SonicWall, Inc.

SonicWALL NSA Series 2600, 3600, 4600, 5600

FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

Level 2

Version 1.6
June 7, 2017

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Copyright Notice
Copyright © 2017 SonicWall, Inc.
May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

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 Table of Contents

Copyright Notice ................................................................................................................ 2 

Introduction......................................................................................................................... 4 
Cryptographic Boundary..................................................................................................... 5 
Roles and Services .............................................................................................................. 7 
User Role Services .......................................................................................................... 7 
Crypto Officer Services ................................................................................................... 8 
Unauthenticated services ................................................................................................. 8 
Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................... 11 
Security Rules ................................................................................................................... 14 
Operational Environment .............................................................................................. 15 
FIPS 140-2 Approved mode Operation ......................................................................... 15 
Non-Approved Mode of Operation ............................................................................... 15 
Definition of Critical Security Parameters........................................................................ 16 
Public Keys.................................................................................................................... 16 
Definition of CSP Modes of Access.............................................................................. 17 
Mitigation of Attacks ........................................................................................................ 19 
Definitions and Glossary .................................................................................................. 19 

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Introduction
The SonicWALL NSA Series 2600, 3600, 4600, 5600 (hereafter referred to as “the cryptographic
module”) is a multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module, with hardware part numbers and
versions as follows:
Module Hardware Version Firmware Version
NSA 2600 P/N: 101-500362-63, Rev. A SonicOS v6.2.5
NSA 3600 P/N: 101-500338-64, Rev. A SonicOS v6.2.5
NSA 4600 P/N: 101-500365-64, Rev. A SonicOS v6.2.5
NSA 5600 P/N: 101-500360-65, Rev. A SonicOS v6.2.5

The overall FIPS validation level for the module is Security Level 2. Note that the different
hardware versions vary only in form factor, CPU and memory. The cryptographic module is an
Internet security appliance, which provides stateful packet filtering firewall, deep packet inspection,
virtual private network (VPN), and traffic shaping services. The appliance Encryption technology
uses Suite B algorithms. Suite B algorithms are approved by the U.S. government for protecting
both Unclassified and Classified data.

Table 1 – Module Security Level Specification

Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Cryptographic Module Ports Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Machine 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A

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Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic boundary is the surfaces and edges of the device enclosure, inclusive of the
physical ports.
The chassis of the modules are sealed with one (1) or two (2) tamper evident seals: one (1) tamper-
evident seal for the NSA 2600 and two (2) tamper-evident seals for the NSA 3600, 4600 and 5600,
which are applied during manufacturing. The physical security of the module is intact if there is no
evidence of tampering with the seals. The locations of the tamper-evident seals are indicated by the
red arrows in the figures below. The Cryptographic Officer shall inspect the tamper seals for signs
of tamper evidence once every six months. If evidence of tamper is found, the Cryptographic
Officer is requested to follow their internal IT policies which may include either replacing the unit or
resetting the unit to factory defaults. For further instructions on resetting to factory defaults, please
review Sonicwall guidance documentation.

Figure 1 - NSA 2600 Front with Tamper-Evident Seal on Left Side

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1

Figure 2 - NSA 2600 Underside/Bottom (same seal)

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Figure 3 - NSA 3600/4600/5600 Rear with Two Tamper-Evident Seals

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Roles and Services
The cryptographic module provides a User role and a Cryptographic Officer role via role-based
authentication. The cryptographic module does not provide a Maintenance role. The User role is
referred to as “Limited Administrator” (individual user) or “Limited Administrators” (user group) in
the vendor documentation. The Cryptographic Officer role is referred to as “Administrator”
(individual user) or “SonicWALL Administrators” (user group) in the vendor documentation. The
“Administrator” user is a local account on the SonicWALL appliance, and the name used to login as
this account may be configured by the Cryptographic Officer role; the default name for the
“Administrator” account is “admin”. The user group “SonicWALL Read-Only Admins” satisfies
neither the Cryptographic Officer nor the User Role, and should not be used in FIPS mode
operations.
The configuration settings required to enable FIPS mode are specified on page 15 of this document.
The User role is authenticated using the credentials of a member of the “Limited Administrators”
user group. The User role can query status and non-critical configuration. The authentication
mechanisms are discussed in the Security Rules Section.

User Role Services

 Show Status – Monitoring, pinging, traceroute, viewing logs.
 Show Non-critical Configuration – “Show” commands that enable the User to view VPN
tunnel status and network configuration parameters.
 Session Management – Limited commands that allow the User to perform minimal VPN
session management, such as clearing logs, and enabling some debugging events. This
includes the following services:
1. Log On
2. Monitor Network Status
3. Log Off (themselves and guest users)
4. Clear Log
5. Export Log
6. Filter log
7. Generate Log Reports
8. Configure DNS Settings
 TLS – TLS used for the https configuration tool or network traffic over a TLS VPN
 IPsec VPN – Network traffic over an IPsec VPN

The Cryptographic Officer role is authenticated using the credentials of the “Administrator” user
account (also referred to as “Admin”), or the credentials of a member of the “SonicWALL
Administrators” user group. The use of the latter allows for identification of specific users (i.e. by
username) upon whom is imparted full administrative privileges through their assigned membership
to the “SonicWALL Administrators” group by the Admin user, or other user with full administrative
privileges. The Cryptographic Officer role can show all status and configure cryptographic
algorithms, cryptographic keys, certificates, and servers used for VPN tunnels. The Crypto Officer
sets the rules by which the module encrypts and decrypts data passed through the VPN tunnels. The
authentication mechanisms are discussed in the Security Rules Section.

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Crypto Officer Services
 Show Status - Monitoring, pinging, traceroute, viewing logs.
 Configuration Settings – System configuration, network configuration, User settings,
Hardware settings, Log settings, and Security services including initiating encryption,
decryption, random number generation, key management, and VPN tunnels. This includes
the following services:
1. Configure VPN Settings
2. Set Content Filter
3. Import/Export Certificates
4. Upload Firmware
5. Configure DNS Settings
6. Configure Access
 Session Management – Management access for VPN session management, such as setting
and clearing logs, and enabling debugging events and traffic management. This includes the
following services:
1. Log on
2. Import/Export Certificates
3. Clear Log
4. Filter Log
5. Export Log
6. Setup DHCP Server
7. Generate Log Reports
 Key Zeroization – Zeroizing cryptographic keys
 TLS – TLS used for the https configuration tool or network traffic over a TLS VPN
 IPsec VPN – Network traffic over an IPsec VPN

The cryptographic module also supports unauthenticated services, which do not disclose, modify, or
substitute CSPs, use approved security functions, or otherwise affect the security of the
cryptographic module.

Unauthenticated services
 Self-test Initiation – power cycle
 Firmware removal with configuration return to factory state – reset switch.
 Status – LED activity and console message display

Note: The same services are available in the non-Approved mode of operation. In the non-Approved
mode of operation, the non-Approved algorithms listed on page 16 can be utilized.

Separation of roles is enforced by requiring users to authenticate using either a username and
password, or digital signature verification. The User role requires the use of a username and
password or possession of a private key of a user entity belonging to the “Limited Administrators”
group. The Cryptographic Officer role requires the use of the “Administrator” username and
password, or the username and password of a user entity belonging to the “SonicWALL
Administrators” group.

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Multiple users may be logged in simultaneously, but only a single user-session can have full
configuration privileges at any time, based upon the prioritized preemption model described below:
1. The Admin user has the highest priority and can preempt any users.
2. A user that is a member of the “SonicWALL Administrators” user group can preempt any
users except for the Admin.
3. A user that is a member of the “Limited Administrators” user group can only preempt other
members of the “Limited Administrators" group.
Session preemption may be handled in one of two ways, configurable from the System >
Administration page, under the “On admin preemption” setting:
1. “Drop to non-config mode” – the preempting user will have three choices:
a. “Continue” – this action will drop the existing administrative session to a “non-config
mode”, and will impart full administrative privileges to the preempting user.
b. “Non-Config Mode” – this action will keep the existing administrative session intact,
and will login the preempting user in a “non-config mode”
c. “Cancel” – this action will cancel the login, and will keep the existing administrative
session intact.
2. “Log-out” – the preempting user will have two choices:
a. “Continue” – this action will log out the existing administrative session, and will
impart full administrative privileges to the preempting user.
b. “Cancel” – this action will cancel the login, and will keep the existing administrative
session intact.
“Non-config mode” administrative sessions will have no privileges to cryptographic functions
making them functionally equivalent to User role sessions. The ability to enter “Non-config mode”
may be disabled altogether from the System > Administration page, under the “On admin
preemption” setting by selecting “Log out” as the desired action.
The cryptographic module provides several security services including VPN and IPsec. The
cryptographic module provides the Cryptographic Officer role the ability to configure VPN tunnels
and network settings.
When configured to operate in FIPS mode, the cryptographic module provides only FIPS 140-2
compliant services. Whether or not the device is in FIPS mode is indicated on the System/Settings
page; checking the FIPS mode enable check box causes the module to execute a compliance check;
the module sets the flag only when all conditions are met, and automatically resets the module to
enter the FIPS 140-2 Approved mode.

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The module supports the following FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms:

Table 2 – FIPS 140-2 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

Description Cert. #
AES (128, 192, and 256-bit) in CBC mode 3901
SHA-1, SHA-256, -384, -512 3214
FIPS 186-4 RSA Key Generation, Signature Generation and Signature Verification 1986
using 2048 and 3072-bit key sizes with SHA-256, -384, and -512
FIPS 186-4 DSA Signature Verification using 2048-bit key size with SHA-256, -384 1061
and -512.
HMAC-SHA-1, -256, -384, -512 2531
SP 800-90A Hash_DRBG (SHA-256) 1117
SP 800-135 KDF's for IKE v1, IKE v2, TLS * 756
* The corresponding protocols were not reviewed or tested by the CAVP or CMVP.
The CAVP certificates associated with this module include other algorithms, modes, and key sizes
that have been CAVP validated but are not available in the Approved mode of the module. Only the
algorithms, modes, and key sizes shown in Table 2 are available in the Approved mode of the
module.
The Cryptographic Module also provides the following non FIPS-approved but allowed algorithms:
 Diffie-Hellman within IKE using 2048-bit keys (key agreement; key establishment
methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
 NDRNG (used to seed the Approved DRBG). The NDRNG provides an effective 768 bits of
entropy input to the SP 800-90A Hash_DRBG for use in key generation.
 MD5 within TLS and internal password storage

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Ports and Interfaces

Figure 1 - NSA 2600 Front Panel (Top) and Back Panel (Bottom)

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 Figure 2 - NSA 3600/4600/5600 Front Panel (Top) and Back Panel (Bottom)

Table 3 describes the physical ports and corresponding logical interfaces.

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 Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces

Physical Ports Qty. Description Logical Interfaces

Console 1 DB-9/RJ-45 serial connector. Provides a serial Data input, control
console which can be used for basic administration input , status output
functions.
USB 2 Non-functional, not currently supported N/A
Reset Button 1 Used to manually reset the appliance to Safe Mode. Control input
Status LEDs 6 Power LEDs: Indicate module is receiving power. Status output
Test LED: Indicates module is initializing and
performing self-tests.
Alarm LED: Indicates alarm condition.
HD and Bypass Status LEDs: 2600 only
M0: Expansion Module 0 activity All but 2600
Expansion 1 Expansion connector, unused, disconnected N/A
internally. Located in the front panel on the 2600,
and in the rear panel in all other configurations.
SDHC 1 Secure Digital High-Capacity port. Non-functional, N/A
not currently supported.
MGMT 1 1Gbps RJ45 isolated out-of-band management Control input, status
(MGMT) port, with integral LINK and ACT LEDs output
Ethernet [2600] 8 10/100/1000 auto-sensing with an RJ-45/SX/SC Data input, data
multimode fiber connector. Labeled X#..., output, status
LAN/WAN/…. Each Ethernet interface includes output, control input
LINK and ACT LEDs.
Ethernet 12 10/100/1000 auto-sensing with an RJ-45/SX/SC Data input, data
[3600,4600,5600] multimode fiber connector. Labeled X#..., output, status
LAN/WAN/…. Each Ethernet interface includes output, control input
LINK and ACT LEDs.
1GE SFP 4 1GbE Ethernet hot-pluggable SFP interfaces Data input, data
supporting RJ-45/SX/SC multimode fiber connector output, status
with LINK and ACT LEDs. output, control input
10GE SFP 2 10GbE Ethernet hot-pluggable SFP+ interfaces with Data input, data
LINK and ACT LEDs output, status
output, control input
Power 1 AC power input and switch Power

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Security Rules
The cryptographic module has the following security rules:
 The cryptographic module provides two distinct operator roles: User role and Cryptographic
Officer role.
 The cryptographic module provides authentication relying upon username/passwords or an
RSA 2048-bit digital signature verification.
o The CO and User passwords must be at least eight (8) characters long each, and the
password character set is ASCII characters 32-127, which is 96 ASCII characters.
This makes the probability 1 in 96^8, which is less than one in 1,000,000 that a
random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur for each attempt (This
is also valid for RADIUS shared secret keys). After three (3) successive unsuccessful
password verification tries, the cryptographic module pauses for one second before
additional password entry attempts can be reinitiated. This makes the probability
approximately 180/96^8 = 1.5E-14, which is less than one in 100,000, that a random
attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in a one-minute period.
o For User authentication based on RSA digital signature verification, the probability
that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/2^112, which
is less than 1 in 1,000,000. Due to processing and network limitations, the module
can verify at most 300 signatures in a one minute period. Thus, the probability that a
random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in a one minute period
is 300/2^112, which is less than 1 in 100,000.
 The following cryptographic algorithm self-tests are performed by the cryptographic module
at power-up:
o Firmware integrity test (using 16-bit CRC EDC)
o AES-CBC Encrypt and Decrypt Known Answer Tests
o SHA-1, -256, -384, -512 Known Answer Tests
o HMAC-SHA-1, -256, -512 Known Answer Tests
o DSA Signature Verification Pairwise Consistency Test
o RSA Sign and Verify Known Answer Tests
o DH Pairwise Consistency Test
o DRBG KAT

 The module supports the following conditional self-tests:

o DRBG and NDRNG Continuous Random Number Generator Tests
o RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
o Firmware Load Test

 When a new firmware image is loaded, the cryptographic module verifies the 2048-bit DSA
signed SHA-2 hash of the image. If this verification fails, the firmware image loading is
aborted.

If any of the tests described above fail, the cryptographic module enters the error state. No security
services are provided in the error state. Upon successful completion of the Diagnostic Phase, the
cryptographic module enters the Command and Traffic Processing State. Security services are only

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provided in the Command and Traffic Processing State. No VPN tunnels are started until all tests
are successfully completed. This effectively inhibits the data output interface.
When all tests are completed successfully, the Test LED is turned off.

Operational Environment
Area 6 of the FIPS 140-2 requirements does not apply to this module as the module only allows the
loading of firmware through the firmware load test, which ensures the image is appropriately DSA
signed by SonicWall, Inc.

FIPS 140-2 Approved mode Operation

The module is not configured to operate in FIPS-mode by default. The following steps must be
taken to enable FIPS-mode operation.
 Set Administrator and User passwords, as well as the RADIUS shared secret, to at least eight
characters.
 Traffic between the module and the RADIUS server must be secured via an IPsec tunnel.
Note: this step need only be performed if RADIUS is supported.
 Use IKE with 3rd Party Certificates for IPsec Keying Mode when creating VPN tunnels.
 When creating VPN tunnels, ensure ESP is enabled for IPsec.
 Use FIPS-approved encryption and authentication algorithms when creating VPN tunnels.
 Use Group 2 or Group 5 for IKE Phase 1 DH Group and Use SHA-256 for Authentication.
 Do not enable Advanced Routing Services.
 Do not enable Group VPN management.
 Do not enable SNMP or SSH.
 Enable FIPS mode from the System/Settings page by checking “FIPS Mode” checkbox.

The FIPS mode configuration can be determined by an operator, by checking the state of the “FIPS
Mode” checkbox on the System/Settings page and verification of the preceding steps. When the
“FIPS Mode” checkbox is selected, the module executes a compliance checking procedure,
examining all settings related to the security rules described above and in this Security Policy, and
reporting any non-compliant settings. The operator, prompted by the compliance tool, is responsible
for updating these settings appropriately. The “FIPS Mode” checkbox and corresponding system
flag will not be set unless all settings are compliant, and as such is a reliable indicator that the
module is running in the FIPS Approved mode of operation.

Non-Approved Mode of Operation

The Cryptographic Module provides the same set of services as listed above, but allows the
following additional administration options and non FIPS-approved algorithms not used in the FIPS
mode of operation:
 MD5 within MSCHAP
 ARCFOUR and ARCFOUR128 within L2TP, TLS and SSH
 AES GCM (non-compliant) within SSL
 DES within SSL, SSH and SNMP

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  Triple-DES (non-compliant) within SSL and SSH
 FIPS 186-2 RSA Signature Generation using 1024, 1536, and 2048-bit key sizes with SHA-1
 Diffie-Hellman within IKE using 1024-bit keys (key agreement; key establishment
methodology provides 80 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant)
 http management GUI
 AAA server authentication (the Approved mode requires operation of RADIUS only, within
a secure VPN tunnel)
 SSH*
 SNMP*

Definition of Critical Security Parameters

The following are the Critical Security Parameters (CSP) contained in the cryptographic module:
 IKE Shared Secret – Shared secret used during IKE Phase 1
 SKEYID – Secret value used to derive other IKE secrets
 SKEYID_d – Secret value used to derive keys for security associations
 SKEYID_a – Secret value used to derive keys to authenticate IKE messages
 SKEYID_e – Secret value used to derive keys to encrypt IKE messages
 IKE Session Encryption Key – AES 128, 192, 256 key used to encrypt data
 IKE Session Authentication Key - HMAC 160 bit key used for data authentication
 IKE RSA Private Key – RSA 2048 bit RSA key used to authenticate the module to a peer
during IKE
 IPsec Session Encryption Key – AES 128, 192, 256 key used to encrypt data
 IPsec Session Authentication Key – HMAC 160 bit key used for data authentication for
IPsec traffic
 TLS Master Secret: used for the generation of TLS Session Keys and TLS Integrity Key
 TLS Premaster Secret: used for the generation of Master Secret
 TLS Session Key: AES key used to protect TLS connection
 TLS Integrity Key: HMAC 160 bit key used to check the integrity of TLS connection
 Diffie-Hellman Private Key – Used within IKE key agreement
 DRBG V and C values – Used to seed the Approved DRBG
 RADIUS Shared Secret – Used for authenticating the RADIUS server to the module and vice
versa
 Passwords – Authentication data

Public Keys
 Root CA Public Key – Used for verifying a chain of trust for receiving certificates
 Peer IKE RSA Public Key – RSA 2048 bit key for verifying digital signatures from a peer
device
 IKE RSA Public Key – RSA 2048 bit key for verifying digital signatures created by the
module

*
Keys derived using the SSH KDF or SNMP KDF are not allowed for use in the Approved mode.

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  DSA Firmware Verification Key – 2048 bit DSA key used for verifying firmware during
firmware load
 Diffie-Hellman Public Key – Used within IKE key agreement
 Diffie-Hellman Peer Public Key – Used within IKE key agreement
 Authentication Public Key – RSA public key used to authenticate the User
 TLS Public Key – RSA public key used in the TLS handshake

Definition of CSP Modes of Access

Table 4 describes the methods of accessing the individual CSPs.
Import: The CSP is entered into the module from an external source.
Generate: The CSP is internally generated using the Hash_DRBG and approved asymmetric key
generation methods, as applicable.
Execute: The module uses the CSP.
Removal/Deletion: The CSP is actively destroyed.
In the table below, TLS and IPsec listings are inclusive of functions that can be operated with IPsec
or TLS communications active.

Table 4 – Roles, Services, CSP Access Matrix

Service Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation
Show Status N/A
Show Non-critical N/A
Configuration
Monitor Network Status N/A
Log On Execute - Passwords
Log Off N/A
Clear Log N/A
Export Log N/A
Import/Export Certificates N/A
Filter Log N/A
Setup DHCP Server N/A (Note: DHCP setup does not use CSPs, but DHCP server setup
is performed with IPsec active. See below for IPsec VPN CSP usage.)
Generate Log Reports N/A
Configure VPN Settings Import - Root CA Public Key
Import/Generate - IKE RSA Private and Public Keys
Import/Generate - Diffie-Hellman Private and Public Keys

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 Service Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation
IPsec VPN Generate/Execute – IKE Shared Secret
Generate/Execute – SKEYID
Generate/Execute – SKEYID_d
Generate/Execute – SKEYID_a
Generate/Execute – SKEYID_e
Generate/Execute – IKE RSA Private Key
Generate/Execute – DH Private Key
Generate/Execute – IKE Session Authentication Key
Generate/Execute – IPsec Session Authentication Key
Generate/Execute – IKE Session Encryption Key
Generate/Execute – IPsec Session Encryption Key
Generate/Execute – DRBG V and C values
Generate/Execute – RADIUS Shared Secret
Execute – Root CA Public Key
Import/Execute – Peer IKE RSA Public Key
Execute – IKE RSA Public Key
Execute – Diffie-Hellman Public Key
Import/Execute – Diffie-Hellman Peer Public Key
Import/Execute – Authentication Public Key
TLS Generate/Execute - TLS Master Secret
Generate/Execute - TLS Premaster Secret
Generate/Execute - TLS Session Key
Generate/Execute - TLS Integrity Key
Execute - TLS Public Key
Execute - Diffie-Hellman Public Key
Import/Execute - Diffie-Hellman Peer Public Key
Import/Execute - Authentication Public Key
Set Content Filter N/A
Upload Firmware Execute - DSA Firmware Verification Key
Configure DNS Settings N/A
Configure Access Import/Execute - Passwords

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 Service Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation
Key Zeroization Remove – IKE Shared Secret
Remove – SKEYID
Remove – SKEYID_d
Remove – SKEYID_a
Remove – SKEYID_e
Remove – IKE Session Encryption Key
Remove – IKE Session Authentication Key
Remove – IKE RSA Private Key
Remove – IPsec Session Encryption Key
Remove – IPsec Session Authentication Key
Remove – TLS Master Secret
Remove – TLS Premaster Secret
Remove – TLS Session Key
Remove – TLS Integrity Key
Remove – DH Private Key
Remove – DRBG V and C values
Remove – RADIUS Shared Secret
Remove – Passwords

Mitigation of Attacks
Area 11 of the FIPS 140-2 requirements do not apply to this module as it has not been designed to
mitigate any specific attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-2 requirements.

Definitions and Glossary

AES Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
CSP Critical Security Parameter
VPN Virtual Private Network
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
Triple-DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
DES Data Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman asymmetric algorithm
IKE Internet Key Exchange
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
LAN Local Area Network
DH Diffie-Hellman
GUI Graphical User Interface

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SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
MSCHAP Microsoft Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
NSA Network Security Appliance (SonicWALL product name)
SFP Small Form-factor Pluggable (a high speed LAN connection type)

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