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Brief History of IPC

British Parliament provided first Law Commission in 1832 by Chartered Act for British
Indian people. Under the chairmanship of Lord Macaulay Law commission was formed
and Macleod Anderson and Millet were members. On 14th October, 1837 draft of IPC
submitted to Governor General of Council by Commission.
In1845 Second Law Commission was formed for reconsider Draft of IPC but its
recommendations were rejected. On 6th October 1860 Sir Macaulay’s Original Draft of
IPC was accepted and law was enacted.
It came into force from 1st January,1862 in India, Ceylon, Brahmdesh and Pakistan.
There are 23 Chapter
Section 1 Except Jammu and Kashmir it applies to entire states
Section 2 Every Act or omission prescribed punishment
There is no time limit. It applies to all the people.
Certain persons having privilege under Art 361 are immune from prosecution under
Cr.PC.
Territorial Jurisdiction : 12 nautical miles from the sea sore

INTRODUCTION:
Differences between Act & Code-Act are related to specific subject, whereas Code is
covering all kind of subjects. Whatever the exceptions provided in the Code is generally
applicable to other penal Acts. Every penal clause has a considerable number of
limitations and to repeat those limitations this chapter is framed in the code. The word
“offense” (sec.40) in this chapter connotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
any special or local law. It indicates its applicability. One more sec.6 is also to be read
which state that each sec. of this penal code is subject to these exceptions.

CONCEPT:
 Every bonafied intention is to be guarded by law and miscarriage of justice is to
be avoided.
 Bonafied intention or act means act done with bonafied mistake
 Act done with bonafied intention- good faith
 Act done by executive or judiciary
 Accidental act but lawful act
 To prevent other harm without criminal intention
 Act of child under seven years ages & under twelve.
 Act of unsound minded person.
 Act of an intoxicated person.
Unintended act causing grievous hurt\death done with consent
 Act not intended to caused death done by consent,
 In special circumstances for the benefit of child or insane person,
 Consent known to be given under fear or misconception, exception to sec.87 to
89.
 These exemptions are not applicable to sec.91, which specified certain
circumstances like acts which are offenses independently of any harm which they
may cause or to be intended to cause or be known to be likely to cause to the
person giving the consent or on whose behalf the consent is given.
 There are altogether 31 sections that give defense to the accuse.
 It means the onus to prove that his case falls under particular exception is lies on
his solders. If he succeeds to prove then laws exempt him from punishment either
it is in form of excusable or a justifiable circumstance.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE EXCEPTION:


Excusable Acts:
1. Mistake of fact-sec.76 & 79
2. Accidental circumstances: Sec.80
3. Incapable to judge the acts - Mental incapacity
(a.) Act of Minor -- under years & under 7 to 12 years -- sec. 82 &83.
(b) Act of Idiot & lunatic - sec.84.
(c) Act committed under the drunken condition sec. 85 & 86.

Justifiable Acts:
1.Act of judiciary- Act of judge sec.77 and act of court - sec.78.
2.Act committed under the necessity to prevent other harm --sec.81.
3 Act committed under the threat -- coercion -- sec.94
4 Act committed with consent but in good faith- sec. 87
5 Act committed without consent but in good faith -- sec.89
6. Communication made in good faith result in to fatal shock -- sec.93

7. Act causing slight harm without intention -- sec. 95


8. Act done in self defense

(a) Right exercise for private defense. Sec. 96


(b) Right exercised in defense
1. To his own body or of any person against any offense affecting the human body
2. to protect property- movable or immovable against any act which is an offense
falling under the Definition of theft, robbery, mischief of criminal trespass, or
which is an attempt to commit such Offenses -- se.97.
(c) Right exercise against the act of unsound mind person -- sec. 98
(d) Act against which there is no right of private defense- sec. 99.
(e) When the right of private defense extends to causing death --sec. 100
76. Act done by a person bound, or by mistake of fact believing himself bound, by
law.—
Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who by reason of a mistake of
fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be, bound by
law to do it.
Illustrations (a) A, a soldier, fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer, in
conformity with the commands of the law. A has committed no offence.
(b) A, an officer of a Court of Justice, being ordered by that Court to arrest Y, and after
due enquiry, believing Z to be Y, arrests Z. A has committed no offence.

77. Act of Judge when acting judicially.—


Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of
any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law.

78. Act done pursuant to the judgment or order of Court.—


Nothing which is done in pursuance of, or which is warranted by the judgment or order
of, a Court of Justice; if done whilst such judgment or order remains in force, is an
offence, notwithstanding the Court may have had no jurisdiction to pass such judgment or
order, provided the person doing the act in good faith believes that the Court had such
jurisdiction.
1. Subs. by Act 8 of 1862, s. 5, for “be less than a”. 2. Subs. by Act 3 of 1910, s. 2, for
section 75. 3. The words “British India” have successively been subs. by the A. O. 1948,
the A. O. 1950 and Act 3 of 1951, s. 3 and the Sch., to read as above. 4. The word “or”
omitted by Act 3 of 1951, s. 3 and the Sch. 5. Cl. (b) omitted by s. 3 and the Sch., ibid. 6.
Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, s. 117 and the Sch., for “transportation for life” (w.e.f. 1-1-
1956).

79. Act done by a person justified, or by mistake of fact believing himself, justified,
by law.—
Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by
reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith, believes
himself to be justified by law, in doing it.
Illustration A sees Z commit what appears to A to be a murder. A, in the exercise, to the
best of his judgment exerted in good faith, of the power which the law gives to all persons
of apprehending murderers in the fact, seizes Z, in order to bring Z before the proper
authorities. A has committed no offence, though it may turn out that Z was acting in self-
defence.

80. Accident in doing a lawful act.—


Nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune, and without any criminal
intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means
and with proper care and caution.
Illustration A is at work with a hatchet; the head flies off and kills a man who is standing
by. Here, if there was no want of proper caution on the part of A, his act is excusable and
not an offence.

81. Act likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent, and to prevent other
harm.—
Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is
likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention to cause harm, and in
good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property.
Explanation.—It is a question of fact in such a case whether the harm to be prevented or
avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of doing the
act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause harm.
Illustrations (a) A, the captain of a steam vessel, suddenly, and without any fault or
negligence on his part, finds himself in such a position that, before he can stop his vessel,
he must inevitably run down a boat B, with twenty or thirty passengers on board, unless
he changes the course of his vessel, and that, by changing his course, he must incur risk of
running down a boat C with only two passengers on board, which he may possibly clear.
Here, if A alters his course without any intention to run down the boat C and in good faith
for the purpose of avoiding the danger to the passengers in the boat B, he is not guilty of
an offence, though he may run down the boat C by doing an act which he knew was likely
to cause that effect, if it be found as a matter of fact that the danger which he intended to
avoid was such as to excuse him in incurring the risk of running down C.
(b) A, in a great fire, pulls down houses in order to prevent the conflagration from
spreading. He does this with the intention in good faith of saving human life or property.
Here, if it be found that the harm to be prevented was of such a nature and so imminent as
to excuse A's act, A is not guilty of the offence.
82. Act of a child under seven years of age.—
Nothing is an offence which is done by a child under seven years of age.
83. Act of a child above seven and under twelve of immature understanding.—
Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and under
twelve, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature
and consequences of his conduct on that occasion.

84. Act of a person of unsound mind.—


Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of
unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing
what is either wrong or contrary to law.

85. Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against


his will.—
Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is, by reason
of intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is
either wrong, or contrary to law: provided that the thing which intoxicated him was
administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.

86. Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is


intoxicated.—
In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge or
intent, a person who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with
as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated,
unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or
against his will.

87. Act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt,
done by consent.—
Nothing which is not intended to cause death, or grievous hurt, and which is not known
by the doer to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, is an offence by reason of any
harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, to any person, above
eighteen years of age, who has given consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that
harm; or by reason of any harm which it may be known by the doer to be likely to cause
to any such person who has consented to take the risk of that harm.
llustration A and Z agree to fence with each other for amusement. This agreement implies
the consent of each to suffer any harm which, in the course of such fencing, may be
caused without foul play; and if A, while playing fairly, hurts Z, A commits no offence.

88. Act not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for person's
benefit.—
Nothing, which is not intented to cause death, is an offence by reason of any harm which
it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to be likely to
cause, to any person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, and who has given a
consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm, or to take the risk of that harm.
Illustration
A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular operation is likely to cause the death of Z, who
suffers under the painful complaint, but not intending to cause Z's death, and intending, in
good faith, Z's benefit, performs that operation on Z, with Z's consent. A has committed
no offence.

89. Act done in good faith for benefit of child or insane person, by or by consent of
guardian.—
Nothing which is done in good faith for the benefit of a person under twelve years of age,
or of unsound mind, by or by consent, either express or implied, of the guardian or other
person having lawful charge of that person, is an offence by reason of any harm which it
may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause or be known by the doer to be likely to
cause to that person:
Provided— Provisos.
First.—That this exception shall not extend to the intentional causing of death, or to the
attempting to cause death;
Secondly.—That this exception shall not extend to the doing of anything which the
person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the
preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;
Thirdly.—That this exception shall not extend to the voluntary causing of grievous hurt,
or to the attempting to cause grievous hurt, unless it be for the purpose of preventing
death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;
Fourthly.—That this exception shall not extend to the abetment of any offence, to the
committing of which offence it would not extend.
Illustration A, in good faith, for his child's benefit without his child's consent, has his
child cut for the stone by a surgeon knowing it to be likely that the operation will cause
the child's death, but not intending to cause the child's death. A is within the exception,
inasmuch as his object was the cure of the child.

90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.—


A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent
is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the
person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in
consequence of such fear or misconception; or Consent of insane person.—if the consent
is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to
understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or Consent
of child.—unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a
person who is under twelve years of age.

91. Exclusion of acts which are offences independently of harm cause.—


The exceptions in sections 87, 88 and 89 do not extend to acts which are offences
independently of any harm which they may cause, or be intended to cause, or be known to
be likely to cause, to the person giving the consent, or on whose behalf the consent is
given.
Illustration
Causing miscarriage (unless caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the
woman) is offence independently of any harm which it may cause or be intended to cause
to the woman. Therefore, it is not an offence “by reason of such harm”; and the consent
of the woman or of her guardian to the causing of such miscarriage does not justify the
act.

92. Act done in good faith for benefit of a person without consent.—
Nothing is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause to a person for whose
benefit it is done in good faith, even without that person's consent, if the circumstances
are such that it is impossible for that person to signify consent, or if that person is
incapable of giving consent, and has no guardian or other person in lawful charge of him
from whom it is possible to obtain consent in time for the thing to be done with benefit:
Provided— Provisos.
First.—That this exception shall not extend to the intentional causing of death, or the
attempting to cause death;
Secondly.—That this exception shall not extend to the doing of anything which the
person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the
preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;
Thirdly.—That this exception shall not extend to the voluntary causing of hurt, or to the
attempting to cause hurt, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or hurt;
Fourthly.—That this exception shall not extend to the abetment of any offence, to the
committing of which offence it would not extend.
Illustrations
(a) Z is thrown from his horse, and is insensible. A, a surgeon, finds that Z requires to be
trepanned. A, not intending Z's death, but in good faith, for Z's benefit, performs the
trepan before Z recovers his power of judging for himself. A has committed no offence.
(b) Z is carried off by a tiger. A fires at the tiger knowing it to be likely that the shot may
kill Z, but not intending to kill Z, and in good faith intending Z's benefit. A's ball gives Z
a mortal wound. A has committed no offence.
(c) A, a surgeon, sees a child suffer an accident which is likely to prove fatal unless an
operation be immediately performed. There is not time to apply to the child's guardian. A
performs the operation in spite of the entreaties of the child, intending, in good faith, the
child's benefit. A has committed no offence.
(d) A is in a house which is on fire, with Z, a child. People below hold out a blanket. A
drops the child from the house stop, knowing it to be likely that the fall may kill the child,
but not intending to kill the child, and intending, in good faith, the child's benefit. Here,
even if the child is killed by the fall, A has committed no offence.
Explanation.—
Mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit within the meaning of sections 88, 89 and 92.

93. Communication made in good faith.—


No communication made in good faith is an offence by reason of any harm to the person
to whom it is made, if it is made for the benefit of that person.
Illustration
A, a surgeon, in good faith, communicates to a patient his opinion that he cannot live. The
patient dies in consequence of the shock. A has committed no offence, though he knew it
to be likely that the communication might cause the patient's death.
94. Act to which a person is compelled by threats.—
Except murder, and offences against the State punishable with death, nothing is an
offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats, which, at the time
of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death to that person will
otherwise be the consequence:
Provided the person doing the act did not of his own accord, or from a reasonable
apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself in the situation by
which he became subject to such constraint.
Explanation 1.—A person who, of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of being
beaten, joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit of
this exception, on the ground of his having been compelled by his associates to do
anything that is an offence by law.
Explanation 2.—A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of instant
death, to do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith compelled to take
his tools and to force the door of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled
to the benefit of this exception.

95. Act causing slight harm.—


Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is
known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary
sense and temper would complain of such harm.
Of the Right of Private Defence
96. Things done in private defence.—
Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence.
97. Right of private defence of the body and of property.—
Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 99, to defend—
First.—His own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting
the human body;
Secondly.—The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other
person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery,
mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief
or criminal trespass.

98. Right of private defence against the act of a person of unsound mind, etc.—
When an act, which would otherwise be a certain offence, is not that offence, by reason
of the youth, the want of maturity of understanding, the unsoundness of mind or the
intoxication of the person doing that act, or by reason of any misconception on the
part of that person, every person has the same right of private defence against that act
which he would have if the act were that offence.
Illustrations
(a) Z, under the influence of madness, attempts to kill A; Z is guilty of no offence. But A
has the same right of private defence which he would have if Z were sane.
(b) A enters by night a house which he is legally entitled to enter. Z, in good faith, taking
A for a house-breaker, attacks A. Here Z, by attacking A under this misconception,
commits no offence. But A has the same right of private defence against Z, which he
would have if Z were not acting under that misconception.

99. Acts against which there is no right of private defence.—


There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the
apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by a public
servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act, may not be
strictly justifiable by law.
There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the
apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the
direction of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that
direction may not be strictly justifiable by law.
There is no right of private defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to
protection of the public authorities. Extent to which the right may be exercised.—The
right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is
necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.
Explanation 1.—
A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted
to be done, by a public servant, as such, unless he knows or has reason to believe, that
the person doing the act is such public servant.
Explanation 2.—
A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted
to be done, by the direction of a public servant, unless he knows, or has reason to believe,
that the person doing the act is acting by such direction, or unless such person states the
authority under which he acts, or if he has authority in writing, unless he produces such
authority, if demanded.
100. When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death.—
The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the
last preceding section, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the
assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the
descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:—
First.—Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will
otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
Secondly.—
Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will
otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
Thirdly.—An assault with the intention of committing rape;
Fourthly.—An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;
Fifthly.—An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;
Sixthly.—An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under
circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to
have recourse to the public authorities for his release.
1[Seventhly.—An act of throwing or administering acid or an attempt to throw or
administer acid which may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will
otherwise be the consequence of such act.]
101. When such right extends to causing any harm other than death.—
If the offence be not of any of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section,
the right of private defence of the body does not extend to the voluntary causing of death
to the assailant, but does extend, under the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the
voluntary causing to the assailant of any harm other than death.
102. Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of the body.—
The right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension
of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the
offence may not have been committed; and it continues as long as such apprehension of
danger to the body continues.

103. When the right of private defence of property extends to causing death.—
The right of private defence of property extends, under the restrictions mentioned in
section 99, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the wrong-doer, if
the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions the
exercise of the right, be an offence of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated,
namely:—
First.—Robbery;
Secondly.—House-breaking by night;
Thirdly.—Mischief by fire committed on any building, tent or vessel, which building, tent
or vessel is used as a human dwelling, or as a place for the custody of property;
Fourthly.—Theft, mischief, or house-trespass, under such circumstances as may
reasonably cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the consequence, if
such right of private defence is not exercised.
104. When such right extends to causing any harm other than death.—
If the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which occasions the
exercise of the right of private defence, be theft, mischief, or criminal trespass, not of any
of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section, that right does not extend to
the voluntary causing of death, but does extend, subject to the restrictions mentioned in
section 99, to the voluntary causing to the wrong-doer of any harm other than death.
105. Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of property.—
The right of private defence of property commences when a reasonable apprehension of
danger to the property commences.
The right of private defence of property against theft continues till the offender has
effected his retreat with the property or either the assistance of the public authorities is
obtained, or the property has been recovered. The right of private defence of property
against robbery continues as long as the offender causes or attempts to cause to any
person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or as long as the fear of instant death or of
instant hurt or of instant personal restraint continues. The right of private defence of
property against criminal trespass or mischief continues as long as the offender continues
in the commission of criminal trespass or mischief.
1. Ins. by Act 13 of 2013, s. 2 (w.e.f. 3-2-2013).
The right of private defence of property against house-breaking by night continues as long
as the house-trespass which has been begun by such house-breaking continues.

106. Right of private defence against deadly assault when there is risk of harm to
innocent person.—
If in the exercise of the right of private defence against an assault which reasonably
causes the apprehension of death, the defender be so situated that he cannot effectually
exercise that right without risk of harm to an innocent person, his right of private defence
extends to the running of that risk.

Illustration A is attacked by a mob who attempt to murder him. He cannot effectually


exercise his right of private defence without firing on the mob, and he cannot fire without
risk of harming young children who are mingled with the mob. A commits no offence if
by so firing he harms any of the children.

RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE


INTRODUCTION
In good faith for the purpose of repelling unlawful aggression limit of the right of private
defence. For the exercising of this right; and bold and high-spirited people accustomed to
take the law; Acts did in to their own hand and to go beyond the line of moderation in
repelling injury. It is fit to provide additional restrictions. All the evils that are likely to
arise from the abuse of that the right is far less serious than the evil that would arise from
the execution of one person for over- stepping what might appear to the court to be the
exact line of moderation in resisting of body of dacoits.
The dangerous on the other side; the people are to little disposed to help themselves; the
patience with which they submit to the cruel depredations of gang robbers, and to trespass
and mischief committed in the most outrageous manner by hands by ruffians. The fear of
the law can never restrain bad persons so effectively as the fear of the sum total individual
resistance. The law does not require a citizen, however law-abiding he may be, to
behave like a rank c coward on any occasion. If a man is attacked he need not ruin away,
and he would be perfectly justified in the eye of law, if he holds ground and delivers a
counter- attacked to his assailants provided always, that the injury which he inflicts in self
defense is not out of proportion to the injury which he was threatened.

SCOPE:
There is no right of private defence under the code against any act that is not in itself an
offence under it. An act done in exercise of the right of the private defence is not an
offensive and does not, and there fore give rise to any right of private defence in return.
The defence of possession either of the goods or lands against a mere trespass, not a
crime does not strictly speaking justifies even a breach of the peace
This right is subjected to in all cases to the restriction contained in sec.99 cl.3 &4 Again
one has to remember that this right is not To be used as in belief of possible aggression.
This right cannot be pleaded against alibi by the accused. These provisions are
complicated. Every society has granted this law because the feeling of self defense lies in
every animal and man is also social animal is a gift of the nature.

Every person has right to defence his body and property. Though this responsibility is
placed on State, but it is again a reality that State cannot provide protection to every
individual and at every eventuality. So, when help is possible from the State then, this
right cannot be pleaded.

Section 97: - Applicability-


1. His own body, & the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the
human body.
2. Property-movable or immovable- belongs to himself or any other person. Against any
act that is an offence of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass or such an attempt.
Meaning: Any person- it concerns public safety that every hones person should consider
himself as the natural protector of every other. A person who is not guilty of an offence
for which arrest without warrant can also use this defence.
Section 99: Exception to private defence.
There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause
apprehension of death or of grievous hurt if done or attempted to be done by the direction
of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office though that direction
may not be strictly justifiable by law
There is no right of private defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse of the
protection from the public authorities.
It also does not extend to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the
purpose of defence.
Further Explanation 1c state that unless having knowledge or reason to believe that the
person doing the act is a public servant, right of private defence is also extended to the
person against an act don or attempted to be done by a public servant.
Explanation 2 also explores the further possibilities such an act or an attempt by the other
person acting under the direction of public servant .Of course it is subjected to the
knowledge or a reason to believe.
Important words in this cl. Are:
Public servant-sec.21,
grievous hurt Sec.320
Good faith Sec.52.
Under color of his office, not strictly justifiable by law. – Time to have recourse to the
protection of the public authorities.
Justifiable harm. - Arrest.

Section 99:
Right of private defence against the act of a person of unsound mind (Sec84), youth
(sec.82-83)— want of maturity and by reason of any misconception (sec.76-79). And
having effective intoxication. (Sec.85).

WRONGFUL RESTRAINT (Sec.339) & WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT


The offender may no have design against human life and no intention to inflict bodily
hurt, either wholly deprive the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges
his personal liberty. The person restraint or confinement may in some cases be so slight
ass to deserve little more than nominal punishment; but the arbitrary imprisonment of a
person that is often a quiet and convenient mode of prosecuting him is more serious
offence deserving of exemplary punishment
MEANING:
Wrongful restraint means the keep man out of place where he wishes to be and has a
right to be. Restraint implies abridgment of the liberty of a person against his will. He/she
can be deprived by sleep or otherwise he cannot while in that condition be subjected to
any restraint. The slightest unlawfully obstruction to the liberty of the subject to go when
and where likes to go in lawful manner cannot be justified and is punishable under this
section.
EXCEPTION
The obstructing of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes
himself has a lawful right to obstruct is not an offence within the meaning of this section.
INGREDIENTS
1. Voluntarily obstruction of a person. Voluntarily (Sec.39). No intentionally word is
used. A verbal prohibition or remonstrance does not amount to such obstruction. It must
be in manner of threat may not cause by physical force. Mere direction or demonstration
will not constitute wrongful restraint and physical present is not necessary.
Person: To any person. Obstruction of vehicle alone cannot amount to wrongful restraint
but if a person were in vehicle then it amount to the offence obstruction caused to animals
belonging to a person would not amount to an offence
2. The obstruction must be such as to prevent that person from proceeding in any
direction in which he has a right. Obstruction should be so complete and successful as to
prevent the person obstructed from preceding any direction in which he has a right to
precede. The wrong against the person.
3. Proceeding in any direction: proceeding in that direction and not in any other direction,
much less in the reverse direction. No absolute prevention of one’s personal movement
but the slightest unlawful interference with his lawful movement Person who can also his
own laws or can move by physical means in the case f baby means the agency of its
natural protector or guardian. If a baby is kept shut up so that its natural protector cannot
get at it, it is a case of wrongful confinement
4. Person has a right to proceed.

Bonafied claim fall under exception.

Cases:1. Removal of ladder and thereby detained a person on the roof of house. Telapolu
Subbodu 1884 1 wir340
Husband and wife occupied a house during their temporary absence the accused put a
lock the other door and thereby obstructed from getting into house- Arumuya Nadar 1910
MWN 727

The driver of a bus made his bus stand across the road in such a manner as to prevent
another bus that was coming from behind to proceed further. -Though the driver of the
obstructed bus and the passengers therein could have either got down from that bus and
walked away or even proceeded in their bus in another direction - Abraham 1950 Mad
858

To keep a Watchdog on way / Removal of cripples from handicapped. To stage


gheroa/but picketing on bootlegger stand or to keep a lock out side the door when a
person is sleeping or someone chases to someone are the cases not amounting to offence.
To threat to sue for trespass is not an offence.

In reference to exception it is not an offence to erect a wall in front of one’s premises to


prevent other person from passing over it. If accused acted bonafiedly then no conviction
could be made.

Where the complainant was taken to a police station. register as suspect and passed to a
charge officer from one police station to another, where a police officer refused to let a
person go home until he gave bail where the accused prevented the complainant from
proceeding in a certain direction with Their carts and exacted from them sum of money
on a false plea where the accused stopped the complainant by force catching hold of his
bandy bull, in all cases it was held to have been committed an offence of wrongful
restraint.

Where the accused prevented the building of party wall between two adjoining backyards
where toll was demanded of cart men in good faith and they went away with their
bullocks leaving the carts where the accused placed an obstruction in a road over which
the complainant had right of passage for men and cattle, it was Held that the act of
accused did not amount to an offence in this section.

If a car is parked on road and due to that garage owner could not come out of with his car,
it was held that no offence is committed because the offence is made against the person
and not against the vehicle, in that particular case if the person was seating with his
Parked car then it can amount to offence.
WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT
Whoever wrongfully restrains any person in such a manner as to prevent that person from
proceeding beyond.

INGREDIENTS:
Wrongful restrains any person It keeps a man within limits out of which he wishes to go
and has a right to go.
Prevention of a person from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits; there must
be total restraint and a partial one. Imprisonment is a total restraint on the liberty of the
person for however short time and not a partial obstruction of his will. A Sub Inspector
conducting an investigation is within the law when he sends for a person to the police
station who can in his opinion give information about a crime and a constable who do no
more than bring such a person to the Sub Inspector and tell him to sit down until the Sub
Inspector sees he, are committing no offenses whatever. They are merely obeying the
lawful order of their superior and cannot be charged with wrongful confinement.

Proof of actual physical obstruction is not essential to support a charge of wrongful


confinement. The mere threat of some future harm in case of departure would not suffice
if he knew that it was open to him to away and refrained from doing so lest he should
suffer such harm but if the circumstances were such as to justify and to create the belief
that he could n not Depart without being seized immediately, then it would be proper to
hold that he was obstructed and confined. Desire to proceed must exit and no element of
consent. If a sec ape is open to person if he wished to avail himself then it cannot be said
wrongful confinement. Mere omission of an attempt to run away when there is no watch
does not mean absence of desire.

A prison may have its boundary large or narrow visible and tangible or though real still in
the conception only it may itself be movable or fixed; but a boundary it must have; and
that boundary the party imprisoned within the ambit of which the party imprisoning
would confine him except of the body with mere loss of freedom; it is one part of the
definition of freedom to be able to go wither sever one pleases; but imprisonment is
something more than the mere loss of this power; it includes the notion of restraint within
some limits defy a will or power exterior to our own.

Detention through the exercise of moral force without the accompaniment of physical
force or actual conflict is sufficient to constitute the offense.
Malice: It is not an essential ingredient in this offense. Period: The time is immaterial so
far the offense is concerned. Arrest made by the police officer and given to some person
is acting in the same lawful manner. If arrest is made illegally it amount to this offense.
Similarly gheroa is staged and no alternate to escape is amount to this offence. Fear of
danger must exist.

SECTION 349 FORCE

A person is said to use force to another if he cause motion, change of motion, or cessation
of motion to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion change of motion, or
cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that other’s
body, or with anything which that other is wearing of carrying or with anything so
situated that such contact affects that other’s sense of feeling; Provided that the person
causing the motion or change of motion, or cessation of motion ,causes that motion
change of motion or cessation of motion in One of the three ways hereinafter described;
1. By his own bodily power. 2.By deposing any substance in such manner that the motion
or change of motion takes place without any further act on his part or the part of any other
person. 3. By inducing any animal to move to change its motion or to cease to move.

This section itself is not an offence, for the use of force may take place under the
circumstances the most benevolent, as where a person pulls another out of well to save
him from being drowned. Force become criminal one only when it is used; without
consent and in order to committing any offence. If when it is used to cause injury, fear or
annoyance to another whom to force is used. It then becomes criminal.
SECTION 350 CRIMINAL FORCE
Whoever intentionally use force to any person without that person’s consent in order to
the committing of any offence or intending by the use of such force he will cause injury,
fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used is said to use criminal force to
that other.
SCOPE: Force become criminal when it is used -
1.Without consent and
2. In order to committing of an offence, or when it is intentionally used to cause injury,
fear or annoyance to another to whom the force is used. It applies in connection with the
human body. The term criminal force includes in English law is called battery. It does not
include anything that the doe does by mean of another person. It is wide term and
includes force of almost every description of which a person is the ultimate object. The
use of force to a person and not to a thing. The framers of code found difficulty to define
the term assault so they have given the definition of force. The assault which neither
cause bodily hurt nor wrongful restraint man who impertinently puts his arm round a
lady’s waist, who arms a severe stroke at a person with a horsewhip, who maliciously
throws a stone at a person, squirts dirty water over a person or set a dog at a Person, may
cause no hurt ad no restraint, yet evidently such acts out to be prevented. Motion-
Cessation of motion and cause to any substance any such motion and brings that
substance into contact with any part of that other’s body and other’s sense of feeling.
Ingredients: 1. The intentional use of force to any person. 2. Such force must have been
used without that person’s consent. And 3. It must have been used- a. in order to the
committing of any offence or b. With the intention to cause or knowing it to be likely that
he will cause, in hurt, fear or annoyance to the person to whom it is used.

The definition is not concerned with mechanical force or human force as applied to
objects other than human Such force is not criminal under this definition which is only
concerned with force used ‘to any person’ The use of force in its ordinary sense as
applied to any object other than human, such as building and property, would probably be
called ‘violence’- Miku v. State. AIR 1953 ALL

Force refers to force to a person either directly or indirectly causing injury, fear or
annoyance to that person. It excludes force or violence to property where a person strikes
a pot which another is carrying and which is in contact with his body, it constitutes the
offence if it is done to cause him fear, annoyance-Darshansingh v. Empror AIR
1941LAH.
The quantum of force, which should be sufficient to keep the offence within limits of this
section. The use of force as defined my be sufficient to cause death, and it may be used
for that purpose, in which case the offence will, rightly enough, be using criminal force-
but it will also much be more and may even be murder itself. It must sufficient to cause
hurt as defined in sec.319. If one pushes another, it may not only cause change of motion,
but also bodily pain. In this case the offence may be both the causing of hurt and criminal
force.
SECTION 351 ASSAULT:
Whoever makes any gesture or any preparation intending or knowing it to be likely that
such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend that he who makes
that gesture or preparation is about to use criminal force to that person is said to commit
an assault.
Explanation; Mere words do not amount to an assault but the words that a person use may
give to his gestures or preparation such a meaning as make those gestures or preparations
amount to an assault.

SCOPE: It is not every threat, when there is no actual personal violence that constitutes
an assault. There must, in all cases, be the means of carrying the threat into effect. If a
person is advancing in a threatening attitude with an intention to strike another, so that his
blow will almost immediately reach the other, if he is not stopped, then, this is an assault
in point of law, though at the particular moment when he is stopped, he is not near
enough for his blow to take effect. The offence of assault is one that is committed against
a person and not against public. It does involve a breach of peace. A person in uniform,
be he officer, or private, is no more than any one else entitled to assault another subject of
the govt. whether in peace or war.

ASSAULT & CRIMINAL FORCE:


Assault is something less than the use of criminal force, the force being cut short before
the blow actually falls. It seems to consist in an attempt or offer by a person having
present ability with the force to do any hurt of violence to the person another. And it is
committed whenever well-founded apprehension to immediate peril from a force already
partially or fully put in motion is created. An assault is included in every use of criminal
force.

INGREDIENTS;
1.Making of any gesture or preparation by a person in the presence of another.

2. Intention or knowledge of likelihood that such gesture or preparation will cause the
person present apprehends that the person making it is about to use criminal force to him.

It is an assault to point a loaded pistol at any one. Mere utterance of some threats,
unaccompanied by any gesture or preparation suggesting intention to use criminal force
does not constitute this offence. Preparation to commit crime is not punishable, yet
preparation with the intention specified in this section amounts to an assault. If a person
throws bricks into the house of another this would be a gesture, as it would cause the
person to into whose use the bricks were thrown to apprehend that criminal force was
about to be used against him. Where the accused went away threatening the officers that
he would return and teach them a lesson and soon afterwards he did come back armed
with a lathi along with some other persons and came sufficiently close to the officers a
so as to raise in their minds a reasonable apprehension that actual force was Likely to be
used it was held that the act of the accused came within definition of assault. The accused
himself did nothing that could come under the definition of assault but simply made a
gesture at which his followers advanced a little forward towards the complainant in
threatening manner, it was held that he was not guilty of assault. Intention is the gist of
the offence. The gesture or preparation must be of such a nature that the person in who
presence it is made should apprehend that criminal force would be used to him. Throwing
bottles to a house, among the inmates, with the intention of hurting or frightening them,
constitute assault. Where one of the accused hit a constable and the others surrounded the
constable in a threatening manner, it was held that that was not sufficient to convict the
other of assault. Mere words do not amount to an assault, but the words which the party
threatening use at the time may either give his gestures such a meaning as may make
them amount to an assault or on the or on the other hand my prevent them from being
held to amount to an Assault. Threatening has no present intention to use immediate
criminal force. Preparation taken with words, which would causes, a person to apprehend
that criminal force would be used to him, if he persisted in a particular course of conduct,
does not amount to an assault.

The difference between Hurt & Assault:

It is an artificial difference. But intention of the legislature, there can be no doubt that the
two offenses must be held to be mutually exclusive, and therefore; whenever there is the
causing of bodily pain it is necessarily a case of hurt and therefore as necessarily it cannot
be a case of criminal force or assault. A Stab with knife is an offence under the heads of
hurt and it is also an assault. Sezing a man by color, and thus preventing him from
proceeding on his way; is unlawful restraint and is also an assault. But there will be many
assaults, which it is absolutely necessary to punish, yet which case neither bodily hurt nor
unlawful restraint.

A man who impertinently puts his arm around d a lady’s waist, who aims a severe stroke
at a person with a horsewhip, who maliciously throws a stone at person, squirts dirty
water over a person or sets a dog act a person, may cause no hurt and no restraint. Yet it is
evident that such acts ought to be prevented. A person may intend to cause hurt, but,
having regard to the effect, the actual offence for which he is responsible may amount to
no more than the use of criminal force. The offence of criminal force must only affect
motion, it must not cause hurt. And the causing of change o, or cessation of motion need
not involve any bodily movement, for it is sufficient if it affects merely one’s sensual
feeling by coming in contact with a physical object in consequence if there force. If one
raises his stick to hit another, and the latter moves how little so ever to save himself, its
amount to an offence, but the case would be different it, before the stick is raised, the
other runs away out of sheer fright.- Mohammed Ishaq Khan v. Emperor. 1 Cr. L.J.1057

In all cases, be the means of carrying the threat into effective, therefore, a party be
advancing in a threatening attitude, e.g. with his fist clenched, to strike another, so that
his blow would almost immediately have reached such person, and he then stopped, it is
an assault at law, if his intent were to strike such person, though he was not near enough
at the time to have struck him.” C.J. Tindal- Stephens v. Myres. 4 CP, 349; Ram Singh v.
Emperor. AIR 1935 Pat. 214

Attacks on human beings, mere preparation by itself may amount to an offence; but for
preparation for the slaughter of animal is not an offence- Parasramji v. Imtiaz AIR 1962
All.22

Assault is threat of violence exhibiting intention to use criminal force, and the present
ability and intention to carry the threat into execution.

SECTION 354 ASSAULTS OR CRIMINAL FORCE TO WOMAN WITH THE


INTENTION TO OUTRAGE HER MODESTY
Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman intending the outrage or knowing
it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine
or with both.

There are two sections in the Code of protecting women against the sexual lust of men.
One is sec.376 which punishes forcible ravishment of women, called, rape, while this
section punishes lesser acts of indecency such as solicitation for sexual intercourse, or the
like. Sec. 511 deals with attempts and as there may an an attempt to comm it rapes
implying a certain outrage on remain modesty, the question whether what was done
merely the ofrfence here described or something more punishable under sec. 375/511 or
376 must not be lost sight of.

Principle: In the interest of decency and morals are regarded. All indecent assault upon a
women, benig an index of a depraved soul and often causing intense shame and suffering
to the sufferer, arouses the lust indignation both of the person assaulted and of the public.

Woman: Female human being of any age (s10).The girl age of six years was taken by
accused to his room where he made her lie down and he lay on her. The girl immediately
screamed and ran away. For this act accused was not convicted by magistrate under this
section on the ground that the girl was too young to have any modesty. He was convicted
under the section 352. But High Court held that the act of the accused was punishable
under this section, for the girl though young was a woman defined by s.10.

RUPAN DEOL BAJAJ V.K.P.S. GILL19995 SCC (Cr)1 1059. at p.1072.

“ The difference between preparation and an attempt to commit an offence consists


chiefly in the greater degree of determination and what is necessary to prove for an
offence on an attempt to commit rape has been committed is that the accused has gone
beyond the stage of preparation. If an accused strips naked and then making her lie on the
ground undresses himself and then forcibly rubs his erected penis on the private part of
the girl but fails to penetrate the same into vagina and on such rubbing ejaculates himself
then it is the difficult to hold that it was a case Of merely assault and not an attempt to
commit rape sec. 376 read with 511. In the facts and circumstances of the present case the
offence of an attempt to commit rape by accused has been clearly established and the
High Court rightly convicted him under sec.376 read with 511.”

The word MODESTY is not defined in the Code. But the Webster’s & Oxford
dictionaries defined as under.

MODESTY :modesty is the quality of modest which means, as regards woman, decorous
in manner and conduct, scrupulously chaste, shrinking from indecency. Decency means
property of behavior; what is required by good taste or delicacy; avoidance of absence
language and gesture and undue exposure of person; respectability.Decorum means
property of speech, manner etc., dignity. Modesty is defined as the quality of being
modest, and relation to woman, womanly property of behavior; scrupulous chastity of
thought, speech and conduct. Modesty has some relation to the sense of property of
behavior in relation to the woman against whom the offence is said to have been
committed. In addtion to the intention or the knowledge of the accused there must be not
merely the physical act of the accused that assault or the use of criminal force, but a
subjective element so far as the woman against whom the assault is committed or the
criminal force used. This result appears to follow in consequences of the use of words
outrage her modesty.

Whether a woman has developed modesty, as that the word is used , is a question of fact
in each case, and there is no abstract conception of modesty that can apply to all case. The
essence of a woman’s modesty is her sex. The modesty of an adult female is writ large on
her body, young or old, intelligent or imbecile, awake or sleeping, the woman posses a
modesty capable of being outraged. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of
the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant., but its absence is not always
decisive, as for example, when the accused with a corrupt mind stealthily touches the
flesh of a sleeping woman. She may be an idiot, she may be under the spell of anesthesia,
she may be sleeping, she may be unable to appreciate the significance of the act,
nevertheless, the offender is punishable under the section..

Intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty.
There must be intention or knowledge that the woman’s modesty will be outraged. What
constitutes an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined. This will differ according to
the country and the race to which the woman belongs. It would be an outrage to the
modesty of one woman to do to her what would be though nothing of any another. A kiss
that would be highly resented by a lady might be not affront to the maid. To place hands
on the shoulder of woman will be an outrage on the modesty of a Hindu or Mohmeden
woman, but not a European. In construing this section the court must have regard to the
race and the position in life of the particular woman; and women of one nationality may
have different standards of modesty from womaen of another nationality. If women
engage in professional work and come out into the open world, they must adopt standards
of ordinary men and women of the world and that can not expect to retain the same
hypersensitive notions of modesty which appealed to their ancestors in Purdaha, at the
same time it is extremely important That men who are brought into professional contact
with women should be exceedingly careful not to do anything to outrage the modesty of
the women with whom they associate, and that the really means that they should be
careful not to introduce their relation with the woman any element of sex.-Balubhai
Harishankar Bhatt (1933)criminal appeal, decided by JJ Beaumount ande Barlee.

The accused can not be convicted of this offence where the woman had either no modesty
to mention or it was not such could be outraged by the acts attributed to him. Where a girl
of tender age was asked by the accused to remove her clothe and she refused to do so and
shouted it was held that it could not be said that she had not developed any sense of
modsty. Knowledge that modesty is likely to be outraged is sufficient to constitute the
offence without any deliberate intention having such outrage alone for its object. For
instance, the pulling of a woman by the arm coupled with a request for sexual intercourse,
amounts to an offence under this section.
Under this section a man as well as a woman can be held guilty of the offencce of
assaulting or using criminal force to any woman with the intention or knowledge as
referred to therein . The pronoun- he- used in the expression-that he will thereby outrage
her modesty - must be taken under s.8 as importing a male or female.

-Where a school master took indecent liberties with a female scholar it was held he was
guilty of assault though she did not resist. Making female patient strip naked under the
pretense that the accused, a medical man, could not otherwise judge of her illness was
held to be an assault. Where the accused took of a girl’s clothes, threw her on to the
ground and said nothing to her nor did he does anything more to her was held guilty under
this section. Nuna(1912)13PLR 350Cr.L.J.

Emperor v. Tatia Mahadev 14 Bom. L.R.

IN the earliest case, Chandribai, girl of 6 years of ages, lived with her parents in a room
on the first floor of a chawl in Bombay. The accused, who lived on the second floor, took
the girl to his room, made her lie down and lie on her. Immediately the girl screamed and
ran away. She reported the matter to her mother. The accused was charged with an
offence u/s.354, but the magistrate convicted under the section 352 holding that the girl
was only six years old and her modesty could hardly be outraged. In appeal against it, the
learned judge after referring to the definition of “woman” pointed out that for the
purposes of sec.354, the girl Chandribai was a woman within that section. Her screamed
and running away construed she felt her modesty is to be outraged by the conduct of the
accused.

The person assaulted was female, the accused - him or her - assaulted or used criminal
force to her. He-or she intended thereby to outraged her modesty or that he knew it to be
likely that would amount outrage her modesty.- Cognizable - Warrant- Bailable - Not
compoundable- Triable by magistrate first class.

KIDNAPPING

The crime of kidnapping consists, according to the definition , in conveying a person


without his consent or the consent of some person legally authorised to consent on his
behalf ,or with such consent obtained by deception out of the protection of the law, or of
those whom the law has appointed his guardians.

Kid - napp meaning thereby kid- child and napp means stealing. It thence came to mean
the forcible abduction or stealing of a human being regardless of sex or age. The term
has, however, been used here in a special sense as meaing the abduction pf a minor male
under sixteen years of age and female under eighteen years of age fro m lawful
guadianship and in the case of an adult abduction from India. The division is not mutual
eshaustive and exclusive.For, there may be kidnapping of a minor both from his lawful
guardianshi as well as from India. the offence of kidnapping is but an aggraved form of
wrongful confinement and is there fore an offencein which iall the elements of that
offence are necessarily present. It is however , confineen t of sucvh a serious form that the
code treats it as a distinct offence. Kidnapping does not include the offence of wrongful
confinent of or keeping in confinement a kidnapped person . The carrying of a grown-up
person by force from one place within the company’s territories to another and the
enslaving him within thre company’s territories, are offences sufficiently provided for
under the heads of restraint and confinement. The enciting of grown-up person by false
promises to go from one place in the company’s territrories to another and the enslaving
him within the company’s territories may be suject for a civil action and under certain
circumstances, for criminal prosecution but it does not appear to come properly under the
head of kidnapping.

SECTION 359 - KIDNAPPING- is of two kinds; Kidnapping from India, and Kidnapping
from lawful guardianship.
SECTION 360 KIDNANAPPING FROM THE INDIA

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