FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 179003. January 9, 2013.]

ANTONIO L. TAN, JR. , petitioner, vs . YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and

CAROLINA TANJUTCO , respondents.

[G.R. No. 195816. January 9, 2013.]

ANTONIO L. TAN, JR., petitioner, vs. JULIE O. CUA, respondent.

DECISION

REYES , J : p

Before the Court are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari led by
petitioner Antonio L. Tan, Jr. (Tan) and docketed as:
(1) G.R. No. 179003 which assails the Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision 1
dated February 6, 2007 and Resolution 2 dated July 24, 2007 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 89346, entitled Yoshitsugu Matsuura & Carolina Tanjutco
v. Hon. Raul Gonzales, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of the
Department of Justice and Antonio L. Tan, Jr.; and
(2) G.R. No. 195816 which assails the CA's Decision 3 dated August 17,
2010 and Resolution 4 dated February 23, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No.
95263, entitled Julie O. Cua v. Antonio L. Tan, Jr., Hon. Raul M.
Gonzales, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice
and Hon. Ernesto L. Pineda, in his capacity as Undersecretary of the
Department of Justice.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 31, 1998, Tan led with the O ce of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati
City a Complaint-A davit 5 charging the respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura (Matsuura),
Atty. Carolina Tanjutco (Tanjutco) and Atty. Julie Cua (Cua) of the crime of falsi cation
under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), allegedly committed as follows: caHCSD

2. On or about the period from 21 December 1996 to 09 January 1997, Mr.

YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA, Ms. HIROKO MATSUURA and Mr. RUBEN JACINTO
have had stolen company's properties and my personal belongings which were
kept "under lock and key" . Among those stolen was my pre-signed DEED OF
TRUST, whose date and number of shares, and the item witness were all in
BLANK. As a result, Criminal Case No. 98-040 for Quali ed Theft was led
against Mr. & Ms. Matsuura and Mr. Jacinto, and now pending before the
Regional Trial Court (of Makati City ) Branch 132;

3. In the said "blank" Deed of Trust, the entries as to the number of shares
and the date of the instrument were then inserted, that is, 28,500 as shares and
20 th day of January, and the signatures of Hiroko Matsuura and Lani C. Camba
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 appeared in the item WITNESS, all without my participation whatsoever, or
without my consent and authority. A copy of the " lled in" Deed of Trust is
attached as Annex "A" and made part hereof;

4. Sometime on 19 June 1997, the said Deed of Trust, was made to be

notarized by JULIE O. CUA, a Notary Public for and in the City of Makati, and
entered in her Notarial Register as Doc[.] No. 2; Page No. 1; Book No. 1 and Series
of 1997, WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT I HAVE NEVER APPEARED, SIGNED OR
T O O K [sic] MY OATH BEFORE THE SAID NOTARY PUBLIC AND ON THE SAID
DATE OF NOTARIZATION because the document (Deed of Trust ) was stolen as
earlier stated, and the relation between us (Mr. and Ms. Matsuura, or Mr. Jacinto,
and the undersigned) had become hostile and irreconcilable. A copy of the
notarized Deed of Trust is attached as Annex "B" and made part hereof.

5. Both documents (Annexes "A" and "B'') were/are in the possessions of

Mr. Matsuura and/or his lawyer, CAROLINA TANJUTCO, who used these false
documents in the cases involving us;

6. Without prejudice to the ling of other charges in the proper venues, I am

executing this a davit for the purpose of charging Mr. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA
and ATTY. CAROLINA TANJUTCO for violation of Art. 172 (2) in relation to Art.
171 (6) of the Revised Penal Code with regard to Annex "A", and likewise charging
MR. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and ATTYS. CAROLINA TANJUTCO and JULIE O.
CUA for violation of Art. 172 (1) in relation to Art. 171 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code, when through their concerted actions they FALSELY made it appeared [ sic]
that the undersigned had participated in notarization of the Deed of Trust (Annex
"B'') on 19 June 1997, and in both instances causing prejudice and damages to
the undersigned. 6

The respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits.

Matsuura vehemently denied Tan's charges. He countered that the ling of the
complaint was merely a scheme resorted to by Tan following their dispute in TF Ventures,
Inc., and after he had obtained a favorable resolution in a complaint for estafa against Tan.
Matsuura further explained that the transfer of the shareholdings covered by the subject
Deed of Trust 7 was a result of Tan's offer to compromise the intra-corporate dispute. He
insisted that it was Tan who caused the notarization of the deed, as this was a condition
for Matsuura's acceptance of the compromise. 8
For her defense, Tanjutco argued that Tan's admission of having pre-signed the
subject deed only proved that he had willingly assigned his shares in TF Ventures, Inc. to
Matsuura. She also argued that Tan failed to present any proof of her participation in the
deed's falsi cation, and explained that she had not yet known Matsuura at the time of the
supposed notarization. 9
For her part, Cua narrated that on June 19, 1997, a group that included a person who
represented himself as Antonio Tan, Jr. approached her law o ce for the notarization of
the subject deed. Tan presented his community tax certi cate (CTC) as indicated in the
subject deed of trust, then was sworn in by Cua as a notary public. Cua claimed to have
conducted her duty in utmost good faith, with duplicate copies of the notarized deed
reported to the Clerk of Court of Makati City. She denied having any business or interest
whatsoever with the law offices of Tanjutco. 1 0
The Ruling of the City Prosecutor

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 On July 13, 1998, the OCP issued a Resolution 1 1 dismissing for lack of probable
cause the complaint against Matsuura and Tanjutco. It considered the fact that Tan had
voluntarily signed the subject deed, and further noted that "[w]hether or not the same
document is notarized, the [d]eed has the effect of a binding contract between the parties.
The element of damage has not been sufficiently shown." 1 2
The complaint against Cua was also dismissed. For the OCP, Tan failed to overturn
the presumption of regularity attached to the notary public's performance of her o cial
duty. Any irregularity attending the execution of the deed of trust required more than mere
denial from Tan. 1 3
Tan's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to le a petition for
review 1 4 with the Department of Justice (DOJ).
The Ruling of the Secretary of Justice
On April 4, 2003, then Secretary of Justice Simeon A. Datumanong issued a
resolution 1 5 denying the petition. He ruled that no evidence was presented to show that
the date, the number of shares and the witnesses' signatures appearing on the subject
deed were merely inserted therein by the respondents. Tan's bare averments were
insufficient to show the actual participation of the respondents in the alleged falsification.
Undaunted, Tan led a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by then Acting
Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez in a Resolution 1 6 dated July 1, 2004. In
nding probable cause to indict the respondents for the crime of falsi cation, the DOJ
noted that a copy of the deed of trust attached by Matsuura and Tanjutco to Matsuura's
Answer dated October 30, 1997 in an intra-corporate dispute before the SEC was not yet
notarized. Furthermore, the print and font of the deed's entries on its covered shares and
date remarkably differed from the other portions of the document. The Secretary then
held: CIHAED

[I]t would appear that the subject deed of trust was indeed never
notarized. If the said document was purportedly notarized on June 19,
1997, the same notarized copy should have been presented by
respondent Matsuura. After all, his Answer led before the SEC was
made with the assistance of respondent Atty. Tanjutco. There being
none, it may be concluded that the notarization of the subject deed of
trust was indeed made under doubtful circumstances. 1 7

The Secretary also held that Cua should have been alerted by the variance in the
deed's print styles, and the fact that the document was presented for notarization almost
ve months from the date of its purported execution. The dispositive portion of the
Secretary's resolution then reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
Resolution No. 189 (Series of 2003) is hereby SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of
Makati City is directed to le an information against respondents Yoshitsugu
Matsuura and Atty. Carolina Tanjutco for violation of Art. 172 (2) in relation to Art.
171 (6), RPC; and another information for violation of Art. 171 (2), RPC against
respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura, Atty. Carolina Tanjutco and Atty. Julie Cua.
SO ORDERED . 1 8

The respondents moved for reconsideration. On April 4, 2005, then DOJ

Undersecretary Ernesto L. Pineda, signing on behalf of the Secretary of Justice, issued a
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 resolution 1 9 a rming the presence of probable cause against Matsuura and Tanjutco, but
ordering the exclusion of Cua from the ling of information. He ruled that Cua had
exercised due diligence as a notary public by requiring from the person who appeared
before her a proof of his identification. The resolution's decretal portion provides:
Premises considered, the Resolution dated July 1, 2004 is hereby
MODIFIED accordingly. The City Prosecutor of Makati City is directed to move
for the exclusion of respondent Julie Cua from the information for violation of Art.
171 (2), Revised Penal Code, if any has been led, and to report the action taken
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. The motion for reconsideration led by
respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Atty. Carolina Tanjutco is hereby DENIED .

SO ORDERED . 2 0

At this point, Matsuura and Tanjutco led with the CA the petition for certiorari
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89346. The DOJ's review of its resolution on Cua's case
continued with Tan's ling of a motion for partial reconsideration. Finding merit in the
motion, the DOJ again reversed itself and issued on December 12, 2005 a Resolution 2 1
with dispositive portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for partial
reconsideration is GRANTED and resolution dated April 4, 2005 is SET ASIDE .
The City Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby directed to include Atty. Julie O. [Cua]
in the information for violation of Article 171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code led
against respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Atty. Carolina Tanjutco and report
to this Office the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED. 2 2

Cua's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting her to le with the CA the
petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 95263.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA granted both petitions questioning the Secretary of Justice's resolutions.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 89346, the CA held that given the elements of the crime, the actual
participation of respondents Matsuura and Tanjutco was not su ciently alleged, and the
element of damage was not su ciently shown. The dispositive portion of its Decision 2 3
dated February 6, 2007 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED . The
Resolution of the DOJ dated April 4, 2005 and July 1, 2004 are SET ASIDE . The
Resolution of the City Prosecutor, Makati City dated July 13, 1998 in I.S. No. 98-C-
15857-58 a rmed by the DOJ through Secretary Datumanong on April 4, 2003
STANDS .

SO ORDERED. 2 4 AcaEDC

Tan's motion for reconsideration was denied.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 95263, the CA held that Tan also failed to discharge the burden of
proving probable cause against Cua. For the appellate court, there was nothing on record
that was su cient to overcome the presumption of regularity ascribed to both the subject
deed as a public document and to Cua's discharge of her o cial functions as a notary
public. The dispositive portion of its Decision 2 5 dated August 17, 2010 reads:
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 WHEREFORE , the instant Petition is GRANTED . The assailed Resolutions
of the Secretary of Justice dated 12 December 2005 and 8 May 2006 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated 4
April 2003 affirming the findings of the City Prosecutor is hereby UPHELD.
SO ORDERED . 2 6

Tan's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution 27 dated February 23,
2011.
The Present Petitions
Unsatis ed, Tan separately led with this Court two petitions for review. G.R. No.
179003 assails the CA's disposition of Matsuura and Tanjutco's petition, while G.R. No.
195816 assails the CA's decision in the petition led by Cua. From these petitions are two
main issues for this Court's resolution:
(a) whether or not the CA erred in taking cognizance of the two petitions
led before it, assuming the role of a reviewing authority of the
Secretary of Justice; and
(b) whether or not the CA erred in upholding the nding of the OCP that
there exists no probable cause to indict Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua
for the crime of falsification.
This Court's Ruling
We emphasize that on February 13, 2012, this Court had already issued in G.R. No.
195816 a resolution 2 8 denying the petition, on the following bases:
Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition
for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated 17 August 2010 and
Resolution dated 23 February 2011 of the Court of Appeals, Manila, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 95263, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for raising substantially
factual issues and for failure to su ciently show any reversible error in the
assailed judgment to warrant the exercise of this Court's discretionary appellate
jurisdiction. 2 9 (Underscoring supplied, emphasis in the original)

Thus, the only pending incident in G.R. No. 195816 is Tan's motion for
reconsideration of the Court's denial of his petition. In his motion, Tan reiterates the
arguments he presented in the petition, yet argues for the rst time that the CA erred in
granting Cua's motion for an additional period of thirty (30) days within which to le her
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 95263. This allegedly violated the provisions of A.M. 00-2-03-SC
that amended Section 4, Rule 65 3 0 of the Rules of Court.
Tan also moved to consolidate G.R. No. 1958156 with G.R. No. 179003, which
motion was allowed by the Court.
Before ruling on the main issues, we address Tan's argument that the CA erred in
granting Cua's motion for extension of time to file her petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 95263.
In Vallejo v. Court of Appeals , 3 1 we emphasized that the Court has allowed some
meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in
keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice and that the strict and rigid application of rules which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be
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 avoided. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice,
rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties. 3 2
Thus, we allowed the petition in Vallejo to proceed even if it was led almost four (4)
months beyond the prescribed reglementary period under the rules.
Pursuant to the foregoing doctrine, in the interest of substantial justice, and given
the merit that was ascribed by the CA to Cua's petition, we sustain the appellate court's
ruling on Cua's motion for extension of time to file her petition for certiorari.
Courts possess the power to review
findings of prosecutors in
preliminary investigations.
On the rst main issue, the petitioner contends that the CA should not have taken
cognizance of the petitions for certiorari led before it because criminal proceedings shall
not be restrained once probable cause has been determined and the corresponding
information has been led in courts. Citing jurisprudence, Tan argues that the institution of
a criminal action in court depends upon the sound discretion of the prosecutor.
The Court remains mindful of the established principle that the determination of
probable cause is essentially an executive function that is lodged with the public
prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice. However, equally settled is the rule that courts
retain the power to review ndings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations, although in
a mere few exceptional cases showing grave abuse of discretion.
Judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution covers the
courts' power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by any branch or instrumentality of the
government in the discharge of its functions. Although policy considerations call for the
widest latitude of deference to the prosecutors' ndings, courts should not shirk from
exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the
prosecutors' ndings are supported by the facts or by the law. In so doing, courts do not
act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary that are exercising their mandate under
the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial rules to settle cases and controversies.
Indeed, the exercise of the courts' review power ensures that, on the one hand, probable
criminals are prosecuted and, on the other hand, the innocent are spared from baseless
prosecution. 3 3
We then ruled in Tan v. Ballena 3 4 that while the ndings of prosecutors are
reviewable by the DOJ, this does not preclude courts from intervening and exercising our
own powers of review with respect to the DOJ's ndings. In the exceptional case in which
grave abuse of discretion is committed, as when a clear su ciency or insu ciency of
evidence to support a nding of probable cause is ignored, the CA may take cognizance of
the case via a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 3 5
Based on the grounds raised by the respondents in their petitions with the CA, the
appellate court's exercise of its power to review was also the proper and most prudent
course to take after the Secretary had successively issued several resolutions with varying
ndings of fact and conclusions of law on the existence of probable cause, even contrary
to the own ndings of the OCP that conducted the preliminary investigation. Although by
itself, such circumstance was not indicative of grave abuse of discretion, there was a clear
issue on the Secretary of Justice's appreciation of facts, which commanded a review by
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 the court to determine if grave abuse of discretion attended the discharge of his functions.
There is no probable cause for
falsification against Matsuura,
Tanjutco and Cua.
The Court agrees with the CA that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion when the latter ruled in favor of Tan, in his complaint against the respondents.
Again, while the courts generally accord respect upon the prosecutor's or the DOJ's
discretion in the determination of probable cause in preliminary investigations, the courts
may, as an exception, set aside the prosecutor's or DOJ's conclusions to prevent the
misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. 3 6
We emphasize the nature, purpose and amount of evidence that is required to
support a nding of probable cause in preliminary investigations. Probable cause, for
purposes of ling a criminal information, has been de ned as such facts as are su cient
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be
prosecuted. A nding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that,
more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. 3 7
While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to
examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused's
constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect
the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and
holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges. 3 8
G.R. No. 179003
The Court a rms the CA's nding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Secretary of Justice in reversing the rulings of the OCP that favored Matsuura and
Tanjutco.
In the Resolutions dated July 1, 2004 and April 4, 2005, the Secretary of Justice
directed the ling in court of two informations against Matsuura and Tanjutco: one
information for the crime of falsi cation under Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6)
of the RPC, and another information for a violation of Article 171 (2) of the RPC. These
penal provisions read:
Art. 171. Falsi cation by public o cer, employee or notary or
ecclesiastic minister . — The penalty of prision mayor and a ne not to exceed
5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public o cer, employee, or notary who,
taking advantage of his o cial position, shall falsify a document by committing
any of the following acts:
cACEHI

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.
xxx xxx xxx

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 (6) Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which
changes its meaning.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 172. Falsi cation by private individuals and use of falsi ed
documents . — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to
cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
xxx xxx xxx

In the rst information , the charge was under Article 172 (2), in relation to Article
171 (6), for the alleged insertions in the deed of trust on its number of covered shares, its
date and the witnesses to the instrument's execution. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals , 3 9 we
identified the elements of falsification under Article 171 (6) of the RPC, to wit:
(1) that there be an alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a
document;
(2) that it was made on a genuine document;
(3) that the alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the
document; and
(4) that the changes made the document speak something false. 4 0
When these are committed by a private individual on a private document, the violation
would fall under paragraph 2, Article 172 of the same code, but there must be, in
addition to the aforesaid elements, independent evidence of damage or intention to
cause the same to a third person. 4 1
Logically, a davits and evidence presented during a preliminary investigation must
at least show these elements of the crime and the particular participation of each of the
respondents in its commission. Otherwise, there would be no basis for a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed, and that the persons being charged are probably
guilty thereof. Probable cause can only nd support in facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonable mind to believe that the person being charged warrants a prosecution.
Upon the Court's review, we a rm the ruling that Tan had failed to adequately show during
the preliminary investigation all the aforementioned elements of the offense.
Petitioner Tan was not able to establish when and how the alleged unauthorized
insertions in the subject document were effected, and that Matsuura and Tanjutco should
be held liable therefor. To warrant an indictment for falsi cation, it is necessary to show
during the preliminary investigation that the persons to be charged are responsible for the
acts that de ne the crime. Contrary to this, however, there were no su cient allegations
and evidence presented on the speci c acts attributed to Matsuura and Tanjutco that
would show their respective actual participation in the alleged alteration or intercalation.
Tan's broad statement that the deed was falsi ed after it was stolen by Matsuura merits
no consideration in nding probable cause, especially after the following ndings of the
OCP in his Resolution dated July 13, 1998:
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 Any alleged irregularity attending the execution of such a voluntary Deed
requires more than mere denial. Criminal Case [N]o. [9]8-040 (I.S. No. 97-20720)
concerning Quali ed Theft of Condominium Certi cate of Title, pre[-]signed
checks and other personal belongings of complainant [herein petitioner], has
already been recommended for dismissal by the Department of Justice on May
25, 1998, directing the withdrawal of the information in the aforesaid Criminal
Case No. 98-040. In said recommendation, the principal subject matter is the
alleged loss of condominium titles, and it appears that after the implementation
of the search warrant, only title[s] and the pre[-]signed checks were not recovered.
There is no mention of a missing Deed of Trust as claimed by complainant. 4 2

Tan also sought to support his falsi cation charge by the alleged intercalations on
the covered number of shares and date of the deed, asking the OCP and Secretary of
Justice to take notice that the print, font style and size of these entries differed from the
other portions of the document. However, it is not unusual, as it is as a common practice,
for parties to prepare and print instruments or contractual agreements with speci c
details that are yet to be lled up upon the deed's execution. We are bound to believe that
such was the situation in Tan's case, i.e., the document had blanks when printed but was
already complete in details at the time Tan signed it to give effect thereto, especially with
the legal presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. Otherwise, Tan
would not have voluntarily a xed his signature in the subject deed. In Allied Banking
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 4 3 we ruled:
Under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is presumed that
a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. Hence, the natural
presumption is that one does not sign a document without rst
informing himself of its contents and consequences . Said
presumption acquires greater force in the case at bar where not only one
document but several documents were executed at different times and at
different places by the herein respondent guarantors and sureties. 4 4
(Citation omitted and emphasis supplied) DSTCIa

While the presumption can be disputed by su cient evidence, Tan failed in this
respect. We even nd no merit in his claim that the incomplete document was merely
intended to convince Japanese friends of Matsuura to extend credit to TF Ventures, Inc., as
he failed to establish any connection between the deed of trust and the credit sought.
It is then the Court's view that the petitioner had voluntarily executed the subject
Deed of Trust, with the intention of giving effect thereto. Even granting that there were
insertions in the deed after it was signed by the petitioner, no su cient allegation
indicates that the alleged insertions had changed the meaning of the document, or that
their details differed from those intended by the petitioner at the time that he signed it. The
petitioner's bare allegation that "the change was without [his] consent and authority" 4 5
does not equate with the necessary allegation that the insertions were false or had
changed the intended meaning of the document. Again, a violation of Article 172 (2), in
relation to Article 171 (6), of the RPC requires, as one of its elements, that "the alteration or
intercalation has changed the meaning of the document. 4 6
Neither was there su cient evidence to support the element of damage that was
purportedly suffered by Tan by reason of the alleged falsification. As correctly observed by
the OCP:
By his voluntary act of signing the Deed of Trust in favor of Matsuura, it
can be safely inferred that the document speaks for itself. Whether or not the
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 same document is notarized, the Deed has the effect of a binding contract
between the parties. The element of damage has not been sufficiently shown. 4 7

The Court emphasizes that the element of damage is crucial in the charge because
the Secretary of Justice directed the ling of the rst information for an alleged
falsification of a private document.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Secretary of Justice's nding of probable
cause against Matsuura and Tanjutco was based solely on surmises and conjectures,
wholly unsupported by legal and factual bases. The CA then correctly nulli ed, on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion, the resolutions that were assailed before it. There is
grave abuse of discretion when the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic manner in the exercise of his judgment, as when the assailed order is bereft of
any factual and legal justification. 4 8
True, a nding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence, or on evidence beyond reasonable doubt. It does not require that the evidence
would justify conviction. Nonetheless, although the determination of probable cause
requires less than evidence which would justify conviction, it should at least be more than
mere suspicion. And while probable cause should be determined in a summary manner,
there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a
potential accused's constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair
play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting
alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges. It
is, therefore, imperative for the prosecutor to relieve the accused from the pain and
inconvenience of going through a trial once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists
to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. 4 9
The Secretary of Justice's directive upon the prosecutor to le the second
information against Matsuura and Tanjutco also lacked basis. It was premised on an
alleged violation of Article 171 (2) of the RPC, by making it appear that Tan participated in
an act or proceeding when as he claimed, he did not in fact so participate. The elements of
this crime are as follows:
(1) that the offender is a public officer, employee or notary public;
(2) that he takes advantage of his official position;
(3) that he falsi es a document by causing it to appear that a person or
persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not
in fact so participate. 5 0
Since Matsuura and Tanjutco are both private individuals, they can be indicted for
the offense only if it is shown that they conspired with Cua, as a notary public, in the
commission thereof.
Contrary to this requirement, however, the Secretary of Justice ordered in its
Resolution dated April 4, 2005 the ling of the second information against Matsuura and
Tanjutco, notwithstanding the order in the same resolution to exclude Cua in the case.
Such ruling evidently amounts to a grave abuse of discretion because as correctly held by
the CA:
Article 171, RPC refers to falsi cation committed by a public o cer,
employee, notary or ecclesiastical minister who[,] taking advantage of his o cial
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 position[,] shall falsify a document, in this case, by causing it to appear that
persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate. Herein petitioners [herein respondents Matsuura and
Tanjutco], not being included in said enumeration cannot, on their own,
be held liable for aforesaid violation. They can be held liable therefor
only in conspiracy with one who is a public o cer, employee, notary or
ecclesiastical minister who, taking advantage of his o cial position,
falsi ed a document. On account of the exclusion of Atty. Julie Cua from said
charge, herein petitioners cannot be held liable for the charge. It is settled that
there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. . . . . 5 1
(Emphasis ours)
The subsequent resolution of the Secretary of Justice to include Cua in the
information, following a separate motion for reconsideration by Tan and, we emphasize,
only after CA-G.R. SP No. 89346 had already been led, was inconsequential to the grave
abuse of discretion already committed by the Secretary of Justice in its nal disposition of
the case against Matsuura and Tanjutco. The CA was tasked in CA-G.R. SP No. 89346 to
determine the issue of whether or not the Secretary of Justice had committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions,
in light of the rulings, ndings and the bases used by the Secretary. In addition, even the CA
later declared in CA-G.R. SP No. 96263 that the Secretary of Justice's order to pursue the
case against Cua amounted to a grave abuse of discretion.
G.R. No. 195816
We now rule on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Court's denial of
the petition docketed as G.R. No. 195816. After review, the Court a rms its earlier denial
of the petition, given Tan's failure to show any reversible error committed by the CA. As
correctly held by the appellate court, no probable cause was established to support a
falsification case against Cua.
We are bound to adhere to the presumption of regularity in Cua's performance of her
o cial duty, and to the presumption of regularity that is attached to the subject deed of
trust as a public document. As held by the OCP, even "[t]he records of the Notarial Division
of the Clerk of Court, Makati City faithfully re ects the duplicate copy of the subject Deed
of Trust 'made and entered on June 19, 1997 executed by Antonio L. Tan, Jr.', as certi ed
by Atty. Corazon Cecilia Pineda." 5 2 It needed more than a bare denial from Tan to
overthrow these presumptions. Adequate supporting evidence should have been
presented to support his assertions.
Tan's denial that he personally appeared before Cua on June 19, 1997 deserved no
weight in the determination of probable cause. He failed to present any plausible
explanation as to why it was impossible for him to be at the notary public's o ce on said
date. Neither did he deny that the CTC indicated in the deed's jurat as evidence of identity
actually belonged to him. The mere circumstance that his relationship with Matsuura was
already strained at the time of the deed's notarization miserably failed to substantiate the
claim that he could not have appeared before Cua. Matsuura had precisely explained that
the transfer of the shares of stock was part of an attempt to compromise a dispute that
existed between them. In addition, we have explained that the alleged theft of the
document by Matsuura was sufficiently rebutted during the preliminary investigation. HaEcAC

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 On the basis of the foregoing, the reasonable probability of the respondents'
participation in the commission of the crime of falsi cation was not su ciently
established during the preliminary investigation. Even the failure of Matsuura and Tanjutco
to attach a notarized copy of the deed to their pleading led with the SEC fails to support a
nding of probable cause. On the contrary, the circumstance that an unnotarized copy of
the deed was submitted to the SEC weakens the argument that the alleged falsi cation
and wrongful notarization was resorted to by the respondents to suit their interests. It
showed that the respondents believed in the value of the deed to their case even if it was
not notarized. We then a rm the CA's ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 96263 that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion, by gross misapprehension of facts, when it
ordered the ling of the information against Cua. Although Tan assails the CA's grant of
the petition on such basis, jurisprudence provides that grave abuse of discretion refers not
merely to palpable errors of jurisdiction; or to violations of the Constitution, the law and
jurisprudence. It also refers to cases in which, for various reasons, there has been a gross
misapprehension of facts. 5 3
WHEREFORE , the Court rules as follows:
(1) I n G.R. No. 179003 , the petition for review is DENIED . The Court of
Appeals' Decision dated February 6, 2007 and Resolution dated July
24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89346 are AFFIRMED .
(2) I n G.R. No. 195816 , petitioner Tan's motion for reconsideration is
DENIED .
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with Associate Justices Ruben

T. Reyes (now retired) and Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court),
concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 179003), pp. 49-62.
2. Id. at 63.

3. Penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta, with Associate Justices Vicente S.E.
Veloso and Michael P. Elbinias, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 195816), pp. 43-54.
4. Id. at 55-56.

5. Docketed as I.S. No. 98-C15857-58; rollo (G.R. No. 179003), pp. 65-66.

6. Id.
7. Id. at 84.

8. Id. at 71-78.
9. Id. at 67-69.

10. Rollo (G.R. No. 195816), pp. 61-62.

11. Id. at 73-77.

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 12. Id. at 76.
13. Id.

14. Id. at 80-99.

15. Id. at 100-106.

16. Id. at 107-111.

17. Id. at 109-110.

18. Id. at 110.

19. Id. at 120-122.

20. Id. at 121.

21. Id. at 138-140.

22. Id. 139-140.

23. Supra note 1.

24. Id. at 61.

25. Supra note 3.

26. Id. at 53.

27. Supra note 4.

28. Id. at 174.

29. Id.

30. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court previously read:

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely led, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall
be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be led in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a
lower court or of a corporation, board, o cer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as de ned by the Supreme Court. It may
also be led in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided
by law or these rules, the petition shall be led in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.

No extension of time to le the petition shall be granted except for compelling

reason and in no case exceeding 15 days . (Emphasis ours)
31. 471 Phil. 670 (2004).

32. Id. at 684.

33. Social Security System v. Department of Justice , G.R. No. 158131, August 8, 2007, 529
SCRA 426, 442; see also Miller v. Perez, G.R. No. 165412, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 158.
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 34. G.R. No. 168111, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 229.

35. Id. at 252-253.

36. Borlongan, Jr. v. Peña, G.R. No. 143591, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 221, 237.

37. Id. at 236.

38. Ching v. The Secretary of Justice, 517 Phil. 151, 171 (2006).

39. 513 Phil. 547 (2005).

40. Id. at 555.

41. Id.

42. Rollo (G.R. No. 179003), p. 88.

43. 527 Phil. 46 (2006).

44. Id. at 56.

45. Rollo (G.R. No. 179003), p. 65.

46. Supra note 39, at 555.

47. Rollo (G.R. No. 195816), p. 76.

48. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Hon. Majaducon , 455 Phil. 61, 71 (2003), citing
Flores v. Office of the Ombudsman, 437 Phil. 684, 691 (2002).
49. Supra note 36, at 240.

50. Bernardino v. People, 536 Phil. 961, 970 (2006).

51. Rollo (G.R. No. 179003), pp. 60-61.

52. Rollo (G.R. No. 195816), p. 75.

53. United Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko , G.R. No. 156337, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA
322, 331.

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