EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-40779. November 28, 1975.]

EPICHARIS T. GARCIA, Petitioner, v. THE FACULTY ADMISSION

COMMITTEE, LOYOLA SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY, herein represented by
FR. ANTONIO B. LAMBINO, Respondent.

Epicharis T. Garcia in her own behalf.

Bengzon, Villegas, Zarraga, Narciso & Cudala for Respondents.

SYNOPSIS

The specific issue posed by this mandamus proceeding to compel the

Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology to allow
petitioner to continue studying there is whether she is deemed possessed of
such a right that has to be respected.

Petitioner alleged that she was admitted by respondent in the Summer of

1975 to pursue graduate studies leading to a Master of Arts in Theology but
was denied re-admission in the following semester. She contended that the
reason given by respondent for such denial, namely: that "her frequent
questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of
slowing down the progress of the class," is not a valid ground for her
expulsion. Respondent, on the other hand, contended that petitioner was
admitted in the Summer of 1975 not to a degree program but merely to
take some courses for credit, since admission to a degree program requires
acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School and no such
acceptance was given; that respondent has discretion to admit or continue
admitting in said school any particular student, considering not only
academic or intellectual standards but also other factors such as personality
traits, character orientation in relation with other students, space
limitations, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size; and that
there was no clear duty to admit petitioner since the school of theology is a
seminary for the priesthood and petitioner is admittedly and obviously not
studying for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus and held that the
academic freedom expressly granted by the Constitution to "institutions of
higher learning" involves two kinds of freedom: that which is enjoyed by
the university as a corporate body to determine for itself who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admittedly to
study, and that which is accorded to a university professor to inquire,
discover, publish and teach the truth as he sees it in the field of his
competence. Universities and colleges, the Supreme Court concluded,
should not be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to
whom to admit or reject.

Petition for mandamus is denied.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ACADEMIC FREEDOM; FREEDOM ACCORDED TO

A FACULTY MEMBER, NATURE OF. — The academic freedom enjoyed by
institutions of higher learning as recognized in the Constitution is more
often identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in
his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result
of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the
event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the
power that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic
establishment. It is "a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher
and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his
conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or
penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to some
constituted authority within or beyond the institution." Otherwise stated, "it
is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover,
publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence. It
is subject to no control or authority except the control or authority of the
rational methods by which truths or conclusions are sought and established
in these disciplines."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. ID.; ID.; FREEDOM ENJOYED BY SCHOOL AS AN INSTITUTION OF

HIGHER LEARNING. — Since the academic freedom recognized by the
Constitution makes reference to the "institutions of higher learning" as
recipients of this boon, it follows that the school or college itself is
possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and
how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference
possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a
wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This
constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a
grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its
intent.

3. ID.; ID.; ACADEMIC FREEDOM OF A UNIVERSITY DISTINGUISHED FROM

THAT OF A FACULTY MEMBER. — The Constitution grants the right of
academic freedom to the university as an institution as distinguished from
the academic freedom of a university professor. For it is a well-established
fact, and yet one which sometimes tend to be obscured in discussions of the
problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of an organization is by no
means the same thing as the freedom of the individual members within it;
in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even necessarily connected. In
considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish
between the autonomy of the university as a corporate body, and the
freedom of the individual university teacher.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FUNCTION OF A UNIVERSITY. — It is the business of a

university to provide that atmosphere which is most conductive to
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there
prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university to determine for itself
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study.

5. ID.; ID.; UNIVERSITIES, UNLIKE PUBLIC UTILITIES, HAVE DISCRETION

AS TO WHOM TO ADMIT OR REJECT. — The full respect that must be
accorded the academic freedom expressly granted by the Constitution to
institutions of higher learning, should not be minimized. Colleges and
universities should not be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any
discretion as to whom to admit or reject. Education, especially higher
education, belongs to a different, and certainly higher category.

6. ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENCY OF GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF ADMISSION OF

STUDENT. — Where a woman student was denied admission to pursue
graduate studies leading to a Master of Arts in Theology in a school of
theology, a seminary for priesthood, and for reasons explained by the
authorities of said school, it was deemed best, in the interests of the school
as well as of the other students and her own welfare, that she continue her
graduate work elsewhere, there is nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the
circumstances deemed relevant, thereby rendering futile the persistence of
said student to continue her studied in said school.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. MANDAMUS; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; CLEAR

DUTY MUST BE IMPOSED ON RESPONDENT. — A petition for mandamus
filed by a laywoman to compel the Faculty Admissions Committee of a
school of theology to admit her as a student in said school (a seminary for
the priesthood) for an M.A. in Theology, will be dismissed where petitioner
admittedly failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, and the facts of
record amply show that petitioner is obviously disqualified, and is not
studying for the priesthood, she being a laywoman and not eligible for
admission to the seminary. Mandamus to order her admission in the
seminary cannot lie in the absence of a clear right on her part and a clear
duty on respondent’s part to so admit her.

2. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO AVAIL OF AND EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE

REMEDIES MUST BE BASED ON JUSTIFIABLE REASONS. — Where petitioner
admitted that she failed to avail of and exhaust administrative remedies
open to her but seeks to justify her failure by alleging that she could have
recourse neither to the President of the school (where she seeks admission
as student for M.A. in Theology) because the latter is abroad, nor to the
Secretary of Education, "since this is his busiest time of the year," such
excuse is patently inept, since neither the university president’s temporary
absence nor the Secretary of Education’s having "his busiest time of the
year" justifies petitioner’s by-passing these officials whose final
administrative decision should first be given. Such exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a precondition for court action and would get all
the facts in so as to enable the courts in a petition for review simply to
decide on the basis of the facts whether the questioned act of petitioner’s
non-admission constitutes an arbitrary action that would warrant judicial
intervention.

3. ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT NOT A TRIER NOR REVIEWER OF FACTS. — In

a petition for mandamus, the Supreme Court will not decide a factual issue
on the basis of assertions and counter assertions of petitioner and
respondent, since said Court is neither a trier nor reviewer of facts and one
of the reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies is that all the facts
may be placed before the final administrative authorities, whose decision
may be reviewed by the courts only upon a clear showing of fraud,
collusion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake.

4. ID.; SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES; COURTS WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH

ACADEMIC JUDGMENT. — Aside from the fact that the non-admission of a
laywoman as student in a seminary for priesthood by virtue of her being
disqualified as such laywoman is a matter of school policy and regulation
that obviously can in no way be said to be arbitrary (since females all over
the world are up to now not admitted to the priesthood), the faculty’s
"strong opposition" to having her back in the school after summer because
"they left that (her) frequent question and difficulties were not always
pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class" and
the faculty of Admission Chairman’s courteous but candid appraisal "that
the advisability of (her) completing a program(with all the course work and
thesis writing) with us is very questionable" are matters of technical and
academic judgment that the courts will not ordinarily interfere with.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. — Only after exhaustion of administrative

remedies and when there is marked arbitrariness, will the courts interfere
with the academic judgment of a school faculty and the proper authorities
as to the competence and fitness of an applicant for enrollment or to
continue taking up graduate studies in a graduate school. The courts simply
do not have the competence nor inclination to constitute themselves as
Admission Committees of the universities and institutions of higher learning
and to substitute their judgment for that of the regularly constituted
Admission Committees of such educational institutions. Were the courts to
do so, they would conceivably be swamped with petitions for admission
from the thousands refused admission every year, and next the thousands
who flunked are were dropped would also be petitioning the courts for a
judicial review of their grades.

6. SCHOOLS; PRIVATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. — Private

educational institutions do not operate merely by delegation of the state;
and they differ from the commercial public utilities whose right to exist and
to operate depends upon State authority.
7. MANDAMUS; FACTUAL ISSUE; ASSUMPTION OF FACTS. — In a petition
for mandamus filed by a laywoman to compel the Faculty Admission
Committee of a school of theology to admit petitioner as a student for an
M.A. in Theology, the Court should not assume that the school has
prescribed "unreasonable rules or regulations" when such rules have not
even been submitted to the Court nor is there any claim that such rules
have even been questioned in or disapproved by the Director of Public
Schools (assuming that said official has jurisdiction over a religious
seminary).

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ACADEMIC FREEDOM; PROVISION OF 1973

CONSTITUTION BROADER THAN THAT OF 1935 CONSTITUTION. — Section
8 (2), Art. VI of the 1973 Constitution which provides that: "All institutions
of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom" is broader than Section 6
of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that: "Universities
established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." Under the
aforecited clause of the 1973 Constitution, all colleges and universities of
higher learning, whether established by the State or not, are guaranteed
academic freedom.

2. ID.; ID.; ALSO DEEMED GRANTED TO STUDENTS. — Academic freedom

is not limited to the members of the faculty nor to the administrative
authorities of the educational institution. It is also deemed granted in favor
of the student body; because all three — the administrative authorities of
the college or university, its faculty and its student population — constitute
the educational institution, without any one of which the educational
institution can neither exist nor operate. The educational institution is
permitted by the State to exist and operate, not for the benefit of its
administrative authorities or faculty members, but for the benefit of its
studentry.

3. ID.; ID.; INDIVIDUAL HAS INHERENT RIGHT TO DEVELOP HIS

FACULTIES. — An individual has a natural and inherent right to learn and
develop his faculties. For this reason, the 1973 Constitution directs the
State to aid and support the parents in the rearing of the youth (Sec. 4,
Art. II, 1973 Constitution); to promote their physical, intellectual and social
well-being (Sec. 5, Art. II); to establish, maintain and ensure adequate
social services in the field of education (Sec. 7, Art. II); to establish and
maintain a complete, adequate and integrated system of education relevant
to the goals of national development (Sec 8[1], Art. XV); to recognize and
protect the academic freedom of all institutions of higher learning (Sec.
8[2], Art. XV); to maintain a system of free public elementary education
and where finances permit, a system of free public education up to the
secondary level (Sec. 8[5], Art. XV); to provide citizenship and vocational
training to adult citizens and out-of-school youths and to create and
maintain scholarships for poor and deserving students (Sec. 8[6], Art. XV);
and to promote scientific research and invention, to patronize arts and
letters, to provide scholarships, grants-in-aid or other forms of incentives
for special gifted children (Sec. 9[1], [2] and [3], Art. XV).

4. ID.; SCHOOLS; OPERATION OF A SCHOOL NOT AN INHERENT RIGHT. —

No private person or entity has the inherent right to establish and operate a
school, college or university.

5. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; DIGNITY OF HUMAN PERSONALITY MUST BE

ENHANCED. — The cardinal article of faith of our democratic civilization is
the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality. Man’s "inviolate character" should be "protected to the largest
possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his
person", so that the individual can fully develop himself and achieve
complete fulfillment. His freedom to seek his own happiness would mean
nothing if the same were not given sanctuary "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small
encroachments and the scorn and derision of those who have not patience
with general principles."cralaw virtua1aw library

6. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS MUST BE RESPECTED BY THE STATE

AND BY ENTERPRISES AUTHORIZED BY THE STATE TO OPERATE. — The
purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the Courts. One’s rights to life, liberty and property, to free
speech or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and to the
fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections, mush less on the caprice of bigoted, intolerant and
impatient professors and college administrators. This individual freedom
and right to happiness should be recognized and respected not only by the
State but also by enterprises authorized by the State to operate.

7. ID.; ID.; ISSUE IN AN ACTION TO COMPEL SCHOOL AUTHORITIES TO

ADMIT A STUDENT. — In an action to compel the faculty admission
committee of a school of theology to admit a female student to pursue a
theology course therein, the issue involved is not merely academic freedom
of the higher institutions of learning as guaranteed by Section 8(2) of
Article XV of the 1973 Constitution. The issue strikes at the broader
freedom of expression of the individual — the very core of human liberty.

8. ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM. — Even if the term "Academic

freedom" were to be limited to institutions of higher learning, the term
"institutions of higher learning" contained in Sec. 8(2), Art. XV of the 1973
Constitution comprehends not only the faculty and the college
administrators but also the members of the student body. While the
university professor may have the initiative and resourcefulness to pursue
his own research and formulate his conclusions concerning the problem of
his own science or subject, the motivation therefor may be provoked by
questions addressed to him by his student. In his respect, the student —
especially a graduate student — must not be restrained from raising
questions or from challenging the validity of dogmas, whether theological or
not. The true scholar never avoids, but on the contrary welcomes and
encourages, such searching questions even if the same will have the
tendency to uncover his own ignorance. It is not the happiness and
selfulfillment of the professor alone that are guaranteed. The happiness and
full development of the curious intellect of the student are protected by the
narrow guarantee of academic freedom and more so by the broader right of
free expression, which includes free speech and press, and academic
freedom.

9. ID.; ID.; SCHOOLS; AFTER STUDENT HAS BEEN ADMITTED, HE CANNOT

BE REFUSED FURTHER ADMISSION EXCEPT FOR JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS. —
After having been admitted to the theology course, petitioner cannot be
refused further attendance therein on the ground that "her frequent
questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of
slowing down the progress of the class." This excuse is merely an
euphemistic way of characterizing her questions which might be
embarrassing to the clergy or to the professor or other sensitive souls, for
her questions might impugn the validity of their tenets, dogmas and beliefs.
But if she flunked in subjects or the entire course, she could be justifiably
denied enrollment in the second semester. Secretarian schools should
realize that intolerance, bigotry and the inquisition — relics of the Dark
Ages — tyrannize the mind and spirit of man and are antithetical to their
very function of nourishing the intellect and spreading enlightenment.

10. ID.; ID.; EDUCATION IS SOVEREIGN STATE FUNCTION; PRIVATE

SCHOOLS SIMILAR TO COMMERCIAL PUBLIC UTILITY. — The fact that
petitioner was admitted free to study theology without intending to be a
priest, does not weaken her position. It should be stressed that education is
a sovereign state function. It is a vital duty of the State which can delegate
the same to private educational institutions that are qualified and duly
authorized to operate. Private educational institutions are, therefore, not
different in this respect from the commercial public utilities, whose right to
exist and to operate depends upon state authority. The moment they are
allowed to operate they must abide by the Constitution, laws and
implementing rules of the Government on the matter.

11. ID.; ID.; AUTHORITY OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS TO ISSUE REGULATIONS

DOES NOT INCLUDE POWER TO PRESCRIBED UNREASONABLE RULES. —
While a college or university can prescribe regulations for admission to the
various courses of study offered by it, this prerogative does not include the
power to prescribe unreasonable rules or regulations violative of the
constitutional rights of the citizen, such as freedom of expression in general
and academic freedom in particular.

12. ID.; ID.; NATURE OF FUNCTIONS OF SCHOOLS. — The educational

institutions perform a more vital function than the ordinary public utilities.
The institution of learning feeds and nurtures the human mind and spirit to
insure a robust, healthy and educated citizenry on whom national survival
and national greatness depend. The ordinary public utilities merely serve
the material comforts and convenience of the people, who can certainly go
on living without them. But the people cannot wallow in darkness and
ignorance without hastening their extermination from the face of the earth.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

The specific issue posed by this mandamus proceeding to compel the

Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, represented
by Father Antonio B. Lambino, to allow petitioner Epicharis T. Garcia to
continue studying therein is whether she is deemed possessed of such a
right that has to be respected. That is denied not only on general principle,
but also in view of the character of the particular educational institution
involved. It is a seminary. It would appear therefore that at most she can
lay claim to a privilege, no duty being cast on respondent school. Moreover,
as a reinforcement to such an obvious conclusion, there is the autonomy
recognized by the Constitution in this explicit language: "All institutions of
higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." 1 The petition must
therefore fail.

Petitioner alleged: "3. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted

Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in Theology; 4. That on May 30,
1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for the first
semester, 1975-76, Respondent told her about the letter he had written
her, informing her of the faculty’s decision to bar her from re-admission in
their school; 5. That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May 19,
1975 . . . do not constitute valid legal ground for expulsion, for they neither
present any violation of any of the school’s regulation, nor are they
indicative of gross misconduct; 6. That from June 25, 1975, Petitioner spent
much time and effort in said school for the purpose of arriving at a
compromise that would not duly inconvenience the professors and still allow
her to enjoy the benefits of the kind of instruction that the school has to
offer, but all in vain; she was in fact told by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school’s
Director, that the compromises she was offering were unacceptable, their
decision was final, and that it were better for her to seek for admission at
the UST Graduate School; 1. Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in
said school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her graduate studies for
an M.A. in Theology, and she was informed that she could enroll at the UST
Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to fulfill their requirements
for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree later in
Theology — which would entail about four to five years more of studies —
whereas in the Loyola School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully
refused re-admission, it would entail only about two years more; 8. That
Petitioner, considering that time was of the essence in her case, and not
wanting to be deprived of an opportunity for gaining knowledge necessary
for her life’s work, enrolled as a special student at said UST Ecclesiastical
Faculties, even if she would not thereby be credited with any academic
units for the subject she would take; 9. That Petitioner could have recourse
neither to the President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being with the First
Couple’s entourage now in Red China, nor with the Secretary of Education,
since this is his busiest time of the year, and June 11, 1975 is the last day
for registration; . . ." 2 She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose
of allowing her to enroll in the current semester. She made it more specific
in a pleading she called Amended Petition so that she would be allowed
cross-enrollment even beyond the June 11, 1915 deadline for registration
and that whatever units may be accredited to her in the UST Ecclesiastical
Faculties be likewise recognized by Respondent. Her petition included the
letter of respondent Father Lambino which started on a happy note that she
was given the grade of B+ and B in two theology subjects, but ended in a
manner far from satisfactory for her, as shown by this portion thereof:
"Now, you will have to forgive me for going into a matter which is not too
pleasant. The faculty had a meeting after the summer session and several
members are strongly opposed to having you back with us at Loyola School
of Theology. In the spirit of honesty may I report this to you as their
reason: They felt that your frequent questions and difficulties were not
always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the
class; they felt you could have tried to give the presentation a chance and
exerted more effort to understand the point made before immediately
thinking of difficulties and problems. The way things are, I would say that
the advisability of your completing a program (with all the course work and
thesis writing) with us is very questionable. That you have the requisite
intellectual ability is not to be doubted. But it would seem to be in your best
interests to work with a faculty that is more compatible with your
orientation. I regret to have to make this report, but I am only thinking of
your welfare." 3

This Court, in a resolution of June 23, 1975, required comment on the part
of respondent Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology. 4
As submitted on behalf of Father Lambino, it set forth the following:
"Respondent is the Chairman of the Faculty Admission Committee of the
Loyola School of Theology, which is a religious seminary situated in Loyola
Heights, Quezon City; In collaboration with the Ateneo de Manila University,
the Loyola School of Theology allows some lay students to attend its classes
and/or take courses in said Loyola School of Theology but the degree, if
any, to be obtained from such courses is granted by the Ateneo de Manila
University and not by the Loyola School of Theology; For the reason above
given, lay students admitted to the Loyola School of Theology to take up
courses for credit therein have to be officially admitted by the Assistant
Dean of the Graduate School of the Ateneo de Manila University in order for
them to be considered as admitted to a degree program; Petitioner in the
summer of 1975 was admitted by respondent to take some courses for
credit but said admission was not an admission to a degree program
because only the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School
can make such admission; That in the case of petitioner, no acceptance by
the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School was given, so
that she was not accepted to a degree program but was merely allowed to
take some courses for credit during the summer of 1975; Furthermore,
petitioner was not charged a single centavo by the Loyola School of
Theology and/or the Ateneo de Manila University in connection with the
courses she took in the summer of 1975, as she was allowed to take it free
of charge; That respondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, S.J., and/or the Loyola
School of Theology thru its Faculty Admission Committee, necessarily has
discretion as to whether to admit and/or to continue admitting in the said
school any particular student, considering not only academic or intellectual
standards but also other considerations such as personality traits and
character orientation in relation with other students as well as considering
the nature of Loyola School of Theology as a seminary. The Petition for
Mandamus therefore does not lie, as there is no duty, much less a clear
duty, on the part of respondent to admit the petitioner therein in the
current year to take up further courses in the Loyola School of Theology." 5
It was likewise alleged in the aforesaid comment that as set forth in the
letter of May 19, 1975, the decision not to allow petitioner to take up
further courses in said seminary "is not arbitrary, as it is based on
reasonable grounds, . . . ." 6 Then reference was made to the availability of
non-judicial remedies which petitioner could have pursued. 7 The prayer
was for the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner sought
permission to reply and it was granted. Thereafter, she had a detailed
recital of why under the circumstances she is entitled to relief from the
courts. In a resolution of August 8, 1975, this Court considered the
comment of respondent as answer and required the parties to file their
respective memoranda. That they did, and the petition was deemed
submitted for decision. As was made clear at the outset, we do not see
merit in it. It must therefore be dismissed.

1. In respondent’s memorandum, it was made clear why a petition for

mandamus is not the proper remedy. Thus: "Petitioner cannot compel by
mandamus, the respondent to admit her into further studies in the Loyola
School of Theology. For respondent has no clear duty to so admit the
petitioner. The Loyola School of Theology is a seminary for the priesthood.
Petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying for the priesthood, she
being a lay person and a woman. And even assuming ex gratia argumenti
that she is qualified to study for the priesthood, there is still no duty on the
part of respondent to admit her to said studies, since the school has clearly
the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of
space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and component
considerations." 8 No authorities were cited, respondent apparently being of
the view that the law has not reached the stage where the matter of
admission to an institution of higher learning rests on the sole and
uncontrolled discretion of the applicant. There are standards that must be
met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of the
essence. In terms of Hohfeld’s terminology, what a student in the position
of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She cannot
therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus
proceeding. Such being the case, there is no duty imposed on the Loyola
School of Theology.
In a rather comprehensive memorandum of petitioner, who unfortunately
did not have counsel, an attempt was made to dispute the contention
of Respondent. There was a labored effort to sustain her stand, but it was
not sufficiently persuasive. It is understandable why. It was the skill of a lay
person rather than a practitioner that was evident. While she pressed her
points with vigor, she was unable to demonstrate the existence of the clear
legal right that must exist to justify the grant of this writ.

2. Nor is this all. There is, as previously noted, the recognition in the
Constitution of institutions of higher learning enjoying academic freedom. It
is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue his
studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish
the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on
him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable
to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic
establishments. For the sociologist, Robert McIver, it is "a right claimed by
the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his
findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any
interference, molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are
unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the
institution." 9 As for the educator and philosopher Sidney Hook, this is his
version: "What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom of
professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the
truth as they see it in the field of their competence. It is subject to no
control or authority except the control or authority of the rational methods
by which truths or conclusions are sought and established in these
disciplines."

3. That is only one aspect though. Such a view does not comprehend fully
the scope of academic freedom recognized by the Constitution. For it is to
be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the
recipients of this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself
is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and
how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It
has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of
students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly
manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose,
nullify its intent. Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the
Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view that it
"definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the university as an
institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university
professor." 11 He cited the following from Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of
the University of Dijon, France, President of the conference of rectors and
vice-chancellors of European universities:" ‘It is a well-established fact, and
yet one which sometimes tends to be obscured in discussions of the
problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of an organization is by no
means the same thing as the freedom of the individual members within it;
in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even necessarily connected. In
considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish,
therefore, between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body,
and the freedom of the individual university teacher.’" 12 Also: "To clarify
further the distinction between the freedom of the university and that of the
individual scholar, he says: ‘The personal aspect of freedom consists in the
right of each university teacher — recognized and effectively guaranteed by
society — to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his
academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of
the individual university teacher is at least as important, in considering
academic freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong
and through which they disseminate their learning.’" 13 He likewise quoted
from the President of the Queen’s University in Belfast, Sir Eric Ashby:" ‘The
internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the
academic staff should have de facto control of the following functions: (i)
the admission and examination of students; (ii) the curricula for courses of
study; (iii) the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (iv)
the allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure. It
would be a poor prospect for academic freedom if universities had to rely on
the literal interpretation of their constitutions in order to acquire for their
academic members control of these four functions, for in one constitution or
another most of these functions are laid on the shoulders of the lay
governing body.’" 14 Justice Frankfurter, with his extensive background in
legal education as a former Professor of the Harvard Law School, referred to
what he called the business of a university and the four essential freedoms
in the following language: "It is the business of a university to provide that
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail ‘the four essential
freedoms’ of a university — to determine for itself on academic grounds
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may
be admitted to study.’" 15 Thus is reinforced the conclusion reached by us
that mandamus does not lie in this case.

4. It is not an easy matter then to disregard the views of persons

knowledgeable in the field, to whom cannot be imputed lack of awareness
of the need to respect freedom of thought on the part of students and
scholars. Moreover, it could amount to minimizing the full respect that must
be accorded the academic freedom expressly granted by the Constitution
"to institutions of higher learning." It is equally difficult to yield conformity
to the approach taken that colleges and universities should be looked upon
as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit or reject
Education, especially higher education, belongs to a different, and certainly
higher, category.

5. It only remains to be added that the futility that marked the persistence
of petitioner to continue her studies in the Loyola School of Theology is the
result solely of a legal appraisal of the situation before us. The decision is
not to be construed as in any way reflecting on the scholastic standing of
petitioner. There was on the part of respondent due acknowledgment of her
intelligence. Nonetheless, for reasons explained in the letter of Father
Lambino, it was deemed best, considering the interest of the school as well
as of the other students and her own welfare, that she continue her
graduate work elsewhere. There was nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of
the circumstances deemed relevant. It could be that on more mature
reflection, even petitioner would realize that her transfer to some other
institution would redound to the benefit of all concerned. At any rate, as
indicated earlier, only the legal aspect of the controversy was touched upon
in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.