(1) Opposition on his appointment as Comelec Chairman for lacking requirement

w/c is practice of law for 10 yrs

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only
legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a
profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
-elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and

eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice

of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract
and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to
be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages
in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in
the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895,
340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-
177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and
all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed

outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning
and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E.
313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144).
(Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging
in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of
employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a
liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to
do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on
Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be
Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who
are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the
clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret
this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their
legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even
chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies
and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made
available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the
Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to
the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on
Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the
practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be
certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members
of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous
with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice,
it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly

understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of
delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole
practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and
members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional
corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the
firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do.
(Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank &
Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v.
Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly
familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most
lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire
practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue
to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self
perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not
reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer,
once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise:
"Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who
principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most
cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as
the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine
can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number
of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers
in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their
specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from
one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much
else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and
negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation
are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is
constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of
the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is
that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature
of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform
that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are
emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of
practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in

corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent
decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making"
and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision
and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated
concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must
stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the
decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses
of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research
has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in
the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context
and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either
a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at
the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts
and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar
types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from
each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised.
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the

"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it
is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some
large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have
in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board
meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the
Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to
deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of
the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action,
or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the organization. This
can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In
short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in
the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is
practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a
foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate
lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while
the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To
borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is
one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and
the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak.
No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject
study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning:
(1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a
corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization
and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a
unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and
the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the
nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not
only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder
— in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These
trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for
promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches
from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of
seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from
other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been
found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the
groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both
to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial
liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool
for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems.
An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow,
enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic,
managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the
system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to
appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the
cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used

directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such
tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be
used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major
part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or
similar facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to
stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of
"law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel
has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal
profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's
strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers,
coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also
gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only
the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he
feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan.
11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the

position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod

as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the
same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments

of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant
petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying
his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-
1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate,
and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the
field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for
and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land
reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the
legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo
V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper
No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law
as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can
be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid.,
p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For
aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score
national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty.
(Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for
Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United
States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by
the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting
and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international
business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they
should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation,
U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms

and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or
more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the
responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when
the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of
whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They
carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and
bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo,
"The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal,
Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly
the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as
a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the
poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the
Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the

officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority
to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess
the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3)
issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v.
Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-
Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years,
two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation
is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual
law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my
written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing
because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the
practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my
statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations,
most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means,
are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact
that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising
law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without
first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President
of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This
matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against
the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except
only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave
abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that
would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of
the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the

Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme
Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked
Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron
rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This
blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on
his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood
flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

 NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of
his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits
nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

 PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at
bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the
sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod
from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent
the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to
finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the
Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced
that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not
been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,

ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including
the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction
of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman.
Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to

the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere
possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action.  To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue
1

an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of
a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public
accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an
accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a
corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a
corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary

actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment
for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis
supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a

Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a
particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's
self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for
services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill
is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901)
and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives
pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v.
Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to
clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law.
(Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence

of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or
writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his
profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or

not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at
least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of
law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY

FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records,
I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice
of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment
as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of
legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated
transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To
become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of
acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that
his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a
source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as

not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just
the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course
respecting his viewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from
resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the
established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that
discretion would still be subject to our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both
possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not
be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for
lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an
appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less
than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first
place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may
have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in
the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to
be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some
law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor
could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely
"to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and
regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern
society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered
a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws
regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must
obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory
Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the

"performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of
law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm,
such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as
a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected
with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose
income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with
pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the
Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which
areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a
practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his
resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an
attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that
he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform,
served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers
like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not
proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period
of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions
worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I
must regretfully vote to grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged
in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave
but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not
practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he
viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have
no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or
whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior
qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational
background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by
the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is
before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has
never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to
say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to
the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a
requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but
also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or
Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business
corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with
no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that
in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular,
not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one
is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with
intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to
the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except
for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his
father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because
he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of
Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not
a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961
consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin

American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities

Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and

affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt —
Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following
companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in
its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working
for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the one
advice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate

"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident
of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the
law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the
business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer,
fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people
honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten
years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but
also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering
of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will,
contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions
involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399
Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what

constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an
attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the
giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation
when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as
being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock
Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was

asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate
transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In
answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties
during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it
would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not
recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large
number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if
he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages
and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not
the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice."
Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for
parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything
that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."

x x x           x x x          x x x

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful
right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in
drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt
but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his
services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

x x x           x x x          x x x

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by

another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons
authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these
professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly
styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at
law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law.
Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an
officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on
the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court
and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3)
to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided
to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law
Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or
perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to
practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to
real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,'
etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a
succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109
[1965]):

x x x           x x x          x x x

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a

required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment
of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when
one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation
with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the
country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary

action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)."
(Rollo, p. 115)

x x x           x x x          x x x
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his
legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated
activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the
practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in
the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities
which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to
isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize
the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of
law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions
or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing
business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of
appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to
qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or
Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman
has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the
public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of

discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Footnotes

1 Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary.

2 14 SCRA 109

3 Commission on Appointments' Memorandum dated 25 June 1991 RE: WHAT

CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW, pp. 6-7.

4 14 SCRA 109.

(2) Pimentel v. LEB

Supreme Court of the Philippines (MANILA BULLETIN)

LEB’s PhiLSAT requirement was declared by the SC as “an act and practice of
excluding, restricting and qualifying admissions to law schools in violation of the
institutional academic freedom on who to admit.”

Specifically, declared unconstitutional was paragraph 9 of LEB’s Memorandum Order No.

7-2016 which provides that “all college graduates or graduating students applying
for admission to the basic law course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a
requirement for admission to any law school in the Philippines and that no
applicant shall be admitted for enrolment as a first year student in the basic law
courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless
he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of studies
for the basic law course.”

With the full court decision written by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes Jr., the SC made
permanent its temporary restraining order (TRO) issued last March against the
implementation of PhiLSAT.

“The regular admission of students who were conditionally admitted and enrolled is left to
the discretion of the law schools in the exercise of their academic freedom,” the SC
declared.

Also declared unconstitutional were:

“The act and practice of the LEB of dictating the qualifications and classifications of
faculty members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law in violation of
institutional academic freedom on who may teach.

“The act and practice of the LEB of dictating the policies on the establishment of
legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs in violation of the institutional
academic freedom on what to teach.”

The 107-page SC decision partially granted the petitions filed a group led by former
Makati City regional trial court (RTC) Judge Oscar B. Pimentel and group of intervenors
led by April D. Caballero.

PhiLSAT examinations were conducted by LEB in April 2017, September 2017, April
2018, and September 2018.

Based on LEB’s Memorandum No. 7, schoolyear 2017-2018 was the pilot year for
PhiLSAT but law schools were allowed to enroll students who took the examinations but
did not pass the tests.

The memorandum issued in 2016 provided for mechanisms to a day’s aptitude test to
gauge the academic potentials of an examinee who wants to enroll in law schools.

On top of the abolition of LEB and PhiLSAT, Pimentel’s group also sought the transfer of
the regulation of law schools to the SC.

The LEB was created under Republic Act No. 7662, known as the Legal Education
Reform Act of 1993, as an agency separate from the Department of Education, but
attached to it only for budgetary purposes and administrative support.

Among the powers vested in the LEB by the law were the administration of legal
education system in the country, supervision of law schools, setting of standards for
accreditation of law schools, prescription of minimum standards for law admission and
minimum qualifications and compensation to faculty members.

Days before the conduct of the first PhiLSAT in 2017, Pimentel’s group filed a petition
with the SC seeking to declare unconstitutional the creation of the LEB and to invalidate
all the issuances of the board, particularly the admission test for law students.

The group said the functions of the LEB under the law that created it are encroachments
on the rule-making power of the SC concerning admissions to the practice of law.
On March 12, 2019, the SC issued a TRO pleaded by Pimentel’s group on the issue on
PhiLSAT.

Among other things, the SC ruled that:

“The PhiLSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant’s aptitude for law
school. The PhiLSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon the law schools who among
the examinees are to be admitted to any law program.

“When the PhiLSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as
its present design mandates, the PhiLSAT goes beyond mere supervision and
regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable and
therefore, unconstitutional.”

Also declared unconstitutional for encroaching on the power of the SC were:

Section 2, paragraph 2 of RA 7662 insofar as it unduly includes “continuing legal

education” as an aspect of legal education which is made subject to executive
supervision and control.

Section 3(a)(2) of RA 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the objective of
legal education to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of
the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society.

Section 7(g) of RA 7662 and Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the
LEB the power to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking
the bar.

Section 7(h) of RA 7662 and Section 11 (h) LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the
LEB the power to adopt a system of mandatory continuing legal education and to
provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and
for such duration as it may deem necessary.

Jurisdiction over legal education

Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction over legal education. The supervison
and regulation of all areas of education including legal education had been historically
and consistently exercised by political departments. Legal education is but a composite
of the entire Phil education system. It is unique because it is a specialized area of study
however, this is not a reason to withdraw it from from the regulatory and supervisory
powers of the political branches. Court only exercises judicial functions and it cannot
arrogate upon itself a power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court violates
the doctrine of separation of power. Court’s exclusive rule-making power covers the
practice of law and not the study of law.

(5) Philippine Bar Now Open to Filipinos with Foreign Law Degrees

"B.M. No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar
Examinations Through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). - The Court
Resolved to APPROVE the proposed amendments to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138, to
wit:

SEC. 5.Additional Requirement for Other Applicants. — All applicants for admission other
than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the
examination, satisfactorily show that they have successfully completed all the prescribed
courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree, in a law school or
university officially recognized by the Philippine Government or by the proper authority in
the foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.

No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be
admitted to the bar examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the
following course in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil
law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law,
political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.

A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the
bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications
showing:

(a) completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its
equivalent degree;

(b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and

(c) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic
program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.

SEC. 6.Pre-Law. — An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall present a
certificate issued by the proper government agency that, before commencing the study of
law, he or she had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high
school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences.

A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of Laws degree or its
equivalent in a foreign law school must present proof of having completed a separate
bachelor's degree course.

The Clerk of Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, is hereby directed to
CIRCULARIZE this resolution among all law schools in the country."

(6) Leakage in Mercantile Law 2003 Bar

B.M. No. 1222             February 4, 2004

Re: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice
Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, was apprised of a
rumored leakage in the examination on the subject. After making his own inquiries,
Justice Vitug reported the matter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and to the other
members of the Court, recommending that the bar examination on the subject be nullified
and that an investigation be conducted forthwith. On 23 September 2003, the Court
adopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug, and resolved to nullify the examination in
Mercantile Law and to hold another examination on 04 October 2003 at eight o’clock in
the evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the De La Salle University, Taft
Avenue, Manila. The resolution was issued without prejudice to any action that the Court
would further take on the matter.

Following the issuance of the resolution, the Court received numerous petitions and
motions from the Philippine Association of Law Schools and various other groups and
persons, expressing agreement to the nullification of the bar examinations in Mercantile
Law but voicing strong reservations against the holding of another examination on the
subject. Several reasons were advanced by petitioners or movants, among these
reasons being the physical, emotional and financial difficulties that would be encountered
by the examinees, if another examination on the subject were to be held anew.
Alternative proposals submitted to the Court included the spreading out of the weight of
Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar subjects, i.e., to determine and gauge
the results of the examinations on the basis only of the performance of the examinees in
the seven bar subjects. In a resolution, dated 29 September 2003, the Court, finding
merit in the submissions, resolved to cancel the scheduled examination in Mercantile
Law on 04 October 2003 and to allocate the fifteen percentage points among the seven
bar examination subjects. In the same resolution, the Court further resolved to create a
Committee composed of three retired members of the Court that would conduct a
thorough investigation of the incident subject of the 23 September 2003 resolution.

In a resolution, dated 07 October 2003, the Court adopted the computation in the
allocation of the fifteen percentage points for Mercantile Law among the remaining seven
bar examination subjects, to wit:

Original Adjusted Adjusted

Relative
Subject Percentage Percentage Relative
Weight
Weight Weight Weight
Political and
International 15% 17.647% 3 3.53%
Law
Labor and
Social 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%
Legislation
Civil law 15% 17.647% 3 3.53%
Taxation 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%
Criminal law 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%
Remedial
20% 23.529% 4 4.71%
Law
Legal Ethics
and
5% 5.882% 1 1.18%
Practical
Exercises
 100% 20%

In another resolution, dated 14 October 2003, the Court designated the following retired
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to compose the Investigating Committee:

Chairman: Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino

Members: Justice Jose A.R. Melo
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza

The Investigating Committee was tasked to determine and identify the source of leakage,
the parties responsible therefor or who might have benefited therefrom, recommend
sanctions against all those found to have been responsible for, or who would have
benefited from, the incident in question and to recommend measures to the Court to
safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations.

On 15 January 2004, the Investigating Committee submitted its report and

recommendation to the Court, herein reproduced in full; thus -

"In the morning of September 21, 2003, the third Sunday of the 2003 bar examinations,
the examination in commercial law was held in De la Salle University on Taft Avenue,
Manila, the venue of the bar examinations since 1995. The next day, the newspapers
carried news of an alleged leakage in the said examination. 1

"Upon hearing the news and making preliminary inquiries of his own, Justice Jose C.
Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, reported the matter to the
Chief Justice and recommended that the examination in mercantile law be cancelled and
that a formal investigation of the leakage be undertaken.

"Acting on the report and recommendation of Justice Vitug, the Court, in a resolution
dated September 23, 2003, nullified the examination in mercantile law and resolved to
hold another examination in that subject on Saturday, October 4, 2003 at eight o’clock in
the evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the same venue. However,
because numerous petitions, protests, and motions for reconsideration were filed against
the retaking of the examination in mercantile law, the Court cancelled the holding of such
examination. On the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court
instead decided to allocate the fifteen (15) percentage points for mercantile law among
the seven (7) other bar examination subjects (Resolution dated October 7, 2003).

"In a Resolution dated September 29, 2003, the Supreme Court created an Investigating
Committee composed of three (3) retired Members of the Court to conduct an
investigation of the leakage and to submit its findings and recommendations on or before
December 15, 2003.

"The Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to
compose the Committee:

Chairman: Justice CAROLINA GRIÑO-AQUINO

Members: Justice JOSE A. R. MELO
Justice VICENTE V. MENDOZA
"The Investigating Committee was directed to determine and identify the source of the
leakage, the parties responsible therefor and those who benefited therefrom, and to
recommend measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations.

"The investigation commenced on October 21, 2003 and continued up to November 7,

2003. The following witnesses appeared and testified at the investigation:

1. Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee;

2. Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, law clerk in the office of Justice Vitug

3. Atty. Marcial O. T. Balgos, examiner in mercantile law;

4. Cheryl Palma, private secretary of Atty. Balgos;

5. Atty. Danilo De Guzman, assistant lawyer in the firm of Balgos & Perez;

6. Atty. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner of Balgos & Perez;

7. Eduardo J. F. Abella, reviewer in commercial law at the Lex Review Center;

8. Silvestre T. Atienza, office manager of Balgos & Perez;

9. Reynita Villasis, private secretary of Atty. De Guzman;

10. Ronan Garvida, fraternity brother of Atty. De Guzman;

11. Ronald F. Collado, most illustrious brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity;

12. Jovito M. Salonga, Asst. Division Chief of Systems Development for Judicial
Application, MlSO;

The Committee held nine (9) meetings - six times to conduct the investigation and three
times to deliberate on its report.

"ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE C. VITUG, chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee,

testified that on Monday morning, September 22, 2003, the day after the Bar examination
in mercantile or commercial law, upon arriving in his office in the Supreme Court, his
secretary,2 Rose Kawada, informed him that one of the law clerks, Atty. Marlo Magdoza-
Malagar, told her that a friend of hers named Ma. Cecilia Delgado-Carbajosa, a bar
examinee from Xavier University in Cagayan de Oro City, who was staying at the Garden
Plaza Hotel in Paco, confided to her that something was wrong with the examination in
mercantile law, because previous to the examination, i.e., on Saturday afternoon, the eve
of the examination, she received a copy of the test questions in that subject. She did not
pay attention to the test questions because no answers were provided, and she was
hard-pressed to finish her review of that subject, using other available bar review
materials, of which there were plenty coming from various bar review centers.

"However, upon perusing the questions after the examinations, Cecilia noticed that many
of them were the same questions that were asked in the just-concluded-examination.

"Justice Vitug requested Marlo to invite her friend to his office in the Supreme Court, but
Carbajosa declined the invitation. So, Justice Vitug suggested that Marlo and Rose invite
Carbajosa to meet them at Robinson’s Place, Ermita. She agreed to do that.
"Cecilia Carbajosa arrived at Robinson’s Place at the appointed time and showed the test
questions to Rose and Marlo. Rose obtained a xerox copy of the leaked questions and
compared them with the bar questions in mercantile law. On the back of the pages, she
wrote, in her own hand, the differences she noted between the leaked questions and the
bar examination questions.

"Rose and Marlo delivered the copy of the leaked questions to Justice Vitug who
compared them with the bar examination questions in mercantile law. He found the
leaked questions to be the exact same questions which the examiner in mercantile law,
Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and submitted to him as chairman of the Bar
Examinations Committee. However, not all of those questions were asked in the bar
examination. According to Justice Vitug, only 75% of the final bar questions were
questions prepared by Atty. Balgos; 25% prepared by Justice Vitug himself, were
included in the final bar examination. The questions prepared by Justice Vitug were not
among the leaked test questions.

"Apart from the published news stories about the leakage, Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. and Justice Vitug received, by telephone and mail, reports of the leakage
from Dean Mariano F. Magsalin, Jr. of the Arellano Law Foundation (Exh. H) and a
certain Dale Philip R. De los Reyes (Exh. B -B-3), attaching copies of the leaked
questions and the fax transmittal sheet showing that the source of the questions was
Danny De Guzman who faxed them to Ronan Garvida on September 17, 2003, four days
before the examination in mercantile law on September 21, 2003 (Exh. B-1).

"ATTORNEY MARLO MAGDOZA-MALAGAR was subpoenaed by the Committee. She

identified the copy of the leaked questions that came from Cecilia Carbajosa (Exh. A).
She testified that, according to Carbajosa, the latter received the test questions from one
of her co-bar reviewees staying, like her, at the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, and also
enrolled in the review classes at the Lex Review Center at the corner of P. Faura Street
and Roxas Boulevard, Ermita. She did not pay for the hand-out because the Lex Review
Center gives them away for free to its bar reviewees.

"ATTORNEY MARCIAL O. T. BALGOS, 71 years of age, senior partner in the law firm of
BALGOS AND PEREZ with offices in Rm. 1009 West Tektite Tower, Exchange Road,
Ortigas Center, Pasig City, testified that in November 2002, Justice Jose C. Vitug, as
chair of the Committee on the 2003 Bar Examinations, invited him to be the examiner in
commercial law. He accepted the assignment and almost immediately began the
preparation of test questions on the subject. Using his personal computer in the law
office, he prepared for three consecutive days, three (3) sets of test questions which
covered the entire subject of Mercantile Law (pp. 3-5, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). As he did not
know how to prepare the questionnaire in final form, he asked his private secretary,
Cheryl Palma, to format the questions (p. 13, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). And, as he did not
know how to print the questionnaire, he likewise asked Cheryl Palma to make a print-out
(Id., pp. 14-15). All of this was done inside his office with only him and his secretary
there. His secretary printed only one copy (Id., p. 15). He then placed the printed copy of
the test questions, consisting of three sets, in an envelope which he sealed, and called
up Justice Vitug to inform him that he was bringing the questions to the latter’s office that
afternoon. However, as Justice Vitug was leaving his office shortly, he advised Atty.
Balgos to give the sealed envelope to his confidential assistant who had been instructed
to keep it. When Atty. Balgos arrived in the office of Justice Vitug, he was met by Justice
Vitug’s confidential assistant to whom he entrusted the sealed envelope containing the
test questions (pp. 19-26, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).

"Atty. Balgos admitted that he does not know how to operate a computer except to type
on it. He does not know how to open and close his own computer which has a password
for that purpose. In fact, he did not know, as he still does, the password. It is his
secretary, Cheryl Palma, who opened and closed his computer for him (p. 45, tsn, Oct.
24, 2003).

"Atty. Balgos testified that he did not devise the password himself. It was Cheryl Palma
who devised it (Id., p. 71).

"His computer is exclusively for his own use. It is located inside his room which is locked
when he is not in the office. He comes to the office every other day only.

"He thought that his computer was safely insulated from third parties, and that he alone
had access to it. He was surprised to discover, when reports of the bar leakage broke
out, that his computer was in fact interconnected with the computers of his nine (9)
assistant attorneys (tsn, pp. 30,45). As a matter of fact, the employees - Jovito M.
Salonga and Benjamin R. Katly - of the Court’s Management Information Systems Office
(MISO) who, upon the request of Atty. Balgos, were directed by the Investigating
Committee to inspect the computer system in his office, reported that there were 16, not
9, computers connected to each other via Local Area Network (LAN) and one (1) stand-
alone computer connected to the internet (Exh. M). Atty. Balgos’ law partner, former
Justice Secretary Hernando Perez, also had a computer, but Perez took it away when he
became the Secretary of Justice.

"The nine (9) assistant attorneys with computers, connected to Attorney Balgos’
computer, are:

1. Zorayda Zosobrado (she resigned in July 2003)

2. Claravel Javier

3. Rolynne Torio

4. Mark Warner Rosal

5. Charlynne Subia

6. Danilo De Guzman (resigned on October 22, 2003 [Exh. D])

7. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner

8. Concepcion De los Santos

9. Pamela June Jalandoni

"Upon learning from Justice Vitug of the leakage of the bar questions prepared by him in
mercantile law, Atty. Balgos immediately called together and questioned his office staff.
He interrogated all of them except Atty. Danilo De Guzman who was absent then. All of
them professed to know nothing about the bar leakage.

"He questioned Silvestre Atienza, the office manager, Atienza is only a second year law
student at MLQU. But he is an expert in installing and operating computers. It was he
and/or his brother Gregorio who interconnected the computers in the law office, including
Attorney Balgos’ computer, without the latter’s knowledge and permission.

"Atienza admitted to Attorney Balgos that he participated in the bar operations or ‘bar
ops’ of the Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity of which he is a member, but he clarified
that his participation consisted only of bringing food to the MLQU bar examinees (Tsn,
pp. 46-47, Oct. 24, 2003).

"The next day, Attorney Balgos questioned Attorney Danilo De Guzman, also a member
of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity, FEU chapter. De Guzman admitted to him that he
downloaded the test questions from Attorney Balgos’ computer and faxed a copy to a
fraternity brother. Attorney Balgos was convinced that De Guzman was the source of the
leakage of his test questions in mercantile law (Tsn, p. 52, Oct. 24, 2003).

"Attorney Balgos prepared a COMPARISON (Exh. E) of the juxtaposed final bar

questions and his proposed test questions, with marginal markings made by Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza (Ret.), indicating whether the questions are similar: (S); or different:
(D), together with the percentage points corresponding to each question. On the basis of
this comparative table and Atty. Balgos’ indications as to which questions were the same
or different from those given in the final questionnaire, Justice Mendoza computed the
credit points contained in the proposed leaked questions. The proposed questions
constituted 82% of the final bar questions. Attached to this Report as Annex A is the
comparative table and the computation of credit points marked as Exh. E-1.

"CHERYL PALMA, 34 years old, private secretary of Attorney Balgos for the past six
years, testified that she did not type the test questions. She admitted, however, that it
was she who formatted the questions and printed one copy as directed by her employer.
She confirmed Atty. Balgos’ testimony regarding her participation in the operation of his
personal computer. She disclosed that what appears in Atty. Balgos’ computer can be
seen in the neighborhood network if the other computers are open and not in use; that
Silvestre Atienza of the accounting section, can access Atty. Balgos’ computer when the
latter is open and not in use.

"ATTORNEY ENRICO VELASCO, managing partner of the firm, testified that on October
16, 2003, he sent De Guzman a memo (Exh. C) giving him ‘72 hours to explain in writing
why you should not be terminated for causing the Firm an undeserved condemnation and
dishonor because of the leakage aforesaid.’

"On October 22, 2003, De Guzman handed in his resignation ‘effective immediately.’ He
explained that:

‘Causing the firm, its partners and members to suffer from undeserved condemnation
and humiliation is not only farthest from, but totally out of, my mind. It is just unfortunate
that the incident subject matter of your memorandum occurred. Rest assured, though,
that I have never been part of any deliberate scheme to malign the good reputation and
integrity of the firm, its partners and members.’ (Exh. D)

"DANILO DE GUZMAN testified that he joined Balgos & Perez in April 2000. He obtained
his LLB degree from FEU in 1998. As a student, he was an awardee for academic
excellence. He passed the 1998 bar examinations with a grade of 86.4%. In FEU, he
joined the Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity which has chapters in MLQU, UE and MSU
(Mindanao State University). As a member of the fraternity, he was active during bar
examinations and participated in the fraternity’s ‘bar ops.’

"He testified that sometime in May 2003, when he was exploring Atty. Balgos’ computer,
(which he often did without the owner’s knowledge or permission), to download materials
which he thought might be useful to save for future use, he found and downloaded the
test questions in mercantile law consisting of 12 pages. He allegedly thought they were
quizzers for a book that Atty. Balgos might be preparing. He saved them in his hard disk.
"He thought of faxing the test questions to one of his fraternity ‘brods,’ a certain Ronan
Garvida who, De Guzman thought, was taking the 2003 bar examinations. Garvida is
also a law graduate from FEU. He had taken the 2002 bar examinations, but did not
pass.

"On September 17, 2003, four days before the mercantile law bar examination,
De Guzman faxed a copy of the 12-page-test questions (Exhs. I, I-1, I-2, I-3) to Garvida
because earlier he was informed by Garvida that he was retaking the bar examinations.
He advised Garvida to share the questions with other ‘Betan’ examinees. He allegedly
did not charge anything for the test questions. Later, after the examination was over,
Garvida ‘texted’ (sent a text message on his cell phone) him (De Guzman), that he did
not take the bar examination.

"Besides Garvida, De Guzman faxed the mercantile law bar questions to another
fraternity brother named Arlan (surname unknown), through Reynita (Nanette) Villasis,
his secretary (Tsn, pp. 20-28, Oct. 29, 2003). But he himself faxed the questions to still
another ‘brod’ named Erwin Tan who had helped him during the ‘bar ops’ in 1998 when
he (De Guzman) took the bar examinations (Id., p. 28). He obtained the cell phone
numbers of Arlan and Erwin Tan from Gabby Tanpiengco whom he informed by text
message, that they were ‘guide questions,’ not tips, in the mercantile law examination.

"When he was confronted by Attorney Velasco on Wednesday after the examination,

(news of the leakage was already in all the newspapers), De Guzman admitted to
Attorney Velasco that he faxed the questions to his fraternity brothers, but he did not
reveal where he got the test questions.

"De Guzman received a text message from Erwin Tan acknowledging that he received
the test questions. However, Erwin informed him that the questions were ‘kalat na kalat’
(all over the place) even if he did not share them with others (Tsn, pp. 54-55, Oct. 29,
2003).

"De Guzman also contacted Garvida who informed him that he gave copies of the test
questions to Betans Randy Iñigo and James Bugain.

"Arlan also ‘texted’ De Guzman that almost all the questions were asked in the
examination. Erwin Tan commented that many of the leaked questions were asked in the
examination, ‘pero hindi exacto; mi binago’ (they were not exactly the same; there were
some changes).

"De Guzman tried to text Garvida, but he received no response.

"De Guzman disclosed that he learned how to operate a computer from Silvestre Atienza,
the office manager, and through self-study, by asking those who are knowledgeable on
computers. He has been using computers since 1997, and he bought his own computer
in 2001, a Pentium 3, which he uses at home.

"REYNITA VILLASIS, the 36-year-old legal secretary of Attorney De Guzman, submitted

her affidavit (Exh. F) and orally affirmed her participation in the reproduction and
transmittal by fax of the leaked test questions in mercantile law to Ronan Garvida and
Arlan, as testified by De Guzman.

"RONAN GARVIDA, appeared before the Investigating Committee in compliance with the
subpoena that was issued to him. Garvida graduated from FEU College of Law in 2000.
He is about 32 years of age. While still a student in 1998, he was afflicted with multiple
sclerosis or MS, a disease of the nervous system that attacks the nerve sheaths of the
brain and spinal cord. It is a chronic disabling disease although it may have periods of
remission. It causes its victim to walk with erratic, stiff and staggering gait; the hands and
fingers may tremble in performing simple actions; the eyesight can be impaired, and
speech may be slow and slurred (p. 737, Vol. 2, Reader’s Digest Medical Encyclopedia,
1971 Ed., compiled by Benjamin F. Miller, M.D.). All these symptoms were present when
Garvida testified before the Committee on November 6, 2003 to answer its questions
regarding his involvement in the leakage of the examiner’s test questions in mercantile
law.

"Garvida testified that when he was a freshman at FEU, he became a member of the
Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity where he met and was befriended by Attorney De Guzman
who was his senior by one and a half years. Although they had been out of touch since
he went home to the province on account of the recurrence of his illness, De Guzman
was able [to] get this cell phone number from his compadre, Atty. Joseph Pajara. De
Guzman told Garvida that he was faxing him ‘possible questions in the bar examination
in mercantile law.’ Because the test questions had no answers, De Guzman stressed that
they were not ‘tips’ but only ‘possible test questions.’

"Garvida had intended to take the 2003 bar examinations. He enrolled in the Consortium
Review Center in FEU, paying P10,000.00 as enrollment fee. However, on his way to the
Supreme Court to file his application to take the bar examination, he suffered pains in his
wrist - symptoms that his MS had recurred. His physician advised him to go to the
National Orthopedic Hospital in Quezon City for treatment. This he did.

"He gave up his plan to take the 2003 bar examinations. Nevertheless, he continued to
attend the review classes at the Consortium Review Center because he did not want to
waste completely the P10,000-enrollment fee that he paid for the review course
(‘Nahihinayang ako’). That was presumably why De Guzman thought that Garvida was
taking the bar exams and sent him a copy of the test questions in mercantile law.

"Upon receipt of the test questions, Garvida faxed a copy to his ‘brod’ Randy Iñigo who
was reviewing at the Consortium Review Center. Randy photocopied them for distribution
to other fraternity brods. Some of the brods doubted the usefulness of the test questions,
but Randy who has a high regard for De Guzman, believed that the questions were ‘tips.’
Garvida did not fax the questions to any other person than Randy Iñigo. He allegedly did
not sell the questions to Randy. ‘I could not do that to a brod,’ he explained.

"In view of the fact that one of the copies of the leaked test questions (Exh. H) bore on
the left margin a rubber stamp composed of the Greek initials ‘BEA-MLQU,’ indicating
that the source of that copy was the Beta Sigma Lambda chapter at MLQU, the
Committee subpoenaed Ronald Collado, the Most Illustrious Brother of the Beta Sigma
Lambda fraternity of MLQU.

"RONALD COLLADO is a senior law student at the MLQU. He admitted that his fraternity
conducted ‘Bar Ops’ for the 2003 bar exams. Bar Ops are the biggest activity of the
fraternity every year. They start as soon as new officers of the fraternity are elected in
June, and they continue until the bar examinations are over. The bar operations consist
of soliciting funds from alumni brods and friends to be spent in reproducing bar review
materials for the use of their ‘barristers’ (bar candidates) in the various review centers,
providing meals for their ‘brod’-barristers on examination days; and to rent a ‘bar site’ or
place near De la Salle University where the examinees and the frat members can
convene and take their meals during the break time. The Betans’ bar site for the 2003 bar
examinations was located on Leon Guinto Street, Malate. On September 19 and 21,
before [the] start of the examination, Collado’s fraternity distributed bar review materials
for the mercantile law examination to the examinees who came to the bar site. The test
questions (Exh. H) were received by Collado from a brod, Alan Guiapal, who had
received them from Randy Iñigo.
"Collado caused 30 copies of the test questions to be printed with the logo and initials of
the fraternity (BEA-MLQU) for distribution to the 30 MLQU examinees taking the bar
exams. Because of time constraints, frat members were unable to answer the test
questions despite the clamor for answers, so, they were given out ‘as is’ - without
answers.

"DEAN EDUARDO J. F. ABELLA of the Jose Rizal University law school in Mandaluyong
City, was the reviewer in Mercantile Law and Practical Exercises at the Lex Review
Center which is operated by the Lex Review & Seminars Inc., of which Dean Abella is
one of the incorporators. He learned about the leakage of test questions in mercantile law
when he was delivering the pre-week lecture on Legal Forms at the Arellano University.
The leaked questions were shown to him by his secretary, Jenylyn Domingo, after the
mercantile law exam. He missed the Saturday lecture in mercantile law because he was
suffering from a touch of flu. He gave his last lecture on the subject on Wednesday or
Thursday before the exam. He denied having bought or obtained and distributed the
leaked test questions in Mercantile Law to the bar reviewees in the Lex Review Center.

"F I N D I N G S

"The Committee finds that the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law were the
questions which the examiner, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and
submitted to Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations
Committee. The questions constituted 82% of the questions asked in the examination in
Mercantile Law in the morning of September 21, 2003, Sunday, in some cases with slight
changes which were not substantial and in other cases exactly as proposed by Atty.
Balgos. Hence, any bar examinee who was able to get hold of the leaked questions
before the mercantile law examination and answered them correctly, would have been
assured of passing the examination with at least a grade of 82%!

"The circumstance that the leaked test questions consisted entirely of test questions
prepared by Atty. Balgos, proves conclusively that the leakage originated from his office,
not from the Office of Justice Vitug, the Bar Examinations Chairman.

"Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions were prepared by him on his
computer. Without any doubt, the source of the leaked test questions was Atty. Balgos’
computer. The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos’ computer without
the latter’s knowledge and consent, and who faxed them to other persons, was Atty.
Balgos’ legal assistant, Attorney Danilo De Guzman, who voluntarily confessed the deed
to the Investigating Committee. De Guzman revealed that he faxed the test questions,
with the help of his secretary Reynita Villasis, to his fraternity ‘brods,’ namely, Ronan
Garvida, Arlan (whose surname he could not recall), and Erwin Tan.

"In turn, Ronan Garvida faxed the test questions to Betans Randy Iñigo and James
Bugain.

"Randy Iñigo passed a copy or copies of the same questions to another Betan, Alan
Guiapal, who gave a copy to the MLQU-Beta Sigma [Lambda’s] Most Illustrious Brother,
Ronald F. Collado, who ordered the printing and distribution of 30 copies to the MLQU’s
30 bar candidates.

"Attorney Danilo De Guzman’s act of downloading Attorney Balgos’ test questions in

mercantile law from the latter’s computer, without his knowledge and permission, was a
criminal act of larceny. It was theft of intellectual property; the test questions were
intellectual property of Attorney Balgos, being the product of his intellect and legal
knowledge.
"Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Attorney Balgos’
right to privacy of communication, and to security of his papers and effects against
unauthorized search and seizure - rights zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution (Sections 2 and 3, Article III, 1987 Constitution).

"He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers’ Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that ‘[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land,
and promote respect for law and legal processes.’

"By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the Beta
Sigma Lambda Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit and to given them undue
advantage over the other examiners in the mercantile law examination, De Guzman
abetted cheating or dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in the examination, which is
violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for members of the Bar, which provide:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct

Canon 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.

"De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. He
violated the law instead of promoting respect for it and degraded the noble profession of
law instead of upholding its dignity and integrity. His actuations impaired public respect
for the Court, and damaged the integrity of the bar examinations as the final measure of
a law graduate’s academic preparedness to embark upon the practice of law.

However, the Investigating Committee does not believe that De Guzman was solely
responsible for the leakage of Atty. Balgos’ proposed test questions in the mercantile law
examination. The Committee does not believe that he acted alone, or did not have the
assistance and cooperation of other persons, such as:

"Cheryl Palma, Atty. Balgos’ private secretary, who, according to Atty. Balgos himself,
was the only person who knew the password, who could open and close his computer;
and who had the key to his office where his computer was kept. Since a computer may
not be accessed or downloaded unless it is opened, someone must have opened Atty.
Balgos’ computer in order for De Guzman to retrieve the test questions stored therein.

"Silvestre Atienza, also a fraternity ‘brod’ of De Guzman, who was responsible for
interconnecting Atty. Balgos’ computer with the other computers outside Atty. Balgos’
room or office, and who was the only other person, besides Cheryl Palma, who knew the
password of Atty. Balgos’ computer.

"The following persons who received from De Guzman, and distributed copies of the
leaked test questions, appear to have conspired with him to steal and profit from the sale
of the test questions. They could not have been motivated solely by a desire to help the
fraternity, for the leakage was widespread (‘kalat na kalat’) according to Erwin Tan. The
possible co-conspirators were:

Ronan Garvida,

Arlan,

Erwin Tan,
Randy Iñigo,

Ronald Collado, and

Allan Guiapal

"The Committee does not believe that De Guzman recklessly broke the law and risked
his job and future as a lawyer, out of love for the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity. There
must have been an ulterior material consideration for his breaking the law and tearing the
shroud of secrecy that, he very well knows, covers the bar examinations.

"On the other hand, the Committee finds that the theft of the test questions from Atty.
Balgos’ computer could have been avoided if Atty. Balgos had exercised due diligence in
safeguarding the secrecy of the test questions which he prepared. As the computer is a
powerful modern machine which he admittedly is not fairly familiar with, he should not
have trusted it to deep secret the test questions that he stored in its hard disk. He
admittedly did not know the password of his computer. He relied on his secretary to use
the password to open and close his computer. He kept his computer in a room to which
other persons had access. Unfamiliar with the use of the machine whose potential for
mischief he could not have been totally unaware of, he should have avoided its use for so
sensitive an undertaking as typing the questions in the bar examination. After all he knew
how to use the typewriter in the use of which he is quite proficient. Atty. Balgos should
therefore have prepared the test questions in his trusty typewriter, in the privacy of his
home, (instead of his law office), where they would have been safe from the prying eyes
of secretaries and assistant attorneys. Atty. Balgos’ negligence in the preparation and
safekeeping of his proposed test questions for the bar examination in mercantile law, was
not the proximate cause of the ‘bar leakage;’ it was, in fact, the root cause. For, if he had
taken those simple precautions to protect the secrecy of his papers, nobody could have
stolen them and copied and circulated them. The integrity of the bar examinations would
not have been sullied by the scandal. He admitted that ‘Mali siguro ako, but that was
what happened’ (43 tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).

"R E C O M M E N D A T I O N

"This Honorable court in the case of Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, June 10, 2002,
383 SCRA 276, pronounced the following reminder for lawyers: ‘Members of the bar
must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, the honesty and integrity of the profession.’ In another case, it likewise intoned:
‘We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts, and to his clients.’ (Reyes v. Javier, A.C. No. 5574, February 2, 2002,
375 SCRA 538). It goes without saying that a lawyer who violates this precept of the
profession by committing a gross misconduct which dishonors and diminishes the
public’s respect for the legal profession, should be disciplined.

"After careful deliberation, the Investigating Committee recommends that:

"1. Attorney Danilo De Guzman be DISBARRED for he had shown that he is morally unfit
to continue as a member of the legal profession, for grave dishonesty, lack of integrity,
and criminal behavior. In addition, he should make a written PUBLIC APOLOGY and pay
DAMAGES to the Supreme Court for involving it in another ‘bar scandal,’ causing the
cancellation of the mercantile law examination, and wreaking havoc upon the image of
this institution.

"2. Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos should be REPRIMANDED by the Court and likewise
be required to make a written APOLOGY to the Court for the public scandal he brought
upon it as a result of his negligence and lack of due care in preparing and safeguarding
his proposed test questions in mercantile law. As the Court had to cancel the Mercantile
Law examination on account of the ‘leakage’ of Attorney Balgos’ test questions, which
comprised 82% of the bar questions in that examination, Atty. Balgos is not entitled to
receive any honorarium as examiner for that subject.

"3. FURTHER INVESTIGATION of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza,

Ronan Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan, Randy Iñigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan
Guiapal by the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police, with a
view to their criminal prosecution as probable co-conspirators in the theft and leakage of
the test questions in mercantile law.

"With regard to recommending measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar

examinations and prevent a repetition of future leakage in the said examinations,
inasmuch as this matter is at present under study by the Court’s Committee on Legal
Education and Bar Matters, as an aspect of proposals for bar reforms, the Investigating
Committee believes it would be well-advised to refrain from including in this report what
may turn out to be duplicative, if not contrary, recommendations on the matter." 3

The Court adopts the report, including with some modifications the recommendation, of
the Investigating Committee. The Court, certainly will not countenance any act or conduct
that can impair not only the integrity of the Bar Examinations but the trust reposed on the
Court.

The Court also takes note that Mr. Jovito M. Salonga and Mr. Benjamin R. Katly, two of
its employees assigned to the Management Information Systems Office (MISO), who
were tasked by the Investigating Committee to inspect the computer system in the office
of Atty. Balgos, found that the Court’s Computer-Assisted Legal Research (CALR)
database4 was installed in the computer used by Atty. Balgos. Mr. Salonga and Mr. Katly
reported that the system, which was developed by the MISO, was intended for the
exclusive use of the Court. The installation thereof to any external computer would be
unauthorized without the permission of the Court. Atty. Velasco informed the two Court
employees that the CALR database was installed by Atty. De Guzman on the computer
being used by Atty. Balgos. The matter would also need further investigation to
determine how Atty. De Guzman was able to obtain a copy of the Court’s CALR
database.

WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating

Committee, hereby resolves to -

(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his
receipt of this RESOLUTION;

(2) REPRIMAND Atty. MARCIAL O.T. BALGOS and DISENTITLE him from receiving
any honorarium as an Examiner in Mercantile Law;

(3) Direct the National Bureau of Investigation (a) to undertake further investigation of
Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Erwin Tan, Randy
Iñigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal with a view to determining their
participation and respective accountabilities in the bar examination leakage and to
conduct an investigation on how Danilo De Guzman was able to secure a copy of the
Supreme Court’s CALR database.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of the records of Danilo De Guzman in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and copies to be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Office of the Court
Administrator to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
Azcuna, J., on official leave.
Tinga, J., No part. Close to family of one of the parties involved in bar scandal.

Footnotes

1
 The leakage was reported on the newspapers on Tuesday, 23 September 2003.

2
 A Law clerk in his office, Atty. Rosalinda E. Beltran-Kawada.

 Report of the Investigating Committee on the Leakage of the Examiner’s Bar

3

Examination Questions in Mercantile Law.

4
 The CALR database contains Supreme Court decisions from May 1996 to May 2002. It
also has a proprietary search engine.

(7) Petition to take lawyers oath of 1 convicted for Reckless Imprudence resulting
in Homicide (Hazing Case)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court
however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a
neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and
seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The
eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded
guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993
imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four
(4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994
submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence
that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court
judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence
that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan,
the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8)
accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to
comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of
his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only
homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness
implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless

imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a
pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and
Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and
compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart
attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son.
However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him
in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the
gruesome manner of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the
bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual
and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and
efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out"
lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal
importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing
the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than
irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for
allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless
beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness
required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and
uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes

impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good
moral character. 1

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in
moral character referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The
suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due
to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third
parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the
cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the
accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent,
given the circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is
now morally fit to be a lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino
is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that
he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of
Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the
sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted
themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier
for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has
been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render
legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take

the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and,
thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Resolution, p. 8.

(8) Disqualfication of Bar Examinee for not disclosing of his pending case

B. M. No. 1154             June 8, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S.

MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS
MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R.
MELENDREZ, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe
while the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.

The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the
2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the
2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and
15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious
Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001,
when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front
of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face
of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that
he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which
shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed

his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against
him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised
him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case
would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being
their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that
actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as "closed and
terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of
do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications
really contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office
clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the

charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition
to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact,
the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that
these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for
the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar
Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an
applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act
of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished
from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in
which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal
and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person
to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him
also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement
or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to
the bar."5

As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of
Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid
reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he
is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not
entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the
appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court. 6

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s
Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations.
Further, it recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be suspended until
further orders from the Court.7

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did
not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to
prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and
academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the
appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and
has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of
right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in
the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.8 The
requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.9

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with
any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of,
any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge
against him/her." Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that
he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment,
done under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is

satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant. 10 The nature of whatever
cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is
endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of
such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately
proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of
the applicant.

Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases
against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in
the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to
its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to discuss
the impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Shari’a Bar who are
not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several
correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his
private capacity. The Court declared that:
…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine
Bar, hence, may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been
admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered "counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they
only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. 12

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case.
The solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be
part of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be
competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and
integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary
and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his
application to take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the
Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the
practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate

sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly,
the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED
until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing
the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for
having become moot and academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 2-25, with Annexes.

2
 Id. at 27.

3
 Id. at 28-32.

4
 Supra, note 1 at 34-38.

 Id. at 35-36, citing Bar Matter 1209, Petition to take the Lawyer’s Oath of Caesar
5

Distrito and Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859.

6
 Id. at 36-37, citing Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court and Bar Matter
1209, supra.

7
 Id. at 38.

8
 Tan v. Sabandal, Bar Matter No. 44, February 24, 1992, 206 SCRA 473.

9
 Leda v. Tabang, Adm. Case No. 2505, February 21, 1992, 206 SCRA 395.

 See In Re: Victorio D. Lanuevo, Adm. Cases No. 1162-1164, 29 August 1975, 66
10

SCRA 245, 281.

11
 A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997, 268 SCRA 628.

12
 Id. at 638-639.

(9) Resumption of practice of law after reacquisition of Fil. citizenship

B.M. No. 1678             December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to
resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments.
He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical
aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in
May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On
that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and
now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether
petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he
gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule
138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant
for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and
must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character,
and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected
with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. 3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of

morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in
good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a
lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which
the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member
of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule,
and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance
with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to
practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an
applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory
proof of educational, moral and other qualifications; 7 passing the bar
examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving
from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a
continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment
of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional
tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement; 13 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to
judicial disciplinary control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in
the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. 15 Since Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. 16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen

of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because
"all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance
with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in
the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and
he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated otherwise,
before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do
so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal

education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of
Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED,

subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such
compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the
Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-

Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de
Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

Footnotes
1
 As evidence thereof, he submitted a copy of his Identification Certificate No. 07-16912
duly signed by Immigration Commissioner Marcelino C. Libanan.

 In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Deliquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon, A.C.
2

No. 1928, 19 December 1980, 101 SCRA 612.

3
 Heck v. Santos, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 329.

4
 In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 03 August 1978, 84 SCRA 554.

5
 Section 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

6
 Id.

7
 Sections 2, 5 and 6, id.

8
 Sections 8 to 11 and 14, id.

9
 Section 17, id.

10
 Sections 18 and 19, id.

 In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 09 January 1973, 49 SCRA 22; In re Atty.
11

Marcial Edillon, supra note 3.

12
 Section 139, RA 7160.

 Resolution dated August 8, 2000 in Bar Matter No. 850 (Rules on Mandatory
13

Continuing Legal Education for Members of the IBP).

 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., G.R. No.
14

L-23959, 29 November 1971, 42 SCRA 302.

15
 See last paragraph of Section 14, Article XII.

16
 In re Bosque, 1 Phil. 88 (1902).

17
 Section 2, RA 9225. Emphasis supplied.

18
 Section 5(4), id.

(10) Resumption of practice of law after reacquisition of Fil. citizenship

B.M. No. 2112               July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE

PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when
he became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that
on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by
taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General
in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted,
to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in
support of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General

Domingo P. Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues

with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education

(MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a
similar petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume
his practice of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to
the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek
medical attention for his ailments and eventually became a Canadian citizen in May
2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A.
No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine Consulate General in
Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his practice of
law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and
is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means
termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in
the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and
1 

later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member
of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of
law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his
2 

profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit
to engage in such practice. 3

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.  It is so

1âwphi1

delicately affected with public interest that it is both the power and duty of
the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect
and promote the public welfare.
 Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the legal profession,
compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement
and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the
bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer
of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and
confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued
exercise of his professional privilege.4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the
OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the
following documents in relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual

membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau

of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good
moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-

MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the
MCLE.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the
MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the
petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership
in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of
law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees
no bar to the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED,

subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the
Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines
for the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the
Bench and Bar.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On Leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
ARTURO D. BRION *

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA **

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes

*
 On Leave per Special Order No. 1257 dated July 19, 2012.
  On Leave.
**

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary

1 

notwithstanding, natural born citizens of the Philippines by reason of their naturalization

as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I ______, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.

Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay, Petitioner, B.M. No.
2 

1678, December 17, 2007.

3 
R.A. No. 9225, Section 5.

4 
Supra note 2.

(11)

The Supreme Court en banc, on June 25, 2019, adopted and

promulgated A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC Rule 138-A Law Student
Practice, otherwise known as the Revised Law Student Practice Rule
(Revised Rule). The Revised Rule is an amendment to the existing
provisions of Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court. A salient feature of the
Revised Rule is that a law student must now be certified to be
able to engage in the limited practice of law.

What are its most important features?

[1] The Rule covers the limited practice of law by students certified

under the Clinical Legal Education Program (CLEP) of the law school.
Examples of law practice allowed are:

[a] Appearances;
[b] Drafting and submission of pleadings and documents before trial and
appellate courts and quasi-judicial and administrative bodies;
[c] Assistance in mediation, legal counselling and advice; and
[d] Others mentioned under Section 1.

[2] The Rule requires that law students, before engaging in practice of law
via the Clinical Legal Education Program (CLEP), must first apply for and
secure the following:
[a] Level 1 Certification for those who have completed the 1st year; and/or
[b] Level 2 Certification for those who are currently enrolled in their third
year, second Semester under Section 3.

[3] Section 4 enumerates the areas of law student-practitioners can engage

in in accordance with their certification.

[4] Section 5 enumerates the requirements for certification application.

[5] Section 6 enumerates the duties of a law student-practitioner. It says

that they are bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

[6] Section 7 is the counterpart of the lawyer's signature provision under

the Rules of Court. A law student practitioner may sign briefs, pleadings,
letters and other similar documents under the direction of the supervising
lawyer and indicating his/her practitioner's certificate number.

[7] Section 9 enumerates the duties of law schools, one of which is to

develop and maintain a legal clinic.

[8] Sections 10 and 11 provide for the qualifications and duties

of supervising lawyers. Unfortunately, the Rule requires the
personal appearance of the supervising lawyer with the law
student-practitioner.

[9] The Rule provides for appropriate sanctions in cases of violation

(Section 13).

[10] The Rule shall take effect at the start of school year 2020-2021.

[11] Rule 138, Section 5 has been amended by this Rule, regarding the
prerequisites to take the 2023 bar examination.

June 25, 2019 – Amended Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, Law Student Practice (A.M. No. 19-
03-24-SC)

Whereas, pursuant to the provisions of Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the
Supreme Court has the power to adopt and promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged;

Whereas, there is a need to amend the provisions of Rule 138-A to ensure access to justice of the
marginalized sectors, to enhance learning opportunities of law students, to instill among them the
value of legal professional social responsibility, and to prepare them for the practice of law;

Whereas, there is a need to institutionalize clinical legal education program in all law schools
in order to enhance, improve, and streamline law student practice, and regulate their limited
practice of law; and
Whereas, to produce practice-ready lawyers, the completion of clinical legal education courses
must be a prerequisite to take the bar examinations as provided in Section 5 of Rule 138.

Now, therefore, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby adopts and promulgates the Revised Law
Student Practice Rule.

The Revised Rule shall take effect at the start of the Academic Year 2020-2021 following its
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

A.M. NO. 19-03-24-SC

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE
Section 1. Coverage. – This rule shall cover the limited practice of law by students certified
herein. The limited practice of law covers appearances, drafting, and submission of pleadings and
documents before trial and appellate courts and quasi-judicial and administrative bodies,
assistance in mediation and other alternative modes of dispute resolution, legal counselling and
advice, and such other activities that may be covered by the Clinical Legal Education Program of
the law school as herein provided.

Section 2. Definition of Terms. –

(a) Clinical Legal Education Program is an experiential, interactive and reflective credit-
earning teaching course with the objectives of providing law students with practical
knowledge, skills and values necessary for the application of the law, delivery of legal
services and promotion of social justice and public interest, especially to the marginalized,
while inculcating in the students the values of ethical lawyering and public service. It consists
of learning activities covered by this Rule undertaken in either a 1) law clinic or an 2) externship,
which shall incorporate the teaching of legal theory and doctrines, practical skills, as well as legal
ethics.

(b) Externship is part of the clinical legal educational program if: (a) it allows students to engage
in legal work for the marginalized sectors or for the promotion of social justice and public interest,
and b) it is undertaken with any of the following: i) the courts, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), government offices; and (ii) law school-recognized non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).

(c) Law Clinic refers to an office or center which is a component of the law school’s clinical legal
education program that renders legal assistance and services as herein provided to eligible persons,
groups, and/or communities.

(d) Law Student Practitioner is a law student certified under Section 3 of this Rule.

(e) Supervising Lawyer refers to a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing who is
authorized by the law school to supervise the law student practitioner under this Rule.

Section 3. Eligibility Requirements of Law Student Practitioners. – No law student shall be

permitted to engage in any of the activities under the Clinical Legal Education Program of a law
school unless the law student has applied for and secured the following certifications:

(a) Level 1 certification, for law students who have successfully completed their first-year law
courses; and/or

(b) Level 2 certification, for law students currently enrolled for the second semester of their third-
year law courses, Provided however, where a student fails to complete all their third-year law
courses, the Level 2 certification shall be deemed automatically revoked.

The certification issued shall be valid until the student has completed the required number of
courses in the clinical legal education program to complete the law degree, unless sooner revoked
for grounds stated herein.

Section 4. Practice Areas of Law Student Practitioners. – Subject to the supervision and
approval, of a supervising lawyer, a certified law student practitioner may:

For Level 1 certification

(1) Interview prospective clients;

(2) Give legal advice to the client;

(3) Negotiate for and on behalf of the client;

(4) Draft legal documents such as affidavits, compromise agreements, contracts, demand letter,
position papers, and the like;

(5) Represent eligible parties before quasi-judicial or administrative bodies;

(6) Provide public legal orientation; and

(7) Assist in public interest advocacies for policy formulation and implementation.

For Level 2 certification

(1) Perform all activities under Level 1 Certification;

(2) Assist in the taking of depositions and/or preparing judicial affidavits of witnesses;

(3) Appear on behalf of the client at any stage of the proceedings or trial, before any court, quasi-
judicial or administrative body;

(4) In criminal cases, subject to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to
appear on behalf of a government agency in the prosecution of criminal actions; and

(5) In appealed cases, to prepare the pleadings required in the case.

Section 5. Certification Application Requirements. – The law student must submit a duly-
accomplished application form under oath in three (3) copies, accompanied by proof of payment
of the necessary legal and filing fees.

The law school, through the dean or the authorized representative, shall submit to the Office of
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) having jurisdiction over the territory
where the law school is located, the duly-accomplished application form together with an
endorsement under oath.

Level 1 Certification

The Executive Judge of the RTC shall evaluate, approve, and issue the certification within ten (10)
days from receipt of the application.

The Level 1 certification issued under this provision shall be valid before all courts, quasi-judicial
and administrative bodies within the judicial region where the school is located.

Level 2 Certification

Within ten (10) days from receipt of the application, the Executive Judge of the RTC shall (a)
evaluate the application together with its attachments, and (b) recommend to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) the approval and issuance of the certification. If the Executive Judge
finds the application to be incomplete, the law school shall be notified and required to comply
with the requirements within five (5) days from receipt of notice.

The Level 2 certification issued under this provision shall be valid before all courts, quasi-judicial,
and administrative bodies.

Section 6. Duties of Law Student Practitioners. – Acting under a certification, the law student
shall:

(a) Observe the provisions of Section 24(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court;

(b) Be prohibited from using information acquired in one’s capacity as a law student practitioner
for personal or commercial gain;

(c) Perform the duties and responsibilities to the best of one’s abilities as a law student
practitioner; and

(d) Strictly observe the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Section 7. Use of Law Student Practitioner’s Name. – A law student practitioner may sign
briefs, pleadings, letters, and other similar documents which the student has produced under the
direction of the supervising lawyer, indicating the law student practitioner’s certificate number as
required under this Rule.

Section 8. Law Student Practitioner’s Oath/Affirmation. – A law student who has been issued a
certificate under this Rule must, before performing the activities allowed herein, take an oath in
the following form:

"I, (name), having been granted a certificate of law student practice by the Supreme court under
Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will maintain allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a certified law student practitioner according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to the parties I represent; and I impose
upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God."

Section 9. Duties of Law Schools. – The law school, through its dean or authorized
representative, must:

(a) Develop and adopt a Clinical Legal Education Program;

(b) Develop and establish at least one law clinic in its school;

(c) Endorse qualified students for certification as law student practitioner under this Rule. Such
endorsement shall constitute as a certification that the dean or authorized representative knows
that the applicant is a student enrolled in the Clinical Legal Education Course, possesses good
moral character, and has met the requirements of Section 3 of this Rule; and

(d) Ensure compliance by law student practitioners and supervising lawyers with the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Section 10. Qualification of Supervising Lawyers. – A supervising lawyer under this Rule shall
be a member of the bar in good standing.

Section 11. Duties of Supervising Lawyers. – The following are the duties of a supervising
lawyer:

(a) Supervise such number of certified law student practitioners as far as practicable;

(b) Personally appear with the law student practitioner in all cases pending before the second-level
courts and in all other cases the supervising lawyer determines that his or her presence is required;

(c) Assume personal responsibility for any work performed by the certified law student
practitioner while under his or her supervision;

(d) Assist and advise the certified law student practitioner in the activities authorized by these
rules and review such activities with the certified law student practitioner, all to the extent required
for the proper practical training of the certified law student practitioner and the protection of the
client;

(e) Read, approve, and personally sign any pleadings, briefs or other similar documents prepared
by the certified law student practitioner prior to the filing thereof, and read and approve any
documents which shall be prepared by the certified law student practitioner for execution by the
eligible party; and

(f) Provide the level of supervision to the certified law student practitioner required by these rules.

Section 12. Clinical Faculty. – Law schools shall have such number of faculty members to teach
clinical legal education courses as may be necessary to comply with this Rule.

Section 13. Sanctions. – (a) Without prejudice to existing laws, rules, regulations, and circulars,
the following shall be considered as unauthorized practice of law by a certified law student
practitioner –

i. Engaging in any of the acts provided in Section 4 of this Rule without the necessary certification
or without the consent and supervision of the supervising lawyer;

ii. Making false representations in the application for certification;

iii. Using an expired certification to engage in the limited practice of law under this Rule;

iv. Rendering legal services outside the scope of practice areas allowed under Section 4 of this
Rule;

v. Asking for or receiving payment or compensation for services rendered under the Clinical Legal
Education Program as provided in this Rule; and

vi. Such other analogous circumstances.

Unauthorized practice of law shall be ground for revocation of the law student practitioner’s
certification and/or disqualification for a law student from taking the bar examination for a period
to be determined by the Supreme Court.

(b) The above provisions notwithstanding, any act constituting a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility shall subject the supervising lawyer, Clinical Legal Education
Program head, and/or law school dean to disciplinary action, as the circumstances may warrant.

Section 14. Effectivity. – This rule shall take effect at the start of Academic year 2020-2021
following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. The requirements under
second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 138 as amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC dated June 25,
2019 shall apply to bar examination applicants commencing the 2023 bar examinations.

June 25, 2019, Manila, Philippines.