The document discusses a case involving a lawyer who shot a taxi driver following a traffic incident. The court held that the lawyer's crime of frustrated homicide involved moral turpitude and that his conviction warranted disbarment. Aggravating factors noted by the court included that the lawyer was the aggressor and acted with treachery in unexpectedly shooting the unarmed victim.
The document discusses a case involving a lawyer who shot a taxi driver following a traffic incident. The court held that the lawyer's crime of frustrated homicide involved moral turpitude and that his conviction warranted disbarment. Aggravating factors noted by the court included that the lawyer was the aggressor and acted with treachery in unexpectedly shooting the unarmed victim.
The document discusses a case involving a lawyer who shot a taxi driver following a traffic incident. The court held that the lawyer's crime of frustrated homicide involved moral turpitude and that his conviction warranted disbarment. Aggravating factors noted by the court included that the lawyer was the aggressor and acted with treachery in unexpectedly shooting the unarmed victim.
The document discusses a case involving a lawyer who shot a taxi driver following a traffic incident. The court held that the lawyer's crime of frustrated homicide involved moral turpitude and that his conviction warranted disbarment. Aggravating factors noted by the court included that the lawyer was the aggressor and acted with treachery in unexpectedly shooting the unarmed victim.
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Soriano vs. Dizon, 480 SCRA 1, A.C. No.
6792 January 25, 2006
Facts While driving on his way home, a taxi driver – Roberto Soriano overtook the car driven by Atty. Manuel Dizon. Incensed, Atty. Dizon tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn. An altercation resulted therefrom that got to the point that Atty. Dizon fired the gun and shot Roberto Soriano, hitting him on the neck. Soriano fell on the thigh of Atty. Dizon but the latter pushed him and sped off. Issue Whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude Whether or not Atty. Manuel Dizon guilt warrants his disbarment? Held Yes. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character. In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC it was explained that Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law. Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer’s assault. Also, the trial court’s finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime. The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.