Democratic Innovations and Quality of Democracy:

Do we need new and more creative recipes?

Thamy Pogrebinschi
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
thamy.pogrebinschi@wzb.eu

Paper prepared for delivery at:

th
7 General Conference of the European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR), Sciences Po,
Bordeaux, 4-7 September 2013
and
Gemeinsame 3-Länder-Tagung der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft (DVPW), der
Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Politikwissenschaft (ÖGPW) und der Schweizerischen Vereinigung
für Politische Wissenschaft (SVPW). Leopold-Franzens Universität Innsbruck, 19-21 September 2013

Abstract: Recent studies on the quality of democrac ha e o luded that the g eate the pa ti ipatio , the highe the
p o a ilit that go e e t a d its de isio s a e espo si e Le i e a d Moli a . Ho e e , quality of democracy
indices usually measure political participation based on voting turnout, opportunities to vote and representativeness of
institutions. In addition to voting, surveys define participation as organizing, assembling, protesting and lobbying. Access to
government offices and membership in groups like political parties and civil society associations are also included in most
indices. Those definitions of participation still amount to a minimalist or, at most, pluralist model of democracy; they do
not account for the social and political changes brought about worldwide by the increasing dissemination of democratic
innovations. This paper claims that an updated and more comprehensive notion of (non-electoral) participation is an
integral part of the task of reforming political institutions and assessing the quality of democracy. It proposes a set of
criteria to assess democratic innovations, envisaging the improvement of current measurements of the quality of
democracy. The paper also argues that an enlarged account of political participation is one of the key elements that
distinguish recent institutional reform in Latin America and Europe, and one that may explain the increasing disaffection
with democracy in the latter in contrast with the decreasing levels of political distrust in the former.
 Assessing the quality of democracy became a central theoretical and practical concern in a
landscape of increasing political disaffection and disenchantment with democratic institutions.
Regardless of the various reasons behind the consistent decline of public trust in governmental
institutions, the conviction that reforms are necessary to respond to this problem seems to be
shared by those seeking to frame what a good democracy is. What seems yet not to be clear,
however, is how to translate the normative values of democracy in an empirical formula able to
countervail political disillusionment and enhance the quality of democracy, and to accomplish it
everywhere democracy has grown roots.
In a major comparative work, Diamond and Morlino (2005) concluded that a particular type
of democracy seems better suited to higher democratic quality, namely, one that generates and
facilitates high levels of participation and competition. That the latters empirically perform as the
e gi es of de o ati ualit indicates that Dahl’s concept of polyarchy (1971) remains central to
measurements, despite the need to reframe it in order to evaluate participation and competition
not merely as rights but as effective exercise of rights (Altman and Pérez-Liñán 2002). The question
that remains open, however, is not whether high participation and competition can boost the quality
of democracy, but how this result can be attained. Reflecting on this, Diamond and Morlino point to
a crucial problem: is it e ough to fi a iall suppo t ep ese tati e ha els, su h as pa ties, a d
have a constitutional design and an electoral system that allow for participation and competition? Or
do e eed e a d o e eati e e ipes? : ii .
This paper claims that new and more creative recipes to enhance the quality of democracy
are to be searched in representative channels that include more than parties and in constitutional
designs that allow for participation and competition beyond the electoral system. New democratic
experiments that provide citizens with opportunities to participate beyond the ballot, and non-
elected bodies that claim to provide representation regardless of mandates are among the
ingredients that compose the assorted and multifarious menu offered by the so-called democratic
innovations.
That democratic innovations are a response for political disillusionment and a possible cure
for the malaises of representative democracy is no new argument (Selee and Peruzzotti 2009,
Geissel and Newton 2012), as well as the potential of democratic innovations to deepen democracy
(Fung and Wright 2003) or to improve its quality (Geissel 2009) is not an unknown issue. However,
not only the scholarships on democratic innovation and on quality of democracy are divorced
(Geissel and Mayne 2013), but both present shortcomings that render dialogue difficult and hinder
joint efforts to creatively devise new recipes for coping with democratic deficits.

1
 On the one hand, there is still little comparative empirical research on the impacts of
democratic innovations, and the few existing cases and studies are mostly limited to the local level.
This brings about the question of whether democratic innovations are feasible in different and larger
settings, as well as whether they are really inclusory and not cursed by social selection. Without
assessing the feasibility of democratic innovations in the macro political level and the inclusiveness
of both their procedures and results, it is quite difficult to estimate their effectiveness, and therefore
their actual potential to reduce political discontentment and ultimately augment the quality of
democracy.
On the other hand, scholarship on and assessments of quality of democracy disregard
research on democratic innovations and produce incomplete measurements, that is indices unable
to account for participatory reforms increasingly undertaken by national and sub-national
governments. Those reforms aimed at expanding opportunities for citizen participation display
different levels of institutionalization and various design options, most of them unable to fit
indicators that insist on measuring participation mainly as electoral turnout, or as voting rights. Even
measurements that take rights to assemble (membership in political parties and civil society
organizations) and to protest (join demonstrations and sign petitions) into account fail to
conceptualize participation in line with democratic innovations. Without a more comprehensive and
updated concept of participation, one cannot properly esti ate the a tual ole of this e gi e of
de o ati ualit , as ell as its a tual elatio ith the othe o o l evaluated dimensions,
including competition itself.
In this paper, I will propose an analytical framework that seeks to address those
shortcomings of democratic innovation and quality of democracy scholarships. I will argue that
democratic innovations must meet three sets of criteria – feasibility, inclusiveness and effectiveness
– in order to be presented as successful responses to the malaises of representative democracy and
their ensuing political disillusionment. Furthermore, I will argue that once a more comprehensive
and updated concept of participation is taken into consideration, democratic innovations can
enhance the quality of democracy if they prove capable to activate other dimensions usually
measured by democracy indices, in particular competition, responsiveness and equality. Finally, I will
conclude by claiming that the institutionalization of democratic innovations within the boundaries of
representative democracy – or the combination of representative, participatory and deliberative
devices – is a recipe of political reform able to restore satisfaction and increase the quality of
democracy.

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From political disaffection to democratic quality through more participation?

In recent years a vast body of literature has been devoted to trying to explain the growth of
political disaffection and distrust in political institutions in consolidated democracies (Dalton 2004;
Inglehart 2003; Newton 2006; Norris 1999 and 2011; Pharr, Putnam and Dalton 2000). In
conjunction with concerns about decline of trust in political institutions, a long list of what Philippe
Schmitter (2010) alls o idit s pto s as developed by scholars. These include decline in
electoral turnout, falling party membership and identification, greater volatility in voter preferences
and outcomes, greater difficulty in obtaining and sustaining majority support for governments,
declining centrality of parliament, and increased devolution of authority to administrative bodies.
Co e s a out those a d othe s pto s had lo g gi e ise to de ate o the isis of
de o a C ozie , Hu ti gto a d Wata uki ; Ha e as ; Liz a d “tepan 1978; Kaase
and Newton 1995 , o , o e spe ifi all , o the isis of ep ese tatio Kö hle ; Ha ad
1996). Scholars however never really seemed to agree on whether the supposed crisis is one of
efficacy (measured by a decline in institutional efficacy) or legitimacy (perceived by change in the
relations between civil society, parties, and government institutions), which would allow one to
differentiate between a crisis of democracy and a crisis in democracy (Morlino 1998).
Several explanations for political discontentment have been considered over the years.
These include, among other things, rise in levels of education and information, change of values,
economic shifts, and the overexposure of governmental shortcomings by the mass media. Some
scholars yet argue that longitudinal evidence shows fluctuation over time, rather than linear
do a d t e ds leadi g to the o lusio that pu li suppo t fo the politi al s ste has ot
eroded consistently in established democracies, not across a wide range of countries around the
glo e No is . Fu the o e, su e s a d a al ses also sho that ost itize s i esta lished
and in newer democracies still share widespread adhesion to the ideals and principles of democracy
(Norris 1999 and 2011).
If the normative support for democracy remains solid, it seems reasonable to suppose that
the e te t of politi al disaffe tio a d talk a out isis of de o a a e somehow overstated.
Further, if the level of trust in representative institutions like parliaments and political parties
decreases while the level of support for the principles and values of democracy remains stable, that
may indicate at least two things: first, itize s’ e pe tatio s to a ds de o a a e highe tha the
ability of representative institutions to fulfill them, and second, citizens no longer associate
democracy exclusively to representative institutions.

3
 If such diagnosis makes sense, then instead of a crisis what the present situation indicates is
a misalignment between citizens’ de a ds fo pa ti ipatio a d the apa ities of t aditio al politi al
institutions to match those demands. This isalig e t ould poi t to the otio of de o ati
defi it Bella a d Castiglio e , Wa e ,o o e spe ifi all to a i ala ce between
the higher demands for more democracy and the perceived lower supply of democracy (Norris
2011). Scholars increasingly recognize that part of the present disenchantment with democracy does
concern procedures and institutions, and stems also from higher citizen expectations of what
democracy can deliver in terms of results (Diamond and Morlino 2005).
Citizens expect more from democracy and demand more to further participate on
governance. Demands for increased participation and more responsive governments are rising
steadily, despite findings that civic participation in social organizations is declining along with
membership in political parties and electoral turnout (Putnam 2000). Higher demands for
participation lead to higher dissatisfaction with democracy when political institutions do not
properly accommodate them. Scholars call to attention the fact that such demands, if left
unattended, could then gradually undermine the legitimacy and responsiveness of democracy
(Warren 2009).
The intrinsic support for democracy by citizens is the core of the concept of legitimacy,
which has long been considered as the defining element of democratic consolidation (Diamond
, Li z a d “tepa if ot the ke to de o ati o solidatio Me kel 998). According
to attitudinal measurements of consolidation, the more supportive the citizens, the more
democratic a regime (Schedler 2001). An important aspect of democratic legitimacy is that citizens
have a fair chance of influencing the outcomes of the decision-making process on issues that affect
their own lives (Schmitter and Trechsel 2004). Participation is therefore an integral part of the
concept of legitimacy. The same is true for responsiveness. Recent studies on the quality of
democracy have co luded that the g eate the pa ti ipatio , the highe the p o a ilit that
go e e t a d its de isio s a e espo si e Le i e a d Moli a . Po ell has sha pl
defi ed de o ati espo si e ess as hat o u s he the de o ati p o ess i duces
go e e ts to fo a d i ple e t poli ies that the itize s a t . If this is t ue, then it is
reasonable to suppose that an effective way to achieve legitimacy and responsiveness is letting the
citizens themselves take part in the formulation and implementation of the policies they want – or,
in other words, enhancing participation.
Reforms intended to promote participation are not a new item on the democracy agenda. In
order to enhance the legitimacy of political institutions, established democracies have been however
seeking to respond to the increasing disaffection of citizens by taking more of the same remedy,

4
namely reforms of the representative institutions, in particular electoral systems, political parties,
and parliaments. Those have been associated mostly with and subsumed under reforms aiming at
enhancing the competition dimension of democratic quality. At the most, demands for more
effective citizen participation in the political process have been incorporated into the agenda of
direct democracy. However, referendums, plebiscites and itize s’ initiatives have been
implemented thus far mostly at the local level in established democracies, and their effectiveness is
still contested, as well as the question hethe di e t de isio s by the citizens effectively increase
their inclusion in the political process and bring about more democratic results (Merkel 2011).
Moreover and most important, the mechanisms of direct democracy are also circumscribed to
voting (Altman 2011), and therefore encompass a limited form of participation.
A limited form of participation is also comprised by most measurements of democracy and
its quality. Participation is consistently defined by all indices and surveys as meaning mainly voting.
Electoral turnout and exercise of political rights are therefore the main indicators, present in all
measurements. Most indices also include organizing and assembling as measures of participation.
Access to government offices and membership in political parties and civil society associations are
therefore also common indicators; however the widely used Freedom House survey only takes into
account the former type of membership. Fewer indices consider protesting a form of participation.
Examples are the World Values Survey and the European and Latino Barometers, which measure
participation also by asking citizens whether they sign petitions, join boycotts, or attend
demonstrations. The use of direct democracy mechanisms is also rarely comprised by
measurements. The Democracy Barometer is one exception, as it takes participation in referendums
along with elections as a form of effective institutionalized participation. It reduces however the
scope of the concept of participation it advances by considering only demonstrations and petition-
signing as forms of effective non-institutionalized participation.
While a large debate in democratic theory over the last years have revolved around the need
to redefine the concept of representation in order to meet the challenges posed by the theory and
the practice of participatory and deliberative democracy (Castiglione e Warren, 2006; Mansbridge
2003; Urbinati 2006; Urbinati and Warren 2008; Saward 2008), comparative studies and quality of
democracy research have not paid attention to the need to redefine the concept of participation.
Altman and Pérez-Liñán (2002) have proposed a new measure to capture effective participation,
which simply consist in redefining electoral turnout as the number of voters over the voting-age
population. Levine and Molina (2011) measure participation by quantifying electoral participation
(voting turnout), opportunities to vote, participation in political organizations, and representativity
of institutions. Diamond and Morlino (2005) concede that ote tu out ates aptu es o l o e

5
aspect of democratic participatio , ho e e thei definition of participation does not comprise
much more than the kind of activities facilitated by membership in parties and organizations. Such
concepts of participation amount to a minimalist (Schumpeter 1942) or, at most, pluralist (Dahl
1956) model of democracy. They do not account for the increasing proliferation of participatory and
deliberative experiments worldwide, and they underestimate the impact of such democratic
innovations on the formal institutions of representation.
Participation today amounts to more than voting, assembling, protesting, and lobbying. It
also entails more than monitoring, petitioning and demanding justification. Participation implies
likewise more than just to validate or veto a previously framed policy, such as happens in most
referendums and plebiscites. Participation is not just about choosing candidates and controlling their
performance or influencing decision-making. Participation is also about taking part in the decision-
making process, having a say about policy priority, and deliberating on policy issues. Without taking
into account all of those contemporary dimensions of participation, research on quality of
de o a ill e i easi gl su je t to the li itatio s e should e pe t he i etee th-
century concepts meet twenty-fi st e tu ealities Wa e , .
One does need a more comprehensive and updated concept of participation, and one does
indeed need new and more creative recipes to assess the quality of democracy. An important step
has been recently taken by Katz and Morlino (2013) in a still unpublished research about quality of
Democracy in Latin America. They advance a quite comprehensive definition of participation as the
entire set of behaviors, be they conventional or unconventional, legal or borderline vis-à-vis legality,
that allows women and men, as individuals or a group, to create, revive or strengthen group
identification or to try to influence the recruitment of, and decisions by, political authorities (the
representative and/or governmental ones) in order to maintain or change the allocation of existing
alues. : . This ould i ol e the empirical assessment of conventional (elections,
referendum, membership in political organizations and associations) and non-conventional forms of
participation (strike, demonstrations, riots). Although their definition of the latter is a way too broad
( hile e o passi g o de li e is-à-vis legalit fo s of pa ti ipatio , Katz and Morlino move
the debate on quality of democracy forward when they consider forms of participation ith ega d
to specific policies and deli e ati e de o a a e as i their empirical assessment. This is possibly
the first time democratic innovations (with the exception of direct democracy mechanisms such as
referendum) are considered in the participation dimension of measurements of quality of
democracy.
Interestingly enough, Katz and Morlino brought about a more comprehensive concept of
participation precisely in an assessment of the quality of democracy in Latin America. An enlarged

6
account of participation seems indeed to be one of the key elements that distinguish recent
democratic reform in the new continent and in the established democracies of Europe and the
United States. In Latin America, non-electoral forms of participation have been increasingly
incorporated within representative institutions in the last years, providing the citizens with
opportunities other than voting to express their preferences and play a role in the policy process.
The degree of institutionalization reached by democratic innovations in some countries turn these
experiments into not so unconventional or borderline forms of participation, as Katz and Morlino
seem to have supposed. In Latin America, governments have been finding creative ways to align
itize s’ de a ds fo pa ti ipatio ith oppo tu ities to do so within the realm of representative
democracy and its institutions.
In addition to incorporating direct democracy mechanisms (like referendums, plebiscites and
itize s’ i itiati es i to thei e Co stitutio s, several Latin American countries have developed
more far-reaching and effective democratic innovations. Beginning with the participatory budgeting
in in Brazil, those experiments now include local and national policy councils, community councils,
advisory councils, national policy conferences, municipal development councils, participatory urban
planning, and several other local experiments that allow citizens and civil society organizations to
play a larger role in the decision-making process and set the policy agenda along with governments.
Democratic innovations have proliferated in countries as diverse as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela, among others not yet examined by the specialized literature. The
impact of citizen participation are already apparent in public expenditure prioritizing, reallocation of
budgetary provisions, management of local resources, policy planning, design and implementation
of local development projects and reforms, and also in the drafting and enactment of laws and
public policies (Cameron, Hershberg and Sharpe 2012; Fung 2011; Selee and Peruzzotti 2009).
Citizens are entitled to deliberate on policy priorities, to suggest specific policies to be adopted by
their respective governments, or even to propose new areas of policymaking (Pogrebinschi and
Santos 2011; Pogrebinschi 2012; Pogrebinschi and Samuels forthcoming).
The potential of such democratic innovations to achieve equality is remarkable. Experiments
like the participatory budgeting have resulted in greater social equality through a more equitable
redistribution of public goods, and increased the levels of participation among disadvantaged
groups, the less educated, and lower-income citizens (Avritzer 2002; Baiocchi 2003; Gret and
Sintomer 2005; Sousa Santos 2005; Wampler 2007). Other participatory innovations like the national
policy conferences have ensured the recognition and inclusion of minority groups by promoting
rights and developing corresponding policies to address matters of gender, race, ethnicity, and other
cultural minority issues (Pogrebinschi 2013b). Democratic innovations give the voiceless a voice

7
(Cameron, Hershberg and Sharpe 2012), like indigenous populations that have been reintegrated
into the political process and have engaged public life, taking an active role on the new participatory
design of the Andes region (Laserna 2009; Va Cott . The de o a ies ith adje ti es Collie
and Levitsky 1997) that emerged in the third wave of democratization are being progressively
displa ed. The delegati e O’Do el , defe ti e Me kel o pseudo Dia o d, Li z
and Lipset 1989) democracies of Latin American are gradually giving way to new, experimental forms
of governance, which can potentially provide new and more creative recipes to enhance the quality
of democracy.
Among the findings of Katz and Morlino in their recent assessment of quality of democracy
in Latin America is the connection between participation and equality, that is, the fact that higher
participation can imply higher equality – o , o e spe ifi all , a different kind of even non-
conventional participation that witness the presence of a lively civil society may push toward a
st o ge e ualit : . Given that their measurement made use of a conception of
participation as broad as to include democratic innovations, it seems plausible to suppose that the
latter play at least some role in bringing more equality.
Although causalities are still to be properly investigated, one must notice that not only
equality, but also levels of political trust have been remarkably rising in Latin America in the last
decade. According to the Latinobarometer, in 2003, 19% of Latin American citizens were said to trust
their governments, while seven years later, in 2010, this proportion had jumped to 45%. The level of
trust in parliaments and political parties has also increased steeply in Latin America in recent years:
in 2003, 17% of citizens trusted their national parliaments, while by 2010 that figure has doubled to
34%. Trust in political parties increased from 11% to 23% over the same seven-year period,
exhibiting very impressive growth. Considering that the third wave of democratization started in
Latin America over three decades ago, the significant and rapid rise in trust levels in the past few
years may not be simply explained by the expected ordinary consolidation of political institutions.
What have happened in the course of Latin America’s o solidatio p o ess in this period
and has not been anticipated by third- a e s hola s as the left tu , as it is called the series of
ele to al i to ies of se e al leftists’ go e e ts i oth lo al a d atio al le els th oughout the
continent starting in 1998. Those various newly-elected governments manifested clear
programmatic concerns with participation and civil society and have created and institutionalized an
expressive number of democratic innovations. An enlarged concept of participation has even been
inscribed in the new constitutions of some countries, where direct democracy, participatory and
deliberative innovations have been institutionalized as means to correct some of the alleged failures
of representative institutions and to achieve social equality (Pogrebinschi 2013a).

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 If, in order to respond to democratic deficits, governments must achieve an effective
ala e et ee itize s’ de a ds fo pa ti ipatio a d apa ities of political institutions to fulfill
those demands, then institutions that manage to provide citizens with more opportunities for
participation beyond elections may perform better in measurements and bring about more
democratic quality. This is not to say, for example, that political parties have their role diminished;
au contraire, they can also make use of the new channels of representation to strengthen their role,
that is to represent, by benefiting from opportunities outside of elections to know the preferences
of their voters (and also of potential new voters) and to do that mo e d a i all as ote s’
preferences may change between elections). This is just one example of how participation can
eventually reinforce competition and responsiveness, and of how democratic innovations may help
improving the quality of democracy.

Democratic Innovations and Quality of Democracy: An Analytical Framework

So far I have claimed that measurements of quality of democracy must encompass a broader
and more updated definition of participation in order to live up to political changes of contemporary
societies, among which are the increasing adoption of democratic innovations. Although the latter
reflects a worldwide trend, they seem to have found in Latin America a quite fertile soil to germinate
roots – even if countless fruits have already grown in dozens of other countries in different
continents, as it is the case with the participatory budgeting (Sintomer, Herzberg, Alegretti, and
Röcke 2010). When contrasted to democratic innovations evolved in Europe (see Geissel 2012,
Newton 2012, and Smith 2009 for an overview), for example, those flourished in Latin America (see
Avritzer 2002, Cameron, Hershberg and Sharpe 2012, Selee and Peruzzotti 2009, and Pogrebinschi
2013a for an overview) offer distinguishing features, which can provide useful insights regarding
their endurance, impact and potential for replication – important characteristics if we are to assume
that democratic innovations call for a broader concept of participation with which to measure
democratic quality.
First, Latin American democratic innovations tend to display some degree of
institutionalization, that is, informal practices have been increasingly turned into more formal
institutions or incorporated within the existing political institutions of representation. When
democratic innovations are not inscribed in laws or constitutions, they tend to be backed up by
governmental policies or political parties programmatic commitments. Second, they enjoy some
degree of representativeness, as they tend to operate within or along with representative
institutions, and are commonly implemented or sponsored or by elected governments with varying

9
degrees of input from civil society. They also frequently revolve around one issue or policy, what
allows for consistent group organization and therefore the representation of collective interests, in
contrast to individual ones. Third, Lati A e i a’s de o ati i o atio s tend to be open for
participation at least in their inital stage, when they involve more than one. Although self-selection
seems to take place in most cases, evidence suggests lower-income and lower-educated citizens are
among those who participate more. Fourth, democratic innovations developed in Latin America tend
to allow citizens to play a role in the policy-making process; that is, they usually incorporate citizens
into at least one of the stages of the policy cycle, more frequently agenda setting or implementation.
Fifth, innovations in Latin America have been revealing that democratic participation is not limited to
the local level and can work well also in the national level. That democratic innovations can impact
on national level politics is very important if we want to assess their potential to activate other
dimensions of quality of democracy. Lastly, these democratic innovations tend not to be merely
consultative, as several do yield decisions as a conclusion of deliberative processes, however those
decisions are not always binding.
Assuming that those features of Latin American democratic innovations explain to some
extent their enduring experience and impact, I propose a set of criteria informed by them as a
backdrop against which democratic innovations can be assessed. These criteria also provide
institutional design options for the implementation of new experiments, ensuring that democratic
innovations are replicable. If innovations are to expand the representative channels and impact on
democratic quality, they are expected to match to some (varying) extent these criteria. This equals
to say that at least some degree of institutionalization is expected from democratic innovations if
they are to be considered in measurements of democratic quality. In other words, democratic
innovations are expected to evolve from an informal practice to a more formal institutional design,
ese li g hat A itze alled pa ti ipato i stitutio s . However, the institutionalization
of democratic innovations does not undermine their experimental character. Institutionalization
does not prevent nor hinder experimentation. But it does raise its chance of impact.

Table 1: Criteria for Assessing the Degree of Institutionalization of Democratic Innovations

Criteria Indicators
Formalization DI is backed up by constitution, legislation or governmental policy
Representativeness DI operates within or together with the elected bodies or officials
Inclusiveness DI is open for participation to some extent, precluding social selection
Scope DI involves participation in at least one of the stages of the policy cycle
Scale Design of the DI does not limit it exclusively to the local level

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Decisiveness DI yields decisions, however those are not necessarily binding

The greater the extent to which the criteria presented in Table 1 are fulfilled, the greater are
the opportunities provided by democratic innovations for citizens to participate, and the higher are
the chances that their preferences are transformed into policies, that is, impacting on decision-
making. Those criteria should not be addressed in a binary fashion, but rather as gradations. For
instance, the scale criterion does not imply that a democratic innovation should take place at the
national, and not only at the local level. Rather, it suggests that the design of a given democratic
innovation should not limit it to take place only in the local level, allowing it eventually to scale up.
Formalization, representativeness, inclusiveness, scope, scale and decisiveness are not criteria to
evaluate democratic innovations as such, but rather criteria to assess experiments that should be
taken into account on quality of democracy research. In other words, not all participatory or
deliberative (or other sort of) experiments possibly labeled as democratic innovations are relevant
for the purpose of having their impact on quality of democracy measured, precisely because it is
these criteria what make them relevant enough to have an impact at all.
Democratic innovations proliferate across the continents with varying degrees of
institutionalization and impact. However, the more an innovation is institutionalized, the higher are
its chances of impact precisely because participatory, deliberative or direct democracy are not
categories that stand outside of or compete with representative democracy. Democratic innovations
expand the opportunities of participation beyond elections, and that not equals to say they do that
outside representation. Democratic innovations expand the channels of representation by providing
citizens with more opportunities to participate, a d that’s h the atter for measurements of
quality of democracy.
The more comprehensive and updated concept of participation advocated in this paper is
therefore one that takes into account its non-electoral, however institutionalized (or formal),
dimension. It does not equal what Katz and Morlino (2013), for example, term unconventional
participation. And it does not equal informal modes of participation such as protests,
demonstrations, occupations, sit-ins, petition signing and the like. The opportunities for participation
created by democratic innovations are expected to have an impact to the extent to which they are
institutionalized, that is turned into an integral part of the larger whole of representative democracy.
Measurements of participation in quality of democracy indices should not just take into account the
volume of participation, but the varieties of forms and of degrees of institutionalization of
democratic innovations. Assuming the latter to be at least to some extent institutionalized, the
opportunities they provide citizens with consist in taking part in at least one of the stages of the

11
public policy cycle, that is, problem definition, agenda setting, policy development, implementation
and policy evaluation. The more stages attained, the greater the degree of participation achieved by
a democratic innovation, and the greater its chances to have an impact.

Assessing the Feasibility, Inclusiveness and Effectiveness of Democratic Innovations

Once (to some degree) institutionalized, the impact of democratic innovations can be
assessed by means of three dimensions: feasibility, inclusiveness and effectiveness. These
dimensions differ from other criteria proposed to evaluate democratic innovations, as for example
those proposed by Smith (2009), Geissel (2012) or Geissel and Mayne (2013), in that they have been
designed with the intent to assess (at least partially) institutionalized forms of non-electoral
participation and their eventual impact on measurements of quality of democracy. While Smith
(2009) focus on the goods to be realized by democratic innovations (inclusiveness, popular control,
considered judgment and transparency) and Geissel and Mayne (2013) concentrate on the qualities
of the citizens (political capacities and democratic commitments) that take advantage of the
opportunities offered by the latters, I focus not exclusively in the output nor in the input, but on the
institutional design of democratic innovations – which does not equal to say I focus on the
procedures (e.g. quality of deliberation).
To some extent closer to Fung and Wright’s (2003) design properties of what they call
empowered participatory governance (devolution, centralized supervision and coordination, and
state-centered, not voluntaristic), the three dimensions I propose aim at assessing whether an
innovation can work, does work, and may impact on democracy. If a democratic innovation is
feasible, then it can be replicated, that is, it might work in different contexts, and the criteria
provided in table 2 may allow for comparative studies among diverse experiments or diverse
countries or cities that implement them. If a democratic innovation is inclusive, then it does fulfill its
aim of bringing citizens in and allowing them to deliberate on policies that may affect their lives. In
this regard, the criteria provided in table 3 may allow assessments of how democratic innovations
are indeed participatory and deliberative, as they usually aim and claim to be. Finally, if a democratic
innovation is effective, then it does somehow impact on democracy, bringing about effects on
representation, policy-making, and equality. The criteria displayed in table 4 may allow case study
and comparative research to assess the impact of democratic innovations not isolated from the
representative whole in which they are parts.
In order to assess feasibility, inclusiveness and effectiveness as the three dimensions of a
democratic innovation, I will propose an analytical framework developed accordingly to Goe tz’s

12
 ethodolog of th ee le els o epts , a el , the ai o ept, the se o da level and
the indicator/data level. The third level of each concept – that is, of each dimension of democratic
innovations – is quite relevant for research on this area that inevitably links theory with empirics, as
it refers to evidence, that is, data that can indicate the fulfillment of each of the secondary levels
proposed for each concept – or in the case of this paper, each of the three dimensions of democratic
innovations.
Beginning with the first dimension, feasibility, the concept refers to the rules and procedures
of democratic innovations. As presented in table 2, at the secondary level it seeks to identify the
levels of openness, stateness and formality of democratic innovations. The assumption is that in
order to be feasible – and therefore work not only under specific conditions given by a particular
context – democratic innovations should be open to participation, engage state and civil society
actors, and be backed up by legislation. Saying that democratic innovations should be open to
participation does not imply that they should not use a method of recruitment like random selection
to gather participants. Experiments using (random) selection have proved to be feasible (as it is the
cases of the British Columbia Citizens Assembly on Electoral Reform and the Icelandic Constitutional
Council). Stateness, for its turn, does not imply a top-down process that precludes bottom-up ones,
but rather a combination of both through the conjoint engagement of state and civil society actors.
Finally, different types of legislation and policies may back up a democratic innovation, and the
important thing here is that it is enabled to be replicated and have continuity.
In what concerns the openness, evidence at the indicator level should determine, among
other eventual variables, who can participate and in what ways, and how open the process is to
citizens and civil society organizations. The data to be assessed here should refer to access rules,
publicity, as well as rules and criteria of selection of participants, when that is the case. As for the
stateness, the indicator level should capture whether the experiment is organized by the state or by
civil society; if by the latter, then it should indicate if alone or along with the state, and to what
extent the state supports the innovation. Data should therefore indicate the degree of state and civil
society involvement and support, the degree of social capital and of civil society political
organization, as well as the rules and procedures of convening and implementing the innovation.
Lastly, formality at the secondary level of the feasibility dimension aims at assessing whether the
democratic innovation is backed up by law or depends on the will of governments and/or political
parties. The evidence provided should comprise rules and other legal acts that indicate the
enforcement and i ple e tatio ’s frequency of the innovation, as well as its ability to be expanded
and replicated.

13
Table 2: Criteria for Measuring the Feasibility of Democratic Innovations
Main Concept Secondary Level Indicator Level
Feasibility Openness Access rules, publicity, rules and criteria of
selection of participants
Stateness Degree of State and civil society involvement and
support, level of civil society organization and
social capital, convene rules and procedures
Formality Enactment of rules and legal acts of enforcement,
frequency, degree of expansion and replication

The second dimension for assessing the impact of democratic innovations is inclusiveness,
criteria that refers to the opportunities for participation made available by a given democratic
innovation. As displayed in table 3, at the secondary level three criteria are assessed: participation,
deliberation and bindingness. The assumption here is that democratic innovations allow for a more
inclusive participation than the one achieved by elections, making room for low-educated and low-
income citizens (as achieved by participatory budgeting in Brazil, for example), as well as for a larger
presence of minority groups such as indigenous peoples (as accomplished by community
organizations in Bolivia, for example). In this same line, it is expected that deliberation enables
democratic innovations to transform the preferences of citizens, providing a more dynamic arena for
the expression of preferences than the electoral one (planning cells in Germany, as well as
deliberative pools in general, are examples of that). Lastly, participation and deliberation are
inclusive inasmuch as they aim at a decision or conclusion, even if those are merely consultative and
do not bind public authorities.
On the indicator level, the participation criterion assesses who participates, whether the
participation of historically excluded and disadvantaged groups has been assured, whether citizens
participate alone or in groups, and whether underrepresented groups take part in the innovation.
Data should therefore indicate the absolute and relative numbers of participants accordingly to
social class, gender, education and other social and cultural indicators. In regard to deliberation,
what is at stake is the extent to which democratic innovations facilitate agenda-setting, policy-
framing, as well as deliberation, monitoring or evaluation of policies. Here the indicators are, among
others, organizational rules and procedures, opportunities for expressing and changing preferences,
as well as the quality of deliberation itself, when such is involved. Finally, bindingness stands at the
secondary level as the criteria for gauging the channels through which deliberations are
communicated to representative institutions, as well as whether deliberations end up on decisions,

14
and eventually on binding decisions. At the indicator level, data should be analyzed to determine if
deliberation is consultative or not, if its results are mere recommendations or binding decisions, if
there are rules ensuring the communication and consideration of deliberative results to
representative institutions and other governmental bodies.

Table 3: Criteria for Measuring the Inclusiveness of Democratic Innovations

Main Concept Secondary Level Indicator Level
Inclusiveness Participation Absolute and relative numbers of participants,
accordingly to social class, gender, education level
and other social and cultural indicators.
Deliberation Organizational rules and procedures, opportunities
for expressing and changing preferences, quality of
deliberation.
Bindingness Binding or consultative results, rules ensuring the
communication and consideration of the results

The third and last dimension is effectiveness, concept that refers to the success and effects
of democratic innovations. On the secondary conceptual level it comprises policy-making,
representation and social equality, as displayed in table 4. The idea here is that democratic
innovations are effective if to some extent they impact on policies, activate old or engender new
forms of representation, and deliver some form of political and social equality. Again, those criteria
are not binary, different democratic innovations may match them to different degrees, and one
same democratic innovation may match them differently accordingly to variables like context and
time. One example is the participatory budgeting, which achieved variable levels of efficacy in
diverse countries (Goldfrank 2007) and within one same country (Avritzer 2009; Wampler 2009).
As for the first criterion, policy-making, one should assess whether laws and policies reflect
citize ’s deli e atio s a d de isio s, an indicator that democratic innovations may increase
congruence. The data to be gauged include bills introduced in the Legislature as a result of citize s’
deliberations, corresponding la s passed that at h itize s’ de a ds, and policies enacted and
implemented following citizens’ deliberations. In what concerns representation, such criteria alludes
in the indicator level to how political parties engage with democratic innovations, as well as to
whether party membership increases or decreases as a result of such engagement, whether
interests groups and lobbies take advantage of democratic innovations or are undermined by them,
and whether civil society organizations, social movements or less organized groups and individual

15
citizens take over representative roles due to the democratic innovation. Data must be analyzed to
gauge, among others, the mobilization of political parties and their members, the volume of
supporters involved, the involvement of lobbies and interest groups, as well as the discourses of civil
society organizations and social movements. Lastly, equality stands as the third criteria, alluding to
whether a more equitable distribution of social goods is achieved through the democratic
innovation, whether it facilitates access to primary goods, whether redistributive policies are
favored, whether resources are reallocated to the benefit of disadvantaged groups, and whether
rights and policies are enacted leading to the inclusion of minority groups. Evidence should be
provided at the indicator level concerning access to primary goods, the provision of education and
health among other basic public services, the enactment of rights and inclusive policies addressing
disadvantaged and minority groups.

Table 4: Criteria for Measuring the Effectiveness of Democratic Innovations

Main Concept Secondary Level Indicator Level
Effectiveness Policy-making Number of bills introduced, number of laws and
policies enacted following citizens deliberations
Representation Mobilization of political parties and their
members, number of supporters involved,
involvement of lobbies and interest groups
Equality Access to primary goods, education and health
services, enactment of rights and inclusive policies

Assessing the Impact of Democratic Innovations on Quality of Democracy

Once they are feasible, inclusive and effective, democratic innovations can impact on the
quality of democracy. More specifically, my supposition is that the opportunities for participation
they engender may enhance political competition and government responsiveness, as well as lead to
increase on equality. Before moving to how the proposed analytical framework assesses such
supposition, I have to provide definitions of competition and responsiveness. I ake use of Dahl’s
(1972) definition of competition, that is, organized contestation by political parties and organized
interest groups through regular, free, and fair elections. One of the hypotheses that can be verified
with the analytical framework is whether democratic innovations induce the creation of new
organized groups as well as empower those already existing, in particular political parties. The
constitution of new groups and empowerment of old parties can raise the level of contestation in a

16
political system. Such a perspective allows the dismissal of trade-offs between competition and
participation. Concerning responsiveness, I adopt Po ell’s defi itio , a el , the a ilit of
de o a ies to t a slate itize s’ p efe e es i to poli ies. T a slati g p efe e e i to poli a e
done through elected representatives, competitive political parties, lobbies and interest groups; but
it can also be achieved through democratic innovations. The Brazilian National Public Policy
Conferences are a seminal example of how it happens in practice.
A more comprehensive and updated conceptualization of participation as a dimension of the
quality of democracy should make clear its strong connections with responsiveness, competition and
equality, other crucial dimensions of the concept. Democratic innovations play a role here showing
how participation and competition, and therefore higher democratic quality, will not come through
the representative channels of elections and parties alone. The question is: how to, on the one hand,
achieve higher participation through non-electoral channels and, on the other hand, use those
channels to improve competitiveness of political systems, responsiveness of governments and
equality of societies?
The suggestion here is that, as democratic innovations turn opportunities for participation
higher, participation itself may increase the opportunities for competition and the chances of
responsiveness, and these two together will bring about more equality. Relevant is therefore also to
assess the ability of non-electoral participation to make the representative channels themselves
more competitive and responsive. Below I will propose an analytical framework, which ultimately
can be used to verify the following hypothesis:

H1: The greater the participation, the more competitive are political systems;
H2: The greater the participation, the more responsive are governments;
H3: The greater the participation, the greater is social equality;
H4: The greater the participation, the higher the quality of democracy.

The proposed analytical framework still follo s Goe tz’s o the th ee le els of
concept-building and comprises three dimensions: competition, responsiveness and equality. The
dimension of competition comprises three secondary levels, namely, plurality, information and
multi-dimensionality. Those concepts refer to the theories of pluralism and political information, as
well as to multidimensional spatial models for the analysis of legislatures and governments. The
plurality criteria seeks to assess the extent to which groups organize, mobilize, and become
empowered as a result of democratic innovations. The information criteria aims at assessing the
extent to which democratic i o atio s fa o heap talk C a fo d a d “o el , aisi g the

17
level of information for members of parliament a d go e e t offi ials ega di g itize ’s
preferences, thereby solving informational problems, as well as the extent to which democratic
innovations work as thi d-pa t speake s Lupia a d M Cu i s , providing members of
parliament and government officials with information that can raise the level of certainty of their
decisions regarding the consequences of policies to be adopted. Finally, the criteria of multi-
dimensionality helps one to verify the extent to which democratic innovations can introduce new
issues to the policy agenda and increase the multidimensionality of legislative politics, so that policy-
making is not reduced to disputes between coalition and opposition parties (or left or right
platforms) in a one-dimensional space.

Table 5: Criteria for Assessing the Impact of Democratic Innovations on Competition

Main Concept Secondary Level Indicators
Competition Plurality Creation of new organized groups and empowerment of
already existing parties and groups
Information Ability of participatory innovations to solve information
problems and facilitate decision making, raising the
level of information of Legislatures and governments
ega di g itize s’ p efe e es
Multi-Dimensionality Ability of participatory innovations to enhance the
multidimensionality of governments and Legislatures by
introducing new issues to the policy agenda; ability to
a oid that politi al pa ties’ ope ati g e lusi el i a
single dimension and therefore lose members and
voters

The concept of espo si e ess is p edi ated o the p io e issio of essages itize s
(Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999:9). A go e e t is espo si e if it adopts poli ies that a e
sig aled as p efe ed itize s Ma i , P ze o ski, a d “tokes : . During elections, those
signals imply voting for particular platforms (regardless the phenomenon of electoral volatility). If by
means of elections, voters cannot justifiably expect that parties would do what they proposed, by
means of extra-electoral democratic innovations citizens may expect that parties do more than what
they proposed before elections. They can expect that policies signaled by (traditional) non-voters are
endorsed by parties seeking (future) new voters. Democratic innovations increase the information
a aila le to ele ted ep ese tati es o itize s’ p efe ed poli ies, as the latte s have more

18
opportunities for signaling the policies they prefer. Furthermore, democratic innovations are more
dynamic and frequent as elections, and therefore can work as a means through which parties can
more rapidly grasp changes on the preferences of their constituencies.
In the proposed framework, responsiveness is a dimension that comprises three secondary
levels, namely, policy impact, issue congruence and substantive representation. As for the policy
impact, what is to be assessed is the ability of governments to implement policies that translate
itize s’ p efe e es. In what concerns the issue congruence, evidence must gauge the degree of
congruence between policies and outcomes of democratic innovations, that is, of resulting
deliberations and decisions exp essi g itize s’ p efe e es. Fi all , the substantive representation
criteria seeks to evaluate the extent to which democratic innovations make representative
institutions become more sensitive to the demands of minority and other under-represented
cultural groups, once those groups engage on the new non-electoral arenas in order to raise their
voices and make their preferences heard.

Table 6: Criteria for Assessing the Impact of Democratic Innovations on Responsiveness

Main Concept Secondary Level Indicators
Responsiveness Policy Impact Implementation of policies that translate itize s’
preferences
Issue Congruence Enactment of laws and policies which are congruent with
the issues deliberated in democratic innovations
Substantive Ability of democratic innovations to stimulate the
Representation representation of minority groups and other cultural groups
that have special needs and demands given their status of
members of such groups (such as women, indigenous
people, and other racial and ethnic minorities)

The last dimension that allows one to assess the impact of democratic innovations on quality
of democracy concerns equality. The proposed analytical framework understands inclusion as
meaning equality, assuming that democratic innovations can include citizens and groups that face
social inequality for various reasons including that of being politically excluded, that is
underrepresented or misrepresented. This concept of equality comprises three secondary levels for
analysis, namely redistribution, enactment of rights and minority and social policies. As for
redistribution, evidence should indicate how democratic innovations impact on the allocation of
state resources, the delivery of public goods, the access to public services, the reallocation of

19
budgetary provisions, and the prioritizing of public expenditure. The enactment of rights is the
second criteria, and it seeks to assess the draft and enactment of legal and constitutional rights
recognizing the identity of new social groups and of minority and historically marginalized groups.
Finally, minorities and social policies stands as a criteria to be examined through indicators such as
the formulation and implementation of policies addressing historically underrepresented minority
groups, as well as the formulation and implementation of policies envisaging the reduction of social
inequality.

Table 7: Criteria for Assessing the Impact of Democratic Innovations on Equality

Main Concept Secondary Level Indicators
Equality Redistribution Allocation of state resources, delivery of public goods,
access to public services, reallocation of budgetary
provisions, public expenditure prioritizing
Enactment of Rights Draft and enactment of legal and constitutional rights
recognizing the identity of new social groups and of
minority and historically marginalized groups
Minority and Social Formulation and implementation of policies addressing
Policies historically underrepresented minority groups; Formulation
and implementation of policies envisaging the reduction of
social inequality

If democratic innovations can empirically prove to impact on one or more of these three
dimensions then they can increase the quality of democracy. More specifically, if non-electoral
forms of participation can increase the competitiveness of political systems, and/or the
responsiveness of governments, and/or the equality of society, then participation is the key
dimension of quality of democracy. A more comprehensive concept of participation is therefore
crucial for both evaluations of democratic innovations and their impact, and assessments of the
quality of democracy.

New Recipes of Political Reform, New Models of Democracy?

Rather than attempting to improve democratic deficits solely by consolidating

representative institutions – that is, reforming electoral systems and political parties, for example –,
several Latin American governments have started to institutionalize democratic innovations that

20
allow citizens to further participate and play a larger role in the decision-making process. Those
participatory reforms indicate that governments have redesigned political institutions in order to
create more opportunities for citizens to take part in the decision-making process, experimenting
with democratic innovations that expand the capacities of representative institutions to match
itize s’ de a ds. Whe e a d oade oppo tu ities fo pa ti ipatio a e eated within the
boundaries of representative democracy and institutionalized by governments as means to improve
its institutions and correct their purported deficits, a new path of reform seem to be opened.
Politi al i stitutio s a e adapted to fit itize s’ de a ds fo o e pa ti ipatio , hile oe
participation can imply more responsive institutions and more equal policy outcomes.
Whether the experimental forms of combining representation and participation positively
affe t itize ’s satisfa tio ith de o a is a ope , e pi i al uestio . The de o ati
innovations recently introduced in Latin America are certainly not the only possible causal
explanation for the sudden rise in levels of political trust in the continent. A number of other
concurrent factors have probably contributed, like economic growth and significant decreases in
poverty and inequality, just to mention a couple. However, itize s’ e pe tatio s to a ds
democracy do seem to be increasingly absorbed by representative institutions through participatory
mechanisms, and that may play at least a role in the improved democratic performance of Latin
America.
Expanding and institutionalizing democratic innovations that increase participation beyond
elections is a recipe of political reform that should be taken into account if one accepts that what is
often called a crisis of democracy is actually a situation of misalignment between itize s’ de a ds
and politi al i stitutio s’ suppl . Interestingly enough, such recipe is at first made available by the
new democracies of Latin America to the old, established democracies of the North. Whether
democratic innovations can strengthen representative institutions, raise citizens’ political
satisfaction and increase the quality of democracy, are questions that worth to be empirically
answered. This paper has aimed to provide some tools for that.

21
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