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FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188603

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

SERENO, CJ,
Chairperson,
-versus- LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
REYES,JJ

RAMIL RARUGAL alias "AMA Y Promulgated:

BISAYA,"
Accused-Appellant.
-JAN 1 6 2013 ..
X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

1
Before this Court is the appeal of the June 30, 2008 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02413, 2 which affirmed with
modification the May 29, 2006 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 86, Quezon City in Crim. Case No. -Q-99-82409, entitled People of
the Philippines v. Rami! Rarugal that found appellant Ramil Rarugal alias
"Amay Bisaya" guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder.

On December 8, 1998, the following infonnation for the crime of

murder was filed against appellant:

That on or about the 19111 day of October, 1998, in Quezon City,

Philippine, the above-named [appellantl, with intent to kill, qualified by
evident premeditation and treachery, did, then and there, wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence

Rollo, pp. 2-16; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam with Associate Justices Monina
Arevalo-Zenarosa and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring.
Entitled People ofthe Philippines v. Rami! Rarugal alias "A may Bisaya."
CA ro!lo, pp. 14-22; penned by Judge Teodoro !\.Bay.
DECISION 2 G.R. No. 188603

upon the person of one Arnel M. Florendo, by then and there stabbing him
with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said Arnel M. Florendo.4

Appellant was only arrested sometime in August 2001. During his

arraignment on August 27, 2001, appellant pleaded not guilty.5 Trial on the
merits ensued.

Based on the testimonies of witnesses presented by the prosecution,

the RTC found that on the night of October 19, 1998 at around 9:45 p.m.,
while victim Arnel Florendo (Florendo) was cycling along Sampaguita
Street, Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City, appellant, with the use of
a long double-bladed weapon, stabbed Florendo; thus, forcibly depriving
him of his bicycle. Immediately thereafter, appellant hurriedly fled the
scene. This incident was witnessed by Roberto Sit-Jar, who positively
identified appellant in court.

Florendo arrived home bleeding. He was quickly attended to by his

siblings, including his brother Renato. When Renato recounted the events of
that night to the court, he testified that Florendo told him and his other
relatives that it was appellant who had stabbed him. They then took
Florendo to Tordesillas Hospital but had to transfer him to Quezon City
General Hospital, due to the unavailability of blood. It was there that
Florendo died6 on October 26, 1998 with the family spending about
P2,896.007 for his hospitalization and P25,000.008 for his funeral.

Autopsy Report signed by Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Dominic L.

Aguda, showed the following Postmortem Findings9:

Cyanosis, lips and fingernailbeds

Brain- pale
Heart-chambers, contain small amount of dark clotted blood
STAB WOUND-
sutured, healing, 3.0 cms, located on left chest, 15.0 cms. from the
anterior median line directed backwards and medially involving the skin
and underlying tissues passing between the 6th and 7th left ribs, entering
the thoracic cavity and severed the lower lobe of the left lung with a depth
of 7-8 cms.
THORACOSTOMY INCISIONS-
sutured, 3.5 cms., located on the left chest, 19.0 cms. from the
anterior median line; sutured, 3.2 cms. located on the right chest 20 cms.
from the anterior median line
Hemothorax- left, 500 cc
Visceral organs- pale
4
Records, p. 1; signed by Edgardo T. Paragua, Assistant City Prosecutor.
5
Id. at 18.
6
Id. at 70.
7
Id. at 161-165.
8
Id. at 166.
9
Id. at 65.
DECISION 3 G.R. No. 188603

Stomach- empty

CAUSE OF DEATH:
STAB WOUND, LEFT CHEST

In his defense, appellant denied that he stabbed Florendo since he was

at that time working as a farm administrator for the town mayor in
Pangasinan. He said he was living with his cousin in Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan on October 19, 1998, where he had been staying since 1997. He
stated that during the period 1997 to 1998, he did not visit Manila at any
point. On cross-examination, appellant stated that he was arrested in front of
his house in Novaliches, Quezon City.10

On May 29, 2006, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. It stated:

After evaluation, the Court finds that the guilt of the [appellant]
was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Witness Sit-Jar positively identified
[appellant] as the assailant of Florendo. In view of the positive
identification made by Sit-Jar, the denial and alibi made by [appellant]
[has] no leg to stand on. Under prevailing jurisprudence alibis and denials
are worthless in light of positive identification by witnesses who have no
motive to falsely testify.

Moreover, [Florendo] did not immediately die after he was stabbed

by the [appellant]. [Florendo], apparently conscious that he could die of
his wound, identified his assailant as the [appellant] Ramil Rarugal. Under
the rules, statements made by a person under the consciousness of an
impending death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his
death. The positive identification made by the victim before he died, under
the consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating
the liability of herein [appellant].

xxxx

As shown by the evidence, the killing of Arnel Florendo was

sudden indicating treachery and the [appellant] being then armed with a
knife, the killing was done with abuse of superior strength. These
circumstances qualify the crime to murder, all of the elements of the
offense being present.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered

finding the [appellant] Ramil Rarugal alias “Amay Bisaya” GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
the victim the amount of P28,124.00 for actual damages, P50,000.00 for
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as and for moral damages.11 (Citations
omitted.)

10
TSN, December 6, 2004.
11
CA rollo, pp. 19-22.
DECISION 4 G.R. No. 188603

Appellant filed his notice of appeal on July 21, 2006.12 He questioned

the RTC’s finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the commission of the
crime and its appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance. He
argued that witness Sit-Jar lacked credibility for giving inconsistent
testimony. Moreover, he averred that there was no basis for the finding that
treachery qualified the crime to murder since its elements were not
established.13

On June 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification

the May 29, 2006 decision of the RTC. It stated that witness Sit-Jar’s
positive identification of appellant as the one who stabbed Florendo takes
precedence over appellant’s defense of denial and alibi. Moreover, appellant
failed to adduce evidence to show that Sit-Jar had any improper motive to
falsely testify against him. The Court of Appeals thus disposed of the appeal
in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from

is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the [appellant] RAMIL
RARUGAL is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of
P27,896.00 as actual damages and the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages. The said Decision in all other respect STANDS.14

Hence, this appeal.15 Petitioner’s confinement was confirmed by the

Bureau of Corrections on September 30, 2009.16

Both the appellee17 and the appellant18 waived the filing of

supplemental briefs and adopted the briefs they filed before the Court of
Appeals.

We affirm the June 30, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals, with
modification respecting the award of damages.

This Court has consistently stated that the trial court is in a better
position to adjudge the credibility of witnesses, especially if its decision is
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.19 We have been reminded in People v.
Clores20 that:

When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are

the guiding rules some of which are that (1) the [a]ppellate court will not
disturb the factual findings of the lower [c]ourt, unless there is a showing
that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or

12
Id. at 23.
13
Id. at 45-50.
14
Rollo, pp. 15-16.
15
Id. at 17.
16
Id. at 24.
17
Id. at 26-29.
18
Id. at 36-39.
19
Ilisan v. People, G.R. No. 179487, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 658, 663.
20
263 Phil. 585, 591 (1990).
DECISION 5 G.R. No. 188603

circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result
of the case x x x; (2) the findings of the [t]rial [c]ourt pertaining to the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect since it had the
opportunity to examine his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand,
and, therefore, can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not[;] and
(3) a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous
and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a
credible witness. (Citations omitted.)

The rationale for these guidelines is that the trial courts are in a better
position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses
themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment and manner of
testifying under grueling examination.21

We see no need to depart from the aforestated rules. After a careful

review of the records, we find that appellant failed to negate the findings of
the trial court with concrete evidence that the latter had overlooked,
misconstrued, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that would have affected the result of the case. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that the prosecution witness recounted the details of that
fateful night in a “clear, straightforward and convincing [manner], devoid of
any signs of falsehood or fabrication.”22

First, prosecution witness Sit-Jar positively identified appellant as the

victim’s assailant in contrast to the appellant’s defense of denial and alibi.
We have stated in Malana v. People23 that:

It is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive

identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive
on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-
serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The prosecution witnesses
positively identified appellants as two of the perpetrators of the crime. It is
incumbent upon appellants to prove that they were at another place when
the felony was committed, and that it was physically impossible for them
to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. x x x.
(Citations omitted.)

The records are devoid of any indication that it was physically

impossible for appellant to have been in the scene of the crime at the time it
was committed. Appellant’s bare alibi that he was working as a farm
administrator in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan and was allegedly staying there at
the time of the commission of the crime does not suffice to prove the alleged
physical impossibility that he committed the crime charged, moreso in the
face of positive identification by the witness, who was not motivated by any
improper motive to falsely testify against him.

21
People v. Escleto, G.R. No. 183706, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 149, 156.
22
Rollo, p. 7.
23
G.R. No. 173612, March 26, 2008, 549 SCRA 451, 465-466.
DECISION 6 G.R. No. 188603

Second, the victim was still alive after the stabbing incident. He had
time to reach his house and confide in his brother, witness Renato, that it
was appellant who had stabbed him.

Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person,

made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in
any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

The Court has stated in People v. Maglian24:

The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as

evidence if the following circumstances are present: “(a) it concerns the
cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) it is
made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been
competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration
is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant’s
death.” x x x. (Citation omitted.)

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statement of Florendo

made to his brother Renato has complied with the requisites of a dying
declaration. It is important to note that Florendo, after being stabbed by
appellant twice on the chest, went home and under labored breathing, told
Renato that it was appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly, the statement
made was an expression of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of
his death, and under the consciousness of impending death. There being
nothing in the records to show that Florendo was incompetent, he would
have been competent to testify had he survived.25 It is enough to state that
the deceased was at the time competent as a witness.26 Lastly, the dying
declaration is offered in an inquiry the subject of which involves his death.
We reproduce the statement of the RTC:

Moreover, the [victim] did not immediately die after he was

stabbed by the [appellant]. The victim, apparently conscious that he could
die of his wound, identified his assailant as the [appellant] Ramil Rarugal.
Under the rules, statement made by a person under the consciousness of an
impending death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his
24
G.R. No. 189834, March 30, 2011, 646 SCRA 770, 778.
25
Rule 130, Sections 20 and 21 which provides:
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. — Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others,
may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. — The
following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination,
is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
26
People v. Santos, 337 Phil. 334, 349 (1997).
DECISION 7 G.R. No. 188603

death. The positive identification made by the victim before he died, under
the consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating
the liability of herein [appellant].27

It is of no moment that the victim died seven days from the stabbing
incident and after receiving adequate care and treatment, because the
apparent proximate cause of his death, the punctures in his lungs, was a
consequence of appellant’s stabbing him in the chest.

Anent the finding of treachery by the RTC, we agree that appellant’s

act of suddenly stabbing Florendo while he was innocently cycling along
Sampaguita Street, Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City constituted
the qualifying circumstance of treachery. As we previously ruled, treachery
is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.28 Here, appellant
surprised Florendo when he suddenly and swiftly attacked and stabbed him
in the chest. The swift turn of events left Florendo defenseless to protect
himself, allowing appellant to commit the crime without risk to his own
person. Thus, we sustain the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the
commission of the crime.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the
crime of murder. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance,
the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised
Penal Code.29

However, to conform to existing jurisprudence, the Court must

modify the amount of indemnity for death and exemplary damages awarded
by the courts a quo.

Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the
following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of
the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6)
interest, in proper cases.30

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the victim were
able to prove before the trial court actual damages in the amount of
P27,896.00 based on the receipts31 they submitted. Moreover, we agree with

27
CA rollo, pp. 19-20.
28
People v. Laurio, G.R. No. 182523, September 13, 2012.
29
People v. Escleto, supra note 21 at 159-160.
30
People v. Rebucan, G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 726, 758.
31
Records, pp. 161-166.
DECISION 8 G.R. No. 188603

the Court of Appeals that the award of exemplary damages is proper in this
case. We have stated that:

Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award
of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the
offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an
award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when
the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative
to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the
Civil Code.32 (Emphasis omitted.)

We, however, increase the award of exemplary damages to

P30,000.0033 and the award for mandatory civil indemnity to P75,000.0034 to
conform to recent jurisprudence.

We sustain the RTC’s award for moral damages in the amount of

P50,000.00 even in the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering
of the victim’s heirs.35 As borne out by human nature and experience, a
violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and
anguish on the part of the victim’s family.36

In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on

all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.37

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The June 30, 2008 Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02413 is AFFIRMED.
Appellant RAMIL RARUGAL alias “Amay Bisaya” is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER, and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs
of Arnel M. Florendo the amounts of P27,896.00 as actual damages,
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall
earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.

No pronouncement as to costs.

32
People v. Salafranca, G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 501, 517.
33
People v. Escleto, supra note 21 at 160.
34
People v. Anticamara, G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 489, 520.
35
People v. Concillado, G.R. No. 181204, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 363, 391; People v.
Fontanilla, G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 150, 162.
36
People v. Escleto, supra note 21 at 160.
37
Id. at 161.
DECISION 9 G.R. No. 188603

SO ORDERED.

~~db~
TERES IT A J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES 1'. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

~
ji'~~NIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VITI of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice