G.R. No.

171672               February 2, 2015

MARIETA DE CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The court should prescribe the correct penalties in complex crimes in strict observance of Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code. In estafa through falsification of commercial documents, the court should
impose the penalty for the graver offense in the maximum period. Otherwise, the penalty prescribed
is invalid, and will not attain finality.

Antecedents

The petitioner, a bank teller of the BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family) at its branch in Malibay,
Pasay City, appeals the affirmance of her conviction for four counts of estafa through falsification of
a commercial document committed on separate occasions in October and November 1993 by
forging the signatures of bank depositors Amparo Matuguina and Milagrosa Cornejo in withdrawal
slips, thereby enabling herself to withdraw a total of ₱65,000.00 and ₱2,000.00 from the respective
savings accounts of Matuguina and Cornejo.

The antecedent facts were summarized in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals (CA),  as 1

follows:

As culled from the evidence, Matuguina and Cornejo left their savings account passbooks with the
accused within the space of a week in October - November 1993 when they went to the bank's
Malibay branch to transact on their accounts. Matuguina, in particular, withdrew the sum of ₱500 on
October 29 and left her passbook with the accused upon the latter's instruction. She had to return
two more times before the branch manager Cynthia Zialcita sensed that something wrong was going
on. Leaming of Matuguina's problem, Zialcita told the accused to return the passbook to her on
November 8. On this day, the accused came up with the convenient excuse that she had already
returned the passbook. Skeptical, Zialcita reviewed Matuguina's account and found three withdrawal
slips dated October 19, 29 and November 4, 1993 containing signatures radically different from the
specimen signatures of the depositor and covering a total of ₱65,000. It was apparent that the
accused had intervened in the posting and verification of the slips because her initials were affixed
thereto. Zialcita instructed her assistant manager Benjamin Misa to pay a visit to Matuguina, a move
that led to the immediate exposure of the accused. Matuguina was aghast to see the signatures in
the slips and denied that the accused returned the passbook to her. When she went back to the
bank worried about the unauthorized withdrawals from her account, she met with the accused in the
presence of the bank manager. She insisted that the signatures in the slips were not her, forcing the
accused to admit that the passbook was still with her and kept in her house.

Zialcita also summoned Juanita Ebora, the teller who posted and released the November 4
withdrawal. When she was asked why she processed the transaction, Ebora readily pointed to the
accused as the person who gave to her the slip. Since she saw the accused's initials on it attesting
to having verified the signature of the depositor, she presumed that the withdrawal was genuine. She
posted and released the money to the accused.
On the same day, November 8, Zialcita instructed Misa to visit another depositor, Milagrosa Cornejo,
whom they feared was also victimized by the accused. Their worst expectations were confirmed.
According to Cornejo, on November 3, she went to the bank to deposit a check and because there
were many people there at the time, she left her passbook with the accused. She returned days later
to get it back, but the accused told her that she left it at home. Misa now showed to her a withdrawal
slip dated November 4, 1993 in which a signature purporting to be hers appeared. Cornejo denied
that it was her signature. As with the slips affecting Matuguina, the initials of the accused were
unquestionably affixed to the paper.

Zialcita reported her findings posthaste to her superiors. The accused initially denied the claims
against her but when she was asked to write her statement down, she confessed to her guilt. She
started crying and locked herself inside the bathroom. She came out only when another superior Fed
Cortez arrived to ask her some questions. Since then, she executed three more statements in
response to the investigation conducted by the bank's internal auditors. She also gave a list of the
depositors' accounts from which she drew cash and which were listed methodically in her diary.

The employment of the accused was ultimately terminated. The bank paid Matuguina P.65,000,
while Cornejo got her refund directly from the accused. In the course of her testimony on the witness
stand, the accused made these further admissions:

(a) She signed the withdrawal slips Exhibits B, C, D and H which contained the fake
signatures of Matuguina and Cornejo;

(b) She wrote and signed the confession letter Exhibit K; (c) She wrote the answers to the
questions of the branch cluster head Fred Cortez Exhibit L, and to the auditors' questions in
Exhibit M, N and O;

(d) Despite demand, she did not pay the bank. 2

Judgment of the RTC

On July 13, 1998, the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City (RTC) rendered its judgment,3 finding the
petitioner guilty as charged, and sentencing her to suffer as follows:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, involving the withdrawal of ₱20,000.00 from the account of
Matuguina, the indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prison
correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 20 days of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay BPI Family ₱20,000.00 and the costs of suit;

(b) In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving the withdrawal of ₱2,000.00 from Cornejo's
account, the indeterminate sentence of three months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one
year and eight months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family
₱2,000.00 and the costs of suit;

(c) In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving the withdrawal of ₱10,000.00 from the account of
Matuguina, the indeterminate sentence of four months and 20 days of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years, 11 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as maximum, and to
pay BPI Family ₱10,000.00 and the costs of suit;

and
 (d) In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, involving the withdrawal of ₱35,000 from Matuguina's
account, the indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay BPI
Family ₱35,000.00 and the costs of suit.

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the petitioner contended in the CA that: (1) her conviction should be set aside because
the evidence presented against her had been obtained in violation of her constitutional right against
self-incrimination; (2) her rights to due process and to counsel had been infringed; and (3) the
evidence against her should be inadmissible for being obtained by illegal or unconstitutional means
rendering the evidence as the fruit of the poisonous tree.

On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its decision  affirming the judgment of the RTC, to wit:
4

In summary, we find no grounds to disturb the findings of the lower court, except the provision of the
dispositive portion in case 94-5525 requiring the accused to pay BPI Family ₱2,000. This must be
deleted because the accused had already paid the amount to the depositor.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with the modification
that the award of ₱2,000 to the complainant in case 94-5525 be deleted.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

In this appeal, the petitioner still insists that her conviction was invalid because her constitutional
rights against self-incrimination, to due process and to counsel were denied. In behalf of the State,
the Office of the Solicitor General counters that she could invoke her rights to remain silent and to
counsel only if she had been under custodial investigation, which she was not; and that the acts of
her counsel whom she had herself engaged to represent her and whom she had the full authority to
replace at any time were binding against her.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

We first note that the petitioner has accepted the findings of fact about the transactions that gave
rise to the accusations in court against her for four counts of estafa through falsification of a
commercial document. She raised no challenges against such findings of fact here and in the CA,
being content with limiting herself to the supposed denial of her rights to due process and to counsel,
and to the inadmissibility of the evidence presented against her. In the CA, her main objection
focused on the denial of her right against self-incrimination and to counsel, which denial resulted,
according to her, in the invalidation of the evidence of her guilt.

Debunking the petitioner's challenges, the CA stressed that the rights against self-incrimination and
to counsel guaranteed under the Constitution applied only during the custodial interrogation of a
suspect. In her case, she was not subjected to any investigation by the police or other law
enforcement agents. Instead, she underwent an administrative investigation as an employee of the
BPI Family Savings Bank, the investigation being conducted by her superiors. She was not coerced
to give evidence against herself, or to admit to any crime, but she simply broke down bank when
depositors Matuguina and Cornejo confronted her about her crimes. We quote with approval the
relevant portions of the decision of the CA, viz:

The accused comes to Us on appeal to nullify her conviction on the ground that the evidence
presented against her was obtained in violation of her constitutional right against self-incrimination.
She also contends that her rights to due process and counsel were infringed. Without referring to its
name, she enlists one of the most famous metaphors of constitutional law to demonize and exclude
what she believes were evidence obtained against her by illegal or unconstitutional means -
evidence constituting the fruit of the poisonous tree. We hold, however, that in the particular setting
in which she was investigated, the revered constitutional rights of an accused to counsel and against
self-incrimination are not apposite.

The reason is elementary. These cherished rights are peculiarly rights in the context of an official
proceeding for the investigation and prosecution for crime. The right against self-incrimination, when
applied to a criminal trial, is contained in this terse injunction - no person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. In other words, he may not be required to take the witness stand. He can sit
mute throughout the proceedings. His right to counsel is expressed in the same laconic style: he
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. This means inversely that the criminal
prosecution cannot proceed without having a counsel by his side. These are the traditional rights of
the accused in a criminal case. They exist and may be invoked when he faces a formal indictment
and trial for a criminal offense. But since Miranda vs. Arizona 384 US 436, the law has come to
recognize that an accused needs the same protections even before he is brought to trial. They arise
at the very inception of the criminal process - when a person is taken into custody to answer to a
criminal offense. For what a person says or does during custodial investigation will eventually be
used as evidence against him at the trial and, more often than not, will be the lynchpin of his
eventual conviction. His trial becomes a parody if he cannot enjoy from the start the right against
self-incrimination and to counsel. This is the logic behind what we now call as the Miranda doctrine.

The US Supreme Court in Miranda spells out in precise words the occasion for the exercise of the
new right and the protections that it calls for. The occasion is when an individual is subjected to
police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom in a
significant way. It is when custodial investigation is underway that the certain procedural safeguards
takes over - the person must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior
to any questioning.

We must, therefore, be careful to note what the Miranda doctrine does not say. It was never
intended to hamper the traditional law-enforcement function to investigate crime involving persons
not under restraint. The general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process, as the US
Supreme Court recognizes, which is not preceded by any restraint on the freedom of the person
investigated, is not affected by the holding, since the compelling atmosphere inherent in in-custody
interrogation is not present.

The holding in Miranda is explicitly considered the source of a provision in our 1987 bill of rights that
any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, a provision identical in
language and spirit to the earlier Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. People vs. Caguioa
95 SCRA 2. As we can see, they speak of the companion rights of a person under investigation to
remain silent and to counsel, to ensure which the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine had also to be
institutionalized by declaring that any confession or admission obtained in violation of these rights is
inadmissible. But to what extent must the rights to remain silent and to counsel be enforced in an
investigation for the commission of an offense? The answer has been settled by rulings of our
Supreme Court in Caguoia and in the much later case of Navallo vs Sandiganbayan 234 SCRA 175
incorporating in toto the Miranda doctrine into the above-cited provisions of our bill of rights. Thus,
the right to remain silent and to counsel can be invoked only in the context in which the Miranda
doctrine applies - when the official proceeding is conducted under the coercive atmosphere of a
custodial interrogation. There are no cases extending them to a non-coercive setting. In Navallo, the
Supreme Court said very clearly that the rights are invocable only when the accused is under
custodial investigation. A person undergoing a normal audit examination is not under custodial
investigation and, hence, the audit examiner may not be considered the law enforcement officer
contemplated by the rule.

By a fair analogy, the accused in the case before us may not be said to be under custodial
investigation. She was not even being investigated by any police or law enforcement officer. She
was under administrative investigation by her superiors in a private firm and in purely voluntary
manner. She was not restrained of her freedom in any manner. She was free to stay or go. There
was no evidence that she was forced or pressured to say anything. It was an act of conscience that
compelled her to speak, a true mental and moral catharsis that religion and psychology recognize to
have salutary effects on the soul. In this setting, the invocation of the right to remain silent or to
counsel is simply irrelevant.

The accused makes a final argument against her conviction by contending that she did not get
effective legal representation from her former counsel who was already old and feeble when the
case was being heard. In fact, the records show, her counsel died during the pendency of the case,
an octogenarian at that. One can truly make a case from one's lack of a competent and independent
counsel, but we are not prepared to say that the accused was so poorly represented that it affected
her fundamental right to due process. Except for the several postponements incurred by her
counsel, there is really no showing that he committed any serious blunder during the trial. We have
read the transcripts of the trial and failed to get this impression. The evidence against the accused
was simply too overwhelming. We may take note that once, the trial court admonished the accused
to replace her counsel due to his absences, but she did not. She must live by that. 5

Considering that the foregoing explanation by the CA was justly supported by the records, and that
her investigation as a bank employee by her employer did not come under the coverage of the
Constitutionally protected right against self-incrimination, right to counsel and right to due process,
we find no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the conviction of the petitioner by the
RTC.

The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial document
was established beyond reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she took advantage of the bank
depositors who had trusted in her enough to leave their passbooks with her upon her instruction.
Without their knowledge, however, she filled out withdrawal slips that she signed, and
misrepresented to her fellow bank employees that the signatures had been verified in due course.
Her misrepresentation to her co-employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in the
withdrawal slips. She thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding BPI Family
Savings, her employer, in the various sums withdrawn from the bank accounts of Matuguina and
Cornejo; and falsification of a commercial document, by forging the signatures of Matuguina and
Cornejo in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor concerned had signed the
respective slips in order to enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were complex
crimes, because the estafa would not have been consummated without the falsification of the
withdrawal slips.

Nonetheless, there is a need to clarify the penalties imposable.

corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Otherwise,
the penalty will be void and ineffectual, and will not attain finality.

In the four criminal cases involved in this appeal, the falsification of commercial documents is
punished with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two years, four months
and one day to six years) and a fine of ₱5,000.00.  In contrast, the estafa is punished according to
7

the value of the defraudation, as follows: with the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period (i.e., four years, two months and one day to eight
years) if the amount of the fraud is over Pl2,000.00 but does not exceed ₱22,000.00, and if such
amount exceeds ₱22,000.00, the penalty is imposed in the maximum period, adding one year for
each additional Pl0,000.00, but the total shall not exceed 20 years, in which case the penalty shall
be termed pris ion mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be, in connection with the
accessory penalties that may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of the Revised
Penal Code; with the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (i.e., six
months and one day to four years and two months) if the amount of the fraud is over ₱6,000.00 but
does not exceed ₱12,000.00; with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period (i.e., four months and one day to two years and four months) if
the amount of the fraud is over ₱200.00 but does not exceed ₱6,000.00; and with the penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two months and one day to six months) if
the amount of the fraud does not exceed ₱200.00. 8

In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, estafa was the graver felony because the amount of the fraud was
₱20,000.00; hence, the penalty for estafa is to be imposed in its maximum period. However, the
RTC and the CA fixed the indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prison
correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 20 days of prision mayor, as maximum.
Such maximum of the indeterminate penalty was short by one day, the maximum period of the
penalty being six years, eight months and 21 days to eight years. Thus, the indeterminate sentence
is corrected to three years of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21
days of prision mayor, as maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving ₱2,000.00, the estafa is punished with four months and one
day of arresto mayor in its maximum period to two years and four months of prision correccional in
its minimum period. The falsification of commercial document is penalized with prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two years, four months and one day to six years) and a
fine of ₱5,000.00. The latter offense is the graver felony, and its penalty is to be imposed in the
maximum period, which is from four years, nine months and 11 days to six years plus fine of
PS,000.00. The penalty next lower in degree is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period (i.e., four months and one day to two years and four months).
Thus, the indeterminate sentence of three months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year and
eight months of prision correccional, as maximum that both the RTC and the CA fixed was
erroneous. We rectify the error by prescribing in lieu thereof the indeterminate sentence of two years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to four years, nine months and 11 days of prision correccional
plus fine of PS,000.00, as maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving ₱10,000.00, the RTC and the CA imposed the
indeterminate sentence of four months and 20 days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, 11
months and 10 days of prision correccional, as maximum. However, the penalty for the falsification
of commercial documents is higher than that for the estafa. To accord with Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty for falsification of commercial documents (i.e., prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of ₱5,000.00) should be imposed in the maximum period.
Accordingly, we revise the indeterminate sentence so that its minimum is two years and four months
of prision correccional, and its maximum is five years of prision correccional plus fine of ₱5,000.00.

In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, where the amount of the fraud was ₱35,000.00, the penalty for estafa
(i.e., prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or four years,
two months and one day to eight years) is higher than that for falsification of commercial documents.
The indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight years of prision mayor, as maximum, was prescribed. Considering that the
maximum period ranged from six years, eight months and 21 days to eight years, the CA should
have clarified whether or not the maximum of eight years of prision mayor already included the
incremental penalty of one year for every ₱10,000.00 in excess of ₱22,000.00. Absent the
clarification, we can presume that the incremental penalty was not yet included. Thus, in order to
make the penalty clear and specific, the indeterminate sentence is hereby fixed at four years of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor, as
maximum, plus one year incremental penalty. In other words, the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence is seven years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor.

The CA deleted the order for the restitution of the ₱2,000.00 involved in Criminal Case No. 94-5525
on the ground that such amount had already been paid to the complainant, Milagrosa Cornejo.
There being no issue as to this, the Court affirms the deletion.

The Court adds that the petitioner is liable to BPI Family for interest of 6% per annum on the
remaining unpaid sums reckoned from the finality of this judgment. This liability for interest is only
fair and just.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on August 18,
2005, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of
three years of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21 days of
prision mayor, as maximum;

(2) In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to four years, nine months and 11 days of prision
correccional plus fine of ₱5,000.00, as maximum;

(3) In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two
years and four months of prision correccional, as the minimum, to five years of prision
correccional plus fine of ₱5,000.00, as the maximum; and

(4) In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven years, eight months and 21 days of
prision mayor, as maximum.

The Court ORDERS the petitioner to pay to BPI Family Saving Bank interest of 6% per annum on
the aggregate amount of ₱65,000.00 to be reckoned from the finality of this judgment until full
payment.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.