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Psychology Essay

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According to attribution theorists the layperson’s judgments of

others are biased. Discuss the evidence for supposing that


these biases are inevitable.

In 1958, Austrian psychologist Fritz Heider theorised the enduring


motivation for humans to recognise and understand the driving forces behind
human behaviour. His theory opened up a new field of research and paved the
way for countless studies investigating the reasoning behind laypeople’s
judgements. As more studies were conducted, the prevalence of bias became
increasingly clear which leads us to ask the imperative question: is this
inevitable? The aim of this essay is to provide a brief overview of attribution
theory, discuss the main attribution biases and provide critical evaluation of these
theories using relevant research and real-life examples.
Attribution theory attempts to explain the reasoning behind our
judgements of other people’s behaviour. According to Heider (1958), we attribute
cause of events and behaviour, to either internal factors such as underlying
personality traits, or to situational factors such as social pressure. We are driven
to do this because we are all naïve psychologists trying to make sense of the
world. However in doing so, we are prone to favouring certain types of
explanations over others. This essay will examine 3 different attribution biases:
fundamental attribution error, actor-observer effect and self-serving bias.
Fundamental attribution error is a theory proposed by Ross (1977). The
theory suggests that when attempting to determine the cause of a person’s
behaviour or event, a layperson attaches greater importance on the actor’s
dispositional characteristics and tends to ignore the contributing situational
factors. An example is a personality psychologist who, when ascertaining the
cause of one’s behaviour, places greater importance on underlying personality
traits than an experimental psychologist would (Hewstone et al, 2009). There are
various examples which can be used to illustrate the prevalence of fundamental
attribution bias in our everyday lives. Kolev (2008) conducted research on CEO
pay and concluded shareholders attribute company profits to the dispositional
factor of CEO skill and ignore situational factors like market conditions. It is
common for us to judge smokers as being foolish in disregarding their health;
however we ignore situational factors such as peer pressure. The British public
regard Gordon Brown with contempt and blame national debt on his lack of skill;
failing to recognise situational factors such as the global force of market failure.
Psychologists have offered 3 main reasons for fundamental attribution
error – focus of attention, differential forgetting and the just world hypothesis.
Taylor and Fiske (1975) suggested we are more likely to attribute cause to
internal factors because the salient nature of behaviour inevitably catches our
attention, while the situational factors blend into the background. They conducted
an experiment where two individuals seated opposite each other were instructed
to have a discussion. Participants placed behind each discussant had limited
view of only one discussant each, and when asked which discussant was most
influential in the discussion, participants chose the one they had view of. This
supports the idea that we pay more attention to projecting information.
Peterson (1980) suggested that the reason we tend to attribute cause to
disposition is because we tend to forget situational factors easier therefore our
mental representation of causal information is dominated by the actor’s
disposition. Lerner (1977) proposed the idea we are all in control of our life,
therefore we get what we deserve. This supports fundamental attribution bias
because it stresses the importance our personal traits have on our lives. In fact,
Putwain (2002) stresses the danger of eye witnesses who are supporters of the
just world hypothesis to display fundamental attribution bias when interpreting a
crime.
There are various studies which support fundamental attribution error.
Jones & Harris (1967) conducted an experiment where American students were
told to write and read out essays which were either supporting Fidel Castro or
condemning him. Some of them were written out of free choice but some of them
had been instructed on which stance to adopt. Observers were asked to infer the
real attitudes the students. Results indicated observers rated pro-Castro authors
to have pro-Castro attitudes, even when they were aware they had been
instructed to write a pro-Castro essay portraying their tendency to attribute cause
to disposition.
Ross et al (1977) conducted a study whereby students were randomly
assigned to the roles of questioner and contestant. After subsequent questioning
by the questioners contestants were asked to rate who they thought was most
knowledgeable. The results support fundamental attribution bias as they
disregarded situational factors by rating the questioner as more knowledgeable,
even though they were aware the role had been assigned randomly by the
experimenters (Abelson et al, 2004).
Bierbrauer (1979) used fundamental attribution error to explain the
reaction of observers of Milgram’s study on obedience. Observers attributed the
cause of electric shock administration to participants’ disposition, rather than to
situational factors such as pressure.
However there have also been studies that question the ‘fundamental’
nature of this bias. Masuda and Nisbett (2001) researched the correlation
between cultures and situational attributions. They conducted an experiment
where Japanese and American students watched short-animations of the same
fish in different backgrounds. American students were more likely to comment
exclusively on the details of the fish and used this as a basis for recognition in
subsequent illustrations, whereas Japanese students commented the fish’s
interaction with their environment and used this as a basis for recognition in
subsequent illustrations.
Miller (1984) also argued that the effect depended on culture; however his
research also indicated a difference between ages. Children in both the West
and East tend to make dispositional attributions, however in the East they
develop the tendency to make situational attributions later in life.
The actor-observer effect is another attribution bias proposed by Jones &
Nisbett (1972). They argued that we tend to explain the cause of other people’s
behaviour by attributing it to dispositional factors; however we attribute our own
behaviour to situational factors. An example of this is a student who failed an
exam. His mother may blame it on laziness whereas the student is likely to blame
it on the difficulty of exam (Eysenck, 2004). Employers display the actor-observer
effect when they attribute employees’ lateness to dispositional factors such as
lack of time-management; whereas the employee will blame it on situational
factors such as a late train.
There are two explanations for this bias; they are perceptual focus and
informational differences. Perceptual focus is the idea that we have different
perspectives of ourselves and of other actors because we can’t see ourselves
behaving; therefore the behaviour of others is more salient against the
background than our own. Storms (1973) conducted a study which supports the
actor-observer effect by recording people having conversations. He then asked
them to comment on their behaviour during the conversation, after watching it
from their own perspective and from a different perspective. Results showed they
made more dispositional attributions when watching from a different perspective
as they were now able to perceive their behaviour, but made situational
dispositions when watching from their own perspective (Eysenck, 2004).
MacArthur and Post (1977) also conducted research that showed participants
were more likely to make dispositional attributions on well illuminated actors than
when determining cause of behaviour for dimly lit actors (Hogg, 2008).
Informational differences refer to the wealth of information a person has
about their own behaviour in different contexts in the past; therefore they are
more likely to see their behaviour as highly influenced by situational factors.
Observers however, do not have this information and cannot judge how the
person has behaved in different contexts. Therefore they attribute their behaviour
to dispositional factors such as underlying personality traits (Jones & Nisbett,
1972).
There are further studies that support this type of bias. Nisbett et al (1973)
asked college students why they liked their current girlfriends, and why their
friends liked their current girlfriends. Students attributed reasons to dispositional
factors when commenting on their friends, e.g. in terms of their own personality
however attributed reasons to situational factors when commenting on
themselves i.e. traits of girlfriends (Abelson et al., 2004).
Robins et al. (1996) propose the actor-observer effect is too simple and
there are a range of other factors involved when attributing cause. They carried
out an experiment where there were 3 brief interactions between different
partners. They were asked to rate the causal factors of their behaviour and
results showed that the differences between actor and observers attributions
depend on the specific causal factor, individuals’ history of the situation and
individual differences amongst the attributers (Robins et al., 1996).
Miller & Ross (1975) proposed the self-serving bias. This type of bias
proposes we protect our self-image by positively self-evaluating ourselves. We
attribute success to dispositional factors and we attribute failure to situational
factors (Hogg, 2008). An example of this is when we go for a job interview. If we
get the job we tend to attribute it to our disposition of being a hard-worker and
highly impressive; however if we don’t get the job we blame it on situational
factors such as tough competition. The former is called a self-enhancing bias
whereas the latter is called a self-protecting bias. Babcock & Loewenstein (1997)
have written about the influence self-serving bias plays in bargaining impasse – a
situation whereby two parties are unable to reach an agreement due to strong
desire to protect their own interests.
Psychologists have offered two reasons for this bias. Snyder et al (1978)
proposed the idea of ‘Attributional egoism’ which is a motivational reason for this
bias. It serves our ego and makes us feel better about ourselves. A study
conducted by Kingdon (1967) supports this. He interviewed politicians of varying
success; successful politicians attributed their success to dispositional factors
such as hard work and ability, whereas unsuccessful politicians attributed their
success to situational factors such as lack of campaign money (Hewstone,
1989). Another study which supports this is one conducted by Johnson et al
(1964). He found that students that were asked to teach other students attributed
better performance to their teaching i.e. dispositional factors, whereas they
attributed decreased performance to the student i.e. situational factors.
However there has been some research which suggests self-serving bias
is not always present. Sedikides et al. (2000) conducted research and concluded
that, “Friendship places boundaries on self-enhancement" (Sekidides et al. 2000,
pg 1). Participants formed pairs which either consisted of strangers or friends,
and they worked together on a task which they either succeeded at or failed.
They were later asked to attribute responsibility. Results showed self-
enhancement present amongst strangers but not amongst friends.
Research conducted by Change & Asakawa (2003) revealed Americans to
be more positive and protective of self-esteem; whereas Japanese were less
positive and protective of self-esteem, indicating that the self-serving bias has
been set into the Western culture. They suggest the differences arise from a
difference in culture; self-enhancement correlated to individualistic cultures and
self-criticism correlated to collectivist cultures.
Serenko (2006) researched the self-serving bias amongst humans using
computer programs. Results showed that people were less likely to attribute
negative results to situational factors i.e. computers than to attribute it to
dispositional factors i.e. their lack of ability, which is the opposite of what self-
serving bias indicates.
A number of studies discussed in this essay offer direct support for the
prevalence of attribution bias in society. It is a discrete type of bias which can be
identified across a vast array of situations: from students in a classroom to
shareholders in a FTSE company. Fritz’s original idea that we are all driven to
understand behaviour and search for a cause has been highlighted in several
aforementioned real–life examples such as judging smokers to be foolish.
Although there is overwhelming evidence to support attribution bias, it is
important to recognise the limitations that research provides. There is evidence
which points towards a high level of difference in the occurrence of this bias
between the West and the East, which suggests the importance our value
systems place on our attributional behaviour. Another key component of
attribution bias is lack of information, as indicated by the lack of bias amongst
friends. In conclusion, we are all prone to attribution biases however the severity
to which we allow it to affect us depends upon our core value systems and the
willingness to actively analyse and consider all possible factors before drawing
conclusions.

Word count: 2000


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