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Soriano Vs Dizon

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Soriano vs. Dizon, 480 SCRA 1, A.C. No.

6792 January 25, 2006


Facts
While driving on his way home, a taxi driver – Roberto Soriano overtook the car driven by Atty.
Manuel Dizon. Incensed, Atty. Dizon tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn. An
altercation resulted therefrom that got to the point that Atty. Dizon fired the gun and shot Roberto
Soriano, hitting him on the neck. Soriano fell on the thigh of Atty. Dizon but the latter pushed him and
sped off.
Issue
 Whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude
 Whether or not Atty. Manuel Dizon guilt warrants his disbarment?
Held
Yes. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have
become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral
character.
In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of
frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no longer open to
question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows:
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC it was explained that Homicide may or may not
involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every
criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any
particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all
the surrounding circumstances.
As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and
his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least
expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was
hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable
actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer’s assault. Also, the trial court’s finding of treachery as a
further indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a
position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the
unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter
unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a
handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape
punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct,
respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a
god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate
reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal
profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in
any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the
persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a
false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.

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