Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest

November 17, 2010
Mr. David Stawick

Secretary
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st Street, NW
Washington, DC 20581
Via Electronic Mail
SUBJECT: RIN 3038-AD01
Dear Mr. Secretary:
The Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Inc. (“MGEX” or “Exchange”) would like to thank the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC” or “Commission”) for this opportunity
to respond to the Commission’s request for comment on the above referenced matter
published in the October 18, 2010 Federal Register Vol. 75, No. 200.
MGEX recognizes the value that the proposed CFTC rulemaking can provide certain
sections of the commodities industry and its market participants, particularly the large
swaps area which lacks sufficient regulatory oversight as well as those parties trading
swaps. MGEX is both a Designated Contract Market (“DCM”) and Derivatives Clearing
Organization (“DCO”) and, while MGEX does not currently trade or clear swaps, the
Exchange will be impacted since the Commission is applying much of the proposed
rulemaking to DCMs and DCOs not trading or clearing swaps. The proposed
rulemaking covers all DCMs and DCOs under a single blanket, and the Commission
has presented various arguments for doing so. However, MGEX would like to ensure
that as a single legal entity that is both a DCM and DCO, the Commission’s final
rulemaking will account for such a combined structure and make clear that the rules for
DCMs and DCOs do not overlap or have unintended interpretations in areas such as
ownership control and voting which we will describe later.
Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest
MGEX agrees with the Commission that mitigating conflicts of interest plays an
important role in the proper functioning of DCMs and DCOs. MGEX applauds the
efforts taken by the Commission and its staff and agrees with many but not all of the
proposed rules to mitigate conflicts of interest. Please find below our comments and
concerns.
130 Grain Exchange Building 400 South 4th Street Minneapolis, MN 55415-1413
lcarlson@mgex.com 800.827.4746 612.321.7169 Fax: 612.339.1155 equal opportunity employer
Page 2
Board of Director Requirements
Independent public directors assist in mitigating structural conflicts of interest and

provide unique insight that might not otherwise be represented by member directors.
The proposed requirements require that the board of directors for DCMs, DCOs and
Swap Execution Facilities (“SEFs”) be comprised of at least 35 percent public directors.
As an additional layer to the 35 percent requirement, the Commission also proposed to
require at least two independent directors be on the board. MGEX already exceeds
both of these requirements and agrees with the Commission that the 35 percent
minimum threshold for public directors on the board and executive committees
operating with board powers strikes a fair balance between the need to mitigate
conflicts of interest and the need for expertise and efficiency. The Commission asked
for comments relating to whether 35 percent was high enough or whether the board
should be 51 percent public or some percent in-between. One of the main factors
driving the increased concern over conflicts of interest regarding public directors being
on a DCM or DCO’s board revolves around swaps. The type of product traded or
cleared should not be determinative as to percentage of public directors. Therefore,
MGEX as a non-swap DCO/DCM, suggests the Commission consider the totality of the
impact of the proposed rule and not focus solely on the issues arising from the swap
area.
Regarding two substantive requirements proposed by the Commission, MGEX believes

the proposed requirements could use clarification as to value and purpose. First,
requiring annual performance reviews of a board of directors and its individual board
members appears excessive and unnecessary. In our case, the board and its members
are already accountable to its members and owners and for ensuring the Exchange is
complying with Commission requirements. The Regulatory Oversight Committee was
established to monitor the latter. Furthermore, term limits already provide as good, if
not better, means for removing directors who are not performing in the best interest of
shareholders. In addition, what does the Commission foresee doing with the annual
reviews – is it for shareholders, the Commission or someone else? Shareholders,
owners and others may well request disclosure of such reviews which will have a
tendency to impede debate on controversial topics, or even move to the other extreme
where board members will conduct exhaustive debate in order to ensure they can be
given a good grade. Worse yet, highly qualified board candidates may choose to avoid
the scrutiny of the proposed requirements which could lead to a less qualified and
effective board. MGEX is not convinced that an annual performance review’s benefit
will outweigh the cost of conducting the review since the voting shareholders have no
obligation to utilize the review. As a last point, publicly traded exchanges might be
served better by this requirement than a nonpublicly traded and mutually owned
exchange.
MGEX notes that the Commission states “each member of a DCO, DCM, or SEF Board
of Directors have sufficient expertise, where applicable, in financial services, risk
management, and clearing services.” Every entity naturally seeks such qualified
individuals. However, the Commission also stated its desire to “balance between (i) the
need to minimize conflict of interest in DCM decision-making processes with (ii) the
need for expertise and efficiency in such processes.” It seems that the Commission’s
Page 3
statement regarding balancing will be the most practical and feasible guidepost to use.
The former standard seems too subjective without employing guidelines to provide
clarity. Further, MGEX cannot guarantee the election of member directors, even if a
Nominations Committee vets a candidate’s qualifications.
Committee Public Director Requirements
MGEX agrees with the Commission that public directors help ensure a high level of
integrity to many committees. MGEX also agrees that DCMs and DCOs should
generally adhere to the same public director requirements. However, the Exchange
requests that the Commission consider the impact of its public director requirements for
single legal entities that are both a DCM and DCO.
For example, consider an eleven-member board of directors of a combined DCM/DCO

entity. At least four of the members must qualify as public directors. The four also
serve on a number of internal committees such as executive, finance and personnel.
Based on the proposed requirements for the nominating, risk management,
membership and regulatory oversight committees as well as for disciplinary panels, the
Commission’s proposals will require the four public directors to sit on perhaps ten
committee seats or more. That is in addition to their normal board obligations. These
steep additional time demands may function as a large disincentive for potential quality
public members to join a board as they may well be spending more time on non-
governing matters. MGEX understands the need for all serving directors to be fully
engaged but also knows there are other non-exchange related issues and duties that
most board members must contend with outside of their director duties. In essence, the
proposed requirements further spread thin the ability of the pubic directors to effectively
serve on each committee and also inhibit the DCO/DCM from efficiently using the
expertise of its public directors’ qualifications. As an alternative, the Exchange
proposes that the Commission promulgate suggested guidelines for public directors
serving on committees as opposed to hard-number requirements of public directors
serving on committees.
Specific Committee Requirements: Nominating Committee
Notwithstanding the forgoing, MGEX currently has a nominating committee and agrees
with the Commission that public directors are valuable asset to help ensure the process
of electing directors maintains a high level of independence and integrity.
If the nominating committee should function as a gatekeeper instead of an overseer, it

would be beneficial to DCOs, DCMs, and SEFs for the Commission to perhaps provide
safe harbor provisions as to who are those “individuals qualified to serve” on the board.
As previously stated, this is a natural goal that any nominating committee attempts to
do. However, limiting who members or owners can vote for may open the DCO, DCM
or SEF to claims of discrimination or other legal claims. Therefore, the Exchange
believes the Commission’s proposal is not necessary. Regardless, it is best to allow
DCOs, DCMs, and SEFs to determine how they wish to set standards or encourage
qualified individuals to serve.
Page 4
Specific Committee Requirements: Risk Management Committee
Regarding the risk management committee, MGEX finds it interesting that the
Commission proposes to require a non-swap DCO to have 10 percent of the committee
be composed of “customers of clearing members, who also routinely execute swap
contracts (as well as commodity futures and options).” Having risk management
committee members who have experience with pricing models is reasonable; however,
the clear focus on swaps indicates that the requirements being promulgated should not
necessarily be applied universally to DCOs not clearing swaps. The Commission
seems to put commodity futures and options as an afterthought, parenthetically
speaking. Considering the difference between swaps and commodity futures, it does
not necessarily make sense to put all DCOs under one umbrella. MGEX respectfully
requests that the Commission instead consider the issues that swap activity represents
and not consistently lump such products with commodity futures and options. MGEX
respectfully suggests that the Commission consider having the 10 percent of the risk
management committee consist of expertise in the type of business that the DCO
primarily does. In the alternative, if the Commission is particularly concerned with
swaps, then if the DCO’s business consists of say, 25 percent or more of swaps, then
that 10 percent of the risk management committee should have expertise in swaps.
Voting Rights and Ownership
The Commission proposes two alternatives for DCOs to limit ownership and voting
rights. The first alternative limits single-member ownership of voting equity to 20
percent and an aggregate limit for enumerated entities to 40 percent. The second
alternative proposes a 5 percent limit on the voting equity that any DCO member or
enumerated entity may own. Remember, MGEX is both a single entity DCM/DCO and
already limits ownership and voting rights to 20 percent of the Exchange’s outstanding
membership. Requiring an entity that is both a DCM and DCO to comply with the
higher DCO standards is discriminatory to us as a DCM. Therefore, this DCO
requirement should not apply to DCMs that are also DCOs, and also not trading or
clearing swaps.
The Exchange thanks the Commission for the opportunity to comment on the notice of
proposed rulemaking. If there are any questions regarding these comments, please
contact me at (612) 321-7169 or lcarlson@mgex.com. Thank you for your attention to
this matter.
Regards,
Layne G. Carlson
Corporate Secretary
cc: Mark G. Bagan, CEO, MGEX

Jesse Marie Bartz, Asst. Corporate Secretary, MGEX
Eric J. Delain, Legal Advisor, MGEX
James D. Facente, Director, Market Operations, Clearing & IT, MGEX

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November 17, 2010

Mr. David Stawick

Via Electronic Mail

SUBJECT: RIN 3038-AD01

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest

Board of Director Requirements

Independent public directors assist in mitigating structural conflicts of interest and

Regarding two substantive requirements proposed by the Commission, MGEX believes

Committee Public Director Requirements

For example, consider an eleven-member board of directors of a combined DCM/DCO

Specific Committee Requirements: Nominating Committee

If the nominating committee should function as a gatekeeper instead of an overseer, it

Specific Committee Requirements: Risk Management Committee

Voting Rights and Ownership

cc: Mark G. Bagan, CEO, MGEX

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