MAJORIE T.

ARIMADO

JD-1

LEGAL ETHICS

CASES: CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

1. Financial Audit of Atty. Raquel G. Kho

FACTS
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) instituted an administrative case against Atty Kho, a
former clerk of court of an RTC, after an audit by the former found that the latter failed to remit
P60K (confiscated cash bonds) and P5K(Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund). Atty Kho
stated that these amounts were stored in the court’s safety vaults, as his usual practice. The
audit team advised him that he should deposit such amounts to the Judicial Development Fund
account and Atty Kho complied with the directives. Subsequently, the ICA received a complaint
that Atty Kho, along with his common-law wife, a stenographer, was engaged with lending out
to court employees money in his possession as clerk of court, personally deriving profit from the
interest earned. The OCA found Atty Kho liable of violating an OCA Circular because he kept the
funds in a safety vault for more than a year. The OCA then recommended that its report be
docketed as an A.C. and Kho be imposed a P10K fine.
ISSUE
W/N Atty. Kho is liable.
HELD
YES. OCA recommendations VALID.
RATIO:
Dishonesty Conduct
Kho failed to make a timely turn-over of cash deposited with him. The failure to remit the funds
in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross misconduct. It diminishes the faith of the
people in the Judiciary. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service even if committed for the first time. His malfeasance prima
facie contravenes Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. And although
Kho had restituted all his cash accountabilities, he was nevertheless liable for failing to
immediately deposit the collections for the judiciary funds.
Unlawful conduct
Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding the Constitution and obeying the
law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer’s responsibilities under Canon 1 mean
more than just staying out of trouble with the law. The least a lawyer can do in compliance with
Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in unlawful conduct. The presence of evil intent on the part
of the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms.
2. Chua v. Mesina
FACTS
Mesina was, for years, the Chua spouses’ legal counsel and adviser upon whom they reposed
trust and confidence. They were in fact lessees of a building (Burgos Property) owned by
Mesina’s family, and another property (Melencio Property), also owned by Mesina’s family
where the Chua spouses constructed their house. These two properties were mortgaged by the
registered owner, Mesina’s mother, Mrs. Mesina, in favor of the Planters Development Bank to
secure a loan she obtained. As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank, Atty.
Mesina convinced the Chua spouses to help Mrs. Mesina to settle her obligation in
consideration for which the Melencio property would be sold to them at P850.00/sq.m. The
spouses Chua and their business partner, Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs. Mesina’s bank obligation
in the amount of P983,125.40. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 19, 1985 conveying the
Melencio property for P85,400.00 was thereafter executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name
appears therein as “Felicisima M. Melencio,” in favor of complainants. As complainants were
later apprised of the amount of capital gains tax they were to pay, they consulted respondent
about it. Respondent thus suggested to them that another Deed of Absolute Sale should be
executed, antedated to 1979 before the effectivity of the law mandating the payment of capital
gains tax. As suggested by respondent, another Deed of Absolute Saleantedated February 9,
1979 was executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name again appears therein as “Felicisima M.
Melencio,” in favor of complainants wherein the purchase price was also indicated to be
P85,400.00. After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses “in the redemption of the
MESINA properties,” Mrs. Mesina was found to have “an existing balance” due the spouses in
the amount of P400,000.00, on account of which they advised respondent about it. Respondent,
by Affidavit “acknowledged such obligation” to be his and undertook to settle it within two
years.
Complainants were subsequently issued on a title over the Melencio property. Not long after
the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale or in February 1986, one Tecson filed an Affidavit
dated charging Mrs. Mesina, the spouses Chua, Marcelina Hsia and the two witnesses to the
said Deed of Absolute Sale, for Falsification of Public Document and violation of the Internal
Revenue Code. In his complaint affidavit, Tecson alleged that he was also a lessee of the
Melencio property and was, along with the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it but that
contrary to their agreement, the property was sold only to complainant and her co-complainant,
to his exclusion. Tecson went on to relate that the Deed of Absolute Sale did not reflect the true
value of the Melencio property and was antedated “to evade payment of capital gains tax.”
Tecson submitted documents showing that indeed the July 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale was
antedated.
Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the falsification charge against Mrs. Mesina et
al. He proposed to complainants that they would simulate a deed of sale of the Melencio
property wherein complainants would resell it to Mrs. Mesina.
Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April
1, 1986 conveying to “Felicisima M. Melencio” the Melencio property for P85,400.00.A new title
was accordingly issued in the name of “Felicisima subsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance
dated September 5, 1986 alleging that his filing of the criminal complaint “arose out of mere
 misunderstanding and difference” with herein complainants and their co-respondents and he
had no sufficient evidence against them.
Some years later, Mesina approached the Chua spouses and told them that he would borrow
the owner’s copy of Mrs. Mesina’s title with the undertaking that he would, in four months, let
Mrs. Mesina execute a deed of sale over the Melencio property in complainants’ favor. In fact,
respondent gave complainants a written undertaking dated May 2, 1990.
In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died “in the early part of 1991.” Despite respondent’s repeated
promises “to effect” the transfer of title in complainants’ name, he failed to do so. Complainants
were later informed that the Melencio property was being offered for sale to the public. The
spouses Chua and complainant Marcelina Hsia thus filed a complaint against Mesina for
Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Reconveyance of Real Property.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mesina is guilty of Gross Misconduct?
HELD
This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to
evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for law and legal
processes, and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of the law; That respondent intended to,
as he did defraud not a private party but the government is aggravating.
Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a simulated
Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants reconveyed the Melencio
property to his mother, he committed dishonesty.
Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua spouses, into
turning over to him the owner’s copy of his mother’s title upon the misrepresentation that he
would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his mother in favor of complainants, he
likewise committed dishonesty.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must
be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which an
attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard that is
required in business dealings where the parties trade at “arms length.”
In fine, respondent violated his oath of office and, more specifically, Canon 1, Rules. 1.01 and
Rules 1.02.
3. Soriano v. Dizon
FACTS
A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on the grounds that
Dizon was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and violated Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found to
have:
a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor;
b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident;
c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend himself (treachery);
d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty);
 e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim (Kawawang driver, binaril na nga,
may lakas pa daw mag maul ng attorney na may baril. Hindi din tanga mag rason si Dizon diba?);
f. Despite neing granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to the victim (Ano ba
problema nito?!)
Issues:
(1) Is Dizon’s crime of Frustrated Homicide considered a crime involving moral turpitude
(2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant disbarment?
Held:
(1) Yes.
Moral Turpitude is “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals…”
Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not only because of his
treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his attempt to wipe off his prints from the
gun. His inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident clearly indicates his non-fitness to be a
lawyer.
(2) Yes.
His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities all justify
disbarment. The court reminds him that in oath and in the CPR, he is bound to “obey the laws of
the land.” The liabilities in question have been sitting for 4 years, unsatisfied, despite it being the
condition for his probation (you ungrateful person!)
Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the
privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty. Manuel Dizon, hereby disbarred.

CANON 2, CANON 3

1. IN RE: TAGORDA
Facts:
Luis Tagorda was a member of the provincial board of Isabela. Previous to the last election,
he admits that he made use of a card written in Spanish containing the fact that he was a
candidate for third member of the Province of Isabela & offering services as notary public
(such as free consultation, execution of deed of sale, etc.). He also admits that he wrote a
letter addressed to a lieutenant of a barrio if his home municipality saying that he will
continue his practice of law and for the lieutenant to make known to the people of his
desire to serve as lawyer & notary public (including his services to handle land registration
cases for P3/every registration).
Issue:
W/N acts of Tagorda constituted advertising
Held:
Yes, Tagorda is in a way advertising his services and is contrary to the Canons of Professional
Ethics. Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations is unprofessional. His
acts warrant disbarment, but because of the mitigating circumstance of his youth and
 inexperience, he is therefore suspended. The law is a profession and not a business. The
lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would
be unprofessional. It is also unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring lawsuit.
Lastly, solicitation of cases result in the lowering of the confidence of the community and
integrity of the members of the bar (as it results in needless litigations and in incenting to
strife otherwise peaceful citizens).
2. ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLO
FACTS
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads:
“Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme
Court, called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her
husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not involve separation of property and
custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements were also published.
An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for
investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for
1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the
advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he should
not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against
advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in any way by the
prohibition.
ISSUE
Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.
HELD
Yes!
The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public
service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public
service and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their
primary interest. Worse, advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” he
erodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in
fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.
Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s
name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not
properly publish in a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar.

3. CANOY V. ORTIZ
FACTS
A complaint was filed on April 2001 by Canoy against Atty. Ortiz, accusing him for
misconduct and malpractice. It is alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against Coca Cola Philippines. Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this proceeding.
 Canoy submitted all the documents and records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the
position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to
follow-up the process of the case. On April 2000, Canoy was shocked to learn that his
complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998 for failure to prosecute, the parties not
having submitted their position papers. Canoy alleged that Ortiz had never communicated
to him about the status of the case.
Atty. Ortiz informs the Court that he has mostly catered to indigent and low income clients,
at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz admits that the period within which
to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes his failure to timely file the
position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, “he was frankly
preoccupied with both his functions as a local government official and as a practicing
lawyer.”
Issue:
W/N Atty. Ortiz should be sanctioned?
Held:
Yes. Atty. Ortiz is to be sanctioned, suspension for 1 month. Atty. Ortiz violated Canons 18
and 22. Under Canon 18.03, a lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed to him. He owes his entire devotion to the
interest of the client. His negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Under
Canon 18.04, the relationship of a lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is an ever
present need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the
case and should not be left in the dark. A lawyer cannot shift the blame to complainant for
failing to inquire the status about the case as this is one of the lawyer’s duties. The adoption
of additional duties due to the election of Atty. Ortiz as councilor does not exonerate him of
his negligent behavior. The CPR allows a lawyer to withdraw his legal service if the lawyer is
elected or appointed to a public office since councilors are not expressly prohibited to
exercise their legal profession.

CANONS 4, 5 & 6

1. SUAREZ V. PLATON

Facts:

Suarez was charged with sedition which was subsequently dismissed. He in turn filed a case for
arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais. After the case was handed to Judge Platon
following several changes in trial judge and several refusals by fiscals to prosecute the case.

Issue:

Should mandamus issue to compel the fiscal to reinstate the case?

Held:

Yes. It is unquestionable that in the proper cases, the prosecutors must reinvestigate in order to
properly dispense justice. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that a prosecutor is the
representative of a sovereignty; he is interested only in the fact that justice is served, and this
also includes his refusing to prosecute if the innocence of the accused is quite clear. He is a
servant of the law, and his two-fold aim is not to let the guilty escape nor let the innocent suffer.
He is not at liberty to strike foul blows because it is his duty to refrain from doing so as much as
it is to use legitimate methods of prosecution.

2. RAMOS V. IMBANG

FACTS

In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang
in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. She gave
respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses.
Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait
outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been
cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each “appearance” in court,
respondent charged her P350. After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became
suspicious.

She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro,
Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses
and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).

HELD

Attorney Imbang is disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys.

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More specifically,
lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they
are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants
who owe utmost fidelity to public service.

3. CATU V. RELLOSA

FACTS

Catu co-owns a lot and building and contested the possession of one of the units in the said
building by Elizabeth (sister in law of Catu) and Pastor, who ignored demands to vacate the
place. The parties went to the Lupon Tagapamayapa to try to settle the issue amicably.
Respodent Rellosa as Punong Barangay presided over the conciliation proceedings. The parties
failed to settle their case, and the petitioner brought the case to court.

Surprisingly, Rellosa appeared in court as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This prompted Catu
to file an administrative complaint against Rellosa for his act of impropriety.

IBP committee on bar discipline, after investigation, ruled that Rellosa violated Rule 6.032 and
RA 67133. The committee recommended Rellosa’s suspension from practice for 1 month.

ISSUE

W/N Rellosa violated Rule 6.03

HELD

No.

Rule 6.03 applies only to a lawyer who has left government service. Rellosa was an incumbent
punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of.

As such incumbent, the proper law that governs him is RA 71604, which actually allows him to
practice his profession. However, being a public official, he is also governed by Revised Civil
Service Rules, which requires him first to obtain a written permission from his department head
who is the Sec. of DILG. This he failed to do. SC ruled that Rellosa violated the lawyer’s oath (to
uphold and obey law), Rule 1.01 (lawyer shall not engage in unlawful conduct), and Canon 7
(lawyer shall uphold integrity and dignity of the profession), for a lawyer who disobeys law
disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. SC punished Rellosa with 6 months suspension and
strongly advised him to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

__________

Hofilena question: under RA 6713, are lawyers allowed to practice their profession?

Answer: Yes, RA 6713 says “if the constitution or law allows it” Public officers however are
subject to Civil Service Rules which state that should they engage in private practice of their
profession, they should first secure a written permission from their department head.

4. PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS

General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. Later on,
Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent. Former Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the
assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation.
After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG for the purpose of recovering ill gotten
wealth. The PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Tan, et al. so PCGG
issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named
persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President
Marcos.
These respondents were represented by Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify
respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents. The motions alleged that respondent
Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, 'actively intervened in the
liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and
became Allied Banking Corporation.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule
6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting 'engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service.
ISSUE
W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza?
HELD
NO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of . In fine, the
Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of 'matter’ under Rule 6.03.
The 'matter’ where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure
provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition.
The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but
is different from the subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096 which is about the sequestration
of the shares of respondents Tan, et al. The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the
dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter
different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in the liquidation case is not significant
and substantial. We note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in
the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to
assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK.
Also, The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. For a fact, the
recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after
the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court
which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan. At the very least, the
circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put
petitioner's motive as highly suspect.
 It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly
disfavors lawyers who 'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides' carries the danger
that former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the
process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the
act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate
GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about
the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. There is no
switching sides for there were no sides.

CANON 7

1. IN RE GALANG

Doctrine:

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he
had been with, or indicted for an alleged crime, as a ground for revocation of his license to practice law,
is well settled.

IN RE ARTHUR M. CUEVAS

FACTS

Petitioner Arthur Cuevas Jr. recently passed the bar examinations, but was precluded from taking the
lawyer’s 1996 oath, pending approval from the Supreme Court This stems from petitioner’s participation
in the initiation rites of the Lex Talionis Fraternitas of Sand Beda where neophyte Raul Camaligan died as
a result of hazing. Cuevas was charged with Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. He applied for and was
granted probation, then was discharged on May 1995 May 1997, he applied to Court that he may take
the lawyer’s oath an attached to his petition certifications attesting to his “righteous, peaceful and law
abiding character.”

ISSUE

May Cuevas take the lawyer’s oath, taking in consideration the certifications attesting to his “righteous,
peaceful and law abiding character”?

HELD

Yes.

Though his deliberate participation in the initiation rites indicates absence of that moral fitness required
for admission into the bar, the court is willing to give the petitioner a chance based on the various
certifications: they sufficiently show that he has a righteous, peaceful and civil oriented character; and
he has proven that he has taken steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for
the death of Raul Camaligan.
3. SAMANIEGO V. ATTY. FERRER

(Complaint for immorality, abandonment and willful refusal to give support to an illegitimate child)

FACTS

Samaniego was a client of Atty. Ferrer and their lawyer-client relationship became intimate, when Atty.
Ferrer courted her and she fell in love. They lived together as "husband and wife" from 96-97 and their
daughter was born. The affair ended in 2000 and since then he failed to give support to their daughter.
Before the IBP Samaniego testified that she knew that Atty. Ferrer was in a relationship but did not think
he was already married. Atty. Ferrer refused to appear during the hearing since he did not want to see
Samaniego.

Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to support their daughter in a position paper. He also reasoned
that he found it unconscionable to abandon his wife and 10 children to cohabit with Samaniego. IBP
Board of Governors imposed upon Atty. Ferrer the penalty of 6 months suspension for his refusal to
support his daughter. Atty. Ferrer filed MR with prayer for to reduce the penalty because it will further
cause extreme hardship to his family of 10 children. Upon finding that Atty. Ferrer lacked the degree of
morality required of a member of the bar, his prayer for reduced penalty was denied.

Held:

SC finds Atty. Ferrer guilty of gross immorality and he is ordered suspended for 6 months.

Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital affair and SC considers such illicit relation as a disgraceful and
immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action. Although it is true that Samaniego was not entirely
blameless for knowing about Atty. Ferrer’s wife, it does not make this case less serious since it is
immaterial whether both are in pari delicto. Atty. Ferrer was held to have violated Rule 1.01, Canon 7
and Rule 7.03.

CANON 8

1. REYES V. CHIONG

FACTS

Two Chinese-Taiwanese businessmen (Xu and Pan) entered into a business venture to set up a
factory for seafood products. Xu invested P300,000. Eventually, Xu discovered that Pan had not
established the factory and asked for his money back. Pan became hostile and ignored Xu. Xu engaged
the services of Atty. Reyes, who filed a complaint for estafa against Pan (represented by Atty. Chiong).
The complaint was assigned to Asst. Manila City Prosecutor Pedro Salanga, who issued a subpoena for
Pan to appear for preliminary investigation. For failure to appear and submit a counter-affidavit, Salanga
filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Pan in the RTC of Manila. The RTC issued a warrant of arrest
against Pan. In response, Atty. Chiong filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest. He also filed with
the RTC of Zamboanga a civil complaint for the collection of a sum of money, damages, and for the
dissolution of the business venture against Xu, Atty. Reyes and Salanga. Atty. Reyes then filed a
disbarment case against Atty. Chiong for filing a groundless suit, alleging that it was instituted to exact
vengeance. Atty. Chiong alleges that Atty. Reyes was impleaded for conniving with Xu in filing the estafa
case. Salanga was impleaded because of the supposed irregularities in conducting the investigation. The
SC referred the case to the IBP.

ISSUE

W/N the civil complaint was groundless

W/N is was proper to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in the civil complaint

HELD

Yes, civil complaint was groundless and it was improper to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor
Salanga in said civil complaint. IBP: civil complaint was filed purposely to obtain leverage against the
estafa case. There was no need to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga since they were not
parties in the business venture. Their inclusion in the complaint was improper and highly questionable
and the suit was filed to harass both of them. In filing the civil suit, Atty. Chiong violated his oath of
office and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP recommended 2 years suspension SC:
affirmed IBP’s recommendation. In addition, the Court mentioned some alternative remedies Atty.
Chiong could have taken if his allegations were indeed true. Chiong could have filed a motion for
reinvestigation or motion for reconsideration of Salanga’s decision to file the information for estafa.
Motion to Dismiss the estafa case was also available if it was indeed filed without basis.

Relevant Provisions:

Canon 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Lawyer’s Oath – “not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same.”

2. ATTY. DALLONG- GALICINAO V. ATTY. CASTRO

FACTS

Facts:

Atty. Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of RTC and Atty. Castro was a private practitioner
and VP of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya. Respondent went to complainant’s office to inquire whether the records
of Civil Case No. 784 had already been remanded to the MCTC. Respondent was not the counsel of
either party in that case. Complainant replied that the record had not yet been transmitted since a
certified true copy of the CA decision should first be presented. To this respondent retorted, “You mean
to say, I would have to go to Manila to get a copy?” Complainant replied that respondent may show
instead the copy sent to the party he represents. Respondent then replied that complainant should’ve
notified him. Complainant explained that it is not her duty to notify the respondent of such duty.
Angered, respondent yelled stuff in Ilocano and left the office, banging the door so loud. He then
returned to the office and shouted, “Ukinnam nga babai!” (“Vulva of your mother, you woman!”)

Later, complainant filed a manifestation that she won’t appear in the hearing of the case in view of the
respondent’s public apology, and that the latter was forgiven already.

Held:

Respondent is fined the amount of 10k with a warning.

Respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. His explanation that he will enter his
appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not
being the counsel of record respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court. He violated
Rule 8.02, because this was an act of encroachment. It matters not that he did so in good faith. His act of
raising his voice and uttering vulgar invectives to the clerk of court was not only ill-mannered but also
unbecoming considering that he did these in front of the complainant’s subordinates. For these, he
violated Rules 7.03 and 8.01 and Canon 8. The penalty was tempered because respondent apologized to
the complainant and the latter accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent should be
absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the consequences of the things they say and
do even if they repent afterwards.

3. ALCANTARA V. PEFIANCO

FACTS

Atty. Alcantara (incumbent District Pubic Attorney of PAO in Anitque) filed a complaint against
Atty. Pefianco for conduct unbecoming of the bar for using improper and offensive language and
threatening and attempting to assault complainant. This happened when Atty, Salvani was conferring
with his client in the PAO office when the wife of the murdered victim, in tears, came and askef for a
settlement. Moved by the plight of the woman, Pefianco, who was standing nearby, scolded and
shouted at Salvani to not settle the case and to have his client imprisoned so that he would realize his
mistake. As head of the office, Alcantara reproached Pefianco, but this ended up with Pefianco saying
that Alcantara was an idiot for sending him out of the PAO. Also, Pefianco tried to attack Alcantara and
even shouted at him, “Gago ka!” The IBP Committee on Bar Discipline found that Pefianco violated
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Issue:

W/N Pefianco is guilty of violating Canon 8

Held:

Yes. Canon 8 admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
their fellow lawyers. Pefianco’s meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused the
incident. And although Pefianco was moved by the woman’s plight, what he thought was righteous did
not give him the right to scold Salvani and insult and berate those who tried to calm him down.

Whatever moral righteousness he had was negated by the way he chose to express his indignation.

CANON 9

1. MAURICIO C. ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

FACTS:

This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease and desist from issuing certain
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law. The
said advertisement of the Legal Clinic invites potential clients to inquire about secret marriage and
divorce in Guam and annulment, and the like. It also says that they are giving free books on Guam
Divorce. Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and destructive of the confidence of the
community in the integrity of lawyers. He, being a member of the bar, is ashamed and offended by the
said advertisements. On the other hand, the respondent, while admitting of the fact of the publication
of the advertisements, claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but is merely rendering legal
support services through paralegals. It also contends that such advertisements should be allowed based
on certain US cases decided.

ISSUE:

W/N the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the practice of law.

W/N the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements complained of.

HELD/RATIO:

Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should be enjoined.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any
kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and
contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.
When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One
who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney
and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation
regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a
practice of law. The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. And
applying the criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as advertised, engaged in the “practice of law”.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers.
With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies
of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by
said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law."

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar
to a merchant advertising his goods. The only exceptions are when he appears in a reputable law list and
use of an ordinary, simple professional card.

The advertisements do not fall under these exceptions. To allow the publication of advertisements of
the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public
opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack. Hence, it should be
enjoined.

2. CAMBALIZA V. CRISTOBAL-TENORIO

FACTS

Cabliza, a former employee of Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, filed a disbarment complaint on the
grounds of deceit, grossly immoral conduct and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office. Deceit:
represented herself to be married to Felicisimo Tenorio Jr, who has a prior existing marriage Grossly
immoral conduct: disseminated libellous affidavits against a Makati City counselor Malpractice: allowed
her husband, a non-lawyer, to practice by making him a senior partner in her law office. This is
evidenced by 1) the law office letterhead which included the husband as a senior partner, 2) an id
wherein he signed as an “atty”, 3) appearance in court as counsel.

HELD

Guilty of malpractice. Violated Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 Canon 9: a lawyer shall not assist in unauthorized
practice of law Rule 9.01: a lawyer shall not delated to any unqualified person the performance of a task
that may only be performed by members of the bar in good standing

Even though Cabliza later on withdrew her complaint, IBP still pushed through with the investigation
because such is a disciplinary proceeding. There is no private interest affected such that desistance of
the complainant will terminate the proceedings. The purpose is to protect the bar from those unfit to
practice law.

3. AGUIRRE V. RAMA

FACTS

Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On 21 May 2001,
one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar, charging respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct,
violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a
member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 but ruled that he cannot sign the

Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Complainant charged respondent for
unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct, alleging that respondent, while not yet a lawyer,
appeared as counsel for Vice Mayoralty candidate George Bunan in the May 2001 elections before the

Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Mandaon, Masbate, and filed with the MBEC a
pleading as counsel entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. Respondent also signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in her
petition to be declared the winning mayoralty candidate.

On the charge of violation of law, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any
court or administrative body, respondent being a municipal government employee (Secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate). The Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (“OBC”) for evaluation, report and recommendation. OBC’s Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May
2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before
he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. Respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar. Such unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission
to the practice of law.

HELD

Respondent is guilty of unauthorized practice of law and was thus denied admission to the Philippine
bar.

1. SC agreed with the finding of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

- Respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan and signed as “counsel” in the pleadings

- was also retained as counsel of mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and of party REFORMA LM-
PPC

CANONS 10 & 11

1. FERNANDEZ V. DE RAMOS-VILLALON
FACTS
This is an administrative case filed by petitioner Fernandez against Atty. Villalon. It started from
a case filed by a certain Carlos Palacios against Fernandez to nullify a Deed of Donation. Atty.
 Villalon represented Palacios in the early part of the case against Fernandez. In 2004, Palacios,
owner of a lot in Makati, sought the help of Fernandez to help him in a case against a land-
grabbing syndicate. Palacios won the case with the help of Fernandez.
In Sept 2005, Palacios bumped into a Mrs. Lirio who expressed interest in buying Palacios’
Makati property. It turns out that it was being sold by Fernandez who allegedly had a Deed of
Donation which Palacios executed in his favor. This Deed of Donation was registered.
Palacios, with the help of Atty. Villalon, filed an action tto nullify the Deed against Fernandez.
However, Fernandez answered that the title transfer in his name was proper, citing a Deed of
Absolute Sale as basis. He furthered alled that it was actually Palacios who forged the Deed of
Donation to cheat in taxes. In 2006, Fernandez filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Villalon for violation of Rule 1.01, 7.03, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3. He claims that Atty. Villalon has
suppressed and excluded in the complaint filed by her knowledge about the existence of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, which was by the way, unregistered. He says that no mention of it was
made in the petition for the annulment of three Deed of Donation. Commissioner of IBP
recommended the dismissal of the case. Sustaining Atty. Villalon’s argument that she, as counsel
for Palacios, was under no duty to include the fact that the Deed of Sale existed because only
the client’s operative facts, and not other evidentiary facts, need to be included in the
complaint. The Deed of Sale was a matter of a defense that Fernandez as defendant can freely
point out during the trial. Fernandez appealed the case.
ISSUE
W/N there was grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint.
HELD
None. Case against Villalon is dismissed.

2. RIVERA V. CORRAL

FACTS

Rivera instituted a complaint for disbarment charging Atty. Corral with malpractice and
conduct unbecoming a member of the Philippine Bar. A decision for an ejectment case was
received by Atty. Corral’s secretary on February 23, 1990. Notice of Appeal was filed by Atty.
Corral on March 13, 1990. Next day, he went to the clerk of court and changed the date
February 23 to February 29 without the court’s prior knowledge and permission. Atty. Corral
later on filed a reply to plaintiff’s manifestation claiming that he received the decision on
February 28, not 29 (because there is no Feb 29).

ISSUE

W/N Atty. Corral should be disbarred for changing the date when he received the
decision of the court without the court’s prior knowledge of decision

HELD
 No, Atty. Corral is suspended for 1 year. The correction of date by Atty. Corral was made
not to reflect the truth but to mislead the trial court in believing that the notice of appeal was
filed within the reglementary period. Because if the decision was received on Feb 22, the notice
of appeal filed on March 13 is filed out of time. To extricate himself from such predicament,
Atty. Corral altered the date he received the court’s decision. By altering the material dates to
make it appear that the Notice of Appeal was timely filed, Atty. Corral committed an act of
dishonesty. Dishonesty constitutes grave misconduct.

3. JOHNNY NG V. ALAR

FACTS

The case stemmed from a labor case filed by the employees of the Ng Company against
its employers. The employees alleged that they did not receive their service incentive leave pay
from their employers due to the latter’s claim that the employees conducted a strike at the
Company’s premises which hampered its ingress and egress. The case was referred to the labor
arbiter and the latter found that the employees have been paid their service incentive leave pay.
The employees appealed to NLRC but the latter affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision.

In reaction to this, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit
(MRMI) where respondent used scandalous, offensive, and menacing languages to support his
complaint. He said that the labor arbiter was cross-eyed in making his findings of fact and that
Commissioner Dinopol acted in the same manner with malice thrown in when he adopted the
findings of the labor arbiter. That the retiring commissioners of NLRC circumvent the law and
jurisprudence when the money claim involved in the case is substantial. According to
respondent, such acts constitute grave abuse of discretion. Because of the MRMI, complainant
filed a disbarment case with IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent wherein it
was alleged that the latter violated certain codes and rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Specifically, respondent allegedly violated Canons 8 and 11 wherein a lawyer is
prohibited from using scandalous, oppressive, offensive, and malicious language against an
opposing counsel and before the courts. In his defense, respondent argues that he did not
violate any of the canons found in the Code because 1) the NLRC is not among the courts
referred to in the rules; 2) the Commissioners therein are not judges; and 3) the complainants in
labor cases are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger. Attached to respondent’s counter-
complaint is an affidavit made by the union president Batan alleging that the lawyers of the
complainant are the ones who violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when they filed
multiple suits arising from the same cause of action and when they deliberately lessened the
number of complainants in the labor case. The findings of the Commission on Bar discipline led
the IBP to conclude that respondent is guilty of violating Canons 8 and 11, while the lawyers of
the complainant did not violate any canons of the Code. It recommended that respondent be
reprimanded with a stern warning that severe penalties will be imposed in case a similar
conduct will be committed again.
ISSUE

W/N respondent violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD

YES. Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
His actions erode the public’s perception of the legal profession. The MRMI contains insults and
diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with
implied accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack of diligence. Respondent used improper
and offensive language in his pleadings that does not admit any justification. Though a lawyer's
language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting
the dignity of the legal profession. The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to
promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration. However, the penalty of
reprimand with stern warning imposed by the IBP Board of Governors is not proportionate to
respondent’s violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he
deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.

CANON 12

1.BERBANO V. BARCELONA

FACTS

Felicitas Berbano, heir of Rufino Hilapo appointed Atty. Daen as their atty-infact for their
pending case with the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (regarding their Ayala
lot being claimed by Filinvest Dev. Corp.). Atty. Daen was subsequently arrested by Muntinlupa
police. The heirs of Hilapo looked for a lawyer to secure the release of Atty. Daen. Berbano was
recommended to Atty. Barcelona (by a certain Naty Sibuya). After the first visit of Atty.
Barcelona in Muntinlupa City Jail, they learned that Atty. Daen had decided to engage the
services of Atty. Barcelona. Atty. Barcelona told Berbano that if they could produce P50K, he will
cause the release of Atty. Daen the next day. Since it was already late in the evening, Berbano
could only produce P15,700 by asking from relatives who were with her. There were several
subsequent meetings between Berbano and Atty. Barcelona regarding the “grease money” to be
used to allegedly bribe an SC justice. Berbano made another payment via a “pay-to-cash” check
for P24,000; and, in another occasion, went to the house of Atty. Barcelona to give him P10,000.
Another P15,000 was handed to Atty. Barcelona by Atty. Daen’s nephew while Berbano gave
him P1000 for gasoline expenses when Atty. Barcelona informed them that he could not secure
Atty. Daen’s because the check had not been encashed. By this time, the total amount given to
Atty. Barcelona reached P64,000. For failure to deliver on his promise and due to his sudden
disappearance, Berbano filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Barcelona with the IBP.
Commissioner Bautista found Atty. Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious breach of the
Code of Professional Responsibility recommending him to be disbarred and ordering him to
return the P64,000 (For failure to file an answer and to appear before the Commissioner, the
decision was rendered ex parte.). Board of Governors adopted the Commissioner’s findings but
reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for 6 years.

ISSUE

W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred

HELD

Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred. Disbarment proceedings are meant to safeguard

the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of
officers of the court and remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their
oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as
members of the bar. Berbano’s Affidavit-Complaint and testimony was sufficient to support the
finding that respondent committed the acts complained of. The act of Atty. Barcelona in not
filing his answer and ignoring the hearings, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for
legal proceedings. Hence, the Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the Investigating
Commissioner’s judgment. Atty. Barcelona is guilty for violations of Canon 1, 7, 11, and 16 (Rule
16.01). Instead of promoting respect for law and the legal processes, respondent callously
demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a client under the pretext of having
connections with a Member of the Court (to secure the release of Atty. Daen). Also, this was not
the first time Atty. Barcelona has been charged and found guilty of conduct unbecoming a
lawyer (The previous case also involved misrepresentation and Atty. Barcelona also did not
appear before the IBP despite due notice.) Atty. Daen was subsequently arrested by Muntinlupa
police. The heirs of Hilapo looked for a lawyer to secure the release of Atty. Daen. Berbano was
recommended to Atty. Barcelona (by a certain Naty Sibuya). After the first visit of Atty.
Barcelona in Muntinlupa City Jail, they learned that Atty. Daen had decided to engage the
services of Atty. Barcelona. Atty. Barcelona told Berbano that if they could produce P50K, he will
cause the release of Atty. Daen the next day. Since it was already late in the evening, Berbano
could only produce P15,700 by asking from relatives who were with her. There were several
subsequent meetings between Berbano and Atty. Barcelona regarding the “grease money” to be
used to allegedly bribe an SC justice. Berbano made another payment via a “pay-to-cash” check
for P24,000; and, in another occasion, went to the house of Atty. Barcelona to give him P10,000.
Another P15,000 was handed to Atty. Barcelona by Atty. Daen’s nephew while Berbano gave
him P1000 for gasoline expenses when Atty. Barcelona informed them that he could not secure
Atty. Daen’s because the check had not been encashed. By this time, the total amount given to
Atty. Barcelona reached P64,000. For failure to deliver on his promise and due to his sudden
disappearance, Berbano filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Barcelona with the IBP.

Commissioner Bautista found Atty. Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious breach of the
Code of Professional Responsibility recommending him to be disbarred and ordering him to
return the P64,000 (For failure to file an answer and to appear before the Commissioner, the
decision was rendered ex parte.). Board of Governors adopted the Commissioner’s findings but
reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for 6 years.

ISSUE

W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred

HELD

Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred. Disbarment proceedings are meant to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers
of the court and remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of
office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of
the bar. Berbano’s Affidavit-Complaint and testimony was sufficient to support the finding that
respondent committed the acts complained of. The act of Atty. Barcelona in not filing his answer
and ignoring the hearings, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings.
Hence, the Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the Investigating Commissioner’s
judgment. Atty. Barcelona is guilty for violations of Canon 1, 7, 11, and 16 (Rule 16.01). Instead
of promoting respect for law and the legal processes, respondent callously demeaned the legal
profession by taking money from a client under the pretext of having connections with a
Member of the Court (to secure the release of Atty. Daen). Also, this was not the first time Atty.
Barcelona has been charged and found guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer (The previous
case also involved misrepresentation and Atty. Barcelona also did not appear before the IBP
despite due notice.).

3. HEGNA V. PADERANGA
FACTS
Hegna was the lessee of a portion of land owned by the Baclayon spouses for 10 years
but during this period the Panaguinip spouses by means of force, threat, intimidation, stealth
and strategy (FISTS) entered upon the vacant portion of the lot and constructed a shop for
which he filed a forcible entry case. Hegna won and the Panaguinip spouses were sentenced to
vacate the leased premises and to pay complainant compensatory damages for illegal
occupation. When the MTCC of Cebu issued a writ of execution and the Sheriff levied certain
properties of the spouses they sent a letter dated Dec 2001 to Hegna for a possible amicable
settlement which he denied. Then Atty. Paderanga filed a Third Party Complaint alleging that he
bought the lot and the vehicle during November and December of 2001 which caused the failure
to levy the properties by the Sheriff. Hegna then filed a letter complaint to the Office of the bar
confidant for “deliberately falsifying documents, causing delay and a possible denial of justice.”
He also filed criminal charges against Atty. Paderanga & Atty. Madarang (notary public) for
falsification of public documents and the Panaguinip spouses for false testimony and perjury. His
grounds were (1) the lot had no record of transfer with the Register of Deeds, (2) the
registration of the vehicle didn’t reflect any change of ownership & (3) the Notarial Register
Book showed tampering and erasures. The City Prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint for
 lack of prima facie evidence of guilt but referred the administrative complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Atty. Paderanga’s defense alleged that for ESTATE
PLANNING purposes, he intentionally left these properties in the name of the previous owner
and that he alleged discrepancies in the notarization were made to correct mistakes so that
entries will speak the truth.
The Investigating Commissioner found that the dismissal was improper in light of the letter
handwritten by Respondent’s clients, written in Cebuano, asking for mercy and forgiveness in
relation to the forcible entry case. Such letter was no longer necessary if indeed there was a
GENUINE transfer of ownership of properties. In addition, there were several instances where
Atty. Paderanga will meet with Hegna offering settlement and it was only when he denied them
that he received the Third Party Complaint.

ISSUE
W/n there was indeed a genuine transfer of the lot and vehicle to Atty. Paderanga?
HELD
Commissioner is convinced that there was indeed an anomaly which constitutes a
violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility so given 1 year suspension. His non-
registration of the sale transaction so it would not appear in the records of the BIR, the City
Assessor or the Register of Deeds, on the Land Registration Office so that he would not pay for
the expenses of the sale and transfer twice, once he decided to sell; or place them in his
children’s name, and avoid paying estate and inheritance taxes upon his death.
Art. 1491 A lawyer ought to have known that he cannot acquire the property of his client which
is in litigation. violated Rule 1.01 which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct violated the Lawyer’s Oath, which mandates that he
should support the Constitution, obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein, and do no falsehood or not consent to the doing of any in court. Further, he
has also failed to live up to the standard set by law that he should refrain from counseling or
abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
The act of non-registration of the deeds of sale to avoid paying tax may not be illegal per se; but,
as a servant of the law, a lawyer should make himself an exemplar for others to emulate.

CANONS 13 & 14

1. FOODSPHERE V. MAURICIO

FACTS

Foodsphere, Inc. is the owner of CDO grocery products. One day, a Mr. Cordero bought canned
goods from a grocery store, one of them being a CDO liver spread canned good. When Mr. Cordero and
his family ate the liver spread, they found that it tasted sour and subsequently discovered that the
canned good was infested with a colony of worms. A complaint was filed with the Bureau of Food and
Drug Administration (BFAD) and a subsequent investigation confirmed the presence of the parasites.
BFAD ordered a hearing between Foodsphere and the Corderos, where the latter demanded P150k.
Foodsphere refused, resulting to the Corderos threatening to bring up the matter to the media.
Meanwhile, Atty Mauricio faxed Foodsphere a sample front page of a tabloid he was involved with,
which contained articles discrediting the latter, and threatened to publish it if they didn’t pay the
amount the Corderos wanted. Foodsphere refused as well. Atty Mauricio thus proposed a ‘Kasunduan’
between the two, where Foodsphere agreed to settle the matter for a lower amount, but added that
Foodsphere advertise in Mauricio’s tabloids and tv shows, in exchange for the withdrawal of the
complaint. The Corderos withdrew their complaint and BFAD dismissed the complaint against
Foodsphere. Mauricio then sent Foodsphere an ‘Advertising Contract’ asking the latter advertisements
of various media (which were a lot…and expensive!) owned by Mauricio. As a sign of goodwill,
Foodsphere offered to patronize some advertisements only. Mauricio was disappointed with this and
threatened to proceed with the publications. And a few weeks later, Mauricio, in his radio talk show
(Batas ng Bayan) held a guessing contest with questions that asked which company had worms in its
liver spread. He also wrote in his columns and aired in his tv shows about the same topic. Foodsphere
filed criminal and civil complaints against Mauricio about the discrediting remarks that he has been
making against the company. Foodsphere also filed the present administrative complaint against
Mauricio to the IBP, where he was ordered not to make any more statements on the matter.
Notwithstanding the pending cases against him, Mauricio continued to publish articles against
Foodsphere and discredit them in his tv shows. Because of this, the IBP ordered that Mauricio be
suspended for 2 years. Mauricio now challenges the validity of the suspension.

ISSUE

W/N Mauricio’s suspension was valid.

HELD

YES! Mauricio suspended for 3 years. Continued Attacks Despite Pending Cases = Violation Of
Rule 13.02 Despite the pendency of the case against Mauricio, and IBP’s orders that he discontinue with
his actions, he still continued with his attacks against Foodsphere and its products. This is a clear and
conscious violation the Code of Professional Responsibility which is an improper conduct of a member of
the bar.

NOTE: The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated.

2. SUSPENSION OF ATTY. BAGUBAYAO

FACTS

Administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5144:
People v. Luis Plaza. Plaza was accused of murdering a policeman. Criminal case was originally raffled to
the sala of Judge Buyser. Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that
evidence presented was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide but not murder. Counsel for Plaza
filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail, but Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo (who was in charge of the
case) objected thereto on the ground that the original charge of murder was not subject to bail (Rules of
Court). Judge Buyser inhibited himself from trying the case because of the “harsh insinuation” of
Bagabuyo that he “lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate” by allegedly suggesting the filing
of the motion to fix the amount of bail. Case was transferred to Judge Tan, who fixed the amount of bail
at P40k. Instead of availing of judicial remediess, Bagabuyo caused the publication of an article regarding
the Order granting the bail in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, “Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge
for allowing murder suspect to bail out.” In the article, Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is
non-bailable, but admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases
when the evidence of the prosecution is weak. He claims that the former judge found the evidence to be
strong. He stated that he was not afraid to be cited for contempt because it was the only way for the
public to know that there are judges displaying judicial arrogance. RTC directed Bagabuyo (and the
writer of the article) to explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the
publication of the article which degraded the court with its presiding judge with its lies and
misrepresentations. Bagabuyo refused to explain and the RTC held him in contempt of court, sentencing
him to 30 days in jail (he posted a bail bond and was released). Despite this, Bagabuyo presented himself
to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS and again, attacked the integrity of Judge Tan.

In the radio interview, Bagabuyo called Judge Tan a liar, ignorant of the law and that as a mahjong
aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law. RTC required Bagabuyo to explain and
show cause why he should not be held in contempt and be suspended from the practice of law for
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 11.05 and Rule 13.02). Bagabuyo denied the
charge that he sought to be interviewed. He said that he was approached by someone who asked him to
comment on the Order. He justified his response to the interview (at the instance of his friend) as a
simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was made without malice.
RTC found his denials lame, held him in contempt, and suspended him from the practice of law for 1
year. In accordance with the Rules of Court, the case was transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant,
which recommended the implementation of the RTC’s order of suspension.

ISSUE

W/N Bagabuyo should be held in contempt and suspended for violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11
and Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility – YES

HELD

Canon 11 mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers. Bagabuyo violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying
judicial arrogance in the published article and when he stated that Judg Tan was ignorant of the law and
that as a mahjong aficionado, he was study in mahjong instead of the law Rule 11.05 states that a lawyer
shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities. Bagabuyo violated Rule 11.05 when he
caused the holding of a press conference and submitted to a radio interview to air out his grievances
against Judge Tan. Rule 13.02 states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. Bagabuyo violated Rule
13.02 when he made statements in the article, which were made while Criminal Case No. 5144 was still
pending in court. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent
disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney.

CANON 15

1. HILADO V. DAVID

FACTS

Mrs. Hilado filed an action against Assad to annul the sale of several house & lot between Assad
and her now deceased husband, during the Japanese occupation

- Assad’s counsel is Atty. Francisco

- Mrs. Hilado’s counsels are the following: Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo

- Atty. Dizon wrote Atty. Francisco to discontinue representing Assad because Mrs. Hilado
consulted her about the case and even turned over some documents to Atty. Francisco

- Atty. Francisco even wrote a legal opinion/letter addressed to Mrs. Hilado regarding the same
case, which states that Atty. Francisco will not represent Mrs. Hilado in the case and he thinks that the
action against Assad will not prosper

- Mrs. Hilado’s counsel filed a motion to DISQUALIFY Atty. Francisco

- Atty. Francisco’s version of the story:

- Mrs. Hilado came to see Atty. Francisco about the case, but he refused to become her counsel
because he thinks that the action will not prosper. Days later, Atty. Francisco’s assistant, Atty. Agrava,
informed him that Mrs. Hilado left some expediente in the firm. Atty. Francisco instructed Atty. Agrava
to return the expediente because they will not handle the case of Mrs. Hilado. Later, the firm’s
stenographer showed Atty. Francisco a letter allegedly dictated by Atty. Agrava which explains to Mrs.
Hilado why they refuse to take the case. Atty. Francisco allegedly signed the letter without reading it.
Later on, Assad went to Atty. Francisco’s office. Afterwards, Atty. Francisco accepted the retainer fee
 - Lower Court Held: no other information was transmitted to Atty. Francisco other than those in
plaintiff’s complaint and there was no attorney-client relationship between Atty. Francisco and Mrs.
Hilado. Hence, motion to disqualify is denied.

ISSUE

W/N there was an attorney-client relationship between Atty. Francisco and Mrs. Hilado

HELD

Yes, there was an attorney-client relationship because the purpose of Mrs. Hilado was to obtain
Atty. Francisco’s personal service as a lawyer

- Retainer and frequency of consultation is not needed , so long as the purpose is to obtain
professional advice or assistance and the attorney permits, then an attorney-client relationship is
established

- Formality is not essential

2. NAKPIL V. VALDES

FACTS

Valdes is Jose Nakpil’s accountant, consultant and lawyer. Nakpil got interested in the
purchase of a summer residence in Baguio but due to lack of funds, he asked Valdes to buy it for
him and hold it in trust. Valdes obtained 2 loans (65k and 75k), then he bought the land and had
the title issued in his name. When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda, his wife, became the administratrix
of Jose’s estate. And, Valdes’ law firm filed for the settlement of Jose’s estate. Baguio property
became an issue because the property was not included in Jose’s inventory of estate, but the
loans used to purchase the property were charged under his name. The title to the property
was transferred from Valdes to Caval Realty, Valdes’ family realty corp. Valdes’ accounting firm
handled the inventory of Jose’s estate but also handled the claims of Jose’s creditors- Angel
Nakpil and ENORN, INC.

ISSUE

W/N Valdes is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the code of professional
ethics

HELD

Yes.

The proscription applies no matter how slight the adverse interest is. Representation of
conflicting interests may be allowed only upon full disclosure of the facts among all concerned parties,
as to the extent of conflict and probable adverse outcome. The preparation of claims of the creditors
against the estate is obviously improper because he had to fight for one side, the claims he was
defending against for the other side. The defense that he had already resigned from the law firm was
not supported by evidence. His resignation from the accounting firm only shows that he was absent for
quite some time but returned to work during the tenure of the litigation of claims. Thus, he cannot claim
ignorance of the case. The test of impropriety of representation of conflicting interests is not the
certainty of such existence but mere probability for it to exist. Even though he could have committed
such misconduct not as a lawyer but as an accountant, the court is not divested of jurisdiction to punish
a lawyer for misconduct committed outside the legal field, as the good moral character requirement is
not only a requisite for entrance to the bar but a continuing requirement for the practice of law. A
lawyer should always act to promote public confidence to the legal profession.

3. HORNILLA V. SALUNAT

FACTS

Complainants in this case are members of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association
(PPSTA) who filed an intra-corporate case against its members of the Board of Directors for unlawful
spending and the undervalued sale of the real properties of PPSTA corporation. Attorney Salunat is the
counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA) and at the same time the counsel
of the PPSTA Board of Directors. Hence, complainants now aver that Atty. Salunat is guilty of conflict of
interest.

ISSUE

Can a lawyer, engaged by a corporation, defend members of the board of the same corporation in a
derivative suit?

HELD

No, a lawyer cannot. Hence, Atty. Salunat is guilty of representing conflicting interest and is
admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. The Court in this case
explained the nature of a derivative suit. Where corporation directors have committed a breach, ultra
vires acts, or negligence… a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the
benefit of the corporation. In this suit therefore, the corporation is the real party in interest, while the
stockholder who files a suit for the corporation’s behalf is only the nominal party. The test of
inconsistency of interest is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the
full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
or double dealing in the performance thereof. A situation wherein a lawyer represents both the
corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest.

4. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY V. ARQUILLO

FACTS
 Northwestern University filed an administrative case against Atty. Arquillo for representing
conflicting interests in a NLRC case. The complaint alleges that Atty. Arquillo appeared as counsel for
both the petitioner and the respondent (Castro) in the labor case. Atty. Arquillo, as a defense,
contended that the petitioners and respondent he represented in the labor case belonged to the same
side as the latter party was absolved from liability. Hence, there was no conflict of interests.

ISSUE

W/N Atty. Arquillo represented conflicting interests.

HELD

YES. When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests, the
existence of which is determined by three separate tests: (1) when, in representation of one client, a
lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2)
when the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously
affect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any knowledge
acquired through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of an attorney’s duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance of that duty. Having
agreed to represent one of the opposing parties first, the lawyer should have known that there was an
obvious conflict of interests, regardless of his alleged belief that they were all on the same side. It
cannot be denied that the dismissed employees were the complainants in the same cases in which
Castro was one of the respondents.

CANON 16

1. LICUANAN V. MELO

FACTS

Licuanan filed a complaint against Atty. Melo for breach of professional ethics. Atty. Melo was
Licuanan’s counsel in an ejectment case filed against her tenant. Atty. Melo failed to remit to her the
rentals collected nor did the said lawyer report to her the receipt of said amounts. It was only after a
year from actual receipt that Atty. Melo turned over his collections to Licuanan because a demand
made by the latter.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Melo should be penalized for failure to remit rentals collected

HELD

Yes! Atty. Melo is disbarred.

Ratio:
 The actuations of Atty. Melo in retaining for his personal benefit over a 1 year period, the mount of
P5,220 received by him on behalf of his client, Licuanan is deprived of its use, and withholding
information on the same despite inquiries made by her, I a breach of the Lawyer’s Oath to which he
swore observance, and an evident transgression of the CPR. Due to Atty. Melo’s professional
misconduct, he has breached the trust reposed in him by his client. Atty. Melo’s unprofessional
actuations considered, the SC find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office.
He has displayed lack of honesty and good moral character.

2. POSIDIO V. VITAN

FACTS

Posidio engaged the services of Vitan in a Testate Proceeding of the deceased Nicolasa Arroyo to
which she paid Php 20,000.00 as legal fees. However, Vitan withdrew his appearance in the said case
thus, Posidio had to engage the services of another lawyer. Six years after, Vitan contacted Posidio and
told her that he has with some tax declarations and other documents purportedly forming part of the
estate of Nicolasa Arroyo, but was not included in the inventory of properties for distribution. He
convinced complainant to file another case to recover her share in the alleged undeclared properties
and demanded P100,000.00 as legal fees. After several months, however, respondent failed to institute
any action. Complainant decided to forego the filing of the case and asked for the return of the
P100,000.00, but respondent refused despite repeated demands. The lower court ruled in favor of
Posidio and ordered Vitan to return the Php 100,000.00 and pay an additional Php 20,000.00 as interest
and damages. In compliance, Vitan issued a Prudential Bank check that was dishonored later on. Despite
being sent a notice of dishonor and the repeated demands to pay, Vitan refused to honor his obligation.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner submitted his Report finding Vitan guilty of violating
the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in defrauding his client and issuing a check
without sufficient funds to cover the same. The IBP penalized Vitan with a reprimand with stern warning
that a similar misconduct will warrant a more severe penalty.

ISSUE

Whether or not Vitan should be penalized?

HELD

The Supreme Court agrees with the findings of the IBP. However, they find that the penalty of
reprimand is not commensurate to the gravity of wrong committed by Vitan. In the instant case,
respondent received the amount of P100,000.00 as legal fees for filing additional claims against the
estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo.
3. LEMOINE V. BALON

FACTS

Lemoine, the petitioner, is a French national who filed an insurance claim with Metropolitan
Insurance. His friend, Jesus Garcia, arranged for the engagement of Atty. Balon’ services as his counsel

Balon advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of the actual amount to being recovered payable
upon successful recovery. Lemoine never gave his consent as to the fee. Since he was leaving the
country, Lemoine signed an undated Special Power of Attorney authorizing Balon to bring any action
against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of Lemoine’s claim as well as to negotiate, sign,
compromise, encash and receive payments Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle Lemoine’s claim
and Balon confirmed his acceptance of the offer December 1998, Metropolitan Insurance issued a China
Bank check payable to Lemoine in the amount of P525,000 which was received by Balon. When Lemoine
asked Balon as to the status of the case, Balon answered that Metropolitan Insurance was offering
P350,000 for settlement which Lemoine suggested that Balon accept to avoid litigation. December 1999,
Lemoine visited the office of Metropolitan Insurance to ask on the status of the case and it answered
that the case was long settled via a check given to Balon. Balon acknowledge that he is in possession of
the check and that he is keeping the check as attorney’s lien pending Lemoine’s payment of his
attorney’s fee equivalent to 50% of the entire amount collected. He also threatened Lemoine that he
will not hesitate to make proper representation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, DOLE
and BIR if Lemoine will make any trouble to Balon and that he has good network with the mentioned
agencies.

ISSUE

W/N Atty. Balon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD

YES. According to the SC, Atty. Balon violated Canons 1, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 21. Specifically, Canon 16
which provides that “a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.” Balon violated this and committed misconduct, when he failed to render an
account upon receipt of the money and further, when he failed to deliver such amount to Lemoine. It is
also the duty of the lawyer to surrender such money collected when demanded upon him. Balon
violated this duty when he refuses to return the amount to Lemoine contending that he has a lien on the
fund. The lawyer’s continuing exercise of his retaining lien, as provided for in Rule 16.03, presupposes
that the client agrees with the amount of attorney’s fees to be charged. In case of disagreement,
however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees,
but rather he can file the necessary action with the proper court to fix the fees. And in the present case,
Lemoine never gave his consent on the proposal of Balon. It must be noted as well that before receiving
the check, Balon proposes a 25% attorney’s fees, after receiving the check, he was already asking for
50%. SC found Balon guilty of malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct, and ordered disbarred.
4. IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY LEON G.
MAQUERA

FACTS

Atty Maquera was counsel for a certain Castro who was indebted to Edward Benavente who
obtained judgment in a civil case. Castro’s propery was sold at public auction to satisfy the obligation,
but Castro retained the right to redemption over said property. In consideration for Maquera’s legal
fees, Castro and Atty Maquera entered into an oral agreement that he would assign his right of
redemption to Maquera. Maquera purchased the property from Benavente for $525.00 then sold it for
$320,000. He was suspended in the practice of law in Guam for two years for obtaining an unreasonably
high fee for his services.

Issue:

May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law
in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also be admitted as an attorney be meted the same sanction as a
member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction?

Ruling:

It is not automatic suspension or disbarment, but is prima facie evidence only.

The power of the Court to disbar/suspend a lawyer for acts an omission committed in a foreign
jurisdiction is found in Sec 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court:

“[…]The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or

other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated. The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.” Also, he violated Article 1492 in relation to
1491 of the civil code which prohibits a lawyer from acquiring by assignment the client’s property which
is the subject of litigation. It extends to legal redemption. Most particularly, Canon 17 which states that
a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and be mindful of the trust and confidence In him; and
rule 1.01, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

HOWEVER, there is a need to ascertain Maquera has the right to explain why he should and
should not be suspended/disbarred on those grounds. Suspension/disbarment is NOT automatic

NEVERTHELESS, the Court rules that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law for
the non-payment of his IBP dues from 1977.

5. REDDI V. SERBIO, JR.

Facts:
 Reddi, an Indian national, is a philanthropist. She decided to put up a hospital in the Philippines
and acquired, with the help of Atty. Serbio, some properties to help speed up generation of funds. It was
later found out that some of the properties did not in fact belong to the ‘owners’ she paid.

Issue:

Is respondent guilty of violating Canon 16?

Held:

Yes. Said canon requires that a lawyer should properly account for all amounts in his custody
which pertain to the client and return the same upon demand. This the respondent plainly failed to do
even after repeated demands made by Reddi.

CANONS 17 & 18

1. HERNANDEZ V. GO

FACTS

Sometime in 1961, Hernandez’s husband abandoned her and her son. Shortly thereafter,
creditors of Hernandez ‘s husband demanded payment of his loans. Hernandez, fearful of mortgage
foreclosures and aware of an impending claim suit, engaged the legal services of Atty. Go. Atty. Go
advised Hernandez to give him land titles covering three lots in Zamboanga City belonging to her, so that
he may sell them to enable her to pay the creditors. Also, Atty. Go persuaded Hernandez to execute
deeds of sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable consideration.

ISSUE

W/N Atty. GO SHOULD BE REPRIMANDED

HELD

YES, for violating Canons 16 and 17. Atty. Go violated Canon 16 His acts acquiring for himself
Hernandez’s lots entrusted to him are acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden
act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in
judgment. Such conduct on the part of Atty. Go not only degrades himself but also the honor of the legal
profession Atty. Go violated Canon 17 which provides that “a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.” Records show that
Hernandez reposed high degree of trust and confidence in Atty. Go and when she engaged his services,
she entrusted to him her land titles and allowed him to sell the same Atty. Go, however, abused this
trust and confidence when he did not sell her properties to others but to himself without giving any
monetary consideration to Hernandez, thus depriving Hernandez the real worth of her properties Atty.
Go is duty bound to render a detailed report to Hernandez on how much he sold the lots and the
amounts paid to her creditors but failed to do so In previous cases, the Court disbarred and expelled
lawyers from the practice of law in similar circumstances, thus, the penalty recommended by the IBP is
too light Atty. Go was ordered disbarred.

2. PANELCO V. ATTY. JUAN AYAR MONTEMAYOR

FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Pangasinan Electric Cooperative I (PANELCO I)
charging Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor with negligence. Some of the omissions of Atty
Montemayor were: Atty. Montemayor failed to serve and file the required Appellant's Brief
despite the lapse of the two extensions of time granted, hence the Court of Appeals considered
the appeal Abandoned The records also show that respondent Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor did
not even bother to answer the complaint nor present his defense. Hence, PANELCO I prays that
the court impose sanctions on Atty. Montemayor’s gross negligence as counsel for complainant
which resulted [in] the damage of PANELCO I.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in mishandling
complainant’s cases on appeal, which eventually led to their dismissal, to the prejudice of the
complainant.
HELD:
Yes. WHEREFORE, Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor is DISBARRED from the practice of law.
As counsel for complainant, respondent had the duty to present every remedy or defense
authorized by law to protect his client. When he undertook his client’s cause, he made
covenant that he will exert all efforts for its prosecution until its final conclusion.He should
undertake the task with dedication and care. CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY
EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE. Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering a
explanation for his failure to do so. CANON 17 — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF
HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable. CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS
CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

3. BELLEZA V. MACASA

FACTS

On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their mutual friend,
Joe Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondent’s legal services in connection with the case of her
son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged
violation of Republic Act (RA) 9165. Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000. The following
day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent thru their mutual friend Chua. On
November 17, 2004, she gave him an additional P10,000. She paid the P5,000 balance on November 18,
2004. Both payments were also made thru Chua. On all three occasions, respondent did not issue any
receipt.

On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of
posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainant’s) son. Again, respondent did not
issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court the next day, she found out that respondent did
not remit the amount to the court. Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent
on several occasions but respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of
complainant’s son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public Attorney’s Office for
her son’s defense. Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent
in the Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). In an order dated July 13,
2005, the CBD required respondent to submit his answer within 15 days from receipt thereof.
Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer dated August 10, 2005, simply
brushed aside the complaint for being "baseless, groundless and malicious" without, however, offering
any explanation. He also prayed that he be given until September 4, 2005 to submit his answer.

Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions for second and third extensions of time praying
to be given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.

HELD

Respondent Grossly Neglected The Cause of His Client, Atty. Macasa is disbarred Respondent
undertook to defend the criminal case against complainant’s son. Such undertaking imposed upon him
the following duties:

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxxxxxxx

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

xxxxxxxxx

CANON 19 – A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE
LAW.

4. ANGALAN V. DELANTE

FACTS

This is a complaint filed by the heirs of an illiterate couple belonging to the Samal Tribe against
Atty. Delante for gross violation of professional responsibility particularly Canons 16 and 17.
 The couple owned a property in Samal, Davao del Norte. On 15 April 1971, Angalan and
complainants borrowed P15,000 from Spouses Eustaquio. To secure the loan, Angalan and complainants
mortgaged their property and surrendered the title to the Spouses Eustaquio. When complainants tried
to pay the loan and recover the title from the Spouses Eustaquio, the Spouses Eustaquio refused.
Complainants learned that the document which the Spouses Eustaquio prepared, and which
complainants signed, was a deed of absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. They also learned that
Navarro R. Eustaquio (Navarro) had transferred the title over the property to his name.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent committed grave violation of [the] Code of Professional

Responsibility when he bought the property of his client[s] without their knowledge, consent and
against their will?

HELD

YES. The Court is not impressed with Atty. Delante’s defenses. Angalan and complainants went
to respondent’s office not to seek advice about borrowing money but to engage his services for the
purpose of recovering their property.

CANON 19

1. ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES V. ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ

FACTS:

The complainant in this disbarment case is Atty. Briones. The respondent is Atty. Jimenez.
Complainant Briones is the Special Administrator of the Henson Estate, while respondent Jimenez is the
counsel for Heirs of Henson. The root of herein administrative complaint for Disbarment is an RTC Order
(2002). The RTC Order directed complainant Briones to deliver the residue of the estate to the Heirs in
proportion to their shares. Complainant Briones did not reply to the demand, so respondent Jimenez
opted to file a criminal complaint in behalf of his clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of the court.
Complainant Briones now claims that respondent Jimenez is guilty of violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code
of Professional responsibility by filing the unfounded criminal complaint against complainant to obtain
an improper advantage:

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case of proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Atty. Jimenez should be administratively liable.

HELD:
 Yes. Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is found guilty of and REPRIMANDED [since no evidence of malice
or bad faith] for violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Fair play demands that
respondent should have filed the proper motion with the RTC to attain his goal of having the residue of
the estate delivered to his clients and not subject complainant to a premature criminal prosecution.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent his client with zeal.
However, the same Canon provides that a lawyer’s performance of his duties towards his client must be
within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. To permit lawyers to
resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one
of the purposes of the state – the administration of justice. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to
the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they should not forget that they
are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.

2. PENA V. APARICIO

FACTS

Atty. Aparicio was the legal counsel for Grace Hufana in an alleged dismissal case before the
NLRC against Pena, President of MOF Company. Atty. Aparicio prayed that his client be given separation
pay. Peña rejected the claim. Thereafter, Peña sent notices to Hufana to return to work. Atty. Aparicio
replied with a letter reiterating the claim of his client. The letter also contained threats against the
company stating that if the claim is not paid on Aug. 10, 2005, they will file multiple charges such as,
criminal charges for tax evasion, falsification of documents, and for the cancellation of the company’s
business license. Peña filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Aparicio with the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the IBP for violating Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Aparicio in turn filed counterclaims for the defamatory charges against him. The IBP dismissed the
complaint because Peña had allegedly failed to file his position paper and the certification against forum
shopping. The IBP transmitted the records of the case to the SC. Atty. Aparicio filed an MR with the SC
reiterating his claim for damages against Peña in the amount of P400M for filing false, malicious,
defamatory, fraudulent suit against him. Peña likewise filed this Petition for Review alleging that he
submitted his position paper and that the dismissal denied him of due process.

ISSUE

W/N Atty. Aparicio is guilty of violating Rule 19.01?

HELD

YES. First of all, the SC found that Peña actually submitted his position paper. In addition,
disbarment proceedings are sui generis, hence, the requirement of a certification of forum shopping is
not to be strictly complied with in such a case. At any rate, Peña actually submitted a certification
against forum shopping after Atty. Aparicio filed the motion to dismiss, curing the supposed defect in
the original complaint. Now to the merits…
Canon 19, “a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law,” this shows that a
lawyer’s duty to his client is subordinate to his duty in the administration of justice. Rule 19.01, “a
lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.” Under such Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to
file baseless criminal cases against the adversaries of his client to secure a leverage to compel the
adversaries to yield to the claims of the lawyer’s client. This is exactly what Atty. Aparicio did in this case.
Furthermore, his threats were not only unethical, but they amounted to blackmail – extortion of money
by threats of accusation or exposure in the public prints. Blackmail and extortion would not only entail
disbarment but also possible criminal prosecution. Worse yet, Atty. Aparicio actually admitted and even
found it his obligation to tell the truth of the offenses he imputed against Peña. He also stated that the
writing of demand letters is standard practice. SC ruled that Atty. Aparicio’s assertions are misleading
because the fact of the matter is, he used such threats to gain leverage against Peña and force the latter
to accede to his client’s claims. The letter even implied a promise to “keep silent” about the said
violations if the claim is met. While it is true that writing demand letters is standard practice in the
profession of law, such letters must not contain threats such as those found in this case.

Nevertheless, SC held that disbarment is too severe a penalty considering that Atty. Aparicio wrote the
letter out of his overzealousness to protect his client’s interests. Therefore, the SC reprimanded him
with a stern warning.

AUTHORITY OF THE LAWYER: CONDUCT OF LITIGATION

1. MANALANG V. ANGELES
FACTS:
Manalang and Cirillo alleged that they were the complainants in a case for overtime and
separation pay filed against their employer, the Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, before the
National Labor Relations. Respondent was their counsel. Judgment was rendered in their favor,
in the amount of P6,500. After the decision became final, a writ of execution issued. However,
without authority from his clients, respondent compromised the award and was able to collect
P5,500 only. Complainants said they made several demands upon respondent to turn over to
them the amount collected minus the agreed upon attorney's fees of thirty percent (30%), but
Atty. Angeles refused and offered to give them only the sum of P2,650. Respondent counsel
stated that he offered to give complainants their money, but they insisted that he "deduct from
this attorney's fees the amount of P2,000, representing the amount discounted by the counsel
of the Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, together with sheriff legal fees and other
administrative expenses." Respondent claimed that to accept complainants' proposition meant
that he "would not be compensated for prosecuting and handling, the case.”
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Atty. Francisco F. Angeles should be suspended from the practice of law
because of grave misconduct related to his clients' funds.
HELD
 Where a member of the bar stands charged with malpractice, the proceedings are not
meant solely to rule on his culpability but also to determine if the lawyer concerned is possessed
of that good moral character, which is a condition precedent to the privilege of practicing law
and continuing in the practice thereof. Money claims due to workers cannot, as a rule, be the
object of settlement or compromise effected by counsel without the consent of the workers
concerned . A client has every right to expect from his counsel that nothing will be taken or
withheld from him, save by the rules of law validly applied. By compromising the judgment
without the consent of his clients, respondent not only went against the stream of judicial dicta,
he also exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to the interest of his clients as well as want of zeal
in the maintenance and defense of their rights. In so doing, he violated Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that may come into his possession. In the instant case, the records clearly and abundantly
point to respondent's receipt of and failure to deliver upon demand, the amount of P4,550
intended for his clients. This is a clear breach of Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

2. GARCIA V. CA

FACTS:

Guevara spouse seeks recovery of a lady's diamond ring which they bought from Rebullida.

Guevara claims that while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia, owner of La Bulakeña restaurant, she
recognized her ring in the finger of Mrs. Garcia and asked where she bought it, which Garcia answered
from her comadre. Guevarra told Garcia that a ring was stolen from her house in February, 1952. Garcia
handed the ring to Guevara and it fitted her finger. Two or three days later, at the request of Guevarra,
her husband Lt. Col. Juan Guevara, Lt. Cementina of Pasay PD, Garcia and her attorney proceeded to the
store of Mr. Rebullida to whom they showed the ring in question. Mr. Rebullida examined the ring and
after consulting the stock card thereon, concluded that it was the very ring that plaintiff bought from
him in 1947. The ring was returned to Garcia who despite a written request failed to deliver the ring to
Guevara. Garcia refused to deliver the ring which had been examined by Mr. Rebullida, claiming it was
lost. Garcias’s defense was that they denied having made any admission before Guevara or Mr.
Rebullida or the sheriff. Her evidence tends to show that the ring was purchased by her from Mrs.
Miranda who got it from Miss Angelita Hinahon who in turn got it from the owner, Aling Petring, who
was boarding in her house; that the ring she bought could be similar to, but not the same ring plaintiff
purchased from Mr. Rebullida which was stolen; that according to a pawn-shop owner the big diamond
was never dismantled. When dismantled, defendant's diamond was found to weigh 2.57 cts, unlike the
one claimed by Guevara spouse. Apparently Garcia’s own counsel admitted through an answer that the
ring in question was the same ring, which is being claimed by the Guevara spouse.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a lawyer needs an SPA to admit the truth of certain facts
HELD:

NO. Garcia is contradicted by her own extra-judicial admissions, although made by her counsel.
For an attorney who acts as counsel of record and is permitted to act such, has the authority to manage
the cause, and this includes the authority to make admission for the purpose of the litigation... Garcia’s
proffered explanation that her counsel misunderstood her is futile because the liability to error as to the
identity of the vendor and the exchange of the ring with another ring of the same value, was rather
remote.

The ring’s identification was confirmed by Mr. Rafael Rebullida, whose testimony is entitled to
great weight, with his 30 years experience behind him in the jewelry business. Indeed, Garcia made no
comment when in her presence Rebullida after examining the ring and stock card told Guevara that that
was her ring, nor did she answer plaintiff's letter of demand,asserting ownership. None of the people
whom she mentioned, was able to corroborate the story of how she bought the ring.

3. SANTIAGO V. DELOS SANTOS

Facts:

Plaintiff, now appellant, applied for registration of a parcel of land. In a motion to set the case
for hearing, he attached documents indicative of the land being public in character, thus lending support
to the opposition of the Director of Forestry, the Director of Lands, and a certain Pacita V. de los Santos.
The then Judge Cecilia Muñoz Palma, now an Associate Justice of this Court, dismissed the suit. Its
reversal is sought in this appeal.

Issue:

Was the counsel negligent in the preparation of the pleadings? Yes.

Held:

Attached to such pleading were the documents, which, in the language of the then Judge Palma,
"show that the land object of this registration proceeding is part of the public domain ... ." Former
counsel ought to have realized the fatal effect on his client's case of such an admission. If it were his
intention to demolish entirely the pretension of plaintiff to the claim that he had been in open, public,
uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner from July 26, 1894 up to the
present, he could not have succeeded any better. What was so categorically therein set forth as to such
parcel of land being a part of a public forest, although thereafter released by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources for agricultural purposes, is conclusive and binding.

CANON 20

SESBRENO V. CA

Facts:
 Atty. Sesbreno is the counsel of 52 employees who sued the province of Cebu for reinstatement
and back wages. They signed 2 documents whereby the employees agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreno 30% as
attorney’s fees and 20% expenses to be taken from their back salaries. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor the employees and fixed Atty. Sesbreno’s attorney’s fees at 40% of back salaries,
terminal leave, gratuity pay and retirement benefits and 20% as expenses, or a total of 60% of all monies
paid to the employees. The court later on modified the attorney’s fees to 50%. Atty. Sesbreno appealed
to the CA, which decided that the attorney’s fees should be reduced to 20% of the back salaries awarded
to the employees. Atty. Sesbreno appeals to the SC on the ground that attorney’s fees amounting to
50% of all monies awarded to his clients as contingent fees should be upheld for being consistent with
prevailing case law and the contract of professional services between the parties.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals had the authority to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees
awarded to Atty. Sesbreno, notwithstanding the contract for professional services signed by the client

Held:

Yes! The CA has the authority to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees. A lawyer may charge and
receive as attorney’s fees is always subject to judicial control. In the case at bar, the parties entered into
a contingent fee contract, wherein Atty. Sesbreno will get 50% from the employees money claims if they
will win the case. However, the court finds the 50% fee as unconscionable. Stipulated attorney’s fees are
unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so disproportionate compared to the value of the
services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetrated upon the client. Contingent fee contracts are
under the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust
charges. The court held that a fee of 20% of back salaries would be a fair settlement.

2. BAUTISTA V. GONZALES

Facts:

Atty. Gonzales is the lawyer of the Fortunados in a civil case wherein Atty. Gonzales agreed to
pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of 50% of the value of the property in
litigation.

Issue:

Whether or not the contingent fee agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the Forunados is valid

Held:

No. There was no impropriety in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados. However,
the agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the Fortunados is contrary to the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the
expenses of litigation. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same
should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between Atty. Gonzales and Fortunados does not
provide for reimbursement to Atty. Gonzales of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby
an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous. Such
agreements are against public policy. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship
between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.

3. GAMILLA V. MARINO

Facts:

Atty. Eduardo Marino Jr. was the president of the UST Faculty Union. There’s a long history of
collective bargaining agreement between UST and UST Faculty Union. During the series of agreements
between UST and the UST Faculty Union, Atty. Marino was removed from his position but continued to
serve as a lawyer for the UST Faculty Union. In the end, the UST Faculty won and was awarded 42 million
pesos for back wages, salaries, additional compensations, etc. Complainants are members of the UST
Faculty Union questioning the lack of transparency in the disbursement of the monetary benefits (42M)
for the faculty members, and prays for the expulsion of Atty. Marino for failure to account for the
balance of 42M ceded to them by UST and the attorney’s fees amounting to 4.2M which he deducted
from the benefits allotted to faculty members.

Issue:

Whether or not the 4.2M attorney’s fees is proportionate to the legal services rendered by Atty. Marino

Held:

No. The record does not show any justification for such huge amount of compensation nor any
clear differentiation between his legal services and his tasks union president comprising in all probity the
same duties for which he has collected a hefty compensation as attorney for the union. Furthermore,
there was lack of notice and transparency in Atty. Marino’s dual role a lawyer and president of UST
Faculty Union when he obtained 4.2M as attorney’s fees. A simple accounting of the money that he and
others concerned received from UST, as well as an explanation on the details of the agreements, would
have enlightened the faculty members about the probability of conflict of interests on respondent’s part
and guided them to look for alternative actions to protect their own interests. The objective of a
disciplinary case is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice
by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court.
Restorative justice not retribution is our goal in this type of proceedings. In view of this, instead of taking
a more stern measure against respondent, a reprimand and a warning would be sufficient disciplinary
action. Hence, Atty. Mariño is admonished to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety
including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection
and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all
transactions with his client.

4. VINSON PINEDA V. ATTY. DE JESUS, ATTY. AMBROSIO AND ATTY. MARIANO

Facts:

Aurora Pineda filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Vinson Pineda. Aurora
proposed a settlement regarding visitation rights and the separation of properties which was accepted
by Vinson. Settlement was approved by the trial court and their marriage was declared null and void.

Throughout the proceedings the respondent counsels were compensated but they still billed petitioner
additional legal fees in amounting to P16.5M. Vinson refused to pay the additional fees but instead paid
P1.2M. Respondents filed a complaint with the same trial court. Trial court ordered Vinson to pay a total
of P9M. CA reduced the amount to a total of P2M.

Issues:

W/N the RTC had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees?

W/N respondents were entitled to additional legal fees?

Held:

A lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the petition as an incident of the main action.
RTC has jurisdiction. The respondents were seeking to collect P50M which was 10% of the value of the
properties awarded to Vinson. What respondents were demanding was additional payment for service
rendered in the same case. The professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was
governed by quantum meruit. Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to
avoid controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to
prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be avoided and should be filed only
when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it. In this case, there was no justification for the
additional legal fees sought by respondents. It was an act of unconscionable greed.

CANON 21

1. REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines instituted a Complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB), through
the Presidential Commission on Good Gov’t (PCGG) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the
principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the
named corps. in PCGG Case No. 33 (CC No. 0033) entitled "RP vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."

ISSUES

WON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PROHIBITS PETITIONERS FROM REVEALING THE IDENTITY OF THEIR
CLIENT(S) & THE OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE PCGG

HELD

YES. Nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them
without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services
may be compensated by honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on
whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the
contract to the person who requested him. But the lawyerclient relationship is more than that of the
principal-agent and lessor-lessee.

2. IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF

ATTORNEY PALANCA:WILLIAM PFLEIDER VS. ATTORNEY PALANCA

Facts:

Palanca was the legal counsel of Pfleider. Pfleider leased an agricultural land to Palanca known
as Hacienda Asia. Pfleider filed a civil suit against Palanca for rescission of the lease contract for
defaulting in rental payments. He also filed this administrative complaint of gross misconduct against
Palanca. Pfleider alleged that in a criminal case for estafa filed against him in which Palanca was his
counsel, the latter sought to negotiate the dismissal of the complaint. Pfleider alleged that Palanca
informed him through letters that he had successfully negotiated the dismissal of the complaint and that
he had deposited P5k with the court.

Issue:

W/N Palanca was guilty of gross misconduct?

W/N the filing of the civil suit for the rescission of the lease contract

terminated the attorney-client relationship?

Held:

Palanca was not guilty of gross misconduct. The letters relied upon by Pfleider did not show that
Palanca stated that he had successfully negotiated the dismissal of the criminal complaint against
Pfleider. The civil suit for rescission terminated the attorney-client relationship. While the object of the
suit was the rescission of the lease contract, the conflict of interest became incompatible with the
mutual confidence and trust essential to every attorney-client relationship.
 3. MERCADO V. ATTY. VITRIOLO

Facts:

Atty. Vitriolo was the counsel of Mercado in a case for annulment of marriage filed by the
latter’s husband. Vitriolo filed a criminal action for falsification of public documents against Mercado
alleging that the latter made false entries in the certificates of live birth of her children which were
presented in the annulment case. Mercado filed this complaint alleging that due to the criminal case
filed against her by Vitriolo, information relating to her civil case for annulment was divulged. Hence,
Vitriolo breached the privilege and confidence reposed within a lawyer-client relationship. Mercado
prayed the Vitriolo be disbarred.

Issue:

W/N Vitriolo violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client when he filed a
criminal case against his former client?

Held:

SC provided the factors which are essential to establish the existence of the communication
privilege between an attorney and his client. There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a
prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication. The client made the communication in confidence. The legal advice must be sought
from the attorney in his professional capacity. SC ruled that in applying all there rules, the evidence on
record fails to substantiate Mercado’s allegations. Mercado did not even specify the alleged
communication. all her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity.

4. GENATO V. ATTY SILAPAN

Facts:

Atty. Silapan was leasing office space in Genato’s building. Atty. Silapan handled some of
Genato’s cases. After a while, Atty. Silapan borrowed money from Genato to buy a car. Atty. Silapan
bought the car, and issued a postdated check to Genato. The check was dishonored. Genato filed a case
against Atty. Silapan under BP 22. In his defense, he alleged that Genato was in the business of “buying
an selling deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals” and that he was also
involved in bribery cases. Genato claimed that Atty. Silapan was guilty of breaking their confidential
lawyer-client relationship.

Issue:

Was Atty. Silapan guilty of the breach?

Held:
 No. While Canon 17 provides that a lawyer shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
on him, especially with privileged communication – the protection is only limited to communications
which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not
extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. Thus, here, the attorney-
client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment in the strictest sense. However,
the disclosures were not indispensable to protect Atty. Silapan’s rights as they were not pertinent to the
case. It was improper for him to disclose those information as they were not the subject matter of
litigation at hand. His professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in the said
case. A lawyer must conduct himself with integrity. He is therefore suspended for 6 months.

5. HADJULA V. ATTY MADIANDA

Facts:

Hadjula claimed that she asked legal advice from her friend, Atty. Madianda. She disclosed
confidential information during that period. However, after the confidential information was given by
Hadjula, Atty. Madianda referred her to another lawyer. Hadjula filed a complaint against Atty.
Madianda because of this, claiming the lawyer just wanted to hear her secrets. In answering the
complaint, Atty. Madianda filed a counter complaint against Hadjula for falsification of public documents
and immorality – using the disclosures as basis for the charges.

Issue:

What is to become of Atty. Madianda?

Held:

Reprimanded. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal
advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Atty. Madianda should have kept
the information secret and confidential, under the attorney-client privilege rule. However, the
seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for
compassion, absent compelling evidence that she (Atty. Madianda) acted with ill-will. It appears that she
was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that in the process of giving bent to a
negative sentiment, she was violating the rule of confidentiality.

6. PALM V. ATTY. ILEDAN

Facts:

Palm is the president of Comtech, which hired Atty. Iledan as its retained counsel. She filed a
case of disbarment against Atty. Iledan for breach of the attorneyclient privilege and conflict of interests.
The basis of the claim of breach occurred during a meeting. Atty. Iledan claimed that the stockholders’
meeting cannot take place via teleconferencing because they have yet to amend the by-laws of the
corporation to allow such mode of communications. Palm claims this was a breach of the attorney-client
privilege of confidentiality. The basis of the conflict of interests stemmed from Atty. Iledan being the
counsel of Soledad who was filed with an estafa case by Comtech.

Issue:

Was Atty. Iledan guilty of breach? How about conflict of interests?

Held:

No. Although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate bylaws may have
been given to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential information. The amendment,
repeal or adoption of new by-laws may be effected by “the board of directors or trustees, by a majority
vote thereof, and the owners of at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or at least a majority
of members of a non-stock corporation.”It means the stockholders are aware of the proposed
amendments to the by-laws. Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made,
copies of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and attached to the original articles of incorporation and by-laws.The documents are public
records and could not be considered confidential. It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and
client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be
confidential. Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least a majority of the
stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not
have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the
stockholders’ meeting could not be considered a violation of his client’s secrets and confidence within
the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

CANON 22

1. WACK WACK GOLF V. CA, PETRONILO ARCANGEL

FACTS

Wack-wack was in a labor case against Arcangel. During the pendency of the case, Wack-wack
wanted to change their counsel from Balcoff, Poblador and Cruz to the Law Office of Juan Chudian.
During the hearing, neither Wack-wack nor their original counsels showed up, so Arcangel was
allowed to present his evidence without Wack-wack. The court awarded judgment to Arcangel. The
law firm of Chuidian then filed a petition to set aside the judgment on the ground of
misunderstanding. This petition was denied by the lower court. Wack-wack assails the denial of the
petition. It has to be taken note of that the court did not know of the change of counsel because
Chudian only entered his appearance after the judgment was rendered against Wack-wack.

Issue:

Was the trial court correct in denying the petition to set aside the judgment?
 Held:

Yes. As such counsel of record, Balcoff, Poblador and Cruz must have known that, its impending
relief as counself for the defendant notwithstanding, it is still under obligation to protect the client’s
interest until its final release from the professional relationship with such client. The court could
recognize no other representation on behalf of the client except such counsel of record until a
formal substitution of attorney is effected. Any agreement or arrangement such counsel of record
and its client may reach regarding the presentation of the client’s case in court is purely their private
concern. Proceedings in court cannot be made to depend on them.

2. VENTEREZ V. ATTY COSME

Facts:

Venterez and friends hired Atty. Cosme as counsel for a land title dispute. The court rule against
Venterez and friends. They wanted to file a motion for reconsideration but Atty. Cosme failed or
refused to do so. Because of this, Venterez was constrained to contract another lawyer to prepare
the MR. Atty. Cosme claims that the son of one of the complainants informed him that he was
withdrawing the case from him because he (the son) already engaged another lawyer to take over
the case. Atty. Cosme explained that he even turned over the records of the case to the son and
thus, ceased to be counsel any longer.

Issue:

Is Atty. Cosme guilty of culpable negligence in handling the case?

Held:

Yes. Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and
must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. An attornery who undertakes an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination – that is, until the case becomes final and executory.
Any dereliction of duty affects the client. The Court cannot accept Atty. Cosme’s defense that he had
already withdrawn from the case. A lawyer may retire at any time with the written consent of his client
filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his
consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The application must be based on a good
case. What constitutes good cause? See Rule 22.01, Canon 22. There was no proper revocation in this
case. He is suspended for 3 months.

3. SANTECO V. ATTY. AVANCE

Facts:
 Santeco got Atty. Avance to handle a case for her in a civil suit. She paid her P12,000 as
acceptance money. Losing in the first instance, Atty. Avance made representations that she was going to
file a petition for certiorari with the CA. She didn’t. She also didn’t appear during scheduled hearings,
causing the case to get dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Issue:

Is Atty. Avance grossly remiss in the performance of her duties?

Held:

Yes. Aggravating her gross negligence in the performance of her duties, she abruptly stopped appearing
as complainant’s counsel even as proceedings were still pending – with neither a withdrawal nor an
explanation for doing so. This violated Canon 22. Suspended for 5 years.

4. FRANCISCO VS. PORTUGAL

Facts:

Atty was counsel for complainants in a criminal case. Atty was retained After judgment was
rendered convicting appellants. Atty filed an MR and another Motion and Petition for review of the
judgment of conviction. But after the filing, Atty disappeared and was nowhere to be found. Later, the
complainants found out that their petitions were denied for being filed out of time and for failure to pay
the docket fees. The decision became final and warrants of arrest were issued.

Issue:

Is Atty guilty of negligence in handling the case?

Held:

Yes! 3 month suspension. Atty should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself if he truly
wanted to withdraw. At the very least, he should have informed the court. For failure to do so, Atty was
negligent. Atty was also negligent in filing the petition out of time. eventually he would have known that
the petition was denied but still he failed to informe the convicts and return their calls. One of the
fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable
cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s
written consent or from a good cause.

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if
the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a
profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration.

SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT

1. GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS V. NALDOZA

Facts:

Atty. convinced his clients to appeal a case from the POEA to the SC. Atty asked from
complainants $2.5K which he said were to be used for payment of docket fees and that the court could
take cognizance of the case. Later, complainant corporation came to know that the fees to be paid to
the SC consisted only of nominal fees for such kind of appeal. Atty in order to cover up presented
complainant a fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme Court receipt representing payment of $2.5K.

A criminal case was filed for estafa. Atty was acquitted but was held civilly liable for $2.5K.

Issue:

Should Atty be disbarred? Should the case be dismissed because of his acquittal?

Held:

Yes disbarred! No, complaint shouldn’t be dismissed. Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases. The burden of proof is clearly preponderant evidence.

A finding of guilt in a criminal case or liability in a civil case will not necessarily result in a finding of
liability in the administrative case and vice versa.

Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer.
The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters,
such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. Disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did he
misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his
money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly,
he does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.

2. SANTOS V. LLAMAS

Facts

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed
against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas. In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997,
complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that: On my oath as an
attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data
(date & place of issuance) in his pleadings This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138,
Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in
the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."

Issues:

W/N counsel is guilty of misrepresentation? YES

W/N he is exempt from paying his dues? YES

Held:

Rule 139-A provides: Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed
sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare
Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof. Sec.
10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. In accordance with these provisions, respondent can
engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is
"limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of
individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption
does not include payment of membership or association dues. Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060"
in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues
to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides: Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

3. LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO AREVALO JR REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUTIES

FACTS:

Atty Arevalo wrote a letter in Sept 2004, asking to be exempted from payment of IBP duties
amounting to P12,035 (unpaid duties from 1977-2005). Atty Arevalo was admitted to the Bar in 1961. He
was with the Philippine Civil Service from 1962 to 1986. After that, he migrated and worked in the USA
until 2003. His main contention was that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the above amount because
he was working with the Civil Service then, and the Civil Service Law prohibits the practice of one’s
profession while in government service. He also contends that he cannot be assessed for the years he
was working in the USA. IBP commented on the letter saying that the IBP membership is NOT based on
the actual practice of law. Once a lawyer passes the Bar, he continues to be a member of the IBP, and
one of his obligations as member is the payment of annual dues. The validity of such dues has been
upheld by the SC in saying that it is necessary to defray the cost of the Integrated Bar Program and no
one is exempted from paying the dues. What was allowed was the voluntary termination and
reinstatement later on of membership. If membership is terminated, dues wouldn’t be assessed.
Basically, the main contention of Atty. Arevalo is that the IBP’s policy of Non- Exemption in payment of
annual membership dues is invalid because it would be oppressive for one who has been in an inactive
status and is without income derived from his law practice. Also, it is a deprivation of property right
without due process.

ISSUE:

W/N Atty. Arevalo is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time he was inactive in
the practice of law, when he was in the Civil Service and abroad?

HELD/RATIO:

NO. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all
the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar.

4. VDA. DE BARRERA V. LAPUT

Gross Misconduct as ground for discipline of lawyer (Lawyer suspended for intimidating his client to sign
papers by placing his revolver on his lap when she refused to do so)

Facts:

Respondent Atty. Laput represented petitioner Vda. de Barrera (Mrs. Barrera) in the estate proceedings
of her late husband. Laput presented to her several papers or pleadings for her signature. However,
Mrs. Barrera refused to sign the pleadings but requested Laput to leave them so that she may ask
somebody to translate the same for her (she was from Cebu). Laput got angry and drew his revolver
from its holster and placed it on his lap to intimidate the 72-year-old woman into signing the papers.
Mrs. Barrera was compelled to sign them, but is now before the court seeking the disbarment of Laput.

Issue:

W/N Laput should be disbarred for gross misconduct

Held:

Yes. The acts are inherently improper and censurable, more so considering that they were
performed by a man dealing with a 72-year-old woman. The offense is compounded by the circumstance
that, being a member of the BAR, the offender should have set an example of a man of peace and
champion of the Rule of Law. Worse still is the fact that the offended party is the very person whom the
offender had pledged to defend and protect – his client. He was suspended from the practice of law for
1 year.

5. VICTORIA BARRIENTOS V. TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL

FACTS

This is a disbarment case filed by Barrientos against Atty Daarol, on grounds of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct. Barrientos first knew Daarlo in 1969. She was a college student, single. Atty.
Daarol went to her house because he was a friend of her sister, hence they also became friends. She
knew Daarol to be a single and as a General Manager of ZANECO (electic cooperative).

ISSUE

ISSUE:

W/N Daarol should be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct.

HELD/RATIO:

YES. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the complainant
became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for
having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that
he would work for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that
respondent never bothered to annul said marriage.

6. FELICITAS BERBANO V. ATTY. WENCESLAO BARCELONA

FACTS:

This is a disbarment case filed by Berbano against Atty. Barcelona for Malpractice and Gross
Misconduct Unbecoming of a Lawyer, Dereliction of Duty and Unjust Enrichment. Berbano was one of
the heirs of a certain Hilapo, who owned a lot in Alabang. Said lot was being claimed by FIlinvest
Development Corp so Berbano and her co-heirs appointed a certain Mr. Daen as attorney-in-fact.
However, Mr. Dane was arrested in Jan 1999 and was detained so he needed the assistance of a law for
his release. Someone recommended Atty. Barcelona to them. So later that month, Atty. Barcelona went
to see Mr. Daen in jail. The latter engaged the services of Atty. Barcelona for his release. Atty. Barcelona
told them that they (Berbano and Co.) had to produce P50,000 at that time so that he could secure
Daen’s release the following day. Berbano didn’t have enough money and time to immediately come up
with such big amount but they were able to come up with P15,700. She handed Atty. Barcelona the
money. He said that he would go to the SC to talk to someone regarding the release of Daen, and that
they should just meet tomorrow. The day after, they met again. Berbano handed over another check
worth P24,000. The day after, they gave another P10,000 to Atty. Barcelona (through his wife and
daughter). There were other payments of money, the total amounting to P64,000. After much time
wasted, and promises reiterated of the release of Daen, Atty. Barcelona wasn’t seen again and he didn’t
return their calls. Daen was still in jail. Atty. Barcelona failed to file an answer. Commissioner on Bar
Discipline found Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious breach of CPR. He recommended
disbarment and return of the P64,000. IBP Board of Governots adopted such findings but recommended
only suspension.

ISSUE:

W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.

HELD/RATIO:

Yes. The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as
to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of
officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of
office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.

7. HILDA D. TABAS V. ATTY. BONIFACIO B. MANGIBIN

FACTS:

This is a disbarment case filed by Tabas against Atty. Mangibin for allegedly having committed
forgery. Tabas claims that in March 2001, a certain Galvan mortgaged to her a piece of real property to
secure a P48,000 loan. The deed of the REM was registered and annotated. On October 2001 however, a
certain Castillejos, falsely representing herself as Tabas, appeared before Atty. Mangibin and asked him
to prepare a discharge of the said mortgage and then notarize it afterwards. Atty. Mangibin prepared
the said discharge but he didn’t ask Castillejos for any other document other that a Community Tax
Certificate. He later on notarized the said deed. Subsequently, the mortgagor Galvan was able to
mortgage the same property again with Rural Bank of Nauilian. When Tabas learned of the cancellation,
she promptly informed Atty. Mangibin that her signature in the deed was forged. However, he did not
help her.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Mangibin is liable for violating the Notarial Law and should be suspended from the
practice of law.

HELD/RATIO:

Yes, suspended for 2 years. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.

Courts, administrative agencies, and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. For this reason, notaries public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments would be undermined. A notary public
should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of matters stated in
the document. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness
of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act
and deed.

8. SESBRENO V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On January 26, 1970, Mrs. Rosario Sen and other camineros hired the petitioner to prosecute
their cases. They had undertaken an an agreement wherein it was stated that Sesbreno will get 30% of
whatever back salaries, damages, etc. they may recover. Atty. Sesbreno registered his
charhing/retaining lien on the Agreement. The camineros he was representing obtained a favorable
judgment. RTC ordered that they be reinstate with back salaries, with privileges and adjustments. The
respondent to that case DPWH appealed to the SC where Sesbreno still represented the camineros.
Later on, the Governor of Cebu proposed a compromise settlement of the cases. The parties signed a
Compromise Agreement wherein it is stated that camineros will be paid full back wages. Also states that
the camineros are subject to lawyer’s charging and retaining liens as registered in the lower court.

ISSUE:

W/N Atty. Sesbreno is entitled to Damages for breach of contract.

HELD/RATIO:

NO. The compromise agreement had been validly entered into by the respondents and the camineros
and the same became the basis of the judgment rendered by this Court.

NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

CANON 1

1. LIBARIOS V. DABALOS

(Gross ignorance of the law; close association)

Facts:

Judge Dabalos without conducting any hearing directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against accused and at the same time fixed the bail for accused Calo and Allocod.

Held:

Judge Dabalos is fined with a warning. It has been an established legal principle or rule that in
cases where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a
summary proceeding to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving
the issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused. Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion
that the evidence of guilt against herein accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence
demanded that a hearing be conducted before bail was fixed. Respondent judge's disregard of an
established rule of law by depriving the prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the evidence of
guilt against the accused was strong, amounted to gross ignorance of the law, which is subject to
disciplinary action.

Considering that respondent judge had a close association with respondent Calo, Jr. as a former
employee of the said accused, prudence and regard for his position as judge demanded that he should
have refrained from fixing the bail of said accused and from concluding that the evidence against him
was merely "circumstantial", in order to avoid any doubt as to his judicial impartiality. Respondent judge
should have waited for the raffle of the case and allowed the judge to whom the case was actually
raffled to resolve the issue of fixing the bail of said accused, if he was bailable. A judge should not only
render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in a manner as to be free from any
suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.

2.GO V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Accused presented himself before the police to verify reports that he was being hunted by the
police. He was thereafter detained. The prosecutor then informed accused of his right to preliminary
investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provision of Art.125 of the RPC. Accused refused
to execute such waiver. The prosecutor filed an information for murder with no recommended bail and
a sign a waiver of the provisions of Art.125 of the RPC. Counsel of accused however later filed a motion
for release and proper preliminary investigation. After the case was raffled to the RTC, Judge Pelayo
initially allowed the release of accused on a cash bond and issued an order granting the leave to conduct
preliminary investigation. Later on however, Pelayo motu proprio issued an order recalling the granting
of bail and proceeded to trial. Accused and his counsel continuously opposed this.

Held:

(Note: What is related to ethics is actually found in the concurring opinion of Justice Gutierrez)

“I am at a loss for reasons why an experienced Judge should insist on proceeding to trial in a sensational
murder case without a preliminary investigation despite vigorous and continued objection and
reservation of rights of the accused and notwithstanding the recommendation of the prosecutor that
said rights be respected… I agree with Justice Isagani Cruz that the trial court has apparently been
moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of justice.
Mass media has its duty to fearlessly but faithfully inform the public about events and persons.
However, when a case has received wide and sensational publicity, the trial court should be doubly
careful not only to be fair and impartial but also to give the appearance of complete objectivity in its
handling of the case.”
3. SABITSANA V. VILLAMOR

Facts:

It was discovered that there were 87 cases undecided by respondent judge beyond the 90-day
reglementary period. The dismal state of the Courthouse of the respondent judge which was described
as bereft of any dignity as a court of law has been noted. Judge Villamor however shifts the blame on his
clerk of court, Atty. Jocobo who he claims was inefficient in the management of the court records. Also,
in the case of theft by Lipango, Villamor designated Judge Pitao as acting judge of the MCTC. Villamor
warned Pitao to acquit Lipango because the case was being backed up by someone powerful. He did this
by sending a letter to Pitao through Lipango’s wife. However, Pitao still convicted Lipango because the
evidence of guilt was strong. When Pitao was away for some conference, he found out that Villamor
revoked his designation and appointed another as judge of the MCTC. And finally, when the case was
elevated to the RTC where Villamor was assigned he acquitted Lipango.

Held:

Villamor violated Canon3 and Canon2. A judge sits not only to Judge litigated cases with the
least possible delay but that his responsibilities include being an effective manager of the Court and its
personnel. Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the Code of Judicial Conduct, provides: “A judge should diligently
discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and
facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.” Also,
under Rule 3.09 is that: “A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the
prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of
public service and fidelity.”

4. TAN V. ROSETE

Facts:

Before the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to
complainant. The staff member told complainant Tan that Judge Rosete was asking for P150,000.00 in
exchange for the non-dismissal of the cases. She was shown copies of respondent judge’s decision in the
criminal cases, both still unsigned, dismissing the complaints against the accused. She was told
thatrespondent judge would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the amount
demanded. Complainant, however, did not accede to respondent’s demand because she believed that
she had a very strong case, well supported by evidence. The criminal cases were eventually dismissed by
respondent judge.

Held:

We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They
must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. The exacting standards of
conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary because the people’s confidence in the judicial system is founded not only
on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the
highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When the judge
himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in
disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s personal behavior both in the
performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond
reproach.

5. DIMATULAC V. VILLON
All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind a cautious attitude as these were
unmistakable indicia of the probability of a miscarriage of justice should arraignment be
precipitately held. While it may be true that he was not bound to await the DOJ's resolution of
the appeal his judicial instinct should have led him to peruse the documents to initially
determine if indeed murder was the offense committed; or, he could have directed the private
prosecutor to secure a resolution on the appeal within a specified time. Given the totality of
circumstances, judge Villon should not have merely acquiesced to the findings of the public
prosecutor.

CANONS 5 & 6

1. REPUBLIC V. CAGUIOA

FACTS

Case 1: Judge Caguioa issued a writ of preliminary injunction against theRepublic for the implementation
of a law5 which required the payment of duties and taxes to importers in the Subic Bay Freeport Zone,
who formerly had an exemption to such taxes but was subsequently required by virtue of such law. He
also granted various ex-parte motions for interventions of different but similarly situated corporations,
and approved an injunction bond of P1M for all the petitioners. These orders were immediately
implemented despite the MRs filed by the OSG. The Republic filed administrative cases against Caguioa
for manifest partiality, gross ignorance of the law and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. This was acted upon by the OCA and subsequently by the CA, stating that Caguioa gravely
abused his discretion for ordering the issuance of the writ of Preliminary Injunction.

ISSUE/S:

W/N Caguioa is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service and Simple Misconduct.

HELD:

YES! Adopt findings of the CA. Caguioa

2.DEE C. CHUAN & SONS INC. V. PERALTA

FACTS:

Sept 13, 2002: Final order of an unlawful detainer case in favor of Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. An appeal
was filed with Peralta, an RTC Judge. March 18, 2003: DCCSI filed a "motion to dismiss appeal and for
issuance of writ of execution" for failure of the appellants to post the required bond and to pay the
rentals due in accordance with the decision of the MeTC. March 21, 2003: Acting on the Motion, Peralta
required appellants to file their comment. August 11, 2003, October 20, 2003 and December 3, 2003:
DCCSI filed a motion to resolve. However, despite the lapse of more than one year, respondent failed
and refused to resolve the pending motions. Complaint thus filed. When asked by the OCA about the
case, Peralta said that it "ha (d) been resolved by (his) Court and the same (was) already for mailing" and
attached a copyof his order dated May 5, 2004. In his order, he dismissed the appeal for failure of the
appellants to file their memorandum and directed the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of DCCSI.
The OCA, in its report, found Peralta indeed failed to resolve several motions for more than a year and
showed indifference in his comment and recommended that he be held liable for inefficiency in the
performance of his official duties and fined in the amount of P11, 000.

ISSUE/S:

W/N Peralta is liable for inefficiency and undue delay in rendering a decision or order.

HELD:

YES. FINED + Sternly Warned.

3.BACULI V. BELEN

FACTS:

Baculi, a Provincial Prosecutor, filed an Information against a personaccused for frustrated homicide.
Belen, a RTC Judge, directed Baculi to submit evidence that the notice of preliminary investigation was
duly served and received by such person. After a series of pleadings filed by Baculi, Belen directed the
former why he should not be cited for tempt of court for making unfounded statements in his pleadings.
No such reason was given, thus Belen found Baculi guilty of direct contempt for making scurrilous
(vulgar) and contumacious (rebellious) statements in one of the latter's Motions, and subsequently for
indirect contempt. Baculi moved that such order be set aside, but was denied by Belen, stating that such
Decisions are final and executory. Therefore, Baculi filed a complaint against Belen, denying the claims
against him, and added that Belen was induced by revenge because it wasBaculi who indicted him in a
previous libel case against him, and that Belen had a 'power complex'.

ISSUE:

W/N Belen is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for citing Baculi in indirect

contempt.

HELD:
YES! Suspended for 6 months + Stern warning.

4. MARIANO V. JUDGE NACIONAL

Facts:

This is an administrative complaint for gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, dereliction of duty
and violation of judicial conduct stemming from an action for ejectment. In the ejectment proceeding,
Judge Nacional issued a pre-trial order dated Sep. 3, 2004 requiring the parties to file their respective
position papers on Sep. 30, 2004 (w/c the parties complied with). Nacional subsequently issued an order
dated Dec. 28, 2004 requiring parties to submit their respective “memoranda in the form of a court
decision” which the parties complied with. The case was eventually decided by Nacional on Feb. 14,
2005. Complaint alleges that the issuance of the Dec. 28, 2004 order violated the prohibition on
memoranda by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and that Nacional violated the Rules when he
decided the case only on Feb. 14, 2005 (136 days from the date required by law).Judge Nacional admits
that he exceeded the maximum period allowed under the Revised Rules and offered the following
excuses: (1) quality of decision had priority over compliance w/ reglementary pd; (2) heavy caseload;
and (3) documents were voluminous.

Issue:

W/N Nacional violated basic procedure and code of judicial conduct?

Held:

Yes, he is fined P40K for gross ignorance of the law and procedure, P20Kfor violation of Canons 3 & 6
(Code of Judicial Conduct) and P10K for violations of CPR The urgency of restoring social order is the
paramount consideration insettling unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases. The necessity of
promptly resolving unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases is made more imperative by express
provisions of the periods of rendition of judgment (30 days after receipt of the affidavits and position
period, or expiration of the period for the filing the same – ROC/Rules of Summary Procedure).
Corollarily, Sec 5 of Canon 6 of Code of Judicial Conduct mandates judges to perform all judicial duties
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.

5. CANEDA V. MENCHAVEZ

Facts:

Complainant Atty. Caneda is counsel for defendant Virginia Guzman, in Civil Case Roberto Borromeo v.
Heirs of Juan Borromeo, for judicial partition pending with Judge Mechanvez’s sala. During the Dec. 14,
2005 hearing of said partition case, the motion to segregate the inheritance shares of one of the
plaintiffs, Roberto Borromeo was due to be taken up. During the hearing, the defendants agreed to a
partition subject to plaintiff’s withdrawal of a motion for reconsideration it filed before the SC to clear
one of the areas (subject to partition) of squatters. Because the plaintiff could not withdrawthe MR
before the SC, Atty. Caneda suggested mediation. Judge Menchavez blurted out “never mind mediation,
walay hinundan na.” When Judge Menchavez checked on the progress of the case, Atty. Caneda
remarked it was being delayed because no proper summons had been served on the defendants who
were residing outside the country. Menchavez reacted angrily and banged his gavel & shouted “I said no
publication period.” Afterwards, Menchavez slammed the table with his hand and went inside his
chambers. Afterwards, Judge Menchavez came back with a holstered handgun and smashed it on the
table, as he angrily shouted at Atty. Caneda “Unsay gusto nimo? Yawa! Gahig ulo!” Atty. Caneda filed a
complaint against Judge Menchavez alleging that theJudge’s act of challenging him inside the courtroom
in the presence of many people was improper

Issue:

W/N Judge Menchavez should be held liable

Held:

Yes, Judge Menchavez overstepped the norms of propriety demanded of a member of the bench by
losing his cool and uttering intemperate language during the hearing.

6. SUAREZ V. DILAG

Facts:

Suarez filed administrative complaints of (a) graft and corruption against Judge Dilag and Court
Stenographer Pascua and (b) grave misconduct and ignorance of the law against Judge Dilag allegedly
for collecting P30K from litigants in consideration of favorable judgments in cases for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage. Suarez further pointed out the existence of conflicting decisions
rendered by Judge Dilar (Pancho Case, Tomboc Case, del Rosario Case which were allpreviously
dismissed but subsequently reopened the case and granted the petition). After referral to an
investigation officer, the Investigating Justice found Judge Dilag liable for (1) gross misconduct for
singing conflicting decisions; (2) gross ignorance of the law and procedure in handling Moreno and Perez
cases; and (3) gross negligence and inefficiency for failing to administer supervision over his staff when a
fake registry return receipt was effected in Cayabyab Case and entries of judgment were effected in
Moreno Case & Dinoso v. Corpuz. Pascua was found guilty of graft and corruption.

Issue:

W/N Judge Dilag should be held liable?

Held:

Yes, Judge Dilag is dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued
leave benefits and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office. A judge is
the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence to uphold and maintain public confidence
in the legal system. Thus, while he is expected to keep abreast of developments in law and
jurisprudence, he is presumed to have more than a cursory knowledge of the rules of procedure (Eg.
taking cognizance of a second petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity when Dilag had already dismissed with prejudice the first petition involving the same parties,
issues, and causes of action with that of the first petition). Not every error is indicative of ignorance, for
if committed in good faith, no administrative sanction is imposed. Good faith, however, inheres only
within the parameters of tolerable judgment. It does not apply where the issues are so simple and the
applicable legal procedures evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error. In the case at
bench, Dilag failed to follow basic legal procedures which are not excusable but renders hi
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure (During questioning, Dilag said that
re-filing is allowed in a dismissal with or without prejudice. Also, he deiced a case even before the
submission of the City Prosecutor relative to the investigation to determine collusion between the
parties as required under Sec. 9 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages) Dilag was charged with gross ignorance of the law. However, to
warrant a finding of gross ignorance of the law, the error must be so gross and patent as to produce an
inference of bad faith. The acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence, but were also motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. For to hold a
judge administratively accountable for ever erroneous order or decision he renders would be
intolerable. In the case at bar, there was no allegation whatsoever that Dilag was motivated by bad
faith, malice or corruption when he issued the premature warrant of arrest. Be that as it may, the Court
holds him administratively liable for his unfamiliarity with the rules on the conduct of prelim
investigations. Judges should be conversant with basic legal norms and precepts as well as with the
statutes and procedural rules. They are expected to follow developments in the law and to apply them.
Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, whereby he judges his fellowmen, the judge owes it to
the public who depend on him, and to the dignity of the court he sits in, to be proficient in the law. Thus,
the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be faithful to the law and be the embodiment of
professional competence.