RULE 130 SECTION 3 – ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RULE

1. Country Bankers Insurance Corp v Lagman 653 S 765

Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced whenever its contents are the subject of
inquiry.
A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. 
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove
the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the
reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss,
and contents. 

2. National Power Corporation v Codilla GR 170491 April 4, 2007

An "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by
sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document.
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in
terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of
its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by
which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
 
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the
contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or
produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a person's signature affixed manually be considered as
information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the
argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these
photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if
not preposterous, interpretation of the law.

3. Republic v Lorenzo and Mateo GR 148025 August 14, 2004

As the immediately quoted provision of the Rules directs, the order of presentation of secondary evidence
is: existence, execution, loss, contents. The order may, however, be changed if necessary in the discretion of the
court. The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an allegedly lost document lies within
the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case. 23

4. RCBC Bankard vs Oracion GR 223274 June 19, 2019

Even assuming that this is allowed procedurally, still, the petitioner is wrong in saying that the pieces of
documentary evidence in question are indeed electronic evidence, which according to the Rules on Electronic
Evidence are considered functional equivalent of paper-based documents 41 and regarded as the equivalent of original
documents under the Best Evidence Rule if they are print-outs or outputs readable by sight or other means, shown to
reflect the data accurately.
Evidently, petitioner could not have complied with the Rules on Electronic Evidence because it failed to authenticate
the supposed electronic documents through the required affidavit of evidence. As earlier pointed out, what petitioner
had in mind at the inception (when it filed the complaint) was to have the annexes admitted as duplicate originals as
the term is understood in relation to paper-based documents. Thus, the annexes or attachments to the complaint of
petitioner are inadmissible as electronic documents, and they cannot be given any probative value. Even the section
on "Business Records as Exception to the Hearsay Rule" of Rule 8 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence requires
authentication by the custodian or other qualified witness.
In the absence of such authentication through the affidavit of the custodian or other qualified person, the said
annexes or attachments cannot be admitted and appreciated as business records and excepted from the rule on
hearsay evidence. Consequently, the annexes to the complaint fall within the Rule on Hearsay Evidence and are to
be excluded pursuant to Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules.
5. Borje vs. Sandiganbayan – 125 S 763
In a criminal case for the falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the judges and the courts have before
them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited or falsified, in order that they may find, pursuant to
the evidence produced at the trial, whether or not the crime of falsification was actually committed; in the absence of
the original document, it is improper to conclude, with only a copy of the said original in view, that there has been a
falsification of a document which was neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a case, even the existence of
such original document may be doubted.

6. Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. vs. CA – 212 S 360

 The copy of OCT No. 351 offered by Ortigas was a certified true copy of the original thereof found in the
Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.  The admissibility of such a copy in court proceedings is an
exception to the ordinary rule on secondary evidence; such admissibility is in fact mandated by Section 47 of Act
No. 496 (The Land Registration Act).

7. People vs. Tandoy – 192 S 28

Presentation of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the conviction of the accused-appellant.
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry.
Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances
relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible.

8. Security Bank and Trust Co. vs. Triumphs Lumber and Construction Corp. – 301 S 537
First, Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court was not complied with by private respondent. The Section explicitly
provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself. This is what is known as the best evidence rule. The exceptions are as follows: 1. When
the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; 2.
When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; 3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time, and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and 4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office. 
In this case, the originals of the alleged forged checks had to be produced, since it was never shown that any of these
exceptions was present. What the private respondent offered were mere photocopies of the checks in question. It was
never explained the reason why it could not produce the originals of the checks. Its expert witness Crispina Tabo
admitted though that the original checks were taken back by the investigating policeman, Glenn Ticson.
RULE 130 SECTION 10 – PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
1. Raymundo vs Lunaria et al GR 171036 October 17, 2008
Respondents to act as agents who will receive 5% commission, as stated in their agreement, if they help petitioners
find a buyer for the parcel of land, which they did. When respondents were claiming their commission, petitioners
said that the money was already given to one of the other agents, by virtue of a subsequent verbal agreement
whereby the 5% is actually to be divided among three people, not just to Lunaria alone
Parol evidence rule does not apply because what is involved is a subsequent agreement, not an agreement executed
at or before the execution of the written agreement. So parol evidence would not apply. But assuming that the
subsequent verbal agreement would be admissible, still petitioners failed to prove the existence of such.

2. Republic vs Roque GR 203610 October 10, 2016

Respondents sold land to the government, saying that they agreed due to the stipulation of the government that the
market price of the adjoining lands would increase ans that the government would return the land should it not use
the land for the NGC project. Respondents filed for annulment of the sale due to the violation of the agreements, and
tried to present testimonies of one of respondents and a city assessor to prove the existence of the oral conditions.
Parol evidence rule applies, and not exception. 1) failed to put in issue in the pleading 2) there is no ambiguity in the
contract

3. Eagleridge vs Cameron Granville GR 204700 November 24, 2014

The parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the deed of assignment and do not base a
claim on it.59 Hence, they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of
assignment.
Even assuming that Rule 130, Section 9 is applicable, an exception to the rule under the second paragraph is when
the party puts in issue the validity of the written agreement, as in the case a quo.
Besides, what is forbidden under the parol evidence rule is the presentation of oral or extrinsic evidence, not those
expressly referred to in the written agreement. "[D]ocuments can be read together when one refers to the other." 60 By
the express terms of the deed of assignment, it is clear that the deed of assignment was meant to be read in
conjunction with the LSPA.
As we have stated in our decision, Rule 132, Section 17 61 of the Rules of Court allows a party to inquire into the
whole of the writing or record when a part of it is given in evidence by the other party. Since the deed of assignment
was produced in court by respondent and marked as one of its documentary exhibits, the LSPA which was made a
part thereof by explicit reference and which is necessary for its understanding may also be inquired into by
petitioners.

4. Inciong, Jr. vs. CA – 257    

Petitioner's assertion that since the promissory note "is not a public deed with the formalities prescribed by law
but . . . a mere commercial paper which does not bear the signature of . . . attesting witnesses," parol evidence may
"overcome" the contents of the promissory note.
 
The first paragraph of the parol evidence rule states: 
o   When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
 
o   Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be a public document. 
 
What is required is that the agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on "long experience that written
evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be
unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and
vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed
by them."
 
Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed by both
parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or
contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.

5. National Irrigation Administration vs. Gamit – 215 S 436

As a general rule, parol evidence is not admissible for the purpose of varying the terms of a contract. However,
when the issue that a contract does not express the intention of the parties and the proper foundation is laid therefor
— as in the present case — the court should hear the evidence for the purpose of ascertaining the true intention of
the parties
Since the complaint in the case at bar raises the issue that the contract of lease does not express the true intention or
agreement of the parties due to mistake on the part of the plaintiff (private respondent) and fraud on the part of the
defendant (petitioner), the court a quo should have conducted a trial and received the evidence of the parties for the
purpose of ascertaining the true intention of the parties when they executed the instrument in question.

6. CKH Industrial and Development Corp. vs. CA – 272 S 333

Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that "when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement."cral
irtua1aw library

The so-called "parol evidence rule" forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by
testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the parties’ written agreement,
other or different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. When an
agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties cannot be permitted to adduce evidence to prove alleged practices
which to all purposes would alter the terms of the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is
understood to have been waived and abandoned.

The rule is not without exceptions, however, as it is likewise provided that a party to an action may present evidence
to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleadings: (a) An intrinsic
ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The validity of the written agreement; or (d) The existence of
other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
RULE 130 SECTION 21 – WITNESSES
1. Marcos v Heirs of Navarro GR 198240 July 3, 2013 - as to qualification to be a witness of the police officer who
examined the handwriting of the alleged donor, wherein lower court ruled that the police officer had no personal
knowledge of the alleged handwriting of the donor
Should not have been disqualified; has all the qualifications of a witness and none of the disqualifications
In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v. Republic of the Philippines, 20 we
said that a witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of
Court. 
In Cavili v. Judge Florendo,21 we have held that the specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the
operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to
include an exception not embodied therein

2. People vs Rullepa GR 131516 March 5, 2003

- rape of a 3.5 year old; victim as the witness testifying in open court
- Her very tender age notwithstanding, Cyra Ma(y) nonetheless appeared to possess the necessary intelligence and
perceptiveness sufficient to invest her with the competence to testify about her experience.

3. People vs. Taneo – 218 S 494

- robbery; accused trying to disqualify a witness who has previously been charged in two criminal cases for robbery
that were dismissed
- Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that except as provided for in the succeeding sections, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Religious
or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law,
shall not be a ground for disqualification. Clearly, the mere pendency of a criminal case against a person does not
disqualify him from becoming a witness. As a matter of fact, conviction of a crime does not disqualify such person
from being presented as a witness unless otherwise provided by law

4. People vs. Balanon – 233 S 679

Appellant faults the trial court for giving credence to the testimony of Acasio who was not only probably drunk, but
was a convicted hijacker and falsifier of public documents as well; hence, apt to fabricate his testimony. But,
probability is not evidence, and even if Acasio took alcohol, it does not follow that he was drunk. Moreover, a drunk
person is competent to testify on what he sees or experiences, however limited or hazy his perception may be. In the
same way, a hijacker or a falsifier is not necessarily a liar. Under the Rules of Court, conviction of a crime, unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification of witnesses

5. People vs. Baid – 336 S 656

Rape of a mental patient; It is contended that as complainant is a schizophrenic, her testimony should not have been
given credence by the trial court.
Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed that she was qualified to be a witness, i.e., she could
perceive and was capable of making known her perceptions to others. 18 Her testimony indicates that she could
understand questions particularly relating to the incident and could give responsive answers to them.
Though she may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with that of a rape victim ("inappropriate affect") during her
testimony, such as by smiling when answering questions, her behavior was such as could be expected from a person
suffering from schizophrenia. Otherwise, complainant was candid, straightforward, and coherent.
Furthermore, aside from the testimony of Dr. Salangad on complainant's consciousness and memory, 21 it is
established that schizophrenic persons do not suffer from a clouding of consciousness and gross deficits of
memory.22 It has long been settled that a person should not be disqualified on the basis of mental handicap alone. 23
6. People vs Lolito Honor – 584 S 547
findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique
position of having observed the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to
the appellate courts.24 When the credibility of the witnesses is at issue, appellate courts will not disturb the findings
of the trial court, the latter being in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial unless certain facts of substance and value had been
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated which, if considered, might affect the results of the case
Minor variances in the details of a witness’ account, more frequently than not, are badges of truth rather than indicia
of falsehood and they often bolster the probative value of the testimony. 26 Indeed, even the most candid witnesses
oftentimes make mistakes and would fall into confused statements, and at times, far from eroding the effectiveness
of the evidence, such lapses could instead constitute signs of veracity. If it appears that the same witness has not
willfully perverted the truth, as may be gleaned from the tenor of his testimony and the conclusion of the trial judge
regarding his demeanor and behavior on the witness stand, his testimony on material points may be accepted. 27
In this case, Panlubasan’s testimony positively points to the accused as the ones who stabbed the victims. At the
time of the incident, the witness may have been under the influence of liquor; nonetheless, nothing in his testimony
and conduct during the trial appears to suggest total erosion of his mental faculties that would negate his
identification of the accused.

7. People vs Solomon Dioneda – 587 S 312

Rape of a 6 year old
Appellant assails AAA’s credibility, citing her inconsistent answers regarding the circumstances before the
commission of the alleged rape, particularly her testimony on direct examination that she stopped at the second
floor of the Dajaos’ house where he allegedly told her to wait ("sandali lang") but that on cross-examination she
stated that she met appellant at the ground floor.
The place where AAA met appellant when she was about to leave the Dajao residence, whether on the ground or
second floor is a trivial matter. AAA, a child of tender age, could not be expected to give a perfect recollection of
the exact floor of the house where she met appellant.
Forthright witnesses are not immune from committing minor inaccuracies in their narration of events. Trivial
inconsistencies and inconsequential discrepancies on minor details in the testimonies of witness do not impair their
credibility. They could, in fact, be badges of truth for they manifest spontaneity and erase any suspicion of a
rehearsed testimony.22 As long as the inconsistencies are immaterial or irrelevant to the elements of the crime and do
not touch on material facts crucial to the guilt or innocence of the accused as in the present case, these are not valid
grounds to reverse a conviction.23

RULE 130 SECTION 23 – DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MARRIAGE

1. Alvarez vs Ramirez GR 143439 October 14, 2005

The reasons given for the rule are: 

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife; 

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury; 

3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and

4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.11

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil
actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other.
Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations
are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may
be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of
interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at
protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the
unhappy home.

Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between
him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him,
eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which
virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing
fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act
totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the disqualification primarily
seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the
conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations between her and the
accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be
preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a
situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims to protect are nothing but
ideals which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. (People v.
Castañeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification
Rule.

2. People v Quidato GR 117401 October 1, 1998

3. People v Pansensoy GR 140634 September 12, 2002
4. Ordoño vs. Daquigan – 62 S 270
5. People vs. Castañeda Jr. – 88 S 562

RULE 130 SECTION 24 – DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

1. Saura vs Atty Agdeppa AC 4426 February 17, 2000
2. Gonzales vs Court of Appeals GR 117740 October 30, 1998
3. Sanvicente vs People GR 132081 November 26, 2002
4. Air Philippines vs Pennswell GR 172835 December 13, 2007
5. Limvs.CA–214S273
6. Krohnvs.CA–233S146
7. Fortich vs. CA – 268 S 152