. The units are composed of soldiers. This was a civil
war, and once the armies separated and declared their territories, amblems and commands,
the rest were nothing but terrorists, who looked like civilians and fought like combatants!)
It further alleges that all acts and omissions charged as crimes against humanity, except those that
formed part of the sniping and shelling campaign in Sarajevo, were part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations of
BiH.8205

Article 3 of the Statute

2440. Based on the evidence set out in detail above regarding the events related to this case, the
Chamber finds that there was an armed conflict in BiH throughout the period relevant to the
crimes alleged in the Indictment. At the latest, the armed conflict in BiH started in early April
1992. In the wake of the referendum on the independence of BiH on 29 February and 1 March
1992, (#Basically incorrect#! The war abrupted because the Muslim side reneged on the
Lisbon Agreement, intending to deceive the Srb side and started the war! In spite of the fact
that referendum had been held on 29 Februari and 1 March, in spite of the killing on the
Serb wedding on 1 March and the crisis about barricades, the Lisbon Conference continued
and resulted in an accord about the internal decentralisation of BiH on 18 March! In spite of
the fact that the #Referendum was illegal# and failed, the Serb side remained conciliatory
and ready for compromises! Neither the Prosecution, nor the Chamber, nor even the UN,
8203
See para. 5.
8204
Indictment, para. 89.
8205
Indictment, para. 88.
 458

considered whether the Referendum was legal, and whether the results enabled the
proclamation of independence. All the violence of the Constitution, the one of BiH as well as
the Federal, didn’t attrackt any attention.) armed clashes between Serb Forces on the one hand
and Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat forces on the other ensued.8206 (The Chamber erred
extremely when accepted the Prosecution’s claim that there were a #“Serb Forces” that
comprised all and every Serb# involved in the conflict. However, even if so, the Chamber
would have to exclude from the charges against the President and all the leaders of Serbs in
Bosnia everything that happened before 20 May 1992, because to that date there was the
JNA as superpositioned armed force over all other groups. Further, the President an his
associates, at least Prime Minister Branko Djeric, Minister for Interion Mico Stanisic, and
once he was nominated as a Commander of the Main Headquarter of the VRS, General
Mladic issued all the necessary orders to protect the humanitarian law, banning all the
violations of it, banning all the paramilitary groups, and the President publicly disowned all
the independent armed groups and ordered their arrest. No court all over the world should
stretch any liability on any of those officials, #no liability#!) These armed clashes intensified
and in early April 1992, municipalities starting with those in Eastern BiH were taken over by Serb
Forces.8207 (These “armed clashes” didn’t intensify in early April, it started in early April,
and before the April 92 there was a terror against the Serb civilians: in Kupres, in the
Neretva River Valley, in Bosanski Brod and the nearby village Sijekovac, and in Bijeljina as
of 31 March to 3 April 92. There is no reasonable possibility to deny this concept! #Muslims
started war, Serbs first victims#!)

2441. For murder charged under Article 3 of the Statute, the Chamber has examined whether it
was closely related to the armed conflict and made such findings where relevant in this
Judgement.8208 (The Chamber erred in estimating all the events and incidents the same way.
However, the clashes between the armies is one, and the terrorist activities far from the
confrontation lines is another matter!# Terrorists are different#! )

2442. In relation to the four so called ―Tadić Conditions‖, the Chamber refers to the applicable
law sections of this Judgement, which expanded on the legal basis for each of the crimes charged
in the Indictment under Article 3 of the Statute.8209 In relation to murder, the prohibition stems
from Common Article 3 which is deemed to be part of customary international law.8210 Further,
the Appeals Chamber has confirmed that violations of the provisions of Common Article 3 entail
individual criminal responsibility.8211 The Chamber is therefore satisfied that the four Tadić
Conditions are met, and consequently that the chapeau requirements for Article 3 of the Statute are
fulfilled, in relation to murder. (#Satisfactory absurdity#! Sure, the Chamber “satisfied” itself,
who would prevent them to do that? But this paragraph of the Judgement is the source of
many irregulatiries, and it is a “novum sui generis” in the legal practice! No “tadic, or other
conditions” should enable sentencig a completely innocent people, so far from any crime,
majority of which had been commited hidden from the very same persons that are “found”
guilty! So many “partial” solutions, so many discriminatory menues and possibilities to
chose what “satisfies” the Prosecution-Chamber alliance. There is a substantial question
unanswered: could it be exercised in the democratic countries that support this court – as it
was exercised in this court?)
8206
See paras. 609, 952, 958, 1242, 1500, 2258, 2306–2308, 2368–2369, 2373.
8207
See paras. 610–614, 711–714, 850–859, 1113–1115, 1248–1251, 1501, 2373, 1592–1593, 1939–1941.
8208
See para. 2455. The Chamber notes that in relation to the Municipalities component, murder is the only charged violation of the laws or customs of war
pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute.
8209
See Section III.A.1: Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal.
8210
Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 143.
8211
Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras. 167, 170, 173–174 (holding at para. 173: ―It is universally acknowledged that the acts enumerated in common Article 3
are wrongful and shock the conscience of civilised people, and thus are, in the language of Article 15(2) of the ICCPR, ‗criminal according to the general
principles of law recognised by civilised nations‘.‖).
 459

ii. Article 5 of the Statute

2443. As found above, there was an armed conflict in BiH throughout the period of the
Indictment. (It was “found above” by the chambers of this court #contrary to any logics and
any jurisprudence#! There was no any conflict deep in the territories of the constituent units,
there was a rebellion after rebellion and other subversive activities and terrorist attacks,
first on the JNA and the Serbs generally, then against both, the Army of Republic of Srpska,
and civilians. Nowhere in the world it could be considered as an armed conflict stricto sensu.)
The evidence admitted at trial and explained in detail in the relevant factual sections of this
Judgement, demonstrates that there also existed a widespread and systematic attack against the
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations of BiH at all times relevant to the crimes
charged in the Indictment. (This sounds as a mere insult of the Serbian people and the Serb
victims. And this was possible because the Tribunal prevented “the whole truth” to come
out.

First, the #Serbs didn’t want the war#, and didn’t need it, because they had their souvreign
territory and legitimate authorities;

second, Bosnia didn’t exist as a whole at the moment it was recognised. The Republic of Srpska
declared the independence in the eve of the international recognition of BiH, with the same,
or even more rights as Bosnia declared independence from Yugoslavia;

third, the Republic of Srpska followed the conclusions of the ICFY in the Hague in 1991 and
commitments that Mr. Alija Izetbegovic have given pertaining to the future structure of BiH,
as well as the results of this Conference in Lisbon;

fourth, the Serbs didn’t cause the war, and didn’t initiate it, because the Serbs didn’t want any
other ethnic territory except a main part of the Serb territory;

fifth, there was no any need for a war to achieve the Serb rights and legitimate objectives, while
those who wanted to deny it to the Serbs – needed a war.) The attack took many forms, as
shown below in relation to each of the relevant components of the case. As reflected below, the
Chamber is also satisfied that the crimes upon which the Chamber has entered findings formed
part of that attack and that the perpetrators knew of the attack and that the crimes were part of
it.8212 (It is impossible to understand and explain how the Tribunal could have been deaf and
blind for an obvious and proven fact that there was no a single Serb attack which wasn’t a
response to the Muslim-Croat attack, and that the individuals and whole settlements that
didn’t act against the RS – didn’t have any problem to the end of the war, as could be seen in
D2424, and P3788 and other documents!)

2444. In the Municipalities, at the time relevant to the Indictment, the Bosnian Muslim and
Bosnian Croat civilian populations were the subject of a widespread and systematic campaign of
violence, including through acts of murder, and forcible displacement.8213 (#Wrong, fake and
uncorroborated# by any evidence! Why some of the Muslims-Croats had troubles, while
others didn’t? because those who had the troubles with the legal structures of the RS
attacket the RS prior to any trouble. There were several incidents commited by a criminal
individuals, but far from any official structure, and hidden from the authorities!) The acts of
violence and crimes committed against the Bosnian Muslim and Croat populations included
killings, cruel and inhumane treatment such as torture and rape, the establishment and perpetuation

8212
See paras. 2456, 2463, 2481–2482, 2517, 2521, 2529, 2537, 2546, 2558, 2569.
8213
See Sections IV.A.2.b.i: Legal findings on crimes (Murder: Counts 5 and 6), IV.A.2.b.iii: Legal findings on crimes (Deportation and inhumane acts (forcible
transfer): Counts 7 and 8).
 460

of inhumane living conditions, unlawful detention, forced labour at the frontlines and the use of
human shields, plunder of property, wanton destruction of private and public property, as well as
the imposition of restrictive and discriminatory measures.8214 While the Chamber finds
differences in each of the Municipalities, it is satisfied that there was a generally similar pattern of
co-ordinated violence during and after the take-over of these Municipalities and in detention
facilities throughout. Indeed, in twenty municipalities in Eastern BiH, the ARK, and the Sarajevo
area, and in detention facilities therein, Serb Forces committed acts of murder, persecution, and
forcible displacement, which resulted in a vast number of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat
victims. The Chamber is therefore satisfied that this demonstrates the systematic and widespread
nature of the attack.

2445. The Chamber is therefore satisfied that the chapeau requirements for the crimes charged
under Article 5 of the Statute are met.

c. Crimes

1. Murder: Counts 5 and 6

A. Killing incidents

2446. The Chamber recalls its factual findings in Section IV.A.1 above, that a large number of
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were killed by Serb Forces during and after the take-over8215
of Bijeljina,8216 Bratunac,8217 Foĉa,8218 Kljuĉ,8219 Novi Grad,8220 Prijedor,8221 Sanski Most,8222
Sokolac,8223 Višegrad,8224 Vlasenica,8225 and Zvornik.8226 (There was no any “take-over”, except
the Serb side took control over the Serb parts of these municipalities, formed their own
municipalities, and offered the same to the Muslim side! #No “take-over” happened#! #Two
municipalities – peace#!)

8214
See Section IV.A.2.b.iv: Legal findings on crimes (Persecution: Count 3).
8215
The Chamber recalls that it did not enter factual findings with respect to killings committed by Serb Forces during and after the take-over of Banja Luka,
Bosanki Novi, Brĉko, Hadţići, Ilidţa, Novo Sarajevo, Pale, Rogatica, and Vogošća as there were no Schedule A killing incidents charged with respect to
these municipalities.
8216
The killing of at least 45 civilians in the town of Bijeljina: Scheduled Incident A.1.1.
8217
The killing of at least four people in the village of Hranĉa and the killing of at least 65 Bosnian Muslims in the village of Glogova: Scheduled Incidents
A.3.1, A.3.2. The Chamber recalls that it did not have sufficient evidence to make a finding beyond reasonable doubt as to the circumstances surrounding
the death of some Bosnian Muslims killed in Hranĉa in the municipality of Bratunac.
8218
The killing of a number of civilians from the village of Jeleĉ and the killing of at least seven Bosnian Muslim civilians from the village of Mješaja/ Trošanj:
Scheduled Incidents A.5.2, A.5.4. The Chamber recalls that it did not have sufficient evidence to make a finding beyond reasonable doubt as to the
circumstances surrounding the death of three individuals during the initial attack on Mješaja/Trošanj in the municipality of Foĉa.
8219
The killing of at least three civilians in the village of Pudin Han, the killing of 52 Bosnian Muslims in Prhovo; and the killing of approximately 200 Bosnian
Muslims in Biljani: Scheduled Incidents A.7.1, A.7.2, A.7.3.
8220
The killing of 15 Bosnian Muslim men following the attack on Ahatovići: Scheduled Incident A.9.1.
8221
The killing of 80 Bosnian Muslims in Kozarac, the killing of at least six Bosnian Muslims in Hambarine and Ljubija, the killing of at least nine Bosnian
Muslim men and women in Kamiĉani, at least eight Bosnian Muslim men in Jaskići, the killing of a number of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the
Brdo area, the killing of at least 300 non-Serbs in Bišcani and surrounding hamlets, the killing of about 50 persons at a mine in Kipe, and the killing of at
least 68 people in the village of Briševo: Scheduled Incidents A.10.1, A.10.2, A.10.3, A.10.4, A.10.5, A.10.6, A.10.7, A.10.9.
8222
The killing of approximately 20 men between Begići and Vrhpolje Bridge, the killing of a number of people in Hrustovo village, the killing of
approximately 18 men from Kenjari in the hamlet of Blaţevići, the killing of approximately 14 people from the hamlet of Budim in Lukavice village, and
the killing of nine men near the village of Škrljevita: Scheduled Incidents A.12.1, A12.2, A.12.3, A.12.4, A.12.5.
8223
The killing of approximately 40 Bosnian Muslim men in the village of Novoseoci: Scheduled Incident A.13.1.
8224
The killing of approximately 45 Bosnian Muslim civilians near Paklenik, close to the village of Kalimanići in Sokolac municipality: Scheduled Incident
A.14.2. While the killing incident charged in Scheduled Incident A.14.2 occurred in Sokolac, for ease of reference and as charged in paragraph 48 of the
Indictment, the Chamber herein includes it under Višegrad since it occurred after the take-over of Višegrad and relates to Bosnian Muslims taken from this
municipality.
8225
The killing of at least 20 Bosnian Muslim men in the village of Drum and the killing of at least 60 people including women and children in the village of
Zaklopaĉa: Scheduled Incidents A.15.1, A.15.2.
8226
The killing of at least 15 people in the town of Zvornik and the killing of a large number of Bosnian Muslim men at Gero‘s slaughterhouse: Scheduled
Incidents A.16.1, A.16.3.
 461

2447. The Chamber also recalls its findings in section IV.A.1 above, that many Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats were killed by Serb Forces while detained at detention facilities8227
in Banja Luka,8228 Bijeljina,8229 Bratunac,8230 Brĉko,8231 Foĉa,8232 Ilidţa,8233 Kljuĉ,8234 Novi
Grad,8235 Pale,8236 Prijedor,8237 Rogatica,8238 Sanski Most,8239 Vlasenica,8240 Vogošća,8241 and
Zvornik.8242

2448. The Chamber further recalls its findings in section IV.A.1 above, that some Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats died as a result of cruel and inhumane treatment by Serb Forces at
detention facilities in Banja Luka,8243 Bijeljina,8244 Bratunac,8245 Foĉa,8246 Prijedor,8247
Rogatica,8248 Sanski Most,8249 and Zvornik.8250

Intent of perpetrators

2449. The Chamber recalls its findings that the death of the victims for each of the incidents
identified above was a result of the acts of Serb Forces. The Chamber finds that the perpetrators
of each of these incidents acted with the intent to kill the victims or at least wilfully caused serious

8227
The Chamber recalls that it did not enter factual findings with respect to killings of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats while detained at detention
facilities in Bosanki Novi, Hadţići, Sokolac, and Višegrad as there were no Schedule B killing incidents charged with respect to these municipalities.
8228
The killing of six Bosnian Muslim men in front of the gates of Manjaĉa, the suffocation of 20 detainees during transportation to Manjaĉa, Banja Luka, the
killing of eight or nine Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats on their arrival at Manjaĉa, and the killing of at least 15 Bosnian Muslim men detained at
Manjaĉa: Scheduled Incidents B.1.1, B.1.2, B.1.3, B.1.4.
8229
The killing of at least six Bosnian Muslim men at Batković camp: Scheduled Incident B.2.1.
8230
The killing of at least 50 detainees at the Vuk Karadţić School: Scheduled Incident B.4.1.
8231
The killing of a large number of non-Serb men at the Luka Camp: Scheduled Incident B.5.1.
8232
The killing of over 200 detainees at KP Dom Foĉa: Scheduled Incident B.8.1.
8233
The beating to death of two detainees at Kula Prison and the killing of at least three detainees from Kula Prison while performing forced labour: Scheduled
Incidents B.13.1, B.13.2. The Chamber notes that the Indictment originally included Kula Prison as being located in Novo Sarajevo municipality; however
it was subsequently corrected to include Kula Prison as falling within Ilidţa municipality. See fn. 7285. The killing incidents related to this detention
facility are therefore considered under Ilidţa.
8234
The killing of 77 Bosnian Muslim men at Velagići School: Scheduled Incident B.10.1.
8235
The killing of 11 Bosnian Muslim detainees who were being held at the cisterns in the Rajlovac barracks and the killing of 47 Bosnian Muslim detainees
who had been taken away from Rajlovac by bus: Scheduled Incidents B.12.1, B.12.2.
8236
The killing of at least three detainees who died as a result of beatings at Pale Gym: Scheduled Incident B.14.1.
8237
The killing of at least 190 persons in Room 3 at Keraterm camp; the killing of a large number of non-Serbs at Omarska or after they were taken from
Omarska; the killing of at least 120 persons taken from Omarska in the area of Hrastova Glavica; the killing of at least 150 persons from the Brdo region
who were detained at Omarska; the killing of a number of non-Serbs after they were taken from Trnopolje; the killing of approximately 200 men at
Korićanske Stijene; and the killing of at least 15 detainees at Ljubija Football Stadium: Scheduled Incidents B.15.1, B.15.2, B.15.3, B.15.4, B.15.5, B.15.6,
A.10.8.
8238
The killing of a number of men taken from the Veljko Vlahović Secondary School and the killing of 24 Bosnian Muslims who had been taken from
Rasadnik: Scheduled Incidents B.16.1, B.16.2.
8239
The killing of approximately 17 men taken from the Betonirka Factory Garage: Scheduled Incident B.17.1.
8240
The killing of nine men from Sušica camp in June and July 1992; the killing of approximately 140 detainees taken from Sušica camp on or about 30
September 1992; the killing of a Bosnian Muslim man at the Vlasenica SJB building; and the killing of approximately 29 Bosnian Muslim men near Nova
Kasaba who were taken from Vlasenica: Scheduled Incidents B.18.1, B.18.2, B.18.3, B.18.4. The Chamber notes that with respect to its finding that 29
Bosnian Muslim men were killed near Nova Kasaba, it is charged in the Indictment as a killing related to a detention facility: Scheduled Incident B.18.4.
While the Prosecution filed a notice of withdrawal with respect to the relevant detention facility (Scheduled Detention Facility C.25.4), the Chamber has
considered these killings as a Schedule B incident as charged in the Indictment.
8241
The killing of at least 16 detainees taken from Planjo‘s House in Svrake and killed while carrying out work on the front-lines or while being used as human
shields: Scheduled Incident B.19.1.
8242
The killing of approximately 88 men at Drinjaĉa; the killing of at least 60 men at Ĉelopek Dom Kulture; the killing of approximately 160 men at the Karakaj
Technical School; and the killing of at least two men at the Ekonomija Farm: Scheduled Incidents B.20.1, B.20.2, B.20.3, B.20.4.
8243
The Chamber found that one elderly detainee died during transportation to Manjaĉa due to intense heat: Scheduled Detention Facility C.1.2.
8244
The Chamber found that some detainees from the Batković camp died from starvation, exhaustion or while being forced to work on the front-lines:
Scheduled Detention Facility C.2.1
8245
The Chamber found that one detainee died of suffocation after Serb Forces piled detainees on top of each other: Scheduled Detention Facility C.6.2.
8246
The Chamber found that at least one detainee died as a result of poor medical care: Scheduled Detention Facility C.10.1.
8247
The Chamber found that at least one detainee died as a result of beatings: Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.3. The Chamber also found that at least two
men died of suffocation after being crammed into a garage for several days: Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.2.
8248
The Chamber found that some detainees died following beatings: Scheduled Detention Facility C.21.3.
8249
The Chamber found that one detainee died as a result of a beating: Scheduled Detention Facility C.22.4.
8250
The Chamber found that approximately 20 detainees died from suffocation after being held in cramped conditions: Scheduled Detention Facility, C.27.2.
The Chamber found that one detainee died following a severe beating: Scheduled Detention Facility C.27.6.
 462

bodily harm, which they should reasonably have known might lead to death. (There were a very
few that lost their lives! Many of them had been counted in twice or many times! The
Tribunal didn’t establish anything essential, particularly the number of victims and the way
they died! If it was the Serb intention, why so many times the Serb superiors prevented
crimes, disbanded and arrested members of disobedient and incompetent units, so many
times rectified a misdemeanors of subordinates, reported every single known crime, and
have undertaken many other measures to secure the law and order???#Conduct of the Serb
officials proper#!)

2450. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber had regard to the circumstances and the manner
in which the victims were killed. With respect to the Schedule A killing incidents, the Chamber
found that many of the victims were deliberately shot.8251 In other incidents, while the Chamber
did not have evidence that the victims were deliberately shot, the Chamber did find that they were
killed during or after the take-over of towns or villages by Serb Forces8252 and is satisfied
considering the surrounding circumstances that these killings were deliberate.8253 (#All the way
around#! The Serbs controlled only the Serb parts, and for that they didn’t need any
fighting. On the contrary, the entire war and everuything that happened during it – was a
result of the Muslim attempts to prevent the Serbs in achieveing their rights for
decentralisation, as agreed on the Conference in the Hague, London, Brussels and Lisbon!
Nobody could contest these true facts!)

2451. With respect to killings in scheduled detention facilities under Schedule B of the
Indictment, the Chamber found that the victims (i) were shot by Serb Forces during their
detention;8254 (ii) died as a result of severe beatings by Serb Forces during their detention;8255 or
(iii) were taken away from the detention facilities by Serb Forces and killed.8256

2452. The Chamber recalls its finding that in Vogošća and Ilidţa a number of detainees were
taken from their place of detention by Serb Forces and killed while carrying out work on the front-
lines or while being used as human shields.8257 The victims died as a result of the actions of Serb
Forces who used them for work on the front-lines or as human shields. In using the victims for
work on the front-lines or as human shields, the members of the Serb Forces deliberately took the
risk that they would be killed. The Chamber finds that in using them as human shields or in
forcing them to work on the frontlines, the perpetrators wilfully caused the victims serious bodily
harm, which they should reasonably have known might lead to death.

2453. With respect to victims who died as a result of cruel and inhumane treatment at detention
facilities, the Chamber found that the victims died in circumstances which showed an intent by the
perpetrators to kill or at least wilfully cause them serious bodily harm, which they should
reasonably have known might lead to death.8258 For example the Chamber found that the
detainees were severely beaten8259 inter alia with chains and metal rods.8260 Others were subjected
8251
Scheduled Incidents A.1.1, A.3.1, A.7.2, A.7.3, A.9.1, A.13.1, A.14.2, A.15.1, A.15.2, A.16.1, A.16.3, A.12.1, A.12.2, A.12.3, A.12.4, A.12.5, B.17.1
(includes victims whose throats were slit), A.10.1, A.10.2, A.10.3, A.10.4, A.10.5, A.10.6, A.10.7, A.10.8, A.10.9.
8252
Scheduled Incidents A.5.2, A.5.4, A.12.3.
8253
For example with respect to the three civilians killed as a result of the shelling by Serb Forces in Pudin Han, Kljuĉ municipality, the Chamber found that the
mosque was blown up and levelled and that upon his return, KDZ024 found everything in the village burned, destroyed, and in ruins: Scheduled Incident
A.7.1. On this basis the Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the shelling was carried out with the intent to cause serious bodily harm which the
perpetrators should reasonably have known might lead to the death of civilians.
8254
Scheduled Incidents B.2.1, B.4.1, B.5.1, B.10.1, B.12.1, B.15.1, B.15.4, B.15.5, B.16.2, B.18.1, B.18.3, B.20.1, B.20.2, B.20.3, B.20.4.
8255
Scheduled Incidents B.2.1, B.4.1, B.8.1, B.12.1, B.15.2, B.15.5, B.18.1, B.1.4, B.12.1, B.13.1. The Indictment refers to a separate category of killings
committed during, and deaths resulting from, cruel and inhumane treatment and detention facilities. Indictment, para. 60(a)(ii). However, the Chamber
notes that some of the Schedule B killing incidents pertain to deaths resulting from such cruel and inhumane treatement.
8256
Scheduled Incidents B.8.1, B.12.1, B.12.2, B.15.2, B.15.3, B.15.6, B.16.1, B.18.2, B.1.1, B.1.3, B.17.1.
8257
Scheduled Incidents B.19.1, B.13.3.
8258
See para. 2448.
8259
Scheduled Detention Facility C.27.6.
 463

to such conditions that they died from starvation, exhaustion,8261 lack of medical care,8262 intense
heat,8263 or suffocation.8264

Status of victims

2454. The Chamber also finds that the victims of each of these incidents were civilians8265 or
had been rendered hors de combat at the time of their killing. Many of the victims were executed
or killed after being captured by Serb Forces;8266 some were killed while trying to escape from
Serb Forces8267 while others were killed after being detained by Serb Forces in scheduled
detention facilities.8268 (Escaping prisoners of war are a combat casualties. Did the Chamber
establish – was there any combat casualties, and how many! The Muslim side waged three
wars: a permanent against the Serbs, and for a considerable portion of time against the
Croats, and against the secular Muslims (Fikret Abdic) - #No Muslim combat casualties
counted#!)

Conclusion

2455. The Chamber has found that there was an armed conflict in BiH throughout the period
relevant to the Indictment. As demonstrated by the Chamber‘s factual findings explained above,
the Chamber finds that the killings referred to in this section were closely related to that armed
conflict and thus constitute murder as violation of the laws or customs of war. (In many of these
“Municipalities” it happened far from any conflict and front-line, and it wasn’t a conflict
between the two Armies. It had been a #conflict of terrorists and Police or Military# deep in
the Serb territory!)

2456. The Chamber has also found that there was a widespread and systematic attack against
the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations of BiH. The Chamber finds that the
killings referred to above were part of this widespread and systematic attack and the perpretrators
of these killings knew of the attack and that their crimes were part of it. In reaching that
conclusion the Chamber considered the locations, time period, and the identity of the victims of
these killings, which correspond with the scope of the widespread and systematic attack, as well as
the magnitude and systematic nature of the attack on the Bosnian Muslim and Croat civilian
populations of BiH. The Chamber therefore finds that these killings constitute murder as a crime
against humanity.

ii. Extermination: Count 4

2457. The Chamber has also had regard to each of the killing incidents identified above to
determine whether they amount to extermination. While the Chamber recalls that there is no
minimum threshold of victims for the purposes of extermination, it still has to be satisfied that the

8260
Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.3.
8261
Scheduled Detention Facility C.2.1.
8262
Scheduled Detention Facility C.10.1.
8263
Scheduled Detention Facility C.1.2.
8264
Scheduled Detention Facilities C.6.2, C.20.2, C.27.6. See also Scheduled Incident B.1.2.
8265
Scheduled Incidents A.1.1, A.3.2, A.7.1, A.13.1, A.14.2, A.15.2, A.7.1, A.12.2, A.12.4, A.10.1, A.10.3, A.10.4, A.10.5, A.10.6, B.15.3.
8266
Scheduled Incidents A.3.1, A.3.2, A.5.4, A.7.2, A.7.3, A.9.1, A.15.1, A.15.2, A.16.1, A.16.3, A.12.1, A.12.3, A.12.5, A.10.5, A.10.6.
8267
Scheduled Incidents A.5.2, A.15.2, A.12.2, A.12.3, A.10.3, A.10.2, A.10.7.
8268
Scheduled Incidents B.2.1, B.4.1, B.5.1, B.8.1, B.10.1, B.12.1, B.12.2, B.15.1, B.15.2, B.15.3, B.15.4, B.15.5, B.15.6, A.10.8, B.16.1, B.16.2, B.18.1,
B.18.2, B.18.3, B.20.1 B.20.2, B.20.3, B.20.4, B.1.1, B.1.2, B.1.3, B.1.4, B.13.1.
 464

killings occurred on a mass scale and needs to conduct a case-by-case assessment in that
regard.8269

2458. As previously noted, extermination may be established based on the accumulation of

separate incidents.8270 However, it has been found that ―as a general matter, the element of killing
on a large scale cannot be satisfied by a collective consideration of distinct events committed in
different prefectures, in different circumstances, by different perpetrators, and over an extended
period of time‖.8271

2459. In this case, the Chamber noted that a large number of killing incidents charged in the
Indictment with respect to the Municipalities were committed in different locations, in different
circumstances, and by different perpetrators over an extended period of time. Having considered
these factors, where the Chamber found that the incidents in question were distinct, the Chamber
assessed on a case-by-case basis whether each incident amounts to a mass scale killing for the
purposes of the actus reus of extermination. In making that assessment, the Chamber has had
regard to the scale of each of the killing incidents and the circumstances in which the killings
occurred. The Chamber has done so where the circumstances indicated that the killings were
committed in geographically proximate locations, in similar circumstances, over a relatively short
period of time and were thus considered to be part of the same operation.

2460. On this basis, the Chamber finds that the element of killing on a mass scale is established
with respect to each of the following incidents which occurred during and after the take-over of the
Municipalities: (i) the killing of at least 45 civilians in the town of Bijeljina;8272 (Nine Serbs,
many Albanian mercenaries, and less than 27 Muslims! And the #Muslims attacket
Bijeljina#, not vice versa!) (ii) the killing of at least 65 Bosnian Muslims in the village of
Glogova in Bratunac;8273 (Glogova, a #Muslim stronghold#, which initiated all the subsequent
events!)(iii) the killing of 52 Bosnian Muslims in Prhovo in Kljuĉ;8274 (iv) the killing of
approximately 200 Bosnian Muslims in Biljani in Kljuĉ;8275 (v) the killing of 80 Bosnian Muslims
in Kozarac in Prijedor;8276 (Kozarac, a very known and extremely militarized #Muslim
stronghold#! All the victims were combat victims!) (vi) the killing of at least 300 non-Serbs in
the village of Bišćani and surrounding hamlets in Prijedor;8277 (vii) the killing of about 50 persons
at a mine in Kipe in Prijedor;8278 (viii) the killing of at least 68 people in the village of Briševo in
Prijedor;8279 (ix) the killing of approximately 40 Bosnian Muslim men in the village of Novoseoci
in Sokolac;8280 (x) the killing of approximately 45 Bosnian Muslim civilians near Paklenik after
being taken from Višegrad;8281 (xi) the killing of at least 60 people, including women and children,
in the village of Zaklopaĉa in Vlasenica;8282 and (xii) the killing of a large number of Bosnian
Muslim men at Gero‘s slaughterhouse in Zvornik.8283(All of the named incidents had been
initiated by the #Muslim attacks# - and nothing similar happened in two third of the Serb
municipalities!)
8269
See Section III.A.2.c: Extermination as a crime against humanity.
8270
See Section III.A.2.c: Extermination as a crime against humanity.
8271
See Section III.A.2.c: Extermination as a crime against humanity.
8272
Scheduled Incident A.1.1.
8273
Scheduled Incident A.3.2.
8274
Scheduled Incident A.7.2.
8275
Scheduled Incident A.7.3.
8276
Scheduled Incident A.10.1.
8277
Scheduled Incident A.10.6.
8278
Scheduled Incident A.10.7.
8279
Scheduled Incident A.10.9.
8280
Scheduled Incident A.13.1.
8281
Scheduled Incident A.14.2.
8282
Scheduled Incident A.15.2.
8283
Scheduled Incident A.16.3.
 465

2461. Similarly, the Chamber finds that the element of killing on a mass scale is established
with respect to each of the following incidents which occurred in charged detention facilities: (i)
the killing of at least 50 detainees at the Vuk Karadţić School in Bratunac;8284 (ii) the killing of a
large number of non-Serb men at the Luka Camp in Brĉko;8285 (iii) the killing of over 200
detainees at KP Dom Foĉa;8286 (iv) the killing of 77 Bosnian Muslim men at Velagići School in
Kljuĉ;8287 (v) the killing of 47 Bosnian Muslim detainees who had been taken away from Rajlovac
in Novi Grad;8288 (vi) the killing of at least 190 persons in Room 3 at Keraterm camp in
Prijedor;8289 (vii) the killing of a large number of non-Serbs at Omarska or after they were taken
from Omarska in Prijedor;8290 (viii) the killing of at least 120 persons taken from Omarska in the
area of Hrastova Glavica in Prijedor;8291 (ix) the killing of at least 150 persons from the Brdo
region who were detained at Omarska in Prijedor;8292 (x) the killing of approximately 200 non-
Serb men at Korićanske Stijene including men taken from Trnopolje in Prijedor;8293 (xi) the killing
of approximately 140 detainees taken from Sušica camp in Vlasenica;8294 (xii) the killing of
approximately 88 men at Drinjaĉa in Zvornik;8295 (xiii) the killing of at least 60 men at Ĉelopek
Dom Kulture in Zvornik;8296 and (xiv) the killing of approximately 160 men at the Karakaj
Technical School in Zvornik.8297

2462. The Chamber recalls its finding that the perpetrators of each of the killing incidents
identified above acted with the intent to kill the victims or at least wilfully caused serious bodily
harm, which they should reasonably have known might lead to death. Having regard to the scale
of the killings, the Chamber further finds that with respect to the killing incidents above, the
perpetrators had intent to kill on a mass scale.

2463. The Chamber found there was a widespread and systematic attack against the Bosnian
Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations of BiH. The Chamber finds that the killings above
were part of this widespread and systematic attack and the perpretrators of these killings knew of
the attack and that their crimes were part of it. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber
considered the locations, time period, and the identity of the victims of these killings, which
correspond with the scope of the widespread and systematic attack. Further, given the magnitude
and systematic nature of the attack on the Bosnian Muslim and Croat civilian populations of BiH,
the Chamber further finds that the perpretrators knew of the attack and that the crimes were part of
it. The Chamber therefore finds that these killings constitute extermination as a crime against
humanity.8298

8284
Scheduled Incident B.4.1.
8285
Scheduled Incident B.5.1.
8286
Scheduled Incident B.8.1.
8287
Scheduled Incident B.10.1.
8288
Scheduled Incident B.12.2.
8289
Scheduled Incident B.15.1.
8290
Scheduled Incident B.15.2.
8291
Scheduled Incident B.15.3.
8292
Scheduled Incident B.15.4.
8293
Scheduled Incident B.15.6.
8294
Scheduled Incident B.18.2.
8295
Scheduled Incident B.20.1.
8296
Scheduled Incident B.20.2.
8297
Scheduled Incident B.20.3.
8298
For the remaining killing incidents the Chamber was not satisfied that the element of killing on a mass scale was established. The Chamber also found that
these remaining incidents were distinct and that it was impermissible to aggregate them for the purposes of assessing the mass scale element of the killings
for the actus reus of extermination.
 466

2464. The Chamber will deal with the issue of cumulative convictions later in this Judgement and the
impermissibility of entering convictions for both extermination and murder under Article 5 of the
Statute where the elements of both crimes have been established.8299

(All and everything in this chapter, since Chapeau requirements for Articles 3 and 5 of the
Statute iss wrong and invalid, all allegedly “established is fake, unfounded and represent the
essence of the wrong concept that was implemented throughout all the cases before this
Tribunal! A true and impartial experts would establish it immediately!)

iii. Deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer): Counts 7 and 8

(A) Actus reus

(1) Movement of population

2465. The Chamber recalls its findings in Section IV.A.1 of this Judgement that a large number of
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Municipalities8300 were displaced. Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats in Bijeljina,8301 Bratunac,8302 Foĉa,8303 Pale,8304 Prijedor,8305 Rogatica,8306
Sanski Most,8307 Sokolac,8308 Vlasenica,8309 Zvornik,8310 Bosanki Novi,8311 Ilidţa,8312 Novi
Grad,8313 Novo, Sarajevo,8314 Kljuĉ,8315 Hadţići,8316 and Vogošća8317 were displaced from their
homes, villages and towns in which they were lawfully present to other locations in BiH. The
locations to which they moved were mostly under Bosnian Muslim control including Tuzla,
Konjević Polje, Srebrenica, Goraţde, Visoko, Zenica, and areas of Sarajevo. In the case of
Bijeljina, the Chamber found that Bosnian Muslims were transferred to ―no-man‘s land‖ before
being able to cross to Bosnian Muslim controlled territory.8318 With respect to these incidents the
Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were displaced within the national
boundaries of BiH.

8299
See Section IV.F.
8300
The Prosecution does not allege criminal responsibility for forcible transfer or deportation in Banja Luka, Brĉko and Višegrad as an underlying act of
persecution under Count 3 of the Indictment. Indictment, fn. 6. The Chamber notes that in fn. 13 of the Indictment, the Prosecution only states that with
regard to deportation as a crime against humanity under Count 7 of the Indictment, it does not allege criminal responsibility for Višegrad. However, the
Chamber has interpreted this restrictively in light of fn. 6 of the Indictment in favour of the Accused and will not make findings with respect to forcible
transfer or deportation in Banja Luka, Brĉko, and Višegrad under Counts 3, 7, or 8.
8301
See Section IV.A.1.a.i.H: Movement of the population from Bijeljina.
8302
See Section IV.A.1.a.ii.I: Movement of the population from Bratunac.
8303
See Section IV.A.1.a.iv.G: Movement of the population from Foĉa.
8304
See Section IV.A.1.c.v.E: Movement of the population from Pale and appropriation of property.
8305
See Section IV.A.1.b.i.D.7: Movement of the population from Prijedor and appropriation of property.
8306
See Section IV.A.1.a.v.H: Movement of the population from Rogatica.
8307
See Section IV.A.1.b.i.E.7: Movement of the population from Sanski Most and appropriation of property.
8308
See Section IV.A.1.a.vi.E: Movement of the population from Sokolac.
8309
See Section IV.A.1.a.viii.F: Movement of the population from Vlasenica and appropriation of property.
8310
See Section IV.A.1.a.ix.H: Movement of the population from Zvornik.
8311
See Section IV.A.1.b.i.B.5: Movement of the population within and from Bosanski Novi.
8312
See Section IV.A.1.c.ii.E: Movement of the population from Ilidţa.
8313
See Section IV.A.1.c.iii.H: Movement of the population from Novi Grad.
8314
See Section IV.A.1.c.iv.E: Movement of the population from Novo Sarajevo and appropriation of property.
8315
See Section IV.A.1.b.i.C.8: Movement of the population from Kljuĉ.
8316
See Section IV.A.1.c.i.E: Movement of the population from Hadţići and appropriation of property.
8317
See Section IV.A.1.c.vi.G: Movement of the population from Vogošća and appropriation of property.
8318
See para. 673.
 467

2466. The Chamber also found that Bosnian Muslims in Bijeljina, Zvornik and Bosanski Novi
were displaced from their homes, villages and towns in which they were lawfully present to Serbia
or Croatia.8319 In addition, the Chamber found that following the attack on Zvornik in April 1992
by Serb Forces, thousands of Bosnian Muslims fled to Mali Zvornik in Serbia.8320 The Chamber
also found that some Bosnian Muslims from Foĉa were transferred to Montenegro.8321 The
Chamber also recalls that Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat detainees from Prijedor were
transferred in convoys to locations in Croatia.8322 With respect to these incidents the Chamber
finds that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were displaced across a de jure or de facto border
between states.

2464. The Chamber recalls that the scale and extent of the expulsions and movement of civilians
from the Municipalities resulted in the displacement of a vast number of Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats.8323

(2) Forcible nature of movement

2465. The Chamber finds that the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats referred to above were
forcibly displaced. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber had regard to the surrounding
circumstances in the Municipalities and found that the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were
displaced as a result of physical force,8324 (This kind of displacement never happened, as far as
it concerns with the official authorities. It is well documented that the persons wanting to
leave some territory asked to be put on the list, submitted many papers about fulfilment of
their obligations, payed taxes, electricity, housing and other papers, in some municipalities
up to 15 dokuments, and payed the transportation expenses, and even to bribe clerks to be
put on the list. The #President issued all the necessary orders# for the respect of the human
rights! This truth will never disappear!) threat of force,8325 (“Threats of force” had never
been implemented by the official authorities, but some threats and unease could have been
caused by the bitter Serb refugees that escaped from the Muslim-Croat areas!) or
coercion.8326 (There could have been such an atmosphere created through the actions against
the armed groups in some areas, municipalities, towns or villages. But, an intimidation had
never been imposed by the authorities out of the actions of disarmament. A mere actions of
disarmament, and in particular a search for perpetrators of criminal acts or attacks on the
Army, police or civilians, by itself couldn’t be pleasant to anybody! But this was not caused
deliberately, nor within any policy. Particularly the President had nothing to do with this,
8319
See paras. 673, 1360, 1458.
8320
See para. 1250.
8321
See para. 933.
8322
See para. 1852.
8323
See paras. 678 (the Chamber found that when the Dayton Accords were signed only 500 to 1,000 Bosnian Muslims remained in Bijeljina from the original
17,000); 788 (the Chamber found that with the exception of a few individuals there were no Bosnian Muslims left in Bratunac by June 1992); 933 (the
Chamber found that by mid-August 1992 there were almost no Bosnian Muslims in Foĉa); 1040 (the Chamber found that by August 1995 there were almost
no Bosnian Muslims in Rogatica); 1072 (the Chamber found that by the end of 1992 there were as few as 30 to 40 Bosnian Muslim families remaining in
Sokolac); 1220 (the Chamber found that in June 1992 there were approximately 150 Bosnian Muslims in Vlasenica who had not been detained and very few
non-Serbs remained by October 1992); 1365 (the Chamber found that by the end of June 1992 very few Bosnian Muslims remained in the town of Zvornik);
1471 (the Chamber found that by the end of 1992 the majority of Bosnian Muslims had left Bosanski Novi); 1567 (the Chamber found that by 1995 only
1,200 of the 17,000 Bosnian Muslims remained in Kljuĉ); 2435 (the Chamber found that by May 1993 only 1.8 per cent of 14 villages in Vogošća were
Bosnian Muslim); 2329 (the Chamber found that during the war only a small number of Bosnian Muslims remained in Pale).
8324
See Sections IV.A.1.a.i.H: Movement of the population from Bijeljina; IV.A.1.a.ii.I: Movement of the population from Bratunac; IV.A.1.a.v.H: Movement
of the population from Rogatica; IV.A.1.a.viii.F: Movement of the population from Vlasenica and appropriation of property; IV.A.1.a.ix.H: Movement of
the population from Zvornik; IV.A.1.c.iv.E: Movement of the population from Novo Sarajevo and appropriation of property; IV.A.1.c.iii.H: Movement of
the population from Novi Grad; IV.A.1.b.i.E.7: Movement of the population from Sanski Most and appropriation of property; IV.A.1.b.i.D.7: Movement of
the population from Prijedor and appropriation of property.
8325
See, e.g., Sections IV.A.1.a.ii.I: Movement of the population from Bratunac; IV.A.1.a.v.H: Movement of the population from Rogatica; IV.A.1.a.ix.H:
Movement of the population from Zvornik; IV.A.1.c.iv.E: Movement of the population from Novo Sarajevo and appropriation of property.
8326
See, e.g., Sections IV.A.1.a.i.H: Movement of the population from Bijeljina; IV.A.1.a.ii.I: Movement of the population from Bratunac; IV.A.1.a.viii.F:
Movement of the population from Vlasenica and appropriation of property; IV.A.1.b.i.E.7: Movement of the population from Sanski Most and appropriation
of property.
 468

since his orders were clear and strict against any abuse of means or situations!) Others fled
out of fear.8327 (That was almost the only reason, certainly more that 90% of the displaced
went for that reason, paying to intermediaries to convey them over the confrontation line. A
liability is on the civil war, not on the authorities! How anyone could connect the President
with any of those events, since he was too far from the terrain, so often out of the country for
conferences, and without any insight in the local developments? The first UN documents
indicated that the civilians escaped from combats, see#@ #) This fear was caused by ongoing
violence and various crimes committed against non-Serbs including inter alia, killings, cruel and
inhumane treatment, unlawful detention, rape and other acts of sexual violence, discriminatory
measures, and wanton destruction of villages, houses and cultural monuments.8328 (Why it
happened exclusively within the attacks caused by the Muslim extremists, and only in the
municipalities, villages and other settlements where there was an attack of the Muslim
forces? Why, for instance in Sanski Most, that happened only in several out of tens of the
non-Serb villages? The horror of the civil war was present everywhere, but depended
exclusively of the Muslim conduct. The war started in different times in different
municipalities, and it never happened because of the Serbs, but always because of the
Muslim-Croat alliance! Whoever is interested in the truth, will easily find a plethora od
evidence within the file of this case!)

2466. Bosnian Muslims were often given limited time to leave their homes before being loaded
onto trucks, buses or trains and transported out of the Municipalities.8329 (This is a negligeance of
the facts that it was only for those who were waiting for the transport, and when the buses
had been secured, the people had been notified that the boarding will be in two hours or so.
There had been examlpes that some villagers never came to the appointed buses, like in
Kotor Varos, and the authorities returned the money to them, see: @ ) Some Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats, when expelled, were forced to sign statements which left their
property to the Bosnian Serb authorities.8330 In some cases they had to sign statements saying that
they were leaving a particular area and would never return again.8331 The Chamber also recalls its
finding that in Vlasenica for example, some Bosnian Muslim women were forced to sign
documents saying they were leaving the municipality of their own free will and those who refused
to sign were subjected to threats to their lives and security.8332 (This endless lies were possible
because of the endless and uncritical trust that the Chamber had in many Muslim witnesses,
who were prepared to lie. The Chamber already confirmed that the change of the ownership
never happened in the entire Republic of Srpska. Particularly this allegation is senseless, and
even more senseless in charges against this President, because he issued many orders agains
any violation of the humanitarian law, and specially annihilated any possible document, if
issued, of that kind, see: D101 of 19 August 1992 #No Appropriation happened#! :
……………………………………………………………….

8327
See Sections IV.A.1.a.i.H: Movement of the population from Bijeljina; IV.A.1.a.ii.I: Movement of the population from Bratunac; IV.A.1.a.v.H:
IV.A.1.a.iv.G: Movement of the population from Foĉa; Movement of the population from Rogatica; IV.A.1.a.viii.F: Movement of the population from
Vlasenica and appropriation of property.
8328
The Chamber found in this section of the Judgement numerous examples of such acts directed against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the
Municipalities.
8329
See paras. 672, 732, 931, 1035, 1060, 1072, 1144–1145, 1267, 1271, 1462, 2320.
8330
See paras. 675, 929, 1093, 1216–1217, 1266, 1467, 1561, 1566, 2033, 2319, 2322, 2436–2438. See also para. 2057.
8331
See para. 730.
8332
See paras. 1186, 1217.
 469

The
proper translation should be I order…. “[a]gainst the civilian population are to be
prevented” with the stress on an imperative nature of this order! How any mentioning of this
President in connection to this issue has any sense?)

2467. In many cases Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were forced to leave following attacks
against their villages or after the take-over of towns by Serb Forces.8333 In other cases, Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats were first arrested, and detained in detention facilities before being
transported out of the municipality.8334 While the transfers of some detainees out of detention
facilities were described as ―exchanges‖, the Chamber finds that given that these ―exchanges‖
were predominantly in relation to unlawfully detained civilians, they also amount to forced
displacement.8335 (#Fights initiated by Muslim terrorists#! This kind of presentation neglects
the essence: there had been fights, but initiated by the Muslim terrorists and extremists, and
they never moved their civilians out of the combat zones, which was their obligation. The
Prosecution had never proven that the Serbs attacked any settled place if there was no a
strong Muslim armed group which attacked the Serb civilians or the Army-police units!
Never!!! As the D2424 described it in Grbavica – Sarajevo, or Edward Vulliamy for
Prijedor, P3788, describing the whole settlements of the non-Serbs where the inhabitants
never had any problem because of a peaceful attitude towards the Republic of Srpska! How
this in unjust and unfair to accuse only one side, could be depicted only by comparison of the
acts against the Serbs in the Muslim/Croat territories with the acts of the Serbs against the
non-Serbs. For instance, there are many settlements with the Muslim or Croat majority that
had never been touched, and it depended on their conduct, such as Bosanski Dubocac,
Bosanski Kobas, Brezovo polje (partly) Janja near Bijeljina (partly) Baljvine in M. Grad
and others@@@)

2468. The Chamber recalls its findings that in some Municipalities Bosnian Muslims may have
requested assistance or permission to leave, and in some cases they paid exorbitant fees to do so.
However, these departures were not voluntary and occurred under circumstances in which they
had no real choice but to leave.8336 (But this circumstances hadn’t been created by the Serbs,
but by the inter-ethnic and inter-religious civil war!) Even when Bosnian Muslim leaders or
other non-governmental organisations were involved in trying to evacuate Bosnian Muslims, this
occurred in an environment of fear and threats which does not suggest that the population left
voluntarily.8337 (The Chamber misses the essential fact: by whom or by what they had been
threatened? It was never any official institution, but the civil war itself!!!) The Chamber finds
that even though non-governmental organisations may have been involved in facilitating some of
these displacements, this does not render lawful what were otherwise unlawful transfers. The
Chamber found that in other municipalities while the Bosnian Serb authorities referred to
movement of the population as ―voluntary departure‖, in reality civilians were fleeing out of fear
for their lives; this occurred in intimidating and violent circumstances which negated any
suggestion of voluntariness in their departures.8338 (Even more unlawful would be to prevent
anyone to leave, and to deny the freedom of movement. Such an agreements had been signed

8333
See paras. 728–732, 747, 858, 929, 972, 977, 1035, 1056, 1060, 1072, 1134, 1139, 1144–1145, 1151, 1216, 1219, 1250, 1260–1261, 1273, 1449, 1456,
1462–1463, 2089, 2313.
8334
See paras. 762–764, 888, 1152, 1186, 1202, 1479, 1850–1852, 1902, 2115, 2343–2344, 2161.
8335
For the Chamber‘s findings with respect to unlawful detention, see Section IV.A.2.b.iv.D: Legal findings on crimes (Unlawful detention).
8336
See paras. 673, 786, 931, 1215, 1222, 1362, 1459–1460, 1561, 1563, 1565–1566, 2039, 2318, 2320, 2331, 2288. See also para. 2058.
8337
See paras. 1110, 1215, 1467–1469.
8338
See paras. 1219, 1268.
 470

by the side to the conflict many times, all of them forbading the forceful transfer and forceful
containment of civilians! The Chamber regularly misses to name the responsible, either
person, or institution, or a situation of the civil ware as itself, and for everything that usually
happens in a civil wars does charge the President and his associates, who in no way could
influence the development! Is that a fair trial? #No liability established#!)

2469. In addition the Chamber recalls its finding that even in municipalities where Bosnian Serb
authorities did invite citizens to return, the number of those who returned was extremely limited,
and the pattern of mistreatment, intimidation and expulsions continued.8339 (By what, or by
whom? This kind of “objectivisation” something that must be a subjective liability is
unbearable in any justice system! The best example is the prematured return of the Muslims
in Bijeljina, when they had been invited by the President and the Prime Minister of
Yugoslavia Mr. Panic. The general situation deteriorated immediately, see@ ) In Vlasenica
for example, Bosnian Muslims when they returned to their villages found that their homes had
been burnt down.8340 (#Military events#! Because there were a fierce fights, while the homes
had been used as fortified military objects!) In another incident the Chamber found that Serb
Forces turned away Bosnian Muslims who tried to return after fleeing their village in Zvornik.8341
(This is also wrong and fake, because there is a document of the Muslim provenance, calling
the Muslims not to return to the town, but to go to the terrain and join the Patriotic League!
See:D1622, p.1:

(#Muslim authorities forbade return#! Having this document, issued by the Muslim
authorities of Zvornik on 8 May 1992, how was it possible to have this “finding” above?)

2470. The Chamber finds that there is no indication that the forcible displacement of the Bosnian
Muslim and Bosnian Croat population was carried out on any grounds permitted under
international law. (Neither the Chamber established beyond reasonable doubt that there was
any forcible displacement of population whatsoever! There is an overwhelming evidence that
the civilians, for whatever reasons, requested and demanded to be transferred to the Muslim
controlled territory, or tho the third or neighbouring countries, as it was written in manmy
agreements signed under the auspice of the ICRC, UNHCR or other mediators. See: D4710
p.1

D4710, p. 2

p. 3

8339
See paras. 677, 720–721, 788–789, 1214.
8340
See para. 1219.
8341
See para. 1269.
 471

(#No “permanent removal” possible#! #No “Joint Criminal Enterprise” possible#!This

document rebuts the very foundation of the Joins Criminal Enterprise! After such a
commitment, nobody was entitled to “find” the alleged “permanent removal” of the
population. Nobody could be proud of the conditions which made the population to ask to
leave, but the responsibility for civil war lies on somebody else, not on the Serb authorities!
There are other documents, signed in 1992, beginning with the 12 April Sarajevo Agreement,
through the 22 May Agreement, a 17 July Agreement, a 27 August Agreement, 30
September, 1 October Agreement, all of them regulatin the right of population to be
transferred out of combat zones, with the right to returne preserved! Are the UN documents
matter before the UN Court?)

ii. Mens rea

2471. With respect to the incidents in paragraph 2465, the Chamber finds that members of the
Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs intended to forcibly displace the
population within a national border. In relation to the incidents in paragraph 2466, the Chamber
finds that members of the Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs
intended to forcibly displace the population across a de jure or de facto border. (Even such an
invalid finding, unfounded in evidence and completely fake, doesn’t fit into the Prosecution’s
allegation about the JCE and alleged “permanent removal” of the non-Serb population out
of the Serb territories! The mentioned paragraph is not by itself any evidence, it is only
numbering od the municipalities allegedly cleansed by the “Serb Forces”….@)

2472. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber had regard to the involvement of Serb Forces and
Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs in the systematic movement of Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities. The Chamber also considered the similar pattern in
which Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were forcibly displaced and the involvement of Serb
Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs in creating an environment of fear in
which Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats had no choice but to leave the Municipalities. (This
is highly incorrect and inacceptable to allocate the inevitable atmosphere of a civil war to the
willing conduct of the Serb side, which was only about 32% of the BiH population! Who was
in fear, and who had a reason to fear? This is flagrant violation of a common sense, to charge
the side which wanted “to avoid the at all costs”, see D1833,

for
trying to exploit the war anf the fear for it’s objectives. If it was so, why it didn’t happen in
all the municipalities with the Serb majority? Or, why it didn’t happen at once, after the war
broke out, on 6 April 1992? Why the Serb side proposed Bosnia to be like Switzerland? Why
the Serbs proposed to the Muslims and Croats to form their own municipalities within the
Republic of Srpska? No a reasonable courth could answer to these questions otherwise but
as the Defense answers it!#Bosnia like Switzerland#! #Two municipalities – peace#!) As
found above, this environment of fear was caused by ongoing violence, killings, cruel and
inhumane treatment, unlawful detention, rape and other acts of sexual violence, discriminatory
measures, and wanton destruction of villages, houses, and cultural monuments. In many cases the
population fled following attacks against their villages and homes by Serb Forces. The Chamber
 472

finds beyond reasonable doubt that these circumstances demonstrate the requisite intent to forcibly
displace the population. (This is equally wrong as all other findings in this Tribunal! Why?
Because it is evident that the #Serbs never initiated# any of the armed skirmishes that
appeared in the different municipalities in a diferrent times. There is no example that any of
those felonies numbered in this paragraph, “ongoing violence, killings, cruel and inhumane
treatment, unlawful detention, rape and other aongoing violence, killings, cruel and inhumane
treatment, unlawful detention, rape and other acts of sexual violence, discriminatory measures,
and wanton destruction of villages, houses, and cultural monumentscts of sexual violence,
discriminatory measures, and wanton destruction of villages, houses, and cultural monuments”
ever happened without prior terrorist attacks of the Muslim or Croat forces, which thus
inflamed the said municipality! There was no a single example that any settlement had been
attacked without a military necessity, while there are many examples of the avoiding a
skirmish once the said settlement handed over their weapons, or declared that will not fight.
All of it is well documented in evidence in this case! If there is any opposition to this
characterisation as a terrorist, it is the simpliest to see what is the #formulation of
terrorism#, for instance in Encyclopaedia Britanica: Although conventional military forces
invariably engage in psychological warfare against the enemy, their principal means of victory
is strength of arms. Similarly, guerrilla forces, which often rely on acts of terror and other
forms of propaganda, aim at military victory and occasionally succeed (e.g., the Viet Cong in
Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia). Terrorism proper is thus the systematic use of
violence to generate fear, and thereby to achieve political goals, when direct military victory is
not possible. This has led some social scientists to refer to guerrilla warfare as the ―weapon of
the weak‖ and terrorism as the ―weapon of the weakest. […] Some definitions treat all acts of
terrorism, regardless of their political motivations, as simple criminal activity. For example, in
the United States the standard definition used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
describes terrorism as ―the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives.‖ How else to qualify the attacks deep into the
Serbian territory by the Muslim groups of armed extremists without any military
prerequisits to be an army, without formed units, without uniforms and amblems, without
known commanders, ready to hide at homes and get out now and then to kill, intimidate and
even try to take over the power? #Terrorists by definition#!)

2473. In addition, the Chamber was able to infer intent from a number of explicit examples. In
this regard the Chamber also recalls its finding that during attacks on Bosnian Muslim villages in
Bratunac for example, members of Serb Forces said ―this is a Serb country‖ and the Bosnian
Muslims should be expelled.8342 (Let us here see this para 744, which was the basis for such a
finding: 744. En route, the soldiers provoked the Bosnian Muslims by saying that ―this is a Serb
country‖ and that they ―should be expelled‖.The men were lined up against the wall of the
supermarket and ordered to put their hands up and stand in that position for half-an-
hour.Many Bosnian Serb soldiers were gathered in the area near the supermarket.These
soldiers were not regular JNA soldiers but included local Bosnian Serbs. There was also a tank
with JNA markings and an APC in the centre of Glogova. (What does it mean, to found such a
mean “finding” only on a #testimony of a Muslim extremist#, who fought agains the Serbs
and had lost? What significance may have anything that the soldiers could have said, if any
at all? How this may be the President’s liability? Did these soldiers participate in the process
of creation of the policy of Serbs in Bosnia? Why to “infer” anything if on the same subject
there is so many #contemporaneous evidence#? Just look at the P941, from 26 August 1992:

8342
See para. 744.
 473

this is a commitment of the most competent Serb leader, and how any nasty remarks of the
bypassing soldiers could be taken to rebut this official standpoint? The President was
sufficiently honest to notice that “all sides practised cleansing over many years” but didn’t
accuse anyone, because the war circumstances brought about the horrifying atmosphere. See
P2953 of 18 August 92:

Or para 5 of the same P941 exhibit:

This official position of the Serb side was not questioned by the Serb Assembly, or public! It
was clear that the final arrangement is going to look as the President envisaged and
accepted, or even proposed! And this is the only relevant position, not jokes, or nasty
remarks of ordinary soldiers! #Jokes vs. documents#!) The Chamber also recalls its finding
that Bosnian Muslims were told that they would have to go to Tuzla because Bosnian Serbs were
going to live in Bratunac.8343 In Pale, Bosnian Muslims were told it was better to go ―voluntarily‖
to areas where they were a majority than to be ―chase[d] through the woods‖ later.8344 (This is also
#not founded, and was rebute#d by the witness from the Pale authorities, who anyway was
very critical about the abilities of police, but as other defense witnesses, it was rejected. What
some paramilitaries or refugees from other areas may have advised to the Muslims is not
under any control of the local authorities, let alone the President, who was physically and
functionally too remote from such a business.)

2474. Bosnian Muslims in Rogatica were also threatened and warned about the forthcoming
―cleansing‖ and were told they would be allowed to leave to Visoko and Zenica because this was
where Bosnian Muslims were ―supposed to live‖.8345 (#Protected lies#! This is as senseless as
everything based upon a solitary statement, particularly of those protected witnesses. Who
was authorised to say that the Muslims were supposed to live in Visoko? A bypassing
civilian, or soldier? This was not decided by such a people, even if they said it. The relevant
documents and commitments are signed by the highest officials, under the auspice of the UN

8343
See para. 769.
8344
See para. 2316.
8345
See para. 1035.
 474

agencies and ICRC, and that is the only what counts! Rogatica is particularly illustrative,
because of the pattern of a new arrangements proposed by the Serbs in order to enable the
BiH independence. This is the system of forming two or more municipalities within one
existing. #Two municipalities – peace#! In Rogatica there were negotiations, but were
interrupted by the Muslim killing of a Serb policemen on 20 May 92. If the Serbs had
premeditated, let alone decided to expel the Muslims from Rogatica, why they waited for six
weeks after the war broke out in Sarajevo? No reaslonable chamber would be able to defend
such a findings in this Judgment, and that is why all of it looks to the Serbs like an assault!)
In Vlasenica, members of Serb Forces were instructed to ―cleanse‖ specific areas of Bosnian
Muslims and that the ―territory had to be 100 percent clean and that none of the Muslims should
remain in the area‖.8346 (Here is another #forgery#, #protected guilt plea lies#!: a protected
witness with the guilt plea agreement testified something that he couldn’t know, but needed
to please the Prosecution and preserve his agreement. But, even if he didn’t lie, let us see how
the Chamber interpreted this in the quoted paragraph 1128: 1128. The Special Police
Platoon first took-over ―several villages‖ on the road from Vlasenica to Milići. Kraljević
received orders for operations against Bosnian Muslim villages from Radenko Stanić.The aim
was to ―cleanse‖ the area of Bosnian Muslims and Kraljević instructed the Special Police
Platoon that the ―territory had to be 100 percent clean and that none of the Muslims should
remain in the area‖. In which area??? It is very easy to see that it was not any political, but
strictly military order, #military necessity#, because it didn’t pertain to the “area” or
“territory” but to the strip along the communication berween Vlasenica and Milici, the only
communication for the Army and economy. The Chamber didn’t allow the Defence to depict
the context: a few days before the inhabitants-terrorists attacked two lorries transporting
boxite from the nearby mine to Zvornik, killed the drivers, civilians, and ruined the lorries,
which is well documented and known. No army all over the world would tolerate such a
conduct deep within its territory! In Zvornik, the Chamber recalls its finding that Bosnian Serb
authorities met to discuss the removal of Bosnian Muslims and that the Zvornik TO was ordered to
organise and co-ordinate the movement out of the Bosnian Muslim population.8347 (Let us see
how this assertion or “finding” is based in para 1363 of the Judgment: 1363. In late May
1992, Bosnian Muslim representatives met with local Serbs, including a member of the Interim
Government to discuss the removal of Bosnian Muslims from the municipality. On or about 28
May 1992, the commander of the VRS 1st Birač Brigade, Svetozar Andrić, ordered the Zvornik
TO to organise and co-ordinate the movement out of the Bosnian Muslim population, with only
women and children to be moved out and men fit for military service placed in camps for
exchange. So, the Bosnian Muslim representatives came to the Serbs not to ask to stay, but to
ask to have their compatriots removed from (the Serb part of) municipality. Having in mind
the Appeal of the authorities of the Muslim municipality of Zvornik of 8 May 92, D1622,p.1

it
is clear that they wanted their population to cross to their part of municipality. The
Chamber neglected the fact that the Serbs controlled only some 30 – 35% of the municipal
territory, the rest remained in the Muslim control to this days, as a separate municipality!
#Muslim demanded to leave#!)

8346
See para. 1128.
8347
See para. 1363.
 475

2475. The Chamber found for example in Bijeljina, that there was a plan for the organised
expulsion of Bosnian Muslims.8348 (All of it was fully commented there, in the paras 671 and
672, and it is #all wrong and unfounded#. The main witness upon whom the Prosecution-
Chamber relied, confessed that he didn’t know for any of the plethora of the President’s
documents in his fight against crimes an irregularities! So, everything that M. Davidovic said
before getting acquainted with the President orders in invalid! ) This involved multiple
phases which created an atmosphere of fear, hardship, intimidation and humiliation where a large
number of Bosnian Muslims were expelled or fled the municipality out of fear.8349 (None of them
“expelled” – and if it was so, after the war there would be a number of litigations before the
Bosnian courts. Those who were indicted, hadn’t been found guilty. For the second part of
this sentence: ‖[o]r fled the municipality out of fear‖ should be the only one, but the President
was not responsible either for the civil war, or for the conduct of intimidators who didn’t act
on behalf of the authorities!) In Rogatica the Bosnian Serb authorities were involved in the
organised displacement of the Bosnian Muslim population and maintained lists of Bosnian
Muslims who had been sent away from the municipality.8350 (There were at least five Muslim
villages in the municipalities Rogatica, (one of these villages was Vragolovi, mentioned in
para 1035 of the Judgment) in which the population handed over the weapons and lived
freely until almost the end of the war, and in one of them (Vragolovi) some Muslims from the
town had found the shelter before proceeding further. #Disarmed villages safe#!) In Pale,
Bosnian Serb authorities convened meetings to discuss and take a position on the departure of non-
Serbs from the municipality. They informed Bijljana Plavšić that there had been ―forced and
wilful‖ efforts to move Bosnian Muslims out of the municipality.8351 (Certainly, this was not
done by the authorities, because the authorities informed the member of Presidency, Ms.
Plavsic. As it is evident and corroborated by many documents, the influx of Serb refugees
from the Muslim areas brought some tensions, and possibly pressure, but the authorities
opposed it. Otherwise, the Court wouldn’t know it, but the vas majority of the charges
against the President and other Serbs originate from the official documents that reported
about the effort done against crimes. This should rather be #EXCULPATORY#! #Officials
proper attitude#!)

2476. The intent to forcibly displace the population was also demonstrated by statements from
Bosnian Serb leaders that for example in Foĉa, not a single Bosnian Muslim was in Foĉa and that
there was ―only one people‖ living in the municipality and ―one religion‖ being practised there.8352
With respect to Zvornik, the Drina Corps reported that ―Turks made up 60% of the municipality‘s
population and it has now been cleansed and replaced with an ethnically pure Serb population‖.8353
(All of it is commented in the said paragraph 1365. Speaking about Zvornik, Vlasenica,
Foca, Gorazde, Bratunac, Ilidza, Vogosca, and many other municipalities it must be kept in
mind that the Serbs controlled only a part, always less that 50% of the municipal territory.
So, there was no a complete “take-over” of municipalities, if there was a critical number of
the Muslim setlements! #Serb parts only#!)

(C) Conclusion

2480. With respect to the incidents above, which relate to forcible displacement within national
boundaries, the Chamber finds that those who were displaced left their homes, belongings and

8348
See paras. 671–672.
8349
See paras. 670–673.
8350
See para. 1036.
8351
See para. 2324.
8352
See para. 933.
8353
See para. 1365.
 476

livelihoods, without any guarantee concerning the possibility to return in the future and this caused
the victims serious mental suffering or injury. (This is incorrect, since the UN and other
mediators in the Conference (ICFY) #guaranteed return# for everyone, and property rights,
and the President signed all of the agreements pertaining to the subject. The guarantees had
been general and on the levele of the entire country, and nobody ever proposed to issue such
guarantees individually!) These acts were committed with the intent to inflict serious mental
suffering, or with knowledge that these acts were likely to cause such suffering. These acts are of
similar seriousness to deportation which is listed under Article 5(d) of the Statute. The Chamber
therefore finds that these acts are sufficiently serious to amount to ―other inhumane acts‖ pursuant
to Article 5(i) of the Statute.

2481. The Chamber found that there was a widespread and systematic attack against the Bosnian
Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations of BiH. (Absolutely unfounded and fake! There
were many areast without any attack, and even where there was combats, it had never been
against the civilians, and it was always initiated by the Muslim/Croats irregular forces!
#Never against civilians! No evidence to the opposite direction#!) The Chamber finds that
these acts of deportation and forcible transfer were part of this widespread and systematic attack
and the perpretrators of these acts knew of the attack and that their crimes were part of it. In
reaching that conclusion the Chamber considered the locations, time period, and the identity of the
victims of these killings, which correspond with the scope of the widespread and systematic
attack, as well as the magnitude and systematic nature of the attack on the Bosnian Muslim and
Croat civilian populations of BiH. The Chamber therefore finds that these incidents constitute
deportation and other inhumane acts (forcible transfer) as crimes against humanity.

b. Persecution: Count 3

i. Killings

2482. The Chamber refers to its legal findings which address murder as a crime against humanity
and a violation of the laws or customs of war charged under Counts 5 and 6 of the Indictment,
respectively. The Chamber found above that many Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats (i) were
killed by Serb Forces during and after the take-over of the Municipalities;(#No “take-overs#! The
very foundation called “take-over” of the Municipalities hadn’t been proven, because all the
time the Serbs controlled only their parts of municipalities, forming their own
administration and offering to the other side to form their municipality with police and all
other organs. In the municipalities where there was no preconditions to form the Muslim or
Croat municipalities, i.e. the municipalities with a vast majority of the Serbs, also there was
no any “take-over” because the authorities that had been elected in 1990 continued to
exercise their duties until the next elections in 1996. But, the Chamber and Prosecution still
like their construct calls “take-over” which never happened! What is needed to have this
obvious and undoubtable fact recognised?) (ii) were killed by Serb Forces while detained at
multiple detention facilities in the Municipalities; (Unfortunately, there had been some killings,
but all together no more than 1 % to 2%, but there had never been established that it was
done by the “Serb Forces”, but only by individuals who intruded the detentions, and
commited crime clandestinely and in the absence of superiors. There is a plethora of
evidence to that, and none to the opposite direction! #No official liability#!) or (iii) died during
and as a result of cruel and inhumane treatment by Serb Forces at a number of detention facilities
in the Municipalities. The Chamber also also found that the perpetrators of each of these incidents
acted with the intent to kill the victims or at least wilfully caused serious bodily harm, which they
should reasonably have known might lead to death. (Is this “second degree murder” equalised
with murder? How this is in the other countries?) The Chamber further found that the victims
 477

of each of these incidents were civilians or had been rendered hors de combat at the time of their
killing. (That would be correct if the real “Serb Forces” acted, but it never happened, but
some #individuals commited crimes# out of any line of command, and these crimes can not
be considered as a part of the system action!)

2483. The Chamber also finds that the perpetrators of the killings mentioned above intentionally
targeted their victims solely on the basis of their identity as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats;
these killings were carried out on discriminatory grounds. In reaching that conclusion, the
Chamber also had regard to the insults, taunts and threats directed at the victims by Serb Forces on
the basis of their identity as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats.8354 (This is also an exaggerated
qualification! That was a civil war with elements of a religious war, and the Serbs had been
attacked, persecuted, killed or expelled only for being Serbs, and a revengeful sentiment
comprised this general antagonism, with a very rare personal acquaintance and #reasons for
revenge!#) As found earlier, these killings were part of a widespread and systematic attack against
the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations of BiH and the perpetrators knew of
the attack and that their crimes were part of it.(The evidence, a big amount of it, doesn’t
corroborate this assertion-finding. Otherwise, how to explain that #many Muslims and
Croats didn’t have any troubles#? Why many of them remained living in the Serb areas to
the end of the war, while some felt a fear and insecurity, or came under a suspicion for
crimes and therefore were questioned? In the Ahmet Zulic testimony it was established that
his father and teo brothers didn’t have any trouble with the Serb authorities, while he did
have. Even he confessed that he possessed a machine-gun, while denied 40 kg of explosives,
which had been founded in his possession. So, the Prosecution summoned to testimony these
kind of Muslims for whose interrogation there was a military or security reason, and the
Chamber generalise “their case” as if all the Muslims had been mistreated! The mere
affiliation to ethnicity or religion HAD NEVER BEEN DECISIVE IN TREATING THE
CITIZENS BY THE AUTHORITIES! #Regardless of ethnicity or religion#!)

2484. Therefore the Chamber finds that these killings constitute persecution as a crime against
humanity. (But, none of it could be connected with the official authorities, or wit the
President! This kind of judging opposes to everything the human kind had achieved to the
days!#No official liability#!)

(B) Cruel and/or inhumane treatment

(1)Torture, beatings, physical and psychological abuse

2485. The Chamber refers to its factual findings in Section IV.A.1 with respect to acts carried out
by members of Serb Forces in the Municipalities. These factual findings demonstrate an egregious
level of mistreatment suffered by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats throughout the
Municipalities while in detention or during and after the take-over of the Municipalities. (This is
well commented there, and is not founded, and particularly couldn’t be allocated to the
authorities!)

2486. For example, the Chamber found that detainees were cut or stabbed with knives.8355 Some
detainees had crosses carved with knives on their body including on their face, arm, and chest.8356
One detainee alone had 30 crosses carved onto his body with a hunting knife.8357 In one incident a

8354
See, e.g., 743, 806, 873, 1019, 1151, 1314, 1552, 1625, 1702, 1722, 1763, 1869, 1875.
8355
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.1, C.6.1, C.6.2, C.21.2, C.25.1, C.27.1, C.27.4, C.27.5, C.20.2, C.20.4, C.1.2.
8356
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.7.2, C.6.2, C.21.3, C.20.2.
8357
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.21.3.
 478

detainee had salt rubbed into his wounds after being cut.8358 In another incident a knife was used
to carve out a detainee‘s tattoo which depicted a crescent and star.8359 In another detention facility,
detainees were forced to eat body parts which had been severed from other detainees.8360 (This is
well commented there, and is not founded, and particularly couldn’t be allocated to the
authorities! In no way it can be associated with the President, not even his knowledge about
such a cases, which may have happened as a solitary cases. If it was the case with the carving
crosses and other cutting by knife, there would be documents about it, photos and
descriptions, but it originates only from some testimonies of the Muslim extremists, who
were facilitated an opportunity to continue their war against the Serbs in this Court!)

2487. The Chamber also recalls its finding that detainees were severely beaten and mistreated
during interrogations.8361 Some detainees were questioned about military operations and security
issues and mistreated at the same time.8362 They had their arms and legs tied and were beaten over
an extended period of time.8363 Detainees were tied with chains and belts and some were beaten
for several hours including on the soles of their feet with a bat,8364 while others were physically
mistreated with pliers during questioning.8365 In another incident, a boy was tied to a fence and
beaten with a rope.8366 Some detainees were also forced to lie on the ground where they were
severely beaten and told to confess about their involvement with Bosnian Muslim forces.8367 At
another detention facility, a guard repeatedly beat a detainee after he could not answer questions;
the detainee fell to the ground and the guard then jumped on him until the detainee lost
consciousness and was revived with water poured on him.8368 Detainees were also threatened or
beaten before being forced to sign statements regarding their involvement in certain activities.8369
(The interrogations had been conducted by the highest professionals, the most competent
and the most responsible. But the very fact that there was interrogations on the subject of
military operations and security issues denied the allegations that there had been detention
of civilians! Why would the authorities spend and vaste resources on investigations of
civilians about a military and security issues?#No civilians detained. Why civilians would be
interrogated?#)

2488. In detention facilities, some detainees were forced to kneel on the floor, they had knives,
bayonets, or guns put in their mouths as a scare tactic;8370 others were ordered to lie on the ground
and then a guard jumped on them.8371 In one incident a detainee was forced to lick his own blood
off the floor after being severely beaten.8372 Detainees were ordered to bend forward against a
wall and kicked until there was a stream of blood running along the wall; their fingers were then
stepped on as they were instructed to position them on top of the wall.8373 Members of the Serb

8358
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.25.1.
8359
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.27.4.
8360
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.27.1.
8361
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.1, C.21.3, C.25.1, C25.2, C.25.3, C.27.3, C.27.6, C.15.1, C.15.2, C.26.3, C.20.3, C.20.2, C.20.7, C.20.4, C.1.2,
C.17.1, C.22.1, C.22.2.
8362
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.25.3, C.20.3.
8363
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.25.1, C.27.6, C.15.2, C.20.5.
8364
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.10.1.
8365
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.21.1.
8366
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.10.6.
8367
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.3.
8368
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.21.3.
8369
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.21.3, C.15.2, C.20.2.
8370
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.25.3, C.15.3, C.26.1.
8371
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.21.3.
8372
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.15.2.
8373
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.6.
 479

Forces also threw smoke grenades, tear gas grenades, and stink bombs into areas where the
detainees were held.8374

2489. Other incidents of mistreatment included detainees being forced to swallow bullets,8375 hair
which had been pulled from their armpits,8376 cigarettes,8377 broken glass,8378 and motor oil.8379
Detainees were also burnt with lit cigarettes8380 and had their teeth pulled out.8381 Other detainees
were ordered to sit for 40 hours in water, with their hands behind their heads and legs spread on
the ground, as they were kicked and beaten.8382 Detainees were also forced to stand up for several
hours which in one incident caused the weaker detainees to faint and fall to the ground. 8383 The
Chamber also recalls an incident where detainees were packed on top of each other in lavatories
and forced to lie in the midst of excrement.8384

2490. In another incident a prominent Bosnian Muslim detainee was thrown down the stairs and
had to be carried out of the detention facility unconscious.8385 Some detainees were forced to
jump, sometimes head first or chest first, from high points, and, as a result they sustained severe
injuries.8386 In another incident, detainees were thrown into a fire made of rubber tires.8387
(#Deadly combination#! Fairy tales of the Muslim extremists#)

2491. Detainees were punched, kicked, and beaten often severely with whatever device could be
found, including chains, batons, bats, clubs, rifle butts, machine guns, heavy wooden sticks, iron
tubes, steel rods, wooden planks, poles, thick plastic pipes, cables, rubber hoses, stakes, chair legs,
and brass knuckles.8388 Some of these beatings occurred while detainees were forced to run a
gauntlet.8389 Detainees were sometimes taken out of the detention facilities and beaten.8390 Some
detainees were also forced to beat or fight each other,8391 while others were severely beaten if they
did not say what they were instructed to say to ICRC representatives.8392 (All uncorroborated by
any document, all founded on the testimonies of a very carefully selected #withesses, a
Muslim extremists#, who were prepared by the secret service, which tried to persuade some
witnesses that they suffered on another place in another circumstances, see@@@)

2492. Detainees were also beaten when they were given permission to use the toilet or get
8393
water, or while receiving food.8394 Some detainees were beaten when forced to carry dead
bodies,8395 while others were beaten for any attempts they made to improve the conditions of their
8374
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.26.3, C.20.3, C.27.3, C.17.1.
8375
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.21.2, C.21.3.
8376
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.21.3.
8377
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.21.3, C.26.1.
8378
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.27.3.
8379
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.2.
8380
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.21.3, C.11.2, C.18.1.
8381
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.21.3.
8382
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.25.3.
8383
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.1.2, C.27.4, C.17.1.
8384
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.2.
8385
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.15.1.
8386
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.26.1, C.26.3.
8387
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.2.
8388
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.2.1, C.7.2, C.10.1, C.6.1, C.6.2, C.21.3, C.25.1, C.25.2, C.25.3, C.27.2, C.27.4, C27.5, C.27.6, C.27.7, C.11.2, C.15.1,
C.15.2, C.26.1, C.26.3, C.20.3, C.20.2 (the Chamber found that in some cases there were nails embedded in the implements so that the skin of the detainees
would be pierced), C.20.1, C.20.5, C.20.6, C.20.4, C.19.2, C.1.2, C.17.1, C.22.1, C.22.3, C.22.4, C.22.5. See also Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.1.
8389
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.1, C.20.6, C.19.2, C.1.2, C.18.1, C.17.1.
8390
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.1, C.21.2, C.21.3, C.23.2, C.23.1, C.25.3, C.27.4, C.4.1, C.17.1.
8391
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.2.1, C.7.2, C.21.3, C.27.1, C.27.4, C.27.6, C.11.2, C.15.2, C.26.1, C.20.3, C.20.2, C.20.4, C.22.1.
8392
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.2.1, C.21.3.
8393
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.7.2, C.25.1, C.25.2, C.20.2, C.20.1, C.18.1.
8394
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.1, C.20.2, C.20.3.
8395
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.7.2.
 480

detention.8396 Other detainees were severely beaten on arrival at detention facilities and when they
were searched for valuables.8397

2493. Detainees were also subject to verbal and mental abuse, intimidation, and threats, including
threats that they would be killed.8398 In addition, detainees were in constant fear as they were
involved in moving dead bodies or could hear the screams of other detainees being beaten and
physically abused during the night.8399 Some detainees were also forced to carry and bury dead
bodies, clean toilets with their bare hands, clean traces of blood of detainees who had been beaten
or killed, and were also taken to loot or clean Bosnian Muslim houses in the town for the use of
Bosnian Serb families.8400

2494. Some detainees were singled out for severe beatings in front of other detainees as an
example of what could happen to them.8401 Detainees were also taunted when forced to carry dead
bodies.8402 Detainees were subjected to humiliation; this included being forced to (i) make the
―Serb three-finger sign‖,8403 (ii) make the sign of the cross,8404 (iii) walk or kneel with their heads
bowed,8405 (iv) eat carbonised bread without dropping anything,8406 and (v) graze grass like
animals at gun point.8407 Some detainees were spat at and verbally degraded.8408 In one case a
Bosnian Muslim priest was targeted for humiliation; he was forced to drink beer, make the ―Serb
three-finger sign‖, and sing ―Chetnik‖ songs.8409 Some Bosnian Muslim detainees were also
forced to sign papers saying that they had ―voluntarily joined the Serbian Orthodox religion‖.8410
(#This never happened#! If did, there would be so many publicity, because this is the most
sensitive issue in Bosnia, since the current Muslims had been forcefully converted into Islam,
and during the WWII there was a forceful conversion of the Serbs to the Chatolic religion. If
there was a single one case, there would be a lot of evidence, while there was no any “paper”
or document, or media report! This court had been very easy to lie and number many crimes
from the list of war crimes, although it never happened! Even president mentioned in an
intern conversation that some Muslims asked to be returned in their previous religion, but
the President advised not to do it ever!) The Chamber also found that Serb nationalist songs
were played loudly and continuously in a detention facility.8411 In Pale, the Chamber found that
detainees had their hair forcibly cut with a knife.8412 In another incident detainees in Novi Grad
were forced to lie on the ground, beaten, and then subject to attacks by dogs.8413

8396
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.1, C.1.2.
8397
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.1.2, C.18.1. See also See Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.2.
8398
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.7.2, C.10.6, C.10.5, C.10.7, C.10.2, C.6.1, C.6.2, C.21.1, C.21.3, C.25.2, C.27.1 (the Chamber found that detainees
were forced to beat each other with the promise that the one who won would not be killed), C.27.4, C.27.5, C.27.6, C.15.3, C.15.2, C.26.3, C.26.1, C.4.1,
C.20.2, C.20.1, C20.4, C.19.2. See also paras. 2093, 2264.
8399
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.2, C.10.1. See also Scheduled Detention Facility C.21.3.
8400
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.7.2, C.21.3, C.25.3, C.20.2, C.20.4, C.27.4. The Chamber also found that other detainees were forced to work at
Ekonomija farm but has insufficient evidence as to the nature of the work to determine whether it amounted to a denial of or infringement upon a
fundamental right to reach the level of gravity of other Article 5 crimes. See Scheduled Detention Facility C.27.6.
8401
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.7.2, C.26.1, C.15.2.
8402
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.7.2.
8403
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.2.1, C.6.2, C.27.6, C.15.2, C.20.2, C.20.1.
8404
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.27.4, C.18.1.
8405
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.2.1, C.1.2.
8406
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.27.4.
8407
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.4.1.
8408
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.15.2.
8409
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.6.2.
8410
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.21.1.
8411
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.2.
8412
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.19.2.
8413
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.17.1.
 481

2495. The Chamber also recalls its findings that Bosnian Muslims were beaten or abused during
or after attacks on villages8414 or during and after their arrest.8415 Some Bosnian Muslim patients
were also severely kicked and beaten in hospitals when it was discovered that they were Bosnian
Muslims.8416 (Since there was no a single “attack on village” but exclusively on a groups of
armed people, there may have happened some individual acts of violence against those who
caused fightihng and casualties on the Serb side. But, the President repeatedly ordered the
respect of the humanitarian laws and forbade any abuse of the captured combatants, or
civilians! If there was some cases of abuse, it must be seen as a revengeful conduct of the
locals againste their local neighbours who dared to kill the people for nothing! Still it was a
crime, but the state organs, and the President in particular has nothing to do with it, and
shouldn’t even been mentioned, let alone incidted and sentenced!#President ordered
properly#! )

2496. The Chamber also recalls its finding that prominent Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats,
including professionals and leaders, were targeted, taken away, detained, and subjected to
intimidation and beatings.8417 (It is commented there, in the respective paragraphs, but to
remind ourselves, those “prominent” professionals and leaders had been a very known
extremists, listed in all the intelligence reports before the war, as the instillers, ideologists or
financist of the armed rebellion and further terrorist activities deep in the Serb territories!)
The Chamber also found that members of Serb Forces mistreated and intimidated Bosnian
Muslims by making derogatory remarks, by shooting at their homes and mosques, and by
stopping, beating, and mistreating Bosnian Muslims at check-points and barricades.8418

2497. The Chamber recalls its finding that many detainees had visible wounds and bruises
following this mistreatment and some were unable to walk or talk for days.8419 Some detainees
were subjected to multiple beatings on a daily basis.8420 Injuries included broken and fractured
bones, bleeding, severe bruises, swelling, and knocked-out teeth.8421 In one case a detainee began
to urinate blood after being beaten severely,8422 and others had their eyes knocked out or were
blinded.8423 Some detainees were beaten severely until they lost consciousness.8424 The Chamber
also found that detainees continued to suffer ongoing physical and psychological effects.8425

2498. Having considered these incidents, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats were subjected to intentional acts which caused severe physical and mental pain or
suffering. These acts were intentionally carried out by members of Serb Forces and were aimed at
(i) obtaining information or a confession; (ii) punishing, intimidating, or coercing the victim or a
third person, or (iii) discriminating against the victim or a third person. The Chamber therefore
finds that acts of torture were carried out against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the
Municipalities.

8414
See paras. 861, 873, 1264, 1266. The Chamber recalls its finding that following the attack on Mješaja/Trošanj by Serb Forces, Bosnian Muslim villagers
were kicked and hit with rifle butts and tree branches, and in one case a Bosnian Muslim lost an eye. See para. 1139.
8415
See paras. 862, 876–877, 970, 985, 1126, 1134, 1155–1156, 1464, 2093; Scheduled Detention Facilities C.27.2, C.27.6, C.20.6.
8416
See para. 863; Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.4.
8417
See paras. 723, 729, 766, 1119, 1162; Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.2, C20.1.
8418
See paras. 950, 952, 970, 1048, 1102, 1119, 1242, 1262, 1266, 1276, 1282, 1493, 1500.
8419
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.1, C.21.3, C.20.2, C.20.1.
8420
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.2.1, C.19.2.
8421
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.21.3, C.25.3, C.27.3, C.27.4, C.27.6, C.15.1, C.15.2, C.26.1, C.20.3, C.20.2, C.20.1, C.20.5, C.20.6, C.20.7, C.20.4,
C.17.1, C.22.1.
8422
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.25.3.
8423
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.27.3, C.4.1.
8424
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.6.2, C.25.3, C.27.3, C.27.4, C.27.6, C.15.1, C.26.1, C.20.1, C.20.6.
8425
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.1, C.2.1, C.15.1.
 482

2499. In addition, these incidents establish that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were also
subjected to deliberate beatings, physical and psychological abuse, including harassment, constant
humiliation, and degradation. The Chamber finds that these beatings and abuse caused serious
mental or physical suffering or injury or constituted a serious attack on human dignity and
amounted to a denial of or infringement upon a fundamental right. The Chamber therefore finds
that these acts of beatings, physical and psychological abuse are of equal gravity to the other
crimes listed under Article 5 of the Statute.

(2) Rape and other acts of sexual violence84268432

2500. The Chamber found in Section IV.A.1 above that Serb Forces committed rape against
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat women and men in Bijeljina,8427 Brĉko,8428 Foĉa,8429 Novo
Sarajevo,8430 Prijedor,8431 Rogatica,8432 Vlasenica,8433 Vogošća,8434 and Zvornik.8435 Some
Bosnian Muslim women and girls were raped on multiple occasions, sometimes on a continuous
basis by members of Serb Forces while in detention facilities.8436 (There no a trustful evidence
that there was rapes more than it happens during the peace times. We remember how the
international media and humanitarian organisations claimed that already in the first several
months of war the Serb soldiers raped up to 80,000 women. After all the investigations, there
was no more than dozen of cases, which would be a rate of this felony during four peaceful
years! #No rapes#!)

2501. In one case a woman was raped approximately 150 times during her detention.8437 There
were incidents where Bosnian Muslim women who had been detained were taken out of the
facilities and raped by Serb Forces; in some incidents the rape was accompanied by additional
threats or use of violence and sometimes involved gang rape.8438 Some Bosnian Muslim women
were moved to houses and apartments where they were raped on some occasions in front of each
other.8439 Other incidents included women being raped and further humiliated publicly by
members of Serb Forces in villages which had been taken-over.8440 The Chamber also found that
some Bosnian Muslim male detainees, including a 13-year-old boy, were also raped by Serb
Forces who used police truncheons and similar objects.8441 (#No rapes, all lies#! Since the
Muslims and Serbs in the “municipal armie units” knew each other very well, there would
be many litigations after the war, nobody could prevent the lawyers to represent the Muslim
women before courts, but that didn’t happen!)

2502. In one incident Bosnian Muslim detainees were ordered to get down on all fours, a pointed
stake was introduced into their anuses causing them to scream in pain; they were then ordered to

8426
The Prosecution does not allege criminal responsibility for rape and other acts of sexual violence in Banja Luka, Bosanski Novi, Bratunac, Pale, and
Višegrad. Indictment, fn. 5.
8427
See para. 631 ; Scheduled Detention Facility C.2.1.
8428
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.7.2.
8429
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.4, C.10.5, C.10.2.
8430
See paras. 2270–2271, 2274.
8431
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.3, C.20.2, C.20.4.
8432
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.21.3.
8433
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.25.3.
8434
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.26.3.
8435
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.27.6.
8436
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.7.2, C.10.4, C.10.2, C.21.1, C.21.3, C.20.3, C.20.2, C.20.4.
8437
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.5, C.10.7.
8438
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.7.2, C.10.5, C.10.2, C.21.1. See also Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.3 (the Chamber found that a Bosnian
Muslim woman was found in a pool of blood after being raped), C.20.2, C.20.4.
8439
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.2, C.21.1.
8440
See paras. 631, 1269.
8441
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.21.1.
 483

wipe the blood with their clothes.8442 In other incidents detainees were forced to have oral and
sexual intercourse with each other, sometimes in front of other detainees.8443

2503. Other acts of sexual violence included male and female detainees who were ordered to
undress, dance, and perform sexual acts in front of Bosnian Serb soldiers.8444 In other incidents
detainees were forced to remove their underwear and bite or suck each others‘ penises while
soldiers stood by and laughed.8445 In another incident detainees were forced to lick the buttocks of
a Bosnian Serb woman, who threatened to slit their throats if they did not comply. 8446 A female
detainee had her breast exposed while a guard went over it with a knife and the other guards
watched and laughed.8447 (Why the Muslim “victims” didn’t sue the “perpetrators” after the
war?)

2504. The Chamber finds that each of these acts of rape and other acts of sexual violence were
committed by members of Serb Forces without the consent of the victims, that the perpetrators
intentionally committed these acts, and that the perpetrators were aware that the victims did not
consent to such acts. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber has had regard to the circumstances
in which they occurred and the horrific nature of the acts themselves. This includes the fact that
the victims were often detained and subjected to threats of or actual violence and humiliation. (A
Muslim high official Silajdzic claimed that there was, in the first year of war, 80,000 raped
women, and 300,000 Muslim casualties! The Chamber still keeps it as a “fact”!)

2505. With respect to the other acts of sexual violence referred to above, the Chamber finds that
they involved serious abuses of a sexual nature which were inflicted upon the integrity of the
victims by means of coercion, threat of force, or intimidation in a way that caused the utmost
humiliation and degradation to the dignity of the victims. The Chamber finds that these acts of
sexual violence amounted to denial of or infringement upon a fundamental right and were of equal
gravity to the other crimes listed under Article 5 of the Statute.

2506. The Chamber therefore finds that Bosnian Muslim women, men, girls, and boys were
subject to rape and other acts of sexual violence.(And this is a specific contribution of the
United Nations and this UN Court to the future hatred among those communities, since only
rape people knew the truth! A high responsibility for this kind of forgery is on the UN! The
only remedy would be a real and impartial investigation)

(3)Establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions

2507. The Chamber found in Section IV.A.1 above that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
were detained in multiple detention facilities. The Chamber recalls its findings that the detainees
were held in terrible living conditions characterised by severe over-crowding;8448 poor sleeping
conditions, including insufficient bedding and blankets;8449 insufficient or no heating;8450 lack of
ventilation and light; stifling heat;8451 poor sanitation and hygiene, including inadequate washing
8442
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.27.6.
8443
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.2.1, C.26.3, C.26.1, C.20.2.
8444
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.21.3.
8445
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.27.6, C.11.2.
8446
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.11.2.
8447
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.20.2.
8448
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.2.1, C.7.2, C.10.1, C.25.1, C.25.2, C.27.2, C.15.3, C.4.1, C.20.3, C.20.2, C.20.5, C.20.4 (the Chamber found that due
to the lack of space detainees were forced to sleep outdoors in makeshift shelters), C.18.1, C.18.2, C.22.1, C.22.2, C.22.3.
8449
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.1, C.21.1, C.25.1, C.25.2, C.25.3, C.11.2, C.26.3, C.26.1, C.4.1, C.20.3, C.19.2, C.1.2, C.22.1, C.22.2, C.22.3,
C.22.4.
8450
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.1, C.18.2. The Chamber found that this was done deliberately, with no heaters in the rooms, windowpanes left
broken, and clothes used to combat the cold confiscated from the detainees. See Scheduled Detention Facility C.25.3.
8451
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.3, C.20.2, C.20.1, C.20.5, C.20.4, C.1.2, C.22.1, C.22.2, C.22.3.
 484

and toilet facilities;8452 the provision of inadequate food and in some cases rotten food;8453
insufficient or restricted access to water;8454 and inadequate or non-existent medical care.8455

2508. At some detention facilities, the detainees were held in dark, cold, and wet conditions due
to leaking roofs.8456 In one of these facilities, food was distributed in bowls which had been used
to feed dogs and in some cases the detainees‘ food was given to the dogs.8457 The Chamber also
recalls its finding that in some detention facilities, there was a terrible stench due to the inadequate
and leaking toilet facilities and that at night detainees were forced to use a pot and when this filled,
they relieved themselves in their pants or in their rooms.8458

2509. In some cases detainees experienced extreme weight loss, malnutrition, and a deterioration
of their health during their detention as a result of the lack of food and medical attention.8459 The
poor hygienic conditions also resulted in a major problem with lice, skin diseases, and dysentery at
some facilities.8460 The Chamber also found that the living conditions in some detention facilities
caused lasting physical and psychological problems for some detainees.8461 The Chamber also
refers to its findings in Section IV.A.2.b.i regarding the detainees who died as a result of the
conditions of detention.

2510. While the Chamber did find that the conditions improved in some facilities with time, this
does not detract from the fact that prior to these modest improvements conditions were deplorable
in the overwhelming majority of detention facilities referred to in the Indictment. 8462 The
Chamber also notes in this regard its findings that Bosnian Serb authorities and officials attempted
to cover up and prevent the leakage of information regarding the conditions of detention and the
condition of detainees.8463 These attempts included hiding detainees before the arrival of
international representatives and threatening detainees with severe punishment if they complained
about conditions and treatment.8464

2511. Having considered these factors the Chamber finds that members of the Bosnian Serb
Political and Governmental Organs and Serb Forces deliberately established and perpetuated
inhumane living conditions at a number of detention facilities in the Municipalities.8465 Having
considered the extent and the deplorable nature of these inhumane conditions in so many detention
facilities, and the grave consequences for those detained, the Chamber concludes that these acts
amount to a denial of or infringement upon a fundamental right and reach the level of seriousness
of other crimes listed under Article 5 of the Statute.

8452
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.2.1, C.10.1, C.10.5, C.10.7, C.21.1, C.21.3, C.23.1, C.25.3, C.11.2, C.26.3 (the Chamber found that detainees were
held in a location where garbage was disposed of and accumulated), C.26.1, C.4.1, C.20.3, C.20.2, C.20.1, C.20.4, C.19.2, C.1.2, C.18.2, C.22.1, C.22.2,
C.22.4.
8453
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.2.1, C.10.1, C.10.5, C.10.7, C.6.2, C.21.1, C.23.1, C.25.1, C.25.3, C.27.2, C.11.2, C.11.1, C.26.3, C.26.1, C.4.1,
C.20.3, C.20.2, C.20.5, C.20.4, C.19.2, C.1.2, C.17.1, C.18.2, C.22.1, C.22.2, C.22.3, C.22.4.
8454
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.21.3, C.25.3, C.11.1, C.4.1, C.20.2 (the Chamber found that detainees were denied water for long periods and when it
was provided it was not potable which caused intestinal problems), C.20.5 (the Chamber found that detainees had to ―earn‖ drinking water by singing songs
about Greater Serbia), C.20.4, C.1.2, C.18.1, C.17.1, C.22.1, C.22.2, C.22.5.
8455
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.21.1, C.10.1, C.25.1, C.25.2, C.25.3, C.26.1, C.4.1, C.20.3, C.20.2, C.20.7, C.20.4, C.19.2, C.1.2, C.22.2, C.22.3.
8456
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.26.3, C.1.2, C.17.1.
8457
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.26.3.
8458
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.25.3, C.20.2, C.20.3.
8459
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.2.1, C.10.1 (finding that some detainees suffered multiple bouts of pneumonia due to the conditions in the facility),
C.26.1, C.4.1, C.20.3, C.20.2. See also Scheduled Detention Facilities C.19.2, C.1.2.
8460
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.1, C.20.3, C.20.2, C.20.4, C.1.2, C.18.2.
8461
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.10.1.
8462
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.25.3.
8463
See paras. 1198, 1200. See also para. 2150.
8464
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.25.3, C.26.3. See also Scheduled Detention Facilities C.4.1, C.20.2.
8465
The Chamber recalls that it did not have sufficient evidence to made a finding as to the conditions of detention at the TO military warehouses at Livade in
Foĉa. See Scheduled Detention Facility C.10.6.
 485

(4)Conclusion on cruel and inhumane treatment

2512. As found above, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Municipalities were subjected
to (i) torture, beatings, and physical and psychological abuse; (ii) rape and other acts of sexual
violence; and (iii) inhumane living conditions. These acts and/or omissions resulted in serious
mental or physical suffering or injury for the victims; this amounts to a serious attack on human
dignity. The perpetrators of these acts or omissions were members of Serb Forces. The Chamber
finds that the perpetrators committed these acts or omissions (i) with intent to cause serious mental
or physical suffering or injury; (ii) with intent to cause a serious attack on human dignity; or (iii)
with knowledge that serious mental or physical suffering or injury or a serious attack on human
dignity was a probable consequence of these acts or omissions.

2513. In addition, the Chamber finds that the perpetrators of these acts or omissions chose their
victims on the basis of their identity as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats. The Chamber finds
that these acts or omissions discriminated in fact and denied or infringed on fundamental rights.
The Chamber also finds that these acts or omissions were carried out deliberately with the intent to
discriminate on the basis of the identity of the victims as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats.8466
In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber infers intent from the fact that those targeted by these
acts of cruel and inhumane treatment were almost exclusively Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian
Croats. In addition, the Chamber also had regard to the insults, taunts, and threats directed at the
victims on the basis of their identity as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats, which expressly
demonstrated this discriminatory intent.

2514. Examples of such insults and taunts which the Chamber found were connected to these acts
of cruel and inhumane treatment include the following. Detainees who were subject to beatings or
mistreatment were called ―balijas‖ and a ―Turkish gang, a fictitious people, a non-existent people‖
and told that they would all be killed or exterminated.8467 Other detainees were subject to similar
ethnic slurs during the beating and mistreatment.8468 In one incident a detainee was forced to run
around the detention facility and swear at the detainees‘ ―balija mother‖.8469 Some detainees were
called ―Ustasha‖ before or during their mistreatment.8470 Detainees were also forced to sing
―Chetnik‖ songs8471 and to make the ―Serb three-finger sign‖.8472 Detainees were also taunted
with political comments such as ―You wanted a state: here is a state for you‖, ―where is now your
Alija to save you?‖, and ―Where is Naser, your liberator?‖.8473 Bosnian Muslims were told ―there
would be no balija state soon‖ and they were ―finished‖.8474 The Chamber recalls that it found that
during one rape, a Bosnian Muslim woman was told that ―Muslim women should give birth to
Serb children‖, and the perpetrator also said that Muslims were not human beings.8475 The
discriminatory nature of the conditions of detention was shown, for example, by the finding that in
facilities where some Bosnian Serb detainees were also held, they received better food and did not
suffer the extreme weight loss of non-Serb detainees.8476

8466
The Chamber considers that discrimination on the grounds of the identity of the victims as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats falls within the prohibited
grounds of discrimination under Article 5(h) of the Statute.
8467
See para. 806.
8468
See paras. 862, 1013, 1196, 1306, 1477, 1532, 1536, 1745, 1764, 1826, 2021, 2093, 2105, 2198, 2277–2278.
8469
See para. 2105.
8470
See paras. 776, 873, 1763.
8471
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.7.2, C.6.2, C.27.4, C.27.5, C.20.2, C.1.2, C.18.1.
8472
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.2.1, C.6.2.
8473
See para. 2514.
8474
See para. 2093.
8475
See para. 1830.
8476
See paras. 893–894.
 486

2515. In finding discriminatory intent for these acts of cruel and inhumane treatment, the
Chamber also had regard to the surrounding circumstances in the Municipalities in the lead-up to,
during, and after the take-over of the Municipalities including specific statements directed against
the Bosnian Muslim population. In Foĉa for example, Bosnian Serb leaders made radio
announcements that it was no longer possible for Bosnian Serbs to live with their Bosnian Muslim
neighbours, that they could not be woken every morning by the hodza from the mosque, and that
the ―the time had come for the Serbs to settle accounts with the balijas once and for all, and that
the Serbs would no longer allow their ribs to be broken. They will no longer allow their children
to be circumcised‖.8477 Similar radio broadcasts were made in Prijedor which referred to the
destruction of the ―balijas‖ and their property and mosques.8478

2516. In addition, the Chamber found in Bratunac, for instance, that in the lead-up to the conflict,
SDS members wrote slogans on street and traffic signs as well as on public and private property,
which were derogatory towards Bosnian Muslims, including messages to the effect: ―Muslims,
Balijas, Turks move out, you‘re going to be slaughtered‖.8479 In Vlasenica, Bosnian Serb leaders
declared that when BiH ―was proclaimed a sovereign state, we will draw up our borders in
blood‖.8480 Similarly in Vlasenica, graffiti was written on the houses of prominent Bosnian
Muslims saying ―Ustasha‖, ―Muslims out‖, ―We will slaughter‖, ―Out‖, and ―This is Serb, this is
Serbia‖.8481 Bosnian Serb leaders in Vogošca said that ―Muslims were simply going to
disappear‖.8482 (No serious chamber would pay any attention to what individuals wrote on
graffits, or said bypassing! It is well known that both Bratunac aand Vlasenica had
concluded an agreement on forming two municipalities, which would guarantee an
autonomy from each other, and nobody would be able to harras the other side. It is also
established that the Muslim population in Bratunac and Vlasenica, after giving up the
agreement, demanded to be escorted to the Muslim-controlled territory, and soon after that,
many Muslim officials did the same! All of it is well documented! Also, it is documented that
the Serb leaders from Vlasenica went to Tuzla, to persuade the Muslim citizens to return!
But, none of this is of any interest for the Chamber!!!)

2517. Further, the Chamber found that there was a widespread and systematic attack against the
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations of BiH. The Chamber finds that the acts
or omissions referred to above were part of this widespread and systematic attack and the
perpretrators knew of the attack and that their crimes were part of it. In reaching that conclusion
the Chamber considered the locations, time period, and the identity of the victims, which
correspond with the scope of the widespread and systematic attack, as well as the magnitude and
systematic nature of the attack on the Bosnian Muslim and Croat civilian populations of BiH.
(But, the two questions, if answered, ruin the entire construction explicated in this
paragraph! First: #why it didn’t happen in the two third of the Serb municipalities#?
Second: why in the one third of municipalities with these dramatic developments, there was
never any “Serb attacks” prior to the Muslim terrorist actions? These periods without any
skirmish lasted up to 7 and 8 weeks, and depended exclusively on the Muslim terrorist
actions!)

2518. The Chamber therefore finds that these incidents of cruel and inhumane treatment
constitute acts of persecution as a crime against humanity.

8477
See para. 852.
8478
See paras. 1604, 1606, 1609. See also para. 688.
8479
See para. 688. See also para. 2184.
8480
See para. 1101.
8481
See para. 1119.
8482
See para. 2362.
 487

(C)Forcible transfer and deportation

2519. The Chamber found above that deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer) were
committed and these constituted crimes against humanity as charged under Counts 7 and 8 of the
Indictment.

2520. The Chamber also finds that the perpetrators of these acts of forcible transfer and
deportation chose their victims on the basis of their identity as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian
Croats. These acts were carried out on discriminatory grounds and with discriminatory intent. In
reaching that conclusion, the Chamber recalled its finding that Bosnian Muslims who were
removed from their villages were subjected to a ―barrage of insults‖ with respect to their ―Muslim
ethnicity‖.8483 Similarly during expulsions in Novo Sarajevo Serb Forces made statements such as
―all Ustašas and Balijas out!‖ and in Prijedor victims were cursed and told they would be sent to
Turkey.8484 The Chamber also refers to its findings above relating to mens rea which are also
indicative of this discriminatory intent.8485 The Chamber also had regard to its finding that these
acts of forcible transfer and deportation were discriminatory in fact given that the victims of these
acts were almost exclusively Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.

2521. As the Chamber found above, these acts were part of a widespread and systematic attack
against the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations of BiH and the perpetrators
knew of the attack and that their crimes were part of it. In addition the Chamber found that the
acts of forcible displacement within national boundaries were sufficiently serious to amount to
―other inhumane acts‖. Therefore the Chamber finds that these acts of forcible transfer and
deportation constitute acts of persecution as a crime against humanity. (This kind of errors must
have been a part of #“systematic attacks against the Serbs in Bosnia#, as well as the entire
Serb nation! The first UN documents reported that the civilians are fleeing because of the
armed conflict and fights. That happened even before the war in a substantial quantity.
Later on, the Chamber could have seen that the Serb municipal authorities rather made
#many obstacles to leaving# the Serb areas, that the candidates to leave had to provide many
poapers and pay many fees, taxes, spendings of electric power, and finally to pay for
transport. Sometimes they had to bribe somebody to get on a “priority lists” to leave the
area! Whoever wants to check it, could do it, undewr the key “#obstacles to leave#!)

(D) Unlawful detention

2522. The Chamber found in Section IV.A.1 that a large number of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian
Croat civilians were detained by members of Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and
Governmental Organs in detention facilities in Banja Luka,8486 Bijeljina,8487 Bosanski Novi,8488
Bratunac,8489 Brĉko,8490 Foĉa,8491 Hadţići,8492 Kljuĉ,8493 Ilidţa,8494 Novi Grad,8495 Novo

8483
See para. 1151.
8484
See paras. 1652, 2283
8485
See paras. 2474–2479.
8486
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.1.2.
8487
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.2.1.
8488
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.4.1.
8489
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.6.1, C.6.2.
8490
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.7.2.
8491
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.10.1, C.10.2, C.10.4, C.10.5, C.10.6, C.10.7.
8492
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.11.1, C.11.2.
8493
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.15.1, C.15.2, C.15.3.
8494
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.2.
8495
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.17.1.
 488

Sarajevo;8496 Pale,8497 Prijedor,8498 Rogatica,8499 Sanski Most,8500 Sokolac,8501 Vlasenica,8502

Vogošća,8503 and Zvornik.8504 (A civilians were only those who were released after the first
interrogations. No chamber all over the world can deny that there was no a single detained
person prior to the armed skirmishes, and no chamber would establish that those first armed
conflikts had been initiated by the Serbs!#No detentions before the Muslim attacks#! #No
skirmishes initiated by the Serbs#! #Interrogations aimed to select civilians#!)

2523. The arbitrary nature of this detention was shown by the Chamber‘s findings that in some
detention facilities the detainees (i) were not detained on any legal grounds; (#Armed rebellion
was a legal ground#! What more legal ground could be than the armed attack on the
military, civilians and public property, or preparations, instigation and financing of such an
attacks? The Chamber asked in the court room for a reasons of detaining someone without
an intention to process them, and they got a satisfactory response: a combatants without
specific and personal crimes, were to be exchanged, unlike those with a personal crimes,
aimed to be processed. After the first interrogations, the civilians had been released!!!) (ii)
were not informed as to why they were arrested and detained; (iii) were not suspected, charged,
tried, or convicted for any crime before being detained or while detained; (This both is absolutely
wrong! How possibly could that be “established” while the Chamber “objected” the
interrogations? While interrogated, they had to be asked about a very specific circumstances
and their participation. Those who hadn’t been interrogated, hadn’t been suspected for any
crime, except for a participations in combats. Such a POWs hadn’t been aimed to legal
procedure, but only for an exchange, and the Defence clarified that in the courtroom, when
asked by the Chamber – why they had been kept, if not intended to be sued!) (iv) were not
advised of their rights before or during their detention and (This is incorrect: those who were
aimed for exchange, had been informed about it, and those who were to be interrogated, had
been informed by the investigators, a high professionals!)(v) their detention was not subject to
review.8505 (Then, how it happened that some of them had been released after the
interrogations, some of them were conveyed to the prisons for POWs, for exchange, some of
them echanged, some of them unilateraly released and abolished by the President, and some
of them handed over to the International agencies, such as UNHCR and ICRC and conveyed
to the third countries? This was a massive, formidable result of reviewing of the detentions!
THIS PARAGRAPH IS A PROOF ABOUT THE #CATASTROPHIC ERRORS#,
OMISSIONS AND IGNORANCE OF THE NATURE OF THIS WAR AND EVENTS
THEREIN!) The Chamber also recalls, for example, that the local authorities in Brĉko were
informed that people were being detained without any legal grounds, and while some detainees
were released, this was done in a selective manner and based on personal connections.8506 (But
why it was forgotten that the detention in Brcko wasn’t an endeavour of authorities, which
escaped the city, but by renegades, for whose arrest the President asked the FRY Prime
Ministed for help in manpower? #Renegades, not authorities#! )

8496
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.1.
8497
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.19.2
8498
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.20.1, C.20.2, C.20.3, C.20.4, C.20.5, C.20.6, C.20.7.
8499
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.21.1, C.21.2, C.21.3. While in Rogatica, some Bosnian Muslims surrendered themselves to Veljko Vlahović
Secondary School, the Chamber recalls its finding that those individuals did not seek shelter but were detained at the facility. See Scheduled Detention
Facility C.21.1.
8500
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.22.1, C.22.2, C.22.3, C.22.4, C.22.5.
8501
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.23.1, C.23.2.
8502
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.25.1, C.25.2, C.25.3.
8503
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.26.1, C.26.2.
8504
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.27.1, C.27.2, C.27.3, C.27.4, C.27.5, C.27.6, C.27.7.
8505
See paras. 883, 1071, 1161, 1297, 1380, 2141.
8506
See para. 802.
 489

2524. The arbitrary nature of the detention is also evidenced, for example, by the decision by the
Bosnian Serb authorities in Hadţići to arrest and detain all Bosnian Muslim men of military age
from certain areas in the municipality8507 and that in the Omarska camp the detainees were
categorised, and included a category of detainees of ―no security interest‖.8508 (But, this
qualification was not established prior to their detention, and they had been detained in spite
of such a qualification, but they had been detained as suspects, and this qualification was
established afterwards, #after the interrogations#, and such a detained had been released,
and there was about 90% of released in Hadzici, and 59% of such a personsreleased in
Prijedor, while only 41% were conveyed to Manjaca, a POWs prison!)

2525. The Chamber found that these detainees were arrested and taken to these detention
facilities from their homes, following attacks on villages or towns, or transferred from other
detention facilities.8509 In some cases, the Bosnian Muslim population was ordered to gather en
masse and then moved to detention facilities.8510 Most of those detained were civilians and
included women, children, the sick, and the elderly.8511 (These two categories can not, and must
not be merged into one! After a counter-attacks on villages from which the Serb Army or
police had been attacked, some of the able bodied had been detained as a suspects, subjected
to interrogation which resulted in one or the other way.See how Mr. Wulliamy wrote about
that, P3788:

The purpose of “bringin them in” was this “screening” to determine whether they are
fighters or civilians.Wulliamy could have been everytnig, but not a pro-Serb journalist!
There was no bringing in all the able bodied men, but only those who may be participating in
the fights. The “gathering en masse‖ was a legal, and #legaly obligatory action of removing
civilians# from an area that was going to be embattled. A typical example was Mahala in
Sanski Most, which had been a stronghold of the armed Muslim terrorists who fired agains
the rest of the town. Once the civilians were moved out of the zone, there was a combat,
which resulted in arresting some of the terrorists, while others escaped to some villages and
continued with fightings! This happened because of the #abuse of civilians in battles# see
what a Muslim said to Ed Wulliamy, P3788:

The inmates came voultarily, and brought their minors with them! Or, an example how a
Muslim, well known sportsman, understood the nature of removing the civilians from the
8507
See para. 2094.
8508
See para. 1753.
8509
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.6.1, C.6.2, C.2.1, C.7.2, C.10.6, C.10.1, C.10.4, C.10.5, C.10.7, C.10.2, C.21.1, C.21.2, C.21.3, C.25.1, C.25.3, C.27.1,
C.27.4, C.27.6, C.15.3, C.15.1, C.26.3, C.26.1, C.20.3, C.20.2, C.20.1, C.20.7, C.20.4, C.1.2, C.18.2.
8510
See paras. 983–984.
8511
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.2.1, C.6.1, C.7.2, C.10.6, C.10.1, C.21.1, C.25.1, C.25.3, C.27.5, C.11.1, C.11.2, C.15.1, C.26.3, C.26.1, C.4.1, C.20.2,
C.20.1, C.20.6, C.20.4, C.19.2, C.1.2, C.18.2, C.22.1, C.22.3.
 490

zone of battle, the same, P3788:

The police removed the Muslim civilians “to do the fighting” #legal and obligatory#! But,
what is the most disturbing is this arbitrariness and superficiality in establishing what some
features were, and what didn’t were! )

2526. The Chamber noted that a small number of detainees in some facilities were Bosnian
Muslim soldiers or combatants.8512 The Chamber is not satisfied that their detention was unlawful.
(Exactly, the soldiers were the Muslim combatants that had been captured along the
confrontation lines, while the combatants that made the uprisal deep in the Serb territory, as
a matter of fact were #not regular soldiers, but terrorists#, without unfiorms, insignias,
known commands. Although the Serb side could have treated them as a terrorists, usually
they had been treated as combatants! If there is any doubt about the terrorist nature of those
combatants, it whould be reviewed how many dugouts and other facilities had existed in
Prijedor, Sanski Most and other municipalities, deep into the Republic of Srpska!).

2527. The Chamber considered the circumstances in which detainees were brought to and
detained at these facilities, the extended period of detention, the large number of individuals
detained across multiple municipalities, and the status of the overwhelming majority as civilians
including women, children, and the elderly. (Let us see what Mr. Wulliamy wrote about the
women of these same Muslim combatants, P3788:

So, not only several percent of the suspects had been brought in for the screening, and not
only 59$=% of the “brought in” had been found not guilty and released, but their families
took a refuge in the Prijedor city core, under the Serb control. While some Muslim and
Croat villages didn’t have any trouble, because they declared not to fight agains the Serb
Army, police and civilians! How the Chamber made this kind of conclusion pertaining to
“women, children and elderly”? see what else Mr. Wulliamy wrote, P3788 pasted above!) On
this basis the Chamber finds that with the exception of the Bosnian Muslim soldiers referred to in
8512
See paras. 883, 1021, 1323, 2209, 2336.
 491

the previous paragraph, the detainees at these facilities were arbitrarily deprived of their liberty
with no legal basis and that the perpetrators intended to arbitrarily deprive these individuals of
their liberty. The Chamber finds that this amounted to a denial of or infringement upon a
fundamental right and was of equal gravity to the other crimes listed under Article 5 of the Statute.
The Chamber therefore finds that there was unlawful detention of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats. (So what? There was a civil war of the Muslim-Croat coalition against the Serbs.
Also, the Muslims (Croats to the lesser degree) organised terrorist groups deep in the Serb
territory, which initiated fights and caused the war in these areas. Those who were suspected
for those unlawful activities had been detained, and after the professional interrogation
either released, or kept in the prisons for POWs. What is wrong with that? But, if the
Chamber doesn’t want to establish the truth, it will accept that those #terrorists were
civilians#!)

2528. (2528) In addition, the Chamber finds that the perpetrators of these acts of unlawful
detention chose their victims on the basis of their identity as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats.
(This finding can not survive a simple question: why only 2 to 3% of the Muslims and Croats
(i.e. non-Serbs) in Prijedor had been detained, andhad been subject to the investigations? In
all other municipalities it was even less than that, while in the two thisr of municipalities
nobody was detained? Why the detainees had been investigated, while their ethnic or
religious affiliation was known to everyone, and there was no any need to investigate that?
Why not all of those known to the local authorities as Muslims or Croats? And why there
was many Croats in the VRS, on a very high positions, and in ordinary units, and why there
was a whole unit (“Mesa Selimovic unit”) composed exclusively of the Muslims in the VRS?
If there was a bit of truth in these findings, none of the Croats and Muslims would stay in the
Serb Army, where they defended not the Serbs, but common values and secularism! #All
together, a small number had been detained#! ) The Chamber finds that these acts were carried
out deliberately with the intent to discriminate on the basis of the identity of the victims as
Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats.8513 (The same comment as the above!) In concluding that
these acts were carried out with discriminatory intent, the Chamber had regard to its finding that
these acts of unlawful detention were discriminatory in fact given that the unlawful detention was
almost exclusively directed against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats whereas the guards and
those in charge of the detention facilities were Bosnian Serbs. (No an Einstein mind needed to
realise that it was a civil, interethnic and interreligious war and it was sufficient to have the
Muslims and Croats in the Serb Army on a battlefield, but it would be very malicious to
task them with such a job! #But, none of the Muslims, or Croats lef the VRS because of the
Serb attitude towards the Muslim and Croat population!#) In addition, the Chamber also had
regard to the insults, taunts, and threats directed at the victims on the basis of their identity as
Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats, which expressly demonstrated this discriminatory intent.8514
(Did the Chamber find that it was a part of the policy of the Serb authorities? Those who did
capture these who were captured first had to fight againste them, losing members of families
and friends from their ynit, and if they expressed their anger verbally, it was on the basis of
this sentiment, and not on the basis of the state policy! What the inter-soldier cursing and
swearing has to do with the central, or even local authorities, let alone with the President?)
For further evidence of discriminatory intent with respect to unlawful detention, the Chamber also
recalls its finding that, for example, in Vlasenica, the Sušica camp was established pursuant to an
order of the VRS, following a decision of the SAO Biraĉ on regulating the ―moving out of the
Muslim population‖.8515 (#Moving out population, due to law and agreements#!The “moving
8513
The Chamber considers that discrimination on the grounds of the identity of the victims as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats falls within the prohibited
grounds of discrimination under Article 5(h) of the Statute.
8514
The Chamber has had regard to its findings with respect to the insults, taunts, and threats which were discussed in the context of cruel and inhumane
treatment of these detainees.
8515
See para. 1181.
 492

out of the Muslim population” signed on 28 May 92, P3240, was an obligation derived from
the Agreement of 22 May, D1603 p.1 – 6, and another document under the same number, p.
7 – 11, also see D1141! So fearce fights between the Muslim and Serb units would cause
many civilian casualties, and Col. Andric signed the order on the basis of the Birac
Government, which founded it’s decision on the Agreement concluded a week earlier, on 22
May 1992in Geneva!) In addition, the Chamber found that Bosnian Muslims during their
transportation to the Sušica camp were subjected to threats and racial slurs.8516 (#The only
perpetrator got a guilt plea agreement! A unique case!#) In Zvornik, the Chamber found that a
member of the Serb Forces said that they would bring in every Bosnian Muslim who was found in
town.8517 (That kind of the #”Serb Forces” didn’t exist#! “a member of the Serb Forces” was
insolent, or indecent, or… Such a conceived “Serb Forces”, as a sum of the JNA, volunteere,
paramilitaries no matter disowned by the President, members of the Territorial Defence, or
any other Serb that fought against the Muslum irregulars, said something nasty to the
Muslims!!! What does it have to do with the President? This is the first time in the history of
criminal procedures that some of the high, even the highest official could be indicted,
charged and sentenced on the basis of “findings” that some Serbs cursed some Muslims, not
to mention killings of some Muslims by some Serbs! For the first time in the human history a
president was charged and sentenced for such a #side-products of a civil war#!)

2529. Further, the Chamber found that there was a widespread and systematic attack against the
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations of BiH. The Chamber finds that the
incidents of unlawful detention were part of this widespread and systematic attack and the
perpretrators of these acts knew of the attack and that their crimes were part of it. In reaching that
conclusion the Chamber considered the locations and time period of those acts, and the identity of
the victims, which correspond with the scope of the widespread and systematic attack. Further,
given the magnitude of the attack on the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations
of BiH, the Chamber further finds that the perpretrators knew of the attack and that the crimes
were part of it. (The Chamber neglected an obvious fact that there had been #fire from the
Muslim settlements#, then there had been an ul;timatum by the Serb Forces to disarm the
settled place and hand over the perpetrators of crimes commited during the Muslim-Croat
assault on the Serbs, and then there was continuation of fighting, and the Serbs moved the
civilians out of the combat zones until they finish the fights. The Chamber had the first class
evidence about it, written by Edward Vulliamy, a notorious anti-Serb journalist, see: D1898,
p.5

Or the statement of Azmir, a Muslim, D1898, p. 5.

8516
See para. 1185.
8517
See para. 1317.
 493

(#Shooting from the Muslim side#! Said a Muslim, wrote down Wulliamy!#So, it was quite
clear to this Azmir, an able bodied Muslim man, who didn’t fight, but was informed that
they as civilians have to be moved until the fights are finished! Nothing similar happened in
many neighbouring municipalities, such as Srbac, B. Gradiska, Derventa, Celinac, Laktasi,
Prnjavor, B. Dubica, Mrkonjic Grad, and many other settled places. No Muslim attacks, no
moving of the population, no detained suspects! And nothing and nobody can prove anything
else! #All depended of the Muslim attacks#!)

2530. The Chamber therefore finds that these incidents of unlawful detention constitute acts of
persecution as a crime against humanity. (Who and how had established that these detentions
had been unlawful? Those that had been collected during the skirmishes and hadn’t been
responsible, had been released immediately after establishing non-participation in the
rebellion! #No unlawful detentions#!)

(E) Forced labour and the use of human shields8518

2531. The Chamber recalls its findings in Section IV.A.1 that detainees at a number of detention
facilities in Bijeljina,8519 Foĉa,8520 Hadţići,8521 Ilidţa,8522 Novo Sarajevo,8523 Rogatica,8524
Vlasenica,8525 and Vogošća.8526 were forced to perform labour on the front lines including, inter
alia, digging trenches, clearing mines, burying bodies, and carrying munitions.8527 (Since none of
this was proven, because there was a plethora of evidence that the prisoners of war #wanted
to go to work#, for the benefits as food, cigarettes, alcohol drinks, this is senseless to
comment, particularly because it has nothing to do with the President, who issued all the
necessary orders forbidding any declination from the International law of war! If anything
happened in contrast to the President orders, #no liability#! )

2532. By way of illustration, the Chamber found, that while undertaking work on the front lines
the detainees were exposed to sporadic crossfire.8528 The Chamber found that some detainees
were forced to work in all weather conditions which affected their health.8529 The Chamber further
recalls that in some municipalities, detainees who did not work fast enough or do exactly as they
were instructed were beaten, insulted, and threatened.8530 The Chamber found that Bosnian
Muslims in Bijeljina were subject to a work obligation including on the front lines.8531 Those who
did not comply with this work obligation were either sent to Batković camp or expelled from the
municipality.8532 (This is a sort of “gallimatias” a senseless salade of words and accusations.
There is the evidence in the file that many POWs wanted to work, and had a benefits out of
that, but there is no a valide evidence to contrary. Also, there is no evidence that President
Karadzic had been informed that his orders on human rights are violated! Also, when

8518
The Prosecution does not allege criminal responsibility for forced labour in Bosanski Novi, Bratunac, Pale and Višegrad. Indictment, fn. 7.
8519
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.2.1.
8520
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.10.1.
8521
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.11.1, C.11.2.
8522
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.18.2.
8523
See para. 2267.
8524
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.21.1, C.21.3.
8525
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.25.2, C.25.3.
8526
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.26.3, C.26.1.
8527
The Chamber also received evidence about detainees being forced to perform other kinds of work not at the front lines. However, the Chamber has
interpreted the allegations in paragraph 60(h) of the Indictment to be limited to forced labour at the front lines.
8528
See Scheduled Detention Facility C.11.2.
8529
See para. 655.
8530
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.21.1, C.25.3.
8531
See para. 670.
8532
See para. 671.
 494

informed that the Police is executing his orders, the Chamber is using it agains the President
and his Police#! #Proper conduct punished#! )

2533. The forcible nature of this work was demonstrated by the Chamber‘s finding that detainees
were afraid for their lives and of being beaten if they refused to work.8533 The Chamber also found
that in one incident detainees were also severely beaten and did not receive any food or water
while they worked.8534

2534. Bosnian Muslims in Rogatica,8535 Kljuĉ,8536 Vogošća8537 were also used as human shields
on front lines to protect Serb Forces. In one incident Bosnian Muslim detainees were instructed to
lead Serb Forces through an area, which had been mined, to recover dead bodies.8538 (This is all
an unproven rubbish! How possibly an army with a permanent defence copuld have used
civilians as a human shield??? No retreat, no advancement, just defending tranchese, #no
any need and no any sense for a human shields#!

2535. The Chamber also had regard to the nature of the forced work, the circumstances in which
the detainees were held, and the vulnerable position of the detainees, including the cruel and
inhumane treatment and unlawful detention discussed above. Having considered these factors, the
Chamber finds that the acts of forced labour and use of human shields amounted to a denial of or
infringement upon a fundamental right and were of equal gravity to the other crimes listed under
Article 5 of the Statute.

2536. In addition, the Chamber finds that the perpetrators of these acts of forced labour and use
of human shields chose their victims on the basis of their identity as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian
Croats. The Chamber finds that these acts were carried out deliberately with the intent to
discriminate on the basis of the identity of the victims as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats.8539
In reaching this conclusion, the Chamber had regard to its finding that these acts were
discriminatory in fact given that only Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats who had been
detained were forced to work or used as human shields. The Chamber also had regard to its
findings with respect to the insults, taunts, and threats which were discussed in the context of other
underlying acts of persecution which expressly demonstrated this discriminatory intent. In
addition, the Chamber recalls its finding that in Vlasenica some detainees who were taken away
for forced labour were subject to insults such as references to ―Balija‘s mother‖.8540 In another
incident where Bosnian Muslims were used as human shields in Rogatica, when one person was
hit by incoming fire, a member of the Serb Forces cursed the detainees by reference to their
―Balija mothers‖.8541 (Had it been so, there would be many legal litigations in the Bosnian
courts, but that was not a case!!! But, even if was true, it has nothing to do with the President
or any other high official of the RS. But, it was not proven in the court room, all was based
either on an adjudicated facts, or the Rule 92bis evidence, so that couldn’t be challenged by
the Defence, i.e. #Deadly combination#!! Each side soldiers used to curse each other, but
certainly that hadn’t been commanded by their superiors. This was a civil war, the
adversaries knew each other well, and their families were acquainted for centuries,

8533
See paras. 902, 1196.
8534
See paras. 2423–2424.
8535
See paras. 992, 1025.
8536
See para. 1511.
8537
See paras. 2432, 2434.
8538
See para. 1019.
8539
The Chamber considers that discrimination on the grounds of the identity of the victims as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats falls within the prohibited
grounds of discrimination under Article 5(h) of the Statute.
8540
See para. 1196.
8541
See para. 1019.
 495

sometimes with a history of mutual extermination that lasted through the centuries! What all
of that has to do with the President!)

2537. Further, the Chamber found that there was a widespread and systematic attack against the
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations of BiH. (Not established, and not found
even a single case of the Serb attack against any civilians or settlements if there was no a
Muslim attack from such a settlement! Not a single one! theMuslim Army, as well as the
Muslim terrorists deep in the Serbian territory abused their own civilians, firing from the
civilian areas and thus forcing the Serbs to respond! Just as simple as it, and the
international representatives noticed that, but were biased in favour of the Muslim side! #No
Serb attacks on civilians#!) The Chamber finds that the acts of forced labour and use of
detainees as human shields were part of this widespread and systematic attack and the
perpretrators of these acts knew of the attack and that their crimes were part of it. In reaching that
conclusion the Chamber considered the locations, time period, and the identity of the victims of
these acts, which correspond with the scope of the widespread and systematic attack, as well as the
magnitude and systematic nature of the attack on the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian
populations of BiH.

2538. The Chamber therefore finds that these incidents of forced labour and use of human shields
constitute acts of persecution as a crime against humanity.

(F) Plunder of property8542

2539. The Chamber found in Section IV.A.1 that Bosnian Muslims were expelled from their
homes, which were then seized by the local authorities and assigned to Serb refugees.8543 Some
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were forced to sign statements leaving their property to the
local authorities.8544 (In a war times any authority has a right to have “at disposal” all
movable or real estate to be temporarily osed for a purpose of defence. There was no a single
case that somebody appropriated a private property for the state or local authorities, and the
Chamber recognised it, see@@....) The Chamber recalls its finding that in Kljuĉ, for example,
the Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs effectively seized the abandoned property of
Bosnian Muslims on a permanent basis.8545 (Let us see how this para 1562, as a basis for this
finding, looks like: 1562. The Accused contends that the renunciations and reassignments
only pertained to temporary use, and not to ownership of such property. The Chamber received
evidence that the municipal authorities did not pass any decision which would have collectively
converted abandoned properties into state property, and that no changes were made to the land
registry books such as would indicate a permanent change in property ownership. However, the
Chamber notes that on 19 June, the ARK Crisis Staff took a decision that all ―abandoned‖
property would be proclaimed property of the state and placed at the disposal of the municipal
assemblies. The Chamber is therefore satisfied that such real property was effectively seized by
the Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs on a permanent basis. First, The
Chamber admitted and confirmed that it “did receive evidence” that there was no evidence
of conversion of private property into a state property, and that there was no change of
property. The Chamber could also mention the President’s order from 19 August 1992 in
which the President forbade any such a practice and annulled any paper issued on this
matter, see D101:

8542
The Prosecution does not allege criminal responsibility for plunder in Banja Kuja, Brĉko, Pale, Višegrad, and Vogošća. Indictment, fn. 8.
8543
See paras. 629–630, 675, 857, 1277, 2436.
8544
See paras. 675, 729, 1217, 1266, 1467, 1561–1562, 1566, 1851, 1903–1904, 2134, 2436.
8545
See para. 1562.
 496

But, the Chamber prefers an alleged decision of the ARK Crisis staff, which had never been
implemented, as many other decisions of the ARK organs. And, finally this decision from
June was subject to the order D101, which declared it “null and void”! so more is the last
sentence senseless: How the Chamber could have been “satisfied that such a real property
was effectively seized by the Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental organs on a
permanent basis,” while there was no a single case. Even if there was any case, it would be a
subject of litigation after the war, which never happened! Those who helped the Chamber to
assemble the Judgement made a bad service to it! #No appropriation, President annulled
and forbade#!)

2540. Serb Forces also looted property and homes belonging to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats during and after the take-over of towns and villages in Bijeljina,8546 Bosanski Novi,8547
Bratunac,8548 Foĉa,8549 Kljuĉ,8550 Ilidţa,8551 Novi Grad,8552 Novo Sarajevo,8553 Prijedor,8554
Rogatica,8555 Vlasenica,8556 Zvornik.8557 The Chamber also recalls its finding that in some cases
Serb Forces used Bosnian Muslim detainees to loot Bosnian Muslim homes and move furniture
and belongings to Bosnian Serb residences.8558 (That could have been some members of the
“Serb Forces” but in no way the Serb Forces, which would mean with the knowledge,
tolerance, approval or order of the commands. That never happened, while we have seen
many orders of the commands #to the opposite direction#! Also, there were examples of
return of stolen property to the real owners on the command of the officers!)

2541. The Chamber found that Bosnian Serb authorities allocated premises left vacant by
Bosnian Muslims for the use of refugees in Sokolac.8559 However, it has insufficient evidence to
determine whether this amounted to an unlawful appropriation of property given that there was
evidence that the Bosnian Serb authorities prohibited the unlawful and unauthorised occupation of
premises, and that when property was allocated to refugees, these were temporary measures and
followed a set criteria including the taking of an inventory of contents by a committee which was
created for the allocation of this property.8560 (#EXCULPATORY#! This was the procedure for
the entire country. A temporary user was obliged to leave an assigned property in the same
condition, and all the movable property too. Not only Sokolac, but all the municipalities,
since all of them got the same order of the President and Government!)
2542. Bosnian Muslims had their money, identification documents, jewellery, and valuables
taken away from them before leaving the municipality,8561 on arrival at detention facilities,8562 or
before their execution.8563 The Chamber found on one occasion that Serb Forces were also
instructed to search the bodies of killed Bosnian Muslims for valuables before the bodies were
8546
See paras. 631, 675.
8547
See paras. 1447, 1449.
8548
See paras. 719–721, 732, 753–754.
8549
See paras. 857, 861. The Chamber also found that paramilitaries were involved in looting gold, jewellery, and money in Foĉa, but it has insufficient
evidence to determine whether or not the victims of these incidents were Bosnian Muslims and/ or Bosnian Croats. See para. 866.
8550
See para. 1512.
8551
See paras. 2131–2132.
8552
See para. 2186.
8553
See paras. 2268, 2273, 2281.
8554
See paras. 1607–1608, 1621, 1638, 1672, 1675, 1680, 1683, 1704, 1723, 1802.
8555
See paras. 951, 1018.
8556
See paras. 1119, 1126, 1134, 1176, 1196.
8557
See paras. 1264, 1282.
8558
See paras. 1018, 1176, 1324.
 497

taken away for burial.8564 Serb Forces also seized the vehicles of Bosnian Muslims.8565 (This
sounds insulting for the Serbs as nation, because this never happen with any knowledge of
the officials. Taking away valuables from the POWs and other prisoners was a #legal
obligation#, as it is even in this UN Detention Unit. For that reason, all of the recovered from
mass graves who had their OWN valuables, ID cards and other belongings that were to be
taken away, for certain weren’t captured prior to their death. An ordinary Serb didn’t
search a killed combatants, and in Srebrenica there was up to 40% of the exhumed who
possessed their belongings, which is a firm evidence that they died as a combatants,
WITHOUT BEING CAPTURED. Of course, those who use to steal valuables in a peace time
would be expected to do the same in a war time, but certainly not with any tolerance by the
superiors!)

2543. The property of Bosnian Muslim businesses was also looted or confiscated.8566 The
Chamber also found that Bosnian Croat companies were looted by Serb Forces in Bijeljina.8567 (In
a cases the state organs – not “Serb Forces” – appropriated some property, #due to the Law
on Defence#, it was done in a regular manner and with recording, and the owners had been
compensated after the war. In some cases, as “Alijagic case” in Trebinje, the owners hadn’t
been satisfied with compensation, and there was a long litigation, and the state lost the case!)

2544. The Chamber finds that these acts involved the unlawful appropriation of the private
property of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and
Governmental Organs. Having considered the extent and scope of the unlawful appropriation of
property owned by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in multiple municipalities, the Chamber
concludes that these acts had grave consequences and amounted to a denial of or infringement
upon a fundamental right and are of equal gravity to the other crimes listed under Article 5 of the
Statute. (#Never happened# This issue was the easiest to check with the Bosnian authorities
after the war: not a single case was reported, and not a single case could be hidden, since
there would be a litigation! This “finding” and such a “findings” are shading a grave doubt
on everything the Tribunal had done! The Defense should be thankful for that!)

2545. The perpetrators of these acts of plunder chose their victims on the basis of their identity as
Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats. The Chamber finds that these acts were carried out
deliberately with the intent to discriminate on the basis of the identity of the victims as Bosnian
Muslims or Bosnian Croats.8568 (#All senseless#! Bosnia is not a wasteland without courts,
which are under the Muslim domination, and certainly wouldn’t be biased in favour of the
Serb perpetrators, but there is #no any judicial evidence# to support this findings of the
Tribunal!) In concluding that these acts were carried out with discriminatory intent, the Chamber
had regard to its finding that these acts were discriminatory in fact given that Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats were systematically targeted by these acts of plunder which were directed at
their homes and property. The Chamber also had regard to its findings with respect to the insults,

8559
See para. 1054.
8560
See para. 1054.
8561
See paras. 673, 1157, 1362, 1458.
8562
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.6.1, C.7.2, C.10.1, C.21.1, C.25.2, C.25.3, C.27.2, C.27.6, C.15.3, C.15.2, C.20.2, C.20.5, C.1.2. See also Scheduled
Detention Facilities C.26.3 (the Chamber found that guards stole from detainees), C.22.5.
8563
See para. 1835.
8564
See para. 1152.
8565
See paras. 950, 1282.
8566
See paras. 857, 1282.
8567
See para. 631.
8568
The Chamber considers that discrimination on the grounds of the identity of the victims as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats falls within the prohibited
grounds of discrimination under Article 5(h) of the Statute.
 498

taunts, and threats which were discussed in the context of other underlying acts of persecution
which expressly demonstrated this discriminatory intent.

2546. Further, the Chamber found that there was a widespread and systematic attack against the
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations of BiH. (This senseless assertion had
been repeated many times in this Judgment, but never corroborated by any evidence.
Repeating a lie doesn’t deliver a truth!!! The simple question is: when and where the Serbs
attacked unless forced by the Muslim attacks? #Serbs never attacked, only reacted!#) The
Chamber finds that the acts of plunder were part of this widespread and systematic attack and the
perpretrators of these acts knew of the attack and that their crimes were part of it. In reaching that
conclusion the Chamber considered the locations, time period, and the identity of the victims of
these acts, which correspond with the scope of the widespread and systematic attack, as well as the
magnitude and systematic nature of the attack on the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian
populations of BiH.

2547. The Chamber therefore finds that these incidents of plunder constitute acts of persecution
as a crime against humanity. (If and when there was some criminal plunder, not
appropriation, that could only be commited by criminals! This hadn’t been a state plunder,
the state didn’t benefit from it, the state persecuted it, and the most logical and reasonable
inference would be that these tiefs were the only one to benefit. There are documents in the
file which confirm that the state organs persecuted tiefs and returned the stalen stuff to the
real owners! Why the Chamber didn’t notice these evidences?)

(G) Wanton destruction of private property and public property including cultural
monuments and sacred sites8569

2548. The Chamber recalls its findings in Section IV.A.1 that during attacks by Serb Forces,
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat homes and businesses were set on fire and Bosnian Muslim
and Bosnian Croat villages were destroyed by Serb Forces in Bosanski Novi,8570 Bratunac,8571
Foĉa,8572 Kljuĉ,8573 Novi Grad,8574 Pale,8575 Prijedor,8576 Rogatica,8577 Sanski Most,8578 Sokolac,8579
Vlasenica,8580 Vogošća,8581 and Zvornik.8582 For example, in the municipality of Kljuĉ alone, the
Chamber found that approximately 3,500 houses were razed to the ground and burned in Bosnian
Muslim villages.8583 (Did the Chamber established, and how, that these destructions weren’t
done in the #frame of the armed conflict# and the fierce fightings in these municipalities?
How the Chamber excluded the military necessity? Had these homes been used as a
fortifications, was there any fire from those homes? Why in so many villages none of the
Muslim/Croat homes had been touched? What Edward Vulliamy wrote about it, see P3788.
p.6
8569
The Prosecution indicated that it would not lead evidence on the wanton destruction of private property in Banja Luka, Brĉko, Hadţići, Ilidţa, Pale, and
Višegrad. Indictment, fn. 9.
8570
See paras. 1442, 1445, 1447.
8571
See paras. 728, 730–731, 742.
8572
See paras. 857, 859–861.
8573
See paras. 1512, 1514.
8574
See para. 2186.
8575
See para. 2313.
8576
See paras. 1621, 1638, 1643, 1666, 1669, 1675, 1680, 1683, 1723.
8577
See paras. 970, 976.
8578
See paras. 1925, 1945.
8579
See para. 1056.
8580
See paras. 1129–1130, 1133.
8581
See para. 2380.
8582
See paras. 1251, 1260, 1269.
8583
See para. 1512.
 499

While the Republic of Srpska was defending it’s boundaries, far from those “Municipalities”
the Muslis – Croats had two choices,

a) to live “quiet life” or

b) to fight agains the Serb civilians, police and military, so far from the frontline, and have a
problems that come out of these skirmishes.

What the President could have done about it, even if informed, although he wasn’t
informed? No president is entitled to prevent the people from defending themselves and their
families! This wasn’t a professional army, which came from somewhere, this was a local
army, an ordinary people, who died because of those Muslim rebelions, and who feared
about their families. And who could order them to undesetimate the danger of the Muslim
armed extremists? #People defend#)

2549. The Chamber also found that Bosnian Muslim neighbourhoods in the centre of Rogatica
were extensively shelled by artillery, mortars, anti-aircraft guns, and tanks and, as a result, a large
part of the town was destroyed.8584 (In the same documents the Chamber found the evidence
that these “neighbourhoods” had been #extremely militarised#, with the mortars and other
big calibres weaponry that fired against the Serb parts on Rogatica! Why it is not important,
why it could be missed in deliberating by the Chamber? For instance, P3405, para 12, the
protected witness described how the Muslim commanders of the common TO and common
police confronted the JNA unit, with a lot of firing, which was a #criminal act against the
federal force#. The same protected witness in his statement P3405, para 36, explained how
much time the Serb Forces needed to enter into the Rogatica town, “a street by street”, a
home after home. Would it be that way if it was a civilian settlement? It is well known to the
Chamber that the Muslims in Rogatica reneged on the ongoing talks about forming #two
municipalities# and killed a Serb policeman patrolling in the Serb area! In other document
there are a precise locations of the Muslim mortars in the area that was shelled, including a
mosque! #Abuse of civil settlements# !) The Chamber also recalls its finding that Bosnian
Muslim detainees were ordered to set fire to property which had been taken from a Bosnian
Muslim house in Vlasenica.8585 Some Bosnian Muslim houses were dismantled for materials.8586

2550. The Chamber finds that the property referred to in paragraphs above was destroyed or
damaged extensively and such destruction or damage was not justified by military necessity.
(When and how it was established? There is so many examples of the #Muslim/Croat homes
untouched,# that it was the Prosecution’s duty to prove that in the cases of destruction there
was no #“military necessity”#. Why all the Muslim homes hadn’t been destroyed?)

8584
See paras. 967–968.
8585
See para. 1196.
8586
See para. 2549.
 500

2551. While the Chamber also found that Serb Forces shelled Konjević Polje in Bratunac,8587 the
villages of Kramer Selo, Kozarde, Dobrašina, and Borovsko in Rogatica,8588 the village of Musići
in Hadţići,8589 the village of Blagaj in Bosanski Novi8590 it has insufficient evidence about the
property destroyed or the extent of damage to conclude whether this amounts to wanton
destruction of private property.

2552. The Chamber recalls its finding that Serb Forces completely destroyed, almost destroyed,
or heavily damaged multiple mosques, Catholic churches and other cultural monuments and sacred
sites in Bratunac,8591 Bosanski Novi,8592 Foĉa,8593 Kljuĉ,8594 Novi Grad,8595 Prijedor,8596
Rogatica,8597 Sanski Most,8598 Sokolac,8599 and Zvornik.8600 (At least for Zvornik the Chamber
had a convincing evidence that the state organs didn’t have anything to do with destruction
of this mosque. A member of the Yellow Wasps testified that the Serb police insisted that he
disclose who and why the Zvornik mosque had been ruined, and he explained that it had
been done because of the metal on roof, cuper probably, which was #thieved by criminals#!.
See: @@@ for other mosques there was no a single evidence that it was done willingly, nor
an evidence that there was no a military necessity, for instance whether a mosque was used
to fire from it, or not. Another reason for a destruction could have been a placing of
explosive and other war materials by the Muslim combatants. It is up to the Prosecution to
prove that none of these features were the reasons, or was it a wanton destruction within the
policy!) The Chamber finds that the Serb Forces intended to destroy these monuments and sites.
In reaching that conclusion the Chamber had regard to the nature and extent of the damage to these
monuments and sites and the manner in which they were destroyed. For example, the Chamber
notes evidence that Bosnian Serb fire brigades stood by and watched while mosques were burnt in
Foĉa.8601 Many of the mosques were completely destroyed by explosives; the rubble was removed
from the site and the location was later used for other purposes including as garbage dumps and
parking lots.8602 (Certainly, there were some cases of destruction of the sacral objects, but it
was always against the President’s stict orders pot reserve it. We remember how a member
of the Yellow Wasps had been questioned by the Serb police mainly on the occasion as who
destroyed the Zvornik mosque and why. In this inter-ethnic and inter-religious war these
things are happening, many, many Serb Orthodox Churches had been destroyed at the very
beginning of the war, and there was many revengeful acts. But, it has nothing to do with the
authorities, in particular with the President, who was too far from these events!The
#President forbade it#!)

2553. The Chamber recalls its finding that the evidence presented with respect to Bijeljina,8603
8604
Pale, and Vogošća8605 was insufficient to allow for an inference to be drawn that Serb Forces

8587
See para. 731.
8588
See para. 977.
8589
See paras. 2089–2090.
8590
See paras. 1442–1443.
8591
See Scheduled Incident D.6.
8592
See Scheduled Incident D.4.
8593
See Scheduled Incident D.10.
8594
See Scheduled Incident D.13.
8595
See Scheduled Incident D.15.
8596
See Scheduled Incident D.17.
8597
See Scheduled Incident D.18.
8598
See Scheduled Incident D.19.
8599
See Scheduled Incident D.20.
8600
See Scheduled Incident D.22.
8601
See para. 925.
8602
See Scheduled Incidents D.10, D.6, D.18, D.20, D.22, D.13, D.4.
8603
See para. 668.
8604
See para. 2352.
 501

destroyed the cultural monuments and sacred sites in those municipalities. The Chamber did not
enter a finding with respect to the destruction of the Catholic Church in Kljuĉ.8606 The Chamber
also found that three mosques in the Vragolovi area of Rogatica were destroyed but had
insufficient evidence to determine when they were destroyed and who was responsible for their
destruction.8607

2554. The Chamber finds that the destruction of these mosques, cultural monuments, and sacred
sites was not justified by military necessity. (When and how? This could only be a sort of belief,
but not a fact, particularly since the Prosecution even didn’t try to prove it!#Believes,
impressions vs. documents and common sense#!) For example, with regard to Foĉa, where the
President argued that certain mosques were used for military purposes in Foĉa, the Chamber
concluded that this evidence was unreliable and further that there was no other indication that the
mosques were used for military purposes.8608

2555. The Chamber also finds that these acts of wanton destruction of private and public
property, including cultural monuments and sacred sites, were carried out with discriminatory
intent against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.8609 In reaching that conclusion the Chamber
noted that in some cases adjacent Bosnian Serb homes were untouched and there were notes which
identified them as Serb property that should not be torched.8610 In addition, fire engines were used
to protect Bosnian Serb houses while Bosnian Muslim houses burned.8611 In an attack on a
Bosnian Muslim village in Vlasenica, Serb Forces were specifically ordered to torch all Bosnian
Muslim houses and told ―you can see for yourselves that if we don‘t set fire to these houses,
they‘ll return later on‖.8612 (The #most reasonable inference# would be, if not the only one,
that from the Serb houses nobody fired against the Serb Army or police, and that was why
nobody tocuched these houses, as nobody touched the Muslim and Croat houses as testified
by Edward Vulliamy, D3788! The Prosecution-Chamber alliance pretended as if there was
no other warring factions, all of them were a peaceful civilians, and wilde Serbs attacked
them! And if the Muslim terrorists used their homes as a fortified military objects, as they
did all the time, then these houses were a legitimate targets and should be destroyed, which
would any army do!)

2556. With respect to the cultural monuments and sacred sites, the Chamber found that the sites
destroyed were targeted given their significance to the Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Croat people in
those locations and were discriminatory in fact and were carried out with discriminatory intent.
(All of it would be correct if it is process against a civil war, but to “find” this as it did the
Chamber, it iz invalid, since there is no any connection with the President. What does it, and
many other contents of the civil, interethnic and interreligious war, one of many during five
centuries, has to do with the President? Is there any obligation of the Prosecution to establish
the President’s liability for those deeds “found” by the Chamber? The way it is presented in
the Judgement, it appears that all the other possible causes had been excluded, such as:
hatred, revenge for the monuments destroyed by the adversary, abuse of a sacred site for a

8605
See para. 2389.
8606
See fn. 5391.
8607
See para. 1032.
8608
See para. 927.
8609
The Chamber considers that discrimination on the grounds of the identity of the victims as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats falls within the prohibited
grounds of discrimination under Article 5(h) of the Statute. (#Why only some of them#? One can conclude whatever wanted, since
there was no possibility to depict the conduct of the other sides. Thus it looks as if thehe was a peace and total
innocence of others, only the Serbs acted criminally without any challenge, jeopardy, provocations, as a born
criminals!)
8610
See paras. 857, 1129.
8611
See paras. 857, 1119 (the Chamber found that the fire brigade was prevented from taking any action when Bosnian Muslim houses were torched).
8612
See para. 1133.
 502

combat, accidental collateral damage, all of it was not excluded, and the Chamber “inferred”
that the only reason for destructions in a war like that was a plan, decision to target objects
that were very important to the Muslims and Croats!!! No a word about evidence to that
diorection! The Defence had pointed out the fact that in the eastern part of the RS, in which
many Serb refugees came from the Muslim areas, and none from the Croat areas, no a single
Catholic church had been damaged. This indicates that at their own places no Catholic
perpetrator ruined any Orthodox church, and the refugees didn’t have any anti-Catholic
sentiment. It was different in the western part of the Republic of Srpska, which admitted
many Serb refugees from the Catholic areas!)

2557. Having considered the nature and extent of the private and public property destroyed, the
Chamber finds that the impact of the destruction was serious given that it affected indispensable
and vital assets of the population, including homes and religious sites. The Chamber therefore
finds that these acts of wanton destruction of private and public property amounted to a denial of
or infringement upon a fundamental right and were of equal gravity to the other crimes listed
under Article 5 of the Statute. (All highly senseless, and would have some sense if there was no
any civil war. Anyway, the destructions in Bosnia during 44 moths of war was not
comparable with the destructions resulting in other current wars, nor even #! comparable
with Mostar and three months of war there#, not to mention cities in the Middle East!)

2558. Further, the Chamber found that there was a widespread and systematic attack against the
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations of BiH. The Chamber finds that the acts
of wanton destruction were part of this widespread and systematic attack and the perpretrators of
these acts knew of the attack and that their crimes were part of it. In reaching that conclusion the
Chamber considered the locations, time period, and the identity of the victims of these acts, which
correspond with the scope of the widespread and systematic attack, as well as the magnitude and
systematic nature of the attack on the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations of
BiH. (#All wrong, unfounded, arbitrary#! There was #no a single example of a Serb attack
on any civilian settlement# if there was no Muslim military presence and their active combat
actions against the Serbs. It was very easy to establish, since there was many more non-Serb
settlements that had never been attacked than those that had been under an attack! Why it
was so?)

2559. The Chamber therefore finds that these incidents of wanton destruction of private and
public property, including cultural monuments and sacred sites, constitute acts of persecution as a
crime against humanity.

(H) Imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures8613

2560. The Chambers found in section IV.A.1 that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were
removed from positions of authority and dismissed from their employment in Bijeljina,8614
Bosanski Novi,8615 Bratunac,8616 Foĉa,8617 Kljuĉ,8618 Pale,8619 Prijedor,8620 Sanski Most,8621

8613
The Prosecution indicated that it would not lead evidence with respect to the imposition and maintenance of discriminatory measures in Banka Luka, Brĉko,
and Višegrad. Indictment, fn. 10.
8614
See paras. 628–629, 865.
8615
See para. 1437.
8616
See para. 723.
8617
See para. 858.
8618
See paras. 1502–1505.
8619
See paras. 2306–2308.
8620
See paras. 1596–1601, 1659.
8621
See para. 1950. See also para. 2061.
 503

Vogošca,8622 Vlasenica,8623 and Zvornik.8624 In Foĉa for example, announcements were made that
the administration of the entire municipality would be run by Bosnian Serbs.8625 In addition, after
the dismissal of Bosnian Muslims in Bratunac, all key positions in local government were taken
over by Bosnian Serbs.8626 In some municipalities, Bosnian Muslims were prevented or
discouraged from reporting for work,8627 while others were subject to threats, harassment, and
insults after which they stopped going to work.8628 In Vlasenica, the Chamber also found that the
salaries of Bosnian Muslim workers were stopped while Bosnian Serb workers continued to be
paid.8629 (In order to be minimally fair, the Chamber should find that prior to these events
there was a long time process of #negotiations about forming two ethnically defined
municipalities# - #Two municipalities#! . Those non-Serbs who would remain to live and
work in the Serb municipality, would have to accept already proclaimed Republic of Srpska
and it’s Constitution, and to commit themselves to the new laws and new organisation of
state. If not, they couldn’t execute any duty with the special authorisations, such as arresting,
investigating and judging citizens. Since the Muslims accepted to form their municipalities
and at the last moment reneged on it, that was their choice, but they could have do either
way! As far as it is concerned with the coming to jobs in companies, a private companies had
every right to decide whether it was safe to have all the workers coming, but both the private
and state enterprises had a drastic decrease in production due to the war and sanctions, and
they didn’t need all the workers from the pre-war time. As far as it is concerned with the
public servants, they could staye in the Serb administration, or cross to the Muslim
municipal administration.)

2561. In Bratunac, Vlasenica, and Zvornik, Bosnian Muslim judges were expelled,8630 (Let us
first see what is “established” in the para 1276 of the Judgement, from this footnote: 1276.
Some Bosnian Muslims were prevented from going to work, and those who attempted to do so,
were stopped at a barricade in Karakaj, slapped, insulted, and sent home.In April 1992, Bosnian
Serb authorities called on both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims to return to work and live
in Zvornik, declaring it was safe to do so. However, Bosnian Muslims who did return were
taken in for interviewing, had to register,and in order to remain employed, had to sign a pledge
of loyalty to the Bosnian Serb authorities.Some Bosnian Muslims after being questioned by the
police were kept effectively under house arrest, and in one case in May 1992, Serb Forces
called out the names of Bosnian Muslims who were still living in a building in Zvornik White
Eagles also searched Bosnian Muslim apartments, at times using violence. Here it is clear than
only “some of the Bosnian Muslims were prevented from going to work”… and not
establishe why not all of them, which would more look like discriminatory measure. Thus, it
seems that “some” of them had been suspected for something, and some not! Not to forget
that the Muslim authorities of Zvornik issued a proclamation on 8 May, demanding the
Muslims not to return to Zvornik, but rather to fight, see: D1622:

8622
See para. 2382 (the Chamber found that non-Serb workers were suspended from their jobs at the medical centre).
8623
See paras. 1120, 1124.
8624
See para. 1276.
8625
See para. 858.
8626
See para. 723.
8627
See para. 865.
8628
See paras. 1033, 1119, 1276.
8629
See para. 1120.
8630
See paras. 723, 1276.
 504

Knowing that many Muslims demanded to be let go to Tuzla, and having in mind this
“Proclamation”, no any room for a Serb ethnic cleansing, particularly since the Zvornik
municipality did split in two parts till now! Let us see what is in the para 723 of the
Judgement, from the same foot note: 723. After the Serb Forces arrived in Bratunac, Bosnian
Muslims in factories and municipal bodies were fired from their jobs and all key positions in the
local government were taken over by Bosnian Serbs. At the 17th session of the Bosnian Serb
Assembly on 26 July 1992, Rajko Dukić stated that he hoped they would not be judged for
having expelled all Muslim judges from the municipalities of Vlasenica, Bratunac, and Zvornik.
Serb Forces began patrolling Bratunac and took away the most prominent Bosnian Muslims,
some of whom were detained at the Vuk Karadţić School. First and the most important: the
Serbs didn’t arrive in Bratunac, they had been the oldest population in the area. Second,
there was a very succesfull negotiations about forming two municipalities, the police
separated peacefully and successfully, there was a good prospective for the peace to be
preserved, and two ethnic communities to live peacefully! But, the Chamber misses the main
point: on 3 May the Muslim extremists attacket the JNA while withdrawing to Yugoslavia.
At the same time the Muslims from Srebrenica reneged on the similar agreement and
attacked the Serbs, expelling thousand of them to Bratunac. Further, on 8 May the Muslim
extremists made an ambush and killed judge Goran Zekic, a prominent Serb representative
in the common Assembly. Then the war broke out in Bratunac, a month after the war start
in Sarajevo!Therefore, the Chamber is making decisions as if there was no any war, or any
negotiations, or any event except a Serb misdeeds! As far as it is concerned with Zvornik, the
Serb authorities called all the refugees, Serb and Muslim, to return , but the fights were still
going on, and the Muslim side issued on 8 May another call, an appeal for the Muslims not to
return to the town, see D1622 above! But, the Chamber never mentioned this
contemporaneous document! Why it was more important to quote an unofficial sentence of
Rajko Dukic, who was critical of the President’s nomination of Muslim/Croat judges, while
still there was the most fierce fighting, and many young Serbs arrived in the towns in coffins.
Dukic even wasn’t a deputy, but many had been disappointed by the President’s action as a
prematured, when the President nominated at least 18 Muslims and Croats as judges or
prosecutors in the regional courts, see:D418 of 30 June 1992:

A Muslim lady judge, nominated by the President on 20 June 92. Further:

further, a Muslim gentlemen Judge:

A Muslim lady judge,

 505

the last one was a Muslim, further:

a Muslim, further: on 2 July 92:

(A Croat a Croat, a Muslim lady, a Muslim lady, a Muslim gentlemen, a Croat, a Croat,

A Muslim gentlemen, a Muslim lady, further, on 20 July 92:

A Muslim gentlemen! Afther that date the President didn’t appoint judges and
prosecutors, since the Assembly gathered regularly! Why the mens rea and actus reus of the
President wouldn’t be seen from his documents rather than from the jokes or other
unofficial words of the deputies or other low ranking Serbs?) : while in Pale,8631 Sokolac,8632
and Vlasenica,8633 Bosnian Muslim members of the SJB were dismissed. (This is also
#insufficient, distorted and not true#. In the inter-party agreement there were pairs of
municipalities of those with similar share of population. In Stari Grad municipality and in
Pale there was similar rate of minorities, and what the Serbs got in Stari Grad, the same
Muslims got in Pale, pertaining to the number and positions in police, administration, and so
on! It functioned well until the Muslims expelled all the |Serbs from the Stari Grad police.
Those policemen had been sent to Pale, to work there. Then the police in Pale hired these
policemen, but dir reciprocal measure and fired the Muslim policemen. Without the entire
picture and the “whole truth” we get such a kind of deliberations! As far as it is concerned
with Vlasenica and other municipalities in process of transformation into two wthnic

8631
See paras. 2306–2307.
8632
See para. 1050.
8633
See para. 1124.
 506

municipalities, the Muslim policemen that didn’t want to recognize the Serb municipality,
Constitution and laws – had a choice, to join the Muslim municipality and it’s police. Why it
is #neglected, although it constitutes the essence# as it was, not as it is interpreted by the
Prosecution?) The Chamber also recalls its finding that a Bosnian Muslim officer in the JNA was
progressively stripped of his duties and authority until he was told that his safety could not be
guaranteed and he left the JNA.8634 (That was not the case, since Dzambasovic left the JNA on
6 April, the first day of war in Sarajevo. However, he loudly opposed any idea of the
Republic of Srpska and persecuted any cooperation of the Serb reserve units and the JNA,
and for that reasons he was seen as a risky man, disobedient to the highest commands of the
JNA, which recommended a good relations with all that join the JNA and respond to the
mobilisation calls! He himself said that he left with dignity and understanding of the other
officers in the Brigade!)

2562. Other discriminatory measures included forcing Bosnian Muslim police officers to pledge
loyalty to the Bosnian Serb authorities and wear the Serb flag on their caps to retain their jobs.8635
(How could it be “discriminatory” since the #Serbs had to accept the new state organisation
too#? Without the oath, none could have the special authorisation in the state organs, as to
arrest, investigate and so on! In no country in the world it would be possible! #The same is
all and every country#! ) Similarly in Bratunac, Bosnian Muslims were given a deadline to
pledge loyalty to the Serbian Municipality of Bratunac but continued to be subject to searches of
their homes and other intimidation.8636 (Although the Bratunac Muslims accepted to form
their municipality and the police station, which is documented in the file, the Muslim
policemen could have stayed in the Serb police station, provided they accept the laws and
Constitution! This is not discriminatory, on the contrary!) Bosnian Muslims in Zvornik who
returned were required to register and sign a pledge of loyalty to the Bosnian Serb authorities in
order to remain employed.8637 (That concerned only those who would have a special
authorisation, others had to be loyal to the laws and Constitution, as in any other country.
No a state would employ somebody decisive to harm the state, particularly in a state of war!)

2563. The dismissal of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their employment was
discriminatory in fact. In addition, the Chamber found in Kljuĉ that the Bosnian Serb authorities
expressly decided that only Bosnian Serb officials could occupy certain important posts in the
municipality and that those dismissed from their jobs were so treated because of their ethnicity.8638
(Not because of their ethnicity, but #because of their disloyalty to the new inner organisation
of Bosnia#. Such a decisive opponents to the peace would harm the municipal peace and
cause sufferings!)

2564. In Foĉa there were widespread arrests of Bosnian Muslim male civilians who were rounded
up and arrested in the streets or in their homes, workplaces, or hospitals.8639 Similarly the
Chamber found that there were random arrests of Bosnian Muslims in Pale and Prijedor.8640
(Wherever it was an unjustified arrest, such a detained people were released after the first
interview. But, the Chamber is accepting the Prosecutor’s qualification of “civilians” as if
civilians couldn’t be culprits in a civil war. There is a big rift between what the
Prosecution/Chamber “found” and the reality. Why the Serb local authorities would arrest

8634
See para. 950.
8635
See paras. 629, 1437 (the Chamber found that even those Bosnian Muslim police officers who signed the oath were also fired), 1502, 1597, 1616. See also
para. 1936.
8636
See para. 721.
8637
See para. 1276.
8638
See paras. 1504–1505.
8639
See para. 862.
8640
See paras. 1587, 2310.
 507

innocent civilians, while not be able to house, guard and feed their ownm population and
army, let alone additional civilians? Another question: why only several percent of the
Muslim population in the most denigrated municipalities had been brought in and detained?
This finding had been based on one of 2,379 adjudicated facts, introduced in this case, which
diminished any illusion of a fairness of the trial! #Deadly combination#! ) For further
evidence on arbitrary arrests, the Chamber refers to its findings in Section IV.A.2.iv.D above
regarding unlawful detention. During and after these arrests, Bosnian Muslims were referred to by
Serb soldiers by the derogatory term ―balija‖ and cursed.8641 Bosnian Muslim homes were also
subject to arbitrary searches sometimes accompanied by violence or intimidation towards the
occupants.8642 On occasions those searches were on the pretext of searching for weapons but
intimidated the Bosnian Muslim population.8643

2565. The Chamber also found that restrictions were placed on the movement of Bosnian
Muslims, including the issuance of movement passes which did not apply to Bosnian Serbs.8644 (In
the war zone everyone had to have a sort of pass, otherwise couldn’t pass. This was a
security measure, and depended on the local security organs, not on the President, nor the
President was entitled to ban it, since it could affect security of soldiers and civilians. The
“non-Serbs” were easier to obtain it, because they hadn’t been obliged to the Army! But,
again, the Chamber neglects the fact that in those several municipalities #there were the
fierce fightings# on a daily basis. In such a situation the local commanders were sovereign in
deciding and implementing the security measures, and neither the President, nor anyone else
could order anything what would indanger the lifes of his soldiers and civilians!) Some
Bosnian Muslims who were involved with the SDA were not issued with passes, and others who
did have such passes were still often arrested and detained.8645 Some Bosnian Muslims were only
able to secure transit passes if they had connections or they had to pay substantial amounts of
money in order to leave the municipality.8646

2566. The Chamber also recalls that there were restrictions on Bosnian Muslims meeting each
other, their phone lines and utilities were cut, and some were placed under virtual house arrest.8647
The Chamber found that in Zvornik, for example, Bosnian Serb authorities banned the sale or
trade of real estate in the municipality unless it was between Bosnian Serbs and and only ordered
the back pay of pensions for Bosnian Serbs.8648 (All military and security necessities# Would
the UN or this Tribunal be responsible if the Muslims succeded to bucher the Zvornik Serbs,
as they din the Pofalici Serbs in the middle if the Muslim part of Sarajevo, or in Bradina, all
of it in May 92? See hwo formidabl;e were the Muslim OS (Armed Forces) in Zvornik on 11
May 1992, D38:

8641
See paras. 862, 1033.
8642
See paras. 864, 1126 (the Chamber found that Bosnian Muslim homes in Vlasenica were visited during the night by members of the Serb Forces who
harassed them and demanded money), 1276, 1610. See also paras. 950 (pertaining to the searches of Bosnian Muslims), 2264–2266, 2268. The Chamber
also found that Serb Forces searched houses in Hadţići but has insufficient evidence to determine if these searches were arbitrary or directed against
Bosnian Muslims and/ or Bosnian Croats. See para. 2086.
8643
See para. 1149.
8644
See paras. 865, 952, 1118, 1506, 1609, 1661. See also paras. 2177, 2182. The Chamber also found that Serb Forces restricted the movement of the
population in Hadţići but has insufficient evidence to determine if these restrictions were directed against Bosnian Muslims and/ or Bosnian Croats. See
para. 2086.
8645
See para. 1118.
8646
See para. 1118.
8647
See paras. 865, 952, 976, 1119 (relating to television broadcasts from Sarajevo), 1276, 2311. See also para. 1269 (the Chamber found that in some cases
after the attack by Serb Forces on Bosnian Muslim villages they cut the electricity supply).
8648
See paras. 1236, 1279.
508
 509

T
here was 5,056 soldiers decisive to fight agains the Zvornik Serbs. Hadnt the Zvornik Serbs
been responsible, that would be a carnage, and nobody in the world cad demand the Serbs to
sustain such a massacres! Let us see what is in this para 1236, that served as a basis for this
assertion: 1236. Also on 15 March 1992, the Assembly of the Serb Municipality of Zvornik
passed a decision banning the sale or trade of real estate within the municipality unless it was
between―ethnic Serbs‖. In late March 1992, local youth were given assignments by Bosnian
Serb police to erect barricades at specific locations, secure important facilities in Karakaj, and
seize bridges. (#All under the JNA auspice, there was no the VRS yet# The ban on the sale or
trade of real estate in a gloomy war atmosphere was rather a #commendable#, because
prevented any deception or the influence of circumstances. The barricades are by definition
a defensive, not offensive action, and since the local Serbs knew what the SDA extremists had
been preparing against the Serbs in Zvornik. Again, the Chamber is “finding” the Serb
felonies as if there was no the war situation, and a carnage of the Serbs in several Bosnian
towns! Let us see para 1279, the same as a basis for this paragraph: 1279. On 17 June 1992,
the President confirmed the appointment of five members of the War Commission of the
Serb Municipality of Zvornik, which was to disband the Interim Government and restore the
Municipal Assembly. On the same day, the Serb Municipality of Zvornik ordered the back pay
of pensions for Serbs. So, if the President ordered re-organisationof the municipal
authorities, it doesn’t mean that he ordered that only the Serbs to get their pensions!
Certainly, he didn’t. at the same time, in Grbavica, in the centre of the Serb Sarajevo, all the
citizens regularly received pensions. In Zvornik there was a separation of municipalities, and
fonds and all the administration, so understandably the Serb municipality was not able to
 510

remunerate incomes for thos that lived in their municipality!) In Vlasenica, the Chamber
found that Bosnian Muslims had restrictions placed on the amount of money they could withdraw
from the bank.8649 (It had been rebuted in the court room by the testimony of Stanic, who
confirmed that there was a general shortage of the cash, because the money, Yugoslav Dinar,
was printed in Belgrade, and it was not simple to obtain it! This practice was introduced
throughout the entire Yugoslavia already in 1989. But, even if it was as said, what does it
have to do with the President, or any other Serb official? The #monetary policy# was under
the control and in competences of the Central Bank of Yugoslavia!)

8649
See para. 1119.
 511

2567. The Chamber considered the circumstances and the environment in which Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats were subjected to restrictive and discriminatory measures. The
Chamber did not consider these measures in isolation, but also had regard to its findings that
contemporaneously Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Municipalities were also subject
to killings, torture, beatings, physical and psychological abuse, rape and other acts of sexual
violence, cruel and inhumane living conditions, forcible displacement, unlawful detention, forced
labour, plunder, and the wanton destruction of private and public property.8650 When these
restrictive and discriminatory measures are considered in conjunction with these other underlying
acts of persecution which were perpetrated at the same time, against the same category of victims,
the Chamber finds that this amounted to a denial of or infringement upon a fundamental right and
was of equal gravity to the other crimes listed under Article 5 of the Statute. (This is so biased,
arbitrary, and not proven to be any part of the state policy. If there was a civil war, one of
many among the same opponents and adversaries, the Prosecution was obliged to show what
of it was in control of the state organs and institutions, what was caused, controlled,
neglected or in other way caused by the President’s actions or missing of the action! The
crimes must be defined as personal, not as general!)

2568. In addition, the Chamber finds that the perpetrators of these restrictive and discriminatory
measures chose their victims on the basis of their identity as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats.
The Chamber finds that these acts were carried out deliberately with the intent to discriminate on
the basis of the identity of the victims as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats.8651 In concluding
that these acts were carried out with discriminatory intent, the Chamber had regard to its finding
that these acts were discriminatory in fact given that the restrictive and discriminatory measures
were directed against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats whereas Bosnian Serbs were not
subject to the same restrictions. (#Absurdity#! Probably because the “Bosnian Serbs” didn’t
wage the war against the Bosnian Serbs, while many Muslims and Croats did wage a cruel
war against the Serb army, police and civilians, as several times in the same century! Again,
the Chamber’s finding look like there was a peace, and the authorities discriminated a
peaceful citizens. As a matter of fact, the vast majority of the “non-Serbs” didn’t have any
trouble living in the Serb areas, and only some percentage, less that 5% all together, did
have troubles as their own choice! There is a sufficient evidence for this in the file!) In
addition, the Chamber also had regard to the insults, taunts, and threats directed at the victims on
the basis of their identity as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats in the Municipalities which
expressly demonstrated this discriminatory intent with respect to other underlying acts of
persecution.8652

2569. Further, the Chamber found that there was a widespread and systematic attack against the
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations in the Municipalities. The Chamber finds
that the incidents of restrictive and discriminatory measures were part of this widespread and
systematic attack and the perpretrators of these acts knew of the attack and that their crimes were
part of it. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber considered the locations, time period, and the
identity of the victims of these acts, which correspond with the scope of the widespread and
systematic attack, as well as the magnitude and systematic nature of the attack on the Bosnian
Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian populations of BiH.

2570. The Chamber therefore finds that the imposition and maintenance of restrictive and
discriminatory measures constitute acts of persecution as a crime against humanity. (#Absurdity#!

8650
For the Chamber‘s findings in this regard, see Section IV.A.2.iv: Legal findings on crimes (Persecution: Count 3).
8651
The Chamber considers that discrimination on the grounds of the identity of the victims as Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats falls within the prohibited
grounds of discrimination under Article 5(h) of the Statute.
8652
The Chamber has had regard to its findings with respect to the insults, taunts, and threats which were discussed in the context of cruel and inhumane
treatment of these detainees.
 512

Was it established that it was on the ethnic basis only? Why the vast majority of the “non-
Serbs” in a critical municipalities hadn’t been treated this way, and why in many
municipalities there was no troubles at all? The Chamber missed to establish the causes and
consequences, the contribution of the other sides to the troubles, as in the criminal justice
must be found out whether the indicted side had any other choice, or had to act in an
ultimate defence. All what the Tribunal made is so arbitrary, unjust and unfounded, so that
will be a paradigm of what must not be done ever!)

1. Genocide: Count 1

2571. In Count 1 of the Indictment, the Prosecution charges the Accused with genocide pursuant
to Article 4 of the Statute. It alleges that between 31 March and 31 December 1992, in seven of
the Municipalities, namely Bratunac, Foĉa, Kljuĉ, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Vlasenica, and Zvornik
(―Count 1 Municipalities‖), the alleged persecutory campaign included or escalated to include
conduct that manifested an intent to destroy in part the national, ethnical and/or religious groups of
Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats as such.8653 It submits that the crimes charged in the
Indictment were not aimed at the victims as individuals but as members of an ―undesired
community‖; the President ―intended the demographic restructuring of Bosnia to be accomplished
by the destruction of substantial parts of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat communities‖ in
the Count 1 Municipalities.8654 According to the Prosecution, the proper name for this crime is
―genocide‖.8655

2572. In his Final Brief, the Accused concentrates his argument in relation to Count 1 on the lack
of genocidal intent from his part or from anyone in the Bosnian Serb leadership; this argument will
be addressed below. The Chamber notes that at the end of the Prosecution‘s case, in his
submissions pursuant to Rule 98 bis, the Accused argued that there was no genocide in the
Municipalities in 1992 and that there was therefore no evidence upon which the Chamber could
conclude that the Accused was guilty of genocide as charged in Count 1.8656 More specifically, he
argued that ―displacement does not equal destruction‖,8657 and referred to all of the previous
Tribunal judgements in which genocide was not found to have been committed in the
Municipalities, or at least in some of the Municipalities.8658

(A) The protected group

2573. For the purpose of Count 1, the Prosecution alleges that the protected groups are the
national, ethnical and/or religious groups of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.8659

2574. The Chamber notes that other Chambers have concluded that both the Bosnian Muslims
and the Bosnian Croats are protected groups within the meaning of Article 4 of the Statute.8660

8653
Indictment, paras. 36, 38. The Chamber gives a restrictive interpretation to paragraph 38 of the Indictment, which states that the ―most extreme
manifestations of an intent to partially destroy these groups took place in [the Count 1 Municipalities]‖. This is in conformity with the Prosecution Final
Brief focusing on the Count 1 Municipalities, by reference only to the ―municipalities specified in Count 1‖. Prosecution Final Brief, para. 570.
8654
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 570.
8655
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 570.
8656
Hearing, T. 28570 (11 June 2012).
8657
Hearing, T. 28571 (11 June 2012).
8658
Hearing, T. 28572–28579 (11 June 2012).
8659
See Indictment, para. 38; Prosecution Final Brief, fn. 2147 (making reference to the ―national group of Bosnian Muslims and of Croats‖).
8660
In relation to the Bosnian Muslim group, see Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 15 (holding that identifying ―the protected group as the national group of
Bosnian Muslims‖ comports with the guidelines in relation to the definition of the protected group pursuant to Article 4 of the Statute). See also Popović et
al. Trial Judgement, para. 840; Krstić Trial Judgement, para. 560. In relation to both the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups, see Stakić Appeal
Judgement, para. 36 (concluding that the Trial Chamber did not err in law either by defining the groups allegedly targeted for genocide as Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats‖). See also BrĎanin Trial Judgement, para. 736.
 513

The Chamber is satisfied for the purpose of Article 4 of the Statute that the protected groups were
the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats.

(B) The actus reus

2575. In relation to Count 1, the Prosecution charges three types of acts under Article 4(2) of the
Statute: (i) the killing of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, including leading members of
these groups;8661 (ii) the causing of serious bodily or mental harm to thousands of Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats, including leading members of these groups, during their
confinement in detention facilities;8662 and (iii) the detention of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats, including leading members of these groups, in detention facilities, under
conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction.8663 The Prosecution alleges
that the evidence is overwhelming that these acts of genocide within the meaning of Article 4(2)
of the Statute occurred on a massive scale.8664

2576. When presenting the Accused‘s closing arguments on genocide under Count 1, the
Accused‘s legal adviser acknowledged that ―crimes such as murder and infliction of serious harm,
were committed during the 1992 events in the municipalities in Bosnia‖.8665

2577. The Chamber will examine below each of the categories of acts charged under Article 4(2)
of the Statute.

1. Killing members of the group

2578. The Chamber entered findings that a large number of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
were killed by Serb Forces throughout the Count 1 Municipalities. Victims were killed during and
after the take-over of these municipalities. Victims were also killed while they were detained at
detention facilities; some of them died as a result of cruel and inhumane treatment infled on
them.8666 (#Eight mistakes#! There are at least eight huge omissioms in this finding: 1.
there was no any “take-over” by the Serb side, but only a “take-over” of control on the Serb
territories only, leaving the same possibility to the Muslim/Croat side; 2. In all and every of
these municipalities the Serb side had been attacked militarily by the illegal terrorist groups,
which first attacked the JNA, and later the Serb institutions, and finally the VRS and Serb
police; 3. There was no a single case of any harassment, detention, hostility prior to an
armed conflict initiated by the Muslim side; 4. There was no a case of the Serb initiation of
armed conflict; 5. There had been detained only persons connected to the armed rebellion,
and if by mistake some civilian had been arrested, such a person had been released
immediately after established the fact. In the most critical municipalities of Sanski Most and
Prijedor, 41% and 59% respectively had been released; 6. In these the most critical
municipalities there had been detained less than 2,8% of the non-Serb population – always
and exclusively on the basis of personal involvement in rebellion; 7. Except in an incident in
the Keraterm detention in Prijedor, where during an excape attempt had been killed close to

8661
Indictment, para. 40(a) (referring to killings carried out during and after take-overs and in detention facilities, including those committed during, and deaths
resulting from, cruel and inhumane treatment at detention facilities).
8662
Indictment, para. 40(b) (referring to cruel or inhumane treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, rape, other acts of sexual violence and
beatings).
8663
Indictment, para. 40(c) (referring to cruel and inhumane treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, rape, other acts of sexual violence,
inhumane living conditions, forced labour and the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care or hygienic sanitation
facilities).
8664
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 572; Prosecution Closing Argument, T. 47577 (29 September 2014).
8665
Accused Closing Argument, T. 47935–47936 (2 October 2014).
8666
See para. 2446. For Bratunac, see fn. 8223, 8236, 8251; for Foĉa, see fn. 8224, 8238, 8252; for Kljuĉ, see fn. 8225, 8240; for Prijedor, see fn. 8227, 8243,
8253; for Sanski Most, see fn. 8228, 8245, 8255; for Vlasenica, see fn. 8231, 8246; and for Zvornik, see fns. 8232, 8248, 8256.
 514

200 inmates, there was no killings in other detentions, except a very few incidental, and
always out of control of the officials! 8. The Chamber facilitated the Prosecution witnesses
to lie as much as they wanted, and among others, the Chamber accepted that there was no a
combat casualties on the Muslim side, during the legal anti-terrorist actions throughout the
militarised villages, thus counting all the combat casualties as a civilian!!! Everyone is free to
challenge these facts, because as time goes, the truth will prevail!!! The general question
remains un-answered: #why only a few villages in the critical municipalities had been
embattled, #why only few percent of the non-Serbs had been participating in rebellion, and
#why it happened in less than one third of the Serb municipalities!)

2579. The Chamber is therefore satisfied for the purpose of Article 4(2)(a) of the Statute that
members of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups were killed.

2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group

2580. Throughout the Count 1 Municipalities, the Chamber found that a large number of Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats were subjected to cruel treatment, including torture, beatings, as well
as physical and psychological abuse. The Chamber described these acts in detail above in relation
to Count 3 and provided vivid examples of the most egregious acts found to have been committed
against the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in detention facilities as well as during and after
take-overs in the Count 1 Municipalities. The Chamber also found that prominent Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats, including professionals and leaders, were targeted for such
treatment. Following these acts, the Chamber found that many detainees bore serious injuries, had
visible wounds, were unable to walk or talk for days, and suffered long-term psychological and
physical effects. These acts were found to cause serious mental or physical suffering or injury.
(By such a partisan approach, the Chamber is becoming a part of the Muslim propaganda
apparatus. It couldn’t be otherwise, since such an #un-critical acceptance of the
partisanship# of the Prosecution and its witnesses – which made these trials unnecessary!
During these alleged misdoings of the Serb side, many #Muslims and Croats participated in
the VRS# against the same enemies, fundamentalists and pro-nazi forces. Had it been even
close to what the Chamber found, there wouldn’t be a singe Muslim or Croat in the Republic
of Srpska, let alone in the Serb Army!)

2581. The Chamber also found that in some of the Count 1 Municipalities, namely Foĉa, Prijedor,
Vlasenica, and Zvornik, Bosnian Muslim women, men, girls, and boys were subjected to rape and
other acts of sexual violence, involving serious abuses of a sexual nature.8667 These acts were
found to cause serious mental or physical suffering or injury.8668 (Not true! Why there was no
any litigation on this after the war! Both sides had known each other very well, and it
couldn’t happen without a common knowledge! #No mas rapes#!)

2582. The Chamber considers that these acts were of such a serious nature as to contribute or
tend to contribute to the destruction of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Count 1
Municipalities. The Chamber is therefore satisfied for the purpose of Article 4(2)(b) of the Statute
that members of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups were subjected to serious bodily
or mental harm in the Count 1 Municipalities.

(3)Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part

8667
See paras. 2500–2505. In particular for Foĉa, see fn. 8435; for Prijedor, see fn. 8437; for Vlasenica, see fn. 8439; and for Zvornik, see fn. 8441.
8668
See paras. 2499, 2505, 2512.
 515

2583. The Chamber recalls that when the same acts are charged under Articles 4(2)(b) and
4(2)(c), a chamber will consider whether these alleged acts amount to conditions calculated to
bring about physical destruction only when it does not find them to amount to ―causing serious
bodily or mental harm‖.8669 The Chamber shall therefore limit its assessment to the acts which are
not included above. These include the imposition of inhumane living conditions, forced labour
and the failure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical care or hygienic
sanitation facilities.8670

2584. In all of the Count 1 Municipalities, the Chamber found that Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian
Croat detainees were held in terrible conditions.8671 (In an #impprovised prisons and
detentions, not deliberately#!) For the purpose of Article 4(2)(c), the Chamber recalls its findings
that the detainees faced severe over-crowding in the detention facilities.8672 This combined with
stifling heat and lack of ventilation led to unbearable conditions for the detainees and some
died.8673 In these detention facilities, medical care was non-existent or inadequate, at best.8674
Access to water and food was insufficient, which led to severe weight loss, malnutrition, and at
times, starvation.8675 Hygienic conditions were poor and the lack of access to washing facilities
led to dysentery, lice, and skin diseases spreading throughout the facilities.8676 The Chamber
further found that the living conditions in some of the detention facilities had serious effects on
some of the detainees.8677 (#Unpredicted number of detainees and Prisoners of War#, a
#general shortage of everything# because of general poverty and particularly because of
sanctions, #no professional militaries or police# capable of handling so many POWs, a #2,000
kilometres of frontline# and a severe attacks on the borders of the Republic of Srpska; these
#rebels deep in the Serb territory# presented the ultimate jeopardy for the Serb civilians,
including families of these soldiers that kept 2,000 km of frontline!)

2585. Further, in Foĉa, Kljuĉ, and Vlasenica, the Chamber found that a number of Bosnian
Muslim and Bosnian Croat detainees were forced to perform labour at the frontline.8678 They were
put in dangerous situations, were afraid for their lives and of being beaten if they refused to
work.8679

2586. However, the Chamber recalls that the ―actus reus of Article 4(2)(c) of the Statute ‗covers
methods of physical destruction, other than killing, whereby the perpetrator ultimately seeks the
death of the members of the group‘‖.8680 While Article 4(2)(a) and (b) in that Article 4(2)(a) and
(b) proscribes acts causing a specific result, i.e.: death and serious bodily or mental harm,
respectively, Article 4(2)(c) concerns ―those methods of destruction that do not immediately kill
the members of the groups, but which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction‖, i.e.: slow
death.8681

2587. While the conditions in the detention facilities in the Count 1 Municipalities were dreadful
and had serious effects on the detainees, the Chamber is not convinced that the evidence before it

8669
See BrĎanin Trial Judgement, para. 905.
8670
Indictment, para. 40(c).
8671
See generally para. 2507.
8672
See para. 2507, fn. 8454. in relation to Foĉa, Kljuĉ, Prijedor, Vlasenica, and Zvornik.
8673
See paras. 780, 1299, 1301, 1756.
8674
See para. 2507, fn. 8461.
8675
See paras. 2507, 2509; fns. 8459, 8460.
8676
See para. 2509.
8677
See para. 2509.
8678
See paras. 2531, 2534.
8679
See paras. 2532–2533.
8680
Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 233 (citing ICJ Croatia v. Serbia Judgement, para. 161).
8681
Tolimir Appeal Judgement, paras. 228, 233.
 516

demonstrates that they ultimately sought the physical destruction of the Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats. The Chamber is therefore not satisfied for the purpose of Article 4(2)(c) of the
Statute that conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats were deliberately inflicted on these groups in the Count 1
Municipalities.

(C) The mens rea

2588. The Prosecution first alleges that there is direct evidence that the President had genocidal
8682
intent. This is exemplified, according to the Prosecution, through the statements the President
made as to the fate of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats if they persisted in pursuing
independence.8683 The Prosecution also claims that by casting the conflict as existential and
genocidal and by requiring the use of reciprocal force, the President ―prepared his followers for the
use of destructive forces‖.8684

2589. Second, the Prosecution alleges that the existence of genocidal intent is confirmed through
indirect evidence.8685 (#indirect evidence# for such a sensitive matters!) For the Prosecution, the
pattern of crimes in the Count 1 Municipalities, taking Prijedor as the core example,8686
demonstrates the intent to destroy the very existence of the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim
communities in the Count 1 Municipalities and to prevent their ability to reconstitute
themselves.8687 The Prosecution submits that ―[n]ot only can the paramount leader of the Bosnian
Serbs‘ intent to destroy be inferred, it is compelled by the nature and extent of the underlying
genocidal acts‖.8688 It further claims that other members of the Overarching JCE shared the
Accused‘s genocidal intent, in particular Mladić, whom the Accused personally selected to
command his military forces and continued to entrust with carrying out his policies, even when the
VRS was perpetrating widespread acts of genocide.8689 (That would have some sense had
General Mladi} been already proven as a “master of genocide”, which is #out of mind#!)

2590. On the contrary, the President submits that there is no direct or indirect evidence that he or
the Bosnian Serb leadership had genocidal intent with regard to the Count 1 Municipalities.8690

2591. The Chamber recalls that in the present case the required mens rea for genocide is the
intent to destroy, in part, the Bosnian Muslim and the Bosnian Croat groups as such.8691 The
Appeals Chamber held that given that the President is charged under Count 1 for his participation
in the first form of JCE, ―it is the genocidal intent of Karadţić and other alleged JCE members, not
the physical perpetrators of the underlying alleged genocidal acts, that is determinative‖. 8692 The
Chamber notes, however, that the President‘s responsibility under Count 1, is alleged in relation to
all modes of responsibility under Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute and therefore at this stage
the Chamber must examine whether there was genocidal intent present at any level from the
physical perpetrators of the crimes to Bosnian Serb representatives not named as alleged

8682
Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 578–581.
8683
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 579.
8684
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 580.
8685
Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 582–595.
8686
Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 589–594.
8687
Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 583–585.
8688
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 585 (further alleging that ―[t]his intent is confirmed by [the Accused‘s] own statements anticipating, threatening, and
embracing just such acts‖.)
8689
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 586.
8690
Defence Final Brief, paras. 2767–2771; Closing Arguments, T. 47931–47935 (2 October 2014).
8691
See para. 549.
8692
Rule 98 bis Appeal Judgement, para. 79.
 517

Overarching JCE members, all the way up to the named alleged JCE members, including the
President himself.

2592. In determining the existence of such specific intent, the Chamber has considered the
evidence as a whole and examined whether there existed direct evidence or whether such inference
could be drawn from all the facts and the circumstances in the case. In this regard, the Chamber
recalls that such inference must be the only reasonable inference that could be made based on that
evidence.8693 Given that the intent of the named alleged JCE members, including the Accused, is
intrinsically connected to all of the evidence on the record pertaining to the existence and the
scope of the Overarching JCE, the Chamber conducted a holistic and contextualised assessment of
this evidence and will indicate below, where relevant, the appropriate cross-references to these
sections.

Intent to destroy the group as such, in part

2593. In the instant case, under Count 1, the Prosecution refers to the intent to destroy a part of
the protected groups of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, namely the Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats in the Count 1 Municipalities.8694 It argues that the part of the Bosnian
Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups in each of the Count 1 Municipalities satisfies the substantiality
requirement when considering the numeric size and significance of the targeted parts as well as the
areas of the perpetrators‘ activity and the possible extent of their reach.8695 Prijedor is taken as the
primary example of the part of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups that would meet the
substantiality requirement with regard to numeric size and the significance of targeting these
communities, given that Prijedor represented a symbol of ―brotherhood and unity‖.8696 (The
Chamber is here on a very weak ice: The Croats in Prijedor didn’t participate massively in
the rebellion, and for that reason, a very few Croats had been suspected and questioned! As
far as the Muslims is concerned with, there was at least some more than 50% of the Muslim
settlements didn’t have any trouble, i.e. all of the villages that didn’t serve as a strongolds of
the terrorists! Out of around 55,000 of the non-Serb population, only about 3,000 had been
arrested and questioned, which makes around 5%, but aftere the first investigations around
1,700 had been released, while around 1,400 had been considered liable for the armed
rebellion and conveyed to Manjaca as a POWs, which makes #about 2,5% of the non-Sern
population#was found liable! Full stop!

2594. The Chamber will examine below whether it can be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that
there was intent to destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat groups, namely the
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Count 1 Municipalities.

Evidence of genocidal intent of the President and named alleged Overarching JCE members

2595. In assessing whether or not the President or any of the named members of the alleged
Overarching JCE had genocidal intent for the purposes of Count 1, the Chamber relies on the
findings in the section of the Judgement pertaining to the ideology and objectives of the President
and the Bosnian Serb leadership, and in particular paragraphs 2634 to 2903 therein.

2596. The Chamber found that the speeches and statements made by the President and the
Bosnian Serb leadership denigrated Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, portrayed them as their

8693
See para. 10.
8694
See Indictment, paras. 36, 38.
8695
Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 589–594.
8696
Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 589–594.
 518

historic enemies, and exacerbated ethnic tensions in BiH. This evidence also demonstrates an
intent to create an ethnically homogeneous Serb state in BiH, to separate from Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats, and remove them from Bosnian Serb controlled territory. It also shows that
the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership advocated a position that co-existence with non-
Serbs within Bosnian Serb-controlled territory in BiH was impossible.8697 However, the Chamber
is not satisfied that the evidence which demonstrates this objective also shows an intent to
physically destroy a part of either of those protected groups.

2597. Even where the Bosnian Serb leadership called into question the identity of the Bosnian
Muslims as a nation or a people,8698 these speeches were delivered in the context that the Bosnian
Muslim population residing in Bosnian Serb-claimed territory should be separated from the
Serbs—by force if necessary—but did not suggest that a part of that group should be physically
destroyed as such.

2598. The Chamber also found that the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership repeatedly
referred to the historic grievances of the Serb people.8699 The Chamber found that these speeches
were used by the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership to remind the Bosnian Serb population
about crimes committed against Serbs by Muslims and Croats and emphasised the need to ensure
that they would not be repeated.8700 The Chamber also found that these references were used as
justification for renewing historical Bosnian Serb claims to land in BiH where they had once been
a majority.8701 These speeches also had the effect of creating fear and inciting inter-ethnic hatred
amongst the population.8702 This rhetoric then made it easier for the President and the Bosnian
Serb leadership to promote their objectives of ethnic separation and the creation of an ethnically
homogeneous state. However, the Chamber did not find any evidence to demonstrate that these
constant references to the historic genocide against Serbs were used to call on the Bosnian Serbs to
do the same. The Chamber therefore finds that while these statements had the effect of identifying
the historic enemies of the Bosnian Serbs and furthering the objective of ethnic separation, they do
not demonstrate that the only reasonable inference is that the Bosnian Serb leadership intended to
physically destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat groups in order to achieve
these aims.

2599. While there were certainly highly inflammatory speeches and statements in which the
President and other alleged members of the Overarching JCE spoke about the ―disappearance‖,
―annihilation‖, ―vanish[ing]‖, ―elimination‖, and ―extinction‖ of the Bosnian Muslims, the
Chamber has considered these statements in the full context in which they were delivered and not
in isolation.8703 The Chamber finds that the early speeches which contained this kind of rhetoric
were delivered mainly as a warning that Bosnian Muslims should not pursue a path to
independence which was contrary to the Bosnian Serb interests, and as a threat that if they did do
so there would be war which would lead to severe bloodshed. The Chamber also recalls that some
of the statements made by the President himself reflected how angry he was about the proposed
moves towards the independence of BiH, which would lead to violence if Bosnian Serb demands
were not met.8704 The Chamber finds that when the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership
issued these threats they envisaged that any attempt to circumvent the interests of the Bosnian
Serbs would result in chaos and extreme violence. (#Not threats, a warnings#. If there was no a

8697
See Section IV.A.3.a.i.D.2: Conclusion.
8698
See e.g. paras. 2664, 2773.
8699
See Section IV.A.3.a.i.B: Identification of historic enemies.
8700
See para. 2670.
8701
See para. 2671.
8702
See para. 2672.
8703
See e.g. paras. 2675, 2766, 2789, 2810, 2864, 2870, 3272–3273.
8704
See para. 2654.
 519

WWII experience, and the most recent experience from Croatia in a civil war, again it
wouldn’t be a threat, but warning! Who is the institution that could impose an illegal
solution ot any nation? Why it is understood in the Tribunal that the Serbs didn’t have any
rights to reject the solutions that turned them into a second class citizens, on an unlawful
basis? The UN Court should be more cotious in pursuing such a views!#Denied right for
political life#!) The record shows that the Bosnian Serbs were prepared to use force and violence
against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in order to achieve their objectives and assert their
historic territorial claims. However, in light of the totality of the evidence, the Chamber is not
convinced that the only reasonable inference to draw from these statements is that the respective
speakers intended to physically destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat
groups.

2600. For example, the Chamber recalls its finding that in the President‘s speech in October 1991
to the SRBiH Assembly in which he spoke about a ―highway of hell‖, he issued very specific
threats about what would happen if the Bosnian Muslims continued to pursue the path of
independence and ignored the will of the Bosnian Serbs.8705 (In the very same speech there is
evidence that it hadn’t been a threat, but a #warning and begging# to stop pursuing a war
policy!)The Chamber finds that the President was clearly threatening war if the Bosnian Serb
interests were ignored, and that he also envisaged that such a war would be ―hell‖ and that the
Bosnian Muslims would be unable to defend themselves in such a scenario. The Chamber finds
that through this speech the President intended to threaten the Bosnian Muslims against pursuing
independence for BiH and that he was fully aware that a potential conflict would be extremely
violent. However, the Chamber is not satisfied that the only reasonable inference is that this
statement demonstrates that the President intended to physically destroy a part of the Bosnian
Muslim group .

2601. Another example is the speech the President delivered in July 1992 before the Bosnian
Serb Assembly where he said that the conflict had been ―roused in order to eliminate the Muslims
[...] They think they are being nationally established, but in fact they are vanishing‖.8706 The
Prosecution refers to this statement as evidence that the President was preparing his followers for
the use of destructive force.8707 However, the Chamber also notes that right after making this
statement, the President went on to say: ―I think we have to save the Serb people in their ethnic
and also historical territories […]. We‘ll have for sure, we‘ll have in the beginning so many Serbs,
but I think that they will leave those states, both the Muslim and the Croat state. In the state that
we are building, we have to ensure that they have all the rights that we have, under the condition
that they are not hostile and that they leave the weapons‖.8708 When read in the full context, the
Chamber is not satisfied that the President‘s statement at the Bosnian Serb Assembly demonstrates
that he intended to physically destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat groups.

2602. Similarly, the Chamber considers that while Šešelj, Plavšić, and Koljević sometimes
delivered highly inflammatory and violent statements,8709 the evidence before the Chamber does
not lead to the conclusion that the only reasonable inference was that they intended to physically
destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat groups.

2603. With respect to an order of 10 April 1994 in which Mladić is quoted as encouraging VRS
operations because ―The [t]urks must disappear from these areas‖, the Chamber notes that the area

8705
See para. 2675.
8706
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), p. 86.
8707
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 580.
8708
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), p. 86.
8709
See e.g. paras. 2657, 2663–2664, 2706, 2728, 2798.
 520

covered by this order is not related to the Count 1 Municipalities.8710 In any event, the Chamber
also notes Michael Rose‘s testimony with regard to this order, namely that he and other
international representatives had thought that the objective of the combat operations in Goraţde
was to move the Bosnian Muslims out of the right bank of the town and therefore he suspected the
reference in the order to ―[t]he Turks must disappear from these areas‖ to mean just that: the
removal—not the destruction—of the Bosnian Muslim population in those areas.8711 The
Chamber also noted statements made by Mladić at the Bosnian Serb Assembly where he stated
that their enemies should be eliminated but later stated that there are ways of neutralising the
Muslims which do not mean that they have to be expelled or drowned.8712 The Chamber therefore
considers that, while the evidence clearly evinces the intent to separate and move Bosnian
Muslims out of Bosnian Serb claimed territory, it is not satisfied that the only reasonable inference
is that Mladić intended to destroy a part of that group in the process.

2604. In relation to the 20 September 1994 entry in Mladić‘s diary, in which Slobodan Milošević
stated that he opposed the view of Krajišnik to ―kill off all the Muslims and Croats‖,8713 the
Chamber notes that it has very limited information about when or in which context Krajišnik
expressed this sentiment, and therefore, that it is of low probative value. The Chamber is therefore
not satisfied that the only reasonable inference is that this demonstrates intent to destroy a part of
either of the protected groups.

2605. The Chamber has also analysed the totality of the evidence relating to the statements,
speeches, and actions of the Accused and the named members of the alleged Overarching JCE.
The Chamber has characterised each of these statements and reached a conclusion about what they
meant and what they showed in terms of intent. In conducting that assessment, the Chamber did
not simply look at these statements in isolation, but also had regard to their meaning in the context
of the totality of the evidence on the record. (#That happened too rarely! The #context# of the
totality of evidence is needed, but the context of events is more substantial. To estimate a
solitary event or even a sentence of some unofficial persons without #context of events# is
unfair and manipulative!) As has been discussed in this section, the Chamber has found that
these statements, speeches, and actions were consistent with the Bosnian Serb objective of ethnic
separation and the forceful creation of an ethnically homogenous state. However, the Chamber is
not satisfied that this evidence—even when considered in the context of the pattern of crimes
found to have been committed in the Count 1 Municipalities as will be detailed below—allows the
Chamber to conclude that the Accused or the named members of the alleged Overarching JCE had
genocidal intent for the purposes of Count 1. In other words, the evidence does not support a
conclusion that the only reasonable inference is that the President or any of the alleged members of
the Overarching JCE had the intent to physically destroy the Bosnian Muslim and/or the Bosnian
Croat groups in the Count 1 Municipalities as such.

Evidence of genocidal intent of Bosnian Serbs not named as alleged members of the Overarching
JCE

2606. In relation to the intent of the Accused‘s ―followers‖, the Prosecution refers to what it coins
as a threat by Miroslav Deronjić that the Muslims of Bratunac would disappear.8714 (A #trivial
lie#, repetition of the part of President’s speech of 15 October 91!) At a meeting between SDS
and SDA representatives in early April 1992, Deronjić reiterated that the police should be divided

8710
P1645 (Order of Višegrad Tactical Group, 11 April 1994).
8711
Michael Rose, T. 7424–7425 (5 October 2010).
8712
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), pp. 33, 39.
8713
See P1487 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 4 September 1994–28 January 1995), p. 17.
8714
See Prosecution Final Brief, para. 580, referring to P3196 (Witness statement of Dţevad Gušić undated), paras. 31–32.
 521

into separate Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim units and when the SDA representatives opposed
the idea, fearing it would lead to further tensions, Deronjić threatened that if they did not comply,
―Muslims would disappear‖.8715 He went on to say that the division would be the best way for the
Bosnian Muslims to prevent violence breaking out.8716 (#EXCULPATORY!#) In the context of
negotiations at the republic and the municipal levels to divide the police into separate entities,8717
the Chamber considers that, in the statement above, Deronjić clearly intended to intimidate the
SDA representatives and coerce them into accepting the division. However, the Chamber is not
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from this
statement is that Deronjić possessed genocidal intent. (#For heaven’s sake, in early April 1992
there was a Lisbon agreement in furtherance of the #ICFY results from 1991, which all
envisaged# the separate police forces! The Chamber #denied the Serb rights on political
life#!)

2607. The Prosecution also refers to a speech made before the Bosnian Serb Assembly in
July 1992 by Miladin Nedić, member of the SDS Main Board and representative at the Bosnian
Serb Assembly, which the Prosecution coins as ―the executioners‘ speech‖.8718 The President, on
the contrary, refers to Nedić‘s evidence that this particular statement must be understood in light
of his later address during the same session.8719 During his first address to the 17th Bosnian Serb
Assembly session, Nedić stated the following

I am against solving the situation in Bosnia in haste, we must admit that the Muslims have
been planted to us as a people whose executioners we are to be. I do not want the Serb people
to be executioners but I am also against us giving up our state, our land and our territory.[…]
Therefore we should not hurry, because we are a people who have been determined to be
executioners and to do someone a favour.8720

2608. Nedić testified that the essence of his statement was that he was advocating a peaceful
solution to avoid the war.8721 The Chamber notes that Nedić indeed described the Serb people as
having been called upon to be the executioners of the Muslims. However, it also notes that he
immediately stated: ―I am against any defined borders while people are getting killed‖.8722
Furthermore, later in the session, during a second address, Nedić reiterated that he opposed any
discussion on the definition of borders and advocated the following:

Let us leave the time to solve that, but I am not for waging a war in order to enslave some and
us to become oppressors. Let us treat the soldiers in accordance with military codes, let us not
kill women and children for wearing dimijas. […] I told a colonel that I am for a knightly
warfare and not for genocide.8723 (#EXCULPATORY#!)

2609. The Chamber notes that the Prosecution refers to later statements made by Nedić before the
Bosnian Serb Assembly, which it claims contradicts Nedić‘s evidence that he was advocating

8715
P3196 (Witness statement of Dţevad Gušić undated), paras. 31–32.
8716
P3196 (Witness statement of Dţevad Gušić undated), para. 32.
8717
See Section IV.A.3.a.ii.C: Split in the MUP and the creation of Bosnian Serb MUP.
8718
Prosecution Final Brief, fn. 2184. The Chamber notes that the Prosecution erroneously refers to D4332 and not to D4232 as the exhibit number for Nedić‘s
witness statement.
8719
Defence Final Brief, para. 2769.
8720
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 41. See also Miladin Nedić, T. 45883 (22 January 2014) (testifying, in relation to
this statement, that he never advocated the extermination of the Muslim people and that the ―only thing I hold against the Muslims as a religious group or
people, whatever you wish, is that they are forcing me to have to fire at them too‖).
8721
D4232 (Witness statement of Miladin Nedić dated 20 January 2014), para. 5.
8722
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 41.
8723
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), p. 60.
 522

peace.8724 Having considered these statements, the Chamber finds that they show Nedić‘s
exasperation with the position of the Bosnian Muslims during negotiations and his wish that peace
be established; albeit solely under the conditions established by the Bosnian Serbs.8725

2610. In light of the above, the Chamber is not satisfied that the only reasonable inference that can be
drawn from Nedić‘s statement at the 17th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly is that he
possessed the intent to destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslim group as such.

2611. The Chamber notes that these are merely examples referred to by the Prosecution to show
genocidal intent of the ―President‘s followers‖ but that the Chamber conducted its own assesment
of the remainder of the trial record to examine whether there was genocidal intent towards the
Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat groups in the Count 1 Municipalities as such, on the part of
Bosnian Serbs not named as alleged Overarching JCE members.

2612. In light of the above and having assessed the entire trial record, including the pattern of crimes
described below,8726 the Chamber is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the only reasonable
inference that can be drawn from the facts and circumstances is that Bosnian Serbs not named as
alleged Overarching JCE members possessed the intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslim and/or the
Bosnian Croat groups in the Count 1 Municipalities as such.

(4) Evidence of genocidal intent of the physical perpetrators

8724
Prosecution Final Brief, fn. 2184.
8725
D115 (Transcript of 25th session of RS Assembly, 19-20 January 1993), p. 25 (stating: ―Everything that we offered them as a people they refused, and had
they been a people, they would have accepted at least one option, for us to live like human beings and like peoples. They are to blame, not us. Let them fare
as God sees fit.‖); P1394 (Transcript of 42nd session of RS Assembly, 18-19 July 1994), ecourt p. 85 (stating:―I don‘t know what /they/ want from us, to go
in front of a wall of pain to beg someone for peace. […] I am not worried about the Muslims who have declared war on us, I am worried about Serbs.‖). The
Chamber notes that the Prosecution erroneously refers to D1379 in fn. 2184, which is a map.
8726
See paras. 2614–2615.
 523

2613. The Chamber examined the record to assess whether there was evidence of genocidal intent by
the perpetrators of the above acts in relation to the Count 1 Municipalities. In relation to Count 3, the
Chamber found that victims of crimes during the take-overs of the Count 1 Municipalities and in
detention facilities in those municipalities were targeted solely on the basis that they were Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats.8727 This led the Chamber to find that the said crimes were committed
with discriminatory intent.8728 The Chamber is not satisfied, however, that there is evidence
establishing, beyond reasonable doubt, that the perpetrators of these crimes possessed intent to destroy
the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat groups in the Count 1 Municipalities as such.

(5.)Evidence of genocidal intent through the pattern of crimes

2467. The Chamber will now examine whether the pattern of crimes in the Count 1
Municipalities, as considered in light of the whole trial record, satisfies the Chamber that the only
reasonable inference that could be drawn from the facts and circumstances was that the acts
described above in the Count 1 Municipalities were committed with genocidal intent.

2468. The Chamber recalls a few key factual findings made above in relation to each of the
Count 1 Municipalities, first in relation to eastern BiH (Zvornik, Foĉa, Bratunac, and Vlasenica)
before turning to the ARK (Kljuĉ, Prijedor, and Sanski Most).

2469. In Zvornik, preparations for the division of municipal organs and the creation of Serb
institutions started at the end of 1991.8729 The take-over of the town of Zvornik by Serb Forces
started on or about 8 April 1992 and by the following morning, a Serbian flag was flying over the
main mosque.8730 During the take-over, Bosnian Muslims were killed by Serb Forces.8731
Restrictive measures were imposed and Bosnian Muslims were dismissed from employment.8732
Paramilitaries looted, mistreated, raped, and killed inhabitants.8733 After the attack on the town,
Serb Forces attacked surrounding villages; they set houses on fire, cut the electricity supply, and
rounded up people who were then either transferred out of the municipality or detained in
detention facilities there.8734 Hundreds of Bosnian Muslims were arrested and detained in
detention facilities throughout Zvornik; there, they were held in appalling conditions, subjected to
severe mistreatment, rape and other acts of sexual violence; some detainees were killed.8735 The
Chamber also found that 26 mosques were heavily damaged, almost destroyed, or completely
destroyed by Serb Forces from April 1992.8736 Finally, the Chamber found that Bosniam Muslims
were forced to leave Zvornik and that towards the end of June 1992, there were very few Bosnian
Muslims remaining in the town.8737

2470. In Foĉa, steps towards the creation of separate Serb institutions were taken starting at the
end of 1991.8738 The town was taken over by Serb Forces in early April 1992.8739 During and
after the take-over, Bosnian Muslim houses were looted and destroyed and Bosnian Muslim

8727
See paras. 2483, 2513–2516.
8728
See paras. 2483, 2513.
8729
See paras. 1232, 1233.
8730
See paras. 1249, 1251.
8731
See para. 1258.
8732
See para. 1276.
8733
See para. 1282.
8734
See paras. 1259–1263, 1269–1274.
8735
See e.g. paras. 1296, 1301, 1305, 1309, 1314, 1323, 1328, 1333, 1340, 1341, 1343, 1346.
8736
See para. 1359.
8737
See paras. 1364–1365.
8738
See paras. 843–846.
8739
See paras. 852–855.
 524

inhabitants left.8740 Then, ensued a period of large-scale arrests of non-Serb men who were taken
to detention facilities throughout the municipality and of restrictions on the Bosnian Muslim
population.8741 The Chamber found that Bosnian Muslim civilians were killed either during
attacks on villages throughout the municipality or in detention facilities.8742 In the detention
facilities, detainees were held in terrible conditions; they were also mistreated and subjected to
rape and acts of sexual violence.8743 The Chamber also found that two mosques were destroyed by
Serb Forces between April and August 1992.8744 Finally, the Chamber found that Bosnian
Muslims were forced to leave Foĉa and that by mid-August 1992, there were almost no Bosnian
Muslim left in Foĉa.8745

2471. In Bratunac, the Chamber made findings that at the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992,
preparations were made to divide municipal structures and create separate Serb institutions.8746 On
or about 17 April 1992, Serb Forces entered the town.8747 From then on, Bosnian Muslim houses
were searched and looted,8748 Bosnian Muslims were dismissed from their jobs,8749 Bosnian Serb
refugees settled in the homes of Bosnian Muslims who had left,8750 and mosques and other Muslim
monuments were destroyed.8751 In the days following the attack on the town, surrounding Bosnian
Muslim villages were attacked by Serb Forces; during the course of these attacks, houses were
looted and burned, and villagers were told to leave.8752 Bosnian Muslims were also killed by Serb
Forces in these villages.8753 From May 1992, hundreds of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
were rounded up from their homes and detained in facilities throughout Bratunac, where they were
subjected to severe mistreatment and held in cramped condition; some detainees died.8754 In these
detention facilities, prominent Bosnian Muslims intellectuals were targeted.8755 The Chamber
found that Bosnian Muslims were forced to leave Bratunac and that by the end of June 1992, very
few remained in the town.8756

2472. In Vlasenica, measures were adopted to divide municipal institutions and create Serb
organs at the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992.8757 Serb Forces took over Vlasenica on or
about 21 April 1992.8758 After the take-over, the movement of Bosnian Muslims was restricted
and they were dismissed from their jobs.8759 They were arrested and interrogated.8760 During the
course of the take-over of villages within the municipality, Bosnian Muslim houses were set on
fire.8761 Bosnian Muslims were also killed during the course of these attacks.8762 There were a

8740
See paras. 855–858.
8741
See paras. 861–865.
8742
See paras. 869, 874, 911.
8743
See paras. 879, 889, 903, 923.
8744
See para. 928.
8745
See paras. 930–934.
8746
See paras. 697–710.
8747
See para. 714.
8748
See paras. 719, 721.
8749
See para. 723.
8750
See para. 725.
8751
See paras. 782–783.
8752
See paras. 728–732.
8753
See paras. 737, 749.
8754
See paras. 759, 766, 767, 780.
8755
See para. 774.
8756
See paras. 789, 791. The Chamber recalls that parts of the territory of Bratunac remained under the control of the Bosnian Muslim forces and that they
launched an offensive in the second half of 1992 and the beginning of 1993. See para. 790.
8757
See paras. 1108, 1109.
8758
See para. 1114.
8759
See paras. 1118, 1120.
8760
See paras. 1116, 1123.
8761
See paras. 1129–1130, 1133.
8762
See paras. 1146, 1153, 1159.
 525

number of detention facilities in Vlasenica; there, Bosnian Muslims were detained, held in
appalling conditions, beaten, raped, and some were killed.8763 The Chamber found that Bosnian
Muslims were forced to leave Vlasenica in 1992 and early 1993 and that by then there were very
few Bosnian Muslims left in Vlasenica town.8764

2620. In Prijedor, measures were also taken for the division of municipal organs and the
establishment of Serb institutions at the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992.8765 At this time,
propaganda in the municipality against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats was common.8766
The town of Prijedor was taken over on 30 April 1992 by Serb Forces.8767 After the take-over,
non-Serbs were dismissed from the workforce and their houses were searched and looted.8768
About a month later, villages in the predominantly Muslim areas of Kozarac and Brdo, as well as
in Briševo were attacked by Serb Forces; villages were shelled, set ablaze, and for the most part
destroyed,8769 During the course of these attacks, Bosnian Muslims and Croats were killed.8770
Thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were detained in detention facilities in
Prijedor.8771 The Chambers has made findings that the conditions in these detention facilities
were, in general, abysmal, that detainees were subjected to frequent and severe beatings, rape and
other acts of sexual violence, and that some were killed.8772 In Prijedor, 17 mosques and two
Catholic churches were heavily damaged, almost destroyed, or completely destroyed by Serb
Forces.8773 The Chamber found that following the attacks on towns and villages in Prijedor
between late May and end of July 1992, the non-Serb population was expelled from the
municipality.8774 As detention facilities were closed in Prijedor, detainees held there were
transferred around the municipality as well as to camps outside of the municipality and ultimately
often to third countries.8775 The Chamber found by 1995, the population of Prijedor municipality
consisted of approximately 92% Bosnian Serbs, 5% Bosnian Muslims, and 1% Bosnian Croats.8776

2621. In Sanski Most, Serb municipal organs were only established in early April 1992.8777
Bosnian Muslim neighbourhoods and villages were attacked on 25 May 1992.8778 Houses were
destroyed and individuals were captured.8779 Thereafter, Bosnian Muslims were dismissed from
their work and Bosnian Croat and Muslim political leaders were arrested.8780 Bosnian Muslims
and Croats were killed.8781 After military operations against Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat
villages in Sanski Most, soldiers collected the able-bodied military-aged men from the village and
transferred them by bus to Sanski Most town.8782 Over a thousand individuals were thus detained
in detention facilities throughout the municipality in poor conditions; they were beaten and some
were also killed.8783 The Chamber also found that at least 16 mosques and the town Catholic
8763
See paras. 1167, 1170, 1179, 1201, 1207, 1213.
8764
See paras. 1220, 1222.
8765
See paras. 1578–1581.
8766
See para. 1582.
8767
See paras. 1592–1593.
8768
See paras. 1596–1603.
8769
See paras. 1618, 1621, 1638, 1666, 1669, 1681–1682, 1684, 1700–1701, 1717.
8770
See paras. 1619, 1631, 1637, 1647, 1657, 1677, 1684, 1692, 1700–1703, 1715, 1735.
8771
See paras. 1628, 1738.
8772
See paras. 1747, 1774, 1778, 1781, 1803, 1815, 1832, 1847, 1861, 1871, 1877, 1885.
8773
See para. 1896.
8774
See para. 1897.
8775
See para. 1902.
8776
See para. 1913.
8777
See paras. 1933–1934.
8778
See para. 1945.
8779
See para. 1945.
8780
See para. 1950.
8781
See paras. 1960, 1965, 1969, 1973, 1978.
8782
See para. 1979.
8783
See paras. 1991, 1998, 2002, 2011, 2018, 2024.
 526

church were heavily damaged, almost destroyed or completely destroyed by Serb Forces between
May and December 1992.8784 The Chamber also found that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
in Sanski Most were forced to leave and that by February 1995, the population of Sanski Most
municipality was approximately 3,350 Bosnian Muslims, 1,050 Bosnian Croats, and 33,600
Bosnian Serbs.8785

2622. In Kljuĉ, preparations to establish separate Serb institutions started at the end of 1991.8786
Violence intensified in March 1992 and the town was taken over in early May 1992.8787 After the
take-over, Bosnian Muslims were expelled from the police, administrative organs, and the
workforce.8788 A large number of Bosnian Muslim houses were destroyed and Bosnian Muslims
were killed during the course or after attacks on villages.8789 Other Bosnian Muslims from Kljuĉ
were rounded up and detained in facilities throughout the municipality, where they were subjected
to mental abuse and physical mistreatment.8790 The Chamber found that eight mosques were
destoyed by Serb Forces between May and August 1992.8791 The Chamber also found that
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were forced to leave Kljuĉ and that by 1995, only 1,200 of
Kljuĉ‘s original 17,000 Bosnian Muslims remained.8792

2623. As summarised above, the Chamber‘s findings in relation to the Count 1 Municipalities show a
clear pattern of widespread intimidation, violence, killings, and expulsions targeted at the Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats, for the most part of 1992 and, in some instances, into 1993. The Chamber
has already found that there was a widespread and systematic attack against the Bosnian Muslim and
Bosnian Croat population of BiH, demonstrated by the existence of a campaign of co-ordinated violence
during the take-overs and in the detention facilities.8793 Further, the acts which the Chamber has
determined herein to constitute acts under Article 4(2) of the Statute were found to have targeted their
victims solely on the basis of their ethnicity and were therefore found to constitute persecution.8794 This
campaign of violence resulted in the Serb-claimed territories of the Count 1 Municipalities being cleared
of the overwhelming majority of their Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat populations, as most had left
by the end of 1992 and into 1993. (The Muslim-Croat coalition was as #twice more numerous as
the Serb side#, and how the Serb side could have intimidate already intimidated Serb minority?
Also, the #genocide against the Serb# people during the WWII shouldn’t be contested by a decent
institution as the UN, to the same degree as it shouldn’t be contested that there was the Jasenovac
camp, paralelly with the Auschwitz and other dreadfull places, created to exterminate the Jews,
but also the Serbs and others. Presenting and depicting the Serb side in BiH as a superior and
aggressive is a grave mistake equal to a crime in WWII against the Serbs and Jews! This kind of
stigmatisation, fortunately, ceased in the Jewish case, but not against the Serbs! The Wiesenthal
Centre made a statement, and it was presented in the court room: Jasenovac was the largest
concentration camp in Croatia. Between 1941 and 1945, over 600 000 were murdered there: the
Serbs, the Jews (around 30.000), and the Gypsies.” The Wiesenthal Centre, http://motlc.wiesenthal.com
Or another Wiesenthal Centre assertion, depicted in the courtroom: The Ustashe were a Croatian
nationalistic and terrorist organization. Their hatred toward the Jews could have been
surpassed only by their hatred toward the Serbs. After the creation of the Croatian puppet state
by Hitler in 1941, the Ustashe terrorists had murdered over 500.000 Serbs, expelled over 250.000

8784
See para. 2031.
8785
See paras. 2039–2040.
8786
See para. 1495–1497.
8787
See paras. 1500–1501.
8788
See paras. 1502–1505.
8789
See paras. 1512, 1515, 1522, 1555.
8790
See paras. 1529, 1536, 1544.
8791
See para. 1558.
8792
See paras. 1567, 1568.
8793
See para. 2444.
8794
See paras. 2513–2514, 2518.
 527

and forcibly converted 250.000 to Catholicism. The Wiesenthal Centre, http://motlc.wiesenthal.com . Even
a Nazi dignitaries had been astonished with the treatment of the Serbs in Jasenivas, as shown in
the court room: The terrible deeds were committed by the Ustashe in Croatia against the Serbs. The
Ustashe groups had committed their horrendous acts especially against the elderly, women and children,
in the most atrocious ways. The estimation of about 300.000 Orthodox Christian individuals, whom the
Ustashe had butchered and tortured with their sadistic methods, must be taken into account. Letter of the
Chief of Germany’s Secret Police, Turner, addressed to Heinrich Himmler, February 17th, 1942. Until midd
February 1942, for the ten months of the war, the Ustasha’s Croatia had already killed around
300,000 Serbs! Now, the UN and it’s Court owe the Defense and the entire Serbian people a #great
apology#, for distorting this well known fact. At the same time, the Chamber made an additional
burden to the Defense, to spend a limited sources on this #“fighting a wind-mills”#. Unseen and
unbelievable! )
 528

2624. This pattern of crimes in the Count 1 Municipalities is illustrated by the commission of
dreadful crimes, namely crimes against humanity and violations of the law or customs of war,
against the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats on a widespread scale. As a result, many
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Count 1 Municipalities, including some prominent
members of that group, were subjected to the acts described above. (Certainly, it is regrettable,
but it can not be #reduced to their ethnic or religious affiliation#. All of those names of the
“prominent members of that group” had been registered in the intelligence reports as a very
“prominent” in the preparations for war, which caused many innocent Serb victims. Still
there is no answer to the crucial question: why only several, les than 5% of the non-Serb
population had some troubles with the Serb Army and Police, and why only one or two
individuals out of thousand had been killed in the detention facilities? A mere answer to
these questions would shed a light on the entire war, at least one half of it. When the Muslim
conduct would be depicted, just for an understanding, not for justification of the Serb
conduct, then it would be a complete picture, the “whole truth”!) The Chamber found that the
scale and extent of the expulsions and movement of the civilians from the Municipalities,
including the Count 1 Municipalities, resulted in the displacement of a vast number of Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats and in drastic changes to the ethnic composition of towns with
almost no Bosnian Muslim remaining there.8795 As recalled above, by early 1993, practically all
of the Bosnian Muslims had been moved out of Serb held territory in the Count 1 Municipalities.
(This is #far from being true#! There was no any census ofpopulation, there were some
assumptions. But, it was established that even in 1994 there was so many Muslims in
Prijedor. After a carnage of the six Serb policemen by the Muslims, many of them wanted to
leave, and the President went through a pressuer by the UN and humanitarian organisations
to allow a daily rate of 80 trucks full of emigrees to cross to Croatia. In Sanski Most there
was12,000 Muslims till the end of war. Not to mention so many municipalities where there
was no armed conflicts at all!) The total number of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
displaced—especially when examined in light of the portion of the groups of Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats allegedly targeted for destruction in the Count 1 Municipalities through the
commission of the acts under Article 4(2) of the Statute identified above as well as the fact that
Serb Forces exercised control over these territories—does not satisfy the Chamber that the only
reasonable inference is that there existed an intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian
Croat groups in the Count 1 Municipalities as such. Rather, the Chamber considers that a
reasonable inference to be drawn from the pattern described above is that the intent behind those
crimes was to ensure the removal of members of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from
the Count 1 Municipalities.

2625. In assessing this pattern of crimes also in the context of its findings on the objectives of
the Bosnian Serb leadership, including the President,8796 the Chamber recalls that their objective
was to create an ethnically pure Bosnian Serb state as well as contiguous Serb areas, which would
require a redistribution—rather than the physical destruction—of the population.8797 (This is as
wrong as many other findings. First of all, the Serb side accepted the Lisbon Agreement in a
good fate, and the Agreement didn’t comprise the territorial continuity of the Serb territory,
because there was no a war, and the #model of Switzerland#, proposed by the President, was
possible to implement; second, even when the war broke out, the continuity was not an
imperative, see: P941, p. 1 of 26 August 1992:

8795
See para. 2467.
8796
See Section IV.A.3.a.i: Objectives of the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership.
8797
See Section IV.A.3.a.i: Objectives of the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership; para. 2898.
 529

And this was #the most official position#, and the only relevant one, because it was the
President’s commitment to the chairmen of the Conference on Yugoslavia. The thesis that
the Serbs “could not live with anyone else” is wrong, and it would be a very malicious if it
was not a linguistic problem. It always pertained to the autonomy, and as the Acused said on
12 May 92, it was a matter of a “state separation”, not ethnic separation! There was no
roblem in living with the ordinary people, but the problem were the common institutions
abused by the Islamic fundamentalists on account of the Serbs (and Croats) and a repeating
this floscula about ethnic separation is deeply incorrect, since the President literaly said: “#a
state separation”#. : Bosnian Serbs promoted the idea that they could not live with anyone else
and therefore that BiH had to be divided along ethnic lines.8798 The results on the ground,
including in the Count 1 Municipalities, were consistent with these goals. (#Why not in all and
every municipality#? Why it didn’t happen in municipalities in which the Muslim terrorists
didn’t initiate fightings? Since these municipalities are more numerous that those with the
armed skirmishes, the peaceful municipalities were a rule, and embattled municipalities
were an exception!) As an example that this pattern of crimes is consistent with the Bosnian Serb
leadership‘s intent to create ethnically pure territories through the removal of the Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats, (This is one of the most incorrect myths in this Tribunal. It had never
been proven that the Serbs wanted to create an ethnically pure territories. On the contrary,
there are many proofs and evidence in the file on the opposite attitude of the Serb side, see
@@@ the Chamber refers to the President‘s speech at the 37th Bosnian Serb Assembly in 1994
where he congratulates Foĉa, then renamed as Srbinje, for being ―a true Serbian town‖ as well as
to the broadcast in which he announced that Bosnian Muslims have given up on Foĉa in their
negotiations.8799 (#Serb parts only#! Foca had never been entirely under the Serb control. A
half of municipality was under the Muslim controlSee first para 2810 of the Judgement:
2810. When the President visited Foča to open a medical school, he gave a speech in which he
said that he was ―satisfied and happy that Foča has been preserved‖ and it was important for
the citizens to know that the Bosnian Muslims had given up on Foča in negotiations. (“Foca
had been preserved” is what the President said, and he never said that Foca was “a true
8798
See para. 2841.
8799
See paras. 2810–2811.
 530

Serbian town”. Further, Foca was aimed to be a fundamentalist centre in Europe, with the
most militant education of future terrorists, so called “white Al Qaeda” no matter the Serbs
had been about 50% of population, while in the Foca town itself the Serbs were majority.
Instead of accepting the ongoing negotiations on the two municipalities, including the urban
area, the Muslims started the war, and lost the urban area, but kept majority of their
villages and a town Ustikolina, which is their municipality of Foca to those days! What is
quoted here was a part of the President’s tries to persuade the deputees to accept a peace
and standstill to the fights, and as usually the Prosecution is abusing the President’s political
speeches!) When seen in this context, the Chamber is not satisfied that the only reasonable
inference that can be drawn from the pattern of crimes described above is that there existed intent
to destroy the parts of the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat groups in the Count 1
Municipalities as such.

(6) Conclusion

2626. Having reviewed all of the evidence on the record, for the purpose of Count 1, the
Chamber is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the acts under Article 4(2) identified above
in the Count 1 Municipalities were committed with genocidal intent. Further, it is not convinced
that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that named members of the
alleged Overarching JCE, including the President, other Bosnian Serbs not named as alleged
members of the Overarching JCE, or physical perpetrators possessed such intent to destroy the
Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat groups in the Count 1 Municipalities as such.

3. Overarching JCE and the Accused‘s responsibility

2627. The Chamber recalls that with respect to the Overarching JCE, the Prosecution alleges that
from at least October 1991 to 30 November 1995, the President participated in an ―overarching‖ JCE,
the objective of which was to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian
Serb claimed territory in BiH.8800

2628. The named individuals who are alleged to have been members of the Overarching JCE and to
have acted in concert with the President are Krajišnik, Mladić, Slobodan Milošević, Plavšić, Koljević,
Mićo Stanišić, Mandić, Jovica Stanišić, Franko Simatović, Arkan, and Šešelj.8801

2629. In addition, the Prosecution alleges that other members of the Overarching JCE included
members and leaders of the Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs and commanders, senior
officers, chiefs of the Serbian MUP, JNA, VJ, VRS, RS MUP, Bosnian Serb TO, and leaders of Bosnian
Serb paramilitary forces and volunteer units.8802 In the alternative, the Prosecution alleges that some or
all of these individuals were not members of the Overarching JCE, but were used by members of the
Overarching JCE to carry out the crimes committed in furtherance of its objective.8803

2630. The Prosecution alleges that the objective of the Overarching JCE was achieved through the
commission of the crimes of genocide, persecution, extermination, murder, deportation, and inhumane
acts (forcible transfer).8804 The Prosecution charges the President with the first and the third form of
8800
See paras. 592–594; Indictment, paras. 9–14, 30–31.
8801
See Indictment, para. 11.
8802
See Indictment, para. 12.
8803
See Indictment, para. 12.
8804
See Indictment, para. 9.
 531

JCE in relation to the Overarching JCE.8805 It primarily argues that the President shared the intent for
the commission of each of these crimes with other members of the Overarching JCE.8806 Alternatively,
the Prosecution argues that the shared objective of the Overarching JCE included at least the crimes of
deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer) and that for the remaining crimes the President is
responsible as it was foreseeable that the remaining crimes might be perpetrated in order to carry out the
actus reus of the crimes which formed part of the shared objective.8807

2631. The Prosecution alleges that members of the Overarching JCE implemented its objective by
personally committing crimes, and/or by using others to carry out crimes in furtherance of its
objective.8808 Those alleged to have been used by members of the Overarching JCE to carry out these
crimes were members of the Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs and members of the Serb
Forces.8809

2632. The Prosecution lists ten ways in which it alleges the President significantly contributed to the
objective of the Overarching JCE.8810

2633. The Chamber will consider the evidence presented with respect to (i) the objectives of the
President and the Bosnian Serb leadership; (ii) the President‘s authority over Bosnian Serb political and
governmental structures; (iii) the President‘s authority over Serb Forces; (iv) the knowledge and acts of
named alleged members of the Overarching JCE; and (v) the President‘s knowledge of crimes and
measures taken to prevent and punish crimes in the Municipalities. The Chamber will analyse this
evidence to determine whether the Overarching JCE existed, and if so, when it came into existence,
what was its common purpose, and whether a plurality of persons, including the President, shared and
acted pursuant to that common purpose. The Chamber will then analyse whether or not the President
significantly contributed to the alleged Overarching JCE and which crimes if any were intended or,
alternatively, whether any of the alleged crimes were foreseeable in the implementation of the objective
of the Overarching JCE.

a. Responsibility related facts

i. Objectives of the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership

(A) Unity of the Serb people and promotion of Serb interests

What a horrible crime! What is illegal and unacceptable in it? The foreign court
doesn’t know what the inter-Serb divisions and rifts meants, but it was presented to the
Chamber, and should be at least explained why it is rejected! The main issue was the
ideological rift at the beginning of the WWII, when a substantive part of the Serb nation
accepted the communist ideology and fought more against the royalist army than against the
occupiers, Germans and Italians! After the WWII the number of the Serb victims was
contested by some internationals, and Germany enjoyed pointing out that the majority of the
casualties was caused by the Croat – Muslim nazi alliance against the Serbs, and on the
second place it was assumed that the Serbs royalists and Serbs communists caused many
casualties! So, the Serb unity is already a myth, and pertains only to the ideological rift! And
this in no way could be a crime!)

8805
See Indictment, paras. 9–10.
8806
See Indictment, para. 9.
8807
See Indictment, para. 10.
8808
See Indictment, para. 13.
8809
See Indictment, para. 13.
8810
See Indictment, para. 14.
 532

(1) Analysis of evidence

2634. In the period leading up to the start of the conflict, the President made statements calling
for the unity of the Serb people and the promotion of Serb interests. These are discussed below.

2635. The Chamber recalls that the SDS was established on 12 July 1990, and the President as
president of the party stated that the objectives of the SDS included ―a federative Yugoslavia, and
in it an equal federal Bosnia and Herzegovina‖.8811 During this speech he also spoke about how
decades of ―single-party rule have intensely disturbed the natural development of the Serbian
nation‖.8812 In addition, he spoke about how ―Serbian entities‖ in BiH had been broken down and
had been left in an inferior ―economic, demographic and political position‖.8813(This is a political
position that in no way insulted others, nor was aggressive, nor pledged for any action except
for a unity in the struggle for democracy and the multiparty system, particularly in terms of
the old ideological rift between the royalists and communists. Anything else what would be
added to this interpretation is incorrect and mean. Also, we have all evidence that the
Serbian municipalities had been retarded in its development, and it was easy to prove. THE
CHAMBER DIDN’T EXPLORE #WHAT KIND OF UNITY# OF THE SERBIAN PEOPLE
WAS ADVOCATED BY THE PRESIDENT, ALTHOUGH IT WAS SAID MANY TIMES!
But as if anything that the Defense submitted didn’t matter!)

2636. On 13 October 1990, in a speech before Serb representatives in Banja Luka, the President
expressed his view that the ―Serbian nation‖ was united and spoke of his fear that BiH would set
its course to separate from Yugoslavia and that the Serbs would be separated from Serbia and be a
national minority.8814 (So what? BiH couldn’t become independent without the consent of all
the three constituent nations. But, in ruining Yugoslavia everything was permitted, anlike in
Spain with Katalonia or elsewhere! This is #exclusive responsibility of the West and the
United Nations#, and one day it is going to be recognised!) The President also said ―[w]hether a
greater Croatia or greater Bosnia and Herzegovina as some kind of independent state, separate
from Yugoslavia, they are equally unfavourable for us, the Serbs. […] The Serbian people of
Bosnia and Herzegovina will not abandon its demands to live in a state which also includes its
main country, the country of Serbia‖.8815 In the same speech, the President spoke about changes to
―the essence of the borders, the quality and nature of our internal borders. So the administrative
lines which are supposed to join us have been transformed, or will soon be transformed into firm
state borders which separate us. (Which was a #drastic violation of the Helsinki Agreement# on
non-violation of international borders without consent of all in these boundaries!) […] They
would like to chop the Serbian nation up in pieces against its will.‖8816 The President also
expressed his concern regarding the collapse of Yugoslavia ―into the abyss‖ and warned that the
Bosnian Serbs would take any threat of civil war seriously.8817 It is now a moment to comment
this. First of all, taking into consideration this #political speeches#, the Chamber enterred
into the constitutional matters, and therefore can not leave the mentioned speeches without
establishing whether it was unjustified, agressive, senseless and finally – illegal and criminal.

The Chamber #didn’t answer# to the inevitable questions:

8811
See para. 58; D255 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the constituent SDS Assembly), p. 2; P971 (Robert Donia‘s expert report entitled ―The Origins of
Republika Srpska, 1990–1992‖, 30 July 2002), p. 20; Patrick Treanor, T. 14001 (1 June 2011). See also Adjudicated Fact 1931.
8812
D255 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the constituent SDS Assembly), p. 1.
8813
D255 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the constituent SDS Assembly), p. 1.
8814
D1280 (Nikola Koljević and Radovan Karadţić's speeches at the All-Serb Council in Banja Luka, 13 October 1990), pp. 5–6.
8815
D1280 (Nikola Koljević and Radovan Karadţić's speeches at the All-Serb Council in Banja Luka, 13 October 1990), p. 6. See also D3015 (Witness
statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), para. 38.
8816
D1280 (Nikola Koljević and Radovan Karadţić's speeches at the All-Serb Council in Banja Luka, 13 October 1990), p. 4.
8817
D1280 (Nikola Koljević and Radovan Karadţić's speeches at the All-Serb Council in Banja Luka, 13 October 1990), p. 4. See also P5860 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 23 September 1991).
 533

1. Was the President entitled to make such a political speech, particularly since his the only post
was the President of the political party?

2. Was he right concerning his worries that Bosnia might go towards the secession, thus turning
a sovreign and constituent Serbs into a national minority against their will.

3. Did the Serbs have any #experience with the independent Croatia and Bosnia#, and whether
they did have any reason to fear about this course of events.

4. Did the Serbs, demanding to maintain the situation of living in the same state with their other
Serbs, demanded some changes of the existing order that would violate anyones rights, or
they just called on their right that they already havbe enjoyed.

5. Was the President wrong saying that our internal, administrative borders are tried to be
turned into a hard interstate borders, which would partition the Serb (as well as the others)
into several states, making them a national minorities, and was it an #anti-Constitutional
action#?

6. Was the Chamber aware that at that moment there was an electoral victory of the HDZ in
Croatia, with the anounced rehabilitation of the Ustasha’s NDH, (Independent State of
Croatia) which was a Hitler’s ally. Was the Chamber curious who mentioned “civil war
threats, and why the President warned that the Serbs must take such a threats seriously?
#Hitler allies again#!)

7. Was it clear to the Prosecution-Chamber alliance that in Sarajevo there already was an
alliance of the SDA, founded by the Hitler’s allies, and the HDZ from Croatia. The last such
a coalition caused more that 700,000 Serb, Jew and Gipsy victims during the WWII?)

At this same meeting, Koljević identified the purpose of establishing the SDS as a means of expressing
the national objective of the Bosnian Serbs, which was ―a federative Yugoslavia and for the Serbs to be
able to survive […] in that Yugoslavia and for all the other peoples to be able to survive together‖.8818
#EXCULPATORY#!) Koljević also emphasised that the SDS was formed in ―response to the new
situation which has arisen and which we will not and must not tolerate‖ and that they should not remain
unprepared.8819 In this same speech Koljević called on the other national parties in BiH to think about
―what the partition of a confederal Yugoslavia means and for them not to push us into another civil
war‖.8820 (#EXCULPATORY#! what was wrong in this Koljevic’s speech? If the Chamber wasn’t
interested in what was the “new situation which has arisen and which we will not and must not
tolerate” dr. Koljevic was talking about, it could explore through the file, and would find out that
the new authorities in Croatia are returning to the fascist retoric and insignias: ―It was extremely
provocative for the Serbs in Croatia that Tudjman‘s Government had adopted the Independent
Croatian (NHD) flag with the same symbol used by Paveli}, the red and whitye checkerboard‖ David
Owen, “Balkan Odyssey”, pg.100hAccused2638. 2638.
2638. 2638.In an interview in November 1990, the Accused discussed the possibility of Serbs being
outvoted in the BiH Assembly and predicted that if that happened ―all conditions for a civil war would
be in place, because the Serbs in BiH are no longer helpless, but very powerful and united‖.8821 The
Accused stated that he did not think civil war would happen ―because the Serbs won‘t start the skirmish
first and others are afraid to. No one has reason to fear the Serbs if they have no misdeeds against

8818
D1280 (Nikola Koljević and Radovan Karadţić's speeches at the All-Serb Council in Banja Luka, 13 October 1990), p. 8.
8819
D1280 (Nikola Koljević and Radovan Karadţić's speeches at the All-Serb Council in Banja Luka, 13 October 1990), p. 8.
8820
D1280 (Nikola Koljević and Radovan Karadţić's speeches at the All-Serb Council in Banja Luka, 13 October 1990), p. 9.
8821
P2539 (Radovan Karadţić‘s interview in NIN, 9 November 1990), p. 3.
 534

them‖.8822 The President further stated that ―under no circumstances will Serbs accept to live in several
independent states, and to become a national minority everywhere outside Serbia. The Serbs will stay in
one state – Federative Yugoslavia‖ and would not be separated from Serbia.8823 (The outvoting itself is
not necessarily a cause for an alarm, but if it is an outvoting on the #constitutional issues#, and
issues pertaining to the equality on nations, neglecting the provision about two third majority,
then it is the #most serious violation of the Constitution.#)

2639. The Accused also indicated that the political life of Bosnian Serbs ―had been fully revived
and established‖, which was the main purpose of setting up the SDS, and that in all places where
Serbs lived they had set up municipal organisations with municipal and local boards.8824 He spoke
about how the SDS had become the party of all Serbs and there was now ―only a unified Serbian
people‖.8825 These statements were made before the first multi-party elections, which the
Chamber recalls were held in BiH on 18 November 1990.8826 (Again, the Chamber erred by not
establishing #what kind of unity# the President spoke. The Serbs were the only Yugoslav
nation that during the WWII had been sharply divided within itself: about one quarter were
the communists and revolutionary, who fought more against the monarchy than against
occupier, and the two third of monarchists, who fought against the occupier, and against the
communists when they attacek the former. There is no other reasonable explanation or
inference for the term “the Serb unity” than that, and it was known to everyone but to the
foreigners, including the Chamber. #Criminalisation of a legal political life#!)

2640. The Accused delivered a speech in 1990 in which he said that Bosnian Serbs did not agree
to ―sacrifice any Croat, any Muslim, and any human being in organizing a state‖ and that those
who did not know how to organise their state ―except with blood and corpses, they must go!‖.8827
(#EXCULPATORY#!!! The President opposed any idea of a forceful unilateral secession!
The meeting was held on the border with Croatia, where the HDZ had already won the
elections, and threatened to form the Independent Croatia and to destroy Yugoslavia. The
President’s speech was a message to the Croats and Muslims living in the (predominantly
Serbian) Srbac municipality. Mr Milincic, a professor of literature, was a very sincere and
trustful by his fellow citizens Croats and Muslims, and nothing happened, except a solitary
incident, to anybody in this municipality. The entirely #Muslim settlements remained
undisturbed# in Srbac, as well as Croat, and this is the best recommendation of the sincerity
of Mr. Milincic, who also was a member of the Main Board of SDS. It was always like that:
wherever a president of municipality was a member of the maind Board od SDS, there was
no crimes. It was the case with: Mrkonjic Grad, Banja Luka, Bosanska Dubica, Gradiska,
Srbac, Celinac, Laktasi, Skender Vakuf (later called Knezevo) B. Samac, Trebinje, Gacko,
Ljubinje… and so on.) In this speech the Accused also said they would act democratically and
be benign so long as democracy was able to function but that the ―moment anyone attacks us, we
shall bring out the spear‖.8828 (Yet another #abuse of the Serb epic poetry#! After being

8822
D1281 (Articles from Veĉernje Novine entitled ―Karadţić shocked me‖ and ―Šešelj is amiable‖, 9 May 1991), pp. 2–3. See also P6540 (Excerpt of video
from Banja Luka, 3 March 1991, with transcript), p. 2; P6617 (Article entitled ―Jovan Rašković on Shrink's Sofa‖), p. 2. The Chamber places no weight on
the opinions expressed by Jovan Rašković in this article, including his view that the Bosnian Serb leadership had ―burnt the fuse of Serbian people‖.
8823
P2539 (Radovan Karadţić‘s interview in NIN, 9 November 1990), pp. 6–8. See also P2555 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Radovan Karadţić and
AnĊelko Vukić; and (ii) Radovan Karadţić and Boro Sendić, 16 October 1991), p. 3; D269 (Radovan Karadţić‘s interview with NIN, 20 July 1990), p. 6;
Radomir Nešković T. 14260 (6 June 2011). But see D3528 (Witness statement of Milan Martić dated 7 May 2013), para. 69; Milan Martić, T. 38106–38109
(13 May 2013) (testifying that contrary to what the Accused said in P2555, the Accused‘s position was not that he wanted to keep Serbian parts of BiH
linked to other Serbian parts of the former Yugoslavia). The Chamber does not find Martić‘s evidence in this regard to be reliable. In reaching that
conclusion the Chamber found that his testimony was marked by contradictions, evasiveness, and indicators of bias.
 535

criticized for being milder than the Serb opponents in Croatia, the President responded
quoting a well known poem from 14th Century:

(So,
a conciliatory and milde attitude of the President is #taken as a crime!#)The Accused also
stated that one of the objectives of the SDS was to improve multi-ethnic relations but that it would
not co-operate with any parties which ―have even the slightest trace of anti-Serbism‖.8829
(#Crippled sentences#! What is wrong with that? And why other “anti” had been skipped:
anti-Yugoslavism, Anti-Semitism, Anti-Democracy? Look at this para.:

2641. In May 1991, the Accused and Plavšić discussed preserving the common state of Yugoslavia,
the danger of BiH ―sliding into chaos and civil war‖, and the need to reach an agreement with
Izetbegović in line with their interests.8830 The President, in June 1991, repeated his position that
BiH would never be independent and that it would not follow the footsteps of Croatia.8831 He also

8824
P2539 (Radovan Karadţić‘s interview in NIN, 9 November 1990), p. 1. See also P5643 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and an
unidentified male, 8 July 1991).
8825
P2539 (Radovan Karadţić‘s interview in NIN, 9 November 1990), p. 1. See also P5063 (Video footage depicting interview of Radovan Karadţić on ―Ask
the President‖, undated, with transcript), p. 47.
8826
See para. 38.
8827
D4185 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech, 2 September 1990, with transcript), p. 2. Miloš Milinĉić testified that the Accused in this speech called for good
neighbourly relations, and that people lived best when they lived together in peace and harmony. Miloš Milinĉić, T. 44937–44940 (11 December 2013).
The Chamber notes that this is based on Milinĉić‘s own interpretation of the Accused‘s speech and is thus of limited weight. In addition, Milinĉić‘s
evidence was marked by extreme evasiveness and indicators that he lacked candour. The Chamber therefore does not find his evidence in this regard to be
reliable. (#Defense witnesses carnage#! This is a model of treatment of the Defence withnesses and documents. Milincic
didn’t have any reason to be evasive, he was an example of a good president of municipality, in his Srbac municipality
there remained pure Muslim setlements and quarts in the town untouched. As a member of the Main Board of the
SDS, he implemented the SDS policy towards other ethnicities, as did every single meyer who was member of the
Main Board of SDS at a same time. This is the only reasonable inference: if a criminal treatment of minorities was
part of theSDS policy, it would be the most thoroughly implemented in municipalities with Mayors – members of the
Main Board. Beside that, Milincic’s understanding of the President’s speech is mutually corroborative with the
speech itself, literally! What else is needed to respect this testimony and this document?
8828
P6563 (Excerpt of Radovan Karadzić's speech in Srbac, 2 September 1990, with transcript).
8829
D255 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the constituent SDS Assembly), pp. 2–3.
8830
P5681 (Intercept of conversation between Biljana Plavšić and Radovan Karadţić, 23 May 1991), pp. 2–3. See also P5727 (Intercept of conversation
between Biljana Plavšić and Radovan Karadţić, 2 March 1992), p. 2; P5605 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić, Goran Milić, Alija
Izetbegović, and an unidentified woman, 3 March 1992), p. 7.
8831
D270 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vitomir Ţepinić, 17 June 1991), p. 7. See also P5896 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and an unidentified journalist, 24 June 1991).
 536

said that if BiH were to collapse, there would be chaos but that they would not bow their heads.8832
Neither this could be understood by the foreigners, who didn’t know what happened at the
very beginning of the WWII. Then the Serbs in Croatia-BiH didn’t have any representation,
and once the NDH was proclaimed on 10 April 1941, started the #genocide against the Serbs,
Jews and Gipsies#, without any resistance. The President warned Izetbegović out of frustration
that they would form a parallel government and parallel police if their people were excluded and
that the Bosnian Serbs were all armed.8833 (Again, we have to deal with a #wrong
interpretation#, one time made by the interpreters, another, as here, by the Chamber. The
quoted sentence didn’t mean that “all the Serbs are armed” but:
“ ‖, i.e. we would withdraw our
armed part of the common police) The Accused also said in a related conversation that they had
―prepared an alternative, which will be atrocious. We prepared it and we‘ll fuck their
mothers‖.8834 Another abuse of the fact, and #missing the context#. See:

1. on 9 Sept. 1991. Milan Martic, a beloved Serbian leader from RSK, had been illegali detained
by the Muslims in Otoka.

2. it was an extremely risky situation, and the President spoke by telephone with the JNA, MUP
and Milosevic.

3. the President tought that the crisis will be ended without problem.

4. the President was called, for the first time ever, by M. Koroman, the chief of the Police in the
region of Romania, a mountain wrap around Sarajevo, informing him that the people are
extremely upset and ready to come to Sarajevo and punish those responsible for the illegal
arrest of Martic. Within this framework the President promised to do his best to resolve the
problem, so to avoid the clashes in the City. Is that his sin??? The President in another
conversation also spoke about territories which would be integral to the Serb part of BiH in the
event that there was a split and that they would have their own ―army and militia‖.8835 (With such a
#patchwork collection of a disseminated sentences# of the President, from different times, occasions,
significance, and different interlocutors – even St. Peter would look as guilty as devil! AGAIN,
TOTAL #LACK OF A BASIC UNDERSTANDING#! At the time there is an inter-Serb “polemos”
about the RSK and Vance plan for Krajina Knin. That is why Babic was mentioned. However, in the
Banja Luka Krajina a several areas wanted to secede from BiH and to have the same what was
proposed to RSK in Croatia: their Police, TO and so on. And this President was dissuading them,
infirming his interlocutor in the common mind, to stay refrained. How this can bi used against the
President? #EXCULPATORY#!!!)

2642. On 23 July 1991, the President told Kuprešanin that the referendum for an independent
Krajina would be a mistake for negotiations at that time because the Bosnian Muslims had
prepared ―all the evidence that the Serbs are creating the Greater Serbia. And now you are playing
right into their hands, as if they are paying you. […]. They have to make a mistake. They will

8832
D270 (Intercept of conversation between Vitomir Ţepinić and Radovan Karadţić, 17 June 1991), pp. 8–9.
8833
P5625 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vitomir Ţepinić, 8 July 1991), p. 1; D364 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan
Karadţić and Vitomir Ţepinić, 24 July 1991), p. 6. See also D2925 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vitomir Ţepinić, 9 September
1991), p. 2.
8834
D364 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vitomir Ţepinić, 24 July 1991), p. 4. See also P962 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Malko Koroman, 9 September 1991), pp. 2–3. Ţepinić stated that he did not take the comments the Accused made during these
intercepted phone conversations in this regard seriously as the Accused was ―blowing off steam‖ and that he did not believe he meant them literally. D2923
(Witness statement of Vitomir Ţepinić dated 11 February 2013), paras. 40, 43, 48–49. While the Chamber accepts that Ţepinić formed this impression
during these conversations, the Chamber finds that these conversations show that the Accused was indeed angry about proposed moves towards the
independence of BiH and was prepared to change their strategy if Bosnian Serb demands were not met and this would include violence.
CONSEQUENTLY, THE CHAMBER DID #wrongfully INFER# AGAINST THE SERBS.
8835
P5616 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and an unidentified male, 13 December 1991), pp. 4–5.
 537

definitely make a mistake we know that‖.8836 (Also #EXCULPATORY# !!! The President
advocated a restraint in actions, so that the Serbs wouldn’t violate any law and constitution,
proposing the let others to make mistakes!)

2643. In an intercepted conversation on 4 September 1991, the Accused said that the army had
been invited to Tuzla and that the Bosnian Muslims should be warned that the Serbs could defend
themselves.8837 When informed about tensions in Bratunac, the Accused responded ―we will arrest
them and kill them. […] Tell them that Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina […] can defend
themselves and defend themselves successfully. There are two hundred thousand armed men and
they should not mess around‖.8838 (Unbelievable!!! This is completely #abused and distorted
meaning# of the tel. conversation (D01643) in this conversation Zvonko informed the
President that there are a skirmishes between the Serbs and Muslims, and Zvonko assessed
that the incident was aimed to involve Serbia itself into the conflict on the BIH soil.

8836
P1084 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vojo Kuprešanin, 23 July 1991), pp. 3–4.
8837
D1643 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Zvonko Bajagić, 4 September 1991), pp. 5–8.
8838
D1643 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Zvonko Bajagić, 4 September 1991), p. 7.
 538

And
that was a Muslim torture of the Serb population of Bratunac as early as 4 September 1991.
The Serb villages deserted, population crossed over to Serbia, males were keeping guards.
See further:
539
 540

Meanwhile, the JNA as a regular force (it was Sept. 91) was expected to come from Tuzla.
So, the JNA was not “invited to Tuzla” but was there regularly, and was expected to come to
Bratunac and intervene in an inter-ethnic conflict caused by the Muslims. The President
tried to prevent an involvement of Serbia, and to limit the Serbs only to the defense. This is a
#commendable# and for a decoration, not for accusation!!! And this is a #CRIMINAL WAY
OF DISTORTION# OF MEANING! Regardless of a high possibility that the Judges weren’t
aware of it, the full responsibility is on them, on the Tribunal and the United Nations!) On 13
September 1991, referring to a proposal by Izetbegović to resolve the question of the army in BiH
and demilitarisation, the Accused said to Koljević ―we will put the army in all our areas, Serbian
Bosnia, right? Down there, on Neretva…‖.8839 (Putting the only legal Army in the Serb areas
was #legal and obligatory# while not letting an army to do it’s job is a federal crime#!That
was not a “proposal to resolve the question of the Army in BiH, because no federal unit
could resolve it without the federal state. The entire intercept is about an illegal and cunning
try of Mrr. Tudjman and Izetbegovic to remove the JNA out of Bosnia, while Tudjman was
preparing the war against Yugoslavia, the Serbs and JNA. The Serb side in BiH opposed any
idea to deny the hospitality to the JNA, and offered the Serbian areas (which in reality
happened during the war, that the JNA dared to stay only in the Serb areas. What inference
the Chamber could draw from this conversation from early September 91?) The Accused
also told international representatives that unless the Serb areas in BiH could remain tied to
Yugoslavia war would result.8840 (#Warnings, not threats#! This witness admitted that his

8839
P5870 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Radovan Karadţić and Mira; (ii) Radovan Karadţić and Nikola Koljević, 13 September 1991), pp. 2–3
8840
Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4172–4173, 4400–4401. See also Herbert Okun, T. 1516–1517 (23 April 2010), T. 1698
(27 April 2010), T. 1843–1844 (28 April 2010); P780 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun‘s Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 37; P777 (Fourth notebook of
Herbert Okun‘s Vance Mission diary), e-court p. 23.
 541

#note books were not to be understood verbatim#, since he intermingled what he heard and
what he tought and assumed! Certainly, the President didn’t mean that the Serbs needed a
war to achieve what they wanted, since they did have it already. Beside that, the President
was asked (this is in the file) who would start a war if it appeares, and the President said, it
would be someone from the lowerest stratums of society. Just to remind: neither Serbs in
Bosnia, nor in Croatia needed any war to achieve their constitutional rights. A war was
needed to those who wanted to prevent and deprive the Serbs from their legal interests and
constitutional rights!) On 30 September 1991, the President stated that the ―war goal‖ of the
Serbian people was Yugoslavia.8841 (#Wrong translation# of the document, P2543:

and wrong interpretation. In the original it meant that the most important for the existence
of the Serb people to have Yugoslavia and Bosnia exist, not as it was interpreted:

The second sentence is correct, but this certainty didn’t rely on the number of citizens, but
on the constitutional guarantees. Further, the “war goal” of the Serbian people” pertained to
the Serbs in the entire Yugoslavia, not to the Serbs in Bosnia, where there was no a war, and
couldn’t concerne with the Serbs in BiH. See the same document:

The country that already had the war was Yugoslavia! Anyway, the document is #dubious#,
no name of the note-taker, it is written in the Crostian variant, which a Serb would never do,
particularly then. Also, the last sentence about “war goals” is #added somewhere later#!)

The SDS was ready to have Serb territories secede from an independent BiH if that was the only
way for Serbs to remain in Yugoslavia.8842 (#Wrong and unacceptable#! First, the Chamber is
makin a #political assessments from the standpoint of the secessionist republics#, and from
those who encouraghed these Republics to violate the Constitution and all the laws. Even if
so, what does it have to do with this Tribunal? The SDS was not intending “to secede” from
Bosnia, but #“not to secede” from Yugoslavia#, which was a #conservative and legitimate
attitude#. The same happened when West Virginia seceded from Union, the western part of
Virginia refused to secede, and President Lincoln accepted their decision, and even after the
victory of Union, West Virginia continued to exist! #The right to maintain a status quo#
against an illegal change is superior to this illegal change. Beside that, the quated document,
the exhibit P02543 is dubious one. First of all, the language: the Serbs would never say
“općina” for municipality. Further, there was no any form of a shorthand or a regular
record of a meeting. Further, the last sentence, added, pertaining to #“the war goal” is
nonsense, since Yugoslavia already existed# over 70 years, why anybody would wage a war
to achieve what already existed. This leaf of paper was probably handwritten by the Muslim
spy who bugged the room!)

8841
P2543 (Minutes of meeting of SDS deputies‘ club, 30 September 1991). See also D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras.
27–28 (stating the Bosnian Serbs wanted to preserve Yugoslavia); D3528 (Witness statement of Milan Martić dated 7 May 2013), paras. 13–14.
8842
See Adjudicated Fact 1932.
 542

2644. In May 1991, Slobodan Milošević told the President that his position should be that they
were against the secession and wanted BiH to remain in Yugoslavia, to which the President
agreed.8843 In another conversation in July 1991, Milošević told the Accused that their objective
was to ―have disintegration in […] line with our inclinations‖ and that they ―should take radical
steps and speed the things up‖.8844 (What does in mean? What inference could be drawn from
it? President Milosevic sounded conciliatory towards the Slovenian/Croat intentions to
secede, but was againste their violent and unilateral secession! What is a crime here?)

This is all a mess in translation and interpretation, all misunderstood. Milosevic was ready
to allow those who wanted to separate to do so, but along the lines the Serbia and Serbs
could have accepted. The speed up was Milosevic’s prediction that we do not have three
months as we required, but much shorter time, and it didn’t mean that the Serbs were
interested in “speeding up” what is this, anyway? What does it show? This is another
#CRIMINAL DISTORTION#! Let us see what really was said: P5890:

last three weeks, let alone three months!

However, this is distorted first in translation. In Serbian it was:

8843
D1282 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 May 1991), p. 3. See also P5686 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 11 June 1991), p. 2; P5687 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Ljiljana Karadţić and Slobodan
Milošević and (ii) Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 12 June 1991), p. 3.
8844
P5890 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 1 July 1991), p. 2.
 543

Should be translated as: M.S.: That’s clear, and they should be allowed to secede! K.R.: Yes!
M.S. The only question now is that this secession goes along lines that suite us!

Another mistake in translation: Karadzic asked whether it comprises the Serbian “naselja”
(which meant “settlements”) in Croatia, but the two words sound really similar: “naselje” is
“settlement” while “nasilje” is violence. Not big deal, but other distortions and
interpretations as a Serb agressivity, is a CRIMINAL!)

2645. In other conversations, Slobodan Milošević told the President that the Serbs would not be
divided into many states, and that this ―should be the basic premise for your thinking‖.8845 He also
questioned who could ―take the Serbian people out of Yugoslavia if it is against their will‖, to
which the Accused responded that it was important to emphasise that the borders had been
artificially created by Tito and did not follow an ―ethnical [or] historical principle‖.8846 (So what?
#Imperial and communist borders#! That was right. That was why we proposed the
Scandinavian model “Scandinavisation” i.e. re-drawing the border on a democratic way, and
let people decide where they wanted to live. The Yugoslav Constitution provided for the
sovereignty to originate from the constituent peoples-nations, not from Republics. And only
a change of the federal Constitution could envisage secessions!)

2646. In July 1991, Milošević encouraged meetings between Serbs and Muslims because the
population did not want war.8847 The President agreed but said that it was Izetbegović who was
preparing for civil war and suggested to ―let everybody identify themselves now, who does not
want an agreement with the Serbs obviously wants a dispute with the Serbs‖.8848 Milošević made
it clear that they were ―offering nothing else but an integral Bosnia, equal to other republics in
Yugoslavia‖.8849 The President repeated that they wanted to have strong ties with Yugoslavia and
if the Bosnian Muslims refused, the alternative would be war.8850 This was confirmed in an
intercepted conversation towards the end of the conflict, where the President and Krajišnik spoke
about the fact that they had waged war because they did not accept BiH as ―integral and separate
from Yugoslavia‖.8851 (Is it now, all of a sudden, important #who was liable for the war#? If
so, than the Defense would have something to say too!)

(#Contrary to Statute#! No matter the crime against the peace is not a subject to this
Tribunal, all of those “words” of this President are searching for the cause of war and a
guilt, responsibility for the war. But, nobody has any right to deny the Serbs their rights to
continue living in their own state as they did till this moment! If somebody wanted to change
this state, it’s shape and nature, integrity and anything that concerns the Constitution, has to
ask for a consent of all the constituent nations. The #Serbs didn’t need a war to achieve what
they wanted#, because they had it already. A war was necessary for those who wanted to
change the nature of this state, AND TO IMPOSE THOSE CHANGES TO ALL OTHERS!
#Not without the Serb consent#!. Such a Judgement looks like a political lecture of the
former regime, which was also anti-Serbian!)
8845
P5881 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 31 July 1991), p. 11.
8846
P5880 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 6 August 1991), p. 5. See also P5877 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 4 September 1991), p. 2; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4164;
Herbert Okun, T. 1479 (22 April 2010); P786 (Third notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 34.
8847
P5881 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 31 July 1991), p. 5. See also P5775 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 5 January 1992), pp. 2–3.
8848
P5881 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 31 July 1991), p. 5.
8849
P5881 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 31 July 1991), p. 6.
8850
P5877 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 4 September 1991), pp. 1–2; P5795 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 17 December 1991), p. 3.
8851
P5607 (Intercept of conversation between Todor Dutina, Momĉilo Krajišnik and Radovan Karadţić, 30 May 1995), p. 9.
 544

2647. On 2 October 1991, in an intercepted conversation with Krajišnik, the President alluded to
there being ―very concrete plans for transfer‖ and combat operations from Western Herzegovina to
―that Ustasha‘s oasis in Goraţde and further to the Drina River‖.8852 In this conversation, the
President and Krajišnik agreed upon and discussed the importance of unifying Serbs in a common
state, and Krajišnik stated that they had a clear, unified vision of a ―state over the state‖.8853 At a
joint meeting between the government of the SAO Krajina and the ARK Executive Council in
Banja Luka on 20 October 1991, which was attended by the President and Krajišnik, a conclusion
was reached to support and implement the objective that the Serb people would remain in a single
joint state.8854 The Accused also spoke to Milošević and told him that Serbs had one third of the
electorate in BiH and that they were ―going to forcefully make some other moves and they can no
longer keep up with us‖.8855 (Again, it is an irresponsible #omission in translation# of the
documents, the intercepted conversation. “[t]o forcefully make some other moves” must not
be translated like that, because the President said:

Another
#CRIMINAL DISTORTION#! After establishing that the electoral body inclined to the
Serbs was far over one third, the President said that the Serbs are “decisively going to make
some other moves”! Therefore, “snazno” doesn’t mean forcefully, but rather decisively.
Second, the “forceful” i.e. “decisive was going to be the Serb “goings” – not the moves. So,
the proper translation should be: “And now we are decisively going to make some other
moves…”! the Prosecution-Chamber alliance looks desperate when trying to exploit such an
insignificant conversation with the help of a clumsy, if not malicious translation!)

2648. In an intercepted conversation in January 1992, the President emphasised his ideology with
municipal leaders and said that the policy of the SDS ―is the unified Serbianhood‖ in BiH and that
if anybody had a problem they could create their own party.8856 (This was an intra-party
discussion about some members who wanted to pursue another party’s program, which is
not allowed in any party in the world. Since there was a multiparty system, everyone who
was not satisfied, could leave the SDS and form a new party. Why it would be significant to
thei court?) The President also spoke about working towards an option involving a ―union of
Serbian states‖ which would involve preparing a Serbian federation and defending ―it with arms
and at any cost‖.8857 He also said that if they could not preserve Yugoslavia, the Serbs would find
their own ―place in the Sun‖ and that the ―back up option‖ was to have all Serb territories in one
state.8858 Similarly in February 1992, in the context of discussing their position at international
negotiations, the Accused emphasised that: ―Our optimum is a Greater Serbia, and if not that, then
a Federal Yugoslavia‖ and that while they could settle for a cantonal structure he stated that
―[t]here are no further concessions‖.8859 (So what? All the others who fought against
Yugoslavia proclaimed their ultimate goals, based on their ethnic interests. Only the Serbs
made so many concessions, far from their ultimate interests! Why this court deals with such

8852
P5856 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 2 October 1991), p. 3.
8853
P5856 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 2 October 1991), pp. 1–2.
8854
D4082 (Article from Glas entitled ―Resolutely in a United State‖, 21 October 1991).
8855
P5822 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 11 November 1991), pp. 1, 3.
8856
P2556 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Nenad Stevandić, 11 January 1992), p. 3; P5821 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Dobrica Ćosić, 11 November 1991), pp. 1–2, 9, 12. See also D300 (Article from Politika entitled ―Transformation of BiH‖, 17
January 1992), pp. 1−2.
8857
P5763 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Dobrica Ćosić, 19 January 1992), pp. 4, 6–7; P5762 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Dobrica Ćosić, 22 January 1992), p. 3.
8858
P5762 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Dobrica Ćosić, 22 January 1992), pp. 7, 9–10; P5063 (Video footage depicting interview
of Radovan Karadţić on ―Ask the President‖ , undated, with transcript), pp. 5–7.
8859
P5748 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Lukić, 13 February 1992), pp. 1–2.
 545

a #political matters# at all? Even without this “efforts” it is clear that the Tribunal is a
political court!)

2649. The President also spoke derisively of Serbs who did ―not comply with the policy of the
SDS, which advocates a single solution for the Serb people in Yugoslavia‖.8860 At a rally in
February 1992, attended by Bosnian Serb leaders including Krajišnik, Plavšić, and Koljević,
speeches were delivered, including by a minister from Serbia, who said that nobody had the right
to separate the Serbian people from Serbia and that if the Bosnian Serbs did not get what they
were asking for in BiH they could rely on the support of Serbia.8861 (So what? The Serbs in
Bosnia were defending their #constitutional rights# by political means, all until the
Muslims/Croats tried to prevent it by a military means! But, if the Chamber considered (and
#contested) the Serb political life#, why none of the opposite political actions were depicted?
By #hiding the Muslim/Croat violent actions against the Serbs# and their constitutional
rights, anything that the Serbs did rightfully looks like unlawful. This is non only unfair, but
this is forbidden in a criminal justice!)

2650. On 29 February 1992, the Accused, Krajišnik, and Koljević attended the 14th session of the
ARK Assembly.8862 At the meeting, the Accused declared that if BiH changed its status in
Yugoslavia then the Serbs would change their status as well.8863 (#Legal and legitimate#! So
what? How it fits with the Statute of the Tribunal? This is a #mere #political issue, and all
directed towards the avoidance of the war, while all the other participanst did everything to
secure a war to go on! How come the Tribunal and it’s chambers can do the #political
assessments, although the crime against peace is not incriminated#. And if the Tribunal is
doing so, why analyses and depicts only the Serb political conduct?) In a March 1992
interview, the President stated: ―I am convinced that the Serbs will never find peace until they
have achieved their age-old aspiration of living in one state. Whether now or in a few years‘ time,
I don‘t know. But they will achieve it.‖8864 (The #Serbs did have it already#, but the others
changed their position, which affected the Serb position, which was unacceptable, because
the Serbs had a constitutional capacities to influence and determine their destiny! Again,
how the political position of the Serb community is relevant, while of the others is not?)

8860
P2596 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and ―Miroslav‖, 7 January 1992), p. 5.
8861
Isak Gaši, P3002 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 400–402, 538–539.
8862
P5452 (Extract from minutes of 14th session of ARK Assembly, 29 February 1992), p. 1.
8863
P5452 (Extract from minutes of 14 th session of ARK Assembly, 29 February 1992), p. 2.
8864
P1940 (Interview with Radovan Karadţić from Naša Borba entitled ―Yugoslavia or Three Bosnias‖, 16 March 1992), p. 1; KDZ310, T. 9175–9176 (29
November 2010).
 546

Conclusion

2651. Having considered the evidence above, the Chamber finds that from 1990 and into mid-
1991, the political objective of the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership was to preserve
Yugoslavia and to prevent the separation or independence of BiH, which would result in a
separation of Bosnian Serbs from Serbia. (#EXCULPATORY#!!! That was completely
legitimate, and the #only legal position#. All others were violating the Yugoslav and the
respective republican Constitutions. So, this is wrong inference, if taken against this
President! In this political position and activity there was no a trace of hostile attitude
towards the “non-Serbs”.)

2652. The Chamber also finds that the Accused emphasised that the Bosnian Serbs did not want
to be a minority in an independent BiH and would not accept separation from Serbia. (#Legal and
legitimate#! Why the Protestants in #Northern Ireland# didn’t accept to be a minority in a
unitary Ireland? Of course, that was the most drastic change in their life and existence. The
Serbs in Bosnia had been deprived from freedom for several centuries, their existence under
the Turkish occupation is hard to be described, the last forty years of Austro-Hungarian
occupation didn’t make any difference, although it was a Christian and European Empire.
Finally, the Empire attacked Serbia and thus caused WWI. Freedom and unity came after
the WWI, but again in WWII the Bosnian Serbs became a minority in NDH, an
“Independent State of Croatia” under the Nazi regime, which caused a genocide against the
Serbs, Jews and Gipsies. Again, in 1990 the Hitler’s allies won the elections in Zagreb,
Croatia, and in BiH, and the Serbs in Bosnia again became the target, although neither
Croatia, nor Bosnia could get the independence without consent of the Serbs living in these
Republics. So flagrant violation of constitutions, laws, rights and international treaties
(Helsinki) had only one precedent – Hitler’s suspension of the League of Nations, with the
full backing by the “International Community”, it’s western part! The Chamber didn’t
allow any context to be presented, nor any element of the conduct of others, but now, in this
Judgement the Chamber is considering the pure political issues and conduct of only one -
Serbian – side. The Serbs were entitled to veto the independence of BiH, and if they didn’t
agree, the whole BiH would stay in Yugoslavia. This is a matter of the Constitution, but the
Sebrs made many concessions in order to please the two other sides and to avoid a war. And
it didn’t depend on the President, but of the people. In these speeches, the Accused also spoke
about the marginalisation of the Serb people and the need to protect their interests. (What kind of
crime is this? #No crime#!) These speeches and statements also demonstrate that the Accused
was passionate about a common Serb identity and working towards creating a unified Serbian
nation, which was viewed as an age-old aspiration of all Serbs living in one state. (The Chamber
is #not entitled to assess the political stands of President Karadzic, unless the crime against
peace is not considered! This way, the Chamber is smuggling this issue, without any
obligation to consider the issue comprehensively! The Serbs had achieved this state twice in
the 20th Century, 1918 and 1945, paying an enormous price in millions of lives! The Serbian
people is much older than it is believed, but even if it was 5th or 6th century, the Serb people
fought many battles to survive, and the only way to survive is to have their own state!) The
Accused continued to adhere to this ideology of Serb unity and the importance of creating a Serb
state into 1992. (This is a #mere ideological element# in the Judgment, and as such it
compromises the entire trial. The Serb unity has it’s history, and pertains mainly to the very
same ideology of division of the Serbs on rightists (monarchists) and leftist (communists),
since the common state already existed. But it is wrong for another reason: it was not true!
The Serbs and the President didn’t seek anything new, #anything that didn’t exist#, but only
tried to oppose to the unlawful and unconstitutional attacks. Unilateral and forceful
 547

destruction of Yugoslavia, which was envisaged to develop on the account of the Serbs. Ant
the secessionist peoples were led exclusively by their ethnic interests!)

(Since dealing with the #political issues#, the Chamber was in a position to see what was the
political development at that time. The Chamber should have notice that the Serbs had
#already lived in a unique state#, from 1918 til 1941. and from 1945 till this crisis. So, the
#Serbs didn’t demand anything new#, anything they didn’t have. The other wanted to leave
Yugoslavia, which could have been agreed upon, but they didn’t respect the constitutional
rights of the Serbs. AND THE SERBS, WHEN ENVISAGING A WAR IN A CASE OF
SOME DEVELOPMENTS, DIDN’T MEAN THAT THEY NEED A WAR TO ACHIEVE
WHAT THEY WANTED, BECAUSE THEY DID HAVE IT ALREADY, and it was
protected by the Constitution of Yugoslavia and the constitutions of the respective
Republics! The war was necessary only to those who wanted to impose the new status to the
Serbs.
 548

2653. The Chamber finds that this evidence demonstrates the central role which the President
played in developing the ideology and role of the SDS after its formation in 1990. The President
also promoted the SDS as the party which would address the political aspirations of Bosnian Serbs
and spoke against Serbs who did not follow the policy of the SDS. (This is also #erroneous
finding#, first of all, the newly formed parties were based on ethnicity, because the
Communist regime neglected the development of traditional culture, and so on. As evident,
the SDS was the last one formed in BiH (not taking into account that the HDZ acted
throughout BiH while being seated in Croatia) The SDS didn’t speak against the Serbs who
didn’t follow the policy of the SDS, but if SDS won ballots, it was responsible to voters, and
no Serbs of communist or other ideology should “smuggle” their ideology in the SDS work.
This can not be anywhere in the world. Who has a program, should have own party, not lay
down its eggs in others nest, like cuckoo bird. Somebody that won 3% of the Serbian votes
can not pretend to speak on behalf of the entire Serbian community! But, this is an
eminently #political issue# and a matter of responsibility for the war (a crime agains peace)
which wasn’t envisaged to be considered in this Court. In a drastic shortage of evidence
against the President, the Prosecution-Chamber are collecting a patchwork, a puzzle of
irrelevant rests of political sentences, to assemble whatever ―mens rea‖ of this President!)

2654. In this period, the Accused also foreshadowed the prospect of civil war if the Bosnian
Serbs were politically outvoted in the BiH Assembly or if Serb areas could not remain tied with
Yugoslavia. He also warned that the Bosnian Serbs were prepared for such a threat of civil war
and were powerful and united. It was clear that even in the speeches in which he spoke in favour
of improving multi-ethnic relations and against violence, the Accused stressed that the Bosnian
Serbs were ready to use violence if they considered that they had been attacked and would not co-
operate with anyone seen to be against the Serbs. (#Another CRIMINAL DISTORTION#! Not
“to use violence” but “not to cooperate” not only with those that are against the Serbs, but
“anyone with an anti-Serbism, anti-Yugoslavism, anti-semitism and anti-democracy! But,
again wrong inference! The President was dissueading the others from a policy that would
cause a war. Having in mind how the Serbs had been slaughtered during the WWII, this
time they saw and recognised what was prepared. Also, to “consider that they had been
attacked” is an objective matter, and anyone is entitled to rebut any attack, and also
everybody is entitled “not to co-operate with anyone seen to be against” him. A lot of
ridiculous matters!!!)

Again, the Chamber erres and is confused: first of all, the Serb unity concerns the
ideological rift from WWII, which was present in a more than in trace between the SDS and
the Army officers. For the first time in the Serb civil wars the Serbs in BiH were a bit
prepared to defend, and this was their own right. #Right to defend#!) He also adumbrated
chaos and violence if BiH followed the path towards independence. The President also spoke
about alternative preparations Bosnian Serbs had made if their demands were not met, and it was
clear that these alternatives envisaged violence. (#Wrong conclusion#! The Serbs didn’t have
any demands except to respect the laws and Constitution. This is the strongest political and
moral position. The Serb “demands” were supported by the Constitution, and if anybody
wanted to change the constitutional order, should do it according to the provisions of
Constitution. If somebody was ready to impose something contrary to the Serb rights, the
Serbs would defend. But, what the Chamber could easily find out as a firm evidence, not an
inference, would be the “Islamic declaration” as a comprehensive political program. Having
in mind the “Islamic declaration”, as well as the fact that Izetbegovic didn’t meet the
President’s begging to denounce the Declaration for the sake of the peace in BiH, the
Chamber would see the President’s political acting as mild and polite as it could be! Why
such an important evidence was never mentioned in the Judgement?)
 549

(B) Identification of historic enemies

Analysis of evidence

2655. At the founding assembly of the SDS in July 1990, the President called for the unity of the
Serbs and also made reference to the genocide which had been carried out against them by their
―enemies‖ and his opposition to a system in BiH ―which seemed to have been established to
ensure our national annihilation‖.8865 (Does the Chamber infer that there was no WWI and
WWII, and that the same enemies, the Muslim and Croat Nazis, didn’t attack the Serbs,
commiting a horrible extermination? Or the Chamber suggests that the Serbian people
didn’t know that part of their history, but the President reminded them, or maybe
persuaded them that they are again in the same jeopardy? This is an #ideological inference#!
There is no a single Serbian family in BiH which didn’t suffer a grave loses from those
enemies!) At the founding meeting of the SDS in Brĉko, the President delivered a speech in which
he said that the ―Serbian people for the first time in its history had a chance to set up its own party
and that for the first time in history the Serbian people would have enough political strength to
avoid the repetition of the bloody history‖.8866 (So what??? Why any Chamber would even
notice this speech? For what purpose, and for what inference this quotation may serve, and
in what sense. At the same time, the entire Yugoslavia has a storm of political speeches, plans
and intentions, all of them aimed against the unity of Yugoslavia and against the Serbs. But,
if the Chamber considered these speeches as wrong and criminal, the Chamber then was
obliged to point out what #was not true it these speeches#, what was false and war-
mongering in these speeches! If it stayed that way, it would mean that the #Chamber altered
the history# of the WWI and WWII in Yugoslavia!)

2656. In an interview in May 1991, the President stated:

―We have today at play the Croat-Muslim party coalition, but we cannot be outvoted in the
Assembly. The Serbs cannot allow the Muslims to declare themselves the majority people on the
basis of the Ustasha genocide against the Serbs in World War II, before which the Serbs were the
majority people in Bosnia. We are a state-building people even if we are just five, let alone
31%.8867 (So what? This was also true. This is a legal normative that the #results of
genocide# and a war crimes must not become a legalised as a legitimate. Anyway, without
this position, there was another: the Serbs were one of the three constituons peoples, and had
a veto right on the constitutional questions. Even this communist Constitution of BiH
contained the provision about veto on some issues pertaining to the equality of ethnic
communities! Any attempt to alter this constitutional provisions would be drastic violation of
the rights guaranteed by the Constitutions! The international community shouldn’t
encourage this kind of subversive and destructive action, but to warn all the sides not to play
with fire!)

2657. Both Šešelj and the President spoke at a rally in May 1991, where Šešelj stated that in the
Serbian part of BiH, they had only one political party, the SDS, and its leadership had ―saved the

8865
D255 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the constituent SDS Assembly), p. 1.
8866
Isak Gaši, T. 16621–16622, 16642–16643 (14 July 2011).
8867
D1281 (Articles from Veĉernje Novine entitled ―Karadţić shocked me‖ and ―Šešelj is amiable‖, 9 May 1991), p. 2.
 550

dignity of the all-Serbian brotherhood‖.8868 Horrible!! What is criminal it that? Or it is

sufficient to mention Mr. [e{elj and the President in the same paragraph and to conclude
that there must be some crime?! Šešelj in this speech also spoke about the ―traditional enemies‖
of the Serbian people and the need for Serbs to be united to prevent a ―new genocide against the
Serbian people”.8869 (Horrible!! Should Mr [e{elj speak in favour of the genocide against his
own, or any other people?! He emphasised that they would avenge the current and historic Serb
victims and that they would not ―give an inch of the Serbian land‖.8870 He also warned the
Muslims not to ―become a weapon of the Croatian Ustashas again‖ and that if they repeated
history again it would be ―fatal to the Muslims, because us Serbs shall no longer forget or forgive.
Our revenge is going to be terrible‖.8871 Acquitted!!!!! Acquitted even it this court! Again, the
Chamber is again rummaging through the trash in order to find any ideological rooth of an President
“mens rea”, confirming thus the ideological nature of this court. This way the entire Serbian people
is undermind, assaulted and convicted, because none of these incriminations wer the President’s
“inventions”, but a deeply rooted fears of the entire population. Even the international mediators,
like Lords Carrington and Owen, admitted that the Serbs had a good reason to be worried in 1990-
es!

2658. In January 1991, at a commemoration ceremony, the President stated, ―Serbs are the only
people in the world who were persecuted and killed only because they exist. That is why we will
no longer allow them to separate us and divide us in three states and gradually destroy us.‖8872 He
also assured the population that the Bosnian Serb leadership would ―not let you be slaughtered like
in 1941‖.8873 (#Permanent mistake#! Did the President lie? Had there been a slaughter of the
Serbs in the NDH, including Bosnia? What was criminal in this statements? What issues of
the Serb political life the Chamber consider to be forbidden as criminal ones?) The President
told Koljević in June 1991 that he had told Izetbegović that ―nobody can form a state on a territory
where there was genocide‖.8874 At a meeting with Bosnian Serb representatives on 10 June 1992,
the President stated that the plan was to empty BiH of Serbs (Had the Chamber admitted the
evidence of a Tudjman-Holbrooke meeting, there would be what Izetbegovic told Tudjman
about expelling the Serbs from Bosnia, and President Tudjman was astonished and asked
him, how he intended to expel one and a half million of Serbs from Bosnia. Had the
Chamber admitted a similar evidence of the Tudjman-Ganic meeting, after the Dayton
Agreement, when the Muslim extremist Ganic repeatedly said to President Tudjman that
they (Muslims) “will marginalise the Serbs in Bosnia”, and again, they intend to
“marginalise the Serb entity”!) and that Bosnian Serbs should persist and defend their borders
against attacks but not attack themselves.8875 (#EXCULPATORY#! This is the most honest and
the most clear position. What is wrong in it? We do have evidence that it was just like the
President said, and the genocide didn’t repeat just as the President said. And that is his the
only guilt! To defend oneself from any attack, and not to attack is the basic right which
nobody can object, why the Chamber found it to be objected?)

8868
P2527 (Video footage of speeches of Vojislav Šešelj and Radovan Karadţić, 6 May 1991, with transcript), pp. 1–2. See also D1281 (Articles from Veĉernje
Novine entitled ―Karadţić shocked me‖ and ―Šešelj is amiable‖, 9 May 1991), p. 1; D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), paras.
36–37.
8869
P2527 (Video footage of speeches of Vojislav Šešelj and Radovan Karadţić, 6 May 1991, with transcript), p. 1.
8870
P2527 (Video footage of speeches of Vojislav Šešelj and Radovan Karadţić, 6 May 1991, with transcript), p. 1; P6391 (Excerpts from Vojislav Šešelj's
speech).
8871
P6389 (Vojislav Šešelj's interview with Pogledi, 31 May 1991), p. 2.
8872
P1939 (Article from Javnost, entitled ―Mind for the Souls of the Innocents‖, 26 January 1991).
This was a service for the innocent people that
had been butchered in WWII. What the Chamber objects here? Does the Chamber sugest that there was no the Serb
holocaust in WWII in Croatia and BiH?
8873
P6540 (Excerpt of video from Banja Luka, 3 March 1991, with transcript), p. 3.
8874
P5683 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević and (ii) Radovan Karadţić and Nikola Koljević, 4 June 1991), p.
4.
8875
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 132–133.
 551

2659. The Accused in his speeches before the Bosnian Serb Assembly repeatedly referred to the
threat faced by the Serb people and the historic threats they faced dating back to World War II and
the need to protect themselves from their ―enemies‖.8876 (So what? The Chamber is doing a very
risky job, denying the very known events, as if some court would contest the Holocoust
against the Jews! And this is something in line with the anti-Serb policy of the part of
international community, but there is a crucial question: whether the United Nations
support this approach, because this court is the UN institution? #Contesting notorious
facts#!) In June 1992, the President signed the ―political platform for the survival of the Serbian
people in BiH‖ which noted that a war to extinction had been imposed on the Serbs.8877 This
platform called for the Bosnian Muslims to end the war and negotiate and claimed that both
Muslims and Serbs had a right to stay in the country.8878 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) The President
continued to make speeches which emphasised the historic suffering and victimisation of the
Serbs.8879 For example, in September 1992, the President spoke about the continuation of the
fascist policy of World War II in which one third of Serbs were to be expelled, one third converted
to Catholicism, and one third were to be killed.8880 (All #political speeches#, all founded on the
historic truth. The author of the “two third” policy is known. This famous sentence,
pronounced by the highest Croatian official #Quaternik# became an official policy of
Croatia, and was carried out thoroughly. That is why only from BH 700.000 Serbs had been
killed. If the Chamber challenges this, we should have known it. Not to forget that both in
Zagreb (Croatia) and Sarajevo (BiH) on the 1990 elections the power was taken by the same
ideology, by the then Hitler’s allies. To be honest, President Tudjman was no Hitler’s ally,
but he rehabilitated Hitler’s allies who returned from the world with the same rhetoric as in
WWII)

2660. These constant references to World War II and the historic suffering and grievances of the
Serbian people polarised the population in BiH and incited inter-ethnic hatred.8881 (. The
Chamber erred relying on an “opinion”, while it was a generally known that the interethnic
hatred never disappeared, and the top of its revival was in 1971 and on. Every European and
western government knew and predicted a bloody ruining of the SFRY afer the Tito’s death.
So, to draw such an inference is not even serious, and is deeply wrong, unjust and insulting
for the entire Serbian people. The UN and the European Community didn’t think so, and
that is why the Conference (ICFY) was established far befor the President said this
sentence!) The media was also used as a propaganda tool to emphasise the historic suffering of
the Serb people and to encourage people to fight for their ―motherland‖ so that all Serbs would be
together.8882 (This is another #political and ideological “invective”# of the Chamber against
the very truth and the real facts. This manner disqualifies the Chamber and the Tribunal as
a whole! While the two other sides at the same time were preparing for the war against the
Serbs, and in Croatia the cruel war already started, by killing the civilian Serb families, the
Chamber is accusing the Serb media for propaganda?!?) In August 1992, VJ General Panić

8876
P1343 (Transcript of 1st session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 October 1991), pp. 56–60 (wherein the Accused spoke about the international Catholic and Islamic
objective to ―drive the Orthodox Slavs from the Mediterranean‖). See also D86 (Shorthand Record of 4th session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 December 1991),
pp. 37, 42; D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), pp. 16–17; P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly,
12 May 1992), e-court p. 4; P1367 (Transcript of 26th session of RS Assembly, 2 April 1993), pp. 3, 8; P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly,
27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), pp. 9, 11; P5492 (Record of speech by Radovan Karadţić, 9 January 1994), pp. 3, 5;
Milorad Dodik, T. 36896–36897 (9 April 2013); P6487 (Declaration of SDS Executive Board, undated); P6688 (Interview with Radovan Karadţić in Duga
Magazine, 23 May 1992), pp. 1−2.
8877
D4686 (Article from SRNA entitled ―Political platform for the survival of the Serbian People in BiH‖, 12 June 1992), p. 1.
8878
D4686 (Article from SRNA entitled ―Political platform for the survival of the Serbian People in BiH‖, 12 June 1992), p. 4.
In the same document
there is a Proclamation to the Muslim people against the war, but the Chamber didn’t pay any attention to it.
8879
See, e.g., D115 (Transcript of 25th session of RS Assembly, 19–20 January 1993), pp. 3, 8.
8880
P809 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić‘s Press Conference at ICFY, 18 September 1992, with transcript), pp. 1–2.
8881
KDZ310, T. 9170–9174 (29 November 2010); P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated) (under seal), p. 14.
8882
KDZ310, T. 9188–9189 (29 November 2010); KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 6812–6813, 6913 (under seal); KDZ240, T.
16084 (5 July 2011) (closed session).
 552

told Mladić that there should be ―propagators among ordinary people‖, that is a person in every
region instructed to say one thing but do another.8883 (But this is the #first class proof that it
wasn’t that way#. Had it been so, this “advise” wouldn’t be said. And what it has to do with
the President? And further, is the Chamber collecting an evidence to prove how the Serbs
are bad? During the process the Chamber repeatedly warned the President not to defend the
Serbs, because the Serb people is not accused, but we see that it was accused and sentenced!)
At a meeting with Sarajevo municipality presidents and commanders of SRK units on 14 January
1994, the Accused suggested to ―give a little more thought to the propaganda war‖ and to create a
small propaganda staff.8884 (So what? #Is that a crime#? The Serbs were losing the
propaganda war, because they didn’t wage it at all! And the international mediators
recognised it and suggested to the Serbs to do more about bringing the Serb part of truth!)

2661. These messages of suspicion and hatred were also reflected at a municipal level where
messages were broadcast on the radio in the lead-up to the conflict to the effect that ―the time had
come for the Serbs to settle accounts with the balijas once and for all, and that the Serbs would no
longer allow their ribs to be broken. They will no longer allow their children to be
circumcised‖.8885 (If it was in an official media, #it would be a widely known#, but many
carnages, including one of 45 people from the place of KDZ239, were mutilated and already
known as a tragedy, because it had been done after an agreement to let the column pass, and
the column had been ambushed and massacred! Is the Chamber of an opinion that there
wouldn’t be any war had the Serbs been mute about so formidable preparations for the war?
So, either it was a lie, or it was some “radio communication” among soldiers, but not in
public media! )

2662. International observers such as Okun noted the constant references to, and intensity with
which the President spoke about, the genocide committed against the Serbs and warned him that if
he kept ―talking about the genocide of the Serbs so much, you will commit a pre-emptive
genocide‖.8886 (#Said somebody else#! How possibly something that was said by Mr. Okun
could be used in this Judgement, particularly against the President? This practice, as similar
in this process, with a testimonies of many incompetent and ignorant international observers
who dropped by in Bosnia from time to time, deeple compromise the Tribunal, as well as the
internationals. The best advise would be – not to admit biased internationals in any area of
crisis, not to talk to them, not to serve them diners, not to chat with them, and to
communicate with them only by a public announcements! Of course, those that were
incorrect are a vast minority compared to the very helpful internationals, but it was
sufficient to have #only several incorrect internationals# to have a disaster in the public
presentation of the marked side!) Okun made this statement to the President to express his shock
at the argument that the genocide committed during World War II ―justified all of Bosnian Serb
behaviour‖.8887 (#Said somebody else#! Again, an obscure “conclusion” of Okun is used as a
“fact” against this President?!? Not even Communists in Yugoslavia would do it that way.)
Mladić in meeting with international representatives also spoke about the genocide committed
against Serbs in World War II in areas including Srebrenica and Sarajevo.8888 (This is sensless to
object it, because it was the same on the entire territory of the NDH, (Independent State of
Croatia) – and why would Mladic mention “Srebrenica and Sarajevo”? This is an #intention
to fabricate a mens rea# for what was happening in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. A search for a

8883
P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), pp. 29, 38.
8884
P1484 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), pp. 133, 148–149.
8885
KDZ239, T. 18929 (15 September 2011). See para. 852.
8886
Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4156, 4164–4165; Herbert Okun, T. 1489–1491 (22 April 2010); P779 (Sixth notebook of
Herbert Okun‘s Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 43; P778 (Fifth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 41.
8887
Herbert Okun, T. 1490 (22 April 2010).
8888
P792 (Ninth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 49.
 553

premeditated plan, in spite of the fact that the Serbs were #against the war at any cost# is
incorrect and malicious, so more since the crime against peace is not subject of this tribunal!
Not to forget what Okun himself admitted, that his notes shouldn’t be taken verbatim!

(One doesn’t need to say anything after the following facts: Tudjman said that “they shell be
hit so hard that will practically disappear; real, practical disappearance of the Serbs from
Croatia; the Izetbegovic’s “promis” to Tudjman that he will expel all of the Serbs from BiH;
Ganic’s “promises” to Tudjman, even after the Dayton, that we [the Muslims] wil
marginalize the Serbs, and, “you know that the international community will allowe us to
marginalize the Serbs. See:…@. If the Chamber is taking into account such a material, then
the Chamber wasn’t fair towards the Defense when limited us in tendering similar evidence)

2663. Other Bosnian Serb leaders including Biljana Plavšić,8889 Nikola Koljević,8890 and
Momĉilo Krajišnik8891 delivered speeches about the historical and contemporary threats faced by
Serbs, the importance of all Serbs living in one state, and the political decisions made by Muslim
and Croat representatives which made it impossible to live together. This sentiment was also
reflected in political rallies attended by other Bosnian Serb leaders; for example at a rally in Banja
Luka in November 1991, Predrag Radić stated ―[t]wice they slaughtered us. We have forgiven but
not forgotten. If they try to do the same for the third time, we shall neither forgive nor forget,
regardless of how non-Christian it may be‖.8892 (#Mentioning WWII genocide forbidden by the
Tribunal#! The main issue is: was Mr. Radic telling lies? If he wasn’t lying, why he would be
guilty of anything? And who is entitled to ban the peoples that suffered genocides to talk
about the subject? That would be the similar crime as the first one, and the Comminists in
Yugoslavia forbade talking about the genocide during the WWII! Would it be the same as if
somebody, as there are such a “somebody” – proposes that the Holocaust be banned to be
mentioned?) At this same rally Krajišnik spoke about not allowing the ―dark forces‖ to ―destroy
our common fatherland, to tear us into pieces‖.8893 (#EXCULPATORY#!!! Krajisnik called for
the preservation of our “common fatherland”!) The Accused spoke and said that by voting to
remain in a federal state ―with all the Serbian lands and those who wish to stay with us, we hope
to, once and for all, put a circle by state where there will be no traitors, a state that will not fall
apart every 20 years or so‖.8894 (Even #without context#, those words are not exaggerations,
because it all was the truth. But it was spoken out in the middle of the political crisis of the
destruction of Yugoslavia, and the armed skirmishes had started already, AND THE FIRST
Serbian families slauthered in Zagreb. THIS IS NOT DECENT FROM ANY CHAMBER
TO CONTEST THESE FACTS!)

2664. In January 1993, other deputies such as Vlado Kovaĉević spoke in the Bosnian Serb
Assembly about the threat faced by the Serb people, and described the Islamic and Catholic threat
as a ―two-headed dragon‖ which wanted to destroy the Serb people and that Europe wanted to

8889
P1347 (Shorthand record of 5th session of SerBiH Assembly, 9 January 1992), pp. 37–41; D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25
February 1992), pp. 22–23; P988 (Transcript of 53rd session of RS Assembly, 28 August 1995), pp. 33–34.
8890
P1347 (Shorthand record of 5th session of SerBiH Assembly, 9 January 1992), pp. 51, 56–57; P1353 (Shorthand record of 10th session of SerBiH Assembly,
11 March 1992), pp. 11, 13–14; Vitomir Ţepinić, T. 33594–33595 (13 February 2013).
8891
D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), pp. 30–31, 62, 64; P1353 (Shorthand record of 10th session of SerBiH
Assembly, 11 March 1992), pp. 15–16. See also P6306 (Letter from Momĉilo Krajišnik to Government of SAO Krajina, 19 December 1991) (where
Krajišnik wrote about the historical right of the Serbian people to live in one state); P6308 (Letters from Milan Martić to Radovan Karadţić, Momĉilo
Krajišnik, Slobodan Milošević, Jovica Stanišić, and Momĉilo Perišić), pp. 1–5; P2448 (Excerpt of video depicting speech of Velibor Ostojić, with
transcript).
8892
P13 (TV footage of plebiscite rally held in Banja Luka, with transcript), p. 1; Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7370–7371,
7377–7378.
8893
P13 (TV footage of plebiscite rally held in Banja Luka, with transcript), p. 1; Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7377–7378.
8894
P13 (TV footage of plebiscite rally held in Banja Luka, with transcript), p. 1; Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7377–7378.
 554

push them into being ―imprisoned in the dark realm of Islam‖.8895 (When Kovacevic gave his
speech, he already in April 92 had in his small town Gacko 690 refugees, the Serbs from the
Neretva River Valey, see R012-0676-0685 The UNHCR, lately disclosed in BATCH 1491.
also, in his small town Gacko there is a very famous cave Koritska jama, which was filed by
the innocent and helpless civilians in 1941. this is a very famous fact. The main issue is: if the
#Tribunal doesn’t know these facts#, there shouldn’t be accusations why the Serbs
mentioned it! ) Krajišnik thanked Kovaĉević for his speech and praised him, saying ―you are the
best when we have opponents‖.8896 (Senseless! What is wrong with that? That was a
Krajisnik’s #courtesy#.) Krajišnik went on to say that the Bosnian Muslims were not a nation or
a people and called on the Bosnian Serb Assembly to take a position that Muslims were a group of
unbelievers, a sect, ―a communist creation and that they are a religious group of Turkish
orientation‖.8897 (What the President has to do with the #statements of others#, who were
members of Parliament, and therefore #free to tell whatever they wanted#? Beside that, up
until 1963 the Muslims were considered only as a religious group, and they mainly declared
themselves in an ethnic terms as a “non-decraled”, or as Serbs, rarely as Croats. In any case,
it was for the first time that a religious group was “proclaimed” as a separate ethnic group.
(Since it seems important to the Chamber, and therefore must be important to the Defence,
let us clarify: nobody said that the Muslims were unbelievers. It is well known, even among
the scientists, that the Christianity and Islam are only a sects of Judaism. However, the
Muslims in Yugoslavia were the Serbs, rarely Croats, who adopted Islam. Many of them,
through the centuries, and the most prominent Muslim scientists and artists, writers, movie
makers even now, kept identifying themselves as a Serbs. It was only after 1963. that the
Communist party promoted them into a separate ethnic group. The quated words of
Krajisnik delth with this issue, and the proposal was to stop considering the Muslims to be
the Serbs any longer. But, it is totally irrelevant, as an #academic discussion#!) Krajišnik
also spoke about the need to ―take the Muslims out of Serbism for ever‖.8898
(#EXCULPATORY#!!! If they didn’t want to be Serbs any longer, the Serbs should stop
considering them as a Serbs!) Šešelj also did not recognise the Bosnian Muslims as a people but
described them as ―Muslim Serbs‖ and stated that there was no such thing as a Bosnian language
and that the Croatian nation was an ―artificial nation under the direct patronage of the Catholic
church‖.8899 (This is all #scientific discussion# with a lot pro/con arguments, why it is
important for this case? If it was posed as a problem, the Defence would obtain more
evidence. Also, the #linguistic problems# appear again: To “take the Muslims out of Serbism
(more appropriate – Serbdom) meant not to nourish the hopes that the Muslims will
remember that they had been Serbs any more, which the extreme Muslims would like to
here!)

2665. In addition to historic crimes committed against Serbs, there were also references made to
the killing of Bosnian Serbs during the conflict. For example, when 29 Bosnian Serb soldiers
were killed by ABiH forces, the funeral was held on 30 September 1992 at the Orthodox church in
Vlasenica.8900 Over 1,000 people attended the funeral, including the Bosnian Serb leadership from

8895
P921 (Transcript of 24th session of RS Assembly, 8 January 1993), p. 38.
8896
P921 (Transcript of 24th session of RS Assembly, 8 January 1993), p. 39.
8897
P921 (Transcript of 24th session of RS Assembly, 8 January 1993), pp. 95–97. This conclusion about the status of the Bosnian Muslims was accepted
unanimously.
8898
P921 (Transcript of 24th session of RS Assembly, 8 January 1993), p. 96.
8899
D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), para. 15; Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39546–39548 (7 June 2013), T. 39558–39559 (10 June 2013);
D3667 (Transcript of Vojislav Šešelj's press conference, 26 March–16 April 1992), p. 20. See also Herbert Okun, T. 1774–1775 (28 April 2010); D119
(Radovan Karadţić‘s speech re cessation of hostilities, May 1992), p. 2.
8900
P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 121 (under seal).
 555

Pale that consisted of the President, Ostojić, Koljević, and Svetozar Andrić.8901 The President and
others gave speeches at the funeral and the speakers and the crowd ―were very agitated and
embittered‖ by the death of the Bosnian Serb soldiers.8902 The Accused delivered a speech in
which he said:

― Nor must we forget their executioners and attackers. I do not know if I am allowed to say that we
must not forgive either. Who knows how many times this century our brothers, who are no
brothers at all, have been at our throats. They assault our good men. But the Lords sees that and
has given us strength to resist […] I will keep telling the international powers that Serbs do not
persecute anyone, that Serbs only defend their homes. And if they do not want to believe, it‘s up
to them. The God believes, and he turned his face to us, and He will help us get out of the
darkness of slavery, fears, lies, pretence, and to become what every nation in the world
deserves.8903

It was not only soldiers that had been killed, but peasants staying at their homes, guarding,
and not attacking anyone. It was in the eve of the Conference in London, and the ceasefire
was supposed to be respected, but the Muslim leaders wanted this drastic and unexpected
action in order to have the Serbe to reject to attend the Conference, and for that purpose
they #killed almost 30 innocent people#, among others to sabotage the London Conference.
Whose “genocidal intent” was confirmed by this crime?

These speeches created a feeling that the Bosnian Serbs would be pardoned for whatever they did and
created a fear that Bosnian Muslims who remained in Vlasenica would be killed.8904 The Chamber
recalls its finding that following this funeral, approximately 140 detainees were taken from Sušica
camp and killed by Serb Forces.8905 (The Chamber was able to hear the speech, not only to
read the transcript, and to see that the speech was a depressive and mild, and not
inflammatory in any sense!) The Accused also gave an interview on the day of the funeral and
said: ―We are concerned about Muslims, we want them to have their own territory. Since we
wanted to separate from them, since we see that we can‘t live together any longer. But, if they do
not proclaim a realistic objective concerning territories, they may lose everything.‖8906 (In the
#context# of the conference the President was going to attend. Has nothing to do with the
funeral)

2666. Such speeches were in contrast to statements the President made to international
representatives. For example, in a meeting with General Morillon in February 1993, the President
claimed that their army had discovered a mass grave containing more than 50 bodies in the
recaptured territory south of Zvornik and that General Milovanović had requested that he not
release this information as it would ―inflame the local Serb population in the area‖8907 (So what?
Is a politician obliged to speak in public as same as he speaks with the negotiators. The
#political speeches# are with a specific aim, and sometimes even a negotiating speeches are
stronger than would be at the end, as even witness Donia admitted. He agreed that at a

8901
P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), para. 121 (under seal).
8902
P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 122, 124–125 (under seal).
8903
P3261 (Excerpt of video footage of Radovan Karadţić‘s speech, with transcript); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 123, 125
(under seal); KDZ033, T. 18110–18114 (31 August 2011) (closed session).
8904
P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 122–123 (under seal). See also KDZ033, T. 18114 (31 August 2011) (closed session).
But see D2932 (Witness statement of Tomislav Savkić dated 11 February 2013), para. 98 (stating that the Accused‘s speech did not incite anyone to hate or
take revenge but seeing the bodies themselves would have created hatred and a desire for revenge). However, the Chamber notes that Savkić‘s evidence was
marked by multiple contradictions and indicators that he was not forthright in his testimony and therefore does not rely on his evidence in this regard. In
addition the Chamber has had regard to the text of the speech itself, and Savkić‘s evidence is in direct contradiction to the content of that speech.
8905
See Scheduled Incident B.18.2.
8906
P3230 (Video footage re excerpt of interview with Radovan Karadţić, with transcript); KDZ033, T. 18023–18024 (29 August 2011) (closed session).
8907
P4228 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadzic and Alija Izetbegović, 16 February 1993), p. 2; P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker
dated 12 May 2010), para. 135.
 556

beginning of any negotiations, a negotiating positions are higher than it would be at the end.
So there is always some space for compromises! But, the most important is: there were
discovered the mass graves, and Gen. Morillon himself attended some of the mass funerals.
And if the President didn’t say too much in public about the matter, and said to the
negotiator, it should be understood as an attempt of the President not to inflame the public!
Not a single good deed of the President went unpunished!)

2667. At a meeting of Serb representatives on 8 January 1993 in Belgrade with the President in
attendance, Vladislav Jovanović, who was the foreign minister of Serbia, stated that the
destruction of the Serb people was a necessary condition of the plan to divide the FRY.8908 (So
what? It was well known that some of the European countries, Germany at first place, didn’t
want Yugoslavia to exist, and they assessed that there were the three guards against the
destruction of Yugoslavia: the Communist party, the JNA and the Serbian people, which was
living in almost all of the republics, because the republic borders were provisional and
arbitrary. If Jovanovic meditated why we are under the attack, he was right, the Communist
party was ruined already, the JNA was in the troubles, and only Serbs opposed to an
unlawful destruction of the country.)

2668. In May 1993, the President described the situation as a ―conflict between us and the
greatest enemy‖.8909 (The President was right, wasn’t he?) He also spoke of the Serbs‘
neighbours as those who ―every 20 years, turn into our executioners‖.8910 (Right: it was only in
20th century as follows: 1912 - 1913, 1914 – 1918, 1941 – 1945, 1991 – 1995. What does it
prove? Was it a lie or a truth?) In September 1993, the President said ―[w]ho knows when we
will settle our relations with Moslems? Most probably never if the fundamentalists keep coming
from the East […](Are those fundamentalists coming from the East? Was the MBO, the
Muslim-Bosniac organisation, and the Socialist party of BiH (Rabija Subic) or Fikret Abdic,
or The Liberal party, Rasim Kadic, and several other #Muslim parties – agaist the theocracy
and fundamentalism#?). Under this kind of circumstances we must have a different kind of the
Army‖.8911 He spoke about recognising the ―ancient danger posed by the toxic, all-destructive
Islamic octopus‖ which was ―constant in its irreconcilable poisonousness towards the Serbian
Orthodox being‖.8912 (How many years have passed until this “prediction” of the President
came to the reality? How this looks like from the Europe now? What was a possible
exaggeration in those words? Was anyone from Bosnia fighting for the Islamic State?)

2669. At a symposium of the VRS held on 15 January 1994, in the presence of the President,
Mladić opened his speech with: ―For three years now our people have been shedding blood,
defending their country and infants from Ustasha and Islamic hordes which have, for decades, in
secret and from within the bosom of our people, been preparing its extermination‖.8913 (First of
all, if Gen. Mladic intended to say what he wrote in his notebook, it doesn’t mean that he
spoke like that. Certainly, he couldn’t take a notes of his own speech. Second, what is wrong
with what he said, if he said it? Third, what does it have to do with the President?)

(2)Conclusion
8908
P1482 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 2–28 January 1993), p. 40.
8909
P1373 (Transcript of 31st session of RS Assembly, 9 May 1993), p. 18. See also P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11
September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), pp. 9, 11 (where the Accused spoke about their ―biggest enemy, our annihilators‖). Other deputies spoke
about the need to distance themselves from their ―blood enemies‖. P1373 (Transcript of 31st session of RS Assembly, 9 May 1993), p. 21.
8910
P939 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the 21st session of RS Assembly, 30 October 1992, with transcript), p. 2.
8911
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), pp. 427–428.
8912
P5492 (Record of speech by Radovan Karadţić, 9 January 1994), p. 6.
8913
P1484 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), p. 150.
 557

2670. The evidence above demonstrates that the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership in
their speeches repeatedly and consistently referred to the historic grievances of the Serb people
and the crimes which were committed against them by Muslims and Croats. The Chamber finds
that these speeches were used by the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership to remind the
Bosnian Serb population about crimes committed against Serbs and emphasised the need to ensure
they would not be repeated. (Even if so, what would be criminal in it? But, the Chamber
adopted the Prosecutor’s formula that those speeches “reminded” the Bosnian Serbs on
what they have experienced from the Muslims and Croats. Contrary to that, the Defence
have shown that there was no a Serb family that didn’t have an innocent victim during
WWII, and that many contemporaries were still alive. This is ridiculous. So, if the Chamber
pays any attention to those issues, then the Chamber was obliged either to allowe the Defense
to submit evidence on the subject, or to facilitate their own expert for the WWII and the
Serbian memories on it. Otherwise, this sounds as an insult. If anything from this denyal of
the sufferingas of the Serbs in WWII served as a basis for this deliberations and the outcome
of the trial, the trial is wothrless and should be either repeated, or the President acquitted!
Let us see what Colin Powel said about the Serb fears:
Colin Powell: The biggest mistake was recognizing all these little countries when they started
to decide they were independent. […] The Serbs had very good reason to be worried about being
in a Muslim-dominated country. #It wasn't just paranoia#.( Henry Louis Gates, Colin Powell
and the Black Elite, The New Yorker, 25 September 1995) In order to convey this message the
Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership often portrayed the Muslims and Croats as the historic
enemies of the Serbs and stressed the importance of recognising this fact for the future survival of
the Serb people. The Accused also used these historic references to emphasise the important role
of the SDS in protecting the Serbs. (#Was there a genocide during WWII#? So what? If the
Chamber was considering the causes of the war, then it should be notified in advance and
enabled the Defence to present it’s case! Otherwise, it is irrelevant, and serves only as a
proof of the biase of the entire project case ICTY!
1. This could have a significance for this trial only if it was established that it was false
assertion,

2. that there was no genocides against the Serbs that were commited by the Croats and Muslims
in the WWI and WWII,

3. and if established that the Serbian people didn’t know it, but the President and his associates
indoctrinate them, and finally

4. that there were no the elections in Croatia end BiH were the #Hitler’s allies won#.

5. The Chamber is trying to establish a liability for war, although the Defence was prevented to
present the arguments that would directly justify the speeches that are now taken as the
President’s and his associate’s “crimes”.

2671. The Accused also often referred to the genocide committed against Serbs during World
War II which made them a minority in BiH and asserted that they could not allow the Bosnian
Muslims to declare themselves a majority people in BiH on this basis. (This also is not correct.
The Muslims had an ambition to turn BiH into a monoethnic state, a new monoethnic nation,
while the Serbs and Croats would be minorities. The Serbs supported the Croatian status as
a constituent people, no matter they were about 17% of population.) The references to the
genocide committed against the Serbs was also used as justification for renewing the historical
claims to land in BiH where they had once been a majority.8914 (But those claims hadn’t been

8914
See para. 55.
 558

either a cause of war, or a reason for any atrocities. #Pure political speeches#, but the UN
court seems to be against any #political life of the Serbs# in Bosnia! Such a huge changes of
the entire region were planed and pursued by others, and the Serbs are forbidden to express
their political interests. What would be the UN court’s position if the Serbs were a
revolurionary side, demanding changes, instead of being conservative, defending the existing
state of Yugoslavia?) The Chamber finds that speeches and messages of this nature were
delivered by the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership from as early as 1990 and continued
throughout the conflict in BiH. (Why it is of any interest of the Chamber. This was a political
struggle initiated by the secessionist republics, and the #Chamber is making an arbitrage in
a political dialectics#. If they really wanted to see what ideas were responsible for the crimes,
since they didn’t search for the cause of the war, they should study the speeches of others
too, and the Islamic declaration obligatorily.)

2672. As these speeches demonstrate, the reference to the historical threats faced by the Serbs was
used by the President to justify his position that the Serbs would not allow themselves to be
separated or outvoted in BiH. It was also used to promote the idea that the Bosnian Serbs could
not live together with the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and formed the foundation for the
separation of the three people and the creation of an ethnically homogeneous Serb state.
(#Contrary to the true positions.# A #dilettant distortion of truth#! This was not a question
of living with others, but whether living as a free and equal, or a in-slavered people! If the
Muslim/Croat coalition wanted to live with the Serbs as an equal people, they wouldn’t
convey a horrifying genocide during the WWII, because the Serbs in the NDH (Croatia and
Bosnia) didn’t do anything to provoke this genocide! The Serbs wanted to stay in Yugoslavia
with all others. The others wanted to create their national states, and did it on a criminal and
anti-constitutional way. The Serbs then wanted to continue with this “transformation of
Yugoslavia, i.e to have in BiH the three ethnically based states, not only “the Serb” state. If
the Chamber really wanted to establish what that meant, there are many evidence in the file
to establish that a “homogeneity” didn’t mean “clear” but it pertained to the distribution of
the territories in accordance with its ethnic distribution.)
(This is a dilettante distortion of the truth. The Serbs were completely clear: they wanted to live
with all of the Yugoslav nation, provided they live in Yugoslavia, with their rights
guaranteed by the federal state. So, this is incorrect and deliberate misinterpretation and
denigration of the Serbs as a xenophobic people, who can not live with the others. But, it is so
clear even to the guards in the Tribunal, that it was not the case. The problem is to be equal
and free, or to be dominated by the traditionally antagonized neighbour. The Chamber is
forcing the Defense to hold a political argumentation. What is this? Doesn’t the UN and it’s
Court justify what happened to the Serbs in Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo?
They do not exist there any more, and this is the responsibility of the international
community! Why it would be better is the Serbs in Bosnia failed to defend their rifhts?)

The Chamber also finds that this rhetoric, which was amplified by the media, had the effect of
adding to ethnic divisions and tension in BiH and incited inter-ethnic hatred. (it could be said
only by someone who just came from the March. The hatred is old almost a millennium, and
this generation had a little to do with this. The Defense is deceived because it was prevented
to show what was the anti-Serb propaganda, and present other evidence of a horrifying
treatment of the Serbe, because the Chamber always indulged the Prosecutor’s claim “Tu
quoque”.) The Chamber further finds that it encouraged Serbs to fight for what was portrayed as
their survival and to fight for the creation of a state were all Serbs would be united. (The
Chamber finding is wrong, because it was not the Serbs who didn’t want to live together
with others, but those ethnics who wanted to secede from Yugoslavia and make their
national states, with the Serbs as an ethnic minorities. This kind of ignorance of the subject
of this process is unacceptable, and looks like mockery. The only nation who called to live
 559

together were the Serbs. Being a constituent nation, and taking into account the
constitutional safeguards against any unilateral secession, the Serbs opposed their
degradation to the minority status. What is not understandable in it?)

2673. These speeches also demonstrate that the Bosnian Serb leadership went so far as to suggest
that the Bosnian Muslims were not a nation or a people at all and that Islam posed a threat to the
Bosnian Serbs. (Erroneus conclusion. Wrong inference Whether the Muslims were a Serbs of
the Islamic religion, which many people are convinced, even Lord Owen, or they are a
separate ethnicity is not a dilemma of yesterday, but it doesn’t have any but academic
relevance. We think they are the Serbs, but nobody prevents them to be whatever they
wanted. Neither war, nor any crime appeared because of it. If the Serbs equalize the
Muslims to themselves, it is not denigration or degradation, or rascism, but rather claims for
equality!)

(C) Reaction to proposed independence of BiH

(1) Analysis of evidence

2674. The Chamber took judicial notice that a confidential SDS document, dated 23 February 1991,
considered specific actions to be taken should BiH move towards independence.8915 (Adjudicated
fact?!?) This document provided that in this situation, municipal authorities were to ensure that
only Yugoslav (federal) law would apply, suspending the implementation of republican
regulations and thus creating a foundation for direct communication and co-operation between the
municipalities and Yugoslavia and its organs. It also provided for the engagement of the JNA and
the Federal Secretariat for National Defence.8916 (Adjudicated fact?!?) This policy was adopted
by the SDS Deputies‘ Club, the parliamentary caucus of the party, and was made public in a
document dated 10 June 1991.8917 (Adjudicated fact?!?) This document indicated the opposition
of the Serbian deputies to unilateral action which would break up Yugoslavia.8918 They also
expressed their opposition to the separation of the Bosnian Serbs from Yugoslavia.8919 At a
meeting of the SDS Deputies‘ Club on 30 September 1991, the President stated: ―We are
politically most numerous in Yugoslavia and Bosnia. Nothing can be done in BiH without the
Serbs and their will‖.8920 (The same comment as in para 2643: Wrong translation of the
document, P2543:

and wrong
interpretation. In the original it meant that the most important for the existence of the Serb
people to have Yugoslavia and Bosnia exist, not as it was interpreted:

8915
See Adjudicated Fact 1917.
8916
See Adjudicated Fact 1918.
8917
Adjudicated Fact 1919.
8918
D4654 (Report of SDS Deputies Club, 10 June 1991), p. 2.
8919
D4654 (Report of SDS Deputies Club, 10 June 1991), pp. 4–5.
8920
P2543 (Minutes of meeting of SDS deputies' club, 30 September 1991).
 560

The
second sentence is correct, but this certainty didn’t rely on the number of citizens, but on the
constitutional guarantees. Further, the “war goal” of the Serbian people” pertained to the
Serbs in the entire Yugoslavia, not to the Serbs in Bosnia, where there was no a war, and
couldn’t concern with the Serbs in BiH.

(This was the Serb #constitutional right and obligation#, to respect the priority of the Federal
state and the federal laws over the republican. The legalist Serbs could only cry: “President
Linkoln, where are you?!?”)

(Nothing here was illegal, clandestine, aggressive or out of the scope of a political party work.
Now we see how unjust was the process, when the Defense was prevented to tender many
opinions of the most prominent officials of the international community, who among other,
supported this Tribunal. Those opinions were unanimously characterizing these secessions as
a unilateral, unlawful and anti-constitutional. Is the Chamber incriminating he Serb political
life, as the Prosecution tried?)

2675. The Chamber recalls that in October 1991, the coalition government in SRBiH broke down
and during the night of 14 to 15 October 1991, the President addressed the SRBiH Assembly,
stressing that the proposed secession of BiH from Yugoslavia was unconstitutional and was
against the will of the Bosnian Serb people.8921 While the President professed that he was not
acting like the ―God of war‖, he emphasised that the Serb people wanted to live in Yugoslavia and
that if the same situation developed in BiH as it did in Slovenia and Croatia, ―the hell would be
one thousand times worse‖.8922 (#Prophesy to punish#! According to which law it was
punishable to profess such a development? And was it one thousand times worse? Did the
President try to persuade the deputies of the common Assembly to go towards a war, or was
he trying to #dissuade them from a war#? ) He also stated that while he was not threatening the
Bosnian Muslims, he was asking them one more time to take seriously the will of the Serbian
people. (Again, the President underlined that it was the Serbian people’s will, not his own.
There were many Serbian uprisals in BiH in the past centuries, much earlier in times before
the President had been born, and he knew what the people he represented could accept and
what not! The President repeatedly stated that the SDS does not create the policy of the
Serbs in Bosnia, but only interpret in and present it. If it wasn’t presented literally, the
people would turn back to some other, more extreme parties!) He finished with a warning that
―[t]his is the road that you want [BiH] to take, the same highway of hell and suffering that
Slovenia and Croatia went through. Don‘t think you won‘t take [BiH] to hell and Muslim people
in possible extinction. Because, Muslim people will not be able to defend itself if it comes to war
here!‖.8923 Given that these speeches were broadcast, the sentiments and particularly the
suggestion that a people would disappear created fear among the Bosnian Muslim population.8924
(This was an #anti-war speech#, and if the Chamber doesn’t consider that, it can not be
8921
See paras. 44, 47; D267 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the 8 th session of SR BiH Assembly, 15 October 1991, with transcript), pp. 1–2.
See also Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4163; D270 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vitomir
Ţepinić, 17 June 1991), pp. 8–9; Milorad Dodik, T. 36839–36840 (9 April 2013); P5843 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Borisav
Jović, 15 October 1991), pp. 2–3; P5842 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vukić, 15 October 1991).
8922
D267 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the 8 th session of SRBiH Assembly, 15 October 1991, with transcript), pp. 2–3. See also Herbert
Okun, T. 1626 (26 April 2010), T. 1669 (27 April 2010).
8923
D267 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the 8th session of SRBiH Assembly, 15 October 1991, with transcript), pp. 3–4. See also Eset
Muraĉević, T. 12673–12674 (1 March 2011); Robert Donia, T. 3101–3105 (1 June 2010); P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011),
para. 96; KDZ310, T. 9176, 9186, 9191–9192 (29 November 2010).
8924
Izet Redţić, P3189 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5022–5023; KDZ026, P2089 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 1993–1994 (under
seal); KDZ026, T. 10414–10415 (18 January 2011) (closed session). See also KDZ029, T. 17613−17614 (22 August 2011) (closed session); Ramiz Mujkić,
T. 12458 (25 February 2011); Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3648–3650; P3707 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić‘s
speech, with transcript), p. 4.
 561

taken as a crime in any other way. It was a public speech in the Parliament, within the
discussion on the matter of the independence of BiH, pursued unilaterally and anti-
constitutionally. As can be seen below, both the President and his community retreated from
this position and made many concessions in order to avoid the war, so that C. Vance
confirmed on 8 March 92 that the President was ready to avoid the war at any cost,
see:..D01833

This is
the #first class evidence#, given by the highest international and the UN representative, and
this is an evidence of an evolution of the Serb position and also a prove of their #concessions
and decisiveness to avoid the war#. So, how possibly the Chamber could accept the
Prosecutor’s claim that the Overarching Joint Criminal Enterprise was established in
October 1991? Between October 1991 and the beginning of the war there was a development
of positions with a constant Serb concessions, to the acceptance of the secession of BiH
provided there would be transformation of the inner structure, which was accepted by the
EC and UN! Had the Lisbon Agreement survived, there would be no war, no any war
crimes, and the solution would be more o lass the same as in the Dayton Agreement! And it is
well known that the Serbs remained faitful to this Agreement!)

2676. This statement was greeted with a loud reaction from the BiH assembly to which the President
responded ―I know these are serious words. Serious situations call for serious words. How will
you prevent that everybody start killing everybody in [BiH]‖ and he concluded that he wanted
them to take the matter of the independence of BiH off the agenda.8925 (#Context, course of
events#! Between this speech of the President and the beginning of the war there were many
events, including the Conference on BiH led by the European Community, with the aim to
facilitate a compromise. The seriousness of the situation as described by the President was
recognized by the entire international community, particularly the EC and UN, and that is
why both of them nominated their mediators far before the war broke out, and the special
Bosnian Conference was posted within the Conference on former Yugoslavia. Had it not
been so serious, there wouldn’t be a #separate conference on BiH#!, as it wasn’t for
Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia. But, is the Chamber of an opinion that the state of mind
of an entire people was a cause of the war? How many alternatives to the war the #Serbs
offered and accepted#, but the Muslim side kept the only variante that secured the war?
#The interest for a war is crucial# in determining any mens rea, any joint criminal enterprise,
any criminal plan. Those who wanted to avoid the war could not have any criminal plan!)

2677. This was not the only occasion on which the President spoke in these terms about the inability
of the Bosnian Muslims to survive if they insisted on independence which would lead to civil war.
On 4 September 1991, he told Krajišnik: ―We‘ll make our point, you see, that‘s where it leads,
where your policies lead!!! […] Do you realise that you will disappear in all this?! [...] Man, you
will disappear. Many of us will also disappear, but you will be annihilated!‖.8926 In response,
Krajišnik suggested that they should deliberately say that both sides would disappear and the
President agreed.8927 (Again, it was a #prediction, not threat#, and that was a result of a
political meditation on a possibility that already had been seen in Croatia, where it was a
civil war, to a higher degree than in Slovenia. On what occasion the President said that? It
was on the occasion of the armed skirmishes in Bratunac, when the Muslim SDA activists

8925
D267 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the 8th session of SRBiH Assembly, 15 October 1991, with transcript), p. 4. See also Vitomir
Ţepinić, T. 33655 (14 February 2013).
8926
P3200 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 4 September 1991), p. 2. See also P5862 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Nikola Koljević, 22 September 1991), p. 2.
8927
P3200 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 4 September 1991), p. 2.
 562

prevented the JNA in taking its record, and the Muslims tried to assassin Rodoljub
Djukanovic, the president of the Executive Board of Bratunac, then there was the killing in
Kravica, and so on. The President said to Kraji[nik what he intended to say to Izetbegovic
concerning his policy. This crisis was one of the first bloody fruits of the SDA policy, and it
was clear that the President opposed this policy. Even out of the context, this can not be used
against the President, because it was aimed to dissuade the SDA from such a policy!)

2634. The President made a similar observation in an intercepted conversation on 12 October 1991
where he said that if the Bosnian Muslims started a war ―they should be thrashed‖ and that they would
―disappear, that people will disappear from the face of the earth […], if they start now. Our offer was
their only chance‖.8928 (The same, #EXCULPATORY#! Dissuading from th war policy!) The
President continued and said that they did not understand that they would be ―up to their necks in blood
and that the Muslim people would disappear, the poor Muslims would disappear, who don‘t know where
he is taking them‖ (Meaning the poor Muslims didn’t know where is their leader Izetbegovic was
leading them!) and that it would be a ―real bloodbath‖.8929 In a similar vein in another conversation on
the same day, the President repeated that the ―Muslims know what it is, it is hell in which five-six
hundreds of thousands of them will disappear, they will disappear‖.8930 (Such a fearfull predictions are
not a crime. Particularly since it was made with the aim to dissuade the Muslims from the cours of
events that led towards the war.

(Yet the Chamber interpreted the #political as well as academic# discussions as threats#, or a
predictions based on some hidden intentions of the President. However, had the Chamber, as
the OTP didn’t, red the President’s words with seriousness, it would be clear that the
President’s position as the position of all the Bosnian Serbs was always defensive. The
position was that the Muslim illegal sovreignity can not be introduced to the Serbian homes
and areas, and therefore they would need a war, to impose the independence to the Serbs.
The Serbs #didn’t have to wage any war# to keep what they did have – a Federal state and
federal laws, which where superior to any republican. Just see what this President said about
this how far the imposed sovreignity would spread: (not further from the Kozja
Cuprija,Goats bridge,) But, there is a plenty of evidence that the Serbs wouldn’t fight to
achieve anything, but would prevent the Muslim authorities to enter their regions and their
homes, see bellow! Also, a treat must be directed to a subject that is treatened, while a
#wards of prediction# communicated to the others can not be considered as a treat, because
in such a case it is not aimed to produce any effect! This must be built up in a
jurisprudence!)

2679. The President echoed this sentiment in an intercepted conversation with Mandić on
13 October 1991 in which he also referred to what happened in Croatia. The President said that
what would happen had nothing to do with his decision or anyone else‘s decision but they knew
what was going to happen in BiH and that ―[i]n just a couple of days, Sarajevo will be gone and
there will be five hundred thousand dead, in one month Muslims will be annihilated in BiH‖.8931
(Exactly, the President said that nothing will depend on him, since the Serbian people sees
what is happening to their brother Serbs in Croatia. In corroboration to this assertion, we
may remind ourselves on the telephone conversation between M. Koroman and the
President, P00962,

8928
D279 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Gojko Đogo, 12 October 1991), pp. 3, 7.
8929
D279 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Gojko Đogo, 12 October 1991), pp. 8–9. See also P5063 (Video footage depicting
interview of Radovan Karadţić on ―Ask the President‖, undated, with transcript), pp. 17–18.
8930
P5846 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and an unidentified male, 12 October 1991), p. 3. For further analysis of this speech, see
Section IV.A.2.b.v: Genocide.
8931
D377 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Mandić, 13 October 1991), p. 2.
 563

and other
documents proving that the ordinary people would act on their own initiative, had they felt
in jeopardy!)

2680. In a telephone conversation on 15 October 1991, the Accused spoke about the attempt to
create an independent BiH, and said ―[t]welve percent of Serbs made hell in Croatia, they didn‘t
allow an Ustasha state to be introduced into their homes, and these here are trying to do this with
thirty-five percent‖ and further stated: ―[t]hat would mean war until their extinction. […] The
Serbs would never forgive them such a thing, it would destroy them completely. First, none of
their leaders would survive, they‘d all be killed in three to four hours. They‘d stand no chance of
surviving whatsoever‖.8932 (Many of these intercepts were just before or after 15 October 91,
in the occasion of the famous Assembly session on which the Muslim/Croat coalition voted
for the independence. In such a dramatic circumstances all the emotions were excited,
because this was a final, climax of the crisis. But anyway, the President only #predicted what
would happen#, not what would he like to happen#, let alone what would he initiate. Also it
wasn’t communicated to the Muslims and can not be considered as a threat.

(If the Chamber interpret the President’s #prediction as his plans#, then it is insane. Neither
the President led the Serbs in Croatia, but they didn’t allowe the Ustasha regime “to be
introduced in their homes” nor could the President stop the Serbs in Bosnia to prevent the
same. From the structure and nature of those conversations it is clearly visible that the
President expresses his own #opinion and expectations, not his intentions#, which was
confirmed in an intercepted conversation (D @ ) when he said that he doesn’t know to
wage a war, and he doesn’t want to wage a war.

2635. The Accused also warned Izetbegović that if the Bosnian Muslims proceeded with a
constitution and referendum for BiH, the Serbs would not be able to recognise BiH since ―events will
overrun you‖ and that he would not be able to hold back the ―extremists‖ who he had until then
restrained with ―all [his] might‖.8933 (#EXCULPATORY#! Exactly, what is in the previous
comment. The Chamber could draw the only reasonable inference that Karadzic was against the
war, and that the events wouldn’t depend on him. Here is a portion of the conversation:

In
the same document (P5877) there is the first killings in BiH, and the President is informing
President Milosevic about that, pointing out the importance of the time and pace of finding out
solutions that are today possiblem, and tomorrow may not be possible, :

8932
P2540 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Miodrag Davidović, 15 October 1991), pp. 5–6. See also Patrick Treanor, T. 14005–
14006 (1 June 2011).
8933
P5877 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 4 September 1991), p. 6.
 564

(And
that this was exactly as it was said it is corroborated with the evidence from Prijedor (they said:
“who is Karadzic to tell us what to do? Let him speak in Sarajevo”. Or from Bratunac, when Mr.
M. Deronjic said that Milosevic-Karadzic policy of preserving Yugoslavia was wrong and there
will be different now!) In October 1991, the President told Milošević that the solution Izetbegović was
pursuing could ―trigger a long-lasting civil war‖ and that the Bosnian Serbs would not accept the BiH
authorities ―in 40 municipalities and all forces would be turned towards opposing this‖; in short, the
situation would be even worse than in Croatia.8934 Milošević responded that it would be better than in
Croatia because the balance of forces was ―vastly more favourable‖.8935 (This is a mere fact, and a
hope that nobody will chose a war while can not win. What is wrong in that? It was clear to the
United Nations and the European Community that the Serbs would simply reject the hostile
fundamentalist authorities, and this fundamentalist authorities couldn’t achieve their supremacy
over the Christian majority without a war!)

2682. The Chamber recalls that after the SRBiH Assembly was adjourned on 15 October 1991
and the Bosnian Serb delegates walked out, the HDZ and SDA delegates reconvened without the
Serb delegates and passed a declaration of sovereignty.8936 (#Illegal Assembly session#! It was
an illegal session of the Assembly, which could be “reconvened” only by the Chairman, or
with his authority! But, it seems to the Chamber that the law and Constitution don’t mean
too much! The only one who could reconvene the Assembly session was it’sh Chairman, Mr.
Krajisnik. #Illegal session means illegal everything#, and anything that was produced at such
a session was nul and void. But some part of the international community do not care about
legal norms!) The SDS Political Council then met to assess the situation.8937 At this meeting it
was noted that the Serbs had to ―shed the illusion that a form of coexistence with the Muslims and
Croats can be found‖.8938 (The Prosecution, and now even the Chamber, is confusing two
crucial elements: there was no any problem with the multy-ethnicity, but only with the
organisation of the state. In other word, the Serbs in BiH, as well as those in Croatia, didn’t
feel secure without protection of the federal state, federal laws and Constitution. Thi is
deeply unfair to shift the main issue of security towards a ethnic intolerance!) The SDS
leadership demanded that the declaration of sovereignty be repealed before 24 October 1991.8939
The SDS position was that unless the declaration of sovereignty was withdrawn within seven days,
the SDS would instruct its members to leave governmental institutions and start creating parallel
institutions.8940 The Bosnian Serb leadership also objected to earlier violations by the Bosnian
Muslims of the inter-party agreement on the sharing of power in BiH.8941 (So what? This was the
#Serb democratic response to a non-democratic violation# of the Constitution. Why the
Chamber takes this arguments in favour of a convicting judgement? No law or any
international provision can deprive one of the constituent communities to rely on the

8934
P5832 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 October 1991), pp. 8–9.
8935
P5832 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 October 1991), p. 9.
8936
See paras. 46, 76.
8937
See para. 76; Adjudicated Fact 1937; D294 (Minutes of SDS Council meeting, 15 October 1991); Robert Donia, T. 3107 (1 June 2010).
8938
D294 (Minutes of SDS Council meeting, 15 October 1991), p. 1.
8939
See para. 46.
8940
D294 (Minutes of SDS Council meeting, 15 October 1991), p. 1.
8941
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4750–4751 (6 July 2010); P1079 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Mandić, 22 July 1991), p. 4.
 565

Constitution! If there is no Constitution, if one side dismisses the fundamental act as

constitution, then the people has rights to self-organisation!)

2683. On 24 October 1991 the President complained to Slobodan Milošević about the steps
which had been taken by Izetbegović towards the independence of BiH.8942 The President
indicated that they had given Izetbegović a deadline to abolish the decisions taken with respect to
the independence of BiH, but Izetbegović did not intend to abolish them.8943 The President
explained that they would ―respond with all means possible‖ and that they would ―establish
Yugoslavia in all the areas where we live‖.8944 He continued and told Milošević that the Bosnian
Muslims wanted ―Europe, to give them a state in which we would be locked within these borders
by international agreements, we can‘t allow that, we have to […] prepare everything, and we have
prepared everything to create a de facto situation […] which they will break their teeth on, they
simply have to break them, there is no way we will live in a country with them. No, no way at all,
that‘s it‖.8945 (This was the Serb right to reject such a huge change of the status without their
consent and against everything that the Constitutions of the SFRY and BiH guaranteed to
them! This was a flagrant #violation of the Serb rights#, and the western “international
community” didn’t react. Any reasonable chamber would see that the #Serb side only
reacted# to the violations of the most important and fundamental rights, by a democratic
means!)

2684. Slobodan Milošević encouraged the Accused to speak to Izetbegović to explain the
position of the Bosnian Serbs but the Accused responded that Izetbegović was a religious fanatic
who could not be talked to.8946 When Milošević asked whether he should speak to Izetbegović,
the Accused responded that he could tell Izetbegović that ―Karadţić and the others will not give up
on establishing an Assembly and parallel organs of authority‖ and that the ―Serbian Assembly‖
would decide on what was to be respected and not.8947 The Accused also suggested that Milošević
tell Izetbegović ―that the Serbs are moving on […] that you can‘t exert influence over us to
mellow things down. We are moving on. We will establish full authority over the Serbian
territories in BiH […]. He will not be able to exercise power. He will not have control over 65%
of his territory. That is our goal‖.8948 (#over the Serbian territories# Once the Muslims
violated the basic principles of the Constitution, particularly those that were guaranteeing
the security of the entire constituent people, there was no more Constitution. At that moment
the Serbs did have every #rights to self-organisation and self-defence#. From this document
it is clear that the Serbs didn’t plan any aggressive move, but only defensive, to prevent the
hostile regime to take over the Serb homes. And these 65% of the territory with the Serb
majority wasn’t result of any military action, that was the fact far before the war!)

2685. Milošević questioned whether it was wise to use ―an illegitimate act in response to another
illegitimate act‖ and questioned the legality of forming a Bosnian Serb Assembly. However, the
President dismissed this and stressed the illegality of the measures taken by the Bosnian Muslims
and the importance of the Bosnian Serb interests.8949 The President emphasised that they held
power in 37 municipalities and had relative majority in about ten municipalities and that they
would not implement ―any of their decisions‖ given that they were leading them to secession from

8942
P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 1.
8943
P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 1.
8944
P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 1.
8945
P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 1.
8946
P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), pp. 1–2, 6.
8947
P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 6.
8948
P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 7. See also P5620 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and an unidentified male, 21 January 1992), pp. 2–4; P5621 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Dobrica
Ćosić, 25 January 1992), p. 8.
8949
P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), pp. 4–5.
 566

Yugoslavia.8950 (This is only another proof that Serbia didn’t run the Republic of Srpska and
that the President and President Milosevic weren’t of the same opinion. President Milosevic
was not right, implying that the Serbs shouldn’t respond on an illegitimate act by another of
the same kind: what illegitimate act, according to what? According to the Constitution which
the Muslims ruined? Once the Muslim/Croat coalition dimissed the Federal and the BiH
Constitution, there was nothing to respect! Finally, the #Badinter’s commission gave the
Serbs right#, and all the conferences right to the Dayton! How come the UN #Tribunal
doesn’t accept what the UN approved and put in a UNSC Resolution#?)

2686. Milošević also suggested that they should not announce the Bosnian Serb Assembly but
the President responded ―[b]ut we have to announce it! There can be no discussion about it, this is
an obligation of the Serbian people and the representatives of the Serbian people in [the]
executive, because they will start arresting us, they‘ll start pacifying municipalities forcibly,
forcibly, installing special forces, we will not allow that‖.8951 When Slobodan Milošević
suggested that the President not call it an assembly, the President insisted: ―No […] we can‘t do
that to the people. The people […] feel they have been robbed and destroyed‖.8952 (A perfect
evidence that the Sebs in BiH were autonomous from Belgrade! There was many other
disagreements and discussions, until President Milosevic got into some obligations to the
West, and did a lot efforts to through the President out of the Office!))

2687. In this same conversation Slobodan Milošević expressed his reservations about how a
Bosnian Serb Assembly could exclude the Muslims who were ―for Yugoslavia‖, but the President
replied: ―There are none, President! Not even 10% [...] we can‘t take a risk for those 10%! That‘s
out of the question! The Serbian people want a clear situation. We cannot go on pretending
anymore. They‘ve destroyed us, we have to respond. We can‘t just mobilise the people for
nothing‖.8953

2688. The President also stated that ―the army can no longer agree to cease-fires, it is out of the
question. TuĊman has to be militarily crushed, the military might of Croatia has to be destroyed. I
guarantee you that after Friday 500,000 Serbs must rise again, there can be no more discussion
about it, this is destroying, exhausting, crippling, dragging us into the winter and we will all be
ruined‖.8954 (Even now many would say that the President was right. The Croatian
secessionsis attacket Yugoslavia, illegaly changed the Constitution, expelled the Serbs from
the Constitution, created a secret army, clandestinely armed it, and finally attacked
Yugoslavia on the territories where the Serbs made majority! The JNA was obliged to
preserve the territorial integrity without waiting any special order. If it was Izrael, the Army
would be in the Croatian Capitol within a few days, instead of exhausting itself, it’s
resources, and creating a bad image in the world public! But, this pertained to the war in
Croatia, and is not relevant for this case, since it was the President’s private opinion, a sort
of “tith-for-that” with President Milosevic, who wanted to influence the Bosnian Serbs!
During the war in Bosnia the President also ordered a maximum of restraint on the
battlefield!) When Slobodan Milošević suggested a more considered approach without getting

8950
P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 5.
8951
P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), pp. 5–6.
8952
P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 6. See also P5817 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Boţidar Vuĉurović, 14 November 1991), p. 2 (in which the Accused said that if he stood up in the Assembly and said that
they accepted the independence and sovereignty of BiH, the people would reject it and take up arms including against him). This conversation was referred
to by the Accused in his final brief. Defence Final Brief, para. 266. The Chamber finds that in light of the weight of evidence, the Accused‘s observation
was purely rhetorical and he had no intention of acknowledging the independence of BiH. (It doesn’t matter, the main issue is that the
President was not an all-mighty lord of the Serbs. As said many times, the SDS didn’t create the policy of the Serb
people, it was interpreting it as it was created by the Serbs themselves, by their political rights and will.
8953
P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 7.
8954
P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 2.
 567

excited, the Accused replied: ―No, we‘re not excited at all. Our steps are calculated and we have
to establish authority and control over our territories, so that he doesn‘t get his sovereign Bosnia.
Croatia doesn‘t have control over 30% of its territory, and Bosnia will not have control over 60%
of its territory!‖.8955 (#Control over our territories#! The President described to President
Milosevic what he ought to do, as did President Linkoln, when the country was facing the
destruction. He didn’t do as Lincoln would. That is why now there is no Serbs in their
eternal areas in Croatia and Kosovo! The Great Britain didn’t allow the Falkland Islands to
unilaterally secede, nor it allowed the Northern Ireland to join the Republic of Ireland, and
this is #the most similar example (Northern Ireland)#: majority of Unionists in the north
part of the Irish island, the same as the Serb majority in a big portion of BiH!)

2689. Despite these words of caution, Slobodan Milošević, in meetings with international
representatives, did not accept the independence of BiH and spoke of the desire of all Serbian
people to live together.8956 (Because it had been a status quo, it had been achieved in 1918, but
with the Comunist tricks it was ruined. Any resistence to the illegal moves is obligatory!) In
September 1991, Milošević told the Accused that they should ―get mobilised, acquire the arms and
get going‖.8957 (A #CRIMINAL DISTORTION#! This is a forgery of the worst kind.
President Milosevic responded to the President’s question whether the ceasefire with Croatia
is sincere, and President Milosevic responded that it seems sincere for a short term, because
they are in troubles, but will not be sincere for a long term. They (The Croatian Army)
would mobilize, get armament and continue with their path: see P5861, p. 5:

So,
President Milosevic described what the Croats are going to do, to temporarily respect the
ceasefire, until they mobilise more people and arme them, and then they are going to
continue with the fights. However, the Chamber interpreted it in the above paragraph as if
President Milosevic gave an advise to the President what to do and what the Serbs should
8955
P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), pp. 7–8.
8956
KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 6747 (under seal).
8957
P5861 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September
1991), p. 5.
 568

do! Couldn’t be worse distortion. In the same document the President confirmed that the
Serbs do not need any party units, and that the SDS is supporting mobilisation and it’s
influence is stopped at the entrance of the JNA barracks. President Karad`i} also confirmed
what were the “Serb war objectives: only those of the Army, to defend the country, wrongly
translated as “to defend the Army: See P5861:

T
his was a genuine expression on the “war objectives of the Serbs” but neither the
Prosecution, nor the Chamber payed any attention to this important sentence! Also, in
September 1991 there was no a war in Bosnia, and how the Chamber could have allowed it’s
associates to make such a huge error?) In November 1991, when the Accused informed
Milošević that Izetbegović did not want BiH to be in Yugoslavia, Milošević asked him to ―take
care of this and nothing else‖.8958 The Accused responded that he would but that they should
―prepare a reserve variant‖ because he did not ―know what will it be like tomorrow‖.8959 (A
precaution forbidden to the Serbs#!) In a conversation with General Uzelac on 2 November
1991, the President discussed the mobilisation of the Serb population in BiH, stating ―I‘ll call all
the presidents of the municipalities […] to deploy the army‖.8960 (Without a #temporal context#
this may sound whatever someone wants, but it must be kept in mind that it was still
Yugoslavia with all laws and obligations. Those who rejected and resisted molibisation,
commited a federal crime. Those who facilitated the mobilisation had fulfilled their
obligation. Even Izetbegovic admitted that they violated the law by hindering the
mobilisation.)

2690. The Chamber recalls that a plebiscite was held in November 1991 to determine whether
Serbs in BiH wished to remain in a joint state of Yugoslavia, and the overwhelming majority voted
in favour.8961 The President delivered a speech connected with the plebiscite where he said if there
was a sovereign BiH it would be ―without our areas‖ unless there was an exchange of
population.8962 (This is again an unacceptable misinterpretation. It was said as follows:

(In
numbering out the alternatives of the solution of the BH crisis, the President said that the
#third alternative was to let the two other sides to form their state# or states, but without the
Serb areas. In that case some of the Serb areas must stay in the state of others, unless they
decide to exchange the property and resettle. This was an alternative that would go without
any war, and in negotiations. Such a way West Virginia was founded, such a way North
8958
P5897 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 14 November 1991), p. 3.
8959
P5897 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 14 November 1991), p. 3.
8960
P5824 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and General Uzelac, 2 November 1991), pp. 1–2, 6–8.
8961
See para. 47. See also Robert Donia, T. 3107 (1 June 2010).
8962
P958 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 5.
 569

Ireland remained in Britain, that was the third democratic alternative, without any war, and
re-setlement would depend only on a free will!)

The Accused in this speech said that he had openly told Izetbegović that ―no Muslim foundation
shall ever be laid in Serb areas and Serb villages whether or not you import Turks because we will
instruct Serbs not to sell land to Muslims. […] The first foundations that are laid will be blown up,
and all foundations that are laid will be blown up‖.8963 (#Distortion#! One has a right to expect a
trial Chamber to be accurate, let alone honest and impartial. However, this quotation is
managed and edited with the aim to damage the President. Look how it is originally:

It was more than clear that the President told to Izetbegovic that the Serbs would oppose
their plan to #resettle a millions of Turks# into BiH. This kind of artificial alteration of the
ethnic composition is not allowed anywhere. Now we see how it could have been achieved:
the whole Europe sees it: they make a chaos in the Midle East, and a millions of refugees flee
towards Europe. But, those manipulations are even worse than those of the Prosecution. It
looks as if the same aiding clarks constructed the Indictment and the Judgement. A so called
“new settlements” of one ethnicity built up on the terrain of another, antagonised, ethnicity
is an act of aggression and an act of war, and when that happens somewhere else, the whole
world is protesting! Remember the West coast settlements#!) He also envisaged that there was
a chance that they would fight, and they were prepared to ―let the chips fall where they may‖ in the
knowledge that the Serbs were better armed and that the war would be bloody.8964 He also
emphasised that they would not give up on their territories and that it was ―a fight to the finish, a
battle for living space‖.8965 (#Not give up their territories! What it was if not a defensive
strategy? But, everyone knows that those who are defending their space are not fighting for
a new living space, whyle those who do so much to occupy other’s living space are fighting
for the living space. And what the Accuse said meant that the Muslims are in a campaign for
gaining a living space. Now, the entire Europe sees it clearly.)

2691. In December 1991, Milošević told the Accused that he should not give in to Izetbegović
and that they had to stick to their line and that ―if they want to fight, we‘ll fight‖ given that the
Serbs were stronger.8966 (#Abused#! Let us see how this intercept is [ab]used for the purpose
of the Prosecution, P5790:

8963
P958 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 6. See also Eset Muraĉević, T. 12673–12676, 12683 (1 March
2011); Eset Muraĉević, T. 12822 (2 March 2011).
8964
P958 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 6.
8965
P958 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 6.
8966
P5790 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 20 December 1991), pp. 2–3.
 570

(#Choice
to fight is their#! Which of those sentences of the President could be used aainst him? The
President Milosevic, talking about forthcoming tour on the Conference in the Hague (ICFY)
announced that there will be no more Serb concessions, no matter what pressure will be
posed on the Serb side. In his words it is clear tha the choice o fighting is on the other side,
not the Serb choice, because the Serbs didn’t demand anything they already didn’t have.
And the President confirmed the prospective of a common life in a complete equality! : They
also spoke about the unconstitutional nature of the decision changing the status of BiH.8967
(Correct, and #EXCULPATORY#!!! There was no possibility for the BiH to declare an
independence bypassing the Constitution. The whole Europe was obliged to warn the SDA
on this violation of Constitution. To be honest, Mr. Badinter contested the BiH declaration
on independence, rejected to approve it, mentioned that already there is the Republic of
Srpska, and directed BiH to a normal procedure encisaged for the changes of Constitution!)
In an intercepted conversation on 17 December 1991, the Accused affirmed his commitment to use
force to ensure that the establishment of a sovereign and independent BiH did not result in the
separation of Bosnian Serbs from other Serbs in the former Yugoslavia.8968 It is again #forged
and misinterpreted#. Let us see how was it in original: P5794, p. 4 (B. Kostic – the

President):

8967
P5787 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 25 December 1991), pp. 2–3.
8968
P5794 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Branko Kostić, 17 December 1991), pp. 4–5 (wherein Kostić stated ―nobody can make a
decision on his own, er, each possible Bosnian request for recognition and so on, leads directly into a conflict‖ and the Accused responded: ―[d]irectly to
war, a bloody, bloody and dangerous war‖.).
 571

BRANKO KOSTIC SAID THAT NOBODY IN BIH COULD DO ANYTHING ON HIS OWN, BECAUSE IT LEADS
INTO CONFLICT, AND THE PRESIDENT AGREED. BUT, IT WAS NOT AS THE JUDGMENT
SAIS, THAT THE PRESIDENT “AFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO USE FORCE…”!
IT WAS A DISCUSSION ABOUT WHAT MAY HAPPEN IF THE SOLUTION IS NOT SETTLED BY THE
TALKS, AND NOBODY INDICATED THAT IT WAS SOMETHING THE INTERLOCUTORS WANTED OR
LIKED TO SEE, OR THAT IT WAS IN ANYONE’S HANDS. HOW THE CHAMBER IS ALLOWED TO
DISTORT THE FACST IN SUCH A WAY? AND THE PRESIDENT CONTINUED:

And on p. 7, talking about an agreement among the four republics, the President said what
the #Chamber mis-interpreted as his “commitment” to use the force#:

So, there is a word about a new arrangement between the four republics, and the President
supported the Yugoslav Presidency’s plan to defend this new arrangement even with a war
had it be necessary. So, this had nothing to do with any plan of the Serbs in Bosnia, nor their
plans and actions, A COMPLETELY WRONG QUATATION AND CERTAINLY WRONG
INFERENCES THAT WERE BASED ON IT. In relation to the possible secession of BiH, the
President stated ―we will completely defend the country‖, including if necessary by war, ―fuck
them, if they fuck around, the country should be defended with all powers‖.8969 This is what was
pasted above, and has #nothing to do with the Bosnian Serbs#. In the same conversation B.
Kostic [a member of the federal Presidency] presented what will be agreed “next week”, and
the President informed him how many political parties, particularly non-Serb parties
wanted to contribute to the preservation of Yugoslavia. All was about the Yugoslav
Presidecy plans how to preserve this smaller Yugoslavia, although after that the republics
would have a possibility to secede on an agreed way:

And explaining that Slovenia #should be granted the independence# immediately, and the
Federal Parliament to be in a constant session, to decrease the tensions:

No confusion: the two were talking about the possibilities to decrease the tensions, to facilitate a
legal secession for the two already seceded Republics, consolidate the state and further

8969
P5794 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Branko Kostić, 17 December 1991), p. 7.
 572

enable Macedonia to secede if wanted. All of it by peacefull means, except if somebody

attacks the Federal State.
(Any #violation of the Constitution deserves a resistance#. Any unilateral and anti-
constitutional partition of a sovereign state can be prevented by politics, but if it turns to be
armed secession, to be opposed by the army. This is in every constitution of every state.
President Linkoln was not sued, because he was right. The examples from recent history are
supporting the Serb right to stay in the Federal state while it existed: Northern Ireland,
West Virginia, Belgium, Spain, and many other states with the different ethnicities. Who
was authorized to subjugate the Serbs to the Muslim domination, even if there was no the
Islamic declaration?)

2692. On 21 December 1991, at the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the President issued another
warning about the hundreds of thousands of deaths, destruction, displacement of people and
population homogenisation which would occur if there was a civil war in BiH.8970
(#EXCULPATORY#!!! Puttning this back in context, first should be remainded that on 19
December 91 the Muslim-Croat part of the Government unilaterally and un-constitutionally
checked to the EC for the independence. Neither the Government was authorised to do that,
nor any body could do that without the consent of the Serb legitimate representatives, and
after that, without a referendum. That is what the #Badinter commission said in it’s Opinion
No. 4#.

(This is a flagrant proof that this #court is a political# one, because it is dealing with a
#selective political issues#. For instance only in this document (D00086) there is a complete
survey of the political life in the crisis, discussed by the most prominent Serbs,
representatives of the Serbian community. In this discussion there had been explicated all
and every irregularity and violation of the laws and constitutions, and yet presented the
#Serbian conciliatory suggestions and alternatives#, all of which led to a peaceful solution.
The President words from only this one document are sufficient to discharge him of any
mean toughts or intentions. Instead, we see in the Judgement a few klips or a #crippled
sentences#, which heavily compromise those who assembled this Judgement. Here are some
examples, only from the President’s speeches: D00086, P. 20 r.

Karadzic:

8970
D86 (Shorthand Record of 4th session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 December 1991), pp. 40–41. See P1353 (Shorthand record of 10th session of SerBiH
Assembly, 11 March 1992), pp. 4–6. See also KDZ310, T. 9191–9192 (29 November 2010).
573

p.21.
 574

(#Commendable# used against Karad`i}#! And those are the critical parts of the President’s
speech at the Serb Assembly (D00086) it is absolutely clear that the President strongly
advocated and defended the idea that later had been proposed in the Lisbon Agreement, in
all other peace proposals, and finally in the Dayton Agreement. And this wasn’t a
“warning”, it was an explanation of the Serb leadership to the Serb Assembly how we can
avoid the most dreadful scenario. Instead of awarding the President for his peacefull efforts,
it is used against him. In the same speech, a bit later (p.38) The President explained what is
at a disposal, which alternatives:
 575

And it
was the same Assembly session, on 21 December, when the President proposed (D00086, p.40
eng) the final political solution that prevailed in all the European and American capitols and
Governments. It was a #peaceful and democratic solution#:

(#Karad`i} proposals valuable, accepted by EC, UN and great powers, built in all the peace
plans#! All other constructions about the mens rea of this President, and others from the
leadership, should be dismissed with the indignation, because the solution proposed by the
President was so valuable to survive the three and a half years of a fierce fratricidal war, for
which the President is not liable a bit, while those who are condemning him are liable 100%.
And this truth is not going to disappear or become pale.)

2693. In January 1992, the Accused spoke to Krajišnik and said ―we have to realise our minimum
aim, there‘s no other way. Nothing should and nothing can stop us. No way‖.8971 (Do not oversee
#“our minimun aim”#, which is crucial minimalist determination. All other sides were never
satisfied with their minimum, they wanted their maximums, which included the subjugation
of the Serbs to their power.) The Accused was also angry about Izetbegović speaking openly
about a sovereign and independent BiH, and said: ―Does he want someone to destroy Sarajevo?
[…] he‘s really crazy […] fuck him. We will release our tigers and let them do their job‖. 8972 He
went on to say that he had been calming the Serb people for a year, but that he ―will not be
calming anyone anymore, nor can I‖ and that they could no longer hold back their people
anymore.8973 (The President was very angry! It was a minimum taking into account
circumstances! Once and for all – nobody, nobody was entitled to violate anyone’s basic
rights, guaranteed in the Constitutions and laws. Nobody! And this Chamber, and this
Tribunal is lecturing the Serbs that their protection of their political rights was a crime,
while all others, including the UN and the Tribunal supporting governments made all these
crimes they charged the President and the Serbs for. Apart from it, this was obvious that the
leadership had a #difficulties to calm down the people# that was extremely upset seeing what
the Muslims were doing!)
2694. As early as January 1992, Koljević warned of the danger of an Islamic republic being
created.8974 In this regard, Koljević spoke with TuĊman and noted that they had a common
interest of separating people, that an independent BiH did not suit them as it would separate them
from their ―mother lands‖, and that they advocated a sovereign Muslim, Serbian and Croatian

8971
P5779 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 1 January 1992), p. 3.
8972
P5779 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 1 January 1992), p. 5.
8973
P5779 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 1 January 1992), pp. 5–6.
8974
P986 (Transcript of a meeting between Nikola Koljević, Franjo TuĊman, and Franjo Boras, 8 January 1992), pp. 3–4.
 576

Bosnia.8975 (The late Dr. Koljevic didn’t propose anything aggressive, but a political solution,
always having in mind the #Islamic Declaration as a leading document# of the Muslim side.
What Dr. Koljevic proposed to President Tudjman had been immediately accepted by the
UN and the European Community! But, anyway, how this #political talks can bi
incriminated#? Dr. Koljevic wasn’t alone with the President Tudjman, he was in his capacity
of the member of the Bosnian Presidency, together with another, a Croatian member of the
same, Mr. Franjo Boras. And it was a talk between the two Presidencies, #what does it have
to do with the President#?)

2695. At a meeting of the SRBiH Assembly on 24 January 1992, the issue of a national
referendum was discussed and the speakers from the SDS opposed the holding of a
referendum.8976 (#Interpretation instead of document itself#! #Criminal distortion#! Not
exactly. And it is not clear why the Chamber used an interpretation of a member of the
ECMM, instead of the original transcript. The ECMM were monitors, not analysts, neither
they understood what was going on, or had the interpreters of the Muslim provenance, who
conditioned their understanding. Neither they had been all the time in the hall. A
#deceptions after deceptions#. This is what was the Serb position, not only SDS, because at
that time there was already the Serbian Assembly formed of several parties. In the eve of this
session there was a meeting of the Club of representatives, discussing the attendance of the
Serb MP-s, and here is what the President said: P03119, p. 1

(#Commendable, conciliatory#! This Assembly session was one of the most important, the
Chamber had a complete transcript of it (D00087) to estimate what was the position of this
President. From p. 99 (eng) there was a completely clear position of the President. The SDA
Vice-President Muhamed Cengic (who at the same time was a Deputy Prime Minister)
agreed with the President to propose to the Assembly the following: the Government to do
the regionalisation and establish a new regions that would make all the three ethnic
communities feel free and be sovereign. Then, all the three communities participate in the
referendum to confirm that such a transformed Bosnia be independent and sovereign. For
that purpose, Mr. M. Cengic proposed that the referendum be postponed to 10 March. The
Serbs and the President agreed. And this is what happened at this session, contrary to what
Mr. Doyle reported to the EC, and the Chamber took it as a meritory “expertise”.
#Opinions contra documents#! This is unacceptable and deeply erroneous and damaging of
the President’s position. Look at that:

8975
P986 (Transcript of a meeting between Nikola Koljević, Franjo TuĊman, and Franjo Boras, 8 January 1992), pp. 5–6, 9, 37–38.
8976
P942 (ECMM report re the BiH Assembly meeting held on 24–25 January 1992), p. 1; Colm Doyle, T. 2825–2826 (27 May 2010).
 577

Radovan Karadzic (…)

The President further said, responding to a question how the JNA would react on the
agreement of the three Bosnian communities: (D00087, p. 109
 578

That is how close to the solution was the Bosnian Assembly, with the full participation and
contribution of the Serb side (all the Serb parties) and the President). The #solution agreed
at this session even before the Lisbon Agreement and Cutilleiro plan, maximally resembles
the Lisbon as well as the final, Dayton Agreement#. But let us se how the Chamber came to
this conclusion, #though an unacceptable distortion#!. After this accord there was a break of
an hour or two, and the SDA withdrew its own proposition sincerely accepted by the Serbs.
As it can be seen from p.113 and on, the document was not on the agenda at all, and the
Muslim side tried to smuggle it and have it voted without the procedure. And that is the
truth about this session, not what the Doyle’s interpretor suggested to him. And why use an
interpretation of an interpretation from an interested in the affair to an outsider (Doyle and
his interpretor) instead of using the original?

The Serb position was that they would not accept or allow themselves to become a minority in BiH
and that they would not be forced to do something they did not want to do. (Should they?) The
Serbs also expressed their concern that the SDA wanted to create an Islamic state in BiH and that
the only guarantee for the Serbs was to have a separate state in BiH.8977 (This was not exactly
what the Serbs expressed at this session of the common Assembly, see the above comment.
As far as it is concerned with the Islamic state, it became of the Serb concern only after the
SDA pushed towards the independence of the unitary BiH under their domination. The SDA
or Mr. Izetbegovic never denounced the Islamic declaration as a state program. What else
could the Serbs think of it? And why the Chamber is quoting that within the frame of this
sentencing Judgement? Was it the President’s crime?) The SDS under the leadership of the

8977
P942 (ECMM report re the BiH Assembly meeting held on 24–25 January 1992), p. 1; Colm Doyle, T. 2825–2826 (27 May 2010).
 579

President withdrew from the session when no agreement could be reached and, following their
withdrawal, the BiH Assembly supported a referendum being held between 29 February and
1 March regarding the sovereignty and independence of BiH.8978 (#Illegal Assembly session#!
They did not have right to re-convene the session, nor to make any decision which would be
contrary to the will of the legitimate Serb representatives. That pertained to any vital and
important decision, particularly those of the constitutional nature. What is to be done that
the Court and some chambers take a look of the constitutions of the republics in the region?
How would it look like if the Flamish people decide for the entire Belgium to join the
Netherlands, contrary to the will of the Valona people?) On 19 February 1992, the Chairman
of the SDS Executive Board ordered the municipal and regional boards of the SDS to hold
immediate meetings and to draw up a plan of action to stop the referendum and to explain to
―every adult Serb‖ that they should boycott the referendum which would be illegal after the
adoption of the Constitution of the SerBiH.8979 (#Wrong, not to stop the referendum, but to
boycott it# Boycotting is legal democratic action! The referendum was illegal no matter the
Constitution of the SerBiH is adopted or not! This is a part of anyone’s political rights. A
general remark: the Chamber is doing something which must not be done by anyone, let
alone by a judicial institution – #dealing with the politics, denying the political rights#, the
rights on the political life, and drawing a #politicaly motivated inferences# under a
presumption that the said ethnic community (in this case the Serb community) didn’t have
any rights prior to the crisis, nor it had any rights to influence the changes that had been
initiated by the two other ethnic communities.

2696. The Chamber recalls that on 23 February 1992, the Cutileiro Plan was proposed and
called for an independent and geographically continuous BiH, comprised of the three constituent
units that represented the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs.8980 The Cutileiro
Plan included constitutional principles for BiH and proposed the structure of the Assembly and
government of BiH.8981 The President decided to accept the Cutileiro Plan notwithstanding the
fact that it contemplated BiH as an independent state, with cantons where ethnic minorities would
remain, even though this was less than what the Bosnian Serb leadership had wished for, namely
to remain in Yugoslavia.8982 (#This is not correct#, although not criminal!!! Already on 21
December 91 the Serb Assembly listened to what the President proposed to the MPs as a new
political platform for negotiations, and the main part of this new platform was this concept
of the BiH as a confederation of the three constituent units. And that was a move of the good
will of the Serbs in Bosnia to coexist in one state of BiH in a way nobody dominate. However,
it was a #painful compromise and concession# from the Serb side, a minimum of the
safeguards of security! The acceptance of the Cutileiro plan is the crown evidence that the
Serbs didn’t have any plan alleged in the Indictment!) In a conversation with Kuprešanin on
23 February 1992, the Accused expressed satisfaction with the recent international negotiations
where the Cutileiro Plan was discussed, stating:

We achieved maximum success because we achieved that Bosnia cannot be a single state anymore
and that it will be composed of three republics. In one paper they even called them states. […]
Our police on our territory. Our national guard on our territory. Our national guard, and we‘re
pushing further: our army on our territory, one that is placed under a single command in case of an

8978
P942 (ECMM report re the BiH Assembly meeting held on 24–25 January 1992), p. 2; Colm Doyle, T. 2825–2826 (27 May 2010).
8979
P5475 (Letter from SDS Executive Board to SDS Municipal and Regional Boards BiH, 19 February 1992).
8980
See International Peace Negotiations Section, para. 14. The Chamber does not consider that Mandić‘s assertion that this plan demonstrated that the Bosnian
Serb leadership did not intend to exchange populations in BiH to have a basis. Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4895 (8 July 2010).
8981
See International Peace Negotiations Section, para. 14.
8982
D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), paras. 39, 50. See also D3645 (Witness statement of Nenad Kecmanović dated
27 May 2013), paras. 55–56; Milorad Dodik, T. 36849–36850 (9 April 2013).
 580

external enemy.8983 (#EXCULPATORY#!!! The EC and UN and USA recognised it as a just

and honest plan, and that is how it was proposed in all the five peace plans, and how it had
been adopted in the Dayton. Why the war was waged? Who needed this war? The local
ethnic communities didn’t! and the Serbs and the President do not bare any responsibility
for this catastrophic development!)

2697. On 25 February 1992, the Accused summarised the outcome of the talks at a session of the
Bosnian Serb Assembly and stated that the Bosnian Serbs had agreed to the three main principles
of the Cutileiro Plan which stated that BiH would (i) be an independent state, (ii) maintain its
present borders; and (iii) consist of three constituent parts.8984 However, when war broke out the
option of an independent BiH with cantons was dropped.8985 (#Unacceptable distortion#! #Quite
opposite#: first the “options of an independent BiH with cantons” i.e. the Lisbon Agreement
and the Cutileiro Plan was abandoned by the Muslim side, and then the war broke out.
Everyone knows that there wouldn’t be any war if the Muslims didn’t reject already agreed
plan, see: D02981 Cutilleiro’s letter to the “Ecconomist” and Cutilleiro’s testimony, D02981:

(Certainly, the solution in the #Cutileiro plan was the bottom line concession# of the Serb
side to accept Bosnia to secede from Yugoslavia. It was a “conditio sine qua non” any Bosnia
with the Serbs out of Yugoslavia. Those who decided to achieve more through the war are
widely responsible for all catastrophy that followed, and that were not the Serbs, not even
the Bosnian Croats, but the Muslims and their international mentors. It was so natural that
the previous peaceful solutions couldn’t survive after the war broke out. The same was with
the Serbian negotiating position, which had to be redefined, as in “6 strategic objectives”
which were different before the war.

2698. The Chamber recalls that the referendum on the question of SRBiH independence was
held on 29 February and 1 March 1992 and resulted in a vote in favour of independence.8986
(#Criminal alteration of facts#!!! This is not right!!! Wrong inference, i.e. wrong finding!
There was no even close to the required two third of the general list of voters. Further, even
if they had the two third on the referendum (which was not the case), they were obliged to
come back in the Assembly and get at least one MP above the two third of all representatives
voting in favour of independence. So, this Tribunal, not only it’s Prosecution, but some

8983
P5745 (Intercept of conversation between (i) Radovan Karadţić and an unidentified male; (ii) Radovan Karadţić and Vojo Kuprešanin, 23 February 1992),
p. 3.
8984
See para. 325; D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), pp. 11–12; P798 (Statement of Principles, Lisbon Agreement,
23 February 1992).
8985
Vladislav Jovanović, T. 34300–34305 (26 February 2013); D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), paras. 38–39, 41.
8986
See Adjudicated Fact 395; P5427 (Proclamation of the SDS Executive Board, undated); P5530 (Proclamation of the SDS Executive Board, 20 February
1992), p. 3.
 581

Chambers too, participates in the huge lie and forgery of the results in BH crisis! #This all
looked like a lynch, so hasty and irregular, that nobidy verified the result! But, anyway, after
this referendum there was agreed the Lisbon Agreement and the Cutileiro’s plan, on 18
March!)

2699. (How come, the Chamber #neglected the most dramatic development#, the killing at
the Serb wedding ceremony on 1 March 92?) In February 1992, Jovanović spoke with the
Accused and Koljević about the Cutileiro Plan; they discussed internal borders in BiH and the
establishment of cantonal units in BiH based on ethnic principles.8987 Jovanović explained to the
Accused that his priorities should be to synchronise the negotiations in order to provide the
maximum protections for the Serbian people and to form cantons which were both economically
and geographically sustainable.8988 (#What is wrong with that#? What would do the
Prosecution without these illegally obtained intercepts? What is wrong with Mr. Jovanopvic
advises?) Jovanović warned the Accused that Europe could ask for a commitment towards an
independent BiH, and told the Accused not to mention state borders.8989 The President spoke
about having three entities in BiH as a confederation ―based on the national territories where
national communities make a majority and they have their organs plus common organs‖.8990 (#All
legal, peaceful, democratic and already negotiated and agreed in the Hague during the 1991#
sessions of the Conference on Yugoslavia. Does this Tribunal deny this heritage of the EC –
UN activity on the Yugoslav crisis in the ICFY in 1991?) Jovanović spoke with Koljević about
maintaining the right to self-determination and to independently organise or integrate with ―the
mother country‖ but that in negotiations they did not have to mention directly integration with the
mother countries.8991 (Totally irrelevant! It was #discussion about what already been agreed
upon with Cutilleiro.# The “integration” with the “mother countries” was codified in the
Dayton agreement as a “special parallel ties”.)

2700. In February 1992, the Accused in meetings with international representatives expressed
his view that the request of BiH for independence was a ―very irresponsible move‖ and he had a
tough time keeping Serbs quiet and that he was worried about deaths and disaster.8992
(#EXCULPATORY#!!! The President was not the only one who said that the offering Bosnia
to request the independence was very irresponsible. Almost all of the contemporary
politicians said so. Peres de Cuellar said so, Cirus Vance said so, Pinheiro said that Bosnia
could only have been a tripartite, Lord Carrington said it was premature, and many, many
others. Lord Owen said that the Serbs had a very founded reasons to fear from the new
authorities established after the 1990. elections.@@@ to paste!) He also stated that it was
very hard to disarm the people in BiH because individuals held 500,000 weapons.8993 ( The
Chamber should already have known that the Tito’s #Doctrine of the armed people# and a
very developed net of the Territorial defence organisations obtained an enormous number of
weaponry, aimed to be used in a defence against the Warshow pact. What is the crime in this
opinion of the President? Wasn’t it also an anti-war attitude? This was another warning of
the President that a war had to be avoided!) He emphasised that any moves towards the
independence of BiH would imply a very cruel war.8994 (This is yet another #irregularity,

8987
D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), para. 49.
8988
D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), para. 49; P5750 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić, Nikola
Koljević, and Vladislav Jovanović, 12 February 1992), pp. 3–4.
8989
P5750 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić, Nikola Koljević, and Vladislav Jovanović, 12 February 1992), p. 6.
8990
P5750 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić, Nikola Koljević, and Vladislav Jovanović, 12 February 1992), pp. 4–5. See also D2149 (Aide
mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 9; P5063 (Video footage depicting interview of Radovan Karadţić on ―Ask the President‖, undated, with transcript),
p. 4; P3119 (Minutes of meeting of the Club of Deputies from the SDS and SPO, 23 January 1992), p. 1.
8991
P5750 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić, Nikola Koljević, and Vladislav Jovanović, 12 February 1992), p. 22.
8992
P778 (Fifth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 41.
8993
P778 (Fifth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 41.
8994
KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 6749–6750 (under seal).
 582

unfairness and unacceptable error#. The Chamber is relying on a conversation interpreted

in another process, in which nobody represented the interests of this President. The
interpretor of this conversation is from an organisation that should never be a witness, nor
speak on this subject which is #out of his scope#. Beside it, the Chamber knows very well
that to the time it was widely known that the Serb position was not that there can be any
independence of Bosnia, and that the Serbs accepted a possibility of the independence of a
transformed Bosnia. The same witness testified in this case, why the Chamber needed
something that happened out of the presence of the President?) The Accused was described by
international representatives as ―very radical‖ and they observed that it was important that the
Accused‘s ―illusions‖ were overcome.8995 International representatives also identified that
negotiations with the Accused, Koljević, and Krajišnik were the most difficult.8996 (#What a
mockery#! The international representatives were not qualified to judge personalities of the
Serb representatives, particularly not to offer their “psychological expertise” to a court.
They were there not even to negotiate, but only to mediate between the sides to the talks
(later conflict). This is #insolent and bruthal#, and arrogant to judge what are “illusions”,
and it would rather be a reason for the Chamber to dismiss this testimony, than to pay a
credit to it. The negotiating process has its dynamics and axiomas. If the President was a
very permissive, then his opponents on the Muslim-Croat side would estimate that the Serb
side is weak and should be pressed more. And what is that anyone’s business how the Serbs
negotiated? The Chamber should neglect that kind of opinions of the people who hoped to be
more successful on the Serb weakness. This is going to be remembered as many other pearls
of a distorted justice. The international community imposed the war on the Serbs, then
negotiated on behalf of the Serb enemies, and then characterized the Serbs from the
standpoint of the interests of the Serb adversaries. Finally, the final solution, The Dayton
Agreement, was what the President indicated as the last Serb concession, and it is the best
proof that he wasn’t radical!)
THERE IS NO MORE FLAGRANT EVIDENCE THAT ALL THIS AFFAIRE IS #PURE POLITICAL
MANIPULATION#. THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIATORS, WHO CAUSED AND CONTRIBUTED A
GREAT DEAL TO THE VIOLENT AND UNLAWFUL DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA WERE NOT
SATISFIED THAT THE SERBS HAD THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AND REPRESENTATIVES WHO
PRESENTED IT…. .

2701. The Accused also told international observers that Bosnian Serbs would not fight after the
map of BiH was decided.8997 (The #bay-pas opinions of a rare and “from time to time”
interlocutors are abused# by the Chamber. It was never said that the President would not
fight after the map of BH be decided. It was an assessment of the President that once the
provinces, the constituent units are agreed, nobody would fight. This was within the
President’s opinion that not too many people wanted to remain in an area which could have
changed the “owner”, i.e. to belong to another ethnic community. ALSO, IF THE
TERRITORIES HAD BEEN ALLOCATED DEFINITLY, NOBODY WOULD FIGHT
ANY LONGER, BECAUSE THERE WOULD NOT BE ANY REASON. ) At an SDS

8995
P779 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 24. Skoko stated that the Accused always looked for reasons to accept
international peace plans and to make concessions during negotiations with respect to other ethnicities. D3321 (Witness statement of Milorad Skoko dated 1
April 2013), para. 30. The Chamber noted that Skoko‘s testimony was marked by multiple contradictions, evasiveness and indicators of partiality and bias
and therefore does not find his evidence to be reliable in this regard. How the Chamber was biased, it is cleare from this footnote. It is
well known that this accused accepted four out of five offered peace plans. And where is here Mr. Skoko unreliable/
why do the Chamber needed Mr. Skoko for this issue?
8996
P779 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 56.
8997
Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4177–4178. Okun‘s assessment was that this meant that the Bosnian Serbs would stop
fighting only when they acquired the territory they wanted.
 583

Deputies‘ Club meeting on 28 February 1992, the President spoke about a confederal BiH with an
―integral Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina within it‖.8998 At this meeting the President also said:

Bosnia and Herzegovina will remain in Yugoslavia until we say it has left Yugoslavia. If
Bosnia and Herzegovina is to leave Yugoslavia, then only three Bosnia and Herzegovinas
will leave Yugoslavia. As Mr Krajišnik says, Muslims who used to be a religious sect, and
have recently been given the status of a people, that‘s what I say, should now get their
independence. For what? [...] If they want independence, then we want independence
too!8999 (#WRONG INFERENCE, i.e. suggestion#. This clearly shows that the Serb side
accepted Bosnia to secede provided there is another internal organisation of BiH. This
is based on the #Serb right to veto# any constitutional matters for which was required
the consensus of all the three sides. From this speech it is clear that the Serbs made a
concession, i.e. Bosnia may become an independent state if transformed. Is this
Tribunal advocating a violation of the constitutions of some countries? What is wrong,
or criminal in these President’s sentences? None!)

2702. The Chamber recalls that the Cutileiro Plan was further refined through a Statement of
Principles which was agreed upon by the parties to the conflict on 18 March 1992.9000 The
Statement of Principles stated that BiH would be one state ―composed of three constituent units,
based on national principles and taking into account economic, geographic, and other criteria‖.9001
The Statement of Principles also provided for a working group to be established to define the
territory of the constituent units.9002 Bosnian Serb negotiators reported back to the Bosnian Serb
Assembly regarding this plan and noted that it aimed at a division of BiH into three constituent
units based not only on nationality, but also on economic and geographic considerations and
would be marked as a ―basis for further negotiations‖.9003 (A “further negotiations” pertained
to the maps only, because the constitutional principles had been agreed! For the reason and
fact that the constituent units were to be defined according to some other than ethnic
criteria, it was clear that there would be a minorities in every of those constituent units.
There wouldn’t be possible any “ethnic cleansing” had the Muslim side remained faitful to
the Cutileiro plan! Therefore, it would be wrong to infer that the Serbs wanted to have an
ethnically pure state.

2703. In April 1992, the Accused in a meeting with international representatives agreed that all
sides would lose if there was a conflict and complained about propaganda against the Serbs.9004
(#EXCULPATORY#!!!) He also said that they founded the TO because many troops were out of
control.9005 ( #JNA perion#! The Chamber should have already known for a more convincing
and original documents pertaining to the TO. The Muslim side had fired Gen. Vukosavljevic
(a Serb) from the post of the Commander of common TO on 6 April, and the Serbs formed
their own TO on 16 or 18 April. No matter when, it was a legal obligation, since even if not
formed on the central level, the TO units existed and had to exist in every municipality, local
commune, bigger company. The international representatives, Colm Doyle in particular, was
avare that in April 1992 there were present the JNA and some armed groups backed by the
JNA, which is a proof that the President didn’t have any unit under his control, see P941, p.

8998
P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), pp. 33–34. Mandić testified that originally all three sides agreed that there should be
three entities in BiH but the Croats and Muslims failed to adhere to this agreement. Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5001 (13 July 2010).
8999
P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 4.
9000
See para. 326.
9001
See para. 326.
9002
See para. 326.
9003
See para. 327.
9004
P780 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun‘s Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 36.
9005
P780 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun‘s Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 36.
 584

2
So, none of firing in April 1992, right to 20 may and further in June 92, the President didn’t
have any influence on the units capable of firing, particularly big calibre weapons! But, the
Prosecution-Chamber alliance unjustifiably #coined a new name “Serb Forces”# that
comprise every single Serb, regardless the local laws, and the President’s announcement that
the #RS disowned all paramilitaries#!) Koljević at this meeting said that he and the Accused
had agreed that they should divide Sarajevo.9006 (That happens always when a #short hand
written notes are used as evidence#, because it misses the crucial part for a proper
understanding. The Chamber has enough evidence what kind of “division” of Sarajevo
Koljevic meant: it was well known that the Serbs proposed that #BH be organised like
Switzerland and Sarajevo like the Brussels#, i.e. that the ethnic communities have their own
municipalities, administratively delineated, like in the Brussels. The same model had been
proposed for all the municipalities in BiH, in order to facilitate a peacefull co-existence. See
the same document P941, p.1:

So, how a book of notes of Mr. Okun, which he recognised had been composed of
#arbitrarily taken notes amalgamated with his toughts#, opinions and assumptions, could
have any #priority over the official UN report# such as P941#? This way, this kind of
selectivness secures a total victory of the Prosecutor, and failure of defense. If there is the
most relevant UN document in favour of the Defence, then the Chamber will undermind this
document and accept a completely #subjective, private opinion of some note-taker, who
never reported what he testified#! From this evidence it was clear that there was no any idea
of “division” of Sarajevo, because neither the Brussels is divided, but only administratively
organized according to the needs of the two ethnicities. To #neglect such a first class evidence
and replace it with a “hear-say” evidence, or jokes on an unofficial interlocutors# – that is
an insult of the United Nation, of Justice, of the President. #This must not happen ever#!)
During a discussion with international observers in September 1992, the Accused proposed
constructing a wall in Sarajevo to separate the Serb controlled areas and the Muslim controlled
areas.9007 (#Observers never reported it!# Aernout van Linden is a shameless liar and a
person without integrity. He pretended as if he was broadcasting a live bombardment of
Sarajevo, while it was too far from being true. Why those international observers didn’t
report to their central about this alleged proposal, this would be a big issue and would be
repeated endlesly. Nobody ever reported this kind of the President’s meditation, let alone
proposal. The only proposal of the Serb side was that Bosnia be transformed to be as a South
Switzerland, and Sarajevo to be as the Brusseles. And this official attitude of the Serb side is
well documented in all the official documents, while some “hear-say” guessing shouldn’t be
superior to the official documents!)
9006
P780 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun‘s Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 36.
9007
Aernout van Lynden, T. 2563–2564 (20 May 2010).
 585

2704. Krajišnik wrote to Cutileiro on 3 April 1992, suggesting a continuation of negotiations

based on the Statement of Principles.9008 In June 1992, Izetbegović withdrew his agreement to the
Cutileiro Plan.9009 (#This is not correct#. The Muslim side withdrew their consent to the
Cutilleiro plan on 25 March, and in June 92 they abandoned the Lisbon Conference. Why it
is important to be accurate about the date: the Agreement was accepted on 18 March. All
jubilated, and particularly the Muslims expressed their happiness, and predicted that the
Serbs will deceive the EC and give up the Agreement. However, the Muslims reneged on the
Agreement on 25 March, esplaining that their acceptance was just a #maneuver to gain a
time# and deceive the Serbs. The next day, 25 March there had been killing of the two
innocent Serbs in Bosanski Brod, and the day after, 26 March there was a massacre of the
Serb civilians in the Sijekovac village! What is right was that the international mediators
gave up the Agreement in late June 92! From that moment on there was a preparation for
the Vance-Owen plan that stepped on power in August 1992!) By July 1992, Izetbegović
stated that he could not agree to certain elements of the Statement of Principles.9010 (#This is also
false#. It is widely known that Mr. Izetbegovic was persuaded by the US Ambassador
Zimmerman to leave the agreement and go for the whole BiH. But, before this statement of
Izetbegovic, on 20 June the rump Presidency of BiH declared the war against the TO of the
Serbian Autonomous Regions, against Yugoslavia and JNA. And nobody in the Tribunal
does pay any attention to this notorious fact, the crucial for the development of events!) The
Accused stated that while he continued to agree with the Statement of Principles, the proposal of
BiH being a unitary state was not satisfactory.9011 (#Exactly, the Principles envisaged a
tripartite Bosnia#! Was that a crime? Exactly because a unitary Bosnia was not acceptable
to the Christian majority (the Serbs and Croats equally) the Statement of Principles had
been accepted. What was unacceptable, was the deception by the Muslim side, to negotiate
falsly and buy some time to prepare a war!)

2705. The Chamber recalls that during a meeting in September 1992, the President and Koljević
stated that the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats would not accept a unitary BiH state; a state
based on one-man, one-vote.9012 (The Chamber should have known that this accord of the
Christian majority in BiH (i.e. the Serbs and Croats) existed always, and at least since 6 May
92, when Boban and Karadzic met in Graz in Austria. So, the Bosnian Croats were in accord
with the Muslims pertaining to the secession from Yugoslavia, but at the same time the
Croats had been in accord with the Serbs about the internal structure of BiH.) Koljević also
stated that the Bosnian Serbs would not accept the internal borders of BiH without some form of
cantonisation.9013 At international negotiations, the President also expressed the Bosnian Serb
position that while they wanted a political resolution they would not abandon their sovereignty or
accept a unitarian state or a ―loss of national status on our land‖.9014 The Accused also called for
three units for the three constituent peoples in BiH and emphasised the security of the Serb people
who he presented as the ―principal victims‖.9015 (Those are all #legitimate political positions
and subjects of the negotiations#, and it can not be used against the President as a proof of
his guilt. Wrong inference! The Chamber is #criminalizing the entire political life of the Serb
community# in BiH. The Serb side didn’t demand anything new, but only defended the
status quo and constitutional order, and demanded that any change in it be done in
accordance with the Constitution itself. It is unusual and not understandable why the

9008
See para. 328.
9009
See para. 333.
9010
See para. 340.
9011
See para. 340.
9012
See para. 357.
9013
See para. 357.
9014
P789 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 9. See also P791 (Eighth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 38–39.
9015
P789 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 45; P790 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 10–11.
 586

Chamber is criminalising the Serbian legitimate political position that had been immediately
recognised by the United Nations and the European Community, aand built in all the
agreements mediated by the international mediators?!? It is even more peculiar, since these
proposals were aimed to secure the secession of BiH without a war!)

2706. At first the President expressed that he wanted to be loyal to Yugoslavia and for the
Bosnian Serbs to stay in this joint state.9016 When the situation deteriorated and it became clear
that BiH would not remain in Yugoslavia, the President adapted this goal.9017
(#EXCULPATORY#!!! The Serbs in Bosnia had every right to stay in Yugoslavia, no matter
the Muslims and Croats stayed or not. In the Yugoslav Constitution it was provided that the
“peoples” i.e. nations that constitute Yugoslav federation, are sovereign, and have the right
for selfdetermination. Not Republics, but peoples! But, the President advised tho his
constituency to redefine this position, only to avoid a war! That was the most painful
concession, and it was not easy to the President to persuade the people to support Bosnia and
Herzegovina as an independent state out of Yugoslavia. The minimal condition was that this
independent Bosnia be decentralised, so that all the three ethnic communities could secure
their equality and freedom! Was it the President’s crime too? Shouldn’t he be awarded for
this flexibility, instead of being indicted? In October 1992, Plavšić stated that the
―establishment of a Muslim state without observing the interests of the Serbian people verges on
insanity‖ and that Izetbegović had walked into that situation and ―the consequences are now
obvious‖.9018 (Ms. Plavsic was polite saying that! It was perfectly clear that Mr. Izetbegovic
was a fundamentalis from his early youth. And he was #devoted to creation of an Islamic
state# “once the Muslims become strong enough to ruin the existing system and to build up
another, the Islamic one (The Islamic Declaration!) For the activities towards the realisation
of this exclusive and racist idea he was convicted at least twice. However, the Serbs didn’t
fear that he may introduce the Islamic regime in one of the Yugoslav republics, but when it
came to an independence, it was obvious that he was going to do that. It wasn’t only the
Serbs who suspected Mr. Izetbegovic for that, there were many European oriented Muslims
too. The President had shown to the Chamber that the Serbs made many concessions, and
the most painfull was the one to leave Yugoslavia PROVIDED they get their constituent unit
within such a transformed BiH. Full stop. All rightfull and legal. And the recent
developments, from the Midle East to Madrid, Brussels and the whole Europe give the Serbs
the bitter right!)

1. Conclusion

2707. The Chamber finds that the President‘s speech to the SRBiH Assembly in October 1991 in
which he spoke about a ―highway of hell‖ clearly shows the President‘s consistent opposition to
the proposed independence of BiH. (#Opposition to illegal independence was a democratic
right, not a crime#! First of all, an opposition to the proposed independence, as a legal and
legitimate political position can not be a crime, except in a Nazi dictatorship regime!
Particularly since the Federal and Bosnian Constitutions provided that for such a huge
change required a consensus of all the republics, and in Bosnia of the three ethnicities.
Second, this was spoken on behalf of the entire Serbian community in BiH, and it wasn’t a

9016
Vladislav Jovanović, T. 34268−34269 (26 February 2013). See also Milorad Dodik, T. 36845 (9 April 2013); D3051 (Witness statement of Momir
Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), paras. 8, 15. The Chamber does not rely on Bulatović‘s general opinion that everything that the Bosnian Serbs did was
in response to acts and threats by Bosnian Muslims.
9017
Vladislav Jovanović, T. 34269 (26 February 2013); D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), para. 16. See also P1349
(Transcript of 6th session of SerBiH Assembly, 26 January 1992), p. 8.
9018
P1360 (Transcript from Joint session (21st session) of RS Assembly and Assembly of Serbian Krajina, 31 October 1992), pp. 9–10.
 587

private opinion. The President could have accepted this “independence” but within hours the
Serb people would reject it in a riots and a very chaotic way. At the very same session the
President said exactly that – the SDS is not creating the policy of the Serbian people, it is
only presenting it. But, there were many statesmen all over the Europe who predicted the
same as did this President, and prior than he did it. Anyway, being it a private or national
standpoint, this was a legitimate political position based on the Constitution and laws. After
all, nobody had any right to make such a vital changes contrary to the Constitution. If the
constitutions do not matter, then it should be said publicly, but until that, it stays a legal
practice, and violation of it have consequences! ) While the President in the speech stated that
he was not threatening the Bosnian Muslims, the Chamber finds that on the contrary, the speech
contained very specific threats about what would happen if the Bosnian Muslims continued to
pursue the path of independence and ignored the will of the Bosnian Serbs. (#Warnings, not
threat# Wrong “finding! It was not as simple as “ignoring the will of the Bosnian Serbs”, it
was a #violation of the Serb vital rights# and interests consistent with their survival. The
President expressed a mere prediction, and the Chamber erred in substance, #neglecting the
right semantics#. The President was always advocating against a war, and persuaded his
Serb community to give many concessions in order to avoid a war. The Muslims would
suffer even more, because as the President predicted, at one moment they waged three wars:
one against the Serbs, another against the Croats and the third one against the pro-
European Muslims. The West didn’t help those pro-European Muslims, but helped the
fundamentalists a lot. At the same time, the Serbs didn’t want to defeate them, otherwise
there would be many more casualties!) The Chamber finds that the President was clearly
threatening war if the Bosnian Serb interests were ignored, and he also envisaged that such a war
would be ―hell‖ and that the Bosnian Muslims would be unable to defend themselves in such a
scenario. (The President #didn’t have anything to threaten with#, because there was the
Federal state and Federal army. The President didn’t persuade Muslims and Croats to go
towards the war to be annihilated, but quite contrary, not to go towards the war. And the
events confirmed that the President was right: the Muslims waged the war on the three
sides: against the Serbs, Croats and the Abdic Muslims. Hadn’t the Serbs being so
restrained, and hadn’t the Western allies supported the Muslims, they would be ih a very
bad position. The President said many times that his main worry is to obtain the possibility
for a kind of peaceful life after the war. And this possibility is still too far. And all of that was
the #Muslim choice#!)

2708. The Chamber also finds that these warnings by the President were not just an isolated
aberration. (Now, the #Chamber accepts that it was about “warnings”# - not threats, but
“found” it as an aberration!) The Chamber finds, by reference to multiple intercepted
conversations in September and October 1991, that the President discussed how he would warn the
Bosnian Muslims that if they persisted with their policies relating to the independence of BiH, this
course of action would lead to extreme bloodshed, annihilation and the disappearance or extinction
of the Bosnian Muslims. These conversations, in addition to speeches made by the Accused in
1991, underscore that the Accused intended to threaten the Bosnian Muslims against pursuing
independence for BiH and that he was fully aware that a potential conflict would be extremely
violent and result in thousands of deaths, the destruction of property, and the displacement of
people and that it would be particularly devastating for the Bosnian Muslim population. (#A
completely wrong inference#! 1. Had president Karad`i} wanted the Muslims top suffer, to
be devastated, he wouldn’t warn them, and not dissuade them from this kind of policy. On
the contrary, he would be happy, as any Muslim enemy was happy when they have chosen a
war;
 588

2. Talking to somebody else his own predictions and expectations of a future evens IS NOT A
THREAT, because a threat could be only if it is directed right to the subject of threat, with a
conditions and consequences if not accepted!

3. President Karad`i} didn’t have anything, any power and device to threaten the Muslims,
since there was a Federal state, federal Army (JNA) and Constitution!

4. This is not right that Karad`i} was totally denying the Muslim?Croat intentions to secede
from Yugoslavia, and the Chamber doesn’t have any right to skip the essence – that the
Serbs didn’t want to be taken out of Yugoslavia and turned into a status of ethnic minority,
against their will. The last Serb, the most painful concession was to accept the secession,
provided the Bosnia got decentralised!)

. Any reasonable chamber would see that it was not something that the President wanted, or
something that he could have caused or exercised, but that it was something that he feared
of. There is the sufficient evidence that the #President only predicted a catastrophic course of
events#, on the basis of the centuries long experience of the antagonisms, and on the basis of
an insight in the state of minds, as well as on tbe basis of experience from Croatia.

The President made many efforts to DISSUADE, not to PERSUADE the Muslims to go
towards an independence and to risk a bloody war. It must be brought back to our attention
and to our consideration that the Muslims didn’t have a legal possibility for an independence
of the entire BiH. Here is the first class evidence that Karadzic didn’t threat and didn’t want
a war – between the times of those speeches and the beginning of the war, the President
persuaded his community to give so many concessions just to avoid such a dark scenario. So,
in spit of the assertion that “the President” was against the independence of BiH, the
independence was accepted by the Serb community under a minimal conditions, a minimal
safeguards of the rights. This fact absolutely makes all allegations about the threats and
violence vain.

Exactly because he “was fully aware that a potential conflict would be extremely violent and
result in thousands of deaths, the destruction of property, and the displacement of people and
that it would be particularly devastating for the Bosnian Muslim population,” he fought to the
last moment to avoid the war under any cost, see D01833. Instead of being awarded and
prized for those peacefull efforts, everything is put upside-down.)

2709. The Chamber finds that the declaration of sovereignty by the SRBiH Assembly in the
absence of the Bosnian Serb delegates on 15 October 1991, escalated the situation. The Bosnian
Serb leadership made it clear once again that they would not accept a sovereign BiH and issued an
ultimatum for the revocation of this declaration. However, it is clear from the conversation on
24 October 1991 between the President and Slobodan Milošević that the President did not expect
the Bosnian Muslims to abolish the decisions they had taken with respect to the sovereignty of
BiH. (It can not be ignored or forgotten that the #Declaration was an illegal and
unconstitutional act#, and the Serb Ultimatum was calling for the return to the legality. Is
the Chamber of an opinion that the Serbs had to accept any unlawful decision??? And the
“situation didn’t escalate” because of the absence of the Serb delegates, but because it was an
illegal session and an illegal decision. Does the Chamber respect the domestic constitutions
and domestic laws? Is the UN backing this kind of justice?)

2710. The conversation with Milošević in October 1991 is also instructive as it shows that the
President envisaged responding in such a way that the Bosnian Serbs would establish full authority
in Bosnian Serb territories, create a de facto situation to ensure that the Bosnian Serbs would never
 589

live in the same state as the Bosnian Muslims, and create their own parallel and separate
institutions and structures. It is also clear from this conversation that Slobodan Milošević was
attempting to take a more cautious approach while the President was adamant that their goal was
to ensure that they would establish full authority in their territories, which would mean that
Izetbegović would not have control of 65% of BiH, and that they would announce their own
Bosnian Serb Assembly. (Is the Chamber of an opinion that the #illegal and anti-
constitutional acts had to be accepted by the Serbs#? Even then, while still in Yugoslavia,
with the protection of the Federal Constitution and Federal laws? Beside that, this is an
evidence that the Serbs had been sovereign on the 65% ot the territory of BiH, and thus the
assertions of the OTP, and “finding” of the Chamber that the Serbs “grabbed” 65% of the
Bosnian territory are not correct. One of the myths in this court is so calle “take-over” of
municipalities, but it never happened that the Serbs took over any municipality, or a part of
municipality in which they hadn’t been majority.

(This was the #Serb right, to defend their basic freedom and not to accept a hostile Islamic
fundamentalist regime established illegally#. In some of the judgements it was found legal to
establish another order once the old one collapses. When a sovereignty breaks apart, the
autonomous constituent elements are entitled to maintain an order in accordance with the
law, and to self-organize!)

2711. The Chamber also finds that while Milošević expressed reservations about excluding Bosnian
Muslims, the Accused was adamant that there were not even 10% of Bosnian Muslims who
supported Yugoslavia and that they could not take such a risk. (#To exclude the Muslims, from
where#? From the fighs in favour of Yugoslavia! Karad`i} moderated his objectives only to
preserve the Serbs in BiH interests and survival. He realised that a small Serb community in
BiH can not save Yugoslavia! Therefore, this is a part of wrong inferences, either because of
the Chamber’s ignorance of the Constitution and the domestic laws, or because of an
intention to promote a dis-respect of the Yugoslav and BiH, as well as the international basic
documents. Nothing can justify such a violation of the constitutional rights of one of the
communities in BiH. Beside, this is not correctly presented. President Milosevic was
interested not in a solution for the Bosnian Serbs, but for the preservation of Yugoslavia, and
counted on the Bosnian Serbs and some Bosnian Muslims to achieve some majority in favour
of Yugoslavia. That was a very wrong calculation, because those who demanded some
changes needed a two third majority votes, and in that case it would be “pro-Yugoslavs”.
However, those who wanted to secede needed those 2/3 majority, while those who were for
preservation of the common state needed only one vote above the 1/3 of the votes. The
Defense is fighting against wind-mills! ) The Accuse also spoke clearly about steps Bosnian
Serbs would take to establish authority and control over territories which they claimed and that the
Bosnian Serbs would be moving towards mobilisation. (Wrong inference! #This kind of mixing
facts and manipulation must be forbidden forever!# The control over owns territories was a
constitutional and legal obligation, and a defense necessity, exclusively political matter. The
issue of mobilisation didn’t have anything to do with any other armed formation except the
JNA, which was in the war against the Croatian secessionists!) The Chamber finds that this
demonstrates that the President from October 1991 vehemently opposed the independence of BiH
and planned on taking over Bosnian Serb claimed territory. (Wrong inference! #Not to take-
over, but to protect and defend#! There was no any plan or even any need to “take over” the
Bosnian Serb claimed territories, but there was a need to protect the Bosnian Serb majority
territories from an imposition of a hostile regime! Is this UN Court of an opinion that the
#Constitution doesn’t matter#? Everything what the Tribunal exercized towards the
President implies that the legality doesn’t matter!
(How it is possible that the Chamber have forgotten and neglected so impressive
circumstances:
 590

1. in Croatia there was the war going on;

2. the Muslim side made a formidable military preparations: a) 30. March 1991, the Muslim
participants in the Presidency and Government decided to form a secret Army; See:@
b) On 30 April 1991 the Patriotic league started to exist, and the members are counted their
term in the PL from this date; 10 June 1991 the Committee for defence of the Muslims, with
the Chairmen of the Presidency Izetbegovic was elected as a president. c)The Patriotic
league had its political and military headquarters, and nine regional and 98 municipal
headquarters and units, BUT THE CHAMBER NOTICED ONLY THE SERBS
ANNOUNCING THAT THEY MIGHT MOBILIZE.

3. See: D00298, The secret Musalim Army, called the Patriotic league already in September
1991 had organized, as follows:

The Muslim side had already over a hundred of thousands of soldiers, former JNA
reservists, mobilized in the Patriotic league and the Green Berets. Every community that
would find itself in such a circumstances is entitled to take a #precautionary and preventive
measures#. This is provided in our All-peoples Defence law, but what is the most important,
it is deep in the recent memories of the fratricidal wars among the South Slaves. At least half
of these 98 municipalities the Serbs were a majority, and in all others a substantively
contributed in the general population. Everyone can imagine how the Serbs felt seeing these
secret preparations for a war against them!)
This conversation also demonstrates that the Accused envisaged a separation of the Bosnian Serbs
from non-Serbs in BiH and that war in BiH would result in ―population homogenisation‖. ‖. (Is
an # “envisaging” of the course of events a crime#, or a matter of inteligencia and political
experience? What would be a responsible politician expected to do when seeing what may
happen? To remain silent, or to speak up and wanr everyone that the course of events is
dangerous?) The Chamber also finds that the Accused supported the creation of ethnically based
entities in BiH. (#Is this a crime? Tell it to the Belgian people! Or Bavarians, or Scotish
people#!) The Accused also encouraged the identification of Serb areas which would be to the
exclusion of Bosnian Muslims. (#A “state separation#! Not only a wrong inference, but also a
forgery! The Chamber is altering what the President said at the Serb Assembly session on 12
May 92: a state separation with the Muslims and Croats, not personal, or ethnic separation.
 591

A STATE SEPARATION, see P00956, on the first strategic objective:

(#All the Yugoslav republics wanted a secession on an ethnical basis!#Why the Chamber do
not specify what would be to the exclusion of Bosnian Muslims. But, for the ethnically based
entities, it has to be said that the entire Yugoslav crisis was about ethnically based entites.
The Slovenians wanted to separate from Yugoslavia not because the rest of Yugoslavs had a
dark eyes, or were taller than the Slovenians, but because the rest of the Yugoslavs were not
Slovenians. So was with Macedonians, Croats. The distruction and dissolution of Yugoslavia
was caused by the different ethnicities of the population in the different republics, which
wanted to be alone on their own ethnic territories. The only Yugoslav republic that didn’t
have a clear precondition to claim for the independence was BiH, and it was established in
the Badinter’s Commision (see: opinion No. 4) the whole crisis was to secure that one
ethnicity didn’t dominate over another. And this Tribunal is implying that the Serbs should
be obedient and accept the dictate. There must be something very wrong in the very
foundation of such a court, which disables it to recognize what is right and what is wrong, or
what is lawful and what is not! #Tribunal can not differentiate right from wrong#!)

2712. The Accused‘s conversation with Krajišnik in January 1992 also demonstrates the
Accused‘s continuing anger with respect to the proposed independence of BiH. (#Not enger, but
responsibility#! This was not a matter of “anger” but of a responsibility for the people who
voted for the SDS, to represent their interests. The independence could not be decided
without the consent of all the three constituent peoples (ethnic communities) In this regard
the President said that he would not be calming the Bosnian Serb people any further and that he
would ―release [their] tigers and let them do their job‖. The President also spoke about the non-
negotiable character of the Bosnian Serb objectives and his position that they would not allow
anything to stop them. (To stop them to preserve the basic and the most vital interests of the
Serbian people that he represented from an unlawful jeopardy! What is wrong with that?
This was a duty, and couldn’t be waved off!) The Chamber finds that the President‘s position
was that the Bosnian Serbs would not allow BiH to secede from Yugoslavia, and if BiH insisted
on independence so would the Bosnian Serbs. (Exactly, reciprocity. There was no any Bosnia
without the Serb community, as an equal component with the two other communities! The
Serb position was legally stronger that the Muslim one, because they were seceding from the
internationally recognized state, on an un-lawful manner, while the Serbs were conservative,
trying to preserve the country that existed 70 years. Just to please the Muslims, the Serbs
intended to secede from an illegally seceded state and a hostile fundamentalist regime!)

2713. The President also described the Bosnian Muslims as a ―religious sect‖ who had only
recently been given the status of ―people‖ and that they had no basis for their independence. The
Chamber finds that this rhetoric when combined with the President‘s references to the Bosnian
Muslims as their historic enemies, created an environment which sought to quash any claim to
independence by BiH and to re-assert the Bosnian Serb interests in BiH. (Wrong inference! First
of all, the matter whether the Muslims are a separate nation-people doenst have anything to
do with their rights to independence. The Croats were a separate nation-people, but they
also didn’t have a right to secede the entire Bosnia, and hardly only themselves. That was the
Serb position about both of them, the Muslims and Croats: if they wanted to leave
Yugoslavia, the Serbs were not willing to prevent them. The Serbs denied the Muslim and
Croat intentions to secede the Serbs from Yugoslavia againste their own will and interests.
Why the Serbs in Bosnia wouldn’t have their own interests in BiH? This is the most
 592

legitimate interest, and those who legally and legitimately represented the Serbs in Bosnia
were obliged to take care of those interests. (It is not difficult to understand: the Serbs didn’t
deny anything to the others, while others denied to the Serbs their fundamental rifhts! The
Chamber already had a sufficient evidence that this was not a Serb standpoint to deny any
rights of the Muslims, but to preserve the Serb rights to stay in Yugoslavia, or, at least, to
remain sovereign within BiH, and not under the Muslim domination. Accordint the
Yugoslav, as well as the BiH Constitutions, the Muslims didn’t have any right, nor any legal
possibility to form a unitary BiH as their own national state, while the Christian majority
(i.e. The Serbs and Croats) were supposed to be turned to become a minorities!)

Those discussions about whether the Muslims are a religious group, or a separate ethnicity
were held by the highest state institutions, and this is an academic question. Until 60-es of the
last century it was widely kept that they were only a religious group of the Serbs, and some
Croats, who converted into Islam. Although the Serbs and some prominent Muslims still
think that the Muslims are the Serbs of the muslim religion, the President’s standpoint is
that nobody should prevent them to feel whatever they want. The scientific and political
aspects are involved. But if the Serbs consider the Muslims to be the Serbs, it does contradict
to the Chambers finding???.

2714. In meetings with international representatives, the Accused repeated his warning about how
the independence of BiH would result in a ―cruel war‖ and his prediction that he would not be able
to calm down the Bosnian Serbs in this scenario. (#EXCULPATORY#! Had Karad`i} been
against the Muslims, he wouldn’t warn anyone! It is only an evidence contrary to the
Prosecutor’s assertion and the Chambers inference: the President didn’t threat and didn’t
plan any violent action, but predicted a very negative course of events. Is it forbidden, that a
politician predict what would happen if…? Wrong inference!

2715. The Chamber also finds that there was a disjuncture between what the President said in
private conversations or before a Bosnian Serb audience and the tone he took in international
negotiations where he was more conciliatory, spoke against conflict, and claimed that the Serbs
were the victims of propaganda. The Accused took a leading role in portraying the Bosnian Serbs
as the victims of the conflict and used this as justification for pursuing their territorial and political
objectives of a separate Serb state in BiH. (Wrong inference! What the President said to the
international mediators was obligatory and was planned to be signed and respected, while
the political speeches are in every country quite different from a formal negotiations. The
main issue is: the #Tribunal is denying the Serb rights to political life!#.

The two very prominent witnesses, Ambasadors Cutileiro and Akashi, said in the courtroom
that they had never taken into account the #President’s political speeches#, because it is
aimed to the public that has to be kept in their morale. The Chamber should have known
that as well!)
 593

ii. Advocating separation of population and creation of a Bosnian

Serb state

1. Analysis of evidence

(a) Separation of population—inability to co-exist

2716. On 27 August 1991, in an intercepted conversation with Koljević, the President expressed his
opposition to BiH independence and indicated his willingness to divide BiH along ethnic lines by
stating ―[l]et us see what it is, what the solution for each ethnic group would be, and for everyone
to agree to it […]. Because if there is no solution acceptable to us in [BiH], we will find our own
solution‖.9019 (First of all, it is a #deeply incorrect re-interpretation#, suggesting that the
President advocated the separation of population. The Chamber should not do it, since the
original speech of the President is available, and in the speech the President underlined “the
state separation”, only if the Muslim/Croat communities insist to secede from Yugoslavia!
And again, the document quoted here is misinterpreted and misunderstood. Look what had
been said in this tel. conversation, P5878:

This is #the most conciliatory proposal#. The Serbs didn’t ask for the changes of the structure
of either Federal, or Bosnian state. The two other communities demaned the changes, i.e.
secession from the Federal state, for which they needed the Serb consent. At the beginning,
the Serbs opposed the idea to ruin Yugoslavia, but in a chain of compromises and
concessions the Serbs came to the conditional acceptance of the secession. Parallel to this
process there was the process on establishing the Historic Serb-Muslim Argeement, which
was acceptable to the Serbs and several Muslim parties, but not to the religious organisation.
Another word, the Serbs were running their political life by defending the Constitution and
the laws, and this mustn’t be incriminated, particularly not such isolated from the other
events and demands of other participants. Dr. Seselj is right sayin that everything looks like
an Inquisition.

Pertaining to the intercepted conversation od 27 August 91, again this is Wrong inference! It
was Alija Izetbegovic who proposed the division of BiH, for the first time, in May 91. See:

9019
P5878 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Nikola Koljević, 27 August 1991), p. 4.
 594

D01282
Therefore, the first who mentioned and proposed the division of BiH was Mr. Izetbegovic,
and the President sad that the Serbs never thought about that, and that they had be shocked!

2717. In November 1991, the President spoke about the ―principle of reciprocity‖ and that the Serbs
alone would not move out of certain areas and then allow the Bosnian Muslims to ―stay in our
areas to settle and build their colonies‖.9020 (This is not correct, and probably not allowed to
imply something from one to another context. This had been said in the occasion of the
Muslim plans to import 4 millions Turks and settle them in the Serbian traditional areas, so
to change the ethnic composition. This speech was a very conciliatory, presenting to the
Muslims what is acceptable and what is not under any circumstances, reminding the
Muslims what they wanted and announced earlier, to make a sovereign those parts of BiH
that they can control prosperously. Let us see what had been said in the quoted document,
P958, p.7:

The examples of of such a ruthless manipulation and domination are numerous even during
the communist regime, and in a fundamentalis regime it would be even worse! An artificial
change of the ethnic picture is a crime!

9020
P958 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 7. See also P988 (Transcript of
53rd session of RS Assembly, 28 August 1995), p. 29.
 595

And further, the President presented a conciliatory form of co-existence with the Muslims,
the way that later proposed the EC and UN mediators, and which had been accepted in the
Dayton Agreement:

So, that
was a Serb proposition, to have a reciprocity in dealing with each other, to understand each
other and live together in a way not to dominate over each other!. And we already have seen
how the domination looks like in the areas where the Muslims were majority. What is the
sense of the representation of an ethnic community, if not to protect it’s rights and facilitate
them a free political, economic and cultural life?)

The President called on the Bosnian Serbs to ―get ready and establish your authority in your
territories; in municipalities, regions, local communities, and to prepare yourselves for
restructuring and regionalizing the municipalities‖ and for them to control the process until the
very last moment.9021 The President concluded that after and during the plebiscite it was important
to ―seize power wherever you can‖.9022 (They already had been keeping the power, but pretty
comfortable and with a surplus tolerance towards the communist officials, who were

9021
P958 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 10.
9022
P958 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 12.
 596

adversaries to the SDS and other victorious parties. Anyway, this was just one sentence, an
appeal to the local authorities to exercise the power strictly, and it does have nothing to do
with the war or war crimes, since it was in October 1991, when all hoped that there would
not be a war. The Chamber is persistent in criminalising every aspect of the Serb political
life! Let us se P958, p.12, what really the President said and what it did mean:

It is clear
what the President meant: to talk to the good, sucsessful managers in companies, so to be
able to secure a good cours in economy for which the SDS authorities had been responsible.
Therefore, not to take-over any power from anyone, but to be strict and responsible in
exercising the power!)

2718. With respect to the ―three national communities‖ in BiH, the President suggested that ―the
more separate things there are the better it will be‖.9023 (It would be better for the Prosecutor if
the Chamber didn’t deal with such a pieces of speeches, because it shows how Karadzic was
right, and the meaning of his words are quite opposite to what the Chamber ruled. Let us se
a portions of this speech.

This part
says that the Serbs were already in a very bad situation in some municipalities, where they
are such a minority, so that they can not protect their human rights. For instance, in Olovo
all of the Serbs were fired, even the las one, working on the gasoline station. Let’s see next:

In the Municipality of Bratunac the Muslim majority doesn’t allowe that one of the two schools
have a name of the great Serb from 19th Century, a reformer of our culture and very
important for all of us. That is a violation of the national rights of the Srbs, and a flagrant
humiliation. If the unique municipality of Bratunac doesn’t tolerate that one of the two
schools has a Serb name, than it is better to have a two municipalities. Or the next:

9023
D84 (Shorthand Record of 3rd session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 December 1991), pp. 13–14; P958 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb
People, November 1991), p. 7. See also D424 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vojo Kuprešanin, 10 February 1992), p. 11.
 597

It is so clearly democratic attitude, to respect the specificity of Bosnian three ethnicities.

Those are
all peacefull meditation, how to regulate the life in a republic which is different from others,
because of the existence of the three communities with the different needs. And the main
objective was to secure everione’s national equality, and if it cant be done otherwise, than
could be done by forming a separate municipalities, and all within the Conference, and all
through an agreement. This was the Serb well known Recommendation for the new
municipalities, and not obligatory! That was recommended on 11 December, while everyone
hoped that there will be a political settlement, and would be no any war. There is no a trace,
let alone evidence about any Joint Criminal Enterprise, because every singe person could
have stayed at own native place, and enjoy a protection of his own municipal authorities.
There couldn’t be any “ethnic cleansing” anything irregular!

And the prediction from this part of the President’s speech had come to reality, as many others
predicted, among them the most prominent politicians and statemen in the world! As the
President said, if we enter a civil war, we will enter a chaos, and then the chaos is going to
control us, we can not control the chaos! Wasn’t it just as predicted by the President and
many others?)

2719. The President in a speech in January 1992 stated that the Bosnian Serbs would ―not impose
anything on each other‖ and that they would work towards a form of state organisation to which
Croats, Serbs and Muslims would agree.9024 This was not that the “Bosnian Serbs would not
impose anything on each other” but that the three ethnic communities will not impose
anything to each other, but to work hard and find out a solution that will be acceptable for
all the three communities. The President repeated his commitment to such a conclusion of
the common Assembly from the session at the beginning of September 1991.

9024
D87 (Transcript of 9th session of SRBiH Assembly, 24–25 January 1992), pp. 103–104.
 598

The President also said that they had ―no influence over the war or peace‖ and that if an inter-ethnic
or religious war started in BiH, Serbs, Muslims, and Croats would run away and go to their own
―fully homogeneous‖ areas and that there would be severe bloodshed and destruction of towns.9025
(EXCULPATORY!!! The President warned on what would inevitably happen, not because
somebody would want it, but because nobody would be able to influence the cours of events.
This was not a “war-mongering “ statement, but a try to dissuade the detrimental policy that
was leading to the war! Also, warning about “running away” to the ethnically homogenous
areas, the President depicted an undesireable course of events, and therefore rebuts all the
allegations about the “ethnic cleansing” as a Serb objective!) Similarly the President told
Vance that BiH independence could lead to war and that there ―will be great mass movements,
homogenisation of territories, migrations from one area into another and, of course, accompanied
by instances of shooting out of hand‖.9026

2720. In January 1992, in a conversation in which there was discussion about having Bosnian
Muslims within their borders, the President said ―they will have their region, we will have our own
region‖.9027 (There is no limits to these distortions of meanings. On 7 January 1992 there stil
was no any entity borders, nor entities, it was a unitary Bosnia still within Yugoslavia. See

P2596: :
There was said that if “we stay within these borders – meaning the unitary Bosnian borders
– not entity borders – the Muslims would stay with the Serbs, and the President said that in a
new structure of BiH the Muslims will have the same as the Serbs, their own areas.
Therefore, to interpret it as if the President excluded a possibility that some Muslims stay in
the Serb areas is out of mind! That pahhens when the Prosecution-Chamber alliance don’t
have sufficient incriminatory evidence, and make a patchwork of sentences out of the time

9025
D87 (Transcript of 9th session of SRBiH Assembly, 24–25 January 1992), p. 103; P5762 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Dobrica
Ćosić, 22 January 1992), p. 6. See also Herbert Okun, T. 1715–1717 (27 April 2010); P5621 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and
Dobrica Ćosić, 25 January 1992), p. 3; P5615 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Nikola Koljević, 11 December 1991), p. 4; D4523
(Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and an unidentified male, 3 March 1992).
9026
P5774 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţićand Vladislav Jovanović, 5 January 1992), pp. 6–7. See also D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo
Milovanović), pp. 18, 28.
9027
P2596 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and ―Miroslav‖, 7 January 1992), p. 5.
 599

frame and other contexts!) The President also spoke about the importance of creating their
country first and then establishing ―krajinas‖ and the danger that they would never create their
state if they started establishing ―krajinas‖ first.9028 (How possibly a political talks, persuading,
argumentation, negotiation… can be used to convict somebody? Beside that, the President
was advocating a restrain from any strong political proclamations which could be
condemned by the EC, see P2596:

From the entire conversation it is clear that the President didn’t decide any personal solution in
Krajina (ARK) but only suggested. Also, it is visible that the President was preventing a
political proclamations whiuch wouldn’t be welcomed in the European Community, but to
work on education, economy etc.

2721. In February 1992, Krajišnik stated that if they were successful in creating a confederal
BiH it would consist of three states and he was ―not interested in Muslims in [BiH]‖.9029 And this
is another blasphemy, done by extracting a sentence out of the context. Mr Krajisnik was in
a polemics with the ARK leaders, and was talking that we (the Serbs) have to take care of
our interests, and not to strive for any Yugoslavia which would be wanted only by the Serbs
and no one else. In that context Krajisnmik said that he is (no longer) interested in having
the Muslims from Central Bosnia within Yugoslavia: see D88 pp.63-64

9028
P2596 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and ―Miroslav‖, 7 January 1992), p. 6.
9029
D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), pp. 62–63.
 600

There can
not be any confusion, Krajisnik said that he wasn’t any longer interested in keeping the
Bosnian Muslims in Yugoslavia, and it was an “open and honest” approach! Quite contrary
to that what the Judgement suggested!) He also stressed that everything which the Bosnian
Serb Assembly did, and everything he did, was ―for pure areas‖ of BiH, that he was in favour of a
―monolithic Serbian state‖ where all Serbs live together.9030 (Again, wrong inference, either
because of misunderstanding, or a manipulation, but it is unacceptable anyway. Mr.
Krajisnik was again in a polemics with the ARK separatists, he said nothing that would be
blamed for. Let us see P05623, p.3:

It is clear that there was a discussion on the Constitution, and Mr. Krajisnik pointed out that
nobody will “rule over someone”. Pertaining to the Muslims and Croats, but the main point
was his opposition to a confederal concept of the Republika Srpska itself, because it would be
unusual to have the BiH as a confederation, and within it a Serb entity as another
confederation. Let us se whot to do with the “pure areas”, P05623, p.4.:

(
This kind of manipulation is not tolerable! Mr. Krajisnig was persuading the ARK
autonomists that he was taking care of all the pure Serbian territories, which meant – all
undisputedly Serbian areas, in terms not to neglect their needs. Again, the Chamber is
picking a sentences from a political polemics in order to prove – what? Nothing can be
proven that way, and this is not correct and fair. The discussion went on before the war, (28
February 1992) and there was a good prospective that there wouldn’t be any war, and it can
not be understood as an ethnically purified areas!) Koljević also emphasised that they would
not allow the Bosnian Muslims to have a sovereign state which extended over both the Serb and
Croat parts of BiH and that they had therefore constituted a Serb Assembly.9031 (Koljevic was
talking about the main problem, the Muslim intention to preserve Bosnia as a unitary state
under their domination. What is this Chamber now doing? Justifying the Muslim unlawful
ambitions? However, the entire international community, including the owner of this Court,
the UN, gave us right for opposing to be subjugated to one of the constituent communities in
BiH. Koljević acknowledged that the process of re-organising municipalities was with the aim of
creating ―homogeneity of certain areas‖ and argued that contrary to the political assertions, it was
not impossible to divide BiH.9032 (How much is this incorrect, it is the easiest way just to see

9030
P5623 (Speech of Momĉilo Krajišnik at the Assembly of Serbian People of BiH, 28 February 1992), pp. 3–4.
9031
P986 (Transcript of a meeting between Nikola Koljević, Franjo TuĊman, and Franjo Boras, 8 January 1992), pp. 11, 24.
9032
P986 (Transcript of a meeting between Nikola Koljević, Franjo TuĊman, and Franjo Boras, 8 January 1992), p. 13.
 601

the sentence:
p.13

So,
Koljevic said that it was possible to divide Bosnia, “but that option is excluded for us on the
basis of a stand taken in advance. The first class evidence about the Serb intentions, all the
contrary to the assertions of the Prosecution/Chamber/ Who is responsible for such a drastic
distortion of meaning and imputation of a criminal statement, although it didn’t exist? The
Serbs excluded this in advance, in order to satisfy the Muslim needs for Bosnia.) Koljević
stated that at a municipal level they had tried separate municipal assemblies and formed new
municipalities.9033 (This was also all within the constitution and law provisions, and any
people in any local commune is entitled to leave an old and join a new municipality. (This
was an inter-republic visit, and had nothing to do with the President. Koljevic first expressed
a condolence for the Croatian victims, than stated that the visit of him and Mr. Boras, as the
two members of the BH Presidency, was to try to pacify the Serb-Croat relations. Koljevic
(p.4) proposed to avoid any provisional solution for BH and advised the talks as long as
necessary in order to make everyone satisfied. The next of Koljevic’s interest was a
pacification, and what he said:

So, the separation was envisaged as a temporary, and with the aim to disengage the
antagonised communities. All of it happened after the Yugoslav-Croatian war, and before
the war in Bosnia, and was aimed to avoid the war in Bosnia! COMMENDABLE! Finally,
what does it have to do with the President? This was an official visit of the members of the
BH Presidency, not of the RS Presidency, and the President even didn’t know about it. How
a words and toughts of another people could represent a mens rea of this President? Further,
he repeatedly called for the expulsion of Bosnian Muslims and the homogeneity of territories,

9033
P986 (Transcript of a meeting between Nikola Koljević, Franjo TuĊman, and Franjo Boras, 8 January 1992), pp. 22–23.
 602

claiming it was impossible for Serbs to live with anyone else.9034 (Deeply incorrect, see it:

There is no mentioning of any “expulsion” of the Muslims. Also, there was nobody in the
courtroom who was interested in a rebuting or challenging anything that concerned Koljevic
or Karadzic. But, let us see another page of the same transcript (P776, Okun) to see of how
much value are those notes: This is the previous page, 4219 of the Transcript of Okun
testimony I in the Krajisnik case, P776

On this page, l. 7 – 9 Okun writes as if Koljevic told him: You need to put pressure on the
Muslims if you want to stop the fighting” this is the only reference about “presing” but, look
at the bottom of this page, l. 17 - 25

9034
Vitomir Ţepinić, T. 33594–33595 (13 February 2013); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4220. During a meeting with Serb
and Muslim representatives in May 1992, Koljević precluded any possibility of Muslims and Serbs cohabitating in Pale; the former had to leave. This is
the most disguasting lie, because Koljevic met the Pale Muslims to dissuade them to leave for Sarajevo P733 (Witness
statement of Sulejman Crnĉalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 38; Sulejman Crnĉalo, T. 1164–1165 (14 April 2010).
 603

T
he lines 17 – 25 clearly disqualify this kind of notes of any witness. Amb. Okun admitted that
Karadzic didn’t say what was written down. So, the Defense must object using any of those
notes particularly when other sources are available. The heads of the negotiating teams
obligatorily made their reports to those who empowered them, and they always report every
significant opinion not only of the head of the Serb delegation, i.e. Karadzic, but of every
member of the negotiating team. Among so many undecencies, the Tribunal should exclude
from the evidence all of those “meditations” of those who used to put some words down now
and then.)

2722. Krajišnik also stated that ―[o]ur aim is to divide with the Muslims, if the Muslims were to
capitulate we would remain with them, if they remained with us they would soon be the majority?‖
and outlined the Strategic Goals, including dividing from Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats.9035 (The entire document is EXCULPATORY, and many elements of it completely
rebuted many Prosecutor’s allegations: see the same document, P01479, p.130 - 131, the VRS
officers were very critical of the authorities and the President (the President) in particular:
Colonel Kovacevic objected generally:

9035
P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), pp. 140, 143–144.
 604

Colonel Balac was critical specifically towards the President’s permissive and cooperative
attitude towards the international representatives: P1479, p131:

reporting that “the President had accepted that all systems be put under the UN control.”
Understandable, the Prosecution doesn’t have any interest to depict this fact, but the
Chamber should notice this big concession of the Serb side to the UN, for the sake of peace.
On p. 139 Karadzic said: “we are already a state, but a state that doesn’t function well. That
is why we met.” On p. 140 (srb) it had been said that there are still a paramilitaries and a
para-authorities, and a fighting for power, 15 kinds of uniforms. P. 141, authorities do not
function, the courts also, there is no clear stand toward the Muslims who declared the
loyalty, (which was responded by Mr. Miskin on p. 155, that those Muslims should be
included in the military industry and digging trancheses) and by Karadzic, p.156 eng.: “the
relation with the Muslims: in our state we do have to have a national minorities”

Th
at was said in a close meeting, among the deputees and officers, was not aimed for a public,
and it is clearly said that there, in the Republic of Srpska wiil be ethnic minorities, which is
contrary to all the allegations of the OTP that the leadership and the President pleaded for
an ethnic putiry!
A huge distrust between the civil authorities and the military was underlined, there are
attempts to form another army; p. 142, the Serbian people in the Area of Responsibility of
IBK (East-Bosnian Corps, comprising Bijeljina), nobody prepared for the war, which
contradicts all allegations that the Serbs wanted or prepared for a war. NOW, the quoted
Krajisnik’ s sentence: at the beginning of the counsuling Karadzic presented what possible
outcomes of the war are at stake, pp. 26 – 30, and concluded that the EC wanted this war,
and Krajisnik added that the Europe wouldn’t like to see a Mulsim state, and if the Muslims
surrendered, then the Muslims would again dominate, explaining that both, the total Serb
victory or the Muslim surrender, would be equally bad.
On p. 24 srb handwrit. Karadzic reports that the “EC offered a text of a new Constitution of
BiH, where it is envisaged a federation. We said that we should continue to work on it, the
Muslims rejected it, while the Croats gave some objections. There was said “sovereign
peoples”. On p. 25 srb. Karadzic informed that he appointed that the Jewish community
from Sarajevo leaves the City through the Serb Sarajevo, and expressed his fear that the
Muslims may fire on the Jews and blame the Serbs.

At pp. 27 I 28 Krajisnik and Karadzic informed the meeting that there are a different options,
that the Europe doesn’t like the Muslims and the first place, and the Serbs at second, that
the West initiated this war in BiH in order to prevent the Muslims to form their own state,
and that for this purpose the Western Europe wants us, the Serbs and Croats to stay in the
same state and control the Islamic factor. Karadzic said that the West is enkouraging the
 605

Muslims, but doesn’t help them. It is absolutely irrelevant whether this informatiom was
right or not, it was a reality in the Serb minds.

2723. In February 1992, the Accused spoke about having less than 10% of Bosnian Muslims in their
―canton‖ of BiH according to the proposed maps.9036 This was after the first accord pertaining to the
inner structure of BiH. Since the idea was to form the three mainly ethnicaly based constituent
units, it was a general attitude to include as many people of the same ethnicity into their
constituent unit, in order to have as least minorities as possible, because they would be dissatisfied
and probably move out. Mr. Izetbegovic expressed this wish of his own, see:_____, and the
Muslims jubilated after the acceptance of the Lisbon Agreement on how well they did, having the
Muslims as least as posible out of their unit. (See D00302) But, in all of those speeches there was
undoubtedly envisaged that every unit would have minorities, and that there will be a reciprocal
protection of their rights. Finally, look at what was the first Muslim reaction after the first accord
on the Cutileiro plan, 18 March 92; see D00302, Ajanovic in “Politika”:

S
o, from the beginning of the Conference on BiH there was an issue of how many of each of
the ethnic communities would be in their respective constituent units, and how many will
remain in the other’s units as a minority. It was never meditated to expel anyone, or to
resettle, or to exchange the population. And it was agreed being aware that a war is been
avoided by this agreement!) The President continued to deliver speeches in which he (i) spoke
about avoiding the subjugation of the Serb people; (ii) advocated the creation of a ―Serbian state‖;
and (iii) blamed the Muslims and Croats for destroying the unity of BiH and Yugoslavia.9037 (So
what? Was it forbiden? Was he right or not? Even if he wasn’t, so what, this is how the
political life goes. But, the sequence is not correct: the first was destruction of Yugoslavia,
then BiH, and then the Serbs, being deprived from their state called Yugoslavia, advocated a
Serbian state”!) The President in May 1992 spoke with Krajišnik, Mladić, and other military
leaders and said that BiH as a state did not exist because it did not have any territory and that the
Serbs were ―on the threshold of achieving our centuries-old dream of creating our own state
without many internal enemies‖.9038 (The audience understood it properly: the Accuse was
always critical of the King Alexander I for his greed for territories, for including Slovenia
and Croatia in the common state in 1918, which the Serbs payed by million and a half lives
during the WWII. For the same reason, the President advocated not to include settlements
with other’s majority in the Serb entity without their will, because they wouldn’t be

9036
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), pp. 2, 15.
9037
P1347 (Shorthand record of 5th session of SerBiH Assembly, 9 January 1992), pp. 45, 47–49; P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May
1992), e-court pp.3–4.
9038
P1477 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 14 February–25 May 1992), pp. 256–258. See also D4025 (Excerpt of SDS Main Board meeting, 14 February 1992), pp.
13, 15 (where Kuprešanin spoke about BiH ceasing to exist as their ―holy mission‖).
 606

satisfied! And this was the only reason and the only instrument in achieving the
homogeneity, just not to force others to live in a constituent unit they don’t prefere!) In this
regard, the President also stated that they were ―controlling the Serbian settlements‖ in Sarajevo
and were expanding them.9039 (Again, so what? If a state is not capable of controling it’s own
territory and rule it, such a state doesn’t exist. Because, the basic preconditions for a state
are: a territory, a people, and an efficient authority on the entire territory. The Bosnian
Muslims envisaged a different Bosnia which never existed, and then participated in the
destruction of Yugoslavia, pretending that the entire Bosnia would be only their. The
Chamber should be clear: whether it deals with the constitutional, political, historical,
geographical matters, whether the Chamber explores and serches for the cause of the war,
and the responsible – or it is clarifying the war crimes? Otherwise, all of the inferences are
wrong!)

2724. In February 1992, the Accused went on to state ―now our main goal is the only goal that
can be achieved: to solve the issue of the majority of the Serbian people‖, namely the creation of
their republic of BiH.9040 (“now our main goal” it is clear that it had been agreed in the
framework of the Conference that there will be the three republics, constituent units. So, if it
is already agreed, “our main goal” is no longer to obtain it, because it was agreed, and now
“our main goals” is to realize it in praxis, to make a good map which would comprise as
many Serbs as possible. That happens when the things are kreated as a salade of a small
leaves. A time and context must not be neglected. But, this part of the President’s speech
concerned Krajina and disputes with some Krajina’s locals. Let us see what was that:
P00938, p. 35:

The
refore, this context is so far from anything that the Judgment suggested. The President was
defending the result of the Conference on BiH, and criticising the childish conduct of some
local leaders in ARK. Let us see how enthusiastic was the President about the Conference:

9039
P1477 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 14 February–25 May 1992), p. 257.
9040
P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 35.
 607

So,
the President was fighting against the greed for territories and warned the locals to be
modest, and not make the ARK problematic. And further, stil on the dispute with the ARK
local leaders:

and the conclusion of the discussion about the dispute with the ARK local leaders:

And this para is used to prove, what? That the President did what? Discussed within the
Party, persuading the locals to be moderate, not to proclaim the unification of the Knin
Krajina and the Bosnian Krajina, not to strive for nore territory, and so on. What is wrong
with this? And since everything was accepted and agreed in the Conference, the main
problem was to define what the territories with the undispoutable Serb majority to include
in the Serb Bosnian Republic. Instead to reward the President for his divotion to the
agreements and the peaceful solutions, we have an obscure charge.

He also stated that ―it is clear to every Serb that Croats and Serbs cannot live in a single state.
Consequently, they cannot be in the same army, and also that BiH cannot have its army. There
would remain national guards in each of the republics, and the police which would be under the
control of the respective republics‖.9041 ‖.9042 (This is what Karadzic reported to the meeting
about what was agreed upon. Those weren’t his words, or his wishes, just look at the draft
agreement.

9041
P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 6.
9042
P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 6.
 608

(This is what the President reported to the meeting about what was agreed upon. Those
weren’t his words, or his wishes, just look at the draft agreement. The President reviewed
the Serb-Croat relationship in general, and here is what was concluded:

So, the President interpreted what had been discussed with the Croats, and the Chamber
allocate this to be the President’s words and his standpoint. There can not be more wrong
inference, and that must happen if one is considering documents out of context! The President
emphasised that there was tension and conflict in undefined territories where ―two national
communities touch each other‖ and that they should be defined as soon as possible.9043 ( prior to
these sentences, the President said that a quantity of disputed territories is not as large as
could be meant: @

2725. In meetings with international representatives, Bosnian Serb leaders including the
President, Krajišnik, and Plavšić openly stated that it was impossible for Bosnian Serbs to co-exist
with the other communities, particularly the Bosnian Muslims, and that it was better to separate
the communities.9044 For example in discussions with Owen and Morillon, the President repeated

9043
P1353 (Shorthand record of 10th session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 March 1992), pp. 2, 7; D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18
March 1992), pp. 4–5, 10.
9044
KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 6751–6752, 6843 (under seal); KDZ240, T. 16064–16065, 16068 (5 July 2011) (closed
session); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4205; Herbert Okun, T. 1496–1497 (23 April 2010); P785 (Second notebook of
Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 25; P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 120; KDZ088, T. 6253–6255, 6314 (7
September 2010) (closed session) [REDACTED]; Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek, T. 5512–5514, 5522–5523 (20 July 2010). See also KDZ088, T. 6314 (7
September 2010) ; P5748 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Lukić, 13 February 1992), p. 1; P5063 (Video footage depicting
interview of Radovan Karadţić on ―Ask the President‖, undated, with transcript), pp. 8–9. [REDACTED].
 609

that separation from the Bosnian Muslims and Croats was essential.9045 ―The state separation”
was the crucial determination, and if it is skipped, then nothing have any sense. The
Chamber does not have a reason to not understand, nor they can pretend as if it was not
known what kind of separation the Serbs, and the Croats too, proposed: like in Switzerland,
and Sarajevo like in the Brussels, see
P941:

.
Does it mean that Switzerland, Belgium and other composed countries are a criminal
creation?

(The entire crisis with Yugoslavia was about the ethnic majorities and the ethnic states. Why
the Muslims insisted to leave Yugoslavia? It wasn’t on a rascial, or economic or sport, or any
other basis, it was that they wanted to have their own national state, while the Serbs and
Croats were envisaged to be minorities. The minority rights in the Balkans are never settled
properly, and are always a source of wars and other skirmishes and unease.

This policy was introduced after the illegal secessions of the Yugoslav republics. Karadzic was
obliged to be clear to the international mediators about what the RS would and what
wouldn’t accept.

9045
P1481 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 5 October–27 December 1992), pp. 349, 357–358.
 610

2726. In meetings with Harland, the President as well as Plavšić openly said that the basic Serb
war aim was to redistribute the population of BiH so that the Serbs would be left in control of a
single continuous block of territory embracing the whole border with Montenegro and Serbia and
also including all of the traditionally Serb-inhabited areas.9046 (The President had never had any
meeting with Harland, see below the part of Harland’s answer to the President questions!
Now, the time comes to analize Mr. Harland as a witness, which was given a very high
position only in the courtroom, while on the terrain about which he was supposed to testify
he wasn’t competent, he wasn’t prominent, he wasn’t present, he wasn’t important, he
wasn’t aquainted even with his job and tasks. As the above para said: “in meetings with
Harland, the President…” must be said that there was never any meeting between Harland
and the President. Further, the subject he testified, i.e. “the basic Serb war aim” was never
discussed with him, but always with the mediators, and only with the highest representatives,
like Lord Carrington, Amb. Cutilleiro, Cirus Vance, Lord Owen, Henry Darwin, Thorwald
Stoltenberg and others of the simmilar level and leverage. Mr. Harland looks like a milky
cow, and the Prosecution is milking out of him whatever can not obtain from the first clas
interlocutors of the President. Why the Chamber admitted this testimony, while this drastic
statement hadn’t been found in any report of the international mediators? If it had been
said, it would be the main issue on the Conference and in media! But, let us see further,
what he said about Karadzic:

It is obvious that he
was in a delegations, “never as a principal”. Let us se what he answered to the question of
the President about their “meetings” (Harland, T. 2057)
Q. Thank you. Can I just ask you something. Who held that
position before you? A. Immediately before me was a colleague
called Emma Shitaka. Q. I'm sorry that I did not manage to
remember you and that I cannot remember her either,
(…)T.2061:
Q. If I understood you well, you said that you drafted your
reports based on other people's reports. A. I certainly used the
information from the UNMOs and our battalions, but I also had my
own office. We had, I mentioned yesterday, a medical doctor.
We also had a statistician. We had political officers making
meetings with people in the city and outside, and, of course, I
attended directly the meetings with the leadership on both sides.
I was usually sitting quietly in the background. But -- so I
would say it's not correct to imply that what I had was second-
hand information. There was a range of sources. Q. You're saying
that you had a direct insight, a direct assessment, but most of
your report was a compilation and analysis of other people's
reports. Could you please tell us what you based your reports on?
You had two types of documents, reports and political assessments,
so tell us what kind of documents you produced and what they
were based on. A. Okay, sure. So the reports on specific
incidents, whether it's a meeting or something that happened to a

9046
P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 269.
 611

convoy or on the battle-field, if it was at a meeting, normally

I was present. Normally, I didn't say anything, but normally I
was present with yourself, or President Izetbegovic, or any of the
other actors, or General Mladic, or General Delic, or many others.
And so normally I observed, myself. If I did not observe, myself,
I had a couple of colleagues who could play the same role.
Is it now clear that Mr. Harland was a low level clark, who didn’t communicate but just was
“observing” and making notes. Also, it is clear, isn’t it, that he was no in a position to talk to
the President or Ms. Plavsic, but the Prosecution kept “milking from him out as much as
possible.” And the Defense made this objection at the courtroom, but the Chamber highly
evaluated this “milky” witness. But, look for what purposes the Prosecution used this
“milky” gentleman:

Of course, everyone knows that the President didn’t wear any hat, let alone a “psychiatric” one,
and certainly wouldn’t speek with guests with a hat on him. But, if it was a figure, it is not an
appropriate conduct, to have such a hostile remarks about a dignitary of the one of the sides
between which the UN mediated, not appropriate, but rather very rude.

Nothing could be less accurate. One should just listen to the intercepts pertaining to the
Igman crisis, and see that the President didn’t command nor controled, but argued and
thretened to be obeyed. Also, it was a well known fact that the President hended the
operational command over to the HQ. Anyway, Harland couldn’t have known anything
about it, because he didne have a required education or a position! It was just enough for
Mr. Harland to know or guess what the Prosecution wanted, and he would deliver. The
Defense is disgusted by the credit the Chamber gave to such a kind of witnesses. The
Chamber (and the Apeal Chamber too) may remember how Mr. Harland and Mr. Banbury
concieved their mandate: to protect the Government, i. e. to be against the Serbs.
And now, the quotation from this fn.

This was published in the official gazzette and given to the EC mediators, so there was nothing
to ask him, or for him to “understend. He wasn’t an expert witness, nor he was qualified to
have his own “understanding” of the things that were in the competence of his bosses.
 612

So, Harland was summoned to be prepared to testify what the OTP needed, not what he himself
saw on the terrain. Look
further:

This is a shameless forgery. Who was he to have such a kind of talks with the highest Serb
leadewrs? Only his superiors could have testified about this and such a subjects, but the
Prosecution couldn’t obtain anyone who would be indecent enough to lie or to invent. If
anything of it was even similar there would be in all the official reports of the mediators, and
in media.

Why his superiors didn’t report this Serb standpoint, or demand, whatever it was? How
drastic it had to be to have attracted their attention? Had it ever been mentioned by any
Serb, that would be on the front pages of every news paper and a headline in other media.
And how the Prosecution allows itself to use such a shameless manipulation, but it is even
more unusual that the Chamber accepted this kind of manipulation. Thus the UN court is
compromising everything that the UN did in the mediation, in the humanitarian mission, in
it’s presence there?

DO WE HAVE TO CONCLUDE THAT THIS #UN COURT NEGLECTS THE FIRST CLASS
UN DOCUMENTS# IN ORDER TO ACCEPT MEMORIES AND OPINIONS OF THE
FIFTH CLASS UN NOTE-TAKERS? See the next par of the paragraph, a literaly taken
from the Harland’s statement: The Bosnian Serb leadership said that due to ―an historical
accident‖, Bosnian Muslims were a majority in certain areas and to achieve their goal, large
numbers of Bosnian Muslims had to be removed because the majority of the population along the
 613

Drina River in northeast BiH, was Muslim.9047 They openly stated that the purpose of war was for
the Bosnian government to accept this redistribution of the population and the President
acknowledged that some ―old people will probably want to remain‖ but he envisaged that to a
large extent the overwhelming majority of the population that would remain in Serb areas would
be Serb and Muslim in Muslim areas.9048 (Again, the Chamber is turning a possible academic
discussion and predictions into an official standpoint of the entire Serb side. More than
wrong inference, a forgery. The Chamber knew that the Serbs envisaged that both the Serbs
and Muslims had been envisaged to have their own municipalities regardless of the entity
where they lived! If it had been said as an official position, as Harland testified, the whole
international community would have known that!) At these meetings, some members of the
Bosnian Serb leadership openly stated that it was good if all non-Serbs left and that they wanted
them to go because they were not living well together.9049 (Look at this “hard proof” – some
members of the Serb delegation said something, what his superiors and chiefs of delegations
didn’t here and didn’t report to their headquarters! How the Chamber accepted such a
flagrant lies?)

9047
P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 270.
9048
P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 270, 272.
9049
P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 274.
 614

2727. Biljana Plavšić spoke about the importance of the partition of territory and executing this
partition ―properly as this business awaits us‖.9050 This “chop” from the Plavsic’s speech is
abused. The entire session was dedicated to the last preparations to adopt the Lisbon
Agreement, and here is what Ms. Plavsic
said:

But, this even wasn’t translated correctly. In Srbian it look as

follows:

It should be translated like that: “Therefore, it seems to me that it would be the most
important than everything to concentrate on the separation of territories. We must be
maximally engaged, we have to do those delineations properly, because this job is waiting
us.”

Therefore, not “partition” but “separation” and “delineation” and this was an obligation
towards the Conference, the mediators asked for that, and nothing criminal was in that,
since there was the Agreement reached! But, the manin question is: why the Tribunal needed
a “note-taker, summoned to testify of the facts to testify as an expert, about a public
statements and documents? Finally, it was a daily job for the delegation of the EC. Look
what the President said at the meeting od the Club of representatives 28 February, P00938,
p.5

We now know that it was Mr. Henry Darwin, who was the first to create the territorial shape of
the future constituent units, and the sides had been pressed by the EC to accept the plan as
soon as possible!) She also expressed the idea that Bosnian Serbs could no longer live with
Bosnian Muslims; on one occasion at a funeral for a Bosnian Serb soldier she said that the Bosnian

9050
P1353 (Shorthand record of 10th session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 March 1992), p. 36.
 615

Muslims should be slaughtered or exterminated.9051 (In May 1992, Plavšić spoke of the entitlement
of the Serbs to 70% of the territory and that Bosnian Serbs ―were used to living in wide spaces‖
while Muslims typically lived in cities.9052 This is a big misunderstanding among the two
whose native language wasn’t English. What the lady (if it was Ms. Plavsic, since Doyle
didn’t say that, it was suggested to him by the prosecutor, T.2667: (A. Yes. This particular
comment was brought up by an official of the Bosnian Serbs when I went to Pale on the 1st of
May, 1992. I don't know in what capacity she was, but certainly she was one of the Bosnian
Serb officials I met up there.) As a matter of fact, it was a very frequent question from the
foreigners, how come the Serbs are majority on 70% of the territory, while the make 32% of
population, and the ansver was always what Mr. Doyle heard, but didn’t understand. It was
not any political position, it was just an explanation how come the Serbs are more rural.
Plavšić further stated that ―if it takes the lives of 3 million people to solve this crisis, lets get it done
and move on‖.9053 (Ms. Plavsic denyed this assertion immediately after it appeared in public.
This was, she explained, a malicious framing in by the communist circles in Belgrade! If Ms.
Plavsic didn’t accept it, and there were no other evidence but a communist gossip, it
shouldn’t be in this Court and it’s documents!) Plavšić also spoke about creating the conditions
for ―forced emigration‖ and that the ―last thing that can be allowed […] is a compromise at the
expense of conquered territories‖ and that foreign countries should be reminded that the Bosnian
Serbs would not give up what they had conquered.9054 (Let us see what Ms. Plavsic was
discussing in the Assembly, for which she couldn’t be President in any country, because it
was a legislative body discussing the platform for negotiations:

Since Ms. Plavsic couldn’t be charged for expressing her opinion in the Parliament, how
possibly the President’s ―mens rea‖ could be derived from another person’s parliamentary
discussion??? Contrary to that, the two elements: the Serbs didn’t conquer, it was their
territory, and second, the envoys had been the only acquainted with the official position, see
P941, and Lord Owen said that it was for the first time that an army that wasn’t defeated
agreed to role back 1/3 of the territory. Doyle couldn’t testify about those things, and his
opinion or assumptions are not relevant. The Chamber had the insight in the President’s
commitment that the territorial issues are relative, and that the Serb side doesn’t recognize
any forcefull occupation of the territory, and that the territorial issues are to be defined on
the Conference. Such a commitment the President made as early as 22 April 1992 in his
Platform for a peacefull resolution of the crisis, see: D220:

9051
Colm Doyle, T. 2667–2668, 2670–2672 (21 May 2010); [REDACTED]; Let us see what a lady said to Doyle: A. Yes. This particular
comment was brought up by an official of the Bosnian Serbs when I went to Pale on the 1st of May, 1992. I don't 3 know in
what capacity she was, but certainly she was one of the Bosnian Serb officials I met up there. And she said, Mr. Doyle, you
know, I'm quite happy to live with others, but I want a fence built round my house. I will only feel safe if I'm inside my house
and I have protection outside. And that was the feeling we got at the time. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN KNOWN THAT IT
WAS A PARAPHRASE of a very known American poet, R. Frost: “a good fense make good friends”. It didn’t say what the
paragraph said. Again, instead of documents, the Tribunal is picking up a patchwork of sentences that were said withouit
any obligation, and by unknown persons. This is a spying on the people when they are out of office. However, no mentioning
of any slaughter Vitomir Ţepinić, T. 33594–33595 (13 February 2013).
9052
Colm Doyle, T. 2671–2672 (21 May 2010).
9053
Colm Doyle, T. 2672 (21 May 2010).
9054
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), pp. 38–39, 52.
 616

Do the documents matter at all, or a gossips are stronger? This is his mens rea and
whatever others said, it can not be used against this President!) .

2728. Koljević was particularly extreme in his views and continued to repeat at important
meetings that it was impossible for the communities to live together.9055 (This is a blasphemy to
say that Mr. Koljevic was an extreme in any sense, because everyone knew how mild and
moderate was he. Again, talking out of context, Koljevic took into account the new course of
the Muslim leadership, and their plans to reform BiH and life in it on the basis of the
Izetbegovic’ program called Islamic Declaration. Professor Koljevic could have been
everything but not extreme in anything. But all of those allegations come from a two or three
obscure witnesses, who are picking up a parts of sentences from private talks or a privileged
parliamentary talks in the midle of a bloody war with daily loses of lives. This looks like a
political lecturing and advocating of the multiethnicity at any costs. What is that? Does the
Chamber have the right to judge the Serb political response to the illegal secession of BiH,
and the Muslim persistent attempts to avoid any decentralisation of BiH in order to be able
to dominate. This is something that the Defense shouls cease to deal with and to defend
against the allegations that the Serbs didn’t accept to live with the Muslims, i.e. “under the
Muslims” and their domination. So what? That was their right. And there were many other
outcomes from this crisis, but the Muslims and their western friends favorized the war, for
which they want to accuse the Serbs. This is another crime of the cosmic dimensions. Stop it!
This crime is delevoping under the auspice of the Security Council and the UN. What does it
matter if some deputies said in the midle of the war that they didn’t want to live with those
who are killing the Serbs every day?) A deputy at the Bosnian Serb Assembly echoed this
sentiment and spoke about their common wish for an ―ethnically pure Serbian state‖ and the need,
in the context of negotiations, to ―emphasise that we can not live with them‖.9056 (Any deputy was
entitled to say whatever wanted, without any possibility to be President, let alone indicted.
How somebody else, as the President, with the different opinion, could be charged of a
deputy’s words? This part of the alleged “ethnicaly pure state” is a monstruous lie,
particularly if it implies the “ethnic cleansing” which usually does. When it was a word of
the ethnic delimitation, it meant that a villages be free to decide to belong to one or other

9055
Vitomir Ţepinić, T. 33595 (13 February 2013). See also Herbert Okun, T. 1497–1498 (23 April 2010); P785 (Second notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY
diary), e-court p. 44.
9056
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 34.
 617

municipality and thus entity. This construction is so unfair, and is perpetuated from the
biased media and political flosculas. Anyway, all that is in the foundation of the Indictment
and this Judgement is from unofficial sources, the fifth class evidence. At the same time,
there are a plethora of a genuine evidence, contemporaneous documents snd commitments to
the opposite of these allegations, while there is no valid evidence in the documents of the RS
in favour of any crime!) Lukić, who was the second Prime Minister of the RS, also advocated
―ethnic cleansing‖ and told leaders in Serbia that Bosnian Muslims could not be trusted.9057
(Incorrect, see below, the comment of the foot note. Let us see from P6161, p. 1 part of the
discussion of M. Bulatovic, President of Montenegro:

President Milosevic asked: “Who said

that? Bulatovic confirmed:

As
if Prime Minister Lukic advised leadership of FRY to ethnically cleanse” Serbian region
callse Sandzak! A bit later President Milosevic said:

And
President of FRY Dobrica Cosic said:

At
the very same moment neither President Milosevic, nor President Cosic knew or believed it,
and Cosic concluded that a right information must be collected as soon as possible. Let us
now see what President Bulatovic said in his testimony, T34540 Q: Mr. Bulatovic, is it your
evidence that the expulsion and crimes that the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims suffered
during the period from 1991 through to 1995 in Croatia and in Bosnia are not the result of the
policies and the actions of their respective leaderships? Is that your evidence? A. Very strong
lifelong conviction is that it was a consequence of the civil war that raged in those areas, and
that civil war was due to the uncontrolled and unlawful breakup of the previous state; that is to
say the expulsions and the crimes are a consequence of the fact that there was a civil war not
that there was any plan. So much about allegations that the gossip about Lukic’s invective
on expulsion was believed by President Bulatovic! Here is the critical sentence about alleged
Prime Minister Lukic advises that the FRY cleanse Sandzak, T34543- 34544: Q.Mr.
Bulatovic, I would like to quote what you said on -- and you say here: "We are obliged to help
them," referring to Republika Srpska, "but we are also obliged to understand that we can
hardly co-operate with someone who, like the Prime Minister of the RS advises us to ethnically
cleanse Sandzak and kill the Muslims there." And can we have the next page in the English.
And then you also say: "The Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, Mr. Lukic, he advises us to

9057
Momir Bulatović, T. 34543–34544 (1 March 2013); P6161 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 8th session, 12 March 1993), pp. 1–2.
Wrong and
incorrect! Bulatovic rebutted previously mentioned alleged words of Lukic. Lukic or any other Serb official never
advocated “ethnic cleansing” or “pure Serbian state”, but all of them advocated a moderate approach to the issue of
territories, meaning not to include territories of the others, who wouldn’t want to be in the Serbian entity. That the
Muslims weren’t to be trusted knew every mediator, and they said it many times publicly.
 618

do it as soon as possible, for Muslims are not to be trusted. They will stab us in the back, they
will mine our railroad, and so on." Mr. Bulatovic, that's what you said and that was your
information; right? A. I remember this meeting very well. It was being decided how to meet
the requests of the Government of Republika Srpska for their military conscripts to be arrested,
those who are in the territory of the FRY and how to deliver them by force to the VRS. That
decision was not taken and I'm very proud about that. This passage deals with the decision-
making process. It is true that this decision was not notified to us in person, but we were just
told that in the ranks of the Government of Republika Srpska occasionally there are some
extreme views. It turned out that those extreme views were something we could not share, they
were not our convictions, and they could not support the making of the decision that was asked
of us to make.
Let us see further, T3454-57 Q: Here you see it basically in where you speak. It's the third
paragraph in which you speak, and that is -- that should be the quote that I had: "That is one
of the most important elements of our national strategy, all the more so because the highest
leadership of Republika Srpska suggests that we should initiate organised ethnic cleansing and
that would be a disaster." That's what you said; right? A. Yes. But look, this was a normal
and responsible reaction to an atrocious crime that was committed. This is a discussion about
what the paramilitary unit of Mr. Lukic had done. They had killed innocent citizens of Serbia
and Montenegro. They were killed on the train only because they were Muslims. You see in
the text a strong conviction of that. There is talk about Lukic and he is described as a horrible
person. The text also speaks about our efforts to preserve peace and tolerance. Sandzak, for
your information, Your Honours, is an area populated mainly by Muslims. That's why I said
one of the main elements of our state strategy was to preserve peace and tolerance. And the
sentence that comes next is linked to the previous one where we describe an extremist excess by
one person from the leadership -- THE PRESIDENT: [Interpretation] If I may say ... JUDGE
KWON: I'm not sure the translation of Mr. Bulatovic's answer has been translated. Yes, we'll
hear what you say, Mr. Karadzic. THE PRESIDENT: [Interpretation] A. I wanted to draw your
attention to the fact that Mr. Bulatovic said it was one of the most important elements of our
state strategy, all the more so because from the highest -- it originates from the highest places
in Republika Srpska, whereas the interpretation refers to the "highest leadership of
Republika Srpska." He actually said from the highest places in Republika Srpska. "Highest
places" is not legally the same as the "highest leadership." […] MS. UERTZ-
RETZLAFF: Q. Mr. Bulatovic, when you -- I assume that "highest places" is the correct
translation as Mr. Karadzic says, and "highest places" means the Bosnian Serb leadership or
who would you mean? A. It's clear. This is a continuation from the same session where we
strenuously condemn the then-Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, Mr. Lukic.

So, there was discussion about another Lukic, President for a killing of the Muslims in a train,
while the assertion about “an extremist excess of one person from the leadership concerned
with the allegations about the Prime Ministed! All on the level of gossip! Let us see what
President Bulatovic said in his testimony, T34584 - 85: Q. Mr. President, in light of what
His Excellency Judge Kwon said on page 40, lines 20 and 21, about Lukic's statement at the
Supreme Defence Council, can you explain, was Lukic present and did he state that at the
Supreme Defence Council session? A. No. From the whole context it is obvious that the
position of Mr. Lukic was conveyed to us in a hearsay way. We were just referring to a
common place that was indirectly passed on to us in the absence of Mr. Lukic. Q. Thank you.
In the course of your work, did you encounter similar positions of Mr. Lukic reflected in some
reliable documents? A. No. Those positions were never officially stated, but the thinking of
the Supreme Defence Council was that we did not want to co-operate with Republika Srpska
based on extreme views. But since we were co-operating non-stop, in my view it is proof that
their views were acceptable to both us and the international community. Q. Thank you. Mr.
 619

President, how does what we saw in the previous document fit in with what reached you in that
hearsay form? A. The difference is obvious. An official address by Prime Minister Lukic is
something that cannot be objected to, whereas the information we received at the Supreme
Defence Council was cause for great concern and for that reason was rejected by us. Q. Can I
just put this to you. This is the 7th Session of the cabinet after that meeting of yours, so on the
19th of May. We have one document from before the session and this one is after the session. I
will read carefully the conclusions of the government. First sentence: "The report on the work
of the commission for refugees and humanitarian aid for the first quarter of 1993 has been
endorsed." And then further below it says: "Of particular importance is to ensure balanced
distribution of aid relative to Muslims and Croats and the commission shall pay special
attention to this." Q. Mr. President, can you tell us from your experience what was the
degree of accuracy of that information, that kind of information that reached you? To what
degree did they prove to be wrong or correct? A. It is well-known that the first casualty of
every war is the truth. Intelligence and security services that cover and monitor every territory
are not always slaves to the truth. They work for their own interests, but most often it is the only
source of information. You have to work with that information although you could never swear
that they are completely correct or truthful. Q. Thank you, Mr. President. (Now, when we see
that the allegation about Prime Minister Lukic criminal proposals is rebuted from the very
source of the information, how was it possible to have it remained in the Judgement? What is
the sense of trials at all? If everything that the Prosecution alleges becomes a fact, why to call
any witness? Only this episode is sufficient to compromise the entire process as unfair and
fake!) International observers reported that the JNA acquiesced in, or in some cases supported,
the creation of ethnically homogeneous regions in BiH which involved ―the seizure of territory by
military force and intimidation of the non-Serb population‖.9058

9058
P937 (UNSG Report re peacekeeping operation in BiH, 12 May 1992), paras. 3–5; Colm Doyle, T. 2663–2666 (21 May 2010).
 620

2729. Krajišnik often recalled that the main Bosnian Serb objective was to separate from the
Bosnian Muslims and to create their own state which was ethnically ―pure‖.9059 (Wrong, see the
comment of the fn below!)

2730. In July 1992, Mandić spoke about the Bosnian Serb territories which were ―supposed to be
taken‖, had already been taken, and identified areas which were still disputable, including in
Sarajevo.9060 Mandić also questioned ―what to do with the Turks‖ and suggested that there
―should be an airlift established with Turkey and let them go, we should split Bosnia in two
parts‖.9061 In this same conversation, Mandić said ―[w]e don‘t want to have a single-nation state,
man. We want to have democratic state where the Serbian people would be in the majority.‖9062

9059
P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), pp. 140, 143–144; There is no a word about “ethnic purity in this
document” P5623 (Speech of Momĉilo Krajišnik at the Assembly of Serbian People of BiH, 28 February 1992), pp. 3–4 Let us see what Mr.
Krajisnikreally said:

All
of that was said after the Conference agreed to have the three units in BiH; See further, p. 3:

The Serb entity had already been accepted at the Conference, but Krajisnik fought his political fight agains the
Krajina separatism and pleaded for a solid, unitary Serb entity, not a confederal one. No a word about “ethnic
purity”, and this kind of abuse of evidence is disastrous for the state of the international justice. Let us see p. 4.:

This is a problem with wrong translation, Krajisnik didn’t mean “pure areas” it meant “clearly Serbian areas”,
meaning undisputable Serbian. But even if it was as it is interpreted, taking into account that it had been said before
the war and in the context of the Agreement that exclude any war, it would only mean that Krajisnik advocated to
claim for only those territories that are “clearly Serbian” and no way to interpret it as an intention to “purify” the
territories. Clearly commendable!!!. P1481 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 5 October–27 December 1992), pp. 146–147; Let us see what is
written in this exhibit:

Krajisnik praised the military for their “successes” but warned that “it (is) very dangerous to seize their territories”.
And that was the only manner to accomplish a homogenous Serbian entity, not to grab their territories.
Commendable and exculpatory, aalthough it is clear that this kind of notes are to verbatim, but interpretative and
shortened. Anyway, no space to comment every single exhibit, but all of them are misinterpreted, missconcieved,
removed from context, and this is unacceptable and must be condemned!
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 48; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4293, 4295. See Adjudicated Fact 2411. Ţivanović acknowledged that separation from the Bosnian Muslims was discussed.
Milenko Ţivanović, T. 42585–42590 (30 October 2013).
9060
P1104 (Intercept of conversation between (i) Momĉilo Mandić and Ivo Rezo; (ii) Momĉilo Mandić and Branko Kvesić, 10 July 1992), pp. 7–8; Momĉilo
Mandić, T. 4619–4620 (5 July 2010). In an earlier conversation in May 1992, Mandić said that they ―should settle the Sarajevo problem through war and
then sit down and talk‖. P1149 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and Milanko Muĉibabić, 26 May 1992), p. 8.
9061
P1104 (Intercept of conversation between (i) Momĉilo Mandić and Ivo Rezo; (ii) Momĉilo Mandić and Branko Kvesić, 10 July 1992), p. 8.
9062
P1104 (Intercept of conversation between (i) Momĉilo Mandić and Ivo Rezo; (ii) Momĉilo Mandić and Branko Kvesić, 10 July 1992), p. 10.
 621

Mandić acknowledged that Croats and ―the rest of Muslims‖ would also have rights after ―we
clean them out‖.9063 (This was a jokey conversation between a Serb (Mandic) and the two
Croats (Kvesic, Rezo) and not an official standpoint. Certainly, Mandic would never say
anything official to the “enemies” since at the time there was a war between the Serbs and
Croats. This is a patetic patchwork with the aim to sentence the President! Mandic was
acquitted even in the BH court!)

2731. The Chamber recalls that Kuruzović, the Commander of Trnopolje, confirmed that the plan
of the Serb authorities was to reduce the number of Bosnian Muslims in Prijedor to 10% or less,
and then later to reduce this to 2% or less.9064 (This is also a very peculiar: Kuruzovic was in
charge of the Trnopolje reception center, not a high official of the RS. Also, the president of
the Prijedor municipality rebuted this assertion in his testimony, under the same footnote!
What the interest would have president of Prijedor Mr. Stakic to lie, since he was already
finally sentenced? So, an Adjudicated Fact was rebuted by a very competent person, but in
vain. Is that a justice?) The Chamber also heard from KDZ051 that around September 1992, he
was told by the President of the Rogatica SDS, Sveto Veselinović, that ―all the Muslims were
going to disappear from the territory‖ and that in conversations with the President in Pale, ―[i]t has
been decided that one third of Muslims would be killed, one third would be converted to the
Orthodox religion and a third will leave on their own‖.9065 Sveto Veselinović testified that he did
not meet KDZ051 in person, that he did not make such a statement, and that he did not have such a
conversation with the President, as he did not speak to him between January 1992 and autumn of
1993.9066 The Chamber finds that Veselinović‘s evidence casts reasonable doubt on this issue and
thus dismisses KDZ051‘s evidence on this point. (The Chamber had been informed that this
famous “formula” was in reality invented in the WWII by Quaternik, the Croat fascist
official, and everyone knows it. That was the official policy of NDH, independent Croatia as
a satellite of the Third Reich. That was the only witness saying such an allegation, nobody
ever said anything like that.)

2732. The President made a number of speeches which spoke about the inability of the ―three
peoples‖ in BiH to live together, and for example compared them to ―plants which cannot grow
side by side. They have to be separated to flourish‖.9067 (The Chamber is quoting these
speeches as if it was a cause of the misfortunate development. However, it was only an
attempt to understand such a persistent antagonism among the BH ethnic communities that
last for centuries. This could not cause any consequence, but to the contrary, the tragic
consequences are always caused by a negligeance of these antagonisms and attempt to
include many antagonised communities in a common state!) He also stated that ―they lived
together only when occupied or under a dictatorship. […] We can only be together like oil and
water. When you mix us, we are together. When you leave us alone, we separate‖ and that if they

9063
P1104 (Intercept of conversation between (i) Momĉilo Mandić and Ivo Rezo; (ii) Momĉilo Mandić and Branko Kvesić, 10 July 1992), p. 11.
9064
See para. 1910 (referring to Adjudicated Fact 1093). But see D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), paras. 28, 42; Milomir
Stakić, T. 45266–45267 (17 December 2013). Stakić testified that he never had any knowledge or heard of such a plan and the municipal authorities in
Prijedor never planned for the municipality to be mono-ethnic and that the rights of all citizens were maintained. In light of the weight of contrary evidence
received by the Chamber and Stakić‘s interest in distancing himself and the authorities from events in Prijedor, the Chamber does not find his evidence in
this regard to be reliable. (Why would Stakic distance himself, since he is sentences finally? Why nobody else mentioned
that?)
9065
P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 95.
9066
D4192 (D4192 (Supplemental witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 17 November 2013). Similarly Karabeg, the President of the SDA Executive
Board in Sanski Most, testified that the ―goal of the Serbian side was not to have more than 10 per cent of the population in Sanski Most‖. Mirzet Karabeg,
T. 18700-187002 (13 September 2011). However, the Chamber does not consider that Karabeg‘s testimony provided any basis for him to reach this
conclusion, or that he was privy to that kind of information. The Chamber therefore does not rely on his evidence in this regard.
9067
D304 (Shorthand Record of 14th session of RS Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 8. See also Vitomir Ţepinić, T. 33586–33587 (13 February 2013) (also
testifying that in his own talks with the Accused, he ―was not convinced that [the Accused] really thought about physical elimination of non-Serbs from
[BiH]‖, but that it was impossible to live together due to the extremism of the nationalist parties). While the Chamber accepts that this was Ţepinić‘s own
assessment, it does not rely on his opinion in this regard. (Once and for all: the President said that they can not live under the same
political and judicial system, because when the fundamentalist Islam comes, this region loses tranquillity!)
 622

were put in the same pot the soup would not mix.9068 (The Chamber forgot that this was a
Njegos’s strophe, stance, ilustrating a complicated relations between the two religions. This
was the greatest Serbian poet and Prince-Bishop of Montenegro in 19th Century, a sort of
icon in the region.) The President stated that ―[w]e are really something different […] we should
not hide that. We are not brothers. We must know that‖ and that when the world asked why they
could not live together, he would answer that ―we are three cultures, three peoples and three
religions‖ and that they had never lived together in democracy.9069 (So what? It was said before
the war as an explanation why Bosnia has to transform into three entities, and such a
political position didn’t cause any harm. Quite opposite, the denial of this transformation
caused the war! The Chamber could have noticed, if wanted, that the Serbs always
considered the Muslims to be the Serbs who converted to Islam. This was a sort of duping
ourselves, because the vast majority of the Muslims joined our enemies in every single war.
Only some extraordinary individuals, whose ethnic indentity was stronger than the religious,
considered themselves the Serbs of the Islamic religion. So is nowadays. Even Lord Owen
said (in the movie Death of Yugoslavia) that all of that was a civil war among the Serbs of the
Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim religion)

2733. This sentiment was also reflected in speeches delivered by Bosnian Serb leaders at a
municipal level. For example, the Chamber recalls that in early April 1992, there were radio
announcements in Foĉa in which SDS President Miroslav Stanić said it was no longer possible for
Bosnian Serbs to live with their Bosnian Muslim neighbours, that they could not be woken every
morning by the hodţa from the mosque, (Again, this is a famous line from the Njegos’s “Gorski
vijenac”, a line of poetry, also well known!) and that there was a danger that the Bosnian Serb
population would be circumcised.9070 (But, anyway, whatever said somebody else is not a
liability of the President! Foca had a long history of mutual extermination of the two
communities!) In May 1992, the President attended a meeting where he said that if there was a
response to the mobilisation of the 1st Krajina Corps, ―then we clear the Posavina of Croats‖.9071
(Again, this is a grave manipulation with this un-finished sentences, not taken verbatim, but
in a short, cripled view! If it was meant to “clear” Posavina from the Croatian civilians, why
there would be needed any mobilisation? Obviously, as well known to everyone who wanted
to know, Posavina was extremely militarised, and the fights lasted until the beginning of July
92. Therefore, to clear Posavina from the Croatian Army and HVO was a legitimate, and
even vital because there was the corridor between eastern part of the RS and Banja Luka
region! While exploiting the Mladic’s notes, the Chamber should notice other elements on
the same pages: see P1478:

9068
P5596 (Video footage depicting interview of Radovan Karadţić on CNN, with transcript), p. 1; P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the
SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 19; P6688 (Interview with Radovan Karadţić in Duga Magazine, 23 May 1992), p. 3.
9069
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), pp. 19–20. KDZ310 testified that the Accused as the head of the SDS
pursued a policy which was designed to prove to ―both peoples that they can no longer live together‖ even though they had lived together for years. (If so,
why the Muslims wanted a unilateral and illegal secession from the common state? Why the Tribunal pretends to be
naïve? It was clearly said that the Serbs didn’t want to lose their freedom accepting a hostile fundamentalist regime in
an independent Bosnia! Once the MBO – Muslim-Bosniak Organisation, proposed the Historic Serb-Muslim
Agreement, the Serbs and the President accepted immediately, and abandoned the regionalisation and other plans!)
KDZ310, T. 9178, 9182–9183 (29 November 2010). During cross–examination, KDZ310 acknowledged that he was in no way involved in politics and he
formed these views based on conversations with people and what was reported in the media. The Chamber therefore places no weight on his assessment.
Similarly the Chamber places no weight on Mujadţić‘s opinion that in Prijedor, the Accused placed his confidence in Stakić as a municipal leader, as he
came from a typical ―Chetnik‖ background, to create a rift between Bosnian Muslims and Serbs and to impair the belief that it was possible for the two
ethnic groups to co-exist. Mirsad Mujadţić, P3703 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 3737–3739, 3903–3904.
9070
KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krnojelac), T. 1185. See para. 852.
9071
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 38, 41.
 623

The
Chamber would notice that the Accuse was very critical about Mauzer, the Muslims are
returning in Bijeljina, on the appeal of the President and the Prime Minister of FRY Panic,
but they have a hostile intentions, and finally, Posavina!)

2734. These speeches are in stark contrast with an interview on 20 July 1990, where the President
stated that

an illusion was created about a discord between the Serbs and the Muslims. […] Basically, there is
nowhere a conflict of interest between the Serbs and the Muslims. Regardless of what may
happen, the Serbs and the Muslims will always live in a common state, and they know how and
they will know in future how to live together. There is no need for a third party to fix the things
between them.9072 (EXCULPATORY!!!

Exactly, that would be as the President said, if only the Muslims didn’t force the illegal,
unlawful and forceful secession. What is not clear here? I the World War I the Muslims
joined the Austro-Hungarian Empire against the Serbs. In the WWII they joined the Third
Reich and the Croatian Nazi regime against the Serbs. Meanwhile the Serbs and Muslims
lived peacefully. The President said that the Muslims do not have any reason to fight against
the Serbs for a sake of another side. However, the President was too optimistic! He didn’t
change his position, the Muslims did!)

2735. The President also stated:

Here, the Muslims are Slavs, people with our blood and language who, for the most part, opt for the
European quality of life and preservation of the Islamic faith. There is no room for panic neither
among the Serbs nor among the Muslims. According to my estimation, the Serbs do not have to
defend the boundaries of the Christian Europe and fight the Islam. We are much closer to our
Muslims than with that Europe.9073 (EXCULPATORY!!!)

There was many Bosnian Muslims, an elite of this community, that was of this opinion and
orientation, as the President hoped to be in majority. Unfortunately, these pro-European
Muslims, who made the elite of this community, were in the MBO and other secular parties,
and they didn’t win the elections. From the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis the President
had a good cooperation with such a secular Muslim parties, but they couldn’t influence their
electoral and create a peaceful solution!)

2736. The Chamber notes, however, that these statements were made by the President in a very
different environment and were delivered in a period where the political objective of the Bosnian
Serb leadership was to emphasise the unity of Yugoslavia and the existence of a common state.

9072
D269 (Radovan Karadţić‘s interview with NIN, 20 July 1990), p. 8.
9073
D269 (Radovan Karadţić‘s interview with NIN, 20 July 1990), p. 9. See also Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4748 (6 July 2010); D363 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 13 July 1991), p. 5.
 624

(EXCULPATORY!!! It is clear that the President didn’t have a negative attitude towards
the Muslims, and living together in the same state, but the President and the entire Serb
community in BiH had a negative attitude towards the independence pursued against their
will, interests and rights! It was also an open hands of the Serbs towards the Muslims, to
encourage them for the common life. It was known (see: Rebecca West book, and another
book: “The Guardians of the gate” meaning the Serbs were defending the Christian Europe
against Islam. (As it is expected now, in this crisis). But, it wasn’t just at the beginning. See
the intercepts throughout entire 91. in which The President demanded from the Serbs to
make the Muslims feel comfortable among the Serbs see:D03171, D03172, D01282, D03377,
and more intercepts from 91.

But, the most important is that this attitude of the President was a presumption that there will
not be the Islamic declaration as a political program, and the encouragement of the pro-
European Muslims, as well as relaxing the Bosnian Serbs about the Izetbegovic’s past. This
is quite contrary to what the Procesution/Chamber alleged, namely that the Serbs didn’t
want to live with the Muslims. They wanted to live with the Muslims, but not in an Islamic
State, under the Muslim unique domination!)

2737. Similarly the Chamber recalls that in the summer of 1991, the President attended an SDS
rally in Zvornik;9074 thereafter, the SDS and SDA issued a joint declaration expressing the need to
maintain peace in the municipality and calling for greater tolerance between ethnic groups
there.9075 In August 1991, the President spoke about peace and reaching an agreement with the
Bosnian Muslims.9076 Was it, by any chance, a reason to acquit this President, or at least to
reconsider what could have changed this steady attitude of the President from time to time.
Then the Chamber would be in a position to conclude that the conduct of the Serbs and the
President depended on the conduct and intentions of the other two sides. Everything in this
fn. is highly exculpatory!)

2738. On 12 May 1992, there was a large public rally in Banja Luka. The President, Mićo
Stanišić, and Stojan Ţupljanin, amongst others, were present.9077 The President addressed the rally
and said that it demonstrated the organisation and power of the SerBiH and that he regretted that
the war in BiH had been imposed on them by the two other national communities and that the
―mutual extermination, killings and tortures have been imposed to us‖.9078 The President stated
that while they had no conflict with the Croats and Muslims they would not allow their ―militant
leadership‖ to make them second class citizens and this was the reason why they created their state
9074
D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilić dated 9 June 2013), paras. 17–18; D3723 (Witness statement of Ĉedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013),
paras. 15, 18. See para. 1230. Vasilić stated that the Accused at SDS rallies in 1991 spoke in favour of a peaceful solution and respect for everyone in BiH.
D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilić dated 9 June 2013), para. 17. The Chamber notes that Vasilić‘s testimony was marked by inconsistencies,
evasiveness and other indicators that he was not forthright in his evidence. The Chamber therefore does not consider his evidence on what the Accused said
at SDS rallies to be reliable. But IT IS THE LEAST PROBLEM, BECAUSE IT MUST HAVE BEEN RECORDED IN THE
MEDIA. See Javnost, 17 August 91, to translate. Since it is contested, we have the right to tender it now. And it would
be more honest to forbid testimonies of a defence witnesses, because all of such witnesses in this case are disqualified
as not “reliable”..
9075
D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 15; D3725 (Joint declaration of Zvornik SDS and SDA, undated). See also D4533
(Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and unidentified male, 9 July 1991) (in which the Accused instructs an unidentified man to ensure that
nothing happens to the Muslims in Bosnian Krajina); D4550 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Dragan Đokanović, 13 December
1991), p. 2.
9076
D276 (Intercept of telephone conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 7 August 1991), p. 2; D277 (Intercept of conversation
between Nenad Stevandić and Radovan Karadţić, 17/18 August 1991), pp. 1–2. See also D272 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and
Vitomir Ţepinić and Momĉilo Mandić, 24 June 1991), p. 2; Robert Donia, T. 3470–3472 (8 June 2010); D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated
16 November 2013), para. 32; Milomir Stakić, T. 45193–45194 (16 December 2013) (stating that he met the Accused for the first time in 1991 when they
were having issues with the political party in Prijedor and the Accused told him that ―everything should be resolved democractically and through elections‖).
See D4546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Levko Ţar, 21 September 1991), p. 3 (wherein the Accused stated that [a]ll disputed
issues should be resolved peacefully.‖); D4545 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 13 September 1991), p. 2
(referring to a Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb agreement).
9077
D494 (Video footage of rally in Banja Luka, 12 May 1992, with transcript); Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5331–5336 (16 July 2010).
9078
D494 (Video footage of rally in Banja Luka, 12 May 1992, with transcript), pp. 4–5.
 625

unit in BiH.9079 The essence of this speech is quite different, see: D494

The essence is that 50,000 citizens of Banjaluka applauded to these words of the President, as
after the next words:

Again, 50,000 citizens of Banjaluka applauded. And this was the President’s commitment,
but also made widely public, so that everyone knows his attitude towards the Muslim and
Croat citizens of the Republic of Srpska, and to adopt the same! There is an additional
element to be noticed, see D494, p.5

An
d again, the applause when all the citizens are mentioned. See further: D494, p.

2
Mr. Zupljanin was publicly reporting that after five weeks of the war in other parts of BiH,
in this region there is a peace and order. Had the Serbs had any Joint Criminal Enterprise to
expel the Muslims and Croats, it would have been done already! But, nothing happened in
the area until 22 May, the Muslim attack in Hambarine, Prijedor. See further: D494, p. 3

9079
D494 (Video footage of rally in Banja Luka, 12 May 1992, with transcript), p. 5.
 626

While already five weeks there is a fierce war in other parts of BiH, but in this huge
predominantly Serb region there is a peace, and there is a public commitment to save the
peace and to make the other ethnicities feel comfortable, and equal to the Serbs, and the
police was proud to have “a great number” of professionals of other ethnicities that
remained to work in the Serb police. And all of it was praised by the applaudisment of
50,000 ordinary citizens of Banjaluka! Does it say anything about the alleged criminal plans,
allegedly coined out in October 1991?) The President also said that they were proud to say that
Muslims and Croats were not in danger in SerBiH and that they had to defend the borders of
SerBiH for all citizens of BiH regardless of their ―confession or nationality‖.9080
(EXCULPATORY!!! It was a public announcement that there would be only a defensive
strategy, a defence of the territory and population regardless of their ethnicity. Exactly as
Gen. Milovanovic said in his interview with the Prosecution on, see: D1598, p. 5

That was it! Not a word about alleged plans pertaining to the JCE! Not a word about any
offensive strategy! All legal, legitimate and necessary!) Similarly in June 1992, the RS
Presidency issued a press statement condemning the BiH declaration of war and noting that this
placed pressure on Serbs to fight ―against their brothers‖ and that they wanted a peaceful
resolution of the conflict and that all those who sought protection in SerBiH would be provided the
bare necessities ―irrespective of their nationality‖.9081 (A HIGHLY EXCULPATORY!!! And
this is widely corroborated by the events: many times, while the two other sides fought
among themselves, the Serb side helped with the humanitarian actions, accepting a great
number of refugees on the Serb territory, and throughout the war time the Serb hospitals
treated the “adverse” wounded or ill soldiers equaly as the Serbs!)

2739. In contrast to these public statements, when the President spoke to Ţepinić about his view
that the different nationalities could not live together in BiH, Ţepinić expressed his concern about
what was going to happen to the large number of mixed families in BiH and the difficulty of
dividing people who lived in the same high-rise buildings.9082 (First of all, the President didn’t
have his own intentions, he was obliged to understand what his people wanted and why. And
the Serbs in BiH did want to live together with the Muslims and Croats in Yugoslavia, or in
the Republic of Srpska, but not in a a unitary BiH! Why the Tribunal and some other
international institutions pretend not to know what it was all about? Europe has many

9080
D494 (Video footage of rally in Banja Luka, 12 May 1992, with transcript), pp. 5–7; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5334–5335 (16 July 2010). See also D1587
(Radovan Karadţić‘s platform for the solution of crisis in BiH, 22 April 1992).
9081
D2244 (Statement by SRBiH Presidency, 23 June 1992), p. 1.
9082
Vitomir Ţepinić, T. 33588–33589 (13 February 2013). Ţepinić also testified that he could not accept this policy of division and he did not believe that the
Accused was able to do so either, but that the Accused faced problems from extremists in his own ranks. Vitomir Ţepinić, T. 33589 (13 February
2013).(Finally, the difference from “facing” some problem and discussing about it, and advocating it as a desireable
solution – is noticed by a witness! That should be implied to all the academic and political discussions. If the President
expressed his opinion about some feature, id doesn’t mean that he desired it, or advocated it, but if it was a reality, he
had to be aware of it, and make others to be aware of it!)
 627

indentical examples, like Northern Ireland, like Flandria and Valona in Belgium, like
Switzerland with so many cantons, like many complex countries, in which their territorial
components would never give up their autonomy! The Serb side never opposed living with
the Muslims and (or) Croats, but the main issue was a nature of a state, and an issue of the
human and national rights protection safeguards, which wouldn’t exist if the Serbs are in a
position of national minority! Rebutting so many confused, false and fake accusations, which
are very easy to understand, looks like fighting against a windmills.

As usually, for the Chamber is of a greater relevance some chatting in private, than all
documents and public activity which obliged, while the private chatting doesn’t oblige, and
may have not happen as well. Mr. Zepinic never spoke in two with the President! Beside
that, he could have expressed his regret for the development in BiH, as the President too
expressed his regret for the destruction of the common life, see the comment in the fn.
Below! The main point is constantly missed: the new occasions, the BiH wanting to be
independent, unitary and led by the Islamic fundamentalists. When talking about the
inability to live together, it was exclusively because of those circumstances, and one of them
was sufficient not to accept that kind of BH, let alone all the three for the Serbs horrifying
conditions. Also, the Serbs didn’t have to accept anything, because the secession of BH was
illegal without the Serb consent!) Ţepinić was threatened by Mićo Stanišić and later arrested for
his opposition to ethnically based parties and also faced pressure from both Koljević and the
President.9083 It is a flagrant proof that Zepinic lied. The ethnicaly based parties had been
formed in 1989 and 1990, participated in the elections, won the elections, formed the
Government, offered to Zepinic a high position in the MUP on an ethnic list, and after a year
and a half Zepinic objected about the ethnically based parties??? Can you believe it?
Nobody was satisfied with his work, that was the reason!

2740. In May 1992, the President issued an announcement to Bosnian Muslims appealing for a
cessation of hostilities and assured them that Muslims who remained in SerBiH and had laid down
their arms had full protection and lived peacefully.9084 (EXCULPATORY!!!) The President
warned against the ―crazy idea of an Islamic state‖ and that the West wanted Muslims to be
―obliterated‖ but the Serbs wanted to reach an agreement with them.9085 (EXCULPATORY!) He
also assured Bosnian Muslims that they would be allowed to leave in the direction of their choice
with the right to return when the war was over.9086 (EXCULPATORY!!!) Okun described this
announcement as ―thoroughly disingenuous‖ and noted that it was issued at the same time as the
Bosnian Serb Assembly issued its war aims.9087 (How Okun could have known that it was
“thoroughly disingenuius” since he was there rarely and from time to time? Let us see hoaw
the events on the terrain look in comparison to the Okun’s assertion: 1. at least five entirely
Muslim villages only on the Romanija mount, laid the weapons down and continued to live
freely, some of them to the very end of the war. (see@____) 2. The Muslims started to return
to Bijeljina, and the Minister of Interior reported to his collegium that the Muslims are
returning to Bijeljina on the President’s invitation, which might be a bit too early, see D473,
p.10

9083
Vitomir Ţepinić, T. 33603–33607, 33619–33620 (13 February 2013). Ţepinić testified, however, that the Accused did in certain situations try to protect him
from extremists in the SDS. When questioned about whether the Accused took a position that Bosnian Muslims and Croats should be expelled, he testified
that if the Accused or the SDS had directly made such a statement he would have been arrested for such an unconstitutional decision. Vitomir Ţepinić, T.
33619–33620 (13 February 2013), T. 33655–33656 (14 February 2013).
9084
D119 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech re cessation of hostilities, May 1992), pp. 1–2. See also Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5183 (15 July 2010).
9085
D119 (Radovan Karadţić‘s announcement re cessation of hostilities, May 1992), pp. 1–2.
9086
D119 (Radovan Karadţić‘s announcement re cessation of hostilities, May 1992), p. 2.
9087
Herbert Okun, T. 1810–1811 (28 April 2010).
 628

General Mladic was reported that the Muslims are returning in Bijeljina, see P1478 (Ratko
Mladić’s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 40.

Finally, the President asked Mr. Okun about this characterisation of the announcement as
“disingenuous”, the answer was as follows (see: Herbert Okun, T. 1818 (28 April 2010).
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
Dr. Karadzic, I'm surprised to hear you say that I alleged that your appeals were disingenuous. I
said the opposite. I said they were praiseworthy, I said they were commendable, I said they had
merit. I said they were not observed in the field, but I never President those documents of being
anything but sincere. (How come this assertion of the Prosecution survived after it was
rebuted by the very same witness, Ambasador Okun? It appears that every defence is in
vain, even if the wame witness clarified his misinterpreted statement!)

2741. On 2 June 1992, the President issued a decision which called for all citizens who had
temporarily left the territory of the SerBiH to return and report to the Crisis Staff in their place of
residence by 20 May 1992.9088 It also promised the right of return to ―[p]ersons whose actions
were not contrary to the interests of the [SerBiH]‖.9089 It provided that persons who had left and
did not return or did not explain their inability to return to the relevant municipal crisis staff,
would be denied the right of citizenship of SerBiH and all acquired rights regarding employment,
housing, health and retirement insurance would cease and their property would be used
temporarily for the needs of defence of SerBiH.9090 Let us see how this is wrong and misused:,
see P2617, p. 2-3

9088
P2617 (Radovan Karadţić Decisions, May–June 1992), pp. 2–3.
9089
P2617 (Radovan Karadţić Decisions, May–June 1992), p. 3.
9090
P2617 (Radovan Karadţić Decisions, May–June 1992), pp. 2–3.
 629

This the first paragraph pertained to all the citizens of the Republic of Srpska. The second
part of para 1. and all the following paragraphs concerned only with the able bodied male
citizens of the Serb nationality:

Here is the rest of this document, P2617

None of the restrictive measures didn’t pertain to the non-Serbs, as it was known that the
Muslims and Croats hadn’t been listed for the Army. Only para 2 pertained to the non-Serbs
too!
 630

All of it that pertained to the able bodied Serbs was in accordance with the law. Skipping
this fact, the entire document looks as a bad will and violation of the rights of non-Serbs.
But, anyway, this measure had never been implemented! And this is an abuse of the
document, and distortion of evidence!)

2742. On 4 July 1992, at the 36th session of the Bosnian Serb Government, it was noted that the
―question has been raised whether there are agreed criteria regarding the moving out of the
Muslim population from the territory of the [SerBiH]. It has been concluded that the Government
has not until now had a point of view on this matter. The Ministry of the Interior is entrusted with
preparing information on this issue that the Government would consider and take the appropriate
standpoint‖.9091 (This two can not be associated, because the Government was searching for
the criteria when and why somebody would be approved to leave SerBiH. There is evidence
that even in Pale, where the Government was sitting, had been a Muslim petition to be
approved to leave! There were some conditions required, particularly concerning with the
distance from battlefield and a degree of jeopardy for civilians!) This idea of ethnic separation
was also supported and reinforced by municipal leaders such as Prstojević who said that ―those
who convert to Orthodox religion on the spot, they can stay‖.9092 (This example was rebuted and
denied by the witness himself, Prstojevic, and that kind of chatting and jokes can not be
equalized with the official documents!)

2743. At a meeting of the Bosnian Serb leadership on 10 July 1992, the President stated that
unlike the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, the Bosnian Serbs were going to build a law-abiding state
rather than an ethnically clean state. Other attendees expressed their agreement as to the stance to
be taken in that regard.9093 (EXCULPATORY!!! It had been said in a close meeting and in no
way had been envisaged to be public! Had it ever been different, had there was any
meditation about crimes, about JCE, the other participants of this meeting would protest
and remain the others about already agreed opposite standpoint! And why the Chamber pay
more credit to some unofficial chats or telephone intercepts than to this official statements?)

2744. On 11 July 1992, at the 17th session of the Bosnian Serb Presidency, attended by the
President, it was decided ―that a decision be adopted on the signing of a proclamation on the
moving out and retention of citizens from certain parts of the former [BiH], and on guarantees and
safety, on condition that the people be disarmed, enemy activities halted and peace
established‖.9094 (So, a retention of citizens in some areas could be unlawful too. Neither
expulsion nor retention could be forceful!) On the same date, the Presidency made an
announcement to the citizens of RS stating that civilians living in areas affected by war must be
allowed to leave those areas and that any emigration had to be voluntary and cannot be obstructed
or encouraged.9095 This same announcement indicated that Croats and Muslims in the RS were
―guaranteed all rights granted by a legal state‖ and that the authorities were not forcibly detaining
people in war zones, as that would make them hostages, or forcing them to emigrate as that would
amount to ―ethnic cleansing‖.9096 The announcement also indicated that all refugees would be
allowed to return.9097 (EXCULPATORY!!!What is “But” here? The same day the President
greeted the St. Peter’s day to the SDS, and again pleaded for the honour and humanity, see:

9091
P1098 (Minutes of 36th session of SerBiH Government, 4 July 1992), pp. 4–5.
9092
P1086 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) NeĊeljko Prstojević and Milenko LNU; (ii) NeĊeljko Prstojević and FNU Novaković, 14 May 1992), p. 3.
9093
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 309, 313–314.
9094
D444 (Minutes of 17th session of Presidency of SerBiH, 11 July 1992, p. 1. See also Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5131–5132 (14 July 2010).
9095
D445 (SerBiH announcement to the public, 11 July 1992); Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5133 (14 July 2010).
9096
D445 (SerBiH announcement to the public, 11 July 1992). See also D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), paras. 16, 18–
18A, 46; Momir Bulatović, T. 34540–34541 (28 February 2013).
9097
D445 (SerBiH announcement to the public, 11 July 1992), p. 1. See also D112 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Request to Serbian MUP, 1 September 1992); D113
(Radovan Karadţić‘s Request to Montenegrin MUP, 1 September 1992) (both requests provided that all refugees regardless of religion or nationality were
obliged to return to their place of residence in SerBiH).
 631

D94:

It
was public, so that everyone know what is his position, and position of others in the
leadershsip!)

2745. Despite these public announcements, the President continued to advocate the division of
BiH on ethnic lines.9098 (Here is this “But”. Let us see why it is wrong: by guaranteeng the
human and ethnic rights for all the inhabitantns in the Republic of Srpska, didn’t mean that
the Serbs gave up the idea of their own constituent unit. It only meant that the Serb
constituent unit will be multiethnic, based on law and equality of citizens regardless of their
religious or ethnic affiliation. It was the ultimate condition for the Serbs: either the entire
and unitary BiH remains in Yugoslavia, or the Serbs get their constituent unit within the
independent Bosnia. All the time throughout the war the Republic of Srpska was a
multiethnic, there was no a single settled plase without the Muslims and Croats living to the
end of war. There are many genuine documents that the President and all the leadership
were always faitful to the idea of law and order and humanity, while contrary to that there is
no a single genuine evidence, but only some jokes, gossip and a statements of biased
witnessesof the Muslim provenance!) For example in July 1992, he spoke about the dangers of
living in a unitary state where they could not control the Muslims. (The control was mentioned
because the attendees knew what that meant: namely, it was a widely understood that the
West wanted us, the Serbs and Croats to control the Islamic element, not to achieve an
islamic regime in the middle of Europe. (See: Q:There is widespread belief among some Serb
and Muslim intellectuals that the West had intended to neutralise the Muslims in Bosnia-
Herzegovina by using the Serbs and Croats. Are you denying that? A: (Okun) That's nonsense.
The sympathy of the West, whether correct or incorrect, was overwhelmingly on the side of the
Muslims. We've established that already. Dr. Karadzic has made that point repeatedly, and it's
correct. (Okun, T. 1811) (…) T1812. Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to read out what
Izetbegovic had written:T.1813: ―As for Tudjman's bragging that some Europeans had
entrusted to him the Europisation of the Bosnian Muslims and the prevention of the creation of
a Muslim state on European soil, I think that there was some truth in these stories of
Tudjman's. Many in Europe and America, with a few honourable exceptions, viewed with
suspicion what was going on in Bosnia. What they considered to be Islamic revival in the
country needed to be extinguished. Many ugly things were done in order to achieve this. One of
them was the criminalisation of the Bosnian authorities in the BH that would intensify after the
war and culminate in a 'New York Times' article in 1999."

This is what pertaines to a “control”, and it should be clear that the participants in those
meetings knew that, but the Chamber should have known it, because the Defense submitted
the evidence about the Western expectations from the Serbs and Croats to control the
Muslims, as well as the evidence that it wasn’t a natural birth rate that worried the Serbs

9098
D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), pp. 5, 10; P921 (Transcript of 24th session of RS Assembly, 8 January 1993),
pp. 5, 9–10; P1367 (Transcript of 26th session of RS Assembly, 2 April 1993), p. 7; KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 6751–
6752 (under seal). See also P3474 (News report re meeting of Derventa SDS Executive Board, 13 February 1992), p. 1; D1591 (Radovan Karadţić‗s
interview from Le Figaro, 23 April 1991), p. 1.
 632

and Croats, but the three powerful sources of the artificial enlargement of the one kind of
population:
1). Re-settlement of many Muslims from Sandzak, Serbia to BiH,
2.) Import of up to 4 million Turks allegedly descendants of the old Bosnians, and finally
3.) the Fatwa of Ceric, the head of the Islamic religion in BiH that every Muslim women was
obliged to deliver at leas five children, so to be able to sacrifice one for the Bosnia.
(See__@@______ of DFB) It was absolutely irrelevant whether it was that way, it is more
important whether and how much the people and their leaders in BH believed in it. If it was
widely believed, than it had a power of reality. In this regard he said ―[w]e know very well what
the fundamentalism is and that we cannot live together, there‘s no tolerance, they quadruple
through the birth-rate, and we Serbs are not up to that‖.9099 The President also spoke about the
Bosnian Muslims overwhelming the Bosnian Serbs ―with their birth rate and their tricks. We
cannot allow that to happen‖.9100 Exactly, the tricks that were mentioned pertained to their
three sources of the artificial, manipulative politicali motivated increase of the birth rate.
But, the main problem was a political, and that speech of the President was a political speech
agains some renegades, who wanted to unite the two Krajinas, Knin and Banja Luka
Krajina, just in the eve of the Agreement was to be concluded. Since the main tensions were
amog the ethnicities, the main kriterion for the transformation of BiH was ethnic. And some
people were close to damage everithing, to partition Croatia and Bosnia, and to ruin almost
concluded Lisbon Agreement, it was 28 February.
Let us see what the President said at the same meeting: p.37

p.38.

(
This is absolutely unacceptable that a UN court is judging a legal and legitimate political
activities of one of the sides! This is particlularly unacceptable since the same activities of the
other two sides are not even taken into account as a reason for the Serb reactions! The fact
that the others produced the crisis by a unilateral and unlawful secessions on the ethnic
basis, imposing to the Serbs such a changes of the existing state which were legitimately
rejected by the Serbs. The whole crisis was based on the ethnic antagonisms, and why the
President wouldn’t take care of the main problem. From the whole evidence it was clear that
the main objective was not to achieve all the territory the Serbs had as a majority, but to
reorganize BiH like Switzerland, which is also organized due to ethnic (linguistic) principle.
9099
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 86. See also D115 (Transcript of 25th session of RS Assembly, 19–20 January
1993), p. 5. See also P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), pp. 18–19; P5828 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 1 November 1991), p. 1; Ronald Hatchett, T. 31958 (16 January 2013); D4686 (Article from SRNA
entitled ―Political platform for the survival of the Serbian People in BiH‖, 12 June 1992), p. 1.
9100
P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 36.
 633

BUT, ALMOST ALL OF THE AGRAVATING EVIDENCE AGAINST THIS PRESIDENT

IS OF A POPLITICAL NATURE, NO MATTER THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY RECOGNIZED THAT IN THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA ON
SEVERAL MONOETHNIC STATES, THE PROBLEM IN BOSNIA WAS PRIMARILY
ETHNIC. And it wasn’t the problem caused by the Serbs, who offered many solutions, but
by the Muslims, who wanted to dominate over the Serbs and Croats. And the Serbs do not
accept to have forgoten that the Islamic Decralation was a political program of a new Bosnia.

2746. In meetings with international observers, these sentiments were repeated by Bosnian Serb
who kept emphasising that ―they simply couldn‘t live with the Muslims‖ and that Bosnian
Muslims wanted all of BiH which they could achieve through their higher birth rate.9101 (Again,
this is an abuse of the linguistic problems: in Serbian language there is a term “prirodni
prirastaj”, which means “natural birthrate”. If there is no this attribute “prirodni” then it is
not a natural birthrate, but political, artificial enlargement of population of certain
ethnicity!) The President continued to emphasise this issue and stated that in ―all variants we must
be cautious so that Muslims don‘t wind up in our state‖ and cited to the example of Serbia as being
unstable even though the population was 65% Serb.9102 Other Bosnian Serb deputies also spoke
about the danger faced by the Serb people due to the high birth-rate of Bosnian Muslims which
would change the demographic percentages in BiH.9103 (What is that? Not even a communist
criticism of the Serb national policy was so meticulous and rude! These sentiments were not
a cause of any development, but only a reaction, a consequence of the development imposed
by the secessionist republics and ethnicities! And the Bosnian Muslims wanted something
that they didn’t have rifght to: the whole Bosnia under their dominatio. That is why they
needed the whole unitary Bosnia. The Serbs had their rights to their autonomy in managing
their life!)

2747. The SDS leadership also commissioned a number of studies on the changing demographics
in BiH which showed the growth rate of the Muslim population and reflected the fears of the SDS
leadership that Bosnian Muslims would soon become an absolute majority in an independent BiH
and impact the position of the Serbs.9104 This concern about demographics and the Bosnian
Muslim birth rate continued to be emphasised by the President throughout the conflict. For
example, at the 37th Bosnian Serb Assembly Session on 10 January 1994, the President stated that
the Muslim population increases by 1% daily because ―that is how it is with them‖. 9105 (It is only
a partial presentation of the affair. If the Chamber took just a short look of the Islamic
Declaration, it would draw another inference. It is known in any Islamic society that after
Muslims achieve 50% of a general population, this become an Islamic society, and all others
are oliged to accept the Shariah and other Islamic laws. Mr. Izetbegovic made it for the BiH
even easier, establishing that “once the Muslim community is strong enough, it has to ruin

9101
Colm Doyle, T. 2668, 2670 (21 May 2010); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4163–4164, 4168–4169, 4220; Herbert Okun,
T. 1487–1489 (22 April 2010); P1417 (Transcript of 55th session of RS Assembly, 22–23 October 1995), p. 60; P777 (Fourth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s
Vance Mission diary), e-court p. 21; P785 (Second notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 26.
9102
P1485 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 9 January–21 March 1994), pp. 88–89.
9103
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 82.
9104
Patrick Treanor, T. 14006–14007, 14009 (1 June 2011); P2541 (Report on demographic trends in BiH prepared by SDS, June 1991). The Chamber notes
that Treanor‘s testimony also included his own assessment about the objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership and the meaning of certain speeches. The
Chamber considers that this falls outside the scope of his expertise and does not rely on his evidence in this regard.
9105
P1385 (Transcript of 37th session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), p. 109.
 634

the existing order and build up another, an Islamic one. No reasonable chamber would
neglect the Islamic Declaration as a mens rea of one of the warring sides.

Rajko Dukić in July 1992 delivered a speech at the Bosnian Serb Assembly in which he asked ―why
we expelled all Muslim judges from Vlasenica, Bratunac and Zvornik. Will we be President then,
I hope we will not […] I would be ashamed and I would regret all the victims if I lived in a state in
which Muslims and Muslim ideology would judge and where their justice is done‖.9106 However,
the Chamber is wrong in inferring on the basis of Mr. Dukic’s words. Let us see what was
said, and why: D00092, p. 72

So, Dukic was complaining to the President’s decision to nominate the Muslim and Croatian
judges aand prosecutors in the Bijeljina regional courts, no doubt about that. The names are
all Muslim. And to whom he complained? To a person who nominated the Muslim/Croat
judges. And who was this person? This was the President. See D00422. Mr. Dukic had his
own rights to express his dissatisfaction, although he was not an MP, but his criticism of the
President didn’t change anything. Let us see further Mr. Dukic’s arguments: D92, p. 73

So, the President was ready to stand any criticism, but didn’t change his decision to have a
proportionate number of Muslims and Croats among the judges and prosecutors! Later,
when the Assembly could sit regularly, the President returned this authorisation back to the
Assembly, and many of the MPs were against it that any Muslim or Croat judge work in the
courts in RS, until the war ends, and the President was politically fighting in the Assembly in
favour of the Muslim/Croat participation in every aspect of the social and political life once
the conditions are normal, but for the judges to start immediately! The Chamber, as would
any reasonable chamber do, should grant the President for his doings in spite od such a
mighty resistence. It is known to the Chamber that nobody have expelled the judges from
the Birac region, but they left after a Serb judge (Goran Zekic) was assassinated on 8 May
92 between Srebrenica and Bratunac. If the hunting of judges was opened, the Muslim
judges were afraid, and left, although Mr. Stanic of Vlasenica went to Tuzla to persuade
them to return. But let us see further, Dukic’s arguments, D92, p. 73 : Dukić also stated that
there were 120,000 Muslims in the Biraĉ region and he hoped that this number ―has at least been
halved‖.9107 (A people from the terrain witnessed every day many tragedies anc innocent
casualties, and could be angry, but their words could not be used to illustrate or establish the

9106
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), pp. 71–73.
9107
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 73.
 635

President’s mens rea!) In August 1992, at a Bosnian Serb Assembly session, BrĊanin proposed
that they ―appoint only those judges who are of Serbian nationality. We cannot say this to Europe
or the rest of the world, but we can say it here between ourselves. Our people do not have the
right to live, yet here we are, crying over those ones‖.9108 Since the Chamber mentioned this
Assembly session, there should be quoted what the President said, because his mens rea
should not be drawn from the words of others. Let us see how the President defended his
concept of the multi-ethnic judicial system, see D422 (the 12 August Assemly session in BL
p.19:

T
he Chairman of the Assembly clarified, p.19:

As
the Chairman of the Assembly clarified, these reserves were temporary, because of the war
situation. But there was more officials who were in favour of the multiethnicity of the
judicial system, D422, p. 1:

p.10, Mandic:

On this list there are 3 Serbs, one Montenegrin, two Croats and one Muslim judges to be
nominated! To use only a piece of the D422 is not correct and not fair, because there is much
more EXCULPATORY elements than those in favour of the Indictment! By such a selective
usage of evidence not even St. Peter would be acquitted!)

2749. On 2 September 1992, the President was among the Bosnian Serb poltical and military
leaders who met in Bijeljina on 2 September 1992.9109 At this meeting, the President observed that
―[w]e are close to the goal and we must run across it […] the Serbian people will either create their
own state […] or we will be squeezed into a small area‖.9110 (Again, the unfinished had-written

9108
D422 (Transcript of 19th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 August 1992), p. 12.
9109
P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), pp. 131–132.
9110
P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), p. 132.
 636

notes, a several lines of a speech that must have been lasting at least a half an hour. Proves
nothing. If the Chamber didn’t oppose to the Defence proposals of a documents which have
corroborated the Muslim plans to expel the Serbs from BiH, there wouldn’t be any
wondering. But this is exactly what happened to the Serbs from Croatia and Kosovo!) At
this meeting it was observed that there was ―no political position as to how to proceed with
Muslims who have declared loyalty‖.9111 (It is clear from the note in question that it was a
question of the 2nd Krajina Corps Commander, and it pertained to the service in the Army,
whether to admit the loyal Muslims or not. That is what a Corps Commander could ask
only, since the civilian authorities didn’t have any dilemma. If the Chamber suggested
something else, it would once again be wrong, and it is already unfair, to cripple sentences
and be obscure, so that it looks like the question was about civilians!) The President expressed
his view that ―we must have ethnic minorities in the state as well‖.9112 Look how Mladic wrote it
down in a laconic manner: P01479, p. 156:

Obviously,
there had been said more on the subject, but Gen. Mladic put down only one sentence, which
is sufficient to confirm that the President was in favour of a multi-ethnic composition of the
RS, and not on the monowthnic. Krajišnik reminded those present that the VRS should not
distance itself from the SDS. He also recalled that the aim of the Bosnian Serbs was to divide with
the Muslims.9113 The President then noted that he had not heard a ―single political difference‖.9114
At a meeting with the Bosnian Serb Presidency and VRS commanders in October 1992, the
President stated that the Bosnian Serbs must insist on having a single Serbian community.9115 This
was the President’s interpretation what had been said in the Geneve Conference. An
objective chamber would notice that the Serb side was praised for a conduct in
humanitarian matters:

And then what all the three delegations proposed:

9111
P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), p. 134.
9112
P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), p. 156.
9113
P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), pp. 131, 141, 143.
9114
P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), p. 153.
9115
P1481 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 5 October–27 December 1992), pp.48, 52.
 637

(Why it was of any interest of the Chamber? What is wrong with that? The Serbs accepted that
the Muslims may have as many constituent units as they want, while the Serbs will have one.
No crime at all, no relevance.To see the right meaning. Generali speaking, this is nothing but
a patchwork of the President’s political short notice, comments, observationa and
meditations without any official obligation, and participation in many unofficial meetings,
mainly how it was taken notes in short!)

2748. The Bosnian Serb leadership did envisage small enclaves in RS where Bosnian Muslims
could live.9116 (This is well known “Switz” idea that every community with a certain number
of their ethnics could form their canton. No matter if their municipalities would be in RS,
they would be free from any Serb domination. And the same pertained to the Serb and Croat
communities. The President was known for advocating Bosnia to be transformed in a sorto
of Southern Switzerland, and it is well known. But, the main issue is: why this Chamber
needed the Okun’s testimony on that issue, since he was rarely in situation to here what the
BSL “envisaged”. Why it was not sufficient and more proper to see the UN and EC mediator
documents, which were the only official Serb position. Beside that, Mr. Okun himself
admitted that his notes shouldn’t be taken literally, since it wasn’t verbatim, and it was
amalgamate of what he heard and what he meditate about what he heard. THE MAIN
QUESTION IS: WHY THE CHAMBER SELECTED LESS CREDIBLE SOURCES
INSTEAD OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS OF THE EU AND EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY? WAS IT BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT WOULDN’T BE SENTENCED
WITHOUT THIS FREELY MENTIONED OBSERVATIONS OF WITNESSESS? IF SO,
THIS IS NOT A COURT AND THIS IS NOT A JUSTICE, BUT A POLITICAL SHARADE
AND MOCKERY OF THE HUMAN KIND’S ACHIEVEMENTS. For example, the President
said that while Bosnian Muslims could stay in the enclaves, ―it is going to be our state‖.9117 At a
meeting on 19 June 1993 in Pale with members of the Supreme Command with, inter alios,
Krajišnik, Koljević, Lukić, Mladić, and Milovanović in attendance, the President stated that the
Serbs and Croats should work together so that the Muslims get some territory in central BiH.9118
Let us look what is written down on this subject:

(
This was the President’s interpretation of the content of the Conference, and not of his own
intentions or wishes. It is visible that the President and his delelgation in Geneva were very
cooperative and constructive. That was not “so that the Muslims get some territory in
Central Bosnia”, but to to “get some additional territory”, so to have 33,33%, as can be seen
in our comment of para 2768..

There was always a problem about percentage for the Muslim constituent unit. The President
proposed not to have the only Serbs giving concession, but to agree with the Croats to
9116
Herbert Okun, T. 1698–1699 (27 April 2010). KDZ026 testified that the Accused advocated and pursued a policy under which in Serb territory, 90% of the
population would be Serb and 10% of Muslims would be allowed to remain. KDZ026, T. 10414 (18 January 2011) (closed session). However, it is unclear
on what basis KDZ026 reached this conclusion. The Chamber therefore does not rely on his evidence in this regard.
9117
P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), para. 149.
9118
P1483 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), p. 212.
 638

participate in solidarity. Otherwise, the war was going to last. Any reasonable chamber
would infer many good conclusions in favour of the President on the basis of it, and none for
the conviction.

2751. At the 34th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, Mladić stated that they had not allowed
―any connection of the enclaves in Eastern Bosnia‖ and that his ―aim was, and I am sure that if we
establish Republika Srpska they could not wait to get out of the enclaves. However, if they don‘t
want to, we have to provide the conditions so that they could feel glad when we offer it to
them‖.9119 (This is a military logics, because those enclaves were full of a well armed
combatants. Disabling them to have a connection with the rest of their units would be against
any military logics. But, even as military, these ideas didn’t have anything mean or wrong or
aggressive towards the Muslims. If the Muslims would like to stay after the war, they will
have a good conditions.

2752. The President in meetings with international negotiators stated that ―Serbs would never
accept to be ruled by Muslims‖, but that if Muslims gave up their claim to rule over all of BiH,
―they could quite happily live alongside each other‖ but each with their own administrations and
safeguards for minorities.9120 (EXCULPATORY!!! The minorities had been envisaged, as well
as the safeguards for they life!) In contrast, at a meeting on 8 September 1992, the President
stated that there were no Serbs, except in Sarajevo, who wanted to live with the Bosnian Croats
and Bosnian Muslims in one state.9121 (Nothing is “in contrast”! Is this President gulty for
what those Serbs felt, or for saying what they felt? Even a stalinist courts would make a
difference. The key word is “in one state” which meant “in one system, under one
administration” and that was right, no matter how the entire world could think of it. But,
any reasonable chamber would find out a way to comprehend the semantics of the Serbian
language, and there would be less misunderstandings.)

2753. Later on, in meetings with international negotiators, the Bosnian Serb leadership indicated
that they were prepared to accept changes in internal borders ―to accommodate ethnic
realities‖.9122 (This falls under the witness’s own remark that his assessments are of not the
first class validity. However, this part pertained to the changes of the municipal boundaries,
so that a village could join neighboring municipality with the same majority if wanted, as it
happened before the war, with the Dobratic group of villages. And this was envisaged to be
valid for all the three communities. It had nothing to do with so called “new realities”
because the Serbs never denounced the agreements on the free return of refugees. How this
was wrong inference shows the key word: internal boundaries! What the internal boundaries
have to do with the refugees? It concerns only domestic inhabitants of a village that would
like to join another municipality, which was their constitutional right.) However, by the time
these statements were made, there had already been a large forcible displacement of Bosnian
Muslims from their homes and the Bosnian Serb leadership sought a peace deal on the basis of the
large percentage of territory in BiH which they had already taken.9123 (“Wrong: the Serbs didn’t
take the “large percentage of territory”, that had it in control always, and it was known to

9119
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 70.
9120
P4216 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadţić, 20 November 1992), p. 3; P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May 2010),
para. 69; Pyers Tucker, T. 23236–23237 (18 January 2012). See also D539 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadţić and Ratko Mladić, 27
November 1992), p. 2.
9121
P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), pp. 167, 171.
9122
P785 (Second notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 34, 44. Okun‘s assessment was that the phrase ―to accommodate ethnic realities‖ was a
―very clear, not-so-subtle reference to the ethnic cleansing‖. This falls under his own remark that his assessments are of not the first
class validity. However, this part pertained to the changes of the municipality boundaries, so that a village could join
a neighboring municipality with the same majority, as it happened before the war, with the Dobratic group of villages
Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4215–4216.
9123
Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4215–4216, 4218–4219.
 639

the Chamber from the evidence that the Serbs kept telling about 65% of the territory that
the Muslim fundamentalists can not include in their state! This is another arbitrary and a
mean conclusion, since it was always agreed that the territorial issues had to be settled on the
Conference, and that a “fait accompli” would not be accepted. It was well known to every
mediator that the Serbs didn’t request even everything of their majority. There are a
plethora of evidence that the Serb side kept from the beginning to the end of the crisis that
the territorial matters would be resolved around the negotiating table. So, this is a wrong,
and even mean inference, since it contradicts to a huge evidence to the contrary!) Similarly,
the Bosnian Serb leadership also suggested holding referenda in early 1993 to solve ―controversial
areas‖ but in reality by this time there were very few Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats who
remained to vote.9124 (Again, one of the #witness’s meditations built in his notes, as he
admitted!# A very, very wrong inference. The inhabitants of the “controversal areas” would
vote in the places of the temporary residence, as is the praxix even today in the whole BiH,
that the people vote in BiH from all over the world, in an organised way. The same would be
in the areas that were contested by any side, the votes would be counted for the areas ot their
original residence! A suggested referendum would be conveyed according to a rules
acceptable to all the parties, otherwise, the areas would remain controversial!)

2754. In September 1992, the Accused continued to stress that their objective was to have a state
and that its borders ―towards the Muslims and Croats are to be thicker than our borders towards
Serbia and Montenegro and the Serbian Krajina‖.9125 (In September 1992 there was the
bloodiest war, and the Croats attacked the Serb Protected zones, and the Croatian regular
Army was present in the battlefields in Bosnia! So what, this is not a crime, to have priorities
in affiliation! It would be a lie if the Serbs said that the Muslims or Croats are going to be
closer top them than the Serbs in Serbia!) When the President discussed maps of BiH and
issues of population and division of territories this also caused a feeling of fear, anxiety, insecurity
and uncertainty amongst people who ―saw themselves living in the territory of another people or
another nation‖.9126 (Now, the Chamber should better understand the Serb fears to leave
Yugoslavia and live in a Muslim dominated state. But, the witness lied as if it was so much of
fear from the President’s words, even more than from the shells, so that the family of the
KDZ310 remained in the Serb territory all the time, although the witness deserted the VRS.
But, anyway, how come that the Chamber takes note of those people’s fear, but not the fear
of 1,5 million Serbs who were to live under the Muslim-Croat domination? But, the Tribunal
doesn’t look sensitive for the Serbian fears, interests or even rights!?)

2755. On 30 October 1992, the Accused delivered a speech at the 21st Session of the Bosnian Serb
Assembly in which he described an artificial state in which we were forcefully held in an artificial
creation that is Bosnia and Herzegovina together with our centuries-old foes. It all reminds me of
the experiment in which a dog and cat are held in a box together against their will, or a bad
marriage maintained by all sorts of forceful means. It transpired that a dog and cat can remain in
the box together under only one condition, namely that they lose their natural characteristics and
cease being a dog and a cat. We will remember that we could not be Serbs and live in such a
box.9127 (So what? The President characterised the relations, and didn’t jubilate for that, nor
he created such a relations, but as a politician was obliged to be aware of it! Although this
part of the speech falls into the range of an academic discussion, everithing else is true. First,
at the First session of AVNOJ there wasn’t envisaged that there would be any BiH. It had
been proposed later. Second, the last 30 years before the war the Muslim nationalism was
9124
Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4245; Herbert Okun, T. 1519, 1522–1524 (23 April 2010); P789 (Sixth notebook of
Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 58; P790 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 40.
9125
D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 55.
9126
KDZ310, T. 9177–9178 (29 November 2010).
9127
P939 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the 21st Session of RS Assembly, 30 October 1992, with transcript), pp. 1, 3.
 640

rapidly developing, and particularly the Serbs were under the surveillance. Many tens of
thousands of the Serbs moved during these years towards Serbia or abroad. The Defence
was prevented to depict what was the situation before the fundamentalists took power. It was
nearly horrible, but wasn’t involving the religion and the Shariya law.

2756. The President characterised the conflict in BiH as a ―conflict among peoples‖ and stated that
―Muslims cannot live with others. We must be clear on that. They couldn‘t live with the Hindu,
who are as peaceful as sheep. […] They couldn‘t live with the Greek on Cyprus, they couldn‘t
live in the Lebanon with Arabs of the same blood, same language, but of a different faith. (The
Chamber permanently questions the President’s #academic discussions and assessments of
the situation, as if the situation depended on the President’s opinion or conduct!# For all of
such “inferences” it could be commented just wit a “So what?” Here, again, the Chamber is
selective in quating and judging the evidence. The President clearly associated the “inability”
to live together with the Muslims in a same political and judicial system – with the
fundamentalism as a new form of Islam, and it was associated so that it was a #crucial part
of the sentence#, and without it, the sentence gets a completely different meaning. Let us see:
P00012, p. 18:

This
was a survey of the situation in the countries where the Muslims were in conflict with their
fellow countrimen of a different religion. That was true, and the Serbs in BH realized that
this kind of Islam came to Bosnia. This is a survey, was it wrong? So what? How this can
incriminate the President?) There can be no discussion here […] We are in power, and we
should exercise that power‖.9128 (This words had nothing to do with the other ethnicities. It
was a discussion about the inter-party discipline, see P938, p. 36:

an
d further, the same page:

9128
P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 36. See P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), para.
153. See also P2493 (Anthony Banbury's notes, 30 April 1995).
 641

(The sentence about the power is exclusively concerned with the authorities in Krajina, a
party that won the elections 1990. This is a serious and grave abuse of the President’s
sentences dispersed throughout the documents, and chosen selectively and arbitrarily, in
order to patchwork any mens rea in a criminal sense!) In this regard the President noted that
there was nothing new, and that in the case of India and Pakistan there had been a ―huge
resettlement of the people‖ and the separation was ―covered in blood‖.9129 (This part is again
misinterpreted, see P938, p.36:

Wrongly translated, the President said: “Imagine this idiotism: the conflict in Bosnia…” Ant
the President characterised the conflict between Hindu and Pakistani as an idiotism that is
now taking place in Bosnia. The President called it “an idiotism” to initiate a war in such a
mixed country, and have a consequence in re-settling of population. Since it was “nothing
new” the world lords should have known what will happen if they encourage a war in such a
country!)

2757. At a gathering in January 1993 attended by UN personnel, the Accused emphasised that
they could not live together anymore with the Bosnian Muslims, they would not allow the past to
repeat itself, and that therefore the Bosnian Muslims would be transferred out of Bosnian Serb
territory.9130 (This witness shouldn’t testify anything about a political issues, because #he
didn’t understan anything.# For instance, this issue of “transfering” Muslims and Serbs was
a regular topic at every meeting with the UNPROFOR officials. But it was about a
temporary release of the civilians to cross to their territory, to suffer as less as possible. The
Chamber could remaind itself of how many times it was the discussion with general
Morillon, to facilitate transfer o the Serbs from Tuzla and Muslims from Srebrenica. The
Serbs always tried to get the Sarajevo Serbs out of the City while the war was going on. Had
it been meant a resettlement, this issue would be condemned in all and every single report of
the UN. But it never happened that the political officials of the UN understood the transfer of
civilians as a permanent removal! Many agreements reached among the sides under the
auspice of the ICRC and UNHCR regulated this transfer!) The Bosnian Serb leaders who

9129
P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 36; P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February
1992), pp. 18–19.
9130
P1258 (Witness statement of Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek dated 16 July 2002), pp. 5–7.
 642

attended included Mladić, Krajišnik, and Plavšić, and they all agreed with what the Accused said
in this regard.9131 They spoke about ―ethnic cleansing‖ as something which was necessary.9132
Another misunderstanding: the necessary was to let people move freely, it had nothing to do
with the permanent status. Did this witness report to the UN in New York about it? Was he a
part of any delegation? Who was a leader of it? Why the Chamber accepts a “third class
evidence” and not establish what the political interlocutors with the President said about the
subject? But, let us see what he said in his Statement, P01258, p. 5:

H
e himself recognized that he didn’t have anything to do with the political leadership, but then
he lied as if the President invited him to a meeting, which is an absurd:

#
Removal” of population? If true, that would be a world news No. 1.# and all the UN
documents would contain it!# How possibly any chamber can accept this nebulous assertion?
Why would the President invite him for a meeting? And how could he accept such an
invitation without an approval of his superior? And had the President said what the witness
claims, this would be immediately on the table of the witness’s superiors, and on the table of
the mediators of Conference. Obviously, he was listening to some other meeting, because he
mistakenly understood the issue of the monitoring of the heavy weaponry:

The issue wasn’t whether the heavy weaponry would be under monitoring of the UN,
because the Serbs wanted it, but the #Serbs never commited themselves to have a UN control
of the weaponry#. Anyway, any chamber would clarify such an obscure assertion, which
contradicts to everything the Chamber had seen on the subject. Here is what was discussed
in Geneve on this subject, D4765, p.40:

This is the evidence that Razek misunderstood everything, and that he couldn’t be invited by
the President on any meeting.

2758. In January 1993, at a meeting attended by Bosnian Serb and Serbian leaders,
Vladislav Jovanović spoke about the importance of ensuring the territory they got was

9131
P1258 (Witness statement of Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek dated 16 July 2002), pp. 6–7, 11–12. See also P1154 (Witness statement of KDZ088 dated 27–29
April 2010), pp. 113–115, 120 (under seal).
9132
P1258 (Witness statement of Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek dated 16 July 2002), p. 7.
 643

―nationally homogeneous as soon as possible‖.9133 Jovanović stated that this was not to be
achieved by ―ethnic cleansing‖ but through the ―exchange of inhabitants‖, and stressed
that where life in BiH becomes impossible everybody rushes off to their ―original
provinces‖.9134 This was described by Jovanović as a ―strategic goal to which we should
aspire, and which should be achieved‖.9135 Jovanović stated that they had to be conscious
that there was attention on Serbs and they were trying to catch them on ―anything that
even resembles ethnic cleansing or linking‖ and that they would have to look out for these
traps and try to ‗catch‘ them where they are weak‖.9136 (Although the quotations and
contexts are erroneous, see P794, p.3:

the words “in other words migration and immigration, which will flow” drastically
difer from what is suggested in the Judgement. Mr. Jovanovic pleaded for a peaceful
processes according to the will of the population. Nothing criminal in the Jovanovic’s
words, and particularly nothing that could be allocated to the President.)

2759. Jovanović also spoke of the need to ensure in an ―indisputable way‖ a territorial link with
Serbia and Montenegro.9137 (So what?) Jovanović also cautioned against freedom of settlement
which could result in the ―mixing of the composition of the population to our disadvantage‖ and
that what they had gained would ―gradually erode‖.9138 (The Chamber neglects the fact that Mr.
Jovanovic said that a territorial link has to be ensured in an indisputable way, which means
to be acceptable for all the sides. Also, a greed for territories would result in a non-Serb
dominance, which was a legitimate concern!)

2760. The Accused went on to say that ―this which Jovanović is talking about, has already happened
to a huge extent. There was fifty-fifty of us in Zvornik. The number of inhabitants of Zvornik is
now the same, approximately 50,000, and they are all Serbs. More than 24,000 Serbs from Zenica
and Central Bosnia have arrived and stopped in Zvornik.‖9139 The President also stated that there
will not be a unitary BiH of the civic type or one in which the Muslim majority will come to the

9133
P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court p. 3; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4284–4285.
9134
P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court p. 3. See also Herbert Okun, T. 1824–
1825 (28 April 2010). Jovanović acknowledged that this meeting took place but that when he spoke about developing an area which would be as ―nationally
homogeneous‖ as soon as possible, this was to be achieved by allowing people to freely move to other cantonal units if they did not want to live in a
particular canton. D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), paras. 53, 64; Vladislav Jovanović, T. 34318–34319 (26
February 2013). The Chamber notes however, that Jovanović‘s testimony was marked by indicators of evasiveness and bias. In addition, the Chamber
considers that he had an interest in characterising his own words in a favourable light. The Chamber therefore does not find his evidence to be reliable with
respect to the voluntary nature of the movement of population which was envisaged. But together with what the President said that the
things are going in this direction by itself, corroborates what Jovanovic said, as Mr. Jovanovic himself confirmed
while testifying, see T… .. .
9135
P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court p.3.
9136
P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court p. 5; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4284–4287.
9137
P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court p. 3.
9138
P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court p. 3.
9139
P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), p. 4; See also Herbert Okun, T. 1823–1824 (28
April 2010); P4518 (Excerpts from Robert ĐurĊević‘s diary, 7–25 September 1993), p. 2. Jovanović‘s assessment was that the Accused had merely been
pointing out undesirable and unavoidable consequences of any war, which was that the Serbs had been fleeing the Muslim-dominated and heading to the
regions where the Serbs made up a majority. D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), para. 53. The Chamber refers to
its credibility assessment in fn. 9139 in concluding that it does not find Jovanović‘s evidence to be reliable in this regard. Unbelievable and
unacceptable! Such a high official why would he lie? Or be evasive?
 644

fore.9140 (The President wanted to corroborate Jovanovic’s advise against a forcefull moving
people, since the people moves by themselves anyway! Beside that, was the President
responsible for the arriving 24.000 Serbs from Zenica. Yet, the President didn’t accuse the
Muslim side for having 24,000 Serbs escaped from Zenica, because this was understandable,
because of fear! What the President said in many occasions neither was his wishes nor his
intentions, but just the state of cause. The Chamber makes wrong inferences!)

2761. The Accused further stated that Serbs must fight for these territories to get a quality piece
and said ―we want some of our rich areas to belong to us‖.9141 (So what? This was an inter-
ethnic war, and what is wrong in having the Serbian rich areas to belong to the Serb
Republic?) The Accused also said that the Neretva was disputable and that they could live
without it, but that they could not give up Podrinje and Posavina.9142 So what? This was a
discussion about what was going to be claimed for on the conferences. Let us see how the
dialogue was going on, P6164, p.65:

(Th
ere is no any doubt that this pertained to the ongoing Geneva Peace Conference, and had
nothing to do with any military matters, or any use of force. The issue was whether to sign
the peace paper, or to seek for more changes! Irrelevant, and can not be used against the
President, because the UN-EC mediators proposed a territorial arrangement tyat was
discussed among the Serbs! But, whatever the Serbs say, it is a sort of crime!) Further, the
President agreed with Slobodan Milošević and Kontić that they could not invoke the democratic
principle if they abandoned the ―ethnic criterion‖.9143 (So what???) The President said that they
would gladly exchange prisoners but would no longer make unilateral releases.9144 (So what?
Should the Serbs continue to release prisoners unilateraly, while the Serbs imprisoned in the
Muslim camps to stay there?) Slobodan Milošević also expressed the view that had there not
been the war, the changes on the ethnical basis would not have taken place, but that now they had
the changes based on the ethnical principle.9145 (#Nothing criminal is in this considerations of
the situation and academic discussions!#. For heaven’s sake, why this academic discussion is
important to this Chamber? Does it mean that anything could be good to charge a Serb?)
9140
D4765 (Notes from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), p. 3.
9141
D4765 (Notes from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), pp. 7−8.
9142
P6164 (Excerpt from notes of enlarged session of Council for Coordinating Positions on State Policy, 9 January 1993), e-court p. 65.
9143
D4765 (Notes from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), p. 43.
9144
D4765 (Notes from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), p. 43.
9145
P6164 (Excerpt from notes of enlarged session of Council for Coordinating Positions on State Policy, 9 January 1993), e-court p. 41.
 645

2762. Krajišnik said that what was important was not how big the territory was but the ―quality of
that territory‖ and that they had to seriously consider the issue of maps.9146 (So what? Krajisnik,
as the President, pleaded for a moderate attitude towards the territorial claims!) Krajišnik
also stated that they had to ―solve one part at a time – something through politics, something else
through migration, and some things through settlement‖.9147 (The same pertains to Mr.
Krajisnik’s words: #all of it was a preparation for the Geneva Conference#. And why the
#Chamber incriminate the political talks and the legitimate claims that were to be posed as a
negotiating position?# What does it mean? The negotiations were organised and mediated by
the same United Nations which founded this Tribunal, and does in mean that the UN are
under the suspicion too?) He also emphasised that the continuity of the territory which they had
was very important to allow for the unification of Serb territory in the RS and also spoke in favour
of connection with their motherlands in Serbia and Montenegro.9148 (So what? #This attitude was
communicated to the mediators as a condition to accept the peace agreement. How it is
forbidden?#) Koljević stated that they would have to ―develop the activity of settlement
homogenisation‖ while there was still time.9149 (At that moment there were more Serb refugees
than the Muslim and Croat together. So, professor Koljevic didn’t have any hope that these
Serbs would ever return to their homes, and thus suggested to have settled them. But, all of
that was a preparation for the Conference. What is to be objected, let alone incriminated in
it?)

2762. In 1993, Velibor Ostojić also referred to their goal of ―ethnical – geographical continuity
of Serb population‖ and that they were ―building new demographic politics for the RS‖ and the
need to have Serbs settle in areas which they held.9150 Ostojić was responible for the Commission
for Refugees and Humanitarian Aid which organised this settlement of Serbs and did not provide
for the return of Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats.9151 Ostojić was the Minister of Information
and was trusted by, and had direct contact with, the President.9152 So what? #Words of others#!
Everyone had contacts with the President, but the President could be liable only for what he
proposed, or accepted, signed, did or did not, but in no way could be liable for any informal,
or even formal words of anyone, unless it was built in a document that the President had to
sign. But, anyway, let us see what Mr. Ostojic really said: P01379, pp.212-213: #

9146
P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court pp. 5–6.
9147
P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court p. 6.
9148
P6164 (Excerpt from notes of enlarged session of Council for Coordinating Positions on State Policy, 9 January 1993), e-court p. 51.
9149
P794 (Excerpt from the session of the Council for Coordinating Positions on the State Policy, 21 January 1993), e-court pp. 8–9; Herbert Okun, P776
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4292 (testifying that in his assessment, this ―settlement homogenisation‖ referred to ―ethnic cleansing‖).
9150
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), pp. 212–213. Vladimir Lukić
testified that the Bosnian Serb Government sought the return of refugees regardless of ethnicity. D3563 (Witness statement of Vladimir Lukić dated 18 May
2013), paras. 33, 46; Vladimir Lukić, T. 38787–38790 (28 May 2013). See also P3129 (Minutes of the 66th session of RS Government, 20 March 1993), p.
8. The Chamber finds that Vladimir‘s Lukić‘s testimony with respect to this issue was marked by evasiveness and indicators of insincerity particularly when
confronted with the speeches made by Ostojić which suggested that the Bosnian Serb policy on refugees was connected with its goal of achieving ethnic
geographic continuity of the Serb population and did not make provision for the return of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. The Chamber therefore
does not find his evidence in this regard to be reliable.
9151
P1388 (Transcript of 39th session of RS Assembly, 24–25 March 1994), pp. 168–169; D3588 (Minutes of 89th session of RS Government, 18 January 1994),
p. 4. Radoslav BrĊanin was tasked along with Velibor Ostojić with preparing a programme for the accommodation of refugees in the RS. D3588 (Minutes
of 89th session of RS Government, 18 January 1994), p. 4; P1392 (Transcript of 41st session of RS Assembly, 31 May to 1 June 1994), p. 50.
9152
P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Ðerić dated 5 April 2012), para. 10. See also D422 (19th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 August 1992), p. 38.
 646

Therefore, so far, so good. Mr. Ostojic reported that Yugoslavia is accepting three times
more Serb refugees, while the RS is accommodating much less, and exclusively in the
traditionally Serb areas. The Serbs held those ares for a centuries, and there was nothing
illegal to accommodate the Serb refugees, expelled from their homes in the Muslim/Croat
areas. Further: P01388, p. 168

First,
the President not greeted, means he wasn’t present. Second, Ostojic nowhere mentioned
Muslim/Croat return. See p. 169

The more honest self-criticism is not possible. The Serb refugees were a big burden for the
local and central authorities, as well as, the most probably, for the local Muslims and Croats,
but all against the will and intentions of the authorities. But, let us see what Ostojic said
further, p.168-69:
 647

So, as usually, the Assembly gathers for making decisions, documents, and it is clear that the
session was planned to adopt a resolution on this issue. #Is anything in this resolution
unlawful, criminal, or even morally unacceptable?#

This process of settling Serbs was done with a view to filling a particular area so Bosnian Muslims
did not have a place to return to.9153 This was in contrast with statements made at sessions of the
Bosnian Serb Government in March and May 1993 where they emphasised the need to create
conditions for the return of refugees who had left the RS during the conflict.9154 So, the speaker
was criticising the “state and political leadership”, calling on them to “consider once again
the issue and to find the option”… how possibly any reasonable chamber couls neglect this
criticism, and a separate and opposite opinion allocate to the authorities? Otherwise, the
care of the refugees was an obligation, and the Serbs didn’t chase those Serbs from the
central BiH, but somebody else. The authorities never adopted what this speaker proposed
“to be considered again”.

2764. In April 1993, in discussions with international representatives, the President stated that he
could not persuade Bosnian Serbs to remain in the Posavina and that they were asking for new
land and territories.9155 It seems that nothing from the Serb political life was innocent. The
situation in Posavina was as a matter of fact the situation of the Province No. 3, according to
the Vance-Owen plan. #How Karadzic could have been liable for the fact that the Serbs
didn’t dare to stay in Posavina,# if it become the Province 3? This was not the President’s
sentiment, or decision, it was a complaint of the Posavina Serbs. We have seen how the Serbs
from Sarajevo left their centuries old homes and properties because it was assigned to the
Federation. Otherwise, it is no more correct, and even decent to rely upon such a short notes
of Okun, Mladic or anyone else, after Mr. Okun admitted that his notes could be red and
understood differently, see, Okun, T1819-1820 A. That's correct, yes. And your point -- the
earlier point you make, that the readers of the note-books could draw different conclusions from
them, is also correct. Mladić also spoke at this meeting and suggested that all sides sit down to
resolve the problems.9156 The President also explained why the proposals at the time were
absolutely unacceptable to the Serbs and questioned whether they could set up a regime to identify
areas where they had to withdraw from and areas where they would have to resettle Bosnian
Serbs.9157 In April 1993, Krajišnik also expressed his opposition to ―any kind of joint state with
the murderers of Serbian people, Muslims and Croats‖.9158 In August 1993, Krajišnik noted with
respect to Banja Luka that the Muslims and Croats had asked for the municipality during
negotiations, but he stressed that the Bosnian Serbs did not accept that ―because we must have that
territory clean‖.9159 (The Chamber is picking up a pieces of a parliamentary discussion about
which part of the RS to leave to the other side. Obviously, both the discussion in the
Assembly and Okun’s diary speak about the Conference, and the Assembly and leadership
are trying to find out what to do with the people who are going to leave their areas that
would belong to the other communities. This kind of “salade” and melange of sentences and

9153
P1419 (Transcript of 56th session of RS Assembly, 17 December 1995), pp. 94–95.
9154
P3129 (Minutes of the 66th session of RS Government, 20 March 1993), p. 8; P3112 (Minutes of the 71 st session of RS Government, 26–27 May 1993), pp.
10–11.
 648

polemics are something that no reasonable chamber would put in a judgment. Of course, the
Serbs were ready to facilitate the Muslims and Croats to form their municipalities in
Banjaluka or elsewhere before the war broke out, even when the war started, but after such
a long war (30 Sept. 93) there was no longer this readiness!)

2765. The President also suggested that Krajina would ―take on an appearance of a rotten apple‖ if their
enemy was in Krajina.9160 This kind of #abuse of materials from a free parliamentary discussions#
is without precedents. This was a discussion on the Assembly session about the peace plan of
Contact group. Here is what the President said: P01394, p. 12

So, it
was not, as the Chamber suggests, if the enemies are in Krajina, but if the parts of the territory
deep in Krajina are given to the Muslim side’s constituent state. Nobody said that “the enemies”
were those Muslims and Croats who lived with the Serbs in RS, and fought against the
fundamentalist’s concept of Bosnia, but those who inciated and waged the war against us past
three years. And why the President was against this part of the Contact Group plan, can be seen
just from the next para:

(#The
Chamber is not supposed to judge the peace conferences discussions#, or the parliamentary
discussions, or any political speech, since the parliamentaries are free to talk whatever they found
9155
P792 (Ninth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 46–48.
9156
P792 (Ninth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 47.
9157
P792 (Ninth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 48–49.
9158
P1367 (Transcript of 26th session of RS Assembly, 2 April 1993), p. 34.
9159
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 48. See Herbert Okun, P776
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4293, 4295.
9160
P1394 (Transcript of 42nd session of RS Assembly, 18–19 July 1994), e-court p. 12.
 649

suitable, and not to answer to anyone but to their voters. That is how it is in all the democratic
countries! And others, while fighting by words for another look of a peace plan are just presenting
their fears and concerns. This #Judgment is relying on a several foundation on which no judgment
should be founded, such as the discussions of parliamentaries, a short handwritten crippled notes
of journalists or a side negotiators, like Okun, or a note takers and a fifth row note taking clarks,
like Harland and Banbury, or a dishonest journalists like Van Linden and other dishonest
journalists who participated in a satanisation of the Serb people, or a “free thinkers” who were
there accidentally and had their own “understanding of the situation”.# This never happened so
far in the human history, not even in the Hitler’s courts, where Georgy Dimitrov was acquitted!)
Similarly the Accused spoke about a ―green stain‖ which had appeared on maps given that there were
proposals for portions of territory to be allocated to Bosnian Muslims and that the Serbs in that area
would not allow that to happen.9161 (So what? This was a matter of negotiations, and only Serbs
were supposed to give the concessions. How possibly that could be a subject of this litigation? Why
the Chamber is attempting to problematize and resolve the negotiations so much time after it
ended? The existence of such an island-like enclaves of territory was possible before the war,
because it would be in a peaceful environment, but after the Muslim side rejected all the Serb
peaceful proposals, there was no more such a possibility, particularly since many Serb enclaves in
the Muslim-Croat territory hadn’t been given the same opportunity! Otherwise, the local Muslims
would have their administration, but within the Republic of Srpska, which was not offered to the
Serbs in Muslim territory!)

2766. At the 37th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly on 10 January 1994, Mladić
addressed the assembly on the issue of lack of resources and material support for the VRS.9162
He went on to describe how the Bosnian Serbs had an historical chance to create an ―all Serbian
state‖ with as little enemies as possible and that the Muslims and the Croats represented a
danger.9163 He thus recommended to keep on fighting as the enemy the Bosnian Serbs were
facing was getting stronger and stated: ―They started the war at first, they are heading this war,
but that is not my concern. My concern is not that they will create the state. My concern is to
have them vanish completely.‖9164 (The reference to the Serb state without too many
enemies must be understood in the light of the forming of the first Yugoslavia. Namely, the
Serbs had been offered by the Western allies to form the Serb state composed of the
traditional Serebian territories. The Serbian Government pleaded for the liberation of all
the South Slaves. By the end of the WWI the Allies wanted Serbia to make a big state,
including all the South Slave countries. This caused an enormous number of casualties
during WWII, 95% of which were killed by the Croats and Muslims. #Words of others#!
But, what does it mean what somebody speaks, if it is not taken into a document and
realised. A military “bravado” is expected from a military people, but it was not decisive
or of any influence on the political process.

2767. At the same session, Krajišnik stated that ―the biggest tragedy would be if the
Muslims accepted to live with us now. […] That is the only thing I would never accept,
and I would rather accept that we get a smaller percentage of the territory than it is the
case now, provided that we remain separated from the Muslims and that we have our
country‖.9165 (This is a political speech aimed to persuade some representatives to
accept some of the territorial solutions. Anyway, why Mr. Krajisnik would be obliged
9161
P6134 (Video footage of interview with Radovan Karadţić, with transcript), p. 2. See also Jose Cutileiro, T. 33964–33967 (19 February 2013).
9162
P1385 (Transcript of 37th session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), p. 43.
9163
P1385 (Transcript of 37th session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), p. 47.
9164
P1385 (Transcript of 37th session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), pp. 48–49.
9165
P1385 (Transcript of 37th session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), pp. 121, 124. See also P796 (Excerpt from 37th session of RS Assembly, 10 January
1994), p. 2; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4298 (testifying that the comments of Krajišnik were consistent with what
they heard during international negotiations about the position taken by the Bosnian Serb leadership with respect to ethnic purity and the creation of a
Bosnian Serb state).
 650

to live with the Muslims, since they have changed their political views approaching
the Fundamentalism?) The main point in the Krajisnik’s statement was “a smaller
percentage of the territory than it is the case now“ and it was the part of persuasion of
the Assembly to accept that some Serb territories would belong to the Muslim-Croat
Federation!) He also spoke about their goal being ―to separate from the Croats and
Muslims forever‖.9166 Krajišnik continued to make similar statements and by 1995 spoke
about their first Strategic Goal being to separate from the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats.9167 (If anything what the Croatia and the Muslims in BiH intended and did
was legitimate, the Serb decisivness not to live in such a states is completely
legitimate. And it was never about not to live with the Muslims, but not to live under
their authority. They were very welcome to stay in Yugoslavia, but they didn’t want
to. For the same reason, nobody was entitled to force the Serbs to live in a new state
that was to be formed against their will and their interests. And all the international
documents, and all the peace conferences recognized these Serb objectives as
legitimate, and finally it was sanctioned in the Dayton Agreement!)

2768. At the same Bosnian Serb Assembly session on 10 January 1994, the Accused
noted that they were now a ―state and what we hold is 100% ours‖.9168 The President also
acknowledged that ―[i]f we are going to divorce from the Muslims, we must give them
something. It is impossible to make the Muslims vanish, and that we keep the entire
territory‖.9169 (#EXCULPATORY#!) The Accused also noted that they could not declare
a ban on the return of refugees according to international law and that in principle they
would say that all refugees could return on a reciprocal basis.9170 (#That was not “on a
reciprocal basis”, it was said that it has to be a comprehensive process, see in
Serbian#:

. All other quoted by the Chamber is #EXCULPATORY#!!! That was a #political

speech and persuasion of the MPs to be more flexibile on the territorial issues of the
peace plan#. But, the entire paragraph is an illustration of what and how the
Chamber erred, by using the Assembly discussions as a deeds and as a facts. The
President was explaining to the MPs, and fighting in favour of a peace through a
territorial generosity towards the Muslims, which should be in his favour before any
court, not against him. A reciprocity is the most legal and legitimate. Let us see what
he said: P01385, p. 107

(Wrong translation, it is not “occupying this land” but rather “pressing” or

“keeping” so much territory, and continued to advise that the Serbs could return a
9166
P1477 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 14 February–25 May 1992), p. 262; P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), pp. 140, 144.
9167
P1419 (Transcript of 56th session of RS Assembly, 17 December 1995), p. 104.
9168
P1385 (Transcript of 37th Session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), pp. 107, 110.
9169
P1385 (Transcript of 37th Session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), p. 132.
9170
P1385 (Transcript of 37th Session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), p. 132. The Chamber places no weight on Vladimir Lukić‘s asssement about the
meaning of this statement. Vladimir Lukić, T. 38794–38796 (28 May 2013). In doing so the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 9155.
 651

half of it, and still be happy with the rest. So, the President was advising a halt in
fighting, and in the ambitions it terms of territories or in terms of a final victory.
Further, the President was persuading the MPs that even 50% of what the Serbs
controlled would be sufficient for the sake of peace. See further: at the same session,
P01385, p. 109, the President was fighting against the further waging war:

If the Chamber didn’t learn anything about the President from this speech, then
there is no chance for any international justice. The President said that “we saved the
majority of our territory.” Means, not all of it, but the majority of the Serb
traditional territories, not the Muslim, or Croat territories. The President opposed
the MP’s opinion to “force – the Muslims – to cave in”, advocating non-victory, a
“win-win” solution! Let us see further: P01385, p. 112:

(#Flexibility on territorial issues presented as “ethnic homogenisation#! So, the

#President continued to fight for a flexibility on the territorial issues#. And the
sentence about the “some territory” in the Central Bosnia that the Serbs and Croats
must find for the Muslims was a task given by the Co-Chairmen of the Conference,
so that the Muslim community has at least one third of the BH territory. (see
comment on para 2750) But, the Chamber takes it against the President, as seen in
para 2750.

2769. In April 1994, Mladić was quoted as encouraging VRS operations because ―[t]he Turks
must disappear from these areas‖.9171 Michael Rose testified that he and other international
representatives had thought that the objective of the combat operations in Goradţe was to move
the Bosnian Muslims out of the right bank of the town and therefore he suspected the reference in
the order to ―[t]he Turks must disappear from these areas‖ to mean just that.9172 However, all know
that the Serbs consider the Muslims to be Serbs of the Muslim relgion. Only those who fight against
the Serbs were called the Turks, and it was through the centuries. The same is with Ustashas and
Croats. Those Croats who do not kill the Serbs are merely Croats, other who kill the Serbs, Jews and
Gipsies are Ustashas. If Mladic said “Turks”, he as any other Serb, meant “armed Muslims”. But,
the President never used a real derogatory name for the Muslims as “balijas”, and very rarely the
Turks, which the Muslims preferred to be called for a centuries, and recently, Reis Ceric said in
Rogatica, on a public meeting, that the Muslims and Turks were one, not two! If the Defence knew
that it will be important, it would tender this evidence.)

9171
P1645 (Order of Višegrad Tactical Group, 11 April 1994).
9172
Michael Rose, T. 7274–7275 (5 October 2010).
 652

2770. In July 1994, the aCCUSED in an address before the Bosnian Serb Assembly, spoke about
achieving our primary strategic aim, which is to get rid of the enemies in our house, the Croats and
Muslims, and not to be in the same state with them any more. Every divorce has a price, we have
to give something up, but we are the winners, we have a majority of the territory now, not only
under our control, but also in our ownership.9173 #Political speech, because the President
persuaded the Assembly to give back territories, and not to cry for Yugoslavia#, which was
“our common home”, not the Republic of Srpska. But, again, this was a #parliamentary
discussion, and the President was under a criticism for being too flexible#. Let us see the
entire paragraph, P01394, p.

So, if the Serbs wanted to “divorce”, they had to sacrifice some dear territories out of a great
amount of what is their ownership and under their control, which is guaranteed by every
international convention.)

2771. In August 1994, in video footage taken of Mladić and Milan Lešić, the founder of a Canadian
charitable organisation called ―Serbian Humanitarian Public Organisation‖,9174 in a car as they
drove through Han Pijesak and Crna Rijeka, Mladić boasted that he ―kicked the hell out of the
Turks […] who gives a fuck about them!‖ and commented that Lešić should film what they had
done to the Turks and pointed to abandoned Bosnian Muslim houses.9175 (What does it have to do
with the President. A military are boasting frequently, how come it is important to the
Chamber, particularly against this Accuse? Mladic didn’t want the war, he didn’t initiate it,
that was the Muslim side, and Mladic used a #military language, which was without any
relevance!#)

2772. At a Bosnian Serb Assembly session in November 1994, the President gave a speech in which
he explained that ―[w]e have created new realities‖ and that Zvornik used to be 60% Muslim but
that Bosnian Serbs from Zenica arrived, occupied Kozluk and the Bosnian Muslims left.9176 He
went on to say that they were requesting Zvornik ―which comes out of a new reality. […] This
war has created the new reality, there are now the Serbs from Zenica here. […] We request

9173
P1394 (Transcript of 42nd session of RS Assembly, 18–19 July 1994), e-court p. 76. See also P1387 (Transcript of 38th session of RS Assembly, 17 January
1994), p. 67.
9174
Milan Lešić, T. 25010 (21 February 2012).
9175
P4442 (Video footage depicting a conversation between Milan Lešić and Ratko Mladić, with transcript); Milan Lešić, T. 25030–25032 (22 February 2012).
9176
P1403 (Transcript of First Part of 46th session of RS Assembly, 9–11 November 1994), p. 157.
 653

Zvornik according to this right‖.9177 (#This “syntagma” the “new realities” was imported by
the International community as an explanation for their support for a forceful destruction of
Yugoslavia, saying: “Yes, you may be right, but now we have a new realities” Before the
war, and without the war, Zvornik would be a unique city with the two ethnic municipalities.
Since the Serbs didn’t want the war, the Muslims pursued the war, and the new realities got
created. Within these new realities is the one that there was no Serbs anywhere in the
Central Bosnia. But, what does it mean, if the President from time to time qualifies the
situation that occurred? It doesn’t mean it was his will, or his plan, or he was happy about
it.) At this same session, Krajišnik stated that ―the primary strategic goal of our people and this
Parliament is partition and separation from Croats and Muslims. And the partition can only be
made if they will have their state while we have our own. How big these states will be is another
issue. We cannot get entire Bosnia‖.9178 (#EXCULPATORY#! It was the cause of the war,
because the Muslims wanted the entire Bosnia only for themselves. Krajisnik was preparing
the MP-s to give back some territories, it is so obvious. But all of this is about the poilitics of
only one side in the political process, as well as in the conflict. This is what Mr. Krajisnik
said, P01304, p. 262:

(#EXCULPATORY#!!! This is now quite clear that Mr. Krajisnik was advocating the peace
and flexibility towards the Muslims and Croats in the territorial terms. How possibly any
chamber could read this speech so selectively? But, the translation of this document is not
correct. Mr. Krajisnik didn’t use the word “partition” but “division”, “separation” and a
same for the Muslims and Croats, to have their own states. Only in a political court, which
would try to preserve some ideology this could be noticed by a chamber. But, when noticed,
it only can be inferred in favour to the President and his associates!) The President in 1995
confirmed this objective when he stated that if they were able to secure the territory they decided
on and if it was ―nearly 100% Serbian‖, they would be great victors and would have realised their
ultimate dream, a Serbian State west of the Drina.9179 But, again, the Chamber is selective!
What motivated the Bosnian Muslims to force a unilateral secession, if not their “ultimate
dream” to have their own state, which would be legitimate if they didn’t want the Serb and
Croat territories in their state. We know that the Prosecution made a selective persecution,
but the court as a whole do it. Let us se #what the President said about that what the

9177
P1403 (Transcript of First Part of 46th session of RS Assembly, 9–11 November 1994), p. 157.
9178
P1403 (Transcript of First Part of 46th session of RS Assembly, 9–11 November 1994), p. 262.
9179
P1417 (Transcript of 55th session of RS Assembly, 22–23 October 1995), p. 60. See also P5608 (Intercept of conversation between Todor Dutina and
Radovan Karadţić, 29 June 1995), p. 2 (where the Accused continued to emphasise the importance of the Strategic Goals into 1995).
 654

Chamber “noticed” as a felony: P01417, p. 59#:

The entire speech is a sort of mourning for the traditional Serb territories that had been lost,
but the President was trying to heal those wounds, and the Chamber shouldn’t take some
parts of it to present it as the President’s political will, or program, or intention for a future
doings. And now, the “critical sentence of the President:

(So, a mere political speech aimed to mitigate the resistance of the MPs against the peace plan,
according to which a many traditionally Serb territories had to be handed over to the Muslims, or
Croats.) The President also acknowledged that they had undertaken military operations to expand
the territory but that after the Bosnian Muslims had been packed into small areas, ―thus achieving
their concentration‖, there was not much more that could be done.9180 (How this is relevant? The
President described what happened on the battlefield, in order to mitigate any militant wish for a
total victory. How possibly this can prove any guilt of the President?)

9180
P988 (Transcript of 53rd session of RS Assembly, 28 August 1995), p. 64. See also D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), pp. 25, 27.
 655

2773. At a meeting of the Supreme Command on 31 March 1995, the President made reference to
the danger posed by Bosnian Muslims who remained in their territory and stated that ―Muslims
remaining there in any way is disastrous for us‖, and that their policy had been the ―separation of
peoples, of cultures, of worlds‖, based on the idea that ―birds of a feather flock together‖.9181 (It
was in the occasion of the disclosure of the complicity in BL and Teslic – Tesanj zone, where the
Muslim military units were invited to attack, and once they attack, they will be helped by the
domestic Muslims, see the pasted part below!. He also spoke about turning a blind eye to private
agencies and arrangements through which Bosnian Muslims left for western Europe because in
those situations ―no one can accuse us‖, whereas if a state institution was involved they would be
President of ―ethnic cleansing‖.9182 Krajišnik stressed that freedom of movement was allowed in
order to pull Serbs out of Muslim territory and ―if the Muslims want to go from our territory, then
we enable them to leave our area, without coercion, because we do not have the right to do that,
nor should anyone take on himself their ethnic cleansing, but there would be no crying if they left
from here‖.9183 The #picking up only one sentence is not correct##. There was a long argumentation
between the GHQ od the VRS and the Supreme Command about many things. But only one of it was
about the able bodied Muslims in our territory, who are prevented to leave. Karadzic and the civilian
authorities were in favour to allowe them to go to the other countries. The Army people opposed it,
because they may become a spies, or return and fight against us. On the ather side, those able bodied
Muslims, deprived from the freedom to leave, are rady to meet their troops. Here is why it was a
subject: P03149, p. 65

At the same time we had the whole entirely Muslim units in the VRS, but those who lived in
the different cities, not working nor doing any civil obligation, were angry for being
prevented to leave. And this is a high risk for my country. The Chamber easily forget that we
were in the midle of the bloodiest war, were civilians suffered a lot. The Muslims returning
in Bijeljina on the apeal of the President, got the message from their fellow Muslims: “just
come, not need to carry weapon, we have it. See P1478, p.40

9181
P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995), p. 65.
9182
P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995), pp. 65–66.
9183
P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995), p. 28. See also D3565 (RS Government conclusion, 26 January 1993).
 656

So, the issue was whether to allow the Muslim able bodied men to leave to the third countries
until the war is over, so not to have them joining the Muslim Army! And they could have
joined the ABiH either if the Serbs allowed them to move to the Central Bosnia, which they
had a right to do, or to allow them to go to the third countries, from which only 10% of them
may return and join the Army! These concerns are justified and appear as a military and
security necessity! The Chamber should have demanded that the Prosecution prove that
some moves were mean and criminal, and not a military or security necessity!)

(b)Territorial claims and control

2774. On 23 December 1991, the President spoke about the plebiscite which had been conducted and
stated that in principle, even if Serbs constituted only 5% of the population, ―everywhere where Serbs
live and where they have voted against secession, or to remain in Yugoslavia, no one can break away
there. In other words, there remain only five municipalities that could separate from Yugoslavia‖.9184
In a conversation with Koljević in December 1991, the President stated that there was great media
interest in whether the Serbs wanted war but they had said that ―we want war by no means‖ and that
―we have no aims, we don‘t want to take what belongs to someone else‖; ―we just don‘t want them to
take ours‖.9185 (The example about 5% was an illustration of the “constitutivity” i.e. if one
community is a constituent part of society, it was not important how numerous it was, if the
community had a “veto right” it had it no matter how numerous was it. Of course, as any
hyperbola, it was not in a literal sense of words, but it is not serious of the Chamber to put it in the
Judgment. As the Chamber knows, the Serbs made a concession and accepted the possibility of
the BiH independence, with some safeguards for the Serb community!)

2775. In February 1992, Krajišnik suggested that the Serbian people had two options, to either
fight by political means or to ―break off the talks and go for what we have done over the centuries:
win our own territories by force‖.9186 In this regard, Krajišnik said ―[y]ou know what our
profession has always been – to wage war‖.9187 (#Jokes! Sayings! Is the Chamber really
serious?# What is the third way? There is no a third way, but only a political means, and if it
is denied by the force, the only way is securing the rights by resistence to the force
implemented!)

2776. In March 1992, Krajišnik also stated that ―[s]ince municipality borders may be adjusted,
we have already made some adjustments and we plan to include all parts that will be Serbian
territory in our municipalities, and what remains to be discussed, the discussion will be about
where it is going to be, where are we going to put our lines‖ and that for strategic reasons ―we
could start implementing what we have agreed upon, the ethnic division on the ground. That we

9184
D4555 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Maristela Luĉić, 23 December 1991), pp. 1–2; D86 (Shorthand Record of 4th session of
SerBiH Assembly, 21 December 1991), pp. 37–38.
9185
P5789 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Nikola Koljević, 21 December 1991), p. 1.
9186
D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), p. 21.
9187
D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), p. 64.
 657

start determining the territory‖.9188 (#In context of Conference, legal, obligatory, agreed#! This
is a worse and more cunning than it was in the Indictment. It is proven that in March 92 the
Conference on BiH was in a final phase and what could we do with the municipality
boundaries unless it was agreed? This is when nobody tought that there would be any war.
How this can be incriminated? There was a constitutional right of inhabitants of any settled
place to reconsider where, to which municipality it wanted to belong, and to change it’s
affiliation. If there is an accord on the issue, a referendum is not necessary, but if necessary,
nobody could deny this right. Remember, the group of the Croatian villages Dobratici did it
far before tha war, and before this Krajisnik’s words, in the presence of the ECMM,
concluding an agreement with their former municipality Skender Vakuf, see d3980, OF 17
December 91, far before the war:

…
And this adjustment of the municipal boundaries was #the only instrument to achieve the
ethnic homogeneity#, established and agreed among the sides before the war, when it was
meant that there will be no any war. See Mr. Krajisnik’s sentence: “we could start
implementing what we have agreed upon, the ethnic division on the ground. That we start
determining the territory.” What the Chamber concluded, in March 1992, with whom the
Serbs hade agreed the ethnic division? Obviously, with the two other sides and in the
framework of the Conference! This could only be #EXCULPATORY#!) Krajišnik, in
interviews, also spoke about the borders and territory held by the VRS but refuted the suggestion
that they were holding territories populated by other national communities, although he
acknowledged that it may have been the case with certain enclaves within their territory.9189 (It is
quite different to talk about the determination of territories in peace time and while the
Conference was regulating the territorial arrangements, that to talk about the same during
the fierce war. And what is criminal in it? The Serb side always kept saying that it was
ready to return a substantial portion of the territory, see P941, but not before the peace is
established!)

2777. In March 1992, the Accused explained that SerBiH existed, (Right, it was proclaimed on
9 January 1992, and Mr. Badinter recognised it when decided that BiH can not get
independence as other republics, since there is the Republic of Srpska established, and the
Serbs have a different attitude, see Opinion No. 4 of Badinter Commision!) that there would
be no return to a unitary BiH and the only contest was of ―quantity, there is a tug of war about who
will have more. We won, we have drawn the rope to a certain point and we are not going to yield
it back‖.9190 (#No connection with the war, it was achieved at the Conference!#) The President
stated that the goals of the Bosnian Serbs were being accomplished stage by stage.9191 (Here is

9188
D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), p. 13.
9189
P797 (TV Belgrade interview with Momĉilo Krajišnik), p. 1. See also Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4306–4307.
9190
D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), p. 43.
9191
D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), p. 43.
 658

D90, p.43, what the President said:

p.44.

That was almost the entire report about the achievement of the Carrington-Cutileiro
Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina. All achieved by political means, has nothing to do
with the war, or with any crimes, all legal, legitimate and peaceful. Had the Muslim side
stick to the Agreement, there wouldn’t be any war, see D2981, Cutileiro’s letter:
 659

The Accused also said that the Bosnian Muslims were forced to accept that BiH was divisible
along national lines, (The same as the Serbs had been forced to leave Yugoslavia, and for the
secession of BiH, which was a painful Serb concession for the peace and the Serb entity!) and
that the Bosnian Serbs would ―decide what our constituent unit is‖ based on ―what conditions we
establish on the ground‖.9192 (#All EXCULPATORY# Before the war, without any war,
achieved at the Conference#! The Chamber should have already known what happened on
18 March 1992. The Chamber should not decide on any evidence unless put it back in the
context, the time frame and a chain of causes-consequences! All what had been said in this
paragraph was the President’s report of what had been achieved on the Conference the very
same day. The President recommended the Agreement to the Assembly with all his
skilfulness. This was achieved before the war, without a war, pure politically and under the
auspice of the EC, with the contribution of the UN. Once the Muslim/Croat coalition
expressed their will to secede from Yugoslavia against the Serb will, they had to accept that
BiH would not be a unitary state any more, and it was recognized by the Badinter
commission, by the EC, by the UN. This is the crucial proof that the Serbs did have their
rights for which they didn’t have to wage a war. A war was needed to those who wanted to
deny the Serbian rights.

2778. On 23 April 1992, Mandić was informed that Višegrad had been taken.9193 Prior to this,
there was a year of the Muslim terror over the Serbs in Visegrad. The dramatic development
was broadcast on TV live. At a first moment, the Muslim terrorists had taken over Visegrad
and expelled the Serbs out of the town. Then, they attacked the JNA too, and lost! How come
both, the Prosecution and the Chamber is not interested in the “whole truth”, i.e. in what
really happened?) On 30 April 1992, the Bosnian Serb Government was informed about the
situation in Foĉa and that Bosnian Serb authorities had control over ―liberated areas‖.9194 (The
then there was a war lasting already four weeks. The Muslim/Croat war coalition started the
war, what is illegitimate, in order to put the places under their own control? General Mladic
still was the JNA officer, not the officer of the Republic of Srpska, because the VRS didn’t
exist at that time. Was it a crime of the President or any other official to know the outcome
of the local skirmishes?)

2779. In meetings with international representatives in April 1992, the Accused showed maps on
which the ethnic composition was marked, as was Bosnian Serb claimed or controlled territory; in

9192
D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), p. 43.
9193
P5701 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić, Zorica and Traparić, 23 April 1992), p. 5.
9194
P4986 (Report of SerBiH Government, 30 April 1992), p. 1. See also P2716 (Notebook of Radovan Karadzić), p. 28.
 660

total, this amounted to approximately 70% of BiH.9195 This was consistent with earlier speeches
by the Accused where he stated that it would be #impossible for Izetbegović to establish authority
in 70% of the territory in BiH.9196 (#Far before the war the Serbs settled and controlled 70% of
the territory of BiH, which directly rebuts all the allegations and “findings” that the Serbs
“took-over” the territory by force.# As of the elections 1990 the Serbs did have their legal
and legitimate authorities on all of this 70% of the BiH territory. Some of the settled places
and towns may have some Muslim majority, but the area was with the Serb majority. Also,
many settled places in the Muslim-Croat areas had the Serb majority, but both of it was to
be negotiated.) Many of the areas which the Bosnian Serbs claimed included municipalities along
the Drina River and in the Posavina area which had a majority Bosnian Muslim population but
later became Bosnian Serb controlled areas with very few Bosnian Muslims remaining.9197 (This
is erroneus consideration and conclusion. First of all, until that time there were a well known
several maps of ethnic distribution, submitted by the sides in the talks and one submitted by
Ambassador Cutileiro on behalf of the European Community. The witness (H. Okun) didn’t
discover anything new, and couldn’t testify on the subject already considered at the
Conference. Showing the pre-war ethnic map was an obligation before the Conference,
which was a precondition for a territorial allocation to the agreed three states in BiH.
Already in April 92 there was the war going on. This map didn’t deal with the municipality
boundaries, but with the settled places, and that was why it looked like all Serbian. It is well
known, and easy to check that the Serbs were living in the rural areas surrounding the
urban cores. But, presenting the status quo didn’t mean that the Serbs demanded everything
marked as a Serbian to be in the Serb unit. This is well known to the main envoys and
negotiators, not to their note-takers!)

As far as it is concerned the Izetbegovic’s inability to establish his authority in 70% of the
territory in BiH, well in advance he was told that he can not make a new state against the
will and interests of the one of the three constituent nations, and that was recognized by the
EC, and by the Badinter commission, and that was why we did have the Conference. A state
can not be recognized if it doesn’t have people, teritory within borders and efficient control
on the entire territory. And a control can have only in democracy, if a vast majority of all of
the three nations accept the state and its power. If anyone would find it other way, then it
would be a new era in history. Why #everything concerning the Serbs is criminal before this
Court?#)

2780. The Accused had previously spoken about territorial issues. For example in an intercepted
conversation in September 1991, the Accused spoke about negotiations regarding territories and
the plan to free Bosanska Krajina, Semberija and Doboj and said that Eastern Herzegovina and
Romanija were ―clean‖.9198 (It was #Drastic abuses! far before the war, before even the war in
Croatia, when it was meant that there will be no any war, but only a political talks. So, there
could not be any talks about “the plan to free Bosanska Krajina”#! Here is what was it
about: there was the regionalisation going on, and it was discussion about what would be
#“clean” which was “clear”, i.e. undisputed in belonging to one of the ethnic communities.
#Linguistic mess#! Let us see, P05864, :

S
9195
[REDACTED]. See also P797 (TV Belgrade interview with Momĉilo Krajišnik); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4300–
4301; Herbert Okun, T. 1477–1483, 1485–1486 (22 April 2010); P784 (First notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 45; P802 (Map of BiH
marked by Herbert Okun); P788 (Fifth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 29; P780 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun‘s Vance Mission
Diary), e-court p. 27.
9196
P958 (Radovan Karadţić‘s speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 11.
9197
Herbert Okun, T. 1487–1488 (22 April 2010), T. 1498–1499 (23 April 2010); P783 (Ethnic map of BiH).
9198
P5864 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 19 September 1991), p. 1.
 661

o, it is clear that something had to be negotiated with the other sides, and once they accept a
principle, all other would be subject to the negotiation. Let us se further:

Clear, the proclamation of a new SAOs was going on, after the SDA reneged on the Historic
Serb-Muslim Agreement. Meanwhile the ARK was proclaimed, without any influence of the
central SDS, and the process accelerated, because the SDA have chosen not to make any
agreement. See further:

And if somebody suggested to the Chamber that this conversation had to do something with
an ethnic cleansing, it must be an insane person. There was no any idea of war, there was
negotiation how BiH was going to look like, whether to stay in Yugoslavia, or to secede, and
in this case, what would be it’s internal structure.) In November 1991, the President had a
conversation about the situation in Novo Sarajevo and said that they would teach the SDA ―the
law pretty soon‖ given that they had blocked the work of the Municipal Assembly and that they
would ―probably carry out some kind of reorganisation of the city‖.9199 The SDA was cheating in
this city municipality with the Serb majority, and it was unlawful, and the President was
obliged to secure a lawful conduct. The President then said, ―[a]nd they can go to fucking
hell‖.9200 But, let us see what had been said (D0090) during the Assembly session on 18
March 92. What the OTP, and now even the Chamber constructed out of this is not only a
selective persecution, it is also a selective deliberation. Let’s start from the beginning. This is
the Agenda of this session:

Everyone knows that the 18 March 92 was the date when the Lisbon Argeement was agreed
upon. This Assembly session was held in this occasion, as it can be seen from the Agenda.
Then, on p. 43. responding to a MP.:

It is clear that the Serb side did have their “strategic goals” before the war, and those goals
were to be achieved through the negotiations, on the Conference.

(#EXCULPATORY#! This is a reporting of the negotiating team to the Assembly. The Serbs
accepted that BiH will be independent, provided it consists of a three units based mainly on
9199
P2574 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Ţarko Ðurović, 19 November 1991), p. 2.
9200
P2574 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Ţarko Đurović, 19 November 1991), p. 2.
 662

the ethnic principle. Finish! No war was needed, all was within the political framework,
under the auspice of the EC. Nobody has any right to criminalize the Serbian legal political
activities.) The President also asked where Bosnian Muslim settlements were in Novo Sarajevo
and questioned how many Bosnian Muslims lived in specific areas and in the municipality
generally.9201 (#Not a crime#! How this collecting of information about the ethnic composition
of this municipality could be a crime? It was necessary for the purpose of delineating
between the two municipalities, so that no one be allocated in the unwanted municipality.

2781. On 6 May 1992, Mladić was at a meeting where he was informed that ―Foĉa has been
finished‖.9202 (It was exactly a month of the beginning of the war. Mladic still was a JNA
officer!) At the 16th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly on 12 May 1992 the President stated
that the conflict in municipalities, including Foĉa, Zvornik, and Višegrad, had ended
successfully.9203 So what? The Muslim side wanted the war, and initiated it along the Drina
River, and wasn’t successful. How come the Chamber was so desperate to pick up every
single sentence of the President and try to milk anything wrong out of it?) On 19 May
1992, in an intercepted conversation, Mićo Stanišić said that Foĉa had fallen along with Višegrad
and that all those who had left these municipalities were in Goraţde.9204 Stanić reported to Mladić
that in contrast to what it was before the conflict, the percentage of Serbs in Foĉa was 99%.9205
(#Serbs controlled only Serb partys#! But to have in mind that the Muslims all the time
controlled a big portion of the Foca municipality. So, Stanic may have been talking about the
town itself, where the Serbs had always been a majority! Anyway, #how the President may
be liable for a conversation of the two other persons, although it was not a crime#?)

2782. On 8 May 1992, the National Security Council tasked the Ministry of Justice with
proposing the state borders of SerBiH.9206 On 24 May 1992, Prime Minister Branko Đeric wrote a
letter in which he stated the Serbs in BiH were ―not an invented people as we have been living on
this land for thirteen centuries‖. (Right! But, what is the meaning of this paragraphs that deal
with history? This is the #politics, not a crime#? All what had been said is correct! Since the
Constitutional principles had been agreed on 18 March, the determination of the boundaries
was a task given to the sides by the mediators at the Conference. No any other conclusion
could be inferred out of this fact!) He also wrote that the Bosnian Serbs held title to 64% of the
arable land, and that they used to be a majority in BiH before the genocide jointly carried out
against Serbs by Muslims and Croats during World War II.9207 (Right! What is criminal in it?
That would be as if a #Jewish minister was indicted for remaining of the genocide and
holocaust?#)

2783. The Accused also stated ―[w]e must prove to the international factor that […] we hold no
siege over Sarajevo. Basically, we are protecting our territories and here it is visible that Sarajevo
sprung up in Serbian territory, as Serbian property, and the entire surrounding of held Sarajevo is

9201
P2574 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Ţarko Ðurović, 19 November 1991), pp. 2–3; Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16641–16645.
9202
P1477 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 14 February–25 May 1992), pp. 253, 255.
9203
P956 (Transcript of 16th Session of Assembly of SerBiH, 12 May 1992), p. 12. See also D115 (Transcript of 25th session of RS Assembly, 19–20 January
1993), p. 51 (where a deputy in the Bosnian Serb Assembly referred to the struggle for Serbdom and the fighters in Foĉa who had liberated 98% of Serbian
territories).
9204
P5671 (Intercept of conversation between Mićo Stanišić and Janković, 19 May 1992), e-court pp. 8, 11–12.
9205
P1480 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 10–30 September 1992), p. 66.
9206
P3078 (Minutes of meeting of the National Security Council and the SerBiH Government, 8 May 1992), p. 1.
9207
P1094 (Letter from Government of SerBiH to James Baker, 24 May 1992). See also D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February
2013), paras. 45, 51; D3026 (Article from Yugoslav Daily Survey entitled ―Montenegrin President: Decisive Step towards Peace in Bosnia‖, 21 June 1993),
p. 1; NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13639–13640 (17 March 2011); P5063 (Video footage depicting interview of Radovan Karadţić on ―Ask the President‖,
undated, with transcript), pp. 5–7.
 663

Serbian‖.9208 (So what? That was a very known fact. But, even if the Serbs held the siege of a
capital of the state that declared a war against the Serbs!) The President spoke about Serbian
villages, towns, and settlements which were beyond dispute and that they should seek to solve
issues where ethnic areas and maps overlap.9209 Right! WHAT IS UNLAWFUL IN THIS? All
of it was true, and it was an #argumentation for the political talks, why it is used as a proof
against the President, and for what#?

2784. At a meeting of the Bosnian Serb leadership on 6 June 1992, Krajišnik stated that ―we
have to conquer what is ours and be prepared to defend our state‖ and that the goal was to form
and unite the ―Biraĉ-Romanija area‖.9210 (#Conquer what is ours and… defend our state#! This
was all the Serb rights, because they were pushed into the war, and denied their rights to
influence the changes of our state. In the same “document” (as much as a notebook may be
it) the President said what was the European standpoint on BiH, p. 95:

2785. After a meeting on 30 June 1992 when he received reports on the combat success of
voluntary formations, the Accused stressed that the Bosnian Serbs had ―by and large outlined their
territory‖ and the most pressing tasks involved successfully establishing democratic civilian
authorities and that the Serb side was ready for a political outcome and negotiations.9211
(#EXCULPATORY#! What is wrong with that? The others decided to have the war, and the
military outcome, or the first to defeat the Serbs, and then to talk. But, the Serbs “outlined”
their territories, and were ready for a talks. What else the Serbs were expected to do? To
surrender?) At a meeting on 30 June 1992 attended by the President and General Mladić, a
municipal leader from Vlasenica reported that part of Cerska would be liberated in the days to
come and if they brought back their forces from Kalesija they ―would liberate everything‖ and that
―[w]hoever controls Vlasenica, controls eastern Bosnia‖.9212 So what? This is a legitimate
wortime subject. Is it still forbiden to the Serbs to run their politics. All of that looks like a
ieological-political lecture from the communist regime. And #while the war goes on, to
control everything is legitimate. WHAT IS UNLAWFUL IN THIS#?)

2786. At the 17th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly held in July 1992, Krajišnik stated that
there were territories which were not under their control but which should be part of SerBiH ―due
to them being ethnic territories‖ and over which the Bosnian Serbs claimed their rights.9213 (So
what? Before the final settlement, any side is entitled to claim what does belong to it. Even if
it will not be included in a respective entity, it is important to see how much territory this
side gave up. In other word, a bargaining chip. Also, the population of this territory would
object why the leadership “even didn’t try” to include their areas in the Serb unit. How this
is proving a guilt even of Krajisnik, let alone of this President?) Krajišnik on this issue
explained that the territories they held constituted the SerBiH and were indisputable to them,

9208
P2578 (Excerpt of transcript of movie entitled ―Bosnia 1992-Serbian Epics‖), p. 5.
9209
P2578 (Excerpt of transcript of movie entitled ―Bosnia 1992-Serbian Epics‖), p. 5. See also Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik), T. 16694–16698.
9210
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 93–94, 108–109.
9211
D3658 (TANJUG news report, 30 June 1992); D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012) (under seal), para. 70. See also D2149
(Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 40.
9212
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 246, 261–262.
9213
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 49.
 664

―[w]hat is ours, is ours. We do not want to take the territories of others and we cannot give away
what is ours‖.9214 He also emphasised that the final goal was the formation of a state and that the
―single space‖ of the SerBiH ―must be achieved‖.9215 So what? #EXCULPATORY, not
UNLAWFUL?# The Chamber missed to point out what Mr. Krajisnik said further: D92, p.
49:

Mr. Krajisnik said that beside “non-debatable” areas, (which meant non disputed, nobody
contested) and a “debatable areas” which meant, somebody else claimed the same rights on
it, and it had to be negotiated. It couldn’t be more clear, and nothing wrong was in it. Mr.
Krajisnik also said that “since we are not alone in BiH” which meant that the others also
have their rights to be respected.)

2787. At the same session, the Accused reported that ―we control all of our territories, and
perhaps also some territories that will be given to other national communities once a deal is
reached‖ but that those territories could not be handed over during the war.9216 (#Right!
Understendable! Rationale! Legal!#) The President gave credit to the JNA, the TO, and the
army of the SerBiH and stated that the borders of their state had been marked by a difficult and
bloody battle.9217 Koljević also acknowledged how much had been achieved militarily.9218 The
President emphasised the significance of controlling territory and the factual situation on the
ground.9219 At this session there was a statement made about the danger of losing Foĉa which
would allow the creation of the ―green transversal‖.9220 (All #legal and legitimate#. It was the
war, and a Muslim secret strategy of the “Green transversal” is reality, and the whole
Europe is watching it now. Taking into account the war: WHAT IS UNLAWFUL IN THIS?)
Particularly since the other side rejected the President’s Platform of 22 April, which
proposed that a forcefully taken territories wouldn’t be recognised, and continued to fight!)

2788. Prstojević also spoke at the 17th Bosnian Serb Assembly session and said that after the
President visited Ilidţa and encouraged them, ―the Serbs from Sarajevo retained control over the
territory, and even extended their territory in some areas, driving the Muslims out of the territories
where they had actually been the majority‖.9221 Mr. Prstojevic said something about this
allegation during his testimony, and clarified it. But, the main issue is, when speaking about
“driving out” somebody, whether it pertained to civilians, or the armed forces. #In the
military vocabulary it is always meant that the armed forces had been chasen out!#)@.
9214
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 50.
9215
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 50.
9216
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), pp. 14, 19.
9217
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), pp. 14, 21.
9218
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), pp. 32–33. See also D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), pp. 7, 25, 27.
9219
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 87. See also Anthony Banbury, T. 13307, 13310, 13338–13339, 13341 (15
March 2011) (testifying about the importance of the ―facts on the ground‖ in international negotiations); P5063 (Video footage depicting interview of
Radovan Karadţić on ―Ask the President‖, undated, with transcript), p. 19.
9220
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 41.
9221
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 66.
 665

2789. At the same session, the President said that the conflict had been ―roused in order to
eliminate the Muslims. [...] They think they are being nationally established, but in fact they are
vanishing. The Chamber doesn’t understand what was been talked about. The creators of
this war were, according to the Serbian understanding, the West, and in particular Vatican,
and those who persuaded the Muslims to abandon the Lisbon Agreement.) If that‘s the case,
then we have our interests for our historical territories‖.9222 Right after making this statement, the
Accused went on to say:

I think we have to save the Serb people in their ethnic and also historical territories […]. We‘ll
have for sure, we‘ll have in the beginning so many Serbs, but I think that they will leave those
states, both the Muslim and the Croat state. In the state that we are building, we have to ensure
that they have all the rights that we have, under the condition that they are not hostile and that they
leave the weapons.9223 (It is more than clear that it pertained to the Muslims and Croats who
will live in the Serbian state. What is wrong with that? The President reafirmes the Muslim
and Croat rights in the RS. #EXCULPATORY#!!!

2790. At the end of the 17th Bosnian Serb Assembly session in July 1992, the Bosnian Serb
Assembly adopted the ―Decision on establishing disputable and indisputable borders of its
territory‖ and identified where those borders would run, which could be subject to corrections and
verifications in accordance with international agreements.9224 (#EXCULPATOR#Y!!! All legal
and in cooperation with the international community, and EC! WHAT IS UNLAWFUL IN
THIS?

9222
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 86.
9223
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 86.
9224
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), pp. 103–104.
 666

2791. The Accused acknowledged with time that during negotiations they risked losing
traditional and ―centuries-old Serb territories‖.9225 These historical territorial claims were also
reflected in the proclamation of the Bosnian Serb Assembly in January 1992 where reference was
made to ―areas in which the Serbian people is now a minority due to the genocide carried out
against it in World War II‖ and in the statements to the international observers that these areas
should be part of the RS.9226 (#Politics, not crime#! At the beginning of any negotiable affair
the sides involved always put the highest price, knowing that there will be concessions. Also,
the people on this territories were a very sensitive to this subject, since they have lost their
families, and now they are supposed to give up the areas because they a minority due to the
genocide! But, instead of #collecting a patchwork of “here-and-there sentences of the
President#, or even worse, of the other people that spoke for themselves, the Chamber
should stick to the binding documets that the President signed or proposed#! Only
documents are relevant, not a parliamentary discussions which were a free speeches, and if
didn’t prevail and influenced documents adopted, all of these speeches are IRRELEVANT#
for this case!)

2792. The objectives which the Bosnian Serb leadership spoke about in the lead-up to and during
the conflict were also reflected in VRS reports. (#Malignant distortion#! The Serbian objectives
were originally pure political, see: D90 of 18 March 92. once the Muslim side decided for the
military outcome, the Serb objectives had to adjust to this Muslim decision, see the Assembly
session on 12 May 92.) For example, the VRS Main Staff analysis of armed activities in 1992
noted that the declaration of independence by BiH and its premature recognition threatened the
Bosnian Serbs and made them a national minority that faced the prospect of being ―subjected to
genocide‖.9227 (So what? Every relevant contemporaneous world leader expressed own
concerns about the premature recognition without a safeguards for the ethnic communities!)
This report noted that in order to prevent this ―humiliation‖, the Serbian people organised itself
politically and when it was attacked, ―it started a defensive and liberating war‖ with the SDS
taking on the most significant political role in the organisation of the Serbian people.9228 (Right:
#when attacked politically, defended politically, ##when attacked militarily, defended
militarily!#)

2793. The VRS reported that during the early phase of the conflict in the RS there were units of
the Serb TO which had been ―formed on the initiative and under the leadership‖ of the SDS and
had been able to protect the Serbs until the formation of the VRS.9229 (To have formed, prepared
and trained TO units, it was a #law binding obligation#, and all in BH had the same. The
Muslim side expelled the Serb component from the TO on 6 April 92 and the Serbian
municipalities and companies had to refresh and reestablish their units. #Every single
municipality had to have a TO unit#! No matter what party exercised the power, it would
have to be the same! The Chamber should have known something about the domestic laws,
or such a courts shouldn’t be formed to try in another system!) The VRS reported however,

9225
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 11. See also D1278 (Transcript of
Radomir Nešković's interview with Karadţić's legal associate, 8 October 2009), p. 26.
9226
P6444 (Declaration of the Assembly of Serbian people in BiH, 9 January 1992), p. 2; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
4165–4168, 4188–4189, 4370; Herbert Okun, T. 1489–1491 (22 April 2010). See also P6540 (Excerpt of video from Banja Luka, 3 March 1991, with
transcript); (This meeting in Banja Luka happened 13 months before the war!!! How this is relevant, unless the Chamber
incriminate the crime against peace, but in this case the Defence would have additional evidence!) Milan Babić, P742
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 3400; KDZ240, T. 16068–16069 (5 July 2011) (closed session); Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8617; P5746 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Dobrica Ćosić, 15 February 1992), p. 5. Ĉeklić testified
that the Bosnian Serb leadership did not want to occupy territories but instead wanted to protect Serbian people in those territories. Savo Ĉeklić, T.
41227−41229 (11 July 2013). However, the Chamber does not find Ĉeklić‘s evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber
noted that Ĉeklić‘s evidence was marked by evasiveness and contradictions and as such did not find his evidence to be reliable in this regard.
9227
D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), pp. 46, 152, 159.
9228
D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 46.
9229
D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), pp. 69, 75.
 667

that these units failed to achieve the ―main strategic objectives of the armed struggle of the Serbian
people‖ in BiH.9230 They failed to open and secure the required corridors and to ―gain control over
a considerable part of the territory of former [BiH] which historically and ethnically belongs to the
Serbian people‖.9231 This report further noted that the VRS was capable of protecting the Serbs
and ―liberating territories which by [historic] birthright are ours‖ and that this would lay the
foundations for a Serb state.9232 (This came out of a rivalry of the VRS and the TO component.
#Not relevant#. That is why armies exist, and every single nation has its rights to have an
army. The JNA was supposed to protect every single settlement which considered itself a
part of Yugoslavia, but the Yugoslav state had been deliberately weakened. The TO is only
one of the components that constitute the “armed forces”, but the main must be an army!)

2794. This report noted that the strategic objectives of the war were promptly defined and formed
the general guidelines for their operations.9233 (#Every single local commune, let alone
municipality, or a bigger company, and finally Republic was obliged to have prepared the
war plans#, to renew them from time to time, and it was introduced after 1948, after the
dispute with the SSSR. See: Kapetina testimony. See All-peoples defence law!@@@) Mladić
reflected this sentiment and said that the people and the VRS had carried out most of the tasks and
the Strategic Goals set for them.9234 He noted that the VRS had ―liberated the territories we
consider our own‖ which had created conditions for the Bosnian Serb leadership to go to
negotiations in a stronger territorial position.9235 (That is how every single state function. An
Army is doing a military job, and a state and political leadership negotiate. Where it is
another way?) The report further noted that the President, as the Supreme Commander, orally
assigned a number of tasks which were vital to ―protecting the Serbian people and its territories‖
and the Main Staff ―translated the set objectives and tasks into general and individual
missions‖.9236 The Accused spoke in favour and praised the military successes of the VRS under
Mladić.9237 (A horrible crimes?!?! What is wrong with that? Should the Serbian people be
deprived from the rights for self-defence, self-organisation aand survival? This is a grave
respoinsibility of the United Nations to have it’s courts to criminalise a basic, anscient rights
of a people!)

2795. On 26 August 1992, in a meeting with Vance and Carrington at the London Conference,
the President stated that following the recognition of BiH, ―Serbs had been forced to act in order to
protect the Serbian population‖ and that they wanted full autonomy.9238 (So what? a
#commendable and # EXCULPATORY#! A mere #legitimate and democratic political
position, that had to be accepted without any war!#) The President further stated that the
Bosnian Serbs were willing to negotiate and even return some territory as part of an overall
agreement, as long as Serb property rights in predominantly Croat and Muslim areas were
protected.9239 When the President spoke about Bosnian Serb territory being geographically
continuous, Vance asked how this could be achieved without ―moving people‖.9240 Nothing
impossible. There was no this need for continuity before the war, but since the war broke
9230
D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 69.
9231
D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 69.
9232
D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 159. See also D232 (Directive 1, 6 June 1992), p. 1; D2149
(Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 40.
9233
D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 159.
9234
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 66. See also D2149 (Aide
mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 27; D232 (Directive 1, 6 June 1992); D593 (Directive 2, 22 July 1992), pp. 1, 3; D235 (Directive 3, 3 August 1992);
P977 (Directive 5, 25 June 1993), p. 2; P3039 (Directive 6, 11 November 1993), p. 6.
9235
D593 (Directive 2, 22 July 1992), p. 1. See also D235 (Directive 3, 3 August 1992), p. 7.
9236
D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 159.
9237
P4440 (Excerpt from video of Radovan Karadţić‘s speech, with transcript).
9238
See para. 347; P941 (London Conference record of a meeting with Radovan Karadţić, 26 August 1992), p. 1.
9239
P941 (London Conference record of a meeting with Radovan Karadţić, 26 August 1992), p. 1.
9240
See para. 347; P941 (London Conference record of a meeting with Radovan Karadţić, 26 August 1992), pp. 1–2.
 668

out, the Serb constituent unit had to have a continuity. Why people would be moved, when it
was clear that in every constituent units would be villages of the other ethnicity. It is clearly
shown in this paragraph, under the fn 9249. WHAT IS UNLAWFUL IN THIS? The same
document P941 clearly proves that as early as in August 1992 the President took a
commitment to return a substantial amount of territory, and pleaded for the rights of the
refugees to return!)

2796. At an international press conference in September 1992, the President stated that Bosnian
Serbs owned, possessed, and controlled 64% of BiH and that they were only a minority in BiH
because of the genocide during World War II.9241 (But, this is a historic fact, and could be
checked in the censuses of population. Is the President guilty for this was a historic fact, or
for spelling out this fact? Only in communist regime it was forbiden to spell out a truths
which the communists didn’t like. There are too many similarities between the communists
and the contemporary West!) When questioned about whether those in the ―wrong part of the
territory‖ (Just let us see how this “wrong part of the territory” found the place in this
Judgement: see P809, p.7

It
was pronounced by the journalist, but it is in the Judgement as if it was pronounced by the
President. However, the President publicly took a commitments to guarantee minority
rights, not only reciprocally!) would have to leave their homes, the Accused denied the
suggestion vigorously and stated that they had to guarantee minority rights.9242
(#EXCULPATORY#! Before the war here was no any mentioning of a population exchange,
except what the Croats proposed, and the President commented as a nightmare (tel. convers.
With S. Milosevic), and even after the war broke out this was not an option, see…. Politika,
response of the President on a journalist question, early May 92 See P01478, p. 97-98,

2797. The Accused told Van Lynden in September 1992 that the Serbs had to have the northern
areas and Banja Luka. He also said that Eastern Bosnia was all Serb and that the enclaves of
Goraţde, Srebrenica, and smaller enclaves were unacceptable and had to become part of Serb
territory.9243 (Why the President would talk to a journalist about that? The #only relevant
was what the President talked to the official mediators#, and what he handed over as a Serb
official propositions. This is an abuse of journalists, by both, the journalist and the Tribunal
(Prosecution/Chamber.) Nothing that the Accuse said or not said to the journalist pertaining
to the political aimes or solutions was irrelevant, because it was not official, and maybe never
happened. There was a sufficient amount of the official, binding documents submitted,
proposed or accepted and signed under the auspice of the Conference mediators! But, this
UN Court rather pays an attention to a gossips and “hear-say” evidence than to the official
UN documents!)

2798. Šešelj, on behalf of the SRS, also expressed his support for the formation of the SerBiH
and his view that the Bosnian Serb authorities should demarcate Serbian territory, proclaim its
own TO and police in territories under its control, and simultaneously ―liberate‖ those areas which

9241
P809 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić‘s Press Conference at ICFY, 18 September 1992, with transcript), p. 6; Vladislav Jovanović, T. 34309–34310 (26
February 2013).
9242
P809 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić‘s Press Conference at ICFY, 18 September 1992, with transcript), p. 9.
9243
P926 (Witness statement of Aernout van Lynden dated 26 February 2010), para. 71; Aemout van Lynden, T. 2419 (19 May 2010).
 669

were not under Serbian control but which were ―part of the Serbian territorial corpus‖.9244 (#The
same what Mr. Seselj proposed was proposed by the European Community at the
Conference, and the Conference had been facilitated only for that purpose and far before the
war!#) In April 1992, Šešelj spoke about the necessity of dividing BiH, where Serbs would end
up with the majority of the area.9245 In an interview in September 1992, Šešelj recognised that it
was ―obvious that Serbs hold larger territories today than they would have if there had been a
peaceful demarcation of borders with Croats and Muslims‖.9246 He further stated that Serbs would
continue to gain more and more territories and Muslims would end up with nothing.9247 (Again,
the #opinion of Mr. Seselj was shared by the EC and the UN#. Why it is contested now,
particularly since the Tribunal is not dealing with the responsibility for the war? Mr. Seselj
was expressing his academic, scientific and political opinion, what is wrong wit it? The
Seselj’s Serb Radical Party had always take care of the legitimate interests of the Muslim
population, although somebody created another reputation of him. Th man was acquitted,
and he should be, because those are political speeches. And what does it mean, to bring a
statement of another man, from another country and another party, to prove something
about the President?)

2799. In November 1992, in a meeting attended by General Morillon, Pyers Tucker, Mladić, and
Koljević, the Accused showed maps with the ethnic distribution in BiH and claimed that ―Bosnian
Serbs had only seized those territories to which they had a right, which [were] territories where the
population was more than 50 per cent Bosnian Serb‖ and they had ―no wish to live with the
Muslims‖, whom he called ―Turks‖.9248 (This must be a lie, because the President used this
term only several times with soldiers, in order to be closer to them, although a “Turks” can
not be derogatory, because the Turks are a great nation. But the Bosnian Muslims wanted to
be considered Turks anyway, we have evidence about it. Anyway, this was a legitimate right
to declare what territories the Serb community in BiH claimed for itself. Why the Chamber
needed witness Tucker to confirm something that was publicly known from the beginning of
the crisis? And why it was a crime?) On 7 November 1992, at a meeting attended by Đerić and
other ministers, the situation in a number of municipalities was discussed and it was reported that
the largest part of the municipality of Vlasenica was ―free‖.9249 (So what? #Free from another
armed forces#. Many other places, towns and cities, were free from the adversary forces, but
not from the minorities, which lived in the Serb areas to the end of the war!) In January 1993,
the Accused also spoke about how they had created a state with their own forces.9250 (So what?
#By their own forces” doesn’t mean by military forces!!!# It was the first anniversary of the
Republic of Srpska, which was created by the political means, and was accepted by the
international community and the two other sides, codified in the Lisbon Agreement, and
finally denied by armed forces of the two other sides. And defended by the Serb own armed
forces!)

2800. The Chamber recalls that on 15 January 1993, at a meeting with Okun and Vance, the
representative for the Bosnian Serbs, Aleksa Buha, stated that the Bosnian Serbs needed the
Posavina ―corridor‖, which was a road that connected Belgrade to Banja Luka via Bijeljina and

9244
D3667 (Transcript of Vojislav Šešelj's press conference, 26 March–16 April 1992), pp. 3, 8, 11; See also P6393 (Video clip of interview with Vojislav
Šešelj, with transcript).
9245
D3667 (Transcript of Vojislav Šešelj's press conference, 26 March–16 April 1992), p. 27 (stating that ―Serbian Herzegovina with a border on Neretva,
Romanija to the Serbs, Ozren to the Serbs, Podrinje to the Serbs, Semberija to the Serbs, Bosnian Krajina to the Serbs. The Central Bosnia to the Muslims.
The Western Herzegovina to the Croats. That is the best solution‖). See also D3668 (Interview with Vojislav Šešelj and Nikola Poplašen, September 1992),
p. 1; Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39585–39586 (10 June 2013).
9246
D3668 (Interview with Vojislav Šešelj and Nikola Poplašen, September 1992), p. 7.
9247
D3668 (Interview with Vojislav Šešelj and Nikola Poplašen, September 1992), p. 7.
9248
P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May 2010), paras. 78–79; Pyers Tucker, T. 23217 (17 January 2012).
9249
D3696 (Minutes of RS Government session, 7 November 1992), pp. 1, 3.
9250
D115 (Transcript of 25th session of RS Assembly, 19–20 January 1993), p. 7.
 670

Brĉko.9251 (SO WHAT? #How this could be a crime?# Before the war this was not a Serb
claim, but since the war broke out, it appeared to be a necessity, and it was possible, since
there was a continuity of the Serb territories in Posavina!) For territories still under dispute,
Buha noted the President‘s request for a resolution by referendum.9252 (Could it be more
peaceful?) The importance of certain municipalities to the political objectives of the Bosnian
Serbs was underscored by statements in the Bosnian Serb Assembly in January 1993 to the effect
that there could be no Serbian state or prospects for the Serbian people ―without Podrinje […]
from Foĉa to Bijeljina‖.9253 (ALL THOSE #PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENTS ARE FREE
FROM ANY BLAME#, AND THE SPEAKERS CAN NOT BE SUED FOR ANYTHING
SAID IN THE PARLIAMENT. This was a discuccion on the Vance-Owen peace plan, and
let us see what the speaker really said: D00115, p. 42

(#What does it have to do with this President#? A #free parliamentary discussion#, for which
no MP could be indicted according to the domestic laws. And it was discussed to be achieved
on the Conference, not on a battlefield!) A deputy from Prijedor spoke against the proposal of
sharing the municipality of Prijedor and stated that they had ―conquered, actually restored only the
Serb territory that they took away from us back in 1941‖.9254 (What does it mean, since it was
only one opinion? What a connection of it is with the statement by the President? An MP
was entitled to say whatever he found true, and this this was true: only fifty years before this
moment the Serbs in Prijedor had been subjected to a genocide! Did the Chamber consider
that there was no a genocide over the Serb people in BiH in WWII? A member of the
Assembly was also criticising the President for a map that had been proposed, but the
Chamber charge the President even for an opinion of his political oponents at this session,
P00921, p. 42

This sentiment reflected the statements by the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership
regarding the historical crimes committed against the Serb people and their historical claim to the
land which they viewed as belonging to them. (No matter this “sentiment” existed, the
President was in favour of the formation of the Muslim municipality in Prijedor. But, if the
President is OK in some aspects, somebody of the Serbs wasn’t, and therefore the President

9251
See para. 362.
9252
Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4245 (opining that holding a referendum would benefit Bosnian Serbs in territories from
which non-Serbs had been removed).
9253
D115 (Transcript of 25th session of RS Assembly, 19–20 January 1993), p. 42.
9254
P921 (Transcript of 24th session of RS Assembly, 8 January 1993), pp. 31–32.
 671

is responsible. To tell the truth, #this is not even decent to deny the Serb horrible victims in
WWII#, as it wouldn’t)

2801. Following the ICFY, the Vance-Owen Plan was formally introduced on 2 January 1993
and provided for constitutional and military arrangements in BiH and a map of the provincial
structure.9255 Izetbegović objected to the map on the basis that regions from which the population
had been removed could not come under the control of those who removed them.9256 The
President noted that certain territories were still under dispute and when the map was discussed, he
asked for a larger Bosnian Serb territory and proposed his own boundaries.9257 (So what? Was it
forbidden for the Serbs to negotiate? It is rather #EXCULPATORY#!)

2802. In April 1993, the President also spoke about the importance of certain Serb areas in the
context of international negotiations pertaining to maps of BiH.9258 In the context of discussing
whether or not to accept the Vance-Owen Plan, BrĊanin at the Bosnian Serb Assembly stated
―[e]verything we have liberated is Serbian land. No one will be able to convince the people of
Prijedor, Sanski Most […] and all the places under threat all the way to Foĉa that we have passed a
just decision‖.9259 The President stressed for example that they could not give up on Sanski Most
because it was in the middle of their territory.9260 The President also spoke about Brĉko being
their ―mutual concern‖ and that they would ―finish with Brĉko the way it should be […] [a]nd if
there is war we will be strong and repel them 50 kilometres to the south‖.9261 (#Skipped
sentence#! All of this was a parliamentary quarrel of the President with some local-patriots,
a #pure political speeches and there was nothing criminal# in it. Let us see what the
President said, P01379, p. 81.# “If there is a peace there will be no probles”# said the
President, and this sentence is skipped by the Chamber.#!!! And if there is a war, naturaly
the sides would fight. What is wrong with it?)

The Chamber recalls that on 2 May 1993, the Accused signed the Vance-Owen Plan in Athens, but
this was subject to ratification by the Bosnian Serb Assembly, which ultimately rejected the
plan.9262 (What is criminal in all of it? The Muslim side decided to have a military outcome of
the war, and it was impossible tu neglect a complet status quo. This was a war, and it seems
the Chamber was lecturing the Serbs morally and politically, but this doesn’t have anything
to do wih the anyone’s crimes!)

2803. At a meeting on 28 May 1993 between members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, including
the President, and the leadership of the FRY, disagreements were voiced among the participants as
to whether to continue fighting, or whether to negotiate a path towards peace.9263 During this
meeting, the Accused stated that there was ―no other way but to fight‖.9264 (So what? The Serbs
had been offered a bad plan, particularly pertaining to the maps, and the Assembly rejected
it. The international community didn’t want to make a fair proposal. Although it often
looked as a dictate, it was a negotiation, and the Serb side was not satisfied with the proposed

9255
See paras. 359–360.
9256
See para. 363.
9257
See para. 363. For more detail on the course of the negotiations the Chamber refers to Section II.E: International peace negotiations.
9258
P1367 (Transcript of 26th session of RS Assembly, 2 April 1993), p. 8.
9259
P1371 (Transcript of 30th session of RS Assembly, 5–6 May 1993), p. 93.
9260
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 80.
9261
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 80.
9262
See International Peace Negotiations Section, para. 61.
9263
P1483 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), pp. 164–180.
9264
P1483 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), p. 175.
 672

solution, although the President initialled the plan, both the Assembly and population
through a referendum rejected it! WHAT IS UNLAWFUL IN THIS? #Not of any concern of
this court#!)

2804. At the 34th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly in August 1993, the Accused cautioned
against the view that they had given up on their far-reaching goals with respect to the union of
Serb states and explained that ―[i]t is a phase we have to finish‖.9265 (The Chamber is picking a
#solitary sentences from a long arguing between the President and the deputies,# who were
very free to oppose and deny many presidential opinions. Look at this sentence of the MP D.
Djuric:

And
the President had to quarrel about every single village whether it will be included in the RS
or not. Within those discussions the President had to give a wide explanations of the historic
prospectivness. But, the Chamber is, just as the Prosecutor, doing a #patchwork of some
words and sentences,# while trying to convict a president of a country in making. Where are
those documents, laws, orders of the President, which brought about any crime? This is
ridiculous. Since the crime against the peace is not the subject of this Tribunal, all what is
brought against this President so far is vain. How possibly a #political arguing could be
taken for granted, particularly when it is an academic or historic reminiscence#?) When the
Accused refused to accept the Vance-Owen Plan, he claimed that the old BiH ceased to exist and
that there was now a state with three constituent peoples.9266 Given the Acused‘s refusal, Owen
stated ―I weep for your country. The path you are heading on is bitterness, hatred and death‖.9267
(Until that time the Serbs already had a year and a half of misery prepared to them by the
European Community and the rest of the West, and this is a firm conviction of the entire
Serb nation! And what kind of evidence against the President could be some meditation of
the author of the plan that didn’t succeed? This is going to be remembered as a unique
reasoning in the international jurisprudence. #Lord Owen’s concern was noble, but has no
relevance for this case#! The mediators would be even more noble if discouraged Mr.
Izetbegovic to wage a war, and offered the respect of laws and Constitution!# Or, at least, if
the mediators offered more balanced and fair solution!)

2805. At this same session, the Accused stated that while he did not think there would be a broader
war in Europe, if there was one ―we shall be stronger‖ and that they would have a corridor again
on the map of BiH.9268 The Accused explained that ―[i]f we want it by force, we could have taken
some more, we can still do it‖.9269 (#Crippled sentences#! So what? The President said it
conditionally, because the Muslim side kept refusing any agreement. Let us see what the
President said: P01379, p.62:

This is what the President said in a discussion on the territorial concessions that the Serbs
9265
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 93.
9266
P791 (Eighth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 76–77.
9267
P791 (Eighth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 76–77. See also P792 (Ninth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 33–
34, 50.
9268
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 62.
9269
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 63.
 673

had been giving for the sake of peace, see p. 63:

He went on to state that they were militarily ready and would not withdraw from anywhere until
they had firm guarantees about the resolution of the conflict.9270 (#Logical, rational legal#!
Which army in the world would withdraw before a peace is guaranteed?) He stated that
while they did not want the war to continue and would be willing to lessen their territory, he
wanted the land they retained to remain theirs ―for all […] time‖.9271 (#See above, what is
skipped.#) The Accused also suggested that the Serbs would vanish if they were weakened, but
they would be given a state if they were seen as strong militarily, economically, and politically.9272
(Now, let us see what this Chamber is doing. The President was defending the Owen-
Stoltenberg peace plan, advocating against the selfishness and greed for the territories. He
did it mixing his considerations with the strategic projections of the near future, as a
president has to do. Here is the “incriminated" part of speech, P1379, p. 63:

This is #the most illustrative example of the abuse of words, shifted out of context#. In this
speech the President is persuading the deputies in the Assembly to accept the Owen-
Stoltenberg Peace Plan, and in response to the “panic and paranoia that doesn’t allow us to
see the situation correctly” he is explaining that the Serbs should accept the map, because
they are not as weak as they assume, and because there will not be wars in Europe… Instead
of being commended for his efforts, the President is President!)

9270
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 63.
9271
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 63.
9272
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 240.
 674

2806. Koljević at the 34th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly stated his view that they had
entered ―this fight‖ not with the aim of winning the most territory but with the aim of the ―spiritual and
moral revitalisation of Serbhood‖.9273 (#EXCULPATORY#! There could be no more justifiable
reason to resist the violence over the people! Koljevic was fighting against the greed for territories
too, and said that for us it is more important to be free and to revitalize our culture which
suffered under the Communists, than to have more territories.) At the same Bosnian Serb
Assembly session, Mladić stated that if the negotiations and agreement failed, they would ―have to find
the means and organise ourselves for the continuation of the even bloodier war‖.9274 (So what? If the
army commanders are not decisive, they are not commanders! #How this statement could be a
crime of the President#? Is it a position of the Chamber that the Serbs would be right and not
guilty only if they surrendered?) Another deputy spoke and recognised that they held 13
municipalities including Prijedor, Sanski Most, Kljuĉ, Zvornik, Vlasenica, Rogatica, Višegrad, Foĉa and
part of Brĉko even though they ―did not belong to Serbs, according to indicators of relative or absolute
majority‖.9275 The Chamber recalls its finding that the control of municipalities, including Bijeljina and
Vlasenica,9276 was geographically important with respect to the Strategic Goals of the Bosnian Serb
leadership. (This is #another distortion. All of this political quarrelling in the Assemby# was within
the acceptance of the Owen-Stoltemnebr Peace Plan (OSPP) and these arguments were pure
political, aimed to get the Assembly consent for this plan. Before the war these municipalities with
a balanced participation of the ethnic communities were proposed by the Serb side to be
transformed into the two ethnic municipalities. Even at the first year of the war the Serb side kept
offering this option. But after the war made a “new realities” on the terrain, there had to be some
concessions. The quoted sentence pertained to the municipalities allocated by the Conference to
the Serbs, although not majority, as a response to the objection why some of the 100% Serbian
municipalities were allocated to the Muslims-Croats. Let us se the entire discussion of an expert,
not an MP, quoted here: P1379:

And
then the Prime Minister Lukic, who was an expert in geography, took the flor as an expert:

9273
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), pp. 44, 46.
9274
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), pp. 66–67
9275
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), pp. 105–106.
9276
See paras. 600, 1099.
 675

So, Mr. Lukic objected to the Skoko’s analysis and rectified him. But# all of it was with the aim of
persuading the Assambly that the mediators weren’t the anti-Serbs, and that we should accept the
peace plan!#) All the discussion was of a political nature! Although the crime against peace is not
the subject of this Tribunal, the Chamber is making a “salade” of sentences of a different people
in a different occasions, officials and non-officials, joking, alluding, a folklore sayings, poems,
idioms, and whatever, in order to allocate it to the President and to prove his intentions. So many
official documents didn’t have any attention of the Chamber in comparison to this “salade” of
words!)

2807. The municipality of Brĉko was an example of where the Accused and the Bosnian Serbs
continued to emphasise their territorial and strategic interests. Brĉko was considered of strategic
importance by the Bosnian Serb leadership as it was viewed as necessary for the formation of a
corridor in the Posavina region through to Bosanska Krajina; this was in accordance with the
second Strategic Goal.9277 Given the strategic importance of Brĉko, despite the Bosnian Serbs
constituting a minority, the Bosnian Serb leadership insisted that it would become a province of
RS.9278 The President also spoke about negotiations relating to Brĉko and the importance of
protecting Serb interests.9279 A representative from Brĉko acknowledged that it had never been a
Serb town, but that even before the war there had been ―strictly defined Serb areas within the
town, separated from the areas in which the other two peoples lived‖ and by agreement this area
had been defined.9280 This representative spoke about the possibility of having to return ―Muslim
territories that we have liberated‖ but emphasised which areas of Brĉko should be retained.9281
(Exactly: there was the Serb varos (town in Hungarian) as a very core of the city. And the
Serbs were ready to have the solution called “bridge-viaduct” so that the city and
municipality be organised that every community governs it’s own part of the municipality.
And it had been accepted and built in the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace plan (OSPP) as a fair and
sustainable solution. The Muslims had been given the Muslim parts of the town, the port on
the Sara River, and a viaduct access to it over the Serb parts of the city. But, why the
Chamber considers so many normal and legal political or military matters as if it was a
crime?)

9277
P2888 (Brĉko‘s War Presidency Summary of events in Brĉko Municipality), pp. 1–2; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
4244, 4258, 4265–4266, 4276. 4306; Herbert Okun, T. 1481–1482 (22 April 2010); P3023 (Witness statement of ÐorĊe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras.
66, 229–231; ÐorĊe Ristanić, T. 16763, 16768–16769, 16819 (18 July 2011). While the Chamber notes that the only crimes charged in Indictment with
respect to Brĉko are limited to the Luka camp, it has had regard to this evidence as supporting the pattern of what occurred in the Municipalities and how
this corresponded with the strategic interests of the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership.
9278
Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4278; P2888 (Brĉko‘s War Presidency Summary of events in Brĉko Municipality), p. 2.
9279
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 13.
9280
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), pp. 37–38.
9281
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 37.
 676

2808. At a meeting held in August 1994 between the President, Krajišnik, and Milan Martić,
Krajišnik stated: ―Everyone is telling us not to give up Brĉko‖.9282 The President stressed that the
corridor being offered to them through Brĉko was too narrow and could not be defended.9283 In a
meeting with UNPROFOR on 19 August 1994, the President expressed his view that if an
―arrangement‖ was reached for Brĉko similar to the plan for Sarajevo, it should ―not prevent the
Serbs from transiting the area with their armaments‖ and that if the Bosnian Serbs kept
―sovereignty in Brĉko‖ they would seriously consider the proposal of not attacking Tuzla.9284
(#Again, “bla-bla”#. This is of #no relevance# for any crime commited in BiH, except the
crime against peace! The Serbs had their legitimate interests, and had been ready for
compromises for the sake of peace, but the peace was an issue that nobody except the Serbs
had been interested in!).

2809. At a Bosnian Serb Assembly session on 11 May 1994, the President stated: ―We have
never been [a] majority in Brĉko, but we were always the third, but we have to solve that with a
combination, we cannot call upon one principle, that is ethnic and historical. […]This is not [an]
important town for the Muslims, but it is important to us‖.9285 In meeting with Akashi in May
1994 the President warned of an ABiH offensive on Brĉko and that they would not agree to
withdraw Bosnian Serb troops to make Brĉko a safe area because it was historically a Serb area
and it had been under Bosnian Serb control since the beginning of the war.9286 (Another proof
that the foreign judges couldn’t understand too many things. In BiH there was a #permanent
“Gerry-manderism”, i.e. merging the Serb settlements with the Muslim, in order to avoid
any Serb majority municipality#. In the very core of Brcko there was and stil is a “Srpska
varos” an old Serbian downtown. Had it be normal situation as in any other European
country, there would be a Serb municipality. Another matter is a military outcome of the
crisis, which was a Muslim choice. In that case, everything is negotiable, because the current
situation must be taken into account!)

2810. When the President visited Foĉa to open a medical school, he gave a speech in which he
said that he was ―satisfied and happy that Foĉa has been preserved‖ and it was important for the
citizens to know that the Bosnian Muslims had given up on Foĉa in negotiations.9287 (Let us first
see what the President really said in Foca, P6206:

[
…..]

9282
P2563 (Minutes of meeting between Milan Martić and Radovan Karadţić, 20 August 1994), pp. 1, 10.
9283
Patrick Treanor, T. 14056–14057 (1 June 2011); P2563 (Minutes of meeting between Milan Martić and Radovan Karadţić, 20 August 1994), p. 5.
9284
D704 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadţić, 19 August 1994), para. 9.
9285
P1390 (Transcript of 40th session of RS Assembly, 10–11 May 1994), p. 40.
9286
D3499 (UNPROFOR report, 4 May 1994), e-court pp. 7, 11. See also: P5422 (UNPROFOR report, 8 May 1994), p. 7.
9287
P6205 (Excerpts of radio broadcast of Radovan Karadţić's visit to Foĉa medical centre, with transcript), pp. 1–2. See Veljko Marić, T. 35595–33596
(19 March 2013).
 677

What the President said during this visit to Foca after 16 months of the war for the first
time, was a greetinigs for preserving Foca and civilians. He also said that the Muslims “gave
up on Foca in these negotiations (…) but it is important for the citizens of Foca to know that
the Muslim republic has given up on Foca”. Therefore, that #concerned only with the
political solution, a negotiations as which constituent republic Foca will belong to, and had
nothing to do with the Muslim citizens rights to live in Foca#!!

Foca, the town itself had the Serb majority. There was envisage to have the two municipalities,
the Serb and Muslim, both communities would have a part in the urban core, and the
belonging hinterland. Since the Muslims abandoned already reached agreement, the
outcome was to be military. In such a case, Foca belonged to the Serbs, but a large portion of
it was kept by the Muslims, and even now it is a Muslim municipality of Foca, as in many
municipalities, like Srolac (the town is Muslim-Croat, Borkovici is Serb) Foca, Zvornik, Pale,
several Sarajevo municipalities, Doboj, Kljuc – Ribnik (Serbian) Skender Vakuf (Dobratic
Croatian) Odzak (Vukosavlje) etc. In 1994, Krajišnik attended a celebration in Foĉa with other
members of the Bosnian Serb leadership and delivered a speech in which he addressed the people
of Srbinje, which was the new Serb name of Foĉa.9288 In this speech Krajišnik said:

Today you are not as you were before. Now I see a true Serbian town. And you proudly bear
your Serbian name. You are the example to every Serb. All that was coming from this town
you‘ve managed to eliminate you prevented it from happening. […] Izetbegović said that this town
would be another Mecca. But you did not let them. And for that, in the name of all Serbs, I thank
you.9289 (#Words of others, jokes, sayings#! Is it really signifficant, every joke? Anyway, so
what, the city of Foca itself was the Serbian majority, and just in the eve of the war, the
Serbs had been so humiliated and fired from Focatrans. The Muslims had been offered to
make their own municipality of Foca, with a urban core for the Sewrb and Muslim
municipality, and the rural areas to administratively belong to the respective municipalities.
Since the Muslims reneged on the agreements and have chosen a war outcome, the Serbs
were entitled to demand the Serb parts of municipality to belong to their republic within
Bosnia. It is not cleare what the crimes are this Tribunal after, a Serb political rights and a
political struggle, or a crimes that weren’t within the military necessity, and had been
commited wanton, just to damage the non-Serb population? Such a kind of courts, that
prevent a presentation of the causes and consequences, a conduct of all sides involved – can
never establish the truth and secure the law and justice!)

9288
P6204 (Excerpt of video clip of Momĉilo Krajišnik's speech in Foĉa, with transcript). See Veljko Marić, T. 35590–33591 (19 March 2013).
9289
P6204 (Excerpt of video clip of Momĉilo Krajišnik's speech in Foĉa, with transcript). See also Adjudicated Fact 2411.
 678

2811. The Accused also noted that in Foĉa the Bosnian Muslims had a plan to ―build a big
Islamic centre‖ and that Foĉa was extremely important to the Bosnian Muslims but ―it will never
be theirs again‖.9290 (Foca was planned to become a very aggressive Islamic Center for the
entire Europe, against the consent of the Serbs. It had nothing with a religious needs of the
population, it was aimed to be a springboard of the fundamentalistic Islam to influence the
whole Europe, both politicaly, and in recruiting the so called “white Al-Qaeda” which would
be easier to enter Europe aand act there! This must not be done without a consent of the
Serbs! Or the UN Tribunal considered that it should be done?)

2812. In 1993 and 1994, commemorations were held to celebrate the anniversary of the
―liberation‖ of Zvornik which were attended amongst others by the President, Koljević, and
Arkan.9291 The President in an interview also said that the Bosnian Serbs would ―never leave
Zvornik again, and the state of facts established by this war, by this one year of the war, will not
be reconciliated without large crimes‖.9292 The Accused‘s position was that Zvornik could not be
given to the Bosnian Muslims because that would mean that the Serbs could not return and would
be refugees.9293 (It is an incorrect interpretation: #not that Zvornik wouldn’t be given to the
Muslims, but it will not be in the Muslim republic#, because the Muslims wanted the war,
there were a lot of victims, and the Muslims kept even more than a half of municipality, but
since they wanted the war, and lost urban part of Zvornik, it had to be in the Serb republic!)

2813. The Accused stated that during the war he had placed the SDS on hold but that in the first
45 days of the conflict, the SDS had been instrumental in ―practically defin[ing] the borders‖.9294
(As of 12 May 92 the President was no any longer a Party leader, since the SDS was on hold,
until February 93. However, the state officials acted not as a party officials, #but the state
officials#. The SDS officials and experts gave a technical service to the negotiating team by
providing it with the accurate data about population and settled places, which was a task
given by the mediators in the Conference! But anyway, what does it mean? Is the Chamber
after the SDS? It could have not been on hold, no any other party was on hold. Why the SDS
wouldn’t be active? The putting SDS on hold was a good will of the Party towards the first
prime minister Djeric, to help him to work independently. #The Chamber erred whenever
considered the SDS and other political and state organs as a criminal organisation. This is
wrong, and this is unacceptable!#) In an interview in July 1995 the President stressed that
everyone should accept the reality that BiH was completely Serbian. He went on to state:

We now possess 64% of the land and control 70% of the territory of that false State Bosnia,
which does not exist, and we are not going to accept anything less than 50% We are not going
to give up on our own State, the ultimate objective for any nation; it is like our home. And we
are not going to end up homeless in a Bosnia dominated by Muslims.9295 So what? This was a
political statement, in accordance with the 45 months of war. #Who authorised the
Chamber to criminalise everything that is Serbian#. During the trial, the Chamber used
to claim as if the Serbs weren’t indicted. However, we see that the entire Serbian people is
indicted. Still the President said that the Serb side was ready to reduce the territory to
50%!#)

9290
P1385 (Transcript of 37th Session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), p. 110.
9291
KW317, T. 39352–39353 (6 June 2013), 39353–39354 (6 June 2013) (private session), T. 39355–39356, (6 June 2013); P6371 (Photographs re celebration
of anniversary of Zvornik liberation); P5167 (Report of Zvornik Brigade, 10 April 1993), p. 2. The Chamber notes that the Accused and Koljević are only
reported to have attended the first anniversary in April 1993. The Chamber also received evidence that Arkan and the Accused both attended a celebration
in Zvornik in 1995. Ĉedomir Zelenović, T. 40323–40326 (24 June 2013), T. 40338–40339 (25 June 2013); P6412 (Photograph of Radovan Karadţić);
P6413 (Photograph of Ţeljko Raţnatović aka Arkan).
9292
P5591 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić on SRT Talk Show).
9293
Momĉilo Krajišnik, T. 43782 (19 November 2013).
9294
P5595 (Excerpt of video footage of Radovan Karadţić‘s speech, with transcript), p. 1.
9295
P2564 (Radovan Karadţić‘s interview in El Pais, 16 July 1995), p. 3.
 679

2814. In the same interview, the President stated that they were ready to end the war on the
condition that the Bosnian Serbs‘ right to self-determination was recognised and observed that if
―we are fighting and dying for certain places, we cannot hand them over afterwards. Nobody can
expect us to guarantee the Muslims that they are always going to keep the same percentage of
territory […]. If they want a military solution, they will get to keep what they have now, at most.
But if they want a political solution, we are ready to be flexible‖.9296 The President also said that
they would ―never accept giving up a single Serbian place, especially if it was taken by force‖.9297
(This is wrong, and the #President never said something like that#! There was no the Serbian
places that had been taken by a Serb force. But, let us see what the President said, P05063, p.

(This is rather #EXCULPATORY#! Now, it is obvious that the President said that no matter
how long the war would last, it would all be in vain, because if the Muslims take some
Serbian place by force, the Serbs wouldn’t recognise it. In no way it could mean that the
Serbs took some of their settled places by force, and wouldn’t return it. To whom they would
return their own territory? If it was their, why would they have taken it by force?

2815. In August 1995, Mladić issued a notice to the Main Staff of the VRS which, inter alia,
praised the VRS and observed that it had thwarted ―a planned and prepared genocide of the
Serbian people, protecting the greater part of Serbian territories, and achieving victory after
victory in the liberation of occupied historically and ethnically Serbian areas‖.9298 (So what? Why
this court measures every Serb word, and contests every Serb right on political and
democratic life? From the content of this greetings it is visible that Gen. Mladic praised the
Army for protecting the people and territory, which rexlected exactly what was the task of
this Army – to protect!)

2816. At a Bosnian Serb Assembly session in August 1995, the President said: : (He was selling
the Dayton plan out to the MP-s, justifyin why some ethnically dominant Serb areas had
been envisaged to belong to the Muslim-Croat Federation.)

To tell the truth, there are towns that we‘ve grabbed for ourselves, and there were only 30% of us. I
can name as many of those as you want, but we cannot give up the towns where we made up 70%.
Don‘t let this get around, but remember how many of us were in Bratunac, how many in

9296
P2564 (Radovan Karadţić‘s interview in El Pais, 16 July 1995), p. 2.
9297
P5063 (Video footage depicting interview of Radovan Karadţić on ―Ask the President‖, undated, with transcript), p. 7.
9298
P2566 (Ratko Mladić notice, 5 August 1995), p. 1.
 680

Srebrenica, how many in Višegrad, how many in Rogatica, how many in Vlasenica, in Zvornik,
etc. Due to strategic importance they had to become ours, and no one is practically questioning it
any more.9299 (A reasonable chamber would see what was the context and reason to say that.
It was within persuading the parliamentaries to accept the peace plan, in spite of the fact
that many towns and cities with the clear Serb majority were given to the Muslim-Croat
Federation, in spite of the fact that the Serbs defended all of them. Those municipalities
were: Drvar, 99% Serbian, Bosansko Grahovo 95% Serbian, Glamoc 89% Serbian, Sanski
Most, balanced proportion, Bosanski Petrovac 77% Serbian, Ilijas, only Serb part, 90%
Serbian, Hadzici, only Serb part 90% Serbian, Vogosca, the Serb half, 90% Serbian,
Rajlovac 90% Serbian, Ilidza, the Serb half, 90% Serbian, not to mention the Muslim
settlements in many other municipalities, like Pale, Foca, Zvornik, Novo Sarajevo, Novi
Grad in Sarajevo, a half of Doboj, a half of Odzak, and so on. Defending the peace plan, the
President numbered several towns where the Serbs weren’t majority, but got those
municipalities, or at least the Serb parts of it. #How this political argumentation in the
favour, and for the sake of peace may be used against this President#? Let us see what was
the context of this discussion: P988, p.4

An MP Dragan Djuric criticised the President, alike many others, since it was an
introduction to the final peace conference in Dayton. See further: now, on p.26 the President
informed the Assembly on the importance of the Serb part of Sarajevo:

and on p.67 the President, explaining a painful negoiatione, said

9299
P988 (Transcript of 53rd session of RS Assembly, 28 August 1995), pp. 68–69.
 681

The words #“less is better” pertained to the territorial issues, and the President pleaded for a
humbleness it the territorial claims.# In that context the President numbered out some
municipalities that the Muslim have lost at the negotiating table, as the Serbs had to, see
p.68:

However, the Serb side was even more modest than the President pleaded: the Serbs
defenden several urban areas in the City of Sarajevo, i.e. municipalities: Ilidza (a Serb part)
Blazuj, Hadzici (a Serbian part) Grbavica, Rajlovac, Nedzarici, Grbavica and Jagomir as a
parts of the municipality Centar, Vogosca (a Serb part) Ilijas and Trnovo, a Muslim part,
but had lost all of it around the negotiating table! Not to repeat Glamoc, B. Grahovo,
Petrovac, Drvar, Serb part of B. Krupa and Sanski Most in the western part of the RS.)

a. Creation of a Bosnian Serb state

2817. In December 1991, the President spoke about how in some municipalities it was ―really
necessary to create separate municipalities‖ and to have dual municipal authorities.9300 (#Wrong
inference. There are many cities with more than one municipality#. Who said there would
be a “dual municipal authorities”? is such a situation in Brussels, or in Sarajevo with 10
municipalities? This is a #mean forgery#! The city of Sarajevo had ten municipalities,
although many of them had been tailored (Gerry-manderism) so to prevent it to be a Serb
majority. It was not about any “dual municipal authorities” but a separate municipalities,
with a unique authorities. It was completely legitimate and legal, and in accordance with the
Constitution and laws. That much even a foreign chamber should have known about the
domestic legal system. Further, let us see what the President really said: D84, p. 13

9300
D84 (Shorthand Record of 3rd session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 December 1991), p. 13.
 682

So, this was a matter of the human and civil rights, the ethnic, economic and cultural rights,
and not about duality in power. Let us see further, p. 13:

Look at that!!!, pp 13-14,

What is wrong with that??? It was a matter of the protection of the very basic rights, and all
of it through the negotiations and agreements within the framework of the Conference, and
without a war. Is the Chamber of an opinion that the Serbs are to be deprived of the rights
that are guaranteed to every community by the International Covenants on Human Rights?.

2818. The Chamber recalls that on 11 January 1992, the first session of the Council of Ministers
was attended by Bosnian Serb leaders including the Accused, Krajišnik and Plavšić.9301 At this
meeting one of the identified priorities with respect to the declaration on the promulgation of the
SerBiH was ―the defining of ethnic territory, establishment of government organs in the territory
and the economic disempowerment of the current authorities in the [SRBiH]‖.9302 On
17 January 1992, the Council of Ministers discussed the need to adopt the Constitution of the
Republic as soon as possible and to consolidate and organise the territory of the regions, including
through the formation of new municipalities.9303 (#What is illegal in this? The Serb Republic in
BiH had been proclaimed on 9 January, the international mediators accepted it and
organised the Conference, and the next steps were to organize a responsible authorities. #A
legal and obligatory matter.#)

2819. In February 1992, the Accused spoke about their hope that nearly 90% of the Serb
population would be in their republic in BiH and that this would be a ―sovereign area of the
Serbian people‖.9304 (#Due to the Conference results#! This was after the Conference
established that an ethnic reorganisation of BiH was possible and acceptable. As far as it is
concerned with the sovereignty, the Serb people was sovereign on the entire territory of BiH
as one of the three sovereign peoples, but in a new organisation, and in a new situation of
BiH as an independent state, with a new (Islamic) regime, the Serbs wanted to be sovereign
only on their territories. There was no any idea that the Conference wouldn’t succeed, and
that there will be a war. Nothing illegal in it. A fluid sovereignty of the Serbian people, an
“ideal” participation in the assets called BiH, the Serbs wanted to convert into a “real” part.
All legal and legitimate. At a meeting of the SDS Deputies‘ Club in February 1992, the
Accused stated
9301
See para. 104.
9302
P1082 (Minutes of 1st meeting of Ministerial Council of SerBiH Assembly, 13 January 1992), pp. 2–3; P2536 (Patrick Treanor‘s expert report entitled ―The
Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992‖, 30 July 2002), para. 227.
9303
See para. 105; P3111 (Minutes of the 2nd meeting of the Ministerial Council of SerBiH Assembly, 17 January 1992), pp. 4–5.
9304
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 14.
 683

until two or three months ago we were hoping to be able to play the ‗Yugoslav card‘[…].
This is slipping out of our grasp. That‘s why we started on another track: a Serbian Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Our sovereign right, our army. We are preparing the constitutional
framework to be able to have immediately […] to have a national guard, to have our own
police force, to have a government, to turn the Yugoslav army into the army of the Serbian
Bosnia and Herzegovina.9305 (Let us first see #what was skipped
and replaced with the brackets# and three points […]:

Exactly this sentence #“and on the basis of the negotiations in Lisbon” is skipped#!!! Why
this sentence was not worthy to be in the quoted text? Because then the President words
couldn’t be interpreted as a criminal intent! Only this manipulation would be sufficient to
dismiss the entire Indictment in all and every democratic country! This
was a public consideration how the Serb community in BiH would respond to the illegal and
anticonstitutional moves of the Muslim-Croat coalition towards the independence. In such a
situation any nation, any people is entitled to express their view, and if neglected in an illegal
manner, they are entitled to self-organize. But let us see which crucial parts of the
President’s speech had been skipped, i. e. replaced with the brackets and full stops. The
entire para looks like this:

/#The
first skipped part of sentence is: “[t]o play Yugoslav card, and to say, the Yugoslav army,
Yugoslavia, legality, etc., underlined was skipped. Next that was skipped is: “[t]o have
immediately, and on the basis of negotiations in Lisbon…” what was the purpose and the
meaning of this “omission” in quoting the President? Does this paragraph look a bit
different? Is the brackets and three points a new legal instruments for avoiding the true
meanings? And all of it was explained before the war, when it was meant that there wouldn’t
be any war, and all what happened was a result of the International Conference on the
Yugoslavia – ICFY, and there fore couldn’t be used in any criminal case#!!!)

2820. At this meeting Koljević expressed his agreement with the Accused over the outcome of
the recently held peace negotiations and the proposed division of BiH into a confederation.9306
(Mr. Koljevic didn’t “propose division of BiH into a confederation” this was a subject of the
Conference!) Koljević stated ―our only chance is to draw borders, to tear them down. That‘s what
we have been doing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, what we have begun in order to be able to draw
the borders and to create our own, and then not to give up on our goal until the times are
better‖.9307 (How it was of the interest of this Chamber, in this case? It all described a
political fight before the war and without a war, and represented the Serb “red line” in
concessions for the sake of peace!) Krajišnik stated with respect to the creation of a unitary
Islamic BiH, ―that will not succeed. We are a force to be reckoned with. We will not agree to that

9305
P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 37.
9306
P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992). pp. 6, 8.
9307
P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992). p. 39.
 684

[…] there is nothing more important than Serbian freedom‖.9308 (Big deal! What is wrong with
this? Is it a communist political lecture? Why the Chamber is dealing with the issues that
were a part of the constitutional rights of the Serbian people in BiH, discussed at the
international conference? Should Krajisnik be right if he said that we will give up our
freedom, and support an establishment of the Islamic regime?)

2821. The President also spoke to other Bosnian Serb leaders about the chance to create ―our
independent state and our Army‖.9309 In this regard, the President also spoke about the preparation
of their constitution and laws which would create ―the basis to receive the Army on our
territory‖.9310 (#None of that was illegal#. The Conference on the future structure of BiH was
going on, with this agenda, and the President was obliged to inform the Serb official
instances about the course of the talks. 9 February 1992 was a time of the Conference, there
was no a war yet!)

2822. The President at Bosnian Serb Assembly sessions reported on the progress of international
negotiations with respect to the situation in BiH and his view on what conditions and
developments were unacceptable to Bosnian Serbs and what he viewed as attempts to prevent the
Serbs from creating a state and exercising their right to self-determination.9311 No crime! In
March 1992, the President complained about the manner in which Bosnian Muslim leaders were
conducting negotiations but stated that ―[f]ortunately we have not been relying on those talks but
have created preconditions for the security of the Serb people in their ethnic space within BiH […]
we have not passed the opportunity to complete all the actions necessary for the protection of Serb
people‖.9312 (So, the President was supposed to be #stupid and naïve and allow to the SDA to
cheat and indanger his Serb community#, or he will be charged and sentenced? Let us see
what had been said, P01353, p. 7:

If we remind ourselves what Ajanovic said a few weeks later about the reason why the
Muslims falsly accepted the Lisbon Agreement, to gain a time, than everything is clear: the
President was obliged not to trust and rely on the false promises of the SDA. See: D00303,
p. 3

9308
P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992). p. 44–45.
9309
P5754 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Dobrica Ćosić, 9 February 1992), p. 2.
9310
P5754 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Dobrica Ćosić, 9 February 1992), p. 8.
9311
D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), pp. 5–12, 16–19, 71–72; P1353 (Shorthand record of 10th session of SerBiH
Assembly, 11 March 1992), pp. 4–10; P921 (Transcript of 24th session of RS Assembly, 8 January 1993), pp. 5–16; D115 (Transcript of 25th session of RS
Assembly, 19–20 January 1993), p. 4; P1371 (Transcript of 30th session of RS Assembly, 5–6 May 1993), p. 10; D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH
Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), pp. 12, 56; D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 13. See also P5476 (Report of 1st
Krajina Corps, 1 October 1992). Other Bosnian Serb leaders including Koljević and Krajišnik gave similar updates on international negotiations. Did the
BS leaders violate any law by updating on international negotiations? P1105 (Transcript of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24
November 1992), pp. 110–112; P6164 (Excerpt from notes of enlarged session of Council for Coordinating Positions on State Policy, 9 January 1993), e-
court p. 9.
9312
P1353 (Shorthand record of 10th session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 March 1992), p. 7.
 685

The Chamber had this exhibit in the case file, and still it blames the President for being
cotious not be cheated!)

2823. In March 1992, the SDS Executive Board confirmed the objective of creating a Serb state
in BiH, with its own army and media.9313 Doyle testified that at the conferences he attended the
general understanding was that ―the overall objective of Serbs was to join physically the territories
that the Serbs controlled in Bosnia to the territory of Serbia to create a Greater Serbia‖.9314 (#“The
general understanding” was their own assumptions, of an incompetent witness#! , but it must
not be used against the President, as it wasn’t his “understanding”, nor it had been
pronounced. Had it been, it would be in their reports to their superiors! This kind of
merging the two states couldn’t be done without an agreement that would be accepted by
the three Bosnian sides and the Security Council of the UN!) Okun also testified that the goal
of the Bosnian Serb leadership was to create an ethnically Serb state in BiH.9315 The difficulty of
this objective of ethnic separation was that BiH was highly intermixed.9316 What #Mr. Okun
thought about it wasn’t relevant, since all those for whom he worked thought different#. Mr
Vance thought different, and it was not a decent to ask for the Okun’s opinion on that
subject. Also, the Chamber erred in reconsidering such a political question that had been
widely agreed and accepted by all the participants in the ICFY, even in 1991 in the Hague,
and the sub-conference on Bosnia. Those as Okun, Zepinic and others should tell what they
allegedly said when the SDA forced towards the independence of BiH, which was much more
“intermixed” than the future constituent units were to be. #Simply, the Chamber must not
charge the President with the political issues based on the legitimate basis and accepted by so
many participants#. Vitomir Ţepinić, for example, warned Plavšić that if they tried to separate
the ethnic communities ―there would be violence and thousands of innocent civilians would be
killed‖.9317 (Zepinic lied! Nobody was going to separate anybody unilaterally, but through the
negotiations. And Zepinic wouldn’t have any basis or opportunity to address Ms. Plavsic,
since she was his President, i.e. a member of the Presidency, and he was a deputy Munister!)

2824. Krajišnik in March 1992 wrote to Cutileiro and emphasised that the Bosnian Serbs were
opposed to the independence of BiH and the creation of a unitary state which could have
―catastrophic consequences‖ and he advocated the creation of ―three-national state entities‖.9318

9313
D1277 (Minutes of joint meetings of SDS's General and Executive Committees and Political Council, 11 March 1992), pp. 1–2.
9314
Colm Doyle, T. 2994 (28 May 2010).
9315
Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4352–4355, 4414–4415 (further testifying that there was no way to achieve this objective
and to separate the people except by forcible means). The Chamber erred in inferring that on the basis of this testimony. #Okun
wasn’t an expert witness,# and it was not about separating individuals, but the ethnically defined areas, as it was
envisaged by the EC and Amb. Cutilleiro. There are more than enough evidence that in every constituent unit there
would be a minorities, which meant that there was no envisaged any separation of people. Similarly, other witnesses testified
that (i) the SDS had ―a policy of ethnically cleansing the territories which they conquered and removing the non-Serb populations from most of those
territories‖; No witness could testify on this subject without any evidence. Their understanding of “a policy of ethnic
cleansing” is a mere gosipp and a reasonable chamber shouldn’t take it into account. (ii) the identical pattern in which the
Bosnian Muslim population was moved out of areas where the SDS was in power meant that it ―could not have happened spontaneously‖ and that it was a
planned, organised, and systematic operation in accordance with the policy of the SDS and that the local authorities were simply implementing the
instructions they had been given; This is not a serious inference, because there was no any model, there was a demand of the
scared population to be allowed to leave, and the allegation that there were some instructions given to the local
authorities is a baseless assertion. There must be something more in terms of evidence. M. Davidovic redefined his
answers after being confronted with the President’s orders, and every reasonable chamber would mention it, either to
discredit, or to accept it. Banbury and Kirudja were a shame of this court, and they could have expressed only their
believes, nothing else, at least on this subject. (iii) the forced expulsions could not have occurred without there being a policy or participation
by Bosnian Serb authorities. Milorad Davidović, T. 15536–15537 (28 June 2011); D1450 (Milorad Davidović‘s statement to Belgrade District Court, 26
December 2007), p. 21; Anthony Banbury, T. 13337–13338 (15 March 2011); P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010),
para. 79.
9316
Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4205.
9317
Vitomir Ţepinić, T. 33589–33590 (13 February 2013).
9318
D2970 (Letter from SerBiH Assembly to Jose Cutileiro, 11 March 1992), p. 1. See also D2969 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić, Nikola Koljević, and
Momĉilo Krajišnik to Jose Cutileiro, 2 March 1992), p. 1.
 686

Krajišnik also expressed their fear about becoming a national minority in a fundamentalistic
Muslim BiH.9319 (So what? #Why the Chamber deals with such a questions which were
legitimate political claims#? For what the President is accused, indicted? It was a legitimate
claim, either against the independence, or towards an internal transformation of such an
independent state. Is the Chamber of an opinion that the Serbs didn’t have any rights to pose
their political claims? Or that the Serbs weren’t the constituent people in BiH, with the right
to veto such a crucial decisions? It seems that the Chamber neglects all the constitutional and
legal premises of the political system in BiH and Yugoslavia, particularly if the Serbs
enjoyed these rights! Other ethnics were entitled even to a unilateral secessions and
violations of the constitutions and the Serb rights!)

2825. On 17 May 1992, the Accused, Krajišnik, and Mladić attended a meeting with the SAO
Romanija and heads of neighbouring municipalities in Sokolac where the political and security
situation was discussed and the President indicated that ―[w]e are looking for results from the
army […] [w]e want our people to be kept safe‖.9320 (This was a week after the Assembly
decided to form the Army. What is wrong with it? It was the main task, to protect the
people!) The Accused went on to recall that creating a separate Serb state and taking that state out
of BiH remained the priority and that they should continue with the transformation of the JNA. 9321
Krajišnik at this meeting indicated that the ―time is ripe for a demarcation of the areas between
Croats, Serbs, and Muslims because […] a common state with them is no longer possible, not
because we do not want that but because that is what they want. The Muslims leadership has
imposed the war on us even though the Serbs wanted a political solution of all problems‖.9322
(What is wrong with that?)

2826. Even in August 1992, Krajišnik spoke about Serbs wanting a unified state: ―We have our
plan, which we must carry out by political, military, and other means, depending on the
situation‖.9323 (So what?) why Mr. Krajisnik should not express his own opinion after five
months of the war, that was declared and waged against his community? That was a decision
of the Parliament and the entire community supported it in at least one elections and one
referendum? Would the Chamber be happier if the Serbs subjugated them to the Muslim
fundamentalist regime?)

2827. At a meeting of the 1st Krajina Corps in September 1992, attended by Mladić and Bogdan
Subotić, and the commanders and presidents of municipalities, it was also noted that the temporary
ceasefire ―cannot replace the aims of our struggle to create a new Serbian Republic‖.9324 (The new
Serbian Republic was already created in January 92, by the political means and in the
framework of the International Conference. Even Mr. Izetbegovic commited himself to an
obligation to facilitate a wide authonomy for the Serbs and Croats, it the Serbs accept the
cession from Yugoslavia. This is all in the documents of the ICFY in the Hague in 1991. Why
it is not of any importance to this Court of the United Nations? Would the UN and
international community back up the deceptions of the Muslim side, as described by Mr.
Ajanovic, a high Muslim official, when they reneged on the Lisbon Agreement? The
Republic of Srpska had been attacked in April 1992, three months after it was established,
and it was attacked by a military means, and had to be defended by a military means. What
is it that those sentences are serving for? What is it that the Chamber is hunting in a

9319
D2970 (Letter from SerBiH Assembly to Jose Cutileiro, 11 March 1992), p. 2.
9320
P1477 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 14 February–25 May 1992), pp. 349–351; P6254 (Article from TANJUG entitled ―Serb Leaders Promote Ethnic
Demarcation‖, 17 May 1992), p. 1.
9321
P6254 (Article from TANJUG entitled ―Serb Leaders Promote Ethnic Demarcation‖, 17 May 1992), p. 1; Milovan Bjelica, T. 36443–36447 (3 April 2013).
9322
P6254 (Article from Tanjug entitled ―Serb Leaders Promote Ethnic Demarcation‖, 17 May 1992), p. 2.
9323
P1357 (Transcript of 18th session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 August 1992), p. 19. See also P5476 (Report of 1 st Krajina Corps, 1 October 1992), pp. 3−4.
9324
D3702 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 14 September 1992), pp. 1–2.
 687

patchwork of the speeches of the Serbs, although they had all the international documents?)
At this meeting, a conclusion was reached to ―[e]liminate sectarian feelings towards other nations‖
based on certain conditions, including their contribution to the advancement of the Serbian
Republic.9325 (#EXCULPATORY#! that was in favour of the other nations, ethnic
communities, why it would be wrong#? And this is the best proof that there was envisaged
the existence of the ethnic minorities in the Republic of Srpska! Therefore, the key charge
about a #“permanent removal of non-Serbs is rebuted#!)

2828. In October 1992, the Accused outlined how before the international recognition of BiH
they were able to declare their republic ―a sovereign and independent state‖ and that he, along with
Buha, and Koljević had insisted in meetings with diplomats on a constituent entity for the Serbian
people.9326 (#Legal and legitimate#! This wasn’t something that the President introduced, it
was so throughout centuries. In the BiH Constitution it was so, and the Serbs never gave up
this right of their own! With such a #lack of knowledge of the domestic legal system#, this
Court couldn’t do better!) He expressed his view that the criteria for establishing provinces in
BiH were unacceptable and noted that Serbs would only be a temporary majority in one or two
provinces.9327 During this speech, the Accused also outlined his view on the position to be taken
during negotiations and that one of the provinces would be a Serbian state called Republika
Srpska.9328 (So what? For heaven’s sake, what this Chamber was searching for? Those are a
pure political questions, completely legitimate and legal! It was accepted by the international
mediators, the UN – EC representatives from the very beginning of the crisis. And this was a
known precondition for the independence of BiH, otherwise only the Muslims and Croats
could have seceded from Yugoslavia! How this can be a crime?#Agreed at ICFY#!).

2829. When the RS and RSK were unified on 31 October 1992, Bosnian Serb leaders including
Plavšić emphasised the unity of the Serbian people and their right to self-determination and
continued to make similar speeches emphasising this right.9329 (Again, nothing criminal in it, but
there is a wrong assertion, and therefore wrong inference! The two Republics never united
or unified, they only cooperated. Let us see what was this Declaration really:

So, the Declaration on cooperation, and about the unification there was only aspirations
declared. But, again, this is a pure political question, without any criminal doings or
influence on the criminal developments! It had been declared the wish of the two entites, so
that the mediators have it in their minds!) The declaration of unification (wrong quoting) also
decided that a co-ordinating committee would consist of the presidents of the republics, the
presidents of the assemblies of the republics and the prime ministers of the republics.9330

2830. In November 1992, Koljević stressed that ―we should finish everything that‘s necessary
militarily as soon as possible, because that‘s going to improve our political and diplomatic

9325
D3702 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 14 September 1992), p. 5. See also D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 292.
9326
P939 (Video footage of Radovan the Accused‘s speech at the 21st Session of RS Assembly, 30 October 1992, with transcript), p. 1.
9327
P939 (Video footage of Radovan the Accused‘s speech at the 21st Session of RS Assembly, 30 October 1992, with transcript), pp. 3, 6.
9328
P939 (Video footage of Radovan the Accused‘s speech at the 21st Session of RS Assembly, 30 October 1992, with transcript), p. 4.
9329
P1360 (Transcript from Joint session (21st session) of RS Assembly and Assembly of Serbian Krajina, 31 October 1992), p. 4; D115 (Transcript of 25th
session of RS Assembly, 19–20 January 1993), pp. 20–21. See P5541 (Prijedor Declaration on the Unification of the RSK and RS, 31 October 1992), pp. 1,
4.
9330
P5541 (Prijedor Declaration on the Unification of the RSK and RS, 31 October 1992), pp. 3–4.
 688

position‖ and that once fighting calmed down, the media scrutiny and pressure would reduce and
they would be able to postpone a political solution based on the territory they held.9331 (A horrible
crime, Koljevic appealed for ending the military phase of the crisis, and turning to the
negotiations. Is there #any sentence said by the Serbs, no matter officials or not, that is not
criminal one#?)

2831. In June 1993, the Accused spoke about recognition of the Bosnian Serb legitimate right to
self-determination, that BiH would certainly be divided into three parts, and that Bosnian Muslims
should be satisfied with the division because of the municipalities which they would obtain, but if
they continued with the war the Bosnian Muslims could lose everything because the Bosnian
Serbs would not allow themselves to be ―subjugated and dominated‖ by Muslims.9332 (#”The
Accused spoke about… various rights of the Serb people”# So what? Only in a case the
Serbs had been forbidden to have any rights and any political life, it would be a felony. Is it
an understanding of the Chamber? This is an insulting and humiliating approach to the
Serbs and their existence, while the “internationals” i.e. European Community and some in
the United Nations kept silent when the Muslim side violated all the constitutional and
human rights of the Serbs in Bosnia!)

2832. The Chamber recalls that, at a meeting with international negotiators on 11 January 1993,
Krajišnik stressed the Bosnian Serb objective of territorial continuity and named three conditions
from the Bosnian Serb Assembly: (i) BiH must be a ―composite state community‖; (ii) the Bosnian
Serbs must have relations with other ―states‖; and (iii) they must have territorial continuity.9333
Mladić told Okun and Owen that the Bosnian Serbs wanted ―peace with justice‖ for all three
peoples but that the Bosnian Muslims could not ―beat‖, ―exterminate‖, or ―cause [the Serbs] to
disappear‖.9334 (#EXCULPATORY#!) The following day, at a plenary meeting, the Accused
expressed his reservations about the ICFY‘s constitutional principles and stated he could not
accept them but that he would convey the ICFY‘s proposals to the Bosnian Serb Assembly.9335 (So
what? This was a #political negotiation, and Mr. Krajisnik, the President and other officials
had been authorised by the Assembly to negotiate, to pose the Serb standpoints and fight for
an acceptable solution. No need for a witnesses who were involved only partially and from
time to time, there are a genuine UN-EC documents from the Conference!)

2833. At a meeting with VRS commanders on 29 January 1994, the Accused stated that while
everyone was aware of the Bosnian Serb objectives, ―appropriate statements‖ should be issued to
hand trump cards to other parties; he instructed not to make ―war-mongering statements‖ but
instead to discuss peace.9336 (So what?) The Chamber recalls that in April 1994, UNPROFOR
representatives went to Pale to speak to the President, who declared that the right bank of the
Drina will be the Bosnian Serbs‘.9337 (So what? It was a very small part of the Gorazde
municipality. The Muslims literally expelled all the Serbs at the very beginning of the war,
and the local Serbs declared that they would accept not to live on the left bank of the Drina
River, which was the only urban area, provided they be allocated the suburb on the right

9331
P1105 (Transcript of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24 November 1992), p. 112.
9332
D3026 (Article from Yugoslav Daily Survey entitled ―Montenegrin President: Decisive Step towards Peace in Bosnia‖, 21 June 1993), p. 2.
9333
See para. 361; P789 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 43.
9334
P789 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 45.
9335
See para. 361; P789 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 48. According to Milovanović, in November 1992, the Accused issued a
public statement that BiH should be made of its three constituent states with the RS as a ―single whole‖ and rejected the Vance-Owen proposal for a
―centralised BiH with ten cantons‖. D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 12. (If the Chamber wanted the accurate
information, it didn’t need any Okun or Milovanovic, because there were the #official documents of the Conference#,
and the main mediator such as Ambassador Akashi, who would present the Serb position in the most accurate way!
But, this UN Court prefers the arbitrary impressions of the people who stepped by from time to time!#)
9336
P1485 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 9 January–21 March 1994), pp. 51, 78–79.
9337
See para. 393.
 689

bank of the River. What is wron with that? The Muslims wanted the entire BiH (sto posto
Bosnia, 100% of Bosnia) only for themselves. Was it correct?)

2834. The Chamber recalls that on 7 July 1994, the Contact Group unveiled a new peace plan
under which 51% of BiH would be administered by a newly formed Bosnian-Croat Federation and
that 49% be administered by the Bosnian Serbs.9338 On 19 July 1994, at the Bosnian Serb
Assembly, the Accused spoke about the Contact Group‘s proposed plan stating that the acceptance
of the plan would not be a guarantee for peace.9339 (So what?) The Bosnian Serbs rejected the
plan stating that the plan was unfair and their demands were not met and in a later referendum in
Bosnian Serb-held territory, 96% of voters rejected the plan.9340 (So what? The Chamber
erroneously concluded that the plad was rejected by the President, which was wrong. The
President conveyed all the plans to the Assembly accept it, or not. Not only the Assembly, but
the entire population in the referendum rejected it only because of the unfair and mean
maps?)

2835. The Accused met with Ronald Hatchett in 1994 to discuss a proposal to end the war and
asked Hatchett to bring back the proposal to the highest level that he could reach in the United
States of America.9341 The Accused proposed that: (i) BiH would remain a single country; (ii) it
would be comprised of two autonomous republics; (iii) each republic would have its own
constitution and government; and (iv) he would be willing to accept a division of BiH which
would give Bosnian Serbs 49% of the territory so long as it was contiguous and that there would
be some trade of areas held by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs.9342 (So what? At least
#EXCULPATORY#! This was a proto-type of the Dayton Agreement that was negotiated
and concluded a year and a half later. Still, the Serbs sacrificed many areas and interests,
but the President did fight in the Assembly that the Dayton Agreement be accepted! The
President and Richard Holbrooke were the two main creators of the Agreement!)

2836. At a meeting held in August 1994 between the Accused, Krajišnik and Martić, the
President of the RSK, the President advocated that ―we should unite in essence, and use formal
unification as a threat. Our unification is not enough to arrive at a complete solution. The right
solution is unification of all Serbian lands‖.9343 (So what? The President tried to postpone a real
unification, which could have caused troubles in the region, but to develop an essential
cooperation instead. A formal unification would have been interpreted as a violation of the
territorial integrity of the two countries, Croatia and BiH. How possibly this can be used
against this President? It is rather #EXCULPATORY#!) Krajišnik also stated that the ―[t]he
objective is a single Serbian state to be agreed upon between the Republic of Serbian Krajina and
Republika Srpska. We must work towards that objective without ever losing ties with Serbia‖.9344
(Not criminal!!! The Serbian people in Srpska Krajina in Croatia were extremely concerned
about their destiny, as now we see, with a very good reason. The people saw the only security
if the R. Srpska and R. Srpska Krajina united, but the President and his associates advised
the essential closeness, equalising schoo system, legal system and economy, but to avoid
territorial and political merging, because it would be against the integrity of the two
countries. Certainly, all the Serbs would like to se the Serb question resolved smoothly and
democratically, but no a reasonable Serb would risk an instability in the region. There are a
9338
See para. 398.
9339
See para. 399; P1394 (Transcript of 42nd Session of RS Assembly, 18–19 July 1994), pp. 15–18. See also D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović),
pp. 45–46.
9340
See paras. 401–406.
9341
D2741 (Witness statement of Ronald Hatchett dated 13 January 2013), para. 15.
9342
D2741 (Witness statement of Ronald Hatchett dated 13 January 2013), para. 16; D2744 (Article from Dallas Morning News entitled ―Don't Ignore the
Serbs‘ Peace Plan‖, 4 August 1995). See also D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 12.
9343
P2563 (Minutes of meeting between Milan Martić and Radovan Karadţić, 20 August 1994), p. 7.
9344
P2563 (Minutes of meeting between Milan Martić and Radovan Karadţić, 20 August 1994), p. 11.
 690

plethora of evidence on how the President tried to please the people in the both Republics,
but to avoid anything that could cause another war. Commendable, rather than blameable!)
In September 1994, when discussing the possibility of tightened sanctions on Pale with
international representatives, the President said ―if the international community treats us like a
beast, then we will behave like a beast‖.9345 First of all, Mr. Harland wasn’t in this delegation
at Pale, see what his superior Andreev said: P00834:

Therefore, Harland was with Izetbegovic, not with the President. Second, there were the two
main events against the Serbs in Bosnia: the Muslims just had exercised an attack on the
Serb Sarajevo from their part of Sarajevo, and the border between the RS and Serbia had
been sealed, and the Serbs in BiH “cornered”, see P00834

Further:

And that is
one of problems with the linguistics. There is a saying in the Serbian: if one tells you that you
are drunk, but you weren’t, jus laugh a bit, if another say the same, just think a bit, and if a
third one tells you that you were drunk, start to stagger. Finnaly, the Chamber skipped to
mention that the President “mellowed somewhat”

This is how the #Chamber is exploiting (and abusing) a negotiationg tactics# of the President
(which is always harsher at a beginning) to establish and maintain a dark image of him!)
The Accused made a similar observation in an interview when he said that if they were treated as
animals or ―wild beasts in a cage‖ they could not be expected to ―act in a tolerant and correct
manner‖.9346

2837. Through Directive 7, issued on 8 March 1995, the President continued to call on the VRS
to ―by force of arms, impose the final outcome of the war on the enemy, forcing the world into
recognising the actual situation on the ground and ending the war‖.9347 In this same directive, the
President called for full support for the creation of a ―free and unified Serbian state‖.9348 The
Chamber recalls that at a press conference in April 1995 in the context of further international
9345
See para. 402.
9346
P5063 (Video footage depicting interview of Radovan Karadţić on ―Ask the President‖, undated, with transcript), p. 13.
9347
P838 (Directive 7, 8 March 1995), p. 8.
9348
P838 (Directive 7, 8 March 1995), p. 14.
 691

negotiations, the President stated that if peace was not possible through political means, the
Bosnian Serbs would put an end to the war by military means.9349 (All of that was entirely
legitimate, although it was not written by the President. The Chamber had a sufficient
evidence to infer that the President only signed it bypassing the VRS Main Staff, whil several
elements of the document, like the protocol number and seal, prove that it was not created in
the President’s office,! The President could be relaxed because the first subordinate would
read it carefully and correct any incorrect matter, as Gen. Subotic always did. In this case it
was done by Gen. Mladic, and the operative form of this directive, the Directive 7/1 didn’t
have the critical sentence. It should be known to the Chamber that the President handed the
operative and tactical competence of command to the Main Staff, and thus none of his orders
were operative directly, without elaboration of the Main Staff as a professional body!)

2838. The Chamber recalls that the Dayton peace talks began in November 1995 and even though
the President had been removed from the RS negotiating team he played a central consultative role
in regards to RS negotiations.9350 (So what? First of all, nobody removed the President, he
removed himself because of the Indictment before this court, but he didn’t cease to exercise
his duties. Because of his absence in Dayton, many agreed elements of the Agreement, and all
the “gentlemen agreements” had been erased!) These talks concluded in the Dayton
Agreement, however, the RS delegation was unsatisfied with specific details of the agreement and
refused to attend the final plenary session of the peace talks as well as the ceremonial initialling of
the peace agreement.9351 The Dayton Agreement was initialled by TuĊman, Slobodan Milošević,
and Izetbegović on 21 November 1995 and signed on 14 December 1995.9352 (Wrong! The
President initialled the Agreement after the delegation returned to Belgrade. Although it was
a case of fait accompli, the President didn’t want to deteriorate the situation, and later on he
defended the Dayton Agreement before the Assembly, which was not happy with many
elements of the solution!)

1. Conclusion

2839. The Chamber finds based on this evidence that the Accused as early as September 1991
was identifying territories which were to be claimed by Bosnian Serbs. (That happened as a part
of the Serb concessions, without which there wouldn’t be any independence of BiH! It was
rather commendable, because the President gave up the idea to prevent the Muslim and
Croat community from seceding from Yugoslavia, which could be achieved through the
Constitution, and accepted a painful compromise. Beside that, an identifying and claiming
territories is not a crime, nor the Indictment pretended to it!) It is clear that the Accused and
the Bosnian Serb leadership advocated and worked towards a territorial re-organisation which
would allow the Bosnian Serbs to claim control and ownership of a large percentage of the
territory in BiH. (The Chamber presumed as if the illegal steps of the Muslim-Croat coalition
towards the independence was legal and legitimate, although the authorised international
arbitrage commission, the Badinter’s commission found that BiH can not claim for the
independence as other Yugoslav republics did, and that BiH needed a referendum!
“Working towards a territorial re-organisation” is also a #legitimate conduct and legal
intentions#, particularly after the Muslim part of the common Government decided to go
towards an independence. Izetbegovic announced as early as in March 91 that the document

9349
See para. 415.
9350
See para. 432.
9351
See paras. 433–435.
9352
See paras. 436–437.
 692

on independence will be adopted, with ot without the Serbs, which couldn’t be done legally!)
In terms of establishing control over this territory, the Accused worked towards the creation of
parallel institutions, organs of government, and military and police structures which could gain or
retain control of those areas. (Couldn’t be more erroneous! There was no any idea that there
would be any war, because the political process was mediated by the international
community, and there was no any space to “gain” control. However, to “retain control” it
was an obligation, since the Serbs won the elections 1990 in all the areas with the Serb
majority, and this authorities remained on power until the 1996 elections! Therefore, the
President and his Party had every right and all the obligations to establish and retain this
control. But, unlike the Chamber’s suggestion, it was an obligation, not a crime. Now, when
the Camber deals with the political issues, the un-fairness of the trial is more visible for
another reason: the #Chamber prevented the Defense to present the reasons for the political
measures of the President and the Serb side, i.e. the conduct of the two other sides#. Either
the President and his side had those reasons, or he and his side were mad. In either case, it
must be considered: #if they did have reasons, these reasons had to be known to the
Chamber, to see whether the President’s conduct was adequate and legal, or not.# If the
President and his 1,500.000 Serbs didn’t have any rationale reason for their fears, concerns
and actions, they must have been either born criminals, or had been mad, and therefore not
liable!) The Chamber‘s findings with respect to the creation of these parallel structures will be
further elaborated in Section IV.A.3.ii. (Whatever the Chamber concluded about the political
action of the President, there is a fundamental question: how come #the UN court is
contesting everything that the same UN initiated, led and ended in Dayton, and by its SC
Resolution?#)

2840. Having considered this evidence, the Chamber finds that from November 1991 the
Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership spoke against Bosnian Muslims being allowed to stay in
Bosnian Serb claimed territory and emphasised the importance of taking control of power and the
creation of separate municipalities and municipal structures. (#Criminal distortion#! The
inference is wrong and impossible, and #contradicts to a huge amount of evidence#. There
was no a simple evidence to that direction, nor it happened in reality. First, “against Bosnian
Muslims being allowed to stay in B.S. claimed territories”: what evidence it was based upon?
There was no any mentioning of such a feature. The Serb side, after being offered by Mr.
Izetbegovic, to divide Bosnia (see D01282) and being confronter with the illegal and
anticonstitutional actions of the SDA towards independence, decided not to accept it, and to
use its constitutional rights to selforganize. This self-organisation was clearly in accordance
with the Constitution and laws, and pertained to the corrections of the composition of
municipalities, so that every ethnic community could govern its own affairs. The list of
evidence contrary to this inference will be added!@@!) The Chamber considers the Accused‘s
statement in February 1992 and the supporting statements of both Koljević and Krajišnik to be
highly probative in terms of explaining the changing objectives of the Accused and the Bosnian
Serb leadership. The Chamber finds that this speech by the Accused confirms that until late 1991,
the Bosnian Serbs were still hopeful of maintaining Yugoslavia, (This approach was the only
legal and legitimate, in accordance with the Constitution and laws!) but when it became
apparent that this objective was slipping away, (It “was slipping away” because of an illegal
interference of the western countries, which supported the unilateral, illegal and violent
secessions!) they changed course and made preparations for the creation of their own sovereign
Serb entity in BiH which would include its own political, civilian, and military structures.
(Insufficient and erroneus inference: before the elections both SDA and SDS, i.e. the
President and Mr. Izetbegovic were for the preservation of Yugoslavia, which was the basis
for their coalition Government. #The SDA changed the position, the SDS didn’t.# The entire
1991 was full of events and political negotiations about the future of BiH. The SDS and the
 693

President kept giving the concessions for the sake of peace and good relations within BiH,
among others giving up the Serb plans to form the regions within BiH, which was in accord
with the Constitution and laws. Only after the Muslim side maintained it’s secessionist plans,
the Serb side posed before the Conference it’s own proposals and conditions under which the
Serb community would accept the independence of BiH. This was acceptable to the EC, and
later to the UN mediators. As far as it is concerned with the Serbian “political, civilian and
military structures” all of it already existed in every municipality, and in the central organs
within the common structures, were the Serb side had at least one third of every structure. A
so called “ideal one third in ownership in everything in BiH” the Serb side decided to turn in
a so called “real one third ownership of assets” because the Muslim side unilaterally changed
the structure of the Bosnian Republic by introducing the Islamic Declaration of Mr.
Izetbegovic as a program!)

2841. The Accused‘s rhetoric and discussions with international representatives also made it clear
that he advocated the separation of people and believed that co-existence with the Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats was not possible. (Wrong inference! #Deliberately distorted, and properly
quoted, it would be: “a co-existence in a unitary Bosnia under the Muslim fundamentalist regime
was not possible”!#There was no this kind of decision among the Serbs in BiH. It didn’t pertain
to co-existence with the people, and to corroborate that, it is sufficient to remind ourselves what
the Serbs were ready to accept if only the two other ethnic communities remained in Yugoslavia,
where they would live together with the Serbs, as they did until that moment. The crucial
element was a new political and judicial system, the independent state under the Muslim
domination. So, it wasn’t a question whether to live together, but under what system. Even the
Croats, who at the beginning were allies of the Muslims in seceding from Yugoslavia, didn’t
accept the Muslim concept of the unitary independent Bosnia, and expressed a solidarity with
the Serb claims. This kind of negligeance of the facts, known to everyone after the eight years of
the trial, is unbelievable and unacceptable. This kind of a simplicistic inferences must not be
accepted. His rhetoric also emphasised that they were fundamentally different people who had been
forced to live together. No matter what we all may think about it (the President, as well as Lord
Owen, thought that all the three communities were Serbs) the truth is that the three communities
were extremely antagonised throuout centuries, with many armed clashes and civil wars. There
are three religions, two languages (some said even three languages, as the President said,
see@…) and whenever the central authorities, whether in Istanbul, in Wienna or in Belgrade,
collapsed, these ethnic communities fought against each other. This fact will not be changed by
any inference of this Chamber, or anything in the world. The President’s “rhetoric” was rather a
loud meditation within the circles of politicians, in form of an academic discussion, but still the
President was ready to give up any Serb plans for the sake of the preservation of common life,
which wasn’t possible and wasn’t safe for the Serbs in a unitary Bosnia under the Muslim
domination, not even without the new fundamentalist ideology!) The Chamber finds that this
ideology was repeated and used by the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership as justification for the
creation of ethnically homogeneous entities in BiH and for minimising the number of Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats who would remain in Bosnian Serb claimed territory. (#Wrong
inference and simplicistic, and even malicious approach, and CRIMINAL IN SUBSTANCE#! 1.
There was never any claims or intentions for a “ethnically homogeneous entity” but for a
ethnically based entity#! 2. This was not any President’s ideology, but a very heavy burden of
heritage of historic developments, and anyone minimally educated knew that, see what l.
Eaglburger said about it: Lawrence Eagleburger:‖ I think the major lesson here is when you got involved
in something like this with a thousand years of history underlying it all, you need to understand that once the
dam breaks, the viciousness can be pretty awful – on all sides. Yugoslavia, the Avoidable War, Part 1, at
46:00.)
 694

It was closely tied with the Muslim decision whether they insisted on the independence,
which they couldn’t achieve lawfully or not. A “minimising the number of Bosnian Muslims
and Croats, who would remain in the B.S claimed territory” as well as “homogenisation” of
the territory are falsly depicted in the Judgment. In spit of a plethora of evidence that a
#homogenisation pertained only to the territories that would or would not be included, a
process of including-excluding settled places from a certain constituent unit.# The only
instrument in homogenisation was to respect the free will of the settled places, villages, even
entire municipalities or it’s parts, to join a constution unit with it’s majority! And this
happened even before the war, in a presence of the ECMM, see D…@(Dobratici from
Skender Vakuf – Knezevo, to join Jajce)… There is no a piece of evidence that there was any
other mechanism of homogenisation, that would pertain to individuals, it is not found and
submitted, and will never be found. The Chamber had seen an original speech of the
President on 12 May 1992 in the Assembly, in which he underlined that it is going to be a
“state separation”, see P956, p.3:

This is the very beginning of the President’s speech. Let us see further, first the explanation
of the recent events, an then the part that pertained to the “strategic objectives” P956, p.4

It was spoken publicly, and nobody ever denied the accuracy of it!) Now, see the part about
the “separation”, P956, p.9
 695

Therefore, there is no any confusion: a separation of states, not of population!) . The

Chamber notes that these sentiments were in contrast with public statements the President had
made in 1990 when the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership continued to emphasise the
unity of Yugoslavia and the existence of a common state. (Wrong inference! This is in a
complete accord! The Serbs wanted Yugoslavia to be preserved, with all the Republics in it,
including a united Bosnia. However, the others changed their course, and the Serbs were
entitled to pose their opposition to the secession of BiH. Finally, the Serbs made concessions,
provided the internal organisation of BiH be changed. Therefore, no obstacle to a common
life was advocated by the President, provided the Serbs-Muslims-Croats remained in a
common and federalised state, with all the safeguards of everyone’s rights protection. In
Yugoslavia wasn’t a unitary state, because the Muslims and Croats wouldn’t accept it, why
BiH would be a unitary state, while the Serbs had their rights?)

2842. The Chamber further finds that the President made extensive use of maps to highlight the
territorial claims of the Bosnian Serbs. These territorial claims included strategically significant
areas where Bosnian Muslims were a majority prior to the conflict. #The Accused defended these
claims and noted that they only seized territories to which they had a right. (#It wasn’t seizing, it
was a legitimate controlling the areas in which the SDS won the elections and had the
responsibility for it.The Muslim side had chosen the war as a mean of achieving their
objectives militarily, otherwise, all the territorial issues would be negotiated.#) This rhetoric
was also linked with the stated position of the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership that they
had no interest in living with Bosnian Muslims. (#Not, “living with Bosnian Muslims”, but
under the Bosnian Muslim domination, or under anyone’s domination, as many European
ethnicities do not accept to be minorities in their own state, and therefore have their entities,
cantons (Switzerland) or other forms of a separate self-government like in Belgium,
Flandreau, Valona, Norther Ireland, Scotland, Welles, Pharos Islands, and others#!
Wrong inference!!! It was not only the Serb side that had the maps, every side had maps,
and the mediators (Carrington, Cutilleiro, Vance, Owen) expected the sides to the talks to
deliver their view of the territorial distribution of the ethnic communities. The first one who
made the maps of the ethnic distribution was Ambasador Cutilleiro and his expert Mr.
Darwin. But what the Chamber is trying is identifying the main villain for the war. In such a
case, the Defence didn’t have a fair and correct trial and possibility to depict who was doing
what. Living with the Muslims was one thing, and another living under the Muslim
domination, and that was unacceptable for both the Serbs and Croats, even without the
fundamentalism!)

2843. The Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership repeatedly referred to and re-asserted the
historic territorial claims of the Bosnian Serbs. (There is an international provision that a
#results of genocide and war crimes must not have a permanent effects, and the Serb side
has a right to remind the world on this#. But, the President didn’t demand those areas, he
was only reminding everyone what happened to the Serbs in BiH and Croatia!) In making
these arguments and territorial claims, reference was also made to the historic crimes committed
against the Bosnian Serbs, which meant they were no longer a majority in BiH and in areas which
they claimed as a ―birthright‖. The Chamber finds that the Accused‘s position with respect to
these historic territorial claims was endorsed by the Bosnian Serb Assembly and formed a core
aspect of the Bosnian Serb objectives in including these territories in the RS. (#Wrong
inference!!! There was anyway too much of territory that the Serbs wanted to return for the
sake of peace.# The rhetoric was a part of political speeches and a preparations for
 696

negotiations, not an ultimate claim!) The Chamber finds that constant references to historic
crimes committed against Bosnian Serbs were used as a means of justifying their territorial
acquisitions which they viewed as belonging to them. (#There was no any “acquisition”#
without a war, it would be negotiated, and as the Chamber concluded, the claims of territory
was not a crime. From the beginning of the war, the #Serb side was ready to return a big
portion of their territories for a political solution#. There is a lot of evidence on it. But
nobody, and certainly not this UN court is entitled to deny the Serb memories of the genocide
which had been commited on them, the Jews and Gipsies only 45 years before the crisis in
Yugoslavia started. That would be as if the Chamber advise that the Jews do not mention the
holocaust any longer!) The Chamber also finds that the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership
referred back to historic attacks they faced from their ―enemies‖ and the manner in which the
Serbs became a minority in BiH to justify their objective of creating a Bosnian Serb State.
(#Wrong inference! The Chamber is criminalizimg entire Serb political life, contesting the
Serb rights to influence the process of secession and transformation of BiH# This is
unbearable and shouldn’t be allowed to any court, let alone to the UN court#! Even if there
was no any genocide against the Serbs, the position of a constituent nation, and also as a
more that one third numerous population, the Serbs had right to veto the secession!# #The
Serbs gave up all the plans, including the plan on regionalisation for the sake of the Historic
Serb-Muslim Agreement. Had there wasn’t the illegal secession with the aim to form a
unitary BiH under the fundamentalist’s control, there wouldn’t be any of the Serb claims
and plans. In a new situation, created by the illegal and anti-constitutional acts of the
Muslim side, the Serbs had every rights to declare their interests and a legal basis for it.
Although the Serbs became a minority in the BiH as a whole, and although it was a result of
the war crimes of an incomprehensible extent, the Serbs remaind the majority in about 65%
of the BiH territory, and nobody had any right to deny it to them! The Chamber is adopting
the communist strategy, to ban the Serb memories on the genocide. Because of this
communist ban, the Serb victims of the genocide were buried properly only after 1990, after
the fall of communism!)

2844. The Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership also spoke about the importance of
controlling Bosnian Serb claimed territories and how significant the factual situation on the ground
in terms of controlling territory was for the purposes of international negotiations. (#Even without
any war, all the authorities in municipalities and local communes had both the rights and
obligations to control the entire territory, particularly against any arms smuggling, an illegal
military organisations out of the JNA control, and to maintain a full control in terms of
prevention of any criminal activity.# The war in Croatia made it even more urgent. The
domestic laws required it due to the All-peoples Defence Law, and the rules of the Social
Self-protection! Not to mention that Bosnia was a lawlwss country, with a chaos and the civil
war!) The Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership emphasised the Serb nature of the land
which they claimed and controlled and the importance of those territorial claims in preventing the
Islamisation of those areas. (Not exactly! #It wasn’t a matter of “islamisation” it was a matter
of an interethnic balance, which must not be changed artificially, through a planned re-
settling of the people of other ethnicity#. The same is in any ethnically mixed territories, in
Israel, West Bank of the Jordan River, in Northern Ireland, in Belgium, everywhere where
an ethnic balance was established and preserved. So, the Chamber doesn’t have any right to
expect the Serbs or any other etnic community to accept that kind of jeopardy for it’s
survival! #That would be a colonial attitude of the UN court#!)

2845. The Chamber further finds that the strategic objectives of the Accused and the Bosnian
Serb leadership were also communicated to and formed a core element in the military strategy of
the VRS which was to create the RS. (#Wrong inference. The VRS didn’t have a task to
“create the RS”, because the RS had been created on 9 January 1992 by the political means.
 697

The VRS wouldn’t be even formed had the Muslim side kept it’s obligation towards the
Lisbon Agreement#. The VRS was formed with the aim to defend the VRS, because the
Muslim side did everything to deny the existence of the Serb entity, and did it by forming a
secret army, the Patriotic League and the Green Berets, and finnaly by reneging on the
Agreement and attacking the JNA and the Serbs. No reasonable chamber would neglect
these facts! See D1598, p.5, General Milovanovic first interview with the OTP in 2001 about
the task the political leadership posed before the VRS, D1598:

S
o, no a #military task before the VRS, only a defensive and protective ones#!) These
speeches and statements also demonstrate that the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership
supported and endorsed the territorial acquisitions which had been achieved militarily by Serb
Forces. (#There was no military acquisitions of territory!# Wrong inference! There was a
very few places that had been “acquisited” by the “Serb Forces” which wouldn’t be the Serb
majority territory. Even when the war started, the Serb side offered the Muslims to form
their municipalities wherever they had enough population. Then, at the beginning, the Serb
side even didn’t try to take control over the Muslim settlements. So, in Zvornik there was
more than 50% of the municipality under the Muslim control all the times, in Ilidza also, in
Hadzici about 80% under the Muslim control, in Foca about 40%, in many other
municipalities, particularly if there was no a war at the beginning, in Aprill. #When it was
clear that there is going to be a long lasting war, some of the location had been kept for the
tactical or strategic reasons, and couldn’t be handed over to the opposite side before the
peace was reached#! The Chamber finds that while these military operations were described by
the Bosnian Serbs as being ―defensive‖ or for the purposes of ―liberation‖, their purpose and effect
was to take control of Bosnian Serb claimed territory in BiH and to expand the area which would
be included in the RS. The Accused supported these military successes and viewed them as a
means of defining Bosnian Serb territory and creating their own state which they would not
relinquish. (#Wrong inference, not even close to a real.# First of all, the Chamber can not
name any significant territory which the Serbs allegedly “liberated” with an aim to keep
them after the final solution. On the contrary, there was always both declaration and
conscious that the territorial issues were to be defined in the Conference#, see the President’s
Platform from April 22, 1992- D110,

and all other documents. The fact that the Serbs had taken off several municipalities around
Sarajevo that were almost 90% Serb proves that even defended areas were not guaranteed
to any side! This UN court is not relying on the UN documents, accepted on the Conference
in a different stages of it, but on a political speeches, gossips, intercepts of the telephone
conversations and other fifth class documents. And this must not be done!!! Otherwise, the
UN as such would be responsible for many negative precedents and a bad consequences!)
 698

2846. While the Accused publicly claimed that he had no influence over the issue of war, it was clear
that he envisaged that in a war, there would be bloodshed and all the communities would flee towards
their ―fully homogeneous‖ areas. In contrast to public statements where the Accused foreshadowed
what could happen, the #Accused was simultaneously calling for seizing power in Bosnian Serbs
claimed territories (#A typical mess of time frame and meaning. First, President Karad`i} said that
if there will be a war, “we (all) would not be able to control it, but it would control us”, while the
“seizing power” in the Serb areas has nothing to do with a war, because the Serbs got the power
through the elections, and it was their obligation, and it was necessary to be done even when it was
meant that there wouldn’t be any war! There a many more Serb municipalities in which the Serbs
“seized power” and there was no any population movements, particularly in the municipalities
with presidents who were the members of the Main Board of the SDS at the same time#!) which
would result in the population movements which he envisaged. (Couldn’t be more wrong inference! It
was not a clearvoyance, it was an experience from the previous wars, and particularly from the
war in Croatia, which lasted to early 92 in a harsh form. In every civil war in this area the same
happened always: the population fled to an area with their people in majority and under control
of their own army. When the President “predicted” what would happen if BiH enters into a war,
it was within a framework of his fighting for a political solution, and within a process of
dissuasion of the two other sides to continue towards a war. In support to this efforts of the
President there are many concessions made by him and his community, just with the aim to avoid
a war. The bloodshed and movement of the population didn’t happen because the President
predicted it, but because the two other sides wanted a war to achieve their objectives. At the end,
the solution was as the EC and the President proposed before the war. Why the Chamber didn’t
point out a single evidence that it was as it concluded? The Chamber finds that the Accused was not
simply foreshadowing what he thought could happen, he was outlining the pattern which was actually
put into practice. (Why it was “put into practice” in only one third of municipalities, and not in all
of them? #”Seizing power”# wasn’t “taking-over, but a lawful obligation!# look at that sentence:
#Accused was simultaneously calling for seizing power in Bosnian Serbs claimed territories //which
would result in the population movements which he envisaged.// The second part of sentence is
unbelievable, and presents a very mean distortion of meaning by the Chamber itself. “The
population movement was envisaged in a case of a civil was and chaos, and to prevent it there was
necessary to execute power efficiently, not vice versa!!!# The Chamber also finds that the Accused
and Bosnian Serb leadership were aware and put on notice that the objective of ethnic separation would
result in violence given the extent to which the population in BiH was intermixed and yet still proceeded
to pursue this objective. (#Again, it is “ethnic separation”, although it was clearly underscored a
“state separation#! How anyone could defend against this persistent distortion and
manipulation???# Why some internationals encouraged the Muslims to secede and form a unitary
Muslim state, in spit of the fact that the Christian majority didn’t agree? If there was a political
solution at the beginning, as it was at the end of the crisis, there wouldn’t be any movement of
population. The movement of population didn’t happen because the Serbs wanted their own
authonomy, but because the Muslim leadership tried to militarily prevent the Serbs to achieve the
objective which had been supported by the European Community and the United Nations! The
Chamber is avoiding so obvious truth, that there wouldn’t be any population movement if the
Muslims didn’t renege on the Lisbon Agreement! The Serbs are not responsible for the war, and
only the war caused all misfortune and disaster! #And finally, there, even with the war, there was
no movement of population in two third of municipalities, in which there was no the rebellion of a
secret terrorist organisation!
# THIS PARAGRAPH 2846 IS A PARADIGMATIC FOR THE ENTIRE JUDGMENT,
BECAUSE CONTAINS ALL THE TYPICAL ERRORS AND DELIBERATE
MANIPULATIONS THAT LEAD TO A SENTENCING CONCLUSION AGAINST ANY
LOGICS: 1. Time-frame shifted, ―control over the issue of war‖ was said before the war, in
advising against the war; 2. a ―foreshadowing what could have happened‖ was said in the same
 699

context, before the war, arguing against the war; 3. ―…simultaneously calling for seizing power in
Bosnian Serb claimed territories‖ was a legal obligation and in accord with the Conference (ICFY)
and meant a responsible execution of the local power which anyway belonged to the Serbs since
the 1990 elections; 4. which would result in the population movements which he envisaged, which
has nothing to do with a chaotic “population movement” in a case of civil war. So, all the
measures that President Karad`i} recommended to the local authorities had a completely
OPPOSITE MEANING AND AIM!#)

2847. The Chamber finds that in international settings and press conferences, the Accused
defended the actions of Bosnian Serbs and spoke in favour of the interests of minorities and denied
the suggestion that people would be forced from their homes. (And that is how it was not only in
the two third of municipalities, but even in this one third – in the settled places where there
was no fights and terrorists intrenched! Out of more than sixty Serb municipalities, #with
more than 3,000 settled places, there were the armed confrontations only in about 50 to 70
settled places#!) However, despite these public statements, the Chamber finds that the evidence
demonstrates that the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership were informed when
municipalities were taken over by Serb Forces and were also aware that their territorial claims and
the military manner in which those claims were asserted resulted in the displacement of thousands
of non-Serbs. (Couldn’t be more wrong inference! There shouldn’t be a war, everything
could have been settled down peacefully and through the Conference, as it happened at the
end. The others decided to be a war. There is #no leadership and command that could order
a defeat of people#. Once a war brakes out, the social processes can not be controlled. The
public statements of the President were aimed to calm down the population and to make the
people know what is the position of the leadership. “Being informed” means nothing. The
municipalities that had been “taken over” wouldn’t be taken over if there was no a war,
otherwise the Serbs had been interested in #only the Serb settled places in those
municipalities#, and even when the war broke out the Serbs offered to the Muslims and
Croats to form their municipalities too, and this process started, but was stopped by the SDA
Centre. NOBODY CAN NEGLECT THIS FACT. When the SDA rejected it and ordered the
war against the “aggresors”, meaning the domestic Serbs, all other went out according to the
war axioms! But, the Chamber is accepting the Prosecution’s generalisation, although there
are meny more municipalities without the events “found” in the Judgement than those in
which the crimes happened. The only difference is: if the Muslims-Croats didn’t attack the
Serbs in their municipalities, there was no these events!) The Bosnian Serb leadership was
also informed about the drastic demographic changes which resulted in Serbs becoming a majority
in a number of municipalities. The Accused himself acknowledged the new demographic and
territorial realities which they had created and that in undertaking military operations to expand
their territory the Bosnian Muslim population had been concentrated in small areas. (#This is an
ogly forgery: it had been said about fights, which resulted with more dense Muslim lines, and
had nothing to do with the demographic or territorial issues!# This demonstrates yet again the
difference between the public statements made by the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership
and the reality on the ground, of which they were fully aware. Wrong inference! What is the
evidence? If the President said that the new realities had been created, those who know
Serbian would see that it was an academic comment of facts, not any bragging or
accomplishing any plan. Since the Muslims declared the war against the Serbs in Bosnia, the
Serbs were entitled to defeat them on every inch of the territory, and then to negotiate. The
Serbs didn’t do it, although that would be a military logics. The Chamber was able to notice
that the President kept saying that he didn’t want a soldiers to die for some areas that hadn’t
been Serbian and are going to be returned to the others, see…@.. Why the Chamber
neglected it? The Chamber knew that the President kept saying from the beginning of the
war (Platform of 22 April 92, i.e. D110, and public statements, see…@) that the forcefully
 700

taken territories shell not be recognised. The Chamber could have known that the President
opposed this military logics and took a risk to have his people defeated and destroyed,
see@….

(1)The sentence “the Muslim population had been concentrated in small areas” never pertained
to the population, but to the forces along the frontlines. The shorter confrontation line, the
more Muslim soldiers on a km. of controntation line, and more the Serb soldiers needed. It
was a mere conclusion after observing what was happening on the terrain. Such a
conclusions didn’t mean anything else but a conclusion and explanation how this change
influenced the war events, and didn’t pertained to the President’s will or conduct. The
Muslim forces attacked, and lost, and retreated, and the population.

(2) To conclude that the Serbs ―in undertaking military operations to expand their territory‖ is
contrary to everything that happened, and the Chamber knew that. It is sufficient to see the
official documents of the UN and EC adopted in the ICFY, and during the meetings with the
mediators, such as P941. The Serb side knew from the beginning trat it can not comprise all
the Serbian territory, that they will return a substantial amount of territory, and that the
President prevented the Army (VRS) to fight for territories, which put him in a very bad
relations with the military people

(3) #Being “aware” of the processes doesn’t mean being able to change the cours of events.
#Once an army is attacked, all the events afterwards depend of both, not of only one #side.
There were the four warring sides, and no unilateral moves could help in any way. Should
the Serb side surrender, because the enemies were losing?)

2848. The Chamber also finds that the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership were aware that
some of the territory which they took over and controlled were areas where Serbs had not been a
majority but the Accused emphasised that these municipalities had to be taken for strategic and/or
historic reasons. (#Once the other side decided that the outcome of the crisis was to be
military, it was fully legitimate# to say that. Even if it was temporary, until the war ends, no
reasonable army, no reasonable warring side would hand over a tactically or strategically
important spots. And if it was a prospective to have a long lasting conflict, the strategic
importance is even more remarkable! The President never said that he was going to include
such a places in the Serb entity, but while the war lasts, there could not be any retreat!)

2849. The Chamber notes that there were some speeches, statements, and announcements by the
Accused which placed the blame on the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats for the separation of
people and claimed that in contrast the Bosnian #Serbs were not creating ―an ethnically clean
state‖. However, the Chamber finds that these statements and announcements were used as a
means of creating a narrative, particularly for the international audience in which the Bosnian
Serbs would not be blamed for the separation and the movement of people. (This is a #very mean,
and completely wrong conclusion-finding#. There is a serial of evidence from the closed
meetings of the Serb leadership with tis kind of conclusions, without any possibility to be
public. See: P1478, p.313:

This was communicated only to the VRS officers, and would never be seen public if the
Mladic’s diaries hadn’t been included in evidence. On the same meeting Professor Koljevic
said, the same page:
 701

So, Mladic wrote down that the final decision on the stand was – #LAW –ABIDING
STATE!- concluded at a strictly confidential meeting#! : In this regard the Chamber notes
for example that the President made it clear that the Bosnian Serbs were making preparations for
their own ―ethnic space‖ in BiH regardless of the tone of negotiations between the parties to the
conflict at that time. (This is completely misunderstood! It was the Serb ―condition sine qua
non‖ any BH independence, and the Serbs gave the last concession. The Serbs had their
“ethnic space” in BiH from immemorial times, they had been the oldest population in BiH.
This “ethnic space” was inhabited mainly by the Serbs, a rural areas of a great extent, but
economically much poorer that the Muslim areas. So, to conclude that the Serbs made
preparations for their own “ethnic space” is out of mind. The Serbs negotiated already in a
good fait, and there could be no other solution without this minimal Serb condition! What
the Serbs wanted was either the entire Bosnia to remain in Yugoslavia, or a new
administrative distribution of power, so that no athnic group dominate over the other. There
are many such examples in the western world, and that is why the European Community
immediately recognised the problem and gave it’s proposal about three autonomous
republicks within BiH. The way the Chamber treats the core of the crisis, it appears as if the
Serbs came from somewhere and wanted to secure their own “ethnic space” on the account
of the others! How it is possible to defend against such a cosmic lack of knowledge about a
very essence of the problem, and a cosmic reluctance to hear about this essence, and about
the domestic legal system?) The Chamber finds that this is indicative of the position taken by the
Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership and that their public statements often directly
contradicted the plans which they had for ethnic separation. (#Wrong inference and a very mean
position of the Chamber#. #There was never any plan for “ethnic separation” – but only for
a “state separation”#! If the Chamber deals with this issue, then there must be considered
the conduct of the two other sides, because the President’s statement got this qualifications.
Now, we see how unfair was it to prevent the Defence to depict the conduct of the other two
warring factions. #The Chamber can not deny that already in September 92 there was no a
single Serb settlement in the Muslim-Croat territory#, while there was many Muslim and
Croat settled places in the RS; that The Serbs empted the M/C territory in a hasty way,
leaving everything behind them, and being killed meanwhile, while the Muslim and Croat
civilians that demanded the transfer to “their” territory formed a list and got a transport
vehicles and police escort; that there was more Serb refugees than the Muslim and Croat
refugees together; if the Chamber is contesting the President’s assertions, frankness and
accuracy, it must check whether it was so by finding out what the two other sides were doing,
particularly if it influenced the events on the Serb territory.

Since the Muslim/Croat side wanted to change the nature of Bosnia, the Serbs publicly and
legitimately declared that either they will stay in Yugoslavia, or will demand another
internal organisation of the state. “Regardless of the tone of negotiations” means nothing,
because this was a “condition sine qua non” the Bosnian independence. It was clear to
everybody, no cheating.
The public statements never contradicted to the plans for a “state separation” because it
wasn’t an ethnic separation in a personal terms, see what the President said on 12 May 92,
P956. There was no contradiction, the three states based on the ethnic majorities, with the
minority rights guaranteed and protected reciprocally. No other clandestine plan existed.
And there was no any legal way that the Muslim side impose to the Serbs this hostile and
 702

unacceptable regime. The outcome was known, but the ways and nuances had to be
negotiated, or Bosnia should return to Yugoslavia, or at least let the Serbs stay in
Yugoslavia!)
2850. The Accused also issued public announcements which promised respect for the rights of
all citizens, promised the free movement of people, prohibited the forcible detention or movement
of people, and guaranteed the right of return of refugees. However, the Chamber finds that these
public announcements were also in stark contrast to the reality on the ground which was marked
by the unlawful detention and forced movement of thousands of people. 9353 (#As if the
Chamber concluded: “He promised to give the umbrelas, but still there was a rain, and a
wind in addition”!# Wy would President Karad`i} “promise” protection against something
what didn’t happen??? But, the President DIDN’T PROMISE, HE ORDERED
PROTECTION AND ANNULED ALL BAD PRACTICE IF HAPPENED!# “The unlawful
detention” didn’t happen. It must have been established whether somebody had been
detained in spite of the evidence that there was no liability for some crimes, including the
participation in the armed rebelion. Nobody can say it was unlawful detention in a cases the
investigations were conducted by the highly educated professional state officers, which
resulted in releasing many of those detained, at least more than 50% of those captured in the
combat areas. In any country there are “taking in” of the suspects – and releasing, or
indicting, how could it be different in Bosnia and the RS during the war? Nobody without
any criminal liability was detained a day longer. Why the authorities would do that,
particularly since there was no adequate facilities, food, medicines and other necessities?
And if the President’s public statement and secret orders were in a ―stark contrast to the
reality on the ground‖ it didn’t mean that the President wanted that his orders be neglected,
but rather that the state apparatus was not capable of conducting all the orders!) The
Chamber finds that these public announcements were also issued by the Accused following
repeated protests at an international level about the treatment of non-Serbs in Bosnian Serb
controlled territory. (Wrong inference-finding! That weren’t “announcements issued by the
President following repeated protests…” #that were the top secret reports of the UN or EC
representatives#! There was no any mistreatment of non-Serbs, but there was a treatment of
a suspects regardless of their ethnicity. The Chamber could have known it even from
document of the international community representatives. Let us just remind ourselves on
the #document D02424#:

The same sufferings and shortages in the Serb parts of Sarajevo as in the Muslim parts.

9353
See Section IV.A.2.b. (in relation to deportation, forcible transfer, and unlawful detention). (9363)
 703

Nobody have chasen anybody, but people displaced themselves because of circumstances.

Why those Muslims weren’t “mistreated”? The same as the Serbs, who is not drafted, has a
working obligation.

The President of the RS had a Muslim friends, and it was publicly known!

The #President protected the prominent Muslim#, professor, and other Muslim intelectuals as a
vulnerable! A small and unnoticed document brings us a remarkable evidence against many
Chamber’s inferences.

Similar document of the international representative visit to Grbavica in 1994 had been lately
disclosed, and will be submitted. Almost with the same wording Edward Vulliamy
#described the situation of the Muslims and Croats in Prijedor municipality#, in August
1992, after all the skirmishes in Prijedor had taken place, see D1898, p. 6:

Why the Chamber of a UN court neglected such a genuine evidence obtained by the UN
personnel, and by thje Prosecurion’s witness? Is it clear that there was #no any persecution
of those who were loyal to the RS, and even of those who weren’t loyal, but didn’t do any
 704

crime whyle waiting to be approved to cross to the Muslim side of Sarajevo#? Or, let us see
another document about visit of the internationals to the same Grbavica, later in the course
of the war, see: D00163, a Muslim mil. Intelligence document, April 3, 1994

Or another document, a news note about a Muslim propaganda alleging the Jews sufferings
in Grbavica, 23 June 92, D886:

or another news note about a visit of internationals to Grbavica, see the SRNA and other
news agency reports how the #UN personnel was surprised that many Muslim families
rejected to go to the Muslim Sarajevo, because they had been treated fairly.#) The Chamber
finds these announcements were issued as means of easing that political pressure but did not
translate into a real improvement in the situation on the ground given that the pattern of
mistreatment, detention, and forcible transfer continued. The Chamber also finds that these
expulsions were discussed at Bosnian Serb Assembly sessions by deputies who warned that they
could only talk about these issues amongst themselves but could not speak about it to the rest of
the world. (Reference???)

2851. The Chamber also finds that these announcements were inconsistent with the Accused‘s
continued emphasis and rhetoric on the importance of a division of BiH along ethnic lines and the
dangers and impossibility of living with Bosnian Muslims. (Wrong conclusion! #There was no
an issue of impossibility of living “with Muslims,” but of living in a unitary Bosnia UNDER
THE MUSLIM DOMINATION”!# There was no the approach of “division of BiH along
ethnic lines” but there was a proposal and a general accord of the internationals and at least
two out of three sides in BiH, that BiH should form a three ethnically based entities, so that
the sovereignty of the three communities be preserved, and existence of BiH in the existing
borders secured. The President and no one else ever said that it was impossible to live with
the Bosnian Muslims in Yugoslavia, or in the Republic of Srpska, but it was unacceptable to
live in a Bopsnia as envisaged by the new political team, the Islamic fundamentalists that
were irreconcilable with anything that wasn’t Islamic, as established in the Islamic
Declaration by Mr. Izetbegovic. The Chamber is neglecting a big amount of evidence that
there was in question only a Serb opposition to unitary state under the Muslim domination,
and nothing else. There is a lot of evidence that the Muslims and Croats had been welcome in
the RS, and particularly by the President!) The Chamber finds that while the aCCUSED did
envisage some minorities in the state the Bosnian Serbs were creating, his position was that this
number should be kept at a minimum and that the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats should
have their own entities in BiH #and should be moved out of Bosnian Serb territory#. (#Wrong
 705

and impossible inference. On what evidence is it founded? On some testimonies of an

incompetent witnesses as was Harland, Bandury, while their chiefs and the main negotiators,
who were familiar with the President’s views, never said such a thing! #The only
“instrument” of TERRITORIAL (not “ethnic”) homogeneity of all the three ethnic republics
was a flexibile approach to the inclusion-exclusion of a settled places in a republic-entity
contrary to the will of their inhabitants!# There is plethora of evidence that the President
advised a moderate claim for territories, and public statements that the municipal
boundaries are not bible, and should be adjusted to the will of the inhabitants#! Even before
the war the Serb authorities in Skender Vakuf (Knezevo) approved secession of the group of
villages and hamlets Dobratici and it’s merging with the neighbouring municipality of
Jajce!@) The Chamber finds that the Accused disseminated propaganda about demographics and
the Bosnian Muslim birth-rate as a further justification for ethnic separation even after he had
issued public announcements guaranteeing that nobody would be forced to leave Bosnian Serb
territory. (Again, #the Chamber is mixing “babe i zabe” (grannies and frogs, apples and
oranges) because the birth rate the President was talking didn’t pertain to the Republic of
Srpska, but the whole Bosnia, and it wasn’t a natural birth rate, but an artificial one,
motivated by political ideas of changing the ethnic balance, with the aim of taking over the
whole Bosnia#. In the Serbian there are two terms for birthrate, with and without attribute
“natural”. If there is no “natural” – this “birthrate” is a manipulation, and in Serbian it is
not literally “birthrate” but rather “prirastaj” which would be more accurately translated as
“growth”. If it was not said “prirodni prira{taj”,i.e. “natural growth”, then it was meant an
artificial enlargement of population. The Defence submitted the evidence about three sources
of this artificial increase of population: re-settling the Muslims from Sandzak, Serbia; re-
settling up to four millions of Turks allegedly descendants of the Bosniaks, and the “fatwa”,
a religious order that every woman deliver at l;east five children, in order to sacrifice one for
Bosnia. The whole Europe should react on this horrible plan, but certainly the neighbouring
nations, as the Serbs and Croats wouldn’t like to see this development, and for their
protection the two ethnic communities needed their constituent units, their autonomy and
self-government, as Mr. Izetbegovic committed in the Hague in 1991, and in Lisbon in 1992!)

1. The Chamber also finds that the Bosnian Serb policy on refugees was connected with its goal of
achieving ethnic geographic continuity of the Serb population and did not make provision for the
return of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. (Wrong inference, without any basis! It had
nothing to do with a “continuity of the Serb population”, but it concerned the #territorial
continuity of the Serb entity regardless of the composition of population#! Even before the
war the Serb side accepted that the Serb republic may not have the continuity, but after the
war broke out, the continuity was a “condition sine qua non” of the Serb survival. There
would be so many skirmishes and incidents, that would indanger the stability, if some Serb
areas remained encircled and without territorial connection with the ehtirety of the Serb
entity!) The Chamber finds that with respect to the right of refugees to return, the Accused was
aware that from a legal perspective they could not declare a ban on their return but that they should
insist that it occur on a reciprocal basis. (#Why the Muslims would have the right to return and
the Serbs wouldn’t#? The reciprocity was envisaged by the international mediators, as a
normal issue, amog others because of a technical matters: where to house so many people, if
the Serbs are not entitled to return, while the Muslims were to return, as happened in
reality, that many more Muslims returned to the RS than the Serbs to the BiH Federation. If
the Serbs had been banned to return, the two groups of ethnic refugees would rise the
tensions and maybe a conflict!) The Chamber finds that this is instructive in terms of
interpreting statements or declarations which ostensibly guaranteed the right of return of refugees.
It demonstrates that the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership were conscious of making
public statements which were in accordance with international expectations and obligations, but
 706

which were at odds with the reality on the ground. (#If it was “at odds with the reality on the
ground, it meant that the state instruments weren’t sufficient enough to secure the
implementation in all and every settled place, but in the bvast majority did. Also, many of
(un)implemented depended on the conduct of the other side#! #This UN Court permanently
neglects the most relevant documents created by the UN agencies and signed by the Accused
and his associates under the UN-UNHCR-ICRC auspice, and judges on the basis of a gossips,
telephone intercepts of even unofficial persons, and on the basis of public announcements, by
minimising the sincerety and interpretations of it to the contrary meanings#. Beside that, the
Chamber had the most convincing evidence that was in accordance with the “public
statements” on the Serb proposals, and a Serb signature to every single agreement of a rights
of refugees to return, which at the same time obliged the Muslim-Croat Federation to do the
same. And the President communicated his devotion to these right not only in the public
statements, but in all the confidential meetings, even with the Army commanders, see:
P1478, p.358

It
was the President’s meeting with General Mladic and other commanders of the VRS, and it
was an equivalent of a written order, and far away from any publicity! But it must have been
that the judges didn’t compose this Judgment, but some inexperienced associates, because it
is so wrong, that couldn’t be done by responsible professionals!)

2853. The Chamber finds that there was a clear disjuncture between the public announcements and
statements made to international representatives and the continued speeches and policy of the Accused
and the Bosnian Serb leadership which advocated ethnic separation and the creation of an ethnically
homogeneous Bosnian Serb state. (Again, the Chamber is making a wrong inferences, although it
had all the evidence that the ethnic separation pertained only to the state separation, not
personal. Look at the President’s speech in the Assembly, a first strategic objective was a state
separation, see P956, p. 9

#Neither
the claim for territories, nor for authonomy are a criminal actions, but a natural rights
stipulated in the ICFY in the Hague in 1991, with the Izetbegovic’s commitment that the Serbs
and Croats are going to have a high degree of autonomy if Bosnia would be independent. But,
this Chamber is persistent in numbering the President’s attitude to achieve this authonomy, in a
new situation and a new circumstances produced by an illegal secession of BiH, as if it was a
crime itself#.) In this regard the Chamber finds that the Accused spoke about the importance of the
Strategic Goals to the creation of their state and how they had succeeded in forcing acceptance of the
division of BiH along ethnic lines. (The #allegations about a “forcing acceptance of the division of
BiH” deserve a separate elaboration, now first about the political objectives: What is wrong with
that? The entire International community understood and accepted the concept, which resembles
the system in several European countries#! #Why the Chamber is against the political issues,
while it was not the subject of the Indictment, and the political claims hadn’t been a crime, so
more since the liability for the war is not incriminated before this Court#? That is why this
#Judgment looks like a communist propaganda and ideological invective#! #The war didn’t
appear because of the Serb political claims, but because of the Muslim attempts to deny it#! After
all, it was the original proposal of the ICFY before the war, see: D88, p. 7 of 25 February 1992:
 707

the President was explaining to the Serb Assembly what had been achieved on the Conference:

#So,
“we were offered a draft document” in which there was a picture of the new look of BiH, and
everything the Chamber is putting on the President’s liability was proposed by the international
community before the war and without the war#! There is the allegation about “forcing
acceptance of the division of BiH, quoted in this paragraph of the Judgment! Why the Chamber
is dealing with this question, or if it is dealing with it, why the Chamber doesn’t see that the Serb
claims weren’t a source of any “enforcement”, nor of the war and accompanied crimes, but that
all of it originated from the Muslim attempts to deny these Serbian (and Croatian) legitimate
rights for autonomy, and this denial was pursued by a military means. #The Chamber should
have known that there was no any possibility for BiH to become independent without the Serb
consent! And the main Serb condition to give this consent was an existence of the Serb state entity
within BiH, for which the Muslim side agreed, but later attempted to cheat and deceive! As any
other truth, this one is as simple, that the Chamber should have realised it!) The Chamber also
finds that the Accused continued to advocate a military solution to achieving the Bosnian Serb
objectives and issued orders in this regard towards creating a unified Serbian state. (Wrong finding-
inference! The President and the Serbs in Bosnia never needed any military solution to achieve
their rights on self determination, but they needed a military protection when the Muslim secret
army attacked the Serbs and JNA. The federal state of Yugoslavia and it’s JNA hardly protected
themselves, let alone to protect the rights of the Serbs to remain a Yugoslav citizens! There is an
enormous amount of evidence that the Muslim side reneged on the Lisbon Agreement which
envisaged a democratic transformation of BiH into three constituent states, and that the
President wanted to avoid the war “at any cost” as Mr. Vance communicated to Mr. Genscher,
see: D1833!)

2854. The Chamber also finds that the Bosnian Serb leadership was conscious of the
international attention and were warned by Jovanović that they should be conscious of taking steps
which would be construed as ―ethnic cleansing‖ but that they should still persist with ensuring that
their territory was as ethnically homogeneous as possible. (A #deliberate darkening of the
evidence. The very same words of Mr. Jovanovic: “as ethnically homogeneous as possible”
meant only TERRITORIES, NOT POPULATION#! there is a proof that there was no talks
 708

about any forceful approach to homogeneity. If he meant to achieve it by force, there

wouldn’t be “as possible”. The Chamber had a sufficient evidence that the homogenisation
had nothing to do with population, but only with territories. It comprised a humble
approach to the territorial questions by the Serb negotiators, and the President spoke about
it in the Assembly many times, advocating modesty in territorial matters. No reasonable
chamber could make such an inference on the basis of evidence! On the contrary!) It was
also clear from these meetings and speeches that the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership
were not only aware of but also supported the demographic changes and ethnic homogenisation
which had occurred in Bosnian Serb claimed territory. The Accused and the Bosnian Serb
leadership in 1994 and 1995 continued to speak about removing Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats from the state they had created and the continued importance of the unification of all
Serbian lands. (Couldn’t be more wrong!# A completely false assertion#, without any
corroboration even in a circumstantial evidence. When and where the President said a single
word in favour of “removing” Muslims and Croats from the Serb territory? Never and
nowhere! What the President said was that the Serbs should stop crying for Yugoslavia as a
common home of the South Slavs, because the common state was the reason for a long
lasting animosities and a fratricidal wars. The #President said it even before the war and
during the war, pointing out that the Serbs and Croats hadn’t being enemies before 1918,
before the foundation of the common state#, see@ ! therefore, there is no a single evidence
that the “enemies in our own home” pertained to the Republic of Srpska, because this was
the President’s attitude far before the war, as his reaction on the Serb, and the only Serb,
sentiments about preserving Yugooslavia! The Chamber had the evidence that the President
advocated a sort of “Skandinavisation” of Yugoslavia, and the transformation of BiH after
the Switzerlan model!)

2855. In the course of international negotiations into 1993, 1994, and 1995, the Аццусед continued
to emphasise the territorial objectives of the Bosnian Serbs and the territories which were still in
dispute but were vital to the Bosnian Serb interests. (So what? There were many disputed
territories, and certainly the President knew that the Serbs will not get all of the disputed,
but also not lose every disputed territories. Is the Chamber of an opinion that the President
was not entitled to represent the RS interests?) The Accused also adhered to the basic
position that the Bosnian Serbs wanted a separate Serb entity in BiH. (Wrong inference! # It was
the last acceptable solution#. The first was to stay in Yugoslavia as a whole Bosnia, second
that the Serb parts of Bosnia remain in Yugoslavia, and the third, the list favourable solution
was to have the Serb entity in BiH. And this wasn’t any crime, the internationals understood,
and the UN mediated to find such a solution which resembled the Serb proposal. But, why
this court is considering the legitimate political questions? If the Serbs didn’t have the right
to influence the future Bosnian structure, neither the EC nor UN, nor the greatest countries
would support these political programs, and facilitate the conferences to achieve it!) The
Chamber also finds that in speeches before the Bosnian Serb Assembly the President and the
Bosnian Serb leadership spoke strongly against having ―enemies‖ in their state and also indicated
that they would not allow certain areas to be allocated to Bosnian Muslims. (As if the Chamber is
deliberately erring, since everyone in the coartroom have learned that it #pertained to
Yugoslavia as a common homе#, because too many members of this “common home” were
against it. This was the Serb standpoint that nobody should be forced to be in this common
state, and it never pertained to the Muslim or Croat population in the RS. If the Chamber,
and this Court as whole is not capable of understanding the Serbian language and to
differentiate the meannings, they should have an expert for semantics. If the Chamber is
capable of understanding, it must not make such a mistakes in inferring and concluding,
because it is the worst violation of the rights of the Serbs and President persons, and is very
poisoning for the future!) The Chamber finds that the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership
 709

adhered to a primary objective of partition and separation from Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats who would have their own entities in BiH and that the Bosnian Serbs would control
territory which was ―nearly 100% Serbian‖. (#Every ethnic community in BiH tried to leave as
less of their members in another constituent unit as possible#. Mr. Izetbegovic asked the
President to try to make it possible (in creating the maps) that as less the Muslims stay in the
Serb, and as less Serbs in the Muslim state. Ajanovic was jubilating and celebrating a fact
that the Muslim community went the best in negotiating the Lisbon Agreement, see D00302,
of 18 March,92……
……………
……………

Therefore, if the Serbs rejected the Agreement, they would be “cheating the EC”, and they
wouldn’t be in favor of the peace in BiH. Since the Muslim side (SDA) rejected already
agreed arrangement, it didn’t concern them!)

2856. Even until 1995 the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats continued to be portrayed as the
enemies of the Bosnian Serbs and their state. The evidence also shows the importance that the
Bosnian Serb leadership and the President placed on territorial acquisition and control. (Wrong,
wrong, wrong inference and assertion. #The entire Yugoslav crisis was about the ethnic
territories#. Slovenia and Croatia wanted to secede from Yugoslavia on the strictly ethnic basis,
not on any class, or racial, or any other basis. The Muslims wanted to do the same, but didn’t
have a precondition to keep the whole Bosnia as their and only their state, because the Serbs and
Croats had their constitutional rights on this Republic, equal to those the Muslims had. And if
any ethnic community in BiH wanted to change it’s position in relation to Yugoslavia, and to
change it’s nature as a state, the two other communities had a decisive vote to approve or deny it.
The Serbs had every right to influence it, they could prevent it on a two bases: as a constituent
people, and as a people that represented more than one third of voters, both in the Parliament
and in population. Does the law and constitutions have any value before the UN Court?).

(E) Strategic Goals

1. Analysis of evidence

2857. The Chamber recalls that during the 16th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly on
12 May 1992, the President presented the Strategic Goals.9354 The Strategic Goals were adopted
9354
See para. 57 See also Branko Đerić, T. 28067–28068 (25 April 2012) (testifying that the Strategic Goals were presented by the SDS leadership and that the
Bosnian Serb Government was not involved in developing these goals).
 710

by the Bosnian Serb Assembly at the same session.9355 (Wrong! There was no any voting, not
even discussion, since it was an exegesis of the new negotiating position of the Serb
delegation before the ongoing ICFY!) These goals were:

a. separation from the other two national communities and the separation of states;
(#Forgery#!It was not “and the separation of states” it was only “the separation of states”!)

b. creation of a corridor between Semberija and Krajina;

c. creation of a corridor in the Drina Valley thus eliminating the Drina as a border between
Serbian states; (Wrong! #Abuse of translation#! It was said “between the wworlds” meaning
the East and West, see P956, p. 9
……………………………………………..

I
If the editors changed this wording, it is not the President’s responsibility, but the Chamber
was served with the original#!!

d. creation of a border on the Una and Neretva Rivers; (This speech was held on 12 May
1992, but several months prior to that the Ambassador Cutileiro on behalf of the EC and
Lord Carrington proposed a preliminary ethnic map, with the boundaries between the
ethnic communities just on these rivers, see: D91:

e. division of the city of Sarajevo into Serbian and Muslim parts; and (#Coloquially, but in
the essence it had never been meant a physical division, but an administrative re-
organisation after the model of the Brusseles, see P1478, p.315:

:) there are many documents confirming the President’s attitude towards the
transformation of BiH and Sarajevo in a manner known to the European Community!#)

9355
P955 (SerBiH Assembly Decision on Strategic Goals of Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992). Prstojević was evasive as to whether the Bosnian Serb
leadership had established a goal of division from Bosnian Muslims and why. In addition his evidence was marked by indicators that he was trying to
mislead the Chamber. The Chamber therefore does not find his evidence with respect to this issue to be reliable. NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13244, 13247 (11
March 2011), T. 13619–13620 (17 March 2011), T. 13748, 13850–13851 (21 March 2011).
 711

f. access of the SerBiH to the sea.9356 (Why not? BiH had 24 km of the sea coast in Neum,
and the Serb state within the BiH was entitled for one third of this coast! Even US President
Villson established in his “14 points” that the Serbs will get unimpeded access to the Adriatic
Sea! But, it should be achieved by negotiations, and President Tudjman of Croatia had
promised this to the President, a swap of a strip between Trebinje and Dubrovnik fot an
access of the RS to the sea. The Serbs have given this strip, but didn’t get what was a
bargain. Anyway, the Serbs in BiH never fought for that goal!)

2858. The Accused stated that the Assembly of BiH had neglected all other tasks and moved
towards ―gaining independence for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unitarist state under Muslim
domination‖ and that the Muslim and Croatian national communities with the assistance of
opposition parties ―decided to enclose us in their own state, to make us wake up in a foreign state‖,
which forced the Serbian people to exercise their ―right to self-determination and set up our own
state‖.9357 (So what? The #Badinter’s Commission for Arbitrage gave the Serbs the support,
and on that basis the EC and UN organised the sub-Conference on Bosnia within the already
existing ICFY#! Why this Court is questioning a merely political issues that had been agreed
before the war? This is untenable, and should have been forbidden, because the Prosecution
was dealing with the political matters, agreed among the sides!) The Accused also stated that
they would finally ―finish the job of the freedom struggle of the Serbian people. That job is not
finished. Anything in history that is not properly finished does not die but it returns to the agenda
again, each time with many more casualties.‖9358 (Anything the President said, even such an
#academic consideration, is us#ed against him. Naturally, since there is no any substantial
evidence for his guilt!) The Accused also cautioned against the ―Serbian megalomania of trying
to include as many of our enemies in our areas as possible‖, and that while their brave people had
taken as much as they could, this ―could put us in danger of including in our state too many of our
enemies, who will again work against that state‖.9359 (#This is the first class evidence that the
President was against the greed for territories where the other communities made majority,
and that a humble approach to the territorial question was the only instrument of the
homogenisation of territory#! It was a very famous approach of the President, not to fight
for the territories with the non-Serb majority, and not to include a settlements in which the
inhabitans would rather be in a neighbouring entity! See P1478, how the President stopped a
military action towards Gorazde, 14 July 1992: P1478,
p.332………………………………………………………………...

No
army would be happy with such a kind of President and Supreme Commander!)

2859. With respect to the first of the Strategic Goals, the separation of the national communities,
the Accused emphasised that separation from their ―enemies‖ was necessary and that their goal

9356
P956 (Transcript of 16th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court pp. 8–10; P955 (SerBiH Assembly Decision on Strategic Goals of Serbian
People in BiH, 12 May 1992); P2561 (Map of BiH re six strategic objectives). See also P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August,
9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), pp. 14–15.
9357
P956 (Transcript of 16th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 4.
9358
P956 (Transcript of 16th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 10.
9359
P956 (Transcript of 16th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court pp. 10–11. See also Ewan Brown, T. 21720 (22 November 2011).
 712

was the ―separation of states‖.9360 In this regard the Accused stated that their enemies had attacked
them at every opportunity in the last century and would continue to do so if they lived in the same
state.9361 (#First of all, a “separation of states” clearly indicates that there was no any idea of
separation of population, but determines the separation of state organisation and system of
authority#. The minority existed in all current republics even before 1918, but was not
causing any killings. Only when a community is “locked” in a state against its free will,
without consent, this is a scenario for catastrophe. Unlike minorities with their maternal
country in neighbourd, every ethnic community, particularly of the constituent peoples, are
legitimate not to accept an imposed state. There should be their consent to be included in a
national state of other nation. Croats and Slovenians asked to be included in Yugoslavia
1918, because they had been defeated in WWI, but later they wanted to secede, but
unilateraly and forcefully!) In a similar fashion the Accused explained the importance of each
of the Strategic Goals by reference to the interests of the Serbian people.9362 The second Strategic
Goal outlined by the President was the importance of a corridor between Semberija and Krajina to
allow for an integration of Serbian lands with unimpeded flow from one part of the state to
another.9363 With respect to the Strategic Goal of creating a corridor, Krajišnik stated that the ―size
of the corridor depends on you. Whether it will reach to the Sava river or be five kilometres wide,
if it is five kilometres wide we will not be able to defend it, but if it is 30 km we will defend it‖.9364
(However, the Chamber neglected the fact that before the war the #President and the Serbs
in Bosnia accepted that their republic may not have the territorial continuity#, and it wasn’t
an imperative for the Serbs if there was no any war. See: The President’s speech before the
Serb Assembly on 25 February 1992, i.e. before the war, D88, p.11:

#No
unsolvable question, nobody needed a war#. But, after the war broke out, due to the Muslim
will, the Serbs wouldn’t dare to live in an enclave surrounded y the hostile Muslims, who
wouldn’t be hostile if there was no war. In Switzerland there is no continuity of the French,
German or Italian speaking groups, but in Bosni after the war nobody would dare to live
such a way!)

2861. With respect to the third Strategic Goal the Accused stated that the belt along the Drina
must belong to the SerBiH and that this would not only be strategically useful to them but also
damaging to the ―interests of our enemy‖ and would prevent the Muslims from connecting to the
―Muslim International‖.9365 Part of the fear of the Bosnian Serbs was to prevent the creation of the

9360
P956 (Transcript of 16th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 9. The Chamber places no weight on Brown‘s opinion that the
implementation of the first Strategic Goal would involve the creation of a Serb state and the movement of a significant part of the non-Serb population out of
that state. P3914 (Ewan Brown's expert report entitled ―Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina – 1992‖, 27 November 2002), para. 1.43. See also
Patrick Treanor, T. 14052 (1 June 2011); P2561 (Map of BiH re six strategic objectives). The Chamber places no weight on Treanor‘s opinion as to the
reasons behind the Strategic Goals or the way in which the Strategic Goals formed part of the objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership. For example, see
Patrick Treanor, T. 14019, 14051, 14054, 14067–14068 (1 June 2011), T. 14378 (7 June 2011). The Chamber also does not rely on Bulatović‘s
understanding that the first Strategic Goal did not involve physical separation of people or his belief that the expulsions did not result from any policy.
D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), paras. 19–20.
9361
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 9. For further evidence and discussion on this issue, see Section
IV.A.3.a.i.B: Identification of historic enemies.
9362
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 9.
9363
P956 (Transcript of 16th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 9; P2561 (Map of BiH re. six strategic objectives). See also Patrick
Treanor, T. 14052 (1 June 2011).
9364
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 45.
9365
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 9.
 713

so called ―green transversal‖.9366 The President also spoke about the ―elimination of the Drina as a
border between two worlds. We are on both sides of Drina, and our strategic interest and our
living space are there‖.9367 This objective was also reflected at a municipal level, where in Foĉa
for example, Stanić stated the Bosnian Serb position that ―the Drina would never become a border
but a windpipe between two lungs‖.9368 (#Making Drina River a border trough the Serbian
areas, without the Serb consent and contrary to the Serb constitutional rights is a crime.
However, there was a way to reconcile the Serb and Muslim interests, so that Bosnia become
independent, and the Serbs to maintain this loose tie to Serbia. The Muslims were offered to
have their municipalities along Drina River#. No matter it was going to be a Serb republic.
But, the most important mater is: the Chamber doesn’t see any difference between the peace
time statements and objectives, and the same subjects after the war broke out due to the
Muslim illegal, unrealistic and irrational ambitions to have Bosnia as only their national
state!) There is another evidence, which even wasn’t noticed by the Chamber. The
President, having a live TV interview together with Krajisnik in early 1993 explained what
did it mean “not to have a border on Drina”, see: D1936:

Yet another President’s prediction (Mastricht before Mastricht) should be punished!?! That

9366
Radomir Nešković T. 14378 (7 June 2011). Bosnian Serbs also expressed fear about Izetbegović‘s Islamic Declaration. D3695 (Witness statement of
Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 4, 25–26, 30. See also D3645 (Witness statement of Nenad Kecmanović dated 27 May 2013), para. 28; Milorad
Dodik, T. 36834–36835 (9 April 2013).
9367
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 9.
9368
P3476 (Video clip of interview with Miroslav Stanić, with transcript), p. 2; KDZ379, T. 18831–18834 (15 September 2011).
 714

was the real meaning of the border on the Drina River# further, the same D1936:

2862. The Accused concluded that the achievement of the Strategic Goals would allow them to
finish the freedom struggle of the Serbian people and that they should avoid including too many
―enemies‖ in their state.9369 (#How could the Serbs “include too many “enemies” in their
state”, and how they could have it avoided? #The only mechanism was to be moderate about
the territorial issues, not to insist in including the Muslim and Croat settled places in the
Republic of Srpska, if they didn’t want it, and if they could be added to their entity. All the
bordering settlements could have their choice where to belong, and that was the only tool for
a homogenisation of the three republics. There is a huge evidence about that, and none about
any other way, particularly not by expelling the population!#)

2863. At this session, Mladić advocated a path which would involve fighting and waging war.9370
Mladić stressed that there would be victims, but that the other option was one of chaos, passivity
and empty talk and would be the ―path to our extinction‖.9371 (So what? Wouldn’t it be the Serb
extinction, as it was in Croatia, Kosovo and BH Federation? And what is criminal in an oral
consideration of the options of people in it’s Assembly?) Mladić also stated that ―we cannot
cleanse nor can we have a sieve to sift so that only Serbs would stay, or that the Serbs would fall
through and the rest leave‖ and that he did not know how the Accused and Krajišnik would be able
to explain this to the world and it would be ―genocide‖.9372 (#General Mladic was speaking
generally in favour of a common life and a good relations among the ordinary Serbs and
Muslims, he praised Colonel Hasotic, a Muslim, who stayed in the VRS, he described
Minister Ostojic and his encounter with the Muslims from his native place, where they live
peacefully, although surrounded by the Serb setttlements. General Mladic didn’t refer to
anything that had been said, he have spoken generally against any differentiation and
discrimination, not in reaction to anything, but agains the general climate of nationalism in
Yugoslavia. This can not be used against this President, unless shown that it was Mladic’s
reaction to something Karadzic or Krajisnik said, but that was not the case! The very same
occasion, the President made his very known public speech before 50,000 citizens, stating

9369
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court pp. 10–11.
9370
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 31.
9371
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court pp. 31–33.
9372
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 35.
 715

that the Muslims and Croats will be safe and secure in the RS, and 50,000 people greeted
that by applauding!)

2864. Mladić stated that there are ways of neutralising the Muslims which do not mean that they
have to be expelled or drowned.9373 (#EXCULPATORY#!!! This was in accord with the policy
of the RS leadership!) In this regard, Mladić identified a common enemy and described them as
Muslim and Croatian ―hordes‖ and that they had to determine whether ―to throw both of them out
employing political and other moves, or to organise ourselves and throw out one by force of arms,
and we will be able to deal somehow with the other‖.9374 9379 (The #“hordes” meant the armed
and organised paramilitaries and terrorists deep in the Serb territory! #Every single country
would do that, because it was legal and obligatory! Such a terrorists, who are not declared,
structured and marked as an army, but live as a false citizens and kill the soldiers, policemen
and their civilian neighbours, do not have any rights that belonged to the POWs, but stil the
Serb side treated them that way!) At the same session, Mladić also spoke about the importance
of defining their goals and the territory of SerBiH and having the forces to achieve this.9375 (So
what? To “defend” is a universal right! What Mladic described already existed, didn’t have
to be achieved, just to be defended!) He also said that their goal should be to have ―a state of our
own where we have left our mark, the bones of our fathers, and that is the goal we must fight
for‖.9376 Mladić stated that if ―we have taken something in this war that was not ours, we need to
keep hold of it so that in political negotiations we can get those things that were ours, and that we
cannot get in any other way‖.9377 (So what? No army would leave any strategically important
places before the final settlement!) Mladić advocated that the actions of the Bosnian Serbs
should remain secret and recommended that they adopt a common rhetoric towards the public.9378
He also stressed the importance of identifying enemies and that on this basis, ―we must make our
move and eliminate them, either temporarily or permanently‖.9379 (So what? Should the Serbs
nourish their enemies? But, the main issue is: why the Chamber is inferring about the
President’s mens rea from the words of other persons, even of a completely different
ideological views, which the President was not suppose to confirm or deny? Mladic was
loudly meditating, it was his first appearance before the Assembly of a new, non-communist
parliament, he didn’t say anything unacceptable, and this is irrelevant for the case against
the President!)

2865. Towards the end of the same session on 12 May 1992, Krajišnik acknowledged that ―we
will surely go to war‖ and that ―it will be possible to solve this thing with Muslims and Croats
9373
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly , 12 May 1992), e-court p. 35.
9374
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 41.
9375
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court pp. 32–33.
9376
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 39.
9377
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 32.
9378
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court pp. 33–34 (stating ―[t]he thing that we are doing needs to be guarded as our
deepest secret‖ and ―[o]ur people must know how to read between the lines‖, and suggesting that they ―adopt such a wisdom that we are against the war but that
we will fight if attacked, and that we do not want a war against the Muslims as a people, or against the Croats as a people, but against those who steered and
pitted these peoples against us‖). .(What the Chamber had expected from a commander of an Army which was declared a war ant attacked, except to
pleade for a care of secrecies. All other that Mladic said was #EXCULPATORY! SIMILARLY SPOKE President Karadzic next day before 50,000
cinizens of Banja Luka, see the transcript from the public meeting on 13 May 92 in Banja Luka D494, S. @upljanin#:

R.

Kara`i}:

9379
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 33.
 716

only by war‖ but that they should select the political solution because it would not look good if the
conclusion of Assembly was that they had chosen the option of war.9380 (So what? #The issue
“war vs. political solution” didn’t depend only on one out of the three sides. This kind of
#“fishing” for sentences freely communicated as a political discourse, while there is so many
relevant documents, is not fair, and should not be relevant it such a cases#! It was done
because in the documents there was no evidence about any criminal intents or deeds!)

2866. Other deputies supported the Strategic Goals and indicated that in order for them to be
realised they could be ―developed further and presented as variations‖ and that the borders would be
established ―when we make them a fact‖ and that peace could ―only be achieved by war‖.9381 They
also emphasised the importance of finding a way to ―keep in peace what we have won in war‖ and in
areas where they were a minority there would need to be a resettlement of the population.9382 (Here is
the entire discussion of a guest at the Assembly session, not deputy, but a guest, professor of
Ecomony at University and a well known expert P956, .29 – 30:

9380
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court pp. 45, 47.
9381
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 27. This speech was delivered by Velibor Ostojić.
9382
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court pp. 29–30.
 717

(#Words OF Others#A! lthough neither the President, nor any other official could be
responsible for a greeting words of a guest at the Assembly session, there is no a single
resemblance to what is “found” in this paragraph of the Judgement#. A “resettlement” had
been mentioned only when the guest was expressing his concern about the Serbs that may
remain in the Muslim-Croat territories, “in the areas where we are a minority”, suggesting that
if they do feel insecure, they must be enabled to resettle to the Serb republic. This was the
Chamber who liked this unofficial words, because had the Prosecution pointed out to this piece
of evidence, the Defence would ask this guest at the Assembly session, who was the witness who
testified, to explain what he meant, although it is clear that a possible “resettlement“ pertained
only to the Serbs, not a non-Serbs in the Serb areas!)

2867. At this session, BrĊanin explained that in areas where Serbs were a majority, ―most of
them are still asking whether they should injure the Muslims, whether they can hold certain posts,
whether loyal Muslims and loyal Croats exist‖.9383 (#There is no such a sentence on this
address!#) BrĊanin was one of the Bosnian Serb leaders who engaged in anti-Muslim rhetoric and
this rhetoric created a great deal of animosity, mistrust and hatred towards the Bosnian Muslim
population.9384 For example, BrĊanin said that he did not know why the Muslims were pickling
cabbage for the winter because they would not be there to eat it.9385 (#A protected lie#!
“protected witness statement!) BrĊanin at a meeting for Serb unity in August 1994 attended by
Krajišnik said ―[t]hose leftist forces which are offering us co-existence again must know that it is
the obligation of Serbs over the next hundred years to wipe their feet from the foul non-Christians
who have befouled this soil of ours‖.9386 Krajišnik then took the stand and praised the words and
patriotism of those who had spoken before him.9387 (#Out of courtesy # #A words of MP-s#! Mr.
Krajisnik praised “those who had spoken before him” which meant nothing in relation to
what Brdjanin said. However, Brdjanin was a deputi, directly elected, and neither Mr.
Krajisnik, nor the President were entitled to “educate” or control, or correct what deputies
were talking, until and unles it was going to dominate and be adopted as an official
standpoint. The Prime Ministers Djeric and Lukic testified that there always were some
extreme opinions, but none of them prevailed. It was very known to the Chamber how the
President was critical of the Brdjanin rhetorics and how often he criticised him, but still it
charges the President for a free-floating repliques or statements of a deputy?!?)

2868. On 7 May 1992, a week before being presented before the 16th session of the Bosnian
Serb Assembly, the Strategic Goals were discussed in the presence of the President, Mladić, and
Krajišnik.9388 Krajišnik acknowledged that he had taken part in adopting the Strategic Goals and
that the first goal was the most important and that the remaining goals were sub-items of this
goal.9389 Mladić also stated that he had ―read, mulled over for a long time and discussed with the
most select circle of comrades whom we convened, the strategic goals that are of substance‖.9390
(#So what?# The Muslims wanted to secede from Yugoslavia, the Serbs didn’t, and the only
compromise was to have the three ethnic states within Bosnia. Before the war, the strategic
objectives of the Serbs were different. But, all of it was legal, even proposed by the UN – EC
mediators, aand no court should question these political issues! Neither these political
claimes of the Serbs and Croats for their entities in BiH caused the war, nor caused any
crime. Both the war and crimes were caused by the Muslim try to dictate how the future

9383
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 25.
9384
[REDACTED].
9385
[REDACTED].
9386
P14 (TV footage of Serb unity meeting in Banja Luka, 21 August 1994, with transcript), pp. 5–6.
9387
P14 (TV footage of Serb unity meeting in Banja Luka, 21 August 1994, with transcript), p. 8.
9388
P1477 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 14 February–25 May 1992), pp. 262–263.
9389
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 45.
9390
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of Assembly of SerBiH, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 32.
 718

independent Bosnia was to look like in it’s internal structure, i.e. to impose a unitary state
with an Islamic regime to the Christian majority!)

2869. At this same session a deputy from Brĉko referred to the tasks set by the President, and
noted that one of the first priorities ―is establishing communication between Semberija and the
Bosnian Krajina‖ and that while military operations had been completed to some extent, there
were still Bosnian Muslim forces in Brĉko, and that Brĉko ―remains uncompleted‖.9391 He noted
that in order to have ―definitive clearing of the area it will be necessary to have many more forces
there‖ and called on the President and Krajišnik to promote general mobilisation of the Serbian
people and referred to the ―conquests that are currently necessary‖.9392 (#So what? The Brcko
deputy in Parliament pointed out to the Muslim forces, not to the civilians#. And he claimed
for an additional mobilisation, which would be senseless if he meant about civilians. Since
there was already six weeks of the war, why that what the deputy from Brcko would be
illegal? The Chamber is mixing up the temporal plans, the times when something had been
said! What had been said before the war and repeated during the war, would have a
different meaning. In addition, the Chamber is allocating so many words said by so many
peoples to the President, no matter he agreed or not. The President was not a teacher to
correct deputies, he could onlu refuse to sign an Assembly document that wasn’t lawful, and
nothing else. He wasn’t even obliged to attend the sessions!)

2870. At this same session, Dragan Kalinić, the health minister, spoke in favour of choosing the
―option of war‖ and that their enemy was perfidious and ―cannot be trusted until they are
physically, militarily destroyed and crushed, which, of course, implies eliminating and liquidating
their key people‖.9393 He further noted that ―only what has been conquered militarily can be really
and truly ours‖ and that there was no point in making maps until they had ―succeeded in defining
and marking our territory militarily‖.9394 (At that moment Dr. #Kalinic was an opposition
deputy#, and the Accuse had even less possibility to warn a deputy of the opposition, that
would be a grave violation of the parliamentary rules!)

2871. Kalinić also noted that since they were in closed session, he could make it clear that when
they called for cease-fires this was only done to demonstrate that they were in favour of
negotiations and a peaceful solution but these statements were for ―external, public use‖ and that
cease-fires could be used to consolidate their armed forces.9395 (That was right, but still, the
#President was not a school teacher, to correct everybody#!) Kalinić also spoke in favour of
the destruction of radio and television facilities and medical facilities ―so that the enemy has
nowhere to go for medical help‖.9396 (It is only an evidence that Dr. Kalinic was very angry
with his Muslim coleagues who grabbed all the hospitals in Sarajevo, denying the Serbs to
use at least one of them. But, this outburst of anger of Dr. Kalinic was recognized by
everyone as a moment, and everyone knew that he didn’t mean it!) Bosnian Serb leaders often
proposed cease-fires at times when they already controlled a large percentage of the territory in
BiH.9397 (#The Chamber didn’t need the Okun’s opinion on this subject, since the Chamber
should have known, after more than 500 day of trial, that the Serbs had always controlled
this amount of territory, and that the Serbs didn’t took the control by a military actions,

9391
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 12.
9392
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court pp. 12–13.
9393
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 17.
9394
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 18.
9395
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 18.
9396
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 19.
9397
Herbert Okun, T. 1779 (28 April 2010). See also Anthony Banbury, T. 13397 (15 March 2011); D1146 (International Conference on Former Yugoslavia
report, 8 June 1994).
 719

although they defended it militarily. What was wrong with the offers of cease-fires? The
Serbs had been against the war from the beginning of the crisis!#)

2872. A deputy who spoke in favour of the Strategic Goals noted that in Bosanka Krupa, ―there
are no more Muslims in the Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa‖ and that they had been
―evacuated‖ and that it was unlikely that they would have a place to return to given that the
President told them ―the happy news that the right bank of the Una is the border‖.9398 (Although
the Defence pointed out in the Defence Final Brief that the #Prosecution have “castrated”
this sentence#, the Chamber didn’t pay any attention to this undoubted fact. First, Bosanska
Krupa about which the witness had been spoken, was onlu one third of the Bosanska Krupa
Municipality, i.e. #only the Serb part of it#. Second, the rest two third of Municipality was
the Muslim Municipality of Bosanska Krupa, without a single Serb. But, the most important
is the fact that the Serb authorities of the Serbian Krupa evacuated the Muslims within their
municipality, from an embattled village or area, to a peaceful area, or, in one case, they
evacuated the Muslim civilians to another municipality, but in the same entity, in Sanski
Most. But, the most importans is the most drastic manipulation with the witness’s crippled
sentence. Let us se the critical part: P956, p.20:

#Th
is was a “take-over” of the Serb municipality, i.e. the Serb part, in addition to the Muslim
two third of Bosanska Krupa#! It is pitty the Chamber didn’t have any interest in the entire
discussion of this deputy. Further, p. 20 :

That the Una River was a natural boundary of the Serb parts of BiH, it was known to the
European Community, and Ambasador Cutileiro realised that and marked it in his
preliminary map, which was to be discussed further.Now, the critical sentence, p.20

“#we have evacuated them, so that there will be none there for the duration of war
operations.”# Why this small part of the sentence, but the very crucial for understanding,
was skipped both in the Indictment, but in the Judgement too, although the Defence notified
about this forgery?p.21

So,
this was a witness’s prediction that the Muslims will not return if the right bank of the Una
River was going to be in the Republic of Srpska, because they would prefer to live in their

9398
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court pp. 20–21. While the Chamber notes that the events in Bosanka Krupa are not
charged in the Indictment, the Chamber has had regard to this evidence as it supports the pattern of the Accused‘s involvement in setting objectives which
were implemented at the municipal level.
 720

area on the left bank of Una River. Therefore, nothing in these sentences relates either to the
witness’s intentions or wishes, let alone with the President’s intentions or doings!) :

2873. These Strategic Goals were also communicated to and discussed during Crisis Staff
meetings at a municipal level.9399 On 18 May 1992, the SDS Municipal Board in Prijedor was
informed about developments at the Bosnian Serb Assembly and informed about the main
guidelines for future activities which related to the Strategic Goals.9400 (So what? #There was the
war declared against the Serb community# in BiH by the others, and all the legal measures
were at the disposal of the attacked side!)

2874. The Strategic Goals were more than mere theoretical objectives and they were concretely
discussed at meetings. For instance, at a meeting of 1st Krajina Corps commanders and Banja
Luka leaders on 2 June 1992, the implementation of the second goal, i.e. creating a corridor
between Semberija and Krajina,9401 was discussed.9402 At the same meeting which was attended
by the President and Mladić, BrĊanin stated that ―everything in the ARK is done at the [Crisis
Staff] level‖.9403 The Accused also referred to the Strategic Goals at a meeting with Bosnian Serb
representatives on 10 June 1992 at which he said that #―[w]e have full control of many of our
territories‖#, (…#we have full control of many of our territories, controlled by the Serbs, so
what? Not anyone’s else, but their own territories!#Why it was wrong? Does the Chamber
know what is a civil war?) that Bosnian Serbs had strong support from the Serbian DB, and that
they had formed their own army.9404 (Nobody formed the Army of the Serbs in Bosnis, but they
themselves! There is no a single evidence of that! #Here is the reference to which the
Chamber refers: P1478, p.133

(It is
not enough just to say that this kind of deliberation must not ever been exercised, through a
wrong translations, or through a #crippling the sentences to the absudrity#! The two reasons
why the Serbs in Bosnia didn’t create their own military organisation are as follows: 1. “The
Army asked us not to”, which meant the JNA wanted the Serbs in Bosnia not to make any
party or ethnic army, and 2. “The State Security was severely watching us.” That meant:
“the Bosnian State Security, while secretly forming their secret ethnic and party army The
Patriotic League, wacthed the Serbs to prevent their response to the Muslim secret moves”.
How possibly this was translated so that a severe surveilance was presented as a “strong
support of the Serbian DB”? Is this kind of manipulation allowed in the countries of the
origin of the Judges? Or the Judges had an unlimited confidence in their Balkans assistents,
who fought against the Serbs even this way? If the Chamber evaluated the entire entry in
the Mladic’s diary, it would have seen that the Serbs in Bosnia from the beginning decided
for a defensive strategy. The Strategic goals werent any secret document, that was a new
negotiating platform, immediately communicated to the EC negotiators and made public, see
D428 of 9 June 1992, a decision of the Presidency, which clearly indicated that the Strategic
9399
See P3431 (Handwritten diary of KDZ192), p. 14 (under seal); KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11526–11527 (under seal). See
also NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13245–13246 (11 March 2011); NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13564–13565 (17 March 2011). The Chamber places no weight on
Donia‘s opinion that the Strategic Goals were published again in 1993 given an ―assessment of the leaders that these were important goals that should be
publicly known and that they had not changed‖. It also places no weight on his assessment about the significance of and the ideological basis for the
Strategic Goals. Robert Donia, T. 3073–3075 (31 May 2010).
9400
P6589 (Minutes of Prijedor Municipal Board meeting, 18 May 1992), p. 1. See Boško Mandić, T. 45774−45775 (21 January 2014); Simo Mišković, T.
45382–45383 (18 December 2013).
9401
P955 (SerBiH Assembly Decision on Strategic Goals of Serbian People in BiH, 12 May 1992).
9402
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 53, 60.
9403
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 53–54. See P6514 (Excerpt from military diary), pp. 2–3 (under seal); Radoslav BrĊanin, T.
43679–43684 (18 November 2013), T. 43685–43689 (18 November 2013) (private session). See also D4056 (News report on Ratko Mladić and Radovan
Karadţić visit to Banja Luka, 2 June 1992) (confirming that the Accused was on a short working visit on 2 June 1992).
9404
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 130, 132–133.
 721

goals were primarily a platform for negotiations with the EC and the sides:

2875. At another meeting in June 1992 of the Bosnian Serb military and political leadership, the
Accused noted that the Bosnian Serb Assembly had defined the strategic aims and further
reiterated the importance of those objectives and that the Bosnian Serbs had to protect their
territories militarily.9405 (#Because these territories had been attacked militarily, how else to
protect it#? How this is criminal, and is not criminal to attack the Serb territories?
Throughout the huge evidence there is many confirmations that the #Serb side controlled
only it’s own territories#, although not all, and that the Serb military actions were always
defensive!) He also noted that ―the birth of a state and the creation of borders does not occur
without war‖ (#Sayings#! So what?!? This was a paraphrase of an old saying that neither a
child nor a state could be brn without blood. But, anyway, this was rather sad meditation
that this rule had been confirmed in this case too, a completely neutral meditation and
description of the development! Is everything the President said a crim? Or the Chamber
produces as much quantity of nothing, to reach an illusion of quality?) and that according to
the map they had 66% of the territory in BiH.9406 (#That was not a result of the war, nor the
Serbs intended to claim for the entire amount of it#!) At this same meeting, Ostojić reported
that there were no Muslims in Bratunac.9407 (Mr. Ostojic reported to the military commander
about the military, not the civilian, situation in Bratunac, and Gen. Mladic made a very
short notes, incomplete, and as any unfinished sentence, could be red differently. Anyway,
the Serbs controlled only 20% of the territory of Bratunac, and from this part of
municipality the Muslim civilians demanded to be escorted to Tuzla, and this happened! The
combatants had been captured and transferred to Pale and further to Visoko. No killings!
See the testimony of a protected witness KW12.)

2876. On 17 June 1992, Mladić issued an order raising the combat readiness of the Biraĉ
Brigade and emphasising that the order was to allow for full control over Biraĉ, to secure the
corridor between Romanija and Semberija, and maintain a link with Serbia.9408 (What is wrong
with that? If the Chamber allowed the Defence to present the #conduct of the Muslim side,
cutting any traffic and killing drivers of the Boxite mines and civilians#, it would be clear
that it was a military necessity. Even if there was no such a huge criminal activity, since the
Muslim side declared and started the war against the Serbs in Bosnia, the militaries were
entitled to secure it’s own communications!) In November 1992, Mladić issued Directive 4 to
―cleanse the free territory of RS of the remaining enemy groups and paramilitary formations‖.9409
One of the tasks of Directive 4 was addressed to the Drina Corps which was instructed ―to inflict
the heaviest possible losses‖ on the ―enemy‖ and force them to leave certain areas such as Biraĉ,
Ţepa, and Goraţde with the Bosnian Muslim population.9410 (#EXCULPATORY#! #The

9405
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 93–95.
9406
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 97.
9407
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 101.
9408
P3238 (Order of the VRS Main Staff, 17 June 1992), p. 1.
9409
P976 (Directive 4, 19 November 1992), pp. 3–4.
9410
P976 (Directive 4, 19 November 1992), p. 5. While Krajišnik had in his own case testified that this was an ―order for ethnic cleansing‖ he somewhat
qualified this during his testimony in this case. The Chamber therefore does not find his evidence to be reliable in this regard. Momĉilo Krajišnik, T.
43823–43824 (19 November 2013).
 722

civilians were not the target of the VRS#! The Defence pointed out the linguistic problem
with this Directive: if the civilian “population was to leave certain areas with the military”
that would mean that the military would take the civilians with them. But, if the militaries
were to leave with the population, that meant that the population was taking military with
themselves. It is necessary to connect this order with the previous one, two weeks prior to it,
when the Muslim combatants from Vecici, Kotor Varos municipality, demanded that the
VRS let their civilians leave the area, while the armed units would stay and continue to fight.
Gen. Mladic agreed that the civilians may leave, but that they had to take the combatants
with them too. There was a very cnown confusion, because the President approved the first
demand, which probably was wrong, but the civilian rights were prioritised. This time Gen.
Mladis demanded that the civilians, who anyway wanted to leave once their army was losing,
take te military with them. See: D3914

So, a #permutation of these two wards drastically changes the meaning#! Two weeks after
that Gen. Mladic issued Dir. No. 4, which certainly wa influenced by the Vecici events,
because the combatanst “didn’t leave with the civilians, and there was a severe fighting and
loses on both sides!)

2877. On 8 November 1992 at a meeting of Corps Commanders attended by the President and
Mladić, Krajišnik expressed his admiration for the military successes and noted that they had a
―disproportionate engagement of the army in relation to the strategic objectives‖.9411 (So what? A
politician was flattering to the Army. Anyway, here is what Gen. Mladic put down from
what Mr. Krajisnik said, P1481, p.146:

So,
Krajisnik pleaded for a restrain from “seizing their territories! He also said that the Army
was more engaged than the results showed) Krajišnik also reminded the attendees of the
progress made in relation to the Strategic Goals and noted that the most important objective had
been assigned to Milenko Ţivanović, namely to mop up the Drina and repeated that the most
important task was the ―separation from the Muslims‖ and that the ―Muslims must not stay with
us‖.9412 (As a matter of fact, Mr. Krajisnik didn’t say that the Muslim civilians shouldn’t stay
with the Serbs, but shouldn’t stay with their state, not even autonomy, see, P1481, p. 147:

9411
P1481 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 5 October–27 December 1992), pp. 141, 146–147.
9412
P1481 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 5 October–27 December 1992), p. 147. Ţivanović acknowledged that separation from the Bosnian Muslims was
discussed but testified that his task was not to engage in ―ethnic cleansing‖ and there was no mention of killing. Milenko Ţivanović, T. 42585–42590 (30
October 2013).
 723

Mopping up Orasje was only meant removing the military, not even the Muslim, but Croat,
the same is with Drina, always meaning the enemy armed groups! There are at least two
reasons why the Chamber shouldn’t do that with such an evidence: it is not clear what Mr.
Krajisnik really said and how accurate is Mladic’s note, and why the President would be
liable for anyone’s words except for his own? #This is nothing but a patchwork#!)

2878. At a session of the Bosnian Serb Government on 20 March 1993, a debate on the draft
law on the territorial organisation of municipalities was held, during which the criteria for the
establishment of municipalties was decided.9413 (#So what? Was it a crime, that the
Government established an administrative conditions for exercising the authority, given
through the democratic elections#?)

2879. At a meeting of 19 June 1993 in Pale with members of the Supreme Command with, inter
alios, Krajišnik, Koljević, Lukić, Mladić, and Milovanović in attendance, the President gave an
update as to developments in relation to the Strategic Goals and the territorial situation in BiH.9414
(So what? Here is what the President said:

9413
P3129 (Minutes of the 66th session of RS Government, 20 March 1993), p. 5.
9414
P1483 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), pp. 212–213.
 724

The President reports his own knowledge about the course of events in the world in
connection with the BiH crisis, and advokates three states, so that all the three communities
be satisfied! What is wrong with this description of the local and world situation?!? “The
Serbs blinked with their eyes”!) In June 1993, Mladić issued Directive 5 and noted that given
the developments, a unified BiH was no longer an option.9415 (Mladic only conveyed the political
position to the soldiers!) Directive 6 was issued by the President in November 1993 and included
specific instructions with respect to the strategic goals of the VRS.9416 Directive 6 referred to the
goals of (i) liberating Sarajevo; (ii) defining the borders of RS on the Neretva River and gaining
access to the sea; (iii) defining the borders of RS in the Una River basin; and (iv) expanding the
borders of RS in the north-east and establishing firmer ties with Serbia.9417 (So what? Since the
war didn’t end, for the rest of the war the President was obliged to outline a prospective to
the military. However, the Tribunal presumes that the President would do the best if
submitted his own population to defeat and slavery!)

2880. Bosnian Serb leaders, including the President, discussed the Strategic Goals openly with
international representatives who were told that RS would be ethnically ―pure‖9418 and that their
aim was to redistribute the population in BiH to allow Bosnian Serb control of a ―single
continuous block of territory‖ which also included ―traditionally Serb-inhabited areas‖.9419 (This
is #below any taste and even decency to rely on these two witnesses and their free
interpretations of the President’s political standpoints# . Neither these two witnesses had
ever been solely in contact with the President, nor had ever been the principal negotiators, to
be privy of the President’d opinions, unlike their superiors, Lord Carrington, Ambasador
Cutileiro, Secretary Vance, Lord Owen, Ambassador Akashi, Mr. Stoltenberg, and many
other interlocutors. These distinguished persons had never reported or testified anything
similar to what these two favourite witnesses of the Prosecution. To be honest to Okun, he
was number two or three in the delegations that met the President, but he himself admitted
that his notes weren’t a verbatim minutes, but rather an amalgam of what was said, and
what he thought about it, see Okun’s testimony, T.1819-1820 A. That's correct, yes. And your
point -- the earlier point you make, that the readers of the note-books could draw different
conclusions from them, is also correct. #So, how the UN could back this kind of
manipulations aimed to sentence an innocent man and denigrate the entire nation and
region#?)

9415
P843 (Directive 5, 25 June 1993), p. 1.
9416
P3039 (Directive 6, 11 November 1993), pp. 1, 6.
9417
P3039 (Directive 6, 11 November 1993), p. 6.
9418
Herbert Okun, T. 1474–1475 (22 April 2010); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4157–4158, 4169.
9419
P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 267–270. While Harland also stated that this required the removal of very large
numbers of Bosnian Muslims as they were a majority in certain areas, this appears to be his own assessment and not to be what the Bosnian Serb leadership
said. The Chamber therefore does not place any weight on this aspect of his evidence. See also P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May
2010), para. 33.
 725

2881. The Chamber also recalls that during the negotiation process at the ICFY, Bosnian Serbs
pushed for an agenda consistent with the Strategic Goals and identified the areas of BiH they
wanted to be under Bosnian Serb control while the Bosnian Muslims maintained their position for
the creation of a unitary state with centralised powers.9420 (Why the Serb position would be
wrong, so more since there was #no any need for a force to achieve# it, while the Muslim
position needed a war to be achieved? And the Muslim (SDA) side waged three wars for this
“strategic goal”, against the Serbs, the Croats and against the Abdic Muslims. Beside that,
the Muslim attitude towards the inner structure of BiH was in a sharp contrast to the
commitment of Mr. Izetbegovic made on the ICFY in the Hague in 1991, when he committed
and accepted that the Serbs and Croats in BiH will have a high degree of autonomy!) The
position of the Bosnian Croats was to take BiH out of the FRY, to declare independence, and to
establish their own state called the Community of Herceg-Bosna with territorial contiguity with
Croatia.9421

2882. In January 1993, the President reported to the Bosnian Serb Assembly on disputes the
Bosnian Serb leadership had at international negotiations with respect to disputed territories in
municipalities including Prijedor, Sanski Most, Kljuĉ, Rogatica, and Srebrenica.9422 The President
also noted that in municipalities including Zvornik, Vlasenica, and Rogatica the municipal
authorities agreed to the legitimate division of those municipalities before the war with the effect
that ―there are areas that are [i]ndisputably Serb, Croat or Muslim‖.9423 (#EXCULPATORY#!
Had this process been continued, there wouldn’t be any war, any crimes, any movement of
population. Every ethnic community would have it’s own administration and a mutual
respect of the basic rights!)

2883. At a meeting held at the Presidency of Serbia on 8 November 1993, with inter alios
Slobodan Milošević, the President, Krajišnik, Martić, Mladić, and Perišić in attendance, the
following common objectives were discussed: (i) unconditionally strengthen the integrity of
Serbia, (ii) set up the RS as a completely independent state; and (iii) ensure Serbs have complete
power in the Krajina.9424 Emphasis was placed on reinforcing co-operation between the armies
and unity in the Krajina.9425 (#All legal and legitimate goals, for which there was no any need
for an offensive approach! At the same meeting President Milosevic presented his analysis
about the German strategy of exhaustion of the Serbs and their engagement the USA to lead
the process which was not in the US interest. Because of this “exhaustion strategy” Pres.
Milosevic meditated about endig the war as soon as possible, with the results acceptable to
the Serbs in BiH and Croatia. It should be noticed that it was a period of the Owen-
Stoltemberg Peace Plan at the Conference. #Let us see what else had been said and advised:
P1483, p. 20.

Why this part was not worthwhile of any attention of the Chamber? Why a selectivness in
prosecuting and deciding is the main characteristics of this Court?#) At the end of the
meeting, conclusions were presented, one of which was to ―work out offensive moves to correct
frontlines in the RS, but go quietly and without noise as soon as possible‖.9426 (#Commendable# !

9420
See paras. 354–356.
9421
See para. 355.
9422
P921 (Transcript of 24th session of RS Assembly, 8 January 1993), p. 8.
9423
P921 (Transcript of 24th session of RS Assembly, 8 January 1993), p. 9.
9424
P1484 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), pp. 19–20.
9425
P1484 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), p. 28.
9426
P1484 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), p. 27.
 726

But, the Chamber misses the main point: Pres. Milosevic was in the middle of preparations
for elections, and the main purpose of this meeting was a creation of an image of the All-Serb
support to his Party!)

2884. On 1 October 1993, the Accused held a meeting with VRS generals, during which he
declared: ―Our fundamental ideology is Serbdom and the Serbian state‖.9427 Mladić asked that
further goals of the war and tasks of the army be defined at the level of the state and the Supreme
Command.9428 (What was wrong with the President’s attitude? The Chamber had already
known that the main Serb problem was an ideological rift in the line #with communism –
royalism, a so called “partisan-cetnik” rift#. At that time there was a communist agitation in
the VRS by some old-fashioned officers, as the President said at the meeting on 8 November,
P1483, p. 24

Nothing illegal in this attitude of the President! As opposed to the Serbdom there were a
communist-internationalist, even pro-yugoslav looking ideas, and each and every of them
caused a catastrophic consequences for the Serb people. The President wanted to prevent any
division in the VRS!)

2885. In December 1993, Krajišnik noted that at the beginning of the war the Strategic Goals
were ―one of the most important documents‖ and that the Bosnian Serb Assembly endorsed these
objectives and ―organised the people to implement them‖.9429 He also noted that the first and most
important objective had been achieved and that the RS now existed with its own state organisation
and territory.9430 (#This the very basic objective was not contested by the EC – UN mediators,
but contrary, it was proposed by the leaders of the ICFY Lord Carrington and Ambasador
Cutileiro.# It should have been achieved without any war, by sticking to the Lisbon
Agreement! That was a political strategic objective, and it became a war objective because
the war was imposed to the Serbs!) Krajišnik noted that in the first months of the war, efforts
were directed towards ―establishing full unity throughout the territory of [RS]‖ and that they had
created the organisational and personnel conditions to allow the state to function normally and to
allow ―a more stable defence and the liberation of Serbian ethnic spaces‖.9431 (So what? Was it an
illegal endeavour? It is clear that Mr. Krajisnik spoke with the full conviction that the
objective was just and correct to the other communities in BiH) Krajišnik noted that in
defining the borders of the RS in accordance with their strategic objectives they ―did not violate
the like rights of the Muslim and Croat communities‖ and what remained was to struggle for ―just
borders of our Republic, to be internationally recognised‖.9432

2886. At a meeting in Belgrade on 13 December 1993 with the Bosnian Serb and Serbian
leadership in attendance,9433 the President stated that the end of the conflict was close and that the
Bosnian Serbs were holding 75% of the territory, some of which he noted would have to be
returned as the international community would not allow it.9434 The President then listed the

9427
P1483 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), p. 369.
9428
P1483 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), p. 372.
9429
P1383 (Transcript of 36th session of RS Assembly, 30–31 December 1993), p. 12.
9430
P1383 (Transcript of 36th session of RS Assembly, 30–31 December 1993), pp. 12–13.
9431
P1383 (Transcript of 36th session of RS Assembly, 30–31 December 1993), p. 13.
9432
P1383 (Transcript of 36th session of RS Assembly, 30–31 December 1993), p. 13.
9433
From Serbia, inter alios, Slobodan Milošević, General Perišić, and Jovića Stanišić were present. From the RS, inter alios, the Accused, Krajišnik, Mladić,
Milovanović, Miletić, Salapura, and Mićo Stanišić were present. P1484 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), p. 53.
9434
P1484 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), p. 53.
 727

Strategic Goals.9435 (#Another confirmation that a territorial issues weren’t so important

when the war ends!#)

2887. At the 37th Bosnian Serb Assembly Session on 10 January 1994, the President stated: ―We
can consider ourselves as winners after occupying this land, since the land is 100% Serbian now.
Therefore, even if we come down to around 50%, we should be more than happy and satisfied, it is
Dušan‘s empire.‖9436 (#First, the term “occupying” was not used, but rathed “secured” or
“pressed”. How the Serbs could have occupied their own territory. See P1385, p. 80 in Serbian:

In the same sentence the President said that the Serbs should be satisfied even if they fell down
to 50% of it. However, this is a regular practice that those who assisted the Chamber in
assembling this Judgement #pull some sentences out of context and depict it as an independent
position#. This Assembly session went in the attempt of the President to gain a support of the
deputies for an acceptance of the proposed proportions 1%, 33% and 49% and to end the war.
In defending his own peaceful attitude the President underlined that the Serbs should have
been satisfied and accept the international proposal. Let us se the discussion of deputies prior
to this sentence of the President: P1385, p.102

This sort of a deep dissatisfaction with the “double-criteria” policy of the internationals was
total and shared by all the Serbs, and unfortunaly they were right. Many other deputies said
similar criticism to the Predisend and negotiating team, and in response to this criticism the
President said that the territory must not be the main issue, but the peace and formation of the
three republics. : In this speech the Accused also stated that their first Strategic Goal was
separation and not the occupation of 60% of the land and they had also achieved their second
objective, which was to have a contiguous territory connected by a corridor.9437 The Accused later
that month delivered a speech in which he stressed that they had not lost any vital territories and had
―kept everything that was important for the Serbian people‖.9438 During a meeting with VRS leaders,
the Accused recalled the substance of the six Strategic Goals and declared that ―they have been
defined with the highest level possible of brazenness‖.9439 (Every single political speech of the
President was used as a plan or intention! This was his effort to persuade the deputies and
military to accept the peace plan, because as he sai in the same session of the Assembly, in the
same context, a local wars do not end with the entire victory of one of the sides, see:P1385, p.

9435
P1484 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), p. 53. See also Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
9064–9067 (confirming that the ethnic division of Sarajevo, drawn along the Miljacka River, was one of the political objectives of the Bosnian Serb
leadership).
9436
P1385 (Transcript of 37th session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), p. 107.
9437
P1385 (Transcript of 37th session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), p. 108. See also P5748 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and
Lukić, 13 February 1992), pp. 1–2; P5723 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and Ţika LNU, 7 March 1992), p. 5. BrĊanin testified that the
second Strategic Goal was absolutely necessary, otherwise, those in the ARK would not have survived; the separation was an unavoidable consequence and
the Accused insisted that the Bosnian Serbs should only defend the regions where they were the majority; and that the Accused never wanted to take any
territory that did not belong to Bosnian Serbs. Radoslav BrĊanin, T. 43687 (18 November 2013) (private session). The Chamber does not find his evidence
to be reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that BrĊanin‘s testimony was marked by evasiveness and in addition the witness
had a self-interest in portrarying these measures in a positive light.
9438
P1387 (Transcript of 38th session of RS Assembly, 17 January 1994), p. 75.
9439
P5593 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić speech).
 728

107.

Even #the most commendable moves of the President are used agains him#!!! So, the President
was begging the representatives to get used to a moderate outcome of the war, and to a
situation without winer, to a win-win result, and that the Strategic Goals had been envisaged
with the highest level of brazenness, a maximalist, so that the Assembly deputies should get
used to a possibility that some of it wouldn’t be achieved! But, the Chamber didn’t recognise
the #EXCULPATORY# elements in this speech!)

2888. At a meeting with VRS commanders held on 29 January 1994, the President stated that the
―plan‖ was, inter alia, the following: (i) do everything to maintain the Croat/Muslim schism; (ii)
separate from the Croats and the Muslims; (iii) let the boundaries of the territory of the Muslims be
clearly ―detained‖ if they do not want to stay in Yugoslavia;9440 and (iv) be in conflict everywhere
with the Muslims and the Croats.9441 (What is wrong with this considerations about
enemies?)The following day, at a meeting of the Supreme Command, the President reiterated that
their task was to defeat the Muslims and that they should be careful that the Muslims do not end up
in the Bosnian Serb state.9442 (#To “end up” in the Serb state, means to be cought in it without
their will#. Again, it was within the context of dissuasion of the military from capturing more
territories, because there wouldn’t be the three republics, and if the Serbs defeated the
Muslims, that would again be a unitary state and nobody would be satisfied. A common states
of the antagonised ethnicities in the Balkans appear to be the main problem of this region!
However, the Chamber, or it’s assistents have carefully avoided the “whole truth” the sentence
about where the Muslims may be situated pertained only to their state unit, not their
population. See what President Karadzic said, carring about the Muslims and Croats to be
satisfied: P1485, p.88-89:

Therefore, President Karadzic is for the Muslim-Croat rights to be respected, whyle the West
may decide to prevente existence of a Muslim state and add the Muslim unit to the Serbs or
Croats. And this is EXCULPATORY, because the President mentioned Serbia which may be

9440
The Chamber notes the reference to a policy of ―immigration‖ with a question mark in the English version of exhibit P1485. Having gone back to the
original version, the Chamber cannot be satisfied that this is indeed the term referred to since this part of the original document is not sufficiently legible.
9441
P1485 (Ratko Mladić notebook, 9 January–21 March 1994), pp. 51, 77. The part of the plan related to Sarajevo will be discussed further below.
9442
P1485 (Ratko Mladić notebook, 9 January–21 March 1994), pp. 88–89.
 729

unstable because of to many minorities included in the state. #Another word, Karadzic was
advocating a modest approach to the territorial issues!#)

2889. At a conference in Vlasenica on 29 January 1994, the Accused delivered a speech in

which he spoke about conquering the entire territory in which there is probably about a million
or a million and two hundred thousand Muslims, if there are still so many out there. Here I
mean not only those who were killed but also those who fled; in order that we achieve and
realize it. It is very hard to imagine. […] We must defeat them everywhere we can and keep
the territory. If possible, we should try to expand the territory; […] and we should force them
to agree to a kind of political and military capitulation […] the starting point will be the actual
situation on the ground.9443 (So what? But, let us first see who assembled this document,
what the provenance if it is? Can not be established. Also, this was not a transcript of a
recorded speech, nor was it a shorthand-stenographie, but a notes as much as cought.
Finnaly, that was some “councelling” with the VRS commanders. Now, let us see what
this speech, mainly political one, contains: P5581, p.1

All of this hypothetical possibilities were presented by the President within the
framework of dissuading the military people from taking to much of territories, depicting
that in such a situation the Muslims may have pretended that they accepted the unity
with the Serb state, but that it would be a life full of infuriation. See further:

”To defeat them”… while “keeping the territory”… is also a #dissuasion from any
offensive strategy#. A member of the VRS Main Staff, testifying in this case …@ said
that the President sometimes objected the military commanders for being “too militant”
and that the commanders responded that an army must be militant particularly in a war,
see:@ The President also said that “if possible, we should try to expand
territory, although this presents a great problem…” Why would that be a “great
problem” because of the fact that the Serbs couldn’t keep all the territory, but since the
Muslim side doesn’t want to talk, it must be defeated in order to negotiate a solution. All
of it had been handwritten down by an unknown author, imprecise and with insufficient
sentences, and therefore should not be used in a criminal case. Therefore, President
Karadzic presented to the military his political assessment that the war was managed by
the “international community”, and that the IC may give up the political and military aid
to the Muslims when it become evident that the Muslims can not achieve more militarily.
To “force them to a kind of political and military capitulation” clearly meant that the
objective was to secure that the Muslims wouldn’t be diluted within a Serb or Croat state,

9443
P5581 (Radovan Karadţić's speech at a conference in Vlasenica, 29 January 1994), p. 1.
 730

or to dominate over the Serbs and Croats, but to accept an agreement about getting what
they were entitled to: their sovereignty on their own territories. And that was what
happened in reality: The “International Community” supported ABIH to achieve what it
could, for instance to try to win the Serbs around Sarajevo in June 1995, and other
fronts, and then the UN-NATO forced a formidable bombardment of the Serb positions
and approached the end of the war. A particularly important question is: whether this
kind of a make-up of evidence, and avoidance of the “whole truth” is allowed in any
judicial system? Will the United Nations through its courts establish a new standards,
accordinfg to which all and everytning is allowed to the prosecutors and chambers?)

2890. The Accused further stated ―[f]rom the very beginning, I accepted entirely the view of all
the commanders and [G]eneral Mladić. We must change the rhetoric. We must speak on TV, we
must participate in live TV shows; we must motivate people for chivalry and prepare them for
victories; and, of course, we must nurture their anger toward the enemy‖.9444 With respect to the
Bosnian Muslims, the Accused also said:

We prepared ourselves better during the time of peace than they. We knew what they
are doing but they did not know what we are doing. They were astonished by the
way we organized #defense of the municipalities#. We were organized; [G]eneral
Kovaĉević knows that, because we were supported by [G]eneral Adţić. He worked
on distribution of ammunition, he knew about. General Subotić also knew about
it.9445

(This is #wrong translation#. There had been said” …Kovacevic knows… he worked
on dispersion of ammunition”. Not distribution, but “dispersion” out of the barrack
that could have been surrounded. There are several orders, including some of the 2nd
Military District, to disperse the military materials on a secure areas, see:D3679:

of 4 April 1992, or see D3823:

9444
P5581 (Radovan Karadţić's speech at a conference in Vlasenica, 29 January 1994), p. 2.
9445
P5581 (Radovan Karadţić's speech at a conference in Vlasenica, 29 January 1994), p. 4.
 731

… and further:

There was no any “distribution” of ammunition or any war material to the Serbs in
BiH, but only to the JNA, which didn’t interfere in the ethnic conflict for a long
period, see: D4636 of 22 April 1992:

How come this #genuine, contemporaneous and strictly confidential internal army
document weren’t of any value to the Chamber, not even as any street gossip, which
the Chamber accepts if against the Serbs#?) The Accused also stated that he was certain
that no territory except in Sarajevo would have to be returned.9446 (Why would the
President confuse his commanders that some territories shouldn’t be defended,

9446
P5581 (Closing Remarks by Radovan Karadţić at a Conference in Vlasenica, 29 January 1994), p. 4.
 732

because it will be returned? #The Chamber equalised the jokes from intercepted
telephone conversations, a statements of some unofficial persons, all the political
speeches, and valued it more than contemporaneous document of the sides and even
of the UN! This way it was possible to create a completely false picture of this
conflict#! But, was it a fair trial???)

2891. At a meeting of Bosnian Serb and Serbian officials in Belgrade on 27 February 1994, the
President initially declared that the Bosnian Serbs might agree for the Muslims to have 33.3% of
the territory, the Croats 14 or 15%, and the Bosnian Serbs 52 or 53%; he then stated that the
Bosnian Serbs could be satisfied with 49% of the territory.9447 (#EXCULPATORY#!!! A
flexibility was another Serb concession, after all the previous one!)

2892. At a Bosnian Serb Assembly session in March 1994, Ostojić identified four areas which
he described as extremely sensitive in terms of establishing ―geographic continuity of the Serbian
population‖ in the RS.9448 (So what? Describing the #sensitive areas was not a crime!# This is
a #patchworking of irrelevant sentences# because the Indictment didn’t obtain a relevant
evidence, and the Chamber is criminalising everything in the Serb legitimate political life, as
well as a necessary military responses!) The areas included Rogatica, Vlasenica, Bratunac,
Prijedor, Kljuĉ, and Sanski Most.9449 The Accused at this session again emphasised the
importance of the actual physical control of territory and that there would be a division of BiH into
three based on ethnicity and that he had been discussing before the war and making plans about
which areas would form part of their state.9450 (The President didn’t invent it, that was an
international proposal for BiH in order to secure it’s independence! A mere reporting to the
Assembly is qualified as a crime? If not, why it is in the Judgement? As if it was in the list of
crimes how the Serbs were doing many things that others do too, like “The Serbs blinked by
their eyes”!)

2893. At a meeting on 8 May 1994 with members of the Supreme Command, including
Krajišnik, Koljević, Mićo Stanišić, and Mladić, Plavšić stressed the importance of Posavina—that
the percentage is less important but that it could not ―exist in two parts‖.9451 Mićo Stanišić
responded: ―49–51%, there is importance, especially if an association is to be entered in with
them‖.9452 The strategic goals referred to in Directive 6, including the operations to reach the
Neretva River and gaining access to the sea, as well as reaching the right bank of the Una River,
were also discussed at this meeting.9453 (#Nothing of it was criminal or forbidden#! This was a
legal and legitimate reconsideration of the military situation and the prospectives for the
final solution. The territorial continuity became an imperative because of the war, while
before the war there was a possibility that the entities would be without continuity! Here, the
Serbs were coughing loudly, which is forbidden!”)

2894. Even into 1995 the President continued to emphasise the Strategic Goals and stated that
the ―Drina should be clean‖ and that the ―corridor must be wide‖.9454 (To be clear, #“clean” in
Serbian meant that it was not disputed#. In no way it pertained to any kind of purity, and it

9447
P1485 (Ratko Mladić notebook, 9 January–21 March 1994), pp. 134, 137–141 (wherein Mladić opposed the Accused‘s position and commented that the
Accused was denying the actual state of affairs).
9448
P1388 (Transcript of 39th session of RS Assembly, 24–25 March 1994), p. 168.
9449
P1388 (Transcript of 39th session of RS Assembly, 24–25 March 1994), p. 168.
9450
P1388 (Transcript of 39th session of RS Assembly, 24–25 March 1994), e-court pp. 86, 88.
9451
P3148 (Handwritten notes of Supreme Command meeting, 8 May 1994), p. 2.
9452
P3148 (Handwritten notes of Supreme Command meeting, 8 May 1994), p. 2.
9453
P3148 (Handwritten notes of Supreme Command meeting, 8 May 1994), pp. 3–5.
9454
P988 (Transcript of 53rd session of RS Assembly, 28 August 1995), p. 68; P5144 (Interview with Radovan Karadţić on Banja Luka Srpska Televizija, 23
August 1995), p. 1. See also D1934 (Video interview with Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, undated, with transcript), p. 5.
 733

was very easy to establish, since it had been said within the context of the Conference on the
territorial issues. See: P988, p.67

The President recommended to the Assembly to accept less of the territory, for the sake of a
defitive solution! No discussion of population, only of territorial issues from the standpoint
what is generally accepted, and what is contested. Further:p. 68

As the Chamber recognised in the next sentence, Krajisnik was talking about #“a clear
Drina”, which only meant – undisputed, and not “ethnically clear”#!) Krajišnik also shared
this objective about a clear Drina.9455 In another interview in May 1995, the Accused maintained
that they had not given up and would never give up on the Strategic Goals and that they would
―seek to achieve them either through political or military means‖.9456 (The entire Assembly
session on 28 August 1995 was a #preparation of the RS delegation for the Dayton meeting#.
How these discussions about what would be requested in the Conference be criminalised?
Could the Serbs do anything, except surrender, that wouldn’t be charged against them and
against the President? This must not happen any time and anywhere, this is contrary to the
very same idea of justice!)

1. Conclusion

2895. The Chamber finds that the Accused played a central role in formulating, promoting, and
disseminating the Strategic Goals. (Every single political entity has own strategic goals. The
Serbs in Bosnia had the prioritized objectives, all in accordance with the Constitution and
laws, i.e. to preserve an intact Yugoslavia and Bosnia in it, but since the others violated the
Constitution and went to an illegal and unilateral secession, the Serbs in Bosnia adjusted
their strategic objectives, always makin concessions to the other side. The international
community supported these objectives and made the Lisbon Agreement, which was in accord
with a just solution, acceptable for all and accepted by all the three sides. When the Muslims
reneged on it, there the war broke out, and the Muslim strategic objective was to conquer
the entire BiH, while the Serbs and Croats didn’t accept it. So, the Serb Strategic Goals
altered in accordance with the war realities, but it was rather a negotiating platform,
communicated to the European Community and it’s mediators. What is wrong with it? Are
the Serbs forbidden to protect their own basic interests? Does the UN support this approach
of it’s Court?) In promoting the Strategic Goals, the Accused continued to emphasise not only

9455
P1377 (Transcript of 33rd session of RS Assembly, 20–21 July 1993), p. 49. See also Herbert Okun, T. 1822 (28 April 2010).
9456
P2562 (Radovan Karadţić‘s interview in Nevesinje), p. 1–4; Patrick Treanor, T. 14055–14056 (1 June 2011).
 734

the #interests of the Serbs to self-determination but also the threat they faced from the Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats who he continued to identify as their historic enemies#. Through
these speeches, the Accused continued to disseminate propaganda against the Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats which allowed him to promote the measures envisaged by the Strategic Goals.
The Accused‘s rhetoric was also picked up by other deputies in the Bosnian Serb Assembly who
similarly spoke about the danger posed by their enemies and used this to advocate taking military
measures to protect their interests. (#This is an irrational and insane construction#. #First, to
say that it was a propaganda, would be the same as if the Jews protested for a Hitler allies
won an election in Germany! Tsih is insulting!# As if the Serbs in Bosnia were trained a flock
of sheep, knowing nothing about their recent history, and the President succeded to inflame
them and persuade them that somebody was their enemy, while it was not so!!! There is no a
single Serb family in BiH that hadn’t lost some of the civilian members of family in WWII.
There was the most horrifying camp for civilians in Jasenovac, where more than 700,000
Serb civilian had been killed, among them several tens of thousands of childen. Together
with the Serbs there had been killed more that 20,000 Jews and 70,000 Romas (Gipsies) Even
a German representative in Zagreb, Croatia Von Horstenau reported to Hitler that the
Croatian state is exercising unimaginable bestialities agains the Serb, Jews and Gipsies. Let
us see what the two Prosecution witnesses testified: General Petar Skrbic, T.26014: Q.
You said today that you also followed new political developments. Do you agree that there were
new parties that appeared, especially in Croatia, and these parties had rhetoric that was
frightening for the Serbs? They also had symbols from the Second World War, flags, coats of
arms, and a particular kind of rhetoric that they would use which the Serbs found frightening?
A. There were symbols and a certain type of rhetoric in speeches, and this showed everyone
that the Serbs were in danger in that territory. The survival of the Serbs was under threat. And
these things could be noticed amongst members of the HDZ, the Croatian Democratic Party,
which was established, I think, in 1991. Q. Thank you. General, did you in Bosnia-
Herzegovina know -- in the Federal Secretariat for All People's Defence, did you know that
there were new parties that were being established and were you familiar with their
programmes and rhetoric that they used, as well as the way in which they conducted
themselves? A. Yes, we followed such events as well. “The survival of the Serbs was under
threat!” further, p. 26017 1 Q. I'll cut it short, General. Did you in the Federal
Ministry of National Defence have concerns about the conduct or media reporting in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and its impact on inter-ethnic relations and the stability of the country?
A. Yes, Mr. Karadzic. We were gravely concerned following the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
We proposed our conclusions to the General, stating that should that situation continue, a result
would be a bloody war. We presented it to him by way of a model, and we reminded him of the
war in Lebanon which had a similar civil war. Q. Thank you. Were your concerns raised
because you seemed to have viewed Bosnia and Herzegovina as a potential powder keg? A.
Precisely, Mr. Karadzic. I believe we even used that very phrase in a number of documents. Q.
Thank you. General, since I was not of any interest to you, do you agree that no Radovan
Karadzic could manipulate or incite the Serb people given the fact that those people had fresh
memories of the genocide of 1941? Were you able to observe that -- whether my conduct was
aimed at manipulating and inciting? A. Mr. Karadzic, I can only address your thesis of
genocide. As for the rest of your question, I'd rather not comment. No person, including
Karadzic or Raskovic or anyone, needed to tell the people of the dangers of genocide. The Serb
people were well aware of it.
This witness was the Prosecutor’s choice, in an ideological sense very far from the President,
and he was surprised when asked this question! There is no living Serb, Jew or Gipsy who
would need any additional information on this subject, but only the Prosecution and
chambers of the UN Court do not know, and do not want to know it!) :
 735

2896. The Chamber further finds that the Accused promoted the implementation of the Strategic
Goals as a means of creating a Bosnian Serb state and warned against including ―too many of our
enemies‖ in the state which they would create. (Not to “include” exactly meant it,# not to be greedy
about territories of the others#, who wouldn’t like to be in the Serb entity. EXCULPATORY! This
had nothing to do with any crime, or expelling of population. What has to be done to have a
proper understanding of the terms in Serbian before this Court? Or maybe there shouldn’t be any
processes before such a courts, where a very basis of language, culture and habits of these who are
processed are so unknown and strange?) In doing so the Accused emphasised the first Strategic Goal
and the importance of separation from the other two ethnic communities in BiH. (This kind of subtle
alteration of facts doesn’t help the image of this Court, nor the UN. On the contrary: it was always
matter of – #separation of their states, not population#!) The Accused was adamant that this ethnic
separation was necessary and acknowledged that the ―freedom struggle‖ of the Serbs had not been
finished and would result in many casualties and again made reference to the historic crimes committed
against the Serbs. (It had been made “necessary” by the illegal and anti-constitutional secession of
BiH, and the “historic crimes commited against the Serbs are a facts! So far only the communist
regime implied an anaesthesia of the Serbs, to forget the horrors they underwent, and now a UN
Court is adopting this communist strategi, and thus its deliberations look rather as a communist
flosculas, than a legal conclusions!)
2897. The Chamber finds that the first Strategic Goal and the separation of the national
communities was the most important to the Bosnian Serb leadership and their objectives. (Why
the Muslim-Croat “national separation” from the rest of Yugoslavia is favourable in this
court? However, the international community represented in the Conference on Yugoslavia
(ICFY) established a principle of an administrative separation of ethnics wherever they had
been located, see “Treaty Provisions for a Convention ("Carrington Plan") from The Hague
Conference” of November 4, 1991, pp.3 -4”

Further : p.4

#All that the President and the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina had claimed for, and had
done, was already envisaged by the ICFY prior to the time the Serbs claimed for it or
conveyed it to practice#. How it is possible that the Prosecution was not aware of it, and how
 736

come the Chamber didn’t task so many experts to take a look of these documents, nor
accepted more that 230 Defence witnesses?)
2898. The President, in promoting the Strategic Goals, and more specifically the third Strategic
Goal, emphasised the importance of eliminating the Drina as a border between Serbian states.(Why this
subtle “shifting” of the meaning of the original words is needed? #In some paragraphs the
Chamber correctly quoted: not to be a border between the worlds, which was a famous saying for
centuries#! The Drina River was said tro be a border between two or three worlds, Orthodox,
Catholic and Islamic!) The Chamber finds that this Strategic Goal was a practical elucidation of the
ideology of Serbian unity and the non-separation of Serbs which was repeatedly promoted by the
Accused. (So what? #This unity had been achieved in 1918, and destroyed in 1941 and in 1991#, by
the same elements, who where not ready to live in the same state with the Serbs. In both of these
destructions of the “common home” of the Yugoslav ethnicities the Serbs had been exterminated,
and this could have been stopped only by a democratic and peacefull separation, as it happened in
Scandinavia in 1905, which the President used as an example to be followed! Will this UN Court
keen to “find out” that the President didn’t say the truth in this respect, i.e. that the Serbs (the
Jews and Roma) people hadn’t been systematically destroyed and exterminated in the 20th
Century, as President Karadzic suggested? Is it now a turn for denial of the Holocoust by another
ad hoc Court of the United Nations?)
2899. The speeches of other Bosnian Serb deputies and Bosnian Serb leaders demonstrate that they
supported the Strategic Goals and the approach advocated by the President. It is also clear that war, the
military conquest of territory, and the movement and resettlement of the population were envisaged by
the Bosnian Serb leadership in the implementation of the Strategic Goals. The President promoted and
shared the objective of creating a Bosnian Serb state which was ethnically pure and creating contiguous
Serb areas which would require a redistribution of the population. (This is the most vicious, malicious
and unfounded assertion of this Judgement. The Chamber neglected all the evidence about the
original Serb objectives, to stay in Yugoslavia, as a whole and undivided Bosnia, or to transform
Bosnia peacefully, which was proposed by the European Community and the United Nations
envoys, and accepted by the President and the Serb community in BiH. It was absolutely
impossible to skip such a formidable evidence, and embrace such an unfounded conclusion coined
by the Prosecution and the Muslim propaganda! This manipulation with the truth must be fought
always and forever, because it is also a manipulation with the destiny of the Serbian people! But,
any “redistribution of population was acompletely excluded by all the documents of the United
Nations and the European Community, which the President ssuported, accepted and even
proposed! How possibly to this Chamber there were of a more importance some gossips than these
original documents of the UN and European Community, which regulated the existence and rights
of the minorities?)

2898. The Chamber also finds that the Strategic Goals not only reflected the objectives of the
Accused and Bosnian Serb leadership but were also viewed as instructions to be followed at a
municipal level in order to achieve those objectives. In this regard, the Strategic Goals were
communicated to and discussed by municipal bodies and also formed the basis for military
operations by the VRS. The President, in meetings with Bosnian Serb military and political
leaders, continued to emphasise the importance of their Strategic Goals and that the creation of
their Serb state required war and the military protection of territories. (It is difficult to believe
that the Chamber is aware of what had been written here on behalf of them: #since when a
military protection of own territories and freedom against a military jeopardy of the same is
a crime#? Comment as the above. Hadn’t the Serbs been attacked, there wouldn’t be any
war in achieving their legitimate goals, after the illegal secession and the violation of the
Constitution! Such a denial of rights to defence of an attacken nation is unique in history,
and certainly in the practice of the United Nations. Even Mr. Izetbegovic himself admitted
 737

that he could have avoided the war, but he needed it to achieve the unilateral secession, and
if (ne) was responsible, then Karadzic is not!)

2899. The Chamber also finds that there was a clear difference between what the President and
the Bosnian Serb leadership were willing to say about the Strategic Goals in closed or confidential
settings versus what they generally said to international representatives. The President in private
meetings was far more candid about their willingness to pursue their territorial objectives even at
the cost of lives and the displacement of thousands of people. The President went so far as to say
that they had to motivate their people and ―nurture their anger toward the enemy‖. (It is rather
unacceptable to have such a serious allegations without any reference. The Chamber
pretended to be naïve, without knowing that in the private sessions the President couldn not
have behave as an indecisive and conciliatory, particularly about the objectives. And
undecisivness could have result in a leaving frontlines, desertion and crisis wi9th a grave
consequences. But, the Chamber had so many examples that the President was readi to
express his readiness to give back more territory in the private sessions than in the official
ones. All of it is irrelevant, since it was a political discours, while the only relevant were
documents singed by the President and the Internationals!)

2901. The Chamber also finds that the Accused received and also gave updates about
developments and progress made towards the achievement of their Strategic Goals, including
territorial control and the separation of people. (#This is a criminal and unacceptable forgery
and insult!# Where are the references? When and how President Karadzic was interested in
“the separation of people”?) He welcomed these territorial gains and spoke about the victory of
the Bosnian Serbs in achieving their objectives and how they had retained control of all vital
territories and continued to emphasise that they did not want Bosnian Muslims in their state. (#All
fake and distorted#! There was a war, and why the President would be indifferent to a
victory-defeat matters? Who jeopardised the Serb “vital territories”, and why it shouldn’t be
a crime to protect it? A “Bosnian Muslims in the Serb state meant “a Bosnian Muslim state,
or a significant settled places, within the Serb state against the Muslim free will was
something President Karadzic didn’t want, as many documents confirmed!)

2902. The Chamber therefore finds that the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership not only
formulated and promoted the Strategic Goals, they also took steps to ensure they were
implemented through military operations and that organisational structures were created to allow
for the creation of a Serb state. (#All fake and distorted!# This form of the Strategic Goals had
been modified after the war had been imposed on the Serbs, and could have been achieved
before the war and without the war, because the Goals were more modest before the war,
and were legitimate, as codified in all the international proposals of agreements, just to the
Dayton Agreement, confirmed by the UN! No any international institution denied the Serb
state rights as it did this UN Court!)

2903. The Chamber finds that the Strategic Goals continued to be the central element with
respect to the Bosnian Serb objectives for the duration of the conflict in BiH and the President
continued to emphasise their importance into 1995. (It is so even now, and would be forever,
because an alternative to it would be a slavery of the Serb people, and it’s eradication in BiH,
as they had been eradicated in other areas of the former “common home” of Yugoslavia!
And this didn’t depend on any individual!)

ii. Bosnian Serb political and governmental structures

2904. The Prosecution alleges that the Bosnian Serb political and governmental organs played a
crucial role in the implementation of the alleged common criminal purpose of the Overarching
 738

JCE, that the President had a pivotal role in establishing and maintaining these organs, and
exercised authority and control over them.9457 In this regard, the Prosecution argues that the
President as the leader of the Bosnian Serbs exercised ultimate authority over these organs.9458 In
this section the Chamber will consider the creation of the political and governmental organs and
the extent of the President‘s involvement in this process as well as the manner in which those
organs were used towards achieving the objectives of the President and the Bosnian Serb
leadership.

(A)Authority over political and governmental structures

1. Analysis of evidence

a. SDS

2905. The SDS party had a hierarchical structure and, from 1990 to 1995, the Accused was at
the head of this structure as the ex officio president of the SDS Main Board.9459 The Accused
implemented his policies and the policies of the Bosnian Serb leadership through, inter alia, the
structures of the SDS.9460 The SDS policies were communicated to the SDS Municipal Boards
through members of the Main Board.9461 SDS Municipal Boards were obligated to implement the
instructions issued by the Main Board or Executive Board.9462 While municipal organs had some
independence with respect to local issues they were obliged and expected to obey and implement
the policies and decisions of the SDS at the higher level and the Accused insisted on respect for
his own personal authority.9463 (#Wrong and fak#e! The President insisted that the decisions of
the Party bodies had to be made democratically, but implemented without distortions or
arbitrarily. Since there was a multi-party system, whoever wanted another policy, could
form another party! Here is one of the documents which the Chamber accepted as a proof
for this assertion of the OTP, P2572, p. 2

p.3

9457
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 208.
9458
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 206.
9459
See Section II.B.1: Serbian Democratic Party (SDS).
9460
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16844.
9461
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16630–16632.
9462
See Section II.B.1: Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). See also Milorad Dodik, T. 36872–36873, 36877–36880, 36887–36888 (9 April 2013); Izet Redţić,
P3189 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5071, 5075; P2571 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Radovan Karadţić and Radomir Nešković;
(ii) Radovan Karadţić and Mišković; and (iii) Radovan Karadţić and Srdo Srdić, 20 December 1991), p. 3; P2529 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to SDS
Municipal Boards, 15 August 1991); P2556 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Nenad Stevandić, 11 January 1992), pp. 3, 5, 8, 13,
16; P5550 (Report of the SDS Executive Board, 24 February 1993).
9463
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16623–16625, 16672–16676, 16751; P2572 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Miroslav Stanĉić, 26 September 1991), p. 2; Radomir Nešković T. 14235 (6 June 2011); P2571 (Intercepts of conversations between
(i) Radovan Karadţić and Radomir Nešković; (ii) Radovan Karadţić and Mišković; and (iii) Radovan Karadţić and Srdo Srdić, 20 December 1991), pp. 3–
4; D1277 (Minutes of joint meetings of SDS's General and Executive Committees and Political Council, 11 March 1992), p. 2; P3118 (Minutes of meeting
of the Club of Deputies from the SDS and SPO, 14 October 1991), p. 1.
 739

The
President said: “let them form SPO, I don’t mind. The President of the Party was in charge
of a verbatim implementation of a democratically adopted decisions and policy, no crime!) It
was difficult for other Bosnian Serb officials, particularly at a municipal level to openly contradict
the President who had ―undisputed authority‖.9464 For example, the President said that he would
―dismiss the idiots […] who are not implementing the SDS policy‖.9465 (This is already
commented above, but once again: this kind of distortion doesn’t make a good service to the
UN and this court of the UN. The President supported a municipal president of the SDS for
opposing a smuggling of the ideology of another party, close to the “Chetniks” stating that
nobody could exercise program of another party under the SDS umbrella, see P2572, p.

The Accused issued express instructions to the SDS Municipal Boards including a mandatory directive
with respect to the structure and activities of all SDS Municipal Boards.9466 (This is a part of
implementing the decisions and realising the party policy, and the President of the SDS, as in any
other party, was responsible for a respect of the democratically adopted decisions, which couldn’t
be modified either by the President, or by someone on the terrain. This kind of misuanderstanding
of the rules of party-functionings could only be an ideological bad will! In doc. P2529 there is
nothing alleged in this paragraph, but here is the entire D4658, also designated as a basis for this
findings:

So, in
the wake of war in neighbouring Croatia, President of the SDS demands from the SDS to get
included in the “All-peoples Defebce” and Social self-protection, which was a legal obligation. In

9464
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16625–16626, 16689–16690; P2557 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan
Karadţić and Goran Babić, 24 June 1991), pp. 3-5; P2559 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Radoslav BrĊanin, 18 October 1991),
pp. 2–3.
9465
P2572 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Miroslav Stanĉić, 26 September 1991), p. 3.
9466
P2529 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to SDS Municipal Boards, 15 August 1991). See also D4658 (Instructions from Radovan Karadţić to all Municipal
Boards of BiH SDS, 11 September 1991).
 740

doing so, the SDS had to work together with the common BiH police and other common
instiuttions. There was nothing “Serbian” in it. Other parties had also been obliged to do the
same, and there was an agreement among the ruling parties (SDA, SDS, HDZ) to coordinate and
help the state organs in preserving the peace and controle of terrain.)
2906. Top and local levels in the SDS communicated in both directions, and municipal leaders, members
of Executive and Municipal Boards of the SDS would frequently visit, write to or phone the
President to speak about municipal matters.9467 For example, the Chamber found that there was a
very close relationship between the Bijeljina branch of the SDS and the SDS party in Pale, and that
the SDS leadership, including the President and Krajišnik, often visited Bijeljina.9468 Similarly, the
Chamber found that a line of communication existed between the Municipal Board of the Bratunac
SDS and the SDS leadership, including the President.9469 Another example can be found in Sanski
Most where the SDS was extremely well-structured and disciplined, so that orders came from the top
and were implemented without any objections.9470 When there were problems in Banja Luka for
example, the President told Krajišnik that they, along with Koljević, needed to visit to ―establish
some order there, separate the soldiers from the people, and appoint some sort of command for these
soldiers and some sort of board for the people‖.9471 (Another example how anything could have
been used against this Accused and against the Serbs generally, no matter it was a crime, or
not. Here is P5798, of 15 December 1991, which was the basis for this conclusion, P5798, p. 1:

Therefore, nothing in connection with the SDS, nor with the authority of President Karad`i}. It
was a matter of humanitarian endeavour of helping a huge number of civilian refugees from
Croatia, West Slavonia, and a significant number of soldiers of the Serb Army of Krajina. So,
these wondering soldiers needed some command, and the civilians some representatives who
would communicate with the Banja Luka authorities. What is criminal in that?)
2907. The Accused also emphasised the importance of local SDS boards9472(Here is a part, p.3-4, of
the P3431 exhibit:

9467
See para. 71; Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16632. See also D2265 (SrĊo Srdić's interview with OTP), pp. 50−51.
See also P5827 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Trifko Komad, 2 November 1991); D4038 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 18
May 1992).
9468
See para. 606. See also P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011) p. 4.
9469
See para. 690. See also P3197 (Minutes of sessions of Bratunac SDS Crisis Staff and Municipal Board), e-court pp. 9, 13; Dţevad Gušić, T. 17804
(24 August 2011); P1357 (Transcript of 18th session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 August 1992), pp. 5–6; P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July
1992), p. 101.
9470
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 6-8, 12 (under seal).
9471
P5798 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 15 December 1991), p. 1.
9472
P3431 (Handwritten diary of KDZ192), p. 4 (under seal).
 741

and
there was #nothing illegal or criminal# in it! As a matter of fact, neither Karadzic nor Krajisnik
were present, but somebody interpreted their standpoints, but even if they were there, what does
it have to do with this case? “The Serbe were sneezing!”) and in an interview, he indicated that the
political life of Serbs in BiH ―had been fully revived and established, which was the main purpose of
setting up the party‖, and that in all places where Serbs lived they had set up municipal organisations
with municipal and local boards.9473 (Why it was of any interest of this Court, as the OTP as the
Chamber? What is wrong with doing it or talking about it? This kind of attitude towards the Serb
rights had only the communist dictatorship!) The President also took an active role in determining
the organisational structure of the SDS at a municipal level and the appointment of personnel.9474 On 31
October 1991, the President emphasised the importance of strong SDS leaders who would implement
directions from the leadership, stating that whoever is ―not able to be the boss in the municipality, to
carry out the mobilisation and even to the full if necessary, should resign immediately‖.9475 (So what? A
leaders had to be capable, or not to be leaders, in such a case they may do something else. Is it
different in any democratic country? Or it was not applicable to the Serbs? The Chamber should
have known that the SDS had been composed of the people opposed tu the previous communist
regime, that many of them feared because of their engagement, and that it was not so easy to
replace the regime, and in addition to that, to change the entire system of society and the state
authority!)?
2908. The Chamber recalls that as early as February 1991, the SDS had considered specific actions to
be taken should BiH move towards independence.9476 The SDS envisaged that in such a case municipal
authorities were to ensure that only Yugoslav (federal) law would apply, suspending the implementation
of republican regulations.9477 This policy was adopted by the SDS Deputies‘ Club and was made public
in a document dated 10 June 1991.9478 (All legal and legitimate, and public. The BiH Muslim-Croat
coalition betrayed the coalition agreement with the SDS and opted for a secession, violating the
Constitution, and the SDS publicly opposed this actions. What is illegal in it? However, yhe very
same day, 10 June 1991, the SDA had formed the Supreme Command of the future secret Army,
the Patriotic League, and Mr. Izetbegovic had been elected President of this political body for
“defence of the Muslim people, although he was ec oficio President of the Board fo Defence of the
entire BiH and all the three ethnic communities. Nobody from the international community saw
anything irregular and significant in that?)

2909. ) The President in a conversation with Ţepinić in September 1991, stated that
―[e]verything we did so far and everything we are doing now is strictly according to the Law.‖9479
(#EXCULPATORY#! Particularly since it was the truth which could be checked easily!) At a

9473
P2539 (Radovan Karadţić‘s interview in NIN, 9 November 1990), p. 1.
9474
P2570 (Book of minutes of Prijedor's SDS Municipal Board meetings, 1991), p. 40.
9475
P5830 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Veljko Dţakula, 31 October 1991), pp. 2–3.
9476
See para. 73.
9477
See para. 73.
9478
See para. 73.
9479
D2926 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vitomir Ţepinić, 18 September 1991), p. 3. Both Ţepinić and KDZ020 testified that the
subsequent measures taken, including the formation of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and a separate republic, were unconstitutional. D2923 (Witness
statement of Vitomir Ţepinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 51; KDZ020, T. 12575 (28 February 2011).
 742

meeting of the SDS Municipal Board on 12 April 1991, it was agreed that instructions would be
requested from the SDS headquarters ―regarding the referendum, our behaviour and functioning‖
and that the regional redrawing of municipal borders, which was occurring in Banja Luka, was
―fully supported, and those questions should be posed in our areas as well‖.9480 It was also noted
that the Presidency of Bratunac should meet with the President urgently with respect to the
questions raised.9481 The President and Krajišnik took a leading role in using the SDS structures to
call on all Serbs in BiH to boycott the referendum on the independence of BiH as it was against
their interests.9482 (So what? #Why this court should back the Muslim illegal and anti-
constitutional political moves#? How to avoid an assumption that this court is merely
political instrument?)

2910. The President led the SDS deputies out of the SRBiH Assembly on 15 October 1991; the
HDZ and SDA delegates then reconvened without the Serb delegates and passed a declaration of
sovereignty.9483 (It was only one among many, but a #drastic violation of the law, Constitution
and the Assembly’s Rule of procedure#. Once the spokesman adjurned the session, it
couldn’t be “reconvened” without the spokesman’s authorisation. There is no democracy
without respect for the regulations and rules, but this court is justifying such a breaches of
laws and democtaric normatives, by charging the Serb side for it’s opposing to that!)
Subsequently there was a meeting of the SDS Political Council, at which statements were made
that it was necessary to ―shed the illusion that a form of coexistence with the Muslims and the
Croats can be found‖.9484 Koljević stated that they could not lose the momentum and had to
announce their plebiscite the next day and that they should emphasise this was a peaceful act in
contrast to the decision on the sovereignty of BiH, which was described as an act of ―political
violence‖.9485 (Wasn’t it?) The President and other Bosnian Serb leaders, including Krajišnik,
emphasised the illegal and unconstitutional nature of the declaration of sovereignty by BiH and the
threat it posed to Serb interests.9486 (So what? Wasn’t it?) At this meeting, the following items
were also discussed: (i) the aim of creating a Greater Serbia; (ii) the activation of parallel
government bodies such as a Serb Assembly; (iii) the intensification of the process of
regionalisation; and (iv) the military organisation at a local level.9487 (What was “discussed”,
wasn’t adopted as a decision, or conclusion or any other act. Here is the first document used
as a basis for this finding, D294, p.1

9480
P3197 (Minutes of sessions of Bratunac SDS Crisis Staff and Municipal Board), e-court p. 13.
9481
P3197 (Minutes of sessions of Bratunac SDS Crisis Staff and Municipal Board), e-court p. 13.
9482
See para. 1931. See also P3431 (Handwritten diary of KDZ192), p. 4 (under seal); P942 (ECMM report re the BiH Assembly meeting held on 24–25
January 1992), p. 1.
9483
See paras. 46, 76. See also Vitomir Ţepinić, T. 33654 (14 February 2013).
9484
D294 (Minutes of SDS Council meeting, 15 October 1991), p. 1. See also Adjudicated Facts 1937, 1938.
9485
D294 (Minutes of SDS Council meeting, 15 October 1991), pp. 1–2; P2581 (Minutes of meeting of SDS Deputies' Club, 18 October 1991), p. 3. See also
D3206 (Witness statement of Milovan Bjelica dated 30 March 2013), para. 11; D4077 (Witness statement of AnĊelko Grahovac dated 23 November 2013),
para. 7; D4212 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Simo Mišković, 15 November 1991), p. 4.
9486
D294 (Minutes of SDS Council meeting, 15 October 1991), p. 2; P5631 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Boţidar Vuĉurević, 19
October 1991), pp. 2, 5; P5622 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 25 January 1992), p. 2; P5621 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Dobrica Ćosić, 25 January 1992), p. 2; P5615 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and
Nikola Koljević, 11 December 1991), p. 4; P5776 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Dobrica Ćosić, 5 January 1992), p. 11.
9487
D294 (Minutes of SDS Council meeting, 15 October 1991), pp. 2–3. See also P2581 (Minutes of meeting of SDS Deputies‘ Club, 18 October 1991), pp. 2–
3; see para. 46. Ćeklić stated that regionalisation was not a secret grouping of Serb municipalities, nor was its goal to join Serbia and the Serbian Krajina,
and in fact it was done in an effort to decentralise BiH. D3854 (Witness Statement of Savo Ćeklić dated 7 July 2013), para. 15.
 743

At that time Mr. Dutina, a known poet, was in the leadership of the Reformist Party, in all
other matters except this one in opposition to the SDS. None of his proposals had been
adopted! See further, what the President said, D294, p. 2:

nothing false ot illegal! Se further, D294, p.2

So, Mr. Cancar reported of the standpoint of the President of Constitutional Court, and Mr.
Neskovic proposed “a change of policy” and turn to creation of a Greater Serbia. So far, it
was not the policy, but he proposed to change this policy! Neither of his proposal were even
commented, let alone adopted! #What is relevance of a free meditations of the members of
the Political Council of the SDS, particularly those that hadn’t been adopted#? Among the
members of the Council there were several mambers of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of
BiH, as well as two elected members of the BiH Presidency. How come every manifestation
of the Serb political life is under the charges?)

2911. With respect to the referendum the President said in an intercepted conversation that not
only was this an illegal decision but through this action, the Bosnian Muslims ―set everything up
for us just perfectly; it‘s all fallen right in place‖.9488 In this regard the President said they would
be strong and establish their own state and that BiH would consist of three sovereign nations.9489
(So what? The international community didn’t support the unity of Yugoslavia, supported
the unlawfull conduct of the Muslim side, and finally had to accept the Serb compromise, to
have BiH transformed into three states!)

2912. On 16 October 1991, the SDS issued its ―Announcement to the Serbian people‖ in which
it stated that the SDA and HDZ had breached the constitutional order and reiterated its support for
9488
P5622 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 25 January 1992), p. 2. See also P5754 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Dobrica Ćosić, 9 February 1992), p. 4.
9489
P5621 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Dobrica Ćosić, 25 January 1992), pp. 2–3.
 744

federal institutions, including the JNA.9490 (What was wrong with this President’s calling for
the legalities in conduct of the state policy?) In an intercepted telephone conversation that day,
the President assured SDS officials in Banja Luka: ―We‘ve worked out a scenario. We won‘t make
a single move today. If necessary, we‘ll do it tomorrow, […] it would be very useful.
Everything‘s been worked out. You don‘t need to worry. […] They can only start fighting us,
killing us, but everyone knows what‘s gonna happen then!‖9491 (So what? If the Serbs in Banja
Luka had been upset with the events in the Assembly, the #President tried to calm them
down#. Also, the Serbs in Srpska Krajina were upset, and desperate, and Milan Babic tried
to proclaim a unification of the two Krajinas, and the President estimated that it would be
illegal and damaging of the Serb interests. What is wrong with that? It rather should be
commended, because the President fought for legality and for a peaceful means in achieving
political goals, see DP2555, p. 1

p.3

p.4

p.

9490
See Adjudicated Fact 1939.
9491
P2555 (Intercepts of conversation between (i) Radovan Karadţić and AnĊelko Vukić, and (ii) between Radovan Karadţić and Boro Sendić, 16 October
1991), p. 6. See also P5842 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vukić, 15 October 1991), p. 1 (in which the Accused tells Vukić to
summon all members of the Executive Board from the Banja Luka region to make a very important declaration).
 745

7
#”out of desperation” people asked what to do, and the President reassured them that
nothing should be done, particularly nothing sudden. How this was wrong#? The same page:

#Contrary to the reality in which the President had to encourage people to endure instead of
being volatile#, the Chamber is inferring that the population was calm and felt secure, but
the President upset them by his stories###. Meanwhile, the very same days, the Serbs in the
neighbouring Croatia were suffering as none of the peoples of Europe did! And there was
nothing that showed that the same will not slip to Bosnia, as it did happen!)

2913. The SDS Deputies‘ Club met again on 18 October 1991, and the Accused rejected the
decision of the BiH Assembly because the Bosnian Serb deputies had not participated.9492 (#Legal,
obligatory#! Not true! Not only that. The two other sides couldn’t vote for anything if the
group of deputies directed the issue to the Council for the National Equality, as was written
in the Constitution, nor the BiH Assembly could vote to change the Yugoslav federal
Constitution, nor they could wote to alter the BiH constitution without two third + 1 of the
deputies, and finally, they were not entitled to reconvene the Assembly session without the
authorisation of it’s president, i.e. violating the Rules of procedure of the Assembly. All of it
was violated! #A lawless country#! Why would the Serbs accept it? What decent people
would?) The Accused noted that a ―team made up of the leading men of the party, the
Government and the Political Council has been working day and night‖ and that he had decided to
impose a state of emergency in the SDS.9493 (So what? It was a “cristal night” of Bosnia, and
the ONO and DSZ (All-Peoples Defence, and Social Self-Protection) as a part of the
Yugoslav legal and defence system obliged all the institutions and organisations to respond to
that kind of violation of stability! The next that could be expected would be a physical
violence, because after the constitutional there a physical violence of the security and life of
the people!) This state of emergency, which was declared by the Accused, was binding on all its
members, bodies and officials.9494 The Accused emphasised that there needed to be maximum
discipline that they had to listen to their leaders and there was no room for a ―single wrong
step‖.9495 As part of this state of emergency, the Accused ordered that there should be daily
meetings of the municipal boards and that they would receive daily instructions on the measures to
be taken.9496 Following the Accused‘s order, an emergency meeting of the SDS Municipal Board
of Bratunac was held where Miroslav Deronjić informed those present about the SDS Main Board

9492
P2581 (Minutes of meeting of SDS Deputies‘ Club, 18 October 1991), p. 1.
9493
P2581 (Minutes of meeting of SDS Deputies' Club, 18 October 1991), p. 4. See also P2556 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and
Nenad Stevandić, 11 January 1992), pp. 8–9; P5837 (Intercept of conversation between Miro Galić and Peda, 19 October 1991), p. 1.
9494
P6238 (Radovan Karadţić's Decision, 18 October 1991). See also P5831 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Miljana LNU, 17
October 1991), pp. 1–2.
9495
P2581 (Minutes of meeting of SDS Deputies' Club, 18 October 1991), p. 4. See also P2716 (Notebook of Radovan Karadzić), p. 30; P5643 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and an unidentified male, 8 July 1991); P5749 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Boţidar
Vuĉurović, 13 February 1992), pp. 3, 5; P5747 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Gojko Đogo, 15 February 1992), pp. 3–4; P5730
(Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovan Ĉizmović, 1 March 1992), p. 2.
9496
P6238 (Radovan Karadţić's Decision, 18 October 1991), p. 1.
 746

instructions and said that they imposed a duty to ―act accordingly‖.9497 The next day, Jovan Tintor
from Vogošća stated in a telephone conversation that following the plenary session, only Serb
Assembly decisions would be binding on the Serb population and that parallel institutions would
be formed.9498 (#None of this is criminal, not even before the Muslim courts. Irrelevant for
this case, because it is presenting the necessary measures and ultimate political defence as a
crimes#! Was the Tribunal tasked by the UN to this approach?)

2914. The Accused was the undisputed authority within the SDS for the duration of the war.9499
Some people who resisted the President were expelled from the Main Board.9500 On 24 June 1991,
the Accused told a Bosnian Serb leader in Prijedor that if the party could not organise themselves,
he will do it for them by introducing new people into the Prijedor SDS party leadership.9501
(#REBUTTED #Irrelevant for such a case#! It is understandable why the Prosecution was
desperate about the lack of evidence, but the Chamber was? Let us see the reference to an
alleged evidence about the President as an autocrat, P2568, a testimony of Neskovic, who
testified in this case too, but the Chamber didn’t check this issue there, but rather exploited
what Neskovic said in another case, in which nobody was interested in contesting or
rebutting his testimony pertaining to this President. P2568, T16625 – 26 – 27:

9497
See para. 701.
9498
P5836 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and Krunić, 19 October 1991), pp. 1–3.
9499
Radomir Nešković T. 14218 (6 June 2011). See also NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12963 (8 March 2011); P5730 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan
Karadţić and Jovan Ĉizmović, 1 March 1992), p. 1; P5722 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and Ţika LNU, 11 March 1992), p. 4.
9500
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16626–16627.
9501
P2557 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Goran Babić, 24 June 1991), pp. 3–5.
 747

So, even this witness confirmed that during the decision-making process, “there was nothing
that you had to do…” and that “you could have expressed…. “it was easier to resist… the
President “mostly tried to persuade everyone”… and so on. But, what was difficult to do,
Neskovic explained: “But if you had a particular task assigned to you by Karadzic or the
Executive or Main Board, … it was very difficult to put up resistence…” it was clear that
even this witness described that the decision making process was democratic, but when it
came to the execution of the tasks on the terrain, there could be no resistence. There could be
resistence that would not be legal, because it wouldn’t be a resistence to the President, but to
the bodies of the Party that made decisions democratically. This is ridiculous to charge the
President for being meticulous in executing the decisions. Further the Witness mentioned
Srdjo Srdic, who was a president of the municipal Board of Red Cross, and the SDS at the
same time, and the deputi in the assembly. He was a dentist, and very old man, and it was a
conflict of interests, and his coleagues from Prijedor made him to chose only one local post,
and he had chosen Red Cross office. Milakovic was a criminal, deviant in many directions,
and finally he founded an illegal brothel, and nobody wanted him to lead the SDS in
Prijedor. V. Srebrov was also a deviant man, and he wasn’t a member of the Main Board,
and the President didn’t remove him, but the maind Board unanimously expelled him from
the party, an if he was a member of the main Board, only Assembly of the Party could
remove him. There was no any example like that. And the President sustained a sharo
criticism for being “too democratic”, which is very easy to check!)
 748

In September 1991, the President intervened to replace the local SDS President in Prijedor, Srdo
Srdić, with Simo Mišković, who promised to follow the policies of the SDS Main Board.9502 (This
document quoted as a basis for this paragraph, we paste here, because it is the strongest
proof how the Judgement is wrong: P2571: p.2 -

9502
P3706 (Minutes of meeting of Prijedor Municipal Assembly, 11 September 1991), pp. 3–4; P2571 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Radovan
Karadţić and Radomir Nešković; (ii) Radovan Karadţić and Mišković; and (iii) Radovan Karadţić and Srdo Srdić, 20 December 1991); Simo Mišković, T.
45351–45361 (18 December 2013). See P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 17.
 749

All the questions of the Party Statute, Neskovic and the others ask the President for advises
and interpretations of the rules, because a small group of deputies in the Municipal
Assembly made an usurpation of the prerogatives of the Party. The entire document is an
example how the President tolerated the inexperience and confusion on the terrains, giving
full support to the locals to resolve the problem, but in accord with the rules. In no way this
document should be used against the President. So many irrelevant elements, findings and
inferences, it is impossible to any Defence to respond to all of it. During the trial the
Chamber rightfully didn’t test so many small elements, and the Defence also didn’t insist on
it, but now we found all of them in the Judgement, although the Chamber didn’t give any
chance to the Defence to rebut it.) : The Accused spoke with an SDS member in Banja Luka
on 11 January 1992. When the President was faced with the suggestion that there were some
individuals in the Krajina who wanted to act independently on certain issues, he insisted on party
discipline and stated ―they cannot. We have all of that in the plans. We have all moves in the
envelopes. They must not do it before we do it in the whole of Bosnia. Why are they playing
smart? They‘re explaining my policy to me‖.9503 (Not to copy-paste to many evidence, this is
ridiculous, insignificant and irrelevant for this case. The President made a great deal of
efforts to calm the Krajina inexperienced officials not to unite with the Serb Krajina,
because tah would be a casus belli with both Croatia and BiH. In all of these examples, the
President was decisive that under the SDS program there can not be smuggled a program of
another party. Who wanted another program, should found another party. There is nothing
more normal and natural, and the President of the SDS was responsible for the executions of
all the decisions without any alterations resembling program of the other parties! See P2556,
p. 3:

p.4

9503
P2556 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Nenad Stevandić, 11 January 1992), pp. 2, 6, 10, 12. See also P6228 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Boţidar Vuĉurević, 2 September 1991), p. 3; P6229 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and
Boţidar Vuĉurević, 3 September 1991), pp. 6–8; P6230 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Boţidar Vuĉurević, 9 September 1991),
pp. 3–6, 8–13.
 750

It is more than clear that it was a political fight between the true SDS members and the local
oligarchy of autonomists, who didn’t have any influence in population, but wanted to abuse
the SDS reputation to form their small principalities, they calld every now and then for some
sensles plebiscites, ruining the stability, and, as NS said, abusing the President’s name during
this games! No patry all over the world would allow a rogue elements to smuggle another
program and ruin the policy of the existing party. What does in prove? Only that the
President was a responsible official!) The Accused also insisted that he would expel and
discipline those who did not follow the SDS policies or acted without his approval or the approval
of the Bosnian Serb Assembly.9504 The President also spoke about having a council of ministers,
and said ―we have plans for everything‖ and that in the Krajina they had to ―synchronise their
work with the party‖.9505 He also spoke about the importance of pursuing the Serbian policy in a
synchronised fashion otherwise ―the Serbs would not have a state‖.9506

a. Bosnian Serb Assembly and governmental structures

2914. The Chamber found that on 24 October 1991, the Bosnian Serb deputies of the SRBiH
Assembly met and decided to establish a separate assembly, which was constituted the same
day.9507 Krajišnik explained that the Bosnian Serb deputies in the SRBiH Assembly were
prompted to form the Bosnian Serb Assembly due to what they saw as a violation of the
sovereignty of the Bosnian Serbs and a threat to their existence in BiH ―where they had lived from
time immemorial‖.9508 Krajišnik also expressed the right of the Serbs to self-determination and
remaining in their ―historical and ethnic territories‖.9509

9504
P2556 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Nenad Stevandić, 11 January 1992), pp. 2–5, 10–12, 15–18; P5732 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovan Ĉizmović, 25 February 1992), pp. 1–2; D4536 (Intercept of conversation between Nikola Koljević and
Radovan Karadţić, 26 July 1991), pp. 1–2; P5841 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Ljubo Grković and Radoslav BrĊanin; (ii) Radovan Karadţić and
Radoslav BrĊanin, 16 October 1991), pp. 3–5. See also P5639 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Nenad Stevandić, 13 December
1991), pp. 2–4.
9505
P2556 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Nenad Stevandić, 11 January 1992), pp. 6–7, 13–14.
9506
P2556 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Nenad Stevandić, 11 January 1992), p. 8.
9507
See paras. 47, 77 .
9508
P3121 (Stenograph of the session of the Club of Deputies from the SDS, 24 October 1991), pp. 5–7, 18; P1343 (Transcript of 1st Session of SerBiH
Assembly, 24 October 1991), p. 6. See also Milorad Dodik, T. 36841–36842 (9 April 2013).
9509
P3121 (Stenograph of the session of the Club of Deputies from the SDS, 24 October 1991), p. 5.
 751

2915. Krajišnik was elected as the first president of the Bosnian Serb Assembly.9510 On the same
day the Bosnian Serb Assembly decided that the Bosnian Serbs would remain in the joint state of
Yugoslavia and called for the conduct of a plebiscite to confirm this decision.9511 In November
1991, BrĊanin was quoted in a newspaper article as having stated that all directors and managers
in the ARK who did not participate in the plebiscite should be urgently dismissed from their
positions.9512 Following the publication of this article, the President said that BrĊanin was ―out of
order‖ in his statement about the dismissals of directors, but that he ―wanted to get [him] off the
hook‖ for the statement and ultimately told BrĊanin that ―it has to be done, but you mustn‘t say
that‖ out loud.9513

2916. The Accused was also involved in organising steps to be taken to carry out the
plebiscite.9514 (What a horrible crime!?!) After the decision of the Constitutional Court of BiH
and the Bosnian Serb Presidency declaring the plebiscite of Serb people unconstitutional and
illegal, the plebiscite was launched and the President stated that the Serbs no longer had any duties
towards the BiH Constitution, that they had obligations towards the Constitution of Yugoslavia
which guaranteed their right to self-determination and the right for the people to organise
themselves.9515 (The #Federal Constitutional Court declared all the secessionist moves
illegal#, but no republic respected it. The BH Constitution didn’t exist after the famous
Assembly session on 15 October 1991. All of a sudden, the Chamber is interested in a
constitutional matters, while even didn’t notice all the previous violations of all and every
rule, law and constitution on the Serb account!)

2917. The Chamber recalls that on 9 and 10 November 1991, a plebiscite was held to determine
whether Serbs in BiH wished to remain in a joint state of Yugoslavia with the overwhelming
majority of Serbs voting in favour of remaining in Yugoslavia.9516 On 21 November 1991, the
Bosnian Serb Assembly proclaimed as part of the territory of federal Yugoslavia all those
municipalities, communes, and settlements where a majority of registered Serb citizens had voted
in favour of remaining in Yugoslavia.9517 In an intercepted conversation on 23 December 1991,
the Accused said: ―A political principle is being introduced. In principle, everywhere where Serbs
live and where they have voted against secession, or to remain in Yugoslavia, no one can break
away there. […] However, we don‘t want to stop the Croatian and Muslim peoples from
reorganising themselves, meaning that their links to Yugoslavia would be weaker than ours.‖9518
(Those are a pure political matters, and the Court had prevented the Defence in this case,
and in other cases to deal with the political matters as an essence of the crisis and a cause of
the war and consequently of the crimes. Now, the main issue against this President are the
political questions that led to the war, although the President’s political actions were purely
reactive, a responses to a political violence of other sides. Although all the President’s actions
had been a chain of concessions, aimed to avoid a war, every single manifestation of the Serb
political life is criminalised and depicted as a cause of war and crimes. But, an impartial

9510
P3121 (Stenograph of the session of the Club of Deputies from the SDS, 24 October 1991), p. 12. See also para. 77.
9511
P3121 (Stenograph of the session of the Club of Deputies from the SDS, 24 October 1991), pp. 13–14, 16. See also Adjudicated Fact 1940; Herbert Okun,
P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4187–4188.
9512
P1632 (Article from OsloboĊenje, entitled ―After the Plebiscite: You should better give yourselves up‖, 12 November 1991); Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7373–7377.
9513
P4 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Radovan Karadţić and Vukić; (ii) Radovan Karadţić and Predrag Radić; (iii) Radovan Karadţić and Radoslav
BrĊanin), pp. 4–5, 10–11; Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7375–7377.
9514
P2570 (Book of minutes of Prijedor's SDS Municipal Board meetings, 1991), p. 63; P5840 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vukić,
16 October 1991).
9515
P6249 (Excerpt from video of Radovan Karadţić's statement, with transcript), p. 1.
9516
See para. 47. See also D83 (Shorthand Record of 2nd Session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 November 1991), pp. 19–23; P5733 (Intercept of conversation
between Jovan Tintor and unidentified male, 17 March 1992), p. 2; P3456 (Decision of SerBiH Assembly, 21 November 1991).
9517
P5412 (Decision of SerBiH Assembly, 21 November 1991), pp. 1–2. See also Adjudicated Facts 1946, 1947; D3989 (Minutes of the SDS Main Board, 21
November 1991), p. 1.
9518
D4555 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Maristela Luĉić, 23 December 1991), p. 1.
 752

court would adopt the Defence’s most frequent comments: “So what? #Exculpatory#!
Irrelevant! #Political in nature! Legal! Legitimate! Not criminal#!” or, at least, would
demand a clarification of the Decence’s position to this regard!)

2918. The Bosnian Serb Assembly functioned as the central body representing Bosnian Serbs
and was the mechanism through which other institutions and political structures were set up.9519
(This is a ridiculous characterisation of an Assembly, as if it was a criminal group, although
it was a democratically elected body, with the main task to “give the democratic respons to
the challenges posed before the Serb community”, as the President described the reasons for
the foundation of SDS 12 July 1990!) This included a Council of Ministers, which was
established on 21 December 1991 and replaced by the Bosnian Serb Government on 24 March
1992.9520 In January 1992 the Accused spoke about how their republic had already started
functioning, had its own authorities, structures organs and a Council of Ministers and that all
Yugoslav institutions including the JNA ―will back us up […] Nobody can do anything about that.
They cannot do anything, because that is 60% of the territory they would not be able to control as
an independent state‖.9521 (So what? #All the Serbs had done in BiH was already envisaged
during 1991 in the Conference in the Hague led by Lord Carrington (ICFY) with a special
commitment of Mr. Izetbegovic that the ethnic constituent communities in BiH would have a
high degree of autonomy.# The same was envisage at the sub-Conference on BiH led by
Ambassador Cutileiro, and finally codified in Dayton and codified in the UN SC
Resolution#!)

2919. In addition, the National Security Council (―SNB‖) was established on 27 March 1992.9522 The
President described the SNB as an advisory body to the Bosnian Serb Assembly which would be
composed of ―all the important organs and institutions‖ of the Serbian people.9523 The SNB was
responsible for military matters during the war and matters relating to security.9524 The SNB served,
until the creation of the Presidency in May 1992, as the de facto Presidency of the SerBiH. The
President was the ex officio president of the SNB,9525 and the decisions of the SNB were made under the
control of the Accused.9526 (A democratically established and maintained body couldn’t be
“controlled” by anyone, and it was not controlled by the President. However, this is one of many
examples of the crucial manipulation in depicting only one side’s conduct, removing all the events
that caused the responses. The SNB was established on 27 March, after the Croatian forces, from
Croatia proper, entered BiH in Bosanski Brod on 25 March, killing a father and son at a gasselin
station, without anyone’s reaction. Then, the same forces proceded to a Serb village Sijekovac and
killed entire several Serb families, again without any defence. It was possible only because the
Minister for Interior in BiH was a Muslim, without whose order there could not be any
mobilisation of the reserve police, although a forces from another country were freely killing the
BiH citizens! The Serb cadres in the common MUP didn’t have any authorisation to protect their
citizens, and other DIDN’T WANT TO DO IT! The establishment of the SNB as an advisory body
to the Assembly was a legal, legitimate, and a move of the ultimate defence!)

9519
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16778–16779; Radomir Nešković T. 14274–14275 (6 June 2011). See also P5749
(Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Boţidar Vuĉurović, 13 February 1992), p. 2.
9520
See paras. 87, 103.
9521
P5620 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and an unidentified male, 21 January 1992), pp. 2–4. See also P5618 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Vidović, 27 December 1991), p. 5 (where the Accused spoke about the importance of only having
the JNA in BiH); P5746 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Dobrica Ćosić, 15 February 1992), p. 5.
9522
See para. 88.
9523
P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 14. See also Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik), T. 9124–9125.
9524
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9125.
9525
See para. 89.
9526
P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Ðerić dated 5 April 2012), para. 28.
 753

2920. At a meeting held in the Presidency of the SFRY in Belgrade on 9 December 1991, the
Accused stated that Europe ―does not accept legality but the factual status. Therefore we have to
be wise enough and prepare both legality and the factual status‖.9527 ( Here is what, and why,
had been said by the President, P2554, p. 78:

(Therefore, #Europe is incosistant, and when it fits their interests, the Europeans say that the
Serbs are legaly right, but there are a new factual states, and when it fits their interests, they
rely on legality. President Karad`i} warned on this duplicity and had every right to respond
in a same manner!) The Accused declared: ―We have made a list of moves. Ten moves in the
direction we want, so that there are results. […] But we don‘t do anything until Alija messes
something up.‖9528 Here is this exhibit, P2554 what the President said. It should be noticed
what was skipped in the brackets: “….so that there are results: Bosnia remains in
Yugoslavia, either as a whole or our areas.” Why this short part of this sentence had been
skipped? Because it was aimed to be understood that the results were some crimes of the
Serbs and the President. The brackets […] served to replace a mitigating or exculpatory
elements, and those who assisted the Chamber, made a bad service to the Court!

2921. On 11 December 1991, the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted a recommendation that
SDS deputies in municipal assemblies in BiH in which the SDS did not have a majority establish
―municipal assemblies of the Serbian people‖.9529 The recommendation stated that the assemblies
would be composed of SDS deputies and ―other deputies of Serb nationality who make a statement
on joining the Assembly‖.9530 Attached to the recommendation was a model decision on the
establishment of ―municipal assemblies of the Serbian people‖ to be adopted by individual
municipalities.9531 These decisions were to be verified by the Bosnian Serb Assembly.9532 (So
what? Since the Chamber knew how the other side mistreated the Serbs in such a

9527
P2554 (Notes from SFRY's Presidency meeting, 9 December 1991), p. 78.
9528
P2554 (Notes from SFRY's Presidency meeting, 9 December 1991), p. 78. See also Patrick Treanor, T. 14038–14039 (1 June 2011). See also P5774
(Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţićand Vladislav Jovanović, 5 January 1992), p. 2.
9529
See para. 131.
9530
D84 (Shorthand Record of 3rd session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 December 1991), p. 11.
9531
D84 (Shorthand Record of 3rd session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 December 1991), pp. 11, 18–20.
9532
D84 (Shorthand Record of 3rd session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 December 1991), p. 29.
 754

municipalities, it would admit that this democratic move was justified. And it was a
recommendation, not obligation!)

2922. Municipal level leaders reported to the municipal bodies on developments at a republican
level including the formation of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and noted that the assembly had been
created as a means of resisting attempts to divide the Serbian people.9533 The SDS Municipal
Board in Prijedor, for example, was informed on 28 October 1991, that Serb assemblies had to be
formed in all the municipalities, that they were establishing their own state with their own forces
and preparations had to be made for the plebiscite of the Serb people and military organisation.9534
The SDS Municipal Board in Prijedor also referred to the position of the President that given the
secession of BiH arranged by the SDA, they were forced ―to form ethnic communities in our
ethnic territories‖.9535 They also discussed the importance of establishing control over their
territories.9536 (Those who assisted the Chamber in the assembling this Judgement missed to
point out that the two other ethnic communities had been offered the same opportunity, to
form their own ethnic municipalities in the Serb territories, which would serve their social
and security needs!#Two municipalities – peace#!)

2923. The Chamber found that on 20 December 1991 the SRBiH Presidency, Koljević and
Plavšić dissenting, voted to apply to the Badinter Commission for the recognition of SRBiH as an
independent state.9537 Members of the Bosnian Serb Assembly met on 21 December 1991,
expressed their strong opposition to the Badinter Commission process, and approved preparations
for the formation of a Serb Republic.9538 On 5 January 1992, the Badinter Commission
recommended that SRBiH be required to hold a referendum to determine the will of its people
regarding independence and the SRBiH Assembly voted to hold such a referendum on 29
February and 1 March 1992.9539 (Such a distinguished Court and it’s chambers should be
precise, #not to skip a crucial elements. One of the crucial elements of the Badinter’s Fourth
opinion# was that there are the Serbs in Bosnia, who do not agree to the secession.) To paste
Badinter’s 4th opionion@

2924. On 9 January 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly proclaimed the SerBiH.9540 This
proclamation noted that the territory of the SerBiH was composed of the SAOs and ―additional
territories, not precisely identified but to include areas where the Serbs had been in a majority
before the genocide of World War II‖.9541 (This was rather a #form of strengthening the
negotiating position! Anyway, this fact didn’t have any negative consequence, it was before
the war, and in context of the Conference – ICFY#!) The area which would comprise the
territory of the SerBiH would include all areas where a majority of Bosnian Serbs had voted in the
plebiscite to remain in Yugoslavia.9542 On 13 January 1992, the Council of Ministers identified
the priorities emerging from the declaration of the promulgation of the SerBiH of 9 January 1992,
which included defining the ethnic territory and the establishment of government organs in the

9533
P2570 (Book of minutes of Prijedor's SDS Municipal Board meetings, 1991), p. 60.
9534
P2570 (Book of minutes of Prijedor's SDS Municipal Board meetings, 1991), pp. 62, 64, 73.
9535
P2570 (Book of minutes of Prijedor's SDS Municipal Board meetings, 1991), p. 90.
9536
P2570 (Book of minutes of Prijedor's SDS Municipal Board meetings, 1991), p. 91.
9537
See para. 48.
9538
See para. 50.
9539
P971 (Robert Donia‘s expert report entitled ―The Origins of Republika Srpska‖, 1990-1992, 30 July 2003), e-court p. 36. See also P1349 (Transcript of 6th
session of SerBiH Assembly, 26 January 1992), p. 16.
9540
See para. 50; Robert Donia, T. 3564 (9 June 2010); P1346 (Minutes of 5th session of SerBiH Assembly, 9 January 1992), pp. 2–3. See also Adjudicated Fact
394.
9541
Patrick Treanor, T. 14027 (1 June 2011).
9542
Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4188.
 755

territory.9543 The Accused and Krajišnik participated in the discussion on the execution of these
tasks.9544

2925. In an intercepted conversation on 13 January 1992, the Accused informed Kuprešanin,

President of the ARK Assembly, that ―[w]e have a complete concept of a polycentric
development. Therefore, centres must exist, and the centres will be developed more powerfully‖
and that ―not a single move should be made which will not be a hundred percent agreed on‖.9545
(So what? The Chamber already knew that the President foght agains the localisms and
merging of the two Krajinas , which would be only an empty declaration, but would justify
and legitimise a military coalition of President Tudjman and Izetbegovic against the Serbs.
The Chamber never takes into account a time-frame in assessing an event. This conversation
happened in January 1992, when it was meant that there was not going to be a war, and that
a transformation of BiH would be political and calm, for which a hundred percent
agreement was needed!) In another conversation, the President also spoke of the territorial claims
of the Bosnian Serbs and in particular that regionalisation should not disrupt the authority of the
Bosnian Serb state, namely that ―I want Serbs to organise themselves in those Krajinas […] but
that the unified Serbian [BiH] still exist‖.9546 (So what? An #irrelevant political issue!)

2926. On 17 January 1992, at a session of the Council of Ministers, a draft programme of its
work was presented.9547 It called for the adoption of the Constitution and for the organisation of
the territory in such a way so as to ―enlarge the territory of the regions and encompass a larger
number of inhabitants wherever possible in order to consolidate the regions both ethnically and
economically.‖9548 (So what? That was a Serb precondition to accept the BiH secession!) At
that same session it was decided that draft legislation to enable the SerBiH to start functioning
would be prepared by 15 February 1992.9549 The Bosnian Serb Assembly also authorised the
Council of Ministers and other Bosnian Serb representatives, including Krajišnik, to prepare a
Constitution and ―other relevant documents in order to regulate further state organisation of the
Serbian people‖ in BiH.9550 Krajišnik was elected to the commission appointed to prepare a
Constitution.9551 The President and Krajišnik discussed the timing of the announcement of the
Bosnian Serb Constitution.9552 (It is another #political issue, irrelevant for any criminal
responsibility#, unless the Prosecution is “smuggling in” the crime against peace, which is
not subject of this Tribunal. It is well known that when a complex sovereignty falls apart, the
part of it are entitled and obliged to self-organize and secure a rule of law. Beside that, ald
the Serbs had done had been agreed in the Hague in 1991, within the ICFY. If the other side
in BiH meant to deceive the Serbs by speeking one thing in the Hague, and another in BiH,
the Serbs didn’t agree to be deceived )

2927. On 26 January 1992, during an extraordinary session convened to discuss how to respond
to the moves towards the independence of BiH,9553 the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted a series of
conclusions. This included a conclusion that the decision to hold the referendum on the

9543
P1082 (Minutes of 1st meeting of Ministerial Council of SerBiH Assembly, 13 January 1992), p. 2.
9544
P1082 (Minutes of 1st meeting of Ministerial Council of SerBiH Assembly, 13 January 1992), p. 2.
9545
P5678 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vojo Kuprešanin, 13 January 1992), p. 2. See also P5803 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 11 December 1991), p. 1.
9546
P5819 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Gojko Đogo, 11 November 1991), p. 11.
9547
See Adjudicated Fact 1964.
9548
Adjudicated Fact 1965. The Council of Ministers placed ―particular stress [...] on the need for political and territorial organization of the regions by the
formation of new municipalities in border areas of these regions. See Adjudicated Fact 1966.
9549
See Adjudicated Fact 1967.
9550
D1185 (Conclusions of SerBiH Assembly session, 26 January 1992). See Adjudicated Fact 1951.
9551
See Adjudicated Fact 1951.
9552
P5744 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 23 February 1992), p. 2.
9553
Momĉilo Krajišnik, T. 43870–43871 (20 November 2013).
 756

independence of BiH was brought about illegally and that it was therefore not mandatory for the
Serb people.9554 The Chamber recalls that the referendum on the question of independence was
held on 29 February and 1 March 1992. It was largely boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs and yielded
an overwhelming majority of votes in favour of independence.9555 (No a reasonable and decent
chamber would accept that the referendum was legal and legitimate. Since Mr. Badinter
posted the only condition to get a peoples opinion at a referendu, without prescribing any
specitic criteria, the referendum had to be held in accordance to the domestic laws and
Constitution. That meant the following chain of steps! #why referendum was illegal#?:

1. A two third votes in the Assembly for appointing a ereferendum pertaining to a

constitutional issues; This wasn’t done!
2. A consent of the Council for the ethnic equality after the appellation of 20 deputees.
This hadn’t been obtained;
3. To have a two third of all the voters, all the electoral body voting in favour of the
required question. This never happened. Not even two third of the voters voted, let alone
voted in favour of independence! So, an “overwhelming majority” was not sufficient for any
constitutional matters, but only for some communal matters, line a water pipelines, or
depodition of garbage;
4. After obtaining all of these preconditions, to return to the Assembly and obtain a two
third plus one deputies voting in confirmation of the results of referendum! None of these
unavoidable and inevitable preconditions and moves hadn’t been obtained, and therefore,
none of the actions towards the independence were legal and legitimate! A UN court should
not sanction such an illegal conduct with so detrimental consequences. If it was not as the
Defence is claiming, the Prosecution-Chamber would be obliged to rebut it legally, not
politically!

Beside that, 26 January 92 comes after 25 January 92, after an unsuccessful session of the
common BiH Assembly, at which the Muslims proposed, and then had withdrawn a
compromise agreement: to postpone the referendum until the regionalisation be
accomplished, which the Serbs accepted. After this, one of the series of deceptions, the Serb
side didn’t have any illusion any longer, and went it’s own way. Why would this Court
support such a flagrant violations of the internal and international legal norms of the
Muslim side?)

2928. One of the Bosnian Serb deputies spoke about the immense duties they had ―because we
are setting up our own state‖ and called on the Bosnian Serb Assembly to set deadlines for the
completion of this plan.9556 The Accused was also asked to ―give us an order […] that the #Serbs
should occupy their territories so that no other forces could enter them‖.9557 #(To #“occupy their
own territories so that no other forces could enter them” was a legal obligation due to the
existing legislation on the All-people’s Defence and Social self-Protection#, but moreover,
that was a pure defensive measure, particularly since the forces from Croatia shelled the
Serb settlements in the RS, and theatenned to enter BiH and kill the Serbs, as it really
happened! Is thi Court of an opinion that every nation, all peoples, all living beings are
entitled to self-defence, except the Serbs! If the Court is dealing with the politics contrary to
it’s mandate, then the UN should see what kind of politics this UN Court is preferring and
backing!)

9554
See para. 53.
9555
See para. 54; see Adjudicated Fact 395.
9556
P1349 (Transcript of 6th session of SerBiH Assembly, 26 January 1992), p. 12.
9557
D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), p. 39.
 757

2929. In February 1992, before the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the President spoke about the
Bosnian Serb strategic aims beginning to materialise and the importance of establishing internal
borders ―as wide as possible‖, and that if those internal borders are wider than the external borders
of BiH they would be able to say ―[w]ho cares about external borders‖.9558 (This is wrong for
several reasons. First, the translation is wrong, it was not said for the internal borders to be
”as wide as possible” but to be “as thick as possible, se D88, in Serbian:

Let us see how it was translated and presented in the Judgement! It is reasonable to assume
that an ordinary reader of this Judgement can not open all the documents to check whether
they are translated accurately and used properly. So an ordinary reader should have a
confidence that the Chamber did it for all the people and for all the times. Let us see how
this Chamber did it, D88, p. 20:

The discussion was within a preparation for the Conference on BiH, and the #President was
persuading the deputies to accept that BiH would remain within the existing borders#, if the
Serbs secure a high degree of autonomy#, i.e. that the internal borders would be thick
enough, so that no one could dominate over the Serbs. There are mentioned other elements
to be negotiated. Why the Chamber extracted this discussion out of the context, and
presented it as a criminal planning?) : In March 1992, the President called for frequent sittings
of the Bosnian Serb Assembly to ―accelerate our preparations for the events that will follow‖9559
and ―because we are now entering the final stage of a process‖.9560 (#All in accord with the

9558
D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), p. 20.
9559
P1349 (Transcript of 6th session of SerBiH Assembly, 26 January 1992), p. 8.
9560
D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), p. 4.
 758

ongoing Conference under the Carrington – Cutileiro auspice#! Without the time-frame and
context, the interpretation of such a “findings” sounds like a crime!!!# What the Chamber is
suggesting was this process? Any outsider would presume that it had something to do with
an illegal accomplishment, or a war, or crimesss… But in March still there was a Lisbon
plan which secured a peaceful transformation of BiH, and that was “the final stage of a
process!” It was only 25 March whenm the Muslim side (SDA) reneged on the Lisbon
Agreement for a peaceful transformation of BiH, but still the Serb side remained faitful to
this Agreement! The Chamber is equally using an exculpatory, as well as a commendable, or
a neutral and political sentences of the President in a foggy and obscure context, so that any
reader would conclude that it was something that corroborated the Indictment and justified
the Judgement. But it is either neutral, or a highly exculpatory! And this sentences and
approach of the President are highly EXCULPATORY, because President Karadzic was
persuading the representatives that there could be a safe life within Bosnia’s external
borders, since there would be an internal borders between the ethnic autonomies!)

2930. The Bosnian Serb Assembly also concluded that the ―[p]lace of the Republic of the
Serbian People in [BiH] is in the common state of all Serbian people. Democratic transformation
of Yugoslavia must be [a] parallel process with the state organisation of the Serbian people into
the Serbian federation or alliance of the Serbian states.‖9561 (So what? That was the standpoint
of the Assembly, a sort of declaration of a political wishes, legal and legitimate in the middle
of illegal and illegitimate unilateral secessions of the Yugoslav republics!) On 15 February
1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly discussed a draft constitution, according to which the SerBiH
would become part of federal Yugoslavia, and not BiH.9562 (So what? That was an interim
“draft”, prior to the Lisbon Agreement, after which the Serb side corrected this “draft”. At
that time the entire Bosnia was within Yugoslavia.) On 28 February 1992, the SDS Deputies‘
Club recommended that the Bosnian Serb Assembly pass the constitution that day as ―a form of
protection against the referendum‖; the Bosnian Serb Assembly then unanimously adopted the
Bosnian Serb Constitution.9563 The Constitution provided for equal rights and freedoms before the
law for all citizens of the republic regardless of, inter alia, their race, ethnicity and beliefs.9564
(Commendable and # EXCULPATORY!#!!)

2931. On 24 March 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly elected Branko Đerić as the Prime
Minister, Aleksa Buha as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mićo Stanišić as Minister of Internal
Affairs in the Bosnian Serb Government.9565 As recalled earlier, while the Bosnian Serb
Constitution provided that the prime minister propose candidates for ministerial positions to the
Assembly, in fact it was the SDS and the SDS President that chose the nominees.9566 For instance,
the Accused, as president of the SDS, asked that Đerić nominate Mićo Stanišić and Buha.9567 (So
what? Djeric himself was nominated by the SDS, to implement the policy of the Assembly which had
more that two third of the SDS deputies. All this about the Government was in accord with the
Lisbon Agreement that was reneged by the SDA only a few hours after this session of the Serb
Assembly!)
9561
D1185 (Conclusions of SerBiH Assembly session, 26 January 1992).
9562
See Adjudicated Facts 1989, 1996.
9563
P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), pp. 15, 17. See also para. 53; D89 (Shorthand Record of 9th session of SerBiH
Assembly, 28 February 1992), p. 14; P1351 (Transcript of 7th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 15 February 1992) (containing lengthy discussions on the draft
constitution); Adjudicated Fact 414.
9564
See Adjudicated Fact 1997.
9565
P1354 (Minutes of 13th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 4–7; P2536 (Patrick Treanor‘s expert report entitled ―The Bosnian Serb
Leadership 1990-1992‖, 30 July 2002), para. 223.
9566
P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Đerić dated 5 April 2012), paras. 7–9; P1105 (Transcript of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24 November 1992), p.
12. The SDS and the Accused exercised control over personnel appointments more generally, including to assistant minister positions and in public
enterprises, though the Government could propose candidates. See Vladimir Lukić, T. 38760–38764 (23 May 2013); P6338 (Letter from RS Government to
SDS Executive Board, 29 August 1993); P6339 (Letter from SDS Executive Board to RS Government, 28 December 1993); P6340 (Letter from RS
Government to SDS Executive Board, 12 March 1994).
9567
Branko Đerić, T. 27942–27943 (24 April 2012); P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Đerić dated 5 April 2012), para. 9.
 759

2932. With regard to Ministers Mićo Stanišić and Mandić, Đerić testified that they kept visiting
the Accused and failed to attend government‘s sessions as they felt that ―the government could be
pushed aside‖ and ―thought themselves as belonging to the top leadership‖.9568 (This falls within a
#psychological crap of a rivalry,# but in a war situation these two Ministries are particularly closely
tied to the President, who was supposed to know what was happening on the terrain, so to be ready
for the negotiations! #What importance and relevance this has for the Judgem#ent?) As described
by Đerić, the SerBiH was a ―party state‖ where the President as the president of the SDS held all
the power, took control of all functions of the SDS and was practically the government too.9569 (A
worthless to comment matter. The other four Prime Ministers didn’t have this opinion! #Not
relevant for this case!) Đerić added that ―the government was there just as a kind of technical
attachment, not a body that should create policies‖ and that it was a state in which the government
did not have any opposition.9570 The President himself said: ―But, believe me, the Government is
mine. I am responsible for its functioning. I appoint and propose‖.9571 (#Irrelevant, since no a
crime appeared because of such an experience of the first and unsuccessful Prime Minister, who was
a professor without any experience in managing or in any executive branch! But, anyway, the
Government didn’t create the policy, it was the Assembly, while the Government proposed, and
implemented the adopted policy!Let us see what was the context of this President’s standpoint,
P1379, p.254-255:

9568
P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Đerić dated 5 April 2012), para. 22
9569
P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Ðerić dated 5 April 2012), paras. 13–14. See also Milorad Dodik, T. 36877–36880 (9 April 2013).
9570
P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Đerid dated 5 April 2012), paras. 13–14. See also Radomir Neškovid, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik), T. 16844. Skoko stated that he never noticed that the Accused attempted to influence on the work of the Government and the decision-
making that was within his power. D3321 (Witness statement of Milorad Skoko dated 1 April 2013), para. 30. However, the Chamber does not find
his evidence to be reliable in this regard given that his testimony was marked by multiple contradictions and indicators of partiality and bias. Krajišnik
testified that it was inaccurate to say that the Bosnian Serb Government and the Ministerial Council were subordinated to him or the Accused and
that these structures were answerable to the Bosnian Serb Assembly. Momčilo Krajišnik, T. 43358–43359 (13 November 2013). While the Chamber
accepts that these structures may not have been formally subordinated to the Accused, the evidence demonstrates that he did play a significant and
influential role in the way in which they operated. (It is hard to believe that the Chamber uses this “instrument” – that a reputation
and influence of President Karad`i} (or Kraji{nik) equal to a formal and substantial ingerence and authorisation which
comprises a criminal liability?!? According to the Constitution of the RS, the political system was a half-presidential, because
president was to be directly elected. As same was hard to believe an understand how the Chamber rejected more than 230
testiomonies of the Defence witnesses,under a foggy explanation that they had contained “a multiple contradictions, and
indicators of partiality and bias.” The Chamber never even attempted to explicate thes “impressions” of their, nor to
corroborate it by any evidence, or justification!)
9571
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 255.
 760

That
as the President’s standpoint. According to the law and Costitution, President Karadzic was
authorized to appoint the Government sessions, to preside it and to produce the
Governmental decisions, but he rarely did that. Djeric was a good professor, but
inexperienced in executing power, and obviously didn’t know the President’s authorisations
regarding the Government!)

2933. On 28 February 1992, Koljević proposed that the Assembly be convened immediately
after the referendum and ―divide up the Television‖ and steps be taken to establish a Bosnian Serb
newspaper.9572 (#Legal#! So what? In Serbia other ethnicities did have their own TV
programs and their own newspapers, magazines and cultural institutions since 1918, and
refgreshed in 1945. It pertained to the Albaniand and Hungarians as the most numerous
ethnicities, but also Romanians, Slovaks, and others. Only the Serbs in BiH didn’t have any
of it until 1992. Meanwhile, the “common” media terrorised the Serbs with such a
propaganda and lies that no nation experienced!) These proposals were accepted by the SDS
Deputies‘ Club.9573 Similar measures had already been taken to establish a separate structure for
Bosnian Serb propaganda and the media. For example in September 1991 the SDS Executive
Board adopted the decision on the appointment of the Commission for Information and
Propaganda.9574 On 27 September 1991, in an intercepted phone conversation, the President
issued an instruction to replace the Bosnian Muslim director of Radio Banja Luka, stating ―replace
him immediately. Appoint a man of yours. These are war times.‖9575 In October 1991, the
President advocated the creation of their own radio television network which would unite Serbian
information as well as their own news agency.9576 (So what? #Legal, defense reasons#! #Would
the Great Britain, or the USA during a war keep a Hitler’s follower in the BBC or the Voice
of America as a general manager#?)

2934. On 7 April 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly declared the independence of the SerBiH
and Plavšić and Koljević resigned from their positions in the Presidency of BiH.9577 The Ministry
of Defence was set up around April 1992.9578

2935. On 8 May 1992, the Bosnian Serb Government established a Central Commission for the
Exchange of Prisoners of War and Arrested Persons.9579 At a session of the Bosnian Serb
Government on 20 March 1993, it decided to dissolve the Central Commission for the Exchange

9572
P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 7.
9573
P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 15. See also Adjudicated Fact 1952.
9574
P6486 (Decision of SDS Executive Board, 9 September 1991), p. 1.
9575
P6509 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vukić, 27 September 1991), p. 2.
9576
D3988 (Minutes of the 1st meeting of Committee for Mass Communication, 8 October 1991), p. 2.
9577
See Adjudicated Fact 2011.
9578
See para. 115.
9579
Seepara. 125.
 761

of Prisoners, due to problems including ―private arrangements and smuggling in the exchange of
prisoners‖.9580 The Bosnian Serb Government decided to form a new Commission for the
Exchange and Release of Prisoners of War and Civilians which would answer directly to the
government and would be more systematic and organised and would co-operate with other
relevant government bodies in order to address the accommodation of exchanged prisoners in the
RS.9581

2936. A three-member Presidency was established on 12 May 1992, composed of Plavšić,

Koljević, and the President, with the President elected the President of the Presidency. On or
around 2 June 1992, the Presidency was enlarged to five members to include the Prime Minister,
Đerić, and the President of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, Krajišnik. On 6 July 1992 the members of
the Presidency allocated tasks among themselves and the President was charged with military
issues.9582 On 17 December 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly replaced the structure of the
Presidency by establishing a single president structure. The President was elected to the position
of President of the SerBiH. Plavšić and Koljević were elected as Vice-Presidents.9583 During its
operations in 1992, the President exercised the most authority in the Presidency.9584 When
international observers met with the top level of the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Krajišnik,
Koljević and Plavšić, they all deferred to the President, and he was seen as ―undoubtedly and
indisputably the leader of the Bosnian Serbs‖.9585 (Many imprecise data, such as “enlarged”
Presidency, but not relevant. The Pressidency seated in a different settings and participants,
but for an “enlarged” Presidency there must have been a state of war in the entire country.
Whenever it was of the interest of subject, there had been summoned different ministers.
However, the President had been respected, but not all-mighty, nor he could do whatever he
wanted. He was criticised oftenly, and questioned many times to explain his moves,
particularly pertaining to the orders to the VRS to refrain, and to his territorial flexibility
and concessions in the negotiations!)

2937. The Accused attended and addressed almost every session of the Bosnian Serb
Assembly.9586 The Accused‘s speeches were often met with explicit approval and praise by
Bosnian Serb representatives.9587 For example, at a session on 25 February 1992, Kuprešanin said
that the Accused ―as the President of the SDS, is truly the leading figure among the Serbian
people. And five of his sentences are enough to change the entire course of the session‖.9588 On
another occasion, after the Accused spoke about the need to centralise the authority, a deputy said
―things that are ordered by [the Accused], the Assembly, the Presidency, the Minister of Defence
and the Army General, must be carried out to the last man‖.9589 Mladić also spoke after the
9580
P3129 (Minutes of the 66th session of RS Government, 20 March 1993), p. 10. See also P3113 (Minutes of the 73rd session of RS Government, 29 June
1993), p. 16.
9581
P3129 (Minutes of the 66th session of RS Government, 20 March 1993), pp. 10–11. See also P3138 (Minutes of the 67th session of RS Government, 6 April
1993), pp. 8–9.
9582
See paras. 96–98.
9583
See paras. 96–98.
9584
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8618; Colm Doyle, T. 2677–2678 (21 May 2010); Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16844. See also Robert ĐurĊević, T. 25908 (7 March 2012); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik), Anthony Banbury, T. 13313 (15 March 2011); Patrick Treanor, T. 14043 (1 June 2011).
9585
Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 25256-25257; Colm Doyle, T. 2677–2678 (21 May 2010). See also D88 (Shorthand
Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), p. 65.
9586
See, e.g., P1343 (Transcript of 1st session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 October 1991), pp. 56–60; D84 (Shorthand Record of 3rd session of SerBiH Assembly, 11
December 1991), pp. 12–14; D86 (Shorthand Record of 4th session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 December 1991), pp. 37–42; D87 (Transcript of 9th session of
SRBiH Assembly, 24–25 January 1992), pp. 103–104; D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), pp. 4–10; D92
(Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), pp. 85–86; D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992),
pp. 51–57; D115 (Transcript of 25th session of RS Assembly, 19–20 January 1993), pp. 3–9; P1373 (Transcript of 31st session of RS Assembly, 9 May
1993), pp. 1, 18–19, 22; P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), pp. 9–16.
9587
P1347 (Shorthand record of 5th session of SerBiH Assembly, 9 January 1992), pp. 57–58; P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24
March 1992), p. 23.
9588
D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), p. 65. See Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43486 (14 November 2013) (further
testifying that ―[q]uite simply, [the Accused]‘s five sentences meant more than who knows how many speeches of mine‖). See also para. 2962.
9589
D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 31.
 762

President and stated: ―I support everything he said […] I am much more optimistic now than I was
ever before‖.9590 (So what? #The 83 a very highly educated deputies commended# the
President, but behind this praise there was only the President’t tolerance in discussions,
responsibility and readiness to listen to a different opinions and proposals, so that the
Assembly decisions be a “product of the mind of the entire people”, - as the greatest Serb
poet Njegos wrote. The President criticised and was criticised, it could be seen from the
shorthands of all the Assembly sessions, but both, he and his interlocutors knew that it was
nothing personal, but only for the sake of the people. If this is accepted by the Chamber,
then no an allegation that he was an autocrat could survive!)

2938. While the Bosnian Serb Assembly operated in a democratic fashion, the President was
described as ―the greatest authority‖, who had ―the best ideas and the best solutions for all issues
crucial to the Serbian people in BiH.‖9591 The President emphasised the supremacy of the Bosnian
Serb Assembly but at the same time stated that he would not allow a few people to ―jeopardise the
entire project‖ and that once the SDS had adopted a policy, anything outside of that policy would
be treason and that maximum discipline was needed.9592 (Exactly! That is how it is in any
democratic institution. While a decision-making process must be free, the execution of such a
democratically adopted decisions must not be improvised and altered by any individual,
including the President!)

2939. Defence witnesses testified that (i) the Accused was a weak president with very little
power; (ii) the President did not have ―unquestionable power‖; (iii) the President was a democrat
who did not dominate the state or the SDS; and (iv) the local SDS leadership was completely
autonomous.9593 However, the Chamber notes that the evidence of Zametica, Kondić and Sojić in
this regard is expressed in general terms and is based on their own feeling, impression, opinion,
and in some cases incomplete information. The Chamber does not therefore find their evidence to
be of much weight in this regard. In addition the evidence of Šojić, Poplašen, and Tadić was
marked by contradictions, evasiveness or indicators of partisanship and bias. The Chamber
therefore does not find their evidence to be reliable in this regard. (# Now, to the Chamber it
was not relevent what was the “opinion, feeling, impression” of the people who used to meet
President Karadzic on a daily basis during four years of the war, while the Chamber
accepted the same “private feelings, impressions and in all the cases incoppmlete information
of the foreign witnesses who were present at the terrain every now and then, and were
summoned to testify about facts they knew!# Why would these people, Defense witnesses, be
biased and evasive? None of them was a suspect for anything, they are a free persons,
successful in their professions, independent, and the President neither could help them, nor
damage their interests. The Chamber inferred that the said witnesses commended the
President because of being partisans, but the more probable inference would be that they
had been partisan because they respected the President for his characteristics that they
described. And some of them came from a Muslim families!) In addition the Chamber finds
that this evidence is outweighed by the volume of reliable evidence discussed above which on the
contrary demonstrates the power and control of the Accused. (It is an unbelievable partisanship,

9590
D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 58.
9591
Andelko Grahovac, T. 44053 (26 November 2013). See also D3364 (Witness statement of Dušan Kozić dated 7 April 2013), para. 28 (describing the
democratic atmosphere in the Assembly).
9592
D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), pp. 45–47; P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24
March 1992), p. 17. Dodik testified that the Accused‘s role in the Bosnian Serb Assembly was to present the situation and that he never requested that
certain decisions be taken. Milorad Dodik, T. 36857–36858 (9 April 2013). The Chamber notes, however, that Dodik‘s evidence was marked by
contradictions, indicators of insincerity and partisanship which undermined the reliability of his evidence in this regard.
9593
John Zametica, T. 42453−42457 (29 October 2013); D2683 (Witness statement of Dragan Šojić dated 15 December 2012), paras. 9, 17; D4163 (Witness
statement of Boro Tadić dated 1 December 2013), paras. 27, 30; D3854 (Witness Statement of Savo Ĉeklić dated 7 July 2013), paras. 4, 6; Savo Ĉeklić, T.
41239−41240 (11 July 2013); D4063 (Witness statement of Novak Kondić dated 23 November 2013), paras. 6–7; D4027 (Witness statement of Nikola
Poplašen dated 11 November 2013), para. 21; D4166 (Witness statement of Mikan Davidović dated 1 December 2013), paras. 5−6, 8–9, 12–14; D3861
(Witness statement of Radovan M. Karadţić dated 14 July 2013), para. 3.
 763

much more impressive than any of the Defence witnesses. It was sufficient just to read the
transcripts of the sessions of different bodies, to conclude that the President was rather a
humbe public servant of his people than a “powerful and controllable” leader, in which case
the Serbs wouldn’t respect him whatsoever!)

1. Conclusion

2940. Having considered the evidence above, the Chamber finds that the President, as the
president of the SDS Main Board, had de jure and de facto authority over the SDS party and its
members. From 1990 to 1995 the President was at the head of the SDS and he exerted great
control and authority over its institutions and direction. In addition, as the President of the SNB,
President of the Presidency and subsequently President of the RS, the President was the highest
civil servant within the SerBiH and later the RS. The President had great authority over the
Presidency, the Government and its key members and, as a result of his position and gravitas, had
great influence at the Bosnian Serb Assembly. The SDS operated with strict respect for the
hierarchical structures which ran from the Main Board and Executive Board to the Municipal
Board structures. The Chamber also finds that the President enforced discipline within the party
and was the most powerful and influential authority within the party. These SDS party structures
facilitated communication between the higher level leaders including the President and the
municipal SDS leaders. (#Wrong to the anbearable degree#. The President was a patien
servant, capable of facilitating the best decisions out of the “mind of all the people” and the
entire his influence had to be proven again and again in every session, and always as an
influence of the rules, Constitution and laws. The President had a good reputation, but all of
it was checked and challenged on a daily basis, and he couldn be private or non-principal,
biased, incorrect, even if he wanted, because it wouldn’t fly!)

2941. The Chamber further concludes that from 1991 the Accused, the SDS, and the Bosnian
Serb leadership planned for and developed measures to be taken should BiH move toward
independence. (The #BiH couldn’t “move toward independence without the Serb consent# -
because the Serbs in BiH made this BiH too, and were an inevitable and unavoidable element
of this BiH, and without their consent, BiH couldn’t make any important decision that would
affect the destiny of the Serbs too. How come this Court of the UN is negligeant about the
respect of the laws and constitutions? Without respect for the most important legal
documents, every community is lost, and then a “rule of force” prevailes over “rule of law”,
and then the only question is: Who is stronger?) When the SRBiH Assembly passed a
declaration of sovereignty on 15 October 1991 in the absence of the Serb delegates, these plans
were further developed and ultimately put into practice. (The SRBiH #didn’t pass a declaration
of sovereign#nty, it was an# invalide move#, a private meeting of the two deputy clubs, and
this truth will never be dismissed! Even the Badinter’s Arbitrage Commision confirmed it in
it’s “4th opinion” according to which this Declaration was insufficient! The UN is deeply
compromised by such an attitude of dishonor for a national legal system!)

2942. The Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership responded vehemently to what they viewed
as an illegal and unconstitutional move towards independence. (That didn’t depend on anyone’s
“view”, that was written in the #Constitution of Yugoslavia and the Constitution of BiH#.
#The countries and institutions supporting such an illegal development are fully responsible
for the tragedy#. Yet, the Serbs in BiH verbally and politically responded vehemently, but
were very careful not to initiate any unrest and not to violate any law and constitutional
provision. Whenthe other side violated every constitution and law, and a decency in the
inter-ethnic communications, the Serbs declared that they are using their rights to
selforganisation and self-defence!) The Chamber finds that the Accused and SDS structures
 764

played a crucial role in this period in developing a response to further the objectives and interests
of the Bosnian Serbs. When confronted with the possibility of BiH independence, the SDS
discussed the objective of Serb unity, activating parallel government structures, intensifying the
process of regionalisation, and furthering military organisation at a local level. (The #Serbs
hadn’t been “confronted with the possibility of BiH independence” but with the violations of
their rights# so drastic that there was no any chance to survive! Nevertheless, the Serbs
offered a way out through the transformation and decentralisation of BiH, which was a
commitment that Mr. Izetbegovic gave in the Hague at the ICFY in September, October and
November 1991. The entire international community was watching the SDA manoeuvres to
cheat both the international mediators and the Serbs!)

2943. The President‘s intercepted conversation on 16 October 1991 in which he reassured

municipal leaders that they had ―worked out a scenario. We won‘t make a single move today […]
Everything‘s been worked out‖ is instructive. The Chamber, having considered the context in
which this conversation took place, finds that it demonstrates the central role played by the
President during this period and that the Bosnian Serbs had already made careful preparations to
respond to any move towards independence by BiH. This conclusion is further supported by the
evidence that the President declared a state of emergency in the SDS on 18 October 1991, and in
so doing emphasised that leaders of the SDS had been working towards developing the measures
which would have to be taken at a municipal level. This declaration also made it clear that the
steps to be taken were meticulously planned and that the President insisted on the highest level of
discipline to ensure that there would not be a ―single wrong step‖. (Had the Chamber intended
to really judge, it would have known that these preparations are a part of the legal system, of
the Law on All-People Defence, and in Law on the Social Self-Defence. Every single
organisation, company, the state institution had in a safe an envelop with the instructions for
an imergency situation, such as the “Variante A and B” as the witness Kapetina testified!
But, anyway, was the President guilty for not being naïve, irresponsible or stupid. Even if the
President was, the rest of the people wouldn’t be, and would continue with the defense
preparations, although in a more chaotic manner! But, a demand to the Highest possible
level of discipline secured that no mistakes appeared because of fear and panic!)

2944. The Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership were also instrumental in the formation of
the Bosnian Serb Assembly. The establishment of the Bosnian Serb Assembly was one of the first
steps towards creating parallel structures, which formed the basis for the formation of a separate
Serb state in BiH. (#The Serb moves had been in accord with the ICFY results#! #Until 24
October 1991 there already had been a great deal of the future inner structure of BiH agreed
in the ICFY in the Hague#. All of it was a legal and legitimate activity, but if the Chamber
judges about that issue, this is out of the realm of Statute, because this way the Court is
considering the causes of the war by judging a political moves of only one side. This must not
be done, after the Defence had been prevented to depict the contexts and the conduct of the
other side!) The Chamber finds that from the date of its creation on 24 October 1991 throughout
the duration of the conflict in BiH, this body played a central role in organising the Bosnian Serb
people and forming a separate state. The Chamber finds that the Bosnian Serb Assembly was the
formal means through which the ideology and objectives of the President and the Bosnian Serb
leadership were officially sanctioned and disseminated. (This is also a #deeply distorted
meaning of a democratic parliament#. These deputies had been legaly elected at the elections
in 1990, and with a pretty different “strategic goals”, complementary with the goals of the
two other ethnic communities, particularly with the Muslims. Throughout it’s existence, the
Serb Assembly was te only body for a creation of the policy of the Serbs in BiH, and it was
clearly said many times. Had the Assembly adopted another “ideology and objectives”
neither the President, nor anybody else would be able to change it. So, the President was a
public servant of this parliament, not vice versa! This kind of distortion is unacceptable even
 765

from the Prosecutor, let alone from the Chamber!) It was also one of the bodies used to
communicate instructions down to the municipal representatives regarding these objectives.
(#Senseless! How else should it be, particularly in a crisis? The deputies communicated the
two way, from the terrain to the Assembly, demanding some changes, fighting for the
interests of their constituencies, and the adopted decisions vere communicated back.#)

2945. For example, the Bosnian Serb Assembly passed decisions which reflected the position of the
Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership that the Serb people would remain in the joint state of
Yugoslavia. (#“Remaining in the joint state of Yugoslavia” wasn’t anything new,
revolutionary, illegal or violent, but to the contrary, it was a conservative, preservation
something that already existed, a “status quo”, and didn’t need any violence! This is a very
insolent forgery! That was not the President’s position, that was the position of the
population, and the population had many parties offering programs that differed widely
from those of the SDS, but the SDS won more than 90% of the Serb votes. Taking into
account the fact that the Serb deputies from these other parties finally disagreed with these
parties and joined the Serb Assembly, which makes more that 98% of the Serb electoral in
BiH. This kind of legitimacy didn’t have any other party in Europe, and the SDS had to
follow the pre-electional program, and to ask the population about any crucial change, for
which reason there were several plebiscites. Depicting the Serbs as a flack of sheep and the
SDS as a rigid shepard is deeply insulting.) It also organised a plebiscite of the Bosnian Serb
people to confirm that decision and then endorsed the result of that plebiscite and declared that
areas where Serbs had voted to remain in Yugoslavia would remain part of the territory of
Yugoslavia. When BrĊanin threatened dismissal of directors and managers who did not
participate in the plebiscite, the President cautioned him against making such statements publicly
but did not condemn the substance of the statements themselves. The Chamber finds that this
evidence demonstrates that the President worked towards full participation in the plebiscite as a
means of showing public support for the policies of the Bosnian Serb leadership. (First of all, the
President had a very dynamic conflicts with Brdjanin, and the President never supported
any discrimination, but if some managers did a sabotage, they should be replaced, but not
because of their ethnicity. But, to object the President’s “full participation in the plebiscite”
which was an obligation, meand a denial of the democratic rights. The aim of the several
plebiscites wasn’t “a mean of showing public support for the policy”, but the most
democratic mean to get a genuine decision of the population that was suffering of the war
events, shortages and finally of the casualties of their dearest young members of families. Is
it a position of this UN Court that these 1,500,000 Serbs were stupid, or masochistic, ready to
suffer and to sacrifice more that 30,000 young men for a sake of the leadership??? This is a
shameless allegation, and a pathetic and insufficient surrogate for a comprehensive
understanding of the Yugoslav crisis. Such a “findings” are securing a long lasting
antagonisms in the region! The responsibility of the UN for such a “findings” of this Court is
enormous and exclusive!)

2946. The Chamber finds that when it became apparent that the objective of remaining in a
joint state with Yugoslavia was no longer possible, the Bosnian Serb Assembly approved
preparations for the formation of a separate Serb Republic. (To remain in a joint state of
Yugoslavia, not “with” Yugoslavia, became impossible because the #European countries
backed the unilateral secessions#, and this surprising move of their explained that the Serbs
and Yugoslavs were right, but there are a “new realities”#. And that was a pretext for the
Serb assertion about a “new realities”.) In this regard, the Chamber also finds that from late
1991 through until mid-1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly played a central role in forming other
parallel Bosnian Serb institutions and structures, such as the Council of Ministers and the SNB. It
also worked towards the drafting of a constitution for the Serb State they wanted to create. The
Chamber finds that the creation of parallel structures at a municipal level was also propagated by
 766

the Bosnian Serb Assembly, which called for example the establishment of ―municipal assemblies
of the Serbian people‖. The Chamber finds that the President led the discussions during the
Bosnian Serb Assembly sessions where these decisions were made. The President directly
promoted the measures which corresponded with his objectives. (All of it are a senseless
assertions! Who else would do a legislation if not a parliament? By #incriminating the
political life of the Serbs and their democratic responses to the multiple violations of the
Constitution and laws, the Chamber is searching for the causes of the war, although it was
not provided by the Statute of the Tribunal, and although the Chamber prevented the
Defence to deal with the same issue during the trial#! Precisely, the Chamber prevented the
Defence to present the contexts, circumstances and motives for the Serb conduct. This is
unimaginable in any other criminal case, because any chamber is obliged to find out whether
an President had to act as acted, whether he had another way to avoid a consequent acts,
what was a contribution of a damaged side to a criminal event, and so on. This is only one of
a mass of the elements of unfairness of this trial[s]! What is that what the UN supports? For
a complete deprivation of entire nations and communities? Then, it should be said publicly,
and to facilitate a foundation of another UN, which would respect the genuine principles of
the UN. The UN Court does not see that fare before the Sebrs in Bosnia made any move, the
Bosnian (Muslim-Croat) authorities have established a “parallel” non-Yugoslav bodies of
authorit, thus violating many laws as well as the SFRY aand BH Constitutions! By which UN
document it had been approved?)

2947. The Chamber finds that the Accused was at the forefront in explaining and promoting the
policies which led to the conclusions taken by the Bosnian Serb Assembly and other Bosnian Serb
political structures. He also promoted the importance of the Bosnian Serb Assembly itself and
explained that it needed to sit often in order to accelerate their preparations for the creation of a Bosnian
Serb state. The Chamber also finds that the President took on a very active role in the creation of the
structures which would support the existence of a separate Bosnian Serb state. For example, the
President and the SDS played the central role in the selection of ministers in the SerBiH. In addition the
Chamber finds that the evidence demonstrates that the President exercised a high degree of control over
the Bosnian Serb Government and its key members. (As senseless as many other “findings”, and it
looks rather as a praising the President for the functioning of the party in power. All of it is done
by any ruling party. As it was known to the Chamber, the SDS had another strategic objectives
before the SDA-HDZ went on the way of a unilateral and unlawful secession. In a new
circumstances imposed by these illegal acts of the partners in authority, the SDS and the President
were obliged to inform their constituency that the cours of the political life had drastically been
altered, and to obtain a new political position of the people they represented, which was obtained
through the several plebictites. And the only “control over the Bosnian Serb Government and its
key members” that President Karadzic was obliged to exercise was the control of the regularities
in functioning of the state organs. The Prosecution never obtained, nor the Chamber established
any President’s violation of the Constitution!)
2948. The Chamber also finds that the President took the leading role in terms of identifying the
measures which had to be taken in order to take control of territory and forming the Serb municipalities
in BiH with their own structures of power. For instance, he spoke about the importance of taking over
power at a municipal level. He was also pivotal in emphasising the level of contact and co-ordination
there needed to be and entrusted Bosnian Serb Assembly deputies to be in permanent contact with
municipal leaders to create the structures necessary in order to assume control at a municipal level in
accordance with the plans which he had prepared. The Bosnian Serb Assembly was also one of the
means through which the policies of the Bosnian Serb leadership were communicated to a municipal
level. (All of it was #legal, legitimate and obligatory due to the domestic laws#. That was what all
the people’s deputies do in any country! But, these flosculas about “taking control of territory”
and “forming the Serb municipalities” and “taking over power at the municipal level” which the
 767

Prosecution smuggled and swindled, and the Chamber accepted contrary to a huge evidence was a
grave mistake. The Serbs in BiH never and nowhere “took a power over´which they didn’t get in
the 1990 elections. Also, in the ethnically mixed municipalities, where the Serbs did have a
legitimate power, they consolidated this power only on their own territories, and formed their
municipalities, recommending to the two other communities to do the same in the Serb majority
municipalities where they did have conditions. That happened only after it was clear that the
constitutional violence was going to be followed by a physical one. How possibly the Chamber
could have accepted this lie and base the entire sentencing Judgement on it? The Defence will
search for these answers as far as the human kind exists. Hear is not at a stake a destiny of only
one person, neither of a whole people, there is much more at the stake. This must not be done
ever!)

2949. The proclamation of the SerBiH in January 1992 by the Bosnian Serb Assembly was
confirmation of the territorial objectives and ideology of the Bosnian Serb leadership which sought
the creation of a separate Serb state. (Only in a new circumstances, imposed by the secessionist
parties, with the aim to creat a new, separate Muslim state, which would comprise the Serb
territories. That was a legal respons to a massive violations of everything that could be violated.
Beside that, by the January 1992 there already had been drafted a #new internal structure of
BiH, accepted by Mr. Izetbegovic in 1991 within the ICFY# in the Hague. #How it is possible to
skip the cause and condemn the legal response as a consequence?#) This proclamation also made
reference to historic crimes committed against the Bosnian Serbs which has been discussed above.
The Chamber finds that the territorial delimitation of Bosnian Serb claimed territories was also
intimately linked to this discourse on these historic crimes, given the view that the Bosnian Serbs had
only become a minority in certain areas because of the crimes committed against them in World War
II. (Was it true? A superficial glance on the censuses of population would respod immediately!
This way the Tribunal intends to sanction and legalize the consequences of the horrifying
crimes from WWII, because the issue of majority-minority became crucial in separating from
Yugoslavia, and the Serbs were again to be the victims of this silenced genocide!)

2950. From late 1991, it was clear that the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership had prepared
―moves‖ which they would implement in order to achieve their objectives and had clearly calculated
when they would take action. The Accused made it clear that there needed to be agreement and
uniformity in the timing of these moves. He also emphasised the importance of SDS structures at a
local level, including SDS municipal and local boards. (#All of those moves had an alternative: to
have the SDA – HDZ returned to the legality and constitutional norms#. The very Assembly of
the Serbian people in BiH was formed only after nine days of a period given to the SDA-HDZ
coalition to annul their illegal decisions. These alternatives were always at the disposal, and the
Serbs were eager to achieve any political compromise, while the other side, encouraged by the
internationals, persisted in it’s illegal conduct! What has to be done to see this duplicity in the
actions of Tribunal? #The European Community and United Nations agreed that BiH can not
be independent unless an agreement on the inner structure of BiH The Badinter arbitrage
commission set up this condition (Opinion No. 4)#, and then some middle and low ranking
officials of foreign ministries of several countries started to support a chain of deceptions made
by the SDA, being well aware that this will lead to a war, as all the relevant politicians of the
time said publicly, as it will be depicted further in these comments!)

2951. The Accused was also the leading figure and authority in the Bosnian Serb Assembly and
insisted on the greatest discipline in following the policies of the SDS in order to achieve their
objectives. The evidence demonstrates that the deputies in the Bosnian Serb Assembly showed
a high level of respect and adherence to the policies and measures which were promulgated by
 768

the President and that the Accused also exercised considerable influence over the Bosnian Serb
governmental organs. (It was publicly said many times, that #the deputies had coined the
Serb policy, not the SDS, and that the President only facilitated the opportunity for a free
discussion and free decisions, after which he was responsible for a precise implementation.
That is what every responsible leader is supposed to do!)

i. Regionalisation and creation of SAOs

(#THE TRIBUNAL CONTESTED THE SERB POLITICAL LIFE!# The entire chapter of
“Regionalisation and creation of SAOs” is a #pure political consideration and
reconsideration of the legal and constitutional rights of the people#, and the realisation of it
in a period of crisis. Since the regionalisation was a legal process, particularly after throwing
the one-party communist system, even the BiH Assembly didn’t ban it, but only
“recommended” a postponment, it is senseless to criminalise a legal political conduct, so
more since there was no crimes caused by this manifestation of the political rights. All that
had been done in this field – had been provided by the constitutions and laws! #Only an
attempt od denial of these rights by a military means was a crime by itself#, and caused
many crimes and sufferings!)

Analysis of evidence

2952. The Chamber recalls its discussion on the process of regionalisation which began with
the establishment of communities of municipalities organised by the SDS in early 1991.9594
(#Wrong! The “communities of municipalities” existed already quite a long time, and did
have the right to change#. How the Chamber envisages the changes of the regime and
system, approved through the election, if nothing is to be chanhed In January 1991, SDS
presidents of municipal assemblies in Bosnian Krajina began preparations for the formation of
the ZOBK which was approved by the SDS regional board in April 1991.9595 On 11 April 1991,
the SRBiH Assembly recommended municipal assemblies to stop issuing decisions in
connection with regionalisation.9596 (This #recommendation was not obligatory! But, these
are a purely political questions, without any connection with a crimes. Why the Chamber
is exploring this matter? Or, if the Chamber does it, then the Defense should be enabled to
present the conduct of the other side, and the Chamber itself was obliged to see “the whole
truth.”) However, municipalities with large Serb majorities voted to affiliate with the ZOBK,
which held its founding assembly on 25 April 1991.9597 At the constitutive session of the
ZOBK, it was said that this community had been established ―regardless of ethnic affiliation‖
and that unity of Yugoslavia was affirmed as one of their objectives in creating this community
of municipalities.9598 (The community of municipalities existed already for a several
decades and had been provided by the Constitution. It was enabled to shange it’s
composition and number of municipalities, none of municipalities had to join it, but if

9594
See paras. 40, 43, 72–75.
9595
See paras. 40, 129.
9596
D284 (SRBiH Assembly recommendation on regionalisation, 11–12 April 1991).
9597
See para. 42.
9598
D1890 (Transcript from Krajina Assembly Meeting), pp. 3, 11–13, 53. See also P5896 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and an
unidentified female journalist, 24 June 1991).
 769

wanted, nobody could prevent them to join whatever community of municipalities was
chosen! This degree of lack of knowledge of the domestic legal system is detrimental to any
deliberation, and compromises all the court of the kind! See, The SRFY Constitution of
1974, D1260, p. .…………………………………………………………

or the
Constitution of the Soc. Rep. of BiH from 1974, D1262, p. 90

p.90, and further, p.91

2953. In May 1991 two other communities of municipalities were created in Romanija and in Eastern and
Old Herzegovina.9599 In September 1991, these communities of municipalities were renamed SAOs.9600
9599
See para. 42.
9600
See paras. 42, 75. The Chamber does not place any weight on the assessment of Treanor and Donia as to the motives and objectives of the Bosnian Serb
leadership with respect to this process of regionalisation. Patrick Treanor, T. 14011, 14015–14016, 14027, 14035–14036, 14069–14070 (1 June 2011), T.
14381 (7 June 2011); Robert Donia, T. 3407–3410 (7 June 2010).
 770

The Chamber recalls that the SAOs Semberija-Majevica, Northern Bosnia, and Biraĉ were formed
between September and November 1991.9601 On 21 November 1991, the Bosnian Serb Assembly
certified the proclamation of the SAOs in BiH.9602 (In the essence, the SAOs were the communities
of municipalities, and they had been entitled to chose the name they wanted! Also, the Serb side
accepted, within the Serb-Muslim Historic Agreement from July 1991. Accepted to abandon this
kind of regionalisation, since this Agreement provided thatBiH was to remain in Yugoslavia!)!
2954. On 30 September 1991 the SDS Deputies‘ Club held a session which was attended by
Krajišnik and the President.9603 At this meeting the President declared that he wanted to ask the
representatives from the Krajina to inform their municipalities that all those who could report to the
army do so and that the Serbs were preparing for regionalisation.9604 (These two matters were in no
way associated. The regionalisation had nothing to do with mobilisation, which was necessary
to the JNA because of the war in Croatia. Supporting the mobilisation was a legal obligation,
anything elsew would be a sabotage punishable by the law! A merging these two matters is not
correct, and is aimed to connect the regionalisation with a military questions. It is the last
matter to be expected from a such distinguished court!) On 7 October 1991, the President referred
to the SAOs as assisting ―so that there is no tension, and that each is the master of his own, and that
there is peaceful co-existence among the peoples here‖.9605 (#EXCULPATORY!#) The President
had discussed the issue of regionalisation with Izetbegović, but Izetbegović‘s position was that
regionalisation could not be carried out because the population in BiH was intermixed.9606 (That was
a legitimate private opinion of Mr. Izetbegovic, but as seen in the constitutions, any obstacle to
this process would be anti-constitutional. On the other hand, all what Mr. Izetbegovic pursued
regarding the independence was illegal and anti-constitutional! For the formation of
Comunities of municipalities there was not required any consensus of the parties, while for the
secession it was inevitable and crucial precondition. But, the Chamber doesn’t see the forest
because of woods!) The Chamber recalls that while the SDA opposed these moves towards
regionalisation in BiH, the President and SDS leaders spoke in favour of it for economic reasons, by
reference to their view that there was a concentration of power in Sarajevo.9607 The Chamber took
judicial notice that despite these justifications, among the functions the SDS assigned to the ZOBK
was the organisation of its defence in times of war or imminent threat of war.9608 (This was a mere
sum of the municipal competences in the field of defence. What is wrong with that? Who
authorised this court to neglect the entire legal and constitutional order of the country in
question? The defence was an obligation of all and every municipality, and transferring their
competences to the Community was their right. How the Prosecution dared to indict so many
people without knowing the domestic legal system?)

The UN should protect it, not undermine it!)

2955. The Accused also took an active role in instructing authorities regarding decisions to be
implemented and measures to be taken in the Bosnian Krajina area.9609 For example, on
9601
See para. 75. See also Milorad Dodik, T. 36881 (9 April 2013).
9602
See Adjudicated Fact 1950.
9603
P2543 (Minutes of meeting of SDS Deputies' Club, 30 September 1991).
9604
P2543 (Minutes of meeting of SDS Deputies' Club, 30 September 1991).
9605
P5849 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Goran Đukić, 7 October 1991), pp. 3–4.
9606
D1278 (Transcript of Radomir Nešković's interview with Karadţić's legal associate, 8 October 2009), p. 14. Nešković also testified that the SDS objectives
with respect to the regionalisation was to first keep BiH within Yugoslavia but if that was impossible, to keep one part of BiH in Yugoslavia and that
regionalisation was a means of countering centralisation. Radomir Nešković T. 14259–14260 (6 June 2011), T. 14355, 14357–14360 (7 June 2011).
9607
See para. 41. See also P2570 (Book of minutes of Prijedor‘s SDS Municipal Board meetings, 1991), p. 10.
9608
See Adjudicated Fact 1915.
9609
D4077 (Witness statement of AnĊelko Grahovac dated 23 November 2013), paras. 20–21; P747 (Co-operation agreement between SAO Krajina and
Bosanska Krajina, 24 June 1991); P5892 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić, Nenad, and Vojo Kuprešanin, 24 June 1991); P5894
(Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and AnĊelko Grahovac, 24 June 1991); P5891 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić
and Vukić, 24 June 1991), pp. 1–2; P5895 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vukić, 24 June 1991), pp. 1–2; P5885 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Ţeljković, 9 July 1991); P5846 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and an unidentified
male, 12 October 1991); P5799 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić, Miĉević, and Radić, 15 December 1991).
 771

12 October 1991, in a conversation with Mišković in Prijedor, the President instructed that the
party should be in ―full mobile state‖ and that units should be on duty 24 hours a day.9610 (Here
is this part of the President’s conversation with Miskovic in Prijedor, P5845, p.1:

So, as
early as in October 91 there was some shooting in Sarajevo, three days before the famous
Assembly session whet the system had fallen apart! P. 2:

So,
the President had this shooting in Sarajevo, and a threats of an attack on the barracks in
Prijedor, he pleaded for preservation of peace and asked Miskovic to keep the SDS
mobile and in alert, and asked about the JNA and TO units there, including whether the
units had a proper ethnic composition. This all could only be commendable and
#EXCULPATORY!#) :

2956. (#In accord with the ICFY!#) The Chamber found that in late 1991, the SDS started
implementing a policy of ―regionalisation‖, which involved taking steps towards the creation of
―regions‖ in which Serbs were the relative majority.9611 (So what?) In September 1991, in a
conversation with Slobodan Milošević, the President expressed that the goal of the Bosnian
Serb leadership was regionalisation, or cantonisation, and that their aim was to take half of
Sarajevo and to have strong links with Yugoslavia.9612 (So what? Not even a Muslim
fundamentalists in Sarajevo would object that as the Chamber did, because #everything
about regionalisation was lawful!#) On 16 September 1991, the SDS Executive Board
approved the appointment of a Regionalisation Staff.9613 This body was tasked with monitoring
the implementation of the decision on the proclamation of autonomous regions and this decision
was distributed to the municipal boards of the SDS.9614 For example on 25 September 1991, the

9610
P5845 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Mišković, 12 October 1991), p. 1.
9611
See para. 74.
9612
P5867 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 19 September 1991), pp. 2–3.
9613
See para. 75. Sejmenović testified that in his assessment the SDS pursued regionalisation in order to create ethnically Serb regions in BiH and that the
position taken at a Republic level by the SDS with respect to ethnic separation were also mirrored at a municipal level. However, the Chamber considers
this to be his own opinion and therefore does not consider this evidence to be of much weight. Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20457, 20464 (27 October 2011).
9614
P2584 (Minutes of 3rd meeting of SDS Executive Board, 16 September 1991), p. 1; P6484 (Information from Ðukić Rajko to SDS, 13 September 1991). See
also P3431 (Handwritten diary of KDZ192), p. 3 (under seal); Radomir Nešković T. 14357–14360 (7 June 2011). While Treanor testified about the
territorial objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership and the reasons for the steps taken towards regionalisation, the Chamber considers these conclusions and
opinions to fall outside the scope of his expertise and will thus not rely on it in this regard. Patrick Treanor, T. 14015–14016 (1 June 2011).
 772

Sarajevo SDS Main Board decided to implement the decision and conclusions of the republican
levels SDS organs with respect to regional organisation and appointed individuals who would
co-ordinate the implementation of the decision.9615 (But, only four days earlier Mr.
Izetbegovic in the Hague at the Conference commited himself to the rights of the Serbs to
a high autonomy, see the docuemnts of the ICFY: see the report of the ICFY of 20
September 1991:

#So, IN ACCORD WITH THE I C F Y#!) This included the promulgation of autonomous
regions as part of Yugoslavia and the separation of settlements in some municipalities and their
integration into another municipality.9616 The Accused also convened a plenary of Bosnian
Serb officials in September 1991 to discuss these issues.9617

2957. At a meeting of the SDS Executive Board in November 1991, attended by the Accused,
there was discussion of a report on ―regionalisation‖ and that conditions should be created
which would allow every region to ―include and incorporate the national and territorial
treasures‖ with the aim of creating a Serb BiH within Yugoslavia.9618 The pursuit of
regionalisation, according to Krajišnik, was used by the SDS in response to the attempts of the
HDZ and SDA to discuss independence of BiH.9619 Regionalisation was leverage, in his view,
to suggest to the SDS‘s coalition partners that the three parties should reach an overall
agreement on the whole of BiH: its status within Yugoslavia as well as its internal
organisation.9620

2958. (Lawful – unlawful#!) The Chamber recalls that on 16 September 1991, the ZOBK was
transformed into the ARK.9621 The ARK was vested with both executive and legislative powers
within its area of jurisdiction and acted as an intermediate level of authority between the SerBiH
and the municipalities.9622 (So what? All of it was legal, legitimate, and envisaged by the
ICFY!) As the ARK was a voluntary association, the ARK Statute made provision for other
municipalities to join, and typically these decisions were taken only by Bosnian Serb delegates
at a municipal level.9623 (Now, the Chamber noticed that at the municipal level only the
Serb delegated voted for an organisational measure that didn’t require a two third votes
of delegates, didn’t alter the Constitution and didn’t violate any law, while the same
Chamber didn’t notice that the only Muslim and Croat deputies voted for such a drastic
change of the Constitution by adopting a Declaration on independence on an illegally
appointed “session” of the Assembly!?!) In addition while the ARK was established as a
multi-ethnic institution, in practice the ARK Assembly was a Serb body.9624 (Don’t tell me
9615
P2530 (SDS decision on appointment of staff, 25 September 1991). See also Patrick Treanor, T. 14017 (1 June 2011), T. 14450–14451 (8 June 2011).
9616
P2530 (SDS decision on appointment of staff, 25 September 1991).
9617
P2544 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 6 September 1991), p. 3. See also Patrick Treanor, T. 14018
(1 June 2011).
9618
P2585 (Minutes of 5th meeting of SDS Executive Board, 7 November 1991), p. 5. See also P2586 (Minutes of session of SDS Deputies' Club, 3 December
1991), p. 1; P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of the Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court p. 6; Radomir Nešković
T. 14358 (7 June 2011).
9619
See Adjudicated Fact 1926. See also D4551 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Salko Ališehić, 21 December 1991), p. 3.
9620
See Adjudicated Fact 1926.
9621
See para. 42.
9622
See Adjudicated Fact 520.
9623
See paras. 2041–2042.
9624
See para. 2042.
 773

that!?! And what was with a much more important bodies, such as the Presidency, the
Government…Why that didn’t bother the Chamber?) BrĊanin was chosen by the President
to lead the ARK and held this position until the ARK was abolished.9625 (The Accused never
imposed any of his opinion about personal matters, and only if asked for a suggestion, he
used to meet this kind of requests!) The President was in regular contact with BrĊanin and
instructed him that he should not call him about ―every trivial matter‖ but that he could call
about issues which he could not resolve.9626 (So what? #Why it was important to the
Chamber?# In a shortage of a real and relevant evidence against the President, the
Chamber continued to patchwork a peaces of sentences from here and there, to make an
illusion of a plethora of evidence. Why?) The President instructed BrĊanin ―You have power
in your hands, and you have presidents of municipalities through whom you can exercise this
power, until we achieve autonomy […] You should execute power vigorously and to the fullest.
Not a single bird should be allowed to fly over Krajina […] You must establish all that. I‘ve
seen what was written and sent. All of that must be implemented. Take care of that. Call each
and every municipality president and keep checking if it has been implemented and
accomplished‖.9627 (This is another “obscuration” and manipulation with the evidence. Not
too many readers are able to open the quoted document and check what is in it. Therefore,
the responsibility of a chamber for an accuracy is even more important. Let us see what
had been said in P2549, and in what circumstances, 31 October 1991 in the middle of the
fierce firghting between the Croatian paramilitaries and the JNA: P2549, p.1

So, the Serb coffins come to the morgue, from the battlefield in Croatia, while the
Croatian irregulars of the enlarged MUP-ZNG are using the Serb areas to reach
Dubrovnik and attack the JNA from behind. See further, p.3

9625
See para. 2045 (referring to the ARK being abolished as a territorial unit of the RS on 15 September 1992).
9626
P2549 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Radoslav BrĊanin, 31 October 1991), p. 5; P2556 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Nenad Stevandić, 11 January 1992), pp. 3–5, 8. See also P5640 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Trifko
Komad, 18 September 1991), p. 1; P5889 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Radoslav BrĊanin, 2 July 1991).
9627
P2549 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Radoslav BrĊanin, 31 October 1991), p. 5.
 774

So, the main objection of the President was on a possible undisciplined conduct of the
soldiers thad died, and on the incapability of Brdjanin to execute the power that was in his
hand, and callen the President for so many trivial matters. P. 4:

How
this could be a crime? The President appealed on Brdjanin to exercise the power that was
vested on him by the Krajina Assembly, and to be as polite as possible!) p. 5
 775

And the Chamber was of an opinion that Brdjanin was supposed to let the paramilitaries
from Croatia freely pass through the Serb areas in BiH, although the local authorities
were responsible for everything that was going on in their respective areas?) :

2959. On 18 October 1991, three days after the SRBiH Assembly session at which the SDA and
HDZ adopted a declaration of sovereignty of BiH, the President informed the leaders of the
Krajina municipalities, including Grahovac and BrĊanin, to come urgently as very important
decisions were going to be made.9628 On 21 October 1991, Grahovac, as President of the ARK
Executive Council, initiated a meeting with the President, Krajišnik, Koljević, and Babić in
Banja Luka to discuss the situation following the 15 October 1991 SRBiH Assembly
session.9629 Following the plebiscite of the Serbian people on 9 and 10 November 1991, the
Bosnian Serb Assembly issued a decision which verified the declared SAOs as part of BiH, a
federal entity in Yugoslavia.9630 (So what? The Chamber presumed that the #SDA and
HDZ were entitled to violate all and every law and constitution#, and the Serbs were
supposed to keep quite and obey everything, abandoning their own basic rights!!!)

2960. The Chamber recalls that the Bosnian Serb Assembly approved on 21 December 1991 the
appointment of Jovan Ĉizmović as the co-ordinator of activities of the executive bodies of the
SAOs.9631 In addition on 24 February 1992, the SDS Executive Board assigned ―coordinators‖
for the SAOs.9632 The SAOs had their own governmental, institutional, and political
structures.9633 (So what? All public and legal!)

2961. At a meeting on 5 February 1992, attended by municipal leaders from the Bosanska
Krajina, Semberija and Northern Bosnia SAOs, there was discussion about the SDS position

9628
P5838 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Boško, 18 October 1991). See D4077 (Witness statement of AnĊelko Grahovac dated 23
November 2013), para. 28.
9629
D4077 (Witness statement of AnĊelko Grahovac dated 23 November 2013), para. 29; D4082 (Article from Glas entitled ―Resolutely in a United State‖, 21
October 1991).
9630
D83 (Shorthand Record of 2nd session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 November 1991), pp. 33–34. See also Adjudicated Fact 1950.
9631
See para. 130; D86 (Shorthand Record of 4th session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 December 1991), p. 34.
9632
See para. 75. See Adjudicated Fact 2181. Radislav Vukić, a member of the SDS Executive Board, was appointed as co-ordinator for SAO Krajina. His
duties were, inter alia, to co-ordinate the activities of SDS municipal boards in SAO Krajina, to work in co-operation with the Assembly president and the
SAO Krajina prime minister to implement the decisions of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and Council of Ministers, and to take part in the work of the SAO
Krajina Crisis Staff. P6530 (Decision of SDS Executive Board, 24 February 1992).
9633
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9101.
 776

with respect to regionalisation, the establishment and definition of Serb territories in BiH, and
Serbia‘s objective of preserving Yugoslavia and ensuring Serbs live in a single state.9634 In
February 1992, at a meeting with Mladić, Adţić discussed the preparations that needed to be
carried out in the Krajina but stressed that these plans were to be kept ―strictly secret‖ and that
―trustworthy people‖ were to be used to implement them.9635 (#During the JNA#! #What does
it have to do with the President#? The JNA still was a legitimate and the only legal armed
force on the entire Yugoslav territory, what the President had to do with some talks of the
JNA high officers with the Portugeeze Ambassador about the Serb Krajina in Croatia?
And that was et early February 1992, while there was no any mentioning of BiH, except in
one line, P1476, p.156-57:

where is the
limit to these manipulations?)

2962. By early 1992, there was increasing tension between the leadership in Pale and the ARK
authorities.9636 The ARK authorities were moving towards independence and wished to
establish the Krajina as a state within a state, or a ―constituent entity‖ of Yugoslavia; the
President strongly opposed this position, maintaining that Yugoslavia should be preserved and
that the Krajinas should not advocate for changes to the borders.9637 (#Commendable and
EXCULPATORY#!) On 23 February 1992, the President told Kuprešanin to remind the
representatives of the Krajina who wanted an independent state ―of their loyalty to the initial
Assembly‖.9638 Kuprešanin also opposed the independence of the ARK and urged the President
to attend an ARK Assembly session to resolve the issue.9639 The President agreed and attended
an ARK Assembly session on 29 February 1992, during which he stated that ―it would be a
crime against the Krajina if it were declared a republic. Those who advocate such childish ideas

9634
P3431 (Handwritten diary of KDZ192) (under seal), p. 3. See also KDZ192, P3416 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 11437–11442, 11452–
11455, 11485–11487 (under seal); P3474 (News report re meeting of Derventa SDS Executive Board, 13 February 1992), p. 1. The Chamber notes
KDZ192‘s evasiveness with respect to who attended this meeting and what precisely was discussed and is satisfied that both the Accused and Krajišnik
attended this meeting.
9635
P1476 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 30 December 1991–14 February 1992), pp. 163–167 (referring more specifically to the setting up of a police force, and
the legal and illegal armament of individuals).
9636
P2552 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovan Ĉizmović, 16 January 1992), pp. 2–7; D424 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Vojo Kuprešanin, 10 February 1992), pp. 5–7; D4077 (Witness statement of AnĊelko Grahovac dated 23 November 2013), para. 37;
P5784 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vojo Kuprešanin, 27 December 1991), pp. 4–5; D4011 (Witness statement of Vojislav
Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), paras. 26, 29, 40. Kuprešanin stated that individuals in Krajina did not respect the Accused or the SDS, before or
during the course of the war. D4011 (Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), para. 29. While the Chamber finds that there
were certainly tensions between the Accused and Krajina leaders, the Chamber does not find Kuprešanin‘s evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching
that conclusion the Chamber noted that his testimony was marked by multiple contradicitons, evasiveness, indicators that he was trying to mislead the
Chamber and lacked sincerity. His demeanour and testimony also indicated partiality and bias through his attempts to protect the Accused and distance him
from any responsibility.
9637
D4077 (Witness statement of AnĊelko Grahovac dated 23 November 2013), paras. 35–38; D4034 (Witness statement of Radoslav BrĊanin dated 8
November 2013), para. 7; D4011 (Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), paras. 27, 29–33; D4081 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and AnĊelko Grahovac, 7 January 1992), pp. 4–5 (wherein the Accused states that the Krajina had not implemented the wishes
of the SDS, including carrying out its elections); D4021 (Agenda and Minutes of 11 th session of ARK Assembly, 8 January 1992), pp. 3–6; P2556 (Intercept
of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Nenad Stevandić, 11 January 1992); P2552 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovan
Ĉizmović, 16 January 1992); D4085 (Intercept of conversation between AnĊelko Grahovac and Radovan Karadţić, 15 January 1992); D4025 (Excerpt of
SDS Main Board meeting, 14 February 1992), pp. 3–7, 15–19; D4015 (Excerpt of Minutes of 13th session of ARK Assembly, 24 February 1992). See also
P5784 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vojo Kuprešanin, 27 December 1991), pp. 4–7; D424 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Vojo Kuprešanin, 10 February 1992).
9638
P5745 (Intercept of conversation between (i) Radovan Karadţić and an unidentified male; and (ii) Radovan Karadţić and Vojo Kuprešanin, 23 February
1992), pp. 5–7. See also P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), pp. 36–37 (during which the Accused asserted that
presidents of municipal boards from Krajina ―should implement the policy of the party that has given them their posts, not to veer away from it‖).
9639
D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), p. 65; D4025 (Excerpt of SDS Main Board meeting, 14 February 1992), pp.
14–15 (wherein Kuprešanin emphasised that Serb territories cannot be divided and ―our goal is to finally live in one country‖); P938 (Minutes from SDS
Deputies‘ Club meeting, 28 February 1992); D4011 (Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), paras. 33–34; Vojislav
Kuprešanin, T. 43470–43471 (14 November 2013) (further testifying on cross-examination that the ―holy mission‖ was that Serbian people be equal in
BiH).
 777

are exposing the Serbian people to trouble‖.9640 At the same session, all 148 of the ARK
deputies in attendance voted to accept the Bosnian Serb Constitution in full, and the status of
the ARK was incorporated therein accordingly.9641 A separate Krajina state never resulted
because ultimately the leadership opted for the integration of all of the Krajinas.9642 (#A quite
contrary#! The President advocated a very close cooperation with the other Krajina, the
Serb Krajina in Croatia, and to equalise the educational, legal and informative systems,
but not to integrate the Krajinas, because it would present a changes of the two states,
Croatia and BiH, which could result in a war of those two countries agains the Serbs.
Beside that, the Serb Krajina had accepter the Vance peace plan, and it would be violated
too.)

2963. At a Bosnian Serb Assembly session in September 1992, a deputy stated: ―Since we are at
war, we must adopt a system which will best defend ourselves and create our own state. At a
time when we had to destroy a unitary Bosnia, the SAO regions and districts were politically
and territorially the best solution‖.9643 The Accused also spoke about the creation of SAOs as
one of the ten measures which were taken before the war which they had ―brainstormed‖
together and which were carried out #after ―Alija made a mistake‖.9644 # The Accused spoke on
multiple occasions about his responsibility for developing the process of regionalisation.9645 At
a Bosnian Serb Assembly session, Kuprešanin stated that the reason for the creation of regions
was to ―destroy Alija‘s state‖.9646 In an interview in January 1995, the President confirmed that
the SDS played the greatest role in ―introducing Serbian awareness and discarding the inferior
position of a dignified nation with its own sovereignty and state‖.9647 He went on to state that
―[w]e had a list of the actions and steps to take, but we always waited for the Muslims to make a
mistake and after they made one, we created a union of municipalities and the Serbian
autonomous areas next, followed by the regions and eventually our assembly, and finally
Republic‖.9648 (So what? #It is senseless to comment such a finding of the public statements
of the Serb dignitaries who described what had happened previously, and what had been
proposed and accepted by the international community, the EC, the USA and the United
Nations”#. What the Chamber was after? What it was hunting? Anything the Serbs said
or did, regardless of whether it was legal and legitimate or not? It seems that it was
sufficient that some Serb existed, to construct something around him!)

1. Conclusion

2964. The Accused argues that the concept of regionalisation and division of municipalities was
something envisaged and provided for by the constitution.9649 Having considered the evidence
above, the Chamber finds that the process of regionalisation was a precursor towards creating
and identifying Bosnian Serb claimed territory in BiH, whether or not this was provided for by a

9640
P5452 (Extract from minutes of 14th session of ARK Assembly, 29 February 1992), p. 2.
9641
P5452 (Extract from minutes of 14th session of ARK Assembly, 29 February 1992). See also AnĊelko Grahovac, T. 44052 (26 November 2013); D4011
(Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), para. 34.
9642
AnĊelko Grahovac, T. 44051–44052 (26 November 2013); D4077 (Witness statement of AnĊelko Grahovac dated 23 November 2013), para. 45. See also
D4034 (Witness statement of Radoslav BrĊanin dated 8 November 2013), para. 8; D3970 (Article from Glas entitled ―There are Differences, But No
Divisions‖, 15 March 1992).
9643
D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 68.
9644
P1387 (Transcript of 38th session of RS Assembly, 17 January 1994), pp. 74–75. See also P6510 (Excerpt of Vojo Kuprešanin's interview with OTP), p. 9.
9645
P5619 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić Miroslav Toholj, 13 January 1992), p. 3; P2556 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan
Karadţić and Nenad Stevandić, 11 January 1992), pp. 6, 11; P1084 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vojo Kuprešanin, 23 July
1991), p. 4; D424 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vojo Kuprešanin, 10 February 1992), p. 8.
9646
D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), pp. 68, 70. See also P1377 (Transcript of 33rd session of RS Assembly, 20–21
July 1993), p. 175.
9647
P953 (Article from OsloboĊenje entitled ―Happy Birthday Republic‖, 6 January 1995), p. 3.
9648
P953 (Article from OsloboĊenje entitled ―Happy Birthday Republic‖, 6 January 1995), p. 3. See also Patrick Treanor, T. 14036–14037 (1 June 2011).
9649
Defence Final Brief, paras. 194–204.
 778

constitutional provision. (So what? If BiH remained in Yugoslavia, as the Historic Serb-
Muslim Agreement envisaged, the Serbs would give up the idea of regionalisation, because
the federal state would protect their rights and security. Since the SDA-HDZ coalition
continued to violate all the norms, the Serbs were free to self-organise, and even the EC
and UN recognised it. Why this UN Court does not recognise it? Why the Defence hadn’t
been notified that this was going to be a political trial and that the Serb political life would
be the main charge, although there is no any evidence that this political life caused any
crime? Was it a trial to establish a crime against peace? That would be out of the realm of
the Statute of Tribunal. This way, all those invectives against the Serbs and the President
not only sound senseless, but insulting and humiliating, but to the highest degree as a
malicious lies!) This process of regional organisation along ethnic lines was a means of
responding to and opposing the proposed independence of BiH. (So what? #All of it, the
regionalisation, claiming for the ethnic territories, autonomy, decentralisation, all of it was
a legal and legitimate endeavour, nobody in the ICFY or anywhere contested it, on the
contrary, accepted it as legal, and organised a conference on BiH to achieve the Serb
demands#. The Serbs would in return accept that BiH remain in the existing boundaries
and secede from Yugoslavia. All the chaos of the political unrest and the chaos of the civil
war had been caused by the Muslim denial of these legitimate Serb (and Croat) conditions
and a democratic transformation of BiH into a “Southern Switzerland”. Nothing wrong
came out from the Serb legal demands, everything wrong came from the political, and
finally military denial of these basic intentions of the Christian majority in BiH!)
Regionalisation, and specifically the delineation of the SAOs, was a means of identifying which
Bosnian Serb territories and settlements in BiH could be separated and remain a part of
Yugoslavia in the event of BiH independence. This process of regionalisation was also an early
means of identifying strategically significant territorial areas. Structures were also created in
order to have co-ordination between the SAOs and the higher authorities within the SDS.

2965. The Chamber finds that the President and the SDS played a leading role in this process.
The President himself spoke about the creation of SAOs as one of the measures which the
Bosnian Serb leadership had ―brainstormed‖ and implemented before the war to respond to
moves towards independence by BiH. He emphasised that regionalisation and the creation of
SAOs were the first steps which eventually led to the creation of the Bosnian Serb Assembly
and the RS. The Chamber also finds that the President opposed the independence of the ARK
and was successful in ensuring that the authorities in the ARK adhered to the SDS policies and
supported the creation of the RS and the unity of the Bosnian Serbs. (Had the Muslims
followed the MBO and other pro-European Muslim parties which supported the Historic
Serb-Muslim Agreement, there would be very easy to abandon all that was achieved in
regionalisation. And that was not the “SDS policies” but the all Serb political parties
represented in the Assembly. This policy was approved through the several plebiscites by
the people who was paying the highest cost in lives of their dearests. How come the
Chamber neglected all of this elements and supported a completely illegal conduct of the
Muslim side?)

ii. Split in the MUP and creation of a Bosnian Serb MUP

1. Analysis of evidence

2966. In July 1991, at a meeting of SDS Deputies‘ Club attended by the President, Mićo
Stanišić and Mandić took the floor and focused on the Serbs being thrown out of the MUP; they
 779

complained that some people in charge were not doing their jobs as required.9650 After these
speeches the President reacted forcefully, and said it was necessary for there to be a balance in
the personnel of the MUP and that developments at the MUP should not be permitted without
his knowledge.9651 In 1991, there were also #problems with Bosnian Muslim personnel
clandestinely being sent to Croatia for training# without the knowledge of the official MUP.9652
(Wasn’t it sufficient for an alarm among the Serbs? #Why the Serbs would accept this
kind of deception and domination in the eve of the break up of Yugoslavia? Why the Serbs
would tolerate that a common state institutions become a party institutions of the SDA,
abused in the preparations of a secret army and a war against the Serbs, sitizens of the
same Republic?)

2967. In July 1991, the Accused had also warned Izetbegović that if the Bosnian Serb demands
were not met, they would establish a parallel state which would include a parallel police.9653
(Exactly! Mr. Izetbegovic had been warned to correct this unacceptable conduct of his
party! After refusing it, the Serbs were free to self-organise and prepare all the security
mechanisms!#And, all of it HAD ALREADY BEEN PROVIDED BY THE I C F Y in the
Hague in 1991.#!))

2968. The President was in regular contact with Mandić and other Bosnian Serb leaders and
discussed personnel issues at the MUP and in September 1991, the President told Mandić that
they had to be in touch almost daily.9654 The President insisted that all nominations had to come
from the party level and took an active role in identifying those SDS members who should be
nominated.9655 The President was also informed about personnel problems and warned that this
could lead to conflict.9656 (That was the President’s duty, to secure that the elections
victory at the elections would be implemented in accordance with the laws, Constitutions
and the results. This is the very essence of the multiparty system, a mutual control of the
processes! Why the Serbs wouldn’t be equal to others, and secure that their election
results be respected and implemented?)

2969. At the municipal level, a division of the police structures based on personnel
disagreements was already envisaged by Bosnian Serb leaders as early as September 1991.9657
(What does mean this senseless conclusion? #The Muslims cheated, the Serbs protested
and demanded that the distribution of power be in accordance with the law and
Constitution, and with the inter-party agreements. All the time the Serb people saw what
the Muslims did in arming and forming a units of the most extreme Muslims, preparing to
start a war, and abusing the common resources of a common state#!) On or around
6 September 1991, the President informed BrĊanin that there would be a meeting the following
day where important decisions would be made and that he or someone from the Krajina should

9650
D3917 (Witness Statement of Ĉedomir Kljajić dated 30 July 2013), para. 15. See also Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
8656, 9319.
9651
D3917 (Witness Statement of Ĉedomir Kljajić dated 30 July 2013), para. 15.
9652
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4734–4739 (6 July 2010); D360 (SDA recommendation for training by Croatian MUP, 11 July 1991), p. 1; D361 (CSB Banja Luka‘s
letter to Biljana Plavšić, 25 July 1991), p. 1; D362 (CSB Banja Luka report re training by Croatian MUP, 25 July 1991).
9653
D364 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vitomir Ţepinić, 24 July 1991), p. 9; P5625 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan
Karadţić and Vitomir Ţepinić, 8 July 1991), p. 1. See also D365 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, undated);
P5806 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Mandić, 3 December 1991).
9654
P1081 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Mandić, 30 September 1991), pp. 2–3. See also P2999 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Mandić, 23 July 1991); D262 (Radovan Karadţić‘s letter to Presidency of SRBiH, 28 July 1991).
9655
P1080 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Mandić, 26 August 1991), pp. 1–2. See also P2222 (Intercept of conversation
between Biljana Plavšić and Radovan Karadţić, 17 June 1991).
9656
P2360 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Rajko Koprivica, 23 September 1991), pp. 1–2; D4287 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Avdo Hebib, 17 September 1992), p. 6.
9657
P2347 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and Milan Plakalović, 7 September 1991), p. 9.
 780

attend.9658 (So what? Unbelievable! #What is criminal in it#? The only criminal are these
illegal and unlawful interceptions of the telephone conversations, which hadn’t beed
approved by the coart!) On 17 September 1991, the President instructed Simović to relay an
important message to Ţepinić regarding the separation of the MUP, stating that ―as of
tomorrow, we are withdrawing all our ministers and all our officials in [the MUP]‖; further the
President stated that he was going to confront Izetbegović that evening and said ―we are going
to […] break apart and then we are going to establish our own [SUP] […] and we‘ll make the
government separately, we‘ll make everything separately‖.9659 (So what? Mr. Izetbegovic was
warned about what his Party was doing, and that this was contrary to all the laws and
Constitution, and that a common institutions wouldn’t be possible any longer. The
Chamber wasn’t interested in finding out whether it was so, or not. No population in a
free world would be supposed to stand that kind of preparations for an eradication of the
same population.)

2970. Around 21 September 1991, the President wrote a letter to all Municipal Boards of the
SDS informing them that there were rumours about the mobilisation of Bosnian Muslim police,
which would result in a Bosnian Muslim police force and would create conditions for a civil
war.9660 The Municipal Boards were instructed by the President to follow developments closely
in this regard.9661 (So what? The Serbs are guilty for noticing such an unlawful
preparations for a war, and the Court is denying the most essential and basic rights to the
Serbs and the President as their representative! Is the UN supporting this kind of justice?)

2971. In an intercepted conversation on 8 October 1991 the President was informed about
problems in Višegrad.9662 The President spoke about the option of establishing ―our public
security station‖ and that in negotiations ―[w]e will say, here you are, if you can solve it within
that deadline, if you cannot we have our own in our area‖.9663 (How come the Chamber was
not interested in the Visegrad affair that caused these words of the President? Why wasn’t
it important? If the Cgamber wanted the “whole truth” it would learn that the Muslim
extremists in Visegrad had terorosed the Serb population, the Orthodox priests, the
pilgrims, and humiliated them on a bestial way. A Serb invited two Muslims he knew to
participate in his celebration of “slava” – a Serbian habit of celebration of a patron saint,
which is under the UNESCOs protection. After being served and esteemed, one of them
shot the host by a gun between his eyes, and all of it with an impunity. Here are excerpts
from the P2558, intercepted conversation of the President abd Brane, the Serb leader in
Visegrad. To be noticed: the interlocutors had been mixed upo, so some repliques of the
President are allocated to Brane and vice versa:

9658
P5886 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Radoslav BrĊanin, 6 September 1991), pp. 2–3 (wherein the Accused stated further that
―now they are looking for any way to mess that Conference‖ to suggest that Serbs do not want peace). See P6513 (Press release on Yugoslavia Peace
Conference, 7 September 1991).
9659
P5868 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Miodrag Simović, 17 September 1991), p. 1.
9660
D369 (Radovan Karadţić‘s instructions to SDS municipal boards, 21 September 1991); Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4789–4790 (7 July 2010).
9661
D369 (Radovan Karadţić‘s instructions to SDS municipal boards, 21 September 1991).
9662
P2558 (Intercept of conversation between Brane and Radovan Karadţić, 8 October 1991), p. 1.
9663
P2558 (Intercept of conversation between Brane and Radovan Karadţić, 8 October 1991), p. 2. See also, Patrick Treanor, T. 14045–14046 (1 June 2011).
 781

So, the President had been informed that a famous Muslim extremist Murat Sabanovic,
who a preveous days occupied a dam on the Drina River and threatened to blou it up,
which would result in a thousands of casualties of innocent people and destruction of a
several settlements, couldn’t be arrested by the Federal police. He continued to terrorise
the town of Visegrad, nobody stopped him, no a Muslim policeman even tried to arrest
him, and the President said that if the Muslim side doesn’t settle down such a dangerous
conduct within seven days, the Serbs must develop their own security organs to protect
their people! #And that was their right of the first class#!). The Accused also gave an
instruction to give ―seven days to bring things to an end and punish the culprits‖ and ―[i]f not,
we shall proceed to organise parallel organs of power…[w]ith a view to protecting the Serbian
people‖.9664 The Accused also inquired whether the towns were separated and whether the
mixed town centre could not be separated.9665 In December 1991, Mandić and the Accused

9664
P2558 (Intercept of conversation between Brane and Radovan Karadţić, 8 October 1991), p. 3.
9665
P2558 (Intercept of conversation between Brane and Radovan Karadţić, 8 October 1991), p. 2.
 782

discussed the preparations for the creation of a separate Serb MUP.9666 (So what? #It already
had been accepted within the ICFY# that the constituent states within BiH will have a
separate police and other legislative and executive organs! Why the Chamber was blind
for the contexts?)

2972. The Chamber recalls that from early January 1992, employees of the SJB in Zvornik were
instructed by the SDS to gather support and prepare for the formation of a Serb SJB.9667 (So
what?)

2973. On 11 February 1992, at a meeting in Banja Luka, Mićo Stanišić, Mandić, and other
Bosnian Serb leaders were informed that the Bosnian Serb Assembly had decided to form a
separate Serb MUP.9668 This was a means of ensuring that Bosnian Serb authority was felt in
territories which they claimed.9669 (Again, #the main point missed: in February 1992 there
had already been fully known and established that the constituent units will have a
separate police#. The issue has a continuity from the Treaty Provisions for a Convention
(Lord Carrington Plan, adopted in the Hague on 4 NOvember 1991, through all and
every Plan for BiH, to the final Dayton Agreement#!) Stanišić at this meeting spoke about
the need to work towards organising a Serb MUP starting at the municipal and regional levels
and moving towards a Serb ministry.9670 At this meeting there were also discussions about the
problems in the MUP of the SRBiH.9671 Ţupljanin indicated that with respect to the Banja Luka
CSB not a single new Muslim or Croat employee would be hired until the status of Serb police
who had fled from Croatia had been resolved.9672 Mićo Stanišić claimed that the MUP was
being divided by the Muslims, through the actions of the SDA, and not the Serbs.9673 (#Exactly,
and that was the reason why the EC and Lord Carrington envisaged a separate police
forces!#)

2974. At this meeting a resolution was passed to create a steering committee, a ―Serbian
advisory board‖ within the MUP under the direction of Mandić ―to carry out all preparations
necessary for the functioning of the Serbian MUP‖ following the adoption of the Bosnian Serb
constitution.9674 Part of the preparation for separation included the arming of Serb police
officers and Serb police stations.9675 (So what? The Muslim part of MUP, although accepted
the reorganisation of the MUP into two, didn’t want to share the equipment and
armament with their Serb coleagues!) The CSBs and SJBs reassigned stockpiled weapons
belonging to the reserve police force to the new Serb MUP.9676 A separate Serb MUP would be
organised at state, regional, and municipal levels.9677

9666
P5806 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Mandić, 3 December 1991), p. 2 (wherein Mandić informs the Accused ―[i]t‘s
not your police, you‘re going to get ours‖ and the Accused responds ―[w]e‘re going to get ours that wouldn‘t tap‖).
9667
See para. 1234. See also Adjudicated Facts 1963, 1981, 1982.
9668
P1083 (Minutes of meeting of representatives of SerBiH MUP, 11 February 1992), pp. 1, 4–5; Ĉedomir Kljajić, T. 42192–42196 (30 July 2013); Momĉilo
Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8646–8648, 8676. See also P1116 (Letter from Momĉilo Mandić to SRBiH MUP re division of
MUP, 31 March 1992); P1103 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and Branko Kvesić/Bruno Stojić/Mićo Stanišić, 5 May 1992), p. 25;
D2923 (Witness statement of Vitomir Ţepinić dated 11 February 2013), para. 55.
9669
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8645.
9670
P1083 (Minutes of meeting of representatives of SerBiH MUP, 11 February 1992), p. 1.
9671
Momĉilo Mandić, C3 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Ţupljanin), T. 9663; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4471–4473 (1 July 2010), T. 4838–4841 (7
July 2010); P1083 (Minutes of meeting of representatives of SerBiH MUP, 11 February 1992); P1112 (Order of SRBiH MUP to all CSBs and SJBs, 13
February 1992).
9672
P1083 (Minutes of meeting of representatives of SerBiH MUP, 11 February 1992), p. 1.
9673
P1083 (Minutes of meeting of representatives of SerBiH MUP, 11 February 1992), p. 1.
9674
See Adjudicated Fact 1983.
9675
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8655. See also Adjudicated Fact 1984.
9676
Adjudicated Fact 1985.
9677
See Adjudicated Fact 1982.
 783

2975. Following this meeting, Mandić wrote to the CSBs and SJBs and asked them to act in
accordance with the conclusions reached at the meeting in Banja Luka and to set up and have a
meeting of senior MUP executives in their areas.9678 After this order, each centre distributed the
stockpile of weapons for the reserve police force to members of the Serb MUP.9679 In Bijeljina
for example, following the 11 February 1992 meeting, the SJB in Bijeljina was instructed by
Mandić to begin preparations for the purpose of creating a Bosnian Serb MUP.9680 (#All in an
accord with the Cutileiro’s Conference!#)

2976. This was the second of two meetings on this topic, the first having taken place in
Sarajevo.9681 The meeting was not held secretly and Mandić personally informed Delimustafić
about it.9682 The minutes and conclusions of the meeting were forwarded to Delimustafić.9683
(#Nothing was secret, because nothing was illegal! Mr. Delimustafic was a Muslim and the
Minister for Interior, i.e. the chief of the common MUP!)

2977. By March 1992, there were further problems given the failure to carry out the 1990
coalition agreement regarding personnel issues in the MUP which resulted in proposals for its
re-organisation.9684 The President on 6 March 1992 emphasised the Bosnian Serb demands
with respect to the re-organisation of the MUP and protested about appointments where the
legal procedure had not been followed.9685 There were also complaints received from a
municipal level about the divisions in the SJB which were blamed on the SDA9686 The
President wanted the Serb collegium in the MUP to reach agreement on its own personnel.9687
In March 1992, the President spoke about announcing their withdrawal from the MUP and that
they had already obtained the badges.9688

2978. On 24 March 1992, the President spoke at the Bosnian Assembly about following
forthcoming instructions so that the sovereign authority of the ―Serbian Assembly and Serbian
people be established on the ground as soon as possible‖.9689 In this regard the President spoke
about having their own separate MUP and that the then newly established municipalities should
set up police stations and their organs as soon as possible.9690 (#All in accord wiyh the
ICFY#! That was a week after the Lisbon Agreement had been agreed by all the three
sides and the European Community. The Lisbon Agreement envisaged a separate police
for each of the republics that were to be parts of BiH! Without contexts and a full
informations, and a conduct of the other sides, this trial is worthless. In any criminal court
there couldn’t be skipped the reasons for an activity of an President side!) Mićo Stanišić
was also in contact with municipal level leaders in March 1992 and discussed the splitting of

9678
P1112 (Order of SRBiH MUP to all CSBs and SJBs, 13 February 1992); Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8649–8650.
See also Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 2869–2870.
9679
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8652–8653, 8655. See also P1113 (Interview with Momĉilo Mandić in Slobodna Bosna,
10 April 1998), p. 2.
9680
See para. 604. See also Ĉedomir Kljajić, T. 42192, 42194−42915, 42197 (30 July 2013).
9681
Momĉilo Mandić, C3 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Ţupljanin), T. 9663.
9682
Momĉilo Mandić, C3 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Ţupljanin), T. 9663, 9667.
9683
Momĉilo Mandić, C3 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Ţupljanin), T. 9663–9664.
9684
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4876–4877, 4881–4882 (8 July 2010); D214 (Minutes of 56th SRBiH Presidency session, 2 March 1992), p. 4;
9685
D380 (Radovan Karadţić‘s letter to SR BiH organs, 6 March 1992) p. 1; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4830–4833 (7 July 2010), T. 4877 (8 July 2010).
9686
D386 (Letter from Serb employees of Stari Grad SJB to SR BiH MUP, 5 March 1992), p. 1; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4889 (8 July 2010).
9687
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4758–4759 (6 July 2010); D364 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vitomir Ţepinić, 24 July 1991), p. 5.
9688
D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), p. 45.
9689
P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 16.
9690
P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 16–17.
 784

police structures.9691 He also reported on steps taken to establish ―police stations in our parts‖
to Đerić.9692

2979. The law on the establishment of the Serbian MUP was passed on 27 March 1992.9693
The Law on Internal Affairs provided for the structure and duties of the organs of the MUP. 9694
The Chamber recalls that at the end of March 1992, a decision was adopted by the Bosnian Serb
Assembly, calling on the Bosnian Serb police to separate by 1 April 1992.9695 On 30 March
1992, Mićo Stanišić addressed the members of the police unit of the SAO Romanija stating that
as of that day, the SerBiH had their own police force.9696 (The speech of Minister Stanisic is a
very short one, and should be quoted in it’s entirety. See, D4271:

Why this short speech of the Minister Stanisic wasn’t worthwhile to be quoted accurately?
Because Minister Stanisic #numbered the legal basis for the formation and existence of the
Serb MUP#, and these bases were: #The Constitution of the RS, #The Law on Internal
Affairs, and, moreover, #the results of the negotiations of the three ethnic communities
under the auspices of the European Community. At the end Minister Stanisic repeated the
distance of the police from the politics and commited the Ministry to the service to “all
citizens in the SerBiH equally.”) On 31 March 1992, Mandić sent a dispatch to all SJBs and
CSBs indicating that the Bosnian Serb Assembly had promulgated the Law on Internal
Affairs.9697

2980. Mandić‘s dispatch indicated that when this law came into force on 1 April 1992, all CSBs
and SJBs on the territory of the SerBiH would be abolished and their functions taken over by

9691
P5598 (Intercept of conversation between Mićo Stanišić and Miroslav Toholj, 2 March 1992), p. 3.
9692
P5698 (Intercept of conversation between Branko Đerić and Mićo Stanišić, 1 May 1992), p. 4; P5716 (Intercept of conversation between Branko Đerić and
Mićo Stanišić, 18 April 1992), p. 5.
9693
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9322.
9694
P2964 (SerBiH Decree on the promulgation on the Law of Internal Affairs, 23 March 1992).
9695
See para. 1237; Petko Panić, P3380 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 2869–2870; P1116 (Letter from Momĉilo Mandić to SRBiH
MUP re division of MUP, 31 March 1992). See also Adjudicated Fact 2729; KDZ555, T. 17263–17264 (16 August 2011) (private session), T. 17346–
17347 (17 August 2011).
9696
D4271 (Video footage of Mićo Stanišić's speech, 30 March 1992, with transcript).
9697
P1116 (Letter from Momĉilo Mandić to SRBiH MUP re division of MUP, 31 March 1992), p. 1; P2964 (SerBiH Decree on the promulgation on the Law of
Internal Affairs, 23 March 1992).
 785

organisational units of the Bosnian Serb MUP.9698 Mandić in a later intercepted conversation
said ―when I sent that dispatch and fucked the MUP to pieces‖ and ―[y]ou have your state, we
have ours. The Muslims should work on their own, fuck them‖.9699 (#Jokes of the others,
words of the others#! Mandic spoke to his Croat colleague B. Kvesic, with a lot of jokes
and mutual teasings! But, this court likes such a conversations more than the UN or EC
documents!) Mandić sent this dispatch following the instructions of the Bosnian Serb political
leadership.9700 (So what? Almost every paragraph with the accurate data could be
commented with this “so what”. The rest of paragraphs deserves comment “wrong”)

2981. On 31 March 1992, Delimustafić, in response to Mandić‘s dispatch of 31 March 1992,9701

wrote a letter to the MUP administrations of all SDBs, CSBs, and SJBs stating that the dispatch
reflected problems in the leadership and appealed to all MUP workers to continue to work
responsibly and noted that the greatest number of MUP workers wish to remain in a united
MUP.9702 Ţepinić was also opposed to the split in the MUP given his view that the split would
―inevitably lead to an armed conflict‖ in BiH.9703 Ţepinić at a meeting attended by the Bosnian
Serb leadership was criticised by Mićo Stanišić for ―destroying‖ their idea of dividing the MUP
and Ţepinić said that the division could not be done peacefully.9704 (This is all rubbish,
because the Muslim part of MUP participated in all the talks, but at the last moment, as in
all other agreements, they retreated. If it couldn’t done peacefully, the UN – EC mediators
would never propose such an arrangement, which was #agreed in the ICFY at leas as of 4
November 1991#. nor all of the international proposals would have the same attitude!)

2982. The BiH MUP was then divided and allowed for the creation of the Bosnian Serb MUP.
Employees of the abolished CSBs and SJBs who wished to work in the Bosnian Serb MUP
were obliged to swear an oath of allegiance before taking up employment.9705 (What would
oblige the employees to conduct the laws and regulations of the Republic of Srpska if they
hadn’t been sworn? There was a new republic in formation with the accord of all the
mediators, and that was a regular procedure!) After the dispatch of 31 March 1992, Mandić
issued a further explanation on how the new MUP would be organised across the territory of the
BiH.9706

2983. On 1 April 1992, it was reported that Mandić had invited all Serb police officers to put
themselves at the disposal of a ―MUP of Serbian Republic‖ pursuant to the Constitution of the
SerBiH.9707 On 1 April 1992, the SRBiH MUP collegium issued a dispatch that in order to
prevent a further deterioration of the security situation that the existing MUP ―should be
transformed peacefully and without any excesses‖ and that equipment of the SJB and SDB

9698
P1116 (Letter from Momĉilo Mandić to SRBiH MUP re division of MUP, 31 March 1992), p. 1.
9699
P1103 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and Branko Kvesić/Bruno Stojić/Mićo Stanišić, 5 May 1992), pp. 25–26.
9700
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8702. Mandić later testified that the political leadership was not aware of his dispatch
and he was simply following the decisions of the Assembly, the Law on Internal Affairs, and the Cutileiro Plan. Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4474 (1 July 2010)
The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable and notes that this is directly contradicted by his prior testimony that this dispatch was sent following
instructions from the political leadership. The Chamber noted that Mandić in his testimony in this case was evasive and was marked by indicators of bias.
Similarly the Chamber does not rely on Mandić‘s evidence about the effect or motivation for the division of the MUP given that this evidence was marked
by efforts by Mandić to distance himself from responsibility for the events in BiH. Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
8687–8688; C3 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Ţupljanin), T. 9681–9683, 9664. The Chamber does not find Samouković‘s evidence with
respect to the extent to which municipal level divisions followed instructions from the central authorities to be reliable. Nevenko Samouković, T. 34602
(1 March 2013). In reaching that conclusion the Chamber noted that his testimony was marked by contradictions, and evasiveness which undermined his
evidence in this regard.
9701
P1117 (Letter from SRBiH Minister of Interior to all MUP administrations, 31 March 1992).
9702
P1117 (Letter from SRBiH Minister of Interior to all MUP administrations, 31 March 1992), p. 2. See also Momĉilo Mandić, C3 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Ţupljanin), T. 9685–9686.
9703
Vitomir Ţepinić, T. 33582–33583 (13 February 2013). See also Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 21394.
9704
Vitomir Ţepinić, T. 33601–33602 (13 February 2013).
9705
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4473–4474 (1 July 2010); P1116 (Letter from Momĉilo Mandić to SRBiH MUP re division of MUP, 31 March 1992), p. 2.
9706
Momĉilo Mandić, C3 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Ţupljanin), T. 9687–9688.
9707
P1118 (Article from OsloboĊenje, entitled ―April Fool Reality‖, 1 April 1992), p. 1.
 786

should not be seized by any nation unilaterally and that employees should not be dismissed
because of their national or political affiliations.9708 (#EXCULPATORY#!) On 3 April 1992,
Ţupljanin sent a dispatch indicating that the reorganisation of the MUP organs and their security
services had begun in line with the dispatch from the Bosnian Serb MUP Collegium dated 2
April 1992.9709

2984. On 5 April 1992, Mandić sent a dispatch to Zvornik, noting that the MUP was being
divided into Serb and Muslim components and ordered the movement of the Bosnian Serb
institutions to Karakaj.9710 Following this instruction, the police stations in the municipality,
were divided into Serb and Muslim parts.9711 With respect to the division of the police, the
President stated that the ―[p]olicemen simply do not work together any more‖ and that this
situation had been ―forced upon us‖.9712 The Chamber also found that in Bratunac at the
beginning of April 1992, in a meeting between SDS and SDA representatives, Deronjić
reiterated that the police should be divided and that separate Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb
police units should be formed.9713 When the SDA representatives opposed the idea as it would
lead to greater tensions, Deronjić threatened that if they did not comply ―Muslims would
disappear‖.9714 (Based only on a #testimonies of the Muslim extremists#, who didn’t report
this incident, since at that time it couldn’t have happened, and the division of
municipality and its organs, such as police, had already been agreed and achieved on
April 1 1992! Anyway, Mr. Deronjic was a priviledged Prosecution’ witness, but he never
confirmed it in several his testimonies. Finally, what does it have to do with the President,
except that the Muslim extremist witness couldn’t invent some other lie, but used a well
known sentence from the President’s speech in October 91?)

2985. The Chamber further recalls that Bosnian Serb SJBs were formed in municipalities
including Bijeljina,9715 Bratunac,9716 Brĉko,9717 Foĉa,9718 Rogatica,9719 Vlasenica,9720
Zvornik,9721 Kljuĉ,9722 Prijedor,9723 Sanski Most,9724 Hadţići,9725 Ilidţa,9726 Pale,9727 and
Vogošća.9728 (The very #same possibility was before the Muslim side#, but they wanted to
preserve and impose a unitary state and a unique police against the will of the Christian
majority (the Serbs and Croats))

9708
D390 (SRBiH MUP dispatch to MUP Ministers, all CSBs, and all SJBs, 1 April 1992), p. 2. See also Momĉilo Mandić, C3 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stanišić and Ţupljanin), T. 9688–9689.
9709
D391 (CSB Banja Luka dispatch to SerBiH MUP, 3 April 1992), p. 1. See also Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4912–4913 (8 July 2010).
9710
See para. 1237.
9711
See para.1237.
9712
P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 16.
9713
See para. 705.
9714
See para. 705.
9715
See paras. 627, 629.
9716
See paras. 703, 707–709.
9717
See para. 797.
9718
See para. 846.
9719
See paras. 958, 960–961.
9720
See para. 1124.
9721
See paras. 1234, 1237.
9722
See para. 1502.
9723
See para. 1597.
9724
See para. 1936.
9725
See para. 2076.
9726
See para. 2125. The Chamber recalls its finding that the ten SJBs in Sarajevo were divided and that the SJB in Novo Sarajevo remained under Bosnian
Muslim control. See para. 2250.
9727
See para. 2307.
9728
See paras. 2364, 2373, 2373.
 787

2986. In a decision issued on 25 April 1992, Mićo Stanisić ordered that CSB heads were
allowed to take over the employees from the former MUP and assign jobs within the CSBs and
SJBs, however, they had to inform the Minister of the Interior of all such decisions.
Furthermore, all heads of CSB had to obtain prior approval from the MUP before assigning
posts at the higher levels, such as the head of the SJBs.9729 (9734) (#Legal! According to the
Law of Internal Affairs, only the Minister was supposed to nominate and appoint an
official in MUP! Only insuch a distant municipalities as Prijedor was, the Crisis Staff
appointed the chief of police, because there was no a communications. But, the Indictment
as well as the Judgment treat all the Serb political actions the same, as if anything that the
Serbs did was forbidden!!!)

2987. In May 1992, there was a meeting between the Accused, RS MUP officials and the Chiefs
of the CBSs at which the existing situation, the problems on the ground, and the work of the
MUP were discussed.9730 The Chiefs of the CSBs were informed that a MUP had been formed
and of the applicable procedure, and the President used this opportunity to inform those present
about the general situation and issues, emphasising that the MUP had to function according to
the legal provisions.9731 A bulletin of daily events was compiled on the work between April and
December 1992 in order to provide the Accused and the RS Prime Minister with information on
the security situation. In addition, the Accused received 80 reports on security issues.9732 (So
what? How was it connected to the alleged crimes?)

2988. The President, as President, also had the power to issue orders for the deployment of the
police during the war.9733

2. Conclusion

2989. The President‘s argues that there were multiple factors which contributed to the ultimate
division of the MUP, particularly personnel disagreements with the SDA.9734 He also argues
that the Cutileiro Plan envisaged all constituent entities having their own police forces.9735 (Not
only the Cutileiro Plan, but prior to this Plan there was a course of the ICFY where Mr.
Izetbegovic commited himself to secure a high autonomy to the Serbs and Croats. This
issue was codified in the Treaty Provisions for the Convention, Carrington Plan of 4
November 1991.)

2990. Having considered the evidence above, the Chamber finds that prior to the conflict in BiH
there were already disputes, personnel issues and divisions between the Bosnian Serb and
Bosnian Muslim personnel in the MUP.9736 (This is not enough from a distinguished and
serious Chamber. There were no a personal disputes, but a legal disputes because of a
massive abuses of the state institutions by the SDA, on the account of the Serb rights and
security!) The Chamber finds that the President himself had warned that if the Bosnian Serb
demands were not met, a parallel police structure could be created. The Chamber finds that the
9729
P6379 (Decision of SerBiH MUP, 25 April 1992; Request of Banja Luka CSB, 4 May 1992; Decision of Banja Luka CSB, 30 July 1992, Decision of Banja
Luka CSB, 13 June 1992), p. 1.
9730
D3917 (Witness Statement of Ĉedomir Kljajić dated 30 July 2013), para. 16.
9731
D3917 (Witness Statement of Ĉedomir Kljajić dated 30 July 2013), para. 16.
9732
P2761 (RS MUP report on work for period April to December 1992), p. 23.
9733
P2602 (SerBiH Defence Act, 1 June 1992), art. 7.
9734
Defence Final Brief, paras. 111–124, 134–154.
9735
Defence Final Brief, paras. 176–179.
9736
While the Chamber finds that these disputes did play a role in the decision to ultimately divide the MUP, the Chamber does not find Mandić‘s evidence that
it was the SDA and these personnel issues which contributed most to the division of the MUP to be reliable: Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4917 (8 July 2010);
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9406. See also P1115 (Video footage of interview with Momĉilo Mandić, July-August
1994, with transcript). In reaching that conclusion the Chamber found that Mandić‘s evidence was marked by evasiveness, inconsistencies and indicators of
bias. In addition it was clear that he had an interest in downplaying his own role and the real reason for the division of the MUP.
 788

Accused closely monitored developments in the MUP. The Chamber concludes however that,
even if such a division was also influenced by personnel disagreements or was provided for by
the Cutileiro Plan, the ultimate split in the MUP structures was precipitated by a decision of the
Bosnian Serb leadership and formed a core part of their objective to create a separate Bosnian
Serb state with parallel structures. The Chamber finds that Mandić took a leading role in
ensuring that this division was carried out at a municipal level and in detailing how this new
Bosnian Serb MUP was to be structured. It also finds that the creation of a separate Bosnian
Serb MUP was a means of undermining the proposed independence of BiH. The Chamber
finds that the directives with respect to the division of the MUP structures and the creation of
the Bosnian Serb MUP were communicated to and implemented at a municipal level. (#This
kind of deliberation is a grave violation of the Serb and the President rights#. Nobody is
entitled to criminalise the political life and political struggle, after the Tribunal decided
not to criminalise the crime against peace, i.e. the liability for the war! Had it been notified
in advance, the Defence would have something to tell and to submit to that aspect, because
the Serbs didn’t initiate any change, but only defended the existing status! This way, the
Chamber is criminalising the entire Serb people for it’s intentions to mitigate the
consequences of the forced independence through a democratic transformation of BiH,
which was supported by the EC – UN mediation! This way, the Tribunal of the United
Nations is justifying all the violent, unilateral and unlawful moves of the other side, and
presumes that the Serbs would be right only if were unconditionally obedient! This is in a
sharp contrast with the international covenants and the basic documents of the UN, and
therefore the UN institutions must not act that way!)

2991. The Chamber further finds that the separation of the BiH MUP and creation of a Bosnian
Serb MUP was also a crucial step in the take-over of municipalities as it created a separate police
structure which would allow Bosnian Serb authority to be maintained in those municipalities. The
Chamber also finds that the President spoke in favour and promoted the creation of this separate
police structure as a means of achieving their objective of sovereignty of the Serb people in the
territories which they claimed. Following the division of the BiH MUP, the President was
informed about developments and the functioning of the Bosnian Serb MUP. The Chamber
recalls its finding that the separate Bosnian Serb MUP, as a component of the Serb Forces, were
involved in the violent take-over of Municipalities and in crimes committed against Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats upon which the Chamber has entered findings above. (This is
another of many shameless #“myths” created by the Prosecution, and accepted by the
Chamber, and is calles “a forceful, or violent take-over of municipalities” #Which of the
municipalities had been violently taken-over, or taken-over anyway? In all and every of the
municipalities with the Serb majority there had been the same authorities as established
after the electioons in 1990, lasting throughout the entire war to the next elections in 1996.
The only what was changed now and then was a change of personnel, mainly in the police,
and on athe inictiative of the internationals. In the municipalities where the others (Muslims
or Croats) had a significant minority, the Serb authorities were limited on the Serb areas
only, through the formation of the Serb municipalities composed of the Serb settled places
only. That was a legal and constitutional possibility, and the Serbs used it legally, because
the SDA extremists continued to abuse all the common state institutions for their purposes,
violating all the constitutional and legal provisions, as well as a common sense and good
habitsof such a mixed society. 5the main purpose of theirs was to subjugate the Serbs (and
Croats) to their political dictate, and finally to expel the Christian majority out of BiH and
to establish their Islamioc Republic. The valuable evidence on these facts nobody ever
rebutted properly!)
 789

(D) Variant A/B Instructions and take-over of power

(#Legal, obligatory#! All and everything about these instructions was legal and provided by the
domestic legislature, based on the All-People’s Defence, and on the Social Self Protection
laws. That was corroborated by the witness Dragan Kapetina, a long term official of the
Ministry for Defence in BiH and later in the Republic of Srpska. There was no a single
institution, territorial unit and social organisation that was without such an instructions for
a possible war or an imminent threat of war! Many institutions had such an instruction
created much earlier, and many years had been deposited in a safes, to be opened in any
imergency situation. Not worthy to comment, the Tribunal chambers were completely
ignorant of the domestic laws and regulations, and from that position the chambers decide
about the most legal and sometimes obligatory measures of the sides. The Instructions
weren’t any political or party document, this kind of documents, which are to be opened only
in a case of threats were a professional instructions, not discussed and not voted about by
any political body! None of these measures envisaged in the Instructions were envisaged to
initiate any situation, but only to react to a jeopardies!)

(1)Analysis of evidence

a. Distribution and contents of the Instructions

2992. Above, the Chamber found that the Variant A/B Instructions were issued by the SDS
Main Board on 19 December 1991.9737 They were distributed by the President at a meeting on
or around 20 December 1991.9738 This meeting was held in Sarajevo and attended by hundreds
of high ranking Bosnian Serbs, including Krajišnik, Plavšić, Koljević, members of the Main
Board and Executive Board, deputies, municipal representatives, and members of the
government.9739

2993. This document was adopted without any discussion, vote, or amendment and was
presented as a set of measures which were to be practically implemented.9740 The stated
purpose of these instructions was to ―carry out the results of the plebiscite at which the Serbian
people in Bosnia and Herzegovina decide to live in a single state‖ and to ―increase mobility and
readiness for the defence of the interests of the Serbian people‖.9741 The Chamber further
recalls that Serb-majority municipalities were designated Variant A, while Serb-minority
municipalities were designated Variant B.9742 The instructions were a means of creating Serb

9737
See paras. 49, 132; P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991); Patrick Treanor, T. 14027–14028 (1
June 2011); Dorothea Hanson, T. 14502 (9 June 2011).
9738
See paras. 49, 132. The Chamber also notes that on cross-examination Grujić was confronted with his prior testimony where he claimed the Variant A/B
instructions came directly from the Accused, but he retracted from this and said he did not know whether the Accused was directly involved or not. Branko
Grujić, T. 40369–40371, 40405–40407, 40417–40418 (25 June 2013); P6415 (Excerpt from Branko Grujić's testimony before Belgrade District Court, 30
November 2005), p. 3.
9739
Radomir Kezunović T. 13938–13939 (31 May 2011); Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16651, 16654–16656, 16795–
16796. See para. 132. See also NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12934–12935, 12939–12941, 12942 (3 March 2011).
9740
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT–00–39), T. 16647–16650, 16657–16659; Radomir Nešković T. 14215,
14264, 14272 (6 June 2011), 14325–14327, 14352–14353 (7 June 2011); D1278 (Transcript of Radomir Nešković's interview with Karadţić's legal
associate, 8 October 2009), pp. 28–29; Radomir Kezunović T. 13939 (31 May 2011). But see KDZ192, T. 19508–19509, 19516–19517
(27 September 2011). KDZ192 agreed with the Accused‘s suggestion that the Variant A/B Instructions were not binding but then distanced himself from his
answer when questioned by the Chamber. The Chamber notes that KDZ192‘s evidence was marked by contradictions and indicators of bias and partiality
and does not rely on his evidence in this regard.
9741
P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), paras. 1–2.
9742
See paras. 49, 132. See also Dorothea Hanson, T. 14504 (9 June 2011). The Chamber does not rely on Hanson‘s opinion that in practice, the instructions
essentially mapped out the take-over of power.
 790

authority in both Variant A and Variant B municipalities.9743 According to the instructions, the
tasks laid out therein were to be implemented over the entire territory of the SRBiH or in every
municipality where Serbs lived, in their entirety in Variant A municipalities and partially in
Variant B municipalities.9744

2994. Before the President distributed the document, he spoke about the position of the Bosnian
Serbs, the threat posed by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, the secession and the
disintegration of Yugoslavia, but did not actually go into the details of the document.9745 The
fear of Bosnian Muslim and Croat dominance ―was a key element that contributed to the
emotional atmosphere‖ which prevailed during the meeting and nobody wanted to be seen as a
traitor by questioning the instructions.9746 The President called out individuals on a list and
distributed copies of the instructions and approximately 100 people were given these
instructions to read and return.9747 The instructions were numbered as they knew which
Bosnian Serb municipal leaders were supposed to be given copies of the document.9748 The
President also discussed these instructions at a meeting of the SDS Deputies‘ Club, which was
attended by municipal representatives.9749 On 18 December 1991, the day before the Variant
A/B Instructions were distributed, the President told Krajišnik in an intercepted phone
conversation that he was ―working on something‖, ―some measures and so on‖.9750

2995. The Variant A/B Instructions required SDS municipal boards in the first level to
―establish immediately Crisis Staffs of the Serbian People in the municipality‖.9751 The
instructions also specified that the composition of these Crisis Staffs should include all
members of the SDS municipal board secretariat, SDS candidates in certain municipal organs
(for Variant A municipalities) or SDS candidates in every municipal organ (for Variant B
municipalities), deputies of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, and members of the SDS Main Board
from the municipality.9752 The Chamber recalls that instructions also provided that the
Commander of the Crisis Staff was, in Variant A municipalities, the president of the municipal
assembly or the chairman of the municipal executive board and, in Variant B municipalities, the
president of the SDS municipal board.9753

2996. The Variant A/B Instructions also called for, in the first level, convening and proclaiming
an assembly of the Serbian people to be composed of Serbian representatives in the municipal
assembly and presidents of SDS local boards.9754 In this phase, preparations were to be
undertaken for the establishment of municipal government organs such as an executive
committee, administration organs, a misdemeanour court and an SJB and for the preparation of
a list of nominees to take on duties in these organs.9755 This first level also required

9743
Radomir Nešković T. 14326–14327 (7 June 2011). The Chamber places no weight on Nešković‘s own assessment that the instructions were a means of
subjugating the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to Serb power. See also P4634 (Witness statement of KDZ145 dated 22 February 2012), para. 14
(under seal); KDZ145, T. 26516 (21 March 2012) (closed session).
9744
P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), p. 2.
9745
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16657, 16793.
9746
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16659–16660; Radomir Nešković, T. 14215 (6 June 2011).
9747
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16648, 16788. See also P6550 (Excerpt from Rajko Kalabić's testimony in
Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 22576–22577.
9748
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16648, 16651, 16656.
9749
P6369 (Excerpts from KW317's statement to OTP, 14 June 2002), e-court p. 2 (under seal); KW317, T. 39337 (5 June 2013).
9750
P5793 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 18 December 1991), p. 1.
9751
See para. 139. Kosta Ĉavoški testified that the Variant A/B Instructions were purely precautionary in nature. Kosta Ĉavoški, T. 37059–37060 (11 April
2013). The Chamber places no weight on Ĉavoški‘s opinion in this regard given that it falls outside the scope of his expertise. In addition the Chamber also
found his testimony was marked by contradictions, evasiveness and clear indicators of partiality and bias which undermined his evidence as an expert and
does not find his evidence in this regard to be reliable.
9752
See para. 139.
9753
See para. 139.
9754
See para. 133.
9755
P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 3–4.
 791

preparations for the take-over of ―staff, buildings and equipment of security services centres and
their integration‖ into newly established organs.9756

2997. The first level of the instructions also required an estimate of the number of active and
reserve police, TO units, and civilian protection units and to bring these units ―to full
manpower‖ and take necessary action for their engagement depending on developments.9757
The instructions also provided that these units would be activated by order of the municipal
Crisis Staffs and also called for a replenishment of wartime units.9758 The instructions also
required preparations to be taken to allow for the protection and evacuation of children,
pregnant women, the elderly and sick.9759

2998. The Variant A/B Instructions also contained provisions to establish ―constant
communication and cooperation‖ between the SDS municipal boards and local boards and to
provide for daily meetings of the SDS municipal board to constantly monitor the situation on
the ground.9760

2999. The second level of the Variant A/B Instructions called for, inter alia, convening a session
of the Serb municipal assembly, establishing a municipal executive board and municipal state or
government organs, mobilising and re-subordinating all Serb police forces in co-ordination with
JNA command and staff, and ensuring the implementation of the order for mobilisation of JNA
reserve and TO units.9761 This second level also provided for the take over of ―staff, buildings
and equipment of security services centres and [to] place them at the disposal of the newly
established organs of the interior‖.9762 In Variant B municipalities, the Crisis Staff was tasked
with organising the defence of Serbs and to constantly monitor the political, military and
security situation and to respond in a timely fashion.9763

3000. For Variant B municipalities there was a further provision which required that members of
the ―other nations‖ who had expressed loyalty to Yugoslavia be ―proportionately represented in
government organs‖.9764 Also in Variant B municipalities there was an additional instruction
for predominantly Serb local communes and settlements to establish ―secret warehouses and
depots‖ to store food, raw materials and manufacturing components.9765

3001. The second level of the Variant A/B Instructions was to be activated pursuant to an order
of the President ―in accordance with a specifically defined secret procedure‖.9766

b. Implementation of the Instructions at the municipal level

3002. The Variant A/B Instructions were communicated from SDS leaders to municipal leaders
and SDS municipal boards which discussed and implemented the variant which was applicable
to their respective municipality.9767 The Chamber also recalls its finding that the

9756
P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 4, 7.
9757
P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 4, 8.
9758
P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 4–5, 8.
9759
P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 4, 8.
9760
P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 2, 6.
9761
P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 5–6, 9–10. See para. 134.
9762
P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 5–6.
9763
P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 9–10.
9764
P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 6–7.
9765
P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 7, 9.
9766
P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), p. 10.
9767
See para. 132.
 792

implementation of these instructions were viewed by the recipients as mandatory.9768 Those

who received the document had to decide the best way to implement the instructions at a
municipal level.9769 There are also municipal decisions on the record which specifically
reference the Variant A/B Instructions.9770 The Chamber recalls that after the Variant A/B
Instructions were distributed by the President they were conveyed, discussed and implemented
through SDS structures at a municipal level in municipalities including Bratunac,9771 Brĉko,9772
Rogatica,9773 Vlasenica,9774 Zvornik,9775 Bosanski Novi,9776 Kljuĉ,9777 Prijedor,9778 Ilidţa,9779
and Novo Sarajevo.9780

3003. The Chamber further recalls that the implementation of the Variant A/B Instructions
resulted in the formation of municipal Crisis Staffs and Serb municipal assemblies, and the
declaration of Serbian municipalities.9781 For example, the Chamber recalls that the decision to
form the Serbian Municipality of Zvornik directly cited to the Variant A/B Instructions.9782
From late 1991, municipalities established Crisis Staffs and some were re-established or re-
formed in around April or May 1992.9783 These Crisis Staffs were formed and in existence
between 1991 and 1993 in the Municipalities.9784

3004. In other municipalities such as Bijeljina,9785 Foĉa,9786 Sokolac,9787 Banja Luka,9788 Sanski
Most,9789 Hadţići,9790 Novi Grad,9791 Pale,9792 and Vogošća,9793 while the Chamber did not
receive direct evidence about the discussion of the Variant A/B Instructions per se, it found that
Crisis Staffs and other Bosnian Serb municipal structures were created in late 1991 or early
1992. The Chamber is satisfied given the timing and pattern of events in these municipalities,
that these structures were also created pursuant to the Variant A/B Instructions.

9768
See para. 2245. KW317 testified that the Variant A/B Instructions were not orders and that nobody had to report on whether they were implemented or not.
KW317, T. 39333–39334, 39337–39338 (5 June 2013), T. 39412 (6 June 2013). However, the Chamber notes that when KW317 was confronted with a
prior interview where he confirmed that he did attend a meeting where they were instructed to implement the second phase of the Variant A/B Instructions.
In light of this qualification the Chamber does not find KW317‘s evidence in this regard to be of much weight.
9769
Ra00domir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16806. For evidence on the manner in which the Variant A/B Instructions were
implemented in Brĉko for example, see P3023 (Witness statement of ÐorĊe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 51–59, 73–76, 94–95.
9770
See, e.g., P2593 (Decision on the establishment of the Serbian Municipality of Tuzla, 3 March 1992), p. 1; P2594 (Decision on the establishment of the
Serbian Municipality of Donji Vakuf, 15 February 1992), p. 1; P975 (Decision of Serbian Municipal Assembly of Ilidţa, 3 January 1992), p. 1; P2591
(Decision regarding the formation of the Serbian Municipality of Zvornik, 27 December 1991), p. 1.
9771
See para. 698.
9772
See para. 796.
9773
See para. 955.
9774
See para. 1109.
9775
See paras. 1231, 1233.
9776
See para. 1439.
9777
See para. 1497.
9778
See para. 1578. See also P2570 (Book of minutes of Prijedor's SDS Municipal Board meetings, 1991), p. 75.
9779
See para. 2123.
9780
See paras. 2245.
9781
See paras. 698, 796, 955, 1109, 1231, 1233, 1439, 1497, 1578, 2123. But see Radojica MlaĊenović, T. 36626–36630, 36680–36682 (5 April 2013).
MlaĊenović testified that the Serbian Municipality of Foĉa was not formed pursuant to instructions from the Accused and tried to characterise the Variant
A/B document as a recommendation rather than an instruction. However, the Chamber notes that his evidence was marked by multiple contradictions and
indicators of extreme evasiveness and does not find his evidence to be reliable in this regard. See also para. 137.
9782
See para. 1233; P2591 (Decision regarding the formation of the Serbian Municipality of Zvornik, 27 December 1991), pp. 1–2.
9783
See para. 137.
9784
See para. 146.
9785
See paras. 605–606.
9786
See para. 845.
9787
See para. 1051.
9788
See paras. 1371–1372. But see D4063 (Witness statement of Novak Kondić dated 23 November 2013), paras. 8–9, 11 (stating that he did not remember
seeing or hearing about the Variant A/B Instructions in Banja Luka and that there was only one session of the Crisis Staff in that municipality).
9789
See para. 1934.
9790
See para. 2080.
9791
See paras. 2173, 2180 (referring to creation of the Rajlovac Crisis Staff).
9792
See para. 2303.
9793
See para. 2361.
 793

c. Monitoring of developments and implementation of Instructions

3005. The Accused also followed up on the implementation of the Variant A/B Instructions. For
example in an intercepted conversation on 21 December 1991, the President asked Krajišnik
―who will implement what we issued last night?‖ and Krajišnik replied that it would be the
Council of Ministers.9794 When the President observed that the Council of Ministers would not
be able to ―run from municipality to municipality and say do this, do that‖, Krajišnik replied:
―He won‘t run either‖ and the President countered with ―[B]ut he must run.‖9795 From the
context of the conversation the Chamber finds that the President and Krajišnik were speaking
about Jovan Ĉizmović. His role is discussed in further detail below.

3006. On 26 December 1991, Krajišnik informed the President that he had been to a Novi Grad
Municipal Assembly session in which voting had been blocked.9796 In an intercepted
conversation on 27 December 1991, the President was asked by Bjelica whether he would come
to Sokolac and was informed: ―We‘re doing the job here, everything is normal‖ and the
President asked whether Tupajić was doing a good job in the municipality.9797

3007. In January 1992, in an intercepted conversation, the President asked Miroslav Stanić, the
president of the SDS in Foĉa, about the situation there.9798 The President specifically asked
Stanić ―[c]an they introduce independence in Foĉa‖, to which Stanić replied that they would not
and they had told journalists who visited them that ―we‘ll never allow that‖.9799 Stanić
proceeded to tell the President that they had formed a ―Serb municipality and you have that
information‖ and that if ―things should go differently on the fifteenth, we‘ll have a public
promotion‖.9800 The President expressed his agreement and said: ―Yes, yes, and take complete
control over your affairs‖; to which Stanić agreed and said that ―everything [is] as it is in the
instructions‖.9801 The President expressed his satisfaction and said: ―Good, good. That‘s very
important […] never again in history will they […] if we give in now, we‘ll never have a chance
and if, if we succeed, we will have succeeded for all times‖.9802

3008. The President was kept informed of the implementation of the instructions. As such, in an
intercepted conversation on 10 February 1992 between the President and Vitomir Ţepinić, the
plan to divide the Bratunac municipality and establish a separate Serb municipality was
discussed and encouraged by the President.9803 Similarly, the previous day, Krajišnik informed
the President of a meeting he had recently attended in Novi Grad, and the discussions he had
about forming the Rajlovac municipality.9804

9794
P2550 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 21 December 1991), p. 3; See also Momĉilo Krajišnik, T. 43857 (20
November 2013); P5792 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Milan Novaković, 19 December 1991), p. 2; Radomir Nešković T.
14272–14273 (6 June 2011).
9795
P2550 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 21 December 1991), p. 3.
9796
P5785 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 26 December 1991), p. 1.
9797
P5783 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Bjelica, 27 December 1991), p. 2.
9798
P3337 (Intercept of conversation between Miroslav Stanić and Radovan Karadţić, 6 January 1992), p. 2; KDZ239, T. 18909 (15 September 2011).
9799
P3337 (Intercept of conversation between Miroslav Stanić and Radovan Karadţić, 6 January 1992), p. 2; KDZ239, T. 18909–18910 (15 September 2011).
9800
P3337 (Intercept of conversation between Miroslav Stanić and Radovan Karadţić, 6 January 1992), p. 2.
9801
P3337 (Intercept of conversation between Miroslav Stanić and Radovan Karadţić, 6 January 1992), p. 2. The Chamber finds that considering the timing of
this conversation and the context, the reference to ―the instructions‖ is a reference to the Variant A/B Instructions which were distributed in December 1991.
P5 (SDS Instructions for Organisation of Organs of the Serbian People in BiH, 19 December 1991), pp. 6, 10. See also P5617 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Predrag Radić, 25 December 1991), p. 4.
9802
P3337 (Intercept of conversation between Miroslav Stanić and Radovan Karadţić, 6 January 1992), p. 2.
9803
D381 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Vitomir Ţepinić, 10 February 1992), p .2. KDZ605 stated that he heard that Deronjić went
to Pale, met with the Accused to ―discuss and organise the takeover of Bratunac‖. However, the Chamber is not satisfied that it can rely on this unsourced
second hand-hear say to establish that this meeting did take place or what was discussed at this meeting.
9804
P5753 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, February 1992), p. 1. Also, sometime in February 1992, Krajišnik
informed Koljević about a meeting he was going to attend in Rajlovac ―in connection with this one municipality.‖ P5758 (Intercept of conversation between
Momĉilo Krajišnik and Nikola Koljević, February 1992), p. 1. On 11 May 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted a law according to which the
 794

3009. There was direct communication between the municipal Boards and their representatives
and the Accused with respect to the implementation of the Variant A/B Instructions and people
came from the field to see the President.9805 Municipal leaders would frequently visit the
President or would communicate in writing or by phone with respect to municipal issues.9806
The President also had regular contact with Bosnian Serb municipal leaders and made frequent
visits to municipalities.9807

3010. The Accused invited representatives of Crisis Staffs to report on their work.9808 He was in
contact with municipal leaders and questioned them on how the local authorities and structures
were functioning.9809 The President was regularly informed about, and gave instructions with
respect to, specific developments at a municipal and regional level.9810 When there were
problems in a specific municipality, Nešković or other Bosnian Serb officials would be sent by
the President or by the Main Board. Nešković would then provide a brief verbal report on the
work he had done even though the President had already been informed from municipal sources
about these developments.9811

3011. The Accused sometimes intervened personally to resolve problems which arose at a
municipal level.9812 For example, in around February 1992, the President and Krajišnik were
involved in resolving an internal conflict in Novo Sarajevo.9813 The President and Krajišnik
attended at least one meeting of the Novo Sarajevo SDS Municipal Board.9814 In June 1992, in
a letter from Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff, the President was informed about developments in the
Serbian Municipality of Novo Sarajevo, including the mobilisation of the population, the
formation of a Crisis Staff, Executive Board and Municipal Assembly, and was requested to
provide further instructions with respect to the formation of war presidencies.9815

municipality of Rajlovac included certain areas. P2315 (Law on Establishment of Rajlovac Municipality, 11 May 1992 and corresponding Decree on
promulgation), p. 1; Stojan Dţino, T. 29865, 29901 (7 November 2012). See also Adjudicated Fact 2580; P967 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan
Karadţić and Ljubo Grković, 22 February 1992).
9805
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16758–16759.
9806
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16632, 16641.
9807
D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), p. 44 (the Accused stated he had been to Banja Luka 27 times to deal with
some problems with the local leadership). See also P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Ðerić dated 5 April 2012), para. 41 (stating that municipal leaders
often visited the Accused and Krajišnik on municipal business); P2332 (Intercept of conversation between Ĉedo and Radovan Karadţić, 30 May 1992), p. 3;
P2534 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Duško and Radovan Karadţić and (ii) Ljubo Grković and Radovan Karadţić, 19 February 1992, pp. 1, 4–5;
P5749 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Boţidar Vuĉurović, 13 February 1992); P5733 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan
Tintor and unidentified male, 17 March 1992), p. 1; P2556 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Nenad Stevandić, 11 January 1992),
pp. 5, 12; P5738 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Krajišnik and Momĉilo Mandić, 4 April 1992), p. 1; P6688 (Interview with Radovan Karadţić
in Duga Magazine, 23 May 1992), p. 4; P3104 (Minutes of the 59th session of RS Government, 19 November 1992), pp. 4–5.
9808
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16685.
9809
P2572 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Miroslav Stanĉić, 26 September 1991).
9810
P5603 (Intercept of conversation between Mirko Ĉabrilo and Radovan Karadţić, 3 March 1992); P5741 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo
Mandić and Milenko Kepeš, 5 April 1992), pp. 2, 5; P5730 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovan Ĉizmović, 1 March 1992), p. 1;
P5729 (Intercept of conversation between Biljana Plavšić, Rajko Dukić, and Radovan Karadţić, 2 March 1992), p. 4; P5747 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Gojko Đogo, 15 February 1992), p. 3.
9811
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16618–16619, 16621–16622, 16628–16629, 16738–16739, 16748, 16760, 16762;
Radomir Nešković T. 14217 (6 June 2011). See also P2572 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Miroslav Stanĉić, 26 September
1991), p. 2; P2571 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Radovan Karadţić and Radomir Nešković; (ii) Radovan Karadţić and Mišković; and (iii)
Radovan Karadţić and Srdo Srdić, 20 December 1991), pp. 1–2. See also D1278 (Transcript of Radomir Nešković's interview with Karadţić's legal
associate, 8 October 2009), pp. 12, 46.
9812
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16641. See also D1276 (Minutes of meeting of Novo Sarajevo SDS local boards, 3
February 1992), p. 8.
9813
See para. 2246. There was a debate about the role of the SDS Municipal Board versus other municipal institutions, and a conflict emerged between Prijić,
the president of the Municipal Board, and Đurović, the president of the executive board. D1276 (Minutes of meeting of Novo Sarajevo SDS local boards,
3 February 1992), pp. 1–3; Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16641, 16672–16679. The Accused and Krajišnik used
their authority to defuse the conflict and Đurović held onto his position as ―president of the municipal authorities‖. Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16641, 16673. See also Zdravko Šalipur, T. 31640 (18 December 2012).
9814
P2576 (Minutes of 13th session of Novo Sarajevo‘s SDS Municipal Board, 28 February 1992), p. 3; Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor
v. Krajišnik), T. 16641, 16675; Zdravko Šalipur, T. 31640, 31657 (18 December 2012); Branko Radan, T. 31092–31093 (6 December 2012).
9815
D885 (Letter from Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to Radovan Karadţić, 5 June 1992), pp. 1, 3–4 (indicating that ―mobilisation was carried out in various ways
personally and directly, through SDS […] local boards and local communes, with the help of police, etc.‖). See also P2575 (Excerpt from session of Novo
Sarajevo's Crisis Staff, 23 December 1991).
 795

3012. The Accused sent commissioners to various locations when the municipal authorities were
not functioning.9816 Jovan Ĉizmović, who was a member of the Council of Ministers, was
appointed as republic level co-ordinator of the activities of the SAOs and the ARK and had the
duty of monitoring the implementation of the Variant A/B Instructions.9817 In an intercepted
conversation on 21 December 1991 the President gave Ĉizmović the ―full authorisation to visit
all our municipalities‖ and indicated that the municipalities would identify the problems they
were facing and that it would be good to hear advice from Ĉizmović.9818

3013. In another intercepted conversation on 16 January 1992, Ĉizmović reported to the President
that he had spoken to Bijeljina and that they were ―prepared for full-cooperation‖ and that he
had prepared a questionnaire for Northern Bosnia to allow them to identify what they had
managed to do and how far they had come and to what extent they were prepared to ―implement
the first level of the instruction‖ and any problems they were facing or needed help with.9819
Ĉizmović indicated that he was prepared to form a team with the help of the President to
provide professional help with any problems the municipalities faced.9820

3014. In another intercepted conversation on 22 January 1992 between the President and
Ĉizmović, there was discussion on sending experts and teams to assist municipalities to deal
with problems and Ĉizmović said: ―It‘s the same situation with Bijeljina […] I‘ve finished with
them, too‖.9821 Ĉizmović reported about measures taken in Doboj and Bijeljina and indicated
that he still had to ―see about Biraĉ, Romanija and Herzegovina. […] But I‘ll see to it that that
should be finished within this short time, too‖. 9822

3015. In another phone conversation, Ĉizmović indicated, and the President, agreed that
―movements which are taking place here shouldn‘t be seen as some sort of secession‖ but as an
alternative ―to a situation, if there should be a need for a reaction, that everything should be on a
hair-trigger‖.9823 The President said that it would allow them to react within two hours.9824 The
President responded positively to Ĉizmović‘s reports that: ―Tonight we also established the
Crisis Staff, which will act when nobody can get together, when they can assemble more
quickly […] So, that‘s working. Because the objective must be carried out, instructions must be
carried out‖.9825 At the 6th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly on 26 January 1992,
Ĉizmović spoke and called for the urgent operationalisation and declaration on the
establishment of the SerBiH and stated that the ―[t]asks set out in the instructions of 19
December 1991 should be carried out‖.9826

3016. In February 1992, the President addressed the Bosnian Assembly and stressed the
importance of co-operation with regional structures and leaders and the development of their

9816
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8633–8634.
9817
D86 (Shorthand Record of 4th Session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 December 1991), p. 34; P1345 (Minutes of 4 th session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 December
1991), p. 6. See also P2536 (Patrick Treanor's expert report entitled ―The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990–1992‖, 30 July 2002), p. 162; Patrick Treanor, T.
14030–14031 (1 June 2011).
9818
P2551 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovan Ĉizmović, 21 December 1991), p. 3. See also P5770 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Jovan Ĉizmović, 10 January 1992), p. 4.
9819
P2552 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovan Ĉizmović, 16 January 1992), p. 7. See also Patrick Treanor, T. 14031 (1 June
2011).
9820
P2552 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovan Ĉizmović, 16 January 1992), p. 7.
9821
P2553 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovan Ĉizmović, 22 January 1992), p. 5.
9822
P2553 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovan Ĉizmović, 22 January 1992), pp. 5–6; Patrick Treanor, T. 14034–14035 (1 June
2011).
9823
P2553 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovan Ĉizmović, 22 January 1992), p. 6.
9824
P2553 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovan Ĉizmović, 22 January 1992), p. 6.
9825
P2553 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovan Ĉizmović, 22 January 1992), p. 7.
9826
P1349 (Transcript of 6th session of SerBiH Assembly, 26 January 1992), p. 14.
 796

strategic objectives.9827 This included creating a questionnaire to be used to check the progress
of municipalities with respect to ―preparations‖.9828 The President spoke about Ĉizmović
visiting municipalities, including Bijeljina and Banja Luka, with a questionnaire to check on
preparations at the municipality level and to check on their loyalty.9829

3017. In March 1992, the President wrote to all the presidents of the municipalities to inform
them that a Republic Operations Centre had been established and that the task of the
municipalities was to urgently connect their own information centres with district centres, to
provide personnel and ensure that other requirements were met so as to monitor the situation on
the ground.9830 The President noted that the district centres were already connected by
telephone and radio communication with the republic centres and it was also necessary to co-
operate with the SJBs continuously to allow for the transmission and receipt of information 24
hours a day.9831 The President stated that consultative meetings would soon be held to go over
technical and organisational issues related to the work of municipal and district centres.9832

3018. Municipal leaders also requested assistance from the higher level Bosnian Serb institutions.
For example, in July 1992, the President of the Executive Committee in Foĉa informed Đerić
that the political and security situation in Foĉa remained critical and requested assistance to find
the best solution.9833 Similarly, in September 1992 the Command of the 2nd Romanija
Motorised Brigade reported to the President about disputes and difficulties in co-operation with
the civilian authorities in Sokolac.9834 The President was also informed of the situation with
regard to the institutions in Bratunac and, for example, in a speech to the Bosnian Serb
Assembly in September 1992 he spoke about the need to ensure the functioning of
authorities.9835

3019. The Chamber received evidence that described disruptions of road systems at different
locations or breakdown of telecommunications between the RS institutions and the local levels,
from March until December 1992.9836

3020. However, the consistent communications between different levels of the SDS party and RS
institutions, both regional and municipal, as depicted above, including other evidence,9837
9827
P1351 (Transcript of 7th session of SerBiH Assembly, 15 February 1992), pp. 58–59; D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25
February 1992), pp. 19–20, 45; D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), p. 43; D304 (Shorthand Record of 14th session
of RS Assembly, 27 March 1992), pp. 9, 20.
9828
P1351 (Transcript of 7th session of SerBiH Assembly, 15 February 1992), p. 59.
9829
P1351 (Transcript of 7th session of SerBiH Assembly, 15 February 1992), p. 59.
9830
P5575 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Presidents of all Municipalities, 23 March 1992).
9831
P5575 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Presidents of all Municipalities, 23 March 1992) p. 1.
9832
P5575 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Presidents of all Municipalities, 23 March 1992) p. 2.
9833
P2809 (Foĉa Municipal Assembly dispatch to SerBiH Prime Minister, 26 July 1992).
9834
D3232 (Letter from 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade to Radovan Karadţić, 3 September 1992), p. 1.
9835
D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 18. See also D1643 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and
Zvonko Bajagić, 4 September 1991), pp. 1–4, 6–7.
9836
See, e.g., Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4962-4963, 4969-4971 (8 July 2010), T. 5194–5195 (15 July 2010); D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9
March 2013), para. 9; D4147 (Information of RS MUP, 7 September 1993), p. 1; D3917 (Witness statement of Ĉedomir Kljajić dated 30 July 2013), para.
12; Ĉedomir Kljajić, T. 42231 (30 July 2013); Goran Maĉar, T. 39518 (7 June 2013); D3197 (Witness statement of Dobrislav Planojević dated 23 March
2013), para. 20; D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 57, 92; Momĉilo Krajišnik, T. 43314-43315 (12 November
2013); D3750 (Intercept of conversation between Tomislav Kovaĉ and Milenko Karišik, 4 May 1992), p. 1; Cvijetin Simić, T. 35713 (20 March 2013);
KW317, T. 39412 (6 June 2013).
9837
See, e.g., D4147 (Information of RS MUP, 7 September 1993), p. 1 (stating that ―with a great deal of work and effort [breakdown of every form of
communication] was gradually overcome and remedied‖); D3197 (Witness statement of Dobrislav Planojević dated 23 March 2013), para. 20 (stating that
since there was a communication breakdown a dispatch was conveyed in person to Bratunac); D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June
2013), paras. 86, 91-92 (while stating that they had poor communication, Subotić also mentioned efforts to remedy it and that ―ministers were reduced to
telephones or written communications sent by messengers or couriers‖); Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35149–35153 (11 March 2013); P6194 (SerBiH Government
request to Foĉa Crisis Staff, 23 May 1992); Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7530–7536; D414 (Minutes of 19th session of
Government of SerBiH, 2 June 1992), p. 2; P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 246 (showing that the Accused and Mladić met with
civilian and military representatives from municipalities including Zvornik, Vlasenica, and Bratunac); P1105 (Transcript of 22nd session of RS Assembly,
23–24 November 1992), p. 105 (while deputies acknowledged that there were periods when telephone lines were down and that mail did not function,
during those periods ―it was necessary to go to the municipalities to see what the situation was like and report to the Presidency‖); Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5109
 797

clearly demonstrate that notwithstanding disruptions in telecommunications from March until

December 1992, it was still possible for the leadership of the SDS, including the President, and
RS institutions to communicate with lower levels and that generally obstacles were
overcome.9838 More specifically, with respect to the RS MUP, CSBs, and SJBs, there were
always communication channels with most communication by fax and telephone and daily
communication between the CSB and SJBs. If there were limited interruptions, for example if
the telephone lines were down, there would be communication by courier.9839

d. Activation of second level of the Instructions

3021. In January 1992, in an intercepted conversation, the President spoke about ―level two‖ of
―that paper of ours‖ and the importance of quickly taking over ―real functions‖.9840

3022. The Chamber recalls that on 14 February 1992, the President at an extended session of the
SDS Main Board and Executive Board activated the second level of the Variant A/B
Instructions.9841 The presidents of SDS municipal boards, presidents and members of regional
boards, presidents of assemblies, and executive boards of municipalities were invited to this
meeting.9842 This discussion and instruction to implement level two were conveyed to SDS
structures at a municipal level.9843

(14 July 2010) referring to D440 (Minutes of 15th session of Presidency of SerBiH, 6 July 1992), p. 2 (commissioners were introduced to establish a link
between the central organs and the municipalities and as a way of exercising ―control over the municipal organs on the ground‖); Momĉilo Krajišnik, T.
43314 (12 November 2013) (while testifying about the communication problems in 1992, the witness stated that throughout 1992 telephones, faxes and
printers ―worked with lots of difficulties‖); P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court pp. 8, 21 (indicating that the
Accused was aware of developments in municipalities such as Foĉa, Zvornik and Višegrad, and a deputy of the Bosnian Serb Assembly reported on his visit
to Bosanski Novi the day before and stated that it was ―sealed off‖.); Radomir Nešković T. 14364–14365 (7 June 2011) (testifying about different modes of
communication when there was an absence of telephone contact in Novo Sarajevo between 10 April and 10 May 1992); P2752 (SerBiH MUP order, 17 May
1992), p. 1 (indicating that Mićo Stanišić issued an order to the Security Service Centres in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Doboj, Sarajevo and Trebinje
municipalities to send reports via ―courier or coded‖); NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 13261, 13264 (11 March 2011) (describing a meeting in or around September
1992 in Jahorina to which the state and political leadership, including the Accused, and all municipal presidents and presidents of Executive Boards
attended); P2794 (Witness statement of Ranko Vuković dated 24 May 2011), pp. 3–5 (testifying that following the establishment of the Republican
Communications Centre in Pale in April 1992, there was communication between the municipalities, the MUP, and the VRS, which included telephone,
short wave and ultra-short wave radio, fax machines, teleprinters, radio relay communications, wire communications, and, when other systems were not
working, a courier system. The Chamber notes that MlaĊenović testified that communications with Pale were non-existent, however, it does not find his
evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching this conclusion the Chamber notes multiple contradictions and extreme evasiveness in MlaĊenović's
evidence. More specifically MlaĊenović testified that while communication was non-existent they did receive some communication including orders and
warnings from the Accused to adhere to the Geneva Conventions. Radojica MlaĊenović, T. 36612 (4 April 2013).
9838
See for example P2240 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Krajišnik, Branko Đerić, and Milenko Karišik, 7 May 1992); P2220 (Intercept of
conversation between Milinković and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 21 April 1992); P5708 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Krajišnik and unidentified
male, 21 April 1992); P5604 (Intercept of conversation between Gvozden and Radovan Karadţić, 3 March 1992), p. 3; D885 (Letter from Novo Sarajevo
Crisis Staff to Radovan Karadţić, 5 June 1992), p. 3; P2625 (Minutes of 11 th session of SerBiH Government, 18 May 1992), p. 2; P3109 (Minutes of the 8th
extraordinary session of RS Government, 1 September 1995), pp. 2–3. The Chamber notes evidence suggesting that there were few or no telephone lines
available for communication between Novo Sarajevo and Pale during the war. Zdravko Šalipur, T. 31656–31657 (18 December 2012); D1278 (Transcript
of Radomir Nešković‘s interview with Karadţić‘s legal associate, 8 October 2009), p. 32. However, considering the communications above, the Chamber
finds that even if there was some disturbance in the telephone lines during the war, it was still possible to establish a line of communication between Novo
Sarajevo and Pale.
9839
Milorad Davidović, T. 15460–15463 (24 June 2011). See also P2850 (Fax of Bijeljina CSB, 29 April 1992); D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić
dated 16 June 2013), para. 92; P3050 (Minutes of joint meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 15 April 1992), p. 1; P2851 (Fax of Bijeljina CSB, 24
April 1992); P2752 (SerBiH MUP order, 17 May 1992), p. 1.
9840
P2596 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and "Miroslav", 7 January 1992), p. 7.
9841
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), pp. 5–7, 17, 24; Simo Mišković, T. 45373–45374
(18 December 2013); P5516 (Minutes of Meeting of SDS Prijedor Municipal Board, 17 February 1992), p. 1. See also P6588 (Receipt of Holiday Inn Hotel,
14–15 February 1992); Adjudicated Fact 1010.
9842
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 1. Vuĉurević stated that he does not remember any reference made
by the Accused to the Variant A./B Instructions. The only variants that he knew of were: first, ―[i]f we cannot live together, we should split in peace‖, and
the second ―if everything else fails‖ to ―defend ourselves‖. Boţidar Vuĉurević, T. 35985-35986 (25 March 2013). See D3146 (Witness statement of
Boţidar Vuĉurević, 22 March 2013), para. 25. However, the Chamber does not find his evidence to be reliable in this regard. In reaching this conclusion
the Chamber concluded that the evidence of the witness was marked by insincerity, contradictions, and bias.
9843
Simo Mišković, T. 45373–45374 (18 December 2013); P5516 (Minutes of Meeting of SDS Prijedor Municipal Board, 17 February 1992); P6587 (Excerpts
from Simo Mišković‘s testimony from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 15187–15188; P2597 (Minutes of meeting of Bratunac‘s SDS Municipal
Board, 24 February 1992), p. 1; P4374 (Witness statement of Milenko Katanić dated 11 October 2011), para. 18; KW317, T. 39337 (5 June 2013).
 798

3023. The Accused called for the ―second level‖ to be introduced and to ―intensify the
functioning of the government at any cost and on every single millimetre of our territory‖.9844
(#“to intensify the functioning of the government…” not to take-it-over from somebody
else!#) At this meeting, the President said that they needed to be wise and united ―in order to
take the last drop of the power into our hands, in a humane way of course, carry it out in a
humane way, a just way towards both Muslims and Croats who live there, that is particularly
important, that there would be no fleeing from our areas‖.9845 (#EXCULPATORY#!!! The
prevention of fleeing from the Serb territories, an order given during the confidential
meeting, before the war, when it was believed that there wouldn’t be any war because of
advancement of the Conference and preparation of the Agreement is a REBUTTAL of
all the allegations about “ethnic cleansing” or a homogeneus Serb republic, or any aspect
of the Joint Criminal Enterprise! That was February 14, 1992, and five weeks later the
Lisbon Agreement had been reached. Again, other measures had been designed not to
“take-over”, but to exercise, intensify the functioning of the governmental organs”!) The
Accused in this regard noted that ―our image with foreign monitors‖ had to change and if
Bosnian Serbs defended themselves too aggressively they would ―lose an awful lot of
points‖.9846 (#This kind of a merging and associating two or more diferent sentences, in
order to create a new meaning is not permissible in any legal system. The two elements, a)
a humane treatment of the population and prevention of fleeing – has nothing to do with
the b) international monitors and the Serb international image. That pertained to c) an
armed skirmishes, a way of defense, in terms not to have it “too aggressive”#! #This
Judgment rather looks like a very bad indictment, than a judgment#! ) The President said
that ―stage number two should also be converted, the one we‘ve talked about, the one you have
[…] in order to have authorities in the field functioning, that a bird cannot fly over really.‖9847
(In the situation of the war in neighbouring Croatia, and an imminent war and emergency
state in BiH, this was a #law obligation to control what was going on in the territory#. The
President appeal to have the authorities function properly and thoroughly can not be
taken against him, but only as an exculpatory element!)

3024. At this session, the Accused spoke about the Bosnian Serb strategic objectives.9848 (“This
session” was held on 14 February 1992, therefore exactly three months prior to the 16th
Assembly session in Banja Luka, when the new “Six strategic objectives” had been presented
to the Assembly. How come the Chamber didn’t differentiate these strategic objectives aimed
for a peace times, from those formilated after the war had been waged against the Serb people?
When a war appears, many strategic objectives must be altered, and in a negotiations there are
needed higher guarantees. But this Cousr didnte understand, and didn’t take into account the
objective situation of a war, nor had any respect, not even a knowledge, for a military
provisions, and the local judicial system!) It was also noted the importance of international opinion
and sympathy and that they should not be the aggressors, and stated that they ―seek nothing that
belongs to somebody else‖ (#EXCULPATORY#, and a paraphrase of the 10th Comendment of
God, and the President kept advocating the modesty in the territorial claims throughout the
crisis!) and that they should defend what was theirs but not ―in an aggressive way, in a combat way‖
but defend it with firm conviction that their rights had been repeatedly violated and that they would
be dominated in a unitary BiH.9849 (#All EXCULPATORY#! The President pleaded for a
9844
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 24. See also Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik), T. 7364–7366.
9845
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 5.
9846
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 13.
9847
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 17.
9848
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), pp. 11–12.
9849
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 14. Ristanić testified that the Strategic Goals were only put in a
document form later, but these objectives were to be achieved in peaceable conditions. ÐorĊe Ristanić, T. 16761–16762 (18 July 2011). See also Milorad
Dodik, T. 36846 (9 April 2013).
 799

minimal use of force, only to the extent necessary to defend!) In contrast the aCCUSED also
stated that he and the Serbs wanted to ―let everything go to fucking hell and that we take the express
way‖ but that they needed to find a balance between power and tactfulness in order to achieve their
goal.9850 (#The two has nothing to do in common. The “hell” had been mentioned in another
talks and context, and was a resignatory reaction of the President because of failure of the
talks, while the “balance” was mentioned on 14 February 1992, as an endeavour of the
President to pursue a moderate way of the political fight, since all of it was before the war!#)
For example he noted that for international political reasons they could not organise their assembly
―without a major provocation‖ and that they knew exactly where they were heading.9851

3025. The Accused emphasised that he, Koljević and Krajišnik were of the opinion that ―it would
be more important to gain the real situation, the factual situation on the ground‖ for the purposes of
international negotiations.9852 The Accused also emphasised that they would have a right to
―introduce the stage number two in functioning of your areas and, relying on your own forces, to
absolutely defend yourselves from the independent BiH‖.9853 He also explained that according to
their ―scheme‖ there would be a municipal board and a local board structure so that not ―a single
Serbian house should be left without contacts with the party‖.9854 The Accused explained that they
had their ―moves ready‖, that the deputies knew about it and that whenever the Bosnian Muslims did
something foolish they would ―disclose our next move, which is ten times more powerful than
theirs‖.9855 (#MIXING UP TIME FRAMES AND CONTEXTS#! #Now it is clear how
damaging for the Defence is the practice of mixing up the time frames: what happens when this
speech from 14 February 1992, before the war, and in a situation looking like a peaceful
outcome is presented as a cpeech from the war times. This very same day there was on
schedule a new round of talks with Lord Carrington and AMbassador Cutileiro, Secretary
Vance and others, with the aim to finalise the Agreement, which was reached a month later.
Therefore, no objectives, or plans, or factual situations pertained to a war events and
outcomes, but strictly to a political ones. And #this fact changes all of the meanings suggested
in this paragraph of the Judgme#nt. There was nothing criminal or forbidden in this words,
because all of it belong to a legitimate defensive conduct and caution achieved by a
recommendable political means!)

3026. MlaĊenović at this meeting spoke on behalf of the Bosnian Serb Executive Committee of
Foĉa and reported that ―we did everything that the centre had requested us to do, and considering the
instructions we received in this field when setting up the Serbian Assembly and Executive
Committee‖.9856 MlaĊenović continued by saying that ―we wish to finally round up the Serbian
territory of Foĉa Municipality‖ within the SAO of Herzegovina and that he found it necessary to
―establish Serbian municipalities regardless of the borders of existing municipalities‖.9857 (#TWO
MUNICIPALITIES – PEACE#! Is there any more markant proof that the Serb side didn’t
have any plan that would be damaging for the legitimate Muslim or Croat interests?
Foundation of the new municipalities, or merging the existing ones, or other changes of
statuses of the settled places – was regulated and guaranteed by the Constitution and laws.
This wasn’t opposed even by this court. To form your own municipalities composed of the
settlements inhabited by the same community is an isolationist and #defensive policy, rather

9850
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 26.
9851
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 26.
9852
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 5.
9853
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 7.
9854
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 10.
9855
P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 25.
9856
P6264 (Excerpt from transcript of extended session of SDS Main Board and Executive Board, 14 February 1992, with audio), p. 1; Radojica MlaĊenović, T.
36631–36632 (5 April 2013).
9857
P6264 (Excerpt from transcript of extended session of SDS Main Board and Executive Board, 14 February 1992, with audio), p. 2.
 800

than an expansionistic strategy that pretended to take other’s territories or jeopardise other’s
rights. That was a reaction which had a meaning:# we do not want to participate in your new
(Islamic) political and judicial system, but you are free to do whatever you wanted.”# Is the
Muslim side opted for an Islamic fundamentalism and this kind or system, and the Croats
wanted to leave Yugoslavia under any cost, the Serbs were entitled to stay in Yugoslavia as
Northern Ireland stayed in GB, or West Virginia in the US Union, or at least to get their own
high autonomy in BiH, WHICH HAD BEEN ENVISAGED AT THE ICFY# and accepted by
Mr. Izetbegovic in 1991.!. No criminal plan was needed for these objectives. It was the most
rationale solution, although not the best for the Serbs!)

3027. Following the activation by the Accused of the second level of the Variant A/B
Instructions, the Chamber recalls that, for example, on 24 February 1992 the SDS Municipal
Board in Bratunac discussed the implementation of this second level.9858 On 2 March 1992, the
SDS Municipal Board of Foĉa sent a letter addressed to the office of the President of the SDS
Crisis Staff in Sarajevo indicating that they were facing pressure in Foĉa but they were ―ready
to carry out any order‖.9859 The Chamber also recalls that the Serbian Municipality of Zvornik
was proclaimed on 15 March 1992 and decided to join the SAO Majevica-Semberija.9860 On 13
March 1992, the President of the Executive Board of the SDS required all SDS Municipal
Board to assess the possibility of establishing Serbian municipalities and the projected territory
that would become part of these Serbian municipalities.9861

e. (ALL LEGAL AND OBLIGATORY#!) Activation of Crisis Staffs and other structures

(The entire section of the activities and regulation of the political life in municipalities is senseless,
because the laws and constitutions of the SFRY and BiH hadn’t been even consulted, let alone
analised. Let us see what is said in the BH Constitution, D1262, p.90:

let see other competences of municipalities, particularly in the domain of defence, D1262, p.89

Therefore, many defence matters had been within the municipal competences, the president of
municxipality was ex oficio president of such a council and the supreme commander of the
municipal Territorial Defence units! See further, D1262, p. 91

9858
See para. 701.
9859
P5515 (Letter from SDS Municipal Board of Foĉa to SDS Crisis Staff in Sarajevo, 2 March 1992).
9860
See para. 1235; D1693 (Decision of Zvornik Assembly, 15 March 1992), p. 1. See also Marinko Vasilić, T. 39920–39922 (13 June 2013); D3654 (Witness
statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), paras. 28–29 (under seal); D3656 (Decision of Zvornik Municipal Assembly, 15 March 1992).
9861
D1187 (Letter from SDS Executive Board to all SDS Municipal Boards, 13 March 1992).
 801

The plans for defence were also #obligatory, specified in the Law of Defence,# and obligatory
for all municipalities, local communes, companies and even political and cultural organisations,
a political parties at the first place!

3028. On 4 April 1992, the Accused , as President of the SNB, issued an announcement that the
Crisis Staffs should be activated.9862 (Why it was not sufficient to the Chamber, which
recognised the reasons bellow – to dismiss the charges for this segment? Was it an
unprovoked, unnecessary, senseless move, or there was a reason? It was well know that
Mr. Izetbegovic and the Muslim-Croat part of the BH Presidency unauthorised by the
Serb members of the Presidency proclaimed the general mobilisation of the Police, reserve
police and Territorial Defence. The only target of such a mobilisation was the Serb people
in BiH, to which there was declared a war. When a Crisis Staffs, or the War Presidencies
of municipalities should be activated if not then? That was a legal obligation, and the only
way to maintain at least a minimum of law and order!) The Accused, made an
announcement that the ―rump‖ presidency of BiH, operating without any Serbs, issued highly
irresponsible and illegal instructions to raise the TO, civilian protection, and reserve police and
that by doing so, the ―rump‖ Presidency acknowledged the collapse of the constitutional and
legal order and instigated chaos, violence, and civil war.9863 He called upon the population to
disregard these moves by the BiH Presidency and ordered that Crisis Staffs and Serb TO be
activated in response to Bosnian Muslim mobilisation in specified areas with the purpose of
maintaining peace, order, and safety of civilians of all nationalities.9864 (Exactly as that!!! A
#“highly irresponsible and illegal instructions”# while expecting an international
recognition. How possibly the international community recognised such a country that
entered such a chaos and a state of war?)

9862
D394 (Announcement of SNB, 4 April 1992). See also Dorothea Hanson, T. 14525 (9 June 2011); P2589 (Dorothea Hanson‘s expert report entitled
―Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions 1991-1995‖, 10 September 2009), para. 36. See para. 141. Šojić testified that Crisis
Staffs were only established following the example of the SDA and HDZ and not pursuant to any instructions and that they were formed spontaneously at
the initiative of local authorities and they were not controlled at the republican level. Dragan Šojić, T. 31752-31754 (19 December 2012). However, the
Chamber notes that the evidence of Šojić was marked by evasiveness, contradictions, and indicators that he was trying to mislead the Chamber. The
Chamber therefore does not find his evidence to be reliable in this regard.
9863
D394 (Announcement of SNB, 4 April 1992), p. 1; Momĉilo Mandić, C3 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Ţupljanin), T. 9705–9706. See also
D392 (Conclusions of SRBiH Presidency, 4 April 1992); D393 (Minutes of 65 th session of SRBiH Presidency, 4–8 April 1992).
9864
D394 (Announcement of SNB, 4 April 1992), p. 2; Momĉilo Mandić, C3 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Ţupljanin), T. 9707. Subotić stated
that TO units were also ―self-organised‖ and nobody had an overview of how many local TO units had been formed and they were not under anyone‘s
command until the VRS was formed. Subotić also stated that the Accused did not have effective command and control over the TO in the period from
1 April to 12 May 1992. D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 52–54, 57–59, 68, 118; Bogdan Subotić, T. 40125–
40126 (20 June 2013). However, the Chamber notes that the evidence of Subotić was marked by evasiveness, contradictions, and indicators of partisanship
and bias. The Chamber therefore does not find his evidence to be reliable in this regard. For further discussion on the Accused‘s involvement with
mobilisation of the TO, see Section IV.A.3.iii: Authority over military and police forces acting in BiH.
 802

3029. On 26 April 1992, Đerić on behalf of the Bosnian Serb Government issued instructions
for the work of Crisis Staffs in the SerBiH.9865 (So what? It was the #Governmental duty#!)
These instructions provided that in wartime conditions the Crisis Staffs would take over ―all the
prerogatives and functions of the municipal assemblies‖ when they were not in a position to
meet.9866 (See the provisions in the Constitution of BiH, articles 269 and 273:

Therefore, all the municipalities had their own competences in the defence too! That is
why the Defence saw the war as a series of the municipal wars, which broke out in a
different times and on a different incentives and incidents! If the Serb side had any of the
alleged criminal enterprices, why would they wait sometimes two months from the
beginning of the war in Sarajevo to start the war in more than a half of the country?!) The
Chamber recalls that the 26 April 1992 instructions provided that the Crisis Staffs ―shall co-
ordinate governmental functions for the purpose of the defence of territory, safety of the
population and its property, establishment of authority and organisation of all other aspects of
life and work‖.9867 (Not a single illegal instruction, and all of them strictly defensive!) They
also provided that the Crisis Staff was to create conditions to allow the municipal executive
board to exercise power.9868 The Crisis Staffs were also required to work in accordance with
the Constitution, law and decisions of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the Bosnian Serb
Government and the Presidency.9869 (All of it was #provided for by the Constitution of BiH
and SFRY, see:

3030. According to the 26 April 1992 instructions, the Crisis Staffs were ―obliged to gather
information on the situation in the field and notify and consult the competent authorities in
[SerBiH], i.e. commissioners of the Government appointed for the areas and regions especially
threatened by war‖.9870 These same instructions obligated the Crisis Staff to ensure the safe
passage of humanitarian aid convoys and to act humanely towards non-combatants, the
wounded, and POWs.9871 (#All EXCULPATORY#! The control of the processes and events
in the municipal territory was provided by the Constitutions and the laws on defence!)

9865
P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992).
9866
P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992), para. 1.
9867
See para. 143. P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992), para. 3. In these instructions, the Bosnian Serb Government
mandated that all Crisis Staffs include the commander of the TO Staff. P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992), para. 2.
The instructions also stated that the Crisis Staffs were to ―create all the conditions for the life and work of members of the JNA‖. P2717 (SerBiH
Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992), para. 8.
9868
P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992), para. 3.
9869
P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992), para. 6.
9870
P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992), para. 11.
9871
D407 (Excerpts from instructions of SerBiH Government for municipal crisis staffs, 26 April 1992), p. 2.
 803

3031. The Accused gave explicit instructions on how the Crisis Staffs and the TO would be
structured, including who would be the highest ranking officials in these structures namely the
presidents of municipalities and executive boards.9872 (The President only interpreted the
law, according to which the president of municipality is ex oficio a president of the
Committee for Defence, and a Supreme Commander of the municipal forces, while the
commanders of units were to be a professional officers, while a president of the Executive
Board was ex oficio a commander of the Civil Protection in municipality!) For example at a
meeting of the SNB on 27 April 1992, it was concluded that ―comprehensive instructions for
crisis staffs should be drafted in which the manner of political work on the ground and
organisation of the functioning authorities will be presented‖.9873 The SNB also concluded that
material and equipment would be provided for the defence of the SerBiH and that the Crisis
Staffs needed to inform the government about developments.9874 (Just see the Constitution
and laws!) The President emphasised that these steps were for defensive purposes and that
peace was in their interests and would benefit them politically.9875 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) He
also stressed that the Bosnian Muslims did not have the forces required to take-over the
extensive territory held by Bosnian Serbs and these ―Serbian areas‖ would never be
incorporated in their state.9876 (#A LEGAL AND LEGITIMATE ATTITUDE#! The
changes of the common state they that the Muslims envisaged didn’t have the Serb
consent, and that didn’t depend on any leader, but on the entire Serb people! Had the
Serbian people wanted to accept this new regime founded on Islam, no Serb leader would
be able to prevent it, or to make the people to oppose it!)

3032. Crisis Staffs operated to some extent independently in each municipality, but ultimately
they had direct contact with the Presidency and followed the SDS party line.9877 For example in
Hadţići, the Crisis Staff President, Ratko Radić had a very good relationship with the
President—he often visited Pale and got instructions from the President.9878 The Chamber also
recalls that all important decisions of the SDS Main Board that needed to be implemented in
Sokolac were sent to the SDS Municipal Board of Sokolac and the Crisis Staff was informed of
these decisions.9879 The Chamber also recalls that the Rogatica Crisis Staff for example had
direct, oral and written contact with the Presidency and ministries of the SerBiH, the
Government, the army, and the police.9880 (The #SDS political Party ceased it’s regular
functions in April 1992#, since the Government wanted it. That state of the frozen activity
remained on power until February 1993. But, since the SDS von the elections in 1990, all
the authorities remained in offices until the 1996 elections, and therefore there couldn’t be
any “take over” in municipalities during the war. The SDS proposed that all the three
ethnic communities form their municipalities, and the SDS exercised control over only the
Serb municipalities, but after the Muslim side rejected the peaceful solution and started
the war in diferent municipalities at diferent times, and then there was inevitable to
controle entire municipalities!)

9872
D304 (Shorthand Record of 14th session of RS Assembly, 27 March 1992), pp. 20–21. See para. 140.
9873
D406 (Minutes of meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 27 April 1992), p. 2. See para. 142. Subotić stated that Crisis Staffs were operating
independently and that this decision related to the provision of instructions relating to respect for international humanitarian law and the laws and customs of
war. D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 270. The Chamber does not find Subotić‘s characterisation of this conclusion
to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 9869.
9874
P2627 (Minutes of meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 28 April 1992), p. 1.
9875
D304 (Shorthand Record of 14th session of RS Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 21.
9876
D304 (Shorthand Record of 14th session of RS Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 20.
9877
P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Ðerić dated 5 April 2012), para. 40.
9878
P2296 (Witness statement of Tihomir Glavaš dated 13 February 2011), para. 25; Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11976–11978 (16 February 2011). The Chamber notes
however, that Radić sometimes would push ideas by exaggerating the extent to which the Accused had agreed to them. Tihomir Glavaš, T. 11796
(14 February 2011), T. 11949 (16 February 2011). The Chamber places no weight on Glavaš‘s impression that the Accused left the municipalities of Ilidţa
and Hadţići to care for themselves.
9879
See para. 1051.
9880
See para. 957.
 804

3033. Similarly in Sanski Most, policy formulated by the SDS leadership at the republican level
would come down to the municipal Crisis Staff to implement.9881 The Sanski Most Crisis Staff
was directly subordinated to the ARK Crisis Staff, which was subordinated to the Bosnian Serb
leadership, including the Accused.9882 (#A “protected lies”#! Wrong as majority of the
testimonies of the protected witnesses. The executive branch of authorities, to which
belonger the Government and Presidency, controlled the execution of the legal acts made
by the Assembly, or the Government and the Presidency from their competences! All legal
and regulated! The only matter that was not regulated was testimonies of the protected
witnesses, because there was no any obstacle to their enormous lies! A worse was only
more that a hundred “testimonies” without witness and any cross examination!) The
Chamber notes that Vlado Vrkeš, the deputy president of the Crisis Staff, was in charge of
implementing policies from the Republic level 9883 and was close to the President.9884 In April
1992, Kuprešanin said in an intercepted conversation to General Kukanjac that they were
waiting for the Accused to return from Europe to tell them what to do next and ―when [the
President] comes whatever he tells us we will do. He is now for us the supreme commander
and we have no other commander‖.9885

(That happened within the numerous disputes between the SDS and the JNA, which wanted to
transport so many equipment back to Yugoslavia. It was payed by the common Serb-Croat-
Muslim money, but the Muslims and Croats didn’t allowe the JNA to take anything from
their areas, and the Serbs did the same! While the President was away for the political talks,
the JNA was not protecting the Serbs ssufficiently, and Kupresanin objected that the JNA
should protect all the peoples equally. General Kukanjac wanted to remove a rocket brigade
from Banjaluka region, and Kupresanin reminded him that now there is a separate
Yugoslavia, and used the President’s absence for keeping the rocket brigade back! See:
P987:

9881
KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3340–3341 (under seal). See, e.g., P3399 (Conclusions of meeting of Sanski Most
Crisis Staff, 20 April 1992).
9882
KDZ490, T. 20282 (20 October 2011) (closed session); P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 81-83, 103 (under seal); P3634 (Witness
statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 11, 57, 66, 81–83 (under seal).
9883
P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated) (under seal), pp. 103–104.
9884
KDZ490, T. 20282 (20 October 2011) (closed session); P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), p. 9 (under seal).
9885
P987 (Intercept of conversation between Milutin Kukanjac and Vojo Kuprešanin, 27 April 1992), p. 2.
 805

(#Before the VRS, during JNA#! Therefore, in April 1992 the #JNA was ecqually concerned
about the security of all the three communities, which Kupresanin didn’t deny, but
supported#. However, the JNA didn’t take it’s armament and equipment from the Muslim-
Croat areas, because it was prevented by the party armies, but only from the Serb ones,
which jeopardised the Serb population. Also it had been visible that the Minister for Defence
of the Republic of Srpska still didn’t have any authority, nor he could make an ordinary
agreement, or a responsible answer, brcause of the supremacy of the JNA, which was
respected only in the Serb areas! Such a partial and selective presentation of some sentences
pulled out of context doesn’t fell within a fair trial. “Only out of fear,” said Kupresanin.
What is not understandable here?)

3034. As found above, by early April 1992 the SNB was issuing instructions to, and receiving
reports from, municipal Crisis Staffs and TOs.9886 On 28 April 1992, Branko Đerić and the
Accused attended a meeting of the SNB where the reports on the work of Crisis Staffs and
municipal organs of government were adopted. At this same meeting there was also discussion
of the need to keep the Crisis Staffs more fully informed about developments and for the Crisis
Staffs to also inform the Bosnian Serb Government about developments.9887 (So what? A
regular duties of the Prime Minister and the President, no matter they were both the
Serbs!)

3035. In this regard the Chamber found that the Bijeljina Crisis Staff kept the SDS Main Board
informed of its activities.9888 (How many times the Defence has to point out that the SDS
(Party) Crisis Staffs were different from the municipal Crisis Staffs? The former didn’t
have any prerogatives of authorities, while the later had all the municipal power in its
hands until the municipal assamblies could gather again! By mixing up these two kinds of
bodies there is an enormous misunderstanding of the documents that originate from one
or the other body, all used against the Defence without any justification!) In addition the
9886
See para. 92.
9887
P2627 (Minutes of meeting SNB and SerBiH Government, 28 April 1992), p. 1. See also Dorothea Hanson, T. 14558 (9 June 2011). The Chamber notes
that Hanson testified about the involvement and role of Crisis Staffs in take-overs and the arming of the population, connections between the Crisis Staffs
and the military and police and detention of non-Serbs: However, the Chamber considers that these conclusions fall outside the scope of her expertise and
will not rely on her evidence in this regard. Dorothea Hanson, T. 14563–14564, 14566–14567, 14577–14579, 14582 (9 June 2011).
9888
See para. 606. For example, see P2626 (Report of Bijeljina Crisis Staff, 1 April 1992) (in which the Bijeljina Crisis Staff reported to the SDS Main Board
on the situation in the municipality).
 806

Chief of the Bijeljina SJB reported to Mićo Stanišić on the situation in the municipality,9889 and
an almost daily report system was operating between the Bijeljina CSB and the Bosnian Serb
MUP.9890 Similarly the Chamber found that the Rogatica Crisis Staff had direct, oral, and
written contact with the Presidency and ministries of the SerBiH, the Government, the army,
and the police.9891 For example, during negotiations in April and May 1992 between the
Rogatica Crisis Staff and the Bosnian Muslim leadership regarding the demarcation of territory
and division of power within the municipality, the SDS representatives said they would report
to the Main Board of the SDS in Pale.9892 The Chamber also found that in Sokolac, all
important decisions of the SDS Main Board that needed to be implemented in Sokolac were
sent to the SDS Municipal Board of Sokolac and the Crisis Staff was informed of these
decisions.9893 (What does it mean? This is a regular communication between the different
branches of authorities! Does it mean #that anything the Serbs did was a crim#e?)

3036. In addition Crisis Staffs were also established in SAOs, including the SAO Semberija and
Majevica, ARK, and SAO Biraĉ.9894 The Chamber recalls that the ARK Crisis Staff was
formally established on 5 May 1992 by a decision of the ARK Executive Council; however, it
had been functioning since January 1992.9895 On 9 July 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff was
renamed the ARK War Presidency.9896 (#All normal, legal and irrelevant for the case#!)

3037. The Chamber recalls its finding that the ARK Crisis Staff acted as an intermediary
regional body between the republican-level authorities and the ARK Municipalities by co-
ordinating the implementation of instructions sent by the republic-level authorities in the ARK
Municipalities.9897 In addition, municipal Crisis Staff presidents in the ARK regularly gave
reports to the ARK Crisis Staff with respect to events within their area of responsibility and
received directives from the ARK Crisis Staff.9898 The Chamber also found that decisions and
conclusions of the ARK Crisis Staff were binding on the ARK Municipalities and were
implemented by the municipal Crisis Staffs.9899 (What is wrong with that? It is sufficient to
take a superficial look at the Constitutions to find out that all of that numbered in this
section was #provided for by the Constitution of BiH and Yugoslavia:# )

3038. On 11 June 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff issued a statement setting forth the composition
of municipal Crisis Staffs/War Presidencies in the ARK and placing responsibility on these
structures for leading the defence and establishing co-operation with organs in other
municipalities and the command of armed units.9900 (Is there #anything wrong with “leading
9889
P2629 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, undated).
9890
P2851 (Fax of Bijeljina CSB, 24 April 1992); Milorad Davidović, T. 15462–15463 (24 June 2011); P2752 (SerBiH MUP order, 17 May 1992), p. 1. The
Chamber notes the evidence of Kezunović that, considering power cuts and continuous interruption in communication, he did not know whether the CSB
from locations such as Bijeljina were able to deliver daily reports to the ministry. Dragan Kezunović, T. 15067–15069 (21 June 2011). However,
considering the evidence presented and Kezunović‘s unsubstantiated speculation, the Chamber gives little weight to his evidence in this regard. Cvijetin
Simić testified that because of the conflicts the whole area of Bijeljina did not have telephones working for several months and that it was cut off from the
outside world until May 1992. Cvijetin Simić T. 35713 (20 March 2013). The Chamber finds that it stands in contradiction with accepted evidence that
demonstrates that communication existed. Further, the Chamber found that Simić‘s evidence was marked by indicators which led to the conclusion that he
withheld information from the Chamber, was evasive, and lacked sincerity. The Chamber shall therefore no rely on this portion of this evidence.
9891
See para. 957.
9892
P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April – June 1992), p. 2; KDZ606, T. 18265–18267 (2 September 2011) (closed session); P3279 (Witness statement
of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), para. 71 (under seal); D2950 (Witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 15 February 2013), para. 14. The
Chamber received Defence evidence that the Bosnian Serb authorities wanted to avoid the conflicts which had already broken out in the neighbouring
municipalities and continued with negotiations until 22 May 199. Mile Ujić, T. 33438–33439 (12 February 2013). See also KDZ606, T. 18317
(5 September 2011) (closed session); P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011) (under seal), para. 84.
9893
See para. 1051.
9894
See para. 146.
9895
See para. 2045.
9896
See para. 2045.
9897
See para. 2047.
9898
See para. 2047.
9899
See para. 2048.
9900
See para. 2049.
 807

the defence#…”? look at the SFRY (para…@) and BiH (para 252 ) Constitutions,
D1262)

So, “rights and duty” to participate in the defence…territorial integrity of SFR

Yugoslavia” and these right and duty are inviolable and inalienable!

All the #municipal structures were obliged to prepare and lead general popular resistance
on its territory#!!! The #Constitutions and laws equilised the civilians and soldiers, both
were supposed to be combatants#. The municipalities had a great deal of autonomy in the
matter of defence. It is a great responsibility of the Prosecution under the UN auspice, for
not taking a minimal knowledge of the domestic judiciary pertaining to a national defence.
The UN share this responsibility, and should annul and forbid this practice in future, not
only for an international, but for an internal conflicts and civil wars such as this one.
Either one of this conflicts are under the domestic judiciary. Also, it should have never be
repeated that such a courts, dealing with the armed conflicts, judge and decide without a
professional judges and prosecutors knowledgeable in military law.)

”…citizens shall organize themselves immediately and prepare to take part in resisting…”

A #“socio-political organizations and other social organizations shal participate in drawing

up and coordinating plans and preparatory measure#s…” the SDS and any political party,
or organization of mountain climbers, singing society… all of them had to prepare
coordinating plans… How the #“Variant A/B looks like now#? As an obligation of the SDS,
 808

although this paper was not a political, but rather professional document pertaining to
defence, created by a people knowledgable of the defence regulations. D. Kapetina confirmed
it in his testimony! Particularly the para 260 is important:

and para 253, which provides for a punishable activities in disturbing or preventing
participation in defence:

As envisaged in para 252 of the Law of Defence above, a defence of Yugoslavia was #obligatory
due to both Yugoslav and BiH Constitutions and laws#!

In addition members of the ARK Crisis Staff were regularly briefed about military
developments.9901 The ARK Crisis Staff was also involved in organising contact with Pale to
discuss defining territory.9902 The Chamber also recalls its findings with respect to the
involvement of the ARK Crisis Staff in the dismissal and movement of Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats from ARK municipalities and the implementation of ARK Crisis Staff policy at a
municipal level.9903 For example, the ARK Crisis Staff issued a decision that all leading positions,
involving access to information, protection of public property and other positions of importance
for the functioning of the economy could be occupied exclusively by persons of Serb
nationality.9904

3039. On 29 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff concluded that all Muslims and Croats would be
able to move out of the ARK on the condition that Serbs living outside the SAOs be allowed to
move into SerBiH and the ARK.9905 This would help carry out the exchange of population or
resettlement of people in an organised manner.9906 The ARK Crisis Staff also decided to oppose
the forceful movement of population and to prevent any such attempts.9907 However, the Chamber
finds that the wording of this conclusion was completely at odds with the forcible nature of the
movement of the non-Serb population from municipalities in the ARK.9908 (This was rather a
precondition and limitation of the right and possibility to leave the ARK, conditioned by a
reciprocal approval of the Serb movement into ARK. The wording was not “at odds” with

9901
See para. 2050.
9902
D4038 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 18 May 1992). See also D4035 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 14 May 1992).
9903
See paras. 2054–2061.
9904
D4040 (Article entitled "Leaders - Only Loyal Serbs", 22 June 1992), pp. 1−2; D4039 (Decision of ARK Crisis Staff, 22 June 1992).
9905
D4045 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 29 May 1992).
9906
D4045 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 29 May 1992).
9907
D4045 (Conclusions of ARK Crisis Staff, 29 May 1992). See also D4194 (Witness statement of Sveto Kovaĉević dated 7 December 2013), para. 37.
Kovaĉević stated that the leadership in Pale had no influence on decisions of the ARK. The Chamber found that Kovaĉević‘s evidence was marked by
condradictions, evasiveness and indicators of insincerity which undermined the reliability of his evidence in this regard.
9908
See Section IV.A.2.b.iii: Deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer): Counts 7 and 8.
 809

anything, because there is an overwhelming evidence that these #obstacles for leaving# the
ARK were numerous, such as many receipts and confirmation about payments of all
financial obligations, such as the electricity bills, housing bills, taxes, and other costs, plus
the spenditure for tharnsport… whoever wanted to stay in ARK could have not obtain some
of these papers, or the for tickets, and wouldn’t be allowed to leave! There is many, many
evidences of that. And by that, all stories about an “ethnic cleansing” as a policy of the
Republic of Srpska are excluded and senseless!).

3040. After receiving the Bosnian Serb government instructions on the work of the Crisis
Staffs, the Bosanski Novi Crisis Staff re-organised itself on 20 May 1992 to ―take over the
prerogatives and functions‖ of the Municipal Assembly.9909 (Due to the Constitution and
laws!) Similarly on 5 June 1992, the Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff wrote to the President of the
SerBiH Presidency and stated: ―The Crisis Staff has performed the function of Municipal
Assembly in war conditions.‖9910 (Legally obligatory and mandatory!) The letter also
indicated that the Crisis Staff co-ordinated and organised a variety of municipal services,
including accommodation for ―all refugees from the occupied territory and people who were left
homeless‖, mobilisation, and accommodation of fighters from other areas.9911 (Everything that
a municipal assembly was supposed to do, now was an obligation of a crisis staffs or war
presidencies! Why it was numbered here as if it was a crime and corroborated a findigns
of a criminal conduct of the President and the Serb authorities?)

3041. From 1993 onwards, when municipal authorities acted autonomously and failed to follow
regulations, these issues were discussed and addressed by the Bosnian Serb Government.9912
The Bosnian Serb Government was also conscious of controlling the parallel organs of
government at a municipal level to ensure that the Bosnian Serb Government was the only
authorised executive organ in RS.9913 (What does it mean? Who else would be “the only
authorised executive organ in RS?)

3042. In 1994, the President reminded the Bosnian Serb Assembly about the Variant A/B
Instructions, and said ―remember how we used to work before the war. Not everything was as
clear as day in the municipalities where we were majority and in those where we were minority.
Do you remember the Instruction A and instruction B? We had Crisis Staffs, and it was clear
that they were the authority‖.9914 In 1995, the President recalled that pursuant to the Variant
A/B Instructions in areas where the Bosnian Serbs were a majority they controlled everything at
a municipal level and that when they were in a minority they ―set up secret government,
municipal boards, municipal assemblies, presidents of executive boards‖ and also established
military units.9915 The President recalled that the JNA had been involved in the distribution of
weapons to Serbian areas and that the SDS had ―organised the people and created the army‖ and
that with the help of the police ―liberated and created the space‖, sometimes with the help of the
JNA.9916 (Any Chamber that would take a look of the Constitution, particularly para 259
9909
P2717 (SerBiH Government instructions for Crisis Staffs, 26 April 1992); P2632 (Report of Bosanski Novi's Crisis Staff, undated), p. 7. Hanson testified to
seeing evidence of these instructions of 26 April 1992 being implemented in several municipalities including Bosanksi Novi, Kljuc, Prijedor, and Bijeljina.
Dorothea Hanson, T. 14533, 14539 (9 June 2011).
9910
D885 (Letter from Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to Radovan Karadţić, 5 June 1992), pp. 1, 4. Nešković stated that the police, TO and later the VRS were
responsible for protecting the territory and defending the population. Radomir Nešković, T. 14277–14278 (6 June 2011).
9911
D885 (Letter from Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to Radovan Karadţić, 5 June 1992), pp. 1–3. See also Radomir Nešković, T. 14288–14290 (6 June 2011).
9912
P3142 (Minutes of 80th session of RS Government, 7 September 1993), pp. 5–6. See also P3139 (Minutes of the 74th session of RS Government, 11 July
1993), p. 6; P3135 (Minutes of the 97th session of RS Government, 27 April 1994), pp. 13–14; P3129 (Minutes of the 66th session of RS Government, 20
March 1993), p. 5; P3124 (Minutes of the 30th session of RS Government, 22 September 1995), pp. 3–4; P3112 (Minutes of the 71st session of RS
Government, 26–27 May 1993), pp. 15, 20–21.
9913
P3112 (Minutes of the 71st session of RS Government, 26–27 May 1993), pp. 20–21.
9914
P1403 (Transcript of First Part of 46th session of RS Assembly, 9–11 November 1994), pp. 347–348.
9915
P970 (Transcript of 50th session of RS Assembly, 15-16 April 1995), p. 316.
9916
P970 (Transcript of 50th session of RS Assembly, 15-16 April 1995), p. 316. But see D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013),
paras. 63–66 (stating that no organised part of the JNA took part in the defence of areas and those JNA commanders who were involved were acting on their
 810

above, and see that every single organisation was obliged to organize itself and to take
part in drawing plans and preparing measures for defence of the country, and so on.
Otherwise, by missing to immediately enact all the preparation and start a defence actions
– would mean a high treason!)

f. War Presidencies / War Commissions

3043. At a joint session of the SNB and the Bosnian Serb Government, on 22 April 1992, it was
concluded that the Government was to appoint a war presidency and war executive boards in all
municipalities where executive boards ―are not functioning‖.9917 (#Exactly as provided for in
the Constitution#. These temporary bodies were to be composed by the most prominent
and most responsible officials of the existing authorities ex oficio, and could be expanded
permanently or from time to time, according to the needs of the population on the given
territories. Immediately after the conditions for a regular meetings is established, the
temporary emergency bodies had to submit all the decisions made during the period of
emergency to the assembly to be considered and passed, or denied!) On 23 May 1992, the
Bosnian Serb Government decided to abolish the Crisis Staffs.9918 The Chamber recalls that the
Bosnian Serb Government concluded that ―the conditions for functioning of the regular
governing organs should be created as soon as possible‖ and War Presidencies established in
municipalities.9919 After the Crisis Staffs were disbanded, they were transformed into War
Presidencies or War Commissions.9920 (#All in an accord of the laws and Constitution of
BiH#, D1262, see para. 269:

3044. On 31 May 1992, the Presidency issued a decision constituting War Presidencies and
provided for the structure of these bodies including who would be members, including a
republican commissioner.9921 (#All legal and commendable#!) The Chamber further recalls
that the republican commissioner, who would be a member of the War Presidencies, was to be
appointed by the SerBiH Presidency and have the ―right and duty […] to ensure permanent
coordination and implementation of the policies and measures that are established and adopted
by the republican state organs and the Main Staff of the [VRS]‖.9922

3045. This decision also stated that the War Presidency ―shall organise, coordinate and adjust
activities for the defence of the Serbian people and the establishment of legal organs of
authority in the municipality‖; ―shall perform all the functions of the assembly and the
executive organ until there is a possibility for these organs to convene and work‖; and ―shall
create and secure conditions for the work of military organs and units on the defence of the

own and their actions were purely defensive). The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 9869 in concluding that it does not find Subotić‘s
evidence to be reliable in this regard.
9917
P3051 (Minutes of expanded meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 22 April 1992), p. 2.
9918
See para. 147; P3082 (Minutes of the 13th session of SerBiH Government, 23 May 1992), para. 4; P2589 (Dorothea Hanson‘s expert report entitled ―Bosnian
Serb Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions 1991-1995‖, 10 September 2009), para. 46.
9919
See para. 147; P3082 (Minutes of the 13th session of SerBiH Government, 23 May 1992), para. 4; P2589 (Dorothea Hanson‘s expert report entitled ―Bosnian
Serb Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions 1991-1995‖, 10 September 2009), para. 46. See also D3715 (Article from Glas entitled ―Crisis
Staffs Abolished‖, 7 July 1992), p. 1.
9920
See paras. 138, 155; Radomir Nešković T. 14280 (6 June 2011); D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 287; Bogdan
Subotić, T. 40037–40038 (19 June 2013). See also D3715 (Article from Glas entitled "Crisis Staffs Abolished", 7 July 1992), pp. 1–2.
9921
See para. 148.
9922
See para. 150; P2607 (SerBiH Presidency decision on constituting war presidencies in municipalities at a time of imminent threat of war or state of war, 31
May 1992), art. 4; P2611 (SerBiH Presidency Decision on the establishment of War Commissions in municipalities, 10 June 1992), art. 4.
 811

Serbian people‖, inter alia.9923 This decision also provided that Crisis Staffs in municipalities
were to cease operating when the War Presidencies were constituted.9924 (#Exactly as it was
envisaged by the Yugoslav Constitution, P4743, and D1260, and the BiH Constitution
D1262, some of relevant paragraphs are pasted above#!)

3046. On 31 May 1992, the SDS Executive Board informed the SAOs that the Crisis Staffs were
to be abolished and that War Commissions/Presidencies were being established instead and
instructed the SAOs to ensure the implementation of this decision.9925 On 2 June 1992, at a
meeting of commanders of the 1st Krajina Corps and ARK leaders, the Accused referred to the
need to immediately introduce a threat of war and referred to the issuance of the decree on War
Presidencies.9926

3047. The Chamber recalls that on 10 June 1992, the Presidency issued a decision establishing
War Commissions in SerBiH municipalities ―which are either affected by war or are facing
imminent threat of war‖.9927 These War Commissions were to supersede Crisis Staffs and War
Presidencies.9928 The War Commissions were tasked with maintaining very close co-operation
with the legal authorities, to convey directives issued by the War Presidency of the Republic, to
convey information about problems and the work of the municipal bodies and to co-operate
with the authorities to create military organs and units.9929 The Chamber notes for example that
War Presidencies existed at least in Bijeljina, Vogošća, Brĉko, Kljuĉ, Zvornik, Sanski Most,
Ilidţa, Hadţići, and Prijedor.9930 War Commissions existed at least in Foĉa, Pale, Zvornik,
Vlasenica, Bratunac, Novo Sarajevo, Vogošća, and Ilidţa.9931 (All the comments for the
findings in this section are the same: #those who assisted the Chamber in assembling this
Judgement made a very bad service to the Chamber , to the Tribunal and to the United
Nations, because they criminalised the most regular activities of the organs, institutions
and their officials#! Just look at the constitutions. None of Defences were aware that a
political life and causes of the war would be the main issue of these judgements! And it
shouldn’t be, due to the Statute of the Tribunal, and if anyway that happened, then it
should be done properly and with respect to the domestic legal system!#)

9923
See para. 149; P2607 (SerBiH Presidency decision on constituting war presidencies in municipalities at a time of imminent threat of war or state of war, 31
May 1992), art. 3.
9924
See para. 151.
9925
See para. 151. See also P3060 (Minutes of the 2nd session of the SerBiH Presidency, 31 May 1992).
9926
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 53.
9927
See para. 153; P2611 (SerBiH Presidency Decision on the establishment of War Commissions in municipalities, 10 June 1992), art. 1; P1093 (Minutes of 5 th
session of SerBiH Presidency, 10 June 1992); P2536 (Patrick Treanor‘s expert report entitled ―The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992‖, 30 July 2002),
para. 262.
9928
See para. 155.
9929
See para. 154; P2611 (SerBiH Presidency Decision on the establishment of War Commissions in municipalities, 10 June 1992), art. 3.
9930
P1142 (Letter from Ministry of Justice of SerBiH to Vogošća War Presidency, 10 August 1992); P2391 (Vogošća War Presidency order, 6 November 1992);
P2874 (Freedom of movement pass issued by Brĉko War Presidency, 7 May 1992); P3025 (Travel permit issued by Brĉko‘s War Presidency, 9 May 1992);
P2888 (Brĉko War Presidency Summary of events in Brĉko Municipality); P3452 (Extract from Minutes of Kljuĉ War Presidency, 10 July 1992); P3453
(Decision of Kljuĉ War Presidency, 13 July 1992); P3462 (Decision of Kljuĉ War Presidency, 30 July 1992); D4365 (Report from Kljuĉ War Presidency to
Banja Luka SJB dated 22 August 1992); P5205 (Minutes from 3rd session of the Zvornik Municipality War Presidency, 2 August 1995); P5536 (Decision of
the War Presidency of Sanski Most Municipality, 14 July 1992); D2563 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Decision on appointment of Ilidţa War Presidency, 20 June
1995); D2920 (Decision of Bosanski Hadţići War Presidency, 23 October 1993); D4472 (Conclusions of Prijedor War Presidency, 6 August 1995); P2929
(Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 3 (under seal). See also D3144 (Witness statement of Dragomir Ljubojević dated 18 March 2013),
para. 11; Dragomir Ljubojević, T. 35899–35901 (22 March 2013) (testifying that while he was not aware of the Crisis Staff, he was aware that the War
Presidency had an active role in decision making in Bijeljina and acted openly).
9931
P2642 (Report of Foĉa War Commission, 18 June 1992); P5417 (Confirmation of a decision of the Pale SDS, 25 June 1992); P5479 (Radovan Karadţić‘s
confirmation of appointment of Zvornik War Commission members, 17 June 1992); D1623 (Order of Zvornik War Commission, 1 July 1992); P5486 (RS
Presidency Confirmation of Appointment of Members of the War Commission in Vlasenica, 17 June 1992); P5491 (RS Presidency Confirmation of
Appointment of Members of the War Commission in Bratunac, 17 June 1992); P5543 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Decision appointing a War Commission in Novo
Sarajevo, 21 July 1992); D4031 (Decision of Vogošća War Commission, 18 June 1992); P6001 (Request of Vogošća Municipality War Commission, 27
June 1992); P6059 (Order of Vogošća War Commission, 29 July 1992); P2390 (Vogošća War Commission order, 6 November 1992); D1244 (Ilidţa War
Commission Decision, 4 April 1993).
 812

3048. From June 1992 onwards, the Accused confirmed the appointment of or himself appointed
members of the War Presidency or War Commission in municipalities including Bijeljina,9932
Foĉa,9933 Ilidţa,9934 Rogatica,9935 Novo Sarajevo,9936 Vlasenica,9937 and Zvornik.9938 With
respect to Brĉko, the War Presidency was formed following the instructions of the President and
as a body would directly approach the government in Pale or the Bosnian Serb Assembly or
Presidency if they had requests.9939

3049. On 17 December 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly declared that the decision on forming
War Commissions ceased to be valid.9940

3050. In November 1994, the President spoke about introducing a state of war, and stressed that
this did not mean that military rule would be introduced; rather, civilian powers would be
concentrated and implemented through operational bodies in the municipalities, thereby
―ensuring more effective functioning of the state‖.9941 (#A legal and commendable
approach!#)

g. Take-over of power in the Municipalities THE NEW COMMENTS TO THIS PAGE,

GIVEN TO PETER!

3051. (#Before the war, within the Conference#, #Time-frame and context#!) As mentioned
above, in March 1992 the Accused advocated that Bosnian Serbs take power into their own
hands in Bosnian Serb claimed territories and that the structure of BiH would depend on the
conditions they could establish on the ground.9942 (That was said in the Serb Assembly
session on 18 March 1992, just after the negotiating team led by the President returned
from the Carrington-Cutileiro talks, at which the #Lisbon Agreement had been appointed
ang agreed#, except the maps. So, after this Agreement, there was an obligation of the
legal Serb authorities to establish an efficient authorities in the Serb territories, so that
there doesn’t appeare any disorder! If it stayed as it is presented, out of the context, it
could be seen as if the President advised something illegal and violent. However, that was
a necessary measure, because it had already been published that the Constitutional
Principles for a future BiH had been agreed, and that there was going to be three
republics within Bosnia. At a previous meeting, on 14 February 1992, after the first accord
on the transformation of BiH in the three states, the President advised the responsible
official to return to their municipalities, and to take care that “there will not be any fleeing
from the Serb areas”, see P12, p.1:

9932
D1428 (Radovan Karadţić‘s decision, 17 September 1992).
9933
P6266 (Radovan Karadţić's Decision, 17 September 1992).
9934
D1228 (Radovan Karadţić's order, 21 August 1992), p. 1.
9935
P3413 (Radovan Karadţić's Order confirming appointment of Rogatica officials, 20 July 1992), p. 1.
9936
P5543 (Decision of Radovan Karadţić appointing a War Commission in Novo Sarajevo, 21 July 1992); D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26
September 2012), paras. 67–68, 73 (under seal) (stating that this appointment was not implemented until August 1992).
9937
P5486 (RS Presidency Confirmation of Appointment of Members of the War Commission in Vlasenica, 17 June 1992); P5399 (Notification by the
Vlasenica Serb Municipality, 16 June 1992). Considering the evidence regarding communication that existed between the municipality and republic
institutions, the Chamber sees no basis for the Accused‘s assertion that the chaos created by Bosnian Muslim attacks led the Vlasenica Crisis Staff to make
decisions independent of the authorities in Sarajevo and Pale. See Defence Final Brief, para. 2838.
9938
P5479 (Radovan Karadţić‘s confirmation of appointment of Zvornik War Commission members, 17 June 1992). See also D1716 (Decision of Zvornik
Interim Government, 28 July 1992), p. 1; Petko Panić, T. 19210 (20 September 2011); Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik),
T. 16592–16593
9939
P3023 (Witness statement of ÐorĊe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 17, 29, 144–145, 149; P2888 (Brĉko‘s War Presidency Summary of events in
Brĉko Municipality), p. 1.
9940
See para. 158; P1364 (Transcript of 23rd session of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), e-court pp. 83–84; D1229 (RS National Assembly Decision, 17
December 1992).
9941
P3147 (Minutes of 9th session of RS Government, 8 November 1994), pp. 3–4. The draft decision to establish War Presidencies during a state of war was
adopted. P3147 (Minutes of 9th session of RS Government, 8 November 1994), p. 5.
9942
D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), p. 43. See also D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26
July 1992), p. 87.
 813

So, R[ajko] D[ukic] the President of the Executive boards of the SDS explained why the
meeteng was late, because of the talks (wirh Amb. Cutileiro) the same exhibit and page:

Mr. Dukic announced that there will be “established the Serbian Bosnia and Hercegovina,
finally” since the SerBiH had been proclaimed on 9 January, it has to be explained why
the same Republic was going to be “established, finally”. Because the mere proclamation
didn’t mean that SerBiH was established and enacted, but only declared. Just after the
Agreement reached on 18 March, the establishment started, by preparing the state organs.
This was the context for everything that had been said. Further:, P12, p. 5:

Here is an President’s report to the Serb Assembly #about what was agreed at the
Conference, and here is a proof of the provenance of the President’s sentence pertaining to
a “Factual State”#. That was what the European Community used tosay to the Serbs,
while destroying Yugoslavia: The Serbs are right taking into account the law and
Constitution, and international agreements, especially the Helsinki agreement on respect
of the state borders. But in spite of being right, the Serbs have to understand that here are
some new factual situatiin. Se, the Serb repeating this sentence was a sort of “tith for thet”
to the EC. Se further:

: The President emphasised that their right to self-determination ―will happen according to
the actual conditions which are up to you to create‖.9943 (Certainly, on the basis of the just
reached Lisbon Agreement. A context is crucial for an accurate understanding and
judging the facts!) In this regard the Accused spoke about when to ―reveal our next move‖ and
that it ―will all be happening in a flash and the set up of the de facto situation based on our

9943
D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), pp. 44–45.
 814

documents‖.9944 He explained that there would be ―no signing before we have achieved what
we want, and you all know our strategic plans. […] The ultimate strategic goal must still
remain a secret‖.9945 (That was #before the war#, and assuming that there was not going to be a
war, but the Serbs had their “strategic plans”, as any other community did!) The President said
they did not ―plan to attack anybody but our plan is to defend ourselves and the army is at our
disposal for that purpose‖; they had the ―right to use the army for the final countdown and for
the final establishment of authority‖ and that if a border was established unjustly they would
―establish a just border‖.9946 (According to the Constitution, the Army was obliged to protect the
“territorial integrity” of Yugoslavia once it became jeopardized, without waiting for any order.
The Constitution was an order! To defend oneself was and still is an undisputable right!)

3052. The President also warned against the perception that Bosnian Serbs were taking ―other
people‘s land through war‖ and that they should not mention war, but establish their authority
and defend that and state that they did not plan to attack anybody.9947 The President spoke
about ―[p]eace at any cost, wherever it is possible‖.9948 (Entirely #EXCULPATORY#!!!) The
President stated that they did not need war, and they could accomplish what they wanted by
political means but once they had achieved their goals if they were attacked they would defend
themselves, including against genocide, and had ―the right to use the army for the final
countdown and for the final establishment of authority‖.9949 (All of it is #the eternal right of
people!#)

3053. On 15 April 1992, the President attended a meeting of the SNB in which it was proposed
that a state of imminent threat of war be declared.9950 (The #Muslim-Croat side had already
been fighting the Serbs since 25 March#, with the well known massacre in Sijekovac
village on 26 March, with the attecks in Kupres and Bijeljina on 31 March through 2
April. The President and the Serb leadership didn’t want to exaggerate by declaring a
state of war, but only a threat of war.) The imminent threat of war was declared on 15 April
1992.9951 On 24 April 1992, the SNB met with the Bosnian Serb Government and adopted a
decision to form a TO Staff composed of current municipal TO commanders with the President
responsible for its realisation.9952 (Until 6 April 1992 there was a common TO, as a part of
the unique Armed Forces of the SFRY, but on 6 April the Muslim-Croat part of
Presidency fired Gen. Vukosavljevic (a Serb) and re-formed a new TO without Serbs. Two
weeks later the Serb leadership re-organised the Territorial Defence, which existed due to
the Constitution(s) of SFRY and of BiH, and could not be dissoluted, see the Constitution
of BiH D1262, para 260

And this TO was obliged to defend not only BiH but the entire SFRY, but the Muslim side
9944
D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), p. 45.
9945
D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), p. 46.
9946
P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 17.
9947
P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 16–17. See also D115 (Transcript of 25th session of RS Assembly, 19–20
January 1993), p. 6; P1371 (Transcript of 30th session of RS Assembly, 5–6 May 1993), p. 9.
9948
P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 17.
9949
P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 17. See also P1364 (Transcript of 23rd session of RS Assembly, 17
December 1992), e-court p. 8 (where the Accused continue to speak about the defensive nature of the war which had been imposed on them); D115
(Transcript of 25th session of RS Assembly, 19–20 January 1993), pp. 3, 7; P1367 (Transcript of 26th session of RS Assembly, 2 April 1993), p. 5; P1375
(Transcript of 32nd session of RS Assembly, 19–20 May 1993, e-court p. 8.
9950
P3050 (Minutes of joint meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 15 April 1992), p. 1.
9951
P3922 (Decision of SerBiH Presidency, 15 April 1992); D3703 (Decision of SerBiH Ministry of Defence, 18 April 1992), p. 2.
9952
P1087 (Minutes of meeting between SNB and SerBiH Government, 24 April 1992).
 815

violated the Constitution.) In addition, it was decided to compile instructions on the use of
national symbols and to procure uniforms and insignia for the TO.9953 At this meeting it was
concluded that a group of lawyers would be tasked with preparing the basic laws in order to set
up a legal system for the SerBiH.9954 On 17 April 1992, the President issued a decision that all
Serb employees who had been appointed from an SDS list be withdrawn from their positions in
bodies and organisations of the ―former Republic of BiH‖ and the City of Sarajevo.9955 This
decision also provided that all these employees be appointed to bodies and organisations in the
SerBiH.9956

3054. While the President called on leaders at the Bosnian Serb Assembly to ―do whatever is
necessary on the ground to establish the de facto situation‖ he also stated that there should be
―full respect for citizens of other nationalities‖ and that ―no one must be harmed, regardless of
their religion, nation‖.9957 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) The President also acknowledged that there
would probably be resettlement but that ―none of it should occur under pressure‖.9958
(#EXCULPATORY#!!!) When the SerBiH was proclaimed, this proclamation provided that
the constitution of this entity would ―guarantee the full equality of peoples and citizens before
the law and their full protection against any form of discrimination‖.9959
(#EXCULPATORY#!!!) Krajišnik had also spoken previously about creating a state which
would be the home for the entire Serbian people and #―for all others who so wish‖.9960
(#EXCULPATORY#!!!)

3055. Bogdan Subotić also made an announcement that Bosnian Muslims who wished to remain
in RS would have the same rights, and those who did not wish to should go to their own people
of their own free will.9961 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) He spoke in favour of clear borders
between ethnic communities.9962 Đerić testified that the Bosnian Serb leadership took into
account that a certain percentage of Serbs, Croats and Muslims would live in each constituent
unit in BiH and worked towards ―preserving the equality of people who remained in their
original places of residence‖ on a reciprocal basis and that the President in his speeches did not
question the rights or freedoms of other ethnic communities to live in RS.9963
(#EXCULPATORY#!!!) The President also spoke about ensuring that Muslims and Croats
have equal rights and privileges in the state they were building on the ―condition that they are
not hostile and that they leave the weapons‖.9964 (#EXCULPATORY#!!! And that was in
practice, as shown in the Edward Vulliamy report, P. and in the UN Report D2424@
and other evidence about many villages and municipalities which didn’t have any troubles
throughout the war!) The Accused continued to emphasise that Muslims and Croats living in
the RS would always have their rights protected as a minority group.9965
9953
P1087 (Minutes of meeting between SNB and SerBiH Government, 24 April 1992), p. 1.
9954
P1087 (Minutes of meeting between SNB and SerBiH Government, 24 April 1992), p. 2.
9955
P5413 (Decision of the SDS, 17 April 1992).
9956
P5413 (Decision of the SDS, 17 April 1992).
9957
D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), p. 45; Branko Đerić, T. 28018 (24 April 2012).
9958
D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), p. 46.
9959
P6444 (Declaration of the Assembly of Serbian people in BiH, 9 January 1992), p. 2. See also P5558 (Declaration on Constitutional and Political
Arrangements of the SerBiH Assembly, 3 September 1992), pp. 2–4 (which provided for the equality of citizens of SerBiH before the law and for freedom
of religion).
9960
P3121 (Stenograph of the session of the Club of Deputies from the SDS, 24 October 1991), p. 8.
9961
D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 49; D3715 (Article from Glas entitled ―Crisis Staffs Abolished‖, 7 July 1992), p. 3.
9962
D3715 (Article from Glas entitled ―Crisis Staffs Abolished‖, 7 July 1992), p. 3.
9963
Branko Đerić, T. 28017 (24 April 2012), T. 28073 (25 April 2012).
9964
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), pp. 86–87. See also D2852 (Witness statement of SrĊan Šehovac dated 27 January
2013), para. 41; John Zametica, T. 42470−42471 (29 October 2013) (testifying that in his opinion the Accused did not appear to have any ethnic hatred and
the Accused did appoint some Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to certain positions within the RS including himself). The Chamber does not find
Ĉeklić and Bajagić‘s evidence that the Accused never proposed removing Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and always insisted on co-existence to be
reliable. D3854 (Witness Statement of Savo Ĉeklić dated 7 July 2013), para. 21; D3853 (Witness statement of Zvonko Bajagić dated 5 July 2013), paras.
36C, 40. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 9231, 11086.
9965
P1375 (Transcript of 32nd session of RS Assembly, 19–20 May 1993, e-court p. 8.
 816

(#EXCULPATORY#!!!) He also emphasised the enormous responsibility of the SDS to

defend the ―Serbian Republic‖ and that their state should ―rest on rule of rights and
humanity‖.9966 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) The Accused called on the SDS members to
―constantly monitor our behaviour, so that the glory of our just battle would not be tarnished by
inhumane actions‖ with special attention to ―just behaviour towards civilians of other
nationalities‖.9967 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) In practice these words were not carried out or
followed.9968 (Incorrect! These words had been carried out in the majority of
municipalities. It is significant and worthwile to notice that these words had been carried
out the most thoroughly in the municipalities in which the presidents of it were at the
same time the memberst of the Main Board of the SDS, such as: Trebinje, Gacko,
Bosanski Samac, Gradiska, Prnjavor, Srbac, Mrkonjic Grad, Banja Luka, Bosanska
Dubica, Celinac, Laktasi, and others. Out of 61 municipalities in the Republic of Srpska,
the Indictment treated only one third of it!)

3056. The Chamber notes that Krajišnik stated at one of the sessions: ―I have discussed this [the
creation of a unified Serb state] openly, even though this is being recorded and even though the
journalists might write it down‖.9969 Similarly when the Accused invited Mladić to brief the
Bosnian Assembly on the military situation and their intentions, he qualified that by asking that
he present ―what can be said at a place like this‖.9970 This is indicative that what was said at
these sessions was often for public consumption and included rhetoric which the Chamber has
approached with caution and weighed in light of the other evidence received. (This is
ridiculous! Every state has some “state secrecies” although the Serbs hadn’t been very
successful in it, and that was well known through the times! Does the Chamber have any
document that differen from what had been said et these meetings? Beside that, there
always had been spies of the adversaries, and of many other sides, and only idiots
wouldn’t have it in mind, not to disclose the next moves, or a maneuvers of the Army! The
political intentions hadn’t been a secret matter to the international interlocutors, since it
had been followed by commitments and obligations! Finally, it is written in the Law of
Defence, P2602 p.13

So, if the President said that Gen. Mladic should say ―what can be said at a place like this‖
clearly tertained to the military secrets which couldn’t be said in a public meeting! What
was criminal in that? )

3057. The President said that in certain municipalities, such as Bijeljina and Pale, where Bosnian
Muslims accepted co-existence and were ―not showing the will to fight against the Serbs and

9966
D94 (Radovan Karadţić‘s letter to SDS members, 11 July 1992).
9967
D94 (Radovan Karadţić‘s letter to SDS members, 11 July 1992).
9968
Herbert Okun, T. 1740 (27 April 2010).
9969
P1357 (Transcript of 18th session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 August 1992), p. 18.
9970
D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), pp. 17–18.
 817

against their state‖, they were living peacefully and well.9971 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) The
President stated that Muslims in Bijeljina and Pale were not being bothered or considered
second-class citizens and that the government officials were trying to convince them that they
had nothing to fear.9972 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) In this regard, the President also mentioned
that in Sanski Most, Kljuĉ, and Prijedor, while there was some fighting caused by ―Muslim
extremists‖, once they were eliminated those who remained were not willing to fight the
Serbs.9973 (True and #EXCULPATORY#!!!) However, the President characterisation of what
was happening in those municipalities does not accord with the Chamber‘s factual findings in
section IV.A.1 about the conditions which Bosnian Muslims faced in those municipalities at the
time. (This is not correct! There were a significant minority of the Muslims, as any
extremists are a minority, in these municipalities that had the troubles, while the vast
majority didn’t have any! It is very easy to count: out of around 50,000 Muslims in
Prijedor,(or 65,000 non-Serbs) only around 3,000 had been brought in and questioned
after a massive attack on Prijedor, and only 1,400 had been detained and conveyed to the
Manjaca POW prison. This is less than 3%, (about 2,5%!) What was with others? How
come that there was so many Muslims in Prijedor in 1994, when the UN and others
mediated and intervened with the Accused to let them go to the Europesn countries?

3058. The President also visited Rogatica in March 1992 and met with municipal level
leaders.9974 On 25 March 1992, the President was informed that Rajko Kušić had threatened to
attack Rogatica unless the municipality and SJB were unconditionally divided into Serb and
Muslim parts within two hours.9975 This letter further indicated that in accordance with the
President‘s instructions, ―the factual division on the ground should be and is already there,
however the official division must be accompanied by laws issued by relevant Serbian
Ministries, as well as party agreements at the highest level‖.9976 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) The
President was informed that it would be dangerous to ―be the originator of the war situation
when the Serbian people are not sufficiently prepared‖.9977 (#EXCULPATORY#!!! These
resignations hadn’t been accepted, but the interfearance of the Army in the state policy
was limited, and the Patry (SDS) ceased to act for an entire year, in order to prevent it to
interfere in the activities of the civil authorities!)

3059. On 24 March 1992 the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted a decision which verified the
decisions of municipal assemblies which had proclaimed newly established Serbian
Municipalities.9978 These municipalities included Vogošća, Srebrenica, Bratunac, Prijedor,
Višegrad, Foĉa, Brĉko, and Zvornik.9979 The SAOs were also required to report on the
establishment of Serbian Municipalities.9980 At the same session the Accused said:

at a desired moment, and this will be very soon, we can form whatever we want. There are
reasons why this could happen in two or three days. Such are the forecasts but I cannot tell
you the reasons now. At that moment, all the Serbian municipalities, both the old ones and
the newly established ones, would literally assume control of the entire territory of the
municipality concerned. The Zvornik municipality takes control of everything that

9971
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), pp. 15, 21, 86. See also Branko Đerić, T. 28022–28023 (24 April 2012).
9972
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 21.
9973
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 15.
9974
P3279 (Witness statement of KDZ606 dated 1 September 2011), paras. 43, 45 (under seal); KDZ606, T. 18310–18311 (5 September 2011) (closed session).
9975
P6105 (Notice of resignation, 25 March 1992), p. 1.
9976
P6105 (Notice of resignation, 25 March 1992), p. 1.
9977
P6105 (Notice of resignation, 25 March 1992), p. 1. See also Tomislav Batinić, T. 33675–33678 (14 February 2013).
9978
P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 23–24. See also Adjudicated Fact 2010.
9979
P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 23–24. See also P1354 (Minutes of 13th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24
March 1992), pp. 8–9; P2536 (Patrick Treanor‘s expert report entitled ―The Bosnian Serb Leadership 1990-1992‖, 30 July 2002), para. 223.
9980
P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 24.
 818

constitutes the Serbian Municipality of Zvornik. Then at a given moment, in the next three
of four days, there will be a single method used and you will be able to apply it in the
municipalities you represent, including both things that must be done as well as how to do
them. How to separate the police force, take the resources that belong to the Serbian people
and take command. The police must be under the control of the civilian authority, it must
obey it, there is no discussion about that – that‘s the way it must be.9981

(#EXCULPATORY!!! “Control of everything that constitutes the Serbian Municipality…”

#therefore, only the Serb settlements and areas!!!# In all municipalities that had a “Serb
municipality” there were envisaged the Muslim or Croat, or both, municipalities, with the
same competences as the Serb municipalities. Had it been respected by the Muslims, there
would be a peace and nobidy could harm another, because the Serb police wouldn’t be
authorised to enter the Muslim villages, and vice versa! There could be no any “ethnic
cleansing”, detentions, any crimes, but that would mean that there wouldn’t be armed
uprisals, rebelions and mutinies, which were the only reason for detaining the perpetrators !
#Two municipalities – peace#!)

3060. The Accused also stated: ―Newly established municipalities must establish their organs
as soon as possible, have their stamps made and start to work. The police, that is, our organs
must be positioned at the border.‖9982 At this session, the Bosnian Serb Assembly instructed the
Government to prepare and submit to the Assembly for adoption an operational plan ―of
assuming power and rendering operational the authorities in the territory of the Serbian
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina‖.9983 (#EXCULPATORY#!!! The authorities already
existed, but it was necessary to have a responsible new organs in charge of only the Serb
territories within the towns and cities with two or more ethnic municipalities!)

3061. The President also emphasised that in the period when the State was being created, the
deputies would have to be the ―pillars of our power‖ in their locations and ―remain in
permanent contact with presidents of municipalities and work on the establishment of local
government‖.9984 The President also acknowledged that the president of the municipality was
who ―carried out our plans‖.9985 (#All legal and in accordance with the laws, nothing
criminal!#)

3062. On 27 March 1992 when the Bosnian Serb Assembly promulgated the Constitution of
SerBiH, the President delivered a speech in which he addressed criticism that they had taken
steps ―with undue haste‖ and stated that ―we are clean before God, because we have not made a
single move which was not provoked‖.9986 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) He also stated that the
Serbs had responded to ―non-democratic measures democratically‖ (#EXCULPATORY#!!!)
and formed its state unit legitimately based on the law exercising their right to self-
determination.9987 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) The President also spoke about the possibility
that all three peoples in BiH may flourish ―if [the declaration of BiH independence] passes

9981
P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 22. The Chamber places no weight on KW317‘s opinion that what
prompted these actions was not the will of the Accused or the SDS but was the result of the actions of Bosnian Muslims. KW317, T. 39338–39339 (5 June
2013).
9982
See para. 136; P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 17.
9983
P1354 (Minutes of 13th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), pp. 8–9. See also P2536 (Patrick Treanor‘s expert report entitled ―The Bosnian Serb
Leadership 1990-1992‖, 30 July 2002), para. 223; Adjudicated Fact 2009.
9984
P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 15. The Accused also met with some municipal leaders and discussed the
functioning of municipal organs of authority. D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 61.
9985
P961 (Shorthand Record of 12th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 17.
9986
D304 (Shorthand Record of 14th session of RS Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 8; P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-
court p. 4. See also D89 (Shorthand Record of 9th session of SerBiH Assembly, 28 February 1992).
9987
D304 (Shorthand Record of 14th session of RS Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 8; P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-
court p. 4.
 819

without bloodshed‖.9988 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) The President also said that a war in BiH
would not solve anything but that if war did break out ―you will get the plans‖.9989
(#EXCULPATORY#!!! This is another proof that the Serb side didn’t have any war
plans, except the obligatory plans for an imergency situations, as Variant A and B. It had
been said, on some of these sessions: “we do not have any other plans, except to defend our
people and territories!)

3063. There was a break in the Bosnian Serb Assembly sessions and the 16th session was held
on 12 May 1992 and was described by Krajišnik as the ―first war session‖.9990 The President
spoke about how the Bosnian Serbs had tried to avoid war, that they had no need to organise
themselves militarily because their policies were being realised politically.9991
(#EXCULPATORY#!!!) He explained that the political maneuvering of the Bosnian Muslims
and the recognition of BiH resulted in war, and that Serbs had been attacked in Sarajevo,
Zvornik and Bijeljina.9992 (True and #EXCULPATORY#!!!) He went further and stated that
the Bosnian Serbs in ―areas bordering other national communities, it has to fight for its survival
against genocide‖.9993 The President also claimed that Serbs had been ―very cautious not to
take what is not ours, not to fight more than is necessary‖, (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) that they
would mark their borders and ―defend them until they are recognised‖ and that the ―factual
situation will be decisive‖.9994 In addition, at a sesssion in September 1992, he emphasised that
without publicly saying so, their internal borders between Muslims and Croats ―are to be
thicker‖ than their borders with Serbia and Serbian Krajina.9995

3064. The Chamber recalls that on 18 May 1992, the Rogatica Serb Municipal Assembly
abrogated the original agreement on the division of the municipality alleging that the Bosnian
Muslim side had avoided attempts to implement that agreement.9996 (True!) This was one day
after the President, Mladić, and Krajišnik held a meeting with representatives of municipalities,
including Rogatica, and discussed the creation of a Bosnian Serb state in BiH, stating that the
time had come for the demarcation of areas between the national groups.9997

3065. At a meeting held in Belgrade on 11 July 1992, the Minister of the Interior noted that the
government was ―preparing a new political and territorial division of the Serbian Republic
which will replace the previous necessary forms, such as autonomous Serb areas and regions,
with districts‖.9998 The Accused at a meeting of the Presidency of SerBiH August 1992 said
that the European Community would accept the ―factual state of affairs‖ and that therefore they
―should not make a single concession in military terms‖.9999 (The President said many times
that the EC confirmed that the Serbs were right about preserving Yugoslavia, but a “new
factual situation is to be taken into account”, and that was why the Serb leadership said
that if it is so, the Serbs had a right to protect their “factual situation”, see P12, and
comment for the para 3051 of this Judgement!)

9988
D304 (Shorthand Record of 14th session of RS Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 8.
9989
D304 (Shorthand Record of 14th session of RS Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 20.
9990
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 1.
9991
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court pp. 5, 9; D3697 (Article from Glas entitled ―Own Army‖, 13 May 1992), p. 1.
9992
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court pp. 5–6, 8.
9993
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 6. See also P5492 (Record of speech by Radovan Karadţić, 9 January
1994), pp. 6–7.
9994
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court pp. 6–7. See also D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15
September 1992), pp. 53–55, 57; P1367 (Transcript of 26th session of RS Assembly, 2 April 1993), p. 109.
9995
D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 55.
9996
See para. 963; P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April – June 1992), p. 3.
9997
P1477 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 14 February–28 May 1992), pp. 349–351; P6254 (Article from Tanjug entitled ―Serb Leaders Promote Ethnic
Demarcation‖, 17 May 1992).
9998
P1096 (SerBiH MUP Report on Some Aspects of Work Done to Date and the Tasks Ahead, 17 July 1992), p. 3.
9999
P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), p. 22.
 820

3066. The President in September 1992 acknowledged the responsibility of municipal

authorities in defining borders and the importance of the government and the Presidency
visiting municipalities in order to restore order.10000 (#EXCULPATORY#!!! There should be
mentioned that in September 1992 the war was going on for more that five months, and
that still there was no order restored. All unlawful that happened during this period was
not accessible to the authorities, and therefore the authorities, including the President,
could have not been responsible, nor the misdeeds committed then were in any way
planned or influenced by the authorities!) Krajišnik acknowledged the presence of presidents
of executive boards and presidents of local SDS branches who attended Bosnian Assembly
sessions as it was the ―best way to keep our people aware of what is going on. We have seen
that the people were leaving Assembly sessions with a clear vision of what they are supposed to
do.‖10001

3067. On 20 December 1992, at a meeting of the Supreme Command attended by the Accused,
Koljević, Krajišnik, Mladić, and Stanišić, Koljević addressed the issue of the truce, claiming
that they should refrain from offensive operations to earn the world‘s trust, to which the
President responded that nothing is over yet, that they must strengthen the army, reinforce and
reorganise their borders, and prove that the Muslims do not want peace to be established.10002
(Both, the opinion of the Vice President Koljevic and one of the President were in accord.
To strengtheten the army reinforce and reorganise their borders…” all of it was within
the framework of the truce, was of a defensive nature, and nothing offensive was in it!
Here is what the President said, P1469, p.1.

So, the President pleaded only for a #status quo#, to maintain the borders. Not a single
offensive plan or intention, just a defensive measures! Further, first Koljevic, then the
President:

It should be kept in mind that it was a meeting of the Supreme Command, as a civilian
advisory body, explaining to the military leaders what was the view of the politics. Nothing
to object, on the contrary, all was commendable!)

3068. In April 1993, the Accused stated that as a result of the war they had created new entities
which would have to be recognised and noted for example that nobody could now ―return the
50,000 Serbs from Zvornik to Zenica, or to central Bosnia‖.10003 (Let us see what the
President really said, P1367, p.109 – 110:

10000
D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 15.
10001
P1367 (Transcript of 26th session of RS Assembly, 2 April 1993), p. 7.
10002
P1469 (Minutes of VRS Supreme Command meeting, 20 December 1992), pp. 1, 4.
10003
P1367 (Transcript of 26th session of RS Assembly, 2 April 1993), pp. 109–110.
 821

It is evident that the President was persuading the deputies to accept the continuation of
the Conference and to abandon an idea of ending of the war by military means, explaining
that a local wars do not end this way, but rather become a chronic wars. The President
“begged” the deputies to support the Conference, since that would be a just and
acceptable solution, and the enemies also need an honourable way out. He also said that
the Serbs would have been in a situation to give up some Serbian territories if there was
no a war, and that the Muslims would do better and get more if there was no the war, but
both the Serbs and Muslims, as well as the international community, have to accept the
“new realities” as a result of the war. The President said that the Serbs had been
recognised “the more than half of Zvornik municipality” before the war and without the
war, but a new reality is that the Serbs expelled from Zenica may not accept to return
there. What is wrong with this speech of the President? The entire speech is full of a very
important and relevant data which explained the situation, and a very honest, peaceful
and conciliatory attitude of the President, but these who assisted the Chamber in
assembling the Judgement noticed only this sentence, but used it against the President in
an unacceptable and unanderstandable manner!): The Accused continued to speak about the
RS as something they had ―created by our own strength, own weapons, own politics‖.10004 (This
is like fighting against a windmill, or against millions of mosquitos! So many dostortions,
so many crippled sentences, all with the aim to paint the President as black as possible. It
should be assumed that the Judges wouldn’t do that, and that their assisstents made them
a bad service. Let us see what the President really said: P1379, p.9:
10004
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 9.
 822

……………………………………………………….

#Crippled sentence#! As it can bee seen, the full stop in the quoted sentence in the
Judgement, “…own weapons, own politics”… is not at the right place. There is a very
#important part of the sentence missing, and this is ”… our own strength, own weapons,
own politics and in interaction with the international community that has not been always
inclined toward us. #Why this part of the sentence had been skipped? Is it permissible in a
serious court and a serious case? Even if the Prosecution did this forgery, in a serious
countries which support this court – it wouldn’t be permissible, let alone if it is done by a
neutral and unbiased chamber!): In January 1994, the President acknowledged the
contribution of the SDS party as the ―main political force‖, the army, police, TO, SDS
members, municipal level structures and leadership to the preservation of the RS.10005 (What is
the meaning of this assertion? The SDS was the main political force, because it won over
90% of the Serb ballots, the army, police TO and municipal structures were obliged to
preserve their country, i.e. RS, due to the Constitution and laws. Who else would preserve
the Serbs and their areas, and settlements, while attacked by their own state? How
possibly could it be of any interest of the Court, since it was a perfectly normal and
natural? Was it interesting because the President said that, i.e. who said that, or what was
said, because it was so, that these structures preserved the RS? This way, gathering so
many neutral, or irrelevant, or crippled sentences of the President and other Serb
officials, or even non-officials whose words meant nothing for this case, the Court is
assembling this Judgement of many, many nothing, to create an impression about guilt of
the President!)

3069. In November 1994, the Accused continued to speak about this reality on the ground which
had to be retained.10006 This sentiment was also reflected in statements made by Mladić that
they would ―impose by the force of arms the final settlement of the war on the enemy‖ which
would then mean the international community had to recognise the actual situation on the
ground.10007 (The most official “international community”, i.e. the European Community
and the United Nations wanted the BiH to be independent, and in order to achieve it, the
very same “international community” proposed the plan that the Serbs embraced and
defended. They wouldn’t defend it, if they hadn’t been attacked by the Muslims, who tried
to deny the Serb rights to their sovereignty and freedom. All of the Serb minimal rights
had been agreed, and all of a sudden denied by a Muslim secret army! Of course, the
international community had to recognise it, after backing the Muslim illegal attempts to
reject already agreed plan, and toexpel all the Serbs from Bosnia!) The President stated that
their strategic goal was to separate themselves and not to take the whole of BiH but insisted that
they should be prepared to resist attempts to take back as much Serb territory as possible and to

10005
P5492 (Record of speech by Radovan Karadţić, 9 January 1994), pp. 8–9.
10006
P1403 (Transcript of First Part of 46th session of RS Assembly, 9–11 November 1994), p. 155. See also P1390 (Transcript of 40th session of RS Assembly,
10–11 May 1994), pp. 36, 43.
10007
P970 (Transcript of 50th session of RS Assembly, 15-16 April 1995), pp. 21–21.
 823

establish new borders.10008 (As many other assertions,# irrelevant for the case. No crime, no
forbidden or illegal intentions or attitudes, only a defensive reactions#!)

3070. The Accused continued to speak about their right to claim territories on the basis that
―[w]e have created new realities‖. He then cited to the example of Zvornik, where there had
previously been a Bosnian Muslim majority, but he noted that Serbs from other locations had
arrived and occupied the municipality while the Bosnian Muslims had left ―for Europe and I do
not know where else‖.10009 (#Distortion#! The Serbs didn’t “arrive” from other localities,
they escaped under a horrible conditions, without property, money, even food. Also, the
Serbs didn’t “occupy” the municipality, but only inhabited in the Serb part of the Serb
municipality of Zvornik#! While the Serb side facilitated the population that wanted to
leave the combat areas to have an escorted transport, the other side did nothing what had
been agreed with the ICRC and UNHCR!) He noted that in this scenario they would claim
Zvornik ―based on the right which comes out of a new reality‖ which had been created through
the war and that if they wanted ―to give Zvornik to the Muslims then you have to wage a new
war in order to expel these Serbs back to Zenica. We request Zvornik according to this right.
We use the same right to ask for our state. And we will get it.‖10010 (#This had nothing to do
with the Muslim possibility or rights to live in Zvornik, but it pertained to the allocation of
Zvornik as a whole to the Muslim side#. The Chamber already knew that even before the
war, and without any war, the EC envoys Carrington and Cutileiro allocated almost 50%
of the Zvornik municipality to the Serbs. Throughout the war the Muslim side possessed
and controlled close to 50% of the Zvornik municipality, since the Serbs didn’t want to
control their settlements unless necessary for the military reasons! Yes, the Serbs “got it”,
i.e. their parts of Zvornik, but they have lost many municipalities almost 100% Serb
municipalities, such as: Ilijas, Serb Vogosca, Serb Ilidza, Serb Hadzici, Glamoc, Grahovo,
Drvar, all above 85% Serb areas!)

3071. The President also observed that the SDS ―endured the armed struggle in a superior
manner. […] With such, well organised defence, the majority of our people has been saved. […]
We should always remember that the people themselves and the SDS fought and set up the
frontlines in 45 days, from 5 April to 20 May‖.10011 (#Before the VRS, during the JNA#!
That meant, until the VRS was established! The JNA was most of the time neutral, or
reluctant to protect the Serbs, but when attacked at the same time, the JNA defence was
helpful for the attacked Serbs! But, let us see what the President said in an interview in
the occasion of the anniversary of the Repulbic, P953, p. 3-4:

10008
P1390 (Transcript of 40th session of RS Assembly, 10–11 May 1994), pp. 41–42.
10009
P1403 (Transcript of First Part of 46th session of RS Assembly, 9–11 November 1994), p. 157.
10010
P1403 (Transcript of First Part of 46th session of RS Assembly, 9–11 November 1994), p. 157.
10011
P953 (Article from OsloboĊenje entitled ―Happy Birthday Republic‖, 6 January 1995), p. 3–4.
 824

(#CRUCIAL PARTS SKIPPED#! Again, the crucial parts of this paragraph of the
President interview had been skipped and replaced by three points (…”and the lines
toward the enemies were established”#!) although it has a relevance! A mere defensive
approach confirmed!)

3. Conclusion

3072. The Prosecution argues that the Variant A/B Instructions established the bodies which
were the primary instruments through which the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership were
able to assert control over territories and remove non-Serbs.10012 It also alleges that the
President supervised the implementation of the Variant A/B Instructions and issued specific
guidelines in that regard.10013 With respect to the Variant A/B Instructions, the President
contends that there was ―absolutely nothing wrong with this document‖ and that it only
envisaged defensive measures in response to moves towards the independence of BiH.10014 (#A
free and creative interpretation#! There was no “envisaging defensive measures in
response to moves towards the independence of BiH,” but in response to a possible
Muslim attempts to militarily attack the Serbs in their sovereign areas and force them to
accept the independence under their conditions, i.e. to become a national minority and
lose many rights, as the Serbs in Krajina in Croatia did! The Court was not interested in
any of the causes of the events, only in a consequences for which the Serbs would be
“found guilty”!)

3073. Having considered the evidence above, the Chamber finds that the Variant A/B
Instructions was a core document in terms of furthering the objectives of the President and the
Bosnian Serb leadership from December 1991 onwards. The instructions reduced to writing the
practical measures and steps which had to be taken at a municipal level in order to achieve those
objectives. The Chamber finds that the Variant A/B Instructions reflected the ideology and
objectives of the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership which have been discussed above.

10012
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 122.
10013
Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 123, 129.
10014
Defence Final Brief, paras.75–78. The Accused also makes a suggestion that there are inconsistencies ―that may bring into question its authenticity or
origin, and dispute its conspiratorial nature‖. Defence Final Brief, para. 75.
 825

(#LEGAL AND OBLIGATORY#! This is a completely wrong “finding”. Namely, the

#Variant A/B was a professional, not political document#, that was obligatory for every
single entity, from republic, to areas and communities of municipalities, to municipalities,
local communes, companies, and “socio-political organisations” such as sport associations,
parties, taxi drivers, every single “subject of the all-national defence. That is written not
only in laws, but in the constitutions, as can be seen above. So, nothing in this papir
contained any political platform, ideology or objectives, which were formulated and
presented by political bodies and in political talks, aimed to be accomplished by the talks,
on the basis of the Serb constitutional rights. Once it was rejected by the Muslims, and the
political means replaced by an armed attack against the Serbs, this papir served as a mere
defensive concept, which would be the same regardless of an enemy, no matter was it
Eastern or Western military block, or an internal enemy of the country! Finally, it was
created by a retired officers as a non-political persons!)

3074. The Chamber finds that the President played the leading role in the distribution and
promotion of the Variant A/B Instructions. In doing so the President re-emphasised the
interests of the Bosnian Serbs and also repeated the threats which Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats and the independence of BiH posed to those interests. (Not entirely correct: #it
was not a mere independence that jeopardized the Serbs, it was a unitary independent
Bosnia under the fundamentalistic regime based on the Islamic Declaration written by
Mr. Alija Izetbegovic#, who was offered by the President to denounce this book as a
political program, and he refused it. The maind proof that it was so was the fact that the
Serbs accepted that BiH may be independent provided the Serbs, and two other ethnic
communities if wanted it, get a high autonomy as Izetbegovic accepted in the Hague ICFY
in 1991! What was wrong with the hifgh autonomy, with a de-centralised Bosnia, while a
decentralisation is achieved in many European countries?) The manner in which the Variant
A/B Instructions were distributed demonstrates a high level of organisation, planning, and co-
ordination to ensure that all key Bosnian Serb leaders at a municipal level received those
instructions. (So what? The Chamber is #charging the Serb leadership and the President
for being good in forecasting the development of events, for being cotious not to be
deceived by the adversaries, and for a capability to organize their ethnic community and
it’s organs!#)

3075. The Chamber also finds that accepted evidence demonstrates that not only were the
Variant A/B Instructions distributed, they were subsequently discussed and implemented at a
municipal level and were considered mandatory. The instructions formed the basis on which
Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, Bosnian Serb municipal assemblies, and other parallel municipal
structures were established in the Municipalities. These instructions provided the basis for the
declaration of Serb municipalities and not only called for the creation of Crisis Staffs, it also
specified their structure, composition, and functions. (So what? How this could be a crime?
What the Prosecution is charging the President for, and the Chamber is trying and
sentencing for?)

3076. The Chamber notes that in Variant B municipalities, the instructions did make provision
for the proportional representation of ―other nations‖ in government organs, but this included a
proviso that this only applied to those who expressed loyalty to Yugoslavia. The Chamber finds
that this is a reflection of the position taken at the time by the Bosnian Serb leadership and that
such statements promising protection of the rights of other ethnicities were highly conditional
on them accepting and following the objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership. (Wrong: this
document had been created by a retired army officers as professionals, and was a
professional, not political paper. It was created while Yugoslavia still existed, and Bosnia
was still in Yugoslavia. Look how this matter was regulated by the REGULATIONS,
 826

issued by the Federal Ministry for Defence on 1 January 1990, P4477, p. 5:

The “socio-political communities” pertained to the regular organs of authority, while

“socio-political organizations” meant all the organizations from the political parties
through the “mount-climbing society, to sport organizations! So, what this paragraph in
the Judgement is something very commendable due to this Regulations, as well as the laws
and constitutions. In a case of an ethnic group takes the armament and fight against
Yugoslavia, it would mean losing all of their rights except the rights of a Prisoners of war
if captured!)

3077. The Chamber also finds that in addition to forming the basis for the creation of parallel
political structures, the Variant A/B Instructions also included provisions directed towards the
military organisation of the Bosnian Serb population at a municipal level. This involved taking
steps to ensure that police, reserve, and TO structures were prepared and ready to be engaged
depending on developments. The Crisis Staff was tasked with taking a central role in making
these military preparations. (So what? This was an #obligation according to the laws of
defence and to the Constitution of SFRY, Constitution of BiH and Constitution of the
Republic of Srpska!# All of those forces already existed, and, as provided in the
Regulations, P4477, the authorities at all levels were obliged to facilitate the functioning of
all of these organs, organizations and units!)

3078. The Chamber also finds that the content of the Variant A/B Instructions included
preparations for the physical take-over and maintenance of power in Bosnian Serb claimed
territory, which ultimately took place. (Incorrect! #The “take-over” of the power in Bosnian
Serb claimed territories happened at the elections in 1990, aand these authorities didn’t
change until the next elections in 1996. There was no a single municipal authority that
didn’t last since 1990!) The Chamber refers to its factual findings with respect to the pattern of
take-overs in the Municipalities. It recalls the involvement of the structures created pursuant to
the Variant A/B Instructions in preparing for and carrying out these take-overs. (#None of
“structures” had been created pursuant to the Variant A/B Instructions, since all of these
structures already existed.# The Instructions only reminded the local authorities to be
cautious and ready for the defence. The Crisis Staffs weren’t a new structure either,
because it was not a new structure, as the Presidencies of municipalities weren’t a new
structures. Both were composed of the same officials, ex oficio, and not nominated by the
President. If anyone cares for the facts and the truth, that is how it was, and that had been
corroborated by the Defence, and it is still very easy to check!) It also recalls the central role
that these structures played in maintaining power and regulating the functioning of the
municipalities after the take-overs were completed. (That was the #mandatory obligation of
the local authorities, what is wrong with that? Only in a case the Serbs came from another
planet without any rights on the earth and in Bosnia, but it doesn’t seem to be the fact!#)

3079. The Chamber finds that while municipalities had some autonomy in terms of the precise
manner in which they implemented the Variant A/B Instructions, they were considered to be
mandatory. (Certainly! #Mandatory due to the Law of the All-People Defence (ONO) and
the Constitution, not due to the Instructions. Had it been due to the Instructions, it would
be titled as an “Order”#! The Accused took an active role in monitoring the implementation of
the Variant A/B Instructions and also following developments which occurred at a municipal
 827

level and difficulties municipal authorities faced. In this regard the Accused not only was in
direct contact with municipal leaders he also specifically tasked Bosnian Serb officials with
monitoring developments and problems at a municipal level in general and the implementation of
the Variant A/B Instructions in particular. (All of that was a # legal obligation of the President
and all other officials, in accordance with the Republic of Srpska Law on Defence, which
was derived from the existing laws on defence of the SRFY and BiH, see P2602 p. 14.

He
co-ordinated efforts to ensure the implementation of the Variant A/B Instructions and sent
Bosnian Serb officials to provide assistance to municipalities in this regard. The evidence also
demonstrates that this system of monitoring was also a means of ensuring discipline and
checking loyalty to the party leadership and programme of action which they had developed.
(What loyalty to the party leadership, while the SDS had frozen it’s activities completely?
There was an obligation of the organs of locat authorities to the central organs of
authorities, established immediately after the WWII and the communist Revolution! #The
monitoring was prescribed by every single document, including the Law on Defence#,
P2602, p. 14:

from Article 74:

 828

and the Regulations, P4477, p. 5.

How it was possible to have the President charged, indicted, #tried and sentenced in the
first degree – for the perfectly legal and law binding activities#? The last two documents
had been tendered by the Prosecution and the Indictment couldn’t be, and mustn’t be
issued without a glance of these basic documents!)

3080. The Chamber also finds that a direct and regular line of communication existed between
the Bosnian Serb authorities at a municipal level and the Bosnian Serb leadership or RS
authorities, including the President. This line of communication allowed the Bosnian Serb
leadership and the President to monitor developments at a municipal level and to issue precise
directions with respect to the establishment and maintenance of Bosnian Serb authority. (This
is not sufficiently specific: if it was pertaining to the pre-war period, that would be correct,
but if this finding pertains to the war situation, particularly the first year of the war (1992)
the finding would be completely incorrect!)
 829

3081. The evidence above also demonstrates that the Accused took very seriously the precise
implementation of these instructions at a municipal level. The evidence, including intercepted
conversations, also shows that municipal level leaders were in contact with the President and
reported on progress in developments in the municipalities and how they were following the
Variant A/B Instructions. The President emphasised the importance of these instructions in
achieving the objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership, namely the creation of a separate
Bosnian Serb state. (#This is all mixed up and incorrect! The instructions didn’t have
anything to do with the objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership to create a separate
Bosnian Serb state! This state had been created by the political means, proclaimed on 9
January 1992, verified by the international mediators on 18 March 1992, and put into the
function by the end of March, beginning of April 1992.# The A/B Instructions was a
document of defence of the people and territories that constituted this state. The
monitoring and following the Instructions was a part of the legal obligation of all and
every official of the existing authorities of SerBiH, which could have been seen in the laws
and Constitution, had the Prosecution prepared their case properly!)

3082. The Chamber also finds that the SDS structures were the core mechanism through which
the SDS policies which had to be implemented were communicated from the SDS Main Board
to the SDS Municipal Boards. The President played a leading role in insisting on party
discipline and the imperative to implement SDS policy and the importance of following the
timing of the measures which had to be taken. (Before the war broke out the SDS was
obliged to secure that the SDS cadres in power were pursuing the state policy in
accordance with the will of their voters. Once the war broke out, the SDS ceased to work,
in order to facilitate the state organs to function unhindered. Even before the war the
President warned the SDS officials that the SDS is not authority, but a service to the
authorities that won the elections, see P12, p.10

: The Chamber finds that these moves were designed and implemented to ensure that Bosnian
Serb structures were created and these structures could be quickly activated when necessary in
order to take-over power in the municipalities. (Once again, #wrong! The power in the
municipalities already existed since November 1990, and the structures had been created
to establish a responsible authorities, in accordance with the Constitution, the laws and
the Lisbon Agreement! But when it was clear that the Muslim side reneged on the Lisbon
Agreement and intend to initiate the war, (on 25 March) this “structures” i.e. the state
institutions, were supposed to save the people and secure the territories and properties!
The evidence that corroborate this facts is very numerous, while there was no any
evidence to the contrary. The most obvious is the following fact:

1. #The authotiries in the Serb majority municipalities had been established in 1990;
 830

2. The formation of the Serb republic in BiH, as #the last concession of the Serb side to agree to
the BiH independence#, had already been decided and proclaimed on 9 January 1992, after
being understood by the international mediators as a compromise which resolves the BiH
crisis;

3. The very same concept of the three republics within BiH continued to be discussed, and
finally agreed on 18 March 1992;

4. The majority of the “findings” and quotations of the President and the Serb leadership
speeches and words quoted in this Judgement are from the times before 24 - 25 March 1992,
while there was a #strong belief that there will be no war#. Only after the Muslim side
reneged on the Lisbon Agreement on 25 March, it was more probable that there may be a
war;

5. Having that in mind, all the assertions that the President words communicated before 25
March meant the evidence of a criminal plan is #materially and legally wrong#! These words
can not be interpreted as a sign, or plan, or premeditation of a “taking over” of the
municipalities, or any other illegal action! Why to take over municipalities, when the
Conference concluded the Agreement according to which the Serbs were entitled to organize
their Republic, which certainly was going to be smaller than the Serb majority territory?
There would be no any war if the Muslim side didn’t abandon the Agreement and went to
the war, advised by some foreign “friends” as Ambassador Cutileiro wrote, see: D2980)

3083. The Chamber finds that when the Accused activated the second level of the Variant A/B
Instructions this was the signal that the structures which had been created pursuant to the first
level had to be activated in order to take-over power. (#“To take-over power” – from
whom#? A simple answer to this question would unveil the entire wrongfulness of this
absurdity in the very foundation of the Bosnian crisis and these accusations and trials!
The Serb side maintained the same authorities since 1990 till 1996. When the war broke
out, in the municipalities with a substantial Muslim or Croat minorities, and in other with
a significant Serb population as minority on a substantial amount of territory, the Serb
authorities formed their ethnic municipalities and facilitated the other ethnicities to do the
same. In these newly formed municipalities the Serb side maintained the same authorities.
It had never been said “to take-over power”, it had always been said “to take power”,
which is completely different. To “take-over” in Serbian would be “preuzeti” i.e. take
something from somebody, and to “take” meant to exercise a power completely,
thoroughly, as it had to be in a war or an imminent treath of war! It is so easy to check the
semantics, that there is no any justification for this negligeance and the abuse of a
linguistic problems of such a trials!) The evidence demonstrates that the second level of the
Variant A/B Instructions was intrinsically linked to the physical control of territory and the
activation of the second level of the Variant A/B Instructions was also communicated to and
acted upon at a municipal level. (A perfectly# legal and obligatory conduct#, according to
the explicite provisions of the law of ONO (All-Peoples Defence) derived from the
Constitution, see already quoted laws and constitutions, as well as D4282, the Strategy of
All-Peoples Defence issued by the SFRY Presidency in 1987, p.9:
 831

3084. While the Chamber notes that the Accused spoke in terms of taking power in a ―humane
way‖ with respect to the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, it is clear that he said this in the
context of trying to ―change [the Bosnian Serbs‘] image with foreign monitors‖.10015 (It is
entirely unfair and #unacceptable to manipulate with the sentences of the President# that
way. See the comment of the same issue in para 3023: This kind of #merging and
associating two or more diferent sentences, in order to create a new meaning is not
permissible in any legal system#. The two elements, a) a humane treatment of the
population and prevention of fleeing – has nothing to do with the b) international
monitors and the Serb international image. That pertained to c) an armed skirmishes, a
way of defense, in terms not to have it “too aggressive”!#) In addition instructions which
were given to Crisis Staffs also required the humane treatment of civilians and respect for
POWs. Despite these statements and orders, the President also clearly stated that he was
prepared to ―let everything go to fucking hell and that we take the express way‖10016 (Another
#bastardous and monster-merge of sentences#, which do not have anything in common.
To let everything “to go to fucking hell” meant a resignation reaction on the failure of his
peaceful endeavours, and “to let something go somewhere” always meant to give up one’s
attempt to prevent a “fucking hell”. but he spoke about taking a tactful approach in order to
achieve their goals given the importance of international opinion and not being seen as the
aggressors. The Chamber finds that this is indicative of the approach taken by the President that
while he envisaged the use force and violence to take-over power he was cautious about the
way in which this would be portrayed at an international level. (This sentence is unbelievable!
#All the words that had been the basis for this “synthesis” had been said before the war,
(14 February 1992)# and with anassumption that there will be no war#, and in the closest
connection with the achievement of the Carrington-Cutileiro Conference on Yugoslavia
and BiH. Again, there is a famous “take-over” of power, although it had never been said
or meant, nor there was any need for that, since the Conference was doing well. The most
critical and a tremendous misunderstanding and misconceiving of the President words
were of his speeches on 14 February 1992, i.e. after the first accord about decentralisation
of BiH into three states, and on 18 March 1992, after the sides accepted the Lisbon
Agreement. Although all of his speeches had been a political discourse aimed to persuade
the MPs to accept some solutions, the essence was accurate, and commendable in all the
cases. Taken out of these contexts, the President words are easy to manipulate and create
a completely different picture. This must not happen in any system or case!) The
international image and ensuring political points were not lost were very important to the
President, but the Chamber does not find that there was a genuine concern about the manner in
which power was taken. (How about the President concerns about the conduct of the Serb
side #before the war#, when there was no any idea of “taking-over the power, and
majority of the Chambers dis-believes are concerning with these speeches? And how
about the President’s “strictly confidential” orders towards the same, humane and lawful
conduct of the Serb authorities and forces. And how about his permanent advocacy of the
moderate manner in fights, territorial claimes, and in particular the treatment of civilians
of all ethnicities – communicated to the military ant the civil authorities on a closed
sessions and meetings, intercepts and other occasions so remote from any public?)

3085. On the contrary, the Chamber refers to its factual findings in section IV.A.1, which
demonstrates that the manner in which Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and
Governmental Organs took over power in the Municipalities and the way in which Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats were treated during and after the take-overs was anything but
humane. (The section IV.A.1. is commented there. The Chamber didn’t establish anything

10015
See para. 3023.
10016
See para. 3024.
 832

that is “found” in this section, nor this what had been established, or even alleged could
justify this conclusion. Let us reconsider the several simpliest questions, answers to which
would clarify all the errors of this findings:

1. There was no any “take-over” and the Chamber have taken it from the Prosecution
without any consideration of the Defence arguments;
2. If it was a systemic or systematic misconduct, why the same crimes hadn’t been
commited in all and every municipality under the Serb control, but only in one third of
them;
3. Why the events characterised as a systematic crimes didn’t appear at the same time,
or close to it, in all the Serb municipalities;
4. Why only several percent of the non-Serb population had a problems with detention
and investigation, while the wast majority, always over 90% of the non-Serb population
didn’t have any problem with the authorities;
5. What was a decisive factor for the outburst of violence, did any “systematic” crime
appear as a solitary incident, or there was an armed skirmish, and what and who caused the
clashes;
6. Without clarification of the contribution of the other side to the concret incidents and
to the sufferings of this percent of civilians – there could not be a realy assessment of the
events. No a reasonabl;e chamber would miss to establish all of it and to obtain the answers
to these questions!) The Chamber recalls its legal finding that Serb Forces were involved in a
widespread and systematic attack directed against the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilian
populations of BiH which was characterised by a widespread and systematic campaign of
violence, including through acts of murder, persecution, and forcible displacement. While the
President was making these public statements about the protection of minorities, Bosnian Muslims
continued to be forced out of municipalities in BiH where Bosnian Serbs had taken-over the
territory. The Chamber also finds a disjuncture between the Accused‘s public statements and his
private discourse in this regard. (For this last sentence the Chamber didn’t have any
corroborative evidence. However, neither the “Serb Forces” had been properly identified,
nor the President was responsible for all the elements of the alleged “Serb Forces” – the JNA
was in no way under his influence let alone control, and the paramilitary part of the “Serb
Forces” couldn’t in any way be a part of the official Serb Forces, since the President banned
their existence and disowned all of them as early as 13 June 1992. Even for the real and
official Serb Forces and their combat conduct the President couldn’t be kept responsible,
since he handed his competences of a use of the army, i.e. operational and tactical
competences – to the Main Staff of the VRS. Further, the Prosecution and the Chamber
didn’t prove that the “Serb Forces” for which the President was strategically responsible,
really attacked the civilian population in any of incidents. This is a grave omission and error
of the Chamber that it didn’t establish who was initiating attacks, and who did abuse the
civilians to attack from their vicinity, and there is a sufficient evidence that it had been the
Muslim side doing it in continuo throughout the war!)

3086. The Chamber also finds that by April 1992, the work and function of Crisis Staffs were
further elaborated by instructions which provided for them to take on the central role in wartime
conditions at a municipal level, particularly with respect to defence. (Who else would do that?
The JNA was obliged to defend the entire territory of Yugoslavia, but the Armed Forces
of the SFRY comprised the municipal forces, TO and police too. Apart of this, the
Constitution and the law on Defence strictly defined the competences and obligations of
the Municipal authorities, under the treath of punishment for a high treason! Fo these
arguments see:@ the Crisis Staffs were only another name of the official municipal
authorities, as were the War Presidencies, composed of the high municipal officials ex
oficio!) It was also clear that the Crisis Staffs were to work in accordance with decisions of the
 833

higher level authorities, including the Presidency, the Bosnian Serb Assembly and Bosnian Serb
Government and were also a crucial structure in ensuring that the higher level authorities were
informed about developments on the ground. (Senseless! How could be otherwise?)

3087. The Chamber finds that the President played a central role in instructing how the Crisis
Staffs would function and be structured and this demonstrates one of the ways in which the
President exercised his authority over the Crisis Staffs. (Taking into account the fact that the
new authorities established after the first democratic elections had been composed of the
persons tha were so many decades far from any administration or rule, there was an
obligation to instruct them how to act in accordance with the laws and Constitution. This
was not a crime, and there was no a single example that the President, or other high
officials or institutions directed any unlawful instruction. The “finding” that the President
of the Republic of Srpska “played a central role” is ridiculous, but is not entirely correct,
since the scope of competences and structures of the local authorities had been regulated
by the laws and constitutions, not by the President’s instructions!) The Chamber does not
find that isolated and limited acts of insubordination at the municipal level negated the
President‘s overall clear authority over Crisis Staffs. In this regard, the Chamber notes that, in
September 1992, the President acknowledged that ―some municipal officials behaved
unlawfully‖ and that the Bosnian Serb Assembly needed to point out these incidents and to take
measures to arrest and punish them.10017 (Only this quotation is sufficient to rebut the
previous “finding” that the President had “overall clear authority over Crisis Staffs.
There was an Assembly session at which the President asked the Assembly to authorise
the Presidency or the Government to be able to dismiss a municipal leaders that didn’t
follow the rule of law, see:D456, p. 15:

So, the President asked the Assembly to authorise the Presidency and Government to be
able to act and intervene in a municipalities where there was an #improper conduct#!):
The President added ―we must visit municipalities and restore order even at the risk of
introducing extraordinary measures, making replacement, arrests, appointments and naming
others who, with the help of deputies, will be able to pull the municipality out of a crisis‖.10018
The Chamber finds this shows that on the limited occasions where municipal officials failed to
follow directions, the President had the authority and the means to rectify such situations. (As it
can be seen, this inference of the Chamber was not correct, since at the same session (see
the pasted part above) the President asked for such an authorisation to be able to rectify a
misconducts inbetween two sessions of the Assembly. If the last sentence was correct, why
the President would ask for an authorisation, and why nobody worned him that he
already has the authorisation? Those who assisted the Chamber in writing the Judgement,
made a bad service to it, and to the Defence by making so obvious mistakes!)

3088. From May 1992, War Presidencies and War Commissions took over the functions of the
Crisis Staffs and the leading role at a municipal level and were the link to the higher level
authorities. (As with the Crisis Staffs, the war presidencies hadn’t been any new organ of

10017
D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 15.
10018
D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 15.
 834

the authority, but the same people that won the elections in 1990. All of it was regulated by
the Laws and Constitution, see: @ : The Accused himself in 1994 and 1995 recalled the
central role which the Variant A/B Instructions and the Crisis Staffs played during the conflict
in order to create parallel Serb structures and military units, which ultimately took control of
territory and power at a municipal level. (This is a unique example that the Defence had to
prove that the# basic legal documents, such as Constitution and the Law on Defence is
violated by the Prosecution and the Chamber#. When indicting the President, the
Prosecution was obliged to point out what a legal provisions he violated, taking into
account the domestic mandatory provisions. Let us see what is defined in the BiH
Constitution, P1262, article 260:

or the same P1262, Article 269:

or the same document P1262

which is a very broad competence and obligation, not introduced in the practice by the
President; or the same document, Article 273.:

The question is: how was it possible that the #Prosecution didn’t know even its own
document# of the basic and inevitable relevance for the Indictment, so deluding the
Chamber to draw so many incorrect inferences?):

3089. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that the Variant A/B Instructions were formulated,
distributed, and ultimately followed at a municipal level. The President was intimately involved
in this process through his distribution of the instructions and his subsequent involvement in
monitoring the implementation of those instructions. The Chamber further finds that the
Variant A/B Instructions were used to create parallel Bosnian Serb structures and bodies at a
municipal level. The instructions also provided for the military organisation of the Bosnian
Serbs at a municipal level. (It is pretty senseless to comment such a senseless assertions and
 835

“findings” while both the Prosecution and the Chamber had at their disposal all the basic
legislature that regulated these issues. See: D1262, the BiH Constitution: and the
Constitution of the SFRY, Article 239:

The “Communes” is another term for “municipalities” and in Serbian original it was
written municipalities. So, every single subject in municipalities, including companies,
associations and municipal bodies were responsible for the defence, and the President
didn’t invent a single innovation or invention of his own!) : The Variant A/B Instructions
were a crucial initial step towards establishing Bosnian Serb authority in Bosnian Serb claimed
territory. As discussed in Section IV.A.1 of this Judgement, following the creation of these
parallel structures, Serb Forces were able to take-over power in the Municipalities. Following
these take-overs, the parallel structures including the Crisis Staffs and Bosnian Serb municipal
assemblies were able to maintain power in the Municipalities. (First of all, there was no any
need for a “parallel structures”, since the elected authorities had their own rights, duties
and obligations in all aspects of the life and management in municilapities. See what was
provided by the Constitution of BiH in the domain of defence, D1262, Article 263, points
14 and 15:

And there are many other competences, so that municipality was a “state within a state”.
But, who established that these institutions were “parallel institutions”? Parallel to what?
#The Serbs and several parties that represented the Serb ethnic community in BiH were a
legal and legitimate part of the political system and the system of the state authorities in
BiH. The #“parallel institutions” were not parallel to anyone and anybody#, but were the
only institutions legaly established and it’s public servants legitimately elected#. If the
Muslims accepted to form their own ethnic municipalities in the Republic of Srpska,
which was offered to them by the Serb side even after the war broke out, even in this case
no a Serb or a Muslim institutions would be “parallel” but the only in a certain territory,
as the Brussels municipalities are not “parallel” to each other, but are the only in their
respective areas. These trials and this Judgement are such a precedent, hopefully only
because of a tremendous misunderstanding, that it may serve as an example how the
international justice is not possible!)

3090. The Chamber finds that one of the first steps in the Bosnian Serb objective of creating a
separate state was the expansion and delineation of territory. The parallel municipal structures
which were created pursuant to the Variant A/B Instructions, played a pivotal role in this
process of territorial expansion and delineation of territory.(These misunderstandings and
 836

misinterpretations are endless, because the very fundamental premises had been wrong.
#There was no any “parallel municipal structures”, but there was a new municipalities,
completely legally and legitimately formed, in accordance with the law and Constitution#,
see: the BiH Constitution, D1292,

As could be seen, both – establishment of a new and dissolution of existing municipalities,

as well as their aggregation in the “communities of municipalities” or a regions, was
regulated by the Constitution as a sovereign right of the people living in the areas, and the
territories of the municipalities was in a competence of municipalities to be determined.
All that the Prosecution charged the President, and the Chamber accepted had been
completely out of any illegal activity, legal, legitimate and a law binding, while the
President was in charge to secure the institutions function properly, particularly in an
immediate treath of war, or in a war, the President was supposed and obliged to monitor
the functioning of authorities more thoroughly! What was the crime in it?) :

3091. The Chamber finds that the aCCUSED played a central role in promoting this territorial
delineation and the steps that needed to be taken in order to establish the borders of the SerBiH
in accordance with their territorial and strategic aspirations. (And #in accordance with the
international mediators, Lord Carrington and Ambassador Cutileiro#. The delineation
was one of the #tasks of all the three sides, to bring their maps of territorial delineation of
the three constituent units. Had it been finished on 18 March, to be adopted together with
the political arrangement, maybe there wouldn’t be any war! How the President could be
charged for such a regular and agreed activities?) The President actively encouraged and
supported the division of municipalities on ethnic lines. (That was true, but that fact is
completely rebuting the main allegation of the Prosecution, the main construction of the
Joint Criminal Enterprise comprised of a criminal attempt to expel all the Muslims and
Croats out of the Serb claimed territories. #On the contrary, offering to the Muslim and
Croat sides to form their own municipalities even in the Republic of Srpska, and run their
affairs unhindered, makes the alleged “permanent removal” and other crimes completely
impossible and unnecessary#. Impossible, because the non-Serbs would have the same as
the Serbs did have, the police, administration, territorial defence, and nobody would
dominate over them, and vice bersa. There can not be “i jare, i pare”, i.e. to eat cake and
to have it, and that is what this court wanted to have, as this paragraph depicts!) He also
emphasised the importance of taking control and power of territory in establishing the de facto
situation which would form the basis for the creation of their state. (Wrong! To take control
was a legal obligation for a responsible authorities, and this task was issued before the
war, and had nothing to do with the armed conflicts. In a state of imminent treath of war,
the municipal authorities must be in control of all processes and events, as it is provided in
the Constitution and the Law on Defence, and other documents, like D4282, pp.5-6.
 837

p.7

So, the population is both entitled and obliged to self-organise and engage in a defence
against all internal and external enemies, without waiting for anyone to order this
defence! Further, D4282, p. 8:.

These provisions give all the answers to the Prosecution allegations/ the Chamber
findings, rebutting all of them! See the same exhibit, p. 8-9 on the rights and obligations of
the local authorities:

): The
Chamber also finds that the President played a leading role in the separation of municipal
structures and the establishment of parallel Serb structures which would allow this objective to
be achieved. (#TIME SHIFTING#! This senseless finding is commented in the para 3051.
Just to remind the readers: the Assembly session at which it had been said had been held
on 18 March 1992, the very #same day when the Lisbon Agreement had been agreed#. The
President made his speech aimed to make the municipal authorities aware that the entire
responsibility for their areas and municipalities from that moment on was on them, the
authorities in municipalities. At that moment there was a firm conviction that the crisis
will be resolved politicaly and that there will not be any war. But, if depicted as if it was
said in another time and occasion, for instance far before the agreement was reached, or
after the war broke out, the meaning sould have to be determined in accordance to a
moment and circumstances!) The steps taken with respect to the creation of the SerBiH were
 838

also informed by the objectives of the unity and non-separation of the Serb people which has
been previously discussed.

3092. The Chamber finds that what the Accused said at the Bosnian Serb Assembly on
18 March 1992 is particularly instructive as it underscores that he and the Bosnian Serb
leadership had clearly made plans which would allow for the rapid seizing of power at a
municipal level when the time was right.10019 This speech also demonstrates that the President
was adamant that the Bosnian Serbs would achieve what they wanted, that they clearly had
strategic objectives which had to remain secret but which would be realised. The Chamber
finds that this objective was the seizure and control of Bosnian Serb claimed territory in a
manner which would allow for the creation of an ethnically homogeneous state. (# All wrong,
as follows: a) the power in the Serb municipalities had been seized after the elections in
1990, and nobody contested it. b) There was a task to execute this authority thoroughly
and completely. That became particularly importans from 18 March on, for the
Agreement had to be implemented. c) none of the plans were ever secret, because it was
posted by the Serb side as a precondition for the independence of BiH: either the entire
BiH remains in Yugoslavia, or the Serb areas remain in Yugoslavia, such as the Nortern
Ireland remained in the United Kingdom, because of the majority of unionists and
protestants, - or, the least and the most painful Serb concession: to reorganise the future
independent BiH, and the Serbs stay in BiH, provided they are recognised their “high
autonomy” within BiH, as Mr. Izetbegovic proposed in the Hague in 1991, at the ICFY.
The ethnic homogeneity was meditated before the war, to be achieved by political means,
by being moderate in claiming the other’s territories, as noticed by the Chamber in
para@. After tis compromising proposal, immediately recognised by the UN and EC,
there was no any chance that the Serbs would accept a unitary BiH, no matter who was
their leader!@

3093. The Chamber also finds that while the President expressed caution and emphasised that
the steps they would take were defensive for the purposes of international opinion,
(#MANIPULATION WITH WORDS#! This is a mere manipulation with the President
words. The defensive strategy was not for the “international opinion”, but because the
Serbs didn’t want to take anything that already wasn’t their. For the international opinion
was a political speech to moderate the goals, and to chose the minimal, only necessary
means in defence, both in rhetoric and in a battlefield if there would be any!) he clearly
envisaged that if their objectives could not be achieved politically they would use military
means and if there was war he would issue plans about how to proceed. (#Further
manipulation#: the Serbs didn’t need any military means to achieve their rifht
objectives, which had been achieved by a political means. A military means were needed
by those who wanted to prevent the Serbs from achieving their political objectives, and the
Serbs needed a military means only to defend themselves from the adversary’s military
means. For what the Serbs would need the military means? They did have in their
possession more territories than they could keep in their republic in a new structure of
Bosnia. In this territory the Serbs had their legitimate authorities. The international
community recognised the Serb rights in a case Bosnia wanted to be independent, starting
from the ICFY in 1991, through the Badinter’s Commission, to the Carringto-Cutileiro
conference and through all other conferences: Vance-Owen, Owen-Stoltenberg, the
Contact Group, to the final, Dayton Agreement!) The Chamber notes that when war did
break out the President repeated his emphasis on the need to protect the Bosnian Serbs from
genocide and characterised their fight as one which was defensive in order to achieve their

10019
See para. 3051.
 839

objectives. (#Not to achieve, to defend their objectives, already achieved#. What was the
alternative? To be obedient and accept an inferior status in a hostile fundamentalist
regime?)

3094. The Chamber notes textual provisions, including the Bosnian Serb Constitution, included
protections for the rights of all people. The President also spoke about the full respect for the
rights of other nationalities and that the probable resettlement of people should not occur under
pressure. Other Bosnian Serb leaders also spoke about respecting the rights of non-Serbs who
decided to remain in the SerBiH. However, the Chamber finds that there was a clear
disjuncture between what was written on paper, what the President and the Bosnian Serb
leadership said in public, and the way in which Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were
treated in practice following the formation of the SerBiH. In this regard the Chamber refers to
its extensive factual findings with respect to the crimes which were committed against Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Municipalities and which resulted in the creation of a
largely ethnically homogeneous state. (Not even close to be true! First, there were #two
third of the Serb municipalities without mentioned crimes; second, in the municipalities
where there was over 90% of the “non-Serbs” who didn’t have any troubles, see D2424,
P3788, see a numerous evidence about the Muslim requests to be facilitated to go
elsewhere, see how many Muslims and Croats remained in the Serb areas to the end of the
war. Nobody can say that it was a systemic attitude towards the “non-Serbs” because for
instance in Sanski Most municipality out of 27 Muslim and 9 Croat villages there was a
war between the Serb and Muslim forces only in three villages and one suburb in the
town! In the very same families one of members had a troubles with the law, while others
didn’t, see the first witness Zulic!) This kind of establishing truth is not seen in the judicial
practice!

3095. The Chamber finds that these public announcements, speeches, and decisions were often
for the consumption of international public opinion and to show that the Bosnian Serb state
which was being created was one which respected the law and the rights of all people. The
Chamber does not find that either the statements of the President or the Bosnian Serb leadership
in this regard were genuine; in fact, they were completely disingenuous, having regard to the
reality of what was happening on the ground in the Municipalities. (There was so many
genuine orders marked and issued as a “strictly confidential” or communicated to the
military or political officials at a closed meetings, that make this finding and assertion of
the Chamber fake and senseless. On the other hand, the# international representatives
requested that the President make his intentions and his attitudes public#, so that his
followers know what they are expected to follow, see P941, p. 3:

The same was repeated, many times, with the ICRC and UNHCR, who wanted the
President to make public his support to their activities, so that they have as smooth
passage as possible, and the President did it many times. The UNPROFOR also asked in
several occasions that the President state something publicly in their favour, and he did, as
well as to make public his position towards the humanitarian convoys and flights, and he
did, and it gave a very good results!) The Chamber also refers to its findings below with
respect to the Accused‘s knowledge of crimes which were being committed in BiH. The
Chamber notes for example its finding above, that while the Accused made these public
statements about the protection of minorities, Bosnian Muslims continued to be forced out of
municipalities in BiH. (There was# no a single evidence on a single case that the authorities
“forced out” the Muslim population#. On the contrary, the authorities made #many
 840

obstacles to their attempts to leave#, demanding up to fifteen papers to be submitted. Also,

the Muslims made many efforts to be put on the waiting lists for convoys. If there was any
harassment, it had never been tolerated, let alone carried out by the authorities. The civil
war among so antagonised communities made more Serb refugees than Muslim and Croat
together, and some of these refugees may have had a negative attitude to the Muslims, but
not the authorities! This kind of “findings” and assertions rather look like a propaganda
built in the Indictment, and picked up from the media propaganda by the Prosecution!)
In addition, the Chamber finds the evidence above demonstrates that the Bosnian Serbs were
aware that some of their speeches were being recorded and could be reported on by journalists
and in that context were cautious in terms of what was said. (On the contrary, the Serbs are
known as a “talkative” people, and both before and in the war the President quarrelled
with some representatives about their radicalism. The military people found useful to be a
tough in their statements, in order to keep the moral of their several times smaller army
and soldiers, but the President realised that they never did what they said.)

3096. The President and the Bosnian Serb leadership continued to emphasise that they wanted to
create a reality on the ground, which then in negotiations could be used to claim territory which
they viewed as belonging to them. (To “create a reality on the ground” was a “tithe-for-
that” for the Europe, which accepted that the Serbs were right in their opposing to the
dissolution of Yugoslavia, but, there are “a new realities on the ground”, see: P12, p. 5,

That was said by the President on 14 February, #before the war#, and not in any
connection with the war, but as a political attitude. The President used this factual control
of territory and the creation of a ―new reality‖ as a means of securing international recognition
for the RS. (Since it had been said in the context of the Conference and before the war, and
when it was thought that there wouldn’t be any war, this assertion of the Chamber is
wrong! But, anyway, how possibly only one out of the three constituent communities could
have imposed their solution to the others, even if there was no control of territory???
Would the international community support this manner?) It was also clear that the
President acknowledged the military manner in which this ―reality‖ was created and gave credit
to the Serb Forces for their role in achieving this objective of territorial control. (On 14
February 1992 there was no any war, and the political means gave a good results, so a
“military manner” was not needed, nor the President at that moment had any military to
threat with!)

b. Authority over military and police forces acting in BiH

i. VRS
 841

3097. The Chamber noted above that the Army of SerBiH was established on 12 May 1992 and
was renamed the VRS on 12 August 1992.10020 It was formed from parts of the JNA, TO, and
volunteer units.10021 It inherited both officers and soldiers from the JNA, many of whom were
of Bosnian Serb origin, as well as a substantial amount of weaponry and equipment.10022 (The
Muslim and Croat armies were formed of the former JNA officers and soldiers, i.e.
reservists as the VRS, and a huge amount of the JNA armament was inherited by these
armies too, but these armies were clandestinely formed at the beginning of 1991 and
clandestinely armed by their international friends!)

1. Supreme commander

3098. As noted above, whether in the three-member or the five-member Presidency, the
President was in charge of military affairs.10023 As the RS President the President was the
Supreme Commander of the VRS,10024 a position that he held until July 1996.10025 (It was until
midd-May 1996, when the President handed the office over to Ms. Plavsic!) The President‘s
position as the Supreme Commander of the VRS was clearly recognised by the civilian and
military Bosnian Serb leadership.10026 (That didn’t depend on anyone’s will, that was
provided by the Constitution and Law on Defense, and Law on military!) During the time
period relevant to the Indictment, the President was the highest authority in the VRS chain of
command.10027 (As of 15 June 1992 the President was only in the strategic level of
command, while he himself handed the operational and tactical command to the Main
Staff of the VRS, see p. 3035, PARA 4! This was within the attitude that a war is waged by
a state, but armed combats are carried out by a military people!)

3099. In an interview on 6 January 1995, the Accused stated that ―all speculations about the
army not obeying the civilian authority are out of place. As the supreme commander, I get all
the respect from the officers and soldiers. […] I want them to ‗argue‘ with me about various
solutions because it helps me to make the right decision, but when I make a decision, they carry
it out brilliantly‖.10028 The Accused cited the example of an order he gave to ―cut the territories
taken by the Muslims on the Bihać battlefield, and to pursue and destroy them, I was absolutely
sure that our army would comply. […] Whatever the Supreme Command decides gets fully

10020
See para. 160. For ease of reference the acronym ―VRS‖ will be used throughout this section to also cover the period prior to 12 August 1992, when the
Army of SerBiH was renamed the VRS.
10021
See para. 161.
10022
See para. 161.
10023
See paras. 96–97; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5107 (14 July 2010); D440 (Minutes of 15th session of SerBiH Presidency, 6 July 1992), p. 3.
10024
P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 174; Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25441 (28 February 2012); Mićo Stanišić, T. 46360 (3 February 2014),
T. 46577 (5 February 2014); Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9108.
10025
See para. 167.
10026
See, e.g., D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 19; Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik),
T. 9436–9440; P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995), p. 49; P970 (Transcript of 50th session of RS Assembly, 15–16 April
1995), p. 313; Bogdan Subotić, T. 40061 (19 June 2013); P5053 (Conclusions from a meeting attended by the highest representatives of RS, 7 October
1993), pp. 4–5. See also P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), paras. 112, 208, 211 (stating that he never sensed that the
Accused lost control of the military; instead ―at all times the military was responsive to the political leadership‖ and that the military and political leadership
were not always in agreement and there were occasional reticent or divergent views, however, ―the chain of command remained intact‖); Anthony Banbury,
T. 13349–13350 (15 March 2011).
10027
P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 174; D422 (Transcript of 19th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 August 1992), pp. 63–64; P5578
(Amended Text of the Constitution of the RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), art. 106; Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9108; KDZ088, T. 6357 (8 September 2010) (private session); Jovan Šarac, T. 47162–47163 (14 February 2014). See also
P3036 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Decision on the establishment of the VRS Supreme Command, 30 November 1992); P1388 (Transcript of 39th session of RS
Assembly, 24–25 March 1994), pp. 85–86; Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25108–25109 (22 February 2012); P3041 (VRS Main Staff Report, 31 March 1994), p.
5; P4493 (VRS Main Staff Order, 7 February 1994); P4447 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order, 24 April 1994); P4495 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order to VRS Main
Staff and RS MUP, 29 March 1995); Rupert Smith, T. 11326–11328 (8 February 2011); Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25444–25445 (28 February 2012), T.
25484–25486 (29 February 2012); Dušan Kovaĉević, T. 39657 (11 June 2013); Jovan Šarac, T. 47162–47163 (14 February 2014); Petar Škrbić, T. 26024–
26026 (8 March 2012); P1469 (Minutes of VRS Supreme Command meeting, 20 December 1992); P3148 (Handwritten notes of Supreme Command
meeting, 8 May 1994); P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995); Milan Ninković, T. 40505–40506 (26 June 2013).
10028
P953 (Article from OsloboĊenje entitled ―Happy Birthday Republic‖, 6 January 1995), p. 9.
 842

done‖.10029 (Why the President was asked such a kind of question? Because there were
rumors that it was not so. It was well known that the President #stopped the VRS many
times, just on the edge of a victory#, and the military people had every right to be
disappointed and unsatirfied by that. Also, there was many disputes about limiting the
VRS only to the Serb areas, which gave a tremendous asvantage to their adversaries, who
were in a position to chose when and where to attack the VRS, and the President was
wrong to that aspect. The Prosecution witness said in his testimony that the President
frequently objected te VRS for being too militant, which was a contradiction in adjecto,
because it was the very essence of any army! But, the President didn’t interfere in a
carring out the battles, since it was handed over to the Main Staff, except when the
President was asked by the internationals to intervene in stopping his own Army, or
during the military riots in September 93 in Banja Luka!)

2. Command and control system

3100. The Chamber notes that, on 15 June 1992, in his capacity as the President of the
Presidency, the President established a system of command and control in the VRS, which
included a Main Staff —directly subordinated to him—that had command and control over the
operative groups.10030 (That meant the operative and tactical level of command handed
over to the Main Staff!)

3101. During the first months of the conflict, the President, Krajišnik, Koljević, and Plavšić did
not deal with issues that related to military affairs and warfare and Mladić enjoyed freedom in
devising and executing military operations while claiming that he was fully subordinate to the
Bosnian Serb political leadership.10031 However, this restraint on the part of the Bosnian Serb
political leadership waned starting in June 1992 when they began to gradually limit Mladić and
eventually the ―political power was on top‖.10032

3102. On 30 November 1992, the President established the Supreme Command for the purpose
of co-ordinating and improving the efficiency of the command system of the VRS.10033

3103. In a report, prepared by the Main Staff, analysing the combat readiness of the VRS in
1992, it is noted that the VRS had evolved into the ―highest strategic organisational formation
of the Serbian people in the former [BiH], capable of realising the strategic and other tasks
assigned to it by the Supreme Command.‖10034 It further stated that the VRS

has been under a single control and command structure, despite the fact that initially we had a large
number of different armies and paramilitary formations. This unity has been attained by following

10029
P953 (Article from OsloboĊenje entitled ―Happy Birthday Republic‖, 6 January 1995), pp. 9–10.
10030
P3035 (Decision on Army of SerBiH, 15 June 1992), p. 3; P4917 (Richard Butler‘s expert report entitled ―VRS Main Staff Command Responsibility
Report‖, 9 June 2006), paras. 2.0–2.1. In 1992, the Main Staff was subordinated to the Presidency. The Chamber recalls that on 17 December 1992, the
Bosnian Serb Assembly replaced the structures of the Presidency by establishing a single President and two vice-Presidents; from then on the VRS Main
Staff was subordinated to the President of the RS. See para. 98. The Chamber also notes the evidence that while the formal conditions for establishing the
army were created on 19 May 1992, it took a while to pass the bylaws and implement regulations on the ground. See Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5202 (15 July
2010). However, the Chamber notes that already on 14 May 1992 the Accused was involved in discussions as to the establishment of the command and
control system. P3079 (Minutes of joint session of the National Security Council and the SerBiH Government, 14 May 1992), p. 2. See also D3695
(Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 276. A similar conclusion was reached to place members of the Cabinet on duty. D414
(Minutes of 19th session of Government of SerBiH, 2 June 1992), p. 3
10031
[REDACTED]. John Wilson stated that he attended a meeting on 25 May 1992, in relation to opening the Sarajevo airport and in the presence of Plavšić,
Mladić stated that he was subordinated to the political leadership. P1040 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Biljana Plavšić and Ratko Mladić, 25 May
1992), para. 7; P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 74.
10032
[REDACTED]. See also D3960 (Witness Statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28 October 2013), paras. 91, 96 (stating that since the founding of the VRS
there was an ―ideological conflict‖ between the civilian authorities and the Main Staff).
10033
See para. 165.
10034
D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 7. See also P976 (Directive 4, 19 November 1992), p. 2
(wherein Mladić reported that the SRK ―has fully stabilised command and control in the Corps and subordinate units‖).
 843

well-known principles, such as: unity, continuity, flexibility, efficiency, operationability [sic] and
security, with subordination and a single command having a crucial bearing on relations in the
control and command process.10035

3104. The strategic level of command was within the remit of the Supreme Command and the
Main Staff whereas the operative level of command was at the corps level.10036 However, as
shown below, the President‘s involvement went beyond planning strategy and in several cases
he was involved in the operational level as well. (Except the case of the military riots in
September 1993 in Banja Luka, all other cases it was on a #direct request of the
internationals, and always in terms of limiting an advancement and success of the VRS#!)

3105. The military chain of command went from the President to the Commander of the Main
Staff and then down to the corps commands and brigades.10037 The Main Staff would prepare
proposals for operations for the Accused; he would then consider them and issue
instructions.10038 In the context of the SRK, Stanislav Galić testified that he could receive
orders from both the President, as the Supreme Commander, and Mladić, as commander of the
Main Staff.10039 Similarly, in a meeting between Milovanović and Bogdan Subotić, the former
confirmed to the latter that the President, as the Supreme Commander, had the ultimate say and
that in a situation where there is a standing order by Mladić the military subordinates had to
obey it unless and until they received an order from the Accused.10040

3106. The Accused stated in 5 April 1993 that:

The Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska has performed the functions of the Staff of the
Supreme Command and at the same time that of the superior command for operational and some
joint tactical formations, which presupposed the agreement of the Supreme Command in respect of
all tasks and objectives of the armed struggle. This relationship between the command structures
and the organs of the government and the Supreme Command made it impossible for the Main
Staff to make decisions absolutely on its own, rather every operational battle was politically
endorsed on the basis of interests of the Serbian people, and approved by the highest authorities of
Republika Srpska.10041

3107. The military reporting chain in the VRS followed a hierarchical structure with the
information originating from the lower military units being reported, up the chain of command,
to the Accused.10042 The Chamber recalls its finding that while there were disruptions in
10035
D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 7.
10036
Stanislav Galić, T. 37593–37597 (23 April 2013).
10037
D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 60, 69; Bogdan Subotić, T. 40061 (19 June 2013). Subotić also stated that this
chain of command was only formed after 12 May 1992 and that before this date the Accused had no formal control of the military. See also Petar Škrbic, T.
25971–25972 (7 March 2012); P1029, (Witness statement of John Wilson 4 November 2008), para. 127. The Chamber notes that according to Kuprešanin
there was no co-ordination or subordination between the civilian authorities and the military authorities, as they each operated independently with their own
chains of command, whereas, according to KDZ490 the SDS party in Sanski Most had enormous influence over the VRS, especially after October 1992,
since the VRS Light Brigades were directly financed by the municipality budgets, except for former JNA officers who were still paid by the JNA. Vojislav
Kuprešanin, T. 43518–43520 (14 November 2013); P3634 (Witness statement of KDZ490, undated), pp. 13, 38 (under seal) (testifying, inter alia, that when
the SDS wanted to remove Colonel Basara, Commander of the 6 th Sana Brigade, because he was ―too soft for the SDS‖, the SDS in Sanski Most exercised
pressure on General Talić to remove him). See also P6510 (Excerpt of Vojislav Kuprešanin's interview with OTP), e-court p. 7. However, the Chamber
notes that the Main Staff of the VRS, when it found it necessary, reminded the commanders of corps and brigades that they could receive assignments and
orders only from the Main Staff of the VRS and the Accused, as the Supreme Commander. P3041 (VRS Main Staff Report, 31 March 1994), p. 5. See also
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25632 (1 March 2012); P4494 (Eastern Bosnia Corps Order, 1 April 1994), pp. 5–6.
10038
D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 72, 84, 89–90. See also Stanislav Galić T. 37594 (23 April 2013); John Zametica,
T. 42457, 42517 (29 October 2013); P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson 4 November 2008), para. 136. The Chamber places no weight on Subotić‘s
opinion that until the formation of the Supreme Command, Mladić did not report to anyone or if he did report to anyone it was to the Accused.
10039
Stanislav Galić, T. 37593–37597 (23 April 2013). However, the Chamber notes that Galić could not remember any ―immediate combat orders‖ received
from the Supreme Command. Stanislav Galić, T. 37602–37603 (23 April 2013). See also paras. 3129, 4755–4756, 4762.
10040
Bogdan Subotić, T. 40061 (19 June 2013).
10041
D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 153. See also Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25632 (1 March
2012) (stating that the army remained under the Accused‘s personal command and that ―no one from the Supreme Command could issue orders to the Main
Staff other than [the Accused]‖. See also para. 3129.
 844

telecommunications in 1992, the RS authorities were still able to communicate,10043 and notes
that the VRS had at its disposal a superior communication system.10044 In its report analysing
the combat readiness of the VRS in 1992, the Main Staff concluded with ―a high degree of
certainty‖ that the existing communication system met the needs of command co-ordination and
reporting at all levels, from the Supreme Command, the Supreme Commander, the Main Staff
to lower levels.10045 The Chamber also observes that Mladić and other members of the Main
Staff had direct telephone contact with the President,10046 and that Mladić also visited the
President frequently.10047

3108. The Accused received regular reports from the army10048 and even during 1992, while the
communication was more limited he received reports based on the modes of communication
which were available.10049 [REDACTED] testified that the President ―was exceptionally well
informed about the complete situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina‖ and the army sent him regular
written or oral reports.10050 (Since all of these reports had been available to the Prosecutor,
was there any of alarming data, which would have to warn the President to act? Since the
same reports had been distributed to a tens of destinations, there could not be any
covering or hiding the reports.)

3109. The Accused received, for example, military intelligence information reports,10051 reports
about the situation in Rogatica in May 1992,10052 reports concerning military formations in the
ARK following a visit of Bogdan Subotić there in September 1992,10053 and a report from the
Command of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade about disputes and difficulties in co-
operation with the civilian authorities in Sokolac.10054 (So what? Did the President neglect

10042
Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tolimir), T. 11973–11974. See also P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff
Structure for July 1995); Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25092–25093 (22 February 2012); P2068 (Witness statement of Jeremy Bowen dated 10 August 2009),
para. 31 (referring to an interview with the Accused in Geneva in the winter of 1992–1993 during which the Accused spoke of the ―disciplined‖ Bosnian
Serb police and army).
10043
See paras. 3019–3020. See also, e.g., para. 2293; Dragomir Milošević, T. 32871–32879 (29 January 2013) (testifying about difficulties in the
communication system in the SRK but added that the system of command is always repaired and improved, and towards the end it functioned meticulously);
P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May 2010), paras. 6, 106 (testifying that in the period of October 1992 until March 1993 ―the Bosnian
Serb Army had very efficient and comprehensive communications‖ and ―[w]henever General Mladić wanted to speak with someone or find something out
from someone, It always happened quickly.‖); P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 228 (Colonel Ţivanović reporting that he had
established communications with several municipalities, including Bratunac, Zvornik and Vlasenica, and that ―Motorola hand-held radios are in companies-
platoons in those sectors.‖)
10044
P1029, (Witness statement of John Wilson 4 November 2008), para. 130. See also P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May 2010), paras. 6,
106; P2794 (Witness statement of Ranko Vuković dated 24 May 2011), p. 4.
10045
D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), pp. 8–9.
10046
Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25103–25104 (22 February 2012).
10047
P4358 (Witness statement of Mira Mihajlović, 6 February 2012), para. 30.
10048
D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 86, 91–92. See also P3061 (Minutes of the 3rd session of the SerBiH Presidency,
8 June 1992) (summarising a session in which the Presidency was briefed on the situation at the front and agreed on a plan of daily activities); D428
(Minutes of 4th expanded meeting of SerBiH War Presidency, 9 June 1992) (briefing the Accused in detail about the overall situation in the VRS, including
figures on the quantities of weapons, ammunition, spare parts and reserves and a reporting on the situation in the area of Banja Luka Corps); P1093 (Minutes
of 5th session of SerBiH Presidency, 10 June 1992); P3063 (Minutes of the 7 th session of the SerBiH Presidency, 16 June 1992); P3064 (Minutes of the 8 th
session of the SerBiH Presidency, 17 June 1992); P3072 (Minutes of the 27 th session of RS Presidency, 31 August 1992) p. 2; P1465 (Minutes of 19 th
session of SerBiH Presidency, 13 July 1992); P1467 (Minutes of 21 st session of SerBiH Presidency, 2 August 1992), p. 2; P1508 (VRS Main Staff Order, 1
June 1992); P1786 (VRS Main Staff Report, 14 April 1994).
10049
D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 86, 91–92.
10050
[REDACTED].
10051
John Zametica, T. 42443 (29 October 2013). See also P1469 (Minutes of VRS Supreme Command meeting, 20 December 1992); D3685 (RS President's
Office request to VRS Main Staff, 3 October 1995); D4780 (VRS Main Staff Intelligence Report, 14 July 1993); D4785 (VRS Main Staff Intelligence
Report, 10 August 1993); P5086 (Report of RS Main Staff, 19 March 1995). But see D3682 (Witness statement of Gordan Milinić dated 8 June 2013), para.
31, referring to D3685 (RS President's Office request to VRS Main Staff, 3 October 1995). The Chamber does not accept Milinić‘s suggestion that the RS
President's Office request to the VRS Main Staff showed that the Main Staff ignored the Accused and did not inform him about developments. The
Chamber notes that the testimony of Milinić was marked by contradictions, bias, and indicators that he lacked candour. The Chamber therefore does not
find his evidence to be reliable in this regard. Rather, the Chamber finds that this requeset is indicative of the extent to which the Accused was kept
informed by the VRS about developments.
10052
See P3265 (Report of Rogatica Batallion, 23 May 1992); D2965 (Rogatica Brigade report, 29 May 1992); D3037 (Rogatica Brigade report, 9 June 1992);
P3414 (Report of the Rogatica Brigade Command, 11 June 1992); P3266 (Report of 2 nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, 15 August 1992).
10053
P3073 (Minutes of the 27th session of RS Presidency, 1 September 1992); D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 291.
10054
D3232 (Letter from 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade to Radovan Karadţić, 3 September 1992), p. 1.
 845

any of a potentially alarming reports? Have he tolerated any illegal activity of which he
was informed?)

3110. The level of knowledge of the President regarding military issues was also apparent when
he informed Bosnian Serb institutions about military developments in RS.10055

3111. Occasionally, the President visited VRS units in the field.10056 For example, the President
was in the SRK command post at the time of the operation to take over Dobrinja in June 1992,
given the importance of the operation, and, as consequence, the President was aware of
developments in this operation.10057 (So what? #Nothing illegal# in the attempt to control
Dobrinja, or in a conduct of the combatants!)

3112. Considering the above, the Chamber rejects the President‘s arguments that there was no
communication with VRS units in the field and finds that such communications did exist.10058
As will be discussed in further detail below, the Chamber also rejects the President‘s argument
that Mladić did not report to him.10059 With regard to the argument that there was a
phenomenon of false reporting in the VRS,10060 the Chamber notes a few instances, in late 1994
and 1995, in which the issue was raised,10061 but is not satisfied that the evidence demonstrates a
phenomenon of false reporting within the VRS, nor that such alleged false reports could affect
the Chamber‘s finding regarding the authority of the President over the VRS. (This is also
#misunderstood and misinterprete#d: it was well known to the Chamber that the
President had many other duties to do as the president, and that the reports directed to
the President’s office were red out by his advisors for the military questions (Gen.
Subotic) and for the state security (Mr. Gordan Milinic) and that the President dedicated
his attemtion only to these reports that were marked by his advisors. Both of them
testified and confirmed this, as well as that there was no any alarming report to which the
President didn’t react properly. Also, the Chamber had heard that the reports from the
units in the field had never reached the President unchanged or directly. All of the
company reports had been integrated in a brigade report, and a brigade reports into a
Corps reports, and all so reduced and integrated were sent to the Main Staff of VRS,
where it was further selected and integrated into a unique report to the President. As of
early 1995 there was a known rift between the President and Mladic, and in that period
the President didn’t know Mladis’c whereabouts, and that pertained to this period. Of
course, the lowest and midd commands kept silent about some of their failures, but
nothing crucial was hidden!)

10055
See, e.g., P3114 (Minutes of the 32nd session of RS Government, 13 October 1995), p. 4 (stating that the Accused informed the Government about the
military and political situation in the RS, especially in Krajina). See also D3364 (Witness statement of Dušan Kozić dated 7 April 2013), para. 25; P956
(Transcript of 16th Session of Assembly of SerBiH, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 8.
10056
P1466 (Herzegovina Corps combat report, 4 June 1992); P5522 (Communication of Drina Corps Command re Meeting with Radovan Karadţić, 2 July
1993); P2845 (Report of Bratunac Brigade, 4 August 1995).
10057
[REDACTED].
10058
Defence Final Brief, paras. 523–529. The Chamber notes, for example, the Accused‘s reference in fn. 1123 to D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat
readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 39, concerning the problem of understaffing in respect of officers and critical specialities in
communications which affected the communication system and the battle readiness. However, the Chamber also notes that it was stated afterwards in the
analysis that ―[d]espite its being undermanned the signals corps has on the whole efficiently performed its tasks of providing good quality and uninterrupted
communications links, whereby it has contributed to more successful control and command in all our units and commands.‖
10059
Defence Final Brief, paras. 560–563.
10060
Defence Final Brief, paras. 565–567.
10061
P1487 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 4 September 1994–29 January 1995), p. 142 (noting that the Accused talked about ―[i]nstances of false reporting‖); P970
(Transcript of 50th session of RS Assembly, 15–16 April 1995), pp. 328–329, 336 (wherein the Accused said: ―I have realised that I do not have control over
the Army‖ and mentioned misinformation regarding the supply of the VRS and the need to monitor and inspect; he further talked about false reports with
regard to military casualties and ―war losses‖, and concluded that ―[a]ll this, gentlemen, could be tolerated while things were going well for us, while it had
no dangerous consequences‖); John Zametica, T. 42443–42444 (29 October 2013). See also P3872 (UNPROFOR report, 10 June 1995), p.1 (reporting that
―Stanisic appeared certain, on the basis of information supplied by the UN, that Mladic was withholding a few things from him about the situation with the
[UN] hostages‖); para. 4860. In the Chamber‘s view, the Accused‘s statement to Zametica that ―[t]hey just send me lies‖, following reading an intelligence
report from Tolimir, was to indicate the Accused‘s dissatisfaction with the quality of the report. Zametica recalled in this context that the Accused said that
in his view Tolimir was using only newspapers articles for his intelligence report. John Zametica, T. 42443–42444 (29 October 2013).
 846

3. Relationship between the Accused and Mladić

3113. The Prosecution argues that the President had firm control over Mladić by virtue of his de
jure powers as President and Supreme Commander.10062 While the Prosecution admits tensions
existed between Mladić and the President, it asserts that their disagreement did not concern the
common purpose of the Overarching JCE but emerged from Mladić‘s complaints about the
President undercutting the chain of command.10063 The Prosecution ultimately argues that the
heated discussions and arguments between the President and Mladić were not a sign of an
existing rift, but were rather healthy and constructive conversations within a superior-
subordinate relationship.10064 (Since there was no any Overarching Joint Criminal
Enterprise, there was no disputes between the two about the real Serb objectives, to
protect the population and property, and to wait for a political solution. However, there
were a frequent disputes about the convoys and restraint of the VRS units, and in these
disputes the President was not always right in limiting the VRS and preventing his troops
to enter Bihac, Gorazde, Srebrenica (1993) Sarajevo and several other sensitive points. If
the VRS remained on Igman and Bjelasnica in August 1993, the war would end in a few
weeks. The VRS had a lot of good reasons to be angry with the President, but the
Chamber and the international law didn’t!)

3114. In response, the President argues that he had no control over the VRS, and that there were
de facto two commanders throughout the war: Mladić, who retained operative command of the
military authorities as the commander of the VRS, and himself, who retained political and
strategic command of the civilian authorities as the Supreme Commander.10065 The President
further argues that from the beginning, there was a lack of co-operation, mistrust, and a chasm
between Mladić and him and as a result, the President had little to no control over VRS
operations.10066 (Neither he should have it, because he himself delegated his competence of
the operational command to the Main Staff of the VRS. Why would a President run an
operational command? No president all over the world do that, and that is why there are
General Headquarters and commands! In spite of the evident rifts between the civilian
authorities which were of a non-communist, if not of an anti-communist orientation, on
one side, and the command cadre of the Army, educated and nourished in the communist
system, there was no any criminal action of the Army as it.some members of the VRS may
have committed, ad did commit, crimes, but it never happened as an army proper activity,
with the knowledge of the competent commands. Always these perpetrators had hidden
their misdeeds from the very immediate commanders!)

3115. As discussed earlier, on 12 May 1992, the VRS was established pursuant to a decision
adopted unanimously at the 16th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly; Mladić who had
assumed command of the JNA 2nd Military District two days earlier, was appointed as its
Commander.10067 The President himself explained in April 1995 how he had sought out Mladić
and supported his appointment:

I asked for Mladić. General Ninković, then a colonel, and General Perišić had visited me before that,
and I had noticed Mladić‘s blunt statements in the newspapers. He was already in Knin then. I
took an interest in him, and together with Mr. Krajišnik, I went to General Kukanjac‘s office and
listened to him issuing orders and commanding around Kupres and Knin. We spent countless
10062
See Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 380, 383–384, 390–391.
10063
See Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 434–443.
10064
See Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 434–438, 443.
10065
See Defence Final Brief, paras. 1268–1271.
10066
See Defence Final Brief, paras. 1251–1285.
10067
See paras. 160–161, fn. 424.
 847

nights in the office of General Kukanjac at that time. President Krajišnik was already President of
the Assembly, and I was just the president of the Party, I did not have any state function. We
asked for Mladić and said that they should set up the headquarters as they saw fit, we wouldn‘t
interfere.10068

3116. From the outset of their relationship, the President had authority to control the VRS,
including over Mladić as its commander.10069 During the same 12 May 1992 Bosnian Serb
Assembly session at which he was appointed Commander of the Main Staff, Mladić affirmed
that ―the President of the [SerBiH] should have command and control over the army‖.10070
Mladić himself referred to the President as the ―Supreme Commander‖.10071

3117. International observers noted that while Mladić did what the President or the Bosnian
Serb Assembly directed him to do with respect to the VRS, there were occasions where Mladić
did not necessarily do what he was ordered to do.10072 While Mladić sometimes expressed
different opinions in the context of international meetings, the President often took the lead and
Mladić allowed himself to be persuaded by the President or deferred to him in the context of
these meetings and indicated that he would do what the President said.10073 International
observers noted that there was a ―moderately healthy‖ relationship between the President and
Mladić.10074

3118. According to Harland and Rupert Smith, the President and Mladić, as well as other
members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, acted like a collective leadership; despite the existence
of some tension between the political and military leadership, this tension was not destructive
and they were ―joined at the hip‖ and conducted themselves in a single direction.10075

3119. Michael Rose, who spent much of his time in Sarajevo meeting with the President and
Mladić, testified that ―it was clear‖ that they were at the peak of the pyramid of control of the
Bosnian Serb forces.10076 He also testified that the relationship between the President and
Mladić ―was, as one would expect in a confused and brutal situation, of varying intensity‖ but
that ―generally speaking, the military were in support of the civil power, and they did not
replace it‖.10077 Throughout his time in BiH, he observed nothing to suggest there was disunity
between the military and political arms of the Bosnian Serb leadership; thus, according to Rose,
the hierarchy was functioning adequately.10078

3120. Wilson also testified that there seemed to be a very comfortable relationship between the
Bosnian Serb civilian leadership and Mladić.10079 While Mladić was a strong personality, and
capable of independent action, he would repeatedly say that he was a soldier with no political
ambitions and ultimately he did ―what his political masters told him to do‖.10080

3121. At the end of 1992, Mladić also stressed that he and the President had a ―natural
relationship‖ and there were no differences between them; they were united and struggling for
the same objectives.10081 Whenever it was considered necessary, the Presidency would call on
Mladić or his deputy to brief them on developments.10082 Mladić visited the President
frequently.10083 He and other members of the Main Staff had direct telephone contact with the
President.10084

3122. However, during the same period, international observers noted that Mladić was
increasingly powerful and they speculated that the President might ―be on the way out‖.10085 At

10068
P970 (Transcript of 50th session of RS Assembly, 15–16 April 1995), p. 317. See also P1477 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 14 February–28 May 1992), p. 292
(showing that during a meeting with Mladić on 11 May 1992, Perišić had indicated that he and Ninković together proposed to the Accused that Mladić
should come to the BiH). See also paras. 160, 169.
 848

this time, the Accused had informed international observers that he wanted to move Mladić but
this was unlikely to succeed.10086

3123. Mladić also gave the impression to international observers that nothing of military
significance could or would happen in Bosnian Serb-controlled BiH without his specific
approval.10087 At a meeting with Mladić on 4 May 1993, General Panić and Bulatović
suggested that Mladić take the floor after the Accused at the Bosnian Serb Assembly session the
following day where the Vance-Owen Plan was scheduled to be discussed and put to a vote, as
―Mladić has the greatest influence on the Serbian people‖, greater even than the President.10088

3124. In 1993 and 1994, the Accused and Mladić denied any rift between them. In August
1993, Mladić emphasised that he had never taken a decision by himself and that ―all claims
about some rift in military and political leadership are untrue‖.10089 In June 1993, Plavšić
attempted to ―inflict damage‖ on the President by referring to a conflict between him and
Mladić in public, however, according to Milovanović, there were never any open conflicts
between the President and Mladić, ―not even then or after that‖.10090 They may have had ―harsh
exchanges of opinion‖ when discussing major joint tasks, but for him, this was a normal aspect

10069
See paras. 3099, 3105.
10070
P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court p. 41.
10071
D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 19. See also P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29
August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 255 (wherein the Accused affirmed his role as Supreme Commander and in particular over
the ―strategic usage of the army, but only in situations when things go wrong […]‖. See also para. 3098.
10072
Pyers Tucker, T. 23226 (18 January 2012); P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May 2010), paras. 277–278. See also D4483 (UNPROFOR
report, 4 August 1993); D3876 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Ratko Mladić, 15 March 1995).
10073
David Harland, T. 2029–2030 (6 May 2010); P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), paras. 133–134; Pyers Tucker, T. 23226
(18 January 2012); D2026 (Excerpt from Pyers Tucker‘s diary, 13 March 1993), p. 26; P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May 2010),
paras. 68, 72, 277–278.
10074
P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May 2010), paras. 68, 72.
10075
P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 283–284 (stating further that when the Accused and Mladić were together,
usually the Accused was the protagonist); Rupert Smith, T. 11302–11304, 11326 (8 February 2011); T. 11671–11672 (11 February 2011); T. 11848 (15
February 2011) (on cross-examination, Smith could not confirm the Accused‘s contention that Slobodan Milošević, the UN, and UNPROFOR were trying to
sow discord between the Accused and Mladić but acknowledged that the political and military leadership were not always in agreement).
10076
P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 207.
10077
P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), paras. 211–212. Rose recounted, however, an incident where Mladić rejected an
agreement Rose had earlier made with the Accused, concerning the re-opening of the Tuzla airport. See P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26
March 2009), para. 32. During his time in Sarajevo, Bell heard that there was tension between the Accused and Mladić, which increased towards the latter
part of the war when the Accused began wearing a military uniform. Bell was told by an UNPROFOR source that, especially in the final year of the war, the
military was less inclined to take orders from the political leadership and supported Mladić more. See P1996 (Witness statement of Martin Bell dated 8
March 2010), paras. 113–114.
10078
P1638 (Witness statement of Michael Rose dated 26 March 2009), para. 164 (opining that the Accused‘s insistence on wearing a camouflage uniform
suggested that the Bosnian Serb leaders were at pains to demonstrate unity).
10079
P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), paras. 127, 132, 134.
10080
P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), paras. 132–134 (citing, as another example, an incident during the Sarajevo airport
negotiations where the Accused took Mladić into an adjoining room and engaged in a heated argument, after which Mladić changed his position and
accepted the proposal to hand over the airport).
10081
P1364 (Transcript of 23rd session of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), e-court p. 105. But see D3682 (Witness statement of Gordan Milinić dated 8 June
2013), paras. 11–12, 24–25, 28, 31; D3687 (RS President's Office request to VRS Main Staff, 7 August 1994); Gordan Milinić, T. 39724–39725, 39727 (11
June 2013), T. 39799–39800 (12 June 2013). Milinić stated that the Accused did not have control of the VRS and that he was not viewed as their supreme
commander and that neither the Main Staff of the VRS nor Mladić respected the Accused and the Accused was powerless. However, the Chamber notes
that the testimony of Milinić was marked by contradictions, bias, and indicators that he lacked candour. The Chamber therefore does not find his evidence
to be reliable in this regard. See also fn. 10056.
10082
Bogdan Subotić, T. 40050–40051 (19 June 2013).
10083
P4358 (Witness statement of Mira Mihajlović, 6 February 2012), para. 30 (stating further that as the Accused‘s secretary between January 1993 and January
1996, she could not recall any confrontations between Mladić and the Accused in her presence).
10084
Ljubomir Obradović, T. 25103–25104 (22 February 2012).
10085
P787 (Fourth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 67–68, 72.
10086
P787 (Fourth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 77.
10087
P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May 2010), paras. 59, 282 (wherein Tucker states that Mladić referred to himself as the Napoleon of the
Balkans and that ―he and he alone‖ would decide on issues pertaining to the safety of Serbs in BiH).
10088
P1483 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), pp. 86–87.
10089
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 72.
10090
D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 26.
 849

of the relationship between the military and political leadership.10091 Further, the President
wrote to Mladić in April 1994 and emphasised the importance of the VRS respecting his
authority and the decisions of the political leadership.10092 At a 4 August 1994 briefing by
commanders of the VRS, the President was recorded as saying: ―Everyone is looking to find a
rift among individuals in the leadership, especially between me and Mladić. They will fail at
that, because Mladić and I talk about things as brothers […] and our aim is to move together
towards the same goal.‖10093

3125. However, the Chamber received evidence of disagreements between the President and
Mladić in 1993 and 1994. On 4 August 1993, in relation to a concern that Mladić would not
withdraw from Mt. Igman and Bjelašnica in Sarajevo and a ―fall-out‖ between UNPROFOR
and Mladić the day before, the President told Milovanović, ―if I give him some orders, he has to
carry them out. He has the right to say that they are not useful and that they are damaging, but
if I later make a decision, he has to carry that out to the end‖.10094 In another conversation later
on the same day, the President told Milovanović not to come between him and Mladić, namely
that he should not ―be between the hammer and the nail, I am the supreme commander and I am
ordering; order them to withdraw and tell Mladić to report to me from the airport‖.10095 In the
same conversation, the President told Milovanović that if Mladić was preventing him from
executing his orders, ―you are then obliged to inform me and I will replace him […] you are to
carry out my executive orders because I am your supreme commander. Mladić has to carry out
every one of my orders; if he hasn‘t, I will replace him and arrest him.‖10096 (Why the
President had to say that? There was something that he ordered, but was not executed. All
the open disputes were about the political cooperation with the internationals, and very
often the President was not right, because the internationals this way protected the
Muslim side from a defeat. The VRS was supposed to win, because the other side declared
the war, not the Serb side, but the President was reluctant to have a complete victory, as it
is evident from the ehtirety of evidence. The President frequently said that if the Serbs
win, there is going to be very difficult to reconcile after the war, and a complete victory
didn’t have any sense, because this kind of wars always end at a conference!)

3126. The President suggested that Milovanović replace Mladić as commander of the Main
Staff on a number of occasions.10097 On 6 August 1993, the President presented Milovanović
with a ―fait accompli‖ in front of a large group of journalists, stating that he would hand over
the army to Milovanović as commander of the Main Staff in place of Mladić; however,
Milovanović said he would deny it without an Assembly decision to that effect.10098 In
December 1993, the President was openly critical of Mladić to Milovanović because he was
upset that he never knew Mladić‘s whereabouts; he asked Milovanović to meet with him in Pale
and stated again that it would be better if Milovanović were in command of the VRS.10099

10091
D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 26. See also P5237 (Video footage of interview with Radovan Karadţić by CNN, undated).
10092
D1590 (Radovan Karadţić ‗s letter to Chief of VRS Main Staff, 27 April 1994).
10093
P1486 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 31 March 1994–3 September 1994), pp. 252, 269.
10094
D3871 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Milovanović, 4 August 1993). See also D4483 (UNPROFOR report, 4 August 1993),
para. 1 (reporting that Mladić made strong statements to UNMOs the day before that he had no intention of withdrawing Bjelašnica and noting generally that
Mladić does not always follow political directions); D4508 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Manojlo Milovanović, 3 August
1993), p. 3 (during which the Accused told Milovanović to tell Mladić that ―only one wrong move he might make could wreck the entire country, the entire
nation. He must be cautious now and not fall for their provocations‖).
10095
P4786 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and General Milovanović, 4 August 1993), p. 2. See also D3872 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Tomanić, 11 August 1993).
10096
P4786 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and General Milovanović, 4 August 1993), p. 3.
10097
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25632, 25642–25643 (1 March 2012). See also para. 3135.
10098
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25632, 25642–25643 (1 March 2012). See also para. 3135.
10099
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25642–25643 (1 March 2012). The Accused requested that this conversation remain private but Milovanović told him that he was
obliged to inform Mladić of their conversation pursuant to the law. Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25643 (1 March 2012).
 850

Milovanović refused and stood by Mladić, who remained as commander of the Main Staff until
the end of the war.10100

3127. In September 1993, there were clear tensions between the President and Mladić,
including during their exchanges in Bosnian Serb Assembly sessions in relation to a number of
issues.10101 The President‘s authority remained clear, however, and the President himself
emphasised the authority he held, stating: ―I have issued an order to the general who is under
my command, that is not testing, that is an order‖, ―I am the Commander-in-Chief and I am
ordering necessary measures to be taken‖.10102 The President also stated that of the civilian
authorities, only he had the possibility of controlling the army and the army had to get ―used to
the fact that they are under the command and control of the civilian authority‖.10103 The
President further stressed at this meeting that if he did not continue to trust Mladić, he could and
would have dismissed him, describing him as ―the glorious fighter from Krajina‖.10104

3128. In November 1993, UNPROFOR reported that the Serbs seemed to be ―directionless‖,
noting that the President is ―blocked by Serbia and by the international community at large‖ and
Mladić is ―frustrated and is becoming increasingly bellicose‖.10105 They observed that Mladić
was more dangerous as he was feeling ineffective as a military commander and marginalised as
an individual.10106 (#UNPROFOR thus was spying#, and reporting a very sensitive
information. There is a delicate question whether any other country in crisis should admit
the UN forces, since they are privy to many secre and vital information, which they share
with another warring side, informing their country of origin and their superiors. During
the mandate, they are very biased in favour of one side, and afterwards they use to testify
at courts. The President was very humble and relactant to disclose a huge material
evidence about this issue, as well as the evidence of a detrimental effects of acting and
presence of some fake humanitarians, compromising the highest international institutions,
and some false journalists, whose conduct jeopardised lives of a genuine journalists
reporting from the local wars!)

3129. There were similar disagreements and tension between the President and Mladić during
meetings in 1994.10107 On 26 April 1994, Milovanović spoke with Gvero over the phone in
relation to an agreement with UNPROFOR whereby heavy weapons were to be withdrawn, or
put under the control of UNPROFOR, and the President had ordered the weapons to be
withdrawn; Milovanović told Gvero, ―[f]uck it, pardon my French, you put my balls in a vice.
[…] Well, because [the President] has ordered weapons to be withdrawn, Mladić doesn‘t allow
it‖.10108 Milovanović further stressed that ―here‘s what‘s important, it‘s important that [the
President] is making me pull out heavy weapons 20 km‖.10109 In May 1994, Mladić proposed to

10100
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25642–25643, 25670 (1 March 2012); D3671 (Witness statement of Dušan Kovaĉević dated 7 June 2013), para. 35. See also
P1489 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 28 August 1995–15 January 1996), p. 135 (noting that Mladić was at a meeting of the RS Supreme Command on 1
December 1995 with the Accused, Krajišnik, Plavšić, and others).
10101
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), pp. 270–272, 274–275, 306; D3695
(Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 124–125, 127–129, 140.
10102
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), pp. 278–279, 281. See also P4203
(Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May 2010), para. 283 (stating that in meetings, the Accused ―always held himself up as the Head of State‖ and
stated a number of times that the VRS reported to the Government and referred to ―my soldiers‖ and ―my army‖).
10103
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 428.
10104
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 316.
10105
P823 (UNPROFOR Weekly Political Assessment, 3 November 1993), p. 1.
10106
P823 (UNPROFOR Weekly Political Assessment, 3 November 1993), p. 6.
10107
See D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 148.
10108
D4526 (Intercept of conversation between Milan Gvero, Manojlo Milovanović and ―Tosa‖ a.k.a Zdravko Tolimir, 26 April 1994), p. 1. Gvero responded it
was impossible to implement and that there was a NATO ultimatum. D4526 (Intercept of conversation between Milan Gvero, Manojlo Milovanović and
―Tosa‖ a.k.a Zdravko Tolimir, 26 April 1994), p. 1.
10109
D4526 (Intercept of conversation between Milan Gvero, Manojlo Milovanović and ―Tosa‖ a.k.a Zdravko Tolimir, 26 April 1994), p. 2.
 851

the SDC that some generals who he believed to support the President be pensioned off.10110 In
September 1994, Gvero complained about not having enough ―real contacts with the state
leadership‖,10111 and that the President was taking decisions without the approval of the Main
Staff.10112 (That was how Gen. Gvero understood the relation between the two, President
and the Main Staff, as in the Soviet era. But he was wrong!) In October 1994, Mladić was
informed that the President did not know what to do with him.10113 (None of these conflicts
were about anyone’s crime, but always because of the international community intentions
to influence the battlefield and mitigate the Serb superiority. Every single military all over
the world would say that the President was wrong in slowing and stopping his own Army,
preventing it to win the enemy!)

3130. The Chamber notes that although the President and Mladić may have had their
differences, in the spring of 1995, they maintained their superior and subordinate relationship
within the chain of command.10114 At a session of the Supreme Command on 31 March 1995,
Mladić stated that he and the President had the greatest responsibility for the army, with the
President ―as the Supreme Command‖ and Mladić as ―[his] right hand in the army.‖10115 While
Mladić also complained that the President had stripped him of his authority to make unilateral
promotions of lower-ranking officers,10116 Mladić affirmed that the President, as the Supreme
Commander, had the right to give orders.10117

3131. Furthermore, in a speech at the 50th Bosnian Serb Assembly session on 15 and
16 April 1995, the President reassured the attendees that despite rumours of a split between he
and Mladić: ―How can there be a split between the Supreme Commander and his subordinate
commander? There is no split‖, but further stated ―[i]f there is a split, it is clear who will have
to go‖.10118 The President further stated he had not resorted to firing Mladić or any of his
assistants, and that on the whole, he had a good personal relationship with Mladić (If there was
any “personal” in these disputes, the President would be a very incapable and
irresponsible leader. All the disputes had a doctrinary matters in it’s foundation, and not
a single personal matter!) and that ―he and his Main Staff members […] respect and
recognise me‖.10119 Mladić responded later that despite the President‘s public statements about
replacing Mladić ―at the stroke of a pen‖, Mladić had made a commitment when he was sworn
in and he requested that the Assembly and the deputies ―take a vote of confidence in me and the
Main Staff‖ and reassured them that ―we‘ll work together‖.10120

10110
D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), para. 44.
10111
P1487 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 4 September 1994–29 January 1995), pp. 38–39.
10112
P1487 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 4 September 1994–29 January 1995), p. 51.
10113
P1487 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 4 September 1994–29 January 1995), pp. 123, 125.
10114
P953 (Article from OsloboĊenje, entitled ―Happy Birthday Republic‖, 6 January 1995), p. 9 (wherein the Accused states in an interview that ―as the supreme
commander, I get all the respect from the officers and soldiers, and I wouldn‘t even want our officers to be obedient or soft like an old woman. I want them
to ‗argue‘ with me about various solutions because it helps me to make the right decision‖); P3149 (Minutes of 14 th session of Supreme Command, 31
March 1995), pp. 13, 15, 20, 21, 57; P970 (Transcript of 50th session of RS Assembly, 15–16 April 1995), p. 315.
10115
P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995), p. 49.
10116
P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995), p. 9 (during which Mladić stated ―[w]e have never proposed anything that you have
done outside your jurisdication; we have proposed everyone to you, that is correct. […] You have taken all operational powers from us and from the Main
Staff‖). A few days earlier on 28 March 1995, Mladić wrote to the Accused asking him to order the Minister of Defence to annul an order he issued without
consulting the Main Staff regarding promotions and that the Minister of Defence not take away the Main Staff commanders‘ ―right to approve promotions
up to the rank and authority which they have so far had‖. D4062 (Request of VRS Main Staff to Radovan Karadţić, 28 March 1995). See also Momĉilo
Krajišnik, T. 43978−43979 (21 November 2013).
10117
P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995), pp. 8–14, 32.
10118
P970 (Transcript of 50th session of RS Assembly, 15–16 April 1995), p. 315.
10119
P970 (Transcript of 50th session of RS Assembly, 15–16 April 1995), p. 315.
10120
P970 (Transcript of 50th session of RS Assembly, 15–16 April 1995), pp. 361–362.
 852

3132. However, further tensions between the VRS and the Bosnian Serb leadership were
apparent during meetings in the spring of 1995.10121 On 29 April 1995, the President addressed
a letter to the VRS Main Staff accusing them of preparing a coup d’état, and summoned them to
a meeting in Pale.10122 On 1 May 1995, the President met with the officers of the Main Staff
and Corps commanders in Pale and complained about the actions and Mladić‘s recent behaviour
and the tension between the military and political leadership.10123

3133. In the summer of 1995, the President communicated directly with Milovanović on a few
occasions and forwarded him reports he received and decisions he made; this caused suspicion
among the other generals.10124 Milovanović reported this to Mladić, and cautioned the President
that the ―system of command was being duplicated‖; however, Milovanović never refused any
of the President‘s orders and merely forwarded them to Mladić.10125 If no response was
received, then Milovanović would act on the President‘s order.10126 By August 1995, Mladić
was more vocal and arrogant in his interactions with the President, and Mladić claimed that he
was in charge.10127 The President complained about the army, the difficulties in influencing the
Main Staff and stated that the army, as a state organ, needed to be under the command of the
state and not Mladić.10128 There were also fears of a military coup but the President continued
to speak in the capacity of the Supreme Commander of the VRS and in the interests of Serb
unity.10129

3134. During a meeting with journalist Robert ĐurĊević on 14 July 1995, the President told
him that he had heard in April 1995 that Mladić was planning a coup d’état in compliance with
instructions from Slobodan Milošević, so the President had to act to prevent it.10130 The
President told ĐurĊević that he had called a meeting of all senior officers, including Mladić, and
had confronted them with the plan; afterwards the President had a one-on-one conversation with
Mladić where, according to the President, the two of them had patched up their differences, at
least so as to be civil and respectful of each other.10131 The President told ĐurĊević that Mladić
had promised to work together with the President and other RS political leaders.10132 However,
according to ĐurĊević, the President still did not seem to be ―speaking very warm terms about
Mladić‖ and he told ĐurĊević that he would have to pension Mladić off.10133 The next day, on
15 July, in a meeting with Slobodan Milošević and Mladić, Akashi remembered Mladić being
―under very tense pressure‖.10134 Akashi recalled that the absence of the President at this
meeting gave rise to some speculation about the relationship between the President and Mladić,
10121
P1473 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 24 January–5 September 1995), pp. 130–131, 146–147. Pyers Tucker had the impression that there were also attempts by
Mladić and others to sideline Plavšić. P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May 2010), para. 36. See also P820 (Witness statement of David
Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 285–286 (stating that as time passed, the Accused seemed to have less control and there was a rift in the
relationship in 1995 which appeared to be due to policy differences).
10122
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25659 (1 March 2012); D2155 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Supreme Command, 29 April 1995).
10123
P1473 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 24 January–5 September 1995), pp. 123, 127–129 (wherein the Accused is recorded as stating that the most recent
behaviour, especially that of Mladić, resembles a ―putsch‖ and furthermore, that ―[i]t is impermissible to lecture the head of state on the state‖); Manojlo
Milovanović, T. 25658, 25661 (1 March 2012); D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 163.
10124
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25647–25648 (1 March 2012); D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 57. See D3512 (UNPROFOR report, 17 July
1995), pp. 1–2 (wherein Akashi refers to the possibility of Mladić being a ―free operator‖ and states that, ―[f]or the past several months, the military
commanders in Pale had been challenging the authority of the civilian colleagues‖).
10125
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25648 (1 March 2012).
10126
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25648 (1 March 2012).
10127
D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 166, 168–169.
10128
D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 169. See also P2683 (Radovan Karadţić‘s request to SRK commander, 5 August
1995).
10129
D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 173–177; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5340 (16 July 2010).
10130
Robert ĐurĊević, T. 25939 (7 March 2012). See also P4515 (Excerpts from Robert ĐurĊević‘s diary, 5–31 July 1995), e-court p. 10; P4513 (Witness
statement of Robert ĐurĊević dated 18 December 2002), e-court pp. 29–30. See also para. 5778.
10131
P4513 (Witness statement of Robert ĐurĊević dated 18 December 2002), e-court pp. 29–30; Robert ĐurĊević, T. 25939 (7 March 2012). See P4515
(Excerpts from Robert ĐurĊević‘s diary, 5–31 July 1995), e-court pp. 10–11.
10132
P4515 (Excerpts from Robert ĐurĊević‘s diary, 5–31 July 1995), e-court p. 11.
10133
P4513 (Witness statement of Robert ĐurĊević dated 18 December 2002), e-court p. 31; Robert ĐurĊević, T. 25939–25940 (7 March 2012).
10134
Yasushi Akashi, T. 37746 (25 April 2013).
 853

but Akashi had no actual knowledge of what was taking place.10135 (All of those meetings that
were unauthorised by the President were a violation of the rules and good habits, but
probably Mladic was not responsible for that!)

3135. On 2 August 1995, pursuant to a decision issued by the President, in his capacity as
President and Supreme Commander, the Main Staff was renamed as the VRS General Staff and
would be called the Supreme Command Staff in ―times of war‖.10136 According to this decision,
on 4 August 1995, Mladić was appointed as Special Advisor to the Supreme Commander, and
removed as VRS commander.10137 In response, on 5 August 1995, Mladić sent a notice to the
corps commands, stating that the President‘s decision to rename the Main Staff and to take over
the authority of direct leadership and command of the VRS was unconstitutional and highly
dangerous and could bring into question the results they had already achieved; he further
stressed that such a decision could lead to the collapse of the VRS.10138

3136. On 5 or 6 August 1995, Milovanović authored a petition that was sent to the Bosnian
Serb Assembly and the President in his capacity as RS President on behalf of 18 generals.10139
The petition stated the generals‘ unanimous refusal to implement the Supreme Command‘s
order to reorganise the Main Staff.10140

3137. However, even following Mladić‘s removal as Main Staff commander, both the President
and Mladić re-affirmed their subordinate-superior relationship. In an interview on 16 August
1995, the President stated that ―[t]here is no conflict, the competence is very clear‖; he was the
President and Commander-in-Chief of the army and that Mladić was the second in the
hierarchy, despite mutual criticism and disagreements.10141 Furthermore, at an SDC session on
23 August 1995 with the FRY leadership, during which Slobodan Milošević attempted to
pressure Mladić to support peace and issue a statement which was contrary to the President‘s
position at the time, Mladić refused and instead stated that he would leave this to the politicians
as he was ―only a soldier of the people‖ and ―not an elected representative‖.10142

3138. On 27 August 1995, the President abrogated his decision of 2 August 1995 to re-organise
the Main Staff, including the decree appointing Mladić as Special Advisor to the Supreme
Commander.10143 Following the annulment of his decision, the President sent a letter to the

10135
Yasushi Akashi, T. 37747–37749 (25 April 2013); D3512 (UNPROFOR report, 17 July 1995), p. 2.
10136
See para. 174.
10137
See para. 174. On 6 August 1995, an extraordinary government session was held, where the RS Government decided to support the Accused‘s proposal to
remove Mladić as General of the VRS. P3108 (Minutes of the 7 th extraordinary session of RS Government, 6 August 1995); D3364 (Witness statement of
Dušan Kozić dated 7 April 2013), para. 26.
10138
D2158 (Statement by Ratko Mladić, forwarded by Novica Simić, 5 August 1995), pp. 1–2. See also D4858 (Communique of VRS Main Staff, 5 August
1995). See also D3882 (SRNA news report, 5 August 1995).
10139
D2159 (Letter from VRS Main Staff to RS National Assembly, 5–6 August 1995); Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25674–25676 (1 March 2012); D2149 (Aide
mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 57; D2843 (Telegram from VRS Main Staff, 7 August 1995); Petar Skrbić, T. 26028–26030 (8 March 2012). See
also Radislav Krstić, D4136 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krstić), T. 6700 (testifying that he had signed a document in support of Mladić on 6 or 7 August
1995, not because he wanted to but because all generals had signed it).
10140
D2159 (Letter from VRS Main Staff to RS National Assembly, 5–6 August 1995), p. 1; Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25676 (1 March 2012). See D2843
(Telegram from VRS Main Staff, 7 August 1995); Dragomir Milošević, T. 32888–32892 (30 January 2013); Stanislav Galić, T. 37606 (23 April 2013). See
also D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 99 (stating that he and Dušan Kovaĉević were the only generals who chose not
to sign the petition).
10141
P6407 (Radovan Karadţić‘s interview with Telegraf, 16 August 1995), pp. 3–4.
10142
P2567 (Note from FRY‘s SDC 42nd session, 23 August 1995), pp. 2, 5–6. See also D3681 (Intercept of conversation between Slobodan Milošević and
Ratko Mladić, undated), p. 4 (during which Milošević tells Mladić that ―unfortunately you have a completely mad political leadership, which is dragging
you to death‖, to which Mladić responds that he cares about people and not ―about a certain individual from any leadership here‖).
10143
D2844 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Decision, 27 August 1995), p. 2; Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25678 (1 March 2012) (testifying that he later learned from Gvero
that the Assembly had adopted the petition and annulled the Accused‘s decision to reorganise the Main Staff). See also para. 174. At a Bosnian Serb
Assembly session held on 22 August 1995, the Accused reported on the conflict between the military and RS state organs, stating that if it was not resolved,
it may have a ―huge negative impact on the safeguarding of the [RS] territory and state‖. P3146 (Minutes of 28 th session of RS Government, 22 August
1995), p. 9. See also D3364 (Witness statement of Dušan Kozić dated 7 April 2013), para. 27.
 854

VRS Main Staff generals, requesting that they ―trust the state leadership‖ and the importance
―finally for us to respect each other‖ and establish a relationship based on mutual respect.10144

3139. However, on 5 September 1995, Akashi reported further miscommunication and discord
between the President and Mladić, stating that ―the pronouncements of the ‗RS‘ civilian
leadership and the [VRS] military leadership are clearly at odds‖ and that there had been a
noticeable rupture in the RS power structure.10145

3140. The Chamber received evidence from Defence witnesses that the relationship between
the President and Mladić was always one of intolerance and that the President had de jure
control over Mladić, but that he did not have control over him in fact.10146 Furthermore,
Defence witnesses testified that within the VRS structure, there was always a duality of
command between Mladić and the President, starting with Mladić‘s appointment as commander
of the Main Staff and throughout the conflict.10147 According to Mandić, there was a lack of
trust and co-operation between the President and Mladić from the beginning and that Mladić did
not respect orders issued by the President or other members of the Presidency.10148

3141. However, the Chamber notes that the evidence of these witnesses, namely of Kuprešanin,
Zametica, Kozić, Kovaĉ, and Ninković, in this regard is expressed in general terms and is often
based on their own impression or opinion. (To be noticed: only the Defence witnesses weren’t
entitled to their “impressions” or “opinions” while so many Prosecution witnesses testified
only about their impressions, opinions or (hear-say”!) The Chamber does not therefore find
their evidence to be of much weight in this regard. In addition the Chamber finds that this
evidence is outweighed by the volume of reliable evidence discussed above. Therefore, in light
of all the evidence, the Chamber finds that while there may have been a lack of trust and periods
of discord between the President and Mladić, the President and Mladić acted as a collective
leadership and conducted themselves in a single direction. (A “single direction” was
determined by the Assembly and was binding for all and everyone in the official
structures! But, the ways of carring out the tasks suffered from a doctrinary differences
between an old-fassioned army officers and the new democratic and multiparty system!)
The Chamber therefore finds that the President maintained his role as Mladić‘s superior, had de
jure control over him, and exercised such control in fact throughout the conflict.

4. Accused‘s powers

10144
D4861 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to VRS Main Staff, 27 August 1995), p. 1.
10145
D3353 (UNPROFOR report, 5 September 1995), pp. 1–2 (referring to a letter from Mladić sent to UNPROFOR on 4 September 1995 regarding his position
on conditions established by NATO and the UN for the cessation of NATO air attacks which conflicted with the position of the Bosnian Serb leadership;
Koljević reassured UNPROFOR of the position of the Bosnian Serb leadership and that Mladić‘s letter was not valid, which Mladić ultimately accepted).
See Prvoslav Davinić, T. 45529–45531 (16 January 2014) (testifying about a conversation between the Accused and Mladić on 4 September 1995, in which
Mladić stated: ―I cannot but act in keeping with your decisions, your directives, and in line with my legal authority‖, and that Mladić‘s statement did not
indicate subservience to the Accused because Mladić had a ―great deal of freedom to act‖ within the scope of his ―legal authority‖).
10146
D3864 (Radovan Radinović‘s expert report entitled ―The Control Authority of Dr. Radovan Karadţić in the Strategic Command System of the VRS‖, 2012),
pp. 5–6; Radovan Radinović, T. 41618–41619 (19 July 2013) (testifying that the Accused did not have actual operative control over the VRS in July and
August 1995); D4011 (Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), paras. 44, 52 (stating further that during the war, it became
clear that the Accused ―was President of the state but did not have power, while, on the other hand, […] Mladić had power but did not have the state‖);
Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43519 (14 November 2013); D3682 (Witness statement of Gordan Milinić dated 8 June 2013), paras. 11–12 (stating that Mladić did
not respect the Accused in the slightest and instead always wanted to do the opposite of what the Accused advocated; as such the Accused had been trying to
dismiss Mladić since as early as 1993 but without success, as the VRS held the power and ―did as it pleased and acted at its own discretion‖); John
Zametica, T. 42453–42455 (29 October 2013) (testifying that the Accused had very little power over the VRS and the VRS was regularly insubordinate to
the Accused); D3364 (Witness statement of Dušan Kozić dated 7 April 2013), para. 26 (stating that there was a lack of co-operation between the civilian and
military authorities throughout the war); D3932 (Witness statement of Milenko Ţivanović dated 27 October 2013), para. 9; D3960 (Witness statement of
Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28 October 2013), para. 99.
10147
D3864 (Radovan Radinović's expert report entitled ―The Control Authority of Dr. Radovan Karadţić in the Strategic Command System of the VRS‖, 2012),
pp. 5–6; D3733 (Witness statement of Milan Ninković dated 23 June 2013), paras. 29, 39; Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43519 (14 November 2013); D4011
(Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), paras. 44, 52. See also D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28
October 2013), paras. 91, 96, 111.
10148
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5340–5341 (16 July 2010).
 855

3142. The Accused, as the President, had the power to organise and implement plans for
defence, order mobilisation, and command and control the army.10149 (All of this had been
taken as the President vices and crimes, objected by the Chamber in the following
paragraphs of the Judgement: @) In addition, as the Supreme Commander, the President
had the power to issue regulations, to define the organisation of the VRS, to appoint, promote,
and dismiss officers of the VRS, to establish a system of command, and to monitor the
implementation of orders.10150 The President had also the power to issue decrees, instructions,
orders, and requests related to the general planning for the preparation of the army, the
mobilisation of the army, and its deployment.10151

3143. In application of these powers, the President, for example, issued instructions to different
units in the VRS and occasionally sent direct orders to corps and brigade commanders to answer
directly to him.10152 (This was #always in connection with the specific requests of the
internationals engaged in Bosnia, to influence the course of war#! The President was in a
position to guarantee some moves to the mediators, and thus he wanted to be secure in
fulfilling the commitments!)

3144. The President‘s personal involvement at the operational level can also be seen in his order
to the Main Staff, on 5 December 1992, to provide reinforcements for the Drina Corps; to
―disarm the opponent in the local communities of Cerska and Konjević Polje and take control of
the Milići-Drinjaĉa-Zvornik and Konjević Polje- Bratunac road‖; and to inform him personally
on the realisation of this order.10153 Also demonstrative of his level of involvement are his
instructions at a meeting of the Supreme Command, on 7 May 1993, to be directly in charge of
approving operations; that all offensive operations be halted; and that any action should be
approved by the Supreme Command personally.10154 (The “approving operations” is still a
strategic command, and it was always in connection with the relation between the Serb
side and international representatives!)

3145. The President also exercised his power to order the VRS to carry out mobilisation.10155
For example, already on 20 May 1992, the President issued a decision on the general
mobilisation of all military conscripts and the requisition of material for the needs of the VRS
and noted that this decision would be delivered to the ―competent organs of all municipalities‖

10149
See para. 162.
10150
See para. 167; P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), art. 174 (stating, inter alia, that the RS President is the Commander-in-Chief of the VRS).
10151
See para. 168.
10152
See, e.g., P846 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order to VRS, 7 February 1994) (which was relayed via P4493 (VRS Main Staff Order, 7 February 1994); Stanislav
Galić, T. 38033 (9 May 2013) (stating that the SRK commander would receive information and directives directly from the Supreme Command and the
Accused); P2276 (VRS Main Staff Order, 9 July 1995); P4925 (Supplement to Directive 6, 12 December 1993); P2645 (Radovan Karadţić‘s order to VRS
Main Staff, MUP, and Ministry of Defence, 20 May 1992) (the Accused ordered the creation of a military police company within the SRK); D43 (Radovan
Karadţić‘s Order to VRS Main Staff, 16 April 1993); P4495 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order to VRS Main Staff and RS MUP, 29 March 1995); D4812
(Radovan Karadţić‘s Order, 15 January 1994); P1503 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order re Nedţarići, 1 July 1992); P1299 (VRS Main Staff request for
information from SRK, 26 April 1995); D4739 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to all local civilian and police authorities, 31 October 1992).
10153
P5083 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order to the VRS Main Staff, 5 December 1992). See also P1493 (Letter from Ratko Adţić to Radovan Karadţić, 12 June
1992) (by which the Accused was informed of the progress of battles around Sarajevo and was asked to use ―his influence‖ for additional weaponry to be
provided).
10154
P1483 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), pp. 89–90. The Chamber notes John Zametica‘s evidence that he did not think that the
Accused was ―particularly involved‖ in ―day-today operative and tactical level‖, that the Accused was ―largely uninterested‖ in the operation and tactical
conduct of warfare, but notes that at the same time Zametica testified that he ―never asserted that [the Accused] had not been involved‖ whatsoever. John
Zametica, T. 42457–42458, 42522 (29 October 2013). The Chamber does not find that Zametica‘s qualified observation regarding the involvement of the
Accused in operative and tactical level affects the Chamber‘s conclusion in this regard.
10155
P5482 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order to Municipal Assembly Presidents and VRS Main Staff, 26 March 1995), p. 1; P5192 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Decision on
general mobilisation, 5 August 1995); P4926 (RS Declaration of war, 16 June 1995); P2248 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order to RS Government, VRS Main
Staff, and Presidents of Municipalities, 26 March 1995). The Chamber notes that the Accused‘s order was relayed the same day by Mladić to the VRS units.
P2249 (VRS Main Staff Order, 26 March 1995). See also P5546 (VRS Main Staff Order, 30 July 1995), p. 1.
 856

of the SerBiH.10156 This decision was delivered and acted upon at the municipal level.10157 (All
in accordance with the Constitution, laws and other binding documents!)

3146. The President exercised his power to promote VRS officers10158 and to reassign VRS
officers.10159 As mentioned above with regard to his relationship with Mladić, the power to
dismiss officers was acknowledged by the President himself when he stated at the Bosnian Serb
Assembly that if he did not trust Mladić he would have dismissed him and added: ―I have the
authority to do that.‖10160

3147. The President also assisted the VRS in his capacity as RS President. In April 1994,
following a letter from the Main Staff informing that there were volunteers from the SRS who
had been operating in two municipalities without the knowledge or consent of the VRS,10161 the
President reminded the municipal authorities that this interfered with the system of single
command and control. The President also required to be informed about developments so he
could take measures.10162

3148. The Chamber observes that Mladić took note in 1994 that while subordination was good at
the Main Staff and corps level, insubordination was found at the lower levels,10163 and it also
observes that in 1995 lack of co-operation and certain acrimony existed between the civilian
and military authorities.10164

3149. The Chamber notes that according to Boţidar Vuĉurević officers of the VRS turned to
Belgrade rather than to the RS.10165 The Chamber finds that Vuĉurević was not forthright in this
regard and does not accept his evidence. The Chamber also notes that Momir Bulatović
testified that the President told Milošević that ―he did not understand why the VRS took Jajce, a
Muslim town that they would never be able to preserve‖ and that Bulatović ―believe[d]‖ that the
Accused‘s statement to Milošević referred to the lack of the Accused‘s control over military
operations.10166 The Chamber does not find that Bulatović‘s interpretation of the President‘s
statement has any weight as Bulatović was not present when it was made. (This kind of
dismissal of so neutral testimonies of a distinguished persons that testified on the
Defence’s summon is pretty #compromising the neutrality of the Court#, and a fairness of
the trial. This is particularly true since the Chamber acceptem a numerous and
convincing evidence that “Belgrade” didn’t communicate with the President since August
10156
P3919 (Radovan Karadţić's Decision, 20 May 1992), pp. 1–2.
10157
P3537 (Decision of Prijedor Crisis Staff, 22 May 1992); Branko Đerić, T. 28059–28060 (25 April 2012).
10158
P2650 (Radovan Karadţić‘s decree on exceptional promotion, 16 December 1992); P2677 (Radovan Karadţić‘s decree on Dragomir Milošević's promotion,
24 March 1994); P5532 (RS Presidential Decree, 25 July 1993); P5533 (RS Presidential Decree, 28 June 1994), pp. 1−2; P3046 (Radovan Karadţić‘s
Decree on promotion of Ratko Mladić, 28 June 1994); P2649 (Radovan Karadţić‘s decree on early promotion, 7 August 1994).
10159
Stanislav Galić, T. 37594–37595 (23 April 2013); P3044 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Decree, 14 July 1995); P5190 (Letter from RS MUP to RS President, 6 July
1995); P5085 (RS Presidential Decree, 15 July 1995); P5085 (RS Presidential Decree, 15 July 1995). The Chamber notes that, while the Accused‘s decree
is dated 14 July 1995, according to a memorandum of the Drina Corps ―the handover of duties of the Drina Corps Commander was carried out on 13 July
1995‖. However, it finds that this minor inconsistency with regard to the date does not affect the substance of the document of the Drina Corps, according to
which reassignments were made ―[p]ursuant to the Decree of the President of Republika Srpska‖. P4485 (Drina Corps information, 13 July 1995). See also
D3874 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Ratko Mladić and 2nd Krajina Corps commander, 14 December 1994); P5451 (RS MUP request to Radovan
Karadţić, 13 July 1995), p. 1. See paras. 5768. 5776.
10160
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 316. See also P970 (Transcript of
50th session of RS Assembly, 15–16 April 1995), p. 315. See also D3495 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Yasushi Akashi, 24 March 1994) (responding to
D3494 (Letter from Yasushi Akashi to Radovan Karadţić, 23 March 1994)).
10161
D1454 (Request of RS President's Office, 29 April 1994); D1446 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order to RS MUP, 29 April 1994).
10162
D1454 (Request of RS President's Office, 29 April 1994); D1446 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order to RS MUP, 29 April 1994); Milorad Davidović, T. 15809 (1
July 2011). See also D1448 (Letter from RS President's Office to President of Petrovo Municipal Assembly, 29 April 1994).
10163
P1485 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 9 January–21 March 1994), pp. 46, 117.
10164
D3364 (Witness statement of Dušan Kozić dated 7 April 2013), paras. 26, 33; D3366 (Report of 1st Igman Infantry Brigade, 20 October 1995); P3114
(Minutes of the 32nd session of RS Government, 13 October 1995), p. 4; Dragan Kijac, T. 44317 (3 December 2013); D4143 (Witness statement of Dragan
Kijac dated 30 November 2013) para. 59. The Chamber notes that Kijac later testified that had normal relations with the military security services. D4143
(Witness statement of Dragan Kijac dated 30 November 2013) para. 60.
10165
D3146 (Witness statement of Boţidar Vuĉurević, 22 March 2013), para. 8.
10166
D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), paras. 29–30.
 857

1, 1994 and the end of August 1995, while never interrupting it’s connections with the
Main Staff of the VRS. Also, President Bulatovic testified about the President resistance to
taking Jajce, and the Chamber had a numerous and genuine evidence that the President
always claimed for a modesty in territorial issues, and against takin places and territories
that couldn’t be included in the Serb entity, in accordance with the President Platform of
22 April 1992, D1587, stating that there wouldn’t be a fait accompli i.e. that a forcefully
taken territories wouldn’t be recognized!)

3150. Finally, Colm Doyle testified that he informed the President, via one of the President‘s
officials, of a planned attack against a TV station in Sarajevo and that the President replied that
the attack will not take place. However, the TV station was bombed, and Doyle relayed
information to the President that he ―was going to hold him personally responsible‖ for the
attack.10167 When the President met with Doyle later that day he said to Doyle that he had not
ordered the attack, that he had condemned it, and that he ―didn‘t control all of the military all of
the time.‖10168 The Chamber finds the President‘s statement to Doyle regarding his lack of
continuous control over the military to be of minimal weight. The President had a clear interest
in distancing himself from, and minimising his involvement in, the attack after Doyle told the
President that he would be held personally responsible for it and that he was going to condemn
this attack on television. (However, the very same Colm Doyle left a very convincing
evidence that he knew the truth, and his words that had been written down confirmed the
President position, see P941: p. 2

Therefore, #in April 1992 the President was not in a position to command to anyone#, as
many witnesses confirmed, see Gen. Subotic testimony commented in Para of this
Judgement: 3105, foot note 10042 ). Subotić also stated that this chain of command was
only formed after 12 May 1992 and that before this date the Accused had no formal control
of the military. There is also another UN document stating that after witdrawing from
Bosnia, the JNA left up 50,000 armed people without any political control, see: S23900 )

3151. In addition, the Chamber finds that the limited evidence regarding the Accused‘s lack of
control over the VRS10169 is not only of minimal weight in and of itself, but that, in any event, it
is inconsistent with the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, described above. (This is
#completely irrelevant without any evidence that the VRS committed any crime as an
army#, with all the prerequisits needed for an army to act, with the knowledge of

10167
Colm Doyle, T. 2678–2679 (21 May 2010); Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 25278–25281.
10168
Colm Doyle, T. 2678–2679 (21 May 2010). See also Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 25279–25281. The Chamber notes
that Doyle‘s testimony could be interpreted as referring to the Accused‘s authority over paramilitary forces. However, considering the features of the attack
described by Doyle and the knowledge of the Accused about the attack the Chamber concludes that, in this context, the Accused was referring to regular
military forces rather than paramilitaries.
10169
The Chamber also notes evidence of a rift in August 1994 between the RS leadership and the FRY concerning negotiations, which included a message from
the FRY leadership to the VRS to refuse obedience to, and not to be manipulated by, the RS leadership. P1486 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 31 March–3
September 1994), pp. 277–279. However, the Chamber notes that this message was not accepted by the VRS officers and did not affect the hierarchial
control of the RS leadership over the VRS. P1486 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 31 March–3 September 1994), pp. 283, 286 (according to which Milovanović
qualified this rift as ―not ideological conflicts, but conflicts in the struggle for power‖ and Miletić stated that ―[d]emanding that the officers turn against the
Serbian leadership is against the people, and that is the biggest crime‖).
 858

commands, orders and tasking of units. Further, even if this happened, there is a direct
connection to the President required in order to charge him for that, but the Prosecution
didn’t establish any!)

5. The issuance of military directives in pursuance of the Strategic Goals

3152. Above, the Chamber found that the Strategic Goals, which embodied the fundamental
objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership were communicated to the VRS and formed a core
element of its military strategy.10170 They were the basis for the military operations that were
formulated in the seven main VRS military directives issued between June 1992 and
March 1995.10171

3153. These directives constituted ―the highest level of political-military direction‖ for the
conduct of the war.10172 They were ―act[s] of command used by the highest echelons of
command‖ that delegated long-term tasks and assignments.10173 They regulated the actions of
the military forces by setting tasks in the form of guidelines governing the division of
responsibilities between the army, police, and civilian protection.10174 They identified
objectives, forces and resources that should be used in achieving the objectives, and contained
basic guidelines.10175

3154. There were three methods of drafting directives: the ―complete‖ method, the ―shortened‖
method, and the method that did no include any consultation with the organs and
commands.10176 The complete method entailed that the Commander of the Main Staff first
opened the discussion, the corps commanders then gave a briefing, and the chiefs of sectors of
the Main Staff—such as security, logistics, training, and morale—in turn also provided
input.10177 During this analysis, conclusions would be made related to the level of
accomplishment of the tasks defined for the previous year, before moving on to define the tasks
for the following year.10178

3155. On this basis, the Commander of the Main Staff, Mladić, would formulate the basic
principles and the command organs would submit proposals to him.10179 He would then adopt
the proposals, and the operative organ would integrate the adopted proposals into a unified
text;10180 this text would then be forwarded to the President, as Supreme Commander.10181 The
President would provide guidelines and revisions would be made pursuant to his
instructions.10182 Directives were either signed by the President as Supreme Commander or by
10170
See para. 2845.
10171
See para. 2899. See also D232 (Directive 1, 6 June 1992); D593 (Directive 2, 22 July 1992); D235 (Directive 3, 3 August 1992); P976 (Directive 4, 19
November 1992); P843 (Directive 5, 25 June 1993); P3039 (Directive 6, 11 November 1993); P838 (Directive 7, 8 March 1995).
10172
Richard Butler, T. 27439 (17 April 2012).
10173
Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tolimir), T. 11992.
10174
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25494 (29 February 2012). See also Mirko Trivić, T. 40538–40539 (26 June 2013).
10175
Radovan Radinović, T. 41392 (17 July 2013).
10176
Radovan Radinović, T. 41394 (4 April 2013); Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tolimir), T. 11992.
10177
Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tolimir), T. 11993; Radovan Radinović, T. 41394 (4 April 2013).
10178
Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tolimir), T. 11993.
10179
Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tolimir), T. 11993. For example, proposals pertaining to the enemy were made by the
intelligence organ, proposals for use of the corps and subordinate units were made by the operations sector, and proposals pertaining to arms were made by
the organ in charge of arms. Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tolimir), T. 1199311994.
10180
Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tolimir), T. 11993. Obradović specified that tasks from prior directives would need to be
reformulated and included in superseding directives in order to remain valid. Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tolimir), T. 12179
(31 March 2011).
10181
Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tolimir), T. 12040. Obradović stated that the Supreme Commander would receive a typed
document, would look at it and enter comments in the margin, and would then return the document for retyping into a version that included his statements.
However, he then stated that he was not privy to or aware of the editing process within the cabinet of the Supreme Commander. Ljubomir Obradović,
P4444 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tolimir), T. 12040. The Chamber shall therefore not rely on this part of his evidence.
10182
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25495 (29 February 2012) (specifically referring to the drafting of Directive 7).
 859

Mladić as the Commander of the Main Staff but in any event, the President examined and
approved all of the seven directives mentioned above.10183 (#The Chamber didn’t establish
thus assertion to be true#. First of all, the President did have his Military Cabinet and the
military advisor, General Bogdan Subotic. He regularly red all the documents that the
President was supposed to sign and advised him. Such a checked document was signed
and recorded in the protocol, sealed by the Presidential Seal and marked by the number
of the Protocole, and deposited a copy of it. The #Directive 7 didn’t have any of these
prerequisits: neither Gen. Subotic red it, nor it was drafted in the Presidential office, nor
was it sealed by the Presidential seal, nor marked with the protocole number, nor the copy
had been saved#. It was obvious that the document had been drafted in the Main
Headquarter, by a known officer, it was sealed by the Seal of the Main Staff of VRS, it had
a protocole nymber of the Main Staff of the VRS. The Chamber had all of it in the file,
and the Subotic’s testimony, what all together confirmed that neither the Directive 7 was
drafted and signed in the Presidential office, nor the sealed, nor red, and that it was signed
while the President was in a short visit to the Main Staff of the VRS. Once signed, the
directive was finalised and could not be altered or amended by others who might receive it.10184
Once finalised, the directive would be forwarded to the assistant commanders and the chiefs of
sectors would receive copies.10185 (If it was written, signed and analised by the President,
how come the Directive 7/1 had been altered and purified from the critical sentences
without the President’s approval#?)

3156. Thereafter, Mladić would produce a further executive order or directive effectively
operationalising the directive.10186 The Main Staff was then responsible for disseminating the
directive to subordinate units in accordance with the directive.10187

6. Conclusion

3157. The Chamber concludes that from May 1992 the President had continuous de jure
authority and control over the VRS, which he exercised in fact, while serving as the President of
the SNB, President of the Presidency, and later President of the RS and Supreme Commander.
The President was regularly informed of the developments in the VRS and in the field. The
President was involved at the strategic level and, when he desired, at the operational level as
well. (In consequence to this “Conclusion” all the charges pertaining to the incidents and
armed conflicts before 20 May 1992 should be dismissed and the President acquitted!)

ii. Bosnian Serb MUP

3158. The Minister of the MUP was the head of the MUP.10188 The Chamber recalls that Mićo
Stanišić was Minister of the MUP from 24 March 1992 until the end of 1992 and again from
10183
Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tolimir), T. 11992. Directives 6 and 7 and the supplement to Directive 6 were signed by the
Accused. P3039 (Directive 6, 11 November 1993), p. 16; P838 (Directive 7, 8 March 1995), p. 15; P4925 (Supplement to Directive 6, 12 December 1993),
p. 3. See also P1415 (Transcript of 54th session of RS Assembly, 15–16 October 1995), p. 84; P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command,
31 March 1995), p. 24.
10184
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25499–25500 (29 February 2012).
10185
Ljubomir Obradović, P4444 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Tolimir), T. 1204712048.
10186
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25505–25506 (29 February 2012).
10187
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25513–25514 (29 February 2012).
10188
P2958 (Christian Nielsen's expert report entitled ―The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control 1990–
1992‖, 19 May 2011), para. 99.
 860

January 1994 until July 1994 and that Tomislav Kovaĉ was acting Minister from September
1993 until January 1994.10189

3159. The Chamber recalls that the Law on Internal Affairs, issued on 23 March 1992,
established a network of CSBs to carry out the work of the Bosnian Serb MUP.10190 The CSBs
were located in Banja Luka (for the ARK), Trebinje (for the SAO Herzegovina), Doboj (for the
SAO of Northern BiH), Sarajevo (for the SAO of Romanija-Biraĉ), and Bijeljina (for the SAO
of Semberija) and co-ordinated the functions of the SJBs.10191 The SJBs, which were
established within the territory of each municipality, were tasked with dealing with all public
security matters. 10192 The Chamber further recalls that the SBP, commanded by Goran Sarić,
functioned as a combat unit and was divided into five detachments located in Banja Luka,
Trebinje, Doboj, Sarajevo, and Bijeljina.10193 PJPs, which participated in combat activities,
were organised by the CSBs at the regional level and their detachments were located at each of
the five CSBs.10194

1. President‘s powers

3160. As Supreme Commander of the VRS, the President had the authority to issue orders for
the deployment of the police and define the basis for the organisation and size of the police
force during times of war in order to protect the rights and duties of the RS and its citizens.10195
The Presidency declared an ―imminent threat of war‖ on 15 April 1992.10196 In addition, the
Chamber recalls that on 15 May 1992, Mićo Stanišić issued an order formalising the co-
operation of the Bosnian Serb MUP and VRS, such that the MUP personnel would be organised
into ―war units‖ and be re-subordinated to the VRS during their participation in combat
activities.10197 Therefore, the Chamber finds that the President had de jure authority over the
MUP.

3161. Branko Ðerić testified that Mićo Stanišić took his orders directly from the President and
that the President was in charge of the ―use of the police‖.10198 He explained that as Minister of
the MUP, Stanišić should have implemented government decisions; instead he ignored the
government and failed to attend government sessions.10199 (This certainly was a very wrong
conception of the Government and MUP, remembered from the previous system. #The
MUP doesn’t implement any government decisions, but implement only the law and it’s
own decisions#. Prime Minister Djeric was a very good professor, but he had a trouble to
understand functioning of the ministries, particularly of those connected with the security!
During the war there are additional duties of President, particularly if in a daily contact
with foreigners who asked for many explanations that only police knew!) The Prosecution
points to one example of Stanišić receiving instructions from the President in an intercepted
conversation from 18 April 1992.10200 (Here is another drastic misunderstanding of
document and misuse of it, P5606, a conversation between the President and Minister

10189
See para. 215.
10190
See para. 217.
10191
See para. 218.
10192
See para. 219.
10193
See para. 222.
10194
See para. 222. The Chamber notes that CSBs were renamed CJBs at the beginning of 1994. Christian Nielsen, T. 16320 (7 July 2011).
10195
P2602 (SerBiH Defence Act, 1 June 1992), art. 7(6); Mićo Stanišić, T. 46484 (4 February 2014); Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik), T. 9107–9110. See also Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25445 (28 February 2012).
10196
P3922 (Decision of SerBiH Presidency, 15 April 1992).
10197
See para. 230.
10198
P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Ðerić dated 5 April 2012), paras. 20–22.
10199
P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Ðerić dated 5 April 2012), para. 22.
10200
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 133, referring to P5606 (Intercept of conversation between Mićo Stanišić and Radovan Karadţić, 18 April 1992).
 861

Stanisic on 18 April 1992. To have in mind, at that time the President didn’t have any
state post, nor a command competence:

So, somebody from the ECMM contacted the President to ask what happened with their
team:

Obviously, the situation was dramatic, because the ECMM team didn’t appear in
Visegrad

Stanisic was talking about Ustikolina, which was the Muslim part of Foca. He had spoken
about a gathering of the Muslim combatants, but the Chamber didn’t find out who was
gathering there! But, this was a crucial element for understanding the conversation! The
Muslims were expected to strike somewhere!
 862

The entire conversation, apart from the concerns about the ECMM team, was about the
Muslim gatherings, their armament, not the Serb, and their intention to attack Pale, the
seat of the RS Government and Presidency! Not a single order, only a discussion how to
prevent the Muslims to deliver armament to Visoko and Svrakino village, both the
Muslim areas close to the Serb areas!) In this intercepted conversation, the President and
Stanišić discussed the whereabouts of a team of European observers and then moved on to
discuss the arming of a group of people preparing for an attack on Foĉa.10201 The President told
Stanišić to stop the chain of weapon delivery and inform Hadţići and Ilidţa not to cross over to
Kiseljak.10202

3162. In addition, the President issued an order with respect to the deployment of police forces
into combat. On 20 May 1992, the President ordered that manpower in SRK units was to be
replenished by agreement with the MUP and SJBs in, inter alia, Ilidţa, Vogošća, Novo
Sarajevo, Rajlovac, Sokolac, and Pale.10203 (So what? #That was his duty#, and according to
the law, the Army couldn’t subordinate the police unit without an approval of President!
No crime, no violation of any rule, irrelevant for this case!) On 2 June 1992, he ordered two
PJP platoons to be redeployed to Nedţarići and put under the military command of the SRK via,
inter alia, Ilidţa where they were to report to Tomislav Kovaĉ regarding the continuation of
their journey.10204

3163. Municipal Crisis Staffs and War Presidencies issued orders to MUP units. For example,
the Crisis Staff in Sanski Most issued orders to the SJB.10205 (Crisis Staff meant municipal
authorities, renamed because of the crisis, hoping that the “crisis” wouldn’t become a war.
When it was obvious tha it would be a war, then the War Presidencies had been
established, but again composed of the ex oficio officials! Their decisions were equal to
those made by the municipal assemblies. The Municipalities did have their competences
on the use of MUP units, particularly in a war, and it was regulated by the Law and
Constitution, as quoted above!)The Banja Luka CSB instructed its subordinate SJBs to
implement decisions of the ARK War Presidency.10206 The Chamber further notes that the
Bratunac Crisis Staff issued the decision that the Bratunac TO and SJB would take over the
defence of the Serbian municipality of Bratunac and issued decisions authorising the SJB to
disarm citizens, and that members of the SJB assist other Serb Forces with actions against
Bosnian Muslims during the take over of Bratunac.10207 (A #very mean alterations in
10201
P5606 (Intercept of conversation between Mićo Stanišić and Radovan Karadţić, 18 April 1992), p. 1.
10202
P5606 (Intercept of conversation between Mićo Stanišić and Radovan Karadţić, 18 April 1992), pp. 2–3.
10203
P2645 (Radovan Karadţić‘s order to VRS Main Staff, MUP, and Ministry of Defence, 20 May 1992).
10204
P1503 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order re Nedţarići, 1 July 1992).
10205
KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3342 (under seal). See, e.g., P2613 (Conclusions of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 22
May 1992); P2614 (Conclusions of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 30 May 1992).
10206
See paras. 2055, 2061.
10207
See paras. 713–714, 717–718.
 863

nuancies: it was not an “action against Bosnian Muslims”, but against the Muslim armed
formations#. Once made error in some paragraphs, the error is repeated in other paras
throughout the Judgement#!) In Foĉa, the SJB acted alongside the TO during the take-
over.10208 The Rogatica Crisis Staff ordered the implementation of the division of the Rogatica
SJB.10209 In Vlasenica, the Crisis Staff was involved in the co-ordination of the take-over of the
town, which was carried out with police acting alongside other Serb Forces, and its aftermath,
which involved the police confiscating weapons from non-Serbs and arresting those who
refused to surrender their weapons.10210 The Vlasenica Crisis Staff also commanded a Special
Police Platoon,10211 and was able to issue orders to the Chief of the SJB in Vlasenica.10212 In
Hadţići, the police implemented a decision of the Crisis Staff to arrest and detain all Bosnian
Muslim men of military age.10213 The Vogošća Crisis Staff also had the authority to provide
instructions to the Vogošća SJB.10214 Finally, the Chamber notes that in many municipalities,
the head of the police was also a member of the Crisis Staff.10215 (Senseless to comment, since
all of that was a #first class legal and constitutional obligation of the municipal
authorities#. How possibly this trials could have been conveyed #without any knowledge
of the domestic legal system#?)

2. Communication and Bosnian Serb MUP reporting system

3164. The Chamber recalls that the system of reporting within the MUP consisted of daily
reports and other reports about more significant security information.10216 Information was
collected from the municipal level by the SJB, then sent to the regional level of the CSB, and
finally sent to the Bosnian Serb MUP.10217 The information was also sent from the MUP to the
Bosnian Serb Government, including to the Presidency.10218

3165. The Chamber received evidence that there were some difficulties in communication
during the first year of the conflict in 1992.10219 However, there were always communication
channels between the Bosnian Serb MUP, CSBs and SJBs.10220 Communication between the
CSB and the ministerial level was on a daily basis, with communication several times a day if
there was a problem or every couple of days if there were no real developments.10221 Mandić

10208
D3319 (Belgrade Radio news report, 8 April 1992). See also para. 858.
10209
See para. 960.
10210
See paras. 1113, 1121, 1149.
10211
See para. 1124. The Special Police Platoon in Vlasenica was within the organisational structure of the SJB, received payment from the SJB, and reported
daily to the SJB. See paras. 1125, 1161, 1182, 1193. The Special Police Platoon engaged in illegal activities, mistreated Bosnian Muslims, and was
involved in take-overs of villages surrounding Vlasenica and expelling Bosnian Muslims. See paras. 1125–1134, 1161–1163.
10212
See para. 1217.
10213
See para. 2094.
10214
See para. 2372. In early March 1992, Tintor, on behalf of the Vogošća Crisis Staff, sent a dispatch to the Vogošća SJB and Kemo Šabović, prohibiting the
SJB from conducting any investigations in Serb villages in connection with the alleged killing of a young Bosnian Muslim by a Serb.
10215
See paras. 698, 957 (referring to P2835 (Report of Rogatica Crisis Staff, April–June 1992)), 961, 1051, 1109 (referring to P6121 (Decision of Vlasenica‘s
SDS Municipal Board, 4 April 1992)), 1581, 2125–2126 (referring to D1193 (Ilidţa Crisis Staff Members, 10 April 1992)).
10216
See para. 228.
10217
See para. 228.
10218
See para. 228.
10219
KW317, T. 39412 (6 June 2013); D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 57. See also D4229 (Witness statement of
Boško Mandić dated 18 January 2014), para. 16. The Chamber does not find Grahovac‘s evidence that it was impossible for the municipal leaders to
communicate or contact the Republican leadership to be reliable. D4077 (Witness statement of Andelko Grahovac), para. 8.
10220
Milorad Davidović, T. 15460–15461 (24 June 2011). See also Christian Nielsen, T. 16270–16271 (7 July 2011); P2850 (Fax of Bijeljina CSB, 29 April
1992); D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 92. For example the SNB confirmed that it would communicate with the
Bosnian Serb Assembly and the government by way of phone and courier. P3050 (Minutes of joint meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 15 April
1992), p. 1. But see D2852 (Witness statement of SrĊan Šehovac dated 27 January 2013), para. 47. Šehovać‘s stated that in the period of hampered
communication in 1992 that the Bosnian Serb leadership could not issue instructions and that matters were left to the municipal leadership. See also paras.
3019–3020, 4862.
10221
Milorad Davidović, T. 15462–15463 (24 June 2011). See also P2851 (Fax of Bijeljina CSB, 24 April 1992). But see Branko Đerić, T. 27937, 27941 (24
April 2012); D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 16. Đerić testified that the government over which he presided
was cut off in terms of communication and that some regions became so independent that it was difficult to establish any kind of communication with them.
 864

testified that the police, in the absence of a special problem, were not bound to report regular
activities to the President but reported to the Prime Minister.10222 In addition, the Chief of the
Bijeljina SJB reported to Mićo Stanišić on the situation in the municipality.10223

3166. Until the end of 1992, the SDB did not send any reports to the RS President; this was
done through the MUP. Only from 1993, were SDB reports sent to the state leadership of the
RS (President, President of the Assembly, Prime Minister, and other government bodies as
required).10224 The President received the information verbally and via written reports multiple
times per month.10225 (There was a necessity to have the members of Presidency informed,
not as much because of any need for their action, but because of their contacts with the
international representatives who seeked confirmations of their knowledge about terrain!)

3. Conclusion

3167. The Chamber finds that the President had de jure authority over the Bosnian Serb MUP
from at least 15 April 1992, which he exercised in fact, in his position as President of the
Presidency, and later President of the RS, and Supreme Commander of the VRS. (#Before
VRS, during JNA#! Before 12 May 1992 the President didn’t have any de jure authority
over the Police, and before 20 May over the Army, as already established. He had some
influence and respect, but not de jure authority!) Although the evidence of his involvement
in the day to day operations of the MUP is limited, the evidence establishes that he had the
ability to re-deploy police officers and give instructions to Mićo Stanišić and lower level MUP
officials. In addition, the evidence establishes that while the communication system was
sometimes interrupted, the President frequently received reports from the MUP. (Was anything
criminal, or unlawful in the President action pertaining to the MUP, or it was sufficient to
establish tha the President existed, the MUP existed, and they had a contacts?)

3168. The Chamber further finds that Crisis Staffs and War Presidencies played a role in
commanding or co-ordinating the tasks of MUP units in the Municipalities. In this regard, the
Chamber recalls that the President exercised authority over such institutions and played a
central role in instructing how they would function.10226 In light of the co-operation between
MUP units and Bosnian Serb authorities, the TO, and the VRS, the Chamber finds that the
President supported the use of MUP units during combat activities throughout the
Municipalities. (#All regulated by the Constitution and laws#, as depicted in the comments
above. Only the Accuse from his position was authorised to submit the police units to the
Army command, otherwise there would be misunderstanding and skirmishes as in any
other country. What is wrong with all of that?)

iii. Territorial Defence

3169. In the second half of 1991, in the context of the conflict in Croatia, the President issued
instructions to the SDS and to municipalities in which SDS was in power, to mobilise all
citizens into the TO and to subordinate them to the command of the JNA.10227 The President

10222
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5050 (13 July 2010).
10223
P2629 (Report of Bijeljina SJB, undated).
10224
D4143 (Witness statement of Dragan Kijac dated 30 November 2013), para. 39.
10225
Dragan Kijać, T. 44320–44321 (3 December 2013).
10226
See paras. 3087–3089.
10227
P5884 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Nikola Uzelac, 9 July 1991), p. 2; P2547 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan
Karadţić and Tomislav Simović, 2 November 1991), p. 4; P2548 (Telex entitled ―The Sarajevo SDS Order‖, 29 October 1991); P970 (Transcript of 50th
session of RS Assembly, 15–16 April 1995), pp. 316–317. See also D4504 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Vidović, 8
February 1992).
 865

monitored this mobilisation effort.10228 (A #Constitutional and law obligation#, it couldn’t

be otherwise! See the laws and Constitution!)

3170. As long as the JNA officially operated in BiH territory, the President supported the
mobilisation of armed forces that operated under the JNA‘s command.10229 (#Obligatory,
mandatory. All other conduct was a violation of several laws, as Mr. Izetbegovic said: “yes
we maybe violated some laws, but there are laws and laws#!) With regard to the
mobilisation and the arming of Serbs who were not subordinated to the JNA, the Accused‘s
position at that time was that the SDS would not arm the Serbs but would not prevent them
from acquiring weapons in other ways.10230 However, the Chamber also recalls that the SDS in
Bijeljina, Bratunac, Rogatica, Vlasenica, Kljuĉ, and Hadţići provided Serbs with weapons
while the JNA still operated in BiH.10231 (All of it under the surveillance of the JNA, since all
of them had been JNA reservists! But, even if it was not so, since the other two sides
formed a secret and very numerous armies, the Serbs were entitled to take a
precautionary measures! The Tribunal made on of the gravest error when #prevented
defences to depict the conduct of other sides and contexts#!)

3171. On 27 March 1992, before the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the President gave instructions
to the newly-formed Serb municipalities to ―organise the people so that they can defend
themselves‖ as a TO and place them under the command of the JNA present at that time.10232
(#All of it ordered by the Constitution and laws#!)

3172. Following the declaration of a state of imminent threat of war in mid-April 1992, the
Presidency of the SerBiH decided that a SerBiH TO ―shall be formed as the armed force of
[SerBiH]‖,10233 led and commanded by municipal, district and regional staffs and the republican
staff of the SerBiH.10234 The TO was subordinated to Minister of Defence Bogdan Subotić until
the appointment of the commander.10235 In addition, a general mobilisation of the TO was
ordered.10236 (So what? #All in accordance with the law and constitution#!)

3173. The SNB decided that the President, as the President of the SNB, would co-ordinate the
command of the TO forces.10237 The SNB adopted decisions on the appointment of the acting
commander of the TO and the chief of staff of the TO,10238 the procurement of uniforms and

10228
P3406 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Sveto, 20 September 1991); Sveto Veselinović, T. 45093–45101 (16 December 2013);
D1643 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Zvonko Bajagić, 4 September 1991), p. 6; D1653 (Intercept of conversation between
Zvonko Bajagić and Radovan Karadţić, 11 December 1991); Zvonko Bajagić, T. 41172–41176 (10 July 2013).
10229
See P2542 (Vojislav Maksimović‘s diary, 24 December 1990 to 24 December 1991), p. 8 (the Accused stated during an SDS Council session that
paramilitary organisations could not be formed and that the SDS should not take any step to provoke the army). See also D4077 (Witness statement of
AnĊelko Grahovac dated 23 November 2013), paras. 3, 14, 31–32 (the Accused told the Prime Minister of the ARK, AnĊelko Grahovac, with regard to a
paramilitary unit in Banja Luka led by Veljko Milanković, that the municipal Serb authorities should not support or rely on ―criminals‖, stating that ―these
independent vojvodas‖ have already done them great damage); AnĊelko Grahovac, T. 44036, 44045–44048 (26 November 2013) (stating further that this
unit was allowed to eventually join the army—first the JNA and later the VRS).
10230
P2542 (Vojislav Maksimović‘s diary, 24 December 1990 to 24 December 1991), p. 8.
10231
See paras. 607, 695, 944, 1104, 1492, 2070.
10232
See para. 211; D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 69. See also P5604 (Intercept of
conversation between Gvozden and Radovan Karadţić, 3 March 1992), p. 3 (Gvozden informed the Accused that he had mobilised Serbs from Pale and
would do the same in other municipalities, including Novi Grad).
10233
P2412 (Decision SerBiH Ministry of Defence, 16 April 1992) p. 1. See also para. 212; D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army
activities in 1992, April 1993), pp. 69, 75; NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12967–12969 (8 March 2011); D394 (Announcement of SNB, 4 April 1992). Bogdan
Subotić also stated that given that during this early phase, the central authorities did not establish control over the TO, the appointment of a Chief of the TO
for SerBiH was an attempt to centralise the command. D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 264–267; D3709 (Decision
of SerBiH Government, 15 April 1992); P3050 (Minutes of joint meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 15 April 1992), p. 2; D3703 (Decision of
SerBiH Ministry of Defence, 18 April 1992), p. 1; Bogdan Subotić, T. 40020–40021 (19 June 2013).
10234
P2412 (Decision SerBiH Ministry of Defence, 16 April 1992) p. 1.
10235
See para. 91; NeĊeljko Prstojević, T. 12970 (8 March 2011).
10236
D3703 (Decision of SerBiH Ministry of Defence, 18 April 1992), p. 2; P2412 (Decision of SerBiH Ministry of Defence, 16 April 1992). See also D406
(Minutes of meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 27 April 1992), p. 1.
10237
P3051 (Minutes of expanded meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 22 April 1992), p. 1.
10238
P3050 (Minutes of joint meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 15 April 1992), p. 2.
 866

insignia for the TO with instructions on markings,10239 and the securing of salaries for members
of the TO.10240 On 24 April 1992, it was decided to charge the President with the responsibility
of establishing a Town TO Staff.10241 Subotić asked, on 27 April 1992, for assistance from the
Military Command in filling ―most vital personnel‖ posts in the TO and also for the provision
of uniforms.10242

3174. In a report of 5 June 1992 from the Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to the President, it was
stated that the Crisis Staff had mobilised about 900 people over the previous two months,
including about 700 in the Lukavica and Tilava areas and about 200 in Grbavica.10243 In
addition, as found above, on 16 April 1992, following an order by the Presidency of the SerBiH,
the Bratunac Crisis Staff issued an order for general mobilisation and also required military
conscripts assigned to Bratunac TO units to immediately respond to the mobilisation.10244
Similarly, the SAO Biraĉ Crisis Staff ordered, on 29 April 1992, mobilisation in the entire SAO
of Biraĉ.10245 (All of it happened before the President took the post in Presidency, but
nothing of it was wrong or illegal!)

3175. The VRS reported that during the period before 20 May 1992 ―the municipal authorities
and party leaderships, primarily of the [SDS], mobilised the Serbian TO as a self-organised
defence form of the Serbian people.‖10246 It also reported that in 1992 infantry units ―grew on a
massive scale out of the territorial defence and other units‖ and that they were only used at the
beginning of the war ―according to the decisions of crisis staffs and similar administrative
bodies‖.10247 (So what? Is it the Tribunal’s position that the Serbs shouldn’t do anything to
protect themselves, #not even a measures obligatory due to the laws#?)

3176. On 12 May 1992, after the formal establishment of the VRS, the SerBiH TO was directly
integrated into the VRS. The President, as the President, was to determine the organisation of
the integrated SerBiH TO units and staff.10248 The President participated in the creation of the
VRS by organising the manpower at the local level and facilitating the transfer of personnel and
supply from the JNA.10249

10239
P1087 (Minutes of meeting between SNB and SerBiH Government, 24 April 1992), p. 1, P2627 (Minutes of meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 28
April 1992), p. 1. The Chamber notes the evidence of Subotić that the attempts of the ―central authorities‖ to procure military uniforms for TO members
were only aimed at ―providing logistical support for the TO units‖ and not commanding them. D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June
2013), para. 272. However, the Chamber finds that this evidence is not consistent with evidence regarding the creation of a hierarchical command structure
nor with Subotić‘s own statement with regard to P5565 (Request of the Ministry of Defence for Personnel, 27 April 1992) in relation to which he testified
that this was part of ―our efforts to organize an efficient command and control over the TO units up until the formation of the VRS.‖ D3695 (Witness
statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 271.
10240
D406 (Minutes of meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 27 April 1992), p. 1.
10241
See para. 92.
10242
P5565 (Request of the Ministry of Defence for Personnel, 27 April 1992); D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 271–
272; P2627 (Minutes of meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 28 April 1992), p. 1; Bogdan Subotić, T. 40020 (19 June 2013).
10243
See para. 2260.
10244
See para. 713; P4383 (Order of Bratunac Crisis Staff, 16 April 1992), p. 1; D2061 (List of decisions and orders issued by the Crisis Staff, War Staff, and
Wartime Presidency of Bratunac Municipality, 29 August 1992), p. 4. See also Adjudicated Fact 2309; D3118 (Witness statement of Aleksandar Tešić
dated 10 March 2013), para. 16.
10245
P2615 (Decision of Biraĉ Crisis Staff, 29 April 1992). Subotić stated that nobody really knew how many local units had been formed. D3695 (Witness
statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 58.
10246
D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 75. See also D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat
readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 69.
10247
D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 13.
10248
See para. 214; D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), p. 13 (stating that when the VRS was formed
the infantry units that grew from TO and other units were incorporated into the VRS).
10249
P970 (Transcript of 50th session of RS Assembly, 15–16 April 1995), pp. 316–317; D1464 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Interview in Delo, 8 November 1993), p. 2;
KDZ088 T. 6245 (6 September 2010) (closed session); P1154 (Witness statement of KDZ088 dated 27–29 April 2010) (under seal), pp. 18–19. See also
D325 (VRS Main Staff analysis of combat readiness and army activities in 1992, April 1993), pp. 69, 75; D409 (Minutes of meeting of SNB and SerBiH
Government, 10 May 1992); P979 (Report from JNA 2 nd Military District to JNA General Staff, 20 March 1992), pp. 5–7; Colm Doyle, T. 2653 (21 May
2010), T. 2738–2739 (26 May 2010).
 867

3177. Based on the above the Chamber finds that the President was instrumental in the creation
of the SerBiH TO and local TO units in mid-April 1992 and that he had de jure authority over
the TO. In addition, given the President‘s authority over Crisis Staffs,10250 the Chamber finds
that the President also had de facto authority over the TO. (What is illegal there?)

iv. Paramilitary units 14.12.

1. President‘s initial attitude towards paramilitary units

3178. As stated above, while the JNA was operating in BiH, the President‘s position was that
the SDS would not arm the Serbs but would not prevent them from acquiring weapons in other
ways.10251 (#How possibly a political party prevent people to take care about their
security#? This is a job for the Army and Police. And what would happen if the Patriotic
league was the only side well armed, and buchered many Serbs, who were prevented by
their party to secure themselves? Besside that, the law prescribed that any prevention of
population to defend would constitute a high treason, see P4743, the #SFRY Constitution:

:Let us see again what is envisaged in the #BiH Constitution, D1262:

Not to have any dilemma, the BiH defense system was an unalienated part of the SFRY
system, according to both, the SFRY and BiH Constitution, see the BIH Constitution,
D1262:

10250
See paras. 3072–3096.
10251
See paras. 3169–3170.
 868

? However, the Chamber notes that already at the end of 1991 the SOS, commanded by Duško
Šaović, was formed and received orders from the SDS in Sanski Most.10252 (First let us se how
it was #regulated in the Federal and BiH Constitutions: D1262,:

This was a quite satisfactory #legal basis for a self-organisation of the citizens in Sanski Most or
elsewhere#, and a municipal authorities were expected to facilitate the self-defence and self-
protection of the population. It is quite known that 1991 there was a state of BiH, and a local TO-s
and reservists existed in coordination with the JNA, and an immediate command of the president
of municipality. What does it have to do with the President? When the entire Sanski Most TO
came under the control and command of the 6th Sana Brigade, the SOS didn’t satisfy the
command of the Brigade concerning the discipline, and they had been expelled from the Brigade.
ALL OF IT, THE EXISTENCE, ORGANISATION, FORMATION OF THE LOCAL UNITS
WAS LEGAL AND LEGITIMATE. IF THERE WAS A CRIMES, IT USUALLY WAS
COMMITED BY A PARTS OF THE UNIT, OR EVEN THE WHOLE UNIT. BUT, THE CRIME
OCCURE ONLY WHEN IT WAS COMMITED, NOT WHEN A UNIT WAS FORMED,
BECAUSE IT WAS LEGAL, LEGITIMATE AND OBLIGATORY. See how the SFRY
Presidency regulated this issue, D4282:

10252
(that was the
See para. 1925. The Chamber recalls that in April 1992, the Crisis Staff decided to integrate the SOS as a special unit of the TO
obligation of the Crisis Staff, the TO, the Army, Police, to subjugate any armed force, or disown them and arrest
them if and when possible) and notes that the order was never executed because the SOS refused to be placed under the TO‘s command. See para.
1928; KW540, D4449 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 3325 (under seal). The Chamber finds, therefore, that the SOS in Sanski
Most remained a paramilitary formation. It did remaind a paramilitary formation, but not under the control of the SDS,
particularly not by the central organs of SDS.
 869

These provisions are rebutting many charges, such as the President appeal that
municipalities “control everything on their territory” and other actions, derived from
these and other provisions. #The Prosecution should have all of it known and not pose a
fake and false charges#!)

3179. Mandić testified that in March and April 1992 the municipalities controlled and co-
ordinated the activities of the paramilitary formations active in their respective territories.10253
At around the same time, the President stated before the Bosnian Serb Assembly that ―[w]e
know that our people have armed themselves. We don‘t know the various ways and means by
which this was done, but we do know that the people have enough weapons‖. 10254 He added,
however, that they did not have paramilitary units and called for the urgent creation of Crisis
Staffs and for the organisation of TOs to be placed under the command of the JNA or reserve
officers.10255 (This was #completely legal and legitimate, and the only right move,
therefore #EXCULPATORY#!!!)

3180. In mid-April 1992, following a question by Vance about the presence of Arkan and Serb
irregulars in BiH, the Accused and Koljević claimed to have never seen Arkan and that
―somebody‖ invited Arkan to Bijeljina after a problem was caused by a Serb in a café,
following which ―Muslims even sent a cable thanking Arkan‖.10256 (#Hiding the crucial
document by the late disclosure, otherwise the last sentence of this paragraph wouldn’t be
possible, as the entire Bijeljina case#! This is again a mess, because this wasn’t the
incident caused by a Serb, but by the Muslims. The incident caused by a Serb happened
several days prior to that, and the perpetrator was arrested and handed over to Tuzla,
where the police, majority of the Muslim ethnicity, processed him. But the Defence is
prevented to submit the proves that the Muslims started the skirmishes, and #Arkan came
aboud 15 hours later#. Had the ECMM document been disclosed timely, everithing would
be clear, because the ECMM interviewd many Muslims in Bijeljina about Arkan and his
conduct, and all of them commended Arkan for his action and theatment of civilians. It
was also clear from the document of the HVO inteligence, concerning Hasan Tiric and his
task to occupy Bijeljina given to him by the Muslim secret army, to be done on 31 March
1992! There is a criminal report and indictment agains the same Tiric and 161 of his
associates, see:D3142)

3181. During an interview that was published on 23 April 1992, the Accused was asked how he
justified that ―Arkan Serbian militia are still seizing control of large sections of Bosnian
territory‖, to which he responded that ―[t]hose militias are paramilitary groups. They arrived in
Bosnia to respond to the infiltration by units of regular Croatian army in Her[z]egovina‖.10257
When he was asked whether he agreed to disband the paramilitary forces he answered that the
Bosnian Serbs did not have an armed force and that ―[w]e have always asked the Serbs not to
mobilize, unlike the Muslims‖.10258 (#Before VRS, during JNA#! It is again confused. The
Serbs asked the Serbian people #not to mobilize in any ethnic army#, but instead to
respond to the JNA mobilization calls. There is a mistake in thanslation. In English it said:
“The notion of territory is entirely relative”, while in the Serbian it was translated as
“relevant” instead of relative, or irrelevant, and this is a mistake. The President said:
“relative” and added “irelevant”. However, in this very document, in April 92 the
President said that all refugees will have the right to return, it was just signed. But the

10253
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9119.
10254
D304 (Shorthand Record of 14th session of RS Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 20. See also Herbert Okun, T. 1515 (23 April 2010).
10255
D304 (Shorthand Record of 14th session of RS Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 20.
10256
Herbert Okun, T. 1515 (23 April 2010); P780 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun‘s Vance Mission Diary), p. 38.
10257
D1591 (Radovan Karadţić‗s interview from Le Figaro, 23 April 1992), p. 1.
10258
D1591 (Radovan Karadţić‗s interview from Le Figaro, 23 April 1992), p. 1.
 870

entire Judgement is based on hearsay and on no relevant document. Also the President
denied any divison of Sarajevo, and spoke about administrative reorganisation!)

3182. The Chamber recalls that the Bijeljina Crisis Staff invited Arkan to the municipality and
that the take-over of Bijeljina on 1 and 2 April 1992 was carried out, inter alios, by the local
TO, the police, the JNA, and Arkan‘s men who operated under the supervision of the Bijeljina
Crisis Staff.10259 (#Before the VRS, before the war#! The Trial Chamber is abusing its
conspirative capacity, but it can not be tolerated: the Bijeljina Crisis Staf didn’t exist, and
everything based on this false assertion is false itself. There existed only the Party Crisis
Staff, and the Crisis Staff of SAO Semberija and Majevica. #BUT ALL OF THAT HAD
HAPPEN DURING THE SR BIH, A COMON Government and comon Presidency, and
had nothing to do with the SDS or its structures. What is necessary to do to prove a pure
undoubted fact? No a reasonable chamber or any court could afford itself such an
arbitrary, comfprtable and irresponsible conclusions!) Davidović stated that although Mićo
Stanišić knew what Arkan and his staff were doing in Bijeljina, Stanišić dared not interfere
because of Arkan‘s links with the Serbian MUP.10260 In April 1992, Mandić was also aware of
Arkan‘s involvement in Bijlejina and that Arkan had ―introduced order‖.10261 (It had to be the
common police which was supposed to establish the order, but it didn’t function neither in
Bijeljina, nor in Bosanski Brod on 25 and 26 March, three days earlier, when the Croatian
forces (from Croatia proper) entered BiH and in two days killed many Serb civilians. The
BH organs didn’t want, and the Serbian component of this organs couldn’t do protect
people without the Minister’s approval, to stop killing the Serbian helpless civilians. But,
the Minister was a Muslim, and he didn’t protect the Serb citizens of BiH!)

3183. Starting in early April 1992, Arkan‘s men also operated in Zvornik municipality, in
conjunction with the police, the Zvornik TO, and the JNA.10262 (At that time, the President
didn’t have any political or a state role, and the JNA was a legitimate state Army, and all
others such as TO, volunteers, all of them were under the JNA competence!) In Bratunac,
in mid-April, Arkan‘s men operated together with the Serb Forces that consisted of JNA troops,
TO members, and local reservists.10263 The same as the above! In Ilidţa, they co-operated with
the local forces in April 1992.10264 And how the Arkan’s men went in Ilidza? Let us se who
invited Arkan’s men to Ilidza D01248, p.12

“
Now,
who is Dragisic? Nobody. He has nothing to do with the officials at Ilidza, living in
Belgrade which can be seen from the next sentence: (D01248, p. 20

Obviously, Legija is in Ilidza, and Arkan and Dragisa are in Belgrade. There are
documents that even more drastically illustrate the negative attitude of the RS officials
and the Arkan’s men, See: P5675, pp. 3-4.
10259
See paras. 608, 611–612, 672.
10260
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 125. Davidović also testified that Arkan‘s men were controlled and
subordinated to the Serbian MUP and that he had a training camp at Erdut for which he had received the consent of the Serbian MUP. See para. 232.
Davidovic himself was borowed from FRY to help, but it was when there was no common state.
10261
P5741 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and Milenko Kepeš, 5 April 1992), p. 3.
10262
See paras. 1245–1246, 1252, 1255, 1319, 1361. The Chamber noted that the local authorities in Zvornik faced difficulties in controlling the actions of the
paramilitaries but that, in some cases the paramilitary formations carried out their illegal activities with the knowledge and consent of members of the
Bosnian Serb authorities. See paras. 1286, 1288.
10263
See para. 714. The Chamber noted that the municipal authorities faced problems with paramilitaries and volunteers who arrived in Bratunac, tried to take
power, terrorised the population and did not accept the command structures or local authorities. See paras. 750–751, 754.
10264
See para. 2142.
 871

And that is how went and how #ended the Arkan’s men presence in Ilidza#! They came on
an invitation of some guy named Dragisic, who lived in Belgrade, they hadn’t been
welcome, they met a rejection from General Mladic, and they couldn’t even contact
Karadzic, whom they characterised to be in good terms with the Muslims, (in Serbian:
“on se ljubaka sa Muslimanima” meaning, he is in a sort of love with the Muslims!) How
possibly after those genuine evidences anybody can allege any connection between the
President and any paramilitaries!) At the beginning of May 1992, Arkan‘s men participated
in the attack on Brĉko in conjunction with Serb units of the JNA, active and reserve police
officers, soldiers, military reserves, and a TO battalion.10265 (#Absurdity!!!# “Serb units of the
JNA!!!# The JNA was not a “Serb units” but the only legal federal army, and President
Karad`i} didn’t have any competence over it! There the Federal Presidency should be
asked about that, not the President, who have heard about that much later, and sent the
special police unit, enforced by the Davidovic’s unit from Belgrade, to settle the situation
down. While present in BiH, the JNA had it’s own troubles with all but with the Serbs,
particularly around bridges on rivers, or an important crossroads, but it had nothing to
do with the President, or his associates, or the local authorities!) Similarly, after Rogatica
was attacked on or about 22 May 1992, Arkan‘s men were posted in Borike ready to start
operations as soon as Kušić, who commanded the Rogatica Brigade, so ordered.10266 (Why this
Judgement skipped to mention who attacked Rogatica? It was well known that the
#Muslim extremists attacked Serbs in Rogatic#a with the aim to take the entire
10265
See para. 798. The Chamber noted that the Bosnian Serb local authorities had difficulties in controlling paramilitary groups which entered and operated in
Brĉko. See para. 824. See also paras. 826–833.
10266
See paras. 969, 3322.
 872

municipality, instead to share it with the Serbs, and to form theit own municipality! Those
who read this Judgement would be unclear who did attack Rogatica, and by an inertia
many would conclude that the Serbs attacked themselves!)

3184. The Chamber notes the evidence that Arkan was not subordinated to the RS authorities.
Milan Martić testified that Arkan was close to the federal SDB and that ―he was practically
there in that capacity‖.10267 Martin Bell testified that ―Arkan took orders from nobody‖;10268
however, he noted that Arkan ―couldn‘t have got across the border through the roadblocks
without some collusion somewhere and somebody letting his men across‖.10269 (And who that
would be who would dare and would be capable of stopping such a mighty unit?) John
Wilson stated that Arkan‘s men ―enjoyed cooperation with Mladić by the fact that they were
able to move about freely in an otherwise relatively tightly controlled area.‖10270 (#This is a
guessing, not a testimony on facts!#)

3185. With regard to the events in Zvornik in early April 1992,10271 KW317 testified that while
there was an attempt of the SDS to negotiate with the Muslims in Zvornik, Arkan and his group
arrived and took control over the situation. Arkan rejected the idea of negotiating and he
launched an attack without the authorisation of the local authorities in Zvornik. KW317 added
that they had no means of contacting the President and he was not aware of anything that would
suggest that the President knew of Arkan‘s attack on Zvornik, let alone approved it.10272
Similarly, Šešelj testified that the President had no role to play in the events in Zvornik in early
April 1992 and did not have any power to exert any influence.10273 (Right! In midd April a
secretary in the MUP named Radmila called somebody in Belgrade to ask who was in
control of Zvornik. Therefore not even the police knew who was in control of Zvornik,
see…)

3186. However, as depicted above, Arkan‘s men were in contact and co-operated with RS
authorities. What authorities? A local in Zvornik were slapped and threatened by Arkan,
while there is no evidence that the central authorities in Pale had even knowledge, let
alone any leverage. We have heard what Mr. Legija reported to Arkan about the local
Ilidza authorities, as well as the central authorities towards them. See: D01248, see . In
addition, Kuprešanin testified that when he and other deputies from ARK called an
extraordinary session of the ARK Assembly to receive explanations from the President about
recent events involving Croatian and Muslim forces in the ARK Municipalities, Arkan
interrupted the session while the President was not present and stated that he had come with 300
volunteers; he demanded that the republican authorities authorise him to defend the
municipalities given that the VRS was not doing so.10274 (Obviously, it was in 1995, when the
RS was attacked by Croatia itself, the FBiH and NATO. At that moment Arkan asked to
be allowed to participate as a volunteers, which was regulated by the law, and then they

10267
Milan Martić, T. 38158–38159 (13 May 2013). See also KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 23628–23629 (under seal)
(testifying: ―I think that [Arkan] didn‘t have any official position [within the Ministry of Interior]‖ and that Arkan had been in contact with the Federal SUP
and the main inspector in the Federal SUP).
10268
Martin Bell, T. 9787 (14 December 2010).
10269
Martin Bell, T. 9787 (14 December 2010). See also Martin Bell, T. 9788, 9809–9810 (14 December 2010); P2002 (BBC news report re Zvornik, with
transcript); P2001 (BBC news report re Zvornik, with transcript); D916 (BBC news report re Ilidţa, with transcript). While the Chamber accepts Bell
testimony that according to his observations there were paramilitary groups operating in BiH, it finds however that Bell was not in a position to conclude
that such groups were under no one‘s control.
10270
P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson 4 November 2008), para. 128. Wilson stated that Mladić commanded not only the VRS, but the TO and
paramilitaries, except, for example, Arkan‘s men.
10271
See paras. 1248–1253.
10272
D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012) (under seal), para. 46. See also paras. 1251–1253.
10273
Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39594 (10 June 2013). See also KDZ610, T. 27199–27200 (29 March 2012).
10274
D4011 (Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), para. 51.
 873

had been subjugated to the MUP, and didn’t make any crime. At the beginning of the war
nobody needed any authorisation, because the #JNA had a priority over the local TO-#s.

3187. The Chamber recalls that when Davidović reported to Mićo Stanišić that some of
Arkan‘s men had taken over the SUP in Bijeljina, Stanišić commented that he knew, that
nothing else could be done, and that‘s ―how it ha[d] to be‖.10275 Stanišić also told Davidović
that Arkan‘s men were in Bijeljina and Zvornik ―helping to liberate territory that they believed
should become part of the [RS]‖.10276 The evidence also shows that at the same period, after
Arkan had entered Bijeljina, Davidović was at a meeting in Belgrade where further activities of
the Serbian MUP were discussed.10277 Arkan arrived at this meeting, which was also attended
by the Accused, Momĉilo Krajišnik, and Mićo Stanišić.10278 (It was a very dramatic period
in Sarajevo, and that is out of question that the entire leadership of the Serbs in Bosnia
had been in Belgrade! Particularly the leadership wouldn’t attend any meeting of the
Serbian MUP! Had it been so, there would be many media reports about that, and they
certainly wouldn’t spend their time with these persons, but rather with the Serbia and
international high officials! #This witness corrected himself several times during the cross
examination, because he admitted that he didn’t know many crucial data when testified or
gave his statements, see his testimony in this case!)

3188. Davidović also testified that during a meeting with the President and Mladić around May
1992 at the Lukavica barracks, some of Arkan‘s men arrived. According to Davidović, Mladić
was angry and the President stated, ―[i]t‘s all right, we asked them to come. They should help
with the liberation of Sarajevo. And, if they can do it, let them do it. Let them take whatever
they can take.‖10279 (#That never happened#, and it is illogical anyway. First, had it been
said, #Mladic would have it in his diaries. Second, there was no any Serb plan to “liberate
Sarajevo” ever! Nobody could hear such a sentence, because the President and the Serb
side as a whole had never meant to take anything in Sarajevo which already wasn’t the
Serb settlement! Finally, from the telephone conversation of the “Arkan’s man” Legija it
was absolutely impossible that this happened, or that the Arkan’s men could get close to
the President of the Republic of Srpska!)

3189. However, in an interview in November 1993, the Accused claimed that not a ―single
soldier from Serbia was fighting at the beginning of the war, only Arkan was in Bijeljina, but
only briefly, however, and not at our invitation‖.10280 Certainly, at that time Serbia didn’t
have its own Army, except for TO. The JNA was a Federal Army. When asked whether
Arkan was also in Ilidţa, the President replied in the negative stating ―[w]e have Šešelj‘s and
Arkan‘s followers but they are our boys, however, who are only wearing their symbols.‖10281
#Everyone could have proclaimed himself as an Arkan’s or Seselj’s man#. As it is evident
from the intercept, Legija reported to Arkan that he couldn’t get in touch with Karadzic,
and that they are not welcome in the RS. See: P5675 above!

10275
See para. 616.
10276
See para. 616. See also para. 1244 (referring to the fact that Grujić and Spasojević were among the Bosnian Serb officials who invited and paid for
paramilitaries to come to Zvornik).
10277
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 66.
10278
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 66. Davidović commented that in light of this meeting Arkan probably did
―what he was authorised to do‖ and he believed that given that there was discussion of tasks and activities that the Accused knew about Arkan‘s activities.
So, Mr. Davidovic “believed” something what “probably” was happening!!! The meeting wasn’t on the territory of
the RS at all, why the President woul interfere in what the Serbian MUP was discussing. There was nothing to
corroborate this “memories” of Davidovic. How come nobody else mentioned such a meeting?)
10279
Milorad Davidović, T. 15465 (24 June 2011); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 55.
10280
D1464 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Interview in Delo, 8 November 1993), p. 2. But see Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić &
Ţupljanin), T. 21491–21492, 21539–21541. Andan stated that he regularly informed the political structures of government about the situation in Bijeljina,
and that the Accused supported the measures Andan was implementing against paramilitary units.
10281
D1464 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Interview in Delo, 8 November 1993), p. 2.
 874

3190. In addition to Arkan‘s men the Chamber noted that Mauzer‘s Panthers, whose commander
was also the commander of the SAO Semberija TO, operated in Bijeljina with the support of the
Presidency of the Bijeljina Municipal Assembly and under the supervision of the Bijeljina
Crisis Staff. (The BN Crisis Staff didn’t exist!!! For other, that was right, but Mauzer
wasn’t “also the commander of the SAO Semberija TO, but his Panthers was a legal unit
of the Semberija TO. In addition, as same as Arkan, Mauzer had a bad reputation, but
just after the war Mauzer passed tests of the SFOR and OSCE, and became a high official
of the MUP RS. Nobody ever reported him for any crime, but only for a rude behaviour,
and nobody indicted or sued him whatsoever!) During the take-over in April 1992, Mauzer‘s
Panthers operated in conjunction with the local TO, the police, and the JNA .10282 (There was
no any take-over, and Panthers itself was a TO unit. It was a defence of the Bijeljina
municipality from the Muslim extremists, and it was carried out by the official forces, the
Police, the TO and JNA. That was the first class obligation due to the legislature, see the
excerpts from the SFRY – P4743, and BiH D1262 - Constitutions, pasted above!) In
April 1992 Mauzer‘s unit also operated in Zvornik,10283 and at the beginning of May 1992
participated in the attack on Brĉko, in co-operation with Serb units of the JNA, active and
reserve police officers, soldiers, military reserves and a TO battalion.10284 (The Chamber
treathed the Serb military actions as if the Serbs came from some other state. This was the
Serb country too, and the Muslim community, their leaders and extremists tried to take it
for themselves, while the Serbs defended agains such a campaign! Everywhere where the
JNA participated, all others were a parts of the operation, because the JNA was superior
to other armed forces. When the JNA withdrew, the TO participated in all needed battles,
mainly under the VRS command!)

3191. With regard to Šešelj‘s men, the Chamber noted that in April 1992 they operated in
conjunction with the Serb Forces in Bratunac.10285 Šešelj‘s men also operated in Zvornik,10286
in Hadţići in co-operation with the TO,10287 in Novo Sarajevo with the VRS and the police,10288
and took part in combat activities in Vogošća alongside the Bosnian Serb authorities.10289
(Inaccurate! None of these combatants were from Serbia. They had been a members of the
Serb Radical Party of Mr. Seselj, which was not opposed to the SDS and they had the
right to participate in the combats as any other Bosnian Serb!)

3192. In addition, on or about 22 May 1992,10290 Šešelj‘s men were involved in the attack on
Rogatica.10291 The Chamber notes Šešelj‘s testimony that all members of the SRS who went to
BiH as volunteers joined the VRS or the TO and that the SRS party never sponsored or
supported paramilitaries, 10292 but finds his testimony in this regard to be unreliable.10293 The
10282
See paras. 608, 611–612, 672. The core of Mauzer‘s Panthers were SDS members close to the leadership of the Crisis Staff in Bijeljina. See para. 233. The
Chamber also found that it was only after paramilitaries started undermining the authority of the local institutions by forming their own parallel authorities
and also attacking Bosnian Serbs that the municipal authorities sought to exercise some real control over paramilitary units, and that there were difficulties
in controlling Mauzer and his unit which opposed the attempts by Davidović and Andan to restore order in the municipality. However, following demands
by Mauzer for his expulsion and the arrest of one of Arkan‘s men by Davidović‘s unit, Davidović‘s authority was obstructed by the Bijeljina Crisis Staff and
his unit was ordered to leave for Belgrade. See paras. 632–633, 637–638.
10283
See para. 1244.
10284
See para. 798.
10285
See para. 714. The Chamber already noted above the problems faced by the Bratunac municipal authorities with paramilitaries and volunteers. See fn.
10268.
10286
See paras. 1244.
10287
See paras. 2104–2105.
10288
See para. 2255.
10289
See para. 2396. See also paras. 2405–2406.
10290
See para. 965.
10291
See para. 969.
10292
D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), paras. 68–69; D3667 (Transcript of Vojislav Šešelj's press conference, 26 March 1992), pp.
36–37; D3668 (Interview with Vojislav Šešelj and Nikola Poplašen, September 1992), pp. 2–3.
10293
The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable given the interest of Šešelj in minimising his own involvement in this regard. In addition, the
Chamber notes that in a later interview Šešelj said that he was a true friend of the Accused ―as long as [the Accused] pursues this kind of politics‖ and that
 875

Chamber also recalls that Šešelj met with the Accused a few times each year during the
war.10294 (#Apple and oranges#. It doesn’t make any sense. As if “the President” was a
famous commander of paramilitaries, so a meeting with the President means that Seselj
supported paramilitaries! Both of them lived in Sarajevo at the same time, both of them
were a public persons before the politics, both of them belonged to the corps of dissidents
from the previous regime, and had spent some time in a different prisons, at a different
times. They used to meet before the war too. So, this fact that they met doesn’t help this
finding of the Chamber!)

3193. The White Eagles also operated in conjunction with the Serb Forces in Bratunac in April
1992.10295 (#Before VRS, before Karad`i} had any command#!) In addition, they operated in
Rogatica in March 1992 with the JNA and TO;10296 in Zvornik in April 1992 with the Zvornik
TO and the JNA;10297 and in Ilidţa with the co-operation of the local forces.10298 The Chamber
found that the White Eagles took part in the main attack on the town of Foĉa that commenced
on the morning of 8 April 1992, in conjunction with soldiers from Serbia and Montenegro and
the Foĉa Tactical Group.10299 The White Eagles also participated at the beginning of May 1992
in the attack on Brĉko in conjunction with Serb units of the JNA, active and reserve police
officers, soldiers, military reserves and a TO battalion.10300 (#Absurdity#! A “Serb units of
the JNA” didn’t exist, this is an invention of the Tribunal, and this indicates the #Tribunal
as primarily an anti-Serb institution#. But, who were the White Eagles? What was the BS
leaders relation with them? The “BS leadership never heard any name of the
commanders, but it was mentioned that it was a party formation of SPO (The Serb
renewal movement, Vuk Draskovic, melted in the JNA!)

3194. The Chamber found that members of the Yellow Wasps would regularly report to the
Zvornik Crisis Staff, had close co-operation with, and were issued arms by the TO and were
subsequently under the command of the Zvornik Brigade.10301 (#Not even a bit of honesty#.
The Yellow Wasps cooperated with the local authorities while they had been the the #JNA
volunteers#, but after they reneged and became paramilitaries, then the authorities turned
against them, and vice versa: the Yellow Wasps attacked, had beaten and humiliated the
local officials. They would never do that if the authorities didn’t turn against their
conduct!)

3195. Plavšić acknowledged during a session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, in November
1992, in the presence of the Accused,10302 that following the call of the ―president of the
Republic‖ for volunteers, she sent letters in order to gather anyone who wanted to fight for the

he will not tell the interviewer ―anything that someone else might use against [the Accused] or that might put him in an unpleasant situation.‖ P6388
(Excerpt from video of interview with Vojislav Šešelj for "Death of Yugoslavia" documentary, with transcript). What this fn. does have to do
with the President? Does it mean that the President was a “big chief” if paramilitaries, and a mere meeting with him
meant that Seselj lied?
10294
D3666 (TANJUG news report, 15 May 1993); D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), paras. 36–37. See also para. 3327.
10295
See para. 714. The Chamber already noted above the problems faced by the Bratunac municipal authorities with paramilitaries and volunteers. See fn.
10268.
10296
See paras. 958, 969.
10297
See paras. 1244, 1249, 1276, 1317. See also Milorad Davidović, T. 15492–15495 (28 June 2011) (referring inter alia to P2865 (White Eagles' payroll, June
1992). The Chamber noted that the local authorities faced difficulties in controlling the actions of the paramilitaries but that, in some cases the paramilitary
formations carried out their illegal activities with the knowledge and consent of members of the Bosnian Serb authorities in Zvornik. See fn. 10267.
10298
See para. 2142.
10299
See para. 855. The Chamber noted that by May 1992 the authorities attempted to expel paramilitary formations from the municipality. See para. 866.
10300
See para. 798.
10301
See paras. 1280, 1287, 1297, fn. 10267. See also Milorad Davidović, T. 15492–15495 (28 June 2011) (referring to P2862 (Yellow Wasps payroll, 1 May
1992) and to P2863 (Yellow Wasps payroll, June 1992).
10302
P1105 (Transcript of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24 November 1992), pp. 2, 60.
 876

Serb cause in RS, and that she sent letters, inter alios, to Šešelj and Arkan.10303 (Here is what
Ms. Plavsic really said, P1105, p. 20:

Ms. Plavsic denied any idea that she was connected to any paramilitary, see line 5! Also,
she mentioned that the President invited a volunteers to come to join the RS sgruggle. The
issue of volunteering was a legal and legaly regulated by the Presidency of SFRY, and
volunteers had been equalised with all other soldiers, with the rights and obligations
prescribed by the law. #So, neither the President, nor Ms. Plavsic meant that a volunteers
should come to become paramilitaries#, but to participate in the defence according to the
law, and there was nothing illegal in it. many volunteers remained in the VRS until the
end of the war as a very disciplined soldiers. Some of these groups soon turned to a
paramilitaries, since there was no the JNA any longer, and the VRS wasn’t in a position to
discipline them yet, while the municipal authorities could only continue to pay them as at
the beginning, and to fear that the “volunteere” may arrest or kill them! The Chamber
had a sufficient evidence to this regard, and shouldn’t twist them meanings of words!
After the state organs and the VRS consolidated their power, the paramilitaries had been
banned, disbanded and if didn’t follow this, had been arrested!) Mandić testified that
Plavsić ―was an advocate of having all paramilitary units from territories where Serbs lived
outside BiH coming to the assistance of their brethren […] in the religious war being waged
there‖,10304 and was the ―bridge‖ between Bosnian Serbs and the people who came from other
states to the conflict.10305 (The existence of volunteers, as well as a call for them were legal
and legitimate. Once registered, the volunteers wrer equated with other members of the
regular armed forces! Here is P6171, a regulation of the engagement of the volunteere,
issued by the Presidency of SFRY in 1991, P6171:

10303
P1105 (Transcript of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24 November 1992), p. 20; Milorad Davidović, T. 15473–15474 (28 June 2011); Momĉilo Mandić,
T. 4625–4626 (5 July 2010). See also P2857 (Video footage of Arkan in Bijeljina), p. 1; P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Ðerić dated 5 April 2012),
paras. 42–44; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5163 (14 July 2010) (explaining that mop-up operations included paramilitary and military formations in combat
operations aimed at taking new territory or territory under the control of another warring party).
10304
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4625–4626 (5 July 2010). See also Mićo Stanišić, T. 46385–46386 (3 February 2014); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad
Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 72; P1106 (Intercept of conversation between Biljana Plavšić and ―Rus‖, 23 April 1992), pp. 1–2.
10305
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4660–4661 (6 July 2010). According to Mandić, while Đeric supported Plavsić, he and Mićo Stanišić opposed Plavsić‘s approach to
paramilitaries. Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4625–4626 (5 July 2010). The Chamber notes that Davidović testified that he heard from many sources that the
Accused invited those who wanted to fight for RS to report as volunteers in BiH and join units of the army. See Milorad Davidović, T. 15473–15474 (28
June 2011). The Chamber rejects this portion of Davidović‘s evidence as it is based on unattributed hearsay. The Chamber also notes Redţić‘s assessment
that the paramilitaries were formed by leaders of the SDS. Izet Redţić, P3189 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5070–5071. The Chamber notes
that Redţić was the president of the Executive Board of Vlasenica, but, as he could not elaborate the basis for his assessment, the Chamber does not place
any weight on his assessment.
 877

Th
e paragrapg No. 7 was a basis for the President’s order of 13 June 1992, P3057

This order of the #President clearly differentiated the legal volunteers from all the
paramilitary# and other independent groups and individuals, disowning the later, and
therefore no the RS official could be liable for their deeds after this Order!)

3196. Milorad Dodik testified in broad terms that paramilitary groups which operated in BiH
were not under the control of the RS authorities.10306 Similarly, Momir Bulatović testified that
the expulsions that were suffered by ―all ethnic groups‖ was the result of the ―collective
mentality of the population‖ and that it was impossible for any political leader to ―control the
population‖.10307 The Chamber, however, does not find that these broad statements have any
weight.10308 (#Unbelievable! The two presidents of the republics are not trusted#! Apart
from that, there was more evidence, like from Radinovic and others, that it was a deeply
rooted tradition that a population leaves territories that their army lost. This is one of the
things that no reasonable chamber would decide that way!)

10306
See Milorad Dodik, T. 36919 (9 April 2013). See also Milorad Dodik, T. 36852 (9 April 2013).
10307
See D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), para. 20.
10308
The Chamber notes that Dodik‘s evidence was marked by contradictions, indicators of insincerity and partisanship which undermined the reliability of his
evidence in this regard. With regard to Bulatović‘s evidence, the Chamber finds his statement to be broad, general and unsubstantiated.
 878

3197. The Chamber finds, to the contrary, that the fact that paramilitary formations, such as
Arkan‘s men, Šešelj‘s men, Mauzer‘s Panthers, and White Eagles were able to move freely in
―an otherwise relatively tightly controlled area‖10309 and to operate in concert with local forces
and authorities, in several of the Municipalities throughout BiH, supports the conclusion that
such co-operation was approved by the Bosnian Serb leadership. (First, it was not established
that these numbered formations had committed crimes, particularly since everyone could
put a red beret on his head and pretend to be whoever wanted! This Chamber’s inference
is far from a possibility to be the only possible or reasonable inference? How about that all
of them had the same uniforms as the former JNA, and how about that some, if not all of
them had at least at the beginning been members of the JNA or TO, or VRS as the regular
formations, and at one moment reneged? And who could differentiate the renegades from
the regular forces? And what power did have the civilian population to stop them even if
they recognized them as renegades? And how it was a “relatively tightly controlled area,”
when then the small army had about 2.000 km of frontline? See: MUP, rep. on attacks on
MUP@

3198. With regard to Arkan‘s men and Šešelj‘s men specifically, the Chamber concludes that
the President knew that they were operating in BiH during the spring of 1992 and that they were
invited by the RS Presidency to operate in conjunction with local authorities and forces.10310
The Chamber also notes the President‘s direct interaction with Arkan and Šešelj and, moreover,
that in May 1992 the President invited, without Mladić‘s knowledge, Arkan‘s men to participate
in operations in the Sarajevo area.10311 (This is noly if the Chamber believed the Davidovic
testimony, which was not corroborated by anything, nor by the Mladic diaries, nor by any
other document, and definitely rebuted by the evidence, i.e. intercepted conversations
between Arkan and his officer Legija, see P5675, and D1248! Pasted above!)

2. Disbandment of paramilitary forces

3199. The Chamber found above that over the course of the conflict the Bosnian Serb leadership
and military commanders increasingly expressed opposition to having units that were outside of
the command and control of the army.10312 (#EXCULPATORY#!Again, the volunteers were
welcome, but nobody invited anybody to commit crimes, and once some of the groups
commited crimes and acted independently, the measures had been undertaken. That fact
can not be denied!!! Here is evidence about arresting and charging the paramilitaries:
@@@@@)

3200. On 2 June 1992, at a meeting of commanders of the 1st Krajina Corps and Banja Luka
political leaders, which the President attended, there was agreement that paramilitary formations
should be dissolved.10313 (#EXCULPATORY#!!! A ten days after that the President made
it formal and strict, issuing the Order pasted above, P3057, which had been followed by
the state organs. In the following months there were a several very numerous and mighty
paramilitaries arrested by the legal Serb Forces, some of them with an assistance of the
police specials from Yugoslavia (Davidovic) in Brcko, Bijeljina and Zvornik!)

10309
P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson 4 November 2008), para. 128. See also Martin Bell, T. 9787 (14 December 2010).
10310
See paras. 3181, 3195.
10311
See paras. 3188, 3192.
10312
See para. 238. The Chamber notes that in certain regions orders against paramilitary formations were already issued by the local authorities in April and
May 1992. See paras. 854, 1943, 2052. However, the Chamber also notes that such orders were not necessarily enforced or were selectively enforced
against non-Serbs. See paras. 855, 2053.
10313
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 53–59. See also D1464 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Interview in Delo, 8 November 1993), p. 1.
 879

3201. On 3 June 1992, the Eastern Bosnia Corp Command issued an order, pursuant to the
decision on the formation of the VRS, that certain volunteer units, including Mauzer‘s Panthers,
be transformed into units of the VRS and that Mauzer be appointed Assistant Chief of Staff.10314
Similarly, as found above, on 13 June 1992, the Accused banned the formation and operation
of armed groups and individuals which were not under the control of the VRS on the territory of
the RS.10315 (#EXCULPATORY#!) The President also stated that he was ―disowning‖ groups
that continued to operate independently and that those groups would suffer the strictest
sanctions for their operations.10316 (#EXCULPATORY#! And they did suffer the strictest
sanctions, as the evidence confirmed!)

3202. As a result Arkan‘s men left BiH, though they returned from time to time. 10317 The
#original Arkan’s men never returned the RS except in fall 1995, at the request of the
attacked municipalities of Krajina, and their commitment to obey the MUP regulations
and orders! If some groups presented themselves as being “Arkan’s men”, that would be
pretending and false presentation, in order to gain a respect!) In addition, Mauzer‘s
Panthers were formally incorporated in the VRS as a ―Special Brigade‖10318 that functioned as a
separate unit under Mauzer‘s authority.10319 The President was aware that Mauzer‘s Panthers
were incorporated in the VRS as a ―Special Brigade‖.10320 (Except for being rude and
impolite, and had a quarrels with the Radical Party, the President had never been
informed about any crime of this unit, and if there was any illegal action, that would be in
competence of the Military Police of the Eastern Bosnian Corps of VRS, not of the
President!)

3203. As described earlier, in June 1992, the Accused and Mladić visited Zvornik after the
Zvornik Government and Crisis Staff building was encircled by paramilitary formations and a
member of Captain Dragan‘s unit threatened the President of the Municipality.10321 (This fact
shouldn’t be forgotten, and there shouldn’t be a #mix-up of causes and consequences#, as
the Prosecution does: #the paramilitaries turned against the local Serb authorities because
these authorities didn’t tolerate their illegal activities#!) On 30 June 1992, Grujić reported
to the Accused and Mladić that in addition to ―major accomplishments‖ there were also many
problems from paramilitary formations which broke free after Arkan‘s withdrawal and called
for their removal.10322 Marko Pavlović reported that the ―[v]olunteer formations enjoyed
exceptional success‖ and were led by Arkan and Šešelj, and that ―Arkan‘s withdrew orderly, but
some that stayed broke free of his control‖.10323 At this meeting, the President stated that it
would be a shame to abolish Captain Dragan‘s training centre at Diviĉi and that it would be
easiest to ―put the incident behind us‖.10324 (So what? Dragan’s Centre didn’t participate in
10314
D1458 (Order of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 3 June 1992).
10315
See para. 239. See also KDZ088, T. 6562–6563 (13 September 2010) (closed session); D455 (Report re events in Doboj, 27 July 1992), pp. 1–2; D3485
(SRK report, 26 June 1993), p. 1.
10316
See para. 239. See also D1933 (Fax from Radovan Karadţić to Boutros Ghali, 13 June 1992).
10317
See paras. 239; 3226–3228.
10318
See D1458 (Order of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 3 June 1992), p. 2; P2855 (VRS Main Staff report on paramilitary formations, 28 July 1992), p. 5; P1480 (Ratko
Mladić‘s notebook, 10–30 September 1992), p. 40 (referring to the ―Special Brigade (Ljubiša Savić)‖); P2716 (Notebook of Radovan Karadţić), p. 7
(referring to ―Ljubiša Savić, Mauzer, Special Brigade‖); P6133 (Drina Corps Order, 12 February 1993), para. 5.3; D2137 (VRS analysis of combat
operations, undated), p. 1.
10319
Milorad Davidović, T. 15812–15813 (1 July 2011); P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 94, 96; Dragomir Andan,
D3774 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 21656–21657. See also P2855 (VRS Main Staff report on paramilitary formations, 28 July
1992), p. 5 (while reporting that Mauzer‘s unit ―formally joined the so-called Special Brigade‖ it was also stated that Mauzer‘s unit ―was formed by the
Bijeljina SDS, and the Presidency of Bijeljina Municipal Assembly decided that this would be the army of Bijeljina […] The greater part of the municipal
authorities in Bijeljina still back [Mauzer‘s unit]‖).
10320
See P2716 (Notebook of Radovan Karadţić), p. 7. The Chamber also notes that in 1993 the Accused was present at a ceremony which was attended by
Mauzer. See P2856 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić at public ceremony); Milorad Davidović, T. 15481–15482 (28 June 2011).
10321
See para. 1286.
10322
See para. 1286; P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 249–250, 252.
10323
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 252.
10324
See para. 1286; P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 250, 270.
 880

combats, but only in a training of inexperienced people. However, the #President accepted
the Mladic’s opinion that they didn’t need Dragan’s service!#)

3204. The Chamber notes the President‘s efforts to disband certain (Not only a “certain”, but
every single about which he was informed!) paramilitary groups, including through the
assistance of the Federal SUP. After the President complained at an international peace
conference about being unable to control paramilitaries in BiH who had come from Serbia, it
was proposed that a group of Federal SUP officers go and assist the Bosnian Serb MUP to deal
with problems with paramilitaries and Milorad Davidović was tasked to lead the investigative
team.10325 According to Davidović, the President had called on him to assist in preventing
crime.10326 Davidović was instructed by Pavle Bulatović to arrest and prosecute paramilitaries
who were found to engage in looting and robbing and was also requested by Mladić to take all
measures envisaged by law against these persons.10327 Davidović acknowledged that he was
given complete autonomy by the President in planning operations and arresting individuals.10328
(#EXCULPATORY#!!!)

3205. Similarly, the Chamber found that in the summer of 1992, following increasing security
problems related to paramilitaries in north-east BiH, including in Brĉko, the President requested
that a special unit be sent to Brĉko, and the Bosnian Serb MUP requested support from the
Federal SUP and Davidović to stabilise the security situation.10329 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!)

3206. However, the Chamber notes that according to Davidović, while some members of armed
groups were arrested, the continued support for armed groups by local authorities, Crisis Staffs,
and ―high-ranking functionaries‖ made investigative measures difficult.10330 He also testified
that while Mladić was always against paramilitary formations, he was unable to confront them
because ―they were protected by those whose existence suited them.‖10331 In Davidović‘s view,
it was only when paramilitaries turned against the Bosnian Serb authorities and stopped sharing
their ―booty‖ that the local authorities wanted to have them removed.10332 (#Views and
opinions# of the witnesses on facts#! Why the Chamber accepted a #“Davidovic’s view”
since it was a blatant guessing without any corroboration#! It was very known that the
most responsible local authorities had been detained by the paramilitaries. Not to #mix up
the causes and consequences# mentioned above!).

3207. For example, Davidović testified that measures were taken in Bijeljina only after
paramilitaries established parallel authorities which posed a threat to the local Bosnian Serb
authorities.10333 (Why would the paramilitaries need a parallel authorities, if the legal
paramilitaries were good for them?) The Chamber notes in this regard that the President
issued on 30 August 1992 a decision addressed to the War Presidency of the Bijeljina
municipality, indicating that all decisions of the municipality of Bijeljina pertaining to military
matters would be suspended. He also ordered the civilian authorities to ―investigate personal
responsibility of officials who issued the illegal decisions in times of war‖, with a report to be
sent to the Presidency on what had been done.10334 (#ALL EXCULPATORY#! Why the
10325
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 73–74; P2899 (Report of Bijeljina CSB, 29 July 1992), p. 2; D1412 (Report of
Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p. 1; Milorad Davidović, T. 15735 (30 June 2011); D1450 (Milorad Davidović‘s statement to Belgrade District
Court, 26 December 2007), p. 4.
10326
Milorad Davidović, T. 15735 (30 June 2011).
10327
Milorad Davidović, T. 15604–15605, 15607 (29 June 2011); D1450 (Milorad Davidović‘s statement to Belgrade District Court, 26 December 2007), p. 72.
10328
Milorad Davidović, T. 15735 (30 June 2011).
10329
See para. 829.
10330
Milorad Davidović, T. 15519–15520 (28 June 2011).
10331
Milorad Davidović, T. 15519–15520 (28 June 2011).
10332
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 72.
10333
D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), p. 6; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 78–79, 121.
10334
D454 (Decision of Presidency of SerBiH, 30 August 1992); Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5199 (15 July 2010). See also [REDACTED].
 881

paramilitaries “formed” their parallel authorities? Because the regular authorities

opposed to their conduct, and for that reason the paramilitaries suspended the legal
authorities, without forming any other. In the cases the legal authorities couldn’t oppose
demands of the paramilitaries and issued some illegal decisions, these decisions had been
withdrawn and the president of the Municipality of Bijeljina, otherwise a good official,
was discharged, forced to resign!)

3208. The Chamber found that Davidović planned the operation to arrest paramilitary groups in
Zvornik in co-operation with Andan and special units of the MUP and that, on 29 July 1992,
Ţućo, the commander of the Yellow Wasps, was arrested and brought to Bijeljina.10335 During
this operation, other leaders and members of the Yellow Wasps were arrested, as were
municipal leaders who had links with or collaborated with the Yellow Wasps, including
Pavlović.10336 However, when the 30 day remand period expired,10337 Davidović was told that
pressure was exerted on the authorities by the President and Krajišnik who ordered that the
Yellow Wasps be released.10338 (#Hear-say,and a lie#!!! all incorrect and not corroborated
by any evidence. The YW hadn’t been released, but handed over to the Serbia judiciary,
where they had been tried and sentenced. And during his testimony Davidovic praised the
President for his orders unknown to Davidovic prior to his testimony and deposition of
statement!)

3209. In contrast, Mandić testified that following this operation the leader of the Yellow
Wasps, Vucković, was tried and sentenced for a war crime.10339 Mandić added that at the
initiative of the President and the Prime Minister, the police and army arrested and handed over
to competent organs a dozen men belonging to paramilitary units who had ―committed crimes
in the Podrinje area between Zvornik and Bratunac and Bijeljina‖.10340 Mandić confirmed that
Brano Grujić testified in Belgrade that the President asked Mićo Stanišić and Karišik to send a
special unit to arrest the Yellow Wasps because the local forces could not arrest them.10341
(#Exculpatory#! Therefore, all the Davidovic actions were facilitated by the President!
Also, a Davidovic’s opinion, feelings and hear-say, originating from his lack of knowledge
as he admitted, couldn’t be corroborated by any evidence, while the Mandic and Grujic
testimonies could easily be checked in the state and court records! What of those two kind
of evidence are more convincing?)

3210. However, as found above, in July 1992, even though the Yellow Wasps did not place
themselves under the joint military command of the VRS, members of the Yellow Wasps went
to Pale and received weapons from the Pale SJB after which Ţućo, their commander, met with
Plavšić.10342 Ţućo also spoke to the Minister of Defence about the status of his group and
Bogdan Subotić confirmed that all those who received orders from VRS officers were part of
the VRS whether they were reservists, volunteers, or paramilitaries.10343 Subotić alerted these
10335
See para. 1290.
10336
See para. 1290.
10337
The Chamber recalls that when a person was arrested by the military police and a criminal report was given to the Prosecutor‘s Office, the person could be
initially detained by the military police for three days. The military prosecutor could then recommend to the investigative judge that the accused be detained
for one month, during which an investigation would begin, and then a panel of judges could decide to extend detention for another two months. See para.
305.
10338
Milorad Davidović, T. 15647–15649, 15653–15654, 15663–15664 (29 June 2011); D1450 (Milorad Davidović‘s statement to Belgrade District Court, 26
December 2007), pp. 30, 79. See also P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 144. Milorad Davidović, T. 15612–15613
(29 June 2011); P6435 (Article entitled ―The Sting of the ‗Yellow Wasp‘‖, 10 December 2002), p. 3.
10339
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5289 (16 July 2010). See also Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5152–5153 (14 July 2010). But see Dragomir Andan, D3774 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 21541.
10340
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5289 (16 July 2010). See also Fadil Banjanović, P104 (Witness statement dated 30 March 2002), p. 5; KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 23637–23638 (under seal).
10341
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5206 (15 July 2010).
10342
See para. 1287.
10343
See para. 1287.
 882

units that they needed to fully comply with the rules and regulation of the VRS, including those
relating to uniforms, insignia and command structures.10344 (#EXCULPATORY#! Ms. Plavsic
was a member of the Presidency and couldn’t know detailes about military matters, but
the Minister for Defence correctly warned the visitors on their duties and obligations
pertaining to the law. Also, the Pale SJB chief couldn know anything about the Yellow
Wasps conduct in Zvornik that would warn him not to cooperate! But, the main issue is
why the Yellow Wasps came to Pale? The only reasonable inference would be that they
felt that an arrest of them is coming soon, and wanted to assess what was a sentiment
towards them, and probably to get some support or excuse, so to avoid the arrest!)

3211. Branimir Tešić testified that the VRS and the civilian authorities had problems with
paramilitaries and that the ―police often brought them [into] the station, took away the items
they had stolen and expelled them to Serbia.‖10345 (#EXCULPATORY#!!! There are many
examples that the Serb Police returned the stolen properties to the owners, mainly
Muslims, and some Croats!)

3212. The Chamber notes that at the 17th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly dated 24 and
26 July 1992, the President emphasised to the Assembly the importance of the effective
elimination of paramilitary and ―para-state‖ factions.10346 He also stated that at that stage, the
priority was to introduce order, by virtue of, inter alia, placing all special police units which
were being misused by some, under the single command of the Bosnian Serb MUP, rather than
under the command of ―local lords‖.10347 Mandić confirmed that at that session the President
highlighted the problem of paramilitary formations and explained that paramilitaries were an
armed force not under the control of any state organ or the army.10348 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!
Having in mind a huge scope of the presidential duties and obligations, particularly at the
permanent the Peace Conference, it should be concluded that the President dedicated
quite a time to the rule of law and to establishment of order and legality!)

3213. On 27 July 1992, in talks with Mladić and Mićo Stanišić, Tolimir stated that crime was a
problem and that persons prone to crime must be removed from the military police but
reiterated that paramilitaries were ―[t]he biggest problem‖.10349 The following day, Mladić
ordered that paramilitary formations must join the regular VRS units, that individuals and
groups who had been involved in criminal acts were not to be included into units, and that all
paramilitary groups should be disarmed by 15 August 1992.10350 (#EXCULPATORY#! All of
it was based on the laws and the President’s order of 13 June 1992, P3057!) The order,
which was relayed to the President,10351 also stated that paramilitary organisations rarely entered
the area of combat activities, but usually followed VRS units when liberating parts of the
territory and were mainly motivated by looting. 10352

10344
See para. 1287.
10345
D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para. 30.
10346
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), p. 20; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5188–5189 (15 July 2010).
10347
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24-26 July 1992), p. 19; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5186 (15 July 2010).
10348
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5188–5189 (15 July 2010). See also D1534 (Order of Romanija-Biraĉ CSB, 28 July 1992), p. 1; D4709 (Letter from Radovan
Karadţić to Lord Carrington, 16 July 1992).
10349
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 375.
10350
P1500 (VRS Main Staff Order, 28 July 1992), pp. 1–2. But see Ewan Brown, T. 21699–21701 (22 November 2011) (suggesting that, as long as they would
come under VRS control, paramilitaries on RS territory were accepted, even if they had committed crimes). See also Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9119.
10351
P1500 (VRS Main Staff Order, 28 July 1992), p. 3.
10352
P1500 (VRS Main Staff Order, 28 July 1992), p. 1. See also P2855 (VRS Main Staff report on paramilitary formations, 28 July 1992), pp. 1–2. According
to this Main Staff report the paramilitaries lacked a cohesive unity, expressed hatred of non-Serbs, were motivated by war profiteering or looting, had links
to corrupt political leaderships, and were not affiliated with the SDS but with opposition parties from Serbia.
 883

3214. On 6 August 1992, the President issued an announcement that the Presidency‘s order to
subordinate all groups to the single command of the army and police has been implemented
―apart from a few renegade groups‖.10353 He conveyed the information that the MUP had
arrested ―groups and individuals who defied the law and looted and committed arson‖ and
praised those units that had subordinated themselves to the single command of the VRS and
were ―fighting courageously for the freedom of their Serbian BiH‖.10354 (#EXCULPATORY#!)

3215. At a ―military-political consultation meeting‖ held on 2 September 1992 in Bijeljina, the

President was informed that paramilitaries and parallel authorities were still an issue.10355 He
reminded all those present that there should be maximum military discipline and training and
stated that municipal authorities should not take too many things in their own hands.10356 On
8 November 1992, representatives from the Bijeljina civilian and military authorities alerted
Mladić that paramilitaries had to be dealt with.10357 (All #EXCULPATORY#!)

3216. In September 1992, following an update from Manojlo Milovanović that a high-ranking
official of the SDS, Rajko Dukić,10358 formed a paramilitary unit in Milići, the Accused ordered
Milovanović to ―route‖ Dukić‘s unit.10359 However, the Chamber notes that in 1994 the
Accused awarded him the ―Order of Nemanjići‖.10360 (What DOES IT MEAN??? Is
Milovanovic a criminal? Or Dukic? #Rajko Dukic’ was perfectly entitled to form a unit of
the Territorial defense, both on behalf of the Municipality of Milici, and the Boxite
Company Milici#. Even without a need for a context, it is worthwile to mention it. On 27
September 1992 the Muslim paramilitaries attacked the Boxite workers, and made a
carnage, killing almost 30 people, workers, civilians and soldiers who were guarding the
Boxite mine. The mass funeral happened by the end of September, and this President was
present, and made a speech, heading to London for the conference (See: D00056, photo,
see: P03859) after this carnage both the Boxite mine and municipality of Milici rectified
their ommissiom not having already established a strong unit. But, the main remark, “a
high ranking official of SDS” didn’t form the unit in his capacity of “a high ranking
official of SDS” but as the general manager of the huge company The Boxite Mine, Milici.
And this unit was a part of the VRS! However, the Chamber didn’t obtain any additional
evidence or data about Rajko Dukic, but it rushed to conclude that Dukic was a criminal
and shouldn’t be decorated in any case. Dukic was a very famous businessman far before
the SDS was formed, he participated in the formation of the Party, and was it’s president
of the Executive Board. He already was decorated several times before the ellections. Let
us see whether Dukic was entitled to form a unit of Teritorial Defence, see: the SFRY
Constitution, Article 239, D1260:

“Organisations of associated labour” meant simply “companies” and the Boxite mine was
10353
D98 (Radovan Karadţić‘s announcement re paramilitary groups, 6 August 1992). See also P3058 (Radovan Karadţić‘s announcement, 6 August 1992), p.
1.
10354
D98 (Radovan Karadţić‘s announcement re paramilitary groups, 6 August 1992). See also P3058 (Radovan Karadţić‘s announcement, 6 August 1992), p.
1.
10355
P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), pp. 131, 133.
10356
P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), pp. 154–156.
10357
P1481 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 5 October–27 December 1992), pp. 152, 156.
10358
See para. 2253.
10359
D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 8.
10360
P5525 (Audio Recording and Transcript of the Ceremonial RS National Assembly, 9 January 1994), pp. 16–18 (referring to ―Rajko Dukić from Milići‖).
 884

a company! See what was provided in the BiH Constitution, D1262:

See Strategy of All-Peoples-Defence, issued by the SFRY Presidency, D4282:

Dukic not only was entitled, but obliged to form the TO unit! See the same D4282, p. 13

! Therefore, the #Prosecutor’s lack of a basic knoelwdge of the domestic legal system#
deluded the Chamber too, and made a very bad service to the UN and the very idea of the
international justice!)

3217. On 12 September 1992, the SRK informed its subordinate units including the Višegrad
Brigade and Rogatica Brigade of the tasks it received from the VRS Main Staff on
7 September 1992, which included the task to eliminate the creation of any paramilitary
unit.10361 (#EXCULPATORY#!)

3218. On 16 October 1992, Bogdan Subotić informed the Zvornik Municipality Executive
Board, following their query about the engagement of Arkan and other volunteer units, that the
VRS was the only legal and legitimate force and all ―volunteer units‖ would be allowed to enlist
in the VRS if they wore the VRS insignia and adopted the VRS command structure.10362
(#EXCULPATORY#!!!) In a letter addressed to the President on 20 October 1992, Bogdan
Subotić proposed that due to the tensions caused, inter alia, by ―increasingly active paramilitary
formations‖ and the fact that decisions issued by the Government and other state organs were
not being respected, that military rule be introduced in several municipalities, including
Zvornik.10363 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!)

3219. Notwithstanding, around the end of October 1992, the President informed Milovanović
that ―400 volunteers from Serbia will also be taking part in defending the [Višegrad
Hydroelectric] Power Plant […] under the command of Professor Košuti […] and that [the VRS
is] to take them on and bring them into combat.‖10364 (So what? The volunteers weren’t
forbidden, but approved by the Order of the SFRY Presidency. Many, a majority of

10361
P1006 (SRK Order, 12 September 1992), p. 1.
10362
D3705 (Letter from RS Ministry of Defence to Zvornik Municipality Executive Board, 16 October 1992); D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić
dated 16 June 2013), paras. 293–294.
10363
D458 (RS Ministry of Defence letter to Radovan Karadţić, 20 October 1992); D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 299.
10364
D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 12. The Chamber notes that this unit never arrived. See D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo
Milovanović), p. 12.
 885

volunteers were correct, particularly those who came with a known and responsible
leader!)

3220. During a Bosnian Serb Assembly session on May 1993, attended by the President,
Vladimir Lukić stated that they had naively ―raised paramilitaries‖ and called them ―brotherly
assistance‖ but ―they were slowly less and less engaged in fighting and more and more in
looting‖.10365 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) Similarly, a Bosnian Serb leader from Sarajevo noted
that in certain municipalities ―chaos, disturbances, looting and stealing was the greatest where
[paramilitaries] were stationed‖.10366 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!) Complaints were also raised
that while certain individuals were arrested, they were released.10367 During the session, Mladić
criticised the audience about how they asked him to let Mauzer ―do as he likes‖ and stated that
―you found your patron in Arkan, who brought you together to tell you how you should
vote‖.10368 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!)

3221. On 28 August 1993, in an order focused on the organisation of the VRS, the President
instructed the Main Staff and MUP to create a plan to seize uniforms from people who were not
members of the army or police and who were committing crimes and other illegal activity in
uniforms.10369 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!)

3222. The Chamber notes that in 1994 the Accused awarded Mauzer‘s Panthers and personally
promoted Vojkan Đurković, a member of Arkan‘s men.10370 (This kind of error shouldn’t
happen to any serious chamber. It is well known that the #Panters were a proper and
courageous unit#, and that they didn’t commit any crime, nor there was any criminal
report let alone indictment! And that was the reason why the VRS or M(inistry) O(f)
D(efence) proposed to the President to decorate the unit. The President always acted after
such a proposals come from the relevant institutions. However, this is an #unacceptable
error to “find” that the President promoted Vojkan Djurkovic, since there was a
convincing evidence that the President, even if wanted, couldn’t promote or demote
Djurkovic, because he never was a VRS member#.)

3223. Davidović testified that while some paramilitaries were arrested the measures were not
successful because the paramilitaries continued to have the support of the local authorities,
Crisis Staffs and ―high-ranking functionaries‖ and as a result they were released and continued
with their actions.10371 (This was an #arbitrary guessing# of the witness, without any
corroboration, and with many convincing evidence to the opposite! Even this Judgement
is full of evidence that #no local authorities were happy with paramilitaries#. Davidovic
was in Belgrade and couldn’t have known what he asserted, he was a communist and he
didn’t like the new system, and didn’t like the fact he was not a favourite of the new
multiparty order, although he wasn’t demoted, but sent to the Federal MUP!) He also
testified that Mladić was always against paramilitary formations; could not confront them; and

10365
P1375 (Transcript of 32nd session of RS Assembly, 19–20 May 1993), e-court p. 39.
10366
P1375 (Transcript of 32nd session of RS Assembly, 19–20 May 1993), e-court p. 65.
10367
P1375 (Transcript of 32nd session of RS Assembly, 19–20 May 1993), e-court p. 67.
10368
P1375 (Transcript of 32nd session of RS Assembly, 19–20 May 1993), e-court p. 90.
10369
D4790 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order to VRS Main Staff, 28 August 1993), p. 5.
10370
See paras. 3429, 3431; P5525 (Audio Recording and Transcript of the Ceremonial RS National Assembly, 9 January 1994), pp. 16–18 (the Accused awarded
―the ‗Panteri‘ Guard Unit from Bijeljina‖ the ―Order of Nemanjići‖). See also para. 672.
10371
Milorad Davidović, T. 15519–15520 (28 June 2011). The Chamber notes Andan‘s ―impression‖ that the Accused was not dealing with the problems of
paramilitary formations adequately. However, since this impression is based on his position that ―the leadership itself was not timely informed of certain
things‖, the Chamber does not find it to be of great weight. See Dragomir Andan, T. 40883 (5 July 2013). See also P6434 (Excerpt from Dragomir Andan's
interview with OTP), pp. 3–4 (stating ―I also think that I stood in the way of a few politicians […] I think that this went all the way to […] [the Accused]‖.)
The Chamber also recalls its finding regarding the proceedings against Đurković. See para. 676. The Chamber found that Đurković was arrested after he
expelled a Bosnian Muslim but that he was released when he provided documents which suggested that he was authorised and had orders to expel Bosnian
Muslim residents from Bijeljina. The Chamber also found with regard to the proceedings against Đurković in 1995 that the evidence led on this issue was
inconclusive.
 886

said that ―they were protected by those whose existence suited them.‖10372 (This was his
“opinion” and no a serious chamber would pay any attention to a witness on facts giving
his general and non-specified opinion! Who were these suspected by him? The only
inference that could be drawn from this kind of assertions would be that Davidovic didn’t
like the authorities in the Republic of Srpska!)

3224. In April 1994, following a letter from the Main Staff reporting that there were volunteers
from the SRS who had been operating in two municipalities without the knowledge or consent
of the VRS, the President reminded the municipal authorities that this interfered with the system
of single command and control and that it was necessary to inform him about developments so
he could take measures.10373 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!)

3225. The President informed Mladić in April 1994 that he had ordered the MUP and other
municipal authorities to assist the VRS in preventing the organisation of paramilitary units and
that the strictest measures would be taken.10374 (#EXCULPATORY#!!!)

3226. In the summer of 1995, Manojlo Milovanović asked the President for a meeting to be
organised with Arkan to discuss the latter‘s presence in the combat zone under the
Milovanović‘s responsibility.10375 (As a matter of fact, Milovanovic had a command
competences over the MUP units present there only through their commander, but not
over a separate units. He could exert his command easily through the number one in the
MUP chain of command!) During the meeting, following Milovanović‘s question concerning
Arkan‘s presence, Arkan replied that his presence was in accordance with the order issued by
the Supreme Command, but he did not present such order.10376 Milovanović then asked the
President whether he had issued Arkan with such an order, but the Accused did not reply—
―[h]e didn‘t say yes and he didn‘t say no.‖10377 (It was a quite clear and known that the
President approved a presence of the Arkan’s unit in the fall 1995, after being assured by
the MUP that Arkan would be under their command and control, and as far as this
precondition was met, he could engage on the front! Beside that, Arkan was never even
criminally reported, let alone indicted, not even by Croatia, which captured him in 1991.
Also, the Prosecution didn’t disclose a document of the ECMM proving that the Muslims
in Bijeljina, interviewd in safity and privately, confirmed only the best about Arkan and
his conduct in April 1992! #There should have been something more that a bad reputation
required for a criminal case#!)

3227. In September 1995, in a letter from Mladić to the President, the former asked that
Arkan and his paramilitary units be expelled from the RS and that the Accused ―revoke his
decision that gave Ţeljko Raţnjatović the power to make arrests, mistreat, disarm and take away
VRS members and civilians with his paramilitary units including /his authority/ to use firearms
on persons who oppose or resist him.‖10378 (However, all of it was a rivalry between the MUP
and VRS, and in the context of tensions between the President and General Mladic. Mladic
obviously was misinformed – there was no any crime in Sanski Most in 1995, committed by

10372
Milorad Davidović, T. 15519–15520 (28 June 2011). See also para. 3206.
10373
D1454 (Request of RS President‘s Office, 29 April 1994); D1446 (Radovan Karadţić‘s order to RS MUP, 29 April 1994; Milorad Davidović, T. 15809 (1
July 2011). See also D1448 (Letter from RS President's Office to President of Petrovo Municipal Assembly, 29 April 1994).
10374
D1447 (Radovan Karadţić‘s letter to VRS Main Staff, 29 April 1994).
10375
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25455–25456 (28 February 2012).
10376
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25457–25458 (28 February 2012).
10377
Manojlo Milovanović, T. 25457–25458 (28 February 2012). The Chamber notes also the evidence that on 19 September 1995 it was agreed in Bijeljina that
Arkan will get paid by the ―Republican Government‖ for liberating Teoĉak. See P6210 (Report of Eastern Bosnian Corps, 20 September 1995). However,
the Chamber does not grant this evidence any weight as it is based on an unknown and uncorroborated ―reliable source‖ which ―has not been verified‖. See
P6210 (Report of Eastern Bosnian Corps, 20 September 1995), p. 2.
10378
P3056 (RS MUP dispatch, 24 September 1995), pp. 2–3. See also D2265 (SrĊo Srdić's interview with OTP), e-court pp. 52–53.
 887

Arkan or any other unit, let alone such a drastic as described by Mladic. Further, Arkan
presented himself as a member of the MUP of RS, see: P3056, Mladic’s telex:

As visible from evidence, Arkan was under the control of the RS MUP. The acting Minister
for Interior Mr. Kovac gave to Arkan an authorisation to arrest and return a possible
deserters of the members of MUP. Since Arkan misused or abused the authorisation, Mr.
Kovac withdrew this authorisation the very next day#!)

3228. In the autumn of 1995, the Accused attended an event in Bijeljina where he inspected the
ranks of Arkan‘s men under the escort of Arkan, and said: ―I am deeply thankful and I
congratulate you, and I hope that we will meet again in peace and you will always have a place
in the heart of those who you have defended‖.10379 Arkan responded on behalf of his unit by
saying that ―we are ready if you call us and that we will be back to defend our ancient
homeland, to defend our women and children, to defend the Serbian territory and our Orthodox
religion‖.10380 According to Mihaljović this event was a product of Arkan‘s manipulation that
surprised the Accused and that Arkan used this event to legitimise his presence in RS given the
stance taken by the Main Staff and the VRS with respect to units not under the VRS command.
10381
However, considering the evidence and the behaviour of the Accused, who gave
documents to Arkan at this event, the Chamber is not convinced by the argument that the
Accused was manipulated or taken by surprise. (There was a proposal that the #President
decorate the unit, not Arkan himself#, who even was not expected to be there. However,
his unit had a great respect and reputation, and no any criminal record, and the unit
deserved a decoration as a whole! Instead of blaming the President for decorating the unit,
there should be an obligation that the Prosecution proves any crime, not a criminal
reputation, but a crime committed by the unit!)

3229. The Chamber notes the general statement of Nikola Poplašen that the President ―argued
for all Serbian forces to be placed under single command‖ and that ―[i]ndividual incidents did
occur, but this was not […] with the approval or knowledge of the Serbian authorities‖,10382 but
finds this statement to be in contradiction with the clear evidence that at least some paramilitary
formations operated in RS with the consent of the authorities.10383 (#Under the JNA#! #Before
VRS#! This is wrong deliberation: many of the volunteers at the beginning were connected
only with the JNA, Because there was no the VRS, as well as many paramilitary forces
which didn’t have any contact with the JNA, but neither they committed any crime,
particularly those domestic self-organized groups. #To be a paramilitary or a self-
organized armed group was a legal and legitimate issue, provided in the Constitution and
Law on Defence, but no group or individual was entitled to do a crimes#. Once the VRS
was formed, there was an order issued by the President, by other officials and by General
Mladic, aand after these orders there was no any possibility to be independent and legal at
the same time. The Chamber erred when equalised a paramilitary, a volunteer units, and
a units integrated within the JNA or VRS, but maintaining their separate name and

10379
P2858 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić and Arkan at award ceremony in Bijeljina, with transcript); D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović
dated 17 March 2013), paras. 10–11; Svetozar Mihajlović, T. 35721–35722 (20 March 2013).
10380
P2858 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić and Arkan at award ceremony in Bijeljina, with transcript). See also P2854 (Letter from Party for Serbian Unity
to Radovan Karadţić, 16 April 1994) (in which Arkan states that ―[a]s always we, with all our available forces, stand to protect Serbian people. We are
expecting your call so we can join armed forces of [RS]‖).
10381
D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), paras. 10–11; Svetozar Mihajlović, T. 35721–35722, 35728–35731 (20 March
2013).
10382
D4027 (Witness statement of Nikola Poplašen dated 11 November 2013), para. 12.
10383
See, e.g., paras. 3182, 3187–3188, 3195.
 888

composition!) Similarly, the Chamber notes the evidence of Bulatović that when he spoke to
the Accused, the Accused was not in favour of the presence of paramilitaries in BiH but did not
have the ability to remove them.10384 (#That was why the President asked the FRY Prime
Minister Panic for a help# (Davidovic) however, President Bulatovic could have spoken
about the SFRY war and Croatia. Still, if the paramilitaries didn’t have any bigger
formation to be integrated, a mere existence of these groups was not a crime. A crimes had
it’s own substance in a judicial terms. Only a tolerance of independent groups while there
is an alternative wasn’t acceptable, because of what could happen!) However, the Chamber
notes in this regard that at a Supreme Defence Council session in August 1992, Bulatović said
―[l]et‘s be honest, we needed those paramilitary formations for a while. They are now a great
burden and a problem.‖10385 This is also corroborated by evidence that in BiH, given a poor
response to mobilisation, the military forces were reinforced by volunteers and
paramilitaries.10386

3. Conclusion

3230. In light of the above, the Chamber finds that, in mid-1992, following the creation of the
VRS, the President sought to have paramilitary groups integrated in and subordinated to the
regular army or otherwise be disarmed and dissolved.10387 (In addition to already quoted legal
and constitutional provisions about subordination of the paramilitaries to the JNA, here is
another orde issued by the Federal Ministry of Defence on 10 December 1991, P2601:

However, his attitude towards these groups shifted depending on the group and according to the
Bosnian Serb interests. (#This is an ordinary lie, without any corroboration#, and no a
serious chamber! And even if so, it must be proven that the President accepted a crimes to
be commited. Where is reference to that? If it was about Arkan’s presence in 95, Arkan
wasn’t independent, he offered participation in the defence of Krajina within the RS
MUP, and the MUP undertook to komand him!)

3231. With regard to Arkan‘s men, for instance, the Chamber finds that the Accused knew that
they were invited by the RS Presidency to operate in conjunction with local authorities and
forces and that in the spring of 1992 they were indeed operating in BiH.10388 (The local
authorities had their own duties and responsibilities in running the defence, and all the
volunteers, particularly #before the VRS# was established, had to check to the local
authorities, which were obliged to deploy them in the local TO units and put them on the
pay rol list. All of it is provided as a mandatory activity in the Constitution and Law on
Defence, as seen above, see P4743, D1260, D1262, D4282… At the time Arkan was in
Bijeljina, the President didn’t have any operative duty, nor a state position, and therefore
no liability. The Accused had direct contact with Arkan in 1992 and 1995,10389 and in May

10384
D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), paras. 40–41; Momir Bulatović, T. 34560–34561, 34565–34566 (1 March 2013).
The Chamber notes that it is not clear which period of time Bulatović is referring to in his statement.
10385
P6165 (Excerpt from notes of FRY‘s SDC 5th session, 7 August 1992), p. 5.
10386
Aleksandar Vasiljević, T. 34699–34700 (4 March 2013).
10387
The Chamber also notes that evidence that the co-operation between Bosnian Serb authorities and paramilitary formations existed as long as the
paramilitaries‘ objectives were aligned with those of the Bosnian Serb leadership. See paras. 3208, 3220, 3223.
10388
See paras. 3181, 3195.
10389
See paras. 3187, 3226.
 889

1992 he invited, without Mladić‘s knowledge, Arkan‘s men to participate in operations in the
Sarajevo area.10390 Here is this para 3188, let us see how it is used against the President: On
3 June 1992, the Eastern Bosnia Corp Command issued an order, pursuant to the decision
on the formation of the VRS, that certain volunteer units, including Mauzer‘s Panthers, be
transformed into units of the VRS and that Mauzer be appointed Assistant Chief of Staff.10391
Similarly, as found above, on 13 June 1992, the President banned the formation and
operation of armed groups and individuals which were not under the control of the VRS on
the territory of the RS.10392 The President also stated that he was ―disowning‖ groups that
continued to operate independently and that those groups would suffer the strictest sanctions
for their operations. #Therefore, there is no a single mentioning of the Arkan’s men, while
Mauzer was a legal TO commander of the SAO Semberija and Majevica. Also, the
Davidovic’s assertion that he was present at a meeting with the President and Mladic is
fake, because there was no such a meeting, nor he could participate in it, nor Gen. Mladic
recorded it in his diaries#. Finally, the intercepted telephone conversations between Legija
and Arkan, see: P5675, and D1248, pasted in para 3183 of the Judgement, which
absolutely exclude any possibility that any of the Arkan’s men, including Arkan, could get
in touch with the President, for whom Legija said that is in a good (loving) terms with
Muslims!) While Arkan‘s men left BiH in mid-1992, the Accused supported their presence and
activities in BiH in 1995.10393 The Chamber also notes that it was important to Arkan that his
actions in BiH would be approved by the Bosnian Serb authorities.10394 (Certainly, Arkan
wouldn’t dare to be present in the RS without approval of the authorities, while in April
92 there was a common authority in BiH! No crime on the President’s side, or Arkan’s
unit side in 1995. He was regularly subordinated to the MUP, and having in mind who was
attacking the RS, it was the Serb right to accept any volunteer.

3232. Similarly, the President knew that Šešelj‘s men were invited by the RS Presidency to
operate in conjunction with local authorities and forces in the spring of 1992,10395 and he met
with Šešelj a few times each year during the war.10396 (#The Seselj’s men never had any
independent unit#, they were always a part of the JNA. Later on, the followers of the
Seselj in the RS were a regular soldiers, without particular unit or command. As far as
Mr. Seselj is concerned with, he lived in Sarajevo at the same time as the President, both
of them were a very known public persons, Mr. Seselj as the author of prominent law and
political works, and was imprisoned by the communist regime for a theoretic article, while
the President was a known writer that published books as of 1968. Why the two of them
wouldn’t know each other without any crime? Anyway, the Chamber adopted the
Prosecution’s approach according to which so many persons that had any contact with the
President – had been the most notorious criminals, while none of them had ever sentenced,
and some of thed hadn’t even been indicted: Mr. Seselj was acquitted in this Tribunal;

10390
See para. 3188.
10391
D1458 (Order of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 3 June 1992).
10392
See para. 239. See also KDZ088, T. 6562–6563 (13 September 2010) (closed session); D455 (Report re events in Doboj, 27
July 1992), pp. 1–2; D3485 (SRK report, 26 June 1993), p. 1.
10393
Considering the Accused‘s silence when asked by Milovanović whether he authorised Arkan‘s men presence in the combat zone; Mladić‘s request from the
Accused to have Akran‘s men expelled and that the Accused revoke his decision granting Arkan the powers to act in BiH; and the Accused‘s behaviour
while inspecting Arkan‘s men and his gratitude for their service, the Chamber finds that the only reasonsble conclusion is that the Accused supported
Arkan‘s men presence and activities in BiH in 1995. See paras. 3226–3228. (There is no a basic precondition for that conclusion: there
was no Milovanovic’s question, or the President didn’t here it, which is another reasonable inference, and Arkan’s
men including him and his son, were under the MUP competence, and the autorisation to return the deserters of the
MUP. Wher Arkan started to return the deserters of theVRS, T. Kovac withdrew this autorisation the very next day,
see : @ )
10394
See para. 3186, 3226, 3228.
10395
See para. 3195.
10396
See para. 3192.
 890

Momcilo Mandic had been acquitted in the court of BiH in which the Serbs are rarely
acquitted, Arkan had never been indicted for a deeds in the war, not even by Croatia
where he was a ptisoner of war; Vojkan Djurkovic had been criminally reported, but was
never indicted; Mauzer was a favourite police official of Ms. Plavsic when she reneged on
the SDS, and passed all the checkings of the international police. Although the President
had never been close and in a friendly private relations, but only in an official, not always
pleasant, they weren’t criminals. They did have a bad reputation, but we all know how a
reputation can be created!)

3233. In addition, the President was aware that Mauzer‘s Panthers was incorporated in 1992 in
the VRS as a ―Special Brigade‖ and, in 1994, he awarded Mauzer‘s Panthers.10397 Will
somebody show what crimes he had commited, what except a bad reputation he had? He
was a part of the legal TO, and later of the VRS. Did the President authorise anyone to act
illegally, or to commit crimes? Once, in 1992 Mauzer was demoted, and the president of
the Municipality Zlatko Jokovic was forced to resign. After that, Mauzer was no longer
under the civilian authorities, but in the VRS, as demoted to a private. After the war he
passed the test of the international community, as clean and suitable for the public service.
15/16 12. 17

3234. The Chamber therefore finds that during the spring of 1992, following the withdrawal of
the JNA from BiH, the President supported the operational co-operation of military forces and
local authorities with Arkan‘s men, Šešelj‘s men, and Mauzer‘s Panthers. These paramilitary
groups were able to operate in several municipalities, in an otherwise relatively tightly
controlled area,10398 in concert with the military forces and the local authorities.10399 (So what?
Nobody authorized them to make any crime, or to behave independently. Many units in
the JNA and VRS had a different names, but it didn’t make them independent!
Particularly as of 13 June no armed unit, group or individual was allowed to exist and be
active! However, there were many armed groups without so markant names, that
remained after the JNA witdrew without any political control, as the UN documents
indicate, see P941, see: @ in the following couple of months the regular “Serb Forces”
ended their existence!)

3235. The President‘s shifting approach to paramilitaries is further demonstrated by his

approach to Captain Dragan‘s training centre;10400 (There is no any reasonable possibility to
compare Captain Dragan’s training centre and the Yellow Wasps, or any other
paramilitary. Captain Dragan didn’t take part in combat activities, and didn’t have any
manpower of his own, except several instructors ready to train the domestic people who
hadn’t serve their compulsory Army term, but Gen. Mladic didn’t agree, and the
President adopted his opinion!) and his order to have the Yellow Wasps released after they
were arrested by Davidović.10401 The Yellow Wasps were arrested by the Special police of
the RS, and Davidovic only helper with his less than two dosen of policemen.

3236. Based on all of the above, the Chamber concludes that the President supported the co-
operation of Arkan‘s men, Šešelj‘s men and Mauzer‘s Panthers with Serb Forces during the
take-overs in the Municipalities—during the course of which crimes were committed. (Neither
a “take-overs” had been proven, nor were proven a crimes allegedly commited during the
“take-overs” that didn’t happen. All what the Prosecution was doing was taking
10397
See paras. 3202, 3222.
10398
See para. 3184.
10399
See paras. 3182–3183, 3190–3192.
10400
See para. 3203.
10401
See para. 3208.
 891

summarily some alleged events and allocate it to the Serb side, and this is real crime
against the whole people. Surprisingly, the Chamber admitted it uncritically and without
any checking of the documents, even of the UN provenance! All of the units that are
mentioned and “incriminated” by the Muslim propaganda full of hatred, were (with some
exceptions) parts of the regular forces which comprised: the Police, the VRS and the
Territorial defense. And all of this criminal conclusion is possible because the defense
couldn’t present what really happened!) The Chamber also concludes that from mid-1992
onwards, following the completion of the take-overs and considering the creation of the VRS,
the President endeavored to disband paramilitary groups in general. However, the President still
tolerated and even supported the activities of certain paramilitary groups, namely, Akran's men,
Yellow Wasps and Mauzer's Panthers. (#For the first two it is a horrible lie (except for
Arkan 95, but it was regulated according to the law) and Mauzer was in the Army#! How
possibly the President could have endeavor to disband paramilitary groups before he
became a member of Presidency on 12 May, and before the VRS was enacted, 20 May
1992??? And where is any evidence that the President “supported the activities of certain
paramilitary groups? The Yellow Wasps, about whom the President heard from the local
authorities and immediately ordered their arrest, had been arrested in a huge and well
organized operation. #Arkan withdrew before the President became the member of
Presidency#, and the Arkan’s 16 men, invited to Ilidza by some Dragisic, had been
ignored#, not welcome by the locals, and they withdrew, see para 3183! The Panters were
an integral part of the VRS, and a very good, proper and celebrated unit, and the
Mauzer’s rude conduct couldn’t damage the huge reputation of this unit!)

c. Knowledge and acts of named alleged JCE members

3237. The Prosecution alleges that the President worked together with other Serb military and
political leaders to achieve the objective of the alleged Overarching JCE to permanently remove
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory in BiH from at least
October 1991 to 30 November 1995, in concert with Momĉilo Krajišnik, Ratko Mladić,10402
Slobodan Milošević, Biljana Plavšić, Nikola Koljević, Mićo Stanišić, Momĉilo Mandić, Jovica
Stanišić, Franko Simatović, Ţeljko Raţnatović (Arkan), and Vojislav Šešelj.10403 According to
the Prosecution, while the membership in the JCE fluctuated over time, each member made a
significant contribution to achieving the common criminal purpose.10404 (“According to the
Prosecution”, the Serbs didn’t have any rights, guaranteed to every nation by the
international Covenants and domestic laws, and guaranteed to any animal or vegetal sort!

3238. In response, the Accused argues that there was no criminal plan or design in the first place
and second, that at no point in time did any of the alleged JCE members have, let alone share, any
common mental state to carry out an agreed criminal plan or design.10405

3239. The Chamber has considered the involvement of the named alleged JCE members in earlier
sections of this Judgement in the context of the objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership and the
creation of and authority over the Bosnian Serb political and governmental structures and military and

10402
The Prosecution alleges that Mladić joined the alleged JCE as of May 1992. See Indictment, para. 6.
10403
See Prosecution Final Brief, para. 84; Indictment, paras. 9–14. Other alleged members of the Overarching JCE are listed in paragraph 12 of the Indictment
and include, among others, members of SDS and Bosnian Serb government bodies at the republic, regional, municipal, and local levels, including Crisis
Staffs, War Presidencies, and War Commissions, and commanders and senior officers of JNA, VJ, VRS, TO, and MUP units.
10404
See Prosecution Final Brief, para. 84; Indictment, paras. 9–14.
10405
See Defence Final Brief, para. 327.
 892

police structures.10406 In this section, the Chamber will consider their further knowledge and acts in
relation to the common purpose of the alleged Overarching JCE. As a part of this analysis, the
Chamber will examine the relationship between the President and alleged JCE members where
necessary.

i. Momĉilo Krajišnik

3240. As discussed above, Momĉilo Krajišnik was a member of the SDS Main Board from July
1991 and was in the core leadership of the party.10407 (A crime?) The Chamber recalls that
Krajišnik was also elected as the first president of the Bosnian Serb Assembly in October 199110408
(Prior to that, Mr. Krajisnik was elected president of the Assembly of BiH, i.e. common
Assembly and presided this parliament until the end of March 1992, why it was not of any
interest of the Prosecution-Chamber structure?) and by virtue of his position, he was also a
member of the SNB which was established on 27 March 1992.10409 The Chamber further recalls
that the original three-member Presidency, comprised of the President, Plavšić, and Koljević, was
enlarged to five members to include Krajišnik and Branko Đerić, and on 6 July 1992, Krajišnik
was assigned to deal with issues related to commissioners and the economy.10410 (Just for the
accuracy: Mr. Krajisnik was doing this task for the Presidency, but this didn’t make him a
member of the Presidency, nor any other official, unles a state of war was proclaimed on the
entire territory of the RS! The Chamber knew it, but nothing the Defence offered was
accepted!)

3241. Krajišnik was described as the Accused‘s ―closest associate‖ and they had a close
relationship before the SDS was even formed; this relationship continued throughout the
conflict.10411 For instance, the Accused personally insisted on Krajišnik‘s appointment as president
of the Bosnian Serb Assembly.10412 (There was no any opposition to this proposal, since
Krajisnik was a very known and successful president of the common Assembly of BiH! A
dilemma was only whether he could be on both of this positions!)

3242. Koljević, Plavšić, Krajišnik, and the President were considered to be the four most
powerful leaders in the RS, with Krajišnik and the President at the top.10413 (That was due to the
Constitution, not due to an arbitrary decision of anyone. In a case of a sudden death of the
President, the president of the Assembly would deputise him until the new elections!) There
was very little divergence of views between the President and Krajišnik10414 and these two were
characterised as the ―Alpha and Omega‖ of the Bosnian Serb government.10415 (Why a differences

10406
See Sections IV.A.3.a.i: Objectives of the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership, IV.A.3.a.ii: Bosnian Serb political and gonvermental structures,
IV.A.3.a.iii: Authority over military and police forces.
10407
See paras. 62, 77.
10408
See para. 77.
10409
See para. 89.
10410
See para. 97.
10411
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16605–16607; P2526 (Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May
2011), para. 75. See P5816 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 15 November 1991); P5803 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 11 December 1991); P5793 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and
Momĉilo Krajišnik, 19 December 1991).
10412
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16606–16607, 16765–16767.
10413
Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4154–4155; Milan Babić, P742 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 3396;
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8610, 8618–8619. See also Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik), T. 16603, 16607, 16744–16747, 16843; P3396 (Photographs depicting Radovan Karadţić, Ratko Mladić, Biljana Plavšić, Momĉilo Krajišnik,
and others). While Krajišnik, Plavšić, and Koljević were also present at SDS Main Board meetings, they did not play an active role in this body. Radomir
Nešković T. 14235–14236 (6 June 2011); D1278 (Transcript of Radomir Nešković's interview with Karadţić's legal associate, 8 October 2009), p. 18.
10414
P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Ðerić dated 5 April 2012), paras. 30–31. See also Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik), T. 16766–16767; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4156; Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik), T. 8622–8623, 8635–8636, 8644–8645 (testifying that after a few years of war, a rivalry developed between the Accused and Krajišnik).
10415
Branko Ðerić, T. 27951–27952 (24 April 2012). See also P1387 (Transcript of 38th session of RS Assembly, 17 January 1994), p. 46; Herbert Okun, P776
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4154–4156; D89 (Shorthand Record of 9th session of SerBiH Assembly, 28 February 1992), p. 11; P1029
 893

of the two high officials should be public, if it existed only during a decision-making process?
It was a matter of a personal and political maturity, but if they knew that it could be used
against the President, they should make a differences public and shake the country in the
middle of the war!)

3243. Krajišnik and the Accused communicated regularly about, inter alia, meetings and
negotiations with international representatives;10416 mobilising Serb forces in BiH;10417 discussions
with political and military leaders in Serbia;10418 and the involvement of the Bosnian Serb
leadership in municipal level affairs.10419

3244. The Accused, Koljević, and Krajišnik led political negotiations on behalf of the Bosnian
Serbs and had the support of the SDS Executive Board.10420 The President would often seek the
advice of Krajišnik during negotiations.10421 Krajišnik emphasised that there was no difference
between the President, Koljević, and himself who worked as a team in negotiations; Krajišnik
tended to repeat ―the established, party line‖ in negotiations.10422

3245. Furthermore, Krajišnik had ―great authority‖ among the Bosnian Serb municipal leaders
and influenced how power should be exercised at the municipal level.10423 (The president of the
Assembly as a legistative body was supposed to communicate with the municipal assemblies
as a legislative bodies, while the Prime Minister was supposed to communicate with the
Executive Boards of municipalities, as an executive bodies. Is everything in the Serb
existence, except a slavery, wrong?) As the President of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, Krajišnik
was noted as a ―skillful leader‖ of the local deputies.10424 The President described Krajišnik to
Slobodan Milošević as a ―great Bosnian patriot‖ and told him that Krajišnik ―would not give one
foot of Bosnian land‖ and wanted all of BiH to remain in Yugoslavia.10425 The Chamber recalls
that the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Krajišnik, formulated and promoted
the Strategic Goals; for Krajišnik, the goal of separating from the Bosnian Muslims was the most
important task.10426 (#A separating of states, not population!)

(Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 121; Izet Redţić, P3189 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 5071–5073; P2526
(Witness statement of Radomir Kezunović dated 21 May 2011), para. 75.
10416
P5805 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 6 December 1991).
10417
P5860 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 23 September 1991). See P5805 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 6 December 1991).
10418
P5874 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 6 September 1991); P5835 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 22 October 1991).
10419
P5833 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 29 October 1991), p. 2 (wherein Krajišnik told the Accused that he had
gone to Ilidţa the night before for a meeting of the board and ―the right people got information, we invigorated them, they got a realistic evaluation, they
were very pleased‖).
10420
D1277 (Minutes of joint meetings of SDS‘s General and Executive Committees and Political Council, 11 March 1992), p. 1. See also paras. 2700, 2703–
2705, 2824, 2832.
10421
P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), paras. 140–141.
10422
P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), para. 214 (stating further that Krajišnik was often difficult to deal with during
negotiations); P1353 (Shorthand record of 10th session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 March 1992), p. 16.
10423
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8628. However, as President of the Banja Luka Municipal Assembly and Banja Luka
Crisis Staff, Radić testified that he did not receive any instructions from Krajišnik in his municipality, other than Bosnian Serb Assembly decisions signed
by him. Between the beginning of the war and the end of 1992, Radić only saw Krajišnik in Banja Luka a few times when he came for the RS Assembly
sessions held there. Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7524–7526, 7571–7574. However, the Chamber does not find Radić‘s
testimony in this regard, in particular regarding his presence in Banja Luka, to be determinative regarding Krajišnik‘s authority among all Bosnian Serb
municipal leaders.
10424
Predrag Radić, P1 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 7431–7432, 7538–7540, 7607. See also P2 (Predrag Radić's interview with OTP, 16 July
2001), pp. 62–63.
10425
P5687 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Ljiljana Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević and (ii) Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 12 June
1991), p. 8.
10426
See paras. 2865, 2868, 2877, 2885, 2895–2903. According to Kecmanović, however, Krajišnik stressed respect for ―other ethnicities, religions and
customs‖. D3645 (Witness statement of Nenad Kecmanović dated 27 May 2013), paras. 32–33. The Chamber however recalls its earlier finding that
Kecmanović‘s evidence was marked by evasiveness, contradictions, partisanship and indicators that his testimony lacked sincerity and candour. His
testimony was also marked by indicators that he was seeking to protect the Accused. The Chamber therefore does not consider that it can rely on his
evidence in this regard.
 894

3246. Between April and May 1992 the President, Krajišnik, Koljević, Plavšić, Đerić, and
Bogdan Subotić met often to discuss a number of issues pertaining to the conditions in
municipalities and decisions were issued as a result of these meetings.10427 Krajišnik was also
informed about events and operations in the Municipalities.10428 For instance, the Chamber notes
that Krajišnik visited Bijeljina, often with the Accused, and that there was a close relationship
between the Bijeljina branch of the SDS and the SDS in Pale.10429 Krajišnik and the Accused also
visited Sanski Most on the occasion of the formation of the SDS there.10430 (In 1990, far before
the war! What is wrong with that? What is the Prosecution-Chamber after? These facts are
irrelevant for any alleged crimes, and “gathering” so many irrelevant data should have
created a picture of a complicity, because there was no any evidence that the President, or
any other high official, was involved, or otherwise connected with any crome! An inference
on a basis of another inference, on another inference, endlessy!)

3247. In May 1992, the President, Mladić, and Krajišnik held a meeting with representatives of
municipalities, including Rogatica, and discussed the creation of a Bosnian Serb state in BiH.10431
Krajišnik also had close connections with Kušić, commander of the Rogatica Brigade, who was
involved in the take-over of Rogatica and in the mistreatment and crimes against Bosnian Muslim
civilians there.10432

3248. Krajišnik was also aware of Bosnian Muslim men being detained at Rajlovac Barracks in
Novi Grad and in June 1992, he gave instructions to authorities at Rajlovac that nothing should
happen to Bosnian Muslim detainees there.10433 He was informed of details regarding the take-
over in Vogošća, and he attended sessions of the Vogošća Serb Assembly, Novi Grad Municipal
Assembly, and Novo Sarajevo SDS Municipal Board.10434

3249. During a January 1994 RS Assembly session, Krajišnik and the President were exalted by a
member of the Assembly for ―standing on top of the Serbian liberation movement and war‖ and
described as their ―highest leaders‖.10435

i. Nikola Koljević

3250. The Chamber recalls that Koljević was a member of the SNB, one of the interim bodies
that served as the de facto Presidency of the SerBiH in 1992, and functioned as one of the acting
presidents of the SerBiH.10436 Koljević was subsequently elected by the Bosnian Serb Assembly
to the three-member RS Presidency on 12 May 1992.10437 As stated above, the Presidency was
enlarged to five members and on 6 July 1992, Koljević was allocated the task of international
relations as well as information and propaganda-related issues.10438 On 17 December 1992, the

10427
D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 61–62. See P5858 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and
Biljana Plavšić, 27 September 1991).
10428
See, e.g., P5740 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Krajišnik and Jovan Tintor, 4 April 1992), p. 2.
10429
See para. 606.
10430
See para. 1920.
10431
See para. 936.
10432
See paras. 944, 948–951, 969–970, 973, 986, 999–1000, 1020.
10433
See Novi Grad Fact section, para. 2221 (referring to P2334 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Krajišnik, Mijatović, and Ljubiša Vladušić, 8 June
1992), pp. 1–2, 4).
10434
See Vogošća Fact section, paras. 2171–2172, 2246, 2359, 2375, 2386.
10435
P1387 (Transcript of 38th session of RS Assembly, 17 January 1994), p. 46.
10436
See para. 90.
10437
Adjudicated Fact 1898; P3032 (Minutes of 1st constitutive session of SerBiH Presidency, 12 May 1992). See para. 96.
10438
D440 (Minutes of 15th session of SerBiH Presidency, 6 July 1992), p. 3. See para. 97. In April 1992, Koljević had already been tasked with communicating
with the international public on the situation in SerBiH. P3050 (Minutes of joint meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 15 April 1992), p. 2. See also
KDZ240, T. 16116 (5 July 2011) (closed session); P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 139 (stating that Koljević
tended to be more on the periphery of the Bosnian Serb leadership). However, given this is a personal opinion from Wilson, the Chamber placed no weight
on that aspect of his evidence.
 895

Bosnian Serb Assembly replaced the structures of the Presidency by establishing a single president
and two vice-presidents of the Republic, electing the President to the position of President of the
RS and Koljević as one of the Vice-Presidents.10439

3251. As early as October 1990, in a meeting before Serb representatives in Banja Luka,
Koljević identified the purpose of establishing the SDS in furtherance of the unity of the Serb
people and the promotion of Serb interests.10440 (So what?)

3252. The Chamber recalls Koljević‘s acknowledgement that the process of re-organising
municipalities was with the aim of creating ―homogeneity of certain areas‖ and that he repeatedly
called for the expulsion of Bosnian Muslims and the homogeneity of territories, claiming it was
impossible for Serbs to live with anyone else.10441 (A horrifyin lies! Professor Koljevic was a
humanist and a very tolerant man, and nobody ever heard him saying anything aggressive to
others!) Koljević was particularly extreme in his views and continued to repeat at important
meetings that it was impossible for Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, and Croats to live together.10442
Koljević also made a statement at the 34th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly in 1993 about the
aim being the ―spiritual and moral revitalisation of Serbhood‖.10443 (So what?) Koljević also
discussed his views with the President and other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership in
private conversations.10444 (So what?)

3253. Koljević was closely involved in negotiations with international representatives.10445 In

January 1992, Koljević warned of the danger of an Islamic republic being created.10446 (So what?)

3254. In this regard, Koljević met with TuĊman and noted that they had a common interest of
separating people, that an independent BiH did not suit them as it would separate them from their
―mother lands‖, and that they advocated a sovereign Muslim, Serb, and Croat BiH.10447 At the
same meeting, Koljević also suggested that an agency be established to regulate the exchange of
property.10448 During another meeting related to the ICFY in September 1992, the President and
Koljević reiterated that the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats would not accept a unitary BiH
state; a state based on one-man, one-vote.10449 (So what?)

3255. In April 1992, Koljević proposed that Bogdan Subotić set up a separate Ministry of
Defence, which he accepted and thereafter, Subotić started organising and preparing drafts of the
Law on Defence and Law on the Army.10450 (So what?)

3256. In May 1992, Koljević spoke to Bosnian Muslims in Pale and when they asked for
guarantees that they could stay in their homes, he replied that ―Serbs don‘t want to continue living
with you here.‖10451 (A shameless lies by an instructed witness, whose wife died in another

10439
See para. 98.
10440
See para. 2637.
10441
See paras. 2721, 2762.
10442
See para. 2728.
10443
See para. 2806.
10444
See, e.g., P5810 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Nikola Koljević, 22 November 1991); P5760 (Intercept of conversation between
Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević, 25 January 1992), pp. 1, 4 (during which Koljević said ―[t]he procedure itself and everything indicates that we are
heading in the right direction. I mean, how good the objective we have chosen is‖ and Koljević and Plavšić further agreed on the idea of separation and the
treatment of Bosnian Muslims ―with indifference‖).
10445
See paras. 2694, 2699–2700, 2703. Koljević and the Accused also discussed such meetings and negotiations with international representatives in private
conversations. See, e.g., P5878 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Nikola Koljević, 27 August 1991), pp. 5–9.
10446
See para. 2694.
10447
See para. 2694.
10448
P986 (Transcript of a meeting between Nikola Koljević, Franjo TuĊman, and Franjo Boras, 8 January 1992), pp. 13–14.
10449
See para. 2705. Koljević also stated that the Bosnian Serbs would not accept the internal borders of BiH without some form of cantonisation. See para. 357.
10450
See para. 115.
10451
See para. 2317. See also fn. 9040.
 896

place and from another causes, but he allowed that her body be planted at Markale in
August 1995!) Koljević also visited units on the ground and attended meetings in inter alia
Bratunac, Foĉa, Vlasenica, and Pale.10452 (So what?)

3257. Finally, on 14 March 1995, the President issued a decision to form a State Committee for
Co-operation with the UN and International Humanitarian Organs, appointing Koljević as its
President.10453

i. Biljana Plavšić

3258. Plavšić was also a member of the SNB, one of the interim bodies that served as the de
facto Presidency of the SerBiH in 1992, and functioned as the other acting president of the
SerBiH, along with Koljević.10454 Plavšić was subsequently elected by the Bosnian Serb
Assembly to the three-member RS Presidency on 12 May 1992.10455 When the Presidency was
enlarged to five members on 6 July 1992, Plavšić was allocated the task of, inter alia, dealing with
contacts with UNPROFOR, except for military issues, and questions related to refugees and
humanitarian aid.10456 Plavšić was in charge of issues related to detention centres, including co-
ordinating with the ICRC and other international organisations on this issue.10457 On 17 December
1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly replaced the structures of the Presidency by establishing a single
president and two vice-presidents of the Republic, electing the President to the position of
President of the RS and Plavšić as one of the Vice-Presidents.10458

3259. The Chamber recalls that Plavšić attended the first session of the Council of Ministers on
11 January 1992, during which the declaration on the promulgation of the SerBiH was discussed,
including the priorities of defining the ethnic territory, establishing government organs in the
territory, and the economic disempowerment of the current authorities.10459 In another meeting,
Plavšić emphasised the unity of the Serb people and their right to self-determination and thereafter
continued to make similar speeches emphasising this right.10460

3260. Plavšić and the President communicated about preserving the common state of Yugoslavia
and necessary steps to take to further Serb interests.10461 The Chamber recalls that in May 1992,
Plavšić spoke of the entitlement of the Serbs to 70% of the territory and that Bosnian Serbs ―were
used to living in wide spaces‖ while Muslims typically lived in cities.10462 Plavšić further stated
that ―if it takes the lives of 3 million people to solve this crisis, lets get it done and move on‖.10463

3261. On 4 April 1992, a commission consisting of Plavšić and Fikret Abdić, among others, as
well as high-ranking army officials visited Bijeljina to assess the situation there.10464 Plavšić
visited the Bijeljina Serb Crisis Staff and congratulated Arkan for saving the Bosnian Serbs and

10452
See paras. 693, 789, 841, 1106, 2317.
10453
See P4543 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Decision, 14 March 1995), pp. 1, 3. See para. 173.
10454
See para. 90.
10455
See para. 96.
10456
D440 (Minutes of 15th session of SerBiH Presidency, 6 July 1992), p. 3. See para. 97. See also KDZ240, T. 16116, 16141 (5 July 2011) (closed session).
Prior to this, Plavšić had been authorised to represent the SerBiH in contacts with the UN. P3050 (Minutes of joint meeting of SNB and SerBiH
Government, 15 April 1992), p. 2.
10457
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik) T. 8942.
10458
See para. 98.
10459
See para. 2818.
10460
See para. 2829.
10461
See para. 2641; P5729 (Intercept of conversation between Biljana Plavšić, Rajko Dukić, and Radovan Karadţić, 2 March 1992), pp. 3–4; P5727 (Intercept of
conversation between Biljana Plavšić and Radovan Karadţić, 2 March 1992), pp. 1–3.
10462
See para. 2727.
10463
See para. 2727.
10464
See para. 626.
 897

was filmed kissing and hugging Arkan.10465 When, in the course of the visit, Plavšić asked Arkan
to hand over control of Bijeljina to the JNA, he replied that he had not yet finished his ―business‖
there.10466 On 23 April 1992, Plavšić was in contact with Arkan‘s men and left a message for him
asking whether it was possible for her to visit.10467 Plavšić also asked whether they could
―possibly bring the merchandise‖ and the member of Arkan‘s men she spoke with responded
―understood, understood‖.10468

3262. Plavšić openly supported paramilitary units, or ―weekend warriors‖ as she called them, and
during a Bosnian Serb Assembly session in November 1992, she openly invited them—including
Arkan‘s men and the White Eagles—to ―send their volunteers to help the defence of the Serbian
people in [RS]‖.10469 As stated above, Plavsić was an advocate of having all paramilitary units
from territories where Serbs lived outside BiH come to assist them and was the ―bridge‖ between
Bosnian Serbs and the people who came from other states to assist in the conflict.10470 Mićo
Stanišić and Plavšić clashed over this issue.10471 According to Mandić, Mićo Stanišić arrested
paramilitary units and Plavšić would intercede on their behalf and have them released.10472

3263. The Chamber also recalls that in mid-April 1992, Plavšić visited the Alhos factory in
Zvornik and met with Bosnian Serb local leaders, including members of the Zvornik Crisis
Staff.10473

3264. In meetings attended by the President in May or June 1992, as well as in a television
interview in July 1992, Plavšić acknowledged that there were detention facilities run by Bosnian
Serbs in BiH, including in Pale, Ilidţa, Banja Luka, and Prijedor; however she qualified that those
in detention were only able-bodied men of military age who actively participated in ―rebellions‖,
assisted such rebellions, or financed the purchase of weapons.10474

3265. On 7 July 1992, Plavšić was informed in writing that there had been ―forced and wilful‖
efforts to move Bosnian Muslims out of Pale, resulting in a large number of criminal acts.10475
Plavšić was informed by the UN that on 30 September 1992, approximately 300 Bosnian Muslim
civilians were expelled by Serbs from the area of Grbavica in Novo Sarajevo; when questioned
about the situation, Plavšić deferred any response.10476

10465
See para. 626.
10466
See para. 626. The Chamber further recalls that at a dinner with UNPROFOR representative, Cedric Thornberry, on 20 April 1992, Plavšić described
Bijeljina as a ―liberated‖ town. See para. 626.
10467
P1106 (Intercept of conversation between Biljana Plavšić and ―Rus‖, 23 April 1992), pp. 1–2.
10468
P1106 (Intercept of conversation between Biljana Plavšić and ―Rus‖, 23 April 1992), p. 2. Without further context, the Chamber is not in a position to
determine the meaning behind Plavšić‘s reference to ―merchandise‖ and will not make a finding thereon.
10469
Mićo Stanišić, T. 46385–46386 (3 February 2014); Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4625–4626 (5 July 2010); P1105 (Transcript of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–
24 November 1992), p. 20. See para. 608.
10470
See para. 3195.
10471
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4625–4631 (5 July 2010) (testifying that Ɖerić supported Plavišić and Mandić supported Stanišić on this issue and it culminated in a
clash between Plavšić and Ɖerić, on one side, and Stanišić and Mandić, on the other). According to Ɖerić, he never approved of Plavšić‘s statements or
actions with respect to paramilitaries and Ɖerić did not consider that this ―was the way things should be done‖. P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Ðerić
dated 5 April 2012), para. 43. In June 1991, the Accused had discussed personnel issues in the MUP with Plavšić. P2222 (Intercept of conversation
between Biljana Plavšić and Radovan Karadţić, 17 June 1991).
10472
Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4626, 4630, 4649–4650 (5 July 2010); Momĉilo Mandić, C3 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 9725–9726
(testifying that Plavšić ordered the release of the Yellow Wasps in late November 1992). Furthermore, Mandić stated that he did not speak to the Accused
for half a year because he allowed Plavšić to do this. Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4627–4630 (5 July 2010); Momĉilo Mandić, C3 (Transcript from Prosecutor v.
Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 9725–9726.
10473
See para. 1253.
10474
P1099 (Video footage of interview with Biljana Plavšić, with transcript) (stating further that the number of prisons run by Muslims, in Sarajevo in particular,
―vastly outnumbers‖ the number of prisons run by Bosnian Serbs in BiH); P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), paras. 101–
103, 138 (stating further that Plavšić countered that similar camps were maintained by other parties to the conflict). Mandić confirmed that this was one
example of war propaganda spread by Plavšić as Bosnian Muslims did not have as many camps as Bosnian Serbs. Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik) T. 8936–8942.
10475
See para. 2324.
10476
See para. 2286. See also Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek, T. 5521 (20 July 2010).
 898

3266. In meetings with international representatives, Plavšić openly stated that it was impossible
for Bosnian Serbs to co-exist with the other communities, particularly the Bosnian Muslims, and
that it was better to separate the communities; she also emphasised the importance of partitioning
the territory so that the Serbs would be left in control of a single continuous block of territory.10477
At a meeting with a delegation from Greece in March 1994, in the presence of Mladić, Plavšić
expressed her disapproval of the President‘s appeasement and ―diplomatic juggling‖ displayed at
international negotiations.10478

ii. Ratko Mladić

3267. The Chamber recalls that Ratko Mladić was appointed Commander of the VRS Main
Staff on 12 May 1992, after being selected by the President.10479 The Main Staff was the highest
operative body of the VRS.10480

3268. As the Commander of the VRS Main Staff, Mladić commanded the VRS in compliance
with the authority that the President delegated to him; he issued regulations, orders, and
instructions relating to the implementation of orders that the President had issued.10481 The
President selected Mladić for this role and promoted him to the rank of Colonel-General on 28
June 1994.10482 Mladić remained in this position throughout the conflict until 8 November
1996.10483

3240. Mladić was in contact with and received instructions from the President and
Krajišnik.10484 In one conversation in May 1992, Mladić told Krajišnik that he would ―stop by to
get new instructions […] So we‘ll arrange for what we should do next‖.10485 (So what?)

3269. Mladić was informed of military developments and take-overs throughout the
Municipalities, as well as crimes which occurred there, during his time as Commander of the Main
Staff. For example, the take-over of Rogatica beginning on or about 22 May 1992 was planned
and executed by the SRK and Mladić was informed of it.10486 In May 1992, Mladić was informed
that ―Foĉa has been finished‖ and later in September 1992, that the percentage of Serbs in Foĉa
was 99%.10487 Furthermore, Batković camp was established in Bijeljina following an order from
Mladić to set up a camp for ―war prisoners‖ in June 1992.10488 (So what?) On 6 June 1992,

10477
See paras. 2725–2727.
10478
P1485 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 9 January–21 March 1994), pp. 180, 184, 186–187.
10479
See para. 3115.
10480
See para. 169.
10481
See para. 170. See also paras. 3107, 3116, 3152–3156.
10482
P970 (Transcript of 50th session of RS Assembly, 15–16 April 1995), p. 317 (noting that the Accused, together with Krajišnik, had taken an interest in
Mladić and requested that he come to assume the role as VRS Main Staff Commander); P3046 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Decree on promotion of Ratko Mladić,
28 June 1994), Reynaud Theunens, T. 16863 (19 July 2011). See also P1477 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 14 February–25 May 1992), p. 292). See also para.
3115.
10483
See fn. 461 (referring to P3034 (Track changes version of Reynaud Theunens‘s expert report entitled ―Radovan Karadţić and the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-
1995)‖), e-court pp. 287, 293); Ewan Brown, T. 21504–21505 (17 November 2011); P3914 (Ewan Brown's expert report entitled ―Military Developments in
the Bosanska Krajina – 1992‖, 27 November 2002), para. 1.64; P1355 (Minutes of 16th Session of SerBiH Assembly), 12 May 1992, p. 2; Manojlo
Milovanović, T. 25439 (28 February 2012); P4446 (Organisational Chart of the VRS Main Staff Structure for July 1995). See also P1489 (Ratko Mladić‘s
notebook, 28 August 1995–15 January 1996), p. 135 (noting that Mladić was at a meeting of the RS Supreme Command on 1 December 1995 with the
Accused, Krajišnik, Plavšić, and others).
10484
See Section IV.A.3.a.iii.A.3: Relationship between Mladić and Accused. See also, e.g., P1145 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Krajišnik and
Ratko Mladić, 24 May 1992); P1519 (Intercept of conversation between Ratko Mladić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 27 May 1992), p. 2.
10485
P1519 (Intercept of conversation between Ratko Mladić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 27 May 1992), p. 2.
10486
See para. 971.
10487
P1477 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 14 February–25 May 1992), p. 255; P1480 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 10–30 September 1992), p. 66. See also para.
2781.
10488
See para. 642.
 899

Mladić issued an urgent directive to secure communications from Sarajevo to Zvornik and mop up
or cleanse the zone of ―remaining enemy groups‖, also stating that the maltreatment of the
unarmed civilian population was prohibited.10489 Mladić was also kept informed of events during
the take-over in Vlasenica and was consulted during the armed conflict in Ilidţa.10490

3270. On 1 July 1992, Mladić paid tribute to all members of the VRS for having successfully
organised and implemented the co-ordinated ―operation for breakthrough, expansion and cleansing
of [the] corridor in Bosanska Posavina, between Eastern and Western Bosnia‖.10491 Mladić
specifically congratulated the units of the Eastern Bosnia Corps and the 1st Krajina Corps for their
unified efforts to support the position of the VRS Main Staff to realise its military and political
goals for the ―preservation of Serbianhood‖ in BiH.10492

3271. On 3 August 1992, Mladić ordered that inter alia Omarska, Trnopolje, and Manjaĉa be
prepared for upcoming visits from foreign journalists and members of the ICRC.10493
Furthermore, in a meeting with Jovi Banjac in September 1992, Mladić was informed that only
5,000 Bosnian Muslims remained in Kljuĉ, and that another 1,500 were leaving on that same
day.10494

3272. The Chamber also recalls that in meetings with international representatives, Mladić
spoke about the genocide committed against Serbs in World War II in areas including Srebrenica
and Sarajevo.10495 (So what?) Furthermore, the Chamber recalls that Mladić agreed with the
President when he said in January 1993 that they could not live together with Bosnian Muslims
anymore and that therefore Bosnian Muslims would be transferred out of Bosnian Serb
territory.10496 Mladić continued to make statements into 1994 about the necessity to fight against
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to the end that they vanish completely or disappear.10497
Finally, the Chamber recalls the notice Mladić issued to the Main Staff in August 1995 in which,
inter alia, he praised the VRS for thwarting ―a planned and prepared genocide of the Serbian
people, protecting the greater part of Serbian territories, and achieving victory after victory in the
liberation of occupied historically and ethnically Serbian areas‖.10498

3273. The Chamber also recalls that Mladić was involved in defining, adopting, and carrying
out the Strategic Goals.10499 Mladić advocated that the actions of the Bosnian Serbs should remain
secret and recommended the adoption of a common rhetoric towards the public.10500 He also
stressed the importance of identifying a common enemy and that on this basis, ―we must make our
move and eliminate them, either temporarily or permanently‖.10501 In relation to carrying out the
Strategic Goals, the Chamber recalls that Mladić issued important military directives, such as
Directive 4 in November 1992 and Directive 5 in June 1993.10502

10489
See para. 1278.
10490
See paras. 1112, 1124, 2133. See also para. 2785.
10491
P5509 (Letter from Ratko Mladić to all members of VRS, 1 July 1992), p. 1.
10492
P5509 (Letter from Ratko Mladić to all members of VRS, 1 July 1992), p. 1.
10493
See paras. 1404, 1784, 1849.
10494
See para. 1565.
10495
See paras. 2662, 2669.
10496
See para. 2757.
10497
See paras. 2766, 2769, 2771, 2806, 2832.
10498
See para. 2815.
10499
See paras. 2794, 2863–2864, 2868, 2874, 2876–2877. The Chamber notes that on 15 July 1994, Mladić complained that the Strategic Goals adopted by the
Bosnian Serb Assembly had not been given the financial support needed and that on the contrary, political structures had hindered the VRS from carrying
out certain operations which were directly within the purview of carrying out the set Strategic Goals. P1486 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 31 March–3
September 1994), pp. 209–210.
10500
See para. 2864.
10501
See para. 2864.
10502
See paras. 2876, 2879, 3155–3156.
 900

iii. Slobodan Milošević

3274. Slobodan Milošević was the President of the Republic of Serbia.10503 Milan Babić
described Milošević as ―the president of all Serbs, not only those in Serbia‖10504 and was referred
to by Jovica Stanišić as the ―main boss‖.10505 He had control over the JNA.10506

3275. Beginning in November 1990, Milošević and the President had a close association and
the President would visit him frequently in Belgrade.10507 Other Bosnian Serb leaders such as
Krajišnik also met with Milošević but their meetings were less frequent.10508 Prior to the start of
the conflict and into 1992, Slobodan Milošević and the President were in constant communication
with each other to discuss and co-ordinate both political and military tactics in relation to
developments in BiH and Croatia.10509 There was a close connection between the authorities in
Pale and Belgrade, and the Bosnian Serb leadership consulted with Belgrade on developments in
BiH.10510 Points of discussion included (i) their opposition to the secession of BiH and the desire
to remain part of Yugoslavia;10511 (ii) opposition to the creation of an Islamic State;10512 (iii)

10503
P3048 (Record of 21st session of FRY's SDC, 7 June 1994), p. 1; Yasushi Akashi, T. 37705–37706 (24 April 2013).
10504
P754 (Milan Babić‘s interview in NIN, 18 June 1991), p. 10; Milan Babić, P743 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Martić), T. 1473.
10505
P5818 (Intercept of conversation between Ljiljana Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 12 November 1991).
10506
Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4147.
10507
Milan Babić, P742 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 3397; Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16612,
16614–16615, 16768.
10508
Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 16616.
10509
D1282 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 May 1991), pp. 1–4; P5686 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 11 June 1991), pp. 1–2; P5687 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Ljiljana Karadţić and Slobodan
Milošević and (ii) Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 12 June 1991), pp. 2–3, 5, 7–9; P5688 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić
and Slobodan Milošević, 17 June 1991), pp. 1–3; P5893 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 June 1991), pp.
1–2; D3531 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 28 June 1991); P5890 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 1 July 1991), pp. 1–2; P5887 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 8
July 1991), pp. 2–5; P5883 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 July 1991), pp. 1–3; P5875 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 July 1991), pp. 1–3; P5881 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and
Slobodan Milošević, 31 July 1991), pp. 4–12; P5880 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 6 August 1991), pp. 1–
5; P5877 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 4 September 1991), pp. 1–6; D365 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, undated); D4545 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 13
September 1991); P5866 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 18 September 1991); P5864 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 19 September 1991), pp. 2–4; P5865 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan
Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 13 September 1991); P5863 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 22
September 1991); P5861 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September 1991), pp. 2–7; P5853 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September 1991), pp. 3–6; P5859 (Intercept of conversations between Radovan
Karadţić, Slobodan Milošević and unidentified persons, 24 September 1991), pp. 7–11; D4496 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and an
unidentified female and Slobodan Milošević, 24 September 1991), pp. 4–8; D4497 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan
Milošević, 26 September 1991); P5848 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 8 October 1991), pp. 2–6; P5847
(Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 October 1991), pp. 1–3; P5834 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 26 October 1991), pp. 1–6; P5832 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan
Milošević, 29 October 1991), pp. 1–13; P5828 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 1 November 1991), pp. 1–9;
P5897 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 14 November 1991), pp. 1–3; P5815 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 15 November 1991), pp. 1–2; P5813 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and
Slobodan Milošević, 18 November 1991), pp. 1–4; P5811 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 22 November
1991), pp. 1–4; P5809 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 November 1991), pp. 1–2; P5808 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 26 November 1991), pp. 2–3; P5796 (Intercept of conversation between Mirko Krajišnik
and Mirĉe Radić, 16 December 1991); P5795 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 17 December 1991), pp. 1–3;
P2224 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 September 1991) (the Chamber notes that while this intercepted
conversation is dated 20 December 1991, it is clear from the context of the conversation that it should be dated 9 September 1991); P5790 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 20 December 1991), pp. 1–4; P5787 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan
Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 25 December 1991), pp. 1–4; P5780 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 30
December 1991), pp. 1–3; P5775 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 5 January 1992), pp. 2–5; P5769 (Intercept
of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 January 1992); P5767 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and
Slobodan Milošević, 12 January 1992), pp. 2–6; P5766 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 15 January 1992),
pp. 1–3; P5752 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 10 February 1992), p. 1; P5751 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 10 February 1992).
10510
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 72, 199. See also P2926 (Official note of Serbia RDB, 27 June 1994); Milorad
Davidović, T. 15830–15834 (1 July 2011). P2926 refers a group identified as the ―Tajfun‖ group operating in Banja Luka and that the Serbian MUP would
only accept the initiative of this group if the Accused and Mićo Stanišić gave their approval. However, Davidović was unable to give direct evidence about
the nature of this group and measures taken in that regard.
10511
D1282 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 May 1991), pp. 1, 3; P5687 (Intercepts of conversations between
(i) Ljiljana Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević and (ii) Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 12 June 1991), pp. 2–3; D3531 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 28 June 1991), pp. 3–4; P5880 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan
 901

political negotiations;10513 (iv) regionalisation;10514 (v) developments in Croatia and Slovenia;10515

(vi) military preparations including mobilisation of the Serb population and the provision of
arms;10516 (vii) developments in Krajina;10517 and (viii) issues pertaining to recognition of the
independence of BiH.10518

3276. The Chamber recalls that from 1990 and into mid-1991, the political objective of the
President and the Bosnian Serb leadership was to preserve Yugoslavia and to prevent the
separation or independence of BiH, which would result in a separation of Bosnian Serbs from
Serbia; the Chamber notes that Slobodan Milošević endorsed this objective and spoke against the
independence of BiH.10519

3277. The Chamber found that based on a conversation between the President and Milošević on
24 October 1991, it was also clear that Slobodan Milošević was attempting to take a more cautious
approach while the President was adamant that the goal of the Bosnian Serb leadership was to
ensure that they would establish full authority in their territories and that they would announce
their own Bosnian Serb Assembly.10520 The Chamber also found that while Milošević expressed
reservations about excluding Bosnian Muslims, the President was adamant that there were not

Milošević, 6 August 1991), p. 1; D4545 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 13 September 1991), p. 2; P5834
(Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 26 October 1991), p. 1; P5828 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan
Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 1 November 1991), p. 6; P5897 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 14
November 1991), p. 3; P5787 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 25 December 1991), p. 4; P5775 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 5 January 1992), p. 3.
10512
D1282 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 May 1991), p. 3; P5877 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 4 September 1991), pp. 2, 4–5; P5828 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan
Milošević, 1 November 1991), pp. 1, 9; P5766 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 15 January 1992), p. 2.
10513
P5687 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Ljiljana Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević and (ii) Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 12 June
1991), pp. 3–5; P5688 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 17 June 1991), pp. 1–3; P5893 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 June 1991), p. 2; P5875 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and
Slobodan Milošević, 29 July 1991), p. 2; D365 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, undated), pp. 1–2; P5859
(Intercept of conversations between Radovan Karadţić, Slobodan Milošević and unidentified persons, 24 September 1991), p. 8; D4497 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 26 September 1991), p. 1; P5832 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić
and Slobodan Milošević, 29 October 1991), p. 11; P5897 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 14 November
1991), pp. 2–3; P5813 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 18 November 1991), p. 2; P5808 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 26 November 1991), p. 2; P5790 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić
and Slobodan Milošević, 20 December 1991), p. 1.
10514
P5688 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 17 June 1991), p. 3; D365 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, undated), p. 2.
10515
D3531 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 28 June 1991), p. 5; P5890 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 1 July 1991), p. 1; P5887 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 8 July
1991), pp. 3–5; P5875 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 July 1991), p. 3; P5880 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 6 August 1991), p. 2; P5877 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan
Milošević, 4 September 1991), pp. 1, 4; P5867 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 19 September 1991), pp. 1–2;
P5861 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September 1991), pp. 5–6; P5853 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September 1991), p. 6; P5848 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan
Milošević, 8 October 1991), p. 5; P5811 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 22 November 1991), p. 3.
10516
P5861 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September 1991), p. 5; P5883 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 July 1991), pp. 1–2; P5887 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 8
July 1991), pp. 3–5; P5853 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September 1991), pp. 3–5; P5859 (Intercept
of conversations between Radovan Karadţić, Slobodan Milošević and unidentified persons, 24 September 1991), p. 10; D4496 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and an unidentified female and Slobodan Milošević, 24 September 1991), p. 4.
10517
P5866 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 18 September 1991), pp. 1–2; P5867 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 19 September 1991), p. 1; P5864 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan
Milošević, 19 September 1991), p. 3; P5863 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 22 September 1991), p. 2;
P5861 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September 1991), p. 4; P5859 (Intercept of conversations between
Radovan Karadţić, Slobodan Milošević and unidentified persons, 24 September 1991), p. 9; P5832 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić
and Slobodan Milošević, 29 October 1991), pp. 1, 11; P5787 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 25 December
1991), p. 1; P5769 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 January 1992), p. 2; P5751 (Intercept of conversation
between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 10 February 1992), pp. 1–2.
10518
P5832 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 October 1991), p. 2; P5795 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 17 December 1991), p. 1; P5775 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan
Milošević, 5 January 1992), p. 4; P5769 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 January 1992), p. 1; P5766
(Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 15 January 1992), p. 1.
10519
See paras. 2644–2645, 2651.
10520
See para. 2710. See also P5782 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 28 December 1991), pp. 1–2.
 902

even 10% of Bosnian Muslims who supported Yugoslavia and that they could not take such a
risk.10521

3278. The Chamber recalls that in December 1991, Milošević told the President that he should
not give in to Izetbegović and that they had to stick to their line and that ―if they want to fight,
we‘ll fight‖ given that the Serbs were stronger.10522 They also spoke about the unconstitutional
nature of the decision changing the status of BiH.10523

3279. On 26 December 1991, the Accused and Krajišnik spoke about their political strategies and
the issues of sovereignty in BiH, regionalisation, and their mutual disappointment with Slobodan
Milošević.10524 The Accused in this regard stated that they would have to pursue their own policy
even if it meant ―splitting with Milošević‖.10525 In January 1992, Milošević told the Accused in an
intercepted phone conversation that he would not describe the Accused as one of his
―satellites‖.10526 (Certainly, why would he! The President and President Milosevic were an
#ideological opponents#, and President Milosevic opposed many of the President’s political
moves that had been aimed to save the Serbs in Bosnia rather than to preserve Yugoslavia,
which couldn’t be saved only by the Serbs in Bosnia! As the Chamber could have seen,
President Milosevic made a formidable efforts to displace the President from the office, and
also made many meetings with the President’s commanders and representatives without any
knowledge of the President!)

3280. In March 1992, in a meeting with international representatives, Slobodan Milošević

described the situation in BiH as similar to ―dynamite‖, and if anyone favoured one of the parties,
there would be hell but he had called the President and told him to ―cool it‖.10527 Milošević also
said that Yugoslavia hoped for intensive links with BiH.10528 Later in the war, in meetings with
international representatives, Milošević also made assurances that he would speak to the Bosnian
Serbs, that he continued to condemn ―ethnic cleansing‖ but that the world was ―satanizing‖ the
Serbs without condemning actions by the other parties.10529

3281. Beginning in 1992, Slobodan Milošević was informed by international representatives

about the expulsion of Muslims in BiH; he responded that everything that would happen in BiH
would be horrendous and the responsibility for these acts remained with those who decided to
separate BiH and that he had no authority as far as the Bosnian Serbs were concerned.10530 (In that
respect President Milosevic was right!) In September 1992, in meetings with international
representatives, leaders of the FRY expressed the view that the international representatives were
justified in asking them to pressure the President.10531

3282. The President in September 1992 acknowledged the support given by ―leading figures
both in Serbia and in Yugoslavia‖ who strongly supported the Bosnian Serbs in achieving their
goal, even if it was temporarily within BiH, but on the condition that the Bosnian Serbs defined
―the borders towards the Muslims and Croats‖.10532 By January 1993, deputies in the Bosnian
10521
See para. 2711.
10522
See para. 2691.
10523
See para. 2691.
10524
P5785 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 26 December 1991), pp. 3–7.
10525
P5785 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Krajišnik, 26 December 1991), p. 7.
10526
P5769 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 January 1992), p. 6.
10527
P779 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s Vance Mission Diary), e-court pp. 36–37.
10528
P779 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun‘s Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 36.
10529
D1140 (Letter to UN Secretary General, 2 February 1993) (under seal), p. 4; P4246 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Slobodan Milošević, 25 March
1993), p. 2. See also D3054 (Notes of session of Council for Coordinating Positions on State Policy, 18 August 1992), pp. 10–12.
10530
[REDACTED].
10531
P784 (First notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 53.
10532
D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 16.
 903

Serb Assembly called on Slobodan Milošević and the Serbian people to do more to help their
brothers in the RS.10533 (So what?)

3283. In May 1993, Slobodan Milošević addressed the Bosnian Serb Assembly and confirmed
the solidarity of Serbia with the Bosnian Serbs but stressed that the assembly should accept the
Vance-Owen Plan to avoid the disastrous consequences of the war continuing.10534 He
acknowledged that the war had been imposed on the Serbs who simply defended themselves.10535
On this point, the President disagreed and stated that he felt deceived by Milošević and explained
that the Vance-Owen Plan was catastrophic for the Serbs, that they would live in enclaves and
areas like Zvornik would be ―Turkish‖, and that there was a danger that they would be bombed
whether or not they signed.10536 (The President Milosevic supported all the peace plans, in
spite of the Serbs in BiH dissagreament! He couldn’t be in any JCE with the President, who
respected him, but didn’t obeyed him or other advisors from Belgrade or the then Moscow!)

3284. At a meeting on 24 September 1993 with Slobodan Milošević and Mladić, Perišić
discussed the danger of war in the Krajina and stated that help in manpower, combat equipment,
and financial resources was needed.10537 Milošević stated that with respect to the ―final
verification of RS‖ it required political co-ordination with the President, economic co-ordination,
military co-ordination with one Main Staff, as well as liaising regarding intelligence and security
functions.10538 Milošević further declared that crime needed to be fought decisively.10539

3285. In October 1993, Perišić discussed personnel issues related to officers from the FRY
who had been engaged in the VRS and there was discussion of whether the FRY should pull out
their personnel from the RS.10540 At this meeting, Slobodan Milosević said that ―Mladić needs to
come here so that we can hear what he has to say‖.10541

3286. The Chamber recalls that Slobodan Milošević attended a meeting held at the Presidency
of Serbia on 8 November 1993, with among others, the President, Krajišnik, Martić, Mladić, and
Perišić, where the following common objectives were discussed: (i) unconditionally strengthen
the integrity of Serbia, (ii) set up the RS as a completely independent state; and (iii) ensure Serbs
have complete power in the Krajina.10542

3287. At a meeting in December 1993, with Slobodan Milošević, Jovica Stanišić and others, the
President stated that the end of the conflict was close and that the Bosnian Serbs were holding
75% of the territory; he acknowledged that some of this territory would have to be returned as the
international community would not allow it.10543 The President listed the Strategic Goals at this
meeting.10544 This meeting was convened to improve the ―operational and tactical position‖ of the
Bosnian Serbs and to discuss help from Serbia.10545 (Not at all! The meeting was convened with
the aim to try to establish a leverage of the Yugoslav leadership on the President, after the

10533
P921 (Transcript of 24th session of RS Assembly, 8 January 1993), pp. 55–56.
10534
P1371 (Transcript of 30th session of RS Assembly, 5–6 May 1993), pp. 29–30, 157–160; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T.
4235; Herbert Okun, T. 1828 (28 April 2010).
10535
P1371 (Transcript of 30 th session of RS Assembly, 5–6 May 1993), p. 161.
10536
P1373 (Transcript of 31st session of RS Assembly, 9 May 1993), p. 18.
10537
P1483 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), pp. 339–340.
10538
P1483 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), pp. 341, 343–344.
10539
P1483 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), p. 345.
10540
P6162 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 14th session, 11 October 1993), e-court pp. 1, 5, 7.
10541
P6162 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 14th session, 11 October 1993), e-court, p. 7. See also P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 28th session, 2
November 1994), p. 47.
10542
See para. 2883.
10543
See para. 2886.
10544
See para. 2886.
10545
P1484 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), p. 53.
 904

Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan had been rejected by the Muslims, and a new Contact Group
Peace plan had been announced. President Milosevic was indicted for a many matters and
deeds that he exerted in order to meet the Western expectations! The Western countries
requested that President Milosevic maintain a close relationship with the leadership of the
Serbs in Bosnia!) Milošević agreed with a proposal from Mladić and suggested that ―the
operation‖ should be planned and the forces prepared but only following negotiations in
Brussels.10546 He also promised to provide fuel supplies from the state reserves for the
operations.10547 Milošević offered further assistance, stating that Perišić will ―give everything that
does not jeopardise combat readiness of units‖ in Serbia.10548 Perišić further stated that they would
help with weapons while Jovica Stanišić spoke about a special combat group which could be
deployed;10549 these units included the Red Berets and Arkan‘s men.10550 The following day,
continuing the meeting, Stanišić and Perišić confirmed that that they would provide manpower of
a few hundred men.10551

3288. At a meeting in Belgrade on 15 March 1994 attended by Jovića Stanišić, Martić, Mladić,
and the President, Slobodan Milošević stated that ―[a]ll members of other nations and ethnicities
must be protected‖ and that ―[t]he national interest of the Serbs is not discrimination‖.10552

3289. International observers noted that Milošević had a dominant influence over the Bosnian
Serb leadership and played a role in convincing them to accept certain proposals during
international negotiations.10553 However, by July 1994, there were rifts in the relationship between
the RS and Serbia, and Slobodan Milošević complained about criticisms directed against
Serbia.10554 In private meetings, Milošević was extremely angry at the Bosnian Serb leadership for
rejecting the Vance-Owen Plan and he cursed the President.10555

3290. The Chamber notes that while originally Milošević had similar interests to those as the
Bosnian Serbs, when their interests diverged, his influence over the Bosnian Serb leaders also
reduced.10556 Milošević also questioned whether the world would accept that the Bosnian Serbs
who represented only one third of the population of BiH would get more than 50% of the territory
and he encouraged a political agreement.10557 He stated that the Serbs had won the war, and that
there were ―hardly any‖ Bosnian Muslims in RS.10558 By August 1994, leaders in Serbia criticised

10546
P1484 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), pp. 57–58.
10547
P1484 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), p. 58. See also P3048 (Record of 21st session of FRY‘s SDC, 7 June 1994), p. 5;
P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), para. 55.
10548
P1484 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), p. 57.
10549
P1484 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), pp. 59–61; P1473 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 January–5 September 1995), p. 80.
See also KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 21025–21027; P31 (List of names referred to during testimony of KDZ446) (under
seal); KDZ555, T. 17248–17258 (16 August 2011) (private session) (pertaining to the distrubution of weapons); D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP,
8 August 1992), p. 10.
10550
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 80, 112–113, 166. See also P6210 (Report of Eastern Bosnian Corps, 20
September 1995).
10551
P1484 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), p. 61. Later, in June 1994, Perišić spoke about requests Serbia had received for
assistance in the war from the RS and the assistance they had provided with respect to financing and material assistance for combat operations and the strain
this was placing on their own resources. P3048 (Record of 21st session of FRY's SDC, 7 June 1994), pp. 5–8.
10552
P1485 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 9 January–21 March 1994), p. 169.
10553
Yasushi Akashi, T. 37705–37706 (24 April 2013). See also P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 277–280.
10554
P1486 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 31 March 1994–3 September 1994), p. 216. See also P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September
2009), paras. 280–281; P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), paras. 52–53, 161; P2457 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political
Assessment, 28 August 1994), p. 3; Anthony Banbury, T. 13336–13337 (15 March 2011); Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39564 (10 June 2013).
10555
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 188–190. See also John Zametica, T. 42468–42469 (29 October 2013)
(testifying that Milošević tried to have the Accused removed after the Vance-Owen Plan); D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013),
para. 41; D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), para. 42; Momir Bulatović, T. 34532–34533 (28 February 2013). The
Chamber does not rely on Zametica‘s general opinion that there was no joint criminal enterprise between the Accused and Milošević or that Milošević was
not interested in a Greater Serbia.
10556
P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), para. 54.
10557
P1486 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 31 March 1994–3 September 1994), pp. 219, 221, 228. See also P3863 (UNPROFOR report, 18 May 1995), p. 1.
10558
P1486 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 31 March 1994–3 September 1994), pp. 219–220.
 905

Bosnian Serb leaders of committing ―crimes against humanity‖ and continuing ―ethnic cleansing‖
and the war for their own purposes.10559

3291. At a meeting held on 22 August 1994 between Slobodan Milošević and Akashi, it was
clear to Akashi that Milošević‘s break with the President was ―serious‖ and stemmed from
differences that arose over a long period of time.10560 Milošević gave the impression that he was
―a politician who is more in command of the overall situation‖ while the President was ―a local
leader wrapped up in the emotions of an ongoing civil war‖.10561 At the meeting, Milošević made
it clear that there was a difference of views emerging in the Bosnian Serb leadership on the
execution of the war.10562 Specifically, Milošević stated that Krajina Serbs were well aware that a
solution based on negotiations was the only way out and this is why they had not accepted the
President‘s suggestion to merge with the RS.10563

3292. Given the difference of opinion between the Bosnian Serb and the Serbian leaderships, in
1993 and 1994, the FRY reduced its support for the RS and encouraged the Bosnian Serbs to
accept peace proposals.10564 In this regard the FRY leadership was on notice about some of the
extreme views held by the Bosnian Serb leadership and they could not support those views,
including with respect to ethnic cleansing.10565

3293. During a meeting held on 20 September 1994 with Mladić, Perišić, and others, Milošević
stressed that there had been a break between Pale and Serbia and reminded them that Serbian
policy was defined in Belgrade, not Pale.10566 He declared that the war must end and that the
Bosnian Serbs‘ biggest mistake was to want a complete defeat of the Bosnian Muslims.10567
During the course of this meeting, Milošević further expressed his disapproval of the Bosnian Serb
leadership‘s disunity from the Bosnian Serbs in Krajina, stating that ―the crazy doctor may think
that Serbia must toady up to him—it‘s not going to happen‖.10568

3294. By November 1994, Perišić noted that the Bosnian Serbs accounted for 20% of the
population but held more than 70% of the territory which, in his view, was unsustainable;
however, according to Perišić, the Bosnian Serbs wanted ―to preserve this at all cost‖, but loss of
territory was inevitable.10569 Slobodan Milošević referred to the President‘s belief that they could
―wage an infinite war and they won‘t give up on anything‖.10570 Milošević noted however that
―our biggest advantage is that the territories, which are to be allocated to Serbs by the peace plan,
are already in the Serbian hands so that nobody has to be removed from them‖.10571 He also
explained that when they tried to convince the President and Krajišnik that they would be forced to
do certain things, they replied that it was better to be forced than to accept.10572 Milošević noted
that the Bosnian Serb political leadership would ―sacrifice many lives in order to preserve their

10559
P2457 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 28 August 1994), p. 3. See also D1140 (Letter to UN Secretary General, 2 February 1993) (under
seal), p. 4.
10560
P3861 (UNPROFOR report, 23 August 1994), pp. 1, 3 (noting that among others, Sergio de Mello and Kirudja were also present at the meeting). See P3804
(Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 135.
10561
P3861 (UNPROFOR report, 23 August 1994), p. 1.
10562
P3861 (UNPROFOR report, 23 August 1994), p. 1.
10563
P3861 (UNPROFOR report, 23 August 1994), p. 3.
10564
D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), para. 43.
10565
Momir Bulatović, T. 34543–34546, 34549–34550 (1 March 2013); P6161 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 8th session, 12 March 1993), e-court pp. 1–2;
P6162 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 14th session, 11 October 1993), e-court. p. 3.
10566
P1487 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 4 September 1994–29 January 1995), pp. 16–17, 21.
10567
P1487 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 4 September 1994–29 January 1995), pp. 23–24.
10568
P1487 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 4 September 1994–29 January 1995), p. 26.
10569
P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), p. 7; Momir Bulatović, T. 34552–34553 (1 March 2013).
10570
P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), p. 25.
10571
P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), pp. 25–26.
10572
P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), p. 26.
 906

vanity and to prove that they are not the ones who accepted the peace plan because a half of BiH is
too little for them‖.10573 He spoke about the Bosnian Serbs wanting to take even more territory by
force even while they already controlled half of BiH and described this as ―complete
madness‖.10574

3295. Milošević tried to reason with the Bosnian Serbs saying that he understood their concerns,
but that it was most important to end the war and that they would achieve any objectives denied
them by the plan when peace talks resumed.10575 When the RS did not accept this plan, Milošević
imposed a blockade on the Drina River and suspended political and economic relations with the
Bosnian Serb leadership; Milošević even wanted to remove the leaders from Pale and have them
replaced by exerting influence on the deputies and the Bosnian Assembly.10576

3296. By May 1995, it appeared to international representatives that the split between Slobodan
Milošević and the President was complete.10577 At a 3 May 1995 meeting with Milošević,
Milinović, Akashi, Banbury, and Kirudja, among others, Milošević stated: ―I have good personal
relations with Mladić. However, as long as Karadţić and Krajišnik are there, they will not accept
a peaceful solution.‖10578 Kirudja observed that Slobodan Milošević still exerted influence over
officials in the RS and RSK, including Mladić.10579 This influence appeared to vary over time, but
Kirudja was under the impression that Milošević considered Mladić to be loyal to him even after
the relations between Belgrade and Pale deteriorated.10580 Milošević also criticised Martić, and
Kirudja noted that the President and Martić were aligned at the time.10581 According to Kirudja,
Milošević seemed to be ―playing his usual game of switching his support for RSK leaders as the
situation best suited his aims at the moment‖ and that Milošević‘s control over RSK or RS
officials seemed to vary with time, depending on events in the region.10582 When Martić aligned
himself with the President, both Martić and the President fell out of favour with Milošević.10583

3297. In November 1995, Slobodan Milošević addressed the Supreme Defence Council of the
FRY, spoke about the leadership in Pale being the biggest obstacle to solving the problems in BiH,
and criticised them for rejecting plans for the territorial division of BiH.10584 Milošević told the
Bosnian Serb leadership that they were not entitled to have more than half the territory in BiH,
stating that

10573
P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), p. 26.
10574
P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), pp. 33–34. See also P3049 (Record of 31st session of FRY‘s SDC, 18 January
1995), e-court pp. 1–2. Milošević also acknowledged that Koljević was in favour of signing a peace plan, but the Accused and Krajišnik did not ask for his
opinion. P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY‘s SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), p. 41.
10575
D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), para. 66.
10576
D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), para. 66; Vladislav Jovanović, T. 34273–34276 (26 February 2013) (further
characterising the relationship between the Accused and Milošević as a ―marriage out of necessity‖ given their opposing political and ideological views, and
it moved from a cordial relationship to a point where Milošević imposed a blockade against the Bosnian Serbs); D3027 (Report re humanitarian activity, 17
August 1994) (under seal), p. 1.
10577
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 144–147. See also P2567 (Note from FRY‘s SDC 42nd session, 23 August
1995), p. 2 (during which Milošević expressed his reticence to meet with the Accused due to the Accused and his team having demonstrated fickleness and
disloyalty; Milošević also showed Mladić a confidential letter from the Accused which showed the Accused‘s intention to ―blame Serbia and the FRY for
any debacle ensuing from the disastrous policies of the RS leadership‖).
10578
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 145. The Chamber notes that from the context of the conversation, Milošević
is referring to the Bosnian Serbs when he said ―they‖.
10579
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 133, 147. In his role as Delegate of the Special Representative of the
Secretary General to the FRY from August 1994 to June 1995, Kirudja dealt with all matters involving UNPROFOR‘s relations with the FRY that were not
military in nature. P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 2, 131.
10580
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 147. See also P2567 (Note from FRY's SDC 42nd session, 23 August 1995),
p. 2.
10581
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 146, 148 (stating further that in February 1995, he referenced the fact that
Milošević would influence Martić over what was going on in the Bihać pocket, but not the Accused). See P3868 (UNPROFOR report, 16 February 1995),
p. 4.
10582
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 146–147.
10583
P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 147 (stating further that based on comments made by Milošević, it appeared
that Mladić remained loyal to him even when Milošević closed the border between the FRY and BiH).
10584
P2604 (Minutes of 47th session of SDC, 28 November 1995), pp. 6–7.
 907

there is no way that more than that could belong to us! Because, we represent one third of the
population. […] We are not entitled to in excess of half of the territory – you must not snatch
away something that belongs to someone else! […] How can you imagine two thirds of the
population being crammed into 30% of the territory, while 50% is too little for you?! Is it
humane, is it fair?!10585 (#Senseless to comment#. This was not a subject of dispute, but the
fact that President Milosevic kept the Bosnian Serb delegation far from any negotiations,
and gave a preciouss parts of Sarajevo, almost 100% Serbian, to the Muslims! That was why
the main negotiator on behalf on the Serbs in Bosnia Krajisnik didn’t initial the Agreement,
and President Milutinovic did it instead, which was improper! The President signed the
Agreement after the delegation returned, because he didn’t want to continue the war!)

iv. Mićo Stanišić

3298. Mićo Stanišić was a member of the Preparatory Committee that established the SDS.10586
He was also a member of the Council of Ministers and the SNB.10587 On 24 March 1992, Mićo
Stanišić was appointed Minister of the MUP.10588 Stanišić served in this position until the end of
December 1992 when he was relieved of his duties by the Bosnian Serb leadership, specifically at
the request of Plavšić and Koljević.10589 Stanišić went to Belgrade until he was appointed by the
President again as Minister of the Bosnian Serb MUP during an interim six month period between
January and July 1994.10590 (The President had no power to appointe a minister if the Assemly
met regularly. However, the President appointed a commission, and investigating team to
explore the objections and allegation of Ms. Plavsic on Stanisic and Mandic. The team was
led by Koljevic, and after they honestly rocognized that all the allegations were fake, and
that Ms. Plavsic was misinformed, the President agreed with the new Prime Minister to call
Stanisic back, because he was fully dedicated to the eradication of crimes!)

3299. Mićo Stanišić was considered to be in the top leadership of the RS and had a very close
relationship with the President, as well as his support.10591 According to Branko Ðerić, Mićo
Stanišić and Mandić were the ―President‘s men‖ and Stanišić took orders directly from the
President.10592 Stanišić also reported to the President.10593 (Thi was all a Djeric’s misconception,
since he thought that the ministries were supposed to obey Prime Minister, as it was in the
Soviet model, while ministers had to act in accordance with the law, and be responsible to
the Assembly. During the war these ministries connected to the security issues had to be in a
close contact with the President, for an immediate information, and also because the

10585
P2604 (Minutes of 47 th session of SDC, 28 November 1995), p. 9. See also P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY‘s SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), p.
32.
10586
P1383 (Transcript of 36th session of RS Assembly, 30–31 December 1993), p. 57.
10587
P3111 (Minutes of the 2nd meeting of the Ministerial Council of SerBiH Assembly, 17 January 1992), p. 1; Mićo Stanišić, T. 46341 (3 February 2014);
P3050 (Minutes of joint meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 15 April 1992), p. 1.
10588
Mićo Stanišić, T. 46327, 46353 (3 February 2014), T. 46440 (4 February 2014); P1354 (Minutes of 13 th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 7.
See also Adjudicated Fact 2146; para. 3158.
10589
Mićo Stanišić, T. 46327, 46353 (3 February 2014); T. 46437–46438 (4 February 2014); P1383 (Transcript of 36th session of RS Assembly, 30–31 December
1993), pp. 51, 59; Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9267–9270 (testifying that Krajišnik informed Mandić and Stanišić of
the decision from the Bosnian Serb leadership, specifically at the request of Plavšić and Koljević, to send them to Belgrade and terminate their positions).
See Branko Ðeric, T. 27947–27948, 27983 (24 April 2012) (testifying, however, that the Accused did not accept to have Mićo Stanišić and Mandić removed
from their positions).
10590
Mićo Stanišić, T. 46327, 46353 (3 February 2014); T. 46437–46439 (4 February 2014) (testifying that in the interim period he was in Belgrade, he did not
work, but the Accused issued a decision appointing Stanišić as a ―republican advisor‖ in order to protect Stanišić from being mobilised into the army during
this time); Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9267–9270.
10591
P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Ðerić dated 5 April 2012), paras. 14, 20–22 (stating that with regard to Mićo Stanišić and Mandić, they kept visiting
the Accused and failed to attend government‘s sessions as they felt that ―the government could be pushed aside‖ and ―thought of themselves as belonging to
the top leadership‖); P1105 (Transcript of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24 November 1992), p. 12. See P5646 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Mićo Stanišić, 21 June 1992); P6624 (Intercept of conversation between Mićo Stanišić and Radovan Karadţić, 12 June 1991). See
also P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 47.
10592
P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Ðerić dated 5 April 2012), paras. 21–22. See paras. 2932, 3161.
10593
See paras. 3164–3167.
 908

President had to know and accurately respond to all what he could be asked by the
internationals!)

3300. The Chamber refers to Section IV.A.3.a.ii.C regarding the split in the MUP and the
creation of a Bosnian Serb MUP and Mićo Stanišić‘s involvement therein.10594 It recalls that
the ultimate split in the MUP structures was precipitated by a decision by the Bosnian Serb
leadership which formed part of their decision to create a separate Bosnian Serb state with
parallel structures. Mićo Stanišić was involved in the decision making and promulgation of
this idea from as early as February 1992, where he spoke of the need to work towards
organising a Bosnian Serb MUP starting at the municipal and regional levels and moving
towards a Serb ministry.10595 The Chamber also found that the creation of a separate Bosnian
Serb MUP was a means of undermining the proposed independence of BiH. Finally, the
Chamber found that the directives with respect to the division of the MUP structures and the
creation of the Bosnian Serb MUP were communicated to and implemented at a municipal
level and were a crucial step in the take-over of the Municipalities, as it created a structure
which would allow Bosnian Serb authority to be maintained through a separate police
structure.10596 (This is all as wrong as could be! The Minister Stanisic explained everything
in his speech on 30 March 1992, a his first inaugural speech to the members of the Serb
MUP, see:D4271:

The #“result of negotiations of the three ethnic communities under the auspice of the
European Community” was quoted as the very foundament for creation of the Serb
separate MUP, because all the proposed plans always envisaged that the entites would
have their own separate and independente police#. If the Muslim side didn’t reneg on the
Lisbon Agreement there wouldn’t be any war or aany “take-overs”, and therefore the
establishment of the separate Serb MUP had nothing to do with this wha is asserted in
this paragraph!)

3301. Furthermore, the Chamber recalls that Mićo Stanisić also ordered that CSB heads were
allowed to take-over the employees from the former MUP and assign jobs within the CSBs and

10594
For example, as early as September 1991, Mićo Stanišić was informed that the Bosnian Serbs wanted to split the police structures in Vogošća given the
disputes they were facing, but Stanišić said that ―it needs some more time. One should act with his head cool‖. P2219 (Intercept of conversation between
Jovan Tintor and Mićo Stanišić, 12 September 1991), pp. 2–5.
10595
See para. 2973. See also D4271 (Video footage of Mićo Stanišić's speech, 30 March 1992, with transcript).
10596
See paras. 2990–2991.
 909

SJBs, however, they had to inform the Minister of the Interior of all such decisions.10597 (So what?
That was a ministerial duty!) Furthermore, all heads of CSB were required to obtain prior
approval from the MUP before assigning posts at the higher levels, such as the head of the
SJBs.10598 In addition, on 15 May 1992, Stanisić issued an order formalising the co-operation of
the Bosnian Serb MUP and VRS, such that MUP personnel would be organised into war units and
re-subordinated to the VRS during their participation in combat activities.10599 (So what? Not
even the Muslim-Croat side would object that, since it was in accord with the Law on
Interior)

3302. In April 1992, Davidović was sent with others from Belgrade to help set up the Bosnian
Serb MUP and to establish a special purpose unit under the direction of Mićo Stanišić.10600 Those
who went to assist the Bosnian Serb MUP were to act with Bosnian Serb MUP IDs in order to
conceal their identity and the fact that the FRY was assisting in the war.10601 (#Wrong, and
misunderstood! Mr. Davidovis and many others had been delegated to the federal MUP on
behalf of the MUP in BiH, and since they originated from the towns in the Republic of
Srpska, they had been a Serb MUP employees on a temporary detached duty#. The federal
institutions had been functioning as a confederal since the 1974 Constitution!) On arrival in
Pale, Davidović reported to and then met with Mićo Stanišić and Mandić.10602 Also, surplus
weapons from the Federal SUP were sent to the Bosnian Serb MUP and were controlled by Mićo
Stanišić and Momĉilo Mandić.10603 These weapons were transported from Belgrade to Pale in
JNA helicopters in around April 1992 and consisted of uniforms, flak jackets, and automatic
weapons.10604 (The Federal MUP was in an obligation to do much more, since there had been
jeopardized the federal state, particularly before the BiH had been admitted in the UN!)

3303. In Bijeljina, the Chief of the Bijeljina SJB reported to Mićo Stanišić on the situation in the
municipality, and an almost daily reporting system was operating between the Bijeljina CSB and
the Bosnian Serb MUP.10605 The Chamber recalls that Mićo Stanišić informed Milorad Davidović
that Arkan‘s forces were in Zvornik and Bijeljina and ―helping to liberate territory [that] they
believed should become part of [the RS]‖.10606 In addition, Mićo Stanišić was informed that
Arkan‘s men had taken over the Bijeljina SUP, and Stanišić commented that he knew, that nothing
else could be done, and that‘s ―how it ha[d] to be‖.10607 In April or May 1992, after Arkan entered
Bijeljina, the President met with Krajišnik, Mićo Stanišić, Frenki Simatović, Arkan, Pero
Mihajlović, and Davidović in Belgrade to discuss ―further activities‖ of the SDB.10608 (Fake and
false! There is nothing to corroborate this absurd testimony of Mr. Davidovic. There was no
10597
See para. 2986.
10598
See para. 2986.
10599
See paras. 230, 3160.
10600
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 43; P2893 (Intercept of conversation between Pero Mihajlović and an
unidentified person, 6 May 1992), p. 2.
10601
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 43–44, 46.
10602
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 45–46. See also P2221 (Intercept of conversation between Mićo Stanišić and
Mićo Davidović, 17 May 1992). The Chamber recalls that Davidović was later tasked to lead a special unit of the Federal SUP to address problems with
paramilitaries in northeastern BiH and arrived in Bijeljina on 27 June 1992; while Davidović‘s unit came from the Federal SUP in Belgrade it was re-
subordinated to the command of the Bosnian Serb MUP. See paras. 634, 3204.
10603
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 39.
10604
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 39–40; Milorad Davidović, T. 15447 (24 June 2011). See also P2876 (Receipt
of weapons issued to Brĉko TO, 13 May 1992); P2877 (Authorisation from Brĉko garrison); P2902 (JNA‘s travel log for vehicles, 8–31 May 1992). But see
D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 18, 67. The Chamber notes that Subotić‘s evidence was marked by evasiveness
and bias which undermined his credibility. The Chamber therefore does not rely on his evidence that no arms came from outside to arm the Bosnian Serbs
and that he was not aware of any organised arming in the first year of the war. The Chamber does find, however, that the Accused proposed that Subotić be
promoted for his organisation of the arming and training of Bosnian Serbs in RS for their ―defence and survival‖ particularly in relation to attacks from
Croatia. D3704 (Radovan Karadţić's clarification of promotion proposal, undated); D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013),
paras. 22–24.
10605
See paras. 606, 3165.
10606
See paras. 616, 1251.
10607
See para. 616.
10608
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 66.
 910

possibility that the President met with this composition, since if the President was meeting
anybody in Belgrade, that would be the President or Prime Minister, not this group! Every
single arrival of the President in Belgrade had been reported in media, why only this onewas
not?)

3304. At the end of May 1992, Bosnian Serb leaders from Zvornik informed Mićo Stanišić and
Mandić about the situation in the municipality, including the actions of the paramilitaries.10609
Mićo Stanišić was also informed in May 1992 about the situation in Ilidţa, and in particular, that
they had received reinforcements which included ―Arkanovci and Šešeljevci‖ to which Stanišić
responded: ―Good‖.10610 (Let us see how the Chamber and Prosecution understand the
Serbian language! See P2229 and this “Good”:

What there could be “good” in a “lot of trouble”? this “good” in Serbian would be adequate
to a “understood”, or “I read you” in English. Now, the last sentence in the document, but
not last in the conversation:

Gagovic was the Commander of the 4th Corps of JNA in LUkavica, later known as a SRK. If
Gagovic sent somebody, there would be a reason to comment it with a “good”, but obviously
Stanisic only confirmed that he heard the interlocutor. Obviously, it was not the end of this
conversation, and we only can gues what Stanisic said after stoped listening to Zugic, but for
some reason this part is cut off. #This is an invalid document, the most probably deliberately
crippled. A serious chamber would reject to value such a document, so more since there is no
an audio of the conversation! In addition, the Chamber had the insight in the other at least
two conversations between the Arkan’s men, Arkan himself and his colonel Legija, P5675,
and D1248, pasted above in para 3183 of this Judgement, which exclude any finding like this
one in this paragraph!) In June 1992, the President received a report on the combat situation in
Ilidţa from Mićo Stanišić and the President instructed him ―don‘t hurry, just proceed according to
your plan‖.10611 (So what? How these two facts are connected? Only because both are
depicted in the same paragraph of the Judgement. But it is a too much of creativity on the
Chamber’s side, and no a serious chamber would do it, or allow the juniors assisting in
assembling this Judgement to smuggle such a connection! This kind of game could be done
only in a deep despair and an absence of a real evidence!)

3305. In an interview in October 1992, Mićo Stanišić stressed that the Bosnian Serb MUP
assisted the VRS in combat operations, yet at the beginning of the conflict, the ―burden of defence
was borne by the police‖ and due to its organisation and dedication, ―we established most of our
borders, exactly like what they look like today‖.10612 (So what? Since the JNA was hesitant to
interfeare in the conflict unles attacked directly, the police and the Territorial Defence were
the only “Serb Force” to oppose to a many times more numerous secter armies of the
Muslims and Croats. What they did was their right, and their legal and constitutional
obligation, and they should be commended for their exercise of these duties!) Finally, during

10609
See para. 1284. By the end of July 1992, pursuant to instructions by Stanišić, Davidović planned an operation to arrest the paramiltary groups in Zvornik
and Foĉa in co-operation with Andan and special units of the MUP. See paras. 866, 1290–1291.
10610
P2229 (Intercept of conversation between Mićo Stanišić and Nedjelko Ţukić, 15 May 1992), pp. 1–2.
10611
P5646 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Mićo Stanišić, 21 June 1992), pp. 2–3.
10612
D4274 (Article from Javnost, entitled ―A Legal State is Being Established‖, 3 October 1992), p. 3.
 911

an Assembly meeting in November 1992, Stanišić affirmed his allegiance to the President and the
SDS stating that he had always followed the policies of the SDS Presidency and he would not
allow himself to be separated from them.10613 (So what? The SDS was a winer party, and was a
ruling party. According to the Constitution and the Law on Defence, the party in power is
obliged to obtain a responsible cadres, and to participate in the deily life and particularly in
the preparations for defence. A ministers were supposed to be a political persons too, while
others within the MUP were mainly professionals without any parti affiliation! Why the
Chamber presumed that a mere association with the SDS, or a personal aquintance with the
President was a proof of crime?)

v. Momĉilo Mandić (It would be senseless to comment anything about Momcilo Mandic,
since he was #acquitted before the Bosnian court#, which is particularly mean and politicaly
posed against the Serb officials.)

3306. Momĉilo Mandić was the Deputy Minister of the Bosnian Serb MUP between 1991 and
May 1992, and was then appointed the first RS Minister of Justice from May to November
1992.10614 Mandić left his position and went to Belgrade in November 1992 due to a conflict with
Plavšić and Koljević.10615

3307. All decisions relating to staffing policies at the Bosnian Serb MUP required Mandić‘s
approval and he consulted with the President and regional leaders in selecting candidates.10616
Mandić worked with the support and approval of the President.10617

3308. The Chamber refers to Section IV.A.3.a.ii.C regarding the split in the MUP and creation
of a Bosnian Serb MUP and Mandić‘s involvement therein.10618 The Chamber found that Mandić
took a leading role in ensuring that this division was carried out at a municipal level and in
detailing how the new Bosnian Serb MUP was to be structured.10619

3309. Through the Ministry of Justice, Mandić was given the responsibility for the exchange of
detainees through the Central Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War and Arrested
Persons established by the Bosnian Serb Government on 8 May 1992.10620 Mandić was directly
involved in organising the exchange of detainees.10621

10613
P1105 (Transcript of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24 November 1992), p. 15. See also Mićo Stanišić, T. 46369–46370, 46403 (3 February 2014).
10614
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8603, 8605; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4427–4428, (30 June 2010), T. 4545 (5 July 2010);
P1083 (Minutes of meeting of representatives of SerBiH MUP, 11 February 1992), p. 4; P3051 (Minutes of expanded meeting of SNB and SerBiH
Government, 22 April 1992), p. 3.
10615
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8609–8610, 9267–9270 (testifying that Krajišnik informed Mandić and Stanišić of the
decision from the Bosnian Serb leadership, specifically at the request of Plavšić and Koljević, to send them to Belgrade and terminate their positions). See
Branko Ðeric, T. 27947–27948 (24 April 2012). See also Milorad Dodik, T. 36909–36910 (9 April 2013); D3321 (Witness statement of Milorad Skoko
dated 1 April 2013), para. 30 (stating that he noticed animosity between Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević on one side and ministers Mandić and Stanišić
on the other).
10616
P1083 (Minutes of meeting of representatives of SerBiH MUP, 11 February 1992), pp. 1, 4; Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik),
T. 8614, 8648.
10617
Branko Ðeric, T. 27947–27950 (24 April 2012); P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Ðerić dated 5 April 2012), para. 22. See also Radomir Nešković T.
14340 (7 June 2011).
10618
The Chamber also recalls that Mandić and the Accused discussed the preparations for the creation of a separate Bosnian Serb MUP early on. See para. 2971
(referring to P5806 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Mandić, 3 December 1991), p. 2).
10619
See paras. 2990.
10620
See paras. 124–128. In June 1992, Mandić spoke to Krajišnik about criticism they had received about prisoner exchanges, and the fact that they were
holding 400 prisoners at Kula Prison. P1101 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Krajišnik and Momĉilo Mandić, 26 June 1992), pp. 2–3; Momĉilo
Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8886. See also P1129 (Letter from BIH Commission for Exchange of POWs to Central
Commission for Exchange of Persons, undated).
10621
See paras. 2111, 2160, 2417. In August 1992, Mandić and a Serb journalist visited Planjo‘s House in Vogošća, and were asked by one of the detainees about
possible exchanges; Mandić replied that there was no need for any exchanges as the detainees were at their ―homes‖. See para. 2417. See also P1128
(Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and Nenad Vanovac, 23 June 1992).
 912

3310. Mandić was advised about Bosnian Muslims being driven out of Ilidţa in May 1992 and
he further informed Prstojević that he was aware that Prstojević was issuing ultimatums to
Bosnian Muslims and evicting them from settlements.10622 In a conversation with Prstojević in
June 1992, Mandić said:

It has come to our attention and that of the Government that you are issuing ultimatums to some
Turks; evicting people from certain settlements and people respond badly to it […] Well please do
not do anything like it, consult with Đerić first and those people up there, because this is very bad
publicity for us […] You have to be a little bit more flexible there and not touch those Muslims
who are willing to listen and who are loyal. We cannot ethnically cleanse Ilidţa or any other
place. At least that is the attitude of the Government and political leadership and all.10623

Mandić continues and says that they should ―place two or three Muslims somewhere‖ so that they
could say that they were employing everyone who was loyal to the Serb state, regardless of
nationality.10624 The Chamber finds that it is clear from this conversation that what was important
to the Bosnian Serb authorities was maintaining a certain appearance regarding what was said in
public, rather than the protection of the non-Serbs.

3311. Mandić was also aware that the Crisis Staffs used detainees for forced labour, including
digging trenches and fortifying barracks on the frontlines.10625 He was involved in providing
detainees from Kula Prison and Planjo‘s House to perform forced labour in Ilidţa and
Vogošća.10626

vi. Jovica Stanišić

3312. Jovica Stanišić was the head of the SDB, which was part of the Serbian MUP.10627

3313. Stanišić and the President were in regular contact and discussed and co-ordinated a
number of issues including political and military developments in BiH and Croatia.10628 There was
also co-ordination pertaining to the involvement of the JNA10629 and recruiting volunteers.10630

10622
See para. 2159.
10623
P1110 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and NeĊeljko Prstojević, 2 June 1992), pp. 3–4.
10624
P1110 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and NeĊeljko Prstojević, 2 July 1992), p. 4.
10625
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8768–8769, 8983–8985, 9107–9108 (testifying further that although Prime Minister
Ðerić insisted that prisoners of war not be used for physical labour, detainees were expected to perform labour and pursuant to the law on the military the
army and the police had the right to request detainees to dig trenches or other similar types of work to defend facilities). See also P1143 (Intercept of
conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and Radivoje Grković, 3 July 1992).
10626
See paras. 2149, 2427.
10627
KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 23620 (under seal); P34 (Structure of Serbian SDB and Zvornik/Bijeljina MUP) (under seal);
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9082. Jovica Stanišić was opposed to the multi-ethnic character of the Federal SUP and
was of the view that its role could be handled by the Serbian MUP. P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 38. The
Chamber recalls that Davidović was tasked to lead a special unit of the Federal SUP and while Davidović‘s unit came from the Federal SUP in Belgrade it
was re-subordinated to the command in RS MUP. See paras. 634, 3204.
10628
P2223 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 8 September 1991), pp. 1–3; P5801 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 4 December 1991), pp. 1–5; P5788 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 21
December 1991), pp. 1–3; P5781 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 29 December 1991); P5771 (Intercept of
conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 7 January 1992); P5768 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica
Stanišić, 12 January 1992); D301 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 22 January 1992), pp. 2–9, 11–13; P5622
(Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 25 January 1992), pp. 2–3 (wherein the Accused informed Stanišić about their
opposition to the independence of BiH). At times, Jovica Stanišić and the Accused spoke in code. D301 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan
Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 22 January 1992), p. 5. See also P6305 (Photograph of Milan Martić, Radovan Karadţić, Momĉilo Krajišnik, Jovica Stanišić,
Franko Simatović, and others).
10629
P5771 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 7 January 1992), pp. 2–3.
10630
P5801 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 4 December 1991), p. 5.
 913

Stanišić also liaised between the President and Slobodan Milošević.10631 (What was criminal in
all of these activities? Mr. Stanisic was the Chief of the State Security of Serbia, and his job
was to collecn as many information as possible. The President had his own Party in the
ruling coalition and the two Serb representatives in the BiH Presidency. Both of them had
their legitimate interests to know what the other knows and other information!)

3314. In May 1991, the President met with Jovica Stanišić and others including Franko
Simatović at the President‘s apartment in Sarajevo, where among other issues they discussed maps
of BiH.10632 (The witness in this foot note was not really a reliable ones. He pleaded guilt for a
smaller fine. But, it is out of question that the BiH maps were any subject of any meeting in
1991, but rather the situation in the Serb Krajina in Croatia. Irrelevant, but there is already
too many lise so to admit another!) The President and Jovica Stanišić were also involved in
creating an account which could be used for ―fictitious payments‖ relating to weapons and
ammunition which had been procured in FRY for the RS and which evaded the embargo.10633 (An
idiotic assertion. Why would the President deal with this issue, since there was so many
financial and economy experts? Beside that, it was well known that after the New Year 1992
the President and the witness didn’t have any contact, since the President supported the
Vance Plan for Krajina, which caused the witness’s resignation, or replacement in the office
in Krajina. So he couldn’t have known anything about the period after the RA had been
established! A “guilt plea” witnesses are a huge weakness of this Tribunal, and the issue is on
the border of a morally acceptable conduct!) Stanišić told the President in November 1991 that
he hoped to have a chance to work with him.10634 (This is the best proof that all these
testimonies about any cooperation and coordination of the President and Stanisic were fake.
The entire conversation was about the President’s attempts to get in touch with President
Milosevic, and some Mira (a secretary) gave to Stanisic the note about that attempt. If Mr.
Stanisic in November 1991 said that he hoped to have an opportunity to work with the
President, it meant that till that moment they didn’t work together!) On 4 December 1991,
Jovica Stanišić asked the President when he should send ―men‖, to which the President responded,
―[a]s soon as possible‖.10635 (So what? The entire conversation was dedicated to the Serb
Golgota in the Western Slavonija, but the Chamber remembered only that some “men” will
come to the President soon, nobody knew why. What is criminal in it? It may only be an
evidence that both the men existed, that from time to time have spoken on telephone or met
each other. A horrible crimes!)

3315. Jovica Stanišić invited Arkan to visit the Serbian MUP and Arkan called Stanišić directly
occasionally.10636 Jovica Stanišić attended meetings with the President, Slobodan Milošević, and
others throughout the conflict to discuss providing assistance from Serbia to the Bosnian Serbs,
including in the form of personnel, such as units of the Red Berets and Arkan‘s men.10637
According to Davidović, the Pale authorities, which included the President, Krajišnik, Mićo
Stanišić, and Mladić, consulted the authorities in Belgrade—Slobodan Milošević, Jovica Stanišić,
and later Perišić—―about everything‖; this was ―common knowledge as they did not have enough

10631
See, e.g., P5872 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 20 December 1991); P5772 (Intercept of conversation between
Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 5 January 1992); P5773 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 5 January 1992),
pp. 2–3.
10632
Milan Babić, P741 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 13082–13084; Milan Babić, P742 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 3407–
3409.
10633
Milan Babić, P741 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 13083–13085.
10634
P5614 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 29 November 1991), p. 2.
10635
P5801 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 4 December 1991), pp. 3–4.
10636
KDZ446, P28 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 23651–23652 (under seal).
10637
P1484 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), pp. 53–61. See para. 3287. See also P1485 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 9 January–21
March 1994), pp. 165–179 (wherein Mladić provided details about another meeting on 15 March 1994 in Belgrade attended by Jovića Stanišić, Martić,
Mladić, and the Accused).
 914

resources of their own‖.10638 (So what? The Sebs in Bosnia didn’t have any ally except in
Serbia, although the President was under a suspition to be too right from President
Milosevic. But, how this loose alliance could be criminal?)

3316. Stanišić spoke about the possibility of an all-out war and that they would ―exterminate
them completely‖.10639 (Let us see how this is misused: D301, p.6.

So, Stanisic was talking about admitting somebody to Belgrade, a Serb Capitol, and as an
alternative there would be an endless fighting to “their extermination”. Nothing is clear who,
what, when and how, but a simple sentence is used for a heavy conclusion. Not to forget, the
conversation was in January 1992, and entirely pertained to the Serbs in Srpska Krajina, not
a word pertained to the situation in BiH, since there stil was no a war, and it was hoped that
there will be no a war whatsoever!) In 1994, Stanišić told RSK MUP officials that he supported
the objective to ―fight to achieve the common goals of all the Serbian lands‖.10640

3317. The authorities in Serbia were also involved in establishing multiple training camps for
Bosnian Serbs including special police units of the RS and a camp run by Captain Dragan.10641
The President supported the work of these training camps.10642

vii. Franko Simatović

3318. Franko Simatović, also known as ―Frenki‖, served under Jovica Stanišić in the SDB, as
part of the Serbian MUP.10643 The Chamber recalls that units such as the Red Berets and Arkan‘s

10638
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 72 (stating further that he often saw Mićo Stanišić at the Federal SUP and
Serbian MUP buildings).
10639
D301 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica Stanišić, 22 January 1992), p. 4.
10640
P6307 (Letter from RDB to RSK MUP, 5 July 1994), p. 1.
10641
P2852 (Video clips depicting award ceremonies), p. 3; [REDACTED]; P4262 (Request of Municipal Assembly Executive Board of Banja Luka, 19 August
1994); P3384 (Report of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 7 June 1992), p. 1; P3023 (Witness statement of ÐorĊe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), paras. 97–103; Milan
Martić, T. 38149–38152 (13 May 2013); P6317 (Letter from Captain Dragan to Serbia TO command, 8 November 1991); Milan Babić, P741 (Transcript
from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 13119, 13121–13122; Milorad Davidović, T. 15513–15514 (28 June 2011).
10642
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 270; P3384 (Report of Eastern Bosnia Corps, 7 June 1992), p. 1.
 915

men were directly subordinated to the Serbian MUP and to Franko Simatović.10644 (This Defence
is not interested in this issue, but for the sake of truth, Arkan was a man of the Federal
MUP, which was in a bad relations with the MUP of Serbia, and particularly with Mr.
Stanisic! Why not to be accurate? However, the Chamber did have an evidence that F.
Simatovi} investigated Arkan and his affiliations, which clearly contradicts to this
“finding”:, see:

3319. In a conversation on 28 January 1992 with the Accused regarding plans to meet,
Simatović told the Accused: ―You‘re the main man there doctor, and that‘s how it stays‖.10645 (So
what? Simatovic didn’t elect the President. This sentence is irrelevant and senseless!) As
stated above, Simatović also attended the meeting in April or May 1992 with the President, Mićo
Stanišić, Arkan, and others to discuss ―further activities‖ of the SDB.10646 (Unreliable witness,
and no corroboration whatsoever!)

3320. Simatović was also responsible for monitoring the training of Serb Forces, includings
units trained in camps run by Captain Dragan.10647 (What was criminal in Simatovic’s conduct?
And how Mr. Simatovic could have been a member of any JCE in BiH?)

viii. Ţeljko Raţnatović (Arkan)

3321. Ţeljko Raţnatović, also known as Arkan, was the commander of a Serbian paramilitary
group named after him.10648

3322. Arkan‘s men were involved in operations in Bijeljina, Bratunac, Brĉko, Rogatica,
Sokolac, Vlasenica, Zvornik, Ilidţa, and Pale in spring of 1992.10649 Arkan himself was personally
involved in the take-over operations in Bijeljina and Zvornik.10650 Arkan also trained members of
the Mauzer‘s Panthers who operated in Bijeljina, Zvornik, and Brĉko.10651 (Was there any other
armed force, or Arkan’s men and the local Territorial Defence fought against civilians? How

10643
P34 (Structure of Serbian SDB and Zvornik/Bijeljina MUP) (under seal); Milan Babić, P741 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 13118;
Milorad Davidović, T. 15824 (1 July 2011). See also P6305 (Photograph of Milan Martić, Radovan Karadţić, Momĉilo Krajišnik, Jovica Stanišić, Franko
Simatović, and others).
10644
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 80, 112. See also para. 830, 3287.
10645
P5759 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Radovan Karadţić and ―Braco‖ and (ii) Radovan Karadţić and ―Frenki‖ Simatović, 28 January 1992), pp. 4–
8. In the summer of 1992, after Davidović arrested members of the Red Berets, Frenki Simatović phoned Davidović twice, cursed him, and asked how he
had the right to act in that way. See para. 830.
10646
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 66.
10647
Milan Babić, P741 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 13118–13125; P5614 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Jovica
Stanišić, 29 November 1991), p. 2; [REDACTED]. See also P6388 (Excerpt from video of interview with Vojislav Šešelj for ―Death of Yugoslavia‖
documentary, with transcript), pp. 2–4.
10648
See para. 232.
10649
See paras. 232, 611–616, 714, 724, 768–769, 798, 969, 986–987, 1049, 1155, 1242–1246, 1249, 1251, 1255, 1260, 2301, 3182–3183.
10650
See paras. 611–616, 1245–1246.
10651
See paras. 233, 608, 611–612.
 916

many Serbs had died during these fights? The Chamber is not interested in knowing what
kind of fight was it, who initiated it, who was responsible for it, particularly for Bijeljina,
which happened while the BiH stil existed!)

3323. The Chamber recalls that after successfully taking over Bijeljina on 4 April 1992, Arkan
was welcomed there and ―treated like a god‖; (By whom he was celebrated? This was the #old
BiH#, which ceased to exixt on 6 April, when the Serbs withdrew from the common
ionstitutions and declared the Republic of Srpska as a souvreign state! But, if the
Prosecution fulfield it’s own duty and disclosed the exculpatory evidence, there wouldn’t be
Arkan in Bijeljina at all. This is a document of the ECMM. They wrote a report how they
wanted to interview Arkan, but prior to this they interviewd a group of Muslims in Bijeljina,
who got in touch with Arkan. They were surprised to learn that these Muslims said had only
the kindest words for Arkan and his unit present there in April 1992.) some of his men were
given official positions and based themselves in the local SDS building.10652 (Wrong and false!)
The Chamber recalls that Plavšić was in communication with Arkan beginning in April 1992.10653
She congratulated Arkan for saving the Bosnian Serbs in Bijeljina and was filmed kissing and
hugging him.10654 (So what? Ms. Plavsic did it on behalf of the BiH Presidency, because she
visited Bijeljina on behaldf of the BiH Presidency, together with Fikret Abdic, another
member of Presidency, and Jerko Doko, a Defence Minister of BiH. All nothing to do with
the SDS or the President!)

3324. Arkan‘s men were also involved in killings of Bosnian Muslim civilians in Bijeljina and
Zvornik in April 1992.10655 (#It had never been established that a “civilians had been killed in
Bijeljine#! Among those “civilians there were two dozen of Albanian merceranies, and others
had been terrorists under command of cpt. Hasan Tiric. This is the most favourite
#distortion# of the Chamber, to depict the combat casualties as a “civilians killed by the
Serbs#!) Arkan‘s men and Mauzer‘s Panthers were also involved in mistreating Bosnian Muslims
in Bijeljina, Bratunac, Rogatica, Vlasenica, Zvornik, and Hadţići, including in detention centres;
these units also looted property of Bosnian Muslims and were involved in expelling Bosnian
Muslims from Bijeljina and Zvornik after the take-overs in those municipalities.10656 (If it was
true for Bijeljina, then the Muslims wouldn’t celebrate him. All other allegations were not
proven, because every group of men could present and identify themselves as a “Seselj’s” or
“Arkan’s” men! This court afforded itself to pay more weight to a reputation than to a
documents, or the judgements of the domestic courts, which are even more hostile than any
other! Anyway, it had nothing to do with the President!)

3325. Arkan attended meetings and had direct contact with the Accused .10657 (The Defence
rejected that with indignation, because there was #no a simple corroboration# to this
testimony of the witness who didn’t know much, and admitted in his testimony that he didn’t
know anything of the President obvious efforts to fight all crimes!) As noted above, Arkan
wrote to the Accused in 1994 to inform him that his men supported the Accused‘s ―heroic
resistance‖ against NATO and that ―[a]s always we, with all our available forces, stand to protect
Serbian people‖ and that they were expecting the Accused‘s call to join the VRS to ―protect
Serbian nationality and Orthodoxy‖.10658 (#Such a peculiar evidence! No signature, no stamp

10652
See para. 614.
10653
See para. 3260; see also Momcilo Mandić, T. 4664 (6 July 2010).
10654
See para. 3260.
10655
See Scheduled Incidents A.1.1, A.16.1.
10656
See paras. 631–632, 672, 768–769, 771, 986–987, 1155, 1245–1247, 1317–1319, 1361, 1365, 2104, 2112.
10657
See paras. 3187–3188. (referring to P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 55; Milorad Davidović, T. 15465 (24 June
2011).
10658
P2854 (Letter from Party for Serbian Unity to Radovan Karadţić, 16 April 1994); Milorad Davidović, T. 15477 (28 June 2011). See also para. 3228.
 917

and seal, no number of protocol, no evidence that this “letter” reached the President, nothing
that would qualify this “letter” to be a credible evidence in such a serious case#! This kind of
evidence could be produced thousands and thousands, and several of such a documents had
been admitted in the file. Just one question: why Arkan allegedly wrote and allegedly sent
this letter to somebody who, according to the Prosecution-Chamber was a member of the
Joint Criminal Enterprise? Why it wouldn’t be expected that they had been in a daily
contact and oral communication? Did the President respond, and did he invited Arkan in
April 1994? Really, no a serious chamber would pay any attention to such a fake document,
but even if it wasn’t fake, it is obvious that neither the President was close to Arkan, nor
Arkan was invited in April 1994#!) In the autumn of 1995, at an event in Bijeljina, Arkan
repeated his commitment to the President to return to defend the ―Serbian territory and our
Orthodox religion‖ if called by the President.10659 On this occasion, the President awarded Arkan
a certificate to congratulate him and thank him and his unit for their efforts in defending the
Bosnian Serbs.10660 (#A reasonable and serious chamber would establish what exactly the
President did#. Then it would be clear that the President didn’t “award Arkan a certificate”
but praised this two units for their courage and patriotism. Even if he decorated Arkan, it
would be as with his unit proposed from the terrains, and there was no any formal obstacle
to do that. Arkan never was indicted by any court, let alone sentenced, and only his rude
nature and conduct made him a bad reputation. Anyway, the President was too bussy and to
far from socialising with a commanders of a small units!)

ix. Vojislav Šešelj

3326. Šešelj was the leader of the SRS and of the ―Serbian Chetnik Movement‖.10661 In May
1991, Šešelj praised the President as ―the true leader of the Serbian people‖ in BiH, stating further
that he enjoyed their ―undivided trust‖ and that the SRS supported the policies of the SDS.10662 (So
what? Although Mr. Seselj friendly objected the President’s personal closeness with the
Democrat Party, the relations between the two leaders remained firm and with a mutual
respect. #Why would that be a crime#? Mr. Seselj spent 12 years in the UN Detention Unit
and went a trial, although during the period of Indictment he was an opposition politician.
#Nothing criminal is proven in knowing Mr. Seselj or in respecting him#! Not even in
Hitler’s and Stalin’s times would be!#) Šešelj stated that BiH was fundamentally Serbian and
that either Muslim fundamentalists should leave or the Muslims should accept this and become
loyal citizens of Serbia.10663 Also in May 1991, the President in an interview spoke of Šešelj and
his ―political force‖ but said that they differed in terms of the choice of method.10664 (That didn’t
mean that the SDS and SRS were a unique party, there were differences, but in a civilised
manner, it didn’t damage their mutual respect! Anyway, it is a bit senseless to comment this
part, since Mr. Seselj was acquitted before this Court, and this comments are just to show
the methods of this Court!)

10659
See para. 3228.
10660
See para. 3228 (referring to P2858 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić and Arkan at award ceremony in Bijeljina, with transcript). After this, Arkan left
RS and went to Serbia. D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March 2013), para. 10.
10661
P6390 (Article from Der Spiegel entitled ―Šešelj: Serbian Policy Must Not Be Defined in Washington‖, 8 August 1991), p. 1; D3666 (TANJUG news report,
15 May 1993); Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39543–39545 (7 June 2013); P6389 (Vojislav Šešelj's interview with Pogledi, 31 May 1991), pp. 1–2.
10662
P6387 (Vojislav Šešelj's interview with ON newspaper, 24 May 1991), pp. 1–2. See also Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39543–39544 (7 June 2013); D3665 (Witness
statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), para. 37; D3667 (Transcript of Vojislav Šešelj's press conference, 26 March 1992), p. 1.
10663
P6387 (Vojislav Šešelj's interview with ON newspaper, 24 May 1991), p. 6–7, 9 (wherein Šešelj further stated that Serbs, with their genetic coding, were
born to be soldiers and were always ready to go to war and that they had fully achieved their objectives that they were trying to establish SRS boards in
every Serbian municipality and consolidate the party).
10664
D1281 (Articles from Veĉernje Novine entitled ―Karadţić shocked me‖ and ―Šešelj is amiable‖, 9 May 1991), p. 2.
 918

3327. Šešelj met with the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership on several occasions
during the war in BiH.10665 In May 1992, Šešelj spoke about contacting the President with respect
to the withdrawal and deployment of his men.10666 Šešelj sent large groups of SRS volunteer
fighters from Serbia to assist in Serb operations in Croatia and BiH.10667 Šešelj acknowledged that
his men were in BiH and were in all areas for the ―protection of the Serbian people‖ and the
defence of their borders.10668 Slobodan Milošević approved of the SRS‘s action in sending
volunteers.10669 (The Radical volunteers had never acted independently. The vast majority of
them were the Seselj followers from Bosnia, and fought either within the JNA or VRS#!)

3328. Šešelj‘s men were involved in operations in Bratunac, Zvornik, Hadţići, Novo Sarajevo
Vogošća, Brĉko, and Rogatica in April and May 1992.10670 Furthermore, Šešelj made public
statements about the participation of SRS volunteers in the take-over of Bijeljina and specifically
the significant contribution of Mirko Blagojević as the commander of the SRS units to the
―liberation‖ of Bijeljina.10671 In May 1993, Šešelj proclaimed Mirko Blagojević a ―Vojvoda‖ in
recognition of his participation in operations in municipalities including Bijeljina.10672

3329. The SRS and Šešelj advocated the idea of a homogeneous Greater Serbia which involved
the unification of all Serb lands and the removal of the non-Serb population.10673 (This can not be
more wrong! Everyone knew that Mr. Seselj considered that in such a meditated “Greater
Serbia” all the population was Serbian with different religions. That may be proven in the
coming times by the genetic explorations, but the President was neutral and indifferent
about these ideas. On the contrary, the President always advised not to grab territories in
which population doesn’t want to belong tho the state or entity with the other’s majority, but
it didn’t mean that his respect for Mr. Seselj, and many other leaders that didn’t think like
him decreased!) In March 1992, Šešelj spoke about the prospect of great bloodshed in BiH and
called upon the Bosnian Serbs to preserve all their ethnic areas.10674 In a speech, Šešelj said that
the ―Muslims and Croats do not represent a threat for us for a long time already. Only, brothers
and sisters Serbs, there should not be hesitating, waiting […] the next time they strike, we should
finish them off, so they never strike back‖.10675 Šešelj also spoke about BiH being undoubtedly
Serbian, and that if ―any Muslim fundamentalists do not like that, they will have to pack their
suitcases and leave‖.10676

10665
D3666 (TANJUG news report, 15 May 1993); D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), paras. 36–37.
10666
P2228 (Intercept of conversation between Vojislav Šešelj and Branislav Gavrilović, April 1992); D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June
2013), paras. 58–59.
10667
P6388 (Excerpt from video of interview with Vojislav Šešelj for ―Death of Yugoslavia‖ documentary, with transcript), pp. 2–4; Milan Babić, P742
(Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 3394–3395; D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), paras. 24, 29–30, 50, 55–59.
10668
P6389 (Vojislav Šešelj's interview with Pogledi, 31 May 1991), p. 1.
10669
Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39571 (10 June 2013).
10670
See paras. 3191–3192.
10671
D3667 (Transcript of Vojislav Šešelj's press conference, 26 March 1992), p. 12; P3033 (Reynaud Theunens‘s expert report entitled ―Radovan Karadţić and
the SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)‖), e-court pp. 379–380.
10672
D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), para. 49; P3033 (Reynaud Theunens‘s expert report entitled ―Radovan Karadţić and the
SRBiH TO-VRS (1992-1995)‖), e-court pp. 381–382.
10673
Milan Babić, P742 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 3393–3394. See also D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013),
paras. 15–16; Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39554–39555 (10 June 2013); P2527 (Video footage of speeches of Vojislav Šešelj and Radovan Karadţić, 6 May 1991,
with transcript), p. 1; P6391 (Excerpts from Vojislav Šešelj's speech); P6389 (Vojislav Šešelj's interview with Pogledi, 31 May 1991), p. 7; P6390 (Article
from Der Spiegel entitled ―Šešelj: Serbian Policy Must Not Be Defined in Washington‖, 8 August 1991), p. 1. Šešelj also stated the SRS advocated
brotherhood and unity of ―Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Serbs, Muslim Serbs, Protestant Serbs and atheist Serbs‖ and complete respect for the rights of national
minorities: D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), paras. 15–16, 31–35, 39, 41; D3667 (Transcript of Vojislav Šešelj's press
conference, 26 March–16 April 1992), p. 20; Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39600–39605 (10 June 2013). The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In
reaching that conclusion the Chamber considered that Šešelj had a clear self-interest in testifying in this regard and his evidence was marked by political
statements which undermined his credibility in this regard.
10674
D3667 (Transcript of Vojislav Šešelj's press conference, 26 March 1992), p. 1.
10675
P6393 (Video clip of interview with Vojislav Šešelj). See also Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39589 (10 June 2013).
10676
P6387 (Vojislav Šešelj's interview with ON newspaper, 24 May 1991), p. 6; Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39546–39548 (7 June 2013).
 919

3330. In May 1992, Šešelj spoke about the ―traditional enemies‖ of the Serbs and the need for
them to be united to prevent a ―new genocide against the Serbian people‖ and of the revenge Serbs
would take against Muslims if they repeated history again.10677 Šešelj, on behalf of the SRS, also
expressed his support for the formation of the SerBiH and his view that the Bosnian Serb
authorities should demarcate Serb territory, proclaim its own TO and police in territories under its
control, and simultaneously ―liberate‖ those areas which were not under Serb control.10678
(#Senseless to comment, just consult the Simon Wiesental Centre for research of the
genocides in the WWII!#)

b. Accused’s knowledge of crimes and measures he took to prevent and punish them

i. Knowledge of crimes committed throughout the Municipalities

3331. The Prosecution argues that from the beginning of the conflict in 1992, the President was
notified of crimes committed against non-Serbs in the Municipalities by Serb Forces.10679 The
President acknowledges that he received information from the VRS, the MUP, and municipal
bodies but argues that the information rarely referred to illegal activities at the local level, and
when it did, the Bosnian Serb leadership reacted immediately.10680

3332. At the outset, the Chamber notes that the President received information about occurrences
in the Municipalities from a number of sources. As President of the RS, he received reports and
attended Bosnian Serb Assembly sessions where representatives would report on the situation in
their municipalities.10681 (But this is not, and was not their job. The Assembly as any other
parliament served for the political talks over the legislature, and the main and the only
function of the Assembly was to produce the fundamental documents from it’s jurisdiction,
all that doesn’t fall in the scope of the Government’s competences. Anyway, there was no
useful information obtained by the MPs, pertaining to any of the presidential duties, as it can
be seen from the transcpirts of the Assembly sessions!) He also met regularly with municipal
representatives and obtained reports in this manner.10682 (All of the encounters of the President
with a local officials were mainly about their problems in obtaining necessities for a daily
needs. If the Chamber alludes that the President could have received any information on
crimes, it is wrong, because this was not a way. The crime was within the scope of the MUP
and judicial system, not within scope of a political persons or individuals His close associates
also regularly visited the field and communicated with municipal leaders.10683 (So what? If there
was something criminal on the side of the official authorities, they certainly wouldn’t
“report” themselves to the superiors. Had there been crimes of a non-officials, they wouldn’t
report it to the political persons, because there were a proper institutions, and it would be an
empty chat to talk to the President, who was supposed to intervene only if the investigating
agencies didn’t do their job. On the other side, the Prosecution-Chamber alliance charge-
sentence the President exactly for the opposite, for the many investigations that had been
conducted, so that more than a half of detained people had been released! The Republic of
Srpska was not a “road gang” in which everybody could do whatever he wanted. The
President was watched carefully by many deputees and oposit parties, so he couldn’t violate
any rule even if he wanted!) Furthermore, the Bosnian Serb leadership followed international

10677
See para. 2657.
10678
See para. 2798.
10679
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 512.
10680
Defence Final Brief, paras. 555, 641.
10681
D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 86; P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 125–126.
10682
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 246 (notes from a meeting on 30 June 1992 between Mladić, the Accused, and municipal
representatives from Srebrenica, Bratunac, Vlasenica, and Zvornik). See also paras. 3246–3247.
10683
See paras. 3246–3248, 3260, 3262, 3269, 3303–3304, 3310.
 920

coverage of the events in BiH during the conflict.10684 (Even far before the conflict the
#international media had shown their extreme bias and an anti-Serb propaganda#, with an
enormous production of lies. The fake media and false journalists are maybe the greatest
shame and comppromitation of the Western part of the international community! The face
journalists jeopardized a true journalist lives making them suspects of a propaganda and
spying!) Finally, the Chamber notes that from the beginning of the conflict in 1992, the President
was informed by international representatives, such as Okun, Mazowiecki, and UNPROFOR
officials of the forcible displacement of non-Serb civilians10685 and that the issue of ―ethnic
cleansing‖ was also often raised with the President in media interviews.10686 The Chamber will
assess below the evidence pertaining to the information that the President received about specific
municipalities. (#Why the international officials would be trusted after the Serbs identified
their ignorance about what was going on in reality#? There should be a special Tribunal to
investigate and try the fake and irresponsible international representatives, journalists and
some humanitarians, who were an ordinary spies?)

3333. In relation to Bijeljina, when at least 45 non-Serb civilians were killed by Serb Forces on
1 and 2 April 1992 the Accused was informed of the event.10687 (This is below every decency: the
Chamber had already known the structure of the Bijeljina casualties, among whom there
were at least 9 Serbs, some of the Albanian Mercenaries and 27 Muslim extremists,
commanded by H. Tiric, as proven in the file by the document of the Croatian (HVO)
provenance!#) On 4 April 1992, members of the BiH presidency and high ranking army officials
assessed the situation in Bijeljina municipality,10688 and the President made a public announcement
referring to the ―regrettable‖ incidents in Bijeljina but blamed the BiH Presidency for instigating
chaos by calling for mobilisation.10689 (#Before being in Presidency#! What was the official
position of the President on 31 March to 2 April? Was he in charge of anything? How could
the Bijeljina incident be associated with the President at all? Bosnia still existed, and Captain
Hasan Tiric was officially sent by the Muslim secret army under the Izetbegovic’s control to
take-over Bijeljina from the Serb majority. The Presidency delegation had nothing to do
with the President and the SDS! Ignoring such a blatant evidence disqualifies the Court as a
whole!

3334. At a meeting of the Bosnian Serb Presidency on 23 June 1992, the President expressed his
view that Mauzer and Blagojević‘s paramilitary units, which were active in Bijeljina, were very
extreme, and that all units should be placed under a single command of the army or the police.10690
(#EXCULPATORY#!) Meanwhile, at a Bosnian Serb Assembly session in late June 1992, the
President said that the Bosnian Muslims who continued to live in Bijeljina, forming 20% of the
population, were not considered ―second class citizens‖ and that the government officials were
actually trying to persuade them that they had nothing to fear.10691 (#EXCULPATORY#! Making
his opinions known to all the Serb officials was aimed to facilitate for the non-Serbs as secure
as possible environment. Had anyone had known that the President played a game of
duplicity, nobody would forgive him, and that would be said loudly!) The Chamber recalls
that in fact during the summer of 1992, Serb Forces instilled fear in the Bosnian Muslims who

10684
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9126; KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 6825–6826 (closed
session).
10685
Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4191; KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 6830–6832, 6834–
6835 (closed session).
10686
Jeremy Bowen, T. 10095–10096 (13 January 2011).
10687
D3089 (Witness statement of Milivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), para. 18. See Scheduled Incident A.1.1.
10688
D3133 (Witness statement of Cvijetin Simić dated 16 March 2013), para. 32.
10689
D394 (Announcement of SNB, 4 April 1992); D392 (Conclusions of SRBiH Presidency, 4 April 1992).
10690
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 219–220; Milorad Davidović, T. 15770–15773 (30 June 2011). See also P2900 (Letter from
Bijeljina CSB to Radovan Karadţić, 29 July 1992).
10691
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 21.
 921

remained in Bijeljina and that Bosnian Muslims were forcibly expelled from Bijeljina by members
of the Bijeljina Crisis Staff, SDS, Mauzer‘s unit, special police units, and Vojkan Đurković, while
others were sent to Batković camp.10692 (First of all, #there was no a “Serb Forces” in
Bijeljina#. Why would they be in Bijeljina instead on the front lines? In Bijeljina for a while
there were a false “volunteers” who were renegades, and which had been arrested and
expelled out of the RS. This sounds like a shameless gossip and a slander! Nothing of it was
ever proven. Nobody was detained in Batkovic for an ethnic reasons. Mauzer didn’t take
part in any “expulsion” – which maked him suitable for the high position in the post-war
MUP, certified by the international police. Why this fact, a document of the same
international community that is running this court, is neglected and the President forced to
defend from something that has nothing to do with him? Arkan and Blagojevic quarrelled
more among themselves than with somebody else. Blagojevic and Radicals had been a very
known for protecting the Muslims, not for mistreating them? None of those named in such a
paragraphs had ever been indicted and sentenced, but the OTP and Chamber use their
names against this President as if they were proven criminals. A bad reputation of them is
not sufficient to sue even them, let alone a completely distant third person!)

3335. The Accused was later informed by the Bijeljina SJB on 29 July 1992 about the criminal
behaviour of paramilitary groups during and after the take-over of Bijeljina, which resulted in
rapes, thefts, robberies, killings, and the displacement of Bosnian Muslim and Serb civilians.10693
What does it mean? That was the MUP’s job to arrest them, not the President’s. the entire quoted
document is a highly #EXCULPATORY#, because it depints that the criminals present in Bijeljina
were not a “Serb Forces” and that they terrorised everyone, without an ethnic prejudice, see P2900,

p. 2

The promoted after a successful arrest of the Yellow Wasps, Mr. Dragan Andan continued to
introduce the law and order in Bijeljina. By this document he informed the President of the Republic
of Srpska that the situation is coming under control, because all, the Government, the Ministry of
Interior and local regular “Serb Forces” are endeavouring to quit with any crime! P. 3!

10692
See paras. 671–673.
10693
P2900 (Letter from Bijeljina CSB to Radovan Karadţić, 29 July 1992), p. 2. See also paras. 610–638.
 922

p.4:

That this was not a “piece of cake” see the next para from p.5.

Zivan Filipovic described it in his way, but it had to be done. So, it was only to inform the
President that the state security institutions are doing their job, and the President could only
be satisfied with such a course of development, which he expressed by his encouragement of
this cours, writing a remark, p.6.

The entire document is #sufficient to acquit the President not only for the Bijeljina events,
but for all such the allegations throughout the municipalities!#) Ţivan Filipović, former chief
of the Bijeljina Municipal TO Staff, testified that the President and Mladić attempted to ―shake off
these paramilitary formations which only caused damage, both to the people and the army and the
political sphere‖.10694 (Is it taken as the President’s felony? It can only indicate how difficult
was it to quit the feature!) After the Accused complained to the Prime Minister of the FRY that
Serbian paramilitaries were out of control, Davidović was sent to Bijeljina in early July 1992 to
investigate the situation.10695 (#Not correct! Karad`i} asked for a special unit to help in
arresting paramilitaries#! Moreover, on 2 September 1992 the Accused was among the attendees
who participated in a meeting with military and political officials in Bijeljina.10696 The Accused
acknowledged that the chief of the party, the MUP and the president of the municipality had been
involved in crime ―here and there‖.10697 Again, an #abuse of the unfinished sentences of
Mladic’s diary#. This hadn’t been said only about Bijeljina, it was an analysis of the overall

10694
Ţivan Filipović, T. 35818 (21 March 2013).
10695
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 73–75. See also paras. 634–638.
10696
P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), pp. 131–132.
10697
P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), p. 155.
 923

situation, look what the President said, incompletely put down by General Mladic:

(#EXCULPATORY#! It was a general criticism of the practice by the President, a criticism

of the practice in any municipality, not necessarily in Bijeljina, because the President spoke
in plural, “presidents”, but this is why the arbitrary handwritten notes can not be taken as
webatim. And, #how it could have been used agains him#, as a proof of his backing crimes?
But, anyway, in Bijeljina the President forced the municipal President to resign, and General
Mladic demoted Mauzer to a private! And a bit further in the same document, the President
said that a municipal authorities should not take to much in their hands:

3336. In relation to Zvornik, Colm Doyle passed on information to the Accused that he
received from Martin Bell of the BBC that on 10 April 1992, 25,000 people were leaving the
municipality.10698 (#Before VRS, before any command responsibility#! Just to look in the UN
documents, to see that at that time the President didn’t have any armed force to command,
didn’t have any capacity and official role, and there was no sufficient information, but even
if there was a sufficient information, who was able to act and what way? The two ethnic
communities clashed after the general mobilisation proclaimed by Izetbegovic. The Muslims
took over at a first moment, then the Serbs consolidated and had re-taken the control. No
man or institution all over the world would be entitled to order to one side not to defend.
And no man would be obeyed, because everyone has a right to defend his own life and lives
of his family!) The Accused ―seemed to be a little bit alarmed‖ and then advised Doyle that he
did not trust or believe the BBC.10699 At a mid-April 1992 meeting with international
humanitarian organisations and members of the SDS and JNA, the Accused placed the blame for
events in Zvornik on irregular paramilitaries who he claimed were not under the control of the
SDS.10700 (#Paramilitaries of all ethnicities#! There were not only the Serb paramilitaries,
but the Muslim also, and some of the HOS (Croatian) irregualrs! But there was no a single
armed group that was under the control of the SDS, because the President and all the
relevant SDS officials agreed not to have a party armed formations, and that was well
known, and could be seen from many documents!) At a meeting held on 30 June 1992
between representatives of the Zvornik municipality, the President, Mladić and other officials,10701
Branko Grujić, a representative of the Interim Government of Zvornik, stated that ―[w]e have

10698
Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 25275. See also Martin Bell, T. 9787 (14 December 2010); P1996 (Witness statement of
Martin Bell dated 8 March 2010), para. 25 (testifying that he informed Doyle of the events in Zvornik and suggested it be brought to the attention of the
Accused). In this regard, the Chamber recalls that following the attack on Zvornik by the Bosnian Serb Forces on 8 April 1992, approximately 10,000
people, the majority of whom were Bosnian Muslim, left Zvornik. See paras. 1250, 1360.
10699
Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 25275. The Chamber received additional evidence that the Accused received
information about the displacement of civilians from Zvornik. On 8 April 2010, [REDACTED].
10700
[REDACTED].
10701
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 246; D3654 (Witness statement of KW317 dated 26 September 2012), para. 69 (under seal).
See also Marinko Vasilić, T. 39954 (13 June 2013).
 924

successfully implemented the President‘s decision to settle Diviĉ and Kozluk with our
children.‖10702 This is misinterpretation of what Mladic put down in a short remarks. Prior to
what Grujic said, another participant, Milenko Stanic, (p.249) said:

And the abandoned property was a great problem, since it was exposed to loothing and
destruction. The official position of the state organs (and the President personally) was that
the #temporarily abandoned property must be given for a temporary use to the refugees, not
to the domestic populations#, which didn’t need it, and wouldn’t keep it safe. See: D01709,
18 May 92, from the Zvornik municipality, signed by Grujic:

See: D01084, from Hadzici, 26 May 92:

“#To make a list, to seal them,#” and the Municipality may have it at a disposal. All
according the law. See further, D01710

10702
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 243, 249–250.
 925

See further, D34, Pale, #protection of abandoned property, see: D02246, - the Government
regulation of handling the abandoned property, See: #D111. the President’s decision on this
issue: Aug. 92:

There is more than a sufficient evidence on what was it all about.

Marko Pavlović said that they were active in moving out Muslims, and had also moved people for
the sake of their ―heroes‖ who had fled from Kovaĉevići.10703 Although B. Grujic testified that
his words hadn’t been recorded accurately, and although there is a great deal of cynicism in
the Pavlovic’s words, it is still used against the President. See what had been said just before
the “critical” words:

10703
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 249–251, 253–254; Petko Panić, T. 19138–19139 (19 September 2011). See also Milenko
Stanić, T. 34033–34034 (19 February 2013) (testifying that he could not recall the issues discussed at this meeting pertaining to Zvornik which were
presented by Marko Pavlović). Branko Grujić testified that the note in Mladić‘s notebook is incorrect as he never uttered the words attributed to him and he
insisted that it was a local decision to remove the Bosnian Muslims and the Accused did not allow forcible transfer. Branko Grujić, T. 40418–40420 (25
June 2013). The Chamber recalls that that Grujić‘s evidence was marked by multiple contradictions, evasiveness, and bias. See paras. 4237, 4239, 4255,
4270, 4279, 4283, 4308, 4357, 4441, 4572. In light of this, the Chamber does not believe his denial as to the content of Mladić‘s notes. The Chamber
further notes that Grujić testified that the BCS word ―iseljavanje‖ in Exhibit P1478 was incorrectly translated as ―evicting‖ when it means ―moving out at
their request‖. Branko Grujić, T. 40421 (25 June 2013), Branko Grujić, T. 40458 (26 June 2013). The Chamber accepts the clarification made by Grujić but
considers that in the context of the notes of the meeting, the meaning is effectively the same as ―evicting‖. #And that is not fair!!! On one hand
are the Mladic’s unfinished notes, on the other is a live testimonies, and the Chamber finds “a hair in egg”.
 926

“Evicting” some domestic people from an illegally occupied appartments for the sake of the
refuges “heroically” escaped from Kovacevici, was not illegal, but was a bitter and cynical
remark! The same Pavlovic, in the same document said that “we have to get rid ourselves
from Zuca, capt. Dragan and other paramilitaries. All what had been said was a sort of
criticism of the reality, which was not satisfactory. This can not be used against the
President!)
The Chamber recalls that in fact, most of the inhabitants of Diviĉ and Kozluk were Bosnian Muslims
and that after they were relocated, Bosnian Serbs who had fled their homes in other areas settled
there.10704 (#All in accordance with the regulations, and all on the temporary basis, see the
documents above, pertaining the hendling of the abandoned property!#)

3337. On 5 July 1992, the President stated that he had ordered an immediate investigation into
the displacement of Bosnian Muslim civilians from Zvornik and had been told that the Bosnian
Muslim inhabitants of Kozluk had requested approval to move to third-countries because they felt
like hostages.10705 He further advised that the Zvornik authorities possessed written evidence that
they left of their own free will and added that they could return anytime they wanted.10706 (As said,
as it happened, almost everyone returned to Kozluk) The Chamber considers that the
implication that the President learned that Bosnian Muslims were removed from Zvornik with the
assistance of the Interim Government of Zvornik in order to settle Bosnian Serbs who had fled
from elsewhere indicates that the Accused was aware of the forcible nature of the movement.
(There should be an #evidence, not an indication#. There was no any force in it. There was a
previous attempt of the population of Kozluk to leave, but the Serb authorities of Zvornik
dissuaded them, with the help of the Christian Orthodox Bishop and the Muslim mufti,
guaranting them security, but when the local authorities couldn guarantee it’s own safety.
They had to inform the population in Kozluk. If the Chamber rejects or denies these facts, it
should have it said so!) This is corroborated by the fact that the Accused was informed that the
Bosnian Muslims who fled Kozluk had felt like hostages. (And this is exactly how the Chamber
should not make inferences without knowing the case in detail. The population in Kozluk
didn’t feel like hostages because of any other reason, but for the reason that #they were not
allowed to leave#. And this directs us to another, the only logical inference: the population
“forced” the authorities to facilitate them the departure!) The President was later made aware
of further efforts to remove Bosnian-Muslim civilians held in the collection centre in Diviĉ in
September 1992.10707 Not a single “inference” is OK. Let us see this document from the fn.
10712, P05402

(#EXCULPATORY#! Instead of being praised for supporting the evacuation of the minors
and unarmed people from this combat zone, it is used for an accusation for an ethnic

10704
Petko Panić, T. 19136–19137 (19 September 2011), T. 19151–19152 (20 September 2011). See also paras. 1261, 1267, 1269.
10705
P2937 (Radovan Karadţić letter, 5 July 1992) (under seal), p. 1.
10706
P2937 (Radovan Karadţić letter, 5 July 1992) (under seal), p. 1.
10707
P5402 (Telegram from Neimar to Kapija 333, 13 September 1992). See also P5403 (Telegram from Neimar to Kapija 333, 10 September 1992).
 927

cleansing! Unbelievable! Let us see P05403:

The wording is clear: #“releasing the civilian population”#. Releasing, not expelling, and all of
it after five months of a fierce fightings in the area. On 21 January 1993, the President
commented that the number of inhabitants in Zvornik remained the same but it changed from
being 50% non-Serb to completely Serb, with more than 24,000 Serbs from Zenica and Central
Bosnia having arrived.10708 On 10 April 1993, the President attended a celebration marking ―the
day of the liberation of Zvornik‖.10709 (So what? The Defence never contested that the
President was alive at the time, that he was in the region and exercised his presidential duties
to the possible degree! As far as it is concerned with the population, the Muslims controlled
about 50% of the municipal territory, the ethnicities didn’t succeed in formatting the two
municipalities, they fought instead and separated chaotically. The Serb part of Zvornik
admitted as many refugees from Zenica. Those are processes within a civil war, what does it
have to do with the President, who wanted to avoid this war at any cost!).

3338. The Chamber also received evidence that the Accused knew that NeĊeljko Prstojević,
President of the Ilidţa Crisis Staff, was involved in ―ethnic cleansing‖ in Ilidţa. In June 1992,
after being relieved of his military command responsibilities due to his involvement in expelling
Bosnian Muslims from Ilidţa, Prstojević managed to return to Ilidţa and continue this practice
after he met with the President in Pale.10710 (This alludes as if this meeting was connected with
an alleged “ethnic cleansing” commited, allegedly, by Mr. Prstojevic! #Prstojevic testified
and denied that the Muslim civilians from Ilidza had ever been “expelled” but the Muslim
combatants had#!) Furthermore, on 2 July 1992, in an intercepted telephone conversation,
Mandić confronted Prstojević about his involvement in forcing Bosnian Muslims out of Ilidţa and
advised him that the information about this had ―already reached the top‖.10711 In addition, at a

10708
See para. 2760. See also paras. 2772, 3068.
10709
P5167 (Report of Zvornik Brigade, 10 April 1993), p. 2.
10710
See para. 2132, [REDACTED]. There is no a single word in this intercept that could have been a basis for any conclusion
about any “cleansing”!!!
10711
P1110 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Mandić and NeĊeljko Prstojević, 2 July 1992), p. 4. See para. 2159. . Look what is in this

intercept:
 928

July 1992 Bosnian Serb Assembly session, in the President‘s presence, Prstojević boasted about
Ilidţa‘s achievements in extending Bosnian Serb territory and driving Bosnian Muslims out of
―territories where they had actually been [a] majority‖.10712 (#No a normal person would brag
about such a kind of felony#. There was no any settlement with the Muslims that the Muslim
extremists didn’t have an armed unit, let alone a settlement with the Muslim majority. This
certainly pertained to an “extending of the territory under the Serb control, and that was
entirely #military wording and logics#, and it appeared that it never happened, and nobody
could name this kind of settlements. Also, the Chamber didn’t establish that the President
was in the hall at that moment. The President was not obliged to attend the Assambly
sessions unless invited to give a speech and respond, although he was present at almost all of
the session, but not all the times. But it was never that he was in the hall all the time, and
there is evidence on that. Such a weak evidence hadn’t been seen since the Inquisition. Even
Hitler and Stalin courts required something more than the inferences from inferences, from
inferences,… endlessly!)

3339. On 6 June 1992, the Bosnian Serb leadership, including the President, attended a briefing
about Bratunac in which it was indicated that there were no Bosnian Muslims remaining in
Bratunac and that it was a ―fully liberated town‖.10713 (only town itself, but the rest of 80% of
the municipality was in the Muslim hands!) On 30 June 1992, the President was further
informed by Ljubislav Simić, President of Bratunac, that from a situation where the Bosnian
Muslims were the majority before the conflict, only two remained in the municipality.10714 Simić
also reported on looting by the army.10715 (So what? He was complaining, and if the President
was in favour of looting, Simic wouldn’t report it to him. This is #exculpatory#!!! Pertaining
to the Muslims from Bratunac, it was well documented that after they didn’t succeede to
fight the JNA and to expel the Serbs, they #ultimatively demanded to be approved that their
civilians leave towards Tuzla!# it is proven and confirmen by the Muslim testimonies!)

3340. On 23 June 1992, the President was informed of events in Bosanski Novi regarding the
9,000 Bosnian Muslims who left after being subjected to intimidation and a policy of harassment
and discrimination at the hands of the Bosnian Serbs.10716 What does it mean – was informed?
So what? This was a local development of a civil war, and the President was not in a position
to know many things, particularly in this period, because there was no communication. But,
even if he knew, what was it that he could have done? Why it happened only in June 92,
while the rest of the BiH was inflamed in the war at the beginning of April? #Nothing
happened before the Muslim extremists initiated fights against the Serbs#. And B. Novi is an
example how the facts are distorted. The Serb authorities, after the failure of it’s attempts to
pacify the area, proposed the population to temporarily move to Banjaluka, which is within
the RS, or to Doboj, also in the Republic of Srpska, which the representatives of this
population initially accepted, but refused to stay in Doboj in a poor conditions. So, the offers
of the authorities were a temporary movement within the same regiona and entity. No crime
was commited. Then, the population demanded to be facilitated to cross to Croatia, and

We had to comment this intercept several times. This intercept could only be EXCULPATORY!!!
10712
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 66.
10713
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 93–94, 101.
10714
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 246, 258. The Chamber notes that Ljubislav Simić testified that he said there were only two
Muslims remaining in Bratunac ironically to highlight the problems being caused by paramilitaries. Ljubisav Simić, T. 37303–37304 (16 April 2013). The
Chamber views Simić‘s evidence in this regard with caution given the problems with his credibility identified earlier in this Judgement at footnote 2268 and
that he had an interest in distancing himself from such a statement.
10715
P1478 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), p. 259.
10716
KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 6786–6789, 6834 (under seal).
 929

further to the European countries. There was no crime in the conduct of the authorities, and
even if there was, what it has to do with the President?

3341. The Accused, in July 1992, acknowledged that there had been a number of ―traitors‖
who had committed inhumane acts and that they would be tried and punished by law, but
suggested that the most severe acts were rare and that there were more frequent examples of
unlawful acquisition of property.10717 (#EXCULPATORY#! So what? It is everywhere in the
world that the most severe crimes are less frequent. But, the Chamber didn’t notice that the
President distanted himself and the authorities from those “traitors”, because the criminals
were betraying the Serb people at the first place. At the same time a #Muslim high official
Silajdzic was spreading the fairy-tales About 300,000 killed Muslims and 80,000 raped
Muslim women#, and the President didn’t exclude that some severe acts had been
committed, but that the majority of crimes pertained to an acquisition of property!) The
President characterised this as a consequence of the ―inter-ethnic and religious war‖ and that some
individuals were involved in taking the property of both Muslims and Serbs.10718 The President
stated that these crimes occurred without the knowledge of regular soldiers and affected their
morale.10719 (Did the Prosecution submit any evidence to the contrary? There was many
evidence that the very next level rectified a misdeeds of their subordinates, which proved
that the state was against any crime?)

3342. On 17 July 1992, the Bosnian Serb MUP wrote a report to the President and the Prime
10720
Minister. It stated that almost all paramilitaries lacked a unified command and engaged in
looting, which posed a major threat to public peace and order.10721 (That means that the Serbian
MUP was doing it’s job properly. How this could be used against the President? Good deeds
are to be punished! Those days and a few days later there were the arrests of paramilitaries.
The MUP only informed the President and Prime Minister, not requiring any action of them,
but just informing that they were aware of the problem and that they will act! #ENTIRELY
EXCULPATORY#!) The report also stated that the army, Crisis Staffs, and War Presidencies
had requested that the army round up as many Bosnian Muslim civilians as possible.10722 (The
Serbian MUP was critical of such a requests and rejected it, and informed the President that
it had been a mistake of the local officials. The fact that it had been required doesn’t mean
that it was accepted and carried out. On the contrary! Since the entire domain was within
the MUP’s competence, they only informed the President, which didn’t mean that there was
required any of his action. #EXCULPATORY#!) The Accused had already received
information in May and June 1992 that Serb Forces were engaged in looting and that there were
problems with robberies ―of even Serbian people‖.10723 (So what? #The President was
informed by those who fought against the crimes, in accord with his orders#!The MUP was
exercising it’s duties, and informed the instances that should be aware of the problem, but all
of those paramilitaries had been put out of law as of 13 June 92, by the President’s order,
and prior to that, by the Mladic and Djeric orders. How it could have been a “Serb Forces”
since the President himself delegitimised all of these paramilitaries? See: D93, see D434,
#ENTIRELY EXCULPATORY#! See D01633, 29 July 92.:

10717
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 17.
10718
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 17. See also D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September
1992), p. 14; P809 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić‘s Press Conference at ICFY, 18 September 1992), p. 1.
10719
D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 17.
10720
P1096 (SerBiH MUP Report on Some Aspects of Work Done to Date and the Tasks Ahead, 17 July 1992).
10721
P1096 (SerBiH MUP Report on Some Aspects of Work Done to Date and the Tasks Ahead, 17 July 1992), p. 2.
10722
P1096 (SerBiH MUP Report on Some Aspects of Work Done to Date and the Tasks Ahead, 17 July 1992), p. 3; Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8944; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5166–5167 (14 July 2010).
10723
D414 (Minutes of 19th session of Government of SerBiH, 2 June 1992), p. 1; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 54;
Milorad Davidović, T. 15612, 15634–15636 (29 June 2011).
 930

See: D98 of 6 August 92

So, there was no empty treats, there were arrests.)

3343. On 19 July 1992, the President wrote, inter alia, to the Novo Sarajevo, Pale, Ilidţa,
Hadţići, Rajlovac, and Sokolac municipalities, requesting that they, in co-operation with the SJBs,
make an inventory of all housing facilities which were left vacant following the ―voluntary
departure‖ of the Bosnian Muslim population and that pursuant to a Presidency decision those
facilities would be given for the temporary use of Bosnian Serbs from Sarajevo.10724 Completely
#EXCULPATORY#! There is a set of documents on the subject of the abandoned property.
The duty of the municipal authorities was to register, seal, save the property and if needed to
give it for use exclusively to the refugees, for a temporary use with the obligation to maintain
it while using it. Beside this P739, see many other documents from many municipalities: See
D00034, Pale, protection of abandoned property, see: D02246, - the Government regulation
of handling the abandoned property, See: the President’s decision on this issue: 0111. Aug.
92:

What is wrong with this instructions?)

10724
P739 (RS Presidency request to various municipalities, 19 July 1992).
 931

3344. The Accused was informed on 28 July 1992 that paramilitary groups frequently followed
VRS units into inhabited areas in order to loot after combat was completed in those areas.10725
This is document P1500, let us see what it said:

Let us see whether it is #“accusatory” or “exculpatory” exhibit#: the Commander of the

VRS reports to the Presidency and other institutions what he had undertaken against the
paramilitaries. This was 28 July, after 13 June and the President’s Order of the same kind,
and some arrests had been done, or were underway, such as in Zvornik (The Yellow Wasps
arrest action was just underway) it is exclusively #EXCULPATORY#, and wouldn’t be
exculpatory only if the President opposed this order, which didn’t happen, since the order
was in accord with his own orders D93, D434 and all other orders.

The Commander of the Main Staff of VRS identified those groups as a “self-proclamed”
special units, appearing at the beginning as a legal volunteers, and after being under the
command “for a day or two”, becoming a paramilitary. During the entire process the
Defence kept this position: their coming in the battlefield was legal, in accordance with the
decision of the Federal Presidency, were registered in the municipal TO for saleries as a
regular soldiers, #but later reneged#, and the authorities tried to arrest or expel them, which
they couldn’t achieve without a help of the central MUP and the VRS. #EXCULPATORY#!

Here, the Mains Staff identified those groups as #affiliated to the opposition parties in Serbia
and suggested also in the RS, and some of these parties had always been opposed to the SDS#

From this document the #President could only see that the VRS and it’s commands are doing
their job, in accordance with his own orders and the provisions of the SR BiH low on the
Army#. Gen Mladic repeated in the strongest manner that all the independent groups and
individuals were to be submitted to the unique command, except those who already

10725
P1500 (VRS Main Staff Order, 28 July 1992), pp. 1, 3. See also Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 9119.
 932

commited crimes:

The document is completely #EXCULPATORY#!

3345. On 16 August 1992, Doyle mentioned to the President that he was familiar with the
practice of non-Serbs being forced to leave their homes and that some of these people were forced
to pay money for permission to leave. The President agreed that this was not legal and should not
happen.10726 As any naïve or stupid man, #the President was extremely trustful of the
international representatives#. Many Muslims payed a bribe to be put higher on a waiting
list for leaving, and had to pay a fee for transportation, all other payments was not known.
But, “paying money for permission to leave” is in a sharp contrast to the allegations about
“expelling” or other ways of an “ethnic cleansing” because these two are excluding each
other. Since Doyle informed the President in London, the Acused couldn’t deny before
researching, but immediately after he returned from London, the President issued an order
banning everything what Doyle was talking about, see D00101

There is no any ambiguity, all was ordered. See further:

An executive order of the Commander in chief, even before he checked whether Doyle was
right, or not.

So, the President indorsed the IRC, whose recommendations had to be followed by the state
organs of the RS.

10726
Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 25307–25308; Colm Doyle, T. 2874–2875 (27 May 2010).
 933

An #exemplary care for the international norms#. The order never was denounced, nobody
objected, nobody had a negative comments.

. So, the President was informed about some criminal features, and immediately took measures
with a remedies. #EXCULPATORY#! Apart from it, there is a contradiction in Doyle’s
words: if the #non-Serbs had to pay for “permission to leave”, it doesn’t look like a forceful
leaving#. Now we know that the population was forcing the local authorities to facilitate
them leaving the area, for which they had to submit up to 15 papers, plus to pay for the
transportation costs. See: many documents showing that the population wanting to leave
demanded it. During his testimony, Mr. Doyle praised the President for this document,
because he didn’t know if it was issued on the basis of his information!)

3346. On 22 August 1992, the President was informed by a report from the Banja Luka MUP
and from international organisations of the incident at Korićanske Stijene in which approximately
200 non-Serb men were killed by Serb Forces and thrown down a ravine at Mount Vlašić on 21
August 1992.10727 (The Chamber already knew that the Accuse was in London for the
beginning of the Vance-Owen Conference. Here is what the witness Subotis said: D3695,
para 246:

The Accused was angry because he had already received calls from international organisations
about the killings and ―he simply couldn‘t believe that something like that had indeed
happened‖.10728 (So what? Would he be surprised had he ordered such a crime? How this
could serve for the conviction of this President? #EXCULPATORY#! Another Chamber
rightfully acquitted Minister Stani{i} of charge for this event, how the President who was
more distant to the perpetrators could have been found responsible?)

3347. On 25 August 1992, the Accused acknowledged his awareness of the ―so called practice
of ethnic cleansing‖ and that ―the majority of those displaced are undoubtedly Bosnian
Muslims‖.10729 He wrote a letter explaining that he had issued an order that the forced transfer of
the civilian population must be prevented and any written statements by refugees that they would

10727
D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 242–246; Bogdan Subotić, T. 40105–40111 (20 June 2013); T. 40173–40175 (21
June 2013). See also D4379 (Witness statement of Vladimir Glamoĉić dated 10 February 2014), paras. 14–15; P3768 (Witness statement of Milan
Komljenović dated 28 October 2011), para. 5 (stating that Glamoĉić admitted to him years after the incident, that the Accused had called him on the night of
the Korićanske Stijene incident to demand answers); P5446 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 22 August 1992); D2040 (Special report of the 22nd Light Infantry
Brigade, 21 August 1992). See Scheduled Incident B.15.6.
10728
D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 246.
10729
D4720 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić re London Peace Conference, 25 August 1992), p. 1.
 934

not return were considered legally invalid.10730 However, he stated that the civilian population
must be allowed to move freely out of a war zone if that was their desire under the Geneva
Conventions, blaming the failure on the part of the international community to understand the
deep-rooted antagonism and hatred between the three ethnicities in BiH, which caused people to
leave their communities in droves.10731 Let us see the entire document D4720, whether it could
be used against the President:

The document quated in this para was this of 19 August 92, as D101, cited above. It was still a
time when the President didn’t have a complete picture of events on the terrain, and he
trusted the internationals over any reasonable measure. See further:

Look how naïve was he!

There could have not been any possibility of a “permanent removal” of anybody, since the most
responsible official of the RS made commitment that everyone will be able to return, and to
have achieved it totally, he proposed not to have the population leaving towards the western
prosperity, but to be taken care in the region.

Conciliatory and #EXCULPATORY#!

10730
See para. 346; D4720 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić re London Peace Conference, 25 August 1992), p. 1.
10731
See para. 346; D4720 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić re London Peace Conference, 25 August 1992), p. 1.
 935

The rest of the document is equally convincing, honest and conciliatory, and can not be used
against either this President or any other Serb individual or institution. All
#EXCULPATORY#!

3348. At an international press conference in September 1992, the President again acknowledged
that there was ―ethnic cleansing‖ in BiH and stated that this was not part of a policy, emphasising
that people were leaving the territory out of fear and that if there were examples of expulsion by
force this was to be condemned.10732 What is wrong with that? #EXCUPATORY#! At this
same press conference when confronted with allegations and reports of atrocities being committed
by Bosnian Serbs, the President claimed the reports were not honest and did not report on what the
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were doing. He also questioned whether these acts were
part of a policy and stated that in an ―inter-ethnic and inter-religious war‖, there was no need for a
command to kill, given that the three ethnic communities had ―been antagonised during
centuries‖.10733 Here is this para from P00908:

This is not properly transcribed, it should be: “So this kind of war does not require
command “start to shoot” but rather “stop shooting”, no “start killing, but “stop killing”.
Whenever the President accepted any possibility that the Serb side commited crimes or
atrocities, because he couldn’t deny before a research, it was accepted as if he admitted the
atrocities commited by his authorities. And this is not hones, and this is rather
#EXCULPATORY#! That was how his honesty payed him back!)

3349. At a meeting attended by the Accused and Koljević on 30 September 1992, Lord Owen
indicated that there was outrage with respect to a story in the New York Times regarding killings
in Brĉko in May and June 1992.10734 The Accused refuted allegations that his forces had
massacred 3,000 Muslims at a camp near Brĉko and called on the U.S.A. to provide evidence of
these accusations.10735 While the number of persons killed as reported in the New York Times
appears exaggerated, the Chamber has found that a large number of non-Serb men were indeed
executed by Serb Forces at the Luka Camp in Brĉko between at least 9 May and 16 May 1992.10736
(However, the President was right in both senses: #neither it was right that there were 3,000
Muslis killed#, nor any of those killings had been commited #“by his forces”#. As we know
after the eight years of the Trial (or rather five) these weren’t “his forces” but renegades for
whose arrest there was no sufficienf “his forces” and for that reason he asked the Prime
Minister of FRY to send him a help of a dozen of specially trained policemen (Davidovic) to
help in #arresting the renegades#. We also know that the same renegades have blocked,

10732
P809 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić‘s Press Conference at ICFY, 18 September 1992, with transcript), p. 10.
10733
P809 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić‘s Press Conference at ICFY, 18 September 1992, with transcript), p. 3.
 936

disabled, arrested the legal municipal authorities, for opposing their conduct! So, #the
perpetrator was not a “Serb Force”, but the police which arrested him WAS A “SERB
FORCE!#)

3350. At a meeting of the Serbian leadership on 8 September 1992 with the President and
Mladić in attendance, General Simonović stated that ―ethnic cleansing‖ had been done more by
paramilitary formations than by the VRS.10737 (Exactly. And #EXCULPATORY#!)

3351. On 19 October 1992, in reporting to members of the RS Presidency and VRS

commanders on the Geneva peace talks, according to Mladić, the Accused stated that there had
been a lot of discussion on ―ethnic cleansing‖ and reminded the members that RS authorities must
not participate in it.10738 He then said: ―We find it important to make a distinction between what is
done by irresponsible individuals and what is done by the authorities.‖10739 (Exactly! And
#EXCULPATORY#! The Chamber has a funny sense of humour!)

3352. In November 1992, Milojević, an Assembly official, complained at a Bosnian Serb

Assembly session attended by the President, that a proposed citizenship law could be interpreted to
allow ―all the Muslims and Croats we expelled‖ to be citizens of the RS.10740 (So what? He may
not like it, but it was in the prepared law, and this is also #EXCULPATORY#!)

3353. On 26 November 1992, Owen and Vance wrote to the President, advising him that they
had received credible reports about ―renewed ethnic cleansing‖ by Bosnian Serb Forces in the
Banja Luka area.10741 (Which appeared to be a Muslim propaganda, since the Muslim
extremists in Banjaluka (M. Krzic and others) had been preparing an armed uprisal in BL,
and were prevented! Anyway, the President invited the Co-Chairmen to visit BL with him,
and they did!)

3354. At a session of the Bosnian Serb Government held on 21 December 1992, at which the
President was in attendance, Vladimir Lukić advised that all government bodies should be
consistently applying regulations that require the return of illegally obtained property to its
original owner.10742 (Did the President oppose this advise of the Prime Minister? If not, how
this could be used against the President? This was his Prime Minister, nominated by him!
#EXCULPATORY#!)

3355. Throughout the ICFY negotiations in Geneva from December 1992 to September 1993,
the Bosnian Serbs were confronted with reports of ethnic cleansing committed by the Serbs in
BiH.10743 During these negotiations, Lord Owen made very clear allegations about detention
centres, military operations conducted against civilian populations, and the physical process of
―ethnic cleansing‖ of areas.10744 Lawrence Eagleburger, former U.S. Secretary of State, around
January 1993, spoke in direct terms to all the parties about the nature of their activities and said
that they would be held accountable.10745 (What the Exellencies said doesn’t mean that it was a

10734
Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4224–4225.
10735
P3030 (Video of TV Belgrade news re Radovan Karadţić's statement on events in Brĉko, with transcript).
10736
See Scheduled Killing Incident B.5.1.
10737
P1479 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), p. 173.
10738
P1481 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 5 October–27 December 1992), pp. 48–49.
10739
P1481 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 5 October–27 December 1992), pp. 48–49.
10740
P1105 (Transcript of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23–24 November 1992), pp. 60, 78.
10741
P5420 (Fax from UNPROFOR forwarding ICFY letters, 27 November 1992), p. 4.
10742
P3106 (Minutes of the 61st session of RS Government, 21 December 1992), pp. 1, 4.
10743
P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), paras. 111–113.
10744
P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), paras. 113–114.
10745
P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 115.
 937

responsibility of the President or his authorities. And also doesn’t mean it was as they
alleged. Since they hadn’t been there, they spoke on the basis of media coverage, or a reports
of the internationals present there, bud in a reduced extent! What the Chamber is assuming:
that the President was supposed to accept uncritically everything the internationals said?
The Accuse was a highest official, but not the only official, and the institutions such as the
VRS, the State Security, the MUP, informed him too, very often contrary to what was
alleged by the internationals, no matted who they were! #THEIR ALLEGATIONS ARE
NOT EVIDENCE#! This is an imperial relict!)

3356. On 2 April 1993, the President was present at the Bosnian Serb Assembly when it was
reported that Foĉa was completely under Bosnian Serb control.10746 (And this was an
argumentation of the parliamentaries over the #Vance-Owen maps# as a very unjust
towards the Serb people. See: P01367, p. 25

So, the delegate from Foca, a prominent lawyer, explained what happened in the past year of
the war. It wasn’t entirely accurate, since the Muslim side kept a big portion of the
municipality, Ustikolina at first, which was, and still is a seat of the Muslim municipality of
Foca. The war had been imposed by the Muslims in Foce. They rejected a Serb proposal to
form a two municipalities peacefully, but the Muslims attacked the Serbs and thus have
chosen the war. Who in this world was supposed to stop the attacked Serbs to defend? That
was a local situation, without any influence of the central organs, but even if there was a
communication, nobody could prevent the Serbs to defend. But, this kind of inference is
possible only when a defence is prevented to depict the whole picture. Reporting the war
situation and the cours of events in the war didn’t mean anything but a report about a
combat success. Also, it is not established that the President was at that moment in the hall.
Even if he was, he couldn’t discipline no one, particularly not an elected deputy!) At the
same session, he acknowledged that ―we could not swear that there are no crimes‖ and that Serbs
who committed crimes should be tried. However, the President claimed that he had only heard of
18 allegations of rape, but the propaganda had turned this into 18,000 cases of rape.10747 Let us see
the para related here, P01367, p. 107-108, what the President said:

10746
P1367 (Transcript of 26th session of RS Assembly, 2 April 1993), p. 25.
10747
P1367 (Transcript of 26th session of RS Assembly, 2 April 1993), pp. 107–108.
 938

What is wrong it the President’s position reflected in this speech? It is completely

#EXCULPATORY#. He didn’t deny that there may have been crimes commited by the
Serbs, and he wouldn’t be considered serious had he denied something unchecked. But from
the entire paragraph it is evident that the President and the officials are strongly agains any
crime, be it 18 or 18,000 rapes. However, there is another #mistake in translation#. The
President said: “Nevertheless, during this war we had never relied on criminals, not
“depended” see, in Serbian:

The Serb word “oslonili” should be translated as “relied”.

On 10 January 1994, the President commented that Bosnian Muslims had planned to build a big
Islamic centre in Foĉa but by then it belonged 100% to the Bosnian Serbs, and that ―it will never
be theirs again.‖10748

3357. During a Bosnian Serb Assembly session in May 1993, at which the President was
present, Vladimir Lukić stated that they had naively ―raised paramilitaries‖ and called them
―brotherly assistance‖ but ―they were slowly less and less engaged in fighting and more and more
in looting‖.10749 So what? The same said Gen. Mladic, and all other Serb officials, advocating
to get rid of them. What Lukic said was what everyone said: the voluteers came in
accordance with the law, but lately reneged. Other deputies spoke about the problems they
faced in municipalities with respect to disturbances, looting, and stealing where there were
paramilitaries.10750 So what? Only to conclude that, in addition to all other officials, the
deputies also were opposed to the presence of the paramilitaries. #EXCULPATORY#!

3358. At a Bosnian Serb Assembly session held in late summer 1993, at which the Accused
was present, Mladić said, ―we cannot allow leaving the mosques with two minarets there‖.10751
(#Words of others#! But, still has to be understood properly: what Gen. Mladic was saying in
10748
P1385 (Transcript of 37th session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), p. 110. See also para. 2811.
10749
P1375 (Transcript of 32nd session of RS Assembly, 19–20 May 1993, e-court pp. 7, 39.
10750
P1375 (Transcript of 32nd session of RS Assembly, 19–20 May 1993, e-court p. 65.
10751
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), pp. 7, 72.
 939

his discussion on the peace plan was his opinion about the new extremism of the domestic
Muslims, which, the extremism, appears to be not of a domestic nature, but of an imported
nature. Understandable, the Chamber may have not been aware of this, but the members of
the Assebmly were, that the “mosques with two minarets” was something completely strange
for the Islam in BiH, and meant an #Islam imported from Saudi Arabia#, together with
“vahabism” and other extreme forms of Islam. See what Mladic said:

It is clear that Gen. Mladic doesn’t propose anything, but warned that this kind of a #“new
Islam”# will not be an Islam we knew, and that such an extreme Islamists will “encroach our
daughters, sisters, brothers and mothers.” What does it have to do with the President. Mladic
was free to express his thoughts, particularly since he didn’t propose anything, nor his
thoughts were to be adopted in a document. Similarly another deputy complained to the
President that if a proposed peace agreement went through and Bosnian Muslims were granted a
right to return to their territory they would have to compensate them for everything that they
destroyed and burned, including the 17 mosques which they had ―flattened‖.10752 Again, an #MP’s
verbal fight against acceptance of a peace plan is used against the President, as if he spoke on
behalf of the President. Let us see what had been said, and in what context, (P01379, p. 24-25:

And the President took flor immediately after this last words of the MP, and said:

10752
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 25.
 940

What an MP said in fighting against a peace plan, being dissatisfied for his village and the
entire area wasn’t included where he wanted it, wasn’t relevant. He never said who was the
one who flattened the mosques, he was speaking generally, and he was entitled to say
whatever he wanted without any restrictions. #Neither his words prevailed, nor were
adopted and built in a document, nor he spoke on behalf of the President. But, what the
President said were his own words, and he said that this MP said something, and nothing
what he said was true. Does it matter? Why in a process against the President a #words of
another person were more significant than a words of the very same President#, and a words
of opposition to what another person said?)

3359. In April 1994, Akashi requested the Accused to allow the ICRC to evacuate Bosnian
Muslims from Prijedor.10753 Here are excerpts from D705, which is the basis for this assertion:
D705:

A constructive atmosphere! In response to Akashi‘s request, the Accused stated that the
situation in Prijedor was an unfortunate development for the Serbs. While he accepted that the
situation could have been predicted—he noted that civilians in the town had, at the beginning of
the war, slaughtered each other—he maintained that the present situation had been prompted by a
Muslim massacre of six Serb policemen from the town. 10754 The President agreed to the
evacuation as suggested.10755 There are several #inaccurate matters#: first, the President
agreed that the ICRC could evacuate several persons that felt insecure, but when hi was
informed that there is a request to evacuate many citizens in up to 80 trucks a day, the
President opposed, and suggested another pace, which would enable that many make up
their mind and decide to stay: D705, p. 3

The Chamber should have noticed that #in April 94 there was so many Muslims in Prijedor,
after exactly two years of war in BiH, and hadn’t been “expelled” or “ethnically cleansed”#,
which Mr. Akashi confirmed during his testimony. How come? Something is wrong, either
there was no so many Muslims in Prijedor, or there was no “ethnic cleansing”. Further, the
Chamber neglected the President’s attempt to give a sufficient time to some of those who
wanted to leave to make up their mind and to decide to stay, which is in a strong opposition
to a perceived President’s intention to “expel” the Muslims from the Serb areas. Finally, if
we count in all those who had been hiding or escaped as a combatants, and those who left
Prijedor through Trnopolje, and those who wilfully left through other organisations, and

10753
D705 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Radovan Karadţić and Alija Izetbegović, 7 April 1994), p. 3; Yasushi Akashi, T. 37704 (24 April 2013).
10754
D705 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Radovan Karadţić and Alija Izetbegović, 7 April 1994), p. 3.
10755
D705 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Radovan Karadţić and Alija Izetbegović, 7 April 1994), pp. 3–4.
 941

those who left on this request in 1994, and those who were there after the war ended, (See:
D04002, see D… @ how many had been “expelled” and what way? #THERE WAS NO ANY
TO BE FORCEFULLY EXPELLED#!)

3360. The Accused continued to receive information about crimes—predominantly mass

expulsions, as well as mistreatment, including beatings, rapes, robberies, killing and forced
labour—being committed against non-Serbs in Bijeljina and other municipalities from 1994.10756
D704 is one of the documents under this fn. See this para:

The troubles in the cities during the civil war weren’t produced by the state, but the state tried to
emprove the situation. What does it mean “the President received information”? He wasn’t all-
mighty God to act alone. The #RS institutions were doing what they could to secure the peace and
rule of law. All of those efforts had been reported to the President and to the other state institutions,
but the Chamber like the Prosecution, treats this exculpatory documents as aggravating evidence#!)

3361. Even into 1995, the Accused was aware of, and involved in, arrangements made with
respect to regulating the movement of non-Serbs out of Bosnian Serb territory which was
described as being in accordance with the right to freedom of movement.10757 (#Not only “the right
to freedom of movement”, but in accordance with many agreements that the sides signed with the
ICRC, UNHCR and other agencies#! Ltet us see how it is wrong. P5213, the document of the Mains
staff, asking the President of the Assembly and the president of the State Committee for Cooperation
with International Organisations, (therefore, not asking the President) to give their opinion on a
requests for departure of 166 civilians to the third countries, posed by the private agency for the
exchange of material goods in Banjaluka, see:

#No a trace of any crime#! A regular conduct, in accordance with a recently signed agreement,
and many agreements since 22 May 92, 18 July 92, 27 August 92, and 30 Sept, and 1 Oct. 92.

10756
D704 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadţić, 19 August 1994), p. 3; D3145 (UNPROFOR report, 6 September 1994; UNPROFOR press
statement, 5 September 1994), p. 1; P2087 (UNHCR protest letter to Radovan Karadţić, 5 September 1994); D1136 (UNPROFOR report, 9 September
1994), p. 2; P2458 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 11 September 1994), p. 4; Anthony Banbury, T. 13356 (15 March 2011); P5421 (Letter
from humanitarian organisation to Radovan Karadţić, 16 September 1993), pp. 1–2 (under seal); P5423 (UNPROFOR report, 20 September 1994), p. 2;
D3500 (UNPROFOR report, 7 October 1994), pp. 3–4.
10757
P5214 (Letter from Momĉilo Krajišnik to VRS Main Staff, 7 April 1995); P5213 (VRS Main Staff request to Radovan Karadţić, 6 April 1995).
 942

Let us see what was in D04839 of 23 January 1995:

Here are humanitarian organisations that are recognized as authorised to require movement of
population. See p.2

Here, in continuity with the Carter’s Agreement on cessation of hostilities, the procedures are
prescribed for carring out the movement, and the UNPROFOR is included in it.

properly signed by the Muslim, Serb sides and the UN.

And this document was a basis for the P05213, the Maind Staff letter, asking an approval to
approve a request submitted by the Agency, which could only be achieved with the UNHCR,
as responded to the Main Staff of the VRS, in doc. P05214, Krajisnik’s response:
 943

No one exercised any criminal conduct, and the President was not even mentioned, let alone
involved in it. Not to approve these kind of requests would be a violation of all this
agreements, as well as the international provisions on freedom of movement of civilians.

3362. In an interview in July 1995, the President stated that Muslims in places like Bijeljina
were completely safe but that there ―is some intimidation by terrorist elements, by extreme Serbs
who have lost everything in central Bosnia. But the authorities protect our citizens, regardless of
whether they are Muslims or Croats. Therefore, what is happening is not ethnic cleansing, but
ethnic displacement, people who want to leave.‖10758 (So what? If somebody is guaranteed the
right to return whenever wanted, there is no any ethnic cleansing, nor any “permanent
removal” of population!)

3363. Based on the evidence set forth above, the Chamber finds that the President was
promptly and well informed of the forced displacement of non-Serb civilians from the
Municipalities by Serb Forces from as early as April 1992. What evidence? Have the legal
authorities commited any crime? Did the population demand to be facilitated to leave a zone
felt as a hostile? No reasonable chamber would conclude that the events inherent to a civil
war were pursued by the authorities without a thorough investigation. On one side, the
Chamber didn’t have any objective evidence that the transfers of the civilian population was
forceful, except some biased and empty claims and beliefs. On the other side, there a re many
documents confirming thatpopulation wanted to leave, that the authorities created many
obstacles in terms of papers, receites of settled taxations and other legal documents. Further
the population had to pay their transport costs, and if they didn’t appear at the appointed
bus, money had to be returned to them, see D01299

Some individuals, event from some “special units” did pressure some families, but the
authorities decided to stop it. Those “special units soon after had been dismantled in the
entire RS. Or see another K. Varos document: P02742 of 26 Jule 92:

10758
P2564 (Radovan Karadţić‘s interview in El Pais, 16 July 1995), p. 5 (emphasis in the original).
 944

On a daily basis the local Serb authorities took care of the lawful life and fought against any
irregulaty.) He continued to learn of such displacements throughout the conflict. In addition, he
learned of other types of criminal activity committed against the non-Serb population by Serb
Forces, including killings, rapes, and property related offences, from the beginning of April 1992
onwards.10759

(B) Knowledge of inadequate conditions and mistreatment of non-Serbs in detention centres

3364. During the conflict, information about occurrences in many detention facilities was
forwarded to the Accused, prime minister, and the relevant ministers, namely the Ministers of
Defence, Interior, and Justice.10760 (So what? The state organs and agencies informed about
difficulties with so many POWs and arrested people, which happened all of a sudden,
unexpectedly, without any preparations. The same organs informed about difficulties in
obtaining food to population, particularly due to the overall sanctions against FRY, and the
Serbs in BiH. This was well known to the Chamber. There was no a single evidence that
anything had been denied to anyone due to the will of the authorities, but exclusively due to
shortage of everything. Usually, those reports had been a cry for help in materials that are at
a minimum. #EXCULPATORY#!)

3365. The President was present at a 24 April 1992 joint session of the SNB and Bosnian Serb
Government, where it was decided that the Ministry of Justice would be responsible for the
exchange of detainees.10761 (Here is the P01087 and the conclusion on exchange of prisoners,
not simply “detainees”:

10759
The Chamber notes that Davidović stated that the Accused must have known that crime was ―rife and widespread‖ and that there was much collusion
between those committing the crimes and those in high positions. Milorad Davidović, T. 15735 (30 June 2011). The Chamber considers this evidence to be
speculative and will not rely on Davidović‘s evidence in this regard. Then, why the paragraph containing this assertion survived? This
kind of speculation was present in many testimonies of the foreigners and people that didn’t know what was where.
10760
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8919, 9111. See paras. 3019–3020.
10761
P1087 (Minutes of meeting between SNB and SerBiH Government, 24 April 1992), p. 1. See also para. 124.
 945

As it is evident, the Ministry of Justice was to manage exchange of prisoners once the organs
of the interior have completed their work.” This is #completely legal and obligatory#, since
there are an obligatory investigation of a possible crimes commited by prisoners. The
Defence was asked why a prisoners of war that didn’t commit a crime were detained, the
answer is the only one: a prisoners of war are to be detained, and those who commited
crimes weren’t to be exchanged, but to be tried, while others were to be exchanged. What is
wrong with the President’a presence?) On 8 May 1992, the Government decided to form the
―Central Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners-of-War, Arrested Persons and the Bodies of
those Killed‖.10762 (Killed in combats, in Serbian it is “poginuly” while criminali killed would
be in English “murdered”, and any murdered was to be investigated, none of them to be
exchanged!) According to Mandić, the impetus for establishing the Commission was to provide
―rule of law and legal security‖ for people detained, many of whom were civilians from conflict
areas.10763 (So what? #Should those civilians, found themselves in a combat zone, be kept
further in detention#? The Army units couldn’t differentiate who was combarant and who
wasn’t, or among combatants, who committed crimes, who didn’t. It was up to the
investigation institutions to decide. The Army units also had to move civilians out of the
combat zones!) The Chamber considers that this evidence demonstrates that the President knew
early on in the conflict in BiH that civilians were being detained by Serb Forces.
(#”Demonstrates” is not an evidence – since in the moment of somebody’s
apprehension in a combat zone – nobody is confirmed to be civilian! Only after
investigations would be known!# The Chamber should base it’s own considerations on
evidence, not on “demonstration” of evidence. The evidence may show that the President
have heard about arrests, or detention of different people, but what does it mean? In a
combat zone there are many lawful occasions for detaining somebody, and in a civil war a
number of such an occasions is endless, and what it proves that the President knew that
somebody was detained? The Army and Police were obliged, both by the laws and by the
President’s orders, to act strictly in accordance with the domestic laws and the International
Law of War, the Geneva Conventions and other norms, and they did so. Detaining people
was not illegal by itself. Illegal could have been keeping detained people who were proven
not to be involved in combats and didn’t commit crimes. In a civil war, civilians litteraly
fought against each other, and against legal armed forces, sometimes intermingled with the
militaries, sometimes being a logistics for their combatants. So, a general assertions about
detention of somebody is useless, and means a #violation of the Defence rights for the
presumption of innocence#!)

3366. Allegations of large-scale detention of civilians were reported in the international press in
May and June 1992 and John Wilson raised these allegations with Plavšić in the presence of the
President.10764 (#International media are not a reliable source#, and the President and the RS
state organs weren’t obliged to pay any attention, as well as the international;
representatives indoctrinated by the Muslim or their national propaganda.) Plavšić
acknowledged the existence of camps but said that they were only for military aged persons who
were detained so they would not fight the Serbs and made counter-claims that the Bosnian
Presidency was holding prisoners.10765 (Ms. Plavsic was right, there was no any detention

10762
P1088 (Decision of SerBiH, 8 May 1992), p. 1. At a further meeting of the SNB and Bosnian Serb Government held on 10 May 1992, members of the
Central Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War and Arrested Persons were appointed. D409 (Minutes of meeting of SNB and SerBiH
Government, 10 May 1992), p. 2. See also para. 125.
10763
Momĉilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 8750. See also para. 127.
10764
P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), paras. 101–103.
10765
P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 102.
 946

motivated by anything else but by a possible involvement in hostilities, in combats, either as

a combatants, or as logistics, financing, or active political support. #THE CHAMBER DOES
NOT HAVE ANY EVIDENCE CONTRARY TO THIS POSITION OF THE DEFENCE,
ONLY HEAR-SAY AND PROPAGANDA.#)

3367. In June and July 1992, the Bosnian Serb leadership requested several reports on detention
camps and prisoners.10766 (And this is an #exculpatory# evidence. Since there was many
allegations about it, the Presidency, the Government and Ministries undertook steps to check
which of those allegations were accurate and which were false. In this case the leadership
and institutions reacted on allegations, is it a felony?) On 17 July 1992, the Bosnian Serb
MUP wrote a report to the President and the Prime Minister, indicating, inter alia, that the
conditions in detention centres were poor.10767 (#EXCULPATORY#! The RS institutions did
their job, it can not be used either against the President, or against the RS institutions!) On
22 July 1992, it was reported to the government that there had been occurrences of unlawful
treatment of detainees.10768 (#EXCULPATORY#! Evidently, this unlawful treatment wasn’t a
Government’s will or a plan. As in any other country, the Government investigated and
researched the issue, in order to be informed, because the villains from terrain wouldn’t
report themselves and their misdeeds. The “next level”, i.e. superiors watched and rectified
misdeeds or ommissions of the superiors!)

3368. On 25 July 1992, the President received a report from the ICRC following a visit to the
Manjaĉa camp.10769 The President was informed that: (i) the authorities at the camp refused to
notify the ICRC about the identity of the detainees; (ii) the ICRC‘s visit was terminated
prematurely when it was observed that two detainees had been subjected to ill treatment during the
visit; (iii) the ICRC observed frequent and widespread traces of severe beatings; (iv) the general
living conditions including food, hygiene, clothing and accommodation were ―absolutely
insufficient‖; (v) many detainees showed marked weight loss and signs of anaemia.10770 The
President was also informed about the medical conditions and concerns with respect to the
detainees and that a list of detainees who allegedly died during detention would be submitted to
the ―Higher Authorities‖ with a request to open an investigation.10771 (So what? If the President
didn’t take it into consideration, if he didn’t do anything in improving the situation, the
Chamber would be right. But, #since the President took every necessary steps from the
ICRC recommendations: #1. he sent a letter to the Prime Minister, expecting of the
Government a “prompt action” on improvement of the conditions of detention facilities
under the civilian authorities;# #2. he sent similar letter to the VRS Main Staff and it’s
Commander Gen. Ratko Mladic with the same instructions pertaining to the detention
facilities run by the VRS#; #3. he informed the President of the ICRC about his steps; and,
finally, #4. he undertook a process to close Manjaca, which had happened several months
later. WHAT ELSE THE PRESIDENT COULD HAVE DONE? The cooperation with the
ICRC was a two way road, and the President respected all the ICRC reccomenadions.
Therefore, this is an #EXCULPATORY# evidence!)

10766
P1093 (Minutes of 5th session of SerBiH Presidency, 10 June 1992), p. 2; P1092 (Minutes of 25 th session of Government SerBiH, 10 June 1992), p. 3
(indicating that the Ministry of Justice should make a report on the treatment of civilians and prisoners to be considered by the government and then
presented to the Presidency); P3098 (Minutes of the 48th session of SerBiH Government, 28 July 1992), pp. 9–10 (stating that the Ministry of Justice and
Administration was due to immediately prepare a Report on the state of detention centres and concentration centres for prisoners). See also D3109 (SerBiH
MUP report, 22 August 1992) (reporting on the existence of detention centres in the SAO Herzegovina); P3549 (Report of the Commission for Inspecting
Collection Centres and Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992) (reporting on the inspection of prisons in Trnopolje, Omarska, Keraterm
in Prijedor; Manjaĉa near Banja Luka, Krings Hall in Sanski Most, and the primary and secondary school in Bosanski Šamac).
10767
P1096 (SerBiH MUP Report on Some Aspects of Work Done to Date and the Tasks Ahead, 17 July 1992), p. 3.
10768
D430 (Minutes of 41st session of Government of SerBiH, 22 July 1992), p. 7.
10769
P3758 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Derić, attaching an ICRC report, 7 August 1992), p. 4.
10770
P3758 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Derić, attaching an ICRC report, 7 August 1992), p. 5.
10771
P3758 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Derić, attaching an ICRC report, 7 August 1992), pp. 6–7.
 947

3369. Several news articles criticising the detention centres in BiH were released in a British
publication, the Guardian, in late July 1992.10772 Also in late July, the Accused appeared on ITN
and responded to allegations and reports about Omarska; during the broadcast, he said to the
media: ―come and see for yourselves‖.10773 (Was it a felony? That certainly was a stupidity of
the President, and his naïvity, because these invited journalists hadn’t been honest, they
staged a scene and caused a horrifying consequences to the Serbian people. What Penny
Marshal did with forging the “barb wire scene” in Trnopolje is a realy crime with more bad
consequences than the NATO bombing left!) On 30 July 1992, the Accused responded directly
to the Guardian in a letter, stating that it was ―completely false‖ that Bosnian Serbs had organised
concentration camps or that they were holding civilian prisoners.10774 (Certainly, the British and
other international media criticised the detention centres in BiH, but only those under the
Serb control, calling them “concentration camps” – and the Muslim propaganda called them
a “death camps” and so on. All of it was a perfidious participation on the Muslim/Croat side.
So, the President denied existence of “concentration camps” and camps for civilians, and
invited and even gave the ride to the ITN TV crew to see for themselves. No warring country
all over the world do that, not even close to that, none of the countries would give any access
to a battlefield or to a rear to a friendly, let alone to a hostile media, but the President did it.
And made mistake, of course, since the ITN crew abused the opportunity and forged the
picture and footage. And this is one of the shameless actions of the internationals involved in
our civil war. A ruthless and shameless. Pertaining “civilians”, there was as usually, taking
in a civilians, but once they had been identified as civilians, they hadn’t been kept detained.
The main evidence, the main proof is the fact that many, many detained people had been
released once established that they didn’t participate in a combat activities!)

3370. At the London Conference in August 1992, there was an agreement between the parties
on a program of action with respect to humanitarian issues.10775 It included recognition of the
―acute problem of the unlawful detention of civilians and the deplorable conditions in which they
were held‖.10776 (This is a general provision, and for sure at least one side, the Muslim side,
kept unloawfully detained civilians, and for that reason it was signed by the President, as
well as in a case that some local Serbs do it in future. But, this recommendation and
commitment of the sides doesn’t mean that it was established that one side, and which one,
had commited this felony., therefore, it is also #EXCULPATORY#, since proves the
President’s intention to accept and carry out the recommended program!) This agreement
recognised that the primary objective should be to secure the release and return of those detained.
If this was not possible the agreement provided for other options including ―repatriation to areas
under the control of their respective ethnic authorities‖ or relocation.10777 But, let us see the main
points from the document, D01142:
…………………………………………………………………..

10772
Edward Vulliamy, P3777 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7904.
10773
Edward Vulliamy, P3777 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stakić), T. 7904, 8095–8096; Edward Vulliamy, T. 21037–21038, 21077–21078 (9 November
2011).
10774
P3778 (Radovan Karadţić's letter published in the Guardian, 30 July 1992).
10775
D1142 (Programme of Action of the London International Conference, 27 August 1992), p. 1.
10776
D1142 (Programme of Action of the London International Conference, 27 August 1992), p. 1.
10777
D1142 (Programme of Action of the London International Conference, 27 August 1992), p. 1.
 948

Thertefore, #nothing else happened in the RS, but one of those possible and envisaged
outcomes#. But, let us see how this Program of action characterised the issues of the
unlawful detention and other felonies:

Therefore, “…#persons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches are
individually responsible.”# However, the Chamber is sentencing the President on no real
evidence of individual or any other kind of responsibility. Let us see further:

It is evident that the London Conference recognised the existence of #“undisciplined

elements”#, which implicitely recognised that there was no evidence of the violations
commited by the official authorities. See further:

This is only one of many commitments that the refugees will have all rights to return to their
own homes and places of living. THIS #ABSOLUTELY EXCLUDED ANY POSSIBILITY
OF SO CALLED “PERMANENT REMOVAL”#. See further:

See how important was the Geneva Agreement of 22 May! It is mentioned in all the subsequent
agreements as a basis. All movement of the civilian population in the RS territory was done
in accordance with this agreement of 22 May 92., see further:

The only side that respected this provisions was the Serb side, while others took all advantages.

3371. The Chamber found that around 9 August 1992, Karadţić visited Kula prison with
representatives of the media and the ICRC, and that the food was better that day and only clean
rooms were shown.10778 (#If it was really so, that meant that the management wanted to
impress the President too#!). He released ten detainees, some of whom were above the age of 60
and others were ill.10779 The President couldn’t “release” anyone, he could only abolish them
from further prosecution by a Presidential act, and that was what he did.

10778
See para. 2150.
10779
P2840 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić's visit to Kula prison), e-court p. 1. One of the prisoners was blind in one eye and not able to fight. P2840
(Video footage of Radovan Karadţić's visit to Kula prison), e-court p. 2.
 949

3372. Doyle encountered the President in the lobby of a hotel in Brussels on 16 August 1992
when the Times had published a photograph of an emaciated detainee in the Omarska camp. The
President appeared to be taken aback by the news.10780 (#General shortages#! Although a
photograph could easily be manipulated and also there was a #chortage of food for
everyone#, the fact that the President “appeared to be taken aback by the news” is
#EXCULPATORY#, meaning that it was not known to the President. And how it could have
been known to him, since there was no communications. Anyway, no president all over the
world would be taken responsible for an omission of his very, very distant subordinates!)

3373. On 17 August 1992, the Report of the Commission for Inspecting Collection Centres and
Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK was issued.10781 It provided a sanitised version of the
conditions in the camps, failing to mention the detention of any civilians and noting that most of
the camps, especially Manjaĉa, had inadequate premises with insufficient food, beds, and
blankets.10782 (Well, this is really too much: the Chamber is suspecting a #“strictly
confidential” document of the Government#, for not notifying something the Chamber
expected to be notified, and what would be notified had it existed. So, for a #negative
finding,# in the absence of any proof that it really existed, the Chamber somehow knew that
the governmental inspection missed to mention civilians in a strictly confidential report from
1992, when there was no any Tribunal, and wasn’t expected that anyone but the
Government could see the report? Is that a Justice? How any chamber could be allowed to
make such a criminal inferences?) It also alluded to difficulties with security due to poor co-
ordination between the army and the police.10783

3374. As a result of further reports received by the President from international representatives,
Mandić tasked Avlijaš with drafting a report on the situation in camps from Sarajevo to
Prijedor.10784 The report was issued on 22 October 1992 and was sent, inter alia, to the RS
Presidency.10785 It included information on several detention centres in BiH, including in
Vlasenica, Zvornik, Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Banja Luka.10786 It also noted that SJBs in
Zvornik, Hadţići, and Ilidţa were detaining people without any authorisation in law.10787 (#Al of
in on the President’s order#! So what? The President received reports from the
internationals, and immediately conveyed it to the Minister for Justice, who promptly
reacted, tasking a responsible and experienced official to inspect the allegations! He found
that there was detained people, since the locals had a right to keep detainees up to three
days. The SJB didn’t have the investigators and other services for the criminal
investigations, the SJB depended a lot on the Centres for Public Security (CSB) and courts,
and it wasn’t possible to anyone to decide whether somebody captured in a combat zone is
civilian, or combatant. But, anyway, this #report is complete and honest, because it criticised
a several SJBs, and didn’t find civilians in other prisons. First of all, civilians are to be
detained if involved in any kind of crime. Second, once it become proven that there is no
crime commited by a detained person, and no a military involvement, such a persons were
released immediately. AND HOW THE CHAMBER FOUND THAT A REGULAR
FUNCTIONING OF THE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES, in accord with the presidential
orders, AND REPORTING ON THIS, COULD BE AN EVIDENCE OF THE
10780
Colm Doyle, P918 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. S. Milošević), T. 25307.
10781
P3549 (Report of the Commission for Inspecting Collection Centres and Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992) (reporting, inter alia, on
the inspection of prisons in Trnopolje, Omarska, Keraterm in Prijedor, Manjaĉa near Banja Luka, and Krings Hall in Sanski Most).
10782
P3549 (Report of the Commission for Inspecting Collection Centres and Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992), pp. 7–8.
10783
P3549 (Report of the Commission for Inspecting Collection Centres and Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992), pp. 7–8.
10784
D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 58; P1607 (RS Ministry of Justice report on prisons and camps on the RS
territory, 22 October 1992).
10785
P1607 (RS Ministry of Justice report on prisons and camps on the RS territory, 22 October 1992), p. 1.
10786
P1607 (RS Ministry of Justice report on prisons and camps on the RS territory, 22 October 1992), pp. 2–6.
10787
P1607 (RS Ministry of Justice report on prisons and camps on the RS territory, 22 October 1992), p. 7.
 950

PRESIDENT’S LIABILITY#? This is rather #EXCULPATORY#, because that is a regular

job of the agencies, which are supposed to carry it out regularly, and to inform the
Presidency, Government and Ministries. This is rather a proof that the agencies did their
job, and nothing in it is proving any liability of the President.

3375. The Chamber concludes that the Accused became aware of the detention of civilians in
April 1992 and inadequate conditions in Bosnian Serb run detention facilities by at least May
1992. (#Wrong in many aspects#! What is a basis for this “conclusion”? What was the
official position and authority of the President during April and May 92? Was he either
formally, or factually in a position to influence the chaotic events on the terrain? First, until
the end of May Karad`i} didn’t have any commanding competence over any armed forces,
nor there was other armed forces except the JNA, and local TO-s, under the JNA – and
municipal command!# Second, the Law on All-Peoples Defence authorised every single
municipality and local commune to organize the ndefence the way they find suitable, and if
the JNA was not around, to carry out all the defense duties!# ) It further finds that the
President sanctioned the forcible removal of civilians who were detained in these facilities either
within BiH or to third countries. (On what evidence is based this assertion? If there was no a
secure option to house a refugees in a place where they come from, than there were other
possibilities of a lawful handling of the civilians that are moved from their area which is
within combat activities! See D1142:

All of these
possibilities had been at disposal to the local authorities and the detained people, who the
most frequently have chosen to go to the areas under control of their respective ethnic
authorities”, or to a third countries! How the President could be responsible and convicted
for a fulfilment of an Argeement reached under the auspice of the UNHCR and the ICFY?)
The Chamber notes the President‘s argument that during the rare visits by the RS authorities to
Vlasenica, they were informed that the civilian population was well-treated, citing evidence that
detainees at the Sušica camp told international representatives that they had received fine
treatment in the camp.10788 The Chamber also notes that on or about 21 June 1992, Dragan
Nikolić and Goran Tešić entered the Sušica camp and took two detainees out for questioning and
beat them to death; a false report was subsequently prepared to suggest that the two detainees died
of natural causes.10789 (How possibly the President could have known that? The very fact that
“a false report was subsequently prepared” is #EXCULPATORY#, because the perpetrators
didn’t brag before the superiors about their misdeed, but tried to hide it! The #“next level”#
wouldn’t tolerate it!) The Chamber accepts the President‘s submission that he and other
members of the Bosnian Serb leadership did not learn of every single act of mistreatment of the
non-Serb population throughout the Municipalities. However, the evidence establishes that the
President was overall promptly and well-informed of crimes committed against non-Serbs in the

10788
Defence Final Brief, confidential, para. 2839 [REDACTED].
10789
See para. 1204, fn. 4146.
 951

Municipalities as described above. (This is not correct, because except for a several unreliable
international sources, the President and the other RS leaders could have learnt about crimes
only from their own, i.e. the RS institutions dealing with the crimes. Instead of taking it as an
exculpatory evidence, the Chamber turns it to the convicting or aggravating evidence. #The
Chamber expected that the RS Presidency and President do a sort of things that no
presidency or president does. In was important that the MUP and VRS institutions fought
against the crimes#, and the President was only informed, but not requested to do anything.
When requested, he did act, but this to was taken against him!)

(C) Misleading statements made by the Accused

3376. The Accused frequently minimised the extent of criminal activity in the Municipalities
when speaking to the international media, negotiators, and to the public. Indeed, the President
admitted to the Bosnian Serb Assembly that it was necessary to be cunning when faced with
questions from the media and when dealing with international negotiators.10790 (This kind of
staging and manipulating with sentences moved out of context is out of any decency, and
certainly out of anything which is acceptable in a criminal procedure. Here is a part of this
speech of the President. He was dealing with the mutiny caused by 1,200 rogue elements in
the VRS, pointing out to the VRS and Gen. Mladic that this was their problem, a problem of
discipline in the Army. Within this discussion the President said that he was challenged by a
several thousand journalists, to which he couldn’t say what he said to Mladic and others
about the mutiny. Look at this para, P01379, p. 76:

The “idiotic questions deserved a “cunning answers”. Therefore, no a single clue about
misinforming the international negotiators, particularly not on the issue of crimes. Such a
huge forgery should immediately result in dismissing the case, not only because it was a
political speech, but it is #abused and distorted#, in order to denigrate the President, and to
be able to convict him. #Ant the Chamber had a quite sufficient amount of evidence on the
irresponsibility, bias, manipulations, indecency and criminal conduct of many fake
journalists!# )

10790
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 276; P1417 (Transcript of 55th
session of RS Assembly, 22–23 October 1995), p. 61 (where the Accused complained about media pressure in relation to questions about killings).
 952

The Accused claimed that civilians were leaving of their own free will and had signed voluntary
declarations that they wanted to leave.10791 Here is this P02937 document:

We see that the President didn’t know what it was all about, and made a short research, and
got the explanation from the terrain. As it is already known to the Chamber, prior to this
demand there was another demand of the Muslims from Kozluk to leave. At the moment, the
local authorities were in control of the processes in Zvornik, and they dissuaded the civilians
from their intent to leave, helped by the Serb Bishop and the Muslim priest, imam. Later on,
under the pressure of the paramilitaries, the authorities weren’t in control any longer, and
the Kozluk population demanded to be facilitated to leave. After the war almost all of them
had returned to Kozluk, as it was promised by the RS authorities! Therefore, a false and
fake assertion of the Prosecutor accepted by the Chamber, which wouldn’t be by any
reasonable chamber!). The Accused made statements to the international media that the Bosnian
Serb authorities did not participate in ―ethnic cleansing‖, they were trying to stop this practice, and
that acts of ―ethnic cleansing‖ were being perpetrated by groups or individuals who did not
originate from the Bosnian Serb authorities.10792
P5596:

In the document P12 from #14 February 92# there is nothing pertaining to the subject, nor
there could be, since it happened before the war. In this document, a transcript of the
meeting, the President made a positive propaganda for the ECMM and its leader, Mr. Doyle,
with the aim to secure a people’s respect for them. That was before the war, and when it was
hoped that there will not be any war, see P12, p. 8:

10791
KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 6789–6790 (under seal); KDZ240, T. 15972–15974, 15977 (4 July 2011) (closed session), T.
16057 (5 July 2011) (closed session); P2937 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić, 5 July 1992) (under seal); D4720 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić re London
Peace Conference, 25 August 1992), p. 1.
10792
P5596 (Video footage depicting interview of Radovan Karadţić on CNN, with transcript), p. 1; P12 (Extended session of
Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 8.
 953

(#How this words could be a basis for such an inference#?)

For example, in a 23 April 1992 media interview, when questioned about the fate of Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats living in Serb areas, the President said that there were ―very few such
people‖ and that in any event they had signed an agreement with the UNHCR to allow the return
of people to their homes.10793 What is wrong with this interview? It was a day after the
President issued his Platform for the political solution of the conflict, in which the President
said that no fait accompli will be recognised. Let us see what was said in the Peace Platform,
D00110:

This commitment would make any further fights for territories senseless.
#EXCULPATORY#! The same pertained to any “accomplished act,” fait accompli as
unacceptable. Also, what was an official capacity of the President on 23 April 1992? #No a
public office, no might, no command over anyone#! However, by that time, the Accused knew
that thousands of non-Serb civilians had been expelled from Bosnian Serb controlled territory,10794
and he continued to learn of such expulsions during the conflict.10795 (#This is wrong as a devil#!
First of all, neither the international community, nor the United Nations qualified this as
“expelled” but quite contrary: people escaped from the combats. See$$@@@ . By 23 April
the majority of refugees were the Serbs. Further, by this date there was no a war in many
municipalities. The war happened in Sarajevo as of 6 April, but there was no the Muslim
refugees, firther in Foca, Zvornik, Vlasenica, Visegrad, a three days skirmish in Bijeljina,
and some incidents among the JNA and Croatian Army (HV) around Derventa and Posavina
(Bosanski Brod and Brcko) The President knew about even more Serb civilians expelled or
escaping from the Muslim/Croat held territories. That was after the two weeks of a bloody
war, imposed to the Serbs by the Muslim/Criat coalition. The President at that time never
President the Muslim/Croat leaders for an ethnic cleansing, because it was the time of chaos.
Everyone knew what would happen if a civil and religious war starts, and this was the reason
why the President made every effort to avoid the war, see: D01833, of 8 March 1992:

10793
D1591 (Radovan Karadţić‗s interview from Le Figaro, 23 April 1992), p. 1.
10794
See paras. 3332, 3336.
10795
See Section IV.A.3.a.v.A: Knowledge of crimes committed throughout the Municipalities.
 954

This sole document is so #exculpatory#, by excluding any war crimes, which couldn’t appear
without a war, that the Indictment shouldn’t survive the disclosure of this document. No
mens rea, no plans, no intentions, at least before 15 June 1992, when the President formed
the VRS and defined who will be in the command of it!)

3377. The Accused also shifted blame for the crimes away from Bosnian Serbs. For example,
he often stated that: (i) his interlocutors had been misinformed; (ii) their sources were biased; (iii)
crimes and terrible things had happened historically and were continuing to happen to Bosnian
Serbs as well; (iv) everybody was guilty; (v) he had warned that the declaration of BiH
independence would provoke a terrible war; and (vi) the international community was
responsible.10796 (#ALL OF IT WAS PRESENT IN THE STATEMENTS OF THE MOST
RESPONSIBLE WORLD LEADERS!# And what was wrong with these assertions of the
President? (i) Were the international interlocurtors (mis)informed by their Muslim hosts,
their Muslim interpretors, of the interlocutors were present at every crime scene? Of course,
they were (mis) informed by their Muslim hosts, and they usually didn’t know any fact about
events on the terrain!. In Sarajevo itself they didn’t know where were the Serb, and where
were the Muslim/Croat forces. (ii) Where, or not, their sources biased? What were their
sources? The governments of a countries that had been completely hostile to the Serbia, the
Republika Srpska and the Serbs generally. Were these sources objective? (iii) Was it true?
Or it was the first time in the history that the civilians of the three confessions fought each
other? It is insulting to the Serbs when the Chamber alludes and suggests that the Serbs
didn’t suffer a true genocide at least twice in the 20th Century. (iv) Everybody was guilty,
wasn’t it? The President even gave an anti-Serb statement, because the Serbs were the least
guilty, they never started any fight, but certainly some of them defended more than
necessary and thus commited crime. (v) and (vi) IT WAS NOT THAT THE PRESIDENT
SAID IT, IT WAS SAID BY THE HIGHEST INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITIES,
INCLUDING LORD P. CARRINGTON, AMB. CUTILEIRO, MIN. PINHEIRO,
B.B.GHALI AND MANY OTHER AUTHORITIES. Let us see what is said in the P00811
exhibit, Okun’s note for the file:

So, neither the President called him, nor he was obliged to talk to him what he wanted to say to
Mr. Vance, nor Okun could have known more about Jajce than the Serb Colonel over there,

10796
KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 6789–6790, 6820, 6826, 6830–6835 (under seal); KDZ240, T. 15972–15974, 15977 (4 July
2011) (closed session); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4191–4192, 4200, 4203, 4252–4253, 4369, 4399; P790 (Seventh
notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 37; Herbert Okun, T. 1505–1513 (23 April 2010); P811 (Herbert Okun‘s note re meeting with Radovan
Karadţić, 31 October 1992); P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson 4 November 2008), paras. 113–115, 122. See also P2451 (Witness statement of
Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), paras. 48–49; Anthony Banbury, T. 13337–13339, 13357–13358 (15 March 2011); D4720 (Letter from Radovan
Karadţić re London Peace Conference, 25 August 1992), p. 2; P784 (First notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 46, 53; P785 (Second
notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court p. 34; P786 (Third notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 39–40; D1137 (Letter from RS, 2
April 1994), p. 2.
 955

nor the President was and should have been expecting that Mr. Okun knew more that his
commander on the spot, nor Mr. Okun was entitled to command to the VRS, to which the
President didn’t command either, and finally, Jajce wasn’t a civil area at all, but a
completely militarised stronghold, and finally-finally, the Muslim/Croat side declared the
war against the Serbs in BiH. Is anyone reasonable to tell us who was a source of the
information that Okun received? Was it the Serb side? Or was it the Muslim/Croat side,
which initiate fights, and when losing, start to cry to a people like Okun. And if somebody
could say that this wasn’t a political trial. All what is said in this paragraph is a pure politics.
This kind of intervention and a biased conduct disqualify the international presence in the
crisis areas, and it is a critical question whether the international mediators should be
invited by a hosts, should they be met and spoken to orally, or only through a wtitten
correspondence!) But, let us see what is in the letter of the RS Government, D01137:

So, it was not only the President who was convinced that the international agencies were
biased. And they had been very biased, and if needed for this Appeal, it is going to be
presented to the entire world.

But the UN agencies didn’t pay any attention to the Serb sufferings, nor to the situation on
terrain.

So, the Prime Minister was rightfully much sharper than the President ever, shame on the
President, for trusting the international “humanitarians” while they were lobbing and
 956

helping only one side in the war.) In addition, Bosnian Serb leaders when confronted with
allegations of rape and expulsion of Bosnian Muslims sometimes would also suggest that these
abuses had been committed by Bosnian Muslims who were masquerading as Serb soldiers but did
not deny that these crimes were happening.10797 (#CONFRONTED WITH ALLEGATIONS# -
BY WHOM? The internationals took some Muslim propaganda and served it as their
“allegations”, but rather as an accusations, and expected that the entire Serb state admit or
deny it immediately! Instead of respecting the #Serb caution about confirming or denying
some crimes#, it is taken as if the Serb officials admitted the crimes. This wouldn’t be decent
to deny something before an investigation! Pertaining to a sharade with names and
uniforms, this is something what really happened, even in the WWII, when the Croat
Ustashas entered the Serb villages calling each other by a Muslim names. This way the
Muslims introduced this practice, calling themselves by a Croat or Serb names. But, anyway,
the Chamber is not interested in the truth, otherwise it wouldn’t pay so much credit to the
Muslim allegations, which was a pure propaganda. To remind the Appeal Chamber, it was
less than a year of war when the Muslim side went out public, claiming that there was
350,000 Muslim casualties and up to 80,000 raped women. This was to highest figure, but
from the beginning it was in thousands. Why the state organs of the RS would pay any credit
to this kind of propaganda? And the international community should have been cautious
about the Muslim claims once it learnt about this false claimes.)

3378. Throughout the conflict, the Accused boasted to the Bosnian Serb Assembly about the
proper conduct of the Serb Forces, when he knew it was not true. (How the Chamber could have
known that? If the Chamber presumed that the President should consider himself well
informed because some international representatives told him something, this is more that
ridiculous. The President #relied upon the reports of the state agencies, the state security, the
MUP, the military intelligence, and lower positioned officials and ordinary people#. The
internationals hadn’t been even closely informed as these structures and soucres!) In a
television interview on 20 August 1992 regarding the release of detainees from detention centres,
the Accused spoke of only releasing prisoners of war who were too ill or weak to go back into
battle, after initially offering to close all of the camps.10798 He stated that ―we don‘t have people in
prisons that have been removed from their own homes. Those people have been captured in the
battle-field‖.10799 (What was inaccurate in this inrerviews? #Why would the Serb side
replenish the adversary army with their captured combatants? #Why the Serb side would
keep innocent civilian in detention units, while they didn’t have enough food for the
population and soldiers#? There is an evidence that a two soldiers shared one small pasteta a
day. The riots in Banja Luka in September 93 was motivated by a bed social position of the
soldiers abd their families!) The Accused claimed in a speech in December 1992 that ―there were
no civilians in our prisons‖, that no institution which inspected their prisons found any civilians or
women, and that they had released a large number of detainees.10800 However, prior to that time,
the Accused had been informed by Bosnian Serb government commissioned reports as well as by
international representatives and the media that civilians were detained and many detention centres
had inadequate or worse conditions.10801 (These two are not opposed to each other. The
President didn’t say that the detention centres, improvised and adjusted inadequate spaces,
were as hotels. He said that the Serb side had released many prisoners of war. Wasn’t it true
that the President himself ordered that the Manjaca prison for POWs be dismantled and
thousand POWs released, just prior to this interview? There also hadn’t been any civilians
10797
Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 4224.
10798
P3695 (Excerpt from video clip of Manjaĉa camp and interview with Radovan Karadţić). See Mevludin Sejmenović, T. 20496–20497 (27 October 2011).
10799
P3695 (Excerpt from video clip of Manjaĉa camp and interview with Radovan Karadţić).
10800
P1364 (Transcript of 23rd session of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), e-court p. 8; P921 (Transcript of 24th session of RS Assembly, 8 January 1993), p.
13.
10801
See paras. 3366–3370, 3372–3375.
 957

or women, although in the ABiH there was about 6% of a female combatants, as their
documents confirmed!) On 8 January 1993, the President also stated that ―no soldier of ours
would be allowed to rape a woman in the presence of another soldier‖ and described these stories
as ―terrible lies‖.10802 Here is how this part of the President’s speech looks like, P00921, p. 13

And this speech of the President wasn’t aimed to a public, let alone to the internationals, but
only to the deputees, while 13 of them were opposition representatives, who wouldn’t mis an
opportunity to blame the government and the President himself. The Appeal Chamber is
maybe not obliged, but it would be a nice and just, to take into account this kind of bias
against the Serb people, and to count in how huge experience of injustice it was faced with.
Another very peculiar “understanding” of the presidential duties and abilities, due to which the
Chamber presumed that if the Governemn and governmental commissions informed the
President how they were doing their job! The President could only have been satisfied and
calm, because the Government and governmental institutions are taking care of regularities.
The President could only intervene if there was no such a reports and the Government and
governmental institutions didn’t do their job. In such a case, the President could only
criticise the Government, reinforce his orders and eventually propose to the Assembly to
vote against the Government, and nominate another Prime Minister. The President asked
the Assembly to change te Government five times in a three aand a half years, not because
the Government or Prime Ministers made a mistakes, but because they were inexperienced
and couldn’t cope with so many problems!)

3379. On 2 April 1993, the Accused stated that the UN could present evidence of war crimes, but
that it was for the RS to investigate and prosecute matters itself, and that their army could never
have committed crime.10803 (Certainly! There was so many allegations, but any serious
allegation was to be investigated by the military police, and to be processed in a military
courts. What is wrong with that? There may have been, and certainly had been, that a
members of the VRS or police commited crimes, but not the VRS or Police as a legal
formation. All so far known perpetrators of crimes hid their misdeeds from their most
immediate commanders and superiors, and that is what the President meant saying what he
said about the subject. It is not a news that the President opposed to any idea of such an
international justice, he even didn’t recognized this Tribunal, but defended before it, as
would defend before a storm or a flood!)

3380. On 9 January 1994, the President went so far as to say to the Bosnian Serb Assembly that
―[c]ontrary to the lies and slander of international propaganda-mongers, the Serbian army
10802
P921 (Transcript of 24th session of RS Assembly, 8 January 1993), pp. 13–14.
10803
P1367 (Transcript of 26th session of RS Assembly, 2 April 1993), p. 108.
 958

maintained the knightly character and military honour, worthy of it.‖10804 (So what? That is true,
and there is no any evidence that the VRS as an army did act criminally, apart from its
members who had hidden their misdeeds from the very “next level”, i.e. from a most
immediate commanders. It is well known how an army acts: with a plan, with a preparatory
orders, executive orders, tasking a concrete unit, obtaining ammunition, food, fuel and all
other needs, and finally, controlling the execution. None of individual crimes must be
considered as a crimes of the Army or police. The same was with the American army in
many countries, always differentiated between an individual crimes and a crimes ordered or
tolerated by the President and a high commands!)

3381. The Chamber finds that the Accused minimised what he knew about criminal activity
committed by Serb Forces and misled international interlocutors and the public with respect to that
activity in Bosnian Serb claimed territory in the Municipalities. (This is another #wrong
inference, and so general# that shouldn’t find any place in a serious Judgement, because it
rather looks like a gossip#! The President was known as a person easy to confess that there
was crimes committed by the Serbs, and very often it was taken as if he admitted that the
“Serb Forces” committed it. There is no any interview where some question didn’t pertain to
the atttrocities, and that the President didn’t answer that all the three sides committed
horrible crimes, but the President never accused the very leaders of the two other sides,
because it wouldn’t be in their interest to have such a crimes committed by their forces.
#What the President knew was what his Army and Police informed him, and it was a quite
different from what the international interlocutors said# to the President. At the beginning,
the President trusted the internationals more than his services, which was wrong. The
international interlocutors, first of all, didn’t make any investigation, but used a media, or
propaganda sources, or had been under the control and instructions of their countries and
governments, while the Army and Police were in a position to know better. Otherwise, the
President wouldn’t have any time to do his own duties from investigating 80,000 alleged
rapes, or 350,000 Muslim victims in a first year of war. What happened with all this
allegations?

(D) Prevention of criminal activity

3382. The Prosecution argues that the orders issued by the Accused to address crimes
committed against non-Serbs were ―simply window dressing designed to disguise [his] role in
supporting the very crimes he was purporting to address‖.10805 (How possibly a “strictly
confidential” documents and orders directed to the police, the military police and
prosecution offices could be a “window dressing”? Had it been a case, there must had been
many complains from the terrain to the President and his orders. Taking into account the
Prosecution’s construct of the JCE and the number of people involved, there certainly would
be many warnings of a possible accomplices against any measure of investigation and
punishment of the crimes commited. Out of so many indicted and sentenced Serbs at least
some of them would get public with his complains against the President for his alleged
“duplicity”! but it never happened. Aside the main question: whi the President would be
interested in crimes, unless he was a born criminal?) The President argues that he made
legitimate efforts to prevent the commission of crimes and ensure Bosnian Serb Forces adhered to

10804
P5525 (Audio Recording and Transcript of the Ceremonial RS National Assembly, 9 January 1994), p. 10; P5492 (Record of speech by Radovan Karadţić,
9 January 1994), p. 9.
10805
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 541.
 959

international humanitarian law.10806 (And he succeded, since the Army as such didn’t commit
crimes, apart from some individuals or alienated groups!)

1. Unlawful detention and inadequate conditions in detention facilities

3383. In relation to the treatment of detainees, on 8 June 1992, the SRNA broadcasted an
appeal by the President to local authorities and prominent Serbs to, inter alia, ensure protection for
all wounded and ill individuals irrespective of what side of the conflict they were on and to treat
all prisoners humanely.10807 (#EXCULPATORY#!) On 13 June 1992, the President issued an
order to the VRS and MUP to apply and respect the international law of war and authorised the
Minister of Defence to prepare instructions on the treatment of captured prisoners,10808 which the
Minister did.10809 (#EXCULPATORY#!) In addition, the Chamber found that in June and July
1992, the Bosnian Serb leadership requested several reports on detention facilities and
detainees.10810 (#EXCULPATORY#! What is wrong here? The orders were issued and a
control was initiated. What is wrong? In which country president do more than that?)

3384. On 1 July 1992, the President asked Mandić to release a Croat who the President believed
was detained at Kula prison.10811 The Chamber finds that this is indicative of the President‘s
ability to secure the release of detainees when he felt like it. The Chamber also received evidence
that Krajišnik and Mandić also intervened on behalf of detainees with whom they had personal
connections.10812 (So what? If a high official of the Republika Srpska guarantees for
somebody, it was a his right of discretion to release such a person. But it couldn’t pertain to
every detained people, otherwise the Serb community would be defeated and expelled from
BiH! Does the Chamber mean that the President as the President should order all the
enemies captured in the battlefield to be released? The people would arrest and detain him,
and would be right!)

3385. The Chamber recalls that around 15 July 1992, a high-ranking delegation of Bosnian
Serbs from Banja Luka and Prijedor visited Omarska and were received by Drljaĉa.10813
Following the delegation visit, the President called Kuprešanin to suggest that he influence the
municipal authorities in Prijedor to close the ―investigation centres‖ in the municipality.10814
(#EXCULPATORY#!) Kuprešanin subsequently asked the authorities of Omarska and Keraterm

10806
Defence Final Brief, paras. 642, 741.
10807
D426 (Radovan Karadţić‘s appeal re ICRC‘s plan for humanitarian aid to BiH, 8 June 1992), p. 1.
10808
D434 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order on the application of laws of war, 13 June 1992), p. 1; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5081–5082 (14 July 2010). See also D1849
(Radovan Karadţić's Order, 13 June 1992); P1134 (SerBiH Ministry of Defence Instructions on the Treatment of Captured Persons, 13 June 1992).
10809
P1134 (Minister of Defence of SerBiH Instructions on the Treatment of Captured Persons, 13 June 1992), p. 1; D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan
Subotić dated 16 June 2013), para. 281; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5083 (14 July 2010) (testifying that on the basis of this order Minister Subotić issued
instructions on the treatment of captured persons and that those instructions made reference to international regulations, the treatment of those persons, who
was in charge of detaining and releasing them and the conditions under which they could be used for work).
10810
P1093 (Minutes of 5th session of SerBiH Presidency, 10 June 1992), p. 2; P1092 (Minutes of 25 th session of Government SerBiH, 10 June 1992) (indicating
that the Ministry of Justice should make a report on the treatment of civilians and prisoners to be considered by the government and then presented to the
Presidency); P3098 (Minutes of the 48th session of SerBiH Government, 28 July 1992), pp. 9–10 (stating that the Ministry of Justice and Administration was
due to immediately prepare a report on the state of detention centres and concentration centres for prisoners). See also D3109 (SerBiH MUP report, 22
August 1992) (reporting on the existence of detention centres in the SAO Herzegovina); P3549 (Report of the Commission for Inspecting Collection Centres
and Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992) (reporting on the inspection of prisons in Trnopolje, Omarska, Keraterm in Prijedor; Manjaĉa
near Banja Luka, Krings Hall in Sanski Most, and the primary and secondary school in Bosanski Šamac).
10811
P1102 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadţić and Momĉilo Mandić, 1 July 1992), pp. 2–3; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4606–4607 (5 July 2010).
10812
P1101 (Intercept of conversation between Momĉilo Krajišnik and Momĉilo Mandić, 26 June 1992), p. 2; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 4598–4603 (5 July 2010);
P5651 (Intercept of conversation between (i) Momĉilo Mandić and Petko Budiša; and (ii) Momĉilo Mandić and Tomislav Kovaĉ, 27 July 1992), p. 2.
10813
See para. 1782.
10814
See para. 1783; D4011 (Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), para. 46; Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43530, 43543–43545 (14
November 2013). See also P6510 (Excerpt of Vojo Kuprešanin's interview with OTP), e-court p. 11.
 960

to close the facilities and to improve the living conditions for the detainees until their
disbandment.10815 (Whay it wasn’t taken as an exculpatory document for the President?)

3386. Vulliamy visited Omarska on 5 August 1992.10816 He was told later by survivors from
Omarska that the detainees who appeared to be in ―better condition‖ were brought out to the
tarmac area between the hangar and the canteen where the journalists would see them during their
visit.10817 (And did those detainees had any incentive to lie? Why their words would have a
greater value than a words of a Serbian officials? This would be too much that the Chamber
grant a credit to such a biased statements.) The Chamber recalls that the authorities at
detention facilities such as Omarska, Trnopolje and Manjaĉa transferred the majority of their
detainees to other locations during this time period and further cleaned up the facilities.10818 (It is
not sufficient for a Chamber’s inference that this reports of a very known anti-Serb agitators
were credible. But, anyway, even if it was such, that still can not be used against the
President, because the President did his job, ordered to give a complete access to the ICRC,
and even to media. All other wasn’t in his hands, and there is no evidence that the President
intervened afterwards to annihilate his own orders! There was no any evidence that the
President tolerated any illegal and criminal activity, or a violation of the international
humanitarian law!) Furthermore, soon after the President agreed to open up the camps to
international visitors, Keraterm was closed, with the detainees being moved to Trnopolje or
Manjaĉa by 5 August 1992.10819 (This is a bad construction. The President never heard of the
Keraterm prison, and didn’t order any make-up. The President didn’t “agree to open up the
camps to international visitors” he proposed it while in London, and invited the
internationals, including media representatives, and took them in his plain, so that there was
no any opportunity to emprove the look off the facilities! However, the President made a
grave mistake by believing the internationals, and particularly media!)

3387. On 6 August 1992 at a session of the RS Presidency, attended by the President, the
treatment of detainees held in Serb controlled territory was discussed. It was concluded that the
MUP would be ordered to examine the behaviour of all civilian authorities and individuals
guarding detainees and report back to the MUP and the Presidency.10820 (#EXCULPATORY#!
However, that was not the first decision, butone in a serial of orders to take care of the
Prisoners of war! The President made such an order several times in 1992, while later, in
1993 to the end of war, there was a much better control of the local authorities! The
Chamber had it all in the file!) At this meeting it was stressed that international conventions on
the treatment of prisoners of war should be followed to ensure the humane treatment of prisoners
of war given that ―they are in prisons and not concentration camps‖.10821 (#EXCULPATORY#!)
10815
See para. 1783; D4011 (Witness statement of Vojislav Kuprešanin dated 11 November 2013), para. 46; Vojislav Kuprešanin, T. 43543–43545 (14
November 2013). See also P6510 (Excerpt of Vojo Kuprešanin's interview with OTP), e-court p. 11.
10816
Edward Vulliamy, T. 21079–21080 (9 November 2011).
10817
Edward Vulliamy, T. 21088 (9 November 2011). The Chamber recalls that the day after the international journalists visited Omarska, Sejmenović was taken
out of Omarska by Kuprešanin. Kuprešanin had been instructed by the Accused to get Sejmenović a suit and allow him time to recuperate, and then he was
planning round-table discussions for Sejmenović to speak publicly about the situation in Bosnian Krajina. See para. 1787.
10818
See paras. 1409, 1789, 1851. See also P731 (Video footage from Kula, Omarska, Trnopolje, and Manjaĉa, with transcript) (wherein Christiane Amanpour,
reporting on Manjaĉa, stated that ―even though Karadţić authorised our visit to this camp, journalists were allowed less than half an hour to assess the
situation‖); Idriz Merdţanić, T. 21396–21397 (16 November 2011).
10819
Idriz Merdţanić, T. 21395–21396 (16 November 2011); P3549 (Report of the Commission for Inspecting Collection Centres and Other Facilities for
Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992), p. 4; P6585 (SRNA press release, 22 August 1992); P5555 (Report of Prijedor SJB, 29 September 1992), p. 4. See
also para. 1804. See also D4725 (Report from Slobodan Avljaš to RS Ministry of Legislation and Administration, 31 August 1992). The Chamber notes
that Idriz Merdţanić, a Bosnian Muslim doctor who was detained at Trnopolje from 26 May until 30 September 1992, testified that after the Accused
promised at the London Conference to allow journalists to visit detention centres, he ordered to have the camps ―prepared‖ for the journalists‘ visits and
suggested that the killing incident in Room 3 at Keraterm on or about 24 and 25 July 1992 occurred as a result of this. Idriz Merdţanić, T. 21394–21396 (16
November 2011). See Scheduled Incident B.15.1. The Chamber considers Merdţanić‘s evidence to be speculative as he was not in a position to know about
specific orders issued by the Accused. Therefore, the Chamber will not rely on his evidence in this regard.
10820
D465 (Minutes of 24th session of SerBiH Presidency, 6 August 1992), p. 2; P1603 (Decision of SerBiH Presidency, 6 August 1992); D97 (Conclusions of
RS Presidency re prisoners of war, 6 August 1992); Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5236–5238 (15 July 2010); D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9
March 2013), para. 54.
10821
D465 (Minutes of 24th session of SerBiH Presidency, 6 August 1992), p. 2.
 961

The decision was relayed to SJB Chiefs in a number of municipalities who were obliged to
provide reports in accordance with the RS Presidency decision by 20 August 1992.10822
(#EXCULPATORY#!) The SJB Chiefs were also informed about the RS Presidency order to
release all civilians and to allow them freedom of movement.10823 (#EXCULPATORY#! Is
something wrong in it? Why it wasn’t sufficient for an acquittal on this point? What else the
Presidency could have done, but to initiate the institutions to do their job?)

3388. On 7 August 1992, the Accused wrote to Branko Đerić about reports they had received
regarding detention facilities, including Manjaĉa, and stated the ICRC and Mladić had been
informed.10824 (#EXCULPATORY#!) The Accused also noted his expectation that the
government would, on the basis of these reports, ―take immediate measures for the improvement
of the living conditions in the jails that are operated by civilian authorities on our territory‖.10825
(#EXCULPATORY#! What else any president could have done?) The President wrote to the
ICRC with respect to these reports, and gave his re-assurance that the ICRC would be enabled to
work without disturbance in RS and that he accepted ―the majority of [their] remarks and
recommendations for improvement of living conditions on these locations‖.10826 The President
also accepted the ICRC suggestion to release all persons older than 60 years of age from detention
and stated that they were ready to speed up the exchange of prisoners through a system of
exchange commissions.10827 (#EXCULPATORY#!)

3389. On 8 August 1992, at a session of the RS Presidency, it was concluded, inter alia, that:
(i) visits by representatives of the ICRC to all prisons must be arranged; (ii) all detainees above the
age of 60 or seriously ill or wounded should be released; and (iii) amnesty should be declared for
persons who have committed minor offences or were misled into committing such offences.10828
(#EXCULPATORY#!)

3390. On the same day, in a letter to, among others, the President, Tomislav Kovaĉ, then
Deputy Minister for Police Affairs and Tasks, identified the problems of detention of non-Serbs
and proposed ―that the status of these people be legally changed in compliance with international
conventions on refugees, prisoners of war‖, given the failure to properly categorise civilians,
prisoners of war and those who had committed criminal acts.10829 (#EXCULPATORY#!) On 9
August 1992, the government responded to the letter immediately and established the Commission
for Inspecting Collection Centres and Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK, which released its
report on 17 August 1992.10830 (#EXCULPATORY#!) The Commission was tasked with
determining the status of persons detained in prisons in the RS ―in accordance with international

10822
D3795 (Romanija-Biraĉ CSB request to SJBs, 9 August 1992).
10823
D3795 (Romanija-Biraĉ CSB request to SJBs, 9 August 1992).
10824
D100 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Đerić, 7 August 1992); Herbert Okun, T. 1753–1754 (28 April 2010). See also P4982 (Witness Statement
of Branko Ðerić dated 5 April 2012), para. 39; D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 200, 219–221, 225. The Chamber
does not find Subotić‘s evidence that the only places of detention were under local authority and that he was not informed about the detention of civilians to
be reliable. In reaching that conclusion the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 9869 and more specifically that his evidence with respect to
this issue was marked by evasiveness and contradictions and attempts to distance himself from the detention of civilians. (Why would he “distant
himself” from something that he didn’t do anyway? And how anyone could have differentiate who was civilian, and
who was combatant? This was a civil war, and as Dzambazovic and others testified, the combatants fought in their
civilian cloathes!)
10825
D100 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Đerić, 7 August 1992).
10826
P3758 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Derić, attaching an ICRC report, 7 August 1992), e-court pp. 2–3.
10827
P3758 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Derić attaching an ICRC report, 7 August 1992), e-court p. 3.
10828
P3071 (Minutes of the 25th session of RS Presidency, 8 August 1992), p. 1.
10829
P1100 (Letter from SerBiH MUP to Radovan Karadţić and Branko Đerić, 8 August 1992), p. 1; D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28
October 2013), para. 84; Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35170–35171 (11 March 2013).
10830
D3960 (Witness statement of Tomislav Kovaĉ dated 28 October 2013), para. 84; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5139 (14 July 2010), T. 5239–5240 (15 July 2010);
Momĉilo Mandić, C3 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 9603–9604, 9820–9821 (testifying that representatives from the Ministry of
Justice and Administration and the Ministry of the Interior were appointed to this commission); P3549 (Report of the Commission for Inspecting Collection
Centres and Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992), p. 2. See also para. 3373.
 962

conventions, and to speed up the procedure of categorising such persons‖, inspecting those
facilities and submitting a report to the government of the Republika Srpska.10831 Slobodan
Avlijaš and Goran Šarić, as representatives of the Commission, visited Bileća, Trebinje, and
Gacko and submitted a report to the Bosnian Serb government on 22 August 1992.10832
(#EXCULPATORY#!)

3391. According to the minutes of the 30th session of the RS Presidency held on
6 September 1992, the President accepted a proposal from the Military Prosecutor‘s Office
attached to the command of the 1st Krajina Corp to pardon some detainees held at Manjaĉa
camp.10833 (#EXCULPATORY#! THE PRESIDENT COULDN’T DO IT WITHOUT A
PROPOSAL OF THE MILITARY PROSECUTOR! The Chamber, just like the
Prosecution, do not understand what was the position of the President, a constitutional, legal
and factual one. It is the same as in any other country – President do his constitutional
duties, and nothing else. Everything else was to be done by the institutions, not by
President!) The proposal stated that the detainees were suspected of having committed crimes
and asked that they be exempted from further prosecution; however the minutes do not indicate the
reason for the request.10834

3392. On 8 September 1992, the President sent a strictly confidential telegram to the presidents
of all municipalities in RS instructing them to ensure ―respect of international humanitarian law
with regard to the treatment of prisoners of war‖ and that civilians who had not committed crimes
should ―not be kept in prisons and collection centres against their will‖ and that they should ensure
their safe passage to territory where they seek refuge from the war.10835 He also indicated that
officials must accommodate the ICRC and the High Commissioner for Refugees.10836
(#EXCULPATORY#! And in accordance with all the agreements signed between the three
sides and the UNHCR, ICRC and European Community! WHAT ELSE HE COULD
HAVE DONE? IT WAS A “STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL” DOCUMENT, NOT AIMEDO
TO PUBLIC, AND IT WAS AS GENUINE AS IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY!)

3393. In a meeting with international representatives in September 1992, the President agreed
to ―support any humanitarian issue‖ and ―clean up‖ detention facilities but also in exchange
requested that Bosnian Serbs, who he viewed as ―hostages‖, be allowed to leave Sarajevo.10837
(#EXCULPATORY#! And legal, and natural!) On 11 September 1992, the President granted
amnesty from criminal prosecution to 69 detainees who were being held at Manjaĉa and
Trnopolje.10838 The President stated, a few days later, at a Bosnian Serb Assembly session that
dealing with humanitarian issues would assist the Bosnian Serbs as they would get credit at an
international level, and in this regard the disbandment of Trnopolje and Manjaĉa camps would suit
them so long as those detained were sent somewhere and did not return to the battlefield.10839
(#EXCULPATORY#! No president is entitled to jeopardize his army and his community by
releasing enemy’s combatants who could appear on the battlefield the very next morning! It

10831
D466 (Decision of Government of SerBiH on establishment of Commission for Inspection of Collections Centres and other facilities for prisoners, 9 August
1992), pp. 2–3; D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 57. See also Slobodan Avljiaš, T. 35140–35142
(11 March 2013).
10832
D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013), para. 56; D3109 (SerBiH MUP report, 22 August 1992) (reporting on the existence of
detention centres in the SAO Herzegovina).
10833
P3074 (Minutes of the 30th session of RS Presidency, 6 September 1992).
10834
P3074 (Minutes of the 30th session of RS Presidency, 6 September 1992).
10835
D3241 (Letter from RS Presidency to presidents of all municipalities, 8 September 1992).
10836
D3241 (Letter from RS Presidency to presidents of all municipalities, 8 September 1992).
10837
P785 (Second notebook of Herbert Okun‘s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 23–24, 36.
10838
P3721 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps re decision by Radovan Karadţić, 11 September 1992).
10839
D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 55.
 963

happened several times around Sarajevo, Rajlovac, where the Serb Army again captured the
same combatants that had been captured in Bratunac, and released to Visoko!)

3394. An agreement between representatives of the President, Izetbegović, Mate Boban, and
representatives of the SDA, SDS, and BiH Presidency was reached on 30 September and
1 October 1992.10840 They, inter alia, agreed to release all civilian detainees who were not
suspected of having committed crimes.10841 The document lists several scheduled detention
centres under Bosnian Serb control, including Manjaĉa, Trnopolje, Batković camp, and Kula
Prison.10842 (This is not correct and not accurate: there were mentioned the camps under the
Croat and Muslim control, not only under the Serb control. Why the Chamber is, in addition
to the selective persecution, selective in any aspect, and does also a selection in numbering
the prisons in the Muslim/Croat territory?)

3395. The President, in October 1992, informed Mladić, Mićo Stanišić and Mandić that he had
received information that some local authorities had ignored his instruction to allow unfettered
access for the ICRC to detention facilities. The President demanded that they inform their
subordinates to respect his instruction to allow access and that he would order a thorough
investigation of all cases of failure to comply.10843 A completely #EXCULPATORY#! Beside his
many genuine tasks and duties, the President payed tribute to the human rights and followed
the implementation of his orders.

3396. On 1 October 1992, Kuprešanin wrote to the President and requested a pardon to allow
for the release of some Bosnian Muslim detainees who were being held at Manjaĉa who had not
participated in ―the rebellion‖ against the RS.10844 On 7 October 1992, pursuant to a decision of
the RS Presidency, Kuprešanin authorised ten detainees who had been released and pardoned to be
permitted to leave the territory of RS through the ICRC in Banja Luka.10845 On 13 November
1992, the President issued an amnesty from prosecution in respect of numerous detainees who
were held at Manjaĉa.10846 The Chamber considers that this further demonstrates the President‘s
ability to intervene in matters related to detention. (So what? Was it wrong? Every President of
a state is authorised to pardon some suspects, if so proposed by the Ministry or the Army.
But, that had to be an exception, and couldn’t be massive! Or should he neglect the security
of his own Army and population, and dismantle all the prisons for POWs, without any
condition? His Army would have all the reasons to eliminate such an irresponsible president.
All those pardonings of the POWs were done in accord of many state institutions, including
the VRS and judiciary!)

3397. It was not until 27 October 1992, that the Bosnian Serb Government officially decided
that the existing illegal camps and assembly centres were to be dissolved as soon as possible and
that the existing penal institutions legally formed in large centres in Republika Srpska were to be
used, since the conditions there were suitable for legal treatment of prisoners and inmates. 10847 (“It
was not until 27 October that the BS Government officially decided…” is #not an accurate
assessment#. First of all, during the previous months there had been issued #many orders# to
10840
P4859 (Agreement on the release and transfer of prisoners, 30 September and 1 October 1992), p. 1.
10841
P4859 (Agreement on the release and transfer of prisoners, 30 September and 1 October 1992), p. 2.
10842
P4859 (Agreement on the release and transfer of prisoners, 30 September and 1 October 1992), pp. 7–9.
10843
D103 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Ratko Mladić, Mićo Stanišić, and Momĉilo Mandić, 22 October 1992). See also Mićo Stanišić, T. 46403–46404 (3
February 2014).
10844
P3722 (Request sent from Vojo Kuprešanin to Radovan Karadţić, 1 October 1992). A similar report was sent from the Manjaĉa camp to the 1 st Krajina
Corps Command identifying individuals who did not deserve to be criminally prosecuted and who could be released and noting that not a single criminal
report or other criminal documentation had been filed against individuals on a list and reported on their release: P3723 (Manjaĉa camp daily report to the 1st
Krajina Corps, 14 November 1992) (under seal).
10845
D4211 (List of persons pardoned and released signed by Vojislav Kuprešanin, 7 October 1992).
10846
[REDACTED].
10847
P3102 (Minutes of the 57th session of RS Government, 27 October 1992), p. 6.
 964

act in accordance with the international law of war, but because of a huge number of the
captives it wasn’t possible to achieve and execute these orders of the President, Ministers,
Prime Minister and the Army commanders, including General Mladic! Only after many had
been released it was possible to group the POWs in the existing prisons, with experienced
administrations. So, it wasn’t for the first time that the Govemrnment acted to this respect,
but was ordering a transfer into existing prisons!)

3398. On 4 December 1992, the President indicated that he would order the release of all
detainees held in Manjaĉa provided that they be transferred to third countries.10851 The Chamber
found above that this is what indeed happened.10848 (#EXCULPATORY#!)

3399. Having considered the evidence recounted above of the President‘s efforts to end the
unlawful detention of non-Serb civilians and to ameliorate the conditions in detention centres, the
Chamber notes that while the President was aware of the large-scale detention of civilians as early
as April 1992, it was not until June 1992 that he issued orders on the protection of detainees and
requested reports.10849 (First of all, who established that there were civilians detained, for
instance in Manjaca? In Omarska there were brought in all captured in the zone of attack
on Prijedor, since 22 till 31 May 1992, but once the professional investigators found out who
was a civilian without participation in the crime of rebellion, these had been released, and
there was 59% of such a detainees. Neither in other detention units were civilians, except in
some perent, but they also had been released immediately after investigation. If if was about
civilians to be detained, why in Prijedor, as the most markant spot, only about 5% of the
non-Serb population HAD BEEN BROUGHT IN, AND ONLY 2,5% SENT TO Manjaca?

Second, the President’s official capacity before June 92 didn’t allow him to act in that
direction! He had been elected to the Presidency only on 12 May 92? He was without any
command or other influence on the JNA before the VRS became the official armed force on
20 May 92. Didn’t he establish the VRS by his order on 15 June 92, see P3035? What could
he have done before this time, and before the late autumn 92? Meanwhile, before the
President became thme presiding of Presidency, the Prime Minister Branko Djeric issued
several orders to that respect, and General Mladic also, at the first half of May 92.) By that
time, many civilians were already unlawfully detained in appalling conditions. (#Unproven,
uncorroborated, arbitrary#! The Chamber didn’t establish whether some detainees
remained in a detention afer it was established that they had been “civilians”, i.e. after the
first results of investigations!) The Chamber further finds that the President had the authority to
order the closure of detention centres and order the release of detainees as evidenced by how
quickly his instructions to close Omarska, Keraterm and later Manjaĉa and his instructions to
release specific detainees were followed by the relevant authorities. (These were an exceptional
discretion authorisation of the President, but it couldn’t becom a rule, because it would
jeopardize the Serb Army and civilians. However, the President was keen to release all those
ordinary combatants under the condition that they wouldn’t join their Army, which is a
legitimate position!) However, by the time the Bosnian Serb Government officially decided to
close all ―illegal camps‖ on 27 October 1992, the make-shift detention facilities used throughout
the Municipalities by Serb Forces to detain non-Serbs had already largely served their purpose of
facilitating the process of the forcible removal of non-Serbs. (This is not correct, nor the
Chamber had any basis for such an assertion. There was a terrain captured by a chaos of the
civil war, and many, many fought in their civilian cloathings and were really civilians. And
the municipalities and their TOs were (due to the Law) entitled to defend as much as they

10851 D1851 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Daniel Shiffer, 4 December 1992).
10848
See paras. 1408–1409.
10849
See para. 3365.
 965

could, and in a way they were able to do it. No any organ could order them to act differently,
if such an organ couldn’t protect them. Their own souvreign right was to save themselves,
and unfortunately they had to defend against their own state, since the RS was not
established in it’s structure, neither was prepared, so to protect them!) The Chamber
considers that the President could have intervened much sooner if he had had the will to do so.
(This is an arbitrary assertion, without knowing the elementary facts and legal positions.
Beside that, the President was not obliged, nor authorized to unilaterally release POWs,
while the Serbs captured by their adversaries were kept detained, and the international
community didn’t care about any Serb need or concerns.) However, instead of excercising
his authority to close make-shift detention centres, he spent months denying that the conditions in
these centres were appalling and that civilians were included among the detainees. (A civilians
could have been included only until it was established that they really had been civilians!
Until that moment, they had been a suspects!) Furthermore, the Chamber notes that Batković
camp, Kula Prison and the Rasadnik detention facility remained in existence during the war and
that they continued to unlawfully detain non-Serb civilians.10850 (No chamber could conclude as
this without investigation and process. How this Chamber could have known it? Only by an
uncritical acceptance of the witnesses that had been adversaries to the Serbs, and are
motivated and educated to lie! And why it was always less that 3% or 4% of a non-serb
population being detained and investigated, why not more that 50% or all of them? A
presumed “systematic” approach of the Serb side towards the non-Serbs would require this
percentage to be much, much higher!)

1. Forced removal of non-Serbs and protection of non-Serbs remaining in Serb controlled

territory

3400. With respect to forced displacement of non-Serb civilians, in advance of the London
Conference, the President issued an instruction to the VRS and MUP, on 19 August 1992 ordering
that the forced resettlement of civilians should be prevented and that ―any certificates of sale of
property or statements that refugees will not return shall be considered as legally invalid and are
declared null and void‖.10851 (#EXCULPATORY#!) On 21 August 1992, the President pledged to
prevent ―ethnic cleansing‖ and punish persons involved in expelling the civilian population.10852
(#EXCULPATORY#!) On 25 August 1992, on the eve of the London Conference, the President
stated, in a letter to the international community, that he had issued the 19 August 1992
instruction, but that the civilian population must be allowed to move freely out of a war zone if
that was its desire, blaming the failure on the part of the international community to understand the
deep-rooted antagonism and hatred between the three ethnicities in BiH, which caused people to
leave their communities in droves.10853 (#EXCULPATORY#! And this was in accordance with
all the agreements signed until this time between the warring sides and the international
organisations, ICRC, UNHCR, and the Conference itself!) The Chamber considers that the
President‘s comments in the 25 August letter were an attempt to downplay the forced nature of the
movement of the population that was occurring, whereas by that time thousands of non-Serbs had
already been expelled from Bosnian Serb claimed territory by Serb Forces. (#WRONG
INFERENCE, for a several reasons: first, the Chamber is qualifying the chaotic events of the
first several months of the war, out of which the first two months the President didn’t have

10850
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.2.1, C.18.2, C.21.3.
10851
D101 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order to VRS Main Staff and RS MUP, 19 August 1992); Colm Doyle, T. 2875–2876 (27 May 2010). See also KW609, T.
46140–46142 (29 January 2014) (testifying that although the 19 August 1992 order was forwarded on by Drljaĉa, these provisions were not observed in
detention facilities in Prijedor to a large extent due to a small group of individuals, including guards and inspectors at the facilities, who did not behave in
accordance with their authority or the law).
10852
D109 (RS Presidency Declaration, 21 August 1992).
10853
See para. 346; D4720 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić re London Peace Conference, 25 August 1992), p. 1.
 966

any official capacity or authority over any “Serb Forces” – as the Chamber accepted the
OTP qualification if it, the JNA, TO and paramilitaries. However, exactly these two months
were the worst in terms of chaos and lack of control by all the sides! Second, the Chamber
neglected the entirety of picture, namely that already by that time, the end of August 92,
there was more Serb refugees than the Muslim and Croat together. By neglecting such a
drastic half of the picture, the #Chamber is participating in a demonization of the Serbs#,
depicting them as a rutheless power, instead of a twice smaller community, attacked by a
Muslim-Croat coalition plus the Army of Croatia itself.

Pertaining to the second assertion, that “by that time thousands of non-Serbs had been expelled
by the Serb Forces…” The Chamber #did not have any valid reason to conclude this#. First
of all, nobody established that the “Serb Forces” forcefully expelled any of those civilians.
The Chamber is conveying a Muslim propaganda and an international media campaign into
an evidence, without any objective investigation. What the President was pointing out about
the freedom of movement of population out of a combat zones, was something provided in all
the agreements, as well as in the domestic and international laws of war. This kind of an
irresponsible “inferring” is not acceptable even in a kangaroo courts. This is particularly
irresponsible without establishing what of the movement of population falls within this
obligation, and what was a crime. For instance, why there was no “forceful expelling” from
the areas where there was no combat activities? This suggests that the President‘s 19 and 21
August orders were not genuine efforts to stop ―ethnic cleansing‖, and were rather designed as an
attempt to cast a positive light on the actions of the Bosnian Serbs in view of the commencement
of the London Conference. (Wrong, and unacceptable speculation, and indecent by a serious
chamber, since it rather looks as propaganda gossip. Here is why: if it was so, there must
have been a parallel order, secretly conveyed to the same instances to neglect the first order.
If not, how the instances on the terrain could have known that it was fake, and that they
hadn’t been obliged to carry the order out? No serious Chamber would infer that way,
which is lower than an old ladies gossip on a market short encounter. The evidence that it
wasn’t fake is in the P02617 exhibit of 8 June 1992, for which period the Chamber concluded
that the President didn’t take a necessary measures to protect the minorities: P02617, p. 2,
the Decision on return of those who left…:

(This is an example of a #positive discrimination#, the non-Serbs didn’t have to serve in the
Army.)

3401. In August 1992, the President issued instructions to the presidents of all municipalities to keep
accurate records on the temporary use of abandoned flats by refugees and prevent any abuse in this
regard.10854 (#EXCULPATORY#!) However, the Chamber recalls that the transfer of abandoned

10854
D111 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Instructions to Presidents of Municipalities, 23 August 1992). See also Branko Đerić, T. 28018 (24 April 2012). Đerić also
issued a decree regulating the temporary use of abandoned agricultural land and buildings. D2246 (Decree on the Temporary Use of Abandoned
Agricultural Land, Agricultural Buildings and Agricultural Machinery and Tools, 20 August 1992); Branko Đerić, T. 28031 (25 April 2012).
 967

non-Serb housing to Serb refugees had the effect of ensuring that non-Serbs who had fled their
homes did not return to Serb held territory.10855 (Wrong! No para of any judgment could serve
as a basis for such an inference. No matter who could have said anything, the only relevant
was what the RS high officials commited themselves to, i.e. that the right to return and
restore all the rights would be completely guaranteed. And that is what is counted, nothing
else! And that is what had happened after the war in a full extemnt. And there was no any
litigation about a state abuse of anyone’s private property!)

3402. Furthermore, the President issued orders for the protection of non-Serbs remaining in Serb
controlled territory. On 11 July 1992 at the 38th session of the Bosnian Serb Government, a
working group was formed to prepare regulations on the treatment of civilians of all ethnicities in
the RS in accordance with constitutional rights and international conventions and obligations.10856
#EXCULPATORY#! On 14 July 1992, the President instructed the presidents of the
municipalities in the Goraţde area to ensure that all Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim
inhabitants in villages who surrendered their weapons and did not intend to fight should enjoy the
full protection of the RS state.10857 (#EXCULPATORY#! And this was in response to some
hints and indications that the Muslim and Croat citizens didn’t feel comfortable!) He issued
a similar order on 23 July 1992 that Serb authorities must act in accordance with the law and
international humanitarian law and all inhabitants who surrender weapons and agree to live
peacefully must be permitted to stay and be protected by the RS.10858 (#EXCULPATORY#!)
However, the Chamber notes that during this time period, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
were forced to leave Bosnian Serb claimed territory in the Municipalities through threats,
coercion, or as a result of physical force. (Wrong! Since many of the Muslim/Croat citizens
didn’t move anywhere, brings the Chamber to a question: #why only some of the M/C
citizens wanted to leave, and other not, or why only some of them had been “expelled”? And
the Chamber can not submit a single evidence that it was a forcible transfere, and not a
demand of the civilians to leave a combat zones? The Chamber is taking all propaganda
claims as an established facts, and this can not be valid even in a Khozak courts! The
Chamber had a first class evidence that these orders of the President had been carried out
exactly as it was written. There were a several Muslim villages in the Birac region, and on
the Romania mount itself, who handed over their weaposn and lived freely as long as they
wanted. Already in august 92 a Prosecution witness Edward Vulliamy wrote how the
Muslims and Croats in the Prijedor area lived while being loyal to the system, see P3788, p.
6:

The witness could be anything, but not a pro-Serb journalist! And this is a first class
evidence that the civilians had a choice: to live peacefully, or to engage in combats!)

10855
See, e.g., para. 2162.
10856
D446 (Minutes of 38th session of Government of SerBiH, 11 July 1992), p. 6; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5136 (14 July 2010).
10857
D95 (Instructions from RS Presidency to presidents of municipalities in Goraţde area, 14 July 1992), p. 1; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5183 (15 July 2010). See
also Herbert Okun, T. 1741–1742 (27 April 2010) (testifying that those who received these 14 July 1992 instructions may have understood that the Accused
did not really mean them). The Chamber places no weight on Okun‘s testimony in this regard because it is speculative.
10858
P2970 (Radovan Karadţić order, 23 July 1992).
 968

3403. On 3 April 1994, the Accused issued an order to the Bosnian Serb MUP and VRS authorities to,
inter alia, investigate criminal activity committed in the RS with particular attention to Prijedor, which
was subsequently distributed to all RBD centres and Drina Corps units.10859 (#EXCULPATORY!#
Had they been “expelled” there would not be a thousands of them in Prijedor still in 1994!#)
On 4 July 1994, the Accused conveyed to the municipal authorities in Prijedor that they should ensure
full protection for the non-Serb population.10860 (#EXCULPATORY#! See the above quated P3788,
which reflects exactly what the President ordered, as well as another paragraph from the same
document, P3788, p. 3

The thousands of the Muslim civilians took refuge in the town of Prijedor, under the Serb
control, while their males had been a suspects under the investigations!) There had been incidents
in mid-1994 of individuals attacking non-Serbs and their property, causing them to apply to municipal
authorities to organise their collective departure abroad.10861 (This was a terrorist activity deep within
the Serb territory, a daily killings of the Serb civilians and soldiers, by individuals or groups that
hid in a digouts throughout the war. One of the incidents was a bucherring of sixt Serb
policemen, which scared both the Serb and Muslim civilians. The Muslim civilians related to
those perpetrators felt extremely unsecure, and demanded to be allowed to leave. But, it was the
sommer 1994, and this proves that they lived in Prijedor two and a half years of war without
being “expelled”!) The President instructed the highest authorities of the municipality to publicly
condemn such cases of assaults on non-Serbs and to maintain law and order, punish the perpetrators,
and take measures to protect all citizens and their property against looting, including the property of
individuals who had left or been killed.10862 (#EXCULPATORY#! It was useful that the local
authority officials do it publicly, so that every singe individual knew what was the official
position. For that reason the international mediators proposed to the President to make public
his strictly confidential orders, so that everyone could have known it, see P941!) A state
commission was to be set up to deal with each registered case.10863 (#EXCULPATORY#! It is an
evidence that the subordinates took it seriously what the President instructed them!) The
Chamber considers by this time there were so few non-Serbs remaining in Prijedor after the
overwhelming majority had already been expelled during 1992 that his instructions in this regard were
rendered otiose. (If so, then why the President was demanded to allow that the Muslim civilians
leave Prijedor by up to 80 tracks a day in 1994? Any why a propaganda about ongoing “ethnic
cleansing” was intense? As if the Chamber was striving for a reason to undermind the genuine
documents in favour of the President! And that can not be a fair trial!)

3404. In response to concerns about the ―ethnic cleansing‖ in Bijeljina in late 1994, the President
explained to UNPROFOR that the authorities in Bijeljina intended to replace the Chief of Police
given that he was providing unsatisfactory security for the population,10864 (#EXCULPATORY#!
The Chief of police wasn’t responsible for any misdoings, but he was not able to secure the
safe stay for some of the endangered people!) and later claimed that people leaving Bijeljina
were being forced from their homes by criminal elements.10865 Let us see what is in the P02458

10859
D1138 (Radovan Karadţić's letter, 3 April 1994); D4151 (Dispatch of RS MUP to all RBD Centres, 5 April 1994); D4816 (Drina Corps Order, 4 April
1994), para. 1. See also [REDACTED].
10860
D4213 (Order of Radovan Karadţić, 4 July 1994).
10861
D4213 (Order of Radovan Karadţić, 4 July 1994).
10862
D4213 (Order of Radovan Karadţić, 4 July 1994).
10863
D4213 (Order of Radovan Karadţić, 4 July 1994).
10864
D704 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadţić, 19 August 1994), p. 3. See also D3145 (UNPROFOR report, 6 September 1994;
UNPROFOR press statement, 5 September 1994), p. 1.
10865
P2458 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 11 September 1994), p. 4; P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009),
paras. 60–61.
 969

report:

#Had it ever been proven that there existed a “labour camps”#? Not at all! But, everything
became clear when we see who was the drafter of this report: a famous Anthony Bambury!!!
There is no a day on which a thousand civilians crossed the confrontation line between Tuzla
and Bijeljina. Another logical question is: #how many troops was needed to “forcefully
expel” a thousand people? Which unit did it? Under which command? How many incidents
occurred during this “forceful transfer?”# Let us se further, P2458:

The “Hong Kong mafia” that the President reffered to was Vojkan Djurkovic on the Serb
side, and certain lawyer (Basic or Pasic) in Tuzla, who organised those who wanted to cross
over, and payed to the “mafia” for this operation!) While the Chief of Police was replaced in
Bijeljina, the UNHCR office continued reporting on the arrival of ―large numbers of refugees who
had been forced to leave the Bijeljina area‖ including over 2,000 people between 18 August to
4 September 1994.10866 (Arrival, certainly, because they wanted to move, but in order to have
a benefit in Tuzla, they rather kept seying that they had been expelled. There was no a
possibility to charge Vojkan Djurkovic, since he had a protection from those Mus;lims who
were allegedly expelled! Similar was with Arkan, as the lately disclosed report of the ECMM
confirmed!) On 9 September 1994, Vieira de Mello requested that the Accused allow Akashi and
UNPROFOR to verify the humanitarian conditions in these regions and pressed for the arrest of
Vojkan and his gang, who the Accused suggested might be acting under Arkan‘s instructions in
the area.10867 See, Vojkan, commended by the ECMM#! On 15 September 1994, the Accused
was told by international negotiators that his response to the crisis in Bijeljina was ―insufficient
[…] as the cleansing itself was apparently continuing‖ and that by the time investigations were
completed ―there would be nobody left to expel‖.10868 (This is something that had been said by
the “international negotiators” or by a drafter of this report, not a fact#, see P3862:

10866
D3145 (UNPROFOR report, 6 September 1994; UNPROFOR press statement, 5 September 1994), p. 1. See also P799 (Excerpts from David Owen‘s book
entitled ―Balkan Odyssey‖), e-court p. 14.
10867
D1136 (UNPROFOR report, 9 September 1994), p. 2.
10868
P3862 (UNPROFOR report, 15 September 1994), para. 7. See also D3145 (UNPROFOR report, 6 September 1994; UNPROFOR press statement, 5
September 1994), p. 1. The Chamber recalls that on 23 September 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 941 in which it noted that UNHCR and the
ICRC had reported grave violations of international humanitarian law in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, and other areas of BiH under Bosnian Serb control, which it
described as ―ethnic cleansing‖. See para. 403.
 970

How something that may be said by the internationals could find a place in the Judgement,
skipping an important reference to Vojkan Djurkovic and the President’s initiation of
investigation of his role?!) On 26 September 1994, the Accused said to international negotiators
that Serbs in Bijeljina were ―fighting for their own land‖ and that ―ethnic cleansing‖ would be an
inevitable outcome of the international community‘s failure to establish any legal mechanism
allowing the population to exchange their homes and move into cantons in which their nationality
would be dominant.10869 (This had never happened! This witness (Harland) lied, and there was
no any possibility that the President talked to him without presence of his superiors, as
Harland confirmed that the President didn’t remember him, for he was sitting back and
taking notes. However, neither Harland, nor his superiors have ever reported such an
President’s position, #which would be a sensational news in the
Conference on BiH#, in all the inter-Government communications, and in media too.)
The Chamber considers that the President‘s statements to the international negotiators demonstrate
his knowledge that ―ethnic cleansing‖ was directly linked to the Bosnian Serb objective to
establish a Bosnian Serb state and that he was not interested in preventing it. (Whatever inference
the Chamber draws, it is not valid, because the premise is wrong and false. Harland lied, and
this is very easy to prove: he was a note-taker, and he admitted that the President didn’t
remember him, because he was sitting in the fifth row taking notes. The only relevant
evidence to this respect would be a genuine UN or EC document, signed by a head of
delegation, or a testimony of such a head of the negotiating delegation, not an arbitrary
improviosation of a note-taker!)

(3)Other crimes

3405. With respect to crimes more generally, including looting and property related crimes, when
the Bosnian Serb government was informed on 27 February 1993 that public law and order in the
Republic was extremely bad, it put the MUP, Ministry of Defence and the Military Security
Service in charge of protecting the citizens and their property.10870 (#EXCULPATORY#!) In
May 1993, the President also issued an order for the security and protection of all places of
worship in Banja Luka and called for the immediate execution of this order and a report on
measures taken.10871 (#EXCULPATORY#!) At a session of the Bosnian Serb Government on 11
July 1993, in which the President participated, the ―need for a swift drive against crime‖, including

10869
P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 140; David Harland, T. 2113–2114 (7 May 2010). The Chamber notes that
Gordan Milinić testified that the Accused formed a commission to examine the situation in Bijeljina in October 1994 and that the Bosnian Muslims living in
Bijeljina told the Commission that they preferred to leave and the Presidency received letters of gratitude from Bosnian Muslims who emigrated. D3682
(Witness statement of Gordan Milinić dated 8 June 2013), para. 13; Gordan Milinić, T. 39771–39772 (12 June 2013). The Chamber notes that testimony of
Milinić was marked by contradictions, bias and indicators that he lacked candour. The Chamber therefore does not find his evidence to be reliable in this
regard. (#This is the most comfortable, but the least correct position of any chamber, to dismiss every Defence withes
without any reason, or any obligation to prove it’s conviction that a withness was lacking candour. And why the
#Harland’s superiors didn’t say what he said in his testimony#? And why it wasnot written down in his reports#?
This is a shameless manipulation with somebody who wasn’t suitable to testify about something that only his
superiors could have testified.
10870
D3569 (Excerpt from Minutes of 65th session of RS Government, 27 February 1993), p. 4.
10871
D106 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order to RS MUP, 12 May 1993). See also Herbert Okun, T. 1767–1768 (28 April 2010).
 971

killing, robbery, and profiteering was discussed.10872 On 28 August 1993, in an order focused on
the organisation of the VRS, the President instructed the Main Staff and MUP to create a plan to
seize the uniforms of people who were not members of the army or police and who were
committing crimes and other illegal activity in the uniforms.10873 (#EXCULPATORY#! It proves
that many crimes already committed could have been committed not by a soldiewrs or
policemen, but by a fake members of these forces. In the former Yugoslav system of the Al-
peoples Defence, the reservists, i.e. all the able-bodied males, had their uniforms, gass-masks
and other military equipment at their homes!)

3406. Furthermore, Mićo Stanišić made efforts to remove criminals from the MUP. On
17 April 1992, Mićo Stanišić wrote to municipal CSBs and SJBs warning them that there had been
reports of MUP members appropriating property and collaborating with persons with a history of
organised crime and requesting that measures, including termination of employment and criminal
prosecution, be taken against perpetrators.10874 (#EXCULPATORY#, both for the Minister
Stanisic and the President!) On 23 and 24 July 1992, Stanišić ordered that members of the MUP
who had been criminally prosecuted or against whom criminal proceedings were being conducted
should be dismissed from duty and placed at the disposal of the VRS.10875 (#EXCULPATORY#!
And that really happened: in accordance with this order, Minister Stanisic and his
subordinates #dismissed about 6,176 policemen and relocated them to the VRS#, see P02761

And, by that time there was neither media, nor the international mediator preassueres, it
had been done for the genuine attitude of the Minister against crimes, as could be seen from
all the records of the Governmental sessions!)

3407. The Chamber notes that the rules on disciplinary responsibility of Bosnian Serb MUP
employees during war stipulated that MUP employees who are terminated for disciplinary reasons
should be reported to the VRS.10876 (#EXCULPATORY#! A disciplinary responsible
employees were not a criminaly responsible, because both Gen. Mladic and Min. Stanisic
didn’t allow a criminally responsible to avoid responsibility, see: P01500, p.1-2, of 28 July 92

As it is evident, the Main Staff of the VRS and Gen. Mladic acted in accordance with the
Law on the Army, and the Decision of the Presidency or the Serb Republic.:

10872
P3139 (Minutes of the 74th session of RS Government, 11 July 1993), p. 8.
10873
D4790 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order to VRS Main Staff, 28 August 1993), p. 5.
10874
D1671 (Warning of SerBiH MUP, 17 April 1992); KDZ601, T. 18625–18626 (8 September 2011).
10875
P2771 (Order of SerBiH MUP, 23 July 1992); P2971 (Order of SerBiH MUP, 24 July 1992).
10876
D4455 (Letter from Mićo Stanišić to all CSBs forwarding Rules on Disciplinary Responsibility, 19 September 1992), Art. 3.
 972

Sentencing of the Minister Stanisic, and his subordinates as Zupljanin, is a big stain on this
Tribunal and the very attempt to establish an international justice!)
However, the Chamber does not consider this an effective means of punishment or prevention of
further crimes because such persons would continue to carry arms in proximity to civilian areas.
(#What this Chamber is doing? As it can be seen from P01500, point 2. pasted above, a
criminally responsible weren’t acceptable either to the MUP or to the VRS. No a reasonable
chamber could mix it up so much. None of those who were criminally responsible were
admitted in any unit. Minister Stanisic re-directed more than 6,100 policemen to the VRS,
which makes two light brigades. It had been done not because of crimes they committed, but
because a lack of professional skillfulness and discipline. This is all wrong, and shows an
enormous lack of knowledge of those assisting the Chamber about the nature of police and
military work. In a police, the individuals were authorized to act independently, and to
report about their activities, while in the Army the individuals didn’t have such an
authorization, and had to act in accordance with an immediate orders of the most immediate
superiors.

3408. Furthermore, on 27 July 1992, Stanišić issued an order stating that, in accordance with an
order by the President, it was necessary to immediately remove individuals from the MUP who
had been held criminally responsible for crimes or were known to have committed crimes during
the war in BiH.10877 (#EXCULPATORY#! That was a strictly confidential order of the
President issued on 23 July and repeated in the D4273, and therefore not aimed to the
public! Also see P2771, a strictly confidential order by Stanisic) On 12 September 1992, Zoran
Cvijetić issued a document to all SJBs, advising that despite Stanišić‘s orders to remove criminals
from the ranks of the MUP, a number of SJBs had not taken the problem seriously enough and that
it was necessary for them to analyse the involvement of MUP employees in criminal acts and
dereliction of duty so that it could be reported to the MUP.10878 (#EXCULPATORY#! A control
of execution existed!) In an interview in October 1992, Mićo Stanišić acknowledged that some
individual members of the MUP had been expelled from their ranks because of acts which they
had committed but he claimed that the number of such cases were rare but were taken
seriously.10879 (#EXCULPATORY#!) He also spoke about measures taken to deal with war
profiteering and that most of the acts occurred at the beginning of the war when ―there was a kind
of legislative vacuum‖.10880 (#EXCULPATORY#!)

3409. In addition, members of the government, VRS, JNA and MUP, including Mićo Stanišić,
issued orders to various divisions in the Bosnian Serb MUP or VRS on crime prevention, to ensure
compliance with international humanitarian law, prevent the abuse of detainees and mistreatment
of civilians, and to report crimes or illegal camps on 24 April 1992,10881 (#EXCULPATORY#! It
was even before the President took the office!) 26 April 1992,10882 30 April 1992,10883 10 June
10877
D4273 (Order of RS MUP, 27 July 1992). See also D1534 (Order of Romanija-Biraĉ CSB, 28 July 1992) (wherein the RS MUP ordered all special units
formed by SJBs during the war be disbanded and placed under the command of the VRS or dismissed from their areas of operation. Any crimes committed
by these groups were to be reported to the appropriate institution).
10878
D1077 (RS MUP order, 12 September 1992).
10879
D4274 (Article from Javnost, entitled ―A Legal State is Being Established‖, 3 October 1992), p. 2.
10880
D4274 (Article from Javnost, entitled ―A Legal State is Being Established‖, 3 October 1992), pp. 4–5.
10881
D3826 (Order of JNA 5th Corps, 24 April 1992).
10882
D2676 (Excerpts from instructions of SerBiH Government for municipal crisis staffs, 26 April 1992), pp. 1–2.
 973

1992,10884 23 June 1992,10885 10 August 1992,10886 17 August 1992,10887 19 August 1992,10888 21

August 1992.10889 (#ALL EXCULPATORY#!) On 24 August 1992, Mićo Stanišić sent a
dispatch to all CSBs and SJBs, requiring data by 30 August 1992 on all detention camps, prisons
or collection centres, their location, the number of persons detained and who ordered the
establishment and detention of people at the camps.10890 (#EXCULPATORY#!) On 14 May
1993, pursuant to an order by the President, Mladić ordered that the Geneva and Hague
Conventions and other provisions of ―the international law of war‖ be observed in all respects.10891
(#EXCULPATORY#!)

3410. The Chamber considers that while the Accused and his subordinates issued orders during
the conflict regarding respect for international humanitarian law, the rampant criminal acts being
committed against non-Serbs in the Municipalities continued. The Accused continued to learn
about the commission of serious crimes committed by Serb Forces against non-Serbs throughout
the conflict and yet he continued to issue the same type of generic orders.10892
(#EXCULPATORY#! Beside that, the President from his position wasn’t commanding the
VRS in terms of operational and tactical commands, since he handed this part of his
ingerences to the Main Headquarted of the Army, and therefore could issue only general
orders, pertaining to the obligations of the Army, about informing the Army on the political
issues, or to inform the Army about his agreements with the negoptiators, which pertained to
the Army, particularly concerning ceasefires or withdrawals!) He made no efforts to ensure
that these orders were implemented on the ground so as to generate a positive effect on the
prevention of crime. (Wrong inference! How possibly the Chamber may have known that the
President didn’t make efforts to ensure an implementation of his orders? This wasn’t up to
him to control all of the orders he issued, because it was impossible, and no president all over
the world could do that. The institutions had the President’s positions on the subject, and the
President had witnessed that the institution conveyed his orders in a good fate and in a very
vigorous manner, and this was sufficient to him. The President orders end at the first person
of an institution, commander or other chief, and institutions from that moment had their
own orders (the President’s orders became an executive orders of these institutions) and the
possibility and obigation to control an implementation. In which country a president is
controlling the lowest levels of executive branches! This is insane to expect a president to do
everything in a country. And in any country, even without a war, and with a well built up
institutions it is impossible to eradicate crimes and disable criminals. The Chamber therefore
finds that these orders are not reflective of genuine efforts to prevent such crimes. (This is too
easy to dismiss the entire defence, but being too easy doesn’t mean too honest and proper.
Since the Chamber doesn’t have any evidence that the President sabotaged his own orders
with a parallel counter-orders, the Chamber doesn’t have any reason to doubt in genuinity
and sincerity of those orders, as Okun testified that he never doubted in sincerity of the
President’s orders, regardless of how much it had been successfully implemented. Even so,
there were many sucsessful arrests and judicial processes of perpetrators of the Serb

10883
D4670 (Telegram from Banja Luka CSB to all SJBs, 30 April 1992), pp. 1−2.
10884
D3829 (1st Krajina Corps dispatch, 10 June 1992; Order of 1st Krajina Corps, 9 June 1992), p. 15.
10885
D3837 (1st Krajina Corps dispatch, 23 June 1992).
10886
D467 (Order of MUP of SerBiH to CSBs Sarajevo, Trebinje, Doboj, Bijeljina, Banja Luka, 10 August 1992), p. 1; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5240–5241 (15 July
2010).
10887
D469 (Order of MUP of SerBiH, 17 August 1992), p. 1. See also Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5268 (15 July 2010); Mićo Stanišić, T. 46401–46403 (3 February
2014).
10888
D4255 (Prijedor SJB dispatch forwarding order from Mićo Stanišić to Banja Luka CSB, 19 August 1992).
10889
D4256 (Banja Luka CSB dispatch to all SJBs, 21 August 1992; Prijedor SJB dispatch forwarding Banja Luka CSB dispatch, 24 August 1992); see KW609,
T. 46144–46148 (29 January 2014).
10890
D475 (SerBiH MUP Order to all CSBs and SJBs, 24 August 1992), p. 1; Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5268–5270 (15 July 2010).
10891
D3309 (VRS Main Staff Order, 14 May 1993); D104 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Directive to VRS Main Staff, 11 May 1993)
10892
See Section IV.A.3.a.v: Accused‘s knowledge of crimes and measures he took to prevent and punish them.
 974

ethnicity, which had been presented to the Chamber by Col. Novak Todorovic, the President
of the Supreme Military Court! Why such a distinguished witness and a judge didn’t mean
anything to the Chamber?)

i. Investigation and prosecution of crimes committed against non-Serbs

3411. The Prosecution submits that the President supported a policy of non-prosecution of crimes
committed against non-Serbs, which resulted in a climate of impunity for crimes committed
against non-Serbs.10893 The President submits that the RS was committed to proper military and
civilian prosecutions but that with the chaos of war and difficulties associated with institution
building, there were reasonable delays.10894

3412. The Chamber recalls that the Bosnian Serb civilian courts were established on 16 May
1992 in some Bosnian Serb Municipalities and that the military courts began to function in
August 1992.10895 (Wrong! A date when it was decided to establish some institutions is not
equal as a date when such an institution starts to function! There was needed a long period
to put the courts to function, to find a facilities, and the most difficult, to find a professional
judges, since many intelectuals had escaped already at the beginning of April!) On one
occasion in 1993, the Accused claimed to have the ability to stop criminal proceedings. At a
Bosnian Serb Assembly session in the fall of 1993, the President advised that whenever there was
an indication that someone had committed a criminal act it should be forwarded to the authorised
body but that ―if it is the state interest to stop it, we will see that, we will stop it just before the
trial, but all of you will know that. All of you will know why something was postponed or why it
was stopped for the interest of the state. However, it is not to be stopped without being
investigated […].‖10896Again, this is an abuse of a political speech of the President in the
Assembly, while he was fighting a special war of empty hear-say gossips about the white-
collier crimes of the state officials, the same as Branko Djeric was testifying. Let us see what
the President really said: P1379, p. 410

So, a crimes of “robbing state” were discussed, and in the light of a futile gossips instead of a

10893
Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 549, 562.
10894
Defence Final Brief, paras. 761, 771.
10895
See paras. 253, 292.
10896
P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), pp. 410–411. But see D3695
(Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 212–213, 217 (stating that the Accused never exerted any pressure on the work of the
judiciary).
 975

thorough investigation. See further:

So, the President recommended that he also be investigated had there be any allegations about
a white-collier crime, just in order to ascertain the people that nothing is covered up, in
order to quit the special war. Se further: p. 411:

So, in a case that the perpetrator has a high position, and that a trial would endanger the
state security, it may be postponed, but only with the knowledge of all the relevant
institutions.THEREFORE, IT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE WAR CRIMES, OR
OTHER CRIMES EXCEPT FRAUDS AND ABUSE OF THE STATE PROPERTY. AND
SUCH A MANIPULATION SHOULDN’T BE ALLOWED TO ANY CHAMBER! There is
no any possibility to defend from such a huge number of distortions, manipulations,
crippling sentences and meanings – all with the authority of a chamber, no matter if it was
imposed by the Prosecution, or a young assistants didn’t have experience!) furthermore, the
evidence demonstrates that the President was able to intervene in proceedings as he had a military
judge removed from his position in 1994 after the judge refused to follow instructions from the
President about how to rule on a case.10897

So, general Subotic in his capacity in the Chief Inspector of the VRS intervened, we will see
how and why. First of all, Mr. Latkovic was a Serb, and this reason is fake. :
However, Mr. Todorovic had been the President of the Military Court of the RS already two
years. Another question is, why Mr. Latkovic was acquitted, and why some judges hadn’t
been dismissed for that?
In light of the foregoing, the Chamber finds that the Accused had influence and authority over the
courts.10898
This Chamber’s finding is based on para 36 of the Novak Todorovic’s statement. Let us see
what it said:

So, as towards the other army officers, the Supreme Commander had competences to
appoint or dismiss them, but in their work they had been independent from the Supreme
Commander. Could it be more clear and unambiguous? It is understood that the President
nominated or discharged the officers on somebody’s proposal. Let us se para 37 of the same
document:

10897
P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011), paras. 32–36, 43–44 (under seal).
10898
See also D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 36.
 976

All other paras in this statement, an interview led by the Prosecution’s official, deny any
involvement of the President in the judicial system. Anyway, this affair in the military
judicial system didn’t have anything to do with a war crimes, but about an alleged crime in
economy in a military factory.

3413. In July 1992, the President assured international representatives that ―war criminals‖
would be subjected to legal procedures.10899 This letter pertained to a possible war crimes. Let
us see what B. Djeric was talking about. However, Branko Ðerić stated that when he advocated
that procedures be put in place to prevent and try crimes in 1992, the Accused blocked such efforts
and ―thought that this could be dealt with later‖, and the MUP and Ministry of Justice did not
implement government decisions that crimes be prosecuted.10900 However, this would be against
the Constitution and law, because the ministries don’t do that, don’t execute the
governmental orders, but leave it to be done by the judiciary, prosecutors and courts.

So far, so confused, he didn’t say what kind of crimes he meant, but he confirmed that
neither others understood and supported him on the issue. His concept of “governing”
ministers was brought from the previous system, and he didn’t accept that his Goverment’s
ministers could only be dismissed in the Assembly#. It was not up to the Government to
decide #“what a crime is”#, because it is not negotiable, it is decided by a law! Also, there
was no a way that Ministries could influence the Prosecution offices, or the courts, but Mr.
Djeric didn’t understand that, see what Min. Stanisic and Min. Mandic told to him in the
Assembly, T.28001: [As read] #"Mr. Djeric says that he is in favour of rule of law and the
constitution. Several times at government meetings, I made some critical remarks stating
that the government cannot take over the powers of the Presidency and the assembly.
Several times we adopted governments -- decisions made by the government establishing
public institutions. All of that is done by the assembly, and you know that full well. Certain
officials were appointed by the government which is supposed to be done by the assembly.

10899
P2937 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić, 5 July 1992) (under seal).
10900
P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Đerić dated 5 April 2012), paras. 14–15, 17, 22; Branko Đerić, T. 28002–28003 (24 April 2012).
 977

Now, who is interfering in whose work, the government in the assembly's work or the
assembly in the government's work? I kept saying that this is not right. Therefore, I was no
good and I could not be part of Djeric's government." And Mr. Stanisic, the Minister of
Interior said to Djeric and the deputates, T28003-4: So Mr. Stanisic says at this very same
assembly session:
[As read] "I would appreciate it if some of the gentlemen here were to say I insisted, first
of all, as the minister of the interior ... there is no rule of law without laws on the basis of
which the Ministry of the Interior can work. The Ministry of Interior cannot work on the
basis of #emotions. We will then turn into a mob committing acts of violence against its own
people. I don't want to do that. I reject that. That has nothing to do with the rule of law.
The -- when there is rule of law, the police force works and it's role is in the rule of law.
Actually, that of the Ministry of the Interior is a preventative one: To report crimes and not
to arrest and beat people. It is not for the police to do other work. There are other organs
responsible for that when there is rule of law. I am in favour of rule of law and I insist that
the police act in such a way or otherwise I will not accept this role." :
Then, the President asked Mr. Djeric, T28004: “Do you remember that that was the
position; and do you remember that there was a certain lack of understanding there, that,
perhaps, the police was wrong, according to the prime minister, but if they submit reports to
the Office of the Prosecutor, #then they have actually carried out their basic function; is that
right?
A. Yes.
Therefore, the MUP finishes it’s job once it hands a criminal report over to the Prosecution.
Also, the Chamber didn’t understand correctly what Djeric said about the President’s attitude,
see: T28047-48 THE PRESIDENT: [Interpretation] P1088 has already been admitted. I don't have
time to call that up. Can I please ask that we look at the transcript from Stanisic/Zupljanin. MR.
KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Q. This is the subject. Did our authorities make any distinctions as far
as criminal prosecution was concerned? Was there any differences in terms of background, ethnic and
religious? I'll read it out in English. MR. KARADZIC: Q. I'm going to read it out. "'It was pointed
out that the priority for both the national service and the crime investigation service, that's the MUP is
to detect war crimes, provide documentation and file criminal reports, documents also provided for war
crimes committed by Serbs.'" Line 6, your answer. Q. And this is what you say: "I already
mentioned that." [In English] "I already mentioned that. No distinction was drawn. All crimes had to
be prosecuted." That's it. That's your answer in line 6. So is that correct; namely, that the authorities
did not discriminate in any way as far as the origin of war criminals was concerned? A. The
authorities could not have acted otherwise, if we look at the constitution and anything else. So #there
were no legal grounds for this, or there was no other reason for people to be treated differently#.
Everyone had to be treated in accordance with the law. If there would be violations, that would be a
violation. Illegal behaviour, it would have to be punished. That's what I said then, and I spoke about
that at length yesterday, and I'm dealing with it today again. And I advocated -- I persistently advocated
the following: All of those who went beyond certain boundaries had to be punished. You did see that at
a very early stage the government adopted all necessary documents for that, and the government asked
for it to be established whether crimes had been committed, whether there had been inhumane
behaviour towards the civilian population, towards prisoners. The government wanted that to be
established and punished, if that had happened.
…and also see para. 10, “it’s not that crimes as such were justified but with regard to the
timing of prosecutions, there was some procrastination… But, see in the para 16 of his
Amalgamated statement what crimes Djeric had in mind:
 978

Evidently, #only the “white collier crimes” could have been procrastinated, and this didn’t
pertain the war crimes. Let us se further:

So, #rumors, gossips, whisperings were supposed to govern the ministers#, which was insane.
See further, p. 10:

Obviously, Mr. Djeric, being a professor all his life, didn’t understand even the law on
Government. Look, the same Amalgamated statement:

That wasn’t “for some reasons of the political leadership” that his resignation wasn’t
adopted the same session, but due to the Law on Government. A resignation had to be
considered and admitted only at a next session. And as he said during his testimony, the
crimes he wanted to accelerate the processing were tied to the economy and a “white-collier
crimes”. Both the ministers who were in dispute with Mr. Djeric, spoke in the Assembly that
the Government can not take a role of the judicial institutions, and that even ministries
couldn’t influence the courts or the prosecutions.
The main issue in the Djeric’s testimony pertaining a procrastination of processing of some
crimes never pertained a war crimes, but a “white colliers” crimes, as said in para 17 of his
Amalgamated statement:
 979

So, the President was for a certain “procrastination” of the Prime Minister’s “count down”
with the two ministers, and never about delay of any war crimes! And #“no procesutions
should take place in compliance with the conclusions of the government!”!
Mr. Djeric clarified misunderstandings between the different institutions, but established tha
pertaining the basic rights, there was no differences, see: T. 27988: You said I was against
the president, or that I had -- had a difference of opinion. That is true. There was a
divergence of opinion between me and Mr. Krajisnik and Karadzic on many things. But
when it came to fighting for certain elementary rights of the people there were no
differences, as was the case in many other things. It also had to do with their understanding
of rights and obligations. They were there people who said, Let's leave it now for the time
being. This is not the right time. We'll deal with it tomorrow and so on and so forth.
Usually such people do not really have any kind of feeling for legal logic or the thrust of time
[as interpreted]. Time is irreversible. Once it's gone, it's gone. There were many people in
our authorities that mixed irresponsibility with dilettantism. There weren't just one or two
but more. However, such people could not be accorded influence over important matters.
Q. An intervention for the transcript. The witness said "the arrow of time" and not "thrust
of time."
A. I was trying to illustrate that the lapsing of time, past, present, future.
But the Chamber didn’t notice this, as well as many other positive assertions which rebut many
“findings” based on much weaker evidence. Also, Djeric said that the President wasn’t
justifying crimes, but was cotious to act quckly and to press the prosecution and courts on
the issues of crimes in economy) In addition, the Accused, in a meeting with Milorad Davidović
and Mladić in the spring of 1992, said that while they should be trying to prevent looting and
stealing by the Bosnian Serb MUP, it was more important to avoid conflicts between Serbs, even
at the expense of not punishing criminal offences.10901 (This meeting didn’t happen, and
couldn’t happen in this composition. No a word about in in Mladic’s Diary, nor other
documents. “looting and stealing” were not a war crimes, but were a “suitable” for an
ideological attacks by the former communists, as Davidopvic himself was!) According to
Branko Ðerić, Mandić and Mićo Stanišić were the ―President‘s men‖, taking orders directly from
the President, and Ðerić was dissatisfied with their work insofar as it related to security as they
ignored government decisions with respect to prevention and prosecution of criminal activity.10902
(It is already commented! Mr. Djeric didn’t understand his position towards ministers. Also,
the Government couldn’t elect the judges, nor could order any prosecution and trial, all of
that is explained in the discussions in the Assembly. As far as it is concerned with the
“president’s” men, this is an old sectarian communist floscula; but, in a war, the two
ministries are closely tied to te President, always!)

3414. As discussed in greater detail below, there was a systemic failure to investigate and
prosecute crimes committed against non-Serbs and few cases in which Bosnian Serbs committed

10901
P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 54.
10902
P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Ðerić dated 5 April 2012), paras. 21–22, 24.
 980

crimes against non-Serbs reached military courts.10903 (#After all the obvious elements that it
hadn’t been question of crimes against non-Serbs, the Chamber continues with suchan
assertion. A “white-colier” crimes had been done only by the Serbs against the state
property!#) The cases prioritised by the military courts in Bijeljina and Banja Luka in August
1992 pertained to failure to respond to mobilisation and desertion by Bosnian Serb Forces and
cases involving Serb victims.10904 The 10 July 1992 logbook for the prosecutor‘s office in Kljuĉ
shows that criminal reports were filed against Bosnian Muslims, with only few being filed against
Bosnian Serbs.10905 Furthermore, it was reported that most cases under investigation in the
Military Court in Sarajevo in November 1993 pertained to crimes against the VRS.10906
(Certainly, these kind of crimes were more frequent than others, and this argument couldn’t
be used for an inference that the military judicial system persecuten only those crimes. It
must be established all the other way around, to depict and prove which crimes hadn’t been
investigated at all. The way must be to establish a positive facts, not negative one. The
Chamber didn’t even notice how many cases had been investigated and documented, and
had been processed, completely during the war, or initiated and completed after the war. For
instance, the Serb judges investigated thirty crimes committed by the Serbs against the non-
Serbs in Sanski most. Since the perpetrators hadn’t been available, these investigations
served for a trials by the Muslim courts after the war, see 1802:

Therefore, no a cover-up, the Serb judges did their job. As well as the police, which
discovered and reported these crimes!)

3415. In relation to crimes committed by Bosnian Serbs against non-Serbs, authorities either
failed to investigate or actively prevented investigations or prosecutions.10907 But, this wasn’t
true! The truth was that Vojkan had been in the Commision for the exchange of people and
reunion of families, but #he was expelled from this commission#, because he used to make a
commercial arrangements with his counterparts in Tuzla. There was no a single Muslim who
wanted to charge him, because he didn’t use any force. Morally it wasn’t acceptable, but
criminally, nobody could sue him, not even after the war!) In Zvornik, municipal authorities
were made aware of the massacre at Drinjaĉa Dom Kulture but nothing was done to investigate
nor was there anything done to investigate the crimes committed at Karakaj Technical School.10908
(But, from the beginning it was clear that these crimes had been commited by the
paramilitaries, which had been banned, arrested and handed over to the Serbian
prosecutors, who prosecuted them and convicted them. What else was to be investigated?)
Bratunac municipal authorities and police learned that civilians were brought to the hangar of Vuk
Karadţić School and heard rumours some may have been killed but the Bratunac SJB Chief

10903
See KDZ492, P3596 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik). T. 3929–3930 (under seal); P3632 (Schedules A and B of ICTY indictment against Momĉilo
Krajišnik); P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), pp. 9–10 (under seal); KDZ531, T. 15852–15855 (1 July 2011) (closed session);
paras. 639–640 .
10904
P2929 (Witness statement of KDZ531 dated 25 June 2011), p. 9 (under seal); P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011) (under seal),
paras. 7–8.
10905
Slobodan Jurišić, T. 47083–47085 (14 February 2014); P6671 (Excerpt from logbooks from Brĉko, Doboj, Kljuĉ, Sanski Most and Travnik Prosecutor‘s
Offices).
10906
D4880 (Report of Sarajevo Military Court, 2 December 1993).
10907
In addition, to the proceeding examples, the Chamber notes that when Vojkan was arrested in 1993 for expelling Bosnian Muslims from Bijeljina, he was
released after he produced documentation showing that he had been authorised to locate and expel Bosnian Muslims by Krajišnik. Svetozar Mihajlović, T.
35737–35740 (20 March 2013); Milorad Davidović, T. 15702–15703 (30 June 2011); D3137 (Witness statement of Svetozar Mihajlović dated 17 March
2013), para. 14; [REDACTED].
10908
Marinko Vasilić, T. 39937–39938 (13 June 2013). See Scheduled Incidents B.20.1, B.20.3.
 981

forbade the police from investigating.10909 (It was easily understandable, since the war crimes
had fallen within the military law competence, and the police hesitated to do any
investigation. At the time, there was no even the VRS, which was established by a decision on
12 May 92, and enacted on 15 June 1992! There was no other army, but only the JNA, which
was the only regular army in BiH until 20 May. The Muslims in Bratunac attacked the JNA
on 3 May in Hranca, a village in the outskirts of Bratunac, and all the subsequent skirmishes
had been a continuation of this conflict. How possibly the local authorities in Bratunac could
have taken the competences of the JNA in the presence of the JNA?) The Prijedor Crisis Staff
and SJB, as well as the Banja Luka CSB and VRS were aware of the Room 3 massacre at
Keraterm, however there was no investigation into the shootings or mention of the incident in
reports on Keraterm.10910 The Keraterm Room 3 massacre was explained as an attempt of
escape, and that is what was an official position. But the President had nothing to do with
that, and even didn’t know anything about it. In this case there are evidence that there was a
riot and an escape attempt, while the Muslim attack on Prijedor was still going on!) Sokolac
municipal authorities became aware of the killings at Novoseoci on 22 September 1992 the same
day but no investigation was carried out.10911 If it was said, or assumed that the crime had been
commited as a war crime, the civilian authorities had no competence to do any investigation.
Since the militaries knew about it, that was up to them to conclude whether it was a crime,
or a legal action in a skirmish between them and the Muslim extremists!) Municipal
authorities were aware of the crimes committed in the Luka Camp in Brĉko.10912 Slobodan Avlijaš
visited Brĉko and was informed that approximately 226 non-Serb civilians were killed in Brĉko
and buried in mass graves and subsequently prepared a report which indicated that the victims
were killed in combat.10913 However, there was never an investigation because according to
Ristanić, it was impossible at the time.10914 (Both, Avlijas and Ristanic were the RS officials,
and they had been working in a horrible, impossible conditions. #Ristanic was arrested# by
the paramilitaries which committed crimes, and if Ristanic was in favour of their criminal
conduct, they would never arrest him. The entire civilian authorities in Brcko had been
mistreated by the paramilitary criminal elements, until the MUP and the Federal MUP
forces arrested them (M. Davidovic) Crimes committed in Vlasenica were widely known and
criminal reports were filed but there were no criminal or disciplinary proceedings.10915 (All of
those crimes appeared to happen at the beginning of the conflict, and there was no either
civilian, or military judiciary system. There are many documents confirming that from
everywhere there were demands to form the courts, and to delineate the civil/military
competences. The Chamber can not think about those areas as about a structured state,
which it became after the first year, year and a half of the war! There were a fierce fightings
imposed by the Muslim extremists, and they had committed crimes, while there was no
crimes committed by the Serbs. Pertaining to a suburb called Drum, that was not a crime,

10909
D3194 (Witness statement of Rodoljub Đukanović dated 24 March 2013), para. 40; D3115 (Witness statement of Branimir Tešić dated 9 March 2013), para.
24. See Scheduled Detention Facility C.6.2, Scheduled Incident B.4.1.
10910
See Scheduled Incident B.15.1; D470 (CSB Banja Luka Report concerning collection centres, undated), e-court pp. 2–4, 28–30; P3549 (Report of the
Commission for Inspecting Collection Centres and Other Facilities for Captives in the ARK, 17 August 1992), p. 4; P2968 (Report of Prijedor SJB, January
1993); P6536 (Report of Banja Luka CSB, 20 January 1993), p. 3; Dušan Janković, T. 47341–47343 (18 February 2014).
10911
Dragomir Obradović, T. 36096–36097, 36100–36103 (26 March 2013). See Scheduled Incident A.13.1.
10912
See Scheduled Killing Incident B.5.1; D1436 (Report of SerBiH MUP, 17 June 1992), p. 3; D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p.
2; D1574 (Report of Brĉko SJB, undated), pp. 2, 4; P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 115–116; Dragomir Andan,
D3774 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Ţupljanin), T. 21423–21424.
10913
P1607 (RS Ministry of Justice report on prisons and camps on the RS territory, 22 October 1992), p. 3; P3023 (Witness statement of ÐorĊe Ristanić dated 15
June 2011), para. 212–223; Slobodan Avlijaš, T. 35196 (11 March 2013). See also D3105 (Witness statement of Slobodan Avlijaš dated 9 March 2013),
para. 23.
10914
P3023 (Witness statement of ÐorĊe Ristanić dated 15 June 2011), para. 210; ÐorĊe Ristanić, T. 16736 (15 July 2011).
10915
See, e.g., Scheduled Incident A.15.1; D3093 (Witness statement of Mane Đurić dated 3 March 2013), paras. 34, 44; Mane Đurić, T. 35006, 35030–35031,
35059–35061 (7 March 2013) (private session); P3227 (Witness statement of KDZ033 dated 7 April 2010), paras. 64, 167 (under seal); D447 (SerBiH
MUP, Analysis of functioning of the MUP, July 1992), pp. 18–19. Several perpetrators of crimes committed against non-Serbs in Vlasenica were eventually
tried and convicted before the Tribunal and courts in BiH. See Dragan Nikolić Sentencing Appeal Judgement; P6132 (Verdict of BiH Court against Predrag
Bastah and Goran Višković, 4 February 2010).
 982

that was a legal action against the Muslim stronghold that fired at the JNA command on a
daily basis.) While the police organs and courts were fully organised and constituted in Novo
Sarajevo they were not active in prosecuting individuals or protecting individuals.10916 (Note
entirely correct, see: @@@) Batko was committing crimes over a period of months there and
the military police and prosecutor‘s office had the capacity to arrest and prosecute him but did not
do so.10917 It was only in Novo Sarajevo that there was a police station, but the entire
municipality of Novo Sarajevo was on the confrontation line, and there was nobody who was
able to control everything and everyone. And certainly the local authorities hadn’t been in
favour of Batko or any other criminal, and it wasn’t that the municipal authorities (among
them Neskovic too) nourished criminals, but weren’t capable of quitting with them. Neskovic
himself was an official, and he knew that the civilian police couldn’t do much, leaving it to
the military, and the military police planned his arrest or liquidation. As we have heard from
the witness KDZ354, #Batko did all his misdeeds secretly, hiding in the dark and avoiding
lightened streets#. See what KDZ354 said in her Amalgamated statement, P02444, para 47:

Obviously, KDZ354 was aware that #mentioning the police the criminal named Batko would
refrain from doing something wrong#. At her testimony, KDZ354 testified that Batko
presented himself with a false name, T.13233

Q. But in any case, he had the need to conceal his identity; is that right?
A. Well, in that kind of thing, you know how it was. He said, "You can call me Dragan,"
even though no one asked him anything.

KDZ354, testimony, T.13221-222 The next day the military police came. I'm saying that
because of those white belts, and I had some relatives who belonged to such units, so -- I
mean in peacetime, had belonged to these units in peacetime. So I could recognise the
military police therefore.
So everybody addressed the commander of that unit as Zenga, Zenga. Zenga. So I have to
say that he was very polite at the very outset. He addressed us in a very polite way. He
asked for our IDs, and he was saying that we were just sitting there while his people were
getting killed.
Q. That's the one who had a Croatian accent; right?
A. Well, that was my impression, yes. I think that that was the case. He sounded like
someone who had lived in Croatia a long time. You can hear that kind of accent.
Q. Do you remember that Zenga was the abbreviation used for members
of Tudjman's National Guards Corps? Did you know that?
A. Later on I knew about that, yes. : So, the regular military police behaved differently.
Further, on T.13240 of the transcript, KDZ354 described how Batko have hidden his
misdeeds: He took these two pouches, and before that he had threatened us by saying, "If
you are lying to me," he also fired some bullets close to my head, "I am going to kill you in
front of your mother." However, as soon as he saw this gold, he took it and said, "If you

10916
Radomir Nešković, T. 14308–14309, 14316–14317, 14319 (7 June 2011); P5065 (Minutes of SRK Command consultation meeting, 15 November 1992), p.
12.
10917
Radomir Nešković, T. 14316–14317 (7 June 2011).
 983

decide to go out, if you talk to anyone about this, I have my men. I have my snipers. I have
my men who are going to kill you." And then he left.:
From whom was he fearing while threatening the ladies if they go out and say what
happened? #Certainly, from the Serbian authorities in Grbavica#. No other inference is
possible!)

3416. Furthermore, local or municipal authorities, SDS members, soldiers, and family members
of President persons often pressured authorities to release persons President of committing crimes
against non-Serbs.10918 The military court in Banja Luka released Bosnian Serbs from custody
before their cases had been completed so they could return to combat activities.10919 Let u see
what the Chamber meant by concluding the last sentence: P03612:

So, this is the source and basis for this inference. Could it be that way? A lawyer fighting to
release his defendant from a custody because of to lengthy investigation and a lack of
prospective that the investigation would be ended soon, mentioned that similar moves
happened earlier. But, we do not know whether it really happened or not. Further, we do not
know whether it happened in this case. How come the Chamber is promoting a defence
submission from another (military) court to an evidence in this case? Even if it was a court’s
10918
[REDACTED]. See e.g. P3611 (Proposal of the Military Prosecutor's Office attached to the 1st Krajina Corps, 29 July 1993) (under seal); P3616 (Proposal
of the Military Prosecutor‘s Office attached to the 1st Krajina Corps, 29 July 1993). See also D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17
February 2013), para. 15. [REDACTED].
10919
[REDACTED]. See also P3612 (Submission to Banja Luka Military Court, 26 January 1993), p. 2; P3610 (Tactical Group 3 request, 27 August 1992);
[REDACTED].
 984

deliberation, it shouldn’t be charged to this President, let alone a mere defence submission!)
: For example: (i) Zoran Ţigić was released from prison a few days after being arrested due to a
request for him to return to active duty even though it was reported to the Prijedor SJB by the
Commander of Keraterm that he had beaten and killed prisoners there;10920 (The Chamber
already knows that nobody should and could influence an investigating judge to maintain a
custody for some suspect, or not. There were a reasons for either, prescribed by in the law,
and it had nothing to do with the presidential duties. What the Chamber would conclude had
the President intervened to release or not release a suspect. Once he intervened, asking for
the reasons why some suspects had so long trial, meanwhile being out. In our judicial system
there wouldn’t be possible to keep a man 12 years in custody without judgment, as this court
did with Dr. Seselj!) (ii) the perpetrators of the killings of at least 77 men at Velagići School on 1
June 1992 were arrested but returned to their units without being tried with the support of the
deputy prime minister of the RS and the chairman of the Kljuĉ Executive Board;10921 Let us see
what is the basis for this findings: P03616, a proposal of the military prosecutor, and
reasons:

Evidently, there were some #reasons which led the military prosecutor to propose “halting” and
not droping the case#. But, what it has to do with the President? He wasn’t asked, as ever, he
didn’t participated in any way, the judicial system was independent, and the case was to be
proceeded once the conditions are fulfilled.
and (iii) Daniluško Kajtez admitted to killing 12 individuals in Manjaĉa in November 1992 but
was released as a result of pressure exerted on the Military Court.10922 Regardless of admittance,
an President had to undergo a trial, but the only witness, Grgo Stojic who testified in this
case, was not available until the war ended, when Kajtaz had been tried and convicted. The
Chamber considers that this evidence suggests a systemic vulnerability of the justice system to
external pressure, including by low-level municipal officials. This is correct, but it happened
only in several cases and at the beginning of the war. Everyone was armed, the unified
command hadn’t been established, but no case was covered up, or dropped on no legal basis.
Particularly, the President had nothing to do with any of those ommisions.)

3417. On 20 December 1992, at a meeting of the Supreme Command in the presence of the
President, Mićo Stanišić spoke of the need to strengthen the judiciary and to consider whether the

10920
D1926 (Order of Banja Luka CSB, 1 July 1992); D1925 (Prijedor SJB criminal report, 2 July 1992), e-court p. 2; P6597 (Request from Prijedor Prosecutor‘s
Office, 3 July 1992); D4140 (Official note of Prijedor SJB, 4 July 1992); Dragan Radetić, T. 45690–45691, 45700–45701, 45711–45713, 45715 (21 January
2014); P6598 (Decision of Prijedor Lower Court, 9 July 1992). See also P6596 (Letter from ARK sabotage and reconnaissance unit to Prijedor Prosecutor's
Office, undated). See para. 1802. Ţigić was eventually convicted by the Tribunal for the crimes he committed at Keraterm. See Kvočka et al. Trial
Judgement; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement.
10921
Adjudicated Fact 2447; P3616 (Proposal of the Military Prosecutor's Office attached to the 1 st Krajina Corps, 29 July 1993); P6143 (Excerpt from ruling of
Banja Luka Military Court, 29 July 1993), pp. 1–2; [REDACTED]; Novak Todorović, T. 34077 (20 February 2013). See Scheduled Incident B.10.1.
10922
See Scheduled Incident B.1.1.
 985

situation at the time was satisfactory since the courts were then attached to commands and
corps.10923 (#EXCULPATORY#! Let us see what Minister Stanisic said at the meeting, doc.
P01469, p. 3:

And see what the President said at the same meeting: P01469, p.5

That
was the first meeting of the Supreme Command, and a substantial part of the time was
dedicated to the rule of law. After such a remarks as Mr. Stanisic said, the President made
further consultations, and decided to distant the seat of the Supreme military court and the
Supreme military Prosecution in Zvornik, as the President of the Supreme military court
Novak Todorovic testified, see: D2986, commented in para 3412 above!)

3418. The Chamber notes that in response to specific events, the President and other members
of the Bosnian Serb leadership or Serb Forces sometimes called for criminal investigations.
(#EXCULPATORY#! It was a regular duty of institutions, but in some drastic cases, he
political leadership was ecpected to react! The international mediators also wanted the
leaders to speak up, so that the population could see what is the position of prominent people
towards such a crimes!) The Chamber notes the President‘s efforts to disband certain
paramilitary groups, including through the assistance of the Federal SUP.10924
(#EXCULPATORY#! But, not only “certain” but all of paramilitary groups, as it was
provided in all the President’s strict orders! And the Chamber may have kept the Mauzer’s
Guard, or some other units with a “pitoresc” name was a paramilitary, it was not the case.
Many units had their names, such as “Vukovi caa Drine – Wolves from Drina, or “White
wolves” etc. but their subordination to the VRS was not questionable) ! Furthermore, on
hearing of the Korićanske Stijene incident, the President requested an investigation and on 31
August 1992, Mićo Stanišić (#EXCULPATORY#!) ordered Ţupljanin, the chief of the Banja
Luka CSB, to investigate the massacre.10925 (#EXCULPATORY#!) However, Ţupljanin was
advised by Drljaĉa that an investigation could not be carried out because the officers who had
participated in the convoy and incident were currently deployed in the battlefield.10926 (But, what
does it have to do with the President, who was in London for Conference. Also, the
perpetrators escaped in the Mount Kozara, and two of them Drljaca tried to disarm and
arrest, The Chamber recalls that none of the policemen involved in the incident were held
accountable for their involvement in the killings.10927 Rather the intervention squad involved in
the killings was disbanded and subsequently returned to active combat.10928

10923
P1469 (Minutes of VRS Supreme Command meeting, 20 December 1992), p. 3.
10924
See paras. 3204–3210.
10925
D4194 (Witness statement of Sveto Kovaĉević dated 7 December 2013), para. 40; D1881 (Dispatch from Mićo Stanišić to Banja Luka CSB, 31 August
1992).
10926
D1882 (Letter from Simo Drljaĉa, 14 September 1992); D1885 (Dispatch from Simo Drljaĉa to Stojan Ţupljanin, 13 October 1992). See also Adjudicated
Fact 2492.
10927
See para. 1845. The Chamber notes that Subotić testified that everybody ―did their part of the job‖ with respect to the investigation. D3695 (Witness
statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 242–246; Bogdan Subotić, T. 40105–40111 (20 June 2013); T. 40173–40175 (21 June 2013).
However, the Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable because Subotić‘s evidence was marked by indicators that he was seeking to minimise his
own knowledge of the investigation which followed this incident and in light of the fact that none of the perpetrators were ever held accountable.
10928
See paras. 1844–1845.
 986

3419. On 6 April 1993, Prime Minister Vladimir Lukić, with the support of the President,
demanded the Command of the SRK and the Main Staff of the VRS to investigate allegations of
looting, killing, arson and rape in Novo Sarajevo committed by the VRS.10929
(#EXCULPATORY#!) On 20 December 1994 Bogdan Subotić, on behalf of the Office of the RS
President, ordered a thorough investigation of an incident involving members of special police and
members of military police of the 2nd Krajina Corps.10930 (#EXCULPATORY#!) In February
1994, the President was notified about a meeting of the municipal leaders, MUP, and military and
judicial organs due to ―a very bad situation regarding public law and order in Trebinje
municipality‖ and that military security organs failed to execute their part, as ―groups of
servicemen were harassing refugees‖.10931 (#EXCULPATORY#! It is not a regular duty of the
President to do so, but if the institutions needed his support, he intervened, and only if it was
needed!) The President ordered the VRS Main Staff to report back to him about the measures
taken.10932

3420. During the conflict, there were some prosecutions of Serbs for crimes committed against
non-Serbs.10933 (#EXCULPATORY#!) However, the calls for investigations and the
prosecutions were insufficient in light of the sheer number of serious offences which were not
investigated and went unpunished. (First of all, it shouldn’t have depended, and it didn’t
depen of the President calls for investigations. Just because this was a civil war, it was useful
to have such a support and encouragement from the high officials. Anyway, There was no a
case known to this Defence which had been covered. All had been registered and ready to
process when possible. The Muslim police in Sanski Most inherited the entire investigative
materials of crimes commited by the Serbs against the non-Serbs, see: D01802. This
document rebuts all the assertions contained in the previous paragraph!)

10929
D3574 (Letter from RS Office of Prime Minister to VRS Main Staff and SRK command, 6 April 1993); D3563 (Witness statement of Vladimir Lukić dated
18 May 2013), para. 36; Vladimir Lukić, T. 38801 (28 May 2013).
10930
D4640 (Letter from RS President's Office to RS MUP and VRS Main Staff, 20 December 1994).
10931
P3053 (Radovan Karadţić‘s order to VRS, 19 May 1994), p. 3.
10932
P3053 Radovan Karadţić‘s order to VRS, 19 May 1994), p. 3.
10933
D3695 (Witness statement of Bogdan Subotić dated 16 June 2013), paras. 208–215, 218, 297; Savo Bojanović, T. 34817–34828, 34830–34835, 34842–
34843 (5 March 2013); D3076 (Witness statement of Savo Bojanović dated 2 March 2013), paras. 11–12, 23–27; [REDACTED]; Novak Todorović, T.
34095–34098 (20 February 2013) (private session); D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 18; Radomir Nešković,
T. 14310–14311 (7 June 2011). For cases in the civilian courts, see D1467 (Bijeljina High Court judgement in Branko Đurić case, 27 October 1995); D1490
(Indictment of Brĉko Public Prosecutor, 28 July 1993); D4239 (Banja Luka Public Prosecutor‘s Office file on Sredo Aleksić), p. 8; D4240 (Banja Luka
Public Prosecutor‘s Office file on Boško Bavarĉić), e-court pp. 3–4, 14–15; D1798 (Banja Luka CSB criminal case file, August-September 1992), e-court p.
48. D4235 (Witness statement of Jevto Janković dated 24 January 2014), para. 7; Jevto Janković, T. 45956–45957 (27 January 2014). For cases in the
military courts, see D1465 (Bijeljina Military Court indictment of Radovan Mićanović, 17 August 1993); D1466 (Bijeljina Military Court judgement in
Radovan Mićanović case, 22 March 1995); D1481 (Bijeljina Military Prosecutor request re Cvjetković/Jurošević case, 29 October 1992); D1482 (Bijeljina
Military Court record re Cvjetković/Jurošević case, 29 October 1992); D1483 (Bijeljina Military Prosecutor request re Cvjetković/Jurošević case, 30
October 1992); P6181 (Bijeljina Military Court‘s Dispatch to Military Prosecutor‘s Office, 28 January 1993); D1489 (Bijeljina Military Court decision in
Cvjetković/Jurošević case, 1 April 1993) (under seal); D1757 (Indictment of the Military Prosecutor‘s Office attached to the 1st Krajina Corps, 18 July
1993); D1758 (Banja Luka Military Court‘s Judgement, 13 October 1993) (under seal); D1759 (RS Supreme Military Court‘s Judgement, 12 November
1994) (under seal); D1799 (Indictment of the Military Prosecutor‘s Office attached to the 1st Krajina Corps, 10 February 1993); D3081 (Bijeljina Military
Court‘s verdict, 18 January 1994); D3077 (Supreme Military Court‘s Judgement, 16 May 1994); D1468 (Correspondence between Bijeljina Lower Court
and Radovan Karadţić, 9 June 2011); D1469 (Correspondence between Bijeljina District Prosecutor and Radovan Karadţić, 24 August 2009); D3082
(Bijeljina Military Court‘s Verdict, 24 June 1993); D3083 (Bijeljina Military Court‘s Verdict, 27 August 1993); D3084 (Bijeljina Military Court‘s Verdict,
11 October 1993); D3085 (Bijeljina Military Court‘s Verdict, 16 September 1993); D3086 (Bijeljina Military Court‘s Verdict, 9 March 1993); D3087
(Bijeljina Military Court‘s Verdict, 22 June 1993); D3088 (Bijeljina Military Court‘s Verdict, 17 June 1993); D3079 (Bijeljina Military Court‘s Ruling, 19
June 1993); D3080 (Bijeljina Military Court‘s Proposition, 26 April 1993); D596 (VRS Military Court judgement against Jovo Pejanović, 17 December
1992); P3597 (Criminal report of the 6th Krajina Brigade, Sanski Most Military Post, 7 December 1992) (under seal); P3519 (Indictment of the 1 st Krajina
Corps Military Prosecutor‘s Office, 2 June 1993); D1788 (Banja Luka Military Court‘s Ruling, 5 April 1994) (under seal); D1793 (Banja Luka CSB
criminal case file, October-December 1992); D1776 (Record of trial of Banja Luka Military Court, 17 December 1992) (under seal); D1777 (Letter from
Banja Luka Military Court to Srbac SJB, 18 December 1992) (under seal); D1780 (Record of deliberation and voting of Banja Luka Military Court, 21
October 1993) (under seal); D1781 (Record of deliberation and voting of Banja Luka Military Court, 20 April 1995) (under seal); D1782 (Record of trial of
Banja Luka Military Court, 20 April 1995) (under seal); P3633 (Judgement of the Banja Luka Military Court, 20 April 1995) (under seal); D1796 (Delivery
Note of Banja Luka Military Court, 19 October 1994); P3631 (Judgement of the Banja Luka Military Court, 6 February 1993) (under seal). See P2931
(Bijeljina Military Court indictment of Zoran Tomić and Dragan Matović, 24 June 1993), pp. 54–60, 84–87; [REDACTED]. See also D4279 (Verdict of
Banja Luka District Court against Mile Zgonjanin, 25 November 2008); Mićo Stanišić, T. 46395−46396 (3 February 2014) (testifying that the judgement
was passed based on the evidence that was collected in 1992.
 987

3421. The Chamber has considered evidence that in 1994 and 1995, the President issued orders
with respect to improving the military justice system.10934 (#EXCULPATORY#!) However, the
Chamber is not convinced that they were sufficient to hold persons accountable for the very
serious offences which had been committed in the Municipalities against non-Serbs in light of the
fact that so many crimes against non-Serbs went without investigation. (First of all, the
#President made what was his duty, to order and facilitate the functional military justice
system#. Nothing else he was expected to do, since the judges were both the regular army
officers and the lawyers and judges, certified and professional. Second, if “they were not
sufficient to hold persons accountable for the bery serious offences…” how possibly the
Chamber found that it was the President’s responsibility? Could there be some other causes,
such as the abilities of the officials on the terrain and so on? Appart of all of it, the Chamber
didn’t indicate which one of these crimes went without investigation? It is natural that the
Chamber is “not convinced” because the Chamber starts with a presumption of guilt, not of
innocence! If the Chamber wanted to be convinced in a negative fact, that something was not
sufficient, what kind of discretion the Chamber seeks, and why in a cases of doubt didn’t
decide in favour of the President? Another word, didn’t there was a requirement of a
positive identification of a crime, not a belief that it could have been done better?) In any
event, the most serious crimes had already been committed by that time.10935 (At least one
admittance of the Chamber that the crimes had been committed before 1994 and 95, i.e. in
the first part of the war, while there was no any state structure and institutions. But, how
many criminal cases are resolved in a countries with the developed judicial system, and in a
peace time? And what does it mean? Have the President done his job? Had any official of the
Republic of Srpska ever issued any order to undermine the President orders?)

3422. In fact, the President was more concerned with punishing offences committed against
Bosnian Serb Forces than the non-Serb civilian population. (This is incorrect assertion, and
shouldn’t be “finding” in any chamber. But, let us see what was a basis!) This is
demonstrated by the fact the President made efforts to ensure that crimes committed against Serbs
were investigated and documented. On 17 June 1992, the President created the State
Documentation Centre for Investigation of War Crimes against Serb People and appointed its
head.10936 This is also incorrect. Let us see what was said at the Presidency session:

10934
On 1 January 1994, the Accused ordered an inspection into the military prosecution system in Bijeljina after receiving reports of flaws in the system,
primarily relating to the release of persons detained under reasonable suspicion of having committed grave criminal offences. D1419 (Radovan Karadţić‘s
order to president of Supreme Military Court, 1 January 1994). On 8 August 1994, the Accused ordered the VRS Main Staff to submit a report on problems
in the military disciplinary tribunals and proposals to improve their function D1421 (Radovan Karadţić‘s order to VRS Main Staff, 8 August 1994). On 6
September 1994, the Accused directed that criminal offences against life, limb, and property and the offence of war profiteering should be given priority and
detention measures ―applied to the maximum in the punishment of these offences‖ and instructing the Court and Prosecutor‘s Office to urgently review all
murder cases currently being tried in military courts and to submit analysis to him so that he could take further measures as President of the Republic.
D2993 (Radovan Karadţić‘s instruction to Supreme Military Court and Supreme Military Prosecutor‘s Office, 6 September 1994). The Military
Prosecutor‘s Office of the VRS conveyed similar instructions to the Intelligence and Security Sector of the VRS Main Staff with reference to instructions
from the President. D2998 (Supreme Military Prosecutor‘s Office report, 8 September 1994) On 11 September 1994, the Accused instructed the organs of
military security to review murder cases and report any irregularities observed to the Office of the President of the Republic. D1423 (RS President‘s Office
request to VRS Main Staff, 11 September 1994). See also D2994 (Supreme Military Court‘s instruction, 16 September 1994), p. 1; D2986 (Witness
statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), para. 10. In a session on 15 September 1994, the RS Government, with the support of the Accused,
authorised the MUP and the Ministry of Justice and Administration to collect information on crimes against humanity and other crimes violating
international law, irrespective of the ethnicity of the victims of those crimes. D3364 (Witness statement of Dušan Kozić dated 7 April 2013), para. 18;
D3373 (Excerpt from minutes of 4th session of RS Government, 15 September 1994), p. 2. On 15 December 1994, the Accused ordered the VRS Main Staff
to issue instructions to security and military police organs setting forth their duty to act in accordance with requests and orders by military prosecutors‘
offices and military courts. D1425 (Radovan Karadţić‘s order to VRS Main Staff, 15 December 1994), p. 1. See also D1426 (Instructions of RS Military
Prosecutor‘s Office, 29 December 1994), pp. 2–5. On 4 January 1995, the Accused promulgated the Law on the Mandatory Submission of Information on
Crimes against Humanity and International Law, which the Bosnian Serb Assembly had passed at its session on 29 to 30 December 1994. D1424 (Radovan
Karadţić‘s Decree on promulgation of Law on mandatory submission of information on crimes against humanity and international law, 4 January 1995), p.
1; P1405 (Transcript of 48 th session of RS Assembly, 29-30 December 1994), p. 129. (None of the regular activities excluded or
underminded the obligation to investigate all the crimes regardless of the ethnicity of perpetrators of victims!)
10935
See Section IV.A.2: Legal findings on crimes.
10936
P3064 (Minutes of the 8th session of the SerBiH Presidency, 17 June 1992), p. 1; D3990 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Decree, 17 June 1992), p. 1.
 988

Therefore, there was not mentioned “investigation”, but only “documentation”. In the
original it was only for gathering documents, and the chief was not a professional in
investigations, but a very famous writer! Only for a “gathering all genuine documents,”
which would be investigated by the professionals. And an editor in the Official Gazette
added the word “investigation”, but further throughout the documentation it had to be
called Documentation Centre:

On 13 July 1992 the Presidency concluded that the work of the Commission for War Crimes
Committed against the Serbian People of BH be urgently activated.10937 This is also
#misunderstood and distorted#. Any commission that was formed meant to collect what had
been done to the Serbs in the areas where the RS MUP didn’t have any access, while all
crimes commited on the territory of RS were in the competences of regular services, and no
commission was allowed to interfere in it’s investigations. As the Chamber notified, it was
about the crimes in BiH, (this para.) but didn’t notice and didn’t wonder: how the crimes
against the Serbian people in the territory where the entire people couldn’t have been
documented, let alone investigated by the RS organs. The Serb MUP and other investigative
organs didn’t have any competence to investigate a crimes committed in the Muslim-Croat
territory, but could collect data about crimes agains the Serbs, while they didn’t have any
legitimacy to even collect data of crimes against the non-Serbs. See what had been said in
P01465, p. 8, of 13. July 92:

and the former Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, clearly indicates that any commission
or a documentation centre couldn’t replace a MUP regular duties. Finally, the chief of the
Documentation centre was a famous writer, not a lawyer, nor a criminologist, nor a
policemen. Let us see what the MUP was doing on the same subject, D01360, of 19. July 92:

Evidently, the #MUP was doing it’s job, and nothing replaced it#. The Minister Stanisic
merged the two important departments, the National Security Service, and the Crime
Prevention Centre to cooperate in investigating the war crimes. They had nothing to do with
the Documentation Centre.

10937
P1465 (Minutes of 19 th session of SerBiH Presidency, 13 July 1992), p. 8.
 989

“#Regardless of ethnicity”#.

This happened almost simultaneously with other activities in documentation of crimes in the
areas not accessible to the MUP RS. So, #no a reasonable chamber would mix it up# and
conclude that a documentation centre was replacing the regular organs and acted selectively.
But it was so far from any reality. The head of the Documentation Centre Mr. Toholj had
written and published a book called “Black book” about the collection of data!):.

On 14 July 1992 the Government decided that measures be taken for the Commission to be activated
for the establishment of war crimes perpetrated against the Serbs.10938 This is again about the
different things. A commission was a political organ, and didn’t replace regular organs, see
P01137, p. 10 of 14 July 92:

Establishing! Not investigating. Similarly, a commission for clarification of the crimes in

economy was established, but the same, not to replace the regular organs: P01137, p. 6

(Only Mr. Trbojevic was a lawyer, all others weren’t, but were a political persons. However,
the translation is wrong, and it should be instead of “for the investigation” translated “for
the clarification”

It is said: a state commission for clarifying (rasvetljavanje) which also didn’t replace the
regular investigative organs, but could overview these organs whether they were doing their
job, or whether they had been corrupted or not. But, not to miss a substantial question: why
the Chamber would keep the President liable for something that the Government was doing
in it’s capacity and competence? The President was not a head of a criminal gang, to be
asked for a permission for any move, there was the Constitution and a clearly assigned
duties!)

10938
P1137 (Minutes of 39th session of SerBiH Government, 14 July 1992), p. 10.
 990

On 6 August 1992, at a RS Presidency session, it was decided that the Commission for Investigating
War Crimes Committed against the Serbian People must commence its work.10939 (That was the
same document, D00465, and also pertained to the Commision for collecting documents from
the people who escaped from the “other side”. Mladić issued an order on 25 September 1992
that information about victims of crimes committed by the ―Croatian-Muslim coalition‖ should be
reported.10940 (Exactly, Mladic understood that it pertained to the crimes commited on the
territory under the Croat-Muslim control) On the same day, Plavšić ordered that all SAOs
spread the word to their municipalities that it was necessary to urgently set up commissions to
gather information on crimes perpetrated against the Serbs by the Croats and Muslims.10941
(Again, pertained to the crimes commited on the territory under the C/M control. What
else? Where on the Serb territory were the C/M forces? And again, it was “to gather
information” not to investigate!)

10939
D465 (Minutes of 24th session of SerBiH Presidency, 6 August 1992), p. 2.
10940
D3987 (Order of Ratko Mladić, 25 September 1992).
10941
P5506 (Request of RS Presidency to Municipal Assembly President, 25 September 1992), p. 1.
 991

3423. On 28 September 1992, the Presidency concluded that the Committee for Investigation of
Crimes against Serbian People should intensify its work.10942 (The same, the crimes on the M/C
territory) On 14 December 1992 the Banja Luka CSB Department Chief wrote to all SJBs to
inform them that a meeting of senior criminal investigators from all centres would occur the
following week in Bijeljina, at which the process of documenting crimes against the Serb civilians,
their property, and Orthodox cultural and religious property would be analysed.10943 (Again,
pertained only to the Muslim-Croat territory. How it is not clear? If it was concerned with
the Serb territory, there wouldn’t be any extraordinary analysis, and it would be in the daily
reports!) At sessions of the Bosnian Serb Government on 6 April and 26 to 27 May 1993, the
work of the ―State Documentation Centre for the Investigation of Crimes Against Serbs‖ was
discussed, as was the ―special importance‖ to instigate criminal proceedings against individual and
group perpetrators of ―crimes and genocide against the Serbian people‖.10944 (And where in the
Republika Srpska these perpetrators existed? It pertained only to those perpetrators on the
M/C territory.) In March 1995, the President advised the Bosnian Serb Assembly that after
reviewing data prepared by the Ministry of Justice and the Republican Prosecutor‘s Office on
cases in civilian courts in 1994, that ―on the whole, the situation in the domain of penal policy is
unsatisfactory‖ and stated that ―this might have far-reaching detrimental consequences for the
overall defence capability of the Republic and the continued successful conduct of the war‖; he
proposed that the Assembly adopt a conclusion that civilian and military courts step up their work
and pass more stringent sentences, especially with respect to criminal offences against the Serb
Forces.10945 This, however, pertained to the crimes commited on the Serb territories, and
those crimes against the Serb Forces could have been commited only by the Serbs, which
weakened the defence capacities. How could it pertain to anything else? If it was as the
Chamber suggested, or “found” in this para, then it would mean that till this time the
judiciary didn’t issue sufficiently “stringent” sentences against the non-Serbs! It is
#impossible to eat a cake and to have it#! “Ne moze i jare, i pare”)

3424. The Chamber notes that some witnesses provided evidence that: (i) the MUP and justice
systems treated perpetrators and victims of different ethnicities in the same manner;10946 (ii) there
was no cover-up of crimes in the MUP, including the CSBs and SJBs;10947 (iii) there were
problems in finding witnesses to proceed with a prosecution, especially in cases involving Muslim
or Croat victims;10948 (iv) there were purported issues deriving from the jurisdiction of the civilian
and military systems, including confusion on the part of civilian and military authorities and
inefficiency;10949 and (v) that investigations and prosecutions were made difficult due to lack of
resources.10950 (#EXCULPATORY#, even if rejected for no reason.)

10942
P3120 (Minutes of the 32nd session of RS Presidency, 28 September 1992), p. 3.
10943
P6642 (Dispatch from Banja Luka CSB to all SJBs, 14 December 1992).
10944
P3138 (Minutes of the 67th session of RS Government, 6 April 1993), pp. 5–6; P3112 (Minutes of the 71st session of RS Government, 26–27 May 1993), p.
12.
10945
D1427 (Radovan Karadţić‘s letter to RS National Assembly, 10 March 1995), p. 1. In this regard, the Chamber notes that on 17 May 1995, following a
meeting of the Government‘s Commission for gathering data on international crimes committed in the RS, Marko Lugonja on behalf of the Intelligence and
Security Department of the SRK Command sent out a request to the Commands of all SRK units to ―gather all the data and evidence in the zones of your
units on war crimes against humanity and international law committed by the enemy against the Serbs and Serbian people. P2646 (Request of SRK's
Intelligence and Security Department, 17 May 1995); P2715 (SerBiH MUP dispatch, 16 May 1992).
10946
D4235 (Witness statement of Jevto Janković dated 24 January 2014), paras. 2, 7; Jevto Janković, T. 45949 (27 January 2014); D3663 (Witness statement of
Goran Maĉar dated 3 May 2013), paras. 26–27. See Dobrislav Planojević, T. 36258, 36262–36263, 36297 (28 March 2013); D3981 (Witness statement of
Miroslav Toholj dated 31 October 2013), para. 72; Branko Đerić, T. 28047–28048 (25 April 2012).
10947
Goran Maĉar, T. 39525 (7 June 2013); Dobrislav Planojević, T. 36297 (28 March 2013). See also Ĉedomir Kljajić, T. 42241 (30 July 2013).
10948
KDZ492, P3596 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. Krajišnik), T. 3937–3938 (under seal).
10949
See Momĉilo Mandić, T. 5125–5127 (14 July 2010); D3076 (Witness statement of Savo Bojanović dated 2 March 2013), para. 16; Savo Bojanović, T.
34844–34846 (5 March 2013).
10950
D3663 (Witness statement of Goran Maĉar dated 3 May 2013), paras. 23–24; Mićo Stanišić, T. 46360 (3 February 2014); D3197 (Witness statement of
Dobrislav Planojević dated 23 March 2013), paras. 22–23. See also D447 (SerBiH MUP, Analysis of functioning of the MUP, July 1992), e-court p. 20;
D2986 (Witness statement of Novak Todorović dated 17 February 2013), paras. 4–5, 20; P3773 (Witness statement of KDZ532 dated 31 October 2011),
para. 8 (under seal); KDZ532, T. 21011–21012 (8 November 2011) (closed session); KDZ492, T. 20058, 20061, 20078–20079 (18 October 2011) (closed
 992

3425. Having considered all of the evidence, the Chamber finds that there was a systemic failure
to investigate and prosecute criminal offences committed against non-Serbs in the Municipalities
during the conflict. (Should the Chamber have been obliged to point out a positive evidence as
a basis for this finding?) The Chamber rejects the evidence presented that the justice system
treated all ethnicities the same in light of the compelling evidence demonstrating a lack of
investigation and prosecution of the serious criminal acts committed against non-Serbs which were
brought to the attention of authorities, as opposed to a clear willingness to investigate and
prosecute crimes committed against Serbs.10951 (This is based on a #wrong and distorted
understanding# of the Commissions for Documentation, which never, under no conditions
replaced the regular investigating bodies. Just take for a moment that the Defence is right
regarding these commissions, and all the construct of a failure of the judicial system will fell
apart as fake.) In addition, lack of resources and difficulties with the determination of
jurisdiction or finding witnesses does not explain or justify the lack of proceedings initiated
against Serbs alleged to have committed crimes against non-Serbs because the evidence
establishes that in most cases in 1992, absolutely nothing was done to investigate or prosecute the
horrific crimes which were known to authorities. The Chamber considers that the inadequate level
of investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed against non-Serbs is consistent with the
President‘s position that such matters could be delayed during the conflict.10952 (This is #in
contrast with the evidence: the President all the time kept demanding and ordering the
strictest treatment of the war crimes#. However, the Chamber rejects to recognize a very
clear Djeric’s testimony about the “white-collier” crimes that weren’t a priority for the
President, particularly since the country was under the sanctions, and the supliers may have
done some irregularities, but it would be madness to persecute them for a small irregularities
in a completely irregular situation! There is no a single valid evidence that any delay
concerned with the war crimes, and this kind of mergins the data and making a bastardous
assertion does not fit with any fairness of a trial!)

i. Rewarding of those who committed crimes against non-Serbs

3426. The Prosecution submits that the President rewarded officials who had committed crimes
against non-Serbs rather than punish them.10953 The President submits that there is no evidence
that he rewarded an official who he knew had committed a crime and that proposals for
promotions came from below.10954

3427. The Law on the Army provided the President with the exclusive competence to, inter alia,
decide on the initial commission of officers, promote officers to the rank of Major General and
above, and decide on the admission into service, subsequent appointment, transfer, and
termination of service of officers with the rank of General.10955 It also authorised him to effect
―exceptional promotion‖ with respect to those officers who did not meet the ordinary criteria of
rank promotion and to raise the rank of those officers who were found to have exhibited courage
and excelled in command and control skills.10956

session). See also D1752 (Request from VRS Main Staff, 5 August 1992); D1755 (Information on crime trends and review of work of Military Prosecutor‘s
Office attached to the 1st Krajina Corps, 19 September 1992), p. 1; D2836 (SRK information, 23 December 1993), pp. 3–4; Dragomir Milošević, T. 32869–
32870 (29 January 2013) D2987 (Report of Supreme Military Court on the work of Military Courts, 20 February 1996), pp. 4–5, 10.
10951
See paras. 3414–3416, 3422–3423.
10952
See para. 3413.
10953
Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 567–569
10954
Defence Final Brief, paras. 1335–1336.
10955
P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), Arts. 11, 369.
10956
P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army, 1 June 1992), Arts. 36, 40.
 993

3428. The President promoted several officials who he knew had committed criminal acts against
non-Serbs or held extremist views. (To persecute somebody for his “extremist views” would be
a renewed communist practice to persecute for thinking!) On 24 August 1992 the President
appointed Jovan Tintor, then president of the Vogošća Crisis Staff,10957 as a presidential advisor
and in April 1995 praised him before the Bosnian Serb Assembly for giving ―everything for this
Party, for this people‖.10958 Tintor had been involved in the expulsion and mistreatment of non-
Serbs from Vogošća, and surrounding areas.10959 He also held extremist views which were known
to the Accused.10960 (The #political views are not relevant for a criminal prosecution, and
until the end of the war, and two decades after the war Tintor wasn’t criminally charged,
investigated, indicted or convicted#! There was no a convincing evidence that Mr, Tintor, a
rich man and a private businessman who sacrifice his wealth for the local people wellbeing,
commited any crime. It can not be inferred or claimed unless there is an investigation on
what really happened, what the other side did and who were those who were allegedly
expelled. Both the Prosecution and the Chamber incline to see a somebody’s reputation as a
fact in criminal sense. But, a reputation is created by one’s opponents, and this is
unacceptable in any criminal system!)

3429. The President awarded Mauzer‘s Panthers on 9 January 1994.10961 The President was
aware that Mauzer‘s Panthers, a paramilitary group active in Bijeljina, was involved in planning
and executing the forcible displacement of Bosnian Muslim civilians, committed killings and other
crimes against non-Serb civilians in Bijeljina in 1992.10962 (However, this was not true. Mr.
Mauzer himself appeared to be a bit arrogant, but there was no any criminal charge against
him. To corroborate this, look at the fact that after the war the same Mauzer passed all the
international police checkings and tests, and he was nominated to be a very high official in
the MUP after the war. So, his reputation didn’t prevent the international police to nominate
him, because, unlike in this court, the international police demanded an evidence, not
reputation. As far as it is concerned with his “Panthers”, ther was no any evidence they
commited crimes as well, and they fought on many battlefields correctly, celebrated by the
people. They had never been even mentioned in any investigation!)

3430. The Accused also awarded Miroslav Deronjić on 9 January 1994 and later appointed him
as Civilian Commissioner for Srebrenica on 11 July 1995.10963 Deronjić was the President of the
SDS and chief of the Bratunac Crisis Staff and oversaw a policy of discrimination against Bosnian
Muslims and was involved in operations leading to their expulsion from Bratunac and killings.10964
On 6 May 1992, it was reported to the Accused and Mladić that Deronjić was ―killing all Muslims
by slitting their throats‖.10965 (#Wrong in fact#. At this meeting there were only generals
Mladic and Mandaric, not the President. Also, all other was wrong. It was true that there
were some people from Vukovar, who came after some Bratunac-Srebrenica Muslims who
killed their relatives in Vukovar, and raped a girl who was in the group, #but it is not true
that the local Serb officials invited them#. On the contrary, the local officials were
endangeroud by the same people, had quarrelled and demanded their departure. How a

10957
See para. 2361.
10958
P5430 (Decision of the RS Presidency, 23 August 1992); P970 (Transcript of 50 th session of RS Assembly, 15–16 April 1995), p. 317.
10959
See Section IV.A.1.c.vi.C.1: Take-over of Vogošća town; Section IV.A.1.c.iii.C: Attack on Ahatovići.
10960
[REDACTED].
10961
P5525 (Audio Recording and Transcript of the Ceremonial RS National Assembly, 9 January 1994), p. 18.
10962
See Section IV.A.1.a.1: Bijeljina; para. 3334.
10963
P5525 (Audio Recording and Transcript of the Ceremonial RS National Assembly, 9 January 1994), p. 18; D2055 (Decision of RS President, 11 July 1995).
See also para. 5692.
10964
See Section IV.A.1.a.ii: Bratunac.
10965
P1477 (Ratko Mladić‘s notebook, 14 February–28 May 1992), p. 253. The Chamber notes that Mladić‘s notebook refers to the President of the SDS as
―Rodoljub Deronjić‖. In addition one of the other Bosnian Serb leaders referred to in the notebook was ―Rodoljub Đukanović‖. In light of Miroslav
Deronjić‘s position as SDS President at the time, the Chamber finds that the reference is indeed to Miroslav Deronjić.
 994

serious chamber could not see the mere facts from so many documents. Also, the old
anthagonism between the SDS local officials and the JNA high officers (over the ideology)
made many gossips and denigrations, but lately it appeared not to be true, but only gossips.
Finally, let us see what is written down in the Mladic’s diary, P1477, p. 253-4:

#Before VRS, during the JNA, Karad1i} was not in charge of anything#! Obviously, the JNA
Generals were in Belgrade discussing the situation in BiH, 6 May 1992. There is no evidence
that the President was informed about this meeting, neither he should be, because prior to 12
May the President didn’t have any state office. General Mladic wasn’t a “Bosnian Serb
General” yet! What General Mandaric said about Deronjic was a mere speculation and
gossip aimed to denigrate a JNA opponent, which is visible from the entire note. Therefore,
what General Mandaric said is not valid, there was no established any crime as he described,
and in particular not a crime committed by Deronjic. Until 6 May 1992 only Serbs had been
killed in the area of Bratunac and Srebrenica. On 3 May the Muslim extremists ambushed
the JNA column and had a real fight. Until 6 May, there were only the Serb victims. On 8
May 1992 the Muslim extremists ambushed and killed a very prominent Serb, Judge Goran
Zekic, who was an MP in the common Assembly. The Serbs resisted only on 10 May, with a
demand that the extremists hand over their weapons. As far as it is concerned with the
President, it was only said that he should send somebody to “pacify the extremists”,
presuming that the President was not an extremist!)

3431. The President personally promoted Vojkan Đurković to the rank of major and awarded
him a medal at a ceremony in Bijeljina in 1994 although the President knew that he had
participated in ―ethnic cleansing‖ of non-Serbs during the conflict.10966 (#Wrong in facts#,

10966
Milorad Davidović, T. 15712––15715 (30 June 2011) (questioning the Accused in his testimony about how the Accused could have presented Vojkan
Đurković an award if the Accused knew that Đurković carried out ―ethnic cleansing‖ throughout the war); D1136 (UNPROFOR report, 9 September 1994),
p. 2 (noting that the Accused identified Vojkan Đurković as a member of Arkan‘s men who was involved in ―ethnic cleansing‖ in Bijeljina in 1994. See
 995

wrong in inference! Neither Djurkovic was in the VRS or any other President’s formation,
nor he was promoted, nor he was decorated#. Not even Arkan was decorated, but only his
unit, which was an exemplary disciplined and brave unit. M. Davidovic #testified that he
“thought” that the President promoted V. Djurkovic, although admitting that Djurkovic was
in the Arkan’s army#. No a reasonable chamber would put such a huge lie in judgement!
Everyone knows it, and it was very easy to check. It appeared that the line up wasn’t in 1994
but on 29th October 1995. It is most probable that Djurkovic even didn’t have Arkan’s rank
of major, nor he ever was a major at all. Also, #Djurkovic worked morally obscure things,
but with a full support of the Muslims wanting to cross the confrontation line towards
Tuzla#. He was never criminally reported, or indicted, let alone found quilty. Although the
President didn’t like what Djurkovic was doing, there was no ground for banning his activity
or to imprison him!) Furthermore, at a meeting of the VRS Main Staff on 5 April 1995, the
President acknowledged that Vojkan had worked illegally.10967 (#Wrong, in facts and in
inference!# Look what had been said by the President: ………………………………..

:So, although Vojkan “worked” (past tense) “illegally’’ which in our language meant
“unofficially”, unregulated”, not unlawful, i.e. not necessarily against the law, he was
expelled from the State Commision.

3432. In November 1993 and June 1994, the President promoted and awarded medals of bravery
to members of the intervention squad, as well as high officials who were implicated in the
Korićanske Stijene, such as Drljaĉa, Paraš, Milutin ĈaĊo.10968 (The President, as it had been
established during the process, awards individualst who were being proposed from
grassroots. Until that time there was no information or evidence that these men commited
any crime!) On 3 September 1992, the 1st Krajina Corps reported to the VRS Main Staff that
Drljaĉa was responsible for the incident at Korićanske Stijene and that it had caused indignation
among citizens and members of the 1st Krajina Corps, creating a ―dark stain‖, but that it was
fortunate that the ―international community did not find out about it in more detail‖.10969 (It
doesn’t matter what was written in the army report, the #RS authorities conducted a proper
investigation and didn’t even try to cover up the incident!#) Drljaĉa was also the chief of the
SJB in Prijedor and established Omarska by written order.10970 (The #establishing Omarska
wasn’t a crime by itself#. There are undisputable facts that the Muslim paramilitary
formations attacked Prijedor and had been captured and detained, investigated and
innocent individuals released#, whyle suspects had been conveyed to Manjaca. The Drljaca’s
reputation was not good, but more towards his police superiors than towards a non-Serbs, or
any citizens. #The Chamber is advocating a persecution based on reputation, which makes
all the judicial system to look like a lynch!#)

also D1432 (Report of Eastern Bosnian Corps Command, 22 August 1994), p. 7 (wherein the Accused condemned Vojkan Đurković for criminal activies
directed against members of the VRS).
10967
P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995), p. 65 (indicating that the Accused stated at a meeting of the VRS Main Staff on 5
April 1995: ―It is the standpoint of our policy, there has been a separation of peoples, of cultures of worlds‖ but acknowledged that Vojkan worked
illegally). See also para. 3404; D1429 (Request of Bijeljina‘s Municipal Assembly, 24 July 1995) (which demonstrates that Vojkan was still at large in July
1995).
10968
See para. 1845; KDZ523, P4257 (Transcript from Prosecutor v. BrĎanin), T. 21164–21166 (under seal); P4264 (Award for bravery presented by Radovan
Karadţić) (under seal); P4261 (Article in the Kozarski Vesnik entitled ―Shoulder to Shoulder with the Army‖, 26 November 1993); P4265 (Compilation of
video footage from various Serbian TV stations, undated, with transcript).
10969
P3929 (Report of 1st Krajina Corps, 3 September 1992), p. 4.
10970
See para. 1751.
 996

3433. The Chamber finds that the evidence that the President rewarded or promoted his
subordinates, who he knew had committed crimes, demonstrates that the President was indifferent
to whether they participated in criminal activity directed at non-Serbs during the conflict as long as
the core objectives of the Bosnian Serbs were fulfilled. (#Not correct, and rather nasty and
offensive conclusion without any support in evidence#. Neither it had been established that
the awarded people had committed crimes, nor that it was known to the President that they
committed a crime. A reputation was not sufficient for any kind of persecution! It should be
kept in mind that it was a time of change not only a regime, but the entire one-party system,
and many Serbs had been opposed to it, and denigrated each other, particularly the military
were opposed to the civilian authorities that hadn’t been a communists, and also between the
military and police therwe were sone tensions and rivalry. But, this development has nothing
to do with crimes! For a criminal prosecution there must had been an evidence!)

1. Existence of a common plan shared by a plurality of persons

a. Common plan

3434. In this section the Chamber refers to its factual findings with respect to the Overarching
JCE discussed above and will assess whether those facts establish that a common criminal purpose
existed, and if so, when it came into existence and what was entailed in that common plan. The
Chamber will also assess whether a plurality of persons acted pursuant to that common plan.

3435. The Chamber found that from 1990 and into mid-1991, the political objective of the
Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership was to preserve Yugoslavia and to prevent the
separation or independence of BiH.10971 (That wasn’t a crime, but an opposition to a criminal
unilateral secessions. Once and for all: #BiH didn’t have any legal possibility to secede
without the Serb consent, and without the Serb votes, that made more than one third of the
electoral body! How the Chamber presumes that the Muslims did have a legal position to do
the secession, while the Badinter’s Arbitrage Commission dnied it? Such a wrongful
foundation of these litigations must deliver a wrongful and unlawful findings!#) The central
themes of this objective were to preserve the unity of the Serb people and to ensure that Bosnian
Serbs would not become a minority in an independent BiH.10972 (#Is the Chamber, or the United
Nations that formed this court of an opinion that the Serbs should have accepted such a
drastic deterioration of their constitutional position#??? What international or domestic
documents provided for this? Rejecting to become a deprived minority in their own state,
after so many centuries of skavery and only seventy years of freedom, was not a crime, and
neither BiH could get an independence without the Serb consent on the two bases: as a
constituent people the Serbs were entitled to veto these kind of decisions, and the Serbs had
more than one third of the members of parliament and in the voting population. The
Muslim, side (Mr. Izetbegovic) proposed a division of BiH between the three ethnic
communities, while clandestinely preparing an independence of a unitary state without any
guarantee for the Serbs and Croats. It was only in fall of 91 he promised to “give” a high
autonomy to the communities that were living in BiH. And this “promise” of his was given at
the international conference ICFY. Until there is no clarified this question, whether the
Muslims had a right to deprive the Serbs from their will and freedom, all the decisions will
be fake, and the international community will not have any credibility!) The Chamber also
found that in October 1991, when it became clear to the Bosnian Serb leadership that BiH was

10971
See para. 2651.
10972
See para. 2652. See also para. 2942.
 997

pursuing the path to independence and the Bosnian Serbs‘ objective of preserving Yugoslavia had
been undermined, the focus shifted and plans were developed for the creation of a Bosnian Serb
state.10973 (The #Chamber neglected several facts and international documents, not to
mention the domestic documents such as constitutions and laws. The international
documents: not only the International Covenants of Human rights, mentioned in the EC
decision to recognise the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, but the more actual,
contemporaneous documents of the very same EC, such as the documents of the Hague
Conference on Yugoslavia#. On 18 October 91, a week prior to the Assembly of the Serbian
people had been established, the Hague Conference finished it’s sixt session, see D03059, and
established (in the annexes, which by an omission weren’t attached to the document, but are
anavoidable) that the minorities had their rights in the areas where it wasn’t majority, as
well as in the areas where they had been majority. #Everything what the Serbs required and
what they did was within the scope of the Conference#. The entire concept of the JCE,
particularly it’s political qualifications, is falling down in the light of only these documents,
let alone a permanent domestic and international documents. The President’s statement in
February 92 (14 Feb. 92) were legal and legitimate, and were founded not only in the results
of the ongoing sub-Conference on BiH led by Carrington-Cutilleiro, but also on the results of
the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia, which had been accepted by the President of
Presidency of BiH Izetbegovic!) The process of regionalisation and the creation of SAOs were
the first steps in this process,10974 (#The regionalisation, the communities of municipalities, a
new shape of a municipalities by a re-joining-joining action of a local communes – all of it
was legal and legitimate, and no crime was committed#, and the Chamber erred in
implementing the law contrary to the domestic legal provisions and standards, founding on
these wrong findings the entire construction of the JCE! See, The SRFY Constitution of
1974, D1260, p. .…………………………………………………………

or the Constitution of the Soc. Rep. of BiH from 1974, D1262, p. 90

10973
See paras. 2654, 2711, 2941–2951. The Chamber recalls that it considered the Accused‘s statement in February 1992 about creating a ―sovereign area of the
Serbian people‖, and the supporting statements of both Koljević and Krajišnik, to be highly probative in terms of explaining the changing objectives of the
Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership. See paras. 2819–2820, 2840. The Chamber notes that during his testimony Jovanović tried to downplay any
knowledge of statements made by the Bosnian Serb leadership regarding their aspirations in BiH and characterised them as ―euphoric statements‖. The
Chamber also noted that the witness showed indicators of bias during his testimony. The Chamber therefore does not rely on Jovanović‘s opinion or
assessment about the goal of the Accused or the Bosnian Serb leadership. Similarly the Chamber has had regard to this credibility assessment and does not
rely on Jovanović‘s assessment and characterisation of the Accused‘s rhetoric during the war. It also does not find his evidence regarding the objective of
―Greater Serbia‖ to be reliable. Vladislav Jovanović, T. 34268−34271, 34296, 34301 (26 February 2013), 34347–34348, 34351–34352 (27 February 2013);
D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), para. 54. See also D3026 (Article from Yugoslav Daily Survey entitled
―Montenegrin President: Decisive Step towards Peace in Bosnia‖, 21 June 1993), p. 1.
10974
See paras. 2964–2965. Pašić stated that the Accused did not participate in the establishment of the communities of municipalities and was opposed to it and
was not aware that the Bosnian Serb leadership used regionalisation as a means of grouping ―Serbian‖ territories. D3849 (Witness statement of Radomir
Pašić dated 5 July 2013), paras. 28−29, 32. However, the Chamber notes that Pašić‘s testimony was marked by evasiveness and indicators of insincerity
which undermined the reliability of his evidence in this regard.
 998

p.90, and further, p.91

: : !) and were followed on 24 October 1991 by the decision of the Bosnian Serb deputies in the
SRBiH Assembly to establish a separate assembly, which was constituted the next day.10975 (#All
legal and in an accord with the ICFY# Both the Hague Conference sessions, on 18 and 24
October were finished and issued their documents, which hadn’t been opposed by the
Bosnian representative. As a matter of facts, the Bosnian representatives on the Conference
even committed to give its “components” a large autonomy at the same Conference in the
Hague held 16 – 19 September 1991, see the Dociument issued by the EC on 20 September
91:

In the same document it was established about the rights to self-determination:

10975
See paras. 2914, 2944.
 999

:
The document wasn’t tendered, but since it was an official document of the EC, and since the
Chamber made this regulation problematic, we are entitled to depict this document (even under
R 115) How possibly any chamber could have made conclusions about any JCE knowing about
those documents that pertained to the Yugoslav crisis, which is anyway regulated in the other
international covenants and documents? From that point on, there came into existence a plan
which entailed the creation of parallel governmental structures to be followed by the physical take-
over of Bosnian Serb claimed territory.10976 (#Wrong inference, and wrong in using the facts: the
Serbs had already have those areas under their authorities, as a result of the first multiparty
elections 1990. Therefore, there was #no any need for the Serbs for a “take-overs”#, since they
would have to “take over” this areas and municipalities from themselves. However, since the
Muslim-Croat side had started the changes of the nature of BiH, contrary to the will of the
Serbian people, the Serbs were entitled to organise their authorities, and it was in accordance
with the existing domestic regulations, as well as with the most recent documents of the EC and
the Hague Conference. Neglecting those documents the Chamber supports the other side which
caused the war and atrocities, and also supporting the results of this UN Court in form of a
disastrous conviction of so many innocent people, a gihg military and civilian representatives of
the Serbian people. But, let us see what the Hague Conference “Treaty Provisions for the
Convention” issued 4 November 1991. Regulated the matter of autonomies and respected
authorities:

And this was a basis for the representatives of the EC to accept all of proposals of the Serbs in
Bosnia to be resolved in the Conference on Bosnia, which started almost immediately after this
documents had been issued.) Physical control of territories was a core element of this plan and
the plan envisaged a territorial re-organisation which would allow the Bosnian Serbs to claim control
of a large percentage of the territory in BiH.10977 (A phisycal control of the territory is an
obligation of every local commune, according to the Constitution and the All-people Defence
Law. See the BiH Consttution, D1262, p.90:

10976
See paras. 2708–2710, 2941–2951.
10977
See paras. 2839–2856.
 1000

see other competences of municipalities, particularly in the domain of defence, D1262, p.89

There was #nothing criminal in it#, and particularly since the country to which the then Bosnia
belonged, Yugoslavia, was in a state of war with Slovenia and Croatia, and the war affected
BiH too, not only in sustaining a granades, but also through transportation of combatants and a
war materials. See how it was provided in the BiH Constitution, D1262: para 252 )

So, “rights and duty” to participate in the defence…territorial integrity of SFR Yugoslavia”
and these right and duty are inviolable and inalienable!

(#All the municipal structures were obliged to fully control it’s territory#, particularly
concerning with a possible transportation of the war material, combatants, explosives, etc. A
matter of the territory that the Serbs in Bosnia would claim was another issue, and it wasn’t
envisaged to be a “fait accompli” isue, but a subject of the negotiations.) These territorial claims
were closely linked to the ideology promoted by the Bosnian Serb leadership, as they tried to revive
historical territorial rights and focused on the perceived threats faced by the Bosnian Serbs from
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats who were portrayed as their historic enemies.10978 (No
reasonable chamber would say such a thing and neglect the unavoidable fact that the Serbs
suffered a genocide during WWI and WWII, commited not by an occupier-aggressor, but by
the domestic peoples, namely the Muslims and Croats, a subjects of the nazi NDH, Independent
State of Croatia, a satellite of the Third Reich. The essence of the claims for the autonomous
regions and autonomous authorities is exactly because of a protection from such a
developments, and was envisaged in all the documents, a permanent international and
domestic, as well as the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia just adopted. This is not up to any
chamber to deny these historic facts and build upon such a foundation somebody’s liability. In

10978
See paras. 2839–2856, 2948.
 1001

order to use such a possibility, the Chamber must have had some documents to rely upon. Since
nobody ever denied a real jeopardy for the minorities, the Chamber didn’t have any basis for
incrimination of the ethnic cautions and fears, which was a reason to envisage the autonomies
for minorities in the Haguse Conference documents!)

3436 . The Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership intended that these take-over operations
be achieved militarily and that Bosnian Serbs maintain control over this territory through parallel
structures of authority.10979 (This is #completely wrong and unfounded inference#. First, there
was no any need to achieve the control over the traditional Serb areas, where there was a
legal Serb authorities#. Second, the Serbs didn’t have any army, unlike the Muslim-Croat
coalition, having a very mighty secret army called Patriotic league, Green Berets, (the
Muslims) and ZNG, HOS and other groups, on the Croatian side. The Chamber had a
sufficient evidence that the Serbs, and the President personally, opposed to all attempts to
forming the Serb military or paramilitary formations. Also, it is false assertion tha the Serbs
wanted to maintain the control through parallel structures of authority, since the Serbs had
their own regular authorities. When the Serbs offered to the Muslims to forme their own
municipalities in areas where they had conditions, doesn’t mean anything “parallel” but
regular local and territorial authorities of both the ethnic communities.) This plan to take
physical control of Bosnian Serb claimed territory in the Municipalities through military means
required the mobilisation and co-ordinated actions of the Serb Forces.10980 (A completely
unfounded, wrong inference and false assertion! There was no any “Serb Forces” neither it
was envisaged to use them in a democratic process recognized and mediated by the
European Community! The Serbs proclaimed their Assembly in the same building of the
common assembly, and continued to participate in working of the common Assembly of BiH,
as envisaged by the international documents. There was no any armed force at disposal of
the Serbs in Bosnia, nor they needed any, until attacked. The Chamber is calling upon the
paras of the very same Judgment, as if it is an evidence, which is not. The “taking over”
started in a peaceful manner and far before the war, with the same authorities that had been
elected in 1990, in the capitol of BiH, Sarajevo, as well as on the terrain. Nothing changed,
except the local authorities reorganized their funds and started to function with a more
autonomy, as envisaged by the ICFY, and accepted by Mr. Izetbegovic.) Earlier in this
Judgement, the Chamber found that the use of force was envisaged to take-over power and there
was no genuine concern about the manner in which power was taken.10981 (The Chamber is
multiplying apples and oranges, by editing some angry comments in a tel. conversation far
before taking any steps with a decisions of the organs founded on the rights given by the
constitution and by the Conference on Yugoslavia. A phrase ““let everything go to fucking
hell and that we take the express way” pertained to a dissatisfaction with the cheating
tactics, and threatening that the Serbs would act adequately, not to use any force. Such an
editing of sentences from different occasions is not right, not fair, and not honest.)

3437. Once the Bosnian Serb Assembly was set up, the President issued the Variant A/B
Instructions in December 1991 to ensure preparations at the municipal level for the establishment
of an ethnically homogeneous separate state. The Chamber found above that these instructions
were central in terms of furthering the objectives of the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership
from December 1991 onwards.10982 (First, it wasn’t established (beyond a reasonable doubt)
that the President issued the A/B document. Second, as testified by D. Kapetina, see T41256
– 41258:

10979
See paras. 2654, 2707–2715, 2844–2848, 2991.
10980
See paras. 2844–2845. See also paras. 2898–2899, 3077.
10981
See para. 3084.
10982
See paras. 3073–3079, 3083, 3089.
 1002

Q. Mr. Kapetina, in paragraph 7 of your statement, you talk about

the manual for developing a contingency plan that you wrote in 1990.
Were you shown the paper known as Variant A and Variant B,and what can
you tell us about it? A. First of all, I authored this manual, and as chief republic inspector, it was
my duty to inspect together with other inspectors contingency plans, and through this manual I
tried to help those who made such contingency plans in Bosnia-Herzegovina to make them
more easily. And those who made such plans was everybody from local authorities, local
communes, businesses, socio-political organisations, even associations of citizens. Each one
had the obligation to develop a contingency plan, and I wanted this manual to facilitate their
work and to teach them how to make these plans. On this page I tried to define contingencies
using, of course, the provisions of the Law on All People's Defence. Q. In line 24 what is
missing is that the making of these plans was their duty. Did you say that it was their duty?
A. Yes, it was their legal obligation. All those who made contingency plans were legally
obliged to do so in keeping with the Law on All People's Defence. Everybody had to develop
a contingency plan for contingencies such as aggression, military aggression, or internal
conflicts that involved the use of weapons. Q. When you said a moment ago socio-political
organisations were also an entity in the defence system, can you translate that into normal
language? What are socio-political organisations? A. I'll try. In the previous system it was
the League of Communists, The Socialist Alliance of Working People, The Socialist Alliance
of Youth, and in the multi-party system it was the political parties.
The witness, Dragan Kapetina, was the chief inspector in the former Ministry for Defence
during the communist rule, and after the elections maintained the same position in a new
Government and the Ministry for Defence. Mr. Kapetina wrote 1987 and 1989 a manual,
that aided the subjects to create their “contingency plans”. He confirmed that in this system
it was an obligation of each and every institution, organisation and company to have the war
plans, what they were to do in an immergency situation. How the Chamber neglect this
domestic legislation? Why the Chamber neglects that it was envisaged only for an
immergency situation, and that it was a legal obligation? The Chamber found that the
structures and organs created pursuant to the Variant A/B Instructions—first and foremost the
Crisis Staffs—played a central role in preparing for, and carrying out, the Bosnian Serb take-overs
in the Municipalities and in maintaining Bosnian Serb authority and power after the take-overs
were completed.10983 These parallel structures were also created in such a way that the objectives,
plans, and instructions of the Bosnian Serb leadership were easily communicated to Bosnian Serb
leaders at a municipal level.10984 (#Wrong in facts and in inferences#! A Crisis Staffs weren’t
any new organs, but only a way of functioning of the regular authorities for an immergency
situation, no matter it was a water flood, storm, earthquake, energy or water supplies colaps,
or a war at the end. So, the existing authorities weren’t to be replaced by any new. How the
Chamber could justify it’s assertions about “taking-overs” while there was no a simple new
organ of the state authorities? In what sense was it a “taking-over”? There was no even
minimal change in a usual competences of the municipal organs, nothing that didn’t exist
before the war, or before the crisis that led to forming a Crisis Staff. This is simply a fog and
10983
See paras. 3072–3096. Defence witnesses testified inter alia that Crisis Staffs (i) were established at various levels in BiH and were simply a means of
responding to a crisis situation; (ii) were by no means ―a secret system of command and control‖; (iii) operated independently and did not receive
instructions from the SDS leadership; and (iv) did not plan for the persecution of non-Serbs. D4194 (Witness statement of Sveto Kovaĉević dated 7
December 2013), paras. 10, 23; D4027 (Witness statement of Nikola Poplašen dated 11 November 2013), para. 5. While the Chamber did find that Crisis
Staffs were created at different levels in BiH and also by Bosnian Muslims, the Chamber does not find the remainder of the evidence of these witnesses to be
reliable in this regard. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber had regard to the manner in which the Crisis Staffs were created pursuant to the Variant
A/B Instructions and the manner in which they were used to establish Bosnian Serb authority and control over municipalities and their involvement in
crimes committed against non-Serbs. It also noted that the evidence of the relevant witnesses was marked by contradictions, evasiveness, and indicators of
bias which undermined the credibility of their evidence in this regard.(According to which instructions were created all other crisis
staffs? Why they didn’t need the A/B Variant? Because it had already been provided for in the laws and Constitution!
What the crisis staffs did what wouldn’t do a municipal authority? Nothing!)
10984
See paras. 2940, 2944, 2947.
 1003

smoke, and nobody is entitled to invent a crimes that didn’t exist, or incriminate a conduct
that had been in an accord with the domestic constitutions, laws and habits!)
3438. On 12 May 1992, six months after the issuance of the Variant A/B Instructions, and
after the second level of those instructions had been activated, the Accused presented the Strategic
Goals before the Bosnian Serb Assembly. The Chamber found earlier that these Strategic Goals
not only reflected the objectives of the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership but were also
viewed as instructions to be followed at a municipal level in order to achieve those objectives.10985

3439. . The Chamber finds that #there was nothing in the Variant A/B Instructions or the
Strategic Goals which called for the commission of crimes per se.# (Thank you very much!!!)
However, the Chamber found that ethnic separation and the creation of a largely ethnically
homogeneous entity were some of the core aspects of the Strategic Goals and that the Accused and
the Bosnian Serb leadership planned the military implementation of these goals which necessarily
entailed the take-over of territory and the forcible movement of the non-Serb population to achieve
that objective.10986 (#However, it is not correct and it is not possible, for the following reasons:

1. #The separation of the three member states in BiH had been agreed politically, and under the
auspice of the ICFY, and on the basis of the Fourth Opinion of the Badinter’s Commision.
No side needed any armed force to carry this agreement out#.

2. #An ethnic separation had been introduced by the Slovens, Croats in their republics
respectively, as well as the Muslims and Croats in BiH. There was no a rascial or class, or
language reasons for the BiH to separate from Yugoslavia. It was exclusively an ethnic
interest of the Muslim (and Croat) side. The #Serbs in BiH didn’t respond to the Muslim
separation from Yugoslavia by an armed force or any other kind of violence#, but made
many concessions for the sake of the peaceful resolution. The Serbs in BiH were entitled to
keep the entire BiH in Yugoslavia, because without the Serb consent there could not be any
secession; the next objective of the Serbs in BiH was to stay in Yugoslavia, the way the
Northern Ireland remained in the GB, because of a protestant majority in the territory, or as
West Virginia decided to stay with the Union instead in Confederation, as the bigger part of
Virginia decided.

3. Since the Serbs in BiH didn’t oppose this separation from Yugoslavia by force, they
instead #used the constitutional rights, as well as the agreed elements of a new arrangement
for the BiH at the Conference under the UN-EC auspice, and in accordance with the laws#.

4. Althoguh the #Serbs didn’t oppose the Muslim-Croat secessionist movements by force, the
Muslim-Croat coalition tried to oppose the Serb delineation of the ethnic territories for an
autonomy that was guaranteed by all the documents mentioned above, approved and
accepted by Mr. Izetbegovic in September, October and November 1991 in the Hague on
ICFY, and finally agreed within the Lisbon Agreement. The M/C coalition used a military
force to prevent the Serbs in achieving their rights and agreed plans!#)

5. Unlike the Serbs, the Muslims were preparing for this violent operation the whole year in
advance, by forming the secret army (PL and ZB) and starting the fights immediately after
recognized. All the Serb actions were aimed to defend from these armed attacks.

6. Finally, the #Muslim side declared a war against the Serbs in Bosnia#. Therefore, it is clear
that the Variant A/B Instructions and Strategic Goals created the basis, and laid the foundations,
for the structures through which a criminal purpose could be achieved. (A “criminal purpose
10985
See paras. 2899–2903.
10986
See paras. 2895–2903.
 1004

could be achieved” without the A/B paper and the Strategic objectives also. But, the
Chamber acts as if a “criminal purpose” really existed, and this was derived from a clear
position to include only undoubtedly Serbian territories in the Serb entity. In spite of the fact
that there was no a single place without the Muslims to the end of war, in spite of the facts
that no Muslim in the RS had any problem unless acted militarily against the RS and it’s
citizens, the Chamber is maintaining this qualification only on a basis of the obscure
witnesses who were taking notes at meenings, like Harland and Banbury. Does this kind of
deliberation of the UN Court mean that the UN deny the rights for selfdefence to the Serb
people, and will this be spread to some other nations, or would it be applied generaly and un-
selectively?) In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber also had regard to the manner in which
the Variant A/B Instructions and Strategic Goals were implemented throughout the Municipalities
and the objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership with respect to ethnic separation. This involved
a widespread and systematic pattern of crimes committed by Serb Forces against non-Serbs
throughout the Municipalities, which is discussed in further detail below.

3440. . The Chamber finds that the planned take-over of Bosnian Serb claimed territories went
beyond the establishment of authority; it also entailed the removal of Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats in order to create a largely ethnically homogeneous entity.10987 (#Wrong assertion
and inference! As it is evident from the file, the homogenisation OF THE TERRITORIES
was envisaged by all the three ethnic communities, but the only way in achieving the
homogeneity was to include only those areas and settled places inhabited by a community
concerned. No one community planned any resettlement of population. The Croats
mentioned A RESETTLEMENT AND EXCHANGE OF POPULATION several times, but
the President qualified it as a nightmare and rejected it (see the intercepted conversation
with President Mili{evi}, and also never mentioned it on the Conference, let alone accepted
or proposed the shifting of population.) This was founded on the ideology that Bosnian Serbs
could not co-exist with Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.10988 (#Then, why the Serbs
concluded the Historic Serb-Muslim Agreement#? Then, why the Serbs invited the Muslims
and Croats to stay with them in Yugoslavia#? It looks unreasonable to repeat this
construction and false assertion contrary to everything that had been seen during the
process. The Chamber had more than sufficient evidence that the President and his
associates tied the assertions about inability to live with the Muslims only on the two facts,
and conditions: the fact that the Islamic fundamentalism won power in the Muslim
community, and the Muslims wanted an independent unitary state, where they would rule
over the Serbs and Croats. Full stop. These facts can not be skipped, and everything has to
be seen in this light.

3441. The Chamber further recalls that there was an organised and systematic pattern of crimes
committed by members of the Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs
in the Count 1 Municipalities.10989 (Wrong inference! The Chamber can not “find” such a
pattern, for the following arguments:

1. #If there was such a pattern, there would be no any municipality without it#;

2. The #war started in different municipalities on a different dates and a different

causes, which indicates that there was no any plan#;

3. There is a #significant number of municipalities which didn’t have a war at all#;

10987
See paras. 2839–2856.
10988
See paras. 2839–2956, 2895–2896. See also paras. 2670–2673.
10989
See Section IV.A.2.v: Genocide: Count 1.
 1005

4. There is a #significant, majority number of municipalities which didn’t have any

atrocities, crimes or any feature allegedly envisaged by the Strategic Goals;

5. It is important to point out that the so called “pattern” or any crimes didn’t happen
in the municipalities where the members of the Main Board of SDS were mayors, who
would, had there been any “pattern”, carry it out more precisely than in other minicipalities.

6. The Chamber or anybody else can not explain why the Serb authority’s attitude
#differed from one municipality to another, or from one Muslim to another, and can not
avoid an inference that it had something to do with a Muslim conduct#. A similar systematic
pattern of crimes against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats was repeated in the remaining
Municipalities which spread over the three main regions relevant to the Municipalities component
of this case, namely Eastern Bosnia, the ARK, and the Sarajevo area. (#Wrong inference, false
assertion! In all of these regions there were both, municipalities and the Muslims who hadn’t
underwent any problem#, which depended only on their approach towards the Muslim
armed attacks against the Serbs. Remember the Vulliamy’s report from Prijedor, and the
Muslim and Croat villages that didn’t have any trouble, because they declared a peaceful
position without any armed resistence!)

3442. The Chamber found that a vast number of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the
Municipalities were forcibly displaced from the homes, villages, and towns in which they were
lawfully present to other locations in BiH or third countries. (#This is a false finding#! A “vast
number” of Bosnian Croats and Muslims demanded to leave because of the war
developments, and there was no a single case that any armed unit expelled people from their
homes. It was presented to the Chamber that there was a procedure for those who wanted to
leave: they had to check themselves to a waiting list, they had to submit many papers about
taxation and other obligations settled down, to pay for a transport, and then to wait at home
to be notified when they will get their transport mean, busses or so. When this time came,
they had been notified that they had a couple of hours to appear at an agreed spot. If some
didn’t come, the money for transport were to be returned to them, (see Kotor Varos doc.)
Victims were given limited time to leave their homes, loaded onto trucks, buses, or trains and
transported out of the Municipalities. (Wrong and false: #they had been informed about the
time their bus was ready to take them, according to the list they made far in advance#. If it
was as the Chamber suggests, there would be so many incidents and skirmishes that there
would be all in the media. This simply didn’t happen, ever!!!) The Chamber found that in
many cases Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were forced to leave following attacks against
their villages or after the take-over of towns by Serb Forces. Many others were first arrested, and
then unlawfully detained in detention facilities and transported out of the Municipalities. These
expulsions resulted in drastic changes to the ethnic composition of towns and by 1995, almost no
Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats remained in many of the Municipalities. (Wrong and not
correct! Nobody was arrested unles in a combat zone! Then, after the first investigation all
that had been captured in a combat zone and didn’t participate in combats were released.
Those who participated in combats were to be transferred to a facilities for POWs and
exchanged, although all of them could have been tried, because they hadn’t been an army,
but a terrorists, and those who commited crimes were to be tried regardless of their
ethnicity. Pertaining the assertion about the change of ethnic composition, it must be noticed
that this happened also because many Serbs had escaped from the Muslim-Croat areas into
the Serb zones. The Chamber was not ready to see the complete picture!)

3443. In particular, the Chamber found that, in a similar pattern throughout the Municipalities,
Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs were involved in the systematic
forced movement of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from the Municipalities, including in
 1006

creating an environment of fear in which Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats had no choice but
to leave the Municipalities.10990 (A Section (IV.A.2.iii) in this Judgment can not be an evidence,
and this is wrong inference. #Why some of the Muslims and Croats “had a choice” and
remained in their homes and their municipalities, while others not#? If somebody didn’t
have “a choice but to leave” it must be established what or who created such an
environment. The answer that follows is not satisfactory, because a fear is extremely
subjective feeling and may not have any real reason, it may be even a projection of own’s
animosity towards those from whom one feared. Again, why there was a lot of Muslims, in
many municipalities and even in the same municipalities that had been left without any
trouble, who didn’t have this fear, weren’t physically forced, or harassed in any sense? Why
many of the Muslim and Croat males voluntarily joined the VRS? An answer to this
question will ruin the entire construction of the JCE!) The Chamber found that Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats were displaced as a result of, or following physical force, threat of
force, or coercion, or that they fled out of fear. (This is #too arbitrary and loose#, without any
specificity: where and when a force had been implemented; when and how a threat of force
had been exercised; how a “coercion” and intimidation had been exercised; what were the
rest of “fears”? There was no any fear inflicted by the authorities, and the only fear was
from the chaotic events of the civil war, which caused leaving of all the citizens, of all
ethnicities. Also, those who had their relatives in the adversary’s army didn’t feel
comfortable while a coffins with bodies of the Serb soldiers used to come, and that was one of
the reasons why the President forbade the mass funerals!) This fear was caused by ongoing
violence and various crimes committed against non-Serbs including inter alia killings, cruel and
inhumane treatment, unlawful detention, rape and other acts of sexual violence, discriminatory
measures, and wanton destruction of villages, houses and cultural monuments.10991 (None of those
crimes, if happened, the Chamber could associate with the legal organs and legal “Serb
Forces”. Even if some of a members of the legal “Serb Forces” commited such a crimes, they
did it out of the command and control of their superiors, clandestinely, and kept silent about
that. No a single rape was proven, and no liability of the official authorities was evident.
There was no any “discriminatory measures” or “unlawful detention”, because detentions
had always been connected with a combat o rebel actions, and it concerned with only several
percent, usually less that 5% of the non-Serb population. There was no evidence on “wanton
destruction of villages” unless there was no an armed skirmich and these vilalges and homes
used as a military strongholds. The evidence is the fact that many villages nobody touched.
Beside that, nobody ever had proven that the authorities tolerated, let alone ordered any
destruction. The Chamber, just like the Prosecution, adopted the two most obscure terms:
the JCE and the “Serb Forces”, and neither is fair and correct. No a Serb could have proven
anything, because a simple affiliation to the Serb nation includes all the Serbs in Bosnia. And
a presumption of guilt and of a nature of civil war as a war of a professional, well trained
and controlled armies delivered such a wrong conclusions!

3444. Further, the similar manner and the short time period in which these crimes were
committed support the conclusion that these crimes were committed during the course of well
planned and co-ordinated operations which involved the military take-over of Municipalities and
the expulsion of non-Serbs. The Chamber found that most of the crimes were committed between
April to October 1992 in each of the Municipalities but then continued through to the end of the
conflict. The Chamber found that many of the attacks on towns and villages in the Municipalities
were carried out in an organised and co-ordinated fashion and involved members of the Serb
Forces. These attacks and the crimes which were committed during and after the take-overs

10990
See Section IV.A.2.iii: Deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer): Counts 7 and 8.
10991
See Section IV.A.2.iii: Deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer): Counts 7 and 8.
 1007

followed a similar pattern across the Municipalities.10992 This is a multiply wrong inference!
There are many others, the most real and evident from the exhibits and testimonies, and that
is:

1. If it was as the Chamber “found” in this paragraph, then #why the war didn’t start in
so many municipalities before the end of May 1992#? Why in these municipalities the Serbs
did everything possible to avoid the war, offering to the Muslims and Croats to form their
own municipalities and live freely, #Two municipalities – peace#? Why in some, so many, the
#two third of municipalities, there was no any war or skirmishes, and therefore no crimes#?

2. A very persuasive inference would be: the chaos because of the abrupt violence
everywhere,

3. A lack of a state organisation, judiciary system, communications, goods,

4. A seven weeks of the war period without any formal Serb army, except for the TO,
which was without professional commands and severed in municipalities without a central
command,

5. The entire period mentioned in the above paragraph without a properly structured
VRS, up until the end of 1992,

6. Up until 20 May 1992 there was no a “Serb Forces”, and the Muslim side had the
Patriotic League and Green Berets as the illegal armed forces got into a conflict with the
JNA, and the JNA never attacked any settled place without being attacked from it. None of
the armed events could be connected with the President at leas before 15 June, the date
when the President issued the Order on Formation and Organisation of the Army. And this
period was exactly the worst in the entire war.

3445. Having regard to the clear systematic and organised pattern of crimes which were
committed in each of the Municipalities by members of the Serb Forces, over a short time
period, the Chamber finds that these crimes were not committed in a random manner, but were
committed in a co-ordinated fashion. (Again, the main question remainds without answer,
i.e. #why some areas didn’t have this “coordinated fashion”#? And why it didn’t happen
in the Sana River Valey until the end of May 92? Had it been a Serb plan, why the Serbs
would wait the JNA to leave BiH, and then risk a conflict with the more numerous
Muslim-Croat forces? Where, in which area, municipality, any settled place the Serb
initiated fights? The Chamber can not point out a single one case!)

3446. The Accused disputes that there was a systematic expulsion of non-Serbs from the RS by
arguing that the Prosecution disregarded the majority of municipalities where non-Serbs were
protected and that this undermines the theory that there was a common plan.10993 The Chamber
does not consider that there is any merit to this argument, given that the Chamber found that
the twenty municipalities in which these crimes were committed, and in relation to which the
Chamber was tasked with entering findings, were of strategic importance to the Accused and
the Bosnian Serb leadership and formed part of Bosnian Serb claimed territory. Even if there
were no crimes committed in other municipalities in BiH, not covered by the Indictment, it
would not affect the Chamber‘s conclusion that crimes were committed in a systematic and
organised manner in the Municipalities. (#Then, how the Chamber established a
“systematic and organised manner”, since the Serbs didn’t implement it from the first
10992
See Section IV.A.2: Legal findings on crimes.
10993
See Defence Final Brief, paras. 966–972, 979.
 1008

day; why not in municipalities with a superior Serb majority, and so on. In such a case,
the Chamber contradicts itself: if it was because of the strategic importance of these
municipalities, then it was not because the Serbs wanted ETHNICALY PURE STATE,
BUT BECAUSE OF SOME MILITARY REASONS! But, still the Chamber doesn’t have
an answer on several crucial questions, such as:

1. The alleged “systematic and organised manner” #couldn’t be implemented without a war,
but it is well known that the Serbs didn’t want a war in BiH, they did advocate against it, the
Serbs weren’t rigid in the negotiations, and decreased their legal aspirations in order to
avoid the war? Without an answer to the question who wanted the war, and who needed the
war, and for what purpose, there is no just and correct findings of the Court#! It is
unbelievable that this Court does not deal with the causes of the war and responsibility for
the crime against peace! Such a way the Court is free to deliberate the most peculiar
decisions, and contrary to this orientation, the Chamber charged the President for every
form of the legal political life of the Serb community#!

2. Did the Serbs accept the sugestions and proposals that were the result of the ongoing
conferences, including a possibility that the Muslims in a Serb majority areas may have their
own municipalities, (see the ICFY documents from 1991) as it was envisaged by the Hague
Conference?

3. Why didn’t the Serbs form their secret army, if they did have so called Joint Criminal
Enterprice? Why did the Croat and Muslim leaderships formed their own secret armies and
prepared for a war beginning as early as of March 91? Against whom they formed their
armies?

4. Did the Serbs, or the Muslim-Croat coalition, violated the Constitution, both the Federal and
BiH?

Another word, the Chamber erroneously and uncritically accepted every single position of the
Prosecution, in spite of the numerous evidence contrary to it.

3447. Having weighed the evidence discussed above in light of the systematic and organised
manner in which crimes were committed in each of the Municipalities, the Chamber finds beyond
reasonable doubt that between October 1991 and 30 November 1995 there existed a common plan
to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb claimed territory
through the crimes as set out in more detail below. The Chamber finds that starting in October
1991, the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership agreed on how they would respond to the
declaration of sovereignty in BiH and the measures they would take to create their own ethnically
homogeneous state. (#Serbs only responded#! All of it on the Muslim-Croat side was illegal
and anti-constitutional, while all of the #Serb responses were legal and in accordance with
the ongoing Conference on Yugoslavia and the sub-conference on BiH#. The Chamber is
persistent in a wrong and false usage of the term “ethnically homogeneus state”. A
#homogeneity pertained only to a territorial issues# and a flexibility in including only own
settlements in own republic, and the President fought against any greed for territories and
an ambition to include every single Serb village into the Serb constituent unit. On the other
hand, the #President personally proposed that the forcefully taken territories wouldn’t be
recognized, and that the territorial issues had to be resolved on the Conference through the
talks, and that the refugees will all have rights to return and recover their properties.# The
Chamber doesn’t have a firm and un-doubtable evidence for such an inference, and is erred
by allocating the events of the civil war to only one side “aposteriory” in a manner: “this was
 1009

happening, therefore it must be the leadership wanted it.” This was happening in all of our
civil wars, and before the Bosnian, it happened in the war in Croatia!)

a. Plurality of persons

3448. The Prosecution alleges that the President worked together with other Bosnian Serb
military and political leaders to achieve the objective of the common plan.10994 While the
Prosecution submits that the membership of the alleged JCE fluctuated over time, it argues that
each member made a significant contribution to achieving the common criminal purpose.10995 The
Prosecution then proceeds to list the named members of the alleged Overarching JCE and their
respective contributions to the common plan.10996

3449. Beginning in late 1991, Krajišnik, Koljević, and Plavšić were intimately involved with the
Accused in developing the policies and plans which formed the foundation of the common plan as
defined above. They made speeches on the themes of preventing the independence of BiH and
that Bosnian Serbs could not live with Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, (#A PERMANENT
DISTORTION: NOT “LIVE WITH BOSNIAN MUSLIMS AND CROATS – BUT UNDER
THEIR DOMINATION IN A UNITARY STATE!!!# #This is contradictory: if the Serbs
“could not live with Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats” why the Serbs wanted Bosnia to
stay in Yugoslavia? This is a grave abuse of the linguistic problems: the Serbs didn’t accept
to be a national minority in their own country, under the Muslim domination, i.e. they didn’t
accept to be a second class citizens in a newly and illegally separated Bosnia!#) and ultimately
advocated the separation of the three peoples and the creation of a separate Serb state.10997
(#Which had been immediately recognized and accepted by the International community#!
That is how the Chamber limits the political and state actions of the Serb members of the
BiH Presidency, and the president of the BiH Assembly! Krajisnik, Koljevic and Plavsic
were the highest positioned Serbs in the common state organs, the Presidency and the
Assembly of BiH. The Chamber acted as if somebody was entitled to demand the Serb legal
and legitimate representatives in the highest Bosnian organs to accept the dictate and the
unlawful and anti-constitutional actions of the other two sides, the actions that definitely
change the position of their people that they represented. Who authorised this Court to make
such an “arbitrage” in the political life of the Serbs in BiH? If the Serbs didn’t have the
rights to oppose those illegal moves, there wouldn’t be any conference on BiH, and there
wouldn’t be any plan for the internal reorganisation of BiH, including the first, Lisbon plan
and the Cutilleiro’s plan, and the final Dayton Agreement, and three other plans in between.
If the Serbs didn’t have any right to their own constituent unit in BiH, how would the UN
and the EU, and many states unilateraly support the recognition of this transformation of
BiH. Instead of identifying those who prevented a peaceful political solution, the Tribunal
and it’s chambers are exercising a judicial assults, humiliation, and finnaly a judicial
violence and crime upon the Serbs in BiH!) For Krajišnik, the goal of separating from the
Bosnian Muslims was the most important task and he often recalled that the main Bosnian Serb
objective was to create their own, ―ethnically pure‖ state.10998 (As with the other Serb officials,
the Chamber is wrong. #The first and the most desireable solution for the Serbs in BiH was
to do nothing, but to stay in the country they already had been, meaning Yugoslavia#. And
had the two other sides and the international community respected the laws and
10994
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 84.
10995
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 84.
10996
Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 85–109.
10997
See paras. 2649, 2663–2664, 2721, 2725, 2727–2729, 2749, 2762, 2764, 2767, 2772, 2786, 2810, 2820, 2825–2826, 2829, 2832.
10998
See paras. 2721, 2729, 2877, 2880, 2898, 3245.
 1010

constitutions, that would stay that way. As far as it is concerned with the Bosnian Serbs
#“ethnically pure” state#, this was never a plan of Krajisnik, or any other Bosnian
Serb official. For Mr. Krajisnik as for all other Serb officials, the “ethnically homogenous”
state never meant “ethnically pure”, and the #“homogeneity of territories”# was to be
achieved by a modest approach to the territorial issues, i.e. not to include settlements that
belonged to the Muslims or Croats. See what Gen. Mladic wrote down from a Krajisnik
speech to the military top commanders, see P1481: , P1481, p.146:

This is only one of many genuine evidence that the homogeneity was to be achieved by a
#moderate territorial claims#, and not by any ethnic cleansing! The Chamber had the insight
in many, many documents pertaining to the Serb attitude towards the other ethnicities to be
living in the Serb republic, and not a single document to the contrary. On what evidence the
Chamber founded this inference? Only on a hear-say evidence, on an unfinished sentences in
the illegally obtained intercepts, only in imprecise conversations, or speeches that the
attendees always understood as it should be understood, while the Chamber never
understood it accurately, because of a linguistic nuances. Whether it was a matter of
linguistics, or an intention of the Chamber, it is all the same for the President Serbs. But, it
must not survive in judgments. Krajišnik and Plavšić both spoke of ethnic cleansing as
something that was necessary to achieve the goals of the Bosnian Serb leadership.10999 (#This is a
shameless lie#! If it wasn’t a lie, why it wasn’t reported to the UN Headquarters, and why
the officials of the UN who negotiated with the named Serb representatives didn’t warn the
international community#? Because it didn’t happen. Repeating the assertion about inability
to live together is an abuse of the linguistic confusion, since everyone present to those talks
knew exactly that it pertained only to an independent unitary Bosnia under the Islamic
Fundamentalist regime, and not if the Muslims stayed in Yugoslavia, and certainly not the
Muslims living in the Republika Srpska.) Krajišnik and Plavšić specifically agreed with the
President that Bosnian Muslims should be transferred out of Bosnian Serb territory given that they
could not live together.11000 (#Had it really happened, the entire world would know it in an
hour#! Is there in the UN documents any trace of this assertions of a UN officer who was not
in charge of the political matters? No! #Why the Chamber of a UN Court is avoiding the UN
official documents#, in this case, as in the case of Markale, as in many other cases,
#preferring hear-say to the official documents#? This matters could be testified about only
by the political negotiators of the same rank as the President, who knew what the President
proposed, what he accepted and what he rejected. None of them testified to this direction,
neither Akashi nor Cutilleiro, nor Owen in his books, nobody. Plavšić went as far as to state
that ―if it takes the lives of 3 million people to solve this crisis, lets get it done and move on‖.11001
(This is another lie. Ms. Plavsic was alleged to be saying it in some interview, but she denied
it, and it was something within her ideological dispute with President Milosevic. Anyway, the
witness that the Chamber is relying on couldnot know that, and he have read it somewhere,
therefore, he didn’t witness it!) In addition, Koljević repeatedly called for the expulsion of
Bosnian Muslims and the homogeneity of territories, claiming it was impossible for Serbs to live

10999
See paras. 2757.
11000
See paras. 2757.
11001
See para. 2727.
 1011

with anyone else.11002 Here is para 2721 from the fn. 11013, what Krajisnik really said:

Remember, it was 25 February 1992, still there was no any idea of war, because the
Conference was doing well. As it can be seen from this para, Krajisnik was quareling with
some representatives in the Assembly about whether the Serbs should stick to the idea of
Yugoslavia, or not, and was advocating to give up this idea, because nobody else wanted
Yugoslavia any more. “We don’t need the relics of Yugoslavia which no one else wants” ,
and added that this Yugoslavia is note the one we knew, comprising (which would have to
include!!!) Macedonia, Slovenia and Croatia. Than he said: “I am not interested in Muslims
in BiH”. What he said is a continuation of the previous sentence, which meant that he was
not interested in persuading the Muslims in BiH to remain in such a Yugoslavia. How the
Chamber could miss so much a very point Krajisnik made? It was before the war, and in the
context of changing a political orientation of the Serbs in Bosnia from Yugoslavia to
independent BiH internally transformed. If it wasn’t clear to the Chamber, why they didn’t
clarify it with some linguist?

And here is P785, Okun’s diary about a meeting of Cyrus Vance and Marti Ahtisari with the
Serb delegation in Geneve. Obviously, once again, this was not a testimony of one of the
negotiators, but of a note-taker, regardless of his rank. Let us see what was on the p.44:

Prof. Koljevic said, as recorded in short terms: “ the War shattered trust; Communities
cannot live together anymore; to deny that is fantasy.” Is this remark of prof. Koljevic in a
manner of an academic discussion such to incriminate this excellent man? This is a crime,
and Mr. Cyrus Vance would never qualify this as it is qualified by the Prosecution and now
by the Chamber. There are other notes, as how the President said that We do not need war,

11002
See paras. 2721, 2728, 2762, 2806, 2820.
 1012

we should stop where they are… and so on. This can not be the basis for such a mean
inference?: Krajišnik, Koljević, and Plavšić also participated in formulating and promoting the
Strategic Goals, and took steps to ensure they were implemented, and that organisational structures
were created through which the criminal purpose could be achieved.11003 Again, this is based on a
discussions that were a colloquial chatting on the subject in general. Here is the para 2723 of
the Judgment, quoting what the President said on the subject of how many Muslims would
stay in the Serb constituent canton: (2723. In February 1992, the Accused spoke about having
less than 10% of Bosnian Muslims in their ―canton‖ of BiH according to the proposed maps.9042
) What should be done to make the Chamber aware of the proper semantic understanding of
this sentence? It was clearly said “according to the proposed maps”. And that was #the only
meditated way of making the TERRITORIAL homogeneity#, to be reasonable in proposing
the maps, not to include to many villages of the others who wouldn’t want it. Remenmber, it
was in Ferbuary 1992, no war, no any possibility for “ethnic cleansing”, only a reasonable
maps. Remember what Ajanovic of the SDA said the next morning after 18 March 1992,
when the Cutilleiro plan was adopted, see D302:

(Therefore, it was a conference about forming three “cantons” or constituent Republics

within BiH, such as exist in many countries, and the task of the UN-EC mediators to create a
viable “cantons” for each of the ethnic communities.)

3450. In addition to their participation in the creation of the common plan and agreement with
the political objectives of the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership, the roles held by
Krajišnik, Koljević, and Plavšić throughout the conflict are indicative of their further contributions
to the common plan. (The Chamber is importing additional confusion in this Judgment. What
was taken against the President and the other Serb officials happened before the war, while
all, or at least the Serbs and the International community, hoped that there would be no war.
And this was astaregic objective of the Serbian community in BiH: #to accept the BIH as an
independent state provided it will be reorganized into the three etnhnic states – units.# SO,
THE CHAMBER IS ERRONEUSLY ASSOCIATING EVERYTHING FROM THE
LEGAL POLICAL LIFE OF THE SERBS IN BOSNIA FAR BEFORE IT WAS CLEAR
THAT THERE WILL BE A WAR, AS IF THE SERBS WERE COUNTING THAT A WAR
WILL BE FOR SURE. NOTHING BEFORE 12 MAY CAN BE CONSIDERED AS SAME
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AS AFTER THIS DATE.) Together with the President,
Krajišnik, Koljević, and Plavšić were considered the top most powerful leaders in the RS.11004
Krajišnik, Koljević, and Plavšić were three of the five members of the RS Presidency; (Wrong!
There was never five members of the Presidency of the RS, but only three. Had there being a
state of war proclaimed for the entire Republic, there would be a war Presidency.)
Krajišnik was President of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and Koljević and Plavšić were Vice-
Presidents of the RS; all three were appointed to deal with important issues throughout the
conflict, relating to detention centres, communications with international organisations, as well as
information and propaganda.11005 Here is a reference in para 2767, Krajisnik speaking about
the separation with the Muslims: 2767. At the same session, Krajišnik stated that ―the biggest
tragedy would be if the Muslims accepted to live with us now. […] That is the only thing I would
never accept, and I would rather accept that we get a smaller percentage of the territory than it

11003
See paras. 2722, 2767, 2860, 2868, 2880, 2885, 2893–2894, 2898–2900, 2902, 3245.
11004
See para. 3242.
11005
See paras. 3240, 3250, 3257.
 1013

is the case now, provided that we remain separated from the Muslims and that we have our
country‖.9170
Here is what Mr. Krajisnik said at the Assembly session in January 94:, P1385, p.123/24

So, Mr. Krajisnik was persuading the MPs to accept les territory at the conference next week,
putting his argumentation before them why it should be accepted. The Chamber is not
looking for a context, nor for a documents that defined the Serb policy in BiH, but only for a
solitary sentences that do not have any weight. In such a manner they could convict even St.
Peter.

3451. Krajišnik had great authority among the Bosnian Serb municipal leaders and had the
ability to issue orders and influence how power should be exercised at the municipal level.11006
(This wasn’t true, and the President testified in the Krajisnik’s case that it was a respect he
enjoyed, not authority. But, did we see any of those “wrong” orders of his own? And even if
we did, which we didn’t, what it has to do with the President?) Plavšić herself openly
supported Serbian paramilitary units and invited them to BiH to support the war efforts and was a
link between these units and the Bosnian Serb leadership.11007 Here is the para 3261 of the
Judgment, containing this assertion: Plavšić openly supported paramilitary units, or ―weekend
warriors‖ as she called them, and during a Bosnian Serb Assembly session in November 1992,
she openly invited them—including Arkan‘s men and the White Eagles—to ―send their
volunteers to help the defence of the Serbian people in [RS]‖.10472 As stated above, Plavsić was
an advocate of having all paramilitary units from territories where Serbs lived outside BiH
come to assist them and was the ―bridge‖ between Bosnian Serbs and the people who came
from other states to assist in the conflict.10473 Mićo Stanišić and Plavšić clashed over this
issue.10474 According to Mandić, Mićo Stanišić arrested paramilitary units and Plavšić would
intercede on their behalf and have them released.10475 However, the main issue in this
sentences of Ms. Plavsic to: ――send their volunteers‖ – which is something quite opposite to
what the Prosecution and the Chamber understood. The #issue of volunteers was regulated
by the law and by an order of the Presidency of SFRY, which equalized them with the
regular soldiers in both, the rights and obligations. Ms. Plavsic never backed any

11006
See para. 3245.
11007
See para. 3261.
 1014

paralimitary group as such, but only as a volunteers, while Mico Stanisic and Momo Mandic,
as the ministers of Interior and Justice respectively, knew that the “volunteers” didn’t
behave properly, and opposed the member of Presidency. #How possibly this could have
been used against anyone, particularly against thie President?#) The Chamber further found
that Krajišnik, Koljević, and Plavšić attended meetings and events throughout the Municipalities
and were informed of crimes committed during and after the take-over of the Municipalities and in
detention facilities there; (Principally, what it has to do with this President? However, this is
again erroneously used facts and erroneously made inference. If they had been informed in
municipalities that there were crimes, that means that the municipalitiy authorities were
reporting it to the top officials seeking a help! #Was there any evidence that the three named
persons, these high official celebrated this course of events#?!?!) furthermore, they were
specifically informed of efforts to forcibly remove non-Serbs from the Municipalities which was
the very result intended by the Bosnian Serb leadership from the inception of their plan.11008 (One
of the documents which the Chamber relied upon for this assertion is P5858, from 27
September, about Mr. Veinands’s arrival for the talks and the Conference on BiH, and
nothing about any crimes in Municipalities, since it was Sept. 91 when it was not even clear
that BiH would go for independence, let alone to have a war. Thus it seems that for the
Chamber it was sufficient to establish that the President really existed and was there at the
time and did some of his duties, to conclude that he must have been guilty!#)

3452. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that together with the Accused, Krajišnik,
Koljević, and Plavšić shared the intent to effect the common plan to permanently remove Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb claimed territory, and through their positions in
the Bosnian Serb leadership and involvement throughout the Municipalities, they contributed to
the execution of the common plan from October 1991 until at least 30 November 1995. (There is
nothing like that in the referent paras: 3246 p. 61-61 pertains the military riots in BL 1993.
3246. Between April and May 1992 the Accused, Krajišnik, Koljević, Plavšić, Đerić, and Bogdan
Subotić met often to discuss a number of issues pertaining to the conditions in municipalities
and decisions were issued as a result of these meetings.10430 Krajišnik was also informed about
events and operations in the Municipalities.10431 For instance, the Chamber notes that Krajišnik
visited Bijeljina, often with the Accused, and that there was a close relationship between the
Bijeljina branch of the SDS and the SDS in Pale.10432 Krajišnik and the Accused also visited
Sanski Most on the occasion of the formation of the SDS there.10433 What does it mean, and
what does it prove? This is #ridiculous#, and nobody should defend against such a #general
and senseless assertions#. In one of those visits, the President and General Mladic forced the
president of municipal assembly to resigne, only for not being strict about paramilitaries,
and Mauzer to relinquish his “wild” rank of major (in the Arkan’s Army) and be degraded
to a private. The President visited Sanski Most in 1990 “on the occasion of the formation of
the SDS there”, and was it a crime? What does it have to do with the events in Sanski Most
between May 92 and the November 95?)

3453. Turning to Mladić, beginning on 12 May 1992 when the Accused recruited and appointed
him as Commander of the Main Staff, he commanded the highest body of the VRS pursuant to the
authority delegated to him by the Accused, and issued regulations, orders, and instructions,
implementing orders issued by the Accused.11009 (Is it by itself a crime? Which of those
regulations, orders and instructions were unlawful? Except for the Directive No. 7, which
anyway wasn’t an executive order, and which the President didn’t read, there is no a single
illegal order or other document.) Given his position and influence, Mladić was closely

11008
See paras. 3246–3248, 3253–3255, 3260, 3262–3264.
11009
See paras. 3266–3267.
 1015

involved with, and was kept well-informed of, military developments throughout the
Municipalities, including during the take-over of towns by units of the VRS and in detention
facilities where non-Serbs were held between April 1992 and November 1995.11010 (#What towns
had been taken over by units of the VRS#? There was no VRS before 20 May 92, there was
the TO, autonomous for each and every municipality. That is why the war appeared to look
like a chain of a municipal wars, beginning in a different times and on a different incentives!
In the areas where the Patriotic League attacket the JNA, there was an action of the JNA,
otherwise nobody protected the Serb people except the TO. #How this Chamber could
conclude that non-Serbs had been detained between April 92 and November 95? Nobody was
detained because for being “non-Serb”, because not all of the “non-Serbs” were detained,
and even those who had been detained and found not suspected – had been released after the
official investigation. This parts of the #Judgment looks like a Muslim propaganda#, or a
campaign in media! Certainly doesn’t look like a legal document!) As stated above, the
Chamber found that Mladić shared the objective with the Bosnian Serb leadership that Bosnian
Serbs could not co-exist with Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and agreed with and promoted
the plan to create a separate Bosnian Serb state and in particular took steps to ensure that the
Strategic Goals were implemented. (So far, there is no any crime on Gen. Mladic’s side.
Certainly, he would prefer the preservation of Yugoslavia, but between a unitary BiH under
the fundamentalist authorities and a confederal BiH, not a single Serb would be confused –
all and everyone would be for what Gen. Mladic is alleged to be! And that was the Serb legal
and legitimate right, immediately recognized by the Badinter’s Commission, and by the UN
and EC, who sponsored the ICFY!) The Chamber therefore finds that Mladić shared the intent
to effect the common plan and contributed to the execution of the common plan through his role as
Commander of the Main Staff and close involvement in operations by VRS units during which
there were forced expulsions of non-Serbs and other crimes committed in the Municipalities. (This
is a wrong assertion, and as all of a kind is not founded in the properly understood evidence.
When and where the VRS “expelled” anyone?) Furthermore, the Chamber found that despite
periods of tension and disagreements between the Accused and Mladić on certain aspects, the
Accused maintained his role as Mladić‘s superior and had de jure control over him, and exercised
such control over him in fact throughout the conflict; thus, any temporary disagreements between
the Accused and Mladić did not undermine their agreement or Mladić‘s contributions to the
common plan at any point between his appointment on 12 May 1992 until at least 30
November 1995.11011 (What “plan” existed between Mladic and the President? If it is meant
for an alleged JCE, the only problem is that such a common plan didn’t exist. What existed
was the genuine right of the Serb people to influence their own future life!)

3454. With respect to Mićo Stanišić and Mandić, Stanišić was the Minister of the MUP in 1992
and Mandić was the Deputy Minister of the MUP until May 1992, and subsequently, the RS
Minister of Justice from May to November 1992; both were closely involved in the creation and
development of the Bosnian Serb MUP from as early as 1992.11012 (The #creation and
development of the Serb MUP can not by itself be a crime#. The MUP of the Serbs in BiH
had been created and developed #on the basis of the Conference results, both in the Hague
and in Lisbon-Sarajevo#. Look at the documents. If the Chamber is of an opinion that the
Serbs in BiH shouldn’t achieve what had been agreed, but just to be passive and wait that
the Muslim side trick them, as Ajanovic said (See: D302) then the Chamber should put it
first in the Statut of the Tribunal! This way of promoting an illegal “rights” of the Muslim
fundamentalist movement to be superior to the Serb rights guaranteed by the International
Covenants, looks like a smuggling a precedent into the international justice!) The Chamber

11010
See paras. 3269–3271.
11011
See para. 3141.
11012
See paras. 3298, 3300, 3306, 3308.
 1016

found that the directives with respect to the division of the MUP structures and the creation of the
Bosnian Serb MUP were communicated to and implemented at a municipal level. (So what? It
had to be that way, because the MUP didn’t exist just for the seat, but for the terrain. And it
was appointed in the Conference, but even if it wasn’t, when one sovereignty fells apart,
those parts are entitled to recover in order to function! That was the main argument to
proclaim Yugoslavia to be “dissolved”!) These were crucial steps in the take-over of
Municipalities, as a separate police structure would allow Bosnian Serb authority to be maintained
in the Municipalities.11013 (This is a complete misunderstanding of the very nature of crisis
and events. The Serb authorities in the Municipalities were legal and legitimate since the
elections 1990, and they had the same MUP units and structures. What changed was that the
top structure was divided into the three MUPs, the Serb, the Croat and the Muslim MUP, as
it was agreed on the Conference, and was envisaged by all the Conference documents and in
all the peace plans! There was no any possibility to be otherwise, because the police had also
it’s own municipal authorities!) The creation of this separate Bosnian Serb MUP was a means of
achieving the objectives of the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership, and Mićo Stanišić and
Mandić contributed to the execution of the common plan through their involvement in this
process. (The entire Serb population decided and participated in the creation of their
separate constituent unit. It happened far before the war, and when nobody was sure there
was going to be a war, all happened through the democratic and political process. Is the UN
court of the opinion that the Serbs had been deprived from a right for selforganisation and
sefldefence? How it was possible that the UN Court incriminate the entire legal political life
of the Serb community in BiH, whyle the UN itself supported all the plans that envisaged the
separation of BiH into three constituent units, with the police and all other legistalive and
executive institutions? In one of the judgments in this Court it had been found that (in the
occasion of A and B papier) there was nothing wrong to selforganise and organise another
structure of authorities once a previous system had collapsed. (I think it was in the Krajisnik
Judgment, to find@@@).

3455. In addition, as head of the MUP, Mićo Stanišić was informed of operations throughout the
Municipalities during which there were forced expulsions of non-Serbs and other crimes
committed.11014 (#Deadly combination#! This is a lie infirmed by this Court, illegaly and
without any basis in evidence, except a mass of the “Adjudicated Facts” and 92.bis
statements! In the paragraphs 3301 – 3304 the Chamber is repeating what Davidovic said,
but the Chamber neglected that it was Stanisic who tasked the MUP Special Brigade to
arrest all the paramilitaries in Bijeljina, Brcko and Zvornik.) Mandić was responsible for the
exchange of detainees through the Central Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War and
Arrested Persons and was informed of non-Serbs being forcibly moved out of the
Municipalities.11015 (The exchange was a legal operation, and all the sides to the war had these
commissions. Pertaining to a “forcible movement” this is a shameless lie, for which the UN
agencies, including this court, are responsible, if pretending that the Serb authorities did it!
The Chamber doesn’t have any reliable evidence that the authorities were responsible for
any “forcible movement”, nor there was any forcible movement!) Both Mićo Stanišić and
Mandić were considered the ―President‘s men‖; Stanišić affirmed his allegiance to the President
and the SDS stating that he had always followed the policies of the SDS Presidency and he would
not allow himself to be separated from them.11016 (Why any president would take in his
administration anyone who would be opposed to his policy? Was it a crime by itself? In such
an attitude there is visible an anti-Serb orijentation of the entire Court, which objects

11013
See paras. 3300, 3308.
11014
See paras. 3301–3304.
11015
See paras. 3309–3310.
11016
See paras. 3299, 3305, 3307.
 1017

everything that the Serbs did, no matter was it legal or illegal!) Furthermore, Mandić made
statements during the conflict that demonstrated his participation in the shared common plan,
including when he stressed ―we should split Bosnia in two parts‖ and that Muslims and Croats
would have rights after ―we clean them out‖.11017 (#JOKES, SAYINGS, PRIVATE
CONVERSATIONS CONTRA DOCUMENTS# No a reasonable chamber would pay any
attention to this telephone conversation between former coleagues, now on the two opposing
sides. This was all a joke, as M. Mandic testified. And neither Mandic, nor his Croatian
interlocutors were deciding about anything except about their jobs in Ministries. Their
words, which had been recorded by the Muslim secret service, see: P01104: p. 4

p. 10

“Munja” was their colleague from the previos MUP, and Mandic was aware that “Munja” was
recording this conversation. Further, B. Kvesic gratified Mandic for the Roman latin letters
on the RS money banknote, se P01104, p. 10

So, if the Chamber considered this conversation to be serious, how the Judges didn’t notice this
Mandic’s sentence, that the Serbs do not intend to have a monoethnic state, which is
contrary to all the Prosecution/Chamber’s assertions.

And now the sentence that the Chamber liked so much to put it in the Judgment and take it as
a basis of the convicting Judgment of the President, who neither participated, nor knew
about this chatting; P01104, p.11

So, M. Mandic is telling to his Croatian colleague that his Croats are going to have all rights
after being “cleaned out”. And if it is not a joke, there are no jokes at all!)

3456. Based on the above, the Chamber finds that through their participation in the creation of
the Bosnian Serb MUP structure, its very goal being to achieve Bosnian Serb authority in the
Municipalities, together with the fact that through their positions as Minister and Deputy Minister
of the MUP, and later Minister of Justice, Mićo Stanišić and Mandić were closely involved with
the units carrying out the operations to forcibly remove non-Serbs from the Municipalities as well
as the commission of other crimes. As such, the Chamber finds that Mićo Stanišić and Mandić
contributed to the execution of the common plan until the end of 1992. Given that both Mandić
and Mićo Stanišić left their positions at the end of 1992, the Chamber cannot find that they were
members of the Overarching JCE after this period. (Mr. Mandic was tried in the Bosnian Court,
which is as fair towards the Serbs as this Tribunal is, and he was acquitted, although this
Bosnian court would rather see him convicted. However, the Chamber was in the possession
of so many documents issued and signed by these two Ministers which are in the sharpest
contradiction to those inferences and assertions. Mr. Stanisic spent all his time in the
Ministry of Interior in fighting for legality. The Chamber had seen his documents against

11017
See para. 2730.
 1018

any crime, and some of this documents are used against this President as a proof that there
were crimes. Of course there were crimes, but the state organs fought against it!)

3457. Turning to Arkan and Šešelj, both provided and trained units of men who were involved
in operations throughout the Municipalities during which forced expulsions of non-Serbs and other
crimes occurred. (This way it may be said: #during the severe raining there happened forced
expulsions of non-Serbs#. What does it have to do with Seselj and Arkan. It must be
established that the rain was causing the expulsion, and also it has to be established that
Arkan’s and Seselj’s men were liable. It was well known that Seselj and Arkan were a fearce
opponents. It is also known that Seselj never had any command over his volunteers, who
were within the JNA. Also, Arkan has a bad reputation, but no criminal reports at all. A
lately disclosed document of the ECMM from Bijeljina and Arkan’s presence there confirms
that the Muslims had to say about Arkan only the best. See this paragraph of a lately
disclosed document R1028281 – 8284. an ECMM report from March 16, 1993:

That is how a reputation may delude even a chamber composed of professionals. But, the
crucial question is: how the cours of trial would go on if this document had been timely
disckosed, as it was a Prosecution’s obligation? No matter the President didn’t have a close
relation with Arkan, and didn’t even have any interaction, the President is in a position do
prove a negative facts, that he didn’t have any relation with Arkan, and absolutely no
interest or contact with Vojkan Djurkovic, the truth is essential!) In addition, the Chamber
found that Arkan communicated with Plavšić during the conflict (Ms. Plavsic was in contact with
Arkan of behalf of the Bosnian Presidency, not on behalf of the Republic of Srpska!) and the
President and Mićo Stanišić were informed of the involvement of Arkan‘s men in the take-over of
Municipalities and crimes committed by his units.11018 (This is not a serious finding! Arkan and
his unit didn’t take over any municipality, a small part of his unit remained in Zvornik and
participated in fights, but no evidence that they committed any crime, and the document
pasted above proves something quite contrary, and this was the period of still existing the
BiH Presidency, while the RS Presidency hadn’t been enacted yet!) Arkan was invited by the
RS Presidency to participate in military operations in the Municipalities; (A lie#!!!) Arkan was
also openly praised by Plavšić and the Accused for his contributions to the efforts to defend the
Bosnian Serbs throughout the conflict.11019 (A lie#!!! His uinit was praised only for a proper
participation in defence in the fall 95!) Even as he left BiH, Arkan repeated his commitment to
the Accused to return to defend the ―Serbian territory‖ if called upon by the Accused.11020 (This
“finding” relies upon the para 3198 of the Judgment, which is as follows: 3198. With regard
to Arkan‘s men and Šešelj‘s men specifically, the Chamber concludes that the Accused knew
that they were operating in BiH during the spring of 1992 and that they were invited by the RS
Presidency to operate in conjunction with local authorities and forces.10315 The Chamber also
notes the Accused‘s direct interaction with Arkan and Šešelj and, moreover, that in May 1992

11018
See paras. 3198, 3260–3261, 3303–3304.
11019
See paras. 3198, 3323, 3325.
11020
See para. 3325.
 1019

the Accused invited, without Mladić‘s knowledge, Arkan‘s men to participate in operations in
the Sarajevo area.10316 Here is how this is wrong: Seselj’s men present in any battlefield,
including BiH in the spring 92 were exclusively within the JNA and under their command.
Even Mr. Seselj was acquitted in this Court. As far as it is concerned with Arkan’s men, they
had been present in Bijeljina on 1 to 3 April 1992, #while the President didn’t have any
authority over the Bosnia and Hercegovina#, since it was the “old” BiH, before the
recognition, and the BiH Presidency was in charge. Apart from the facts that Arkan’s men
didn’t commit any crime this time, the President had nothing to do with this presence of the
Arkan’s men. The “President’s direct interaction with Arkan and Seselj must be another
crime which is not envisaged either by the domestic judicial system, or by the Statute of this
court. And with Arkan there was no “direct interaction”, while Mr. Seselj was a very
respected member of the anti-communist opposition to which the President belonged also. As
far as the “finding” that the President invited the Arkan’s men” in Sarajevo in 1992, this is
another lie, which could have been easily checked in the documents and intercepts from the
time, see: D01248, of 15 May 92, p.4

Legija,
the main Arkan’s man said that what they had been promised by someone was not adopted,
and that they “came here and started organizing things on oue own initiative” but let us see
further: p. 12, Legija and Arkan talking:

Therefore, the Arkan’ men had been invited by a private person, some Dragisic, who lived in
Belgrade, who was not authorized by anyone, and couldn’t connect them to anyone. It was
not he President, otherwise it would be said in this conversation! Further, se D03705, a letter
of Gen. Subotic, the Minister for Defence, explaining to a municipality the issue of
volunteers, their rigths and obligations. D03705, p.1 and 2
 1020

See further: and another at least one intercept, which shows that Arkan’s men weren’t
welcome in Sarajevo, and that their commander Legija couldn’t get in touch with the
President. See P5675:

”
#”They just don’t want to accept us for who and what we are!” could it be more cleare#? Or:
“These people from up there are rather going to arrest me. “Up there” meant Karadzic and
Pale, i.e. the top officials of the RS.. Or “this Karadzic guy up there. They are holding hands
with the Muslims up there”, and all other what the two interlocutors said, totally and
definitely rebut everything the Prosecution alleged and the Chamber “found” about the
President attitude towards the paramilitaries, and Arkan,’ men in particular.)
 1021

5458. Regarding Šešelj, he was in frequent contact with the President and the Bosnian Serb
leadership and supported the policies of the SDS. More specifically, Šešelj advocated for a
homogeneous Greater Serbia which involved the unification of all Serb lands and the removal of
the non-Serb population; as such he clearly shared the common plan. (This is also ridiculous!!!
Mr. Seselj always explained, many times, including in the court room, that there wouldn’t be
any differentiation of a non-Serbs, since he considered all the Catholics and Muslims to be of
the Serbian origine, i.e. the considered as the Serbs all belonging to the Serb culture and
language regardless of their religious affiliation. But, this kind of charging an President for
knowing somebody, a distinguished professor of law, a publicist and a colleague from the
political life, is too much even for Stalin.) He sent large groups of SRS volunteer fighters to
assist the Bosnian Serbs in BiH in the implementation of the common plan throughout the conflict
and contributed to the execution of the common plan as such.11021 (So, #the Chamber is pushing
forward in spite of the facts#! The volunteers came in accordance with the law and the
decision of the Yugoslav Presidency, and they acted exclusively under the JNA#, and later
the VRS command. Beside that, Mr. Seselj did have many followers throughout Bosnia, and
if they checked to the JNA as a members of the Radical Party, it didn’t necessarily mean
they came from Serbia!)

3459. The Chamber therefore finds that Arkan and Šešelj both contributed to the common plan
as envisaged by the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership by providing and training men who
were involved in operations throughout the Municipalities during which there were forced
expulsions of non-Serbs and other crimes were committed. (#Wrong findings, wrong inference,
everything wrong!# The Seselj’s men didn’t exist as a formation, because they had all been
integrated in the JNA, and after the JNA withdrew, there wasn’t any Seselj’s group from
Serbia in the VRS. Further, although some young man had been followers and members of
the Seselj’s SRS (Serbian Radical Party) all of them were from BiH, and none of them were
independent, except for a short time some domestic group in Ilidza, which didn’t fight, and
didn’t receive orders from anyone. The group had been banned, dismantled and deprived
from a facilities where they had been accommodated. Another Seselj’s fan, Vaske,
participated in disabling this group. Arkan’s men came to BiH, and left it before the
President seised any power, and didn’t return before 1995, when they had accepted the
control of the RS MUP.

Another wrongness is that the training of the Seselj’s and Arkan’s man were aimed as the
Chamber stated in this para. All of it was far before anyone knew that there may be a war in
BiH, and it was because of the war in Slovenia and in Croatia, while the President didn’t
have any office in the BiH authorities. If some groups proclaimed themselves, or others
proclaimed them as Seselj’s men, it doesnit mean that they really were “Seselj’s” man!)

3460. With regard to the evidence presented in this case in relation to Slobodan Milošević and
his membership in the JCE, the Chamber recalls that he shared and endorsed the political objective
of the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership to preserve Yugoslavia and to prevent the
separation or independence of BiH and co-operated closely with the Accused during this time.
The Chamber also recalls that Milošević provided assistance in the form of personnel, provisions,
and arms to the Bosnian Serbs during the conflict.11022 However, based on the evidence before the

11021
See paras. 3327–3330. Šešelj also stated there was no joint criminal enterprise between the Accused, himself, and other individuals to expel Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats and that the Accused did not have an antagonistic attitude towards Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. D3665 (Witness
statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), paras. 31–35, 39, 41; D3667 (Transcript of Vojislav Šešelj's press conference, 26 March 1992), p. 20;
Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39600–39605 (10 June 2013). The Chamber does not find this evidence to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber
considered that Šešelj had a clear self-interest in testifying in this regard and his evidence was marked by political statements. Understood! How any
Serb would tell the truth?
11022
See paras. 3275–3288.
 1022

Chamber regarding the diverging interests that emerged between the Bosnian Serb and Serbian
leaderships during the conflict and in particular, Milošević‘s repeated criticism and disapproval of
the policies and decisions made by the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership,11023 the Chamber
is not satisfied that there was sufficient evidence presented in this case to find that Slobodan
Milošević agreed with the common plan. (At least, a bit of truth, but just a bit: namely, it is
correct that President Milosevic wasn’t in accord with the Acussed, and tha there were the
ideological differences among them, but not regarding Yugoslavia, but the second part is
senseless, because there was no any “common plan”! Or, if President Milosevic “didn’t
agree” with a “common plan” #we do no have any evidence that he was aware of an
existence of a common plan, and was able to reject his participation#?!?!)

3461. Finally, with respect to Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, head and deputy head of the
SDB, respectively, the Chamber recalls that Arkan‘s men and the Red Berets were subordinated to
them and that they sent units to BiH which were involved in take-over operations in the
Municipalities during the conflict; Stanišić and Simatović were also involved in establishing and
monitoring training camps for Bosnian Serbs.11024 However, the Chamber is not satisfied that
there was sufficient evidence presented in this case to find that Jovica Stanišić and Franko
Simatović agreed with the common plan. (Did the Chamber establish that the named officials
of Serbia knew about any “common plan” at all? The criticism from President Milosevic,
President Bulatovic and others had been motivated, first of all, #by a misinformation and
propaganda, which couldn’t be checked because of the broken communications between the
two leaderships, as well as because if a frustrations of the FRY leadership with the refusal of
the RS leaders and people to accept their suggestions pertaining to the peace plans. However,
the period for which the Chamber finds to be a period when a majority of the charged
crimes had been committed there was a sufficient communication, which certainly would be
cut immediately, had the FRY leaders been convinced that the RS leadership was involved,
or liable for the chaos in the first year of war! Anyway, #since the Chamber accepted the
Prosecution allegations about the common plan, agreed by so many persons, and known to
so many persons and institutions, how come nobody in Yugoslavia and surrounding
countries didn’t know about that, and how come the international intelligence never found
any evidence, not even a clue indicating that such a plan existed?# We have heard the
President Bulatovic testimony, and him saying that on a mere gossip that the Prime Minister
was in favour of killing the non-Serbs – the leadership of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia reacted
fiercely and decided to quit all relations to the RS oficials, see: @@@)

3462. The Chamber therefore finds beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused, Momĉilo
Krajišnik, Nikola Koljević, Biljana Plavšić, Ratko Mladić,11025 Mićo Stanišić,11026 Momĉilo
Mandić,11027 Ţeljko Raţnatović (Arkan), and Vojislav Šešelj were members of the Overarching
JCE and that they formed a plurality of persons who acted pursuant to the common plan that
existed between October 1991 and 30 November 1995 as defined above.

iii Scope of common plan

3463. In concluding that a common plan existed to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb claimed territory in the Municipalities from October 1991 to
11023
The Chamber notes that the relationship between Milošević and the Accused had deteriorated beginning in 1992; by 1994, they no longer agreed on a course
of action to be taken. Furthermore, beginning as early as March 1992, there was apparent discord between the Accused and Milošević in meetings with
international representatives, during which Milošević and other Serbian leaders openly criticised Bosnian Serb leaders of committing ―crimes against
humanity‖ and ―ethnic cleansing‖ and the war for their own purposes. See paras. 3280, 3289–3297.
11024
See paras. 3312, 3314–3315, 3317–3320.
11025
The Chamber finds that Ratko Mladić was a member of the Overarching JCE from 12 May 1992.
11026
The Chamber finds that Mićo Stanišić was a member of the Overarching JCE until the end of 1992.
11027
The Chamber finds that Momĉilo Mandić was a member of the Overarching JCE until the end of 1992.
 1023

30 November 1995, the Chamber had regard to its findings that in internal discussions among
Bosnian Serb leaders it was clear that the forcible movement of the population had occurred and
had taken place in accordance with instructions received from the highest level of the Bosnian
Serb leadership and was well planned.11028 (This is a #blatant forgery# and an unacceptable
construct. Let us see on what evidence it was based: see the first part of fn. 11032 below: The
Chamber notes that Defence witnesses testified, inter alia, that the Accused and the Bosnian
Serb leadership (i) pursued policies which tried to preserve peace; (ii) tried to accommodate
and respect the rights of non-Serbs; and (iii) did not support or plan the forcible movement of
the population or the commission of crimes against non-Serbs”. After numbering at least 12
(twelve) the most distinguished witnesses, among whom were at least three former or current
presidents of republics, a professor of Law and member of the SANU – Serbian Academy of
sciences and Arts, the Chamber laconically concluded: “However, the Chamber finds that
their testimony was marked by contradictions, evasiveness, and clear indicators of partiality
and bias, or was based on their own unfounded assessment or impressions. The Chamber
found that these factors undermined their evidence and does not find their evidence in this
regard to be reliable. While Ronald Hatchett also testified that the Accused was committed to
ending fighting and saving civilians, this observation was only limited to his own assessment
during meetings with the Accused in 1994 and is thus of limited weight.” In addition to these
testimonies there are many “strictly confidential” orders, reccomendations and appeals to
preserve the civilians, and also many internationally mediated agreements and obligations
that the refugees are to return and recover their property. Contrary to these firm evidence
there is nothing except the Prosecution allegations unsupported by any evidence, and a very
few testiomonies of the adversaries and political opponents.) The Chamber also had regard to
its findings that the Accused and the other members of the Overarching JCE were not only
informed about the forcible take-over of towns and municipalities by Serb Forces, but were also
aware that this had led to massive demographic changes through the forcible displacement of non-
Serb civilians and resulted in ethnic homogenisation, which they supported.11029 This senseless
assertions (those are not “findings” but the Prosecutor’s assertions” are commented below,
under the fn. 11039, however, all the construct of the Overarching JCE comprising a
permament removal of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats from the Serb territories in BiH is
senseless, and must be desmentleed immediately, on the basis of facts that are as firm as
concrete. What does it mean that the President was “not only informed about the forcible
take-over of towns and municipalities by Serb Forces, but were also aware that this had led to
massive demographic changes through the forcible displacement of non-Serb civilians and
resulted in ethnic homogenisation, which they supported‖? Being informed doenst mean that
the President or his associates did anything to produce such a process, and being aware of

11028
#The Chamber notes that Defence witnesses testified, inter alia, that the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership (i) pursued policies which tried to
preserve peace; (ii) tried to accommodate and respect the rights of non-Serbs; and (iii) did not support or plan the forcible movement of the
population or the commission of crimes against non-Serbs.# Kosta Ĉavoški, T. 37052 (11 April 2013); Dragomir Keserović, T. 40914–40915, 40944–
40946 (8 July 2013); D4194 (Witness statement of Sveto Kovaĉević dated 7 December 2013), paras. 5, 9, 15–16, 37; D4063 (Witness statement of Novak
Kondić dated 23 November 2013), paras. 5–7; D4166 (Witness statement of Mikan Davidović dated 1 December 2013), para. 7; D3861 (Witness statement
of Radovan M. Karadţić dated 14 July 2013), paras. 5, 10–11; D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), paras. 16, 18–18A,
46; Momir Bulatović, T. 34540–34541 (28 February 2013), T. 34560–34561 (1 March 2013); D4027 (Witness statement of Nikola Poplašen dated 11
November 2013), paras. 18, 21; D3089 (Witness statement of Milivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), paras. 18–19; D3072 (Witness statement of Pero
Marković dated 1 March 2013), para. 28; D4313 (Witness statement of Gojko Kliĉković dated 7 February 2014), paras. 3–8; D3146 (Witness statement of
Boţidar Vuĉurević, 22 March 2013), para. 5. #However, the Chamber finds that their testimony was marked by contradictions, evasiveness, and
clear indicators of partiality and bias, or was based on their own unfounded assessment or impressions. The Chamber found that these factors
undermined their evidence and does not find their evidence in this regard to be reliable. While Ronald Hatchett also testified that the Accused was
committed to ending fighting and saving civilians, this observation was only limited to his own assessment during meetings with the Accused in
1994 and is thus of limited weight.# D2741 (Witness statement of Ronald Hatchett dated 13 January 2013), paras. 10–12.
11029
See paras. 2846, 2850, 2852, 3363. Dodik testified that he never heard anyone at a Bosnian Serb Assembly or meeting speak about the permanent removal
of Bosnian Croats or Muslims from BiH and that the Accused sought to resolve conflicts peacefully and the crimes in BiH were committed by
paramilitaries. Milorad Dodik, T. 36842–36843, 36914 (9 April 2013). The Chamber notes however that Dodik‘s evidence was marked by contradictions,
indicators of insincerity, and partisanship which undermined the reliability of his evidence in this regard. (How possibly the main political
opponent to the Accused could have been underminded because of the “partisanship?)
 1024

the process could only produce more the President orders and obligations to revert the
situation once it would be possible. But the conclusion that it all “resulted in ethnic
homogenisation, which they supported” is a nasty and unacceptable forgery. Neither the
Serbs in Bosnia “supported” this kind of homogenisation, nor it could be recognized at the
end of the war. The Chamber had a sufficient evidence that the hopmogenisation pertained
only to the creation of the boundaries, so that all the border settlements may decide to belong
to one or other entities. Here are the facts that nobody can deny:

1. the Serb side wanted to avoid the war at any cost, and did everything to have the war
avoided, the Chamber has the evidence from Secretary Cirus Vance;

2. the Serb side made many concessions fot that purpose;

3. the Serb side had offered many abilities to have every ethnicity to be safe and satisfied, such
as forming of their own municipalities regardless of a canton or constituent unit it belongs
to, and this possibility remained even when the war broke out;

4. There was no a single day without one of the Conferences on BiH going on;

5. The results, proposals, reccomendations and agreements of all of these conferences gave the
Serbs in Bosnia the right to proceede with their activities to establish their high autonomy in
BiH;

6. No matter what different people were chatting duging telephone conversations, or even what
some MPs may have said in any occasion, the only official in charge of the rights to return
was the President. He was the one who, according to the Constitution, represented the
Republika Srpska as a state – entity, and if the President agreed that the refugees will have
all the rights to return and to regain their properties, it was the only to be counted, and no
allegation about a “permanent removal” could survive;

7. The President had proposed, as early as April 22 1992, in his Platform (see D01587) that no a
forcefully taken territories should be recognised, which meant that a war was senseless,

Ta
king into account the fact that the Conference on BiH was going permanently, that the
President accepted the principles of conferences, particularly that the final settlement to be
done on the Conference, both pertaining to political and territorial matters, including rights
of refugees, the Overarching JCE was impossible. NO A PERMANENT REMOVAL WAS
POSSIBLE! How the Prosecution, and now even the Chamber imagine this? That wasn’t a
Wild West, there was the conference and regulations, and nobody could count on a fait
accompli in any sense.) The Chamber found that the Overarching JCE members, including the
President, promoted and shared the objective of creating a Bosnian Serb state which was ethnically
pure and contiguous Serb areas that would require a re-distribution of the population.11030 (Big
deal, the evidence of such a huge charge is a two paragraphs of the very same Judgement.
Here is a parafraph on which the Chamber is relying as on a firm evidence for this “finding”
and assertion, while it is another assertion of the Chamber, without any corroboration: 2896.
The Chamber further finds that the Accused promoted the implementation of the Strategic
Goals as a means of creating a Bosnian Serb state and warned against including ―too many of
our enemies‖ in the state which they would create. In doing so the Accused emphasised the first

11030
See paras. 2896, 2898.
 1025

Strategic Goal and the importance of separation from the other two ethnic communities in BiH.
The Accused was adamant that this ethnic separation was necessary and acknowledged that the
―freedom struggle‖ of the Serbs had not been finished and would result in many casualties and
again made reference to the historic crimes committed against the Serbs. The Chamber finds
that the first Strategic Goal and the separation of the national communities was the most
important to the Bosnian Serb leadership and their objectives. (First, the President said “a
#separation of states”#, not population, see P956:

The same wanted all the secessionist Republics, a separation from others and forming their
own states. What is a difference between this para, and the para abowe, both are empty
assertions, nothing else. Let us see the next on which the Chamber counts in this fn. 11041:
2898. The speeches of other Bosnian Serb deputies and Bosnian Serb leaders demonstrate that
they supported the Strategic Goals and the approach advocated by the Accused. It is also clear
that war, the military conquest of territory, and the movement and resettlement of the
population were envisaged by the Bosnian Serb leadership in the implementation of the
Strategic Goals. The Accused promoted and shared the objective of creating a Bosnian Serb
state which was ethnically pure and creating contiguous Serb areas which would require a
redistribution of the population. So, #the Chamber is testifying in their own case against the
President#, quoting one empty para to support another empty para, all full of empty
assertions based on nothing, or on a wrong understanding of the Serbian language and
words of the President. The President never said that it was about the separation of the
ethnic communities, but a “state separation”. The President never said that there was an
objective of “eliminating the Drina as a border between Serbian states, (see para 2897) but
between the worlds, meaning East and West, see the transcript of the 16th session of the Serb
Assembly). What somebody may have changed while publishing it in the Official Gazette is
not the President’s liability. Further, the assertion that a “contiguous Serb areas would
require a redistribution of population” is wrong, mean and unfair, because the Chamber had
enough of evidence that the President himself was extremely opposed to any redistribution of
populations, see: (intercept with Milosevic, June 91, see D1282:

The first ideas of the division of Bosnia came from Mr. Izetbegovic, see D@@@ and then
from the Croats, see further D1282

the response to journalists 4 May 92 in Politika, and other) But, let us see what the
 1026

President sent as a message to the Muslim population in the RS, a public appeal, in May 92,
D00119, p. 1

So, there is no ambiguity: the most responsible official of the RS is publicly commited to the
fair treatment of the Muslims and Croats in the Serb areas. He is also informing the
minorities that at the end of the war they may be living in their constituent unit, because it
will depend on the political agreement “which is inevitable” but meanwhile they shouldn’t
fight and should be civilians and enjoy all the rights as the Serbs, to stay or to leave, but to
returne when the war is over.
Here is a document about evacuation of the Muslim civilians from village Arapusa, Bos.
Krupa municipality, on May 1 1992, agreed between the Serb authorities and
representatives of the population: D01353, 1 May 92:

This is a manner of an evacuation of the population from the combat zones, within the same
municipality, and there were a written guarantees for a safe return.
3464. The Chamber finds that the only reasonable inference to draw from all of the evidence
analysed earlier in this Judgement is that the crimes of deportation, inhumane acts (forcible
transfer), and persecution (forcible transfer and deportation) were intended to achieve the objective
of the Overarching JCE and that the President and other members of that JCE shared the intent for
these crimes. With respect to forcible transfer and deportation as underlying acts of persecution,
the Chamber also finds that the President and the other members of the Overarching JCE shared
the specific intent to discriminate on the basis of the identity of the victims as Bosnian Muslims or
Bosnian Croats.11031 (This kind of inferences are damaging the reputation of the UN ant this

11031
In addition, based on all the evidence, the Chamber finds that the Accused was aware that his conduct as discussed further below was part of a widespread
and systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
 1027

Court. Such a markant conclusions shouldn’t be based only on inferences, there must be a
real evidence. There are more that one more reasonable inference, such as the chaos of the
civil war, antagonisms on the local level, revenges for something that adversaries had
committed some days prior to incidents. However, it should never be accepted that there was
a forceful displacement of population. However, so far nobody had shown a single real
evidence. Could anyone imagine a forceful displacement of population without incidents,
resistance, skirmishes, journalists recording such an event, wounded people, a formidable
armed force???? Nobody ever reported about any force, or any presence of the armed
soldiers, or any numerous presence at all. On the other hand, there were to many evidence to
the contrary: the waiting lists, composed only by those who wanted to cross the front line to
their ethnic majority territory, and to or three intermediaries, checking whether the applicants
obtaine all the required papers and thus fulfilled the conditions to leave. In some municipalities there
were up to 15 papers and receipts required, which was rather an obstacle to departure.
3465. Similarly, the Chamber also had regard to the manner in which the take-over of
Municipalities was carried out by Serb Forces and the number of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats who were residing in the Municipalities prior to their take-over. There was no a single
example of so called “take over by the Serb Forces”. Which municipality was taken over by forces?
All of the municipalities in question were the municipalities with the Serb majority and the legal
authorities with the Serb majority, or there was a substantial part of population of the Serb
affiliation. In such a Serb municipalities, where there was a substantial presence of the Muslim or
Croat population, the Serb authorities proposed that each ethnic community form it’s own
municipality, as in many cities all over the world, and to establish it’s organs of power, security,
education, anything that could function apart, while a municipal services that were common would
be run by a common roof institutions. Nobody can deny it! If so, there is no a bit of the JCE. Let us
see what Mr. Alija Izetbegovic said at the ICFY in the Hague, at the ICFY on 18 October 1991, just
after the Serbs left the Assembly session:
TRANSCRIPT OF 2ND PEACE CONFERENCE ON YUGOSLAVIA, THE HAGUE 18 October 1991.
!D07816 p.25.26
 1028

So, #before the war, the Serbs had a legitimate substantial power in more that 50
municipalities#, out of 109 total number, while only Sarajevo had 10 municipalities.
#THERE WAS NO ANY “TAKE-OVER OF MUNICIPALITIES”#What would be a need
that the Serbs “take over” any new municipality?Such an ignorance of the facts is
intolerable! However, the “International Community” was fully aware of the anti-
constitutional nature of the Muslim action, as it was recorded in the Conference documents,
see:
 1029

The EC was aware that there was #neither constitutional, nor political preconditions to
require and grant the independence#! Also, it was not only the President who predicted that
the “BiH request for recognition would lead to armed conflict in the republic”! what now?
Are the all of them responsible for what happened in the civil war, or there is an exclusive
responsibility on those who knew that the recognition would cause a war, but proceeded with
the unloawful and anti-constitutional acts? For that reasons Mr. Badinter in his opinion No.
4 reccomended that BiH is not qualified for the recognition, because one of the three
constituent nations, a pillar of the state, the Serbs, didng agree. However, this referendum
was also a big cheat, because it didn’t have a required majority, nor it was confirmed and
ratified in the Assembly. Some of the internationals assisted a fraud in political life and
democracy without precedent!) With respect to the widespread practice of unlawfully arresting
and detaining non-Serbs prior to removing them from Bosnian Serb claimed territory, the
Chamber notes that there were repeated attempts by the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership
to justify the existence of detention facilities in which they knew that civilians were detained. (The
Chamber doesn’t have a single evidence for these assertions. In many municipalities there
didn’t exist any detention facility, nor there was any crimes, and it entirely depended on the
conduct of citizens regardless of ethnicity. In municipalities where there was combat activity
of the Muslim side, there were a detention facilities, because there were many captured
combatants. There are a numerous examples and evidence that had a civilian been taken in
and detained, immediately after established a fact, civilians were released. On the other
hand, what was a percentage of the Muslim or Croat population that had a troubles, and
how many had been detained? This data would ruin the Chamber’s findings to dust!)
Promises were also made to international representatives to improve conditions and release
detainees.11032 It had been fulfilled! However, the Chamber finds, in light of its factual findings
with respect to the Municipalities, that these assurances were completely at odds with the reality
on the ground. (First of all, it didn’t entirely depend on the Serb side, but the Muslim/Croat
sides made it impossible to improve anything. As they never started conflicts in some
municipalities, they didn’t stop their volatile actions in some other, but the Chamber
prevented the Defence to depict the both sides of coin. Neither the Prosecution nor the
Chamber ever submitted any credible evidence that the conditions in detention facilities

11032
See Section IV.A.3.a.v.B: Knowledge of inadequate conditions and mistreatment of non-Serbs in detention centres. (So what? The Serbs were
under a total sanctions, and not prepared for a war, and it wasn’t possible to do better!)
 1030

could have been better, but hadn’t been improved delibetarely. Without that, the Chamber
couldn’t infer as it did, namely that it was a crime of the Serb authorities. On the contrary,
the Defence submitted a sufficient evidence about generally bad economic situation, a
shortage of food, energy, water, medicines, and particularly about an unexpected
development and a huge number of captured combatants. These facts can not be denied, and
being so, this is shading another light on everything what the Chamber did.) This reality
involved the unlawful arrest and detention of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
following the forcible take-over by Serb Forces of villages, towns, and municipalities, before they
were ultimately transferred to other locations.11033 (#There is no any village “taken over” by
force, in which the Muslim forces didn’t start the war against their Serb neighbours, or the
JNA, or the VRS after 20 May 92.# There are many, many villages exclusively or
predominantly Muslim or Croat, which didn’t have any problems, but that entirely
depended on them and their decision whether to fight, or to keep a civil life and be a
civilians. This truth nothing can change. See the entire evidence, and in particular D2424
and P3788, E. Wulliamy reports! Regarding this matter, the villages that did have troubles
with the Serb Army or police are a remarkable minority, i.e. not as a rule, but as an
exception, while the villages that didn’t have any trouble were in majority!) The Chamber
finds that the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership were not only aware of these detention
facilities but used unlawful detention at these facilities as a core element in achieving their
objective of the permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb
claimed territory. (#THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE ACT OF THE CHAMBER#!The leadership
didn’t deal with the security matters, and detentions were in competence of the Army or the
Police!# This is not true, and there is no evidence regarding to this. As Gen. Galic wrote,
civilians evacuated from a combat zone were to be housed somewhere, and it was the most
immediate to accommodate them in his barracks. He asked to cease with this practice and
accommodate them somewhere else. From his order, see: D432 of 10 October 1992:

It is clear that he was well aware that these civilians #weren’t detained, but only
accommodated# while the firghts were going on. That Order is the most illustrative example
of the misunderstanding and abuse of the accommodation of civilians in a combat zone. This
was an obligation provided by the law. If it happened that those civilians decided to be
transferred to the Muslim territory, then it could have happened, such as from the Lukavica
barracks or Kula prison, or Trnopolje camp, but the decision was always their, and no force
was applied.) They also used the unlawful detention of civilians to secure the ―exchange‖ of
Bosnian Serbs detained by Bosnian Muslims. (No matter whether the warring sides were
entitled to do a retorsion, i.e. a reciprocal measures, this didn’t happen on the Serb side.
11033
See Section IV.A.3.a.v.B: Knowledge of inadequate conditions and mistreatment of non-Serbs in detention centres.
 1031

There were such a demands from different locals, but the authorities never approved it,
unless the civilians didn’t want it to be done. The only quoted evidence was what Zupljanin
said at a MUP meeting, but he only said that there were such a demands, while his attitude
towards the issue was negative, and he never said that it had been carried out! See D447, p. 8

#Proper conduct of the officials#! The “concentration centres” should be translated as

“collection centres. What is the most important is the fact that a high MUP official,
Zupljanin, was criticising this kind of demands, and particularly the conditions in the
facilities. It is clear that this practice was #condemned by the MUP officials already in July
1992#, and it is obvious that there was no any deliberate worsening of the conditions, but it
was an inevitable consequence of the abrupt hostilities among citizens! See further, the same
D447, p. 8

As seen, nobody was ready for a war, all the organisation was a peace time tipe, and on the
side of authorities there was no any inclination to crimes! Or Mr. Bjelosevic, the Chief of the
Doboj CSB, the same document D447, p. 10:

(#Proper conduct of the officials# Both the Chiefs of the

CSBs, Banja Luka and Doboj, described the chaotic situation which was not deliberately
produced by the authorities, but on the contrary, the authority attitudes are reflected in the
two Chiefs words! And the chiefs of the regional police were more critical than the Chamber,
but a villain was not the President, but the civil war!) The Chamber therefore finds that the
Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership shared the intent to unlawfully detain Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats as one of the means through which they could achieve their objective of ethnic
separation. (This #sounds only as a gossip or a calumny#, because it is so far from any truth,
and not corroborated by evidence. Again, the President kept repeating all the time, before
the war and during the war, that nothing will be resolved by the force, and everything will be
resolved on the Conference, as it really happened at the end. But only these two discussions
of Zupljanin and Bjelosevic at a confidential MUP session are sufficient to rebut the sentence
above!) The Chamber therefore finds that the only reasonable inference from this evidence is
that the crime of persecution, through the underlying acts of unlawful detention and the imposition
 1032

and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures, was intended to achieve the objective
of the Overarching JCE and that the Overarching JCE members, including the Accused, shared the
intent for these crimes. With respect to these underlying acts of persecution, the Chamber also
finds that the Accused and the Overarching JCE members shared the specific intent to discriminate
against the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats on the basis of their identity.11034 (This would be
#the least reasonable inference#, and one of many more reasonable inferences would be what
the two high MUP officers said on 11 July 1992: a general lack of everything, an unexpected
abrupt of a civil war of everyone against everyone, a poverty of the country under the
sanctions, a lack of preparations for a war, and so on! The Chamber had heard the Prime
minister Lukic testifying on the occasion of a Croatian entity Herceg – Bosnia Prime
Minister Prlic’s visit to Banjaluka in 1993, and his statements exactly contrary to what the
Chamber inferred, see T.38836-37 Q. Could you please read the first two sentences. A.
"My wish to visit Banja Luka to convince myself that Croatian people live here was realised
today because political conditions in that regard have been established. Serbs and Croats in
these areas did not wage war. The majority of Croats remained in Banja Luka which is as a
result of a positive attitude of the Republika Srpska. Therefore, the departure of Croats from
these areas should be prevented. In other words, the vacating of the apartments which should
be regulated by law." This was said by Jadranko Prlic, the president of Herceg-Bosna whom I
mentioned a few minutes ago. I had known him from before the war. Q. Thank you. What
kind of a reaction did this provoke on the Croats in Banja Luka? A. The reactions were mostly
positive, although some could be negative too. It wasn't always harmonious. It was not all
wine and roses. The majority of politicians, however, understood that this was the direction to
move in and this also gave us strength to continue working in this way.
And there was admitted D3621, see it:

Mr. Prlic realised that if there was no any fightings, the human rights are preserved, and this
meant that if the authorities had any possibility to prevent any bad event, the authorities
would do that! And the Chamber had these evidences at their disposal, and therefore no
inference was possible as a way to deliberation, because there are evidence!)
3466. Thus the scope of the Overarching JCE includes the crimes of deportation, inhumane acts
(forcible transfer), persecution (forcible transfer and deportation), and persecution through the
underlying acts of unlawful detention and the imposition and maintenance of restrictive and
discriminatory measures (―JCE I Crimes‖). However, having considered all of the relevant
evidence, the Chamber finds that it is insufficient to demonstrate that the only reasonable inference
is that the other acts of persecution charged in Count 3 of the Indictment or the crimes of murder
and extermination charged in Counts 4, 5, and 6 of the Indictment were included in the common
plan or intended by the Accused. (It is a miracle!!! However, there is no any evidence that the
11034
In addition, based on all the evidence, the Chamber finds that the Accused was aware that his conduct as discussed further below was part of a widespread
and systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
 1033

President contributed to any of those crimes, neither there is any reasonable explanation
how that would be in his interests!) In coming to this conclusion, the Chamber has considered
not only the evidence of the President‘s intent for the JCE I Crimes, but also that the President
received information about the perpetration of crimes committed by Serb Forces against non-Serbs
throughout the conflict, including that Serb Forces killed approximately 45 non-Serb civilians in
Bijeljina in April 1992 and approximately 200 non-Serb detainees at Korićanske Stijene in August
1992 and continued to act in furtherance of the common plan. (First of all, if the Chamber had
any evidence that the President had an intent for the JCE I Crimes, the Chamber wouldn’t
need any other additional corroboration as how he was “informed about ctimes.” What does
it mean, he “was informed?” #The Serb Police (MUP Services) had informed the President
about what they had been doing in investigations and prevention of the crimes!# The
Services (a State Security, a Criminal Department and others) informed him just to know
and could answere to anyone’s question, but it was not supposed that the President do
anything, because it was not in the realm of his duties. The President had every reason to be
satisfied that the Services are doing their job. But, the two examples quoted in this
paragraph are completely wrong, to the following reasons:

1. What has to be done to indicate that the Bijeljina incident didn’t appear under the
President’s authority, since at that moment there was a unique BiH still functioning?

2. The Presidency was in charge, B. Plavsic and F. Abdic and J. Doko visited Bijeljina on behalf
of the unique authorities of BiH, not on behalf of the Serb authorities.

3. The Serbs in Bijeljina didn’t intiate the skirmish, it was the Muslim side and Capt. Hasan
Tiric, who was tasked by General Karavelic to go to take control over Bijeljina on 31 March
92, see D1608, a Croatian Secret Service document:

The allegation about Tiric’s opposing the JNA further distant the President from this event,
since neither there was any Serb army, nor the President had any official state office, nor the
BiH common institutions had dissolved yet! 4. the first victims were the Serb civilians, 5. and
there was no 45 Muslim victims, but up to ten the Serb victims! What any defence could do
except to submit an evidence which rebut all the inferences and make them impossible and
vain? How any reasonable chamber could neglect so obvious facts?) The Chamber is of the
view that another reasonable inference available on the evidence is that while the President did not
intend for these other crimes to be committed, he did not care enough to stop pursuing the
common plan to forcibly remove the non-Serb population from the Municipalities. (This was not
established, particularly from the standpoint what the President could have done, and did he
do what he could. Without a specific intent, which was not established at the President’s
mens rea there must have beed established whether the President deliberately missed to act,
or he acted, but with a variety of success. As Mr. Okun said, he never considered the
President orders to be disingenuous, but to the contrary, a very commendable, but these
orders hadn’t been implemented on the terrain, see: T.1818 THE WITNESS: Your
Honour, could I make a brief statement in connection with what Dr. Karadzic just said?
JUDGE KWON: Yes, please. THE WITNESS: Thank you. Dr. Karadzic, I'm surprised to
hear you say that I alleged that your appeals were disingenuous. I said the opposite. I said they
were praiseworthy, I said they were commendable, I said they had merit. I said they were not
observed in the field, but I never President those documents of being anything but sincere. THE
 1034

PRESIDENT: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. This is a very highly positioned
international official, Mr. Okun, and his testimony didn’t leave any doubt about the intent of
the President. How can this be neglected, since it was clear that the witness wasn’t prone to
the Serbs at all?!?)
.,While the Chamber considers that these other crimes resulted from the campaign to forcibly remove
the non-Serb population from the Municipalities, the Chamber does not find them to be an
intended part of the common plan. The Chamber will therefore consider below whether the
Accused is responsible for these crimes pursuant to the third form of JCE liability below. (Until
we dismantle this construction of the Overarching JCE, nothing could be said on this
senseless and nasty assertions. But, if “it didn’t intend to be a part” of a common plan, why
the President was convicted for those crimes? Why “in dubio pro reo” principle disappeared
in this case, and we had seen so many doubts?)

(c) Accused‘s contribution to the Overarching JCE

i. Submissions of the Parties

3467. Having found that the Overarching JCE existed from October 1991 and continued until at
least 30 November 1995, the Chamber will now assess whether the Accused‘s significantly
contributed towards that JCE during this time period. In making that assessment the Chamber has
limited itself to the Accused‘s conduct during the period of the Overarching JCE. Any conduct
which falls outside the temporal scope of the Overarching JCE has only been considered, if at all,
for the purpose of establishing the Accused‘s intent to participate in the JCE. It can now turn to
each of the alleged contributions through which the Prosecution alleges the President implemented
the Overarching JCE.

3468. In paragraph 14 of the Indictment, the Prosecution alleges that the President significantly
contributed to achieving the objective of the Overarching JCE through the commission of crimes
in one or more of the following ways:

(a) Formulating, promoting, participating in, and/or encouraging the development and
implementation of SDS and Bosnian Serb governmental policies intended to advance the objective
of the JCE; (Therefore, the #Prosecution is looking for a side responsible for the war#. The
policy of the SDS and the Serb community couldn’t in any way be criminalised, since it was a
policy of maintaining the statu quo, i.e. conservative, #while the other sides
imposed changes that were unlawful, anti-constitutional, unilateral,
and prepared the secret armies needed to achieve such an unlawful
objective!#)

(b) Participating in the establishment, support and/or maintenance of Bosnian Serb Political and
Governmental Organs and Bosnian Serb Forces through which the objective of the JCE was
implemented; (#Wrong and unacceptable deduction ad absurdum!# It was not the Serb policy
that needed a force to be implemented, it was the Muslim/Croat policy of denial of the Serb
legitimate rights to be achieved. So, the Serbs didn’t initiate any change except the change of
system from an one-party to the democratic system. The others wanted the changes that
concerned the Serbs too, and without their consent. When the others in BiH (Muslims and
Croats) started to impose the changes of the nature of common states, Yugoslavia and BiH,
the Serbs in BiH didn’t respond by any violence, but declared the same, a change that would
 1035

fit their vital interests. And what happened? The Serbs had been denied this right, and had
been attacked militarily, and imposed a war!)

(c) Disseminating, encouraging and/or facilitating the dissemination of propaganda to Bosnian Serbs
intended to engender in Bosnian Serbs fear and hatred of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats or
to otherwise win support for and participation in achieving the objective of the JCE;11035 (This
#qualification is not decent, and is insulting, since only in the 20th Century the Serbs
sustained two genocidal campaigns, and the third attempt in 1991 and on#. #There almost
80% of the Serbs from Croatia dissapeared, in the BiH Federation there is no
more than 5% of the Serbs, on Kosovo the same, and to assert this would be as
same as if somebody denied the Holocoust!# Even before the war in Bosnia there was
so much of horror in Croatia against the Serbs, that any assertion about propaganda looks
like an insult! Beside that, there were the OTP witnesses who confirmed that nobody could
make any propaganda, since the Serbs knew wery well what they could have expected! A
chain of evidence of a selective persecution and other discriminatory measures of the
Prosecution is endless!)

(d) Directing, encouraging, facilitating, and/or authorising Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental
Organs, SDS officials and members, and Serb Forces to carry out acts in furtherance of the
objective of the JCE; (#All false! There is no a trace of it in evidence! What the leadership
encouraged, facilitated and/or authorised the Serb pollitcal and Governmental organs was in
accord with the Conference (ICFY) and it’s results in agreed transformation of BiH, always
underlining the necessity to keep stick to the international law procisions. If it was not so,
why the Prosecution didn’t present a contrary evidence?)

(e) Participating in the design or formulation of acts carried out by Bosnian Serb Political and
Governmental Organs, SDS officials and members, and Serb Forces in furtherance of the objective
of the JCE; (The Prosecution is understanding #all the political life of the Serbs in Bosnia as
a JCE#!!! The Prosecution can not give a satisfactory answer to a simple question: 1. Did the
Serbs have the rights to what they claimed for? 2. Did the Serbs could achieve their claims
by a political means envisaged by the ICFY in the Lisbon Agreement and all the subsequesnt
proposals? 3. Did the Serbs tried to prevent the rest of BiH to secede from Yugoslavia, or the
rest of BiH tried to deny the Serb rights to a high degree of authonomy envisaged by every
single document of the ICFY, and accepted by the Muslim leader Izetbegovic? 4. What of all
those alleged crimes, joint criminal enterprises, atrocities and other violations of the
humanitarian laws would be commited if the Muslim side didn’t try to win theentire Bosnia
for themselves, i.e. if they didn’t reneg on the Lisbon Agreement? The OTP was obliged to
know all the relevant facts before indicting the higest representatives of only one side!)

(f) Obtaining, facilitating, encouraging and/or supporting the participation of JNA/VJ forces and
Serbian paramilitary forces to further the objective of the JCE;

(g) Failing to take adequate steps to ensure that Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs
and/or Bosnian Serb Forces would act to protect Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats residing in
areas under their control;

11035
The Prosecution submits that this included claims (i) that Bosnian Serbs were in jeopardy of oppression, including genocide, at the hands of Bosnian
Muslims and Croats; and (ii) that territories on which Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats resided were Bosnian Serb land. See Indictment, para. 14(c).
 1036

(h) Facilitating and/or encouraging the commission by Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and
Governmental Organs of crimes that furthered the objective of the JCE by failing to take adequate
steps to prevent and/or investigate such crimes, and/or arrest and/or punish the perpetrators of such
crimes;

(i) Engaging in, supporting, and/or facilitating efforts to deny or provide misleading information
about crimes against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and about the role Serb Forces had
played in those crimes to representatives of the international community, non-governmental
organisations, the media, and the public; and

(j) Directing and/or authorising the restriction of humanitarian aid to Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian
Croat enclaves located in territory controlled by Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs
and/or Bosnian Serb Forces in an effort to create unbearable living conditions for inhabitants there
in furtherance of the objective of the JCE.11036 (NONE OF IT HAD BEEN PROVEN!)

3469. The Prosecution argues that the Accused led the Overarching JCE in translating the pro-Serb
ideology into SDS and governmental policies designed to further the objective of the permanent
forcible removal of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb claimed
territory.11037 The Prosecution submits that the President was the key figure in creating power
structures that would transform policy into action by transforming the SDS bodies into RS
structures and laying the groundwork for the creation of the Bosnian Serb MUP, Crisis Staffs,
Bosnian Serb Government and Presidency, TO brigades, and the VRS.11038

3470. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused dominated, guided, and directed the actions of the
Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs and Serb Forces throughout the period of the
Indictment.11039 The Prosecution further argues that the Accused disseminated propaganda to
incite Bosnian Serb fear and hatred of Muslims and Croats, which had the effect of encouraging
his subordinates to follow his example.11040 The Prosecution also argues that the Accused
obtained, facilitated, and encouraged the participation of JNA forces in arming Serbs and in the
take-over of the Municipalities; the Accused further oversaw and encouraged the participation of
Serb paramilitaries in pursuit of the common purpose.11041

3471. The Prosecution argues that the Accused, by denying the commission of crimes, justifying
them, and/or misleading the international community and the media, created an environment of
impunity, through which he encouraged the ongoing implementation of the common plan11042 The
Prosecution further submits that the Accused (i) failed to take adequate steps to ensure that
Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs and/or Bosnian Serb Forces would act to protect
non-Serbs in Serb claimed territory, and (ii) by doing so, in turn facilitated and/or encouraged the
commission of crimes in furtherance of the common purpose of the Overarching JCE.11043

11036
Indictment, para. 14.
11037
See Prosecution Final Brief, para. 597; Indictment, para. 14(a), 14(e).
11038
See Prosecution Final Brief, para. 598; Indictment, para. 14(b).
11039
See Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 598, 600; Indictment, para. 14(d).
11040
See Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 597, 600; Indictment, para. 14(c).
11041
See Prosecution Final Brief, para. 599; Indictment, para. 14(f). With regard to whether the Accused‘s contribution to the Overarching JCE through
obtaining, facilitating, encouraging, and/or supporting the participation of the JNA/VJ forces and Serbian paramilitary forces, the Chamber has included the
VJ/JNA and Serbian paramilitary forces under the definition of Serb Forces. See Indictment, para. 14(f). See also para. 159.
11042
See Prosecution Final Brief, para. 601; Indictment, para. 14(i).
11043
See Prosecution Final Brief, para. 601; Indictment, para. 14(g), 14(h).
 1037

3472. In response, the Accused argues, inter alia, that he never had the objective of expelling
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Serb areas of BiH and that he did everything humanely
possible to avoid the war.11044 The Accused further alleges that he did not promote hatred against
other peoples and that, in fact, he always promoted respect for the Geneva Conventions and
insisted on humane treatment of non-Serb civilians and prisoners of war.11045 Furthermore, he
concedes that at a state level, there were plans to defend Serbs or to protect Serb territory, but that
there were never any plans or instructions on harming, expelling, or disenfranchising non-
Serbs.11046 According to the Accused, the Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs were
not created or maintained for the purpose of committing crimes against non-Serbs.11047 The
Accused also contends that he had no control over the VRS and that he did not support or use
paramilitaries to implement the common plan.11048 The Accused argued inter alia that the
Strategic Goals were not the basis for the expulsion or destruction of non-Serbs in RS and were
merely political goals to be realised through negotiations.11049 The Accused submits that he did
not promote a climate of impunity for crimes committed against non-Serbs.11050 Furthermore, the
Accused argues that there was no JCE and moreover, that he did not possess the intent to further
any common plan of the JCE or to commit crimes.11051 Finally, according to the Accused, his only
―significant contribution‖ is shown in his efforts to maintain peace, legal order, and the security
for all citizens in BiH.11052

3473. The Chamber will assess these alleged contributions as far as they are relevant to the
Overarching JCE. In that regard, the Chamber notes the alleged contribution at paragraph 14(j) of
the Indictment which pertains to the Accused‘s role in restricting humanitarian aid to Bosnian
Muslim and Bosnian Croat enclaves in Bosnian Serb claimed territory. In its final brief, the
Prosecution refers to the restriction of humanitarian aid in relation to the implementation of the
third of the Strategic Goals through the issuance of Directive 4, namely the establishment of a
corridor in the Drina Valley and the elimination of the Drina as a border between the RS and
Serbia.11053 It also refers, more generally, to the fact that in directing and authorising the
restriction of humanitarian aid to the Eastern enclaves in an effort to create unbearable living
conditions, the Accused furthered the common purpose of the Overarching JCE.11054

3474. However, the Chamber does not consider restrictions on humanitarian aid to be relevant to the
Accused‘s alleged contribution to the achievement of the objective of the Overarching JCE for the
following reasons. The Chamber recalls that the crime base for which the Accused ultimately
faces responsibility in relation to the Overarching JCE mainly pertains to events in 1992 and 1993
in twenty municipalities in BiH defined by the Chamber earlier in this Judgement as the
―Municipalities‖. Above, the Chamber found that the crimes of murder, extermination,
persecution, deportation, and inhumane acts (forcible transfer) were committed in the
Municipalities by Serb Forces during and after their take-over and in detention facilities there.
The Chamber did not receive any evidence of restrictions of humanitarian aid into the
Municipalities, which would have contributed to the creation of unbearable living conditions
forcing the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat populations from these Municipalities to move
11044
See Defence Final Brief, para. 218.
11045
See Defence Final Brief, para. 222.
11046
See Defence Final Brief, para. 223.
11047
See Defence Final Brief, paras. 226–230.
11048
See Defence Final Brief, confidential, paras. 1052–1137, 1248–1285, 1293–1298.
11049
See Defence Final Brief, paras. 1286–1293.
11050
See Defence Final Brief, para. 761.
11051
See Defence Final Brief, paras. 231–285.
11052
See Defence Final Brief, para. 285.
11053
See Prosecution Final Brief, para. 175.
11054
Prosecution Final Brief, para. 600.
 1038

out. The evidence that the Chamber did receive was that there were restrictions on humanitarian
aid going into the Eastern BiH enclaves—Bihać, Goraţde, Ţepa, and Srebrenica from the spring of
1993 until the summer of 1995.11055 The Chamber is not satisfied that such restrictions can attach
in any meaningful way to the Accused‘s alleged contribution to the common purpose of the
Overarching JCE, which was implemented through the commission of crimes committed in the
Municipalities primarily in 1992 and 1993; therefore well before the period of these restrictions
elsewhere in BiH. (When wanted, the Chamber has ability to see.)

ii. Analysis

3475. The Chamber found that the Accused was at the forefront of developing and promoting the
ideology of the SDS. #(#NOW, THE SDS AS A PARTY IS ACCUSED#! TOGETHER WITH THE
“SERB IDEOLOGY”#) This ideology included the non-separation of Serbs, the identification of
historical Serb territories, and the creation of a unified Serb nation. (#THE “UNIFIED SERB
NATION ALREADY EXISTED SINCE 1918, BOTH IN ETHNIC AND A STATE-NATION
TERMS! THIS WAS A SERB ACHIEVMENT AND ANY CHANGE OF IT WAS A
VIOLATION OF THE OLDEST HUMAN AND NATIONAL RIGHTS!# IS IT POSSIBLE
THAT THE UNITED NATIONS COURT DOES NOT AND DOES CONTEST IT?#) These
principles formed a core element of the policies of the SDS and informed the objectives of the Bosnian
Serb leadership.11056 (#There is nothing more wrong. The Prosecution-Chamber did have the
Program of the SDS, which at a very core had a fight for democracy, multiparty system, an open
society, freedom for the cultural development, freedom for a religious life, and a good relations
between different nations, and so on.# The very same Chamber found that the President started
his political life with an enthusiasm about a common life in Bosnia, in full accord among the
ethnicities on the main issues. #How come the Chamber had it forgotten#? What happened
meanwhile? Meanwhile the SDA (Muslim Party) reneged on the proclaimed program on
preservation of Yugoslavia and decided to secede from Yugoslavia, neglecting the Serb opposition
to this huge change, which anyway couldn’t be done without consensus of the three peoples in
BiH. This is wrong also for the following reasons: The “non-separation” of Serbs had been
achieved by forming Yugoslavia as a common state of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians 1918, and
again in renewing Yugoslavia in 1945. So, “non-separation” in a sense of state separation wasn’t
any objective or ideology, since it already existed. The SDS ideology included a preservation of
Yugoslavia as a common state of all the South Slavs, and not to achieve something that didn’t
exist. In another terms, ideological terms, the Chamber may have misunderstood the Serb
inclination to an ideological division on the right and lefti, i.e. on monarchists and socialists
(communists) and the President was speaking about it far before Yugoslavia was falling apart.)
As the Chamber found above, while the political objectives themselves were not criminal, they created
the basis and laid the foundations for the structures through which a criminal purpose could be
achieved.11057 (#This thesis has a deep rift in logics, and since this is the crucial
moment of this Judgment, the damage couldn’t be recovered!# But the finding (or
inference) must had been be different. If the political objectives themselves were not criminal, and
it was evident that it could have been achieved by a political means, then the objectives didn’t lead
to the crimes, but the Muslim-Croat denial the Serb rights either to preserve their belonging to

11055
Restrictions of humanitarian aid into Srebrenica, as well as in Sarajevo, will be dealt with elsewhere in this Judgement. See Sections. IV.B.1.a: Chronology
of events in Sarajevo, IV.B.1.f.i.B: Shortage of food and supplies in Sarajevo, IV.C.1.b.ii: Restrictions on humanitarian convoys and the humanitarian
situation in Srebrenica. For evidence on restrictions of humanitarian aid going into the Eastern BiH enclaves, see, e.g., [REDACTED]; P2243 (UNPROFOR
report re meeting with Ratko Mladić, 14 February 1995); P1470 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Ratko Mladić, 5 March 1995), pp. 3–4.
11056
See paras. 2651–2653, 2940–2943.
11057
See paras. 3435–3440, 3447.
 1039

Yugoslavia, or to achieve their genuine goals within BiH. Although the Serb side took all the
precautions to achieve the objectives by a peacefull political means and to avoid a war, the other
two sides tried to deprive the Serb community from their rights by a military means, forming a
secret armies and sabotaging political talks and the peace conferences!) The Chamber finds that
the Accused, first as President of the SDS, and then in turn as President of the SNB, Presidency, and RS,
played the most important role in laying the ground work for that criminal implementation through the
creation of, and support for, the structures and bodies which carried out that plan. (#Wrong, wrong,
wrong!# What the Chamber can say on this question: why the Serb political objectives, as being
legal and not criminal, and being recognized by the EC, the Badinter Commision, and UN before
the war as an endeavour possible to be achieved by the Conference, and finally recognized by the
Dayton Agreement – why it had been denied by the Muslim-Croat armed attack and the war that
lasted 45 months? Does the Chamber and the UN Court advocate that the Serb side was obliged to
obey such a drastic deprivation of the basic rights? This approach and this process is the most
serious violation of all the international institutes and documents, such as the UN Charter, the
International Covenants on Human Rights, and other. Why? Because the UN court is slipping
over the essential fact – that the Serbs did have their rights, and accepted much less than was
entitled for the sake of a peaceful solution. But, the Muslim side wanted to prevent the Serbs from
realising their legal rights, and started the war. So, if the Chamber “found” that the President was
responsible for “through the creation of, and support for, the structures and bodies which carried out
that plan.‖. Then the Prosecution-Chamber alliance was obliged to prove that the Serbs didn’t
have any right to form their institution, which were envisaged to regulate the life in their
constituent unit, but formed it without a legal basis and only for the purpose to carry out the
criminal plan. However, nobody could prove that. The “structures” in terms of the instances of
authority existed since the elections 1990. What had been formed were only the Republic level
institutions. It had been done not only on the basis of the right for selforganisation, or on the basis
of the International Covenants on Human Rights, but on the ground of the decisions of the
Conference (ICFY) from the first, Lisbon Agreement, to the last one, the Dayton Agreement. The
fact that these structures participated in the organisation of defence and other war events – it was
not their primary purpose, nor it could have been avoided once the Serbs had been attacked and
imposed the war!) He did so by developing an ideology which was loaded with Serb nationalism and
emphasising the unity of Serbs and the importance of creating an ethnically homogeneous Serb
state.11058 (“Creating an ethnically homogeneus Serb state” is not a crime in any sense, and it
wouldn’t be an issue if the Muslims didn’t want to secede from Yugoslavia, and subjugate the
Serbs undet their Islamic regime. As such, the issue of the Serb state was recognised by the EC
and UN, which facilitated the Conference to achieve it. An ideology, and other political questions
lead us to a liability for the crime against peace, which is not in the scope of this Tribunal. But, if
it is needed for an establishment of a mens rea of the President, then the Chamber must take into
account the mens rea and actus reus of each and every leader of the Muslim community, from the
Islamic Declaration of Mr. Izetbegovic, to the every single document before the war that led to a
Serb fears and cautions, and finally to the war.) The Chamber finds that the Accused was central in
outlining the goals of the Bosnian Serb leadership and the measures which would have to be taken to
establish Bosnian Serb authority in territories which they claimed.11059 (The “Bosnian Serb
authorities” #already existed#, and the only new matter was to enable the Muslims and Croats to
form their own municipalities if wanted. The Chamber didn’t have a sigle example of an offensive
Serb intentions, but only a defensive, aimed to prevent the armed attacks on the Serb community,
with the aim not only to subjugate the entire community to the Muslim fundamentalist rule, but to
expel all the Serbs out of BiH, as General Dzambasovic testifies that the objective of the Muslim
leadership was “to liberate all to the last foot of the territory of BiH”

11058
See paras. 2651–2654, 2670–2673, 2839–2841.
11059
See paras. 2707–2714.
 1040

3476. The Chamber found that the Accused envisaged a separation of the Bosnian Serbs from non-
Serbs in BiH and that war in BiH would result in ―population homogenisation‖ and that he called
for the creation of ethnically based entities in BiH.11060 (#Mixing oranges and apples##! The
President envisaged that the secessionist policy imposed by the Muslim leadership would
lead to a war in BiH, which would result in homogenisation of population, killing of many,
destruction of properties and settlements – all of it unless BiH doesn’t give up the unlawful
secession, or unless BiH become transformed and decentralised. How this mixage is possible
and allowed??? In order to avoid so predictable development, and to avoid any crime, the
Serbs gave up their right to stay in Yugoslavia, and accepted an independent, but
transformed Bosnia, and that was welcomed by the EC and UN, and accepted by the three
ethnic communities in BiH. If the President wasn’t calling for a creation of the ethnically
based entities, which de facto existed, there wouldn’t be any consent to the independence,
and there would be a worse development, with an endless conflict. That was why the
Conference was established, to which the Serb side remained faitful, and therefore can not
have anu liability for such a development.) The Accused also encouraged the identification of
Serb areas from which Bosnian Muslims would be excluded.11061 (#This is a forgery, this is a
bastardous sentence, either created by an assistant, or because the Chamber didn’t
understand what it meant to create a territorially homogenous region#. It meant to exclude
territories, settled places as a whole, administratively, from one entity to another – if the
inhabitants wanted it, simply by drawing the administrative borderline on one or the
opposite side of such a settlement. And that really requires a huge amount of
misunderstanding, if not a bad will and intended attack on the truth not to see from the
documents and even examples from practice, that it had nothing to do with any “exclusion”
of population. Just an example of the Dobratici group of the Croatian villages, which
concluded an agreement with the maternal municipality of Knezevo (former Skender
Vakuf) in the presence of the ECMM, to dissociate and to associate with the neighbouring
municipality of Jajce, see T20851, testimony of an OTP witness Nenad Krejic Q. Thank
you. I'll try to remind you. Is it true that the lowerbottom concentration of 15, 20 villages in
Okur [phoen], are these Croatian settlements across the Ugar canyon, which separates
Croatian and Serbian settlements? I believe it's called Dobratic. A. Yes, correct. The entire
area is called Pougarje, named after the Ugar River, and Dobratici was one of the four local
communes before the war. And nowadays -- and this area was taken out of the pre-war
Knezevo municipality to form a separate municipality called Dobratic which belongs to the
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Q. Could we agree to begin with that there are no
Muslim villages in what remains and that the Muslims lived in Skender Vakuf, that is to say
Knezevo? A. Yes. We have just cleared that up with the Prosecutor. In the little town of
Knezevo itself and two smaller suburbs, Sapani and Bastina, which are one kilometre from the
centre of town each, they contained very few houses.…) We may now see how much the
development on the local level depended on the local circumstances, the same OTP witness,
T20854 Q. And you did not fight with Dobratici all the time, did you? A. I hope you don't
mean myself. Q. Certainly not. A. No, especially at the beginning of the war there was an
understanding between Knezevo municipality -- or, rather, that part of Knezevo municipality
made up of Croats that we should avoid conflict of all sorts, and we had no reason to fight
anyway. You've already mentioned that there's a deep canyon of the Ugar River there, and it
has always separated the 100 per cent Croatian area on one side and the Serbian side. There
was no reason for war between them, and we displayed restraint and containment until the war
when some other circumstances that prevailed that were beyond the control of the civilian
authorities of Knezevo or Dobratici. We had a sort of gentlemen's agreement until then. The
Map illustrating the testimony is D1880, showing how big area inhabited by Croats was
11060
See para. 2711.
11061
See para. 2711.
 1041

agreed to separate from the Serb majority municipality of Knezevo (Skender Vakuf) . Not
only did the President formulate and promote these policies, the Chamber finds that he was
adamant that he would not allow anything to stop the Bosnian Serbs from achieving their
objectives.11062 (But this had to be understood and interpreted toward a completely opposite
direction: the President didn’t say that it was his will, but he warned all and everyone that
the Serbs are decisive either to prevent the secession from Yugoslavia, which was their right
that would even President Linkoln recognize, as he recognised the same right to West
Virginia, or to have their own entity in BiH. As a representative of this ethnic community,
the President didn’t allow any possibility to stop the community in exercising their rights.
All peacefully and politically. Now, a more than academic question is: should the Serbs give
up their fundamental rights, because the opponents would try to deny those rights by a
military means?)

3477. The Chamber also found that the Accused was pivotal in making careful preparations to allow the
Bosnian Serbs to respond to any move towards independence by BiH with the creation of its own
parallel structures and take-over of power at a municipal level.11063 (Again, this is completely wrong,
for the following reasons: 1. There was no any “take-over” of power at a municipal level, because
“take-over” in Serbian means “preuzeti” i.e. take something away from somebody, whil it had
never been said or meant “preuzeti” but only “uzeti” i.e. “take” meaning get control of. 2. A
“responding” to moves that were illegal, anti-constitutional and in contrast to the Serb legitimate
interests – is simply the main objective of every politics. . 3. While attacked politically, the
attacked community is defending by a political means, but when attacked militarily by own state,
a defence must be military!) . The Accused‘s involvement in this regard included formulating
policies and actively promoting the creation of the parallel governmental, military, police and political
structures that were used to gain or retain control of Bosnian Serb claimed territory.11064 (Since the
Serb political objectives, i.e. policy of claiming the territories for their autonomy within BiH, was
not criminal by itself, the right for self-organisation of any community is also not a crime by
itself. The only crime, and all the #crimes that appeared, was in the attempt of armed prevention
of this legal Serb political action!#). These parallel structures were designed to support the existence
of a separate Bosnian Serb state and allow for the furtherance of the objective of the Overarching
JCE.11065 (The first part of the inference may have been correct, although it should be said that
the Serbs accepted it to be a “constituent state” or constituent unit in BiH instead to stay in
Yugoslavia, and had it bean achieved by political means, that would be so. The second part is
wrong, because no a Serb official or institution wanted, planned or promoted that kind of the
Serb state. A separate Serb state structures were aimed to prevent chaos and to maintain the
peace, but it appeared that those institutions were needed to facilitate the defence of the people
and territories against an illegal military attack!)

3478. For example, the Accused was responsible for the distribution and promotion of the Variant
A/B Instructions, which the Chamber has found formed the basis on which Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs,
Bosnian Serb municipal assemblies, and other parallel municipal structures were established in the
Municipalities.11066 The Accused actively monitored the implementation of the Variant A/B
Instructions, followed developments which occurred at a municipal level, and co-ordinated efforts to
ensure they were implemented.11067 He issued precise directions with respect to the establishment and
maintenance of Bosnian Serb authority and emphasised the importance of the Instructions in achieving

11062
See para. 2710.
11063
See paras. 2940–2942, 2947.
11064
See para. 2839.
11065
See paras. 2944–2951.
11066
See paras. 3073–3075.
11067
See paras. 3079–3081.
 1042

the objective of creating a Bosnian Serb state.11068 In this regard the Chamber found that the President
instructed how the Crisis Staffs would function and be structured and this was one of the ways in which
the President exercised his authority over them.11069 (So what?#LEGAL AND OBLIGATORY#! If
the Serb political objectives were not criminal by themselves, (see para 3475) the existing
authorities, no matter acting as a Crisis Staff, or a War Presidency, or a regular peace time
organs, had their obligations to secure the area of their responsibility. Everything the local
authorities did before the war was in accord with the domestic laws, and Constitution, undet the
threat of punishment for a high treason!)

3479. The Accused was instrumental in the formation of, and support for, the Bosnian Serb
Assembly and used this as the formal means through which the Bosnian Serb ideology and objectives
were officially sanctioned and disseminated.11070 (That is a basic role of the legislative representative
institutions served for. The Chamber is anxious to notice that the political objectives and
preparations to control own territory by itself wouldn’t deliver any crime, but only a forceful
prevention of the communities to achieve their legitimate goals were producing crimes!) The
Chamber also found that the Accused had influence and authority as the leading figure in the Bosnian
Serb Assembly.11071 (Influence maybe, but the President didn’t have any authority in the
Assembly, since it would be a violation of the Constitution, and the representatives wouldn’t
allow it. The President was rather at a disposal to the Assembly, while his presence wasn’t
obligatory to him, neither he was present every minute. But, if the representatives or the
Government needed some information concerning the international negotiations, the President
must have been in the vicinity, to respond!)

3480. Throughout the existence of the Overarching JCE, the Chamber found that the Accused was
at the apex of a number of political, governmental, and military structures and was not only
instrumental in establishing these structures, but he was also able to use his power and influence
over them in order to further the objective to permanently remove the Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory. (If it was so, then it must have been very
easy to the Prosecution-Chamber alliance to submit a single convincing document about the
President’s intentions, plans or acts towards a permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats. However, there is no a single evidence to that direction, while there is a
plethora of evidence to the contrary! As far as it is concerned with the presidential duties
that the President exercised, it was strictly regulated by the Constitution and the Law, and
controlled by the opposition! Nothing extraordinary!) The Chamber found that the Accused
demanded and enforced the strictest of discipline within the SDS in its adherence to the policies
which he had developed.11072 (Wrong!!! The President never made a sole decisions, there was
always a democratic process of making decisions. The President, as a President of the SDS,
was obliged to secure the decisions were implemented strictly, and not changed in an
unauthorised way!) In this regard, the Chamber found that the Accused had de jure and de facto
authority over the SDS party and its members and exerted the greatest control and authority over
its institutions.11073 (Wrong! As the above, the President was completely faitful to the
democratic procedure, he sustained a criticism very often, and didn’t succeed to have all his
proposals to be adopted. There is a sufficient evidence of that, both in the SDS and in the RS
Assembly. The locals in the SDS used to be even harsh towards the President’s interventions

11068
See paras. 3080–3081.
11069
See paras. 3086–3087.
11070
See paras. 2944–2950.
11071
See para. 2951.
11072
See paras. 2940–2943.
11073
See para. 2940.
 1043

in “their business”, as can be seen from the S. Srdic’s statement, D2265, p.47-48

or p. 58:

and many others! But, all of this looks rather like a gossip, without any basis in facts!)

3481. The Chamber finds that through insisting on this strict discipline and relying on his extensive
authority, the President was more easily able to direct, encourage, facilitate, and authorise actions
which furthered the objective of the Overarching JCE. (Wrong!!! It was only an intervention aimed
to make some individuals and groups to stick to the adopted policy, not to one’s own private
policy. And the most of the President’s influence he used for a benefit of the peace, of a respect of
Constitutions, and when the war started, almost exclusively his activity was aimed to a restraint
of the Army, respect of civilians and free passage of the humanitarian aid.) The Chamber also
found that the SDS party structures, which the Accused supported, facilitated communication between
the higher level leaders, including the Accused, and the municipal SDS leaders.11074 (The Chamber
may say something like that only pertaining to the peace period, before the elections 1990 and
before the war broke out. At the very beginning of the war there was no communications at all,
and this particularly concerns the first year of war, the one for which the Chamber “found” the
President responsible for persecutions and other crimes in Municipalities, mainly in the western
part of country. There was a sufficient evidence that there was no sufficient communication,
particularly within the SDS, whoe activity was frose. The way the Chamber presents the
President is exactly what the Prosecution tried: to depict him as an autocrat and dictator within
the SDS, which is far from any truth!) The Chamber finds that this was a crucial link in the chain to
ensure that the Accused‘s policies were effectively disseminated and that he could monitor the way in
which they were implemented at a municipal level. (There was no any President’s policy. The
Chamber itself asserted that the Serbs in BiH had their intentions and objectives. The President
adopted the people’s program and as a represent of the Serb community checked it in the SDS
and on the general elections, and the Serbs in BiH approved it and wanted their representatives
be faithful to their constituency, which is the only way to be!) There was a direct and regular
line of communication between the Bosnian Serb authorities at a municipal level and the Bosnian Serb
leadership or RS authorities, including the Accused. (Wrong assertion, because there was a
sufficient evidence that particularly in the first year of war there was no even a minimal
communication between the President and other leaders in Sarajevo and those in municipalities.
This is in particular impressive in a year for which the Chamber “found” to be the period of the
persecutions and killings. But, the way the Chamber is concluding is: there were some
communications, therefore the crimes had been ordered by the President. This is wrong, and
shouldn’t be allowed. Instead, there should be an evidence on what was the content of these

11074
See para. 2940.
 1044

communications!) This line of communication allowed the Accused to monitor developments at a

municipal level and to issue precise directions with respect to the establishment and maintenance of
Bosnian Serb authority.11075 (But the Chamber had every reason, as would any reasonable
chamber, to conclude that even the poor communication with the terrain the President used to
influence the development to the better. Not to mention that the President very frequently was
out of the country, at the conferences, and this additionally decreased his abilities to be in
contact with the terrain. The only valuable evidence would be a document depicting the
President orders that enabled a commission of crimes!)

3482. The Chamber found that the Accused was intimately involved in identifying Bosnian Serb
claimed territories, and advocated and worked towards a territorial re-organisation which would allow
the Bosnian Serbs to claim control and ownership of a large percentage of the territory in BiH. This
was done in order to establish the borders of the Bosnian Serb state in accordance with their territorial
and strategic aspirations.11076 (Exactly! That was the Serb right, and that was a task given by the
mediators at the Conference. All the three sides made their maps, but the international
mediators particularly. They demanded the sides to bring their own territorial proposals. How
come the Chamber still doesn’t know that? But, what the Chamber said in this para is in
contradiction with it’s assertion that the method of homogenisation was expelling the non-Serbs,
while in this para the Chamber recognized that the homogenisation was to be done by re-
organization of the territories!) The Chamber also found that the Accused supported the military
successes of the Serb Forces which resulted in major changes to the demographic landscape of BiH.
(The President was in a quarrel with the VRS just for a contrary reasons, because he was
stopping the Army when winning and limiting it just to the defence. The Prosecution witnesses,
as Milovanovic, Skrbic, Obradovic and other testified that the President objected to the army for
being “so militant”. There is more than enough evidence that this assertion is wrong. The
military successes had nothing to do with the demographic landscape, since the political matters,
such as return of refugees wasn’t in any aspect a matter of military, but exclusively of political
negotiations. Those who encouraged the Muslim side to go for a war are responsible for the
movement of population. There is almost none of the Serbs in the Federation BiH!) He ultimately
supported the military implementation of their goals which necessarily entailed the take-over of
territory and the forcible movement of the non-Serb population to achieve that objective. He viewed
these military operations as a necessary means of defining Bosnian Serb territory and creating their
own state and these operations resulted in the ethnic homogenisation of Bosnian Serb claimed territory
in the Municipalities.11077 (But this #has nothing to do with the ethnic composition, neither the
Army defined the Bosnian Serb territory, which was defined a centuries ago#. The Army
defended this territory. Had it been done without a war, it would look the same, only there
wouldn’t be refugees and casualties. Also, the defence of the Serb territories was important only
within the defence of the Serb population, while the military territorial successes meant nothing,
because of the Conference. The Serbs defended many territories and municipalities, but it had
been given to the opposite side around the Conference table! Several Serb municipalities of the
pre-war City of Sarajevo, that had been defended throughout the war, had been given to the
Muslims at the Conference!)

3483. The Chamber further recalls its finding that the Accused formulated, promoted, and
disseminated the Strategic Goals and that he tied the promotion of these goals to the threat faced from
the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats who he continued to identify as their historic enemies and to
minimising the number of those ―enemies‖ who would remain in their state.11078 (Not correct! First, it

11075
See para. 3080.
11076
See paras. 2839, 3090–3091.
11077
See paras. 2845–2846, 3091–3096.
11078
See paras. 2895–2896, 2901–2903. Kecmanović stated that the Accused and Krajišnik were among those who shared the view that it was necessary to find a
solution to conflicts in BiH through political negotiations and to avoid or stop war at all costs and that the Accused did not view Bosnian Muslims and
 1045

was about who should be prevented to leave Yugoslavia, which was a common home of all the
South Slavic nations. It was a painful development, but the politicians had to explain to their
people why the Serbs shouldn’t further insist on preservation of Yugoslavia. As regard to BiH,
the only matter was whether to be modest about the territorial claims, or to insist on every single
village, no matter how many Muslims or Croats may be dissatisfied for being included in a
canton with the other’s majority. The Chamber does not have a right to neglect the facts and
evidence that corroborate this position of Defence! Otherwise, the Chamber is writing a new
History of the region, which for sure would be a source of new tensions. Nobody is entitled to do
that, let alone the UN Court!) The Chamber found that the President was steadfast in emphasising
that ethnic separation was necessary in the promotion of these Strategic Goals.11079 Further, he
received and gave updates about developments and progress made towards their achievement,
including territorial control through military operations and the separation of people.11080 (Certainly
wrong! The military operations had the only purpose to preserve the population and to endure
until the poliotical settlement would be achieved. No territorial od demographic issues had been
connected with the military operations! Otherwise, the Serbs would keep their municipality in
the City of Sarajevo and other places that had been defended!)

3484. The Accused also activated the second level of the Variant A/B Instructions which were
intimately linked to the physical control of Bosnian Serb claimed territory.11081 (A #control of one’s
own territory is an obligation even during a peace times, let alone when against a
people is declared a war#. The authorities on these territories were established during the
elections 1990, and didn’t change until the elections 1996. Since the Muslim-Croat coalition didn’t
want (the Muslim component) a political solution so that all the three communities be satisfied, it
was clear that they would try to prevent any Serb autonomy by an armed force for which they
had been preparing a secret army a whole past year. Who was, according to this Chamber’s
finding, supposed to control the areas where the Serbs had been majority? All orf it is provided by
the Constitution and several domestic laws, and no regulation enabled different conduct, which
would be prosecuted as a high treason!) The Chamber found that while the Accused envisaged the
use of force to take-over power he was cautious about the way in which this would be portrayed at an
international level. (This wrongful position of the Chamber is the source of many other errors in
this process. There was no any need for use of force “to take over power” neither the President
envisage a use of force in the case of transformation of BiH, buy he envisaged a chaos and a civil
war if Bosnia continued to force the independence without the transformation and
decentralisation. The power already belonged to the ethic communitis in almost 90% undisputed
areas, and no “take-over” ever happened. A use of force appeared when the Muslim side decided
to reneg on the Lisbon Agreement, and to try to prevent the Serbs from organizing their
constituent unit!) However, there was no genuine concern about the manner in which power was taken
and there was a clear disjuncture between the Accused‘s public statements to international observers and
his private discourse in this regard.11082 If the Chamber (like the Prosecution) persists on a “take-

Croats as enemies. D3645 (Witness statement of Nenad Kecmanović dated 27 May 2013), para. 35; Nenad Kecmanović, T. 39124–39125 (31 May 2013).
The Chamber however notes that Kecmanović‘s evidence was marked by evasiveness, contradictions, partisanship and indicators that his testimony lacked
sincerity and candour. His testimony was also marked by indicators that he was seeking to protect the Accused. The Chamber therefore does not consider
that it can rely on his evidence in this regard. (The witness was the main political opponent (with Dodik) to the President, (no
partisanship) #but he didn’t accept to confirm the lies against President Karadzic#, in spite of the fact that their
political differences remained to these days. There are many other evidence that the ordinary Muslims and Croats
have never been considered by the President as enemies, but only parts of their extreme leaderships. Tha is what the
President said in Banjaluka at the meeting 12 May 92.
11079
See para. 2896.
11080
See para. 2901.
11081
See para. 3083.
11082
See paras. 3084–3085. Defence witnesses stated that the Accused was very moderate and tolerant both in speeches he gave in the lead-up to the war and
through his policies and that he insisted on respect for minorities and the peaceful resolution of problems. Savo Ĉeklić, T. 41230–41231, 41239 (11 July
2013); D3126 (Witness statement of Jovan Nikolić dated 10 March 2013), para. 60; D3853 (Witness statement of Zvonko Bajagić dated 5 July 2013),
para. 41; D4077 (Witness statement of AnĊelko Grahovac dated 23 November 2013), para. 10; D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June
 1046

over” term, no argument can help, but there was no any “take-over”. The Serbs had one third of
power on the central level, and a complet authority in all the municipalities where the Serbs and
“Yugoslavs” were a majority population. So, it can only be said that the Serbs were in a position
to defend the power which they already had. And that was their obligation, and their necessity, an
ultimate defence of survival!) There was an even greater disparity between his assurances given in
speeches and orders and the reality on the ground. (If there was a criminal orders, why the Chamber
relies on a chatting of other people, allocating their jokes to the President as his own standpoint?
However, it a strictly confidential orders of the President hadn’t been entirely implemented, as the
witness Okun said, there may be many reasons, and the last one would be an insincerity of the
orders, as also Mr. Okun testified. The most probable and the most reasonable inference would be
that some of the President orders couldn’t be implemented because of the combat activities of the
adversaries. The next could be that the forces on the terrain didn’t have sufficient manpower, or a
capable and professional officers. But, if the other side to the conflict didn’t respect a ceasefire,
nobody could, not even the President, order the attacked units to do something else, but to defend
themselves!) What transpired in the Municipalites were widespread crimes committed by Serb Forces
against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and this resulted in the creation of a largely ethnically
homogeneous state which corresponded to the objective of the Bosnian Serb leadership.11083 (This is as
much wrong as everything what this Tribunal represent and does. The crimes in the
Municipalities appeared only on the incentive made by the Muslim armed assault on, first JNA,
and later on the Serb civilians and the VRS. There is more than sufficient evidence that
corroborate this assertion of the Defence. Had this Tribunal been a real court, it would find it by
itself and protect the President from so long process and detention. Now, after the process, and all
the evidence that the Defence had submitted, it is unbelievable that the Chamber makes that kind
of inferences. There was no any objective that was counting on the achievement by the military
means, because it all had to be done at the Conference, as it had really happened. Many territories
had changed the “owner” at the Conference table, as the President knew from the beginning, and
that is why he prevented the VRS to take more territory, or to defeat the adversaries completely.
There is evidence about it.)

3485. The Chamber now turns to consider the Prosecution‘s submission that the Accused
disseminated propaganda to incite Bosnian Serb fear and hatred of Muslims and Croats, which had the
effect of encouraging his subordinates to follow his example. The Chamber recalls that the President
was also a central figure in the dissemination of propaganda against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats. This propaganda identified them as the historic enemies of the Serbs.11084 More specifically, the
President in speeches repeatedly referred to the crimes committed against Serbs during World War II,
and that they could not allow the Bosnian Muslims to declare themselves a majority people in BiH on
this basis and threaten the Serbs again.11085 The President‘s speeches were also used to promote the idea
that the Bosnian Serbs could not live together with the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and
formed the foundation for the separation of the three people and the creation of a Serb state.11086 The

2013), para. 44; Branko Grujić, T. 40373–40374 (25 June 2013); D3692 (Witness statement of Jovan Ivanović dated 9 June 2013), para. 33; D3528 (Witness
statement of Milan Martić dated 7 May 2013), paras. 23, 70–71; D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), para. 12; D2549
(Witness statement of Branko Radan dated 3December 2012), para. 20. The Chamber notes that the evidence of the relevant witnesses were marked by
evasiveness, contradictions and/or indicators of insincerity and therefore does not find their evidence that the Accused did not intend to commit crimes and
always called for respect of minorities to be reliable. However, the Chamber finds that the Accused did speak in terms which portrayed himself publicly as
the peaceful negotiator but he insisted that this peace was conditional on following the objectives of the Bosnian Serbs. The Chamber also places no weight
on Filipović‘s personal opinion that the Accused prevented ―bigger bloodshed in BiH‖ through his policies. D3140 (Witness statement of Ţivan Filipović
dated 18 March 2013), para. 21. The Chamber is erred in disqualifying so many witnesses who testified publicly, and had
been exposed to the public opinion, which would make them weak on a criticism, had they lied. This action and
attitude of the Chamber is a unique, and completely disqualifies the very idea of the international justice.
11083
See paras. 3091–3096.
11084
See para. 2670.
11085
See paras. 2671, 2843, 2851.
11086
See paras. 2672, 2711, 2841.
 1047

Chamber finds that the President played on this historical narrative and amplified its effect to suggest
that the Serbs faced a similar existential threat.11087 (#The Chamber deals with the subject about
which doesn’t know anything#, and didn’t allow the Defence to submit evidence about it. First, the
Camber neglected the fact that in Croatia on the elections 1990, in April, even before the SDS was
established, the power was taken by a Hitler’s allies, anti-Serb and anti-Semits. Alhtough
President Tudjman was an anti-fascist during the WWII, he himself bragged that luckily his wife
was neither Jew, nor Serb, and many of his closest associates were Ustashas and hated the Serbs,
and participated in the genocide against the Serbs. At the very same time there started an anti-
Serb campaign, some Serbs had been killed, many Serb properties had been ruined and an anti-
Serb propaganda overwhelmed Croatia. It was clear that Croatia was going to secede from
Yugoslavia and to be a very hostile towards the Serbs.

In Sarajevo, although the SDA started as a pro-Yugoslav party, it turned back to the
fundamentalist ideology, which had been developed in BiH in 1939 by the same people that
formed the SDA, and the tensions among the ethnic communities started to grow. The
Chamber must not establish such an assertion that the Serbs didn’t have any reason to fear
from the events that were to face in the most immediate time. Had it been left as it is, it
would become an adjudicated fact that would deliver many further tensions. Lord Owen
said publicly that the Serbs had a good reason to fear from the new development.)

3486. The Chamber finds that this rhetoric was used by the Accused to engender fear and hatred of
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and had the effect of exacerbating ethnic divisions and tensions in
BiH.11088 The President used fear and hatred to promote the historical territorial claims of the Bosnian
Serbs and to garner support for the idea of creating a largely ethnically homogeneous Bosnian Serb state
on this land.11089 (Now, the President didn’t “engender” but “used” fear and hatred… However,
the Chamber neglects the crucial fact, i.e that the Serbs invited the Muslims and Croats to stay in
the common state of Yugoslavia and to give up a unilateral and unlawful secession. When they
refused and pledged for a unitary states of their own, the Serb side was entitled to go it’s own way.
Why the Chamber is re-defining the Positions of the UN and EU on the subject? Both, the UN and
EU (EC) at the time recognised all the Serb concerns as legitimate. The Badinter Commision
issued it’s Opinion No. 4. All the most important political officials of the world at the time said the
same as the President. Even if there was no any genocide against the Serbs in WWI and WWII,
the Serbs were entitled to participate actively in the changes that had been imposed by the
secessions of the Yugoslav republics. So, it id irrelevant whether the President “used fear” to
promote the historical territorial claims, or not. These historical claims were legal and legitimate,
although subject to negotiations about a concrete territories. The UN Court is deciding directly in
contrast to the UN Charter and the UN position concerning the Serb rights to decide about their
future. Also, the UN Court is advocating a political violence and obedience to a slavery, which will
be remembered as a dark period of the UN!) The Chamber also found that the Accused‘s position
with respect to these historic territorial claims was endorsed by the Bosnian Serb Assembly and formed
a core aspect of the Bosnian Serb objectives in including these territories in the RS. 11090 (That was a
democratic approach to the challenge of the illegal secession! The President was serving his people
and it’s legitimate intentions, which had been defined by the Assembly, and confirmed through
several referenda!)

3487. The Chamber finds that these speeches and statements went beyond mere rhetoric and formed
a core element in the policies and plans developed by the President and the Bosnian Serb

11087
See paras. 2672, 2708, 2841–2843.
11088
See paras. 2671–2672, 2895.
11089
See paras. 2670, 2711, 2713, 2841–2843.
11090
See para. 2843.
 1048

leadership. (The Serb policy of preserving Yugoslavia, and later of securing their entity
within BiH was legal and legitimate, and it was recognised both by the UN and EC. Is the
Chamber now changing it? On what basis? These legitimate intentions didn’t cause any
violence, including the war itself, but the Muslim denial of these rights through a military
attack and declaration of the war against the Serbs!) The Chamber also found that the
Accused disseminated propaganda about demographics and the Bosnian Muslim birth-rate as a
further justification for ethnic separation.11091 (The Chamber neglects an obvious evidence that
this didn’t concern with a natural birth-rate, but an unnatural and politically motivated
huge operation of obtaining a majority for the purpose of getting “strong enough” to
establish an Islamic regime. There was evidence admitted, and the Chamber was obliged at
least to explain why it neglected trhis challenge and the threat to the Serbs. See: D02768,
showing what was planned to be done to the Serbs in BiH;

It was published in the Vox Magazine, owned and edited by Mr. Sahinpasic, a high official
of the SDA, aand re-printed a year later, with an excuse that it was a joke. But, nobody saw
it as a joke, since it was exactly what happened during the Turkish occupation, as well as

11091
See para. 2851.
 1049

written down in the Islamic Declaration authored by Mr. Izetbegovic!) see: @@00174
showing a huge clandestine intervention of the Turkey in the war in BiH, which resulted in
many punishing actions agains the Serbs, see:???? @…#But, let us suppose that
somebody tried to change the ethnic balance in the Northern Ireland,
what would happen?# . The Chamber found that this ideology was repeated and used
by the President and the Bosnian Serb leadership as justification for the creation of ethnically
homogeneous entities in BiH and to decrease the number of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
who remained in the Bosnian Serb state.11092 (The homogeneity was supposed to be achieved
only by a selection of the settled places to be included in the ethnic states, and not in any
other way. See what Mr. Ajanovic, a high SDA official said after the Lisbon Agreement had
been accepted, see D302, of 19 March 1992:

it was obvious that the homogeneity was a matter of the maps, not of the redistribution of
population. It was never an objective to have an ethnically pure state, which is invented and
forged by the Prosecution, in spite of so many documents proving opposite!) The Chamber
finds that the President persisted with promoting the objectives of ethnic separation and the
territorial claims of the Bosnian Serbs into 1995.11093 (This was not a crime! This was a
legitimate demand of the transformation of BiH, which was going towards the illegal
secession, against the legitimate political will of the Serb people in BiH. Since all of the
President claims had been acceptable to the International Community (UN and EC) up until
18 March 1992, the rest of time went on in a Muslim military denial of the already agreed
state separation. The International institutions never abandoned the Serb claims for their
entity, and it was acceptable for the mediators from the very beginning of the crisis, to the
very end of the war and the Dayton Agreement. Why the #Chamber is questioning this
already legalised and legitimised matter#?)

3488. The Chamber found that the President was instrumental in the creation of the SerBiH TO and
local TO units in mid-April 1992 and that he had de jure and de facto control over the TO.11094 (Wrong!
Before the nomination of the Commander of the Republic’s TO, and even after it, the TO units
belonged to the municipalities or companies that formed them. The President was only
coordinating them for a short period!) The Chamber also found that the President was closely
involved in giving instructions for mobilisation of the TO at a municipal level and the creation of the
Bosnian Serb TO which was used to take-over and maintain Bosnian Serb authority in the
Municipalities.11095 (All in the accord with the domestic laws, and the Chamber is doing it’s
findings contrary to the domestic laws. The TO had to be established in every local commune, as
well as in companies, regions, and the Republic as a whole and provided both in Constitution and
in Law on All-people Defence. Any other way would be a crime of a high treason, as written in the

11092
See paras. 2839–2840, 2851, 2854–2855.
11093
See paras. 2854–2856.
11094
See para. 3177.
11095
See paras. 3172–3173.
 1050

law.) The President also took a leading role in the co-ordination of TO forces and their subsequent
integration into the VRS.11096 (This is also an inherited rule, and all the armed forces, i.e. Army,
Territorial Defence, Civil Protection, and the Police when necessary, are integrated under the
command of the Army. Therefore, the #President can not take any credit for inventing this rule#!)

3489. The President, as the highest authority in the VRS chain of command,11097 had the power to
organise and implement plans for defence, order mobilisation, and command and control the
army.11098 The Accused exercised his powers, for example, by ordering the VRS to carry out
general mobilisation, which was delivered and acted upon at the municipal level, and by
reassigning VRS officers.11099 He was key in planning strategy and was closely involved in
examining and approving the VRS military directives, which were issued in furtherance of the
Strategic Goals.11100 (All legal, nothing illegal, no crime was commited. These were all
ordinary presidential duties, as same as in the countries known to the Chamber! But, this
shows how deep is the rift between this Court and the domestic legal system!)

3490. The Chamber also found that the Accused‘s involvement in the command of the VRS as
Supreme Commander went beyond planning and strategy as he was involved at the operational
level as well. For example, the President issued instructions based on proposals for operations he
received from the Main Staff and occasionally sent direct orders to the corps and brigade
commanders to answer directly to him.11101 (Nothing illegal. But the President got involved in
the direct command #only in a cases of the request of the internationals#, to stop an
advancement, to withdraw from some areas, to help with the humanitarian convoys. Was
there any crime commited on the basis of the President’s orders? Although the President
handed the operational and tactical command to the Main Staff, it was his decision, and in
some exceptional cases he was entitled to take this command back, and it was always in
favour of peace or humanitarian aid, and once in the case of the riots in Banja Luka! But,
this shouldn’t be of any interest of the Chamber, unless the President issued a direct
executive order that caused a crime!)

3491. The Accused was central in promoting the creation of a separate police structure.11102
(All legitimate, and all in accordance with the Conference on Yugoslavia (ICFY) and the
sub-conference on BiH. See the Theaty Provisions, R0414668-R0414682

11096
See para. 3176.
11097
See para. 3098.
11098
See para. 3142.
11099
See paras. 3145–3146.
11100
See paras. 3142, 3152–3156.
11101
See paras. 3104, 3142–3144.
11102
See paras. 2990–2991.
 1051

How come the Prosecution was ignorant of the crucial documents of the ICFY, and who is
responsible for this deluding the Chamber about what was legal and what illegal in the
President’s conduct?) This reflected his objective of creating a separate Bosnian Serb state with
parallel structures and this separate police structure was a means of achieving the objective of
sovereignty of the Serb people in the territories which they claimed.11103 (THIS IS A VERY
CORNER STONE OF THE CASE AGAINST THIS PRESIDENT, FROM WHICH ALL
HIS “SINS” HAD BEEN DERIVED. HOWEVER, THIS WAS POSSIBLE ONLY
BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION AND THE TRIAL CHAMBER DIDN’T WANT TO SEE
THE FACTS, AND INSTEAD THEY CALLED H. OKUN TO TESTIFY ON THE BASIS
OF HIS NOTES, FOR WHICH HE HIMSELF SAID THAT ARE ARBITRARY AND
COMPOSED OF WHAT HE HAD HEARD AND WHAT HE HAD CONTEMPLATED. If
the Chamber was responsible towards the facts, once notifying that there was a Conference
on Yugoslavia from the summer 1991 (see Paras 312 and 313 of this judgement) to the end
of the war.) it would see what were the #agreements and commitments# made at the
Conference in 1991. Then the Chamber would see that the President and the Serb side didn’t
do anything that hadn’t been agreed. Particularly the accusations contained in this
paragraph. It was only after the trial that the OTP disclosed the documents from this
Conference, although both the Chamber and the Prosecution were obliged to rely upon the
genuine documents of the international character, particularly since this Conference had
been taken into account and mentioned in this Judgement, paras 312, 313 and other. Let us
see several of those documents: 1. Badenter’s Commission opinion No. 4 (in English) 2. In
addition, as Supreme Commander of the VRS and the President of the RS, the President had de
jure authority over the MUP during times of war, which he exercised in fact directly, as well as
through the municipal Crisis Staffs.11104 (Those assertions are ridiculous. The #President had
only those competences that had been provided for by the Constitution and by laws#, no
more, no less. The only order pertaining to the MUP was when there was a need to subjugate
a MUP unit to the VRS! But according to the regulations, the President couldn’t and didn’t
order anything illegal and criminal to be commited by the MUP, as well as by the VRS.
There was no a jungle, but a people with a very long history of statehood, and everything
had to be in accord with regulations!)
3492. Turning to whether the Accused obtained, facilitated, encouraged, and/or supported the
participation of JNA forces and Serbian paramilitary forces, the Chamber found that the VRS was
formed from parts of the JNA, TO, and volunteer units and inherited both officers and soldiers
from the JNA, many of whom were of Bosnian Serb origin, as well as a substantial amount of

11103
See paras. 2990–2991.
11104
See paras. 3167–3168.
 1052

weaponry and equipment.11105 (Not “many of them” were of Bosnian Serb origin, but up to
99% of the officers, and a 100% of combatants were the Serbs from Bosnia. Further, apart
from the Patriotic league and Green Berets, which were formed claindestinely by the former
JNA officers of the Muslim affiliation, the ABiH was formed from the JNA officers, soldiers
and reservists, as the HV (Army of Croatia) as any army in the former Yugoslavia. The only
difference is that the Muslims and Croats left JNA gradually in a longer period, while the
Serbs in BiH didn’t form their own armed forces while the JNA was there, because it would
be illegal. And the President was explicitely against any such a formation of separate ethnic
army, which is evident from the exhibits. The Accused participated in the creation of the VRS
by organising the manpower at the local level and facilitating the transfer of personnel and supply
from the JNA.11106 (So what? No crime!) Furthermore, following the withdrawal of the JNA
from BiH, the President supported the operational co-operation of military forces and local
authorities with Arkan‘s men, Šešelj‘s men, and Mauzer‘s Panthers.11107 (Wrong and false! Once
the JNA announced that it will withdraw, the Serb Assembly decided to form its own Army,
the VRS, on 12 May 92, the same day the President was elected in the Presidency, and
General Mladic nominated by the Assembly to be a Commander of the VRS. Even before
that, the Prime Minister Djeric issued orders to the teritorials (TO) to behave in accordance
with the international and domestic laws and banned the paramilitaries, see@ . In May 92
General Mladic issued orders against any paramilitary group, see @. On 13 June the
President issued his own order to ban, dismantle, subordinate all independent groups of
armed people, or to arrest them. There was no any “co-operation of military forces and local
authorities with Arkan’s men, Seselj’s men and Mauzer’s Panthers. Arkan’s men weren’t
welcome in Ilidza, and their prior presence in Bijeljina and Zvornik was in the period when
the JNA was there, and in Bijeljina during the former authorities of BiH, when the President
didn’t have any competence over the development. They appeared again only in the fall of
95, but under the command of the RS MUP. Seselj’s men were integrated in the JNA and
later in the VRS, and the only group that had some relation to SRS party was Brne’s group,
but it was blocked, disabled in action and finally dismantled.

3493. The Chamber now turns to consider the Prosecution‘s submission that the Accused failed
to make meaningful efforts to exercise his authority to prevent or punish crimes committed by his
civilian and military subordinates and that these failures significantly contributed to the
Overarching JCE.11108 The Chamber recalls that for an accused to contribute to a JCE by
omission, he must have had a legal duty to act, and that the failure to act pursuant to that legal duty
significantly contributed to the JCE.11109 The Chamber found that during the time period relevant
to the Indictment, the Accused was the highest authority in the VRS chain of command.11110 Prior
to its establishment, the Accused had de jure authority over the TO and took steps to create a
hierarchical command and control structure, which included some municipal Crisis Staffs over
which he had authority.11111 Here is the para 3177, to which the Chamber referred: 3177.
Based on the above the Chamber finds that the Accused was instrumental in the creation of the
SerBiH TO and local TO units in mid-April 1992 and that he had de jure authority over the TO.
In addition, given the Accused‘s authority over Crisis Staffs, the Chamber finds that the
Accused also had de facto authority over the TO. (However, the Chamber erred in inferring
so, because there are a sufficient evidence in the file that it was not so. According to the local
legislation, the TO units were under the command of their respective commanders, in
11105
See para. 3097.
11106
See para. 3176.
11107
See paras. 3234–3236.
11108
Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 535, 601.
11109
See para. 566.
11110
See para. 3098.
11111
See para. 3177.
 1053

municipalities it was president of the municipality, in companies it was somebody who was
nominated by the chief manager and approved by the JNA. Since the President didn’t have
any de jure, nor de facto authority over those units it can be seen from the Djeric’s order in
April 92, see D03709

Since the President was at Pale, why would the Government decide on it, callin upon the
articles of the Law of National Defence? Or, why would the Prime Minister issue the orders
to the TO? See: D00219, 20 April 92:
 1054

It is clear that before the formation of the VRS, 15 June 92, (see: P03035) the #President did
not have any authority over the combat units of the TO#, and other combat units didn’t exist
out of the JNA, or if existed, then it was illegal and the JNA would ban it and arrest it!)
According to the Bosnian Serb Constitution and the Law on the Army, as Supreme Commander,
the Accused had the authority to, inter alia: (i) appoint, promote, and dismiss VRS officers in
accordance with the law; (ii) appoint and dismiss presidents, judges, and assistant judges of
military courts and military prosecutors; (iii) issue regulations prescribing internal order and
relations in the military service; and (iv) issue regulations on military training and discipline.11112
The Chamber also found that the Accused had de jure authority over the MUP, which he exercised
in fact.11113 The Chamber finds that in light of his position of authority over the VRS, TO, Crisis
Staffs, and MUP, the Accused had a legal duty to prevent and punish crimes committed by them.
(Commited by them? Does the Chamber have shown any evidence that the said formations
and bodies had committed crimes? What are these evidences? If a member of some of those
formations had committed a crime, the organs were in charge to punish them. However,
there is no any evidence that those formations as such, i.e. in their official capacity did any
crime. And that they did so, there is an overwhelming evidence, both in dismissing
individuals from job, (more than 6,000 incompetent policemen had been fired in the first
year of war) and indicting the villains. This wasn’t a duty of the President, as is nowhere in
the world. But, before 12 May 1992 the President didn’t have any authority over the MUP,
and prior to 15 June the President didn’t have any authority over the VRS! How come this
Court didn’t know what are the duties of a president, since it is the same in any
parliamentary democracy!)

3494. The Chamber will now consider the efforts made by the Accused to ensure the protection of
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats residing in areas of Bosnian Serb control and to prevent and
11112
P5578 (Amended Text of the Constitution of RS and Rules of Procedure of RS Assembly, 17 December 1992), Art. 106; P2603 (SerBiH Law on the Army,
1 June 1992), Art. 174(12), (13). See also D434 (Radovan Karadţić‘s Order on the application of laws of war, 13 June 1992) (in which the Accused issued
an order, imposing a duty on the ―competent superior officer‖ to initiate proceedings to punish persons who violate the laws of war).
11113
See para. 3167.
 1055

punish crimes committed by his subordinates. The Chamber recalls that the President established
the military courts and that the civilian courts existed during the conflict; however the Chamber
found that the system functioned in a discriminatory manner, with a lack of attention to crimes
committed against non-Serbs.11114 The Chamber found that the inadequate level of investigations
and prosecutions of crimes committed against non-Serbs was consistent with the President‘s
position that such matters could be delayed during the conflict.11115 Here is a part of this para
3425 to which is this para referring: 3425. Having considered all of the evidence, the Chamber
finds that there was a systemic failure to investigate and prosecute criminal offences committed
against non-Serbs in the Municipalities during the conflict. The Chamber rejects the evidence
presented that the justice system treated all ethnicities the same in light of the compelling
evidence demonstrating a lack of investigation and prosecution of the serious criminal acts
committed against non-Serbs which were brought to the attention of authorities, as opposed to a
clear willingness to investigate and prosecute crimes committed against Serbs. Again, this para
relies on the next para from the fn 10955, i.e. 3414-3416 , 3422-3423. Let us see on what are
based those paras: let us see 3414: 3414. As discussed in greater detail below, there was a
systemic failure to investigate and prosecute crimes committed against non-Serbs and few cases
in which Bosnian Serbs committed crimes against non-Serbs reached military courts.10907 The
cases prioritised by the military courts in Bijeljina and Banja Luka in August 1992 pertained to
failure to respond to mobilisation and desertion by Bosnian Serb Forces and cases involving
Serb victims.

3495. The Chamber found that the Accused made minimal efforts to prevent or punish the crimes
of forcible displacement and deportation after he learned about such crimes repeatedly throughout
the conflict, starting from as early as April 1992.11116 (A #president, anywhere in the world, is
not investigating and punishing anyone#. There exist the institutions that do their job, and
not even Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice could do anything out of the judicial
system. What was the constitutional and a lawful duty of a president and ministries was to
create as good as possible conditions that those institutions work properly. The honourable
members of the Chamber should have known that in their countries is a similar system.
Once the laws are adopted, passed through the Assembly and promulgated by the President,
and the institutions formed, there is no possibility for anyone to interfere, unless there is a
criminal charge, or a political assessment of the Assembly to make some changes!) This is
unsurprising given that he established and co-ordinated the political and military structures which
implemented the goal of the Bosnian Serb leadership to create an ethnically homogeneous state
and intended for these very crimes to be committed. (Where is an evidence for this assertion?
There must have been a law, order, instruction, interfearance in the judicial system…. How
the President could have done what is “found” in the Judgment? Look what the Chamber’s
trusted witness Djeric said about the forming of the Serb institutions, see: T. 27924, on the
Lisbon Agreement as a basis for the formation of the Serb institutions: formed -- changed all
these formations without any detrimental effects? Do you agree that what you said and what the
assembly did was after the Lisbon agreement had been agreed to; namely, the offer that had
been made to us that we have our own constituent unit in Bosnia? A. Yes, I agree with that.
And that was done on the basis of the ideas presented in the Lisbon Agreement. Q. So you do
remember that already then we accepted to have a Bosnia outside Yugoslavia, to have its
external borders preserved but internal decentralisation would be carried out on the basis of the
provisions of the Lisbon Agreement, right? A. Yes. For example, within a few months of

11114
See para. 3425.
11115
See para. 3425.
11116
See Section IV.A.3.a.v.E: Accused‘s knowledge of crimes and measures he took to prevent and punish them.
 1056

being presented with information that non-Serb civilians were being expelled from Zvornik in
early April 1992, the Accused ordered an investigation and then advised international
representatives that Bosnian Muslim inhabitants in Zvornik had requested to move out because
they felt like hostages. However, the Chamber found that the Accused had also been informed
that the municipal authorities in Zvornik had participated in the expulsion of non-Serb civilians in
order to allow Serb refugees to settle there and also blamed paramilitaries for these events. (This is
#incorrect and almost a criminal inference#. First of all, in April 1992 the President neither
had sufficient information, nor any authority and ability to intervene. The Chamber must
have known that Mr. Izetbegovic ordered (illegally) a general mobilisation of 4 April
evening, and that the fights in Bijeljina just stopped on 2 or third April, and started in
Zvornik on 5 April. The first day the Muslims had a success, and the Serbs had to escape
from Zvornik. They returned within next few days, and had more success than the Muslims,
liberated the very urban core of Zvornik, while 80% of the municipal territory was under
the Muslim control. At that moment there was no a Serb refugees to be settled in Zvornik.
And the authorities in Pale didn’t know who was in control of Zvornik, since there is a
document that certain Rada, a secretary in the Serb MUP called Belgrade and Arkan, to ask
him who controlled Zvornik, see: P01109

Not only the MUP didn’t know who was controlling Zvornik on 16 April 1992, but also
Arkan was endangered by the Serb authorities, and he withdrew his men!) He therefore
clearly knew that the expulsion was forced but took no actions to punish the perpetrators of such
acts. He later celebrated the ―liberation‖ of Zvornik and the fact that there were almost no non-
Serbs remaining there in 1993.11117 (#LIBERATED FROM THE ARMED MUSLIM
EXTREMISTS#! This is more than wrong, this is #mean and malicious#. The Chamber had
the opportunity to see the evidence that the Muslim extremists were the first to fight and
expel the Serb civilians from Zvornik, although the Serb side was negotiating with Muslim
side to have formed the two ethnic municipalities. In April 92 the President didn’t have any
influence on events in Zvornik. The Chamber saw the document that the Muslim civilians
from Kozluk demanded to leave, but the Serbian Orthodox bishop called the Muslim priest
and they together with the Serb authorities dissuaded the civilians from their intent to leave.
Later, the civilians from Divic demanded to be allowed to leave towards Tuzla. When a

11117
See paras. 2812, 3337.
 1057

paramilitaries started to torture the officials in Zvornik, the authorities couldn’t guarantee
their own security, and anything to anybody. Another unacceptable and extremely unusual
manipulation with evidence is the sentence that the President “celebrated … the fact that
there were no non-Serbs remaining there in 1993. The Chamber is misinterpreting the
discussion of the President with the Yugoslav leadership, and when Minister Jovanovic was
talking against an “ethnic cleabsinng” because the natural and non-violent processes are not
a crime, the President supported his thesis, stating that many thousand Serbs from Zenica
already arrived in Zvornik. The Chamber knew that the Serbd controlled only a small part
of the municipality and the town itself, while more than 60% of the territory was, and still is,
a Muslim municipality, without any Serb there. This way of distortion would be the same as
if the President said that he celebrated Christmas, and that there happened an earthquake –
and that meant that he celebrated an earthquake too.)

3496. The Accused continued to learn about instances of ―ethnic cleansing‖ throughout the
conflict.11118 (The President and everyone knew it even before the war, that all the three
ethnic communities would flee towards their territories, and that was why the President was
against the war. At the first period even the international monitors qualified the feature
correctly, as a chaotic escape of population…In the next document, which was disclosed to
the Defence after the trial ended, it is evident that the events, and not authorities, displaced
population, 21 April 1992 :

It was only much later that somebody inventer the term “ethnic cleansing” as a “suitable”
term to dis-qualify the Serb side, despite the fact that there was more the Serb refugees than
the Muslim and Croat together!) However, it was not until 19 August 1992 that he issued an
instruction to the VRS and MUP ordering that the forced resettlement of the civilians should be
prevented and that ―any certificates of sale of property or statements that refugees will not return
shall be considered as legally invalid and are declared null and void‖ and 21 August 1992 that he
pledged to prevent ―ethnic cleansing‖ and punish persons involved in it.11119 On 25 August 1992,
the President wrote a letter to the international community explaining that he had issued the 19
11118
See Section IV.A.3.a.v.A: Knowledge of crimes committed throughout the Municipalities.
11119
See para. 3400.
 1058

August 1992 instruction and stated that the civilian population must be allowed to move freely out
of a war zone if that was the desire of the civilian population, under the Geneva Conventions,
blaming the failure on the part of the international community to understand the deep-rooted
antagonism and hatred between the three ethnicities in BiH, which caused people to leave their
communities in droves.11120 The Chamber considers this latter statement to be an attempt by the
Accused to cover up and minimise the forced nature of the removal of non-Serbs from the
Municipalities and indicates that his orders to prevent such forced removal were not intended.
This finding is supported by the fact that he continued to share the intent to forcibly remove non-
Serbs from the Municipalities until 30 November 1995. (This is as wrong as devil. You will find
at least 18 documents of the President, mainly orders, one guidelines and two appeals – all
issued far before 19 August 1992, the exhibits as follows: D94, D95 D96, D434, D1603,
D3111, D4702, D445, D477, D2244, D426, D576, D494, D110, D4702, D1141, D4710, and
some of these documents will be pasted below in parts or the entire documents. First see:
D01603, p. 9 which was signed as early as 22 May 1992, which, as an Agreement, regulated
the matter of civilians in a combat zones.

The Prosecution-Chamber #did not prove that there was a displacement out of the
required “security reasons” or “imperative military reasons”# . Since there was
many occasions when “such displacements had to be carried out” the Prosecution was
obliged to show which one was not falling within this necessity. Here is precisely provided
when and why civilians could be displaced and detained. Further, see D01141, of 1 October,
p.1. signed by the three sides under the auspice of the ICRC:

11120
See para. 3400; D4720 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić re London Peace Conference, 25 August 1992), p. 1.
 1059

#What is wrong with this document so that the Chamber neglected it#?
There was no any movement of population unless there were armed conflicts and
open fights. The two third of the municipalities under the Serb control didn’t
have any crimes, or any “forceful” displacement. Why? Because there was no a war,
wherever the Serbs had been a majority population, the Muslims and Croats were safe, and
this fact nobody can deny, and the fact is rebutting all the allegations about the JCE.
Further, the inference of the Chamber is wrong and deeply incorrect – that it was for the
first time on 19 August that the President issued orders towards the protection of the non-
Serb civilians. It only happened after Mr. Doyle informed the President while in London,
about the feature, but it was a permanent concern of the President nd other state organs. In
addition to the evidence: D00434, of 13 June 1992, the Order on respect for the International
law of war; and D01603, p. 9 which was signed as early as 22 May 1992, which, as an
Agreement, regulated the matter of civilians in a combat zones, see also D00096, of 23 July
1992:
 1060

Why the Chamber neglected this document? Further, there were other documents: see D04710
of 17 July 92, and Agreement between the warring sides, p. 1:

p. 2 (accompanying draft of the SC SG statement:

Also, D00095 of 14 July 92, the order of the President to the municipalities in the South-East
Bosnia, region of Gorazde:

In the occasion of the anniversary of SDS, 11 July 92 the President issued a public greetings
to the members of SDS and appealed for a humain approach to the crisis, D94:
 1061

So, in this, as well as in many other occasions, the President made it known to the public
what was his attitude towards civilians of the other two communities. Therefore, prior to 19
August 1992 there was at least acts, orders and appeals to the respect of the protection of
non-Serbs: 22 April 1992, the President’s Platform D110, the President’s speech in Banja
Luka meeting on 12 May 1992, D494, p. 5

further, D576, order of S. Galic, 2 Jun 1992

further, The Appeal of the President: D426 of 8 June 1992 :

 1062

There is no any doubt about these efforts. See further, D2244 OF 23 June the Declaration of
the Presidency of the RS:

further, D477, of 1 July 1992, the Order to facilitate ICRC access:

 1063

further D94, the Greetings of the President to the SDS anyversary:

further, D445, of 11 July 1992,

 1064

See also D4702, an Appeal of the President to the inhabitants of Gorazde. Further, see D95,
an Order of the President to all the municipal presidents,

f urther, see D3111, the President’s Guidelines to the authorities, of 14 July 1992
 1065

How come this Guidelines of the President to the state organs was not wworthy of any
attention of the Chamber? Who were those who reviewed the evidence? See further D4710,
an Agreement from London. Further, D96, order of the President after the London
Conference agreements:

How was it possible that somebody deceived the Chamber so cruelly, while a simple glance of
the evidence would give another, contrary picture! And what a Defence could do if the truth
is so neglected? Is it possible to argue with both the Prosecution, and a Chamber which
trusts only Prosecution and nobody other. Such a prejudice is of a cosmic dimensions, and
God help us that this kind of trial never repeate!)

3497. It is further supported by comments that the Accused made in response to information he
received from international representatives about ―ethnic cleansing‖ in Bijeljina in late 1994.
(First, how come there was so many Muslims in Bijeljina in late 1994, if they had been
“expelled” when it was alleged, and reported by “international representatives”? Second,
why the President, occupying the presidential office, would rely on information of an
international representatives, who even then and now confess that they had been biased in
favour of the Serb adversaries? The President had the state institutions, and whenever he
trusted more the internationals than his services, and the VRS personnel – he made a
mistake. Even the highest UNPROFOR officers didn’t trust the Military Observers and their
reports! The international representatives hadn’t been stationed in Bijeljina all the time, and
they had been hed by the Muslim propagandists, and an insistence on obedience to the
internationals is insulting!) On 26 September 1994, the Accused said to international
negotiators that Serbs in Bijeljina were ―fighting for their own land‖ and that ―ethnic cleansing‖
would be an inevitable outcome of the international community‘s failure to establish any legal
mechanism allowing the population to exchange their homes and move into cantons in which their
 1066

nationality would be dominant.11121 The Chamber found that these statements demonstrated that
―ethnic cleansing‖ was directly linked to the President‘s objective to take-over Serb claimed land
and that he was not interested in preventing it.11122 (So, when the President said something
within an academic discussion, trying to understand and make others to understand
processes, the Chamber qualifies that as the President’s wishes or intentions. But the reality
is going it’s own way, undersood we it, or not. This is not correct to hunt the President’s
colloquial reconsiderations at a lunch time as his criminal intentions. None of these
allegations brought into this trial by a note-takers, mainly Harland and Banbury, their
superiors ever understood as an official standpoint of the President. This kind of testimonies
of a very low positioned clerks compromises the entire international presence in the crisis
areas, and advises the leaders in the crisis areas not to admit internationals either for chats,
or for negotiations, let alon to invite them to diner, but only to communicate with them in
written. Certainly, the was majority were real exellencies, but this Prosecution is ruining
their reputation by calling incompetent clerks to testify about things they didn’t
understand!)

3498. With respect to the crime of unlawful detention, the Chamber found that the President
was aware of the unlawful detention of non-Serb civilians from conflict areas by 24 April
1992.11123 On 8 June (D04491) and 13 June 1992, (D00434) the President issued an appeal to
local Bosnian Serb authorities and an order to the VRS and MUP, respectively, to ensure
protection for all detainees11124 (#EXCULPATORY!!! Furthermore, members of the government,
VRS, JNA, and MUP, including Mićo Stanišić, issued orders to their subordinates to, inter alia,
prevent abuse of detainees and mistreatment of civilians and report illegal camps from April to
August 1992.11125 (#XCULPATORY!!! In mid-July, the Bosnian Serb government received
reports from the MUP that conditions in detention centres were poor and that there had been
occurrences of unlawful treatment of detainees.11126 (#EXCULPATORY!!! The governmental
institutions didn’t cover and didn’t tolerate such a misconduct!) On 25 July 1992, the
President received a report from the ICRC following a visit to the Manjaĉa camp, informing him
that the conditions there were ―absolutely insufficient‖ and that there was evidence that detainees
were being subjected to ill treatment.11127 But it was only when the international media started
reporting on the inhumane conditions in the detention centres in Prijedor in July 1992 and
following a Bosnian Serb delegation to visit the camps, that the President made efforts to close
them down.11128 (#EXCULPATORY!!! The President accelerated the reporting, invited the
British journalists and repeatedly ordered the respect of the humanitarian law. However,
even before the President took steps to close the detention centres, there was a daily release
of those that weren’t responsible for the rebellion and killings. There was no a single day
without investigations, and the result was that 59% of the detained and captured during the
attack of the Muslim terrorists on Prijedor – had been released, while 41% of them had been
conveyed to Manjaca as a prisoners of war, although they could have been treated as a
terrorists!)! Meanwhile, on 30 July 1992, the President continued to present to the public that the
allegations made by the Guardian that the Bosnian Serbs had organised concentrations camps or
were holding civilian prisoners were ―completely false‖.11129 (The allegations about an existence
of a “concentration camps” were and still are “completey false”. There had never been any

11121
See para. 3404.
11122
See para. 3404.
11123
See paras. 3365, 3375.
11124
See para. 3383.
11125
See para. 3409.
11126
See para. 3367.
11127
See para. 3368.
11128
See paras. 3385–3386, 3399.
11129
See para. 3369.
 1067

“concentration camps” in the RS. There were a detention units for the POWs, a detention
units for those captured in a combat zones and had to be investigated, and consequently
released, or conveyed to the POWs prisons. There were a reception centres, such as
Trnopolje. Let us see what the ICRC reported about Trnopolje: see: D03110, of 2 October
92:

It said: “The people concerned are civilian victims of the ongoing hostilities…” while the
Defence had a hard time to prove that it was so. The Tribunal and its chambers do not
respect the UN, or the ICRC or UNHCR documents, but rather listen to a testimonies of the
opposite side, a witnesses that are interested in denigtarion of the Serbs. The Agreement that
the ICRC Report mentioned was one on which the Defence pointed as a basis for evacuation,
and not an expelling of civilians!)

3499. The Chamber notes that it was concluded at a session of the RS Presidency on
6 August 1992, that the MUP would be ordered to examine civilian authorities and individuals
guarding detainees and report back to the Presidency. (#EXCULPATORY!!!) The decision was
relayed to SJB Chiefs in a number of municipalities who were obliged to provide reports in
accordance with the RS Presidency decision by 20 August 1992. The SJB Chiefs were also
informed about the RS Presidency order to release all civilians and to allow them freedom of
movement.11130 (#EXCULPATORY!!!) From August to October, the President made further
efforts to reduce the number of civilians who were unlawfully detained in Serb controlled
detention centres.11131 (#EXCULPATORY!!! In October 1992, the President informed Mladić,
Mićo Stanišić, and Mandić that he had received information that some local authorities had
ignored his instruction to allow unfettered access for the ICRC to detention facilities and
demanded that they inform their subordinates to respect his instruction to allow access and that he
would order a thorough investigation of all cases of failure to comply.11132 (#EXCULPATORY!!!
The vast majority of those documents of the President had been of a “top secret” type, and
certainly hadn’t been aimed to the public.) On 27 October 1992, the Bosnian Serb Government
officially decided to close all illegal camps as soon as possible and in December 1992, pursuant to
the President‘s order, all detainees held in Manjaĉa were released on the condition that they be
transferred to third countries.11133 (#EXCULPATORY!!! The Chamber considers that prior to the
President‘s intervention in Prijedor to close the camps with the worst conditions in August 1992,
the measures taken to prevent or punish the unlawful detention of civilians were completely
inadequate. . (But, the Chamber is neglecting the key fact – there hadn’t been any unlawful
detention of civilians. For all of the centres there had been submitted explanations, which
had been in accordance with the course of events, i.e. first there were fights initiated by the
Muslim armed terrorists, because they didn’t met the criteria to be considered a regular
11130
See para. 3387.
11131
See paras. 3388–3390, 3392–3394.
11132
See para. 3395.
11133
See para. 3397.
 1068

army, which were an illegal formation deep in the Serb territory. There was no a single case
of any detention without a military skirmishes prior to the establishment of a detention
facilities. What was an impression, assumption of a jeopardy, and expectation of the local
people in charge, this couldn’t be influenced by anyone, because the people were entitled to
protect themselves. There could have been a certain degree of exaggerations and over –
esteem of jeopardy, but this is not subject to anyone’s correction. Neither a state could
influence it, if a state was not capable of securing lives and freedom of people. In such a
cases, the population and municipal authorities are entitled due to the SFRY Constitution
(P4743) the BiH Constitution (D1263) and the BiH Law on Defence (D1359) and the
Strategy prescribed by the SFRY Presidency (D4282), to undertake all the necessary
measures to protect the people!) The Chamber further considers that after that point, he began to
take measures to close the temporary detention centres in the Municipalities, however, these
measures did not have much effect until closer to the end of 1992. The Chamber further notes that
ultimately, while many civilians were released from detention by the end of 1992, detention
centres remained in existence for the duration of the war and continued to hold non-Serb civilian
detainees.11134 (“for the duration of the war”, certainly. That was a civil war, and civilians
participated in the combat activities on many ways, as the Law on All-People Defence
provided, and equilised the civilians and combatants. The Chamber should have already
known that there was no a professional armies, and a number of professional officers and
commanders was very low. The civilians could have been detained only till the moment their
innocence had been established. There is a lot of evidence on this subject. In Sanski Most
there was released more than 40% of the detained, and from Omarska it was 59% of the all
detainees. Also, a housing and other acceptance and accommodation of civilians removed
from the combat zones is theated in this Court as an unlawful detention, without any
consideration of the obligations prescribed in the domestic laws!)

3500. The Chamber now turns to consider whether the Accused was able to do more to prevent
and punish crimes committed by his subordinates. The Chamber recalls that Momĉilo Mandić,
Minister of Justice, and Mićo Stanišić, MUP Minister, ignored government decisions with respect
to prevention and prosecution of criminal activity and answered more to the Accused than to the
government.11135 This implies that the Accused had the ability to influence Mandić and Stanišić to
ensure that their respective ministries functioned to prevent and punish crimes more effectively.
(This is #all wrong, and hard to believe that the Prosecution and then the Chamber too, do
not know how the judiciary functioned. A personal disputes between the then Prime
Minister Branko Djeric on the two ministers should not darken the law, because neither the
Ministry for Interior and Ministry for Justice, nor the Government and Prime Minister do
punish criminals. It was within the remit of the office of Prosecutor and Courts, and
everyone was able to deposit a criminal report on any crime known. Both the Ministries and
judicial system worked without any influence or interference of the President or anyone else.
What the two Ministers reported to the President had nothing to do with a regular duties of
their ministries, but only a matters pertaining to the state security. In order to show how the

11134
See Scheduled Detention Facilities C.2.1, C.18.2, C.21.3.
11135
P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Ðerić dated 5 April 2012), paras. 21–22, 24.
 1069

Chamber was wrong in inferring so, see: D01360 of 19 July 1992.:

:
And the Questionary, as a part of this document, follows, showing that there was no difference in
theating the Serb and non-Serb victims, which makes all the allegations that The State
Documentation Centre, led by M. Toholj (see D: ) are in vain, because the Center was not a
surrogate of the regular investigation of crimes, but only documentation of the crimes out of reach of
the MUP RS. Concerning the Justice department, the President didn’t have any reason to intervene,
since there was a huge activity in creating and adopting the legislation, many laws (as Mr. Djeric
admitted, see: T….@Amon other the Justice department issued an instruction which would be
considered as a governmental A/B Variante, see D00448:

There follows 31 page of the tasks for the Ministries and other Governmental agencies and
services. Here is para 27, D448, p.15:
 1070

This is a proper Commission in the criminal terms, and it had to identify all the crimes
regardless of the ethnicity of victims and perpetrators, different from the Documentation
Center led by a writer Toholj, which collected documents about crimes over the Serbs in the
Muslim-Croat areas, that was out of reach of the first Commision.) Furthermore, the fact that
the President, when he chose to act to remedy the situation in detention centres, was able to
influence the closure of camps, shows that had he wanted, he could have used this influence more
effectively and quickly to prevent crimes. (This is also misunderstood and misinterpreted: the
President issued all the necessary general orders on a proper time, and that should be
sufficient, but when informed about some specific ommisions or trespases, the President
undertook the specific warnings of the immediate officers in charge, and that could have had
some more effect than a general orders. Once the international agencies secured their
admittance in a third countries, it was possible to release them. Therefore, it was also
#EXCULPATORY!)

3501. The Chamber considers that the Accused‘s failure to exercise his authority to adequately
prevent or punish crimes committed against non-Serbs signalled to Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb
Political and Governmental Organs that criminal acts committed against non-Serbs were tolerated
throughout the period of the Overarching JCE. (This kind of inferring is unacceptable! No any
institution in the RS had any idea about any Overarching JCE, nor did any of the
institutions thought that crimes were tolerated, or were to be tolerated. Where is any
evidence on this issue which would corroborate what the Chamber inferred? This looks like
a ferry tale. There was no a crime that a police or the VRS unit commited as a unit, with the
all prerequisites that goes with the actions of units, i.e. that a crime had been commited with
a plan and preparations, with all that is required, a decision of an immediate commander,
and a knowledge of the next superior commander, and with the participation of a substantial
part of the unit! No, that never happened. The crimes were not based either on the system,
or any decision, any plan, any knowledge let alone consent of the official authorities.) In
light of this, his failure to take adequate steps to prevent and punish criminal activity committed
against non-Serbs in the Municipalities had the effect of encouraging and facilitating the JCE I
Crimes. (The President doesn’t investigate, doesn’t indict, nor he does judge, sentence and
punish. In no country Presidents do that! The Presidential duty is to facilitate that the
Government and institutions can do their job, but not even to ask how and why a court
decided something different from the President’s expectation. But, the President didn’t skip
any of his duties to warn, to ban certain conduct, organisation, features. Why the Chamber
didn’t number what the President did on the issue, what measures he have taken, what
orders had issued, whether he intervened in the MUP, or the military police, or military or
civilian prosecution, or the courts? Did the President ever withdrew his orders pertaining to
the respect of the himan rights and the international laws of war? If he didn’t, were these
orders still on power? Did the Chamber notice how many rogue elements and paramilitaries
had been disbanded, arrested, persecuted, and how many perpetrators had been tried? Did
the Chamber point out to a single case that had been covered with the President’s
knowledge, or anyway?) The Chamber further finds that the Accused‘s failure to prevent and
punish crimes committed by Serb Forces against non-Serbs and his tolerance for such crimes
 1071

demonstrate a failure on his part to take adequate steps to ensure that Serb Forces and Bosnian
Serb Political and Governmental Organs would act to protect Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats residing in areas under their control. (This is #in continuo incorrect finding and
assertion, or slunder, whatever it is. The President is not supposed to search for such an
evidence. Why the Prosecution, and/or the Chamber didn’t establish what the President
failed to do, when the failure is at stake, as well as an President’s misdoing, giving an order
contrary to the law? Since there was many settled places with a substantial number of the
Muslim-Croat inhabitants who didn’t have any problem, the Chamber must ask itself – who
or what protected them? A document from the UN visit to Grbavica in 1994 is illustrative
enough that the ordinary people of any ethnicity didn’t have any need to move, because they
had been treated as the Serb citizens had been treated, even better, because the non-Serbs
didn’t have to go to the army, see D2424, and another similar document that had been
disclosed too late, i.e. after the trial!)

3502. In addition, the Chamber found that during the spring of 1992 the President supported
the operational co-operation of military forces and local authorities with Arkan‘s men, Šešelj‘s
men, and Mauzer‘s Panthers. While the President took actions to have paramilitary formations
disbanded, these actions were initiated in mid-1992, after all the take-overs had already been
completed in the Municipalities with the active involvement of these paramilitaries. These take-
overs resulted in the forcible removal of thousands of non-Serbs. (This “findings” are without
any real basis, and in #contradiction with all the evidence#:
1. During “the spring of 1992” there was no any state office occupied by the President,
or any ingerences over the armed formations or groups;
2. First of all, as early as 13 June 92, even before the President ordered a formation and
organisation of the VRS (which he did on 15 June 92) the Acussed issued the known order,
which substance was: “to submit all the independent and self-organised armed groups to the
military or police commands, withing three days, or to face a legal persecution.
3. Before the VRS was formed, the JNA was in charge, and it had it’s own orders from
the Federal Presidency, pertaining to a volunteers. The Chamber doesn’t understand what
did it mean “to subordinate a group”. It didn’t mean necessarily to disband it and
subordinate individuals. A group was entitled to keep together, but to receive commands
from the official forces. In that terms there were many units that had their separate names,
but weren’t independent.
4. The Chamber is baselessly repeating this “take-over” as if the Serbs came to a
municipality where somebody else was on power, and “took it over” from somebody. The
Defense challenged the Prosecution to prove where there was a single “take-over”, but now
the Defence has to challenge the entire Tribunal to submit the proofs to this regard!) The
Chamber also found that the Accused‘s attitude towards certain paramilitary formations after the
creation of the VRS was flexible and shifted according to Bosnian Serb interests and concluded
that he tolerated or even supported the co-operation of Arkan‘s men, Šešelj‘s men, Mauzer‘s
Panthers, and the Yellow Wasps with Serb Forces.11136 The Chamber finds that this had the effect
of encouraging and facilitating the JCE I Crimes committed by Serb Forces. (That is hard to
believe that the Chamber made this “finding”, since it was well documented that the
President ordered a complete subordination of all the volutneeres and other groups formed
prior to the formation of the VRS, on the basis of the Constitutional and lawful provisions.
Until 20 may all of these groups were in the JNA responsibility. Once the VRS had been
formed, these groups couldn’t exist and act out of the unique command of the VRS or the
Police. This assertions rely on the paras of the Judgment, 3234, 3235. Let us see what is said
it the para 3234: 3234. The Chamber therefore finds that during the spring of 1992, following
the withdrawal of the JNA from BiH, the Accused supported the operational co-operation of
11136
See paras. 3234–3235.
 1072

military forces and local authorities with Arkan‘s men, Šešelj‘s men, and Mauzer‘s Panthers.
These paramilitary groups were able to operate in several municipalities, in an otherwise
relatively tightly controlled area, in concert with the military forces and the local authorities.
However, this entire paragraph is based upon another paras, namely 3184, 3182 – 3183, 3190
– 3192 and we will see what those paras said. The current para asserts that the President
supported in the spring of 1992 the numbered paramilitary units. However, Mr. Seselj didn’t
have any independent unit from the beginning to the end of war. Arkan was in Bijeljina
while the state of BiH existed, and his stay in BN had nothing to do with the President, or his
associates. Had the Prosecution disclosed the exculpatory documents during the trial, and
not after it, there would be a ECMM document that acquits Arkan for his deeds in Bijeljina.
See this part of the document:

Let us see the same page of this document #describing the Batkovic Prison, and Vojkan
Djurkovic involvements: ThE 700 PRISONERS I! BATKOVIC ARE WELL TREATED, AND
THEY HAVE 3 MEALS A DAY WHEN WE CANE, A HUNDRED OF THEM WERE
WASHING THEIR LAUNDRY. THE MU!ITY OF WATER IS ABUNDM{T (EXTERIOR
TAPS, SHOWERS). THE ENCLOSURE OF THE PRISON, WHICH IS SETTLED IN THE
BUILDENGS OF A LARGE FARM, IS NO CLOSED El A FENCE. POLES HAVE BEEN
PUT, BUT THERE IS NO WIRE AROUND. THE GATES ARE 11(71 ClOSED AND THE
PRISONERS ARE FREE TO MOVE INSIDE AND AROUND THE FARM. *E OF THEN
ARE SHOPPING IN LODAL STORES, FOR THEY RECEIVE HONEY FROM THEIR
FAMILIES VIA RED CROSS MEDIATORS. SQl‘S 300 OF THEM ARE IZATED IN OTHER
TOWNS FOR SPEGIFIC WORKS ON THOSE OF PUBLIC INTEREST (WE NET ONE AT
THE VLASENICA HOSPITAL AND 6 AT THE DVCIROVP ROTEL IN Th). WE HAD THE
POSSIBILITY TO QUESTION THEN: THEIR INTENT ION IS TO SIGN A PETITION
ASKING TUSLA TO RELEASE SEREnE PRISONERS HELD III THAT REGION.
BESIDES, SOlE OF THEN HAVE BEEN WORKING NEAR THE FRONT IN THE REGION
OP LOPARE (40 KM 3.0, BaN). FINALLY, THEY WERE THANKFUL FOR THE EFFORTS
OF MAJOR VOJKAN (ARKAN ‗S TIGER) TO APROVE THEIR CONDITIONS OF
LIVING. On the previous page the ECMM described a nice conduct of Vojkan Djurkovic
who after an explosion and a terrorist act secured the MM with guards:

Now it is clear why Vojkan Djurkovic had never been indicted, because whatever he did, was
#agreed between him and the Muslim civilians#. The Defence couldn’t use this, as well as
many other #exculpatory documents#. B. Plavsic was in the common presidency, and didn’t
deal with Bijeljina on behalf of the President or SDS. The Mauzer’s Panthers was a legal
unit of the regional TO, also associated in cooperation with the Arkan’s army, from whom
he got a rank of major, which the President and Gen. Mladic annulled in sommer 92. But,
his unit become a regular unit of the VRS, under his command, but fully under the VRS IBK
Corps’s control. How many times the Defence has to point out that Mauzer after the war had
passed all the accreditations posed by the international police, he was certified as suitable for
 1073

a high posts in the RS MUP. Recently Mauzer had been post mortem decorated with the
highest decoration, Mr. Seselj had been acquitted before this court, Vojkan Djurkovic had
never been indicted by any court, and the ECMM commended him for protecting the Misson
anf facilitating them to see what they wanted to see.
Let us see what the para 3235 sais: 3235. The Accused‘s shifting approach to paramilitaries is
further demonstrated by his approach to Captain Dragan‘s training centre; and his order to
have the Yellow Wasps released after they were arrested by Davidović. (This was an ordinary
lie that the Accuse even knew what further happened with the Yellow Wasps, because it
wasn’t his job to follow up the procedure. Once in the hands of the judicial system, there was
nothing the President should do. The Yellow Wasps had been tried and sentenced in their
country, Serbia, and they hadn’t been acquitted of released from the prosecution. They had
been handed over to Serbia. But this fn. is another para, 3208. This the Chamber
corroborates it’s own findings by it’s own findings,, by it’s own findings, endlessly, but
always in a general assertions and statements. Let us se what is the 3208 3208. The Chamber
found that Davidović planned the operation to arrest paramilitary groups in Zvornik in co-
operation with Andan and special units of the MUP and that, on 29 July 1992, Ţućo, the
commander of the Yellow Wasps, was arrested and brought to Bijeljina. During this operation,
other leaders and members of the Yellow Wasps were arrested, as were municipal leaders who
had links with or collaborated with the Yellow Wasps, including Pavlović. However, when the
30 day remand period expired, Davidović was told that pressure was exerted on the authorities
by the Accused and Krajišnik who ordered that the Yellow Wasps be released. However, this lie
had been contested by other witnesses, who knew better than Davidovic. For much less, the
Chamber discredited the Defence witnesses. Mr. Davidovic was cought in lie concerning his
son, and also during the testimony, Davidovic claimed that he didn’t know about many
President’s document, and praised the President for that. Since the Chamber trusted every
witness hostile to the President, the Defence will obtain the certificate from the investigating
judge in Bijeljina on this occasion, Peter, please remind me. However, Mr. Davidovic was
wrong stating that he planned the arrest of the Yellow Wasps. This had been done
exclusively on the President’s order to Minister Stanisic and the Commander of the Special
unit of MUP General Karisik. Mr. Davidovic wasn’t invited by name, but the President
asked Prime Minister of FRY Panic to send him a small but capable police unit, and this unit
had a small impact in this operation, while it was successful in Brcko, with the individuals.
Now, how the President could be liable for the Yellow Wasps, when he ordered, once he
learned about them, ordered their arrest and deportation to the Serbia’s justice system?
Somebody in the Chamber is not serious at all. This error is a grave mistake and
responsibility of those who analysed evidence for the Chamber, but this kind of lies must not
be established by any chamber in the world!)

3503. Above, the Chamber found the many different ways in which the Accused, having been
informed of crimes in the Municipalities, provided misleading information to representatives of
international organisations, the public, and to the media in relation to these crimes.11137 (This is
again wrong. The international representatives had a poor information, while the state
organs did have a complete investigations, and their information was more accurate than the
foreigners ever. The President depended on the information obtained by the state official
organs, and why would he trust more the internationals that had been informed by the
Muslim side, than to his state organs? Many times the President had been restrained in
denying or confirming some allegations of the foreigners, because he didn’t want to be
superficial and couldn’t state anything before he asked his organs in the ministries, in the
municipalities, or in VRS and police. The internationals were very damaging for one side,
biased and engaged on the Muslim side, so that in this war there are so many violations
11137
See paras. 3333–3334, 3337, 3341, 3347–3348, 3359, 3369, 3376–3381.
 1074

made by journalists, negotiators associates and humanitarians, probably a spies that abused
the UNHCR and ICRC. One day it is going to be public, as the Iraqi war!) He covered up, for
instance, the severity of the conditions in detention facilities,11138 (The President visited only
Kula Prison in Sarajevo, together with Lord Ashdown and sir Jonston, and the conditions
there were acceptable. For all other allegation the President asked the legal institutions to
inform him and the Government about the conditions, and repeatedly ordered that the
conditions be improved. The Chamber and the entire international community didn’t see
whether the Serb authorities deprived the detainees deliberately, or the country itself didn’t
have enough food, medicine, water, electricity. This is deeply incorrect and insulting to the
poor Serbian people, which had been under a triple sanctions! Had the Prosecution and
Chamber conveyed a proper investigation, or even red some reports about the condition of
population and soldiers, they would see that two soldiers shared one small pasteta can a
day!) and he deflated criticism expressed by internationals in relation to claims of ―ethnic
cleansing‖ by claiming that non-Serbs were leaving ―out of fear‖.11139 (A decent nation shouldn’t
admit this kind of internationals even close to the crisis territory, because some of them
helped thepopulation, but the effects of the rotten minority annihilated all the benefits,
because they caused more sufferings and procrastinated the war by being so blatantly
biased. This conduct encouraged one warring side to reject cessations of hostilities and
peace, so that the war which could have been avoided lasted for three and a half years. This
kind of “internationals” are criminally responsible, and should not be trusted then and now!
The Prosecution never submitted any convincing evidence that it was a forceful expulsion.
There is so many evidence that it wasn’t so, that some people feared from the development of
events, and asked to be put on a list to leave. Since the President was the only one authorise
to say whether the refugees will return or not, since only he, or his plenipotentiary signed so
many agreements regulating the rights to return. According to the numerous agreements
and commitments, there can not be a word about a “permanent removal”. Beside that, there
was no a single incident during these evacuations, which would be unimaginable had it been
a forceful operation. There is only one reasonable answer to a question: why so many
Muslims didn’t even want or try to leave? Because they didn’t fight, nor they had their close
relatives in the Muslim Army, and hadn’t any troubles with the authorities, nor had any
fear, see a UN report D2424, see an E. Vulliamy’s report P3788!) The Chamber found a clear
disjuncture between the manner in which the President defended the actions of the Bosnian Serbs
in international settings and press conferences and the reality on the ground, of which he was fully
aware.11140 (Being aware of a situation doesn’t mean that he approved it, produced it, or was
happy how his country and countryman were suffering. There were a several commissions
initiated by the President end the Government to overview the conditions and improve it.
What else the President could do? The Chamber thinks that the President should give up the
Serb objectives. But, who was he to rule over the free Serb people? And who would obey
him? Simply, nobody had any rights to disable the Serbs to protect themselves, at least from
what happened to the Serbs in Croatia this time, let alone what happened to them in the
WWI and WWII. And no Chamber all over the world is entitled to impose another view of
the Serb people to what they had undergone in the WWII. This is not even decent, and some
of the Serbs may sue the Tribunal and many Prosecution witnesses for lying!) In statements
and speeches, the President created a narrative for an international audience in which the Bosnian
Serbs would not be blamed for the movement of the non-Serb population.11141 This is ridiculous!
As if there was no movement of others, but only the Muslims. There was more the Serb
refugees than the Muslim and Croat together. It was a process, and a temporary one, and it

11138
See para. 3378.
11139
See paras. 3337, 3347–3348.
11140
See para. 2847.
11141
See para. 2849.
 1075

was agreed in many conferences and agreements, which were available to the Chamber. Let
us see one of the early letters of the President to the international public, and see whether it
was fake or not, see P3787 of 30 July 1992, a letter to the Guardian:

What a naïve leader, naïve to the stupidity, to invite the hostile journalists and open to them
all the prisons and access to everything, and even give them ride in his governmental plain!!!
And what they did? They forged a presence of a barb wire fense around Trnopolje, and
other false data. The name of Ms. Penny Marshal will never be forgotten in the Serb people’s
memory! The President stupidity can not be justified by any excuse, such as that he believed
that a British journalists could not be anti-Serb. And the letter of 30 July 1992 is fully
consistant with the entire arguments of the Defence!)

3504. At the same time that he was learning about crimes committed against non-Serbs and not
taking sufficient steps to prevent or punish them, the Accused was providing misleading
information to international observers on the ground and the media. By his denials that Bosnian
Serbs were committing crimes in the Municipalities and his disingenuous portrayal of the reality
on the ground, of which he was in fact fully aware, the President created an environment in which
Bosnian Serbs could continue to commit the crimes through which the common purpose of the
Overarching JCE was implemented. (This is a shameless lie. The President never said that
 1076

there was no crimes in the Serb controlled areas, but he stated that it was not commited by
the authorities, or the official Serb Forces. Some of the members of these forces may have
committed a crime, but far from the sight of the first, the most immediate superior, and
there are many evidence of the “next level” corrections, as the Defence named it: the very
next commanding or controlling level rectified a misdemenour whenever leaned about it.
And there was no evidence that the authorities, either on central or local level did commit
crimes, or tolerated it. Iven for the smallest rude conduct towards the non-Serbs, the highest
SDS officials and deputies reacted publicly, like in Bijeljina!)

(3) Conclusion

3505. In the preceding paragraphs, the Chamber identified the various ways through which the
President, in his functions as Supreme Commander, SDS President, SNB President, President of
the Presidency, and President of the RS, participated in furthering the objective of the Overarching
JCE, namely the permanent removal of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian
Serb claimed territory. Considering the totality of the Chamber‘s findings in this regard, and the
extent of the President‘s contribution by virtue of the functions and positions he held at the time,
and the impact of his conduct—through his acts and omissions—on the implementation of this
JCE, the Chamber finds that the President significantly contributed to the Overarching JCE. (The
Chamber – Prosecution complex didn’t even prove any Overarching JCE, let alone the
President’s awareness of any JCE, so consequently couldn’t have proven the President’s
contribution. The entire UN Court in it’s anti-Serb campaign relies only on several
unproven constructs, such as: 1. “ethncally pure Serb state”, 2 “take-overs” of
municipalities, 3. The “Serb Forces” composed of incompatible elements contradicting to the
orders and reality, 4. A “permanent removal of the non-Serbs” 5. A “forceful
displacementand expulsion of civilians”…

1. Link to crimes committed by non-members of the JCE

3506. In order to hold the President criminally responsible for crimes committed by non-
members of the JCE, there must be a link between the President or another JCE member and the
criminal conduct. This link is established if the President or another JCE member used the non-
member in accordance with the common purpose of the JCE to carry out the actus reus of the
crimes included therein.11142 This may be inferred from the close co-operation of the President, or
any other JCE member, with the non-member in order to further the common criminal purpose.

11142
See para. 567.
 1077

The non-member of the JCE need not share the intent of the members of the JCE.11143 It is also
not necessary to establish the existence of an additional understanding or agreement between the
President and the non-member to commit that particular crime.11144

3507. The Chamber found that the Crisis Staffs, paramilitaries, and members of the TO, MUP,
and VRS carried out crimes in furtherance of the common plan of the Overarching JCE during the
take-over of the Municipalities.11145 (#Wrong inferences!!! See wh#y:

1) Not all the municipalities that had a Crisis Staffs had commited crimes, but rather two third
of the municipalities didn’t have any of the alleged attributes of any JCE, which would be
inevitable if it was a JCE and a systemic approach. As a matter of fact, the municipalities
which did have members of the Main Board of the SDS as presidents, did not have crimes at
all. Had it been a JCE and a plan backed by the SDS and President, these municipalities
would be the first to complete the “criminal task”;

2) Neither was it an inherent element of a CSs to tolerate, let alone to commit a crimes. The CSs
were not a new bodies, but only a way of functioning of the regular elected bodies;

3) Beside the fact that there were many municipalities where the CSs didn’t do anything wrong,
there were many municipalities that didn’t have a CSs whatsoever. If it was a matter of
systemic approach, it wouldn’t be imaginable;

4) Further, no all of members of the CSs commited mistakes, ommisions, let alone crimes;

5) Some members of the VRS or Police may have committed crimes, but it never happened in
their official capacity, with a knowledge of a commands, let alone by it’s orders;

5) No one in the entire RS knew about any OJCE, nor thought that a crimes are allowed. We
remember how the Serb population was disgusted and bitter after the Koricanske Stijene
crime. For these elements the Chamber doesn’t have a single evidence and basis for such a
findings, and the arguments numbered out here will neverlose it’s accuracy, because they are
a sort of “marble truth”!)

3508. The Chamber found that the Accused had de jure and de facto authority over the SDS party
and its members from at least October 1991 until 1995.11146 (What does it mean? How possibly
one could have had “de facto and de jure authority” over a democratic party? All the
decisions had been passed democratically, and the only role of a president was to facilitate a
democratic environment till a decision is made, and a strict implementation after a decision
is done. In all other aspects, president of a democratic party was equal to the other members
of a party bodies. The Chamber had a sufficient evidence that it was a case with the
President, who had to fight for his views as any other member of the Party!) It also found
that the municipal Crisis Staffs and Serb municipal assemblies were formed as a result of the
implementation of the Variant A/B Instructions, which the President had issued and distributed to
high ranking Bosnian Serbs, and the implementation of which he monitored through meetings and
discussions with municipal leaders.11147 (Wrong inference! Having formed the Serb municipal
assemblies was not a crime in any way, nor the Crisis Staffs vere illegal or criminal. A mere
existence of the A/B Variant Instructions didn’t caused any crime, and was not a criminal

11143
See para. 567.
11144
See para. 567.
11145
See Section IV.A.2: Legal findings on crimes.
11146
See para. 2940.
11147
See para. 3437; Section IV.A.3.a.ii.D: Variant A/B Instructions and take-over of power.
 1078

paper. It is corroborated by the fact that in a number of municipalities it was not

implemented, while in some municipalities where it was implemented, didn’t cause any
problems. The A/B Instructions were in an accord with the Law of All-People’s Defence, as
testified by D. Kapetina, and depicted by the excerpts of the SFRY Constitution (P4743) and
BiH Constitution (1262), the Law on All-People’s Defence (1359) the Strategy of Defence
(D4282). How was it possible that these genuine and all-binding documents didn’t matter to
the Chamber? The instructions as itself didn’t contain any element that could facilitate any
crime. In some of judgments it was adjudicated that it was not a crime. So, a crimes didn’t
occure on that basis, nor this basis facilitated any misconduct. There were a crimes in
municipalities which didn’t even receive A/B Instructions, as well as there were no crimes in
municipalities which received and implemented the A/B Instructions. A lot of evidence, see
testimony of a Prosecution’s witness B. Djeric, T.27933-34:
Q. Thank you. Do we agree that the Crisis Staffs were simply a way of concentrating executive
authority in limited, areas as well as in such municipalities where the legal authorities were
non-functional? The staffs of that nature were temporary organs which were put in place to
speed things up, rather than going beyond their remit.
A. I agree that they could not go beyond their scope of authority or to work in any different
fashion than was prescribed by regulation.
Q. Thank you. Do you agree that we understood quite early on that people no longer controlled
-- or, rather, that they could not control the legislative branch and that we had to dispose of
these Crisis Staffs?
A. We strove, both the Presidency and the government, to put the Crisis Staffs in a situation
where they could hold power within their respective remit and in limited areas where they were
necessary and not to work with any prescribed limits they assigned to themselves.
Crisis Staffs had direct contact with the Presidency and followed the SDS party line.11148
(Wrong inference, see what about the CSs said B. Djeric or finding, as a matter an assertion! In
a period with the communications, there was no crimes almost at all, while the vast majority
of crimes happened just in the period when the communications didn’t exist. See what B.
Djeric testified on the occasion:T.27936-37:
Q. Do you agree that the government being cut off in terms of means of communication was a
factor which only contributed to the strengthening of the local factors and it made the
government feel as if its hands were tied?
A. Yes. Perhaps I can add that the central authorities, given that the PTT network was based in
Sarajevo, cut off all communications, so you can just about imagine how it was for the
government to work under such conditions. See also D02531 Crisis Staffs had direct contact
with the Presidency and followed the SDS party line.11149 The President was instrumental in
creating and activating the Crisis Staffs.11150 They played a central role in preparing for and
carrying out the take-over of the Municipalities by Serb Forces and in maintaining Bosnian Serb
authority and power after the take-overs were completed.11151 (Wrong inference, because the
premise is wrong: there was no any “take-over” – in the municipalities in question the Serbs
had their own substantial amount of power gained by the elections 1990. The Serbs never
wanted to govern over the Muslims-Croats, who had been offered to form their own
municipal institutions, which they initially accepted, but reneged on under the influence of

11148
See paras. 3009–3011, 3080–3081.
11149
See paras. 3009–3011, 3080–3081.
11150
See para. 3074.
11151
See paras. 3437, 3083, 3078.
 1079

the Central SDA. A maintaining legally obtained power was a lawful obligation! Throughout
the entire Judgement there are a very few matters of a peripherical significance that may be
accurate, all other matters, “established facts” and particularly inferences and findings are
absolutely incorrect!) Crisis Staffs were tasked with making military and security preparations
and the Accused gave explicit instructions on how the Crisis Staffs and the TO would be
structured, including who would be the highest ranking officials in these structures, namely the
presidents of municipalities and executive boards.11152 (So what? This had been regulated by
the Law of All-People’s Defence, and the A/B instructions only reminded them what they
were obliged to do. The Chamber can not escape the local legal system when deciding about
a matter regulated in this system!) The Chamber also found that the Variant A/B Instructions
required that all active and reserve police, TO, and civilian protection units be brought ―to full
manpower‖ and provided that the units would be activated by order of the municipal Crisis
Staffs.11153 (So what? This was a law-binding obligation, under the threat of punishmept for a
high treason! That would be the same as if it was an Executive Board and a municipal
Assembly, the same duties and obligations, all provided in the Law on All-Peoples Defence!
And it could be activated only in a case of an attack, which explaines why in two third of the
Serb municipalities there was no any crime, and many of those municipalities maintained the
regular bodies of authority, so they didn’t have any Crisis Staffs.) The President announced in
March 1992 that while they did not plan to attack anyone, they had the ―right to use the army for
the final countdown and for the final establishment of authority‖.11154 Let us see those two paras
of the Judgment mentioned in this fn., 3051. As mentioned above, in March 1992 the Accused
advocated that Bosnian Serbs take power into their own hands in Bosnian Serb claimed
territories and that the structure of BiH would depend on the conditions they could establish on
the ground. The President emphasised that their right to self-determination ―will happen
according to the actual conditions which are up to you to create‖. In this regard the President
spoke about when to ―reveal our next move‖ and that it ―will all be happening in a flash and the
set up of the de facto situation based on our documents‖. He explained that there would be ―no
signing before we have achieved what we want, and you all know our strategic plans. […] The
ultimate strategic goal must still remain a secret‖. The President said they did not ―plan to
attack anybody but our plan is to defend ourselves and the army is at our disposal for that
purpose‖; they had the ―right to use the army for the final countdown and for the final
establishment of authority‖ and that if a border was established unjustly they would ―establish a
just border‖. (#TIME SHIFTING#! Needless to remind that #March 1992 was a time when
the Lisbon Agreement was agreed#, and the conduct of the local authorities in establishing a
stabile peace and control of the processes was of a vital importance. So, everything about
“taking power pertained to the municipalities that had been allocated to the Serbs by the
Lisbon Conference. Such a shifting of time frame and context is illegal and criminal, and the
Prosecution should appologise to the Chamber and the President for planting a deluding
facts. Just notice that a stratecig goals existed even before the 12th May Assembly session, as
any party has it’s own strategic goals and a tactitcs to achieve it. See what is in para 3052 of
the Judgement, that was the basis for this “findings”:
3052. The Accused also warned against the perception that Bosnian Serbs were taking ―other
people‘s land through war‖ and that they should not mention war, but establish their authority
and defend that and state that they did not plan to attack anybody. The Accused spoke about
―[p]eace at any cost, wherever it is possible‖. The Accused stated that they did not need war, and
they could accomplish what they wanted by political means but once they had achieved their
goals if they were attacked they would defend themselves, including against genocide, and had
―the right to use the army for the final countdown and for the final establishment of authority‖.

11152
See paras. 3079, 3082.
11153
See paras. 2997, 3077.
11154
See paras. 3051–3052.
 1080

(And this was completely legitimate. Once the constitutional system was broken, the Serb
ethnic community was entitlet to influence what would be the future system. If it was denied,
the Serbs did have all rights to self-organise and to re-build a secure system of an efficient
power. If anybody tried to prevent them by a military means, they had been entitled to
defend by a military means. IF THE CHAMBER DENIES THIS TRUTH, THAT WOULD
BE A NEW ELEMENT OF THE POLITICAL SCIENCES, AND A PRECEDENT WITH A
HUGE CONSEQUENCES! The UN as a paternal institution of this Court should have taken
stance on this standard newly produce by the UN Court!)

During this time, he was preparing for the take-over of power in the Municipalities. In addition,
the Chamber found that Krajišnik, a member of the Overarching JCE, had ―great authority‖ among
the Bosnian Serb municipal leaders and influenced how power should be exercised at the
municipal level.11155 (That was his duty, as it was the duty if those in municipalities to exercise
a power they got through the elections. Neither Mr. Krajisnik, nor the President had an
effective authority over the authorities in municipalities. See: (evidence of complains of the
President on inability to replace a president of municipal assembly, or what B. Djeric said,
T.27925,:
So was it already then that you identified this chaotic situation, and even our inclination towards
excessive autonomy, small fiefdoms, did you already forecast that this would be a major obstacle
in the functioning of a proper government?

A. Yes, I agree. This paragraph shows all of it. It is clear enough. The local factor was very
influential, highly influential. For the most part, this is the result of the existential fear that
prevailed among people then, as regards these state matters. So Yugoslavia was falling apart as
a state or was in the process of disintegrating, so people were losing their state, and on the other
hand even in this new state, which had already become an international subject, there was this
outvoting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. T. 27927-28 [As read] "One of the essential problems
we are facing is the poor functioning of the central authorities. The responsibility partly or
mostly lies with us primarily because we have not fully defined the status of the SAO
autonomous regions or their organs in relation to the central authorities; namely, fearing that
we would be overcome or dominated by the Izetbegovic government, we prepared some political,
not exactly state mechanisms, to resist abuse coming from the centre. Meaning that we inherited
such mechanisms now that we have our own state. Now they return to us as a negative echo.
We will all know immediately that this is about a Serb tendency towards autonomy, creating
one's own principalities ruled by small scale princes behind which there is only private interest,
never the interest of the people." Do you remember not only this particular speech but this
problem that we had to deal with in the assembly? Because the establishment of the SAO gave
an opportunity to local princes to do whatever was in their own interest. A. Yes, I remember
that. Every day that was being confirmed; namely, that the local factor want to rule on the
ground.
(This sole testimony, from a trusted witness, who was at the very centre of the authorities in
the period the most crimes had been committed, is sufficient to rebut all the Chamber
unjustified “findings” in a previous para!)

3509. The Chamber found that the Accused had de jure and de facto authority over the TO from
mid-April until mid-May 1992 when the TO units were transformed into the VRS.11156 (However,
this #wasn’t true too#. All the TO organisation collapsed on 6 April, when the Muslim side
re-organiozed it without the Serbs, and fired General Vukosavljevic from the commanding

11155
See para. 3451.
11156
See para. 3177.
 1081

post. The Serb side re-established it’s own TO on 16 April, and the Prime Minister, not the
President, nominated the new commander of the Serb TO, see: D03709:

So, the President hadn’t been in command over the TO a single day, but was tasked to
coordinate the activities of the TO, because of lack of communications. Also, the existing TO
units in every single local commune, municipality as well as in companies, were
authonomous in their actions unless the JNA (later the VRS) took the duty. In such a case,
nobody could order the municipal TO units not to act in accordance with their assessment of
a jeopardy for their community. The only one who could order them was the one who could
take the role of the local TO and protect the population, assets and territory, and it was a
president of municipality, who ex oficio was president of the Defence Committee, and his
commander of the local TO unit. Those who couldn’t take this role from the TO didn’t have
any possibility to order them to accept a jeopardy, defeat, massacre, or any harm that an
enemy could inflict to them! That is how it was regulated in the laws and Constitution, and
any chabmer is obliged to take it into account!) The Chamber found that from May 1992, the
President had de jure control over the VRS, which he exercised in fact continuously as the
President of the SNB, President of the Presidency, and President of the RS.11157 Furthermore, the
Chamber found that the President had de jure authority over the Bosnian Serb MUP, which he
exercised in fact.11158 Mićo Stanišić, a member of the Overarching JCE, was the head of the MUP
from 24 March 1992 until the end of December 1992.11159 (It is not enough to state that “the
President had such and such authorities” over some formations. All of that was regulated by
the Constitution and laws. It wasn’t an unlimited power, control or authority, and the
President couldn’t act outside of the legal framework. Now, since “a control” wasn’t a crime
by itself, the Chamber owes to the President to explain on what it founded it’s deliberations?
Whether the President trespassed his authorisations? Did he order something illegal? Did he
fail to issue all the necessary orders, regulations, laws needed for a lawfull functioning of
those formations upon which he “had a control”? Every president has the same control, but
none of them are responsible for crimes that were out of their presidential control, commited
out of the system of command by a very distant and low ranking perpetrators!)

3510. With respect to paramilitary forces, the Chamber found that armed groups, including
groups from Serbia, were at times invited by Crisis Staffs to assist in combat activity in the
Municipalities, and acted in concert with units of the Serb Forces.11160 (This is both wrong, and
false. It was only in the very beginning of the conflict in Bijeljina that the Crisis Staff of the
SAO Majevica and Semberija invited Arkan’s unit to help them against the Muslim
extremist’s attack. But, it was while the BiH still existed, and the President didn’t have any
competence over any force, and the stay of this unit was very short. However, the Chamber
is mixing “babe and zabe”, apples and oranges. Any group could report to the municipal TO
units, or the JNA, which was supreme to the TOs, to be a volunteers, as the Yellow Wasps
did when arrived. It was confirmed during the trial that it was a comom feature that a group
of volunteers arrive and check in to be volunteers, according to the Federal Presidency
order. It was only later that some of such a groups became a paramilitaries, and at that
11157
See para. 3157.
11158
See paras. 1160–1161.
11159
See paras. 3298, 3158, 3454.
11160
See paras. 3182–3183, 3190, 3193–3194, 3231. Notably, the Chamber found that the Yellow Wasps co-operated with the Zvornik Crisis Staff and TO.
 1082

moment the authorities turned against their presence. There is a lot of evidence on it!) In
other instances, paramilitary forces were invited by JCE members, notably Plavšić,11161 (Not
correct! Ms. Plavsic as a member of the common Presidency of BiH invited by a general
invitation everyone who could help in defending, but not out of the existing law, which was
very known, because it had been passed recently. All of those who were invited were
supposed to subordinate themselves to the legal formations, the JNA or police, or a TO units,
also subordinated to the JNA).or were affiliated with other members of the Overarching JCE,
namely Arkan and Šešelj.11162 (Once and for all, Mr. Seselj didn’t send anyone, particularly
not to be an independent armed group, and after the JNA withdrew, Seselj didn’t send
anybody to the VRS. If somebody indentified himself as a “Seselj’s man” it could have been
a local guy, a fan of the Radical Party. Arkan wasn’t present in the RS between 10 April 92
and September 95. Meanwhile, the Prosecution disclosed to the Defence, lately, a new
documents about Arkan’s conduct in Bijeljina, which contradict to everything the
Prosecution-Chamber asserted!) The Chamber found that the Accused supported the
operational co-operation of military forces and local authorities with Arkan‘s men, Šešelj‘s men,
Mauzer‘s Panthers, and White Eagles as long as the objectives of these groups were aligned with
those of the Bosnian Serb leadership.11163 (There is no defence against so many insolent lies, so
often repeated, and the decent Chamber shouldn’t avail itself to that kind of statements. The
President never wanted any White Eagles in the RS. The White Eagles were associated with
a Serbian Renewal Party with which the President was in an irreconcilable dispute, then,
and now. It is explained, Mauzer’s unit was a legal TO unit, and it was subordinated to the
VRS, and Mauzer himself was awarded by the international commission to be clean and
suitable for the highest positions in the post-war MUP. As said, recently, in 2018, Mauzer
had been post mortem decorated by the highest decoration!)

3511. The Accused and other members of the JCE used their authority and influence over
Crisis Staffs, TO, VRS, Bosnian Serb MUP, and paramilitaries to carry out the crimes envisaged
by the common plan of the Overarching JCE. (What evidence support this allegations, except it
was picked up from the Indictment? Is an indictment an evidence by itself? If not, then it is
ridiculous! Does there exist a single document from the central organs towards the CSs in
municipalities ordering a criminal conduct? Since there was a huge amount of interceptions
the telephone conversations, and since the Prosecution had an access to every single
document, there must had been documents of a criminal nature, or a record of them. If it
was not submitted, as it was not, #there was no such an activity#! Apart from the fact that
there was no communications between the Center of RS and the terrain, what is a basis for
such a nasty assertion? Nobody neglect the facts that the problems appeared only in
municipalities where the Muslim side iniciated the war events, nowhere else! And even in the
municipalities were there had been skirmishes and crimes, it never happened on the Serb
initiative, and until this defence assertion is rebuted, all other allegations are vain!)
Furthermore, at times, paramilitaries, local Serbs, JNA, MUP, TO, and VRS units acted at the
behest of the Crisis Staffs, which were under the Accused‘s authority and influence, to commit
crimes in furtherance of the common plan. (How it is possible that a serious professionals make
such an assertion? Neither the Crisis Staffs were under the President’s authority, nor there
was a single order to commit a crime. If the President was in favour of forming the Crisis
Staffs, it all was in accordance with the law, it was a regular authority, only functioning in a
crisis. Finally the CSs were responsible to their municipal assemblies, which had to pass all
the decisions made meanwhile, as the Presidency of the Republic had to submit its decisions
made on behalf of the Assembly to this Assembly to verify them. The JNA was never under

11161
See paras. 3195, 3261, 3198.
11162
See paras. 3189, 3191–3192, 3322–3324, 3327–3328.
11163
See para. 3236.
 1083

any control of the local authorities, and therefore neither under the President’s one, let alone
under the CSs. How long this Tribunal and it’s institutions will pretend not to know such a
firm facts?) Therefore, the Chamber finds that the crimes that were found to be committed by
Serb Forces in the Municipalities are imputed to the JCE members or to the Accused. The
Chamber finds that such a link existed based on the identity of the perpetrators, which takes into
consideration their affiliation, uniforms, and vehicles; the behaviour and utterances of the
perpetrators while the crimes were committed; and the identity of the victims. This finding is also
based on the assessment of the context in which the crimes were committed, including the timing
and the correlation with the actions taken and crimes committed by other Serb Forces and Bosnian
Serb authorities who acted in furtherance of the common plan. (Now, #all of a sudden, the
context is of relevance#. The Defence cried for eight years to be allowed to depict a context of
certain events, but was prevented. But, this paragraph of the Judgement is a blatant
confession of the Chamber that the Judgement and the most important findings had been
established arbitrary and on the basis of circumstantial evidene, along the chain of
inferences drawn from inferences, drawn from inferences, endlessly! There had bee a civil
war, the war was waged by only one side, the Serb side, there happened some crimes
committed by some Serbs, and since all the Serbs had undoubtedly being the Serbs, by virtue
of that fact – they mush have been a members of the “Serb Forces”, and since the President
was the highest positioned official, it must be that he knew and even wanted and ordered
these crimes! The Judgement doesn’t sound any better than this simplification!)

e) Accused‘s responsibility for crimes outside the scope of the Overarching JCE

3512. The Chamber found that the common purpose of the Overarching JCE was to
permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb claimed territory
through the commission of the crimes of deportation, inhumane acts (forcible transfer), and
persecution through forcible transfer, deportation, unlawful detention, and the imposition and
maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures. The Chamber turns now to consider
whether the Accused is responsible pursuant to the third form of JCE liability for the other acts of
persecution charged in Count 3 of the Indictment or the crimes of extermination and murder
charged in Counts 4, 5, and 6 of the Indictment in relation to the Overarching JCE, which have
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The crimes in question are:

i. Persecution, as a crime against humanity through killings, cruel and/or inhumane

treatment (through torture, beatings, physical and psychological abuse, rape and other acts of
sexual violence, and the establishment of and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in
detention facilities), forced labour at the frontline and use of non-Serbs as human shields,
appropriation or plunder of property, and the wanton destruction of private property, including
cultural and sacred sites;11164

ii. murder as a crime against humanity and/or a violation of the laws or customs of
11165
war; and

iii. extermination as a crime against humanity.11166

11164
See Indictment, paras. 10, 60. See also paras. 2482–2518, 2531–2559.
11165
See Indictment, paras. 10, 60, 63–64, 67. See also paras. 2446–2456.
11166
See Indictment, paras. 10, 63–64, 67. See also paras. 2457–2464.
 1084

3513. The Chamber must determine whether it was reasonably foreseeable to the Accused that
any of these crimes might be committed if he acted in furtherance of the common plan of the
Overarching JCE and whether he willingly took that risk.11167 The Chamber recalls that the
assessment of what was reasonably foreseeable to the Accused must be made on the basis of his
individual knowledge and that what may be foreseeable to one member of a JCE may not be
foreseeable to another.11168 It is not necessary for the purposes of JCE III liability that an Accused
be aware of the past occurrence of a crime in order for the same crime to be foreseeable to him.
However, it must be established that the possibility of any of these crimes being committed was
sufficiently substantial as to be foreseeable to the Accused.11169

3514. The Chamber recalls that in coming to the conclusion that the Accused shared the intent
to commit the crimes encompassed by the Overarching JCE, the Chamber found, inter alia, that
the Accused: (i) knew that the forcible take-over of towns and municipalities by Serb Forces led to
massive demographic changes through the forcible displacement of non-Serb civilians;11170 and (ii)
promoted and shared the objective of creating an ethnically pure Bosnian Serb state and the
creation of contiguous Serb areas which would require a redistribution of the population.11171 Here
is para 3463, mentioned in this fn as a basis for this findings: 3463. In concluding that a
common plan existed to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from
Bosnian Serb claimed territory in the Municipalities from October 1991 to 30 November 1995,
the Chamber had regard to its findings that in internal discussions among Bosnian Serb leaders
it was clear that the forcible movement of the population had occurred and had taken place in
accordance with instructions received from the highest level of the Bosnian Serb leadership and
was well planned. And here is the content of the fn. 11032 which was a basis for para 3463:
11032 The Chamber notes that Defence witnesses testified, inter alia, that the President and the
Bosnian Serb leadership (i) pursued policies which tried to preserve peace; (ii) tried to
accommodate and respect the rights of non-Serbs; and (iii) did not support or plan the forcible
movement of the population or the commission of crimes against non-Serbs. Kosta Čavoški, T.
37052 (11 April 2013); Dragomir Keserović, T. 40914–40915, 40944–40946 (8 July 2013);
D4194 (Witness statement of Sveto Kovačević dated 7 December 2013), paras. 5, 9, 15–16, 37;
D4063 (Witness statement of Novak Kondić dated 23 November 2013), paras. 5–7; D4166
(Witness statement of Mikan Davidović dated 1 December 2013), para. 7; D3861 (Witness
statement of Radovan M. Karadţić dated 14 July 2013), paras. 5, 10–11; D3051 (Witness
statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), paras. 16, 18–18A, 46; Momir
Bulatović, T. 34540–34541 (28 February 2013), T. 34560–34561 (1 March 2013); D4027
(Witness statement of Nikola Poplašen dated 11 November 2013), paras. 18, 21; D3089 (Witness
statement of Milivoje Kićanović dated 3 March 2013), paras. 18–19; D3072 (Witness statement
of Pero Marković dated 1 March 2013), para. 28; D4313 (Witness statement of Gojko Kličković
dated 7 February 2014), paras. 3–8; D3146 (Witness statement of Boţidar Vučurević, 22 March
2013), para. 5. However, the Chamber finds that their testimony was marked by contradictions,
evasiveness, and clear indicators of partiality and bias, or was based on their own unfounded
assessment or impressions. The Chamber found that these factors undermined their evidence
and does not find their evidence in this regard to be reliable. While Ronald Hatchett also
testified that the President was committed to ending fighting and saving civilians, this
observation was only limited to his own assessment during meetings with the President in 1994
and is thus of limited weight. D2741 (Witness statement of Ronald Hatchett dated 13 January
2013), paras. 10–12. (And this exactly is catastrophe of the very attempt of an international

11167
See para. 570.
11168
See para. 570.
11169
See para. 570; Šainović, et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1081.
11170
See para. 3463.
11171
See para. 3463.
 1085

justice. The Chamber gathered 13 Defence witnesses, all of them a very distinguished men,
among them several university professors, two members of the Academy of Sciences and
Arts, a former statemen and politicians, and dismissed them at once, because “there were
clear indications” of partiality and bias. As if they hadn’t been or couldn’t been cross-
examined and instead of “indications” to obtain an “evidence” that they weren’t been
credible. And for Ronald Hatchet, a figh official of the Republican Party of USA, the
Chamber concluded that his testimony wasn’t worthwile the Chamber’s attention because
“this observation was only limited to his own assessment during meetings with the President
in 1994 and is thus of limited weight”. However, all and every Prosecution’s witness testified
with a much less experience and knowledge about the President or the situation. Among
them many had been biased, either for a Muslim affiliation, or because of their nation had
been on the Muslim side and against the Serbs. If the criterion used in this case would be
implemented to the entire case, there wouldn’t be any case, and the trial would have to be
repeated. Since almost entire “finding” of the Chamber relied on inferences, such a diversity
of a more reasonable inferences rebut the entire result of the Judgement!) Furthermore, the
Chamber found that the President contributed to the commission of those crimes by participating
in the Overarching JCE through promoting an ideology of ethnic separation, using a rhetoric that
amplified historical ethnic grievances and promoting propaganda to that effect, establishing the
institutions used to carry out the objective of the common plan, and creating a climate of impunity
for criminal acts committed against non-Serbs. (Another word, the Chamber is denying the
basic and completely legitimate human and national rights to the Serbs, while all other
Yugoslav nations were free to violate constitutions, laws, to illegaly secede, to form their
secret bodies, a secret army and police, to prepare for a war and to start this war against the
Federal institutions, and in BiH and Croatia against the Serbs. And this is not going to
happen, nobody has this right, and the Defence and many defendants have a good reasons to
sue the Tribunal for such a practice and precedents that may damage many nations, but at
the first place the Serbs!)

3515. The Chamber notes that the geographical scope of the common plan of the Overarching
JCE was broad and it was implemented in a manner that involved many groups and individuals
spanning several levels of the Serb Forces and Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs.
There was no genuine concern about the manner in which power in the Municipalities was taken.
(But the basic assertion about #“taking-over” of power in municipalities is false#. The Serbs
had their authorities in all and every of those municipalities, but the Muslim side didn’t want
to share the power, and didn’t want to make agreements, but wanted a control over the
entire BiH, in a medieval manner, as during the Turkish occupation, and in accord with the
Islamic Declaration authored by Mr. Alija Izetbegovic!) Furthermore, the Chamber found that
there was an environment of extreme fear in which the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat
population was forced to leave the Municipalities in circumstances that included displacement by
physical force, threat of force or coercion, or fear of ongoing violence, killings, cruel and
inhumane treatment, unlawful detention in terrible conditions, rape and other acts of sexual
violence, discriminatory measures, and destruction of villages, homes, and cultural
monuments.11172 This Conclusion relies upon para 2468 of this Judgment, mentioned in fn.
11182. Let us see what is there: 2468. The Chamber finds that the Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats referred to above were forcibly displaced. In reaching that conclusion, the
Chamber had regard to the surrounding circumstances in the Municipalities and found that the
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were displaced as a result of physical force, threat of
force, or coercion. Others fled out of fear This fear was caused by ongoing violence and various
crimes committed against non-Serbs including inter alia, killings, cruel and inhumane
treatment, unlawful detention, rape and other acts of sexual violence, discriminatory measures,
11172
See para. 2468.
 1086

and wanton destruction of villages, houses and cultural monuments. Now, the Chamber
explains and justifies this assertion by the fn. 8334, and let us see what is in this fn: 8334 The
Chamber found in this section of the Judgement numerous examples of such acts directed
against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Municipalities. (Therefore, no evidence,
just to trust the Chamber on word! However, it was not difficult to establish that there was
crimes, pressure, harrasments, but it was necessary to establish who was responsible for this.
First of all, there is no evidence about a forceful displacement of the people. On the contrary,
there is a huge amount of evidence that the Muslims and Croat who wanted to leave had a
many obstacles until they reached the list for convoy. But the fear was present, and is
understandable, and ubiquitous, omnipresent, and everyone feared, BECAUSE THIS WAS
AN INTER-ETHNIC AND INTER-RELIGIOUS CIVIL WAR ALL AGAINST ALL. There
were also many, many Serb refugees from the Muslim-Croat areas, and their presence was
of an influence on the climate; also, there were many cases of the combat casualties of the
Serb soldiers, and their arrival and frunerals used to upset the Muslim or Croat population.
For such a reason, the President banned all group funerals, because it was evident that
nobody felt easy in such a cases!) In several municipalities, the Chamber found that non-Serbs
left because they were being terrorised and conditions made it impossible for them to continue
living in the area.11173 (Let us see what is concluded in para 2471, on which this assertion is
based: 2471. The Chamber recalls its findings that in some Municipalities Bosnian Muslims
may have requested assistance or permission to leave, and in some cases they paid exorbitant
fees to do so. However, these departures were not voluntary and occurred under circumstances
in which they had no real choice but to leave. Even when Bosnian Muslim leaders or other
non-governmental organisations were involved in trying to evacuate Bosnian Muslims, this
occurred in an environment of fear and threats which does not suggest that the population left
voluntarily. The Chamber finds that even though non-governmental organisations may have
been involved in facilitating some of these displacements, this does not render lawful what were
otherwise unlawful transfers. The Chamber found that in other municipalities while the
Bosnian Serb authorities referred to movement of the population as ―voluntary departure‖, in
reality civilians were fleeing out of fear for their lives; this occurred in intimidating and violent
circumstances which negated any suggestion of voluntariness in their departures. (Let us see
what is wrong with this paragraph 2472! It is not entirely accurate that “in some
Municipalities Bosnian Muslims may have requested…” it was a case in every municipality
which did have the armed skirmishes, and wasn’t a case in so many, the two third
municipalities which didn’t have combats. Such a municipalities are those in which
presidents were members of the Main Board of the SDS, such as: Trebinje, Ljubinje, Gacko
B. Samac, B. Dubica Srbac, Mrkonjic Grad, Drvar, Sipovo, Sekovici, Rudo, Pelagicevo,
Vukosavlje, Cajnice, Derventa, Laktasi, (dr…@ etc. Further, an alleged “exorbitant fees”
were rather an obstacle than an incentive for leaving municipality. Next assertion, that
“these departures were not voluntary” is not correct, and would be correct if it was said that
these departures were not joyfull, but very sad, but still voluntary. An “environment of fear
and threats” is an environments that was created by the two main causes, both oput of the
control of the Serb authorities, namely – the civil war, and previous Muslim attack within
municipality, or from out of municipality. This is for the first time in the judicial practice
that there was forbidden to depict what the alleged victims did to contribute to the
development! The Victimology as a science suggests otherwise!)
In many cases Bosnian Muslims were forced to leave or fled following killings in and/or attacks
against their villages or following the take-over of towns or villages by Serb Forces and in many
cases they were first arrested and detained before being transported out of the
Municipalities.11174(#THERE HAD NEVER BEEN ANY ATTACK AGAINST “VILLAGES”
11173
See para. 2471.
11174
See para. 2470.
 1087

BUT ALWAYS AGAINST THE TERRORISTS THAT MILITARISED SUCH A

VILLAGES!# THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON THAT IN THE FILE#! The
Chamber is neglecting an obvious patern while inventing a patern that didn’t exist: first, if a
village or any other settled place had been attacked by the Serbs, it couldn’t happen without
prior Muslim attacks from such a village, which was always militarised. There is no any
example that the “Serb Forces” attacked a settled place unless the Muslims attacked first.
There is so many evidence that it is unbelievable that the Chamber didn’t notice that, if the
Prosecution wasn’t fair enough to depict that. It is simply sufficient to see how many villages
in Sanski Most municipality did have, and how many didn’t have any trouble. The same is
with all the municipalities fom Indictment, not to mention the two third of the overall
number of the Serb municipalities where the non-Serbs didn’t have any problem. Nobody
was ever arrested aand detained if it was not in continuum with the Muslim attacks!) Based
on the nature of the common plan and the manner in which it was carried out, the Chamber
considers that it was foreseeable to the aCCUSED that Serb Forces might commit violent and
property-related crimes against non-Serbs during and after the take-overs in the Municipalities and
the campaign to forcibly remove non-Serbs. (That how it looks like in this judicial system,
where there is no an institute of a “wrongfully and insufficiently established factual state”
which is inevirtable in the Balkan copuntries judual systems. This is an example of mixing
up causes and consequences. Everyone could have foreseen that if there is going to be a civil
war, there may and will be a lot of crimes, at least a bit more than in a peace times. But, the
cause of the war was not a single Serb move, the cause of war was the Muslim intention to
deny the Serbs their rights that were a “condition sine qua non” any independence! That was
a very painful concession of the Serb side, and nobody was entitled to cheat the Serbs, to
promise them a high autonomy if they accept the secession of BiH from Yugoslavia. Invented
and established false term of “taking-over” municipalities is helping many other lies. There
was no any take-over, the Serb had been a vast majority in about 50 municipalities, but even
in such a municipalities they offered to the Muslims to form their ethnic municipalities
(Variant A) no matter it was “foreseable” the #Serbs didn’t produce the situation and
development that delivered what was “foreseable”, it was the Muslim side which tried to
prevent the Serbs from achieving their legal objectives!)

3516. In addition, the evidence of the Accused‘s knowledge of criminal activity in the
Municipalities demonstrates that the Accused was well aware of this environment in which the
forcible displacement of non-Serbs occurred. The Chamber notes the Accused learned of the
killings of non-Serb civilians in early April 1992 in the town of Bijeljina immediately after their
occurrence.11175 (So what? What was the President’s position on 31 March to 3 April 1922?
None! The President didn’t have any authority when the Bijeljina incident appeared and
ended. It was Mr. Izetbegovic who was in charge. And also it was his Cap. Hasan Tiric that
was sent on 31 March to take Bijeljina under the Muslim control. And further, the “non-
Serb civilians” were about 20 Albanian mercenaries, at leas 8 Serb civilians, which makes 28
out of 41 casualty, and the rest 13 were the Bosnian Muslims. Furthermore, on 23 June 1992,
the Accused was informed that Bosnian Muslims were subjected to intimidation and a policy of
harassment and discrimination at the hands of the Bosnian Serbs, causing thousands to leave.11176
Founded on para 3334: 3334. At a meeting of the Bosnian Serb Presidency on 23 June 1992,
the President expressed his view that Mauzer and Blagojević‘s paramilitary units, which were
active in Bijeljina, were very extreme, and that all units should be placed under a single
command of the army or the police. Meanwhile, at a Bosnian Serb Assembly session in late
June 1992, the President said that the Bosnian Muslims who continued to live in Bijeljina,
forming 20% of the population, were not considered ―second class citizens‖ and that the
11175
See para. 3333.
11176
See para. 3334.
 1088

government officials were actually trying to persuade them that they had nothing to fear. The
Chamber recalls that in fact during the summer of 1992, Serb Forces instilled fear in the
Bosnian Muslims who remained in Bijeljina and that Bosnian Muslims were forcibly expelled
from Bijeljina by members of the Bijeljina Crisis Staff, SDS, Mauzer‘s unit, special police units,
and Vojkan Đurković, while others were sent to Batković camp. (This is a grave and malicious
lie which was easy to see from the evidence in the file. Based on fn. 10693 ( P01478, p.219-
220

(…)
For Heaven’s sake!!! How possibly this “document” (a notes with the unfinished sentences)
could be used as a proof of guilt of this President? Once he had learnt that a two groups
hadn’t been placed under a single controle, he ordered the highest possible delegation to visit
Bijeljina. He also implied that the irregulars had suspended the civilian authorities. And
Djeric added: “It looks there is plundering there…” NOT A single WORD ABOUT
HARRASING, let alone expelling, THE MUSLIM CIVILIANS! So, an action of the
President to rectify an aberration is qualified as his felony. The Judgment “corroborates”
this “finding” also by the P02900 exhibit. Let us se what the two concluding paras of this
document said:

See! The penultimate para! The central MUP of the RS had already sent an expert team to
 1089

rectify all the unlawful conduct, but it had been resisted even by armed actions. The “protest
against the “newcomers” meant that the newcomers could have been mainly the Serb
refugees, or a Muslim returnees. Let us se the last para and the President’s remark:

“…the full protection of all the citizens in Bijeljina” was something what the high MUP
official reported to the President, and the President responded:

After this report, the officer who reported (D. Andan) had been promoted to the post of
acting chief of the Bijeljina CSB. So, the President’s Police established the law and order
under the threats of a renegade, but the Chamber treats it as a proof of the President’s
liability! But that was exactly the reason why the President asked the Yugoslav Prime
Minister Panic to send a dozen of a very capable policemen to help the RS MUP!)
In addition, he frequently discussed or was informed of the violent criminal behaviour of armed
groups during the take-over of some municipalities.11177 (And what was his position on this
issues? Did the President undertake any measures in regard to the issues? Of course, the
Chamber-Prosecution alliance is adding another, false context, “during the take-over of
some municipalities”! Neither there was any “take-over”, nor the official authorities
tolerated and supported, let alone ordered any misdemeanour!) For example, on 29 July 1992
he was told about the criminal behaviour of paramilitary groups during and after the take-over of
Bijeljina, which resulted in rapes, thefts, robberies, killings, and the displacement of Bosnian
Muslim civilians.11178 (The document refered to is P02900, comented above. The time the
President “was told about the criminal behaviour of paramilitary groups during and after
the take-over of Bijeljina” was exactly the #period of the huge military/police action against
these very same groups#. Not only the President ordered this action, bu supported the officer
who acted against the vilains and the officer was promoted. But a malicious inaccuracy is the
added sentence “during and after take-over, which is far from any truth. Again, the lawful
action of the RS authorities are used agaist these very same authorities and the President,
and there was no any “take-over, because the same authorities established in 1990 after the
election, remained until 1996 and the new elections!!!) On 22 August 1992, the President was
informed of the incident at Korićanske Stijene in which approximately 200 non-Serb men were
killed by Serb Forces and thrown down a ravine at Mount Vlašić on 21 August 1992.11179 ( The
President was already in London for the Conference led by Lord Carrington and Ambass.
Cutileiro. And what was the President’s attitude towards this event? Did the Chamber notice
an overwhelming evidence about the actions of authorities? In particular, did the Chamber
notice the President’s rage and dissatisfaction?) The President was also aware that
paramilitaries, volunteers, and other irregular armed groups were being used to further the
common purpose of the Overarching JCE, and were difficult to control.11180
(#EXCULPATORY!!! This sentence is highly contradictory in itself: if the said formations
had been difficult to control, then, how come they had been used to further the common
purpose”? And if the formations had been used for that purpose, why would the President

11177
See paras. 3334–3336, 3341, 3350.
11178
See para. 3335.
11179
See para. 3346.
11180
See paras. 3230–3236, 3334–3336, 3341–3342, 3344, 3350.
 1090

order their ban and arrest as early as on 13 June 92, and his associates, Prime Minister
Djeric already in April, and General Mladic in May, before the President took the office in
Presidency?) The Chamber considers that in light of his knowledge of crimes committed in the
Municipalities, the Accused was aware of the environment of extreme fear in which non-Serbs
were forced to leave and of other acts of violence committed by Serb Forces against non-Serbs
during the campaign of forcible displacement. (the #President was aware that a possible civil
and religious war in BiH would cause a chaos, and warned the entire public, as well as the
BiH Assembly, but the war occurred against the President’s will and contrary to all the
concessions he offered to avoid the war.# But, the last two words are incorrect, there was no
a forcible displacement. BUT, WHY THE CHAMBER AVOID TO ESTABLISH WHAT
WAS THE PRESIDENT’S ATTITUDE TOWARDS IT? AND WHETHER HE
UNDERTOOK A NECESSARY MEASURES TO PREVENT IT, AND A REMEDY
AGAINST PERPETRATORS? WAS THERE A SINGLE ONE CASE OF COVER UP?)

3517. The Accused was also told about looting, particularly of Bosnian Muslim homes, on
several occasions,11181 and knew that paramilitary groups involved in the JCE I Crimes were
notorious for pillaging and stealing.11182 (An unfair and incorrect implying that the
paramilitary group were involved in JCE I Crimes. If it was so, either the JCE Crimes and
the JCE I generaly, weren’t an objective of the President and the official policy of the RS, or
the paramilitaries weren’t efficient in pillaging and stealing, because for what reason would
the President be after them, ordering their ban, arrest and prosecution? All that happened,
and the Chamber had an overwhelming evidence that the official policy was opposed to any
paramilitary, and acted to this regard. The Serb police arrested many of these tiefs and
returned the stolen goods to their owners regardless of ethnicity!)

3518. The Chamber found that the Accused intended the unlawful detention of civilians.11183
And this “finding” is based on the para 3465, let us see what it said: 3465. Similarly, the
Chamber also had regard to the manner in which the take-over of Municipalities was carried
out by Serb Forces and the number of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats who were residing
in the Municipalities prior to their take-over. With respect to the widespread practice of
unlawfully arresting and detaining non-Serbs prior to removing them from Bosnian Serb
claimed territory, the Chamber notes that there were repeated attempts by the President and the
Bosnian Serb leadership to justify the existence of detention facilities in which they knew that
civilians were detained. (Not only “they” didn’t know that civilians were detained, but a
civilians weren’t detained in any of those facilities. All the detention units were under the
permanent investigation by the state official services, and once some civilian was established
to be only civilian and not a combatant or other kind of trespasser, he was released. All that
had been detained after an investigation process weren’t civilians. The Chamber neglected to
take into consideration all the evidence to this regard. A mere fact that many had been
released from the most notorious “camps” such as Omarska and Sanski Most proves that it
was as the Defence claims. No reasonable chamber would neglect such a genuine and
objective documents, which are not a testimony of somebody interested in the outcome..
Promises were also made to international representatives to improve conditions and release
detainees. However, the Chamber finds, in light of its factual findings with respect to the
Municipalities, that these assurances were completely at odds with the reality on the ground.
This reality involved the unlawful arrest and detention of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats following the forcible take-over by Serb Forces of villages, towns, and
municipalities, before they were ultimately transferred to other locations.11037 The Chamber

11181
See paras. 3335, 3339, 3341–3342, 3344.
11182
See paras. 3220, 3357.
11183
See para. 3465.
 1091

finds that the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership were not only aware of these detention
facilities but used unlawful detention at these facilities as a core element in achieving their
objective of the permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb
claimed territory. They also used the unlawful detention of civilians to secure the ―exchange‖ of
Bosnian Serbs detained by Bosnian Muslims. The Chamber therefore finds that the President
and the Bosnian Serb leadership shared the intent to unlawfully detain Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats as one of the means through which they could achieve their objective of ethnic
separation. The Chamber therefore finds that the only reasonable inference from this evidence
is that the crime of persecution, through the underlying acts of unlawful detention and the
imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures, was intended to achieve
the objective of the Overarching JCE and that the Overarching JCE members, including the
Accused, shared the intent for these crimes. With respect to these underlying acts of
persecution, the Chamber also finds that the President and the Overarching JCE members
shared the specific intent to discriminate against the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats on
the basis of their identity.11038 And this Chamber’s finding is based on the footnote 11038
which is nothing substantial, but the testimony of the Chamber itself, and a Chamber’s
conviction. So, the Chamber is testifying for itself, see: 11038 In addition, based on all the
evidence, the Chamber finds that the President was aware that his conduct as discussed further
below was part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
There is missing another Chamber’s product as a basis for this empty assertion, because this
footnote is not sufficient to be a basis for this para 3465 of the Judgement. All of it looks like
an old Serbian saying: “Kadija te tuzi, kadija ti sudi” from the times of Turkish occupation,
and meant: “the same judge is indicting and judging you!”
The Chamber notes that thousands of individuals, including women, children, and elderly people
were detained for extended periods of time before they were ultimately transferred out of the
Municipalities. In several of these detention facilities, Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental
Organs and Serb Forces deliberately established and perpetuated inhumane living conditions.11184
(The Chamber doesn’t have any ground for such an assertion and finding that women,
children or elderly people had been detained. There had been a cases that such a people had
been admitted in a reception centres, because of the fierce fights in the zone, and they didn’t
dare to return to their homes, but they had never been detained. This was a pattern in all
municipalities where there was a fierce combat activity, always initiated by the Muslims,
because the Serbs didn’t have any reason to inflame their own depth, far from any frontline.
That was why the municipalities that didn’t have any combat activities didn’t have a
detentions either. Again, the Chamber is calling upon another empty and unsupported
assertion-finding of itself, para 2511, see: 2511. Having considered these factors the Chamber
finds that members of the Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs and Serb Forces
deliberately established and perpetuated inhumane living conditions at a number of detention
facilities in the Municipalities.8471 (Let us see what is under the fn. 8471 8471 The Chamber
recalls that it did not have sufficient evidence to made a finding as to the conditions of
detentionat the TO military warehouses at Livade in Foča. See Scheduled Detention Facility
C.10.6. (The Chamber never established that the poor conditions in any detention or
reception facilities were deliberately posted or any human being deliberately deprived in any
needs by the official representatives of the authorities. From the names and purpose of the
facilities it was clear that the purpose was a quite different, not to be detention, but to be a
farm, factory etc, that means the spaces and facilities had been improvised. All the detainees
and authorities had been from the same places, they knew each other, they helped each
other, and only somebody from the outside could behave criminally. The Chamber had a
sufficient evidence that the Serb controlled territories had even more shortages in food,
energy, water, medicines, that the Muslim part of BiH. See how it was in Grbavica 1993,
11184
See para. 2511.
 1092

D02424:

Or what Gen. Nambiar wrote as early as in July 92, see: D04647:

The sanctions mentioned here never eased, but became worse, until the FRY imposed its own
ctrict sanctions in August 94. So, this is a permanently present situation, that the Serb side
was squeezed by many elements, which directly influenced lives of ordinary people, soldiers
as well as detainees. Without willing deprivation, or a negligeance, there is no a crime on the
Serb side for poor conditions in detention facilities! Beside that, if there was no a military
necessity to detain some people, why the Serb authorities woul take the burden of feeding
and guarding those detained? Both the Prosecution and Chamber never established and
differentiated whether the conditions in the detention facilities were a deliberate
aggravation, or was it a maximum that could hav been obtained in such a situation!) The
Chamber found that the Accuse knew early on in the conflict in BiH that civilians were being
detained by Serb Forces.11185 (Let us see how the Chamber came to this conclusion, calling
upon para 3365 of the Judgment: 3365. The Accused was present at a 24 April 1992 joint
session of the SNB and Bosnian Serb Government, where it was decided that the Ministry of
Justice would be responsible for the exchange of detainees.10764 (#DETAINEES, NOT
CIVILIANS#! This fn. directs us to P01087, but in this document there is no a word about
what the Chamber implied in this para. On 8 May 1992, the Government decided to form the
―Central Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners-of-War, Arrested Persons and the Bodies
of those Killed‖.10765 (#PRISONERS OF WAR, NOT CIVILIANS#! The document from
this fn. P01088 also doesn’t have anything illegal and criminal, and it was an obligation
according to the law on war. According to Mandić, the impetus for establishing the
Commission was to provide ―rule of law and legal security‖ for people detained, many of whom
were civilians from conflict areas.10766 The Chamber considers that this evidence
demonstrates that the President knew early on in the conflict in BiH that civilians were being
detained by Serb Forces. The fn. 10766 calls for para 127, let see a part of it: 127. The
Commission‘s official role was to co-ordinate exchanges and to provide information on
captured persons. As part of that role the Commission was to differentiate between civilians and
prisoners of war, with a view to releasing the former and preventing crisis staffs or paramilitary
formations from committing crimes against the latter.333
( This is #EXCULPATORY#!!! #All the “brought in” were subject to differentiation whether
they were civilians, in which a case they had been released immediately#! So, once again, the
#Chamber is punishing a good deeds of the President#! How possibly a correction of a
possible misdeeds on the terrain through adoption of the decision on forming a commission
to regulate the issue and rectify a possible felonies – could be used against the President? It
was well known to the Chamber that the RS had to build up a completely new legislation and
infrastructure in order to have the state institutions function. This was one of the regulation
that had been made by the Government, and the President or some of his associates would be
responsible if it didn’t happen, and not because it did happen?

11185
See paras. 3365, 3375.
 1093

The Accused was told by international representatives of the large scale detention of civilians as
early as May 1992.11186 This assertion relies on para 3366, let us see it: 3366. Allegations of
large-scale detention of civilians were reported in the international press in May and June 1992
and John Wilson raised these allegations with Plavšić in the presence of the Accused.10767
Plavšić acknowledged the existence of camps but said that they were only for military aged
persons who were detained so they would not fight the Serbs and made counterclaims that the
Bosnian Presidency was holding prisoners.10768 And this fn (10768) calls on para 102 of the
Wilson’s Statement, see, P01029, para 102:

(So, even Wilson was not sure whether the President said something, and therefore couldn’t be
sure whether the President was present, or at least, was he listening to their conversation,
and why should he, since Ms. Plavsic was in charge of the humanitarian issues. But, in the
para 3366 of the Judgment the Chamber “established” that the “allegations of large-scale
detention of civilians were reported in the international media in May and June 92”, as if the
international media were a reliable source. The same media reported that in the first year of
war there were 300,000 Muslim victims, and 80,000 raped women. Should any serious man
pay any attention to these allegations? Why would the RS state officials read the
international media, particularly in a situation when it was clear that these media were
drastically biased, and not to rely upon the official reports of the state agencies, the Army,
Police and the State Security Service? Which state would allow this kind of conduct of the
most responsible statesmen?)
On 17 July 1992, the Bosnian Serb MUP wrote a report to the Accused and the Prime Minister,
indicating, inter alia, that the conditions in detention centres were poor.11187 And this assertion
relies on the P01096, a MUP report of the anomalies on the terrain, see:

#GOOD DEEDS TO BE PUNISHED#! There is no doubt that it #pertained to the combat

zone#s, and there is no doubt that the RS MUP was critical of this practice, and once again, a
#proper functioning of the RS MUP and other organs is used as an evidence agaist this very
same state of RS and it’s organs, including the President#. What does it mean that MUP
wrote a report? That was their duty, to monitor the respect of the international standards,
and domestic laws, and to report. How could this be used against any instance in the RS.
Again, the Chamber forgets that a removal of civilians from a combat area was an obligation
due to laws.
On 22 July 1992, it was reported to the Bosnian Serb Government that there had been occurrences of
unlawful treatment of detainees.11188 This is D00430, p. 7, let us see what is an argument
against the President:

11186
See para. 3366.
11187
P1096 (SerBiH MUP Report on Some Aspects of Work Done to Date and the Tasks Ahead, 17 July 1992), p. 3.
11188
D430 (Minutes of 41st session of Government of SerBiH, 22 July 1992), p. 7.
 1094

#EXCULPATORY#!!! “On some occurrences” not on a systemic unlawful treatment of POWs.

There can be no better evidence on how the Government took care of the issue of legality of
the treatment of POWs, but is was used against the President, who, by definition doesn’t
deal with this kind of matters, unless the other state organs are neglecting a problem. It is
evident that the Government took care, inspected, learned about irregularities, and
concluded to take all measures, particularly mentioning the President’s Order “regarding
the treatment of war prisoners”! This is rather to prize the President and the Government of
the RS than to blame them. As in all other cases, when the evidence of the proper conduct of
the authorities is used against these same authorities, a conclusion must have been contrary
to it made by the Chamber, the only reasonable inference is: had there been any plan, the
Government and other organs would celebrate when they learn that some crimes are
commited, because there are many members ot the Government, Assembly, Presidency and
other organs who are alleged to be members of the OJCE. It can not be both – the officials
investigating and rectifying a bad practice, and deliberately creating and introducing the
same practice!)
On 25 July 1992, the Accused received a report from the ICRC following a visit to the Manjaĉa
camp, informing the Accused, inter alia, that two detainees had been subjected to ill treatment
during the visit, frequent and widespread traces of severe beatings were observed, and that the
general living conditions were ―absolutely insufficient‖.11189 (So what? The #President
welcomed the ICRC presence everywhere in the RS#, issued several orders, and made a
public recommendation to the population to be friendly towards the ICRC, see @). At the
London Conference in August 1992, the ―acute problem of the unlawful detention of civilians and
the deplorable conditions in which they were held‖ was recognised.11190 “Recognised” means
noticed and accepted to deal with, and this is the concerned para of D1142:

First of all, it didn’t concern only with the Serb side, but with all sides. Second, the sentence
“If not immediately feasible” meant that there also had been recognised that there could
have been a real and objective reasons why they couldn’t be at their homes. But, the
President had been cooperative and accepted all the measures that would ease the situation
of civilians! Was it established, and by whom, that the authorities of the RS were practicing
such a felony of detaining civilians? Or anything that happened in the civil war was due to
wishes of the authorities, including corrections of all deviations? But, let us see what else was
provided by this agreement:

Therefore, not ethnic cleansing, but repatriation to the areas where they would be safe and
feel secured.

And this was one of several agreements concluded in 1992 between the warring sides and the
international mediators and humanitarian organisations (ICRC, UNHCR et all.) according
to which the sides were obliged to move civilians to a safity. Yet, the Chamber is “finding” a

11189
P3758 (Letter from Radovan Karadţić to Branko Derić, attaching an ICRC report, 7 August 1992), pp. 4–7.
11190
D1142 (Programme of Action of the London International Conference, 27 August 1992), p. 1.
 1095

crime in exercising these obligations and commitments, without establishing whether it was
in accordance with some of these agreements. The Conference also recognised that all the
sides to the conflict had their undisciplined and independent, rogue elements, and agreed on
the issue with the commitment to discipline them, see D01142:

So, the #Conference recognised that an anarchy was an axiom, something that is understood
to appear in such a civil war#, and a full control over the territory was the only remedy. But,
the Chamber found that it wasn’t allowed to the Serb authorities to control their own areas.
This Agreement also contained another provision pertaining to the rights of refugees to
return if wished so: D01142:

Once signed, there couldn’t be any talk about a “permanent removal” of minorities, because
it would be impossible to achieve. However, the entire construct of this case of JCE relies on
this impossible assertion.)
In light of this evidence, the Chamber considers that the Accused knew that the conditions in many
of the detention centres where non-Serbs were detained were poor while others were inadequate at
best. (The President knew that the conditions in the entire RS were poor and inadequate, but
#neither one of it was a deliberate conduct of the authorities, nor the authorities could do
better in any way#. Of course, there is a huge evidence that the only solution was – not to
wage war, not to fight, because the Muslims in such a places didn’t have any problem, as can
be seen from the evidence.)

3519. The Chamber also notes that prior to the outbreak of armed conflict in April 1992, the
Accused was well aware of the ethnic animosity between Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and
Bosnian Muslims and played on these historic antagonisms in order to further the objective of the
Overarching JCE and its common plan.11191 (This is not a serious assertion. All of it is all the
way around, and this is upside down logics. The antagonisms lasted for several centuries,
and the last genocide commited against the Serbs and Jews in BiH and Croatia happened 45
years prior to this crisis, and nothing was forgotten. So, an ethnic separation, which took
place in the entire Yugoslavia, had a sense in BiH just contrary to what the Chamber
concluded: to save the peace and to guarantee a free life to all the three ethnicities, as it
would happen hadn’t there been abandonment of the Lisbon Agreement by the Muslim side.
The need to separate the states of the three antagonised ethnicities was aimed to avoid the
chaos and killings, not vice versa, and it was understood by the UN and the European
Community exactly that way. The Chamber doesn’t have a single evidence and any basis to
conclude that the intention of the ethnic separation in a separate entities had anything to do
with any JCE. On the contrary, even the EC and UN recognised it as a solution. Many the
most prominent persons at the time expressed their conviction that the only possible Bosnia
is a three-partite Bosnia. Let us see some of these opinions: within this frame there are some
of the opinions of the most prominent statesmen and authoritative persons:

11191
See Section IV.A.3.a.i.B: Identification of historic enemies.
 1096

1. Generally on Western powers’ involvement and policy of recognition

Lord Peter Carrington:

I think that what the international community on the whole – the Europeans, and the
Americans and the UN – have done, on the whole made it sure there was going to
be conflict. (I)

Lawrence Eagleburger:
I think the major lesson here is when you got involved in something like this with a
thousand years of history underlying it all, you need to understand that once the
dam breaks, the viciousness can bepretty awful – on all sides. (II)

Former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia James Bissett:

As the Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1990 to1992 I witnessed at first hand
how western diplomatic ineptitude and clumsiness hastened the breakup of
Yugoslavia and contributed to the dreadful violence and bloodshed that followed
the disintegration of the country.
Here are a few examples:[…]
 The premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia before any guarantees
of civil and human rights were given to the Serbian population of Croatia, which,
because of the horrendous events that occurred there during the Second World War,
made civil war inevitable.
 The encouragement of Alija Izetbegovic to withdraw his signature from
the so-called Lisbon agreement and to proceed with a referendum on independence
in Bosnia which everyone knew would lead to the death and displacement of
thousands. (III)

(I) George Bogdanich, Yugoslavia, the Avoidable War, 1999, Part 1, at 0:59 (Time
stamps for this movie refer to the subtitled version shown on RTV-BN). Parts of
this documentary were played by Slobodan Milosevic during his opening statement
(see Transcript of 18 February 2002, p. 475 et seq.) and by the Popovic defence
during the defence opening statement in Popovic et al (Transcript of 2 June 2008, p.
21566 et seq.).
(II) Yugoslavia, the Avoidable War, Part 1, at 46:00.
(III) James Bissett, Speaking Notes: Congressional Hearing [Hearing before the US
Congress in 2000], at http://www.deltax.net/bissett/a-congres1.htm.

Colin Powell:
 1097

The biggest mistake was recognizing all these little countries when they started to
decide they were independent. […] The Serbs had very good reason to be worried
about being in a Muslim-dominated country. It wasn't just paranoia.(IV)

Alexander Solzhenitsyn:
[W]hen – also in the period of a few days – Yugoslavia began to fall apart, the leading
powers of the West, with inexplicable haste and irresponsibility, rushed to
recognize these states within their artificial borders. Therefore, for the exhausting,
bloody war which is today convulsing the unfortunate peoples of the former
Yugoslavia, the leaders of the Western powers must share the blame with Tito. (V)

Early Warning by UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar on 10 December 1991:

In his report to me today, Mr. Vance has described widely expressed apprehensions
about the possibility of premature recognition of the independe of some of the
Yugoslav republics and the effect that such a move might have on the remaining
republics Leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were among the many
political and military figures who last week underscored to Mr. Vance their strong
fears in this regard. More than one of the high-level interlocutors described the
possibly explosive consequences of such a development as being a―potential time
bomb‖. […] I am deeply worried that any early, selective recognition could widen
the present conflict and fuel an explosive situation especially in Bosnia-
Hercegovina and also Macedonia; indeed, serious consequences could ensue for the
entire Balkan region. I believe, therefore, that uncoordinated actions should be
avoided.(VI)

Former GDR Ambassador to Yugoslavia Ralph Hartmann on Genscher‘s statement

that if ―the bloodshed goes on‖, Germany would ―seriously consider‖ the
recognition of Croatia:
The signal was understood. The prize promised by Genscher had its effect. The Croat
separatists intensified their armed activities, blockaded the JNA barracks, their
access to water and electricity, the bloodshed went on, and at the year‘s end
Germany pushed through the recognition of Croatia as well as Slovenia. Bosnia-
Hercegovina, the wonderful ―small-scale Yugoslavia‖, was driven into a disastrous
civil war lasting several years.(VII) _______________________________
(IV) Henry Louis Gates, Colin Powell and the Black Elite, The New Yorker, 25
September 1995.
(V) Alexander Solzhenitsyn On The New Russia, Forbes.com, 5 August 2008
(reprint of Paul Klebnikov, Zhirinovsky Is An Evil Caricature Of A Russian
Patriot – An Interview With Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Forbes magazine, 9 May
1994).
(VI) Letter dated 10 December 1991 from the Secretary-General of the United
Nations addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, UN Doc.
S/23280, 11 December 1991, Annex IV.
(VII) Ralph Hartmann, Verneinende Bestätigung, Ossietzky 23/2007. Hartmann
has also written a book “Die ehrlichen Makler“: Die deutsche Außenpolitik und der
Bürgerkrieg in Jugoslawien: Eine Bilanz, 1999 („The honest brokers―: German
foreign policy and the civil war in Yugoslavia: taking stock).
Original text of the above quote in German: ―Das Signal wurde verstanden. Die von
Genscher ausgesetzte Prämie wirkte. Die kroatischen Separatisten intensivierten
ihre bewaffneten Aktionen, blockierten die Kasernen der jugoslawischen
Volksarmee, ihre Wasser- und Stromzufuhr, das Blutvergießen ging weiter, und
 1098

zum Jahresende setzte Deutschland die Anerkennung Kroatiens wie auch

Sloweniens durch. Bosnien-Herzegowina, das wunderbare ‚Jugoslawien im
kleinen‘, wurde in einen verheerenden mehrjährigen Bürgerkrieg getrieben.―

Lord Peter Carrington on Germany‘s promise of recognition of Croatia and

Slovenia:
It broke up the constitutional conference because once you go throughout the six
republics for independence, those two had no further influence on the constitutional
conference, but you had to ask the other republics whether they wanted their
independence, which meant that you had to ask Bosnia and it was perfectly plain
that […] there was going to be a civil war in Bosnia if you did do that.'(VIII)

James Baker:
Because we said if Yugoslavia does not break up peacefully, there is going to be one
hell of a civil war. It nevertheless broke up non-peacefully, it broke up through the
unilateral declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia and the seizing by
these two country's republics of their border posts which was an act of force and
which was an act that was in violation of the Helsinki principles, but the European
powers and the United States ultimately recognised Slovenia and then Croatia and
then Bosnia as independent countries, and admitted them to the United Nations. The
real problem was that there was a unilateral declaration of independence and a use
of force to gain that independence rather than a peaceful negotiation of
independence which is the way it should have happened. (IX)
Cyrus Vance reportedly referred to the conflict in Yugoslavia as ―Mr. Genscher‘s
war.‖ (X)
According to former US State Department official George Kenney:
Vance argued that recognition would take away the diplomatic leverage that he
had to try to bring the conflict in Croatia to an end and could possibly result in
Bosnia blowing up. (XI )
James Bissett:
The premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was a guarantee that the
breakup of Yugoslavia would not be resolved by peaceful means. Once again
western intervention had exacerbated and complicated a serious Balkan
problem. Again the German intervention had little to do with the actual
problem faced on the ground in Yugoslavia. (XII)

Chancellor Kohl's insistence that Slovenia and Croatia be recognized as

independent states was the death sentence for Yugoslavia. Sadly it was also the
death sentence for many thousands of Serbs and Croats. (XIII)

____________________________________________________

(VII) Yugoslavia, the Avoidable War, at 39:17.

(VIII) Yugoslavia, the Avoidable War, at 13:42.
(IX) Yugoslavia, the Avoidable War, at 3:22.
(XI) Yugoslavia, the Avoidable War, at 3:27.
(XII) James Bissett, Speaking Notes: Congressional Hearing [Hearing before the
US Congress in 2000], at http://www.deltax.net/bissett/a-congres1.htm.
 1099

(XIII) James Bissett, Kosovo and Human Rights, at http://www.deltax.net/bissett/a-

humanrights2.htm.

Warren Zimmermann exlained that the US was initially reluctant to recognize

Croatia and Slovenia because of fears that recognition would prolong the
fighting in Croatia and trigger a war in Bosnia. He stated that
[w]ith regard to Bosnia, our fears proved out.
On whether the German push for early recognition of Croatia provoked more violence:
We opposed the German initiative at the time. I continue to think the initiative
was wrong, but it is now a part of reality. (XIV)
(Defence remark: the new realities was not invented by the Serbs, but by the
internationals, to justify their support for the unlawful secessions!)

Lawrence Eagleburger on domestic political reasons for US recognition of Croatia:

When we finally went ahead and recognised, one of the reasons we did so is because it
had become a major domestic political issue for us here. We have particularly a
large Croatian-American community and Mr. Bush lost most of them in the [1992
election] because they were unhappy with our having delayed as long as we did in
recognising Croatia. (XV)

Even Lord David Owen made a vaguely critical remark on the policy of recognition:
―My view has always been that to have stuck unyieldingly to the internal boundaries of
the six republics within the former Yugoslavia […], before there was any question
of recognition of these republics, as being the boundaries for independent states,
was a folly far greater than that of premature recognition itself.‖ (XVI)

Warren Christopher:
“There were serious mistakes made in the whole process of recognition, quick
recognition, [of Croatia and Slovenia,] and the Germans bear a particular
responsibility in persuading their colleagues and the European Community.
[… Many serious students of the matter think the beginning of the problems
we face here today stem from the recognition of Croatia and thereafter of
Bosnia.‖ (XVII)

Izetbegovic to the Bosnian assembly on 27 February 1991:

“I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, but for that peace in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, I would not sacrifice sovereignty.” (XVIII)

________________________________________________
(XIV) David Binder, Warren Zimmermann; Haunted by What the U.S. Didn‘t Do in
Yugoslavia, New York Times, 14 June 1992.
(XV) Yugoslavia, the Avoidable War, at 46:24.
(XVI) David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 34.
(XVII) Interview with USA Today, 17 June 1993.
(XVIII) Quoted in Laura Silber/Alan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 2nd ed. 1996,
233.
 1100

Lord Peter Carrington on why it was clear from the beginning that recognition of
Bosnia would lead to war:
“The Bosnian Serbs, until comparatively recently, have been in the majority in
Bosnia and then the Muslims, who had a very much higher birth rate than the
Serbs, became the […] majority population. And this, of course, was something
very hard for the Serbs to swallow. And they made it abundantly plain very
early on that they were not prepared to accept a situation in which there was
an independent Bosnia under the Constitution which then prevailed. And
indeed, under the Constitution which then prevailed, it was […] illegal for
Izetbegovic to declare independence because any constitutional change of that
magnitude had to be agreed by all three parties.” (XIX)

George Kenney:
“The intelligence community was unanimous in saying that “if we go ahead and
recognize Bosnia, it will blow up.” (XX)

US sabotage of the Carrington-Cutileiro plan

Lord Peter Carrington describing the plan:

“It was the last chance, I think, of trying to preserve Bosnia before the war broke
out in earnest.” (XXI)
José Cutileiro on US ―encouragement‖ to Izetbegovic to seek recognition of an
independent BiH: “After several rounds of talks our "principles for future
constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Hercegovina" were agreed by the
three parties (Muslim, Serb and Croat) in Sarajevo on 18 March 1992 as the
basis for further negotiations. These continued, maps and all, until the
summer, when the Muslims reneged on the agreement. Had they not done so,
the Bosnian question might have been settled earlier, with less loss of (mainly
Muslim) life and land. To be fair, Izetbegovic and his aides were encouraged to
scupper that deal and to fight for a unitary Bosnian state by well-meaning
outsiders who thought they knew better.” (XXII)
(Defence remark: Is it now clear that the Serb side didn’t create any Joint
Criminal Enterprise, but made the most painful concession and compromise to
accept an independent Bosnia if the Serbs get their republic within it. So, the
war was not waged with any Serb aim or goal, but contrary, the Muslim side
foght for a unitary and independent Bosnia, and that was a Joint Criminal
Enterprise!)
__________________________

(XIX) Yugoslavia, the Avoidable War, at 47:30.

(XX) Yugoslavia, the Avoidable War, at 1:13.
(XXI) Yugoslavia, the Avoidable War, at 52:48.
(XXII) Jose Cutileiro, Letter to the Editor, The Economist, 9-15 December 1995.

Warren Zimmermann on the US position in early 1992:

“The embassy was for recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina from sometime in
February on. Meaning me.” (XXIII)
 1101

George Kenney on Warren Zimmermann‘s meeting with Izetbegovic:

“Zimmerman told Izetbegovic “look, why don't you wait and see what the US can
do for you”, meaning ―we will recognise you and then help you out so don't go
ahead with the Lisbon agreement, don't accept the Cutileiro Plan and just hold
out for some kind of unitary Bosnian state.” So this is a major turning point in
our diplomatic efforts. (XXIV)

Lord Carrington:
“The American Administration made it quite clear that they thought the
proposals – Cutileiro and my proposals – were unacceptable.” (XXV)

Zimmermann in 1993 in the context of negotiations on the Owen-Stoltenberg plan:

“Our view was that we might be able to head off a Serbian power grab by
internationalizing the problem. Our hope was the Serbs would hold off if it was
clear Bosnia had the recognition of Western countries. It turned out we were
wrong.
[…] The Lisbon agreement wasn't bad at all.” (XXVI)

James Bissett:
“This US intervention guaranteed civil war in Bosnia and the death and
displacement of thousands of people. […] It appeared that the United States
was determined to pursue a policy that prevented a resolution of the conflict by
other than violent means. (XXVII)

Whatever the reason [for sabotaging the Cutileiro plan], it seems evident the U.S.
intervention did more harm than good.” (XXVIII)

(XXIII) David Binder, U.S. Policymakers on Bosnia Admit Errors in Opposing

Partition in 1992, New York Times, August 29, 1993
(XXIV) Yugoslavia, the Avoidable War, at 53:45.
(XXV) Yugoslavia, the Avoidable War, at 54:10.
(XXVI) David Binder, U.S. Policymakers on Bosnia Admit Errors in Opposing
Partition in 1992, New York Times, 29 August 1993.
(XXVII) James Bissett, Kosovo and Human Rights, at http://www.deltax.net/bissett/a-
humanrights2.htm.
(XXVIII) James Bissett, Western Interference, Part 7: Bosnia, at
http://www.deltax.net/bissett/western/bosnia.htm.

David Owen
“[T]he European Community's mistake over recognizing Croatia could have been
overcome, if it had not been compounded by going forward regardless of the
consequences with the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The U.S., which
had opposed the recognition of Croatia in December 1991, became very active
in pushing for recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the spring of 1992.
Yet it should not have been judged inevitable, nor indeed was it logical to push
ahead and recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina, an internal republic of
 1102

Yugoslavia that contained three large constituent peoples with very different
views on independence.” (XXIX)

Lord Carrington described the recognition of Croatia, Bosnia and Slovenia as a

“tragic error” and stated that he had advised the EC against recognition of Bosnia
as
“…scenario of this sort [was] unacceptable for the Serbs in Bosnia [and] would
lead to civil war.” (XXX)

Cyrus Vance stated ”that premature recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia by
the EC and U.S. brought about the war that is going on now.” (XXXI)

George Kenney:
“Unfortunately, Izetbegovic reneged on his word after encouragement from U.S.
Ambassador Warren Zimmerman, and the deal fell apart. Two weeks later
U.S, and European recognition of Bosnia triggered the war.” (XXXII)

Warren Zimmermann considered the timing of the EU recognition of BiH to be

“atrocious‖ and stated that
“[h]ad Izetbegovic pleaded for time to allow the Bosnian parties to work out their
mutual relationship … he might have avoided a war” (XXXIII)

Roger Cohen of the New York Times on the recognition of Bosnia:

“[T]his international decision on Bosnia looks as close to criminal negligence as a
diplomatic act can be. Indeed, international recognition and the outbreak of
the Bosnian war were simultaneous: the world put a light to a fuse.” (XXXIV)

________________________________________
(XXIX) David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 344.
(XXX) Michael Colomes/Marc Roche, Big Blunders in Yugoslavia, Cleveland Plain
Dealer, 19 October 1992. as quoted in Danielle S. Sremac, War of Words:
Washington tackles the Yugoslav conflict, 1999, 94–95.
(XXXI) David Binder, Vance, Leaving, Sees Hope for Bosnia Plan Despite Fighting,
New York Times, 14 April 1993.
(XXXII) George Kenney, Steering Clear of Balkan Shoals, The Nation, 8 January
1996.
(XXXIII) Warren Zimmermann, A Pavane for Bosnia, 37 The National Interest
(1994), 78, as quoted in: Richard D. Caplan, Europe and the recognition of new
states in Yugoslavia, 2005, 121.
(XXXIV) Roger Cohen, The World; Balkan Moral Order Upset as Victim Becomes
Victor, New York Times, 6 November 1994.

New York Times columnist A.M. Rosenthal stated that the war in Bosnia
“…was not the result of immutable historic forces but of the combined catalytic
catastrophic stupidity and arrogance of officials in Western Europe, the
former Yugoslavia and the U.S. […] When Yugoslavia fell apart without Tito's
boot to kick it into line, Germany led the West into early recognition of
Slovenia and particularly Croatia, Germany's World War II ally. President
Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia himself had warned that premature recognition
 1103

would detonate the powderkeg of Serbs, Croats and Muslims living in Bosnia.
It did.” (XXXV)

As far as Genscher and Kohl have commented on German foreign policy in the context
of recognition, they have not, to the knowledge of Defence, made any statements
critical of that policy.

4. Some quotes on which were not accessible to check the original source

French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas criticized the EC‘s ―hasty‖ recognition of
Croatia and Slovenia, stating that that premature recognition had destroyed the
possibility of preventing the breakup of Yugoslavia through negotiations and
contributed to the civil war in Bosnia and that the responsibility of Germany and the
Vatican for the escalation of the crisis was enormous. (XXXVI)

Dutch PM Ruud Lubbers explained that the German government was pushing for
recognition against the resistance of other European countries and that the result
was ―a catastrophe.‖ (XXXVII)

Henry Kissinger stated that the premature recognition of the former Yugoslav
republics, especially of Bosnia, did not create a new state but instead provoked a
new civil war. (XXXVIII)

Turkish Foreign Ministry Expert and later Ambassador to the FRY Alev Kilic asserted
that the early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia buried any hope for a peaceful
solution of the Balkan conflict. (XXXIX)

______________________________
(XXXV) A.M. Rosenthal, On My Mind; Bosnia: Empty Promises, New York Times, 10
September 1993.
(XXXVI) Le Monde, 22 June 1993 and Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21 June 1993.
(XXXVII) Volkskrant, 21 December 1997.
(XXXVIII) Die Welt, 8 September 1996.
(XXXIX) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 February 1992.

(Was it known to the Prosecution when it constructed the Indictment against this President? If
it wasn’t, than it was irresponsible and incompetent Prosecution, which caused another
“civil war” and deterioration of the regional situation, planting a seeds for new conflicts. If
the Prosecution was aware of these statements of the most competent participants of the
Yugoslav crisis resolution, then it would be a real crime punishable in any of the countries
that support this Prosecution!) The President knew that leading up to the outbreak of armed
conflict, ethnic tensions were rising.11196 (This is something everyone knew, and the responsible
world leaders warned not tu rush with the recognitions until all the questions of security be
resolved. A special responsibility is on those world leaders who encouraged Mr. Izetbegovic
to abandon the Lisbon Agreement and fight for the whole BiH for his community! The
President knew, and he was begging both the domestic partners and international mediators
to wait a bit, until BiH be decentralised! This awarnes of the inevitable conflict was the
ground for the President’s political fights for the peace and peaceful solution, including his
speech od 15 October 91. This also had been a basis for all those concessions the Serb side
offered in order to make all the sides satisfied, and to avoid the war! But, in this Court all is
put upside down, and the President anti-war statements were interpreted as a threats!)
 1104

Furthermore, during the conflict, the President frequently dismissed the commission of crimes by
armed groups, blaming this ethnic animosity.11192 (Certainly, the President knew that it wasn’t
a policy of the RS, or VRS, or the RS Police, but it didn’t mean that if the authorities are
against commission of crimes, that crimes wouldn’t be committed. Exactly for these reasons,
for a centuries long lasting animosity among the three ethnic groups!) For example, at an
international press conference in September 1992, in response to a question about a report alleging
atrocities, including executions, and brutal ―Nazi-like‖ conditions, the President said that in an
―inter-ethnic and inter-religious war‖, there was no need for a command to kill, given that the three
ethnic communities had ―been antagonised during centuries‖.11193 That is correct. The President
said at the same occasion that in such a kind of war the most needed command would be
“stop” rather than “fire”. What is wron with it? Remember, when asked by somebody fron
the IC (int. Community) who is going to start a war, the President said: “nobody knows.
Probably somebody from the lowest stratum of society.” See….. The killing of the Serb, a
groom’s father on 1 March 92 hadnt been commited by a distinguished Muslim, but
somebody from a bottom of society. But, the Chamber still didn’t interpret the President’s
respons to the journalists correctly. See this part of P809, p.3:

P809, p.3

So, the President gave an #academic response, honest and unbiased, recognising the chaotic
situation#, and without accusing the Muslim leadership, because he believed that it had been
done out of control of their officials too! This document contains other useful answers, such
as whether there is envisaged the transfer of population, and the President responded that it
must not happen, and the remedy is a full respect of the minority rights, but the Chamber
wasn’t interested in any exculpatory evidence!

3520. Having assessed all the evidence on the information available to the Accused prior to and
during the execution of the common plan of the Overarching JCE, the Chamber considers that the
President knew that the common plan, whereby thousands of non-Serb civilians were expelled en
masse from their homes during and after the forcible take-over of towns and villages, and detained
in facilities throughout the Municipalities, occurred in a context of inter-ethnic animosity and
violence. (This is insane! There was no any “common plan”, but just for a moment let us
assume that the other side didn’t have such a plan, what these animosities produced there,
where there was no a plan, and where the #President didn’t have any influence!# How come
the #cruellest crimes on the Muslim side happened “without a plan”# and out of sight and
influence of their leaders, while on the Serb side there was necessary to have a plan? Also,
there was no a single evidence that the “Serb Forces” expelled civilians from their homes.
The patern was always the same: the Muslim extremists and terrorists attack the JNA and
later the VRS and the Serb settlements. The Serbs respond, the terrosirts escape tu their

11192
See para. 3341.
11193
P809 (Video footage of Radovan Karadţić‘s Press Conference at ICFY, 18 September 1992, with transcript), p. 3. See para. 3348.
 1105

settled places, the Serbs chase them to capture them, mainly they succeded, and civilians
seeked a shelter while the fights go on. After they had been housed somewhere, many of
them didn’t dare to return to their homes and demanded to be aalowed to leave! To this
respect there is an overwhelming evidence, and none to the opposite!) Furthermore, he
knew that a climate of impunity for crimes committed against non-Serbs existed in Bosnian Serb
claimed territory, particularly in 1992.11194 (This was not proven or corroborated by a single
evidence. The abilities of the state structures were very low in 1992, but there was no a
climate of impunity, and the Defence challenges both the Prosecution and the Chamber to
show any evidence regarding the state structures being indifferent, let alone active in
creating such a climate!) In light of these factors, he ought to have known that the non-Serb
population was vulnerable to violent crimes that might be perpetrated by Serb Forces. (Both, the
non-Serb and Serb population was vulnerable to violent crimes by the same perpetrators –
the Muslim terrorists that terrorised them deep in the Serb territory and far from any front
line. The “Serb Forces” were very responsible in all the areas where there was no combats.
All the municipalities without armed skirmishes and, all the settled places without fights
were without any crimes. The state organs fought a permanent fight against crimes and
unlawful conduct, and the Chamber have seen it, but used it against the Serbs. But, this
truth is never going to disappear, and the Prosecution and the entire Court is going to be
blamed for such a ruthless forgery of the history of this conflict!)

3521. On the basis of the foregoing, the Chamber is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that it
was foreseeable to the Accused that persecution through torture, beatings, physical and
psychological abuse, rape and other acts of sexual violence, and the establishment and
perpetuation of inhumane living conditions in detention facilities as cruel or inhumane treatment,
killings, forced labour at the frontline, the use of non-Serbs as human shields, the appropriation or
plunder of property, and the wanton destruction of private property, including cultural and sacred
sites, might be committed by Serb Forces used to carry out the objective of the common plan,
during the execution of the common plan, with discriminatory intent. (The only problem with
this “findings” is that there was no any plan, and that it could have been foreseeable without
any plan, and that the President warned all the sides in BiH not to push towards the war,
because a war would produce a chaos, and a chaos will be a commander in chief to all of us.
But, the Chamber qualified this speech as a threat. How come the Prosecution-Chamber of
this UN Court so desperately searched for a Serb ―mens rea‖ and a phantom plans, while
only the Serbs gave up their best interests for the sake of peace, and had it been respected,
there wouldn’t be any war and crimes? On the other side, the Court did have an insight in
the “Islamic Declaration” authored by Mr. Izetbegovic, which was a plan of the first class for
what happened to the BiH nations?) Furthermore, the Chamber finds that it was foreseeable to
the Accused that murder might be committed by Serb Forces used to carry out the objective of the
common plan, during the execution of the common plan. (This is completely unfair. Why there
was no “carrying out” the objectives of a common plan in the rest of #two third
municipalities#? Why the Chamber was so negligeable to miss to check the most markant
remark and objection of the Defence, that the Serbs never and nowhere initiated fights?
Then it would be clear whether the Serbs had a plan, or not. There are only several questions
without an answer, but these answers are going to be searched for through the next decades,
an it will not be something the United Nations and the international community is going to
be proud of!) Finally, the fact that the Accused knew that the common plan was executed
across a large geographic scope which involved numerous protagonists from civilian and military
units, and was directly made aware of mass killings at the beginning of April 1992, demonstrates
that he knew of the possibility that killings on a large scale might be committed by Serb Forces
used to carry out the objective of the common plan. Therefore, the Chamber finds that the
11194
See Section IV.A.3.a.v: Accused‘s knowledge of crimes and measures he took to prevent and punish them.
 1106

possibility that extermination might be committed by Serb Forces was sufficiently substantial as to
be foreseeable to the Accused. These crimes will hereinafter be referred to as ―JCE III Crimes‖.
(What risk, and what the President could have done, when #everything depended on the
other side#. Had the other side ceased to attack, there wouldn’t be any “common plane” any
risk, any crimes, as it was the case in many municipalities were the Muslim side didn’t
attack, and the civilians didn’t have any troubles. The same was even in the municipalities
where the Muslim terrorists attacked, the civilian un-related to these terrorists didn’t have
any trouble, their homes hadn’t been used for fights, and they remained living in these
municipalities to the end of war. The Chamber didn’t notice this fact, and didn’t even try to
establish whay some did have, and some didn’t have any troubles!)

3522. The Accused‘s continued participation in the Overarching JCE until 1995 demonstrates
that he acted in furtherance of the common plan with the awareness of the possibility that the JCE
III Crimes might be committed either by members of the Overarching JCE or Serb Forces who
were used by him or other members of the Overarching JCE to carry out the common plan,11195
during the execution of the common plan, demonstrating that he willingly took that risk.11196
(What risk, and what the President could have done, #when everything depended on the
oth#er side. Was the President expected to surrender entire his Serb community to the
Muslim forces and accept a slavery for his people, and get for himself a good bargain? Even
if he was a traitor of such a kind, who would obey him? Why a nation that fought for
freedom during several centuries would accept it? Within a few hours there would be a
formidable reaction of the entire community!)

3523. The Chamber is satisfied that the JCE III Crimes which have been found to be proven
beyond reasonable doubt are sufficiently linked to the Accused because they were found to have
been carried out by members of the Serb Forces who were used by the Accused or another JCE
member to carry out the JCE I crimes.11197 The Chamber has found that the JCE III Crimes were
committed either during or after the take-overs of Municipalities during the campaign to forcibly
remove the non-Serb population or in connection with unlawful detention in a scheduled detention
facility. The Chamber has also considered the context in which the crimes were committed,
including the timing and the correlation with the actions taken and crimes committed by other Serb
Forces and Bosnian Serb authorities who acted in furtherance of the common plan. (In
numbering so many “circumstances” it is miraculous how the Chamber successfully avoided
to mention that the #crimes never happened unless the Muslim terrorists attacked deep in
the Serb controlled territory#! But, this is the crucial element, and skipping it, the whole
picture becomes fake and detrimental for the future of this region!)

1. Conclusion: Accused‘s individual criminal responsibility

3524. The Chamber found above that the Overarching JCE came into existence in October 1991
and continued until at least 30 November 1995, that the Accused significantly contributed to the
Overarching JCE, and shared the intent with respect to the JCE I Crimes. (If so, how come the
Serbs and the President so easily gave up all these JCEs for the sake of the Lisbon
Agreement? From 15 October 1991 until 6 April, when it happened the war broke out, there
is a period of almost 6 months, when many other outcomes of the crisis had been possible
exclusively because the Serbs and the President were flexible in giving concessions! It is
obvious that the Chamber accepted the entire Prosecution allegations according to which all
and every manifestation of the political life of the Serbs in Bosnia was unacceptable and
11195
See para. 3511.
11196
See para. 3466, where the Chamber found that the evidence of the Accused‘s intent to commit the JCE I crimes, coupled with his knowledge of the
commission of crimes by Serb Forces against non-Serbs in the Municipalities did not rise to the level of intention for the crimes discussed herein.
11197
Judge Morrison dissenting with respect to Scheduled Incident B.12.2.
 1107

criminal. Nobody in the world is so partisan of the #Bosnian illegal fight for independence#
as this UN court! Even those who pushed the region in a horrible bloodshead are more
critical about it, than the Prosecution and the Tribunal!) In addition the Chamber found that
the President acted in furtherance of the Overarching JCE with the awareness of the possibility
that the JCE III Crimes might be committed either by members of the Overarching JCE or Serb
Forces who were used by him or other members of the Overarching JCE to carry out the common
plan, and that he willingly took that risk. (#Couldn’t be more wrong!# If it was true, then there
would certainly have been his operative orders to the VRS or Police to that respect#. Not
only the Prosecution didn’t submit any written evidence, but there was no any verbal hint
towards that conclusion, nor a telephone intercept, nor a testimony, not even a
circumstantial evidence, that the President wanted or supported, or tolerated any of the
JECs. The President didn’t issue any executive orders to the VRS, except about the
international requests to stop fighting, or let a humanitarian aid to pass. That means that
any of his orders would have to be registered in the VRS Main Staff, and the subsequent
executive orders would inevitably call upon the superior’s order to theMain Staff.) The
Chamber therefore finds that the President bears individual criminal responsibility pursuant to
Article 7(1) of the Statute for persecution, a crime against humanity (Count 3); extermination, a
crime against humanity (Count 4); murder, a crime against humanity (Count 5); murder, a
violation of the laws or customs of war (Count 6); deportation, a crime against humanity (Count
7); and inhumane acts (forcible transfer), a crime against humanity (Count 8). The Chamber will
address the issue of cumulative convictions in Section IV.F below. (A common sense can not
understand it!!!)

3525. In addition to the Accused‘s liability through participation in a JCE, the Prosecution also
alleges that the Accused is individually criminally responsible for planning, instigating, ordering,
and/or aiding and abetting the crimes relevant to the Municipalities component through certain
acts and omissions.11198 It also charges the Accused with individual criminal responsibility
pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute.11199 However, having considered all of the evidence and in
light of the findings made above, the Chamber finds that commission through JCE pursuant to
Article 7(1) most accurately and appropriately reflects the Accused‘s responsibility for the crimes
in the Municipalities component as charged in the Indictment. The Chamber will therefore not
analyse the Accused‘s responsibility under the other modes alleged by the Prosecution in the
Indictment.

11198
Indictment, paras. 30–31; Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 1115–1118.
11199
Indictment, para. 32; Prosecution Final Brief, paras. 1113–1114.