Jose Pilapil
Jose Pilapil
Jose Pilapil
Common carriers are required to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers
transported by them according to all the circumstances of each case. In case of death of or injuries to
passengers, the law presumes them to be at fault or to have acted negligently. Such being the case,
however, they are not insurers of the absolute safety of their passengers against any and all risks. They
merely undertake to perform certain duties to the public as the law imposes and hold themselves liable
for any breach thereof.
While as a general rule, common carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, it would seem
that this is not the standard by which its liability is to be determined when intervening acts of strangers
is the direct cause of the injury. Article 1763 governs. Under the said provision, a tort committed by a
stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the
carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the
carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen
and prevented by them. Furthermore, it must be noted that, the degree of care essential to be exercised
by the common carrier in cases like this is only that of a good father of a family
FACTS:
Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded Alatco Transporation’s bus in Iriga City at about 6:00 P.M.
While the said bus was traversing the distance between Iriga City and Naga City, upon reaching the
vicinity of the cemetery of Baao, Camarines Sur, an unidentified bystander along the national highway
hurled a stone at the left side of the bus. Pilapil was hit above his left eye. Alatco Transportation’s
personnel lost no time in bringing the victim to the hospital where he was treated.
Pilapil instituted an action for recovery of damages sustained as a result of the stone-throwing incident.
He argues that the nature of the business of a transportation company requires the assumption of
certain risks. The stoning of the bus by a stranger is one such risk from which a common carrier may not
exempt itself from liability.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent should be liable for the acts of a stranger. (NO)
RULING:
Common carriers are required to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers
transported by them according to all the circumstances of each case. In case of death of or injuries to
passengers, the law presumes them to be at fault or to have acted negligently. Such being the case,
however, they are not insurers of the absolute safety of their passengers against any and all risks. They
merely undertake to perform certain duties to the public as the law imposes and hold themselves liable
for any breach thereof. It must be noted that Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of
extraordinary care to only such as human care and foresight can provide. Moreover, Article 1756 of the
Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier, merely
relieves the victim, for the time being, from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the carrier.
The latter may rebut the same by presenting proof that it had exercised extraordinary diligence as
required by law or that the injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event.
In the case at bar, Pilapil contends that the respondent failed to rebut the presumption of negligence
against it. The Court does not agree. First, the injury sustained by Pilapil was in no way due to any defect
in the means of transport or to the negligent or willful acts of the respondent's employees since it arose
wholly from causes created by strangers over which the respondent had no control or even knowledge.
As such, the presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not to be held liable. To rule otherwise would
make a common carrier the insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers which is not the intention of
the lawmakers. Second, while as a general rule, common carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary
diligence, it would seem that this is not the standard by which its liability is to be determined when
intervening acts of strangers is the direct cause of the injury. Article 1763 governs. It provides:
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful
acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the
exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission.
Under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not
accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held
responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being
committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Furthermore, it must be
noted that, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier in cases like this is only
that of a good father of a family
As to Pilapil’s argument that respondent could have prevented the injury if something like meshwork
grills had covered the windows of its bus, the Court finds the same untenable.Although the suggested
precaution could have prevented the injury, the rule of ordinary care and prudence is not so exacting as
to require one charged with its exercise to take doubtful or unreasonable precautions to guard against
unlawful acts of strangers. Where the carrier uses cars of the most approved type used generally by
others engaged in the same occupation, and exercises a high degree of care in maintaining them in
suitable condition, the carrier cannot be charged with negligence in this respect.