Judgment On - Need For Regulation of The Conduct of Lawyers in Court
Judgment On - Need For Regulation of The Conduct of Lawyers in Court
Judgment On - Need For Regulation of The Conduct of Lawyers in Court
“ 30. In the instant case, from a perusal of the memorandum of various petitions
filed by the contemner in this Court and the language used therein, it is apparent that
he has cast aspersions on each and every learned Judge who in the discharge of his
judicial functions decided the matter not liked to by the alleged contemner at one
stage or the other. The aspersions cast by him undoubtedly have the tendency to
scandalize the Court. The alleged contemner has been attempting to browbeat the
learned subordinate Judges as well as the learned Judge of the High Court and
cause interference in the administration of justice. Even in this Court, after the rule
was issued to him, he tried to browbeat the Court. He filed an application stating that
since he had filed a contempt petition against the Judges constituting the Division
Bench which had issued the rules against him, this Bench should transfer the case. It
was an obviously motivated action on his part to intimidate the Bench. He did file the
contempt petitions against both the Judges constituting the Bench. Those petitions
were dismissed by a Bench comprising of Hon'ble Mr Justice J.S. Verma (as the
Hon'ble Chief Justice then was) and Hon'ble Mr Justice B.N. Kirpal by the following
order:
“We regret to find that the petitioner who is a practising lawyer of some
standing has chosen to resort to such a proceeding which, in our view, is
misconceived. We find no merit in the same, but before dictating this order, we
have tried to explain this position to the petitioner with the hope that he will
appreciate that as a member of the Bar, he is expected to utilise his time in a
better manner to assist in the administration of justice. The contempt petition is
dismissed.”
The alleged contemner in this case has been making continuous attempts to subvert
the course of justice in whichever court his case was. He has been acting not only as
if he is above the law but as if he is a law unto himself. Notwithstanding his own
assessment of his “merit and competence” as stated by him in the memo of petitions,
the alleged contemner appears to be blissfully ignorant of the role of a lawyer and
the law relating to drafting of pleadings — which must be precise and not scandalous
or abusive. It is sad that by filing the applications and the petition as a party in
person, couched in very objectionable language, he has permitted himself the liberty
of indulging in an action which does little credit to the noble profession to which he
belongs. An advocate has no wider protection than a layman when he commits an
act which amounts to contempt of court. It is most unbefitting for an advocate to
make imputations against the Judge only because he does not get the expected
result, which according to him is the fair and reasonable result available to him.
Judges cannot be intimidated to seek favourable orders. Only because a lawyer
appears as a party in person, he does not get a licence to commit contempt of court
by intimidating the Judges or scandalizing the courts. He cannot use language,
either in the pleadings or during arguments, which is either intemperate or
unparliamentary and which has the tendency to interfere in the administration of
justice and undermine the dignity of the court and the majesty of law. These
safeguards are not for the protection of any Judge individually but are essential for
maintaining the dignity and decorum of the courts and for upholding the majesty of
law. Judges and courts are not unduly sensitive or touchy to fair and reasonable
criticism of their judgments. Fair comments, even if outspoken, but made without any
malice and without attempting to impair the administration of justice and made in
good faith in proper language do not attract any punishment for contempt of court.
However, when from the criticism a deliberate, motivated and calculated attempt is
discernible to bring down the image of the judiciary in the estimation of the public or
to impair the administration of justice or tend to bring the administration of justice into
disrepute, the courts must bitter (sic bestir) themselves to uphold their dignity and
the majesty of law. The alleged contemner, has, undoubtedly committed contempt of
court by the use of objectionable and intemperate language. No system of justice
can tolerate such unbridled licence on the part of a person, be he a lawyer, to permit
himself the liberty of scandalising the court by casting unwarranted, uncalled for and
unjustified aspersions on the integrity, ability, impartiality or fairness of a Judge in the
discharge of his judicial functions, as it undoubtedly amounts to an interference with
the due course of administration of justice. No litigant, even a lawyer appearing in
person in his own cause, can be permitted to overstep the limits of fair, bona fide and
reasonable criticism of the judgment and bring the courts generally into disrepute or
attribute motives to the Judges rendering the judgment. Perversity, calculated to
undermine the judicial system and the prestige of the court, cannot be permitted for
otherwise the very foundation of the judicial system is bound to be undermined and
weakened. Liberty of free expression is not to be confused with a licence to make
unfounded, unwarranted and irresponsible aspersions against the Judges of the
courts in relation to judicial matters. In the established facts of this case, we hold that
the alleged contemner has committed gross contempt of court and convict him
accordingly.”