Naval Weapons

NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
NAVAL SHIP SYSTEMS II

WEAPONS
CNET P1550/1 (REV 11-99)
CHIEF OF NAVAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................... i
RECORD OF CHANGES ......................................... ii
LETTER OF PROMULGATION .................................... iii
DEFINITION OF MEASUREMENT OF TERMS ........................ iv
PROFESSIONAL CORE COMPETENCY OBJECTIVES ................... v
LESSON TOPICS ............................................. ix
INSTRUCTIONAL AIDS ........................................ x
VIDEOTAPE LIST ............................................ xi
DEFENSE CONTRACTORS AND OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION ...... xvi
TRANSPARENCY SERIES ....................................... xviii
BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................. xxiv
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INSTRUCTOR ........................ xxvii
Lesson Guides:
1. Introduction/Weapons System Overview ......... 1

2. Energy Fundamentals .......................... 4
3. Radar Principles and Systems ................. 8
4. Feedback Control/Automatic Tracking Systems .. 13
5. Track-While-Scan (TWS) ....................... 16
6. Electronic Scanning and the Phased Array ..... 19
7. Case Study: USS Vincennes ................... 22
8. Electronic Warfare ........................... 39
9. C4ISR and Information Warfare ................. 46
10. Principles of Underwater Sound ............... 58
11. Underwater Detection and Tracking Systems .... 64
12. Military Explosives/Warheads ................. 70
13. Fuzing ....................................... 75
14. Guidance and Control Principles .............. 78
15. Weapon Propulsion and Architecture ........... 82
16. Case Study: OOD Midwatch .................... 89
17. Launching Systems ............................ 95
18. Fire Control ................................. 100
19. Mine Warfare ................................. 105
20. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Platforms and Weapons 112
21. Case Study: Aircraft Mishap Incident ........ 126
i
RECORD OF CHANGES
CHANGE NUMBER DATE OF CHANGE DATE ENTERED BY WHOM
ii
iii
DEFINITION OF MEASUREMENT TERMS
I. Know - Recall facts, bring to mind the appropriate

material; recognize knowledge.
Examples: Know the objectives of damage control aboard

ship.
Know the safety procedures used to provide

the fullest measure of safe small boat
operations.
II. Comprehend - Interpret principles and concepts and relate

them to new situations.
Examples: Comprehend the mission of the U.S. Navy and

the U.S. Marine Corps.
Comprehend the concepts of internal forces

(e.g., stress, strain, shear).
III. Apply - Utilize knowledge and comprehension of

specific facts in new relationships with
other facts, theories, and principles.
Examples: Apply correct plotting procedures when

navigating in piloting waters.
Apply correct procedures to determine times

of sunrise and sunset.
IV. Demonstrate - Show evidence of ability in performing a

task.
Examples: Demonstrate third-class swimming skills and

water survival skills.
Demonstrate the correct procedures used in

radio-telephone communications.
iv
PROFESSIONAL CORE COMPETENCY OBJECTIVES
The following professional competency objective statements for

this course are taken from the Professional Core Competency
Manual for Officer Accession Programs promulgated in 1996.
1. The student will comprehend the moral and ethical

responsibilities of the military leader.
a. The student will comprehend the leader's moral and

ethical responsibilities to organization and society.
b. The student will comprehend the relationship of

integrity, moral courage, and ethical behavior to
authority, responsibility, and accountability.
2. The student will comprehend the following personal qualities

and be able to relate them to a leader's effectiveness:
a. Loyalty
b. Honor
c. Integrity
d. Courage (moral and physical)
3. The student will know the basic characteristics and

capabilities of the major weapons systems and platforms of
the U.S. naval forces.
a. The student will know the designations, characteristics,

capabilities, and missions of ships, aircraft, and weapon
systems of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps.
b. The student will know the role of active and passive

electronic warfare and their employment in the fleet.
c. The student will know the significance of intelligence in

the application of naval warfare.
4. The student will know the concept of naval command and

control within the armed forces.
a. The student will know how the following doctrine

contributes to the basic sea control and power-projection
mission of the naval service: C4I warfare (command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence).
b. The student will know the basic concepts of the detect-

to-engage sequence.
v
5. The student will be familiar with procedures for effecting
communications security, including the common causes of
security compromise and safeguard to prevent unauthorized
disclosure.
6. The student will comprehend the basic application of

electronics systems, communications theory, and
electromagnetic wave theory to maritime and naval
applications in radars, communications, and radio-navigation
systems.
a. The student will know the theory of operation and key

components used with naval electronics and communications
systems, including:
(1) Amplifiers
(2) Antennas
(3) Power Amplifiers
(4) Oscillators
(5) Filters
(6) Waveguides
b. The student will know the fundamental means of imparting

information to radio waves and will comprehend the uses,
advantages, and disadvantages of the various means.
c. The student will know the use of computers and digital

electronics in naval and maritime communications.
d. The student will know wave theory, including the
relationship between frequency and wavelength.
e. The student will know refraction, polarization, and

propagation as related to electromagnetic waves.
f. The student will know the definition of the effects of

ground plane, free space, re-radiation, sky waves, space
waves, ground waves, and tropospheric waves.
g. The student will know the characteristics, advantages,

and disadvantages of various communication frequency
ranges.
h. The student will be able to apply radar theory and

comprehend basic operation, major components, and
parameters.
vi
i. The student will know radio theory, basic operation,
major components, and parameters.
j. The student will know basic electromagnetic interference

factors in ship and weapon design.
7. The student will comprehend the physical properties

associated with sound travel in water and the application of
these properties to sensing and detection systems.
a. The student will comprehend sound propagation, including

Snell's Law, effects of temperature, pressure, and
salinity, sound velocity profiles, sound ray traces,
sound channels, and convergence zones.
b. The student will comprehend sound propagation loss,

including spreading and absorption.
c. The student will comprehend the concepts of self and

ambient noise.
d. The student will apply the active and passive sonar

equations.
e. The student will comprehend basic transducer and

hydrophone theory.
f. The student will comprehend the differences between

active and passive sonar systems; contrast the advantages
and disadvantages of each.
g. The student will comprehend the basic properties of ocean

currents.
8. The student will comprehend the basic principles of fluid
dynamics and be able to apply them in shipboard situations.
a. The student will know the concepts of lift and drag,

atmospheric properties and effect, subsonic and
supersonic flow characteristics and high speed
aerodynamics.
b. The student will know aerodynamic and hydrodynamic

controls.
9. The student will comprehend and be able to apply the basic

geometry of the fire control problem and applicable
principles of internal and external ballistics, propulsion,
launching, and guidance.
a. The student will comprehend the basic concepts of

relative motion, bearing rate, and speed across and in
the line of sight.
vii
b. The student will know the basic factors of the fire
control problem.
c. The student will comprehend the factors effecting

solution of the fire control problem.
10. The student will comprehend countermeasure principles,

including basic principles of electronic warfare.
11. The student will comprehend the basic application of space

and electronic warfare in naval operations.
a. The student will know the military space roles, including

the role of space systems in strategic and tactical
command and control architectures.
b. The student will know the military opportunities and

applications in space.
(1) The student will know the principles of space-based

communications.
(2) The student will know the basics of space-based

remote sensing and applications to space-based
surveillance opportunities.
c. The student will know how to utilize space assets and

information for mission planning.
viii
LESSON TOPICS
LESSON
NUMBER TITLE HOURS
1 Introduction/Weapons System Overview 1
2 Energy Fundamentals 2
3 Radar Principles and Systems 3
4 Feedback Control/Automatic Tracking Systems 2
5 Track-While-Scan (TWS) 1
6 Electronic Scanning and the Phased Array 1
7 Case Study: USS Vincennes 2
8 Electronic Warfare 2
9 C4ISR and Information Warfare 2
10 Principles of Underwater Sound 3
11 Underwater Detection and Tracking Systems 2
12 Military Explosives/Warheads 2
13 Fuzing 1
14 Guidance and Control Principles 1
15 Weapon Propulsion and Architecture 2
16 Case Study: OOD Midwatch 1
17 Launching Systems 1
18 Fire Control 2
19 Mine Warfare 2
20 U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Platforms and Weapons 4
21 Case Study: Aircraft Mishap Incident 1
___
Total: 38
ix
INSTRUCTIONAL AIDS
1. Videotapes: See Videotape List.
2. Power Point Presentations/Slides: The PowerPoint

presentations for the Weapons lessons are available from the
Weapons Course Coordinator. Slides can be acquired from many
sources. The list of contacts below is only a partial
listing.
Defense Visual Information Center

Comm: (909) 413-2522/2514/2515
DSN: 348-1522/1515/1514
The Defense Visual Information Center researchers can supply

slides, photographs, transparencies, and motion videos on naval
platforms.
Aegis Program Office

Public Affairs Officer
Comm: (703) 602-7249, DSN: 332-7249
The Aegis Program PAO can supply slides, viewgraphs, and videos
on the Aegis weapon system. Call for details.
3. Instructional Materials
Overhead Projector 35mm Slide Projector

Television Monitor VHS Tape Player
LCD Projector
4. Transparency Masters: The transparency masters, which can

also be used as student handouts, are distributed by CNET.
Copyright approval has been granted to utilize these masters.
5. Internet Web Sites: Numerous worldwide web network sites are

available for exploration. Instructors should be aware of
the following sites (at a minimum) and should encourage
students to "surf the net" for additional information.
Surface Warfare Officers School Command: www.swos.navy.mil/
Navy Fact Files: www.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/ffiletop.html
U.S.M.C. Research Center: www.usmc.mil/factfile/default.html
Weapons Department, USNA: http://wseweb.ew.usna.edu/
6. Other Aids: Other information and instructional aids may be

acquired from sources listed in Defense Contractors and Other
Sources of Information (page xvi). Jane's Naval Weapon
Systems also lists defense contractors with addresses and
phone numbers.
x
VIDEOTAPE LIST
1. Videotapes are extremely useful in highlighting key points

and giving visual demonstrations. Instructors should not,
however, rely on a video to cover a whole subject area, but
rather should use them as supplemental material. It may be
best to use short clips of videos instead of the entire
length. Instructors have sometimes been disappointed using
videos, since they may not introduce material in the desired
order, may emphasize points other than those the instructor
wants to emphasize, and may take too little or too much time
to cover the subject. Videos do allow almost any training
environment to be brought into the classroom, which is the
benefit of not relying entirely on lecture or printed
materials.
2. The list that follows was compiled using the Defense

Automated Visual Information System (DAVIS) and the most
recent electronic media product catalogues. The DAVIS gives
a synopsis for each video, although it lists some obsolete
and non-Navy products. The Norfolk and San Diego media
center catalogs list all current Navy products held at those
centers, organized by title and topic. These catalogs do not
include descriptions.
3. Only those productions found in the media center catalogs or

distributed by CNET are included in this list. Each
production is listed within a specific lesson and includes
the production identification number (PIN), year of
production (year), length in minutes (time), and availability
at the Norfolk (NF) and San Diego (SD) libraries (avail).
The videotapes available through CNET do not have a PIN or an
availability location. All videos listed are unclassified.
4. Instructors can select videos based on the Videotape List,

the synopsis in the DAVIS, or the title and topic listings in
the media center catalogs. The media centers can provide a
synopsis for a video if the instructor cannot find this
information elsewhere.
5. Ordering Instructions: Effective 1 February 1997, the Navy

visual information library mail-order services were
consolidated at the Navy Media Library in Norfolk. The San
Diego library continues to provide over-the-counter services
to the San Diego area only. The videos that can be obtained
from CNET are marked accordingly on the Videotape List. The
media center catalogs describe how to obtain electronic media
from that center. The Norfolk center issues the Navy Media
Library Catalog, and the San Diego center issues the Catalog
of Navy Training Products. Ensure the following information
is included in the request for electronic media:
xi
Product Identification Number (PIN)
Title
Classification
Media format and alternate
Exhibition date(s) and alternate
Unit Identification Code (UIC)
Name, title, telephone number
Full mailing address (using zip code + 4)
6. Media Center Addresses and Phone Numbers
a. NETPDTC Norfolk Regional Electronic Media Center:

Services all NROTC units. Requests for training media
may be submitted by mail, fax, or electronic mail at the
following addresses. Most videotapes requested by Navy
commands are issued on a permanent or one-way issue.
Commercial/Copyrighted videotapes, 16mm films, and
sound/slide programs are provided on a two-week temporary
loan. A return date will be indicated on the shipping
invoice for those videotapes which must be returned.
Mailing Address
NETPDTC Norfolk Regional Electronic Media Center

448 Bullpup Street, Suite 100
Virginia Beach, VA 23461-2106
Phone: DSN 564-4011/1468 Comm (757) 444-4011/1468

Fax: DSN 492-6587 Comm (757) 492-6587
Internet E-Mail
donna.kerley@smtp.cnet.navy.mil
steve.freeman@smtp.cnet.navy.mil
b. NETPDTC San Diego Regional Electronic Media Center:

(Over-the-counter service for San Diego area only)
NETPDTC San Diego Regional Electronic Media Center

921 West Broadway
San Diego, CA 92132-5105
Phone: DSN 522-1360 Comm (619) 532-1360

Fax: DSN 522-1130 Comm (619) 532-1130
7. Some Hollywood and other commercial movies contain material

relevant to this course. Students often find such movies
interesting and normally questions abound. Class discussions
can be lively and may help to separate fact from fiction in
matters surrounding naval operations and protocol. Some
movies that may be suggested for viewing outside of class
xii
include, "Top Gun," "Crimson Tide," "The Hunt for Red
October," and "Courage Under Fire."
NOTE: The instructor should review the identified video tape

during class preparation and decide how to best use it in class
to enhance the students’ overall learning experience. Because of
time constraints, instructors are encouraged to use only short
segments of the video material listed.
PIN TITLE YEAR TIME AVAIL
Lesson Guide 7: Case Study: USS Vincennes
CNET "7 Minutes That Stunned the Navy" 1993 50 N/A
Arts and Entertainment Network documentary regarding

the USS Vincennes shootdown of Iran Air Lines, Flight
655.
Lesson Guide 10: Principles of Underwater Sound
11184DN "Underwater Sound Raypath Theory" 1974 20 BOTH
Despite its age, this video includes a good descrip-

tion of sound waves, sound propagation, and sound
paths. Describes the use of sonar in detection and
ASW, and the use of aircraft in ASW.
Lesson Guide 11: Underwater Detection and Tracking Systems
35798DN "Tracking the Threat" 1980 23 BOTH
Describes tracking and destroying a submarine threat

using several U.S. Navy platforms and ASW techniques.
Lesson Guide 12: Military Explosives/Warheads

35368DN "Development of Military 1981 17 BOTH
Explosives"
Lesson Guide 14: Guidance and Control Principles
35362DN "Laser Weapons for the Fleet" 1979 20 BOTH
CNET "Warship" 1991 30 N/A
An excellent description of surface warfare elec-

tronics and weapons. Based on the capabilities of the
USS Lake Champlain. Use the section on Tomahawk
guidance systems.
xiii
Lesson Guide 17: Launching Systems
68103DN "Harpoon Antiship Weapon System" 1978 10 BOTH
34648DN "Tomahawk" 1976 3 BOTH
802298DN "Sea Warriors" 1988 15 BOTH

A description of surface warfare based on the early
Ticonderoga class cruisers (non-VLS). Good discussion
of the Ticonderoga as a multi-mission platform. Use
the section on the transfer and launching of an SM-2MR
missile.

USS Lake Champlain. Shows several different launchers,
including those for Harpoon and Tomahawk.
Lesson Guide 20: U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Platforms and
Weapons
35206DN "Top Gun" 1984 14 BOTH
68014DN "LHA" 1979 19 BOTH
805240DN "Today's Submarine Force" 1992 19 BOTH
Explains the different missions and capabilities of a

submarine.
804818DN "Sea Power for the 90's" 1990 18 BOTH
Explains the use of U.S. naval forces in modern-day

conflicts. Includes discussion on the new missions of
the Navy.
802298DN "Sea Warriors" 1988 15 BOTH

A description of surface warfare based on the early
Ticonderoga class cruisers (non-VLS). Good discussion
on the Ticonderoga as a multi-mission platform.

USS Lake Champlain.
xiv
CNET "Storm from the Sea" 1991 67 N/A
The U.S. Naval Institute video of the Navy and Marine

Corps operations in the Gulf War. Includes interviews
and combat action footage.
xv
DEFENSE CONTRACTORS AND OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The following defense contractors' public relations offices

and U.S. Navy commands can answer questions instructors may have
on specific weapons or platforms. They also may be able to
supply videos, posters, or brochures. Jane's Naval Weapon
Systems also lists defense contractors with addresses and phone
numbers.
1. AEGIS PROGRAM OFFICE

Public Affairs Officer
Arlington, Virginia
(703) 602-7249 extension 421
Aegis weapon system
2. BATH IRON WORKS

Public Relations Department
Bath, Maine
Susan Pierter
(207) 442-2914
FFG-7, CG-47, DDG-51 class ships
3. HUGHES MISSILE SYSTEMS COMPANY

Marketing and Communications
Tucson, AZ
Gary James, Customer Marketing Representative
(520) 794-2966
GDJames@CCGate.HAC.com
Hughes Missile Systems Company products
4. INGALLS SHIP BUILDING

Pascagoula, MS
(601) 935-3355/3971
Put all questions in writing and fax to:
Jim McIngvale
FAX (601) 935-5766
DD-963, CG-47, DDG-51, LHA-1, LHD-1 class ships
5. LOCKHEED MARIETTA (Government Electronic Systems Division)

Moorestown, NJ
Eleanor Goodman
(609) 722-3454
Aegis weapon system
6. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION

Charles Manor, Vice President of Public Relations
6801 Rockledge Drive
Bethesda, MD 20817
(301) 897-6258 Phone
(301) 897-6552 Fax
Lockheed aircraft, weapons, EW equipment and radar
xvi
7. MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS CORPORATION
St. Louis, MO
(314) 947-6722 (Harpoon missile)
(314) 232-8203 (F/A-18)
McDonnell-Douglas missiles and aircraft
8. SANDERS, A LOCKHEED MARTIN COMPANY

Nashua, NH
Joseph Wagovich
(603) 885-2816/2817
Sanders radar and surveillance systems, integrated
defense countermeasure systems, ASW systems
9. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS SCHOOL COMMAND

Combat Systems Department
Naval Education and Training Center
Newport, RI 02841
(401) 841-4962/4963/4964/4965 DSN: 948-4962/3/4/5
Division Officer's School

Naval Education and Training Center
Newport, RI 02841
(401) 841-2509 DSN: 948-3055
10. UNITED DEFENSE (formerly FMC Corporation)

Armament Systems Division
Marketing Communications
Minneapolis, MN 55421
Rick Snider, Manager of Marketing Communications
(612) 572-7947 FAX: (612) 574-0114
Shipboard main armament, 5-inch/54-caliber gun system,
guided-missile launching systems
11. UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY

Weapons and Systems Engineering Department
105 Maryland Ave
Annapolis, MD 21402-5025
(410) 293-6101
DSN: 281-6101
12. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION

Naval Systems Division
Public Relations
Cleveland, OH
(216) 692-5112
Torpedoes (Mk-48, Mk-48 ADCAP)
xvii
TRANSPARENCY SERIES
For transparencies, use the NROTC Naval Ships Systems II

(Weapons), CNET P1550/11 (Rev. 6-94), Transparency Masters.
These transparencies are numbered based on the 6-94 revision of
this course. The list below indicates which lesson these trans-
parencies support in this revision. There are some transparen-
cies that have been eliminated as they no longer apply to the
lessons in this course.
Lesson Guide 1: Introduction/Weapons System Overview
1-2 Weapons system concept

1-3 Block diagram of a simplified missile control system
1-5 Defense in depth for ASW operations
1-6 Area defense and point defense
Lesson Guide 2: Energy Fundamentals
2-1 Characteristics of a radio wave assuming a frequency

of 3 hertz
2-2 Methods of plotting wave characteristics
2-3 The electromagnetic frequency spectrum
2-4 Generation of electromagnetic radiation
2-5 Formation of electric and magnetic fields around an
antenna
2-7 Reflection
2-8 Trapping/Ducting, diffraction, attenuation
2-9 Relationship between skip zone, skip distance, and
ground waves
2-10 Earth's atmosphere
Lesson Guide 3: Radar Principles and Systems
3-1 Pulse transmission

3-2 Pulse width and pulse repetition rate
3-3 Range parameters verses range
3-4 Formation of a time base
3-5 Pulsed echo radar block diagram
3-6 Doppler Theory
3-7 CW radar block diagram
3-8 Electromagnetic energy modulation techniques
3-9 Half-wave dipole antenna
3-10 Broadside array
3-11 Radiation patterns with and without parasitic reflector
3-12 Beam width and target position accuracy
3-13 Adjusting vertical beam and horizontal beam for
accuracy
3-19 Summary of radar performance factors
3-20 Radar indicator displays
xviii
Lesson Guide 4: Feedback Control/Automatic Tracking Systems
4-1 Control system elements

4-2 Digital computer organization
4-4 Negative feedback control system
4-6 Relationship between the line-of-sight and the tracking
line
4-7 Block diagram of a typical automatic tracking system
employing a radar sensor system
4-8 Shorted delay-line range error detector
4-9 Conical scanning
4-10 Conical scanning with target on tracking line
4-11 Conical scanning with target displaced from the
tracking line
4-12 Monopulse radar system: Amplitude changes
Lesson Guide 5: Track-While-Scan (TWS)
5-1 Track-while-scan volumetric windows

5-2 Track-while-scan processing
5-3 Simplified computer target track file
5-4 Simplified track-while-scan algorithm flow diagram
Lesson Guide 6: Electronic Scanning and the Phased Array
6-1 Beam positioning along, above, below the boresight axis

6-2 Time delay scanning
6-3 Frequency scanning
6-4 Phase scanning
Lesson Guide 8: Electronic Warfare
7-2 Functional relationships of electronic support measures

7-3 Functional relations of electronic countermeasures
7-4 Effective and ineffective jamming
7-5 Spot, barrage, and sweep jamming
7-6 The effect of bandwidth on jammer spectral power
density
7-7 Jamming tactics
7-8 Range deception as it would appear on an air surveil-
lance radar scope
7-9 System degradation with ECM
7-10 Functional relations of electronic counter-
countermeasures
Lesson Guide 9: C4ISR

17-1 Nominal weapon range and defensive reaction time
17-2 Frequency spectrum: Typical uses
17-3 Frequency spectrum: Propagation on characteristics and
typical uses
17-4 Navy tactical data system
17-5 Display consoles
xix
Lesson Guide 10: Principles of Underwater Sound
8-1 The three elements of sound

8-2 Longitudinal waves
8-3 Simple longitudinal wave
8-5 Bottom loss
8-6 Patterns of flow noise
8-7 Cavitation
8-8 Ambient noise levels (modified Wenz curves)
8-9 Diagrammatic view of active sonar equations
8-10 Diagrammatic view of passive sonar equations
8-11 Graphical relationship of sound speed to pressure,
salinity, and temperature
8-12 Expendable bathythermograph
8-13 Typical deep-sea speed profile divided into layers
8-14 Sound travel in isothermal water
8-15 Sound travel in water of decreasing temperature
8-16 Sound travel in water of increasing temperature
8-17 Layer depth phenomenon
8-18 Sound channel
8-19 Convergence zone
8-20 Bottom bounce
8-21 Possible propagation paths
Lesson Guide 11: Underwater Detection and Tracking Systems
9-1 Simplified passive and active sonar operation

9-2 Basic sonar system
9-3 Sonar system block diagram
9-4 Searchlight magnetostrictive transducer
9-5 Main components of scanning sonar
9-6 Scanning sonar
9-7 Passive sonar functional diagram
9-8 Summary of factors affecting sonar tactical performance
9-9 Tactical towed array sonar (TACTAS)
9-10 Finding submarines in shadow zones
9-11 Doppler degree
9-12 Defense in depth in ASW operations
Lesson Guide 12: Military Explosives/Warheads

10-1 Nuclear bursts: Surface burst, deep underwater burst,
air burst
10-2 Typical energy distribution for a low altitude air
burst
10-3 Three stages in the development of a 100-kiloton
shallow underwater nuclear burst
10-4 Classification of nuclear bursts according to location
10-5 High explosive train
10-6 Isotropic and non-isotropic propagation
10-7 Effects of a blast wave at a given distance from blast
center
xx
10-8 Pressure vs. time relationship of a blast wave at a
given distance from blast center
10-9 Direct and reflected shock waves for an underwater
burst
10-10 Formation of mach wave and triple point
10-11 Three stages in the development of a 1-megaton air
burst at 6500 feet height
10-12 Basic construction of a fragmentation warhead
10-13 Effect of a fragmentation warhead on a target at sea
10-14 Effect of a fragmentation warhead on a target on land
10-15 Shaped charge sequence
10-16 Expansion of a continuous rod warhead
Lesson Guide 13: Fuzing

11-1 Basic fuze system
11-2 Progression of a detonation wave
11-3 Actuation of an impact fuze
11-4 Mechanical time fuze action
11-5 Fuze classification by mode of operation
11-6 Example demonstrating the principle of an acceleration-
integration safety and arming device
11-7 Projectile forces
11-8 Fuze system redundancy
Lesson Guide 14: Guidance and Control Principles
12-1 Guidance phases of missile flight

12-2 Command guidance system
12-3 Simple beam-rider guidance system
12-4 Homing guidance
12-5 Torpedo programmed path
12-6 Cruise missile programmed path
12-7 Accelerometers in guided missiles
12-8 Terrestrial guidance
12-9 Current guidance system examples
12-10 Air-to-air missile guidance phases
12-11 Pursuit path
12-12 Constant bearing path
12-13 Proportional navigation flight path
Lesson Guide 15: Weapon Propulsion and Architecture

13-1 Explosive propellant train
13-2 Impulse propulsion principles
13-3 Pressure-travel curve
13-4 Pressure-travel and velocity-travel curves
13-5 Degressive burning grains
13-6 Neutral burning grains
13-7 Progressive burning grains
13-8 Solid propellant configurations
13-9 Development of thrust in a rocket motor
13-10 Elements of a solid rocket motor
xxi
13-11 Axial flow turbojet
13-12 The turbojet engine
13-13 Low-supersonic ramjet
13-14 Hypersonic ramjet
13-15 Reaction motor advantages
13-16 Reaction motor disadvantages
13-17 Forces on a missile in flight
13-18 Functional systems of a guided missile
13-19 Location of components in guided missiles
13-20 Guided missile definitions
13-21 Control surfaces
13-22 Architecture of a bullet
13-23 Gun barrel rifling
13-26 Special purpose projectiles: Illumination, white
phosphorus
13-27 Penetrating projectiles
Lesson Guide 17: Launching Systems

14-13 Mk-32 torpedo tubes
14-14 Guided missile launch system Mk-26
14-15 Vertical launch system
Lesson Guide 18: Fire Control
15-1 How own ship motion affects range and deflection

15-2 Miss-producing effects
15-3 Iterative procedure employed in a fire control solution
15-4 Flow diagram for ballistic procedure considering only
gravity
15-5 Effects of transverse wind
15-6 The way to compensate for air resistance
15-7 Drift
15-8 Summary of the solution to the fire control problem
15-9 Close-in weapon system (Phalanx) closed-loop gunfire
control
Lesson Guide 19: Mine Warfare

22-1 Bottom mine (typical) and moored mine (typical)
22-2 Mines Mk-25 and Mk-52 (typical)
22-3 Mines Mk-55 (typical), Mk-56, and Mk-57
22-4 Mine Mk-60
22-5 Mines Mk-62, Mk-63, Mk-64, and Mk-65
22-6 Mine Mk-67
Lesson Guide 20: U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Platforms and Weapons
18-1 Ticonderoga class cruiser diagram and information

18-2 Aegis weapon system displays
18-3 Aegis ASW detection systems
19-1 Spruance class destroyer diagram and information
19-2 Spruance class destroyer diagram
19-4 ASW detection system
xxii
20-1 Los Angeles-class submarine diagram and information
20-2 Major components of a typical submarine combat system
21-1 F/A-18 Hornet diagram and information
21-2 F-14 Tomcat diagram and information
21-4 F-14 Tomcat weapons options
xxiii
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Texts (1 per student, 1 per instructor)

Frieden, David R., LCDR, USN, ed. Principles of Naval Weapons
Systems. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985.
Harrel, Gary, LT, USN, ed. NROTC Supplement to Principles of
Naval Weapons Systems Workbook. Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1985.
Naval Doctrine Command. Naval Intelligence. Naval Doctrine

Publication 2. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995.
2. References (1 per instructor)

** Indicates essential references which are provided by CNET.
The other references are not essential to the teaching of the
course but can provide clarifying or amplifying information.
The individual unit should take measures to obtain copies of
references, if their use is desired.
NOTE: Instructors should incorporate current and past articles

from magazines such as Surface Warfare, Proceedings, and Aviation
Week and Space Technology, as they apply to the various subjects.
Although some particular articles may be listed in the biblio-
graphy and the lesson guides, it should not be assumed to be an
exhaustive listing of applicable articles.
Barry, John and Roger Charles. "Sea of Lies." Newsweek,

13 July 1992: pp. 29-39.
** Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Office. Joint Vision

2010.
Church, George J. "High-Tech Horror." Time, 18 July 1988:
pp. 14-17.
Department of Defense. Defense 92. Alexandria, VA:

American Forces Information Service, 1992.
** Department of Defense. Final Report to Congress: Conduct of

the Persian Gulf War. Washington D.C.: GPO, April 1995.
**Department of Defense. Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed

Forces. Joint Publication 1. Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1995.
** Department of Defense. Doctrine for Command, Control,
xxiv
Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to
Joint Operations. Joint Publication 6-0. Washington,
D.C.: National Defense University Press, 30 May 1995.
** Department of the Navy. Force 2001: A Program Guide to the

U.S. Navy. Washington, D.C.: Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations, Resources, Warfare Requirements and
Assessment (N8), 1997.
** Department of the Navy. ...From the Sea, Preparing the Naval

Service for the 21st Century. Washington, D.C.: GPO,
September 1992.
** Department of the Navy. Forward...From the Sea. Washington,

D.C.: GPO, 1994.
** Friedman, Norman. The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval

Weapons Systems, current edition. Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press.
** Hall, Joseph, CDR, USN, ed. Principles of Naval Weapons

Systems, preliminary edition. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt
Publishing Co., 1999.
** Hartmann, Gregory K. and Truver, Scott C. Weapons That Wait:

Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1991.
** Lambert, Mark, ed. Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1994-95.

Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group Inc., 1994.
** Libicki, Martin, C. What Is Information Warfare?

Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press,
1995.
MacDonald, Scot. "Slick Warriors and the '32'." Surface

Warfare, January/February 1990: pp. 14-17.
McClane, Joseph L. Jr., CAPT, USN (Retired) and McClane,

James L., CDR, USN. "The Ticonderoga Story: Aegis
Works." Proceedings/Naval Review, 1985. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1985, pp. 118-129.
** Naval Doctrine Command. Naval Command and Control. Naval

Doctrine Publication 6. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995.
** Naval Doctrine Command. Naval Warfare. Naval Doctrine

Publication 1. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994.
Naval Education and Training Command. Damage Controlman 3&2.

NAVEDTRA 10572. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1986.
xxv
** Naval Education and Training Activity. Mine Warfare
Supplementary Text. SAUF 32537 (8-91).
Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity. NAVSEA Mine

Familiarizer. Yorktown, VA: Naval Mine Warfare
Engineering Activity, April 1985.
Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity. U.S. Navy Mine

Countermeasures Familiarizer. Yorktown, VA: Naval Mine
Warfare Engineering Activity, October 1991.
Sabalos, Nicholas Jr., ed. "C4I for the Warrior." Surface

Warfare, July/August 1995: pp. 2-27.
Sabalos, Nicholas Jr., ed. "...Now Build the Best." Surface

Warfare, September/October 1996: pp 11-35.
** Sharpe, Richard, CAPT, RN, ed. Jane's Fighting Ships,

1994-95. Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group Inc.,
1994.
** Sharpe, Richard, CAPT, RN, ed. Jane's Naval Weapon Systems.

Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group Inc., 1993-
1995.
** Skolnik, Merrill I. Introduction to Radar Systems. New

York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1962.
** Thomas, Vincent C., ed. The Almanac of Sea Power, current

edition. Arlington, VA: Navy League of the United
States.
Truver, Scott C. "Weapons That Wait ... and Wait..."

Proceedings, February 1988: pp. 31-40.
** Urick, Robert J. Principles of Underwater Sound, 3rd ed.

New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1983.
Walsh, Edward J. "USN Seeks 'Technology Roadmap' for Next

DDG." Sea Power, February, 1993: pp. 39-45.
xxvi
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INSTRUCTOR
1. Instructor References: The references listed in this

curriculum guide are possible resources for the instructor.
The reference information is abbreviated in the lesson
guides; full bibliographical information can be found in the
bibliography. It is imperative to keep the lessons and
examples current by also reading periodicals such as Surface
Warfare, Proceedings, and Aviation Week and Space Technology.
References to current world events, weapon deployment in
recent conflicts, and popular movies and books add much to
this course and lead to better student understanding and
increased interest.
2. Teaching Techniques: This course lends itself to a variety

of teaching methods. Experiment with different interactive
learning techniques, which are far more effective than the
standard lecture format. Many instructors have found student
presentations and guest lecturers (even other instructors
from the unit or recent graduates) to be effective methods of
keeping the students interested. Use multimedia
demonstrations as often as possible without becoming
dependent upon them to do the teaching.
3. Student Assignments: Instructors should be thoroughly

familiar with the textbook and the supplement before
assigning homework or reading.
4. LTG Guide Organization: Lesson topics are grouped in the

same general order as the textbook. Instructors may shift
the sequence to derive maximum benefit from guest speakers,
field trips, or other unit education and training activities.
5. Professional Core Competencies: The instructor should be

thoroughly familiar with the Professional Core Competencies
(PCCs). It is incumbent upon the instructor to ensure all
PCCs are mastered by the midshipmen. With the permission of
the Professor of Naval Science, the instructor may modify the
course if the PCCs are met. Instructors should ensure they
are not focusing the course only upon the warfare areas or
platforms with which they are familiar. The midshipmen
should leave this course with an equal understanding of the
platforms and weapons used by all four U.S. Navy warfare
areas and by the U.S. Marine Corps.
xxvii
NAVAL SHIPS SYSTEMS II (WEAPONS)
LESSON GUIDE: 1 HOURS: 1
TITLE: Introduction/Weapons Systems Overview
I. Learning Objectives
A. The student will know the course structure and the

topics to be presented.
B. The student will know the course policies, require-

ments, and the purpose of the course.
C. The student will comprehend the concept, requirements,

and components of naval weapons systems.
II. References and Texts
A. Instructor references
1. Principles of Naval Weapons Systems, appendices A,

B, C
2. NROTC Supplement to Principles of Naval Weapons

Systems Workbook, Chap. 1
B. Student texts
1. Principles of Naval Weapons Systems, appendices A,

B, C
III. Instructional Aids
A. Chalkboard/Easel
B. Instructor-developed handouts/syllabus/transparencies
or PowerPoint presentation
C. Overhead and/or LCD projector
IV. Suggested Methods and Procedures
A. Method options
1. Discuss the course objectives and student evalua-

tion.
2. Present an overview of the sections of the course

with the logical progression toward an overall
integrated combat system.
1
B. Procedural and student activity options: Distribute
copies of student text and course syllabus.
V. Presentation
A. Introduction of instructor, including a short auto-

biography of naval assignments.
B. Discuss course policies, requirements, and grading

procedures.
C. Discuss the purpose of the course and relate course

structure with naval assignments for junior officers.
D. Have students with previous experience discuss weapons

systems encountered.
E. Present an overview of the course.
1. Professional core competency objectives for the

course
2. Lesson topics
3. Basic definitions: Weapons, weapon system,

ordnance
4. System of classification and nomenclature of naval

weapons and platforms
F. Introduce and explain the concept of a weapon system.
1. Purpose of weapon systems
2. Single or multiple weapons
3. Components of a weapon system
a. Units that detect, locate, and identify the

target (example: radar)
b. Units that direct or aim a delivery unit

(example: computer and tracking system)
c. Units that deliver or initiate delivery of the

weapon to the target (example: launching
system)
d. Units that destroy the target when in contact

with it or near it (example: missile)
G. Explain weapon systems requirements.
1. Military requirements
2
2. General characteristics
a. Reliability
b. Flexibility
c. Safety
d. Simplicity of operation
e. Maintainability
H. Introduce appendices in basic text for student

familiarization of weapons systems terminology.
I. Summary
3
TITLE: Energy Fundamentals
A. The student will comprehend the basic application of

electronics systems, communications theory, and elec-
tromagnetic wave theory to maritime and naval applica-
tions in radars, communications, and radio-navigation
systems.
B. The student will comprehend radar and radio wave

parameters, including frequency, period, wavelength,
coherency, velocity, and amplitude.
C. The student will know and be able to apply radar and

radio wave theory, including:
1. Maxwell's Theory
2. Relationship between wavelength and frequency
3. Relationship between wavelength and velocity
4. Relationship between frequency and wave propagation

paths
5. Relationship between frequency and period
D. The student will comprehend the basic operation of a

simple radar/radio system, including:
1. The concept of the generation of electromagnetic

energy
2. Polarization
E. The student will comprehend the concepts of time and

distance as they affect wave phase angle and construc-
tive/destructive interference.
F. The student will know basic electromagnetic inter-

ference factors in ship and weapon design.
G. The student will know electromagnetic wave propagation,

including the principles of reflection, refraction,
diffraction, and ducting.
H. The student will know the definition of the effects of

ground plane, free space, re-radiation, sky waves,
space waves, ground waves, and tropospheric waves.
4
I. The student will know the fundamental means of
imparting information to radio waves and will compre-
hend the uses, advantages, and disadvantages of the
various means.
1. Principles of Naval Weapons Systems, Chap. 1
2. Introduction to Radar Systems, Chaps. 1, 2, 7, 11,

12
B. Student text: Principles of Naval Weapons Systems,

Chap. 1
A. Chalkboard/Easel
B. Instructor-developed handouts and transparencies or

PowerPoint presentation
D. Transparencies: Course series
A. Method options
1. Lecture and demonstration
2. Discussion
B. Procedural and student activity options
1. Study assignment
2. Reading assignment: Student text, Chap. 1
V. Presentation
A. Introduction
1. Radar is an acronym for radio detection and

ranging.
2. Radar is an electromagnetic wave that acts like any

other electromagnetic wave (radio, light, etc.).
3. Apply the concepts in lessons two and three to

radar, communications, and radio/navigation sys-
tems.
5
B. Discuss the use of electronic systems, communications,
and electromagnetic waves in maritime and naval sys-
tems.
C. Discuss the characteristics of traveling waves and how

they interrelate.
1. Frequency
2. Period
3. Wavelength
4. Coherency
5. Velocity
6. Amplitude
D. Discuss Maxwell's Theory.
1. An accelerating electric field will generate a

time-varying magnetic field.
2. A time-varying magnetic field will generate a time

varying electric field.
E. Briefly explain how electromagnetic waves are

generated.
F. Discuss constructive and destructive interference.
1. Phase difference due to different distances
2. Phase difference due to time difference
3. Using interference to maximize efficiency
4. Considering electromagnetic interference factors in

ship and weapon design
G. Explain polarization.
1. Horizontal
2. Vertical
3. Signal Reception
H. Discuss propagation paths.
1. Reflection
2. Refraction
6
3. Diffraction
I. Discuss wave propagation and the relationship between

frequency and distance.
1. Ground waves
2. Sky waves
3. Space waves
4. Tropospheric waves
5. Ground plane
6. Free space
7. Re-radiation
J. Discuss transmission range factors.
1. Antenna height
2. Target height
3. Ducting
4. Losses due to spreading and absorption
K. Discuss the means of imparting information to radio/

radar waves.
1. Amplitude modulation
2. Frequency modulation
3. Pulse modulation
L. Summary
7
TITLE: Radar Principles and Systems

A. The student will comprehend the basic operation of a

simple pulse radar system.
B. The student will know the following terms: pulse

width, pulse repetition frequency, carrier frequency,
peak power, average power, and duty cycle.
C. The student will know the block diagram of a simple

pulse radar system and will comprehend the major compo-
nents of that system.
D. The student will comprehend the basic operation of a

simple continuous wave radar system.
E. The student will comprehend the concept of doppler fre-

quency shift.
F. The student will know the block diagram of a simple

continuous wave radar system and will comprehend major
components of that system, including amplifiers, power
amplifiers, oscillators, and waveguides.
G. The student will comprehend the use of filters in a

continuous wave radar system.
H. The student will comprehend the function and charac-

teristics of radar/radio antennas and beam formation.
I. The student will comprehend the factors that affect

radar performance.
J. The student will comprehend frequency modulated CW as a

means of range determination.
K. The student will comprehend the basic principles of

operation of pulse-doppler radar and MTI systems.

2. Introduction to Radar Systems, Chaps. 3, 4, 6, 8, 9

Chap. 2
8
A. Chalkboard/Easel

A. Method options
2. Discussion
1. Study assignments
V. Presentation
A. Discuss the basic operation of a simple pulse radar

system.
B. Describe pulse radar parameters.
1. Pulse width (PW)
a. Time of one pulse
b. Effects of varying PW
(1) Maximum range
(2) Minimum range
(3) Range resolution
2. Pulse repetition frequency (PRF)
a. Pulses per second
b. Effects of varying PRF
(1) Maximum range
(2) Accuracy
c. Relation to pulse repetition time (PRT)
9
3. Peak power
a. Maximum signal power of any pulse
b. Affects maximum range of radar
4. Average power
a. Total power transmitted per unit of time
b. Relationship of average power to PW and PRT
5. Duty cycle
a. Ratio PW (time transmitting) to PRT (time of

entire cycle, time transmitting plus rest
time)
b. Also equal to ratio of average power to peak

power
C. Discuss the determination of range with a pulse radar.
D. Describe the components of a pulse radar system.
1. Synchronizer
2. Transmitter
3. Antenna
4. Duplexer
5. Receiver
6. Display unit
7. Power supply
E. Discuss the basic operation of a simple continuous wave

(CW) radar.
1. Doppler frequency shift
a. Source moving towards target
b. Source moving away from target
c. Stationary/Moving target
2. Advantages and disadvantages over pulse radar

system
F. Describe the components of a CW radar system.
10
1. Two antennas (transmit, receive)
2. Oscillator or power amplifier
3. Mixer
4. Amplifier
5. Discriminator
6. Indicator
7. Filters: Noise reduction
G. Discuss radio/radar antennas and beam formation.
1. Half wave dipole (basic radiating element)
2. Beam power distribution
3. Beam requirements
4. Methods of obtaining directivity
a. Linear arrays
(1) Broadside arrays
(2) Endfire arrays
b. Quasi-optical systems
(1) Reflector
(2) Lenses
5. Function of wave guides
H. Discuss factors that affect radar performance.
1. Signal reception
2. Signal-to-noise ratio
3. Receiver bandwidth
4. Receiver sensitivity
5. Pulse shape
6. Pulse compression
7. Power relation
8. Scan rate
11
a. Mechanical
b. Electronic
9. Beam width
10. Pulse repetition frequency
11. Carrier frequency
12. Antenna gain
13. Antenna aperture
14. Radar cross section of target
I. Discuss combined radar systems.
1. Frequency modulated CW
2. Pulse doppler radar
3. MTI systems
J. Summary
12
TITLE: Feedback Control/Automatic Tracking Systems

A. The student will know the definitions of the following

terms: input, output, feedback, error, open loop, and
closed loop.
B. The student will comprehend the advantages of closed-

loop control in a weapon system.
C. The student will comprehend the difference between the

line-of-sight (LOS) and the tracking line.
D. The student will comprehend the operation of a simple

automatic tracking system.
E. The student will comprehend the concepts, advantages,

and limitations of conical scan, conical scan on
receive only (COSRO), and monopulse.
F. The student will comprehend stabilization as associated

with tracking systems.
G. The student will know the difference between range

tracking and angle tracking.
1. Principles of Naval Weapons Systems, Chaps. 3, 5

2. Introduction to Radar Systems, Chap. 5

Chaps. 3, 5
A. Chalkboard/Easel

13
A. Method options
2. Discussion
3. Sample problems
1. Study assignment
2. Reading assignment: Student text, Chaps. 3, 5
V. Presentation
A. Describe control system terminology.
1. Input
2. Output
3. Feedback
4. Error
5. Open-loop control
6. Closed-loop control
B. Discuss the advantages of closed-loop control in weapon

systems.
C. Explain the concepts of feedback in weapon systems\

control.
D. Introduce automatic tracking systems (relate to feed

back control).
1. Target tracking parameters
a. Azimuth
b. Elevation
c. Range
d. Relative target velocity
2. Line-of-sight (LOS)
3. Tracking line
E. Describe angle-tracking servo systems.
1. Five basic functions
14
a. Sense position error magnitude and direction
b. Provide position feedback
c. Provide data smoothing/stabilization
d. Provide velocity feedback
e. Provide a power-driving device
2. Uses of angle-tracking servo systems
a. Monotrack fire control radars
b. Homing missiles
c. Acoustic homing torpedoes
d. Aviation fire control tracking systems
3. Methods of tracking
a. Conical scan
b. Conical scan on receive only (COSRO)
c. Monopulse
4. Discuss the advantages and limitations of each

system.
F. Discuss data smoothing and stabilization.
1. Unstabilized
2. Partially stabilized
3. Fully stabilized
G. Discuss the differences between range tracking and

angle tracking.
H. Summary
15
NAVAL SHIP SYSTEMS II (WEAPONS)
TITLE: Track-While-Scan (TWS)
A. The student will comprehend the central concept of a

TWS system.
B. The student will know the six basic functions of a TWS

system.
C. The student will comprehend the concepts of acquisi-

tion, tracking, and turning gates.
D. The student will know the structure and purpose of a

track file.
E. The student will comprehend the basic method of track

gate prediction, smoothing, and positioning.

Chap. 6
A. Chalkboard/Easel

A. Method option
2. Discussion
16
1. Study assignment
V. Presentation
A. Introduction
1. Discuss the limitations of traditional search

radar.
2. Discuss the problems associated with tracking a

target with a fire control radar.
a. The target knows it's being tracked.
b. The target can initiate electronic attack or

electronic protection.
c. The target can use weapons that home in on

the radar.
B. Describe the central concepts of track-while-scan

(TWS).
1. The sensor continues to perform primary function of

search (scanning) and data input.
2. The remainder of system performs target tracking

function.
3. Eliminates process of target designation from

search radar to fire control radar.
C. Explain the fundamentals of TWS.
1. Six basic functions performed by a TWS system
a. Target detection
b. Target track correlation and association
c. Target track initiation and track file

generation
d. Generation of tracking gates
e. Track gate prediction, smoothing, and

positioning
f. Display and future target position calculation
2. TWS gates
a. Acquisition gate
17
b. Tracking gate
c. Turning gate
3. Track initiation and track file generation
a. Initiation of track file
b. Updating the file
4. Gate positioning and smoothing functions (compare

with servo tracking systems)
D. Discuss the advantages of a TWS radar system.
E. Briefly discuss real world applications.
F. Summary
18
TITLE: Electronic Scanning and the Phased Array
A. The student will comprehend the basic principles of

electronic scanning operation.
B. The student will know the advantages of electronic

scanning.
C. The student will comprehend how phase relationships

affect beam positioning.
D. The student will comprehend the three methods of beam

steering.
E. The student will comprehend the principles of synthetic

aperture radar.
3. "The Ticonderoga Story: Aegis Works"

Chap. 7
A. Chalkboard/Easel

A. Method options
2. Discussion
19
1. Study assignment
V. Presentation
NOTE: Emphasis should be placed on a theoretical vice mathemati-

cal approach to electronic scanning and phased array. Although
pertinent, the mathematical approach extends beyond the scope of
the course.
A. Introduction: Discuss the limitations of TWS and

mechanical scanning radars.
B. Discuss benefits of electronic scanning.
1. Increased data rates
2. Instantaneous positioning of beams
3. Elimination of mechanical failures
4. Increased flexibility (simultaneous multimode

operation)
C. Explain the basic principles of operation.
1. Review phase relationships
a. Constructive interference
b. Destructive interference
2. Methods of beam steering
a. Time delay scanning
(1) Time delay networks between the feed

network and the radiating elements
(2) Frequency flexibility
(3) High cost, complexity, weight
b. Frequency scanning
(1) Serpentine wave guide
(2) Inexpensive, relatively simple, resistant

to jamming
(3) SPS-48 air search radar
20
c. Phase scanning
(1) Phase-shifting networks between the feed

network and the radiating elements
(2) More expensive than frequency scanning,

less expensive than time delay
(3) SPY-1 radar (Aegis weapon system)
D. Discuss synthetic aperture radar (SAR).
E. Discuss the advantages of electronic scanning over

mechanical scanning in target detection and tracking.
F. Summary
21
TITLE: Case Study -- USS Vincennes
A. The student will comprehend the moral and ethical

B. The student will comprehend a leader's moral and

ethical responsibilities to the organization and
society.
C. The student will comprehend the relationship of

D. The student will comprehend the following personal

qualities and be able to relate them to a leader's
effectiveness:
1. Loyalty
2. Honor
3. Integrity
4. Courage
1. "High-Tech Horror," Time, 18 Jul 88, pp. 14-17

2. "Sea of Lies," Newsweek, 13 Jul 92, pp. 3
B. Student references
1. Instructor-developed handout regarding the
Vincennes case
2. "High-Tech Horror"
3. "Sea of Lies"
A. Chalkboard/Easel

22
D. VCR/Monitor
E. Videotape: “Seven Minutes That Stunned the Navy”
A. Method options:
1. Lecture/explanation of facts by instructor,

followed by class discussion
2. Student presentation of facts followed by an

instructor-facilitated discussion
3. Role play
4. Student debate
B. Procedural activities: Research the subject. "High-

Tech Horror" and "Sea of Lies" can be found in most
school libraries.
V. Presentation
A. Discuss the events leading to the Vincennes incident.

(See case study at end of this lesson.)
1. Iran-Iraq War
2. Attack on the USS Stark
3. The USS Samuel B. Roberts hit a mine in an Iranian

minefield in April 1988.
B. Discuss the changes in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) in

the Persian Gulf.
1. Commanding Officers were authorized to take

positive protective measures.
2. U.S. warships did not have to wait for the

enemy to fire first.
3. U.S. assets required positive identification and

description of intentions from all aircraft and
ships operating in those waters.
4 Why did the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

think this was necessary?
a. Responsibility for American lives
b. Responsibility for the U.S. reputation
23
c. Responsibility for foreign lives
C. Discuss the use of force by USS Vincennes prior to the

downing of the airbus.
1. Discuss the surface conflict with the gunboats.

Compare weapons of the Vincennes to those of the
gunboats. Were the gunboats really a threat?
2. Were the decisions and actions of Captain Rogers

justified in his use of force against the gunboats?
a. Consider control of airspace with extended

range of his helo's antiwarfare weapons.
b. Was the use of force justified under the ROE?
c. Was the use of force justified under the Law of

Armed Conflict?
(1) Necessary action
(2) Proportional action
(3) Ethical action
D. Review the facts surrounding the downing of the Iran

Air airbus airliner by the Vincennes.
E. Discuss the leadership considerations.
1. What was the CO's motivation?
a. Defend the crew
b. Follow the ROE
c. Improve the Navy's image
d. Improve America's image
(1) As a warning to other nations
(2) In the eyes of the U.S. public
2. Discuss responsibility.
a. Commanding Officer of USS Vincennes
b. Commanding Officer of USS Sides
c. Other members of the two crews
d. How could this incident have been avoided?
24
e. Who could have prevented these deaths?
f. Who was accountable/responsible for the deaths?
3. Discuss leadership traits.
a. Examples of loyalty
b. Examples of honor
c. Examples of integrity
d. Examples of courage, including moral courage
F. Summary
25
Vincennes
A Case Study
by
Lieutenant Colonel David Evans, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Captain Mohsen Rezaian was piloting his fully loaded Iran Air Airbus through 13,000 feet on a
routine Sunday morning flight across the Persian Gulf to Dubai, when a burst of shrapnel ripped
off the left wing and tore through the aft fuselage.
We shall never know Captain Rezaian's last moment; but in that instant before oblivion he may
have looked in horror out his left window and thought that the slab of flapping aluminum and
severed hydraulic lines where the wing had been was the result of some sort of structural defect.
It is doubtful that he ever saw the two fiercely burning points of light streaking up at his airplane
-- the Standard missiles launched by the cruiser USS Vincennes (CG-49).
It is also doubtful that Captain Rezaian ever heard the warning messages broadcast by the
Vincennes, or by the frigate USS Sides (FFG-14), about 18 miles from the cruiser. The two ships
were broadcasting on military and international air distress frequencies; and during the busy
climb-out phase of his flight, Captain Rezaian likely was monitoring the approach control
frequency at Bandar Abbas, where he took off seven minutes before, and air traffic control at
Tehran Center.
If he had been monitoring the distress frequencies, the American-educated Captain Rezaian,
although fluent in English, might not have known that the warning transmissions were intended
for him. Indeed, as the Navy's report to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
would later state, only one transmission made by the Sides, just 40 seconds prior to the
Vincennes' missile launch, was clear enough that it could not have mistaken as being intended for
another aircraft.
Besides, Captain Rezaian's Mode 111 transponder, the civilian equivalent of the military's
“identification friend or foe” (IFF) electronics, was broadcasting the unique code of a
“commercial airliner.”
Flying at a speed of about six miles per minute, the Iranian pilot had no way of knowing that
moments earlier he had crossed the 20-mile point where Captain Will Rogers, the skipper of the
Vincennes, had announced to his crew and to other U.S. naval elements in the area, that he would
shoot if the Iranian aircraft did not change course. Captain Rezaian could not have guessed that
by now his lumbering A-300 Airbus had been evaluated in the Vincennes as a diving Iranian F-14
-- the spearhead of a "coordinated attack" from the air from gunboats on the surface -- and that
Captain Rogers had given him an unspoken momentary reprieve by waiting until the airliner was
11 miles from the Vincennes before he authorized firing of the ship's SM-2 antiaircraft missiles.
As torn aluminum and 290 bodies from the shattered airliner rained down on the waters off
Qeshm Island, the pieces fell into place for Captain David Carlson, who as a commander then
was skipper of the frigate Sides. This curious track number 4131, designated an Iranian F-14 by
the Vincennes, simply had not behaved like a combat aircraft.
26
Indeed, as Captain Carlson would learn minutes after the Airbus plummeted into the water, the
electronic specialists in the Sides combat information center had correctly identified the aircraft's
commercial transponder code at virtually the same instant that the Vincennes fired her missiles.
Captain Carlson recalled their exclamations: "He shot down COMAIR [a commercial aircraft]!"
To Captain Carlson, the shootdown marked the horrifying climax to Captain Rogers'
aggressiveness, first seen just four weeks before.
The Vincennes had arrived in Bahrain on 29 May and got underway for her first Persian Gulf
patrol on 1 June. On the second day of this patrol, the Vincennes was on the scene when an
Iranian warship (the frigate Alborz) had stopped a large bulk carrier (the Vevey) and had
dispatched a boarding party to search the merchantman for possible war material bound for Iraq.
Although it was within the Iranian skipper's rights to do so under international law, this appeared
to be the first search-and-seizure of the Iran-Iraq War.
Simultaneously, the Sides was transiting out of the Persian Gulf to rendezvous with an inbound
merchant vessel for a routine escort mission. Then-Commander Carlson had arrived on board
the frigate by helicopter only four days earlier to relieve Captain Robert Hattan. Both men were
in the Sides' combat information center (CIC).
As Sides approached the scene, it appeared to Captain Hattan that the Vincennes was too close to
the Iranian frigate. "Hattan didn't like the picture. We were not at war with Iran, and Hattan
understood the need to deescalate the situation whenever possible," Captain Carlson would later
relate.
Nevertheless, the situation soon deteriorated when the Vincennes took tactical control of the
Sides.
Captain Hattan recounted that "Rogers wanted me to fall astern of the Iranian frigate by about
1,500 yards. I came up on the radio circuit and protested the order from the Vincennes. I felt that
falling in behind the Iranian [warship] would inflame the situation."
Captain Carlson added: "This event has to be put in its proper context. Less than two months
earlier, half the Iranian Navy was sunk during operation Praying Mantis, and our government had
been making strong statements about America's determination to protect neutral shipping. Now
what does the Iranian skipper see? He's conducting a legal board-and-search, and here's an Aegis
cruiser all over him. Next, an American frigate joins the action. Incidental to all this, Hattan
knew that a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft was scheduled to fly over the area, which the Iranian
might well detect on his air search radar. Hattan also knew that two other U.S. warships were
behind us leaving the Persian Gulf. The Iranian captain would be seeing all sorts of inbound
blips on his radar scopes, and he was alone."
"It was not difficult for Hattan to envision the Iranian skipper's apprehension that he was being
set up. On top of that, let us say that Sides' position relative to the Iranian warship was not
tactically satisfying," Captain Carlson said.
27
Tensions increased. The Iranians, clearly skittish, fired warning shots at a civilian helicopter
flying overhead with an NBC crew on board.
"Hattan was very concerned that Rogers was going to spook the Iranian skipper into doing
something stupid. He wanted out and recommended de-escalation in no uncertain terms,"
Captain Carlson said.
The higher headquarters at Bahrain, designated Joint Task Force Middle East, agreed and
detached the Sides from the Vincennes' control and, in addition, ordered the cruiser to back off
and simply observe the Iranian warship's activities.
This account stands in sharp contrast to the version in Captain Rogers' Naval Institute book,
Storm Center, where he paints himself as the soul of caution. Captain Rogers described the
incident as occurring during his second patrol, on 14 June, when he was barely into his first
patrol. "Sensitive ground being broken; no one wanted to escalate the problem," Captain Rogers
wrote.
Captain Carlson, who relieved Captain Hattan as commanding officer of the Sides, observes:
"This confrontation happened on 2 June, and if anyone should get credit for cooling off a hot
situation, it's Captain Hattan."
In a telephone interview, Captain Rogers agreed that 14 June is in error and 2 June will be used
in subsequent editions of his book.
To Captain Carlson, it is not just a minor clerical error. "Rogers moved the June 2nd incident to
the 14th and took credit for de-escalating the situation. But if the story is told as it actually
happened, the Rogers comes across as a loose cannon on his first patrol. A junior four-striper
[Hattan] had to set him straight and calm things down. The Alborz incident was the beginning of
all the concern about his ship," Captain Carlson said.
Although this incident was the genesis of the "Robocruiser" moniker hung on the Vincennes by
the men on board the Sides, it was not mentioned in the formal investigation of the shootdown or
in any of the subsequent testimony of senior naval officers to the public. The implications of the
aggressiveness Captain Rogers displayed on his first Persian Gulf patrol were glossed over.
On the morning of 3 July, Captain Carlson and his men in the Sides' combat information center
had a close-up view of the fateful train of events leading up to the shootdown of the Airbus.
Unlike the USS Elmer Montgomery (FF-1082), the third U.S. warship involved in the events that
day, the Sides was equipped with the Link-11 data link. This electronic system enabled the Sides
and Vincennes computers to exchange tactical information in real time. Although they were 18
miles away, Captain Carlson and his watch officers had a front-row picture of virtually the same
information that Captain Rogers saw on the large-screen displays in the Vincennes.
Shortly after sunrise, the Sides was on her way back through the Strait of Hormuz to rendezvous
with another merchantman scheduled for a U.S. Navy escort through the narrow strait and into
the northern Arabian Sea.
Over the radio, personnel on board the Sides heard reports from the Elmer Montgomery of
28
Iranian gunboats in the Strait of Hormuz and in the vicinity of merchant shipping. "Montgomery
reported sounds of explosions. There was vague discussion of some action taking place. Not
much, but we were told by the surface staff [Commander Destroyer Squadron (ComDesRon) 25
in Bahrain] to increase speed and close the Vincennes' position as fast as possible."
Captain Carlson recalled, "Within minutes we got told, in effect, 'Nah, that's it, resume your
normal speed.' Fifteen minutes passed, maybe half an hour. Again, the word came down to the
Sides to crank up speed and join the Vincennes. This order, too, was soon canceled."
"I'm going down in my CIC now, thinking, 'Gee, this is starting off as kind of a fouled-up day,
isn't it?' And then, lo and behold, the message came over the radio from Captain Rogers to the
staff [DesRon 25] that his helicopter had been shot at," Captain Carlson said.
Earlier, at around 0720, Captain Rogers had launched his helicopter with orders to fly north and
report on the Iranian gunboat activity.
Also acknowledging the information, according to Captain Carlson, was the staff of the
Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East, Rear Admiral Anthony Less. Admiral Less's staff
was on board the USS Coronado (AGF-11) at Bahrain. Captain Dick McKenna, commander of
DesRon 25, and his staff were located on board the USS John Hancock (DD-981), at the Sitrah
Anchorage in Bahrain.
"I smelled that something wasn't good here," Captain Carlson said. With good reason. Under the
rules of engagement in effect at the time, the Vincennes' helicopter, piloted that morning by
Lieutenant Mark Collier, should not have been flying close enough to be threatened by the light
weapons on the Iranian small craft. If Lieutenant Collier was in danger, it was because he was not
following the rules: to approach no closer than four miles.
In a letter published last August, in the wake of a Newsweek magazine cover story on the
incident, Lieutenant Collier wrote that he was never closer than four miles from the Iranian craft.
However, that letter is at variance with Lieutenant Collier's sworn testimony to the investigators,
in which he conceded that he had closed to within two to three miles of the Iranian craft.
In fact, when the investigating officer asked Lieutenant Collier, "You were actually inside the
CPA [closest point of approach] that you were told not to go inside, is that correct?" Lieutenant
Collier replied,"Yes sir."
With the report that the Vincennes' helicopter had taken fire, Captain Carlson order his crew
assigned to small arms details topside.
"I was in CIC, and I remember my tactical action officer, Lieutenant Richard Thomas, saying,
'My God, the Vincennes has really cranked up the speed here.' You could see it, the long speed
line on the scope. 'Where the hell are they going?' I was wondering," Captain Carlson said.
When this question was posed in a telephone interview with Captain Rogers, he replied, "I
wanted to get him [my helicopter] back under my air defense umbrella. That's why I was heading
north."
29
This rationale raises questions. The Vincennes' helicopter could dash away from danger at 90
knots, three times the speed of the advancing mother ship and, in addition, Captain Rogers
already
had control of the airspace his helicopter was occupying, some 19 miles distant given the
extended range of his antiair warfare weapons.
In fact, in the 3 August 1992 Navy Times Captain Rogers offered a different explanation for his
decision to press north. "Because of the bad atmospherics, any time the helo was farther than 15
miles, we lost contact," he said.
Captain Carlson recounted that "Rogers then started asking for permission to shoot at the boats.
We already knew the helicopter was okay, and if the boats were a threat, you didn't need
permission to fire."
Finally, after what Captain Carlson described as a couple minutes of "dickering" on the radio
between Captain Rogers and the Joint Task Force staff in Bahrain, the Vincennes' skipper was
given permission to shoot.
"My executive officer [Lieutenant Commander Gary Erickson] and I were standing together; we
both went like this," Carlson said, pointing both thumbs down. "It was a bad move. Why do you
want an Aegis cruiser out there shooting up boats? It wasn't the smart thing to do. He was
storming off with no plan and, like the Biblical Goliath, he was coming in range of the shepherd
boy," Captain Carlson said.
Captain Carlson directed Erickson to go to the bridge and to sound general quarters. "On the way
out, Gary asked, 'What's your worst concern?' And I remember saying I was afraid that we might
have to massacre some boats here," Captain Carlson said.
"I mean they were not a worthy adversary. Take a look at my ship, with a chain gun, 50-caliber
machine guns, a grenade launcher, and a 76-mm. gun--all this against a guy out there in an open
boat with a 20-mm. gun and a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. You'd rather he just went
away," Captain Carlson said.
The Sides continued to track the Vincennes whose speed line indicated high speed. At 0920 the
Vincennes joined with the Elmer Montgomery and took the frigate under tactical control. The
two vessels pushed north, with the Elmer Montgomery maintaining station off the Vincennes'
port quarter.
On board the Vincennes, a team of Navy journalists recorded events as seen from the cruiser's
bridge on a video camera. On the videotape, the Vincennes' executive officer, Commander
Richard Foster, informed the combat information center, "We've got visual on a Boghammer," a
reference to the Swedish-built boats operated by Iran's Revolutionary Guards. The camera
zoomed in to an Iranian boat, which appeared dead in the water and floating between the
Vincennes and Elmer Montgomery as they raced by.
The two U.S. warships held fire. They were headed for bigger game, the blips on the surface
search radar indicating more Iranian boats in the distance. According to the data later extracted
from the Vincennes' computers, it appears to have been a stern chase situation, where the Iranian
30
boats were headed toward the safety of their territorial waters.
As shown by the Vincennes' videotape, the two American warships passed a second Iranian
gunboat, this one to starboard of the cruiser. The boat's crew can be seen relaxing topside.
Hardly threatening behavior and the Iranians appeared not the least threatened by the passage of
the U.S. Navy cruiser.
Yet at this moment, at 0939, Captain Rogers asked for permission to fire at Iranian gunboats he
described as closing the USS Montgomery and the Vincennes.
On the Sides, Captain Carlson was mystified. As he recounted in my interview with him:
"Rogers' actions didn't make any sense on at least two levels. First, if he was bent on retaliation
[for the shooting at his helicopter], why was Rogers waiting for a second demonstration of
hostile intent? He could have engaged the boats he was pursuing at his convenience. Second, if
the situation was so threatening, why ask for permission to fire? Under the rules of engagement,
our commanders did not have to wait for the enemy to fire; they were allowed to exercise a level
of discretion."
When he was asked about all this apparently unnecessary effort to obtain permission to fire, and
the time it might consume, Captain Rogers offered a variety of reasons. To this writer, he stated,
"It was ingrained in our training to ask the boss." However, on an ABC Nightline broadcast the
evening of 1 July 1992, Captain Rogers related, "Time is a demon here. If I [sic] have a long
time to sort things, you are going to take more time to look at this, and more time to look at that.
But when you don't have time, you basically take what you have and...at some point in time you
have to make the decision." Yet in an interview later that month, Captain Rogers told a Navy
Times reporter, "It's always a good idea, if you have the time, to ask for permission."
At about 0940, the Vincennes and Elmer Montgomery crossed the 12-mile line into Iranian
territorial waters. There is no mention of this crossing in the unclassified version of the official
report of the investigation."
According to the investigation report, at 0941 Captain Rogers was given permission to open fire.
Note, he was now inside Iranian territorial waters and ready to engage boats that had not fired at
him.
From the data extracted from the Vincennes' Aegis combat system, the Iranian gunboats did not
turn toward the cruiser until 0942 -- after Captain Rogers had been given permission to fire.
Time 0942 is the vital piece of information that destroys the myth that the Vincennes and Elmer
Montgomery were under direct attack by a swarm of gunboats.
The time the Iranian gunboats turned was duly recorded by the Aegis data tapes, but it was not
contained in the investigation report. Not until four years later, when Admiral William J. Crowe,
U.S. Navy (Retired), the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, testified to the House Armed
Services Committee on 21 July 1992, did this significant datum come to public light.
Assuming his recollection is correct, Admiral Crowe said, "We actually know that they turned
around toward Vincennes at time 42." But Admiral Crowe then diminished the significance of
what he just revealed by hastening to tell the congressmen, "I won't confuse you with these times
31
and so forth."
At about 0943, the Vincennes' forward five-inch gun mount commenced to lob shells at the
Iranian gunboats.
From the videotape recorded on Vincennes' bridge that day, the gunboats, seen as mere specks in
the distance, returned fire; they did not initiate the shooting. The Iranian gunboats' light weapons
were greatly outranged by the heavier ordnance on the Vincennes, and the spent shells from the
Iranians' weapons fell harmlessly as a brief line of splashes in the water, hundreds of yards short
of the Vincennes, and fully 45 seconds after the Vincennes' first rounds were fired.
At 0947, Captain Rezaian pushed the throttles on his Airbus to take-off thrust and began rolling
down the runway at Bandar Abbas.
On board the Sides moments later, the tactical action officer (TAO) informed Captain Carlson,
"Captain, we have a contact. Vincennes designated this contact as an F-14 coming out of Bandar
Abbas." The contact was assigned track number 4131 by the Sides, and through Link-11 the
Vincennes, following the same contact as track 4474, dropped that number and adopted Sides'
track number.
Captain Carlson recalled, "I was standing between my TAO and weapons control officer. I
asked, 'Do we have it?'"
"Yes, sir, we've got skin, it's a good contact." was the reply, indicating that electronic energy
transmitted by the Sides' air search radar was bouncing off the plane.
"I glanced at it," said Captain Carlson. "It was around 3,000 feet, 350 knots. Nothing
remarkable, so I said to the ESM [electronic support measures] talker, any ESM [emissions]?"
"No, sir. She's cold nose. Nothin' on her."
"Okay, are we talking to him?"
"Captain, we've gone out over the IAD [International Air Distress] and MAD [Military Air
Distress], and so has Vincennes. We are trying every net with this guy, and so far we have no
response," was the reply.
"Okay, light him up," Captain Carlson ordered. He explained that it was standard practice to
illuminate Iranian military aircraft with missile fire control radar as a warning for them to turn
around.
"When you put that radar on them, they went home. They were not interested in any missiles,"
Captain Carlson recalled.
"But this contact didn't move. I looked at the console again. More altitude. More speed. Got
any ESM?" Captain Carlson asked.
"Nothing."
32
"And he's still not talking?"
"No, sir, we're getting nothing out of him."
"I evaluated track 4131 verbally as not a threat. My TAO gave me a quizzical look, and I
explained. 'He's climbing. He's slow. I don't see any radar emissions. He's in the middle of our
missile envelope, and there is no precedent for any kind of an attack by an F-14 against surface
ships. So, non-threat,'" Captain Carlson recalled.
As Captain Carlson and his tactical action officer were evaluating an Iranian P-3's activities on
the radar scope, they overheard Captain Rogers' transmission, announcing to higher headquarters
his intention to shoot down track 4131 at 20 miles.
Captain Carlson was thunderstruck: "I said to the folks around me, 'Why, what the hell is he
doing?' I went through the drill again. F-14. He's climbing. By now this damn thing is at about
7,000 feet. Then, I said in my mind, maybe I'm not looking at this right. You know, he's got this
Aegis cruiser. He's got an intelligence team aboard. He must know something I don't know."
On the Vincennes the picture was different. Captain Carlson knew that from Captain Rogers'
perspective the presumed F-14 would pass almost directly overhead. What he did not know was
that the watchstanders might also have been telling Captain Rogers the contact was diving.
"Rogers saw it as a threat because he supposedly was being told it was diving. As I was going
through the drill again in my mind, trying to figure out why I was wrong, he shot it down,"
Captain Carlson said.
"Then I found out that my guys back in the corner had evaluated the IFF [identification friend or
foe] and had determined that it was a commercial aircraft. They were horrified."
"And this is where I take some responsibility for this mess. If I had been smarter, if I had said it
doesn't smell like an F-14, and pushed for a re-evaluation, and if my guys had come forward,
saying that's an IFF squawk for a haj [Islamic pilgrim] flight, I might have been stimulated to go
back to Rogers and say, 'It looks like you've got COMAIR here.'"
"But I didn't do it, and the investigators walked away from that," Captain Carlson said.
In his book, Captain Rogers said that at 0953, just before the authorized missile firing, he again
requested verification of the IFF code being broadcast by track 4131 as that of an Iranian military
aircraft. "This was reaffirmed," he wrote.
The information on the transponder emissions is unambiguous, however. According to Admiral

Fogarty's report of investigation, "The data from USS Vincennes' tapes, information from USS
Sides and reliable intelligence information corroborate the fact that TN 4131 was on a normal
commercial air flight plan profile...squawking Mode 111 6760, on a continuous ascent in altitude
from take-off at Bandar Abbas to shoot down."
The number in the 6700-series indicated it was a commercial aircraft.
33
Both Captain Rogers and Captain Carlson had this information.
"I told the investigators that I believed there was sufficient information, had it been processed
properly, to have stopped this thing from happening. And that point is never addressed in their
report." Captain Carlson said. And Captain Carlson has a theory about this curious avoidance.
"Why do they walk away? Because if you want to hang Dave Carlson, you've got to hang Will
Rogers, then the question is going to be why was he doing this shit in the first place? That means
you've got to pull the rope and hang Admiral Less for giving him permission," Captain Carlson
said.
"And worse than that, you would then have to go back in front of the American people and say,
'Excuse me, folks, but the explanation you just got from Admiral Crowe, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, saying that this was a justifiable action, and that the Vincennes was defending
herself from an attack, cannot be supported by the facts," Captain Carlson said.
All this, of course, would have come out if information available within days of the tragedy had
been made public.
The U.S. Navy's reluctance to face weeks of scandalous media attention was matched by what we
might surmise as a certain political hesitancy against full disclosure. The Vincennes affair
occurred four months away from the 1988 Presidential election. Then Vice President George
Bush had gone before the United Nations on 14 July and declared, "One thing is clear, and that is
that USS Vincennes acted in self-defense.... It occurred in the midst of a naval attack initiated by
Iranian vessels against a neutral vessel and subsequently against the Vincennes when she came to
the aid of the innocent ship in distress."
As it came to pass, none of this was true.
However, the truth of the matter would have given the Democratic candidate for President,
Michael Dukakis, ammunition to embarrass George Bush.
There were good reasons for spinning the story in a way that put the Iranians in the worst
possible light.
Further, a court martial might have raised many ugly questions about crew training, and more
questions about why Admiral Less, with one of the most important and sensitive commands in
the world, was not equipped with Link 11 for real-time access to vital tactical information. Add,
too, questions about command selection. And ultimately, full disclosure would have led to
bedrock questions about professional ethics. For example, what is the obligation of a serving
officer like Captain Carlson, an eyewitness to an event, to speak up when the facts as he sees
them cast doubt on the "official" story? Indeed, what is the obligation of higher authority to own
up to a mistake?
Instead, an incomplete investigation was blessed. Captain Rogers was left in command of the
Vincennes and, in fact, he and key officers were rewarded with medals for their conduct. As an
added fillip, all hands aboard the Vincennes and the Elmer Montgomery received combat action
34
ribbons.
The investigation left gaping holes in at least four elements. They could be labeled the four T's --
of time, tactics, truth, and television.
>Time: Admiral Fogarty's investigative report and the approving endorsements dwelt at great
length on the confusion and pressure of events in the five minutes preceding Captain Rogers'
order to launch missiles at the Airbus, but none of the senior leaders commented on the actions
that created the time pressure. Captain Rogers had been cruising at top speed for fully 30
minutes into the fray. If he had proceeded more slowly, Captain Rogers could have purchased
more time to sort out the tactical situation on the surface, and perhaps to resolve a second
ambiguous track (110 miles away but descending) which he wrote later in his book was a factor
in his decision to shoot.
"We weren't leaning on our toes trying to create a problem," Captain Rogers told this writer.
However, the course and speed records for his own ship suggest otherwise.
>Tactics: By all accounts Captain Rogers' Aegis cruiser was dispatched hurriedly to the Persian
Gulf to counter the threat of Iranian Silkworm antiship missiles. With its 1,100 pound warhead,
a 23-foot Silkworm launched from the beach would have severely crippled or sunk any ship it
hit. Aegis was the shield.
Instead of positioning his ship to best deal with the Silkworm threat, and to manage the air
picture, Captain Rogers stormed into littoral waters. Moreover, he was allowed to hazard this
prime asset by higher authority. Admiral Fogarty's report does not question these key matters of
tactical judgement, although they are relevant to the employment of Aegis-capable ships in future
coastal operations.
>Truth: Admiral Fogarty's investigation accepts the testimony of console operators in the
Vincennes' combat information center who said the supposed F-14 was diving. However, one
officer, Lieutenant William Montford, who was standing right behind Captain Rogers and
testified that he never saw indications that the aircraft was descending. At about 0951, Montford
warned Captain Rogers that the contact was "possible COMAIR."
The Aegis data tapes agree with his view. Beyond doubt, the console operators' electronic
displays showed the aircraft ascending throughout. Admiral Fogarty chalked up the disparity in
the statements of the majority to "scenario fulfillment" caused by "an unconscious attempt to
make available evidence fit a preconceived scenario." He offered no opinion regarding the
veracity of the console operator's statements.
Admiral Fogarty's report also noted that the Iran Air Airbus took off to the southwest, although at
least four people in the Vincennes' CIC testified that it took off in the other direction, toward the
northeast--another major contradiction that is left unresolved.
Captain Rogers' recollections also contain inconsistencies. Case in point: his disclosure on the
mysterious track 4474. Recall that the Iranian Airbus was briefly designated as 4474 by the
Vincennes.
35
Captain Rogers claimed that a Navy A-6 flying more than 150 miles away was entered into the
Naval Tactical Data System by the destroyer Spruance (DD-963) on patrol outside the Persian
Gulf, using the same track number, 4474.
According to Captain Roger's explanation, this track was passed that morning to HMS
Manchester, and through automatic exchange of data among shipboard computers the track
appeared on the Vincennes display screens at just about the same time the supposed Iranian F-14
(now track 4131) was 20 miles from the Vincennes.
The re-appearance of track 4474, Captain Rogers claimed, added to the perception of an in-bound
threat and contributed to his decision to shoot.
But Captain Rogers wrote in Storm Center, and Admiral Fogarty's report confirms, that he
decided before it was 20 miles away to shoot down the inbound Iranian aircraft. If track 4474 did
not re-appear on the screen until it was 20 miles away, then by definition track 4474 could not
have been a factor in pushing Captain Rogers to make his initial decision to shoot.
>Television: After the engagement, the Navy camcorder crew boarded one of the Vincennes'
launches to assess damage to the cruiser. The close-up views of the starboard side of the hull,
where Captain Rogers told Admiral Fogarty's investigators shrapnel or spent bullets had struck
the ship, are revealing.
Yes, there are dents and scrapes. Most look like the normal wear and tear that would result from
the hull rubbing against objects pierside. There are shallow craters in the steel, but at the deepest
point, where one would expect that the strike of a bullet would leave bare metal, the paint is in
pristine condition.
Not shell craters. Mere dents. It appears that Admiral Fogarty displayed little interest in
confirming Captain Rogers' damage report for himself. After all, the Vincennes was tied up at
Bahrain during the inquiry.
The videotape shows more, such as the navigator on the bridge announcing to the officer of the
deck that the Vincennes was crossing the 12-mile line demarcating Iran's territorial waters en
route to the open waters of the Persian Gulf after the engagement.
The totality of information now available suggests that Captain Rogers "defended" his ship into
Iranian territorial waters, and when the air contact appeared, he blew the call.
What has happened since?
Captain Rogers retired in August 1991, and to this day insists, "At no time were we in Iranian
territorial waters." "I think it's a problem of semantics," he said in a 2 July 1992 appearance on
the "Larry King Show" to publicize his book.
Call it spin control. Call it denial psychosis. Call it what you will, the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) report of December, 1988, clearly placed the Vincennes well
inside Iran's territorial waters.
36
Captain David Carlson has written and spoken out publicly criticizing Captain Rogers' account of
the tragedy.
"Captain Rogers has got the whole force of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the United States
Navy supporting him," Captain Carlson said.
"I will be silent as soon as someone else in the Navy stands up for what really occurred," Captain
Carlson declared.
Although Captain Carlson has not received a scintilla of support from the top echelon, he has
received numerous letters from fellow officers. Some are rather illuminating, such as this
extract:
"... I came in contact with Capt. Rogers while he was enrolled in the Commander's Tactical
Training Course at Tactical Training Group, Pacific. At the time, I was the Operations
Evaluation Group Representative to the staff. As such, I assisted...instructors...in the training
wargames...Capt. Rogers was a difficult student. He wasn't interested in the expertise of the
instructors and had the disconcerting habit of violating the Rules of Engagement in the
wargames. I was horrified, but not surprised, to learn Vincennes had mistakenly shot down an
airliner." he wrote.
The top military officer involved in the Vincennes affair was Admiral William J. Crowe, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. His five-page endorsement of Admiral Fogarty's investigation put
the rap on Iran for allowing its airliner "to fly directly into the midst of a gunfight."
Admiral Crowe's accusation begs the question: How could the pilot, or the air traffic controllers
at Bandar Abbas, possibly have known of the surface engagement under way?
When the Newsweek magazine cover story on the Vincennes affair appeared last July, headlined
"Sea of Lies," Admiral Crowe, now retired, was called to testify before the House Armed
Services Committee. Again, he placed much of the blame on the Iranians. Admiral Crowe also
trashed the Newsweek story for its "slim evidence" and "patently false charges of a cover-up."
But if not a "sea of lies," the official story is hardly a river of truth. The full body of evidence is
anything but slim. It includes Admiral Fogarty's investigation, the separate report to ICAO,
ships' logs, dozens of interviews, and the 38-minute video recorded by the Navy camcorder crew,
just to itemize some of the evidence.
Admiral Crowe conceded in his 21 July 1992 appearance before the House Armed Services
Committee that the Aegis tapes pulled from the Vincennes definitely showed her crossing into
Iranian territorial waters, and the time was known to the second.
Admiral Crowe declared that under the right of innocent passage the Vincennes had de facto
clearance to enter Iranian waters. Innocent passage? Captain Rogers wasn't passing anywhere.
And if not innocent passage, then did he have the right under hot pursuit to pass through the 12-
mile line? He was not already engaged. He was not under imminent threat. Indeed, according to
the annotated supplement to the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, for
hot pursuit to apply the initiating event must occur in the pursuing state's territorial waters.
37
Neither of Admiral Crowe's conditions apply.
Indeed the pursuit appears to have started at about 0916, when the Iranian boats were at least
seven nautical miles away. Visibility was four nautical miles, at best. Sitting low in the water,
looking into the haze, the boat's crews would likely have not even been aware initially of the
haze-grey cruiser bearing down on them.
Representative Larry Hopkins (R, KY), questioning Admiral Crowe, asked, "Do you find any
fault...with what Captain Rogers did under the circumstances?"
Admiral Crowe answered that he did not find "malperformance of a criminal nature."
The subtlety of this point apparently slipped by Representative Hopkins and his colleagues, but
Admiral Crowe's remark should raise eyebrows among naval professionals. What he said, in
effect, was that Captain Rogers cannot be held accountable because he was not criminally
negligent. Yet under military law a commander can be held accountable for a non-criminal act --
a major difference from civil jurisprudence.
A retired Army colonel who attended the hearing was surprised and disappointed by Admiral
Crowe's testimony.
As part of a four-page commentary on this hearing, he wrote: "Graduate seminars of my day

would mine the admiral's words to prove our Navy is too dangerous to deploy...."
I see a sole winner in the Navy's present struggle. It is not the nation, but the Air Force's
contractors. I shudder, not at paying for the hardware that will come, but for the piper who waits
near the door," this colonel concluded glumly.
And this remark came from an officer who knows how vital the Navy's role in littoral waters will
be in coming years. Indeed, the latest maritime strategy document, issued 1 October and titled
"...From the Sea," redirects the Navy's Cold War focus on open-ocean combat with a now-
nonexistent Soviet fleet to "littoral or 'near land' areas of the world."
The Vincennes affair is more relevant than ever as a vivid example of the kind of military-
political gymnastics in which the Navy may be engaged in coming years. It is important for the
Naval Service and for all Americans to look at the events that July day five years ago objectively,
and to learn, especially since Iran continues to be demonized as a threat to stability in the region.
Basic facts are still in dispute. The full text of Admiral Fogarty's investigation merits
declassification, and especially the geographic track files of the vessels and air contacts involved.
Indeed, the secrecy still surrounding the Airbus shootdown only serves to conceal ethical and
operational weaknesses from ourselves.
38
TITLE: Electronic Warfare
A. The student will comprehend the basic principles of

electronic warfare (EW) and the three divisions of EW:
electronic support (ES), electronic attack (EA), and
electronic protection (EP).
B. The student will know the role of active and passive

electronic warfare in the fleet operations.
C. The student will know the basic characteristics and

requirements of electronic warfare receivers.
D. The student will comprehend the principles and the

categories of EA.
E. The student will comprehend the principles of EP.
F. The student will comprehend the parameters of radars

and radar systems pertaining to EP.
G. The student will know the basic EW capabilities of U.S.

Naval platforms.

3. Jane's All the World's Aircraft
4. Jane's Fighting Ships
5. Jane's Naval Weapons Systems
6. The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons

Systems
7. "Slick Warriors and the '32'"

Chap. 11
A. Chalkboard/Easel
39
NOTE: The transparencies have the former electronic

warfare terms, but they are still good teaching aids if
the instructor points out the terminology changes to
the students. (See "NOTE" in paragraph V below.)
A. Method options
2. Discussion
1. Study assignment
V. Presentation
NOTE: In 1994, the Navy made the following terminology

changes which are not reflected in most references:
1. Electronic support measures (ESM) has been

changed to electronic support (ES).
2. Electronic countermeasures (ECM) has been

changed to electronic attack (EA).
3. Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) has

been changed to electronic protection (EP).
A. Introduction
1. Electronic warfare (EW) is a component of command

and control warfare (C2W).
2. C2W is defined as the military strategy which

implements information warfare (IW). C2W includes
the integrated use of operations security (OPSEC),
military deception, psychological operations
(PSYOPS), electronic warfare (EW), and physical
destruction.
3. C2W will be discussed in more detail in Lesson 9,

"C4ISR and Information Warfare."
40
4. EW has become increasingly important.
a. Increased reliance on radar and over-the-

horizon targeting.
b. Increased use of communications and tactical

data systems.
c. Increased speed of missiles and weapon systems

requires high speed detection and tracking.
d. Active-homing or passive-homing long-range

missiles give little warning.
B. Introduce the basic electronic warfare terminology,

including abbreviations and definitions:
1. Electronic support (ES): Surveillance of the

electromagnetic spectrum for immediate threat
recognition and other tactical actions such as
threat avoidance, homing, and targeting.
2. Electronic attack (EA): The use of electromagnetic

or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities,
or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutra-
lizing, or destroying enemy combat capability.
3. Electronic protection (EP): The protection of

friendly combat capability against undesirable
effect of friendly or enemy employment EW.
C. Discuss electronic support (ES).
1. Passive EW
a. Electronic intelligence (ELINT): Information

derived from foreign non-communications elec-
tromagnetic information, particularly radar
emissions.
b. Communications intelligence (COMINT): Informa-

tion derived from foreign communications
transmissions by other than the intended
recipients.
c. Advantages and limitations of passive EW.
2. Subdivided into:
a. Threat warning and avoidance
b. Direction finding
c. Target homing and tracking
3. ES receiver design requirements
41
a. Wide spectrum surveillance
b. Wide dynamic range
c. Unwanted signal rejection
d. Angle-of-arrival measurement
e. Signal analysis capability
f. Display
g. Recording system
4. Signal collection process
a. Signal warning
b. Signal sorting
c. Signal analysis
D. Discuss electronic attack (EA).
1. Active and passive EW
2. Nondestructive EA
a. Confusion: Mask or hide real targets by clut-

tering the radar display
(1) Jamming
(a) Noise jamming
(b) Spot jamming
(c) Barrage jamming
(d) Sweep jamming
(2) Chaff
(3) Infrared flares (Torch)
b. Deception: To create a false image (create a

false target for the enemy to see on their
displays) or change the image’s characteristics
on the enemy’s radar display (enlarge or shrink
the image)
(1) Repeaters: Create a false echo by delaying

the received radar signals and retransmit-
ting at a slightly later time
42
(2) Transponders: Create a false signal by
playing back a stored replica of the radar
signal
(3) Chaff
(4) Radar decoys
(5) Blip enhancers
(6) Radar cross-section modification
3. Destructive EA
a. Anti-radiation missiles
(1) SLAM
(2) HARM
(3) Sidewinder
b. Directed energy
4. Advantages and limitations of passive EA
5. Advantages and limitations of active EA
E. Discuss electronic protection (EP).
1. Passive and active EW
2. Radar design
a. Power
b. Frequency
c. Pulse repetition frequency (PRF)
d. Pulse length
e. Antenna design
f. Scan pattern
3. Burnthrough: Increase signal strength to overpower

jammer noise
4. Emission control (EMCON)
5. Operator training
6. Advantages and limitations of passive EP
7. Advantages and limitations of active EP
43
F. Discuss the basic EW capabilities of U.S. Naval
platforms.
1. Shipboard EW
a. SLQ-32 Sidekick
(1) Radar warning, detection, and jamming
(2) Uses and internal library to automatically

detect and categorize
(3) Found on all combatants
b. Infrared flares: All combatants
c. Chaff: All combatants
d. SSQ-108 Outboard
(1) Real-time, over-the-horizon passive detec-

tion, localization, and targeting
(2) Spruance class (DD-963)
e. SLQ-49 chaff buoy: Arleigh Burke class

(DDG-51)
2. Airborne EW
a. ALQ-99 EW system
(1) Detection, identification, tracking
(2) Communication, data link, and radar jamming
(3) Deception: Mimics radar signals
(4) EA-6B Prowler
b. ALQ-126 EA system
(1) Radar jamming
(2) F-14 Tomcat and F/A-18 Hornet
c. ALQ-142 ES system
(1) Detection, identification, location
(2) SH-60 Seahawk
d. ALQ-165 EA system
(1) Radar jamming
44
(2) F/A-18 Hornet
e. ALR-47 ES system
(1) Detection, identification, location
(2) S-3 Viking
f. ALR-73 ES system
(1) Detection, direction-finding, signal data

collection
(2) E-2 Hawkeye

g. Chaff: SH-60 Seahawk
G. Summary
45
TITLE: C4ISR and Information Warfare
A. The student will know the concept of command, control,

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) within the armed forces.
B. The student will know the concept of command and con-

trol warfare (C2W) within the armed forces.
C. The student will know the characteristics, advantages,

and disadvantages of various communication frequency
ranges.
D. The student will be familiar with the procedures for

effecting communications security, including the common
causes of security compromise and the safeguard methods
to prevent unauthorized disclosure.
E. The student will know the use of computers and digital

electronics in naval and maritime communications.
F. The student will know the significance of intelligence

in the application of naval warfare.
1. The student will know the definition of

intelligence as it applies to naval warfare.
2. The student will comprehend the scope of naval

intelligence.
G. The student will comprehend the role of information

warfare (IW) in national security.
1. The student will know of the concept of IW.
2. The student will know of the concept of information

infrastructure.
3. The student will know the opportunities and

vulnerabilities associated with the concept of IW
(defensive and offensive).
H. The student will comprehend the basic application of

space and electronic warfare in naval operations.
1. The student will know the military space roles,

including the role of space systems in strategic
and tactical command and control architectures.
46
2. The student will know the military opportunities
and applications in space.
a. The student will know the principles of

space-based communications.
b. The student will know the basics of space-

based remote sensing and applications to
space-based surveillance opportunities.
3. The student will know how to utilize space assets

and information for mission planning.
1. "C4I for the Warrior," Surface Warfare magazine
2. Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and

Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations
3. Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces
4. Joint Vision 2010
5. Force 2001: A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy
6. Forward...From the Sea
7. ...From the Sea
8. Naval Command and Control
9. Naval Intelligence
10. Naval Warfare
11. "...Now Build the Best," Surface Warfare magazine
13. What Is Information Warfare?

Systems
B. Student texts

2. Naval Intelligence
47
A. Chalkboard/Easel

A. Method options
2. Discussion
3. Invite PNS or other post-command staff as guest

lecturer
1. Study or research assignment
2. Reading assignments
a. Principles of Naval Weapons Systems, Chap. 20
b. Naval Intelligence, Chap. 1 (minimum)
V. Presentation
A. Discuss C4ISR.
1. Command, control, communications, computers,

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are
the information and decision support systems to
assist commanders at all levels to plan, direct
and control their activities.
2. Explain why C4ISR is necessary.

a. Operations in the littoral environment
require faster response times.
b. Joint operations require higher levels of

coordination and communication between
forces.
c. More sophisticated weapons systems require

higher situational awareness and more
information to the operator/shooter as well
as to the commander.
3. C4ISR has four functions.
48
a. Creates a common tactical picture. All
information is shared by operators and
tactical commanders, who can extract the
pieces relevant to their specific needs and
tactical situation.
b. Ensures connectivity. Ensures rapid and

reliable information exchange. Global
Information Exchange System (GLOBIX) and
Tactical Data Information Exchange System
(TADIXS) are examples. Refer to Force 2001
for more current/future examples.
c. Directly links sensor-to-shooter. Focuses on

the process of putting a weapon on target.
Ensures all information is directly available
to system operators, from surveillance to
identification, targeting, engagement,
guidance, and battle damage assessment (BDA).
d. Supports and uses information warfare (IW).

IW is used to avoid hostilities or gain an
information advantage before weapons are
deployed or plans are executed.
4. C4ISR supports the warfighter at all levels.

a. The watchstander
b. The composite warfare commanders
c. The commander of joint task force
d. The shore commanders
B. Command and control (C2), command and control warfare

(C2W)
1. C2 is the exercise of authority and direction by a

properly designated commander over assigned and
attached forces in the accomplishment of the mis-
sion.
2. C2W is actions taken to deny information to,

influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command
and control capabilities, while protecting
friendly command and control capabilities against
such actions.
3. Objectives of C2W
a. Defeat the enemy by destroying its C2W system
b. Separate the enemy's command structure from

its forces
49
c. Protect one's own C2W systems
d. Connect commanders and forces
4. C2W is based on the philosophy that preventing an

enemy's use of its forces may be just as good as
defeating that force.
5. C2W has five tools to achieve its objectives.
a. Operations security (OPSEC): Prevents

information on one's own operations from
being discovered by an enemy's command and
control systems.
Example: Not publishing ship departure/arrival information.
b. Military deception: Gives enemy commanders

information that misleads them about one's
own operations.
Example: After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, allied forces

amassed on Kuwait's southern border to give the
impression that the offensive would come from the
south. Additionally, a massive amphibious force stood
off Kuwait's coast, preparing for a landing. Leaks to
the press led to considerable media coverage of an
imminent amphibious landing and ground offensive from
the south. However, General Schwartzkopf deftly moved
troops to the Northwest before countering Iraqi troops
by surprise, allowing allied forces to pin Iraqi troops
between the southern edge of Kuwait and the Persian
Gulf.
c. Psychological operations: Delivers information

to enemy forces in ways that make it difficult
for enemy leaders to influence or control their
forces or population.
Example: Leaflets dropped on Iraqi troops during Operation

Desert Storm.
d. Electronic warfare: Example is jamming; HFDF.
e. Physical destruction: Attacks upon enemy

command and control assets.
Example: Tomahawk strikes against Iraqi AAW radar sites to

retaliate for unauthorized troop movement in the
northern no-fly zone.
6. The C2W decision-making process is based on the

OODA loop.
a. OODA is observe, orient, decide, act.
50
b. Requires intelligence at all stages.
c. Commanders must complete the OODA loop faster

and more effectively than the enemy.
d. C2W can slow down the enemy's OODA loop while

speeding up one's own OODA loop.
7. Space systems play a significant role in strategic

and tactical command and control.
a. Satellite communication systems
b. Satellite-based intelligence and information

systems
c. Required to collect and disseminate

information to shore-based commanders for
mission planning
C. Discuss communications.
1. Satellite communications
a. Connects forward-deployed tactical units with

shore-based decision support centers
b. UHF satellite communications
(1) Limited to a relatively narrow bandwidth
(2) Low, unprotected data rates
c. SHF satellite communications
(1) High data rates and high capacity
(2) Access to joint C4I systems

(3) Initially, antennas were large (>7 ft
diameter), but latest version expected to
be 4-7 ft diameter. Antenna size is
related to the gain (power), not the
frequency of the signal.
d. EHF satellite communications
(1) Anti-jam, anti-scintillation
(2) Low interception and detection

probability
(3) Will be installed on shore stations,

submarines, and ships
2. Discuss the uses of different frequencies and the
51
advantages and disadvantages of each.
a. LF: Long-range communications (marine

communications, navigational aids)
b. HF: Long-range communications (back-up for

satellite-based fleet communication systems)
c. VHF: Short-range communications (safety,

bridge to bridge, and Coast Guard)
d. UHF-line of sight: Short-range

communications (battle group)
3. Tactical data communication systems
a. The most important communication system

during combat situations is a real-time,
common track picture available to all units.
b. The Navy predominantly uses Link 11, Link 16,

and Link 4A to exchange tactical information
between operational units.
(1) Link 11/TADIL A (Tactical Digital

Information Exchange Link A)
(2) Link 16/TADIL J/JTIDS (Joint Tactical

Data Link System)
(a) To replace Link 11
(b) Extends the composite warfare

commanders' tactical picture to
include joint and allied
information
(c) Secure, jam-resistant, high data

rate
(3) Link 4A/TADIL C
c. Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS)
(1) Combines tactical data from Links 4A,

11, and 16 with onboard and off-board
weapon and sensor data.
(2) Produces a coherent, operator-tailored

tactical display for non-Aegis ships.
(3) ACDS Block O installed in 12 CV/CVN's,

4 LHD-1's, and several combatants.
ACDS Block 1 in CVN-69 and LHD-1, and
currently being installed on others.
52
4. Communication security (COMSEC)
a. The protection resulting from all measures

designed to deny unauthorized persons
information from the possession and study of
telecommunications
b. Communication security management system

(CMS): System to ensure communication
security
c. Composed of four elements
(1) Cryptosecurity: Actions to ensure the

proper use and maintenance of
cryptosystems
(2) Transmission security: Measures to

protect transmissions from interception
and exploitation
(3) Emission security: Measures to deny

unauthorized individuals information
that can be derived by intercepting and
analyzing emissions from telecom-
munications systems
(4) Physical security: Physical measures to

safeguard communications equipment,
material, and documents
d. Discuss the common causes of security

compromise.
D. Discuss computers.
1. The quantity of information requires effective

information management only possible by computer
systems.
2. Computers are required to sort, process, organize,

correlate, and disseminate information.
3. Computers are required to maintain the real-time

element in the information exchange.
4. Required for all elements of C4I
a. Blend critical tactical, operational, and

administrative data to the warfighter so
tactical objectives drive operations.
b. Deliver rapid information to operational

commanders; allow commanders to access the
information through a "pull" vice "push"
system.
53
c. Present information in a multimedia format to
best suit the operator or the equipment.
d. Standardize the equipment to reduce training

and increase proficiency.
e. Standardize hardware designs to allow upgrade

and additions to equipment.
E. Discuss intelligence.
1. Definition of intelligence
a. Product resulting from the collection,

exploitation, processing, integration,
analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of
available information concerning foreign
countries or areas.
b. Distinguish between information and

intelligence. Integration and analysis,
combined with a thorough understanding of
mission requirements, convert information
into useable intelligence.
2. Scope of intelligence. Naval intelligence is used

at several levels to support policy, planning, and
operations.
a. Strategic intelligence: For plans and

policies at the national and international
level
b. Operational intelligence: For plans and

operations within a region or theater; for
employment of forces
c. Tactical intelligence: For tactical

operations at the component or unit level;
for immediate actions
3. Functions of intelligence
a. Prepares the battlespace
(1) Defines environmental or physical

characteristics
(2) Evaluates threat
(3) Determines the threat's course of action
b. Provides early warning
c. Evaluates the situation: Evaluates the
54
threat based upon current action and changing
situations
d. Identifies and targets the enemy's

vulnerabilities
e. Assesses battle damage: Assesses own and

enemy's equipment, forces, and C2W
f. Manages intelligence information
g. Prevents enemy's offensive and defensive

intelligence efforts
4. Intelligence uses information warfare (IW).
a. IW is action taken to achieve information

superiority by affecting adversary
information, information-based processes,
information systems and computer-based
networks while defending one's own
information, information-based processes,
information systems and computer-based
networks.
b. The information infrastructure is comprised

of three components, which intermesh to
provide the "BIG PICTURE" (GCCS). The three
components are:
(1) Surveillance grid
(a) Satellites
(b) Electronic warfare and signals

intelligence
(c) Human intelligence
(2) Communication grid (i.e. - INMARSAT)
(3) Tactical grid (i.e. - JMCIS)
(a) Computers
(b) Database management
c. IW subsumes C2W, which is centered on a

military command and control target set. IW
has an expanded target set, to include both
offensive and defensive IW planning and
execution.
d. Offensive IW (opportunities)
(1) Offensive IW will degrade or exploit an
55
adversary's collection or use of
information.
(2) Examples
(a) "Antihead" method: Traditional

means of removing the commander or
command center
(i) Requires knowledge of

commander/command center
location.
(ii) Knocking out command center

systems can effectively
destroy the enemy.
(iii) Example: Precision attack to

destroy an enemy's command and
control capability.
(b) "Antineck" method: Nontraditional

method of cutting enemy's
communications
(i) Enemy's command and control

becomes disabled.
(ii) Effectiveness depends on

enemy's reliance on
communication networks.
(iii) Example: Electronic intrusion

into an information and control
network to convince, confuse, or
deceive enemy military decision
makers.
e. Defensive IW (vulnerabilities)
(1) Defensive IW is the protection of our

ability to conduct information
operations.
(2) Examples
(a) Physical security measures
(b) Encryption
(c) Antivirus protection
(d) Secure data transmissions
F. Discuss space and electronic warfare.
56
1. Space dominance is integral to strategic and
tactical command and control architectures.
a. C4I assets are delivered to deployed forces

via space. (Example, see "...Now Build the
Best," p. 25.)
b. The flow of command and control resources and

information to and from the fleet is
dependent on space systems.
2. Military opportunities and applications in space

include space-based communications, sensing, and
surveillance.
a. UHF satellite communications are used

worldwide for information exchange,
navigation, surveillance, identification,
tracking and other reasons.
b. SHF/EHF satellite communications available on

limited basis to provide greater range of
available frequencies, and to protect
communications against scintillation effects
associated with nuclear blasts
c. Strategic/Ballistic missile attacks can be

warned against from remote infrared sensors
in space.
3. Some mission planning is dependent on information

derived from space assets.
a. Meteorological data for voyage/operation

planning
b. Preview lay of the land before execution of

mission, to include terrain, ocean depth,
shoreline characteristics, vehicle/aircraft
trafficability
G. Summary
57
TITLE: Principles of Underwater Sound
A. The student will comprehend the physical properties

associated with sound travel in water.
B. The student will know why sound energy is employed for

underwater surveillance and detection.
C. The student will comprehend sound propagation losses

due to spreading, absorption, scattering, and bottom
loss.
D. The student will comprehend the concepts of self-noise

and ambient noise, including the sources and effects.
E. The student will comprehend the concepts of signal-to-

noise ratio and its application to underwater sound.
F. The student will comprehend and be able to apply the

basic sonar equations for passive and active sonar and
will comprehend the concept of figure of merit (FOM).
G. The student will comprehend the effects of temperature,

pressure, and salinity on sound speed values.
H. The student will know the basic thermal and sound-

velocity structure of the ocean.
I. The student will comprehend the use of Snell's Law in

determining sound ray path structure.
J. The student will comprehend the concept of sound ray

traces.
K. The student will comprehend the three basic sound-speed

gradients and how they affect sound propagation to
produce the following paths: surface duct, shadow
zone, sound channel, convergence zone, and bottom
bounce.
L. The student will comprehend the basic properties of

ocean currents.
58
2. Principles of Underwater Sound, Chaps. 1, 2

Chap. 8
A. Chalkboard/Easel

E. VCR/Monitor
F. Videotape: "Underwater Sound Raypath Theory"
A. Method options
2. Discussion
1. Study assignments
V. Presentation
A. Describe the reasons why sound energy is used for

underwater surveillance and detection.
1. Range of penetration in the medium
2. Ability to differentiate between objects in the

medium
3. Speed of propagation
B. Discuss the fundamental concepts of sound propagation.
1. Three elements required to produce sound
a. Source: Any vibrating object
b. Medium
59
c. Detector/Receiver
2. The vibrating object causes a series of compres-

sions and rarefactions in the medium.
3. Review the relationship between frequency and

wavelength.
C. Describe factors contributing to transmission loss.
1. Spreading (divergence)
2. Attenuation
a. Absorption
(1) Process of converting acoustic energy

into heat
(2) Increases with higher frequency
b. Scattering and reverberation
(1) Volume: Marine life, bubbles, etc.
(2) Surface: Function of wind speed
(3) Bottom loss
(a) Not a problem in deep water
(b) Significant problem in shallow water

combined with refraction and absorption
into bottom
3. Explain how to compute total propagation loss.
D. Describe sources and effects of background noise.
1. Self-noise
a. Machinery
b. Flow noise
(1) Ship speed
(2) Marine fouling
c. Cavitation
2. Ambient noise
a. Hydrodynamic noise
b. Seismic noise
60
c. Ocean traffic
d. Biological noise
E. Explain the terms associated with the basic sonar

equation.
1. Signal-to-noise ratio (S/N)
2. Detection threshold (DT)
3. Equipment parameters
a. Own sonar source level (SL)
b. Self-noise level (NL)
c. Receiving directivity index (DI)
4. Environmental parameters
a. Transmission loss (TL)
b. Reverberation level (RL)
c. Ambient noise level (NL)
5. Target parameters
a. Target strength (TS)
b. Target source level (SL)
F. Explain the passive sonar equation: For a target to be

detected, (DT) must be less than or equal to (SL - TL -
NL + DI).
G. Explain the active sonar equation: For a target to be

detected, (DT) must be less than or equal to:
1. (SL - 2TL + TS - NL + DI) in a noise-limited

situation
2. (SL - 2TL + TS - RL) in a reverberation-limited

situation (RL = NL - DI)
H. Explain figure of merit (FOM).
1. Measure of sonar capability
2. Passive FOM formula: For a detection probability

of 50 percent, the maximum transmission loss is
(SL - NL + DI - DT).
3. Active FOM formula: For a detection probability of
61
50 percent, the maximum transmission loss is
(SL + TS - NL + DI - DT).
4. Methods to improve FOM
5. Uses of FOM
a. Equipment tuning to peak performance
b. Prediction of detection ranges (if propagation

losses are known)
I. Discuss the speed of sound in the ocean.
1. Speed of sound is affected by the medium.
a. Elasticity
b. Density
c. The speed of sound in a fluid is dependent upon

volume elasticity (bulk modulus) and density.
2. Variables affecting the speed of sound
a. Salinity: An increase in salinity of one part

per thousand (ppt) will result in an increase
in the speed of sound of approximately 1.3
m/sec.
b. Pressure
(1) More important than salinity.
(2) Every meter of depth increase results in a

0.017 m/sec increase in sound speed.
c. Temperature
(1) Predominant factor above 1,000 meters.
(2) An increase in temperature of one degree

Celsius will cause a corresponding increase
of 3 m/sec in sound speed.
3. Thermal characteristics of the ocean
a. Surface layer
b. Seasonal thermocline
c. Permanent thermocline
d. Deep isothermal layer
4. Typical deep-sea sound velocity profile
62
a. Sound velocity profile is a composite of the
pressure, salinity, and temperature profiles.
b. Temperature is the dominant factor.
5. Ocean currents can create an unexpected thermal

layer.
a. Traps sound waves
b. Can be advantageous (extends range) or not

(prevents sound waves from reaching the
receiver)
6. Ocean fronts
a. Narrow zones separating water masses of

different characteristics
b. Usually exhibit large horizontal gradients of

temperature and pressure
J. Discuss ray propagation theory.
1. Snell's Law
2. Ray traces
3. "Sound is lazy": Sound bends towards areas of slow

speed.
(a) Isothermal: Sound speed constant, so sound

travels in a straight line from source.
(b) Positive gradient: Sound speed increases with

depth so sound waves bend up.
(c) Negative gradient: Sound speed decreases with

depth so sound waves bend down.
K. Describe propagation paths for various conditions.
1. Layer depth phenomena
2. Surface duct
3. Shadow zone
4. Sound channel
5. Convergence zone (CZ)
6. Bottom bounce
L. Summary
63
TITLE: Underwater Detection and Tracking Systems
A. The student will comprehend the application of the

physical properties associated with sound travel in
water to sensing and detection systems.
B. The student will comprehend the basic theory and

operation of active and passive sonar systems.
C. The student will comprehend the basic principles of

magnetic anomaly detection (MAD).
D. The student will know the three basic types of trans-

ducers and will comprehend the basic theory and opera-
tion of transducers.
E. The student will comprehend the theory and operation of

hydrophones.
F. The student will comprehend the differences between

active and passive sonar systems, including the advan-
tages and disadvantages of each system.
G. The student will know the various other sonar systems,

including sonobuoys, dipping sonar systems, tactical
towed array sonar systems, and sound surveillance
systems (SOSUS).
H. The student will comprehend the fundamentals of sound

energy doppler and how it is used to determine target
aspect and motion.
I. The student will know the methods of acoustic

countermeasures.
J. The student will know the basic ASW capabilities of the

major U.S. Navy platforms.

4. Jane's Naval Weapon Systems
64
Systems
6. Principles of Underwater Sound, Chaps. 3, 4, 13

Chaps. 9, 11
A. Chalkboard/Easel
B. Instructor-developed handouts and transparencies and

E. VCR/Monitor
F. Videotape: "Tracking the Threat"
A. Method options
2. Discussion
1. Study assignment
V. Presentation
A. Discuss magnetic anomaly detection (MAD).
1. Basic operation
2. Advantages/Disadvantages over sonar systems
B. Explain basic sonar systems.
1. Active/Echo ranging systems
2. Passive/Listening systems
C. Discuss transducer theory.
1. Types of devices
65
a. Crystal
b. Ceramic
c. Magnetostrictive
2. Hydrophones
3. Directivity
4. Power
D. Describe active sonar systems.
1. Searchlight echo ranging (early sonar)
a. Operation
b. Limitations
2. Scanning sonar systems
a. Operation
b. Principal advantages over searchlight system
3. Displays
a. Scanning switch operation
b. Sonar cathode ray tube (CRT)
E. Describe passive sonar systems.
1. Purpose/Function
2. Hydrophone arrays
a. Cylindrical
b. Conformal
c. Spherical
F. Discuss the following advantages and disadvantages of

active and passive sonar systems.
1. Limitations of sonar due to the physical properties

of sound travel in water
2. Limitations of active and passive sonar in

detection
3. Limitations of active and passive sonar in tracking
66
G. Discuss the following types of sonar and compare to
hull-mounted sonar.
1. Tactical towed array sonar system (TACTAS)
2. Sonobuoys
a. Passive
b. Active
c. Special purpose
3. Dipping sonar
4. Sound surveillance system (SOSUS)
H. Describe the use of doppler in ASW.
1. Up doppler
2. Down doppler
3. Doppler degree
4. Target aspect
I. Discuss the tactical considerations of sonar employ-

ment.
1. Items under the control of the ASW commander
2. Items not under the control of the ASW commander
J. Discuss acoustic emission control (EMCON) and acoustic

countermeasures.
K. Describe the ASW capabilities of various U.S. Navy

platforms.
1. Surface ships
a. Ticonderoga class (CG-47), Arleigh Burke class

(DDG-51), and Spruance class (DD-963) have
similar systems.
(1) Sensors
(a) SQS-53 bow-mounted sonar
(b) SQR-19 passive towed array (TACTAS)
(c) SQQ-89 system combines input from both

sensors
(2) Weapons: Mk-46 torpedoes, to be replaced
67
by Mk-50
c. Oliver Hazard Perry class (FFG-7)

(1) Sensors
(a) SQS-56 or SQS-53 bow-mounted sonar
(b) SQR-19 passive towed array (TACTAS)
(c) Most ships have the SQQ-89 system which

combines input from sensors.

by Mk-50
2. Aircraft
a. P-3 Orion
(1) Sensors
(a) MAD
(b) Up to 100 sonobuoys

by Mk-50
b. S-3 Viking
(1) Sensors
(a) MAD
(2) Weapons
(a) Mk-46 torpedoes, to be replaced by

Mk-50
(b) Mk-54 depth charges
c. SH-60 Seahawk
(1) Sensors
(a) MAD
(c) AQS-13F dipping sonar
(2) Weapons
68
Mk-50
(b) Depth bombs
d. SH-3 Sea King
(1) Sensors
(a) MAD
(c) AQS-13 dipping sonar
(2) Weapons

Mk-50
(b) Depth bombs
3. Submarines: Los Angeles class (SSN-688)

a. Sensors
(1) BQQ-5 hull-mounted sonar
(2) BQR-23/25 passive towed array
b. Weapons: Mk-48 torpedoes
L. Summary
69
TITLE: Military Explosives/Warheads
A. The student will comprehend the fundamental chemical

and physical principles of conventional and nuclear
warheads.
B. The student will comprehend the principles of explo-

sives.
C. The student will know the basic categories of chemical

explosives.
D. The student will know the characteristics that deter-

mine the suitability of explosives for military use.
E. The student will know the functional parts of a basic

warhead.
F. The student will comprehend the principle effects of

detonating nuclear and conventional warheads, including
the varying effects of blast, heat, and initial radia-
tion from a nuclear burst.
G. The student will comprehend the high-explosive train

and the mechanics of detonation.
H. The student will comprehend the principles of operation

of various warheads.

2. Damage Controlman 3&2, Chaps. 8, 9

Systems
Chaps. 12, 13
A. Chalkboard/Easel
70
E. VCR/Monitor
F. Videotape: "Development of Military Explosives"
A. Method options
2. Discussion
1. Study assignment
V. Presentation
A. Define explosion.
B. Explain the characteristics of military explosives.
1. Availability and cost
2. Sensitivity
3. Stability
4. Power/Performance
5. Brisance
6. Density
7. Volatility
8. Hygroscopicity
9. Toxicity
C. Discuss the mechanism of a chemical explosive reaction.
1. Changes occur in the electron configurations, causing

rapid decomposition or rearrangement of the compound.
2. The four features common to all chemical explosives

are as follows:
71
a. Formation of gases
b. Evolution of heat
c. Rapidity of reaction
d. Initiation of reaction
D. Discuss the categories of chemical explosives.
1. Low explosive: For propulsion
2. High explosive: For weapons
a. Primary (sensitive)
b. Secondary (insensitive)
E. Discuss the mechanism of a nuclear explosive reaction.
1. Explosion caused by uncontrolled nuclear fission
a. Atoms of unstable isotopes are split by high

speed neutrons.
b. The split of the nucleus creates energy and

more neutrons.
c. These neutrons go on to split more nuclei,

creating a chain reaction.
2. Blast: Shock wave and negative suction wave
3. Creation of heat and radiation
4. Energy released during a nuclear reaction is much

greater than the energy released during a chemical
reaction (equal weight of material).
5. Nuclear weapons are used because they create a

highly destructive shock wave, not because they
produce radiation.
6. The use of nuclear weapons is minimal.
F. Describe the functional parts of a simple warhead.
1. Fuze
2. Explosive fill
3. Warhead case
G. Explain the process of a high-explosive train.
72
1. Initiating force (detonator)
2. Auxiliary explosive (booster)
3. Main charge
4. The shock wave travels from the detonator, is rein-

forced by the booster, and activates the main charge.
H. Discuss warhead characteristics.
1. Damage volume
2. Attenuation
3. Propagation
I. Discuss warhead types and the effects of detonation.
1. Blast
a. Conventional
(1) Creates shock wave followed by negative

suction
(2) Examples
(a) Tomahawk (TASM, TLAM-C)
(b) Harpoon
(c) Phoenix
(d) AMRAAM
b. Underwater
(1) Creates a series of high pressure bubbles
(2) Examples
(a) Mines
(b) Depth charges
c. Nuclear
(1) Creates shock wave followed by negative

suction, heat, radiation
(2) Examples
(a) Trident
(b) Tomahawk (TLAM-N)
73
d. Mach effect: Used to increase the effect of a
blast warhead
2. Fragmentation
a. Damage due to velocity and material
b. Examples
(1) SM-2
(2) Sidewinder
(3) HARM
3. Shaped charge
a. Impact causes casing to collapse, resulting in

a high-velocity jet of armor-piercing liquid.
b. Example: Mk-50 torpedo
4. Continuous rod
a. Damage by high-speed, radially-expanding rods
b. Examples
(1) SM-1
(2) Sparrow
5. Special purpose
a. Thermal
b. Biological and chemical
c. Radiation
d. Pyrotechnics
e. Antipersonnel
f. Chaff
g. Cluster bombs
h. Mines
i. Torpedoes
j. Antitank
J. Summary
74
TITLE: Fuzing
A. The student will comprehend the basic functions of a

fuze system in a conventional or nuclear warhead.
B. The student will comprehend the functions of the three

basic fuze components: target sensors, safing and
arming devices, and detonators.
C. The student will know the basic types of fuzes.
D. The student will comprehend the concepts of reliability

and redundancy as they apply to safety and arming.

Systems

Chap. 14
A. Chalkboard/Easel

A. Method options
2. Discussion
75
1. Study assignment
V. Presentation
NOTE: This lesson applies to both nuclear and conventional fuzes;

it is unnecessary to distinguish between the two in this course.
A. Discuss the basic concepts of fuzing.
1. Definition of fuze
2. Four functions of a fuze system
a. Keep the weapon safe
b. Arm the weapon
c. Recognize or detect the target
d. Initiate the detonation of payload
3. Three components of a fuze
a. Detonator
b. Target sensor/Target detection device (TDD)
c. Safing and arming device (S&A device)
B. Fuzes are categorized by the manner of fuze operation

(i.e., by target sensor).
1. Impact or contact (backup fuzes)
a. Sidewinder
b. Mk-46 torpedo
c. Tomahawk
d. Harpoon
2. Ambient
a. Senses particular environment
b. Example: Depth charges
3. Timer (including delay)
a. Example: Hand grenades
b. Impact fuzes can be combined with a timer to

ensure the weapon is deep within its target
76
before detonation.
4. Proximity: Can be active, semi-active, or passive
NOTE: Differentiate a TDD from a guidance device.
a. Electromagnetic
b. Magnetostatic
c. Acoustic
d. Seismic
e. Examples
(1) SM-2
(2) Sidewinder
(3) Sparrow
(4) Mines
5. Command detonate
6. Combination (two or more of above types)
C. Discuss the safing and arming device concept.
1. Safing and arming devices isolate detonator from

booster.
2. Activation forces
a. Time
b. Acceleration (setback)
c. Deceleration (creep)
d. Centrifugal force
D. Explain redundancy as it applies to fuze system safety

and reliability.
1. Safing and arming devices are arranged in series

for safety.
2. Detonators and target sensors are arranged in

parallel for reliability.
3. Use mathematical illustrations to prove system

design provides a safe and reliable fuze.
E. Summary
77
TITLE: Guidance and Control Principles
A. The student will comprehend the purpose and function of

a guidance and control system.
B. The student will know the three phases of guidance.
C. The student will comprehend how control, homing, and

self-contained guidance systems are utilized singularly
and together to direct missiles to their intended
target.
D. The student will comprehend the basic operation of

accelerometers.
E. The student will comprehend preset and variable flight

paths.

Systems
Chap. 15
A. Chalkboard/Easel

E. VCR/Monitor
F. Videotapes
1. "Laser Weapons for the Fleet"
78
2. "Warship"
A. Method options
2. Discussion
1. Study assignment
V. Presentation
A. Describe guidance and control systems.
1. Purpose: Control flight path
2. Components
a. Attitude control system
b. Flight path control system
3. Function is based on the principle of feedback.
B. Explain the three phases of guidance.
1. Boost
2. Midcourse
3. Terminal
C. Discuss types of guidance systems and give examples of

weapons.
1. Controlled by electromagnetic devices
a. Control guidance
(1) Command
(a) SM-2 MR (during midcourse phase)
(b) SM-2 ER
(c) Mk-48 torpedoes can be wire guided
(2) Beamrider
b. Homing guidance
79
(1) Active
(a) Tomahawk (TASM) (during terminal phase)
(b) Harpoon (during terminal phase)
(c) Phoenix (during terminal phase)
(d) AMRAAM (during terminal phase)
(e) Mk-46 and Mk-48 torpedoes
(2) Semiactive homing (SAH)
(a) Phoenix (during midcourse phase)
(b) Sparrow
(c) SM-2 MR (during terminal phase)
(3) Passive
(a) SLAM (infrared version of Harpoon)
(b) HARM (radiation)
(c) Sidewinder (infrared)
(d) Mk-46 and Mk-48 torpedoes (acoustic)
2. Self-contained guidance systems
a. Preset
(1) Tomahawk (TASM) (during midcourse phase)
(2) Harpoon (during midcourse phase)
(3) Phoenix (during midcourse phase)
(4) AMRAAM (during midcourse phase)
(5) Mk-46 and Mk-48 torpedoes can follow a

preset search pattern.
b. Inertial: Discuss principles of accelerome-

ters.
(1) Trident
(2) Tomahawk (TLAM) (during beginning of mid-

course phase)
c. Terrestrial: Tomahawk (TLAM) (during end of

midcourse phase and during the terminal phase)
80
d. Celestial navigation
D. Discuss guided flight paths.
1. Preset
a. Constant
b. Programmed
2. Variable
a. Pursuit
b. Constant bearing
c. Proportional navigation
c. Line-of-sight (being phased out)
E. Summary
81
TITLE: Weapon Propulsion and Architecture
A. The student will comprehend gravity, impulse, and reac-

tion propulsion.
B. The student will comprehend the factors involved in

impulse propulsion, including the explosive propellant
train, the factors controlling burn rate, and interior
ballistics.
C. The student will know the different types of reaction

propulsion systems.
D. The student will comprehend the basic principles of

fluid dynamics and be able to apply them in shipboard
situations.
1. The student will know the concepts of lift and

drag, atmospheric properties and effect, subsonic
and supersonic flow characteristics, and high speed
aerodynamics.
2. The student will know aerodynamic and hydrodynamic

controls.
E. The student will comprehend basic weapons architecture.


Systems

Chap. 16
A. Chalkboard/Easel

82
A. Method options
2. Discussion
1. Study assignment
V. Presentation
A. Discuss gravity propulsion and give examples of weapons

with gravity propulsion.
1. Bombs
a. Rockeye
b. Walleye
2. Mk-46 torpedo when launched from an aircraft (until

submerges)
B. Discuss impulse propulsion and give examples of weapons

with impulse propulsion.
1. Explosive propellant train
a. Primer
b. Igniter
c. Propellant powder
2. Solid propellants
3. Factors controlling burning rate
4. Burning rates
a. Degressive/Regressive
b. Neutral
c. Progressive
5. Interior ballistics
83
a. Chemical source
b. Working substance (high pressure gas)
c. Equipment to release and direct the working

substance
d. Pressure-travel curve
6. Propulsion created by a high pressure gas is also

impulse propulsion.
7. Examples of weapons with impulse propulsion
a. Guns
(1) 5 inch/54 Mk-45
(2) 20mm Vulcan Phalanx Mk-15 (CIWS)
(3) 20mm Vulcan cannon
b. Initial propulsion of Trident, Tomahawk, and

Harpoon when launched from a submarine
C. Discuss reaction propulsion and give examples of

weapons with reaction propulsion.
1. Basic elements
a. Combustion chamber
b. Exhaust nozzle
c. Diffuser (if air is required)
2. Rocket engines
a. Solid fuel rocket
(1) Trident
(2) SM-2
(3) Sparrow
(4) Phoenix
(5) HARM
(6) Sidewinder
(7) AMRAAM
b. Liquid fuel rocket
84
3. Thermal jet engines
a. Turbojet
(1) Tomahawk
(2) Harpoon
b. Ramjet
4. Torpedoes
a. Mk-46 torpedo: Two-speed, reciprocating

external combustion engine
b. Mk-48ADCAP torpedo: Pump jet, external

combustion engine
c. Mk-50 torpedo: Stored chemical energy system
D. Discuss fluid dynamics.
1. Aerodynamics: The study of the motion of gaseous

fluid flows and of their actions against and around
bodies in motion in that fluid.
a. There are four forces that act upon a missile

in flight.
(1) Thrust: Due to the force from the engine
(2) Weight: Due to the force of gravity
(3) Lift: Due to the difference of air pres-

sure above and below the airfoils, perpen-
dicular to the direction of flight
(4) Drag: Due to the friction caused by air in

front of and along the missile, opposes
missile motion
b. Bernoulli's Principle: Air flow on the top of

an airfoil is faster than that on the bottom,
thus the density of the air is less on the top
of the airfoil, causing the missile to rise.
c. Aerodynamic forces are greatly due to

atmospheric properties.
(1) Static pressure
(a) Caused by the weight of the air upon an

object
(b) Static pressure decreases with an

increase in altitude.
85
(2) Density
(a) Mass of air per unit volume
(b) Density decreases with an increase in

altitude.
(3) Temperature: Temperature decreases with an

increase in altitude.
(4) Humidity: As humidity increases, air

density decreases (less air molecules and
more water molecules per unit volume).
(5) Viscosity
(a) Air's resistance to flow
(b) Viscosity increases as temperature

increases.
d. Atmospheric conditions change with altitude,

season, weather, location, and time of day.
e. Lift is directly related to the density of the

air and the missile's velocity and angle of
flight.
(1) As static pressure decreases, lift

decreases.
(2) As density decreases, lift decreases.
(3) As humidity increases, lift decreases.
(4) As altitude increases, the combination of

atmospheric effects reduces lift and the
angle of attack must be adjusted.
f. Drag is affected by atmospheric conditions.
(1) As temperature increases, viscosity

increases.
(2) As viscosity increases, friction and drag

increase.
g. At high speeds, the effects of aerodynamic

forces and atmospheric forces are amplified.
h. Subsonic and supersonic flow characteristics
(1) At supersonic speeds, air is compressed and

the density of the air changes.
86
(2) At subsonic speeds, density changes are
minimal and can be ignored. As area
decreases, velocity increases.
2. Hydrodynamics: The study of the motion of fluids

and of their actions against and around bodies in
motion in that fluid.
a. Air and water are both fluids and act

similarly.
b. There are differences due to differences in

density and mass, and the lack of
compressibility of water.
c. Torpedoes, like missiles, are affected by lift

and drag, and pitch, roll, and yaw.
d. Torpedoes, unlike missiles, are affected by

buoyancy.
E. Discuss control surfaces.
1. Missiles
a. Canard control
(1) Small control surfaces are forward.
(2) Lifting surfaces are aft.
b. Wing control
(1) Control surfaces are near the center of the

airframe.
(2) Control surfaces also provide lift.
c. Tail control
(1) Control surfaces are aft.
(2) Lift surfaces are near the center of the

airframe.
2. Torpedoes
a. Upper and lower fins control roll and pitch.
b. Port and starboard fins control pitch.
F. Discuss basic missile architecture.
1. Guidance system
2. Warhead and fuze
87
3. Autopilot
4. Propulsion system
5. Control surfaces
G. Discuss basic torpedo architecture.
1. Propulsion system
2. Control and guidance system
3. Warhead and fuze
H. Discuss gun ammunition architecture
1. Penetrating
2. Fragmenting
3. Special purpose
I. Summary
88
TITLE: Case Study: OOD Midwatch

A. The student will comprehend the moral and

ethical responsibilities of the military leader.



effectiveness:
1. Loyalty
2. Honor
3. Integrity
4. Courage
A. Instructor references:
1. Watch Officer’s Guide

2. Ethics for the Junior Officer, Issue 116
B. Student text: None
A. Chalkboard/Easel
B. Instructor-developed handouts
C. PowerPoint presentation
D. LCD projector
A. Method options: Since the case studies in this course

follow similar lines of discussion, use different
teaching methods to maintain the students' interest.
89
1. Lecture/explanation of facts by instructor, then
discussion.
2. Student presentation of facts, then discussion.
3. Student discussion of facts based on instructor

questions, then discussion.
4. Role play: Some students play the roles of the

main individuals involved; the other students ask
questions.
5. Debate teams representing the different points of

view.
1. Research the subject
2. Reading assignment: Instructor-developed handouts
V. Presentation
A. Case Scenario
1. Officer of the Deck
a. Responsibility
(1) Direct representative of the Captain
(2) Carry out the ship’s routine
(3) Safety of the ship
(4) Can not be delegated
b. Authority
(1) Limited by the Commanding Officer’s

Standing Orders
(2) May be delegated
c. Relationship with the Captain
2. Background Information
a. Commanding Officer – An extremely gifted ship

handler with an extremely short temper. His
leadership style emphasizes yelling and
berating poor performance.
b. Relieved Officer – The Weapons Officer in this

case is the officer of the deck off going.
90
The officer has a poor reputation in the
wardroom. He generally puts himself before
his people or the ship. He is a master at
placating the Commanding Officer.
c. Torpedo Transmission Checks – Periodic

maintenance performed on a torpedo that
requires applying ship electrical power to
weapon. Commanding Officer’s permission is
generally required for such checks.
d. Incident: See the Student Handout. The class

should then discuss the options and
responsibilities of the OOD. Possible
outcomes are listed below.
3. Responses to student decisions. (The students
should suggest something like the options below;
the consequence of the decision is listed as a
suggestion. The instructor is free to elaborate.)
a. Wait until the morning – The CO wakes to your
post watch turnover brief. He is furious you
didn’t get the checks done on time. The
exercise is delayed three hours.
b. Conducted the checks without permission
(1) Nothing happens - The matter is never

discussed. Are there any consequences to
your decision or did you really get away
with it?
(2) CO questions how the checks were completed–

The Commanding Officer finds out the tubes
are loaded and asks you why. He does not
remember giving permission. What would you
say?
(3) Casualty during the checks – During the

transmission checks, a junior torpedoman
incorrectly believes he has started a hot
run in the torpedo room. He calls it away
on the 31MC. You respond immediately and
call it away on the 1MC. A few minutes
later, the MMC (TM) calls up on the 31MC
reporting no casualty, just a mistake.
What are the consequences?
c. Call the Commanding Officer – He yells at you

and asks you if you have a brain. He then
gives permission. What have you gained and
what have you lost in this situation?
d. Call the Weapons Officer, Off-Going OOD – He

tells you he forgot to get permission, but to
91
go ahead and do the checks and tube load the
torpedoes. What do you do?
B. Discuss the leadership considerations.
1. What would be the OOD’s motivation?
a. To do nothing
b. To conduct the evolution without the CO’s

permission
c. To call the Commanding Officer and wake him up
d. To call the Weapons Officer and have him get

permission
2. Discuss the OOD’s responsibilities.
a. Pre-watch tour
b. Keep the Commanding Officer informed
c. Follow the Standing Orders
d. Keep the ship’s schedule
3. How could this situation have been prevented?
C. Discuss the moral and ethical considerations.
1. What are the moral and ethical considerations

in the use of force against another nation?
a. Example for the rest of the crew
b. Effect on the Commanding Officer’s level of

trust
2. Are there examples of moral courage or lack of

courage in this situation?
a. By the OOD
b. By the Weapons Officer
c. By the Torpedoman Chief
3. Does the end result justify the means?
a. If the OOD was just doing what he knew the

Commanding Officer would want, are his action
justified?
b. Since his reasons were honorable, aren't the

actual actions honorable?
92
c. Using the same logic, were these actions
morally correct?
D. Summary
93
OOD MIDWATCH CASE STUDY
You are the officer of the deck (OOD) on a submarine. You took the watch at 1157 from
the ship’s Weapons Officer (Department Head). You conducted the required pre-watch tour of
the ship prior to taking the watch. You know from reading the night orders that tomorrow will
be the first day of the ship’s pre-Tactical Readiness Examination exercise. You will shoot two
exercise torpedoes. You are a newly qualified Officer of the Deck and expect to get your
Submarine Warfare Qualification later this month.
At 0300, the Torpedo Division Chief stops by the control room to find out about conducting
transmission checks and tube loading the two exercise torpedoes. You realize that you do not
have permission to do either. The Commanding Officer’s Standing Orders clearly state that
weapons checks and tube loading torpedoes require the Commanding Officer’s permission. The
MMC (TM) quickly responds after you tell him you don’t have permission. He tells you that he
specifically asked the Weapons Officer, who was the officer of the deck before you, to get
permission. He then tells you that since the torpedoes in question are exercise torpedoes, the
Commanding Officer's Standing Order doesn’t apply. He explains that as long as the OOD gives
permission, it will be alright -- after all, the torpedoes have to be ready for the shoot later that
morning.
The previous day, the ship conducted two drill sets involving both a forward fire and
propulsion casualties. The drill debriefs went well into the evening. The Commanding Officer
was up for about the last 40 hours because of a night SEAL insertion the previous mid-watch.
The other Junior Officers have told you to NEVER call the CO at night for a non-emergency.
What are your options?
What do the regulations say to do in this situation?
What about what the Chief said?
What would you do?
94
TITLE: Launching Systems
A. The student will know the general requirements and

functions of launching systems.
B. The student will know the basic types of launchers.
C. The student will comprehend the principles of gravity,

impulse, and reaction launchers.
D. The student will know the different types of impulse

launchers.
E. The student will comprehend the principles of gun-type

launchers and recoil systems.
F. The student will know the different types of reaction

launchers.


Systems

Chap. 17
A. Chalkboard/Easel

95
E. VCR/Monitor
F. Videotapes:
1. "Harpoon Antiship Weapon System"
2. "Tomahawk"
3. "Sea Warriors"
4. "Warship"
A. Method options
2. Discussion
1. Study assignment
V. Presentation
A. Discuss the general requirements of a launching system.
1. Speed
2. Reliability
3. Safety
4. Compatibility
B. Explain the functions of a launching system.
1. Storage
a. Primary magazines
b. Ready service magazines
c. Lockers
2. Transfer
a. Storage to launcher
b. Limits rate of fire
3. Loading
96
4. Control
a. Positioning to line-of-fire (LOF)
b. Weapon orders
5. Launching
C. Discuss the three basic types of launchers and give

examples.
1. Gravity
a. Only used with slow-moving aircraft
b. Example: Torpedoes dropped from helicopters
2. Impulse
a. The force to separate the weapon from the

launcher is created by the launcher.
b. Gun-type launchers
(1) Uses gases created by a low explosive
(2) Internal stresses
(3) Recoil/Counter-recoil systems
(4) Soft recoil systems
(5) Examples
(a) 5-inch/54 Mk-45
(b) 20mm Vulcan Phalanx Mk-15 (CIWS)
(c) 20mm Vulcan cannon
c. Ejector-type launchers
(1) Uses gases created by a high-pressure gas

system on the launching platform
(2) Examples
(a) Tube launchers on submarines for

Tomahawk, Harpoon, and Mk-48 torpedoes
(b) Tube launchers for Trident
(c) Tube launchers for Mk-46 torpedoes
(d) Launchers for Phoenix and Sparrow
97
(e) Launchers for bombs dropped from high-
speed aircraft
3. Reaction
a. The force to separate the weapon from the

launcher is created by the weapon.
b. Rail launchers
(1) The weapon travels along a rail, tube,

ramp, or tower.
(2) The launcher provides initial guidance,

stability, and flight control.
(3) Not widely used in the Navy due to space

and weight constraints of Navy platforms.
(4) Examples
(a) LAU-130 folding fin rocket launcher
(b) MLRS, Barrage rockets
c. Zero length
(1) The weapon travels along a rail less than 8

centimeters.
(2) The launcher provides no initial guidance

or flight control.
(3) The weapon must have immediate flight

control.
(4) Examples
(a) Mk-26 twin-arm missile launcher
(b) Mk-13 single-arm missile launcher
d. Platform
(1) Used when the weapon must achieve high

altitude as quickly as possible.
(2) The launcher provides no initial guidance

or flight control.
(3) No missile in the Navy requires this type

of launcher.
e. Canister
98
(1) Launcher also used for weapon storage
(2) Weapon contained within the launcher during

launch and initial flight
(3) Requirements
(a) Launcher must withstand the heat

and shock wave created by weapon launch
(b) Requires an exhaust gas system
(c) Must be able to withstand the complete

burn of the rocket motor in the event
of a launch malfunction
(4) Examples
(a) Vertical Launch System (VLS)
(b) Harpoon launcher
(c) Box launcher for Sea Sparrow, ASROC,

and Tomahawk
D. Summary
99
TITLE: Fire Control
A. The student will comprehend the basic geometry of the

fire control problem.
B. The student will be able to apply the basic fire

control problem.
C. The student will know the basic factors of the fire

control problem.
D. The student will comprehend the factors effecting the

solution of the fire control problem.
E. The student will comprehend the basic concepts of

relative target motion, bearing rate, and speed across
line-of-sight.
F. The student will comprehend the following exterior

ballistic effects upon the trajectory of the weapon:
gravity, drag, wind, drift, and Coriolis force.
G. The student will know the basic concepts of the detect-

to-engage sequence.

B. Student texts

A. Chalkboard/Easel

100
A. Method options
2. Discussion
1. Study assignment
2. Reading assignment
a. Student text, Chap. 19
b. Supplement, Chap. 3
V. Presentation
A. Introduction
1. The fire control problem is part of the detect-to-

engage sequence, which involves one or more units.
a. Target is detected by one or more sensors.
b. Additional sensors are used to gain better

information on the target.
c. Target information is sent to other units

through the naval tactical data system or other
means.
d. Target is identified.
e. Original unit or other unit completes a threat

analysis.
f. The operational commander evaluates the threat

and the ability to counter the threat.
g. The operational commander assigns a launch

platform, if necessary, based on threat evalua-
tion.
h. The launch platform completes the fire control

solution, assigns a weapon, and attacks the
target.
2. The fire control problem consists of determining

target position, target motion, and a weapon path
that intercepts the target at a particular point.
101
3. The problem begins when a target is assigned by the
operational commander and ends when the target is
destroyed.
4. The fire control problem is difficult because

several factors are uncontrollable.
a. Target motion is different for every target

(ship, aircraft, submarine, missile).
b. Target motion can change for any one target at

any time.
c. Weapon motion is different for every weapon.
d. Weapon motion is affected by several outside

forces that can change at any time.
B. The fire control problem can be divided into two

problems:
1. Relative target motion problem
2. Ballistics problem
C. Discuss the relative motion problem.
1. Solves a tracking problem that consists of

position-keeping between own ship and the target
2. Does not deal with the weapon
3. Target motion analysis (TMA)
a. Process of mathematically analyzing available

target and own ship motion data
b. Input
(1) Ship motion from own ship sensors
(a) Navigation systems
(b) Gyrocompass
(c) Electromagnetic log
(d) Dead reckoning analyzer indicator

(DRAI)
(e) Depth indicator equipment
(2) Target position (range or bearing)
(a) Radar
102
(b) Sonar
(c) Electronic warfare equipment
(d) Data systems (NTDS)
c. Analysis of the input data collected over

several time intervals
d. Output
(1) Target course and speed
(2) Target position (range and bearing)
e. Predicted target position from TMA is compared

to actual target position to determine errors.
4. Target position-keeping: Analysis of target motion

to determine the rate of change of target position
D. Discuss the ballistics problem.
1. Solves the problem of getting the weapon to the

target
2. Requires the following information, which must be

updated continuously:
a. Target data
(1) Target position from sensors
(2) Target motion from TMA
b. Own ship data from ship sensors
c. Weapon exterior ballistics
(1) The study of the forces that cause a

projectile in flight to change direction
and velocity
(2) Involves the following factors:
(a) Gravity
(b) Drag
(c) Wind
(d) Drift
(e) Coriolis force
103
d. Weapon specifics
E. Discuss the fire control problem.
1. Computations
a. Relative motion equations
b. Ballistics equations
c. Ballistics computation procedure flow diagrams
2. Solutions
a. Weapon time of flight
b. Bearing rate
c. Line of sight (LOS): The course the weapon

must follow to intercept the target
d. Speed across LOS
e. Launch angles
(1) Launch azimuth
(2) Launch elevation
f. Weapon positioning orders
F. Describe the simplified flow diagram of a fire control

problem.
G. Demonstrate how to apply the fire control problem.
H. Summary
104
TITLE: Mine Warfare
A. The student will know the mission of mine warfare.
B. The student will know the methods of classifying

mines.
C. The student will know the basic types of mines in the

U.S. Navy's current inventory.
D. The student will comprehend the factors involved in

planning a minefield.
E. The student will comprehend the principles of mine

countermeasures.
1. Force 2001

Systems
3. NAVSEA Mine Familiarizer
4. U.S. Navy Mine Countermeasures Familiarizer

5. "Weapons That Wait...and Wait..."
6. Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy
A. Chalkboard/Easel

A. Method options
105
2. Discussion
3. Suggest MOI assist in USMC applications
4. Student presentations
1. Prepare presentations
2. Outside reading from magazine articles
V. Presentation
A. Introduce mine warfare by giving a brief history.
1. Revolutionary War: Bushnell's keg mine (powder

keg, tar covered, flintlock firing device)
2. Civil War
a. Mines first widely used.
b. The Confederacy used large scale mining on land

and sea.
3. World War II
a. U.S. mine efforts were concentrated in the

Pacific.
b. 23,000 mines were laid which sank or damaged

1,075 Japanese ships.
4. Vietnam War: Extensive mining in inland waterways
5. The U.S. has considerably reduced the use of mines

since the end of the Cold War.
6. Recent events
a. USS Samuel B. Roberts
b. USS Princeton
c. USS Tripoli
7. Operation Desert Storm showed the need for a rapid

clearing of shallow water minefields in preparation
for an amphibious assault.
B. Discuss the mission of mine warfare.
106
C. Discuss classification of mines.
1. By method of delivery
a. Air-delivered mines
b. Surface-delivered mines
c. Submarine-delivered mines
2. By position in water after delivery
a. Moored mines
b. Bottom mines
c. Drifting mines (not in U.S. inventory)
3. By method of actuation
a. Contact mines
b. Influence mines
(1) Magnetic
(2) Acoustic
(3) Pressure
(4) Combination
4. Contact mines are usually moored mines.
5. Influence mines are usually bottom mines.
D. Describe the mines currently in the U.S. Navy's

inventory.
1. Destructor mines: Mk-36, Mk-40, Mk-41
a. Shallow-water bottom mine
b. Target: Surface
c. Delivery platform: Aircraft
2. Mark 50 series
a. Mk-52 and Mk-55
(1) Shallow-water bottom mine
(2) Target: Submarines and surface
(3) Delivery platform: Aircraft
107
b. Mk-56 and Mk-57
(1) Medium-depth moored mine
(2) Target: Submarines
(3) Delivery platform: Aircraft (Mk-56) and

submarines (Mk-57)
3. CAPTOR mines: Mk-60
a. Deep-water moored mine/rising mine
b. Target: Submarines
c. Delivery platform: Aircraft, submarines
d. The CAPTOR (encapsulated torpedo) mine releases

a torpedo when it detects a ship.
4. Quickstrike mines: Mk-63, Mk-64, Mk-65
b. Target: Surface
c. Delivery platform: Aircraft
5. Submarine-launched mobile mine (SLMM): Mk-67
b. Target: Surface
c. Delivery platform: Submarine
d. Self-propelled
E. Explain minefield planning and considerations.
1. Determine performance objectives (desired number of

casualties, desired threat level, etc.).
2. Determine minefield planning objectives (MPO). The

planner must make the most effective use of weapons
and delivery systems to accomplish the MPO.
3. Types of minefields
a. Offensive
b. Defensive
c. Protective
108
4. Environmental considerations
a. Geographic location (choke point, harbor, port)
b. Water depth
c. Currents
d. Bottom type and slope (so mines do not "walk"

or roll)
e. Prevailing sea state
5. Delivery considerations
a. Type of minefield
b. How many mines are to be delivered?
c. Is the minefield area defended?
d. What types of mines are to be delivered?
e. What is the required accuracy of delivery?
6. Delivery vehicles
a. Aircraft
(1) The most suitable vehicle for delivery of

offensive mines
(2) P-3 Orion
(3) S-3 Viking
b. Surface ships
(1) Normally used for laying defensive or

protective minefields
(2) The U.S. does not use surface ships to lay

mines.
c. Submarines
(1) For laying mines covertly
(2) For laying mines in well-defended areas

inaccessible to aircraft and ships
(3) Los Angeles class (SSN-688)
F. Discuss mine countermeasures (MCM).
1. Objectives
109
a. Self-protection
(1) Silencing: Protection from acoustic mines
(2) Degaussing: Protection from magnetic mines
(3) Steaming slowly to prevent abrupt pressure

changes: Protection from pressure mines
b. Clearance
(1) Mine sweeping
(a) Mine neutralization of a large area
(b) Moored mines: Cut mine cables, then

activate to destroy
(c) Acoustic and magnetic mines: Sweep

area with acoustic/magnetic noise-
makers
(2) Mine hunting
(a) Searching and neutralizing individual

mines
(b) Involves searching an area for objects

that look like mines, then investiga-
ting to determine if the object is a
mine
(c) Usually use sonar to detect suspected

mines
(d) To detect and neutralize pressure mines

and other mines that are difficult to
sweep
2. MCM force composition
a. Surface
(1) Avenger class (MCM-1): Mine counter-

measures ship
(2) Osprey class (MHC-51): Coastal mine hunter

ship
b. Airborne: MH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter
c. Underwater
(1) Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
110
(2) Special warfare forces
G. Summary
111
TITLE: U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Platforms and Weapons
A. The student will know the designations and missions of

ships, aircraft, and weapon systems of the U.S. Navy
and U.S. Marine Corps.
B. The student will know the basic mission, characteris-

tics, capabilities, and weapon systems of the following
U.S. surface platforms:
1. Ticonderoga-class cruiser (CG-47)

2. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer (DDG-51)
3. Spruance-class destroyer (DD-963)
4. Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate (FFG-7)
C. The student will know the basic mission, characteris-
U.S. submarines:
1. Los Angeles-class attack submarine (SSN-688)

2. Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN-726)
D. The student will know the basic mission, characteris-
U.S. aircraft:
1. F-14 Tomcat
2. F/A-18 Hornet
E. The student will know the basic mission, characteris-

tics, capabilities and weapon systems of the Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU).
F. The student will know the ships, aircraft and

combat vehicles that support the MEU.
1. The Almanac of Sea Power

2. Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian
Gulf War
112

Systems
Systems Workbook
8. The Almanac of Sea Power
9. "Slick Warriors and the '32'"
10. "The Ticonderoga Story: Aegis Works"
11. "USN Seeks 'Technology Roadmap' for Next DDG"
A. Chalkboard/Easel

E. VCR/Monitor
F. Videotapes:
1. "Top Gun"
2. "LHA"
3. "Today's Submarine Force"
4. "Sea Power for the 90's"
5. "Sea Warriors"
6. "Warship"
7. "Storm from the Sea"
G. Aegis Program Office training aids (see “Instructional

Aids”, page x)
H. Slide projector and slides (see “Instructional Aids,”
113
page x)
A. Method options
2. Discussion
3. Guest lecturers: Use the experience of the other

instructors in the unit.
4. Student presentations: Divide the class into

groups with each group responsible for the presen-
tation of one platform.
5. Slide presentation
1. Prepare presentations
2. Outside reading from magazine articles
V. Presentation
A. Discuss the Ticonderoga-class cruiser (CG-47) and the

Arleigh Burke-class destroyer (DDG-51).
1. Both ships have the Aegis weapon system.
a. Designed for an antiair warfare (AAW) mission

(against Soviet antiship missiles), but now
considered multi-mission: AAW, antisubmarine
warfare (ASW), antisurface warfare (ASUW), and
strike warfare.
b. Aegis is a complete weapon system centered

around the SPY-1 radar and the command and
decision system.
c. Incorporates fast reaction time and high fire

power.
d. Able to send target information automatically

to other units.
e. Data displays combine input from all sensors.
2. Components of the Aegis weapon system
a. SPY-1 radar system
(1) Purpose
114
(a) Primary air and surface search radar
(b) Primary fire control radar
(c) SM-2 guidance: Command guidance during

mid-course phase
(2) Characteristics
(a) Four electronically scanned, phased

arrays
(b) Uses a four-bay computer suite
(c) TWS techniques are used by the

computers.
(d) SPY-1 computers also perform automatic

antijamming procedures (e.g., burn-
through), uplink/downlink, and
jamming.
b. Command and decision (C+D) system
(1) Purpose
(a) Performs overall system coordination;

controls all systems
(b) Provides the operator/machine interface

for Aegis
(c) While many system functions are auto-

matically controlled by computer (e.g.,
search, tracking, EA), operator inputs
via the C+D system provide ultimate
system/weapon control.
(2) Functions
(a) Track file generation based on informa-

tion from internal sensors, NTDS, and
LAMPS
(b) Threat evaluation/classification
(c) Threat priority decisions
(d) Make/recommend weapon assignments
(e) Recommend fire
(f) Training support
(3) The C+D system is used to select the Aegis

system mode ("doctrine") and this deter-
115
mines how the system will react to detected
targets.
(a) Automatic special: Automatically fires

all weapons (except Tomahawk, CIWS, and
5"/54 guns) based on the preset threat
criteria
(b) Automatic: Performs all functions

except fire
(c) Semiautomatic
(d) Casualty (manual)
c. Aegis display system
d. Weapons control system (WCS)
(1) Standard missile (SM-2MR)
(3) Harpoon
(4) Tomahawk
(5) 5 inch/54 Mk-45 guns
(6) Mk-46 torpedoes, to be replaced with Mk-50
(7) Weapons from other platforms
(a) Ship's own SH-60 helicopter
(b) Aircraft
(c) Surface ships
e. Fire control system
f. Missile launching system
(1) Mk-26 launching system: Only on the first

five ships of the Ticonderoga-class cruiser
(a) SM-2MR
(b) ASROC
(2) Vertical Launch System (VLS): On the
Ticonderoga-class cruiser (CG-52 and up)
and the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer
(a) SM-2MR
116
(b) Tomahawk
(c) ASROC (in development)
g. Operational readiness test system, ORTS
h. Aegis combat training system, ACTS
3. Compare the Ticonderoga-class cruiser (CG-47) and

the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer (DDG-51).
a. Size
(1) CG-47: 9500 tons, 567 feet long
(2) DDG-51: 8400 tons, 504 feet long
b. Propulsion: Four gas turbine engines, two

shafts (DDG-51 has more shp)
c. Weapon capacity
(1) Ticonderoga class has two 64-cell VLS for

122 missiles
(2) Arleigh Burke class has one 64-cell and one

32-cell for 96 missiles
d. Helicopters
(1) Ticonderoga class can hold two SH-60

Seahawks.
(2) Arleigh Burke class only has a helicopter
pad.
e. Arleigh Burke class has Kevlar armor

B. Discuss the Spruance class destroyer (DD-963).
1. Mission: Antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
a. Still considered the best surface platform for

ASW
b. Advanced self-noise reduction features for

quiet ASW operations (e.g., Prairie/Masker
System)
2. Size: 8,000 tons, 563 feet long
3. Propulsion: Four gas turbine engines, two shafts
4. Weapon systems
a. SQQ-89 ASW weapon system
117
(1) SQS-53 bow-mounted sonar
(2) SQR-19 tactical towed array sonar system
(3) LAMPS Mark III
(4) Mk-116 ASW control system
(5) SVTT-32 over-the-side torpedo tubes for

Mk-46 torpedoes
(6) ASROC
(a) From box launcher on non-VLS ships
(b) From VLS (still in development)
b. Antiair warfare (AAW)
(1) NATO Sea Sparrow point defense subsystem
c. Antisurface warfare (ASUW)
(1) 5-inch/54 Mk-45 guns
(2) Harpoon
(3) Tomahawk: Most have been backfitted with

VLS; the remainder have box launchers.
C. Discuss the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate (FFG-7).
1. Most of the older ships of this class are in the

Naval Reserve Force (NRF).
2. Missions: ASW, ASUW, AAW
3. Size: 4100 tons, 453 feet long
4. Propulsion: Two gas turbine engines, one shaft
5. Weapon systems
a. Antisubmarine warfare (ASW): SQQ-89 ASW system

in ships in the active fleet
(1) SQS-53 bow-mounted sonar
(2) SQR-19 tactical towed array sonar system
(3) LAMPS Mark III
(4) Mk-116 ASW control system
118
(5) SVTT-32 over-the-side torpedo tubes for
Mk-46 torpedoes
b. Antiair warfare (AAW)
(1) SM-1MR
c. Antisurface warfare (ASUW)
(1) 3-inch/62 Mk-75 OTO Melara gun
(2) Harpoon
D. Discuss the Los Angeles-class attack submarine

(SSN-688).
1. Missions: ASW, ASUW
2. Size: 6900 tons (submerged), 360 feet long
3. Propulsion: One nuclear reactor, two turbines, one

shaft
4. Sensors and detection systems
a. BQQ-5A passive/active hull-mounted sonar
b. BQR-23/25 passive towed sonar array
c. Radar for surface operations/navigation
d. Mine and ice detection and avoidance systems

(SSN-751 and up)
5. Weapons systems
a. Tomahawk (TASM and TLAM): SSN-719 and up have

12 VLS launch tubes external to the pressure
hull.
b. Harpoon
c. Mk-48 torpedoes
d. A total of 26 weapons can be tube-launched from

tubes located amidships (any combination of
Tomahawk, Harpoon, torpedoes).
e. Mk-67 or Mk-60 mines can be laid from the

torpedo tubes.
6. With the decrease in the Soviet submarine threat,

several new missions are being explored.
119
a. Deployment of Special Forces (SEALs)
b. Battle group operations
E. Discuss the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine

(SSBN-726).
1. Mission: Deterrence; part of the nuclear triad
2. Size: 18,700 tons (submerged), 560 feet long
3. Propulsion: One nuclear reactor, two turbines, one

shaft
4. Sensors and detection systems
a. BQQ-6 passive hull-mounted sonar
b. BQS-9 active/passive hull-mounted sonar for

close contacts
c. BQR-15 passive towed sonar array
d. Radar for surface operations/navigation
5. An extremely low frequency (ELF) communication

system can receive messages/orders from aircraft
while the submarine is submerged.
6. Weapons systems
a. Trident I or Trident II nuclear ballistic

missile from 24 missile tubes
b. Mk-48 torpedoes from torpedo tubes
F. Discuss the F-14 Tomcat and the F/A-18 Hornet
1. Considerable research and development (R&D) funds

are being contributed to F-14 and F/A-18 programs.
Rapid changes in roles, missions, and weapons are
occurring.
2. With the elimination of the A-6, the cancellation

of the A-12 (in January 1991), and the delay in the
A/F-X projects, the Navy is modifying and improving
the existing aircraft to carry out the attack and
strike missions.
3. No more F-14's will be built, but many of those in

existence will receive considerable upgrades.
4. Missions
a. F/A-18 Hornet
120
(1) Carrier-based and land-based attack/fighter
(2) Considered the A-6E's replacement
b. F-14 Tomcat: Carrier-based, long-range

interceptor with attack capabilities
5. Propulsion
a. Two turbofans
b. Speed
(1) F/A-18: More than 1,360 mph
(2) F-14: More than 1,500 mph
c. Flight time: Approximately 3 hours
6. Capabilities
a. F/A-18 Hornet
(1) Multimode digital air-to-air and air-to-

ground tracking radar can track 10 targets.
(2) Digital flight controls and two flight

computers
b. F-14 Tomcat
(1) Able to track 24 targets and attack 6

simultaneously
(2) AWG-9 weapon control system for automatic

target detection and tracking
7. Weapons
a. Air-to-air
(1) Sidewinder
(2) Sparrow
(3) Phoenix (F-14 only)
(4) Advanced medium range air-to-air missile

(AMRAAM)
(5) M61 Vulcan 20mm cannon
b. Air-to-surface
(1) Maverick (F/A-18 only)
121
(2) Harpoon (F/A-18, to be added to F-14)
(3) HARM (F/A-18, to be added to F-14)
(4) Mk 80 series general purpose bombs (F/A-18

only)
(5) GBU-10/12/16 laser-guided bombs (F/A-18

only)
(6) CBU-59 APAM and CBU-20 Rockeye cluster

bombs (F/A-18 only)
G. Discuss the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).
1. Fleet Marine Force (FMF)
a. Serves the fleet in the seizure and defense of

advanced bases and in the conduct of land
operations.
b. Organized into air-ground landing forces of

different sizes trained in amphibious tactics
and techniques
c. Marine expeditionary unit (MEU)
(1) Smallest FMF air-ground task force
(2) Primary purpose: Ready force of high

visibility to show U.S. presence and
resolve during crisis situations
(3) Routinely assigned to forward deployed

ships
(4) Capable of operations against small,

lightly armed enemy
(5) May be used as the base unit of a larger

build-up
2. Composition of MEU
a. Divided into air, ground, and combat support

services commands
b. 2,500 troops
c. 18-24 helicopters
d. Can have fixed wing aircraft
e. Supported by 4-7 amphibious ships
122
f. The ground combat element is the battalion
landing team (BLT).
3. Weapons of the MEU
a. M-16 rifle: Primary hand-held infantry weapon
b. Personal Defense Weapon: Beretta 9mm semi-

automatic M9 pistol
c. Machine guns
(1) .50 caliber M2: Mounted on tripods,

vehicles, and helicopters
(2) M60E3: Fired from shoulder, hip, sitting,

or prone
d. Hand grenades
(1) Fragmenting warhead: Anti-personnel
(2) Chemical warhead
(a) Tear gas or other irritant for anti-

personnel
(b) White phosphorous or colored smoke for

signaling, marking, screening, or
incineration
e. Grenade launchers
(1) M203 40mm grenade launcher: Used with

the M16A2 rifle
(2) Mod 19 40mm rapid grenade launcher:

Mounted on the ground and on vehicles and
helicopters
f. Squad automatic weapon (SAW): Fired from

shoulder, hip, or underarm
g. Shoulder-launched, multipurpose assault weapon

(SMAW): Dual-mode and anti-armor rockets
h. 60mm and 81mm mortar: Smooth-bore, muzzle-

loaded, indirect-fire weapons
i. Antitank weapons
(1) Tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-

command link guided missile (TOW)
(a) Heavy antitank or assault weapon
123
(b) Carried by vehicle or aircraft
(2) M-47 Dragon antitank guided missile
(a) Medium antitank or assault weapons
(b) Hand-carried, shoulder-fired
(3) Light anti-armor weapon (LAW)
(a) Self-contained launcher and rocket
(b) Hand-carried, shoulder-fired
j. Artillery: 155mm towed howitzer
k. Mines: Antitank and anti-personnel
4. Combat vehicles
a. Landing craft air cushion (LCAC)
(1) Amphibious personnel and cargo carrier
(2) Travels high speeds and long distances
b. Amphibious assault vehicle (AAV): Amphibious

personnel carrier
c. Light armored vehicle (LAV): Amphibious,

multi-role vehicle
d. Main battle tank M1A1
5. Aircraft
a. CH-46 Sea Knight: Transports personnel and

supplies
b. CH-53 Sea Stallion and Super Stallion
(1) Transports personnel, supplies, equipment
(2) Super Stallion is larger; can lift an LAV

and most fighter, attack, and EW aircraft
c. UH-1 Huey
(1) Versatile and durable
(2) Transports personnel and supplies
(3) Can be armed
d. AH-1 Super Cobra: Close-in fire support and

assault fire suppression
124
e. AV-8 Harrier: VSTOL fighter/attack aircraft
f. F/A-18 Hornet: All-weather attack aircraft
6. Navy support ships
a. Amphibious assault
(1) Operates helicopters and VSTOL aircraft,

transports marines, weapons, vehicles
(including LCACs, tanks, LAVs), and equip-
ment
(2) Wasp class (LHD-1): Newest ship
(3) Tarawa class (LHA-1): Floodable well deck
(4) Iwo Jima class (LPH)
b. Amphibious transport dock: Austin class

(LPD-4)
c. Dock landing
(1) Flooded well deck enables these ships to

load and launch LCACs at sea.
(2) Whidbey Island class (LSD-41)
(3) Anchorage class (LSD-36)
H. Summary
125
TITLE: Case Study: Aircraft Mishap Incident
A. The student will comprehend the moral and ethical




effectiveness:
1. Loyalty
2. Honor
3. Integrity
4. Courage
A. Instructor references: Articles in Proceedings, and

various news magazines.
1. “Who Should Have Tried Captain Asby?” Proceedings,

May 1999, pp 2, 4.
2. “U.S. Fighter jet. . .” Newsweek, February 16,

1998.
3. “Tolerance Is Low for Low-Flying Training Around

the World,” Boudreaux. L.A. Times, February 23,
1998.
B. Student text: Handout attached
A. Chalkboard/Easel
B. Instructor-developed handouts and PowerPoint

presentation
C. LCD projector
126
A. Method options: Since the case studies in this course

follow similar lines of discussion, use different
teaching methods to maintain the students' interest.
1. Lecture/explanation of facts by instructor, then

discussion.
2. Student presentation of facts, then discussion.
3. Student discussion of facts based on instructor

questions, then discussion.
4. Role play: Some students play the roles of the

main individuals involved, the other students ask
questions.
5. Debate teams representing the different points of

view.
6. Guest lecturer who can present in detail the

procedures and regulations that help ensure
aircraft safety in the Navy and Marine Corps.
1. Research the subject
2. Reading assignment: Instructor-developed handouts
V. Presentation
A. This case study can be used in a variety of ways. As

presented, the case is based on the event in Italy
1998; it is not intended to be a mock trial of those
involved in the Prowler – gondola incident. This case
study is simply based on the Aviano Incident because of
the limited information that the author had of the
actual incident and should not be considered a
completely historical account. The instructor may feel
it is more valuable to stick to the facts presented in
the media and have the students discuss their opinion
on what the crew of the EA-6B should have done.
B. Case Scenario
1. The students should consider themselves as the new

guy at the squadron. They are on detachment duty
from their home base in Washington State to a
joint command in Italy.
2. The students should consider themselves to be one

of the ECMO’s on a Prowler conducting a rare low-
level training mission.
127
3. Both the Pilot and Navigator are popular in the
squadron. The pilot is slated to transition to an
F/A-18 squadron within 6 months. He has been
flying high altitude missions and hasn’t completed
a low level training mission in 7 months. The
Navigator is the senior junior officer in the
squadron.
4. Aircraft crews have a responsibility to tell their

pilot to “Knock it off”, if they feel the pilot is
being reckless.
5. The following is an excerpt from Instructor

Reference #3:
Italians have long protested in vain about NATO

flights roaring at eye level past their
mountainside villages, especially after such
flying was stepped up to support NATO operations
in war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some offending
flights came from Aviano, the expanding U.S. base
in northeastern Italy, but many were Italian.
Mauro Gilmozzi, the mayor of Cavalese, says that

villagers reported four incidents of unidentified
warplanes hitting ski-lift cables in the Alpine
region between 1990 and 1997, and two incidents of
others flying under the cables in Cavalese in the
1980s. No casualties resulted, but the lack of
explanations from higher authorities disturbed him.
So did a letter the Italian air force sent last
year to a Cavalese resident admitting that its
pilots often dip below the minimum altitude while
"flying blind" -- without navigational instruments.
The letter insisted that such training was safe and
in the interest of national defense. "At least 100
people from our village have telephoned the
authorities about antennas knocked off their roofs,
windows broken, babies awakened, old folks
frightened," the mayor said in an interview.
"I've called the Italian air force four or five

times myself. In the end, I concluded there is
nothing a small village can do when it's the very
state that plans these flights." Similar protests
came from other villages dotting the mountains, but
they were never coordinated and rarely got beyond
the regional air force command.
The Defense Ministry in Rome says it has had just

20 complaints from the Alps in the past three
years; of those, five involving U.S. aircraft were
passed on to Aviano, but U.S. officials there
denied any altitude violations -- until the Prowler
cut the gondola cables about 300 feet above the
128
ground.
6. Incident: See handout at the end of the lesson.
C. Discuss the leadership considerations.
1. What was the navigator’s motivation?
2. What was the pilot’s motivation?
3. Discuss the pilot’s responsibilities.
4. Was the training necessary?
a. Could the training be handled in other less

dangerous ways?
b. If the pilot did deviate from the pre-brief,

what could you do about it?
5. What responsibilities do junior officers have when

faced with ambiguous requirements?
D. Discuss the moral and ethical considerations.
1. What are the moral and ethical considerations

in this case?
a. Death of U.S. citizens?
b. Death of foreign civilians?
c. Is destroying evidence ever justified?
d. What if the evidence will be used to carry out

injustice?
2. Are there examples of moral courage in this

situation?
3. Does the end result justify the means?
a. Where should the line be drawn between

realistic training and safety?
b. If the crews’ reasons were honorable, aren't

the actual actions honorable?
c. Using the same logic, were these actions

morally correct?
E. Summary
129
AIRCRAFT MISHAP INCIDENT CASE STUDY
You are on the last training flight of the deployment. Your EA-6B detachment has almost
completed its six-month tour patrolling the skies of Yugoslavia. Your squadron CO has
managed to get permission for your aircraft to complete a much needed low level training
mission. You know such opportunities are rare because of limited fuel allotted for training and
because the local government has been complaining about the jets “barnstorming” through the
Alps. You have heard stories about some other units back in the States that play it pretty loose,
but your Commanding Officer believes in sticking to your services’ training standards. You
don’t mind, because flying along at 1000 ft at 550 kts is plenty of excitement for you. At the
RAG, you almost earned BARF as your call sign after your first few low levels. The pre-brief
goes off without a hitch; your pilot also runs a tight show and briefs the mission at a minimum
altitude of 1000 ft and maximum speed of 450 kts. During the preflight checklist, you hear the
navigator set the radar altimeter alarm at 800 ft.
About twenty minutes into the flight, that old feeling hits you, and you start regretting the
greasy brauts you ate for lunch. Just when you thought you were cured, it hits you. As you reach
for the "barf" bag, you can already hear over the intercom the ECMO give a play by play to the
front seats on your performance. You hear some laughter and a few quips about the new guy not
handling the fun stuff. You remember that the navigator was taping the flight for a training
video. Great! Everyone is going to know. You feel better quickly and notice that the plane
seems low, but that always seems to be the case in these mountain valleys; and you don’t hear the
radar altimeter alarm, so you don’t say anything. The next thing you know, the aircraft pitches
down and rolls right. Something yellow blurs past and the aircraft shakes a little. You ask what
is going on and hear the navigator and the pilot discussing something about a gondola. Gondola?
There aren’t any gondolas on this mountain. Since you are working on your navigator
qualifications, you have a chart of the route and, sure enough, there isn’t a gondola on the chart.
The pilot tells everyone else in the plane that he thinks he may have just missed a gondola. Your
plane immediately returns to the airbase.
It turns out that although you missed the gondola, your wing tip cut one wire and the vertical
stabilizer cut the other wire supporting the gondola. It fell to the bottom of the valley, killing 20
persons aboard. The cable was 300 feet above the valley floor. At the airbase, you are all
immediately split up and questioned. You don’t say much, because you were busy with your
station and the backseat affords little view. You tell the investigators that you are sure you heard
no radar altimeter alarms.
That night, the other ECMO visits you with the navigator. They want to know what you
think about the video tape. The navigator has not even looked at it, but he figures that the host
country will use the puking incident to hang the entire crew. You have felt partially responsible
and are afraid that you might have distracted the pilot.
130
Aircraft Mishap Incident Case Study (con't):
What could have been done to prevent the accident?
What responsibilities did the crew have to ensure the mission went according to briefing?
Pilots on low levels must closely watch the terrain to ensure aircraft safety. Must they also watch
the altimeter at the same time to adhere to regulations?
Should the crew have trusted an automatic alarm?
Who is responsible for the accuracy of the charts?
Who sets the safe flight envelopes? The Italians required a minimum altitude of 2000 feet. The
squadron was unaware of the requirement. Who is responsible?
The navigator wants to turn the tape in, but the other ECMO wants it to simply disappear. What
would you do and why?
131

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NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS

NAVAL SHIP SYSTEMS II

CNET P1550/1 (REV 11-99)

CHIEF OF NAVAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................... i

RECORD OF CHANGES ......................................... ii

LETTER OF PROMULGATION .................................... iii

DEFINITION OF MEASUREMENT OF TERMS ........................ iv

PROFESSIONAL CORE COMPETENCY OBJECTIVES ................... v

LESSON TOPICS ............................................. ix

INSTRUCTIONAL AIDS ........................................ x

VIDEOTAPE LIST ............................................ xi

DEFENSE CONTRACTORS AND OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION ...... xvi

TRANSPARENCY SERIES ....................................... xviii

BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................. xxiv

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INSTRUCTOR ........................ xxvii

1. Introduction/Weapons System Overview ......... 1

CHANGE NUMBER DATE OF CHANGE DATE ENTERED BY WHOM

I. Know - Recall facts, bring to mind the appropriate

Examples: Know the objectives of damage control aboard

Know the safety procedures used to provide

II. Comprehend - Interpret principles and concepts and relate

Examples: Comprehend the mission of the U.S. Navy and

Comprehend the concepts of internal forces

III. Apply - Utilize knowledge and comprehension of

Examples: Apply correct plotting procedures when

Apply correct procedures to determine times

IV. Demonstrate - Show evidence of ability in performing a

Examples: Demonstrate third-class swimming skills and

Demonstrate the correct procedures used in

The following professional competency objective statements for

1. The student will comprehend the moral and ethical

a. The student will comprehend the leader's moral and

b. The student will comprehend the relationship of

2. The student will comprehend the following personal qualities

d. Courage (moral and physical)

3. The student will know the basic characteristics and

a. The student will know the designations, characteristics,

b. The student will know the role of active and passive

c. The student will know the significance of intelligence in

4. The student will know the concept of naval command and

a. The student will know how the following doctrine

b. The student will know the basic concepts of the detect-

6. The student will comprehend the basic application of

a. The student will know the theory of operation and key

(3) Power Amplifiers

b. The student will know the fundamental means of imparting

c. The student will know the use of computers and digital

e. The student will know refraction, polarization, and

f. The student will know the definition of the effects of

g. The student will know the characteristics, advantages,

h. The student will be able to apply radar theory and

j. The student will know basic electromagnetic interference

7. The student will comprehend the physical properties

a. The student will comprehend sound propagation, including

b. The student will comprehend sound propagation loss,

c. The student will comprehend the concepts of self and

d. The student will apply the active and passive sonar

e. The student will comprehend basic transducer and