Agnieszka Kozyra

Nishida Kitarō’s Logic of Absolutely Contradictory Identity

and the Problem of Ethics in Zen

Ethics is learning about the concept of good and principles in human

behaviour; it is associated with the existence of moral standards. In the
case of Zen, however, we cannot speak about ethics in the sense of some
collection of precepts, which distinctly belong to this school. Can Zen
ethics even be said to exist, since Zen masters advocate overcoming the
duality of all opposites, including the opposition between good and evil?
The answer to this question also seems not to be clear to some Zen
practitioners, for instance in contemporary American Zen centers, where
some masters have justified their blameworthy behaviour (drunkenness,
seduction of female pupils) by claiming to be free from the concepts of
good and evil1. Of course, such behaviour has been criticized not only by
public opinion, but also by other Zen masters.
In my opinion, Zen ethics should be treated as a part of philosophical
reflections on the experience of Enlightenment. Such a statement brings us
to the problem of Zen philosophy.
In this article, I would like to present the analysis of Zen ethics from the
point of view of Nishida Kitarō’s philosophy of ‘absolute nothingness’
(zettaimu) and its logic of paradox, i.e. logic of absolute contradictory self-
identity (zettaimujunteki jikodōitsu no ronri), which is, in my opinion, the
key to Zen master’s teaching and kōans2 .
The scope of this article does not allow me to present all the arguments
which are important to defend my interpretation of Zen philosophy as
‘paradoxological nihilism’ and Zen logic as the logic of absolutely
contradictory self-identity, which I have discussed elsewhere. 3 I will
mention only the most important problems.

1
Yampolsky 1986: 64.
2
Kōan is an account of a Zen master’s actions or statements, including questions and answers,
which is regarded as the expression of Enlightenment. Also, quotations from various texts, not
only Buddhist, are treated as kōans, since they point to the reality of Enlightenment.
3
This article is partly an English translation of Chapter Five from my book on Zen philosophy
(Kozyra 2003), which was published in Polish. The first part of this book (Chapter Two on
Polemics on Zen theory and practice, and Chapter Three on Zen language) was translated into
English and published as Nishida Kiatrō’s Logic of Absolutely Contradictory Self-Identity and the
Problem of Orthodoxy in the Zen Tradition (Kozyra 2008). Chapter Six on Paradoxological
Nihilism as well as its relation to Nishida’s philosophy of science, which was analysed in my book
on Nishida Kitarō’s philosophy of Nothingness (Kozyra 2007) was translated into Japanese (see:
Kozyra, 2006). See also on Nishida and Shinran: Agnieszka Kozyra 2007.
32
In the first part of this article, I will present some interpretations of Zen
philosophy, which are different from Nishida’s. After explaining how
Nishida’s own experience of Zen practice made him abandon institutional
Zen and seek his own philosophical interpretation of Zen, I will introduce
the outline of Nishida’s philosophy of ‘absolute nothingness’ (zettaimu)
and his logic of paradox as (the logic of absolute contradictory identity) as
related to Zen teaching.
In the second and third part of my article, I will use Nishida’s interpretation
of Zen Enlightenment as the experience of the reality regarded as
absolutely contradictory self-identity (the structure of such reality is
paradoxical) to answer the following questions:
How can one explain the logical connection between Enlightenment (Jpn.
Satori) and Great Compassion (Jpn. Daihi) as the Buddhist ethical ideal?
(The realization of true self and the experience of reality ‘as it is’, i.e. as
Thusness or Suchness (Sk. Tathāta, Jpn. Nyo) is only one aspect of
Enlightenment (the epistemological aspect), the other aspect of
Enlightenment is ethical.)
Why do Zen masters stress the importance of overcoming the dualism of
good and evil but, on the other hand, demand from their disciples
compliance to strict rules in monastic life and do not tolerate behavior that
in society is regarded as immoral?
In my opinion, the answers to the above questions are crucial to understand
Zen ethics. The answers for these questions can also be found in Buddhist
sutras and commentaries, but I would like to focus on the words of Zen
masters, since Zen is claimed to be “transmission separate from [written
Buddhist] teaching” (kyōge betsuden). Let me concentrate on the problem
of the logic of paradox in Zen ethics, since the scope of this article does not
allow me to discuss other important Zen dilemmas, such as, for instance,
why Zen masters have left so many written accounts and commentaries if
Zen is not to be explained in words. (I have discussed them in my other
books and articles4).

I. The Logic of Paradox and Zen Philosophy

Polemics on the philosophy of Zen

Let me introduce just a few voices in the discussion on philosophical
reflection in the Zen tradition, since some scholars deny philosophical
discourse in Zen.

4
See for example: Kozyra 2003:144-183, Kozyra 2007: 125-132, Kozyra 2008: 96-98.
33
Hsueh-li Cheng, probably influenced by the “negative method” of the
Madhyamika school of Buddhism, claims that Zen masters had no vision
of reality. According to him, the essence of Zen philosophy is not an
explanation of the nature of reality but a critical attitude, intellectual liberty,
creativeness and practical attitude. Such “critical philosophy” liberates a
human being from prejudices, dogmatic tendencies and illusions. 5 His
analysis of the practical aspect of Zen leads him to the rather controversial
comparison of Zen and Confucianism. Hsueh-li Cheng does not explain the
difference between chaotic and arbitrary choices and the “openness of Zen
philosophy,” that he postulates. He does not determine the criterion of
Truth, which is crucial to Zen, since Enlightenment must be verified. 6
Hsueh-li Cheng’s conclusions reminds one of Thomas Cleary’s
interpretations of Zen as not an ideology but a “practical psychology of
liberation.”7
Suzuki Daisetz always emphasizes that, while Enlightenment liberates a
man from all conditional determinations, at the same time true Zen masters
throughout history “have a certain firm basis of truth obtained from a deep
personal experience.”8 Zen teaching may look chaotic but in fact there is
one clear current in Zen masters’ teaching. It should be noted that Suzuki
was referred to by many authors of books on Zen, such as Allan Watts or
Robert Linssen, who claimed that treating Zen as a philosophy is a grave
mistake.9 They usually quote the following words of Suzuki Daisetz: “To
understand Zen one must abandon all he has acquired by way of
conceptual knowledge and strip off every bit of knowledge that he has
painfully accumulated around him.”10 Suzuki warned that any „philosophy
of Zen” would be nothing more than „a castle in the sand.”
The above statement by Suzuki only apparently contradicts his opinions
presented in his article titled “The Philosophy of Zen.”11 The problem is
the meaning of the phrase “to understand Zen.” When Suzuki denies
rational thinking, he means that it is an obstacle on the way to the
experience of Enlightenment. Of course, he is right to claim that rational
discourse is not the way to the experience of Enlightenment — all true Zen
masters, past and present, would agree to this conclusion. However, Zen is
also a form of human expression and, as such, is meant to be

5
Cheng 1959: 29-30.
6
Ibid.: 30.
7
Cleary 1989: vii.
8
Suzuki 1969: 54.
9
Watts 1960: 17, Linssen 1960: 46.
10
Suzuki 1956: 349.
11
Suzuki 1951: 5.
34
communicated and articulated in concepts and notions, belonging to the so-
called rational sphere. The following quotation is proof of the fact that
Suzuki Daisetz was aware of the unavoidability of the philosophical aspect
in Zen: “Zen is not to be conceptualized, let me repeat, if it is to be
experientially grasped; but inasmuch as we are human in the sense that we
cannot remain dumb, but have to express ourselves in one way or another,
indeed, we cannot have an experience if we cease to give expression to it.
Zen would not be Zen if deprived of all means of communications. . . . The
conceptualization of Zen is inevitable: Zen must have its philosophy. The
only caution is not to identify Zen with a system of philosophy, for Zen is
infinitely more than that.”12
In my opinion, Suzuki’s interpretation of Zen is not all that different from
that of his friend, Nishida Kitarō, but in contrast to Nishida, Suzuki avoids
systematic analysis on the logic of Zen. Although Suzuki calls the
philosophy of Zen “the philosophy of emptiness,” he is not a
philosopher—first and foremost he is a Zen master concerned with leading
people to the experience of Enlightenment itself. Dealing with Zen, he is
not just a scholar whose main aim is to clarify philosophical aspects of the
doctrine. Suzuki encourages everybody to experience the emptiness, not to
understand its philosophical implications. According to him, only by
emerging in emptiness can one experience emptiness. “The proper way to
study śūnyatā [emptiness – A.K.] is to become aware of it, in the only way
śūnyatā can be approached. That is to say, the philosopher has to purge
every residue of what the mind has accumulated by assiduously applying
himself to the work of intellect. . . . There is no other way than that of
casting away this intellectual weapon and in all nakedness plunging right
into śūnyatā itself.” 13 In Nishida’s writings, one cannot find any
encouragement of Zen practice. Unlike Suzuki, Nishida is first of all a
philosopher; concerned with the logical structure of his vision of reality, he
tries to prove his point of view by linking his conclusions not only to
dilemmas of Western philosophy or to religious experience, but also to
modern physics.14
Abe Masao continues Suzuki Daisetz’s mission of explaining the essence
of Zen to foreigners by comparing Zen philosophy with such Western
philosophers as Nietzsche, Whitehead, or Tillich. However, Abe does not
characterize the philosophy of Zen in a systematic way—in his

12
Ibid.: 4.
13
Ibid.: 5.
14
As seen for instance in Nishida’s philosophical essay Keiken Kagaku (Experimental Science,
1939).
35
comparative studies he admits similarities but mainly emphasizes
differences, clearing out what is not Zen philosophy.
Many previous studies have overlooked the firm logical structure of
paradox in Zen. An example of an interpretation that totally neglects not
only the logical aspect of Zen but also its philosophical aspect is Bernard
Faure’s book Chan Insight and Oversights: An Epistemological Critique of
the Chan Tradition. Faure stresses the importance of historical analysis,
including the examination of the particulars that inform the ritualistic
character of Zen teaching. 15 He writes, “Chan texts are necessarily
rhetorical in the sense that they imply a departure from an ontological
conception of truth toward a more reformative and dialogical
conception.” 16 The deconstructive approach to Zen tradition that Faure
takes is very interesting and innovative, but in my view some of his
conclusions oversimplify the problem. He suggests, for instance, that the
enigmatic structure of kōan is not the expression of the unique “will to
truth” but rather of a “will to power.”17 This interpretation is justified only
in some marginal aspects of Zen kōan, such as, for instance, their usage
during funeral rituals in medieval Japan. In my opinion, the meaning of
“enigmatic structure od kōan” was explained by Nishida — according to
him kōans complies with the logic of paradox and expresses the
paradoxical structure of reality experienced in the act of Enlightenment.

Nishida Kiatrō’s Zen Practice

Nishida’s unique interpretation of Zen tradition, which is philosophical and
free from a sectarian approach (he does not advocate orthodoxy of any
specific Zen line, such as Rinzai or Sōtō), was also influenced by his own
experience of Zen practice.
Nishida started his practice of Zen in April 1896 at Senshin’an, a small
meditation center at the foot of Utatsuyama in Kanazawa, under the
guidance of Setsumon Genshō (1850-1915). Nishida was apparently
encouraged by his friend, Suzuki Daisetz (Daisetsu, 1870-1966), who had
attained the initial awakening—‘seeing one’s nature’ (kenshō 見性)—at
Engakuji in Kamakura in 1895. It is possible that Nishida may have found
some consolation in his Zen practice during times of personal crisis, as he
endured a short separation from his wife and encountered difficulties in
obtaining a new post after he lost his job in 1898 at the Fourth Higher
School in Kanazawa. In 1901, Setsumon formally received him as a lay

15
Faure 1993: 212, 225.
16
Ibid.: 242.
17
Ibid.: 215.
36
disciple (koji 居 士 ) and gave him the name Sunshin (Inch Mind).
Subsequently, in Kyoto, Nishida took part in sesshin (an intensive Zen
practice) under the guidance of master Kokan Sōhō (1839-1903) at Taizōin,
one of the subtemples of Myōshinji.
Convinced that Zen should be explained in philosophical terms, Nishida
never discarded his philosophical approach. Perhaps it is for this reason
that he encountered so many difficulties in his kōan practice. Even in 1903,
when master Kōjū Sōtaku (1840-1907) verified that Nishida had passed the
kōan “Mu,” which indicated that he had experienced kenshō (initial
awakening18), Nishida remained unsatisfied. He wrote to Setsumon about
his doubts, although his teacher in Kanazawa merely replied stressing that
he should not doubt the validity of Zen training. In a letter to Suzuki
Daisetsu, Nishida complained, “What good is it if the master considers that
I have passed a kōan, and yet I am not satisfied? There are Zen
practitioners who pass one kōan after another, thereby achieving seniority
status. I am impressed by neither their behaviour nor by what they say”.19
Years later, after Nishida’s death, Suzuki Daisetz commented on this
problem: “There are those cases, especially with a man like Nishida, who
has a rational, logical mind. But Nishida must have grasped something.
Otherwise, the kind of philosophy he developed would never be
possible”.20
Although Nishida abandoned his formal Zen practice in 1904 and
thereafter solely devoted himself to philosophy, in Suzuki Daisetz’s view, it
was in 1923 that Nishida’s final breakthrough in Zen took place, nearly
twenty years after he had ceased his practice. Nishida said to Suzuki: “My
thoughts have reached the point where they cannot be explained by the
framework of conventional philosophical language”.21
His philosophy began a new phase at around the same time. He proposed a
philosophy of “absolute nothingness” (zettaimu 絶対無) and a logic of
absolutely contradictory self-identity. Even if one doubts that the new
phase of his philosophy was connected with his “final breakthrough,” it is
evident that Nishida linked his logic of absolutely contradictory self-
identity to the Zen tradition. Nishida’s philosophical approach to Zen was
expressed in a letter he wrote to Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990) in 1943. “It is

18
Kenshō – is sometimes translated as ‘initial awakening’ in relation to the idea of grades in Zen
practice. However, in some phrases it is directly related to Enlightenment – kenshō godō 見性悟道,
kenshō jōbutsu 見性成仏.
19
Yusa 2002: 75.
20
Ibid.: 73.
21
Ibid.: 190.
37
true that my philosophy is related to Zen experience. Most people do not
know what Zen is. I believe that the essence of Zen is grasping reality itself
(genjitsu haaku 現実把握). I always wanted to translate Zen experience
into the language of philosophy, although I may not have succeeded in my
attempt. But to do so was my most important ambition from the time I
reached thirty.”22
Nishida’s philosophy is not Zen philosophy, although it is inspired by Zen.
He continued dialogue with Western philosophy all his life and also tried to
resolve many problems that were not discussed by Zen masters, such as the
problem of the philosophy of science.
In his essay Bashoteki Ronri to Shūkyōteki Sekaikan (Logic of Topos and
Religious Worldview) Nishida makes clear his own definition of kenshō
(‘seeing one’s nature’). According to him, ‘seeing one’s nature’ means to
penetrate to the roots of one’s own self, to the bottom (kontei 根底) of
absolute contradictory self-identity23.
For the purpose of this article it is not necessary to answer the question
“Was Nishida Kitarō really enlightened?” I would like to argue that
Nishida’s philosophy offers a coherent interpretation of Zen Philosophy
and Zen Ethics.

Nishida Kitarō’s logic of absolutely contradictory self-identity (the

logic of paradox) and Zen kōans
It should be noted that Nishida distinguished three types of discrimination:
1. irrational indiscrimination (higōriteki mufunbetsu 非合理的無分別),
which is not logical. In the case of irrational discrimination we cannot
judge irrational statements to be true or false, since such statements are
chaotic and have no logical rules to govern them, so we simply reject them
without analyzing them.
2. rational discrimination (gōriteki funbetsu 合理的分別), which is in
compliance with the principle of non-contradiction (“A” is not “non-A”)—
formal logic. It should be noted that to designate formal logic Nishida also
uses such terms as ‘abstract logic’ (chūshōteki ronri 抽 象 的 論 理 ),
‘objectifying logic’ (taishōteki ronri 対象的論理). In the case of formal
logic we regard true judgment as affirmation or negation, so we can call it
“two-value” logic (affirmation or negation).
3. ‘discrimination without discrimination’ (mufunbetsu no funbetsu 無分別
の分別), which is in compliance with the principle of self-contradiction—

22
Muramoto 1997: 91.
23
NKZ vol. 11: 445-446.
38
the truth is both affirmation and negation at the same time and in the same
respect, so it is a “one-value” logic of absolutely contradictory identity (the
complete logic of paradox).
The principle of non-contradiction of formal logic (“A” is not “non-A”) is
only one aspect of the logic of absolutely contradictory self-identity (“A”
is not “non-A” and “A” is “non-A”). That is why “rationality” of formal
logic is included in the logic of paradox as one of its aspects—formal logic
is the aspect of self-determination of the reality in self-negation. Delusions
arise if one becomes attached to objective determination and thereby is not
able to grasp the whole structure of absolutely contradictory self-identity.24
To designate the logic of absolute contradictory self-identity, Nishida also
uses such concepts as ‘concrete logic’ (gutaiteki ronri 具体的論理), ‘true
dialectic’ (shin no beshōhō 真の弁証法), and ‘logic of paradox’ (hairi no
ri 背 理 の 理 ). From the point of view of the logic of absolutely
contradictory self-identity, the truth (the judgment which is truly adequate
to the reality conceived as absolutely contradictory identity) is a paradox,
i.e., affirmation and negation at the same time and in the same respect.
That is why the logic of absolutely contradictory identity is “one-value”
logic, which is ‘a standpoint without a standpoint’ (tachiba naki tachiba 立
場なき立場).25
Nishida states that his logic of absolutely contradictory self-identity is a
paradox from the point of view of formal logic. He also uses such
expressions as hairi no ri to designate his logic of absolutely contradictory
self-identity. The meaning of the word ‘paradox’, which in Greek means “a
judgment opposed to the prevailing opinion” (gyakusetsu 逆 説 ) is
connected with the problem of self-contradiction. Since the principle of
non-contradiction is the demarcation line of formal logic, paradoxes are
thought to be absurd, since they are considered to be caused merely by
erroneous reasoning. Therefore, much effort has been given to “solving”
such paradoxes in philosophy and science. However, Nishida’s ‘absolutely
contradictory self-identity’ is a paradox which cannot be solved by proving
that paradoxical self-contradiction is only superficial and can be explained
in terms of formal logic. In this article the word ‘paradox’ is defined as
“one dimensional self-contradictory judgment,” and “one dimensional”
means that self-contradiction belongs to the same temporal and spatial
aspect. Nishida’s ‘absolutely contradictory self-identity’ is a synonym for a
thus-defined ‘paradox’. I am proposing that Nishida’s logic of absolutely

24
NKZ vol. 11: 445-446.
25
NKZ vol. 8: 570.
39
contradictory self-identity is the most complete expression of the logic of
paradox.
According to Nishida, the Buddhist notion of “form is emptiness and
emptiness is form” (shiki soku ze kū 色即是空; kū soku ze shiki 空即是色)
complies with the principle of self-contradiction of the logic of paradox.
(Form (A) is emptiness (not-A) and yet emptiness (not-A) is form (A).)
Nishida states it very clearly: “Emptiness is form and form is emptiness as
absolutely contradictory identity of affirmation and negation.” 26 He also
emphasizes that to grasp the meaning of ‘seeing into one’s own nature’
(kenshō) is “to grasp fully the logic of paradox.”27” “Zen speaks of seeing
into one’s own nature and attaining enlightenment (kenshō jōbutsu). But
this Zen phrase must not be misunderstood. Seeing here does not mean to
see anything externally as an object; nor does it mean to see an internal self
through introspection. The self cannot see itself, just as an eye cannot see
itself. And yet this does not mean that we can see the Buddha-nature
transcendentally either. If it were seen in that way [as an object] it would
be a hallucination.”28
For Nishida, the functional meaning of Zen kōan is a tool or means
(shudan 手段) that helps in grasping the paradoxical structure of reality.
He quotes the following kōan to explain his point of view: “One day
Shoushan Shennian29 taking up a bamboo stick, said: ‘When you call this a
bamboo stick, you are wrong; and when you don’t call it a bamboo stick,
you are also wrong. What, then, do you call it?’”30 Shoushan’s words can
be taken as expressing the direct paradoxical judgment: “Calling a bamboo
stick a bamboo stick is wrong and is not wrong at the same time and in the
same respect.”
It is important to take into consideration the usage of direct and indirect
paradoxical judgments and concepts in Nishida’s philosophy. Kōans not
only function as “tools,” but they are also descriptive—they are
paradoxical judgments describing the true reality, i.e. the structure of
reality, which complies to the logic of absolutely contradictory self-identity.
Nishida stated that the words of Zen masters should be understood in terms
of the logic of absolutely contradictory identity.31 He sometimes uses direct
paradoxical judgments, stating for instance that “the world of absolutely

26
NKZ vol. 11: 18.
27
NKZ vol. 11: 446.
28
Ibid.: 424-425.
29
Jpn. Shuzan Shōnen, (926-993).
30
Ibid.: 446.
31
Ibid.: 430-431.
40
contradictory identity is self-identical in itself and at the same time is not
self-identical in itself”32 or “the world of absolutely contradictory identity
is always determined and at the same time it is always changing.”33 He also
uses direct paradoxical concepts such as ‘immanent transcendence’
(naizaiteki chōetsu 内在的超越) or ‘discrimination without discrimination’
(mufunbetsu no funbetsu 無分別の分別). In his philosophy the reality is
regarded as ‘continuation without continuation’ (hirenzoku no renzoku 非
連続の連続),34 and inner unity of the self as ‘unity without unity’ (tōitsu
naki tōitsu 統一なき統一).”35
However, direct paradoxical judgment and concepts alone may not be
sufficient to communicate to others the vision of reality as absolutely
contradictory self-identity. Nishida had to explain that his approach is not
irrational or at its best mystical (in the sense that “mysticism has nothing to
do with objective knowledge”). That is why he used indirect paradoxical
concepts and judgments to link his common sense/formal logic vision of
reality with his vision of reality as absolutely contradictory self-identity.
Indirect paradoxical concepts explain various aspects of absolutely
contradictory self-identity.
Let us consider the notion of ‘absolute nothingness’ as an indirect
paradoxical concept. It is not a direct paradoxical concept because the
‘name’ of this concept itself is not self-contradictory (there is no self-
contradiction in the name of ‘absolute nothingness’ as there is in the case
of ‘immanent transcendence’). However, ‘absolute nothingness’ is defined
as nothingness identical with being (u soku mu 有即無), and that is why its
meaning is paradoxical.
Nishida’s concept of ‘topos of absolute nothingness’ must not be
objectified but also treated as an indirect paradoxical concept. ‘Topos of
absolute nothingness’ is the spatial aspect of absolutely contradictory
identity, and as such is also a paradox: place/topos of ‘absolute
nothingness’ is the ‘final place’ (kyūkyokuteki basho 窮極的場所) which
has no place; that is why it is ‘groundless ground’ (mukiteiteki kitei 無基底
的基底).36 If it had its place, it would not be the final place. ‘Absolute
nothingness’ can be regarded as the field of consciousness in only one of
its many aspects. Forgetting about the whole paradoxical structure of

32
NKZ vol. 9: 278.
33
Ibid.: 301.
34
NKZ vol. 6: 217.
35
Ibid.: 219.
36
NKZ vol. 11: 18.
41
absolute nothingness leads to the mistaken conclusion that the field of
consciousness is something out of which the individual consciousness
emanates. ‘Topos of absolute nothingness’ (the spatial aspect of absolute
contradictory identity) is the paradoxical state, in which all individual
entities are unique and separated, and yet are mutually unhindered and
interfused—a state which cannot be objectified.
Nishida warns that the state of contradiction can neither be thought of from
the standpoint of subject-object dualism nor can it even be imagined,
therefore it is a grave mistake to objectify its approach. The world of
absolutely contradictory identity in its spatial/ topological aspect is
‘groundless ground’ since there is no foundation of beings which can be
separated from other beings, just as there is not anything that emanates
being. Nishida believed, it should be noted, that the Buddhist expression
“because there is no place in which it abides, the Mind arises” should be
understood as implying the ‘topos of absolute nothingness’ or ‘groundless
ground’.37
Nishida emphasized that the relation of ‘one’ and ‘many’ is a relation of
absolutely contradictory self-identity: ‘many’ remain ‘many’ and at the
same time is ‘one’; ‘one’ remains ‘one’ and simultaneously is ‘many’.38
‘One’ cannot be regarded as the foundation of ‘many’, since in such a case
the relation of ‘one’ and ‘many’ could not be ‘absolutely contradictory self-
identity’ in which no element is regarded as a fundamental element or at
least as more important than the others. Nishida states that the world of
absolutely contradictory self-identity of ‘one’ and ‘many’ means that
“innumerable things always contradict one another and at the same time
are ‘one’.” 39 Nishida compares such a paradoxical state to an infinite
sphere, which has no circumference and its center is everywhere. Such an
infinite sphere is groundless (mukiteiteki) and reflects itself within itself.40
It should be noted that such a vision of reality as infinite with the center at
any point is reminiscent of the notion of “the mode of existence in which
all phenomenal things are mutually unhindered and interfused” (jijimuge)
of the Kegon school.
In fact, Nishida’s absolutely contradictory self-identity of one and many
should be regarded as exactly such a paradoxical state in which all
individual entities are unique and separated and yet are mutually
unhindered and interfused, and that is why they are ‘one’. In such a vision

37
NKZ vol. 11: 415.
38
NKZ vol. 6: 170.
39
NKZ vol. 11: 18.
40
Ibid.: 18.
42
of reality, there is no single element which is more real than others and can
be regarded as lying beyond or behind the interdependence of all
individual entities. In Kegon thought, the state of all phenomenal things
being mutually unhindered and interfused was compared to ‘Indra’s Net’, a
net of jewels in which each jewel reflects all other jewels. It is easy to
imagine that one jewel reflects the jewels that are close to it, but it cannot
be imagined that it reflects all jewels, no matter how far they are from it.
Nishida expresses the same idea of unhinderedness, quoting Zen master
Panshan Baoji (Jpn. Banzan Hōshaku, 720-814), a disciple of Mazu Daoyi
(Jpn.. Basō Dōitsu, 709-788):
“It is like waving a sword in the air. It does not leave any trace as it cleaves
the air. The blade is also untouched. The individual self and the world,
individual entity and totality, are in a relation of absolutely contradictory
identity.”41

Relation of “Mind” and “Buddha” as Absolute Contradictory Self-

Identity
Many passages in Nishida’s essay Bashoteki ronri to shūkyōteki sekaikan
(Topological Logic and Religious Worldview) express his conviction that
the relation of ‘Mind’ and ‘Buddha’ in the Buddhist tradition must be
understood in terms of the logic of paradox. He writes, for example,
“Whole Mind is Buddha” (zenshin soku butsu 全心即仏), “Buddha is
wholly man” (zenbutsu soku jin 全仏即人), and “no difference between
Buddha and man” (jinbutsu fui 人仏不異).”42 “Mind in itself is Buddha,
Buddha in itself is Mind,” he says, yet this “does not mean that Buddha
and Mind are identical from the point of view of objectifying logic/formal
logic.”43 In this context ‘Mind’ (Jpn. shin 心; Sk. citta; Ch. xin) means the
conceptual, discriminating mind, which distinguishes between subject and
object. Individual self is the same as Buddha—such a statement is
contradictory since individual self is relative and Buddha is absolute.
Zen masters often referred to the notion “Mind is Buddha.” It should be
noted that one of the kōan from the collection The Gateless Gate
(Mumonkan) directly expresses this truth: “Mind is Buddha” (sokushin
sokubutsu 即心即仏).44 Mazu Daoyi also stressed that “Outside mind there
is no Buddha, outside Buddha there is no mind.” 45 The same truth was
41
NKZ vol. 11: 430.
42
Ibid.: 430.
43
Ibid.: 423.
44
Nishimura 1996: 135.
45
Dumoulin 1979: 57.
43
expressed by the Japanese Zen Master Shinchi Kakushin (1207-1298),
whose words Dumoulin rendered in verse:

Mind is the Buddha.

The Buddha is mind.
Mind and Buddha, such as they are,
Are the same in the past and the future.46

If the sentence “Mind is Buddha” were to be interpreted from the point of

view of formal logic, the conclusion would be that no religious practice is
required. “Mind” and “Buddha” would be synonyms, and would not be
different from each other at all. However, all Zen masters claim that people
must follow religious practice to realize their ‘buddha-nature’. Hakuin
Ekaku (1689-1769) wrote: “Yet sentient beings do not know how close it
[Buddha] is, and search for it far away. How sad!”47. How could it be that,
as Ikkyū Sōjun (1394-1491) stated, “we have one moon [Buddha nature],
clear and unclouded, yet are lost in darkness.”48
Nishida maintained that the identity of the individual self and Buddha
should not be understood in terms of formal logic, since it makes sense
only from the point of view of the logic of absolutely contradictory identity.
From the point of view of formal logic the statement “Mind is Buddha”
means that two elements are identical; they are only different names for the
same thing (A=A). From the point of view of the logic of contradictory
identity, however, “identity” is always contradictory—the individual self is
Buddha and is not Buddha at the same time and in the same respect. “Mind
is Buddha, Buddha is Mind”—this true statement does not mean that the
world is an emanation of the Mind. An individual self (shin 心) is not an
individual self (hishin 非心), and that is why it is an individual self (shin
心). The relation of Buddha and human beings must be understood as
“contradictory identity” in compliance with “‘is’ and ‘is not’ logic” (the so-
called sokuhi 即非 logic, soku no ronri 即の論理) characteristic of The
Perfection of Wisdom Sutras (Sk. Prajnāpāramitā-sūtra, Jpn. Hannya
Haramita Kyō).”49 The sokuhi logic of The Perfection of Wisdom Sutras
expresses the truth that the true ‘absolute’ must be ‘absolutely
contradictory self-identity’.50
46
Dumoulin: 1990: 30.
47
Stevens 1993: 7.
48
Ikkyū 1982: 79.
49
NKZ vol. 11: 446.
50
Ibid.: 405.
44
Nishida took the words of the famous Japanese Zen master Shūhō Myōchō,
known as Daitō Kokushi (1282-1338) to be the best expression of the
paradoxical relation between the relative ‘Mind’ and the absolute
‘Buddha’: “Separated by a billion eons (kalpas), and yet not separated even
for a moment. Always face to face, yet never met.”51
The logic of absolutely contradictory self-identity neither nullifies the self
nor merely signifies that the self becomes Buddha or comes closer to
Buddha. It indicates rather that the relation of the self and ‘the absolute’ are
always ‘reciprocal polarization’ (gyaku taiō 逆対応)52, i.e. one becomes
the other through self-negation. According to Nishida, Dōgen’s (Dōgen
Kigen, 1200-1253) saying “to study the way of Buddha is to study the self,
to study the self is to forget the self” should be understood in this context.53
The logic of absolutely contradictory self-identity can also be seen in such
Buddhist concepts as “passions are Enlightenment” (bonnō soku bodai 煩
悩即菩提 or “samsara is nirvana” (shōji soku nehan 生死即涅槃).
If it is admitted that the reality experienced in Enlightenment is absolutely
contradictory self-identity, it must also be admitted that only judgments in
which the opposites are contradictory identical (paradoxical judgment) are
adequate to such reality. This is not the problem of finding or not finding
sufficient expressions to describe the experience of ‘Enlightenment’. It is
the problem of shifting from formal logic to the logic of absolutely
contradictory self-identity. Nishida calls such a ‘shift’ ‘the overturning of
the self’ (jiko no tenkan 自己の転換).54 What is the difference between
attaining ‘buddha-nature’ by transformation and attaining ‘buddha-nature’
by shifting?
Let us compare this difference to a visual change in the perception of
geometrical figures. If one sees a square and then after sees a triangle in the
same place, that means either the square was replaced by a triangle or by
some transformation a square was changed into a triangle. However, when
one is looking from the point where diagonals of a square, which is the part
of a cube crosscut, one sees a square and then if one changes one’s point of
view even a little bit, one can see a cube, although no transformation has
taken place. In such cases the change from a square to a cube will be due to
a shift in point of view.
Another argument that the logic of absolutely contradictory self-identity
constitutes the structure of reality revealed in the experience of

51
Ibid.: 399.
52
Ibid.: 415.
53
Ibid.: 411.
54
Ibid.: 425.
45
Enlightenment is the Zen term munen 無念 (‘non-thinking’). Both Nishida
and Suzuki Daisetz argued that true insight into reality is possible only as
‘discrimination without discrimination’, a notion which is a paradox itself.
It should be noted that the term ‘no-thinking’ (munen) is interpreted by the
Sixth Patriarch, Huineng (Jpn. Enō, 638-713) as “thinking while not
thinking,” 55 which is exactly the meaning of Nishida’s concept of
‘discrimination without discrimination’. Huineng taught: “This Dharma-
door of mine, from the past onwards, from the beginning has been
established with no-thought as its doctrine, no-mark as its substance, no-
dwelling as its basis. No-thought means to be without thought while in the
midst of thought. No-mark means to be apart from marks while in midst of
marks. No-dwelling is the basic nature of human beings.”56
The same logic of paradox can be seen in the Zen term ‘No-Mind’ (mushin
無心). Dahui Zonggao (Jpn. Daie Sōkō, 1089-1163) said: “The so-called
No-Mind is not like clay, wood, or stone, that is, utterly devoid of
consciousness; nor does the term imply that the mind stands still without
any reaction when it contacts objects or circumstances in the world. It does
not adhere to anything, but is natural and spontaneous at all times and
under all circumstances. There is nothing impure within it; neither does it
remain in a state of purity.”57 Dahui complies to the logic of paradox, when
he states that: There is nothing impure within No-Mind; neither does it
remain in a state of purity.

I think that Nishida’s logical approach to Zen—in terms of his logic of

absolutely contradictory self-identity—provides a coherent explanation of
inner logical structure of such Zen concepts as No-Mind. The limited scope
of this article does not allow us to reflect on how Nishida’s logic of
absolutely contradictory self-identity is useful in interpreting such
problems as the meaning of Zen metaphors, levels of meanings in kōan
(including the typology of paradoxical judgment in kōan), or relations of
Zen to the doctrine of other Buddhist schools.58
From the point of view of the logic of absolutely contradictory self-identity,
the orthodoxy of Zen is not any “formal logic doctrine” but the structure of
paradox itself. Only those Zen statements which comply with the logic of
contradictory self-identity indirectly (as a ‘skillful means,’ hōben 方便) or
directly can be labeled “orthodox.” Each thesis alone, and each antithesis

55
Yampolsky 1967: 138.
56
Ibid.,: 162.
57
Chang 1957.
58
Kozyra 2003.
46
alone is only the “partial truth,” while the truth of Zen itself is the
absolutely contradictory self-identity of any thesis and its antithesis.
According to Nishida, the main function of kōan is to describe the nature
of reality revealed in the experience of Enlightenment in compliance with
the logic of paradox. Nishida would not agree with Faure that the
enigmatic structure of kōan is not the expression of the unique “will to
truth” but rather of a “will to power.”59 According to Nishida, kōans are
direct reflections on the experience of absolutely contradictory identity,
and as such they are direct or indirect paradoxical judgments. As a method
of Zen religious practice, kōans also play the role of “catalysts of
Enlightenment”; they “catalyze” a reaction that can be described as a shift
from the formal logic of perspective to the perspective of the logic of
absolutely contradictory self-identity. Zen kōan are definitely expressions
of a ‘will to truth,’ and only by the distortion of their original meaning and
purpose could they become the expression of ‘will to power.’ To overlook
the paradoxical structure of indirect paradoxical concepts and judgments in
Zen tradition is to forget that “the finger pointing to the moon remains a
finger and under no circumstances can be changed into the moon itself.”60

II Zen Paradoxical Ethics

The following key issues need to be considered when analyzing Zen

Ethics: the critique of formal ethics rooted in the duality of good and bad,
the contemplation of the essence of ‘great compassion’ (daihi) and the
differences between ‘paradoxical ethics’ and formal ethics.

Dualism of Good and Evil as an Obstacle on the Way to Enlightenment

Why should a Zen disciple not distinguish between good and evil or sacred
and profane?
Under Nishida’s ‘logic of paradox’, choosing between any pair of
opposites, including good and evil, is an obstacle to overcoming
epistemological dualism, considered to be an essential condition for
‘Enlightenment. The distinction between good and bad, so important for
the norms of social life, turns out to impede those seeking ‘Enlightenment’.
This is why Huineng taught his pupils: “Don’t think about what’s good,
don’t think about what’s bad”61.
Sengcan (Jpn. Sōsan, ?-606?), the Third Zen Patriarch wrote:

59
Ibid.: 215.
60
Suzuki 1969: 78.
61
Nishimura 1996: 98.
47
 Ignorance begets the duality of calm and anxiety […],
Gain and loss, good and evil –
Let’s discard these concepts62.

The necessity of going beyond the duality of opposite notions also applies
to the sacrum-profanum dichotomy. Linji Yixuan (Jpn. Rinzai Gigen,?-
866) taught: “If you love what’s sacred and hate what’s worldly, you will
drift on a sea of births and deaths, and in the end you will drown in it.’63
Such names as ‘Buddha’ or ‘Enlightenment’ are only intermediate concepts
pointing to the reality of ‘Enlightenment’, which cannot be objectified. “If
you look for ‘buddha’, you become a slave to the concept ‘buddha’” 64,
taught Linji, who had in mind the concept ‘buddha’ as the object of the
subject’s cognition. Wherever there is a duality of subject and object of
cognition, there can be no change of perspective in perceiving reality,
which is why emancipation cannot take place. It is in this context that the
following words of Linji should be understood: “If you meet ‘buddha’, kill
‘buddha’” 65 . ‘Buddha’, or ‘enlightened self’, means going beyond all
duality, thus it cannot be an object of perception. A student of Zen must kill
‘buddha’, that is, reject the concept of ‘buddha’ in order to realize that the
‘individual self’ is contradictorily identical with the ‘enlightened self’.
A similar purpose lies behind other seemingly blasphemous statements by
Linji, such as deeming ‘final emancipation’ or ‘enlightenment’ to be
hitching posts for asses66. For only fools allow themselves to be tied to
intermediate concepts without realizing that they are merely ‘a finger
pointing to the moon’, not the moon (essence of reality). Huangbo Xiyun
(Jpn. Ōbaku Kiun, ?-850) warned that ‘buddha’ cannot be treated
objectively, because then the “path of ‘buddha’ will lead you astray just as
the path of demons”67.
The following words of Daitō Kokushi mean much the same:

Breaking through [to ‘Enlightenment’ – A. K.], I set aside

all ‘buddhas’ and patriarchs68.
Ignorance and ‘Enlightenment’ –

62
Suzuki 1962: 126.
63
Iriya 1996: 52.
64
Ibid.: 83.
65
Ibid.: 96.
66
Ibid.: 35.
67
Blofeld 1973: 75.
68
Kenneth Kraft 1992: 192.
48
 those are deceptive words
always deluding monks69.

Bassui Tokushō (1327-1387) taught: “When ignorance appears, break

through it, even if you encounter ‘Enlightenment’, ‘Buddha’ or a demon as
ignorance”70.
Such concepts as ‘Buddha’ or ‘Enlightenment’ point only indirectly to the
true essence of reality, which is ‘absolutely contradictory self-identity’. No
concept which can be negated in such a way as to generate an opposite
concept can be treated as commensurate with reality, even if it is a sacred
name. If we consider the word dharma (Chin. fa; Jpn.. hō) to refer to all
objects of cognition distinguished by negation, the words of the Perfect
Wisdom Sutra – that there are no better or worse dharmas – become
comprehensible” 71 . All dharmas are empty, that is, have no permanent
nature, thus we cannot determine their hierarchy.
Mazu Daoyi emphasized that the concept of evil is as empty as all other
dharmas:

Do not become attached to good,

do not reject evil.
Defilement and purity –
If you are not dependent on them,
You will comprehend the empty nature of evil.
You can never grasp it at any moment,
Because evil has no constant nature72.

Mazu stressed that “you cannot get attached to anything, even the dharma
‘buddha’” 73 , precisely because all dharmas are empty. Recognizing the
superiority of one dharma over another (for instance, the dharma ‘buddha’
over the dharma ‘tree’) can occur only due to their utility in leading people
to ‘Enlightenment’. That is because such concepts as ‘cosmic body of
Buddha’ or ‘Enlightenment’ often become an ‘appropriate way’ by which
Zen masters lead people to emancipation. These sacred concepts, however,
can become obstacles to attaining the experience of ‘Enlightenment’ if they
are regarded as direct signs, that is, commensurate with reality.

69
Ibid.: 16.
70
Dumoulin 1990: 200.
71
Conze 1968: 115.
72
Dumoulin 1979: 57.
73
Ibid.: 57.
49
Many seemingly blasphemous statements by Zen masters are meant to
stress that absolutely everything has the ‘nature of buddha’. Yunmen
Wenyan (Jpn. Unmon Bun’en, 864-949), when asked about the ‘nature of
buddha’, replied that it can even be found in excrement74. Some scholars
see in these words the influence of Chuangzi, who, when asked where the
‘Way’ is, replied, “The ‘Way’ is in urine and feces”75.
A person who does not understand the ‘emptiness’ of good and evil cannot
fathom the essence of reality. This is precisely why Baizhang Huaihai (Jpn.
Hyakujō Ekai, 720-814) stated that rejecting the duality of good and evil is
a condition for ‘Enlightenment’. “When you forget about what’s good and
what’s evil, about secular life and religious life, when you forget about all
dharmas and do not allow any thoughts relating to them to arise, when you
relinquish body and mind – then you will achieve complete freedom”76.
This type of approach by Zen masters to the dualism of such opposite
concepts as good-evil or sacred-profane is the reason why objects of
Buddhist veneration had no absolute value for them – at most, such objects
had relative value due to their utility on the path to ‘Enlightenment’. Zen
masters warned that excessive attachment to Buddhist religious objects
could be barriers on the path to the experience of ‘Enlightenment’. For
example, Dōgen cited the legend of a monk who always carried a casket
with a golden statuette of Buddha Śākyamuni, which he venerated every
day by burning pastilles and praying. A Zen master commanded him to
throw away the casket, as the master saw excessive attachment to form in
his behaviour. The monk, however, did not want to do this and intended to
leave the monastery. Before he left, the master summoned him and told
him to open the casket. Inside was a venomous snake. Dōgen commented
on this parable as follows: “Images of Buddha and relics should be
accorded respect, because statues or pictures present the one who attained
‘Enlightenment’, and relics are his remains. It is mistaken to expect,
however, that ‘Enlightenment’ will occur as a result of venerating religious
objects. This mistake condemns you to the torment of venomous snakes
and evil forces”77.
Religious objects thus do not have absolute value. This is reflected in the
behaviour of Danxia Tianran (Jpn. Tanka Tennen, 739-824), who spent a
night in a ruined temple together with two other monks, and since it was
very cold, he started a fire using wood from a Buddha statue. When his

74
Nishimura 1996: 73.
75
Buswell 1997: 335.
76
Dumoulin 1988: 171.
77
Dumoulin 1979: 99.
50
companions asked him why he destroyed the Buddha statue, he replied, “I
only looked for the sacred remains of Buddha”. One of the monks said,
“But Buddha’s remains are not in a piece of wood”. To which Danxia
responded, “So I burned only a piece of wood”78. According to Dōgen,
Danxia’s behaviour was an expression of absolute freedom from form79.
As Daisetz Suzuki correctly observed, Danxia’s behaviour did not at all
mean that Zen masters called for the destruction of Buddhist statues. This
parable merely serves as a reminder that attachment to religious forms
should not eclipse religious spirit.
This is why Myōan Eisai (1141-1215) gave a large starving family a piece
of copper meant to serve as the halo on a Buddha statue – he did not have
anything else to give them. When other monks criticized him for this, Eisai
said that Buddha sacrifices even his entire body if the hungry need it80. The
issue of religious objects in Buddhism must be considered also in the
context of ‘an expedient mean’ (Jpn.. hōben), which a master should
choose to fit the specific situation. Daitō Kokushi stressed that the most
important thing is to go beyond the duality of all concepts, including the
duality of sacred and profane. He admitted, though, that the adoration of
Buddhist statues or the financing of temples helps many people to
strengthen their karmic bonds with Buddhism81.

‘Great Compassion’ as an Ethical Ideal

Transcending the duality of good and evil does not mean that persons who
have attained ‘Enlightenment’ behave randomly and chaotically – instead,
their behaviour is governed by the ‘logic of paradox’. They are not
unconstrained hedonists, because the freedom attained in the act of
‘Enlightenment’ means freedom from all desires considered to give rise to
suffering. Furthermore, in the act of ‘Enlightenment’, they become aware
of their paradoxical identity with the entire universe. Due to an experience
of ‘absolutely contradictory self-identity’ with everything that exists, they
are capable of perfectly empathizing with everything that exists, which is
why they are filled with ‘great compassion’.
The Sanskrit concept mahākarunā (Chin. taibei; Jpn. daihi) is usually
translated as ‘great compassion’, but it should be noted that from the
standpoint of the ‘logic of paradox’ it means total acceptance resulting
from the structure of reality as ‘absolutely contradictory self-identity’. For

78
Ibid.
79
Ibid.
80
Stryk, Ikemoto 1981: 16.
81
Kraft 1992: 119.
51
true compassion is possible only when the subject and object of cognition
are identical. It is only under the ‘logic of paradox’ that you can love others
as yourself, because others are you, and you are identical with them.
As opposed to ‘The Smaller Vehicle’ of Buddhist teachings, in ‘The Great
Vehicle’ ‘Enlightenment’ is always connected with the will to emancipate
all beings. Being aware that “form is emptiness” means awakening ‘perfect
wisdom’. By extension, understanding that “emptiness is form”, thus
ultimately grasping the ‘absolutely contradictory self-identity’ of
‘emptiness’ and form, engenders ‘great compassion’. Those who have
attained enlightenment feel unity with all suffering beings, which is why
compassion is their natural state. They spontaneously act for the good of all
beings, striving to emancipate them from the circle of birth and death.
Because they are contradictorily identical with the entire universe, ‘great
compassion’ does not refer only to ‘sentient beings’ – in this context,
Dōgen stated that “‘great compassion’ is also shown in birds or flowers”82.
According to Abe Masao, the indissoluble tie between ‘perfect wisdom’
and ‘great compassion’ was expressed most fully in the following passage
from a translation of the Heart Sutra by Xuanzhuang (Jpn Genjo, 600-
664): “When Avalokiteśvara (Jpn.. Kannon) practices the excellence of the
‘supreme wisdom’, he sees five aggregates creating the illusion of a
separate ‘I’ as ‘emptiness’ and frees all people from all suffering”83. In the
Nirvana Sutra, ‘great compassion’ is considered to be an attribute of
‘buddha-nature’84. Abe agreed with Suzuki Daisetz’s view that many Zen
practitioners identified ‘Enlightenment’ only with ‘perfect wisdom’ without
attaching importance to the meaning of ‘great compassion’ 85 . He
emphasized that it is impossible to separate these two concepts, though he
pointed out that ‘great compassion’ is not the result of moral self-perfection,
but the “direct action of the ‘individual self’ that is ‘non-self’, because it
transcends the duality of all opposites, including the good-evil
opposition”86. Abe cited the following parable about the master Zhaozhou
Congshen (Jpn. Jōshū Jūshin, 778-897). When asked whether ‘buddha’ is
free from all desires, Zhaozhou replied in the negative: ‘buddha’ is
overflowing with the desire to emancipate all suffering beings 87. Dōgen
also stressed that the essence of Buddha Śākyamuni’s teaching is ‘great

82
Abe 1985: 114.
83
Cleary 1991: 158.
84
Suzuki 1948: 117.
85
Abe 1985: 79.
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid.
52
compassion’: “The compassion of Tathagata cannot be expressed in words.
Everything he did was for the good of sentient beings”88.
Perfect compassion is possible only if the subject (I) and the object of
cognition (for instance, another person) are one, though they preserve their
separate characteristics. Masao Abe cites Vimalakirti: “I am sick because
other people are sick” - this sentence can also be interpreted in accord with
the ‘logic of paradox’89.
The state of ‘Enlightenment’, deemed ‘non-self’, proves to be compassion
so profound that we cannot imagine it. This is why those who set off on the
path of ‘enlightenment’ make the following vow: “I pledge to emancipate
countless beings”. As Chen-chi Chang rightly noted, ‘great compassion’ is
unconditional love that can be realized only by reaching ‘true emptiness’90.
He emphasized that ‘great compassion’ is unrelated to righteous retribution,
because according to karmic law, he who does evil must reap the
consequences – evil begets evil. There is no just judge who orders and
rewards91.
The Enlightened person expresses their ‘great compassion’ in acts that
others consider to be good as well as acts considered to be bad. It is in this
context that the passage from the Vimalakirti Sutra – where Bodhisattva
attained ‘enlightenment’ while taking the path of evil – should be
understood92. Zen ethics distinguishes no acts considered bad always and
everywhere. ‘Great compassion’ can be expressed in many different forms
depending on the situation, because it is not the letter of the law – it has
much in common with the evangelical spirit of love.
The concept of ‘great compassion’ is paradoxical, because those who
demonstrate ‘great compassion’ cannot pass to the opposite state – they are
unable to act without compassion. It means final, total, timeless affirmation.
It should not be supposed that Buddha loves a man for abiding by ethical
precepts, or for deserving Buddha’s love in some other way. It was
precisely for the purpose of distinguishing ‘great compassion’ from the
concept of love conditioned by the concept of absence of love that Buddha
Sakyamuni taught the following in the Lotus Sutra:

I neither love nor hate anyone,

I am not attached to anything.

88
Dumoulin 1979: 99-100.
89
Abe 1985: 79.
90
Chang 1959: 158.
91
Ibid.: 160.
92
Komatsu 1984: 284.
53
 I convey true knowledge all the time93.

This approach signifies not indifference, but unconditional love that rejects
no one and no thing. Without the spiritual breakthrough of ‘Enlightenment’,
this state is unattainable for man – he cannot love unconditionally to the
point where even speaking about love would be impossible because no
other emotion could exist from which it could be distinguished. Those
filled with ‘great compassion’ are incapable of hatred or indifference. This
state of absolute acceptance cannot be achieved by persistent religious
practice. It is as unfeasible as the evangelical injunction to love thy
enemies, that is, the demand made upon Christians to emulate Christ and,
after receiving a blow to one cheek, turn the other cheek without feeling
hatred toward the perpetrator. We come to the conclusion that ‘great
compassion’ is the supreme value (thus the supreme good), yet it is a
paradoxical value because it is not conditioned on its negation. In this
sense, Great Compassion can be regarded as an indirect paradoxical
concept.
The necessity of overcoming epistemological dualism (including dualism
of good and evil) on the way to Enlightenment does not lead to the
conclusion that good deeds do not make sense. However, one must not
forget that we never encounter abstract good or evil, but concrete acts
whose effects are felt as good or evil. Deeds treated as good in certain eras
are treated as bad in others (slave holding, for instance – Aristotle
considered slaves to be “tools endowed with a soul” 94 ). Furthermore,
changing circumstances determine the value of an act – killing a man on
the street in peacetime is bad, but killing an enemy soldier on the
battlefield is considered praiseworthy. Good in the human world is never
perfect – often it is merely a lesser evil. The motives behind ethical actions
are important, as insincere intentions can lie behind so-called good deeds
(for instance, enjoying a feeling of moral superiority over others). We must
keep in mind that a longing for absolute good lies behind Zen masters’
denial that ethical self-perfection has any value. They believed that
absolute good can flow only from ‘great compassion’, which is closely
related to ‘Enlightenment’. Zen practitioners were thus advised not to try to
perfect themselves ethically, but to strive for ‘Enlightenment’ at all costs,
as this is the source of absolute good. The enlightened do not do good by
automatically abiding by specified rules. Instead, they demonstrate the
spirit of ‘great compassion’ in a manner suitable for the situation in which

93
Murano 1974: 101.
94
Łanowski 1978: 119.
54
they find themselves, in accordance with the principle of choosing the
‘appropriate means’. Thanks to this, all beings can be led to emancipation.
It is in this context that the following words of Daitō Kokushi should be
understood: “When you succeed in making the ‘Enlightened self’ your own,
then even if you do not seek perfection, perfection will appear in you by
itself”95. Dōgen taught: “The best way is to rid yourself of attachment to
your ego, so that you can perform good deeds for others without expecting
a reward. There is no rejection of ego if there is no desire to help others.
But in order to achieve this state, you must first realize that everything is
‘emptiness’”96. Musō Soseki (1275-1351) taught that the perfect doing of
good is possible only after attaining ‘Enlightenment’, which is why
perfecting oneself ethically should not be the aim of religious practice97.
He emphasized the paradoxical character of compassion, stating that it has
no object. 98 Those who have attained ‘Enlightenment’ bestow ‘great
compassion’ upon all beings regardless of whether they are good or evil.
Overcoming the duality of good and evil, or transcending epistemological
duality, enables ‘great compassion’ to emerge, the fulfillment of
humanity’s dream of not having to choose between good and evil, but
merely to act in accordance with the spirit of love. The essence of ‘great
compassion’ can thus be expressed by citing the words of St. Augustine:
“Love and do what you want”99.
According to Nishida, “love is an imperative flowing from the depths of
the human heart”100. According to Nishida, few people know what love
really is. True love is not instinctive, not physical infatuation, not the desire
to possess someone only for oneself, not acceptance understood as a
reward for obedience or success. Absolute love means compassion that’s
possible precisely because ‘I’ is contradictorily identical with ‘you’. Love,
thus understood, is an absolute imperative stemming from the nature of
reality101. Nishida wrote: “We find compassion at the foundation of our
‘self’, because all opposites become unified in true compassion on the
principle of ‘absolutely contradictory self-identity’”102. ‘Great compassion’
occurs only as the result of self-negation, when you discover that you are
absolutely contradictorily identical with the Absolute. The only path to

95
Kraft 1992: 115.
96
Takahashi 1983: 28.
97
Cleary 1994: 2.
98
Ibid.
99
Tatarkiewicz 1990, vol. 1.
100
Ibid.: 436.
101
Ibid.: 437.
102
Ibid.: 445.
55
‘great compassion’ is the spiritual breakthrough known in Buddhism as
Enlightenment, not ethical self-perfection. Nishida cites the words of the
Zen master Shidō Bunan (1603-76) in this matter: “While alive, be like the
dead. Whatever you might do in this state of empty self will be good”103.
Great compassion can be spontaneously expressed only by someone, who
experiences the paradoxical state in which “one is all and all is one” - here
is a logical link between the epistemological aspect and the ethical aspect
of Enlightenment – the experience of paradoxical identity with everything
that exists is the reason of “feeling what is felt by others” and therefore the
source of Great Compassion.

‘Paradoxical Ethics’ Versus Formal Ethics

In the logic of paradox (the logic of absolutely contradictory self-identity)
the truth is both affirmation and negation at the same time and in the same
respect, so it is a “one-value” logic – truth is only the paradoxical unity of
the opposites. That is why choosing one of the opposites (breaking rules as
the opposite of not-breaking rules) does not comply to the logic of paradox.
The problem of breaking the rules or not breaking the rules in Zen should
be analyzed also in the above context. If one chooses only one of the
opposites (chooses to break rules) it means that one’s behaviour does not
comply to the logic of paradox.
Zen masters were aware that teaching the necessity of overcoming the
duality of good and evil could be understood as moral indifference or,
worse, praise of actions heretofore considered evil. This duality cannot be
transcended by choosing what is generally considered to be bad. This is
why Zen practitioners, who regarded breaking all socially recognized rules
to be an expression of ‘enlightenment’, were admonished by their masters.
For example, Ikkyū Sōjun rebuked one of his pupils who delighted in
desecrating Buddhist religious objects. The pupil slept on an altar among
Buddhist statues and used Buddhist sutra scrolls as toilet paper. When
asked by Ikkyū why he did these things, he replied he could do so because
he was a ‘buddha’. Then Ikkyu asked him, “Since you are a ‘buddha’, why
don’t you wipe yourself with clean, white paper instead of paper covered
with ink writing?” The pupil was unable to answer. Asked for his verse
expressing ‘Enlightenment’, he recited:

When I sit in zazen meditation

at the Fourth and Fifth Avenue bridges [of the capital – A. K.],
all the people walking past,
103
Ibid.: 437.
56
 are like trees in a dense forest104.

The pupil’s words attest to the fact that he had not come to grasp the true
meaning of ‘emptiness’. According to the famous Buddhist teaching: ”form
is emptiness and emptiness is form” (shiki soku ze kū, kū soku ze shiki).
During a disciple’s meditation, people ceased to be people for him, because
he stopped on one aspect of the truth – he reached only the state in which
“form is emptiness”, but he did not reach the state in which “emptiness is
form”, since he had broken away from the ‘ordinary perspective’ of
perceiving reality. Ikkyū thus corrected him, stressing that people walking
by someone who has attained ‘Enlightenment’ are not like trees in a dense
forest – “they are as they are”105. Identity of form and emptiness is self-
contradictory, one should not forget that emptiness is not simply the
negation of form.
Constantly rejecting ethical norms recognized by society is not an
expression of ‘Enlightenment’ – it merely shows that the duality of
opposite concepts has not been overcome. Spectacular cases of breaking all
rules were incidents justified by the given circumstances, not a regular
practice of Zen masters.
I feel Dōgen made a highly apt remark concerning this problem: “Some
Zen monks make a great mistake by doing evil under the pretext that they
don’t have to do good or accumulate good karma. I have never heard of
any [Buddhist – A. K.] teaching that would bid monks to rejoice in doing
evil”106. Dōgen encountered this erroneous interpretation in China as well
as Japan. He considered this mistake to stem from the treatment of Zen in a
manner abstracted from Buddhist teaching as a whole.
Zen ethics relating to the concept of ‘great compassion’ can be called
‘paradoxical ethics’. The notion of ‘great compassion’ is an intermediate
paradoxical concept, because it is not conditioned on its negation. It is not
the opposite of the absence of compassion, but total, unconditional
acceptance. This is precisely why the culmination of Bodhisattva’s
practices is the ‘state of cloud dharma’ (Sk. dharma-meghā bhūmi; Chin.
fayundi; Jpn.. hōunji), in which Bodhisattva does not scorn anything and
aspires to emancipate all suffering beings, like a cloud that sprinkles rain
upon all thirsty plants, including the basest weeds107.

104
Stevens 1993: 36.
105
Ibid.
106
Takahashi 1983: 23.
107
A reference to a parable from Murano 1974: 99.
57
‘Great compassion’ is inextricably linked to ‘Enlightenment’, and it cannot
be demonstrated by someone who has not experienced ‘Enlightenment’.
Zen practitioners should aim for ‘Enlightenment’ without devoting
attention to distinguishing between good and evil, which would inevitably
lead to epistemological duality. ‘Paradoxical ethics’ differs from formal
ethics in that it does not establish any Ten Commandments or other moral
principles – instead, it is the spirit of the law.
Zen masters were aware that teaching about overcoming the dualism of
good and evil could be erroneously understood as encouragement to break
all moral precepts. This is why they emphasized the necessity of abiding by
Buddhist commandments and warned against committing the ‘Ten Evil
Deeds’ or the ‘Five Gravest Offenses’108 in their preaching to laymen. They
also advised observance of Confucian ethics, which also lay at the
foundation of social relations in feudal Japan.
Dōgen considered loyalty to one’s feudal lord to be consistent with
Buddhist doctrine. He also stressed that there is no conflict between filial
loyalty and becoming a monk, because the merits accumulated by a son-
turned-monk enable emancipation not only of his parents in this
incarnation, but also his parents in the six previous incarnations 109 .
According to Dōgen, everyone should try “to refrain from evil and do
good” (Jpn.. shiaku shūzen) while keeping in mind their limitations and the
relativity of the concept of good. People should behave in accordance with
the teachings of Buddha and do good unto others even when such deeds
are truly slight and have no lasting effects110. Dōgen stated that any deed
whose purpose is to win praise is not a good deed. He taught: “You should
do good while concealing yourself from people’s sight, but if you do
something bad, admit to it and rectify the evil you have done”. He
emphasized that Zen practitioners should concentrate completely on
seeking the way to ‘enlightenment’ without being concerned about
criticism from others, provided the practitioners are convinced they are
right. They should not spend time reproaching others’ faults, because such
an attitude entails entangling oneself in the duality of good and evil111.

108
The ‘Ten Evil Deeds’ (jūaku) are: ‘killing’ (sesshō), ‘stealing’ (chūtō), ‘adultery’ (jain), ‘lying’
(mōgo), ‘harsh words’ (akku), ‘uttering words which cause enmity between two or more people’
(ryōzetzu), ‘engaging in idle talk’ (kigo), ‘greed’ (ton’yoku), ‘anger’ (shinni), ‘wrong views’ (jaken).
The ‘Five Gravest Offenses’ (gogyaku) are: ‘matricide’ (setsumo), ‘patricide’ (setsupu), ‘killing an
arhat’ (setsuarakan), ‘wounding the body of Buddha’ (shutsubusshinketsu), ‘causing disunity in
the Buddhist order’ (hawagōsō).
109
Dumoulin 1979: 97.
110
Ibid.
111
Ibid.: 98.
58
Hakuin Ekaku warned feudal rulers that excessive oppression of their
subjects would lead to rebellion, which could result in the extinction of
their clan112. Some of his advice must have shocked those to whom it was
addressed. For instance, he wrote a letter to Lord Nabeshima of Okayama
recommending that the ruler “wash the hooves of his vassals’ horses whilst
smiling”113. Some Zen masters referred to the concept of punishment in
successive incarnations for bad deeds. For example, Ikkyū Sōjun said that
killing causes you to be reborn in hell; lust, in the world of hungry ghosts
(Jpn.. gaki); stupidity, in the world of animals (Jpn.. chikushō); anger, in
the world of fighting demons (Jpn.. ashura) – but abiding by Buddhist
moral precepts enables you to be reborn in the world of people (Jpn..
ningen)114.
The introduction of detailed monastic rules was meant to show that the
freedom of ‘Enlightenment’ is not based on the permanent rejection of all
principles and duties. In India, monks were itinerant, collecting alms and
leading an ascetic life. In China, under the influence of local customs,
monks also had to work the fields in order to satisfy their daily needs,
though they did not give up the practice of collecting alms. The Fourth
Patriarch, Daoxin (Jpn Dōshin, 560-651), introduced rules regulating the
lives of his purported 500 pupils. The first rules regulating a monastic
community are believed to have been established by Baizhang Huaihai,
though the text of these rules has not survived. The oldest entirely extant
set of rules regulating Zen monastic life dates back to 1113, and was
brought to Japan before the end of that century 115 . Many Japanese Zen
masters used Chinese instructions as models in formulating their own
monastic regulations. A third of Dōgen’s Treasury of the Eye of the True
Dharma is just such a collection of detailed instructions concerning,
among other things, the way monks should clean their teeth116. The most
important rules concerned the prohibition of killing, stealing, lying, sexual
relations and drinking alcohol. Numerous rules in contemporary Zen
monasteries in Japan prescribe how monks should behave not only during
meditation, but also while eating or when outside the monastery 117 .
Although pupils had to break all the rules occasionally in order to express
their ‘Enlightenment’, over time it became a tradition in the Japanese
Rinzai school to limit such eccentric behaviour solely to private meetings

112
Yampolsky 1971: 194.
113
Ibid.: 220.
114
Stevens 1993: 45.
115
Kraft 1992: 103.
116
Ibid.
117
Nishimura 1973.
59
with the master. On these occasions, the pupil could express the freedom
stemming from ‘Enlightenment’ in the most shocking ways.
The complete absence of discipline in monastic life was sharply criticized,
as is evident in Eisai’s comments on the Daruma school. Eisai deplored the
fact that adherents of this Japanese Zen school “eat when they are hungry
and rest when they are tired” 118 . The school’s founder, Nōnin, taught:
“There are no precepts that you should be guided by, there is no religious
practice. No lusts exist initially, everyone is enlightened from the
beginning. That’s why we do not practice and do not observe rules. We eat
when we are hungry, we rest when we are tired. Why recite invocations to
Buddha, why make offerings, why refrain from eating fish and meat, why
fast?” 119 Eisai, a staunch supporter of monastic discipline, believed the
Daruma approach led to corruption. Unfortunately, we know too little
about the Daruma school. Its downfall and absorption by the Sōtō school
was primarily the result of Nōnin’s failure to obtain direct confirmation of
his ‘Enlightenment’ from a Chinese Zen master120.
Ignoring all rules is incorrect from the standpoint of the ‘logic of paradox’,
because it betrays an attachment to breaking rules as the antithesis of
following them, in which case conceptual duality is not transcended.
Eisai’s critical remarks were justified, however, only if Nōnin and his
pupils did in fact believe that the way to ‘Enlightenment’ was breaking all
ethical precepts.
Strict monastic discipline was also necessary to deal with down-to-earth
problems that priors faced. The ban on women (including nuns) staying
overnight in male monasteries was no doubt meant to insulate Zen pupils
from dangerous temptations. Monastic discipline, for example, in 14th-
century Daitokuji must have been in a sorry state, since Daitō Kokushi was
forced to implement the following punishments: novices who failed to
memorize the sutras used during the three daily ceremonies were to be
deprived of their vestments and bowl (attributes of a monk), then expelled
from the monastery; other transgressions were to be punished by whipping
(five lashes) or deprivation of meals for an entire day; monks holding
prominent positions who behaved improperly were to lose the prior’s favor
forever121.
We must keep in mind that monks in monasteries where discipline was not
properly enforced often led idle lives, neglecting their spiritual

118
Dumoulin 1990: 9.
119
Ibid.
120
Kraft 1963: 143.
121
Kraft 1992: 122.
60
development. Moreover, the majority of novices were young boys turned
over to monasteries by their families despite not showing any particular
religious predilections. Buddhist monasteries were important educational
centers before the rise of a well-developed neo-Confucian school system.
Masters often reproached monks for their love of luxury. “Do not become
attached to worldly things; devote yourselves entirely to searching for the
‘Way’. Buddha taught: ‘Have for property only vestments and a bowl, and
if you receive food from someone as alms, do not consume it all and share
it with the needy.’ If keeping food for later is not allowed, it’s all the more
blameworthy to have a fondness for worldly goods” 122 . Daitō Kokushi
pointed out however, that while the rules he advised were appropriate for
monastic life, they “should not be treated as the most important, are not the
essence of Buddhist practice, as they do not constitute the path to
‘Enlightenment’” 123 . Bankei Yōtaku (1622-1693), too, expelled pupils
from the monastery for various transgressions, though he took back those
who repented. He told higher-ranking monks to set an example for novices
through their behaviour and applied the penalty of expulsion from the
community, though only as a last resort124.
Zen masters stressed that the pressure of external restrictions in monastic
life should have no effect on generating internal freedom, which should be
manifested in every situation. This is the sense behind the following
verses: “Carrying buckets of water, toting kindling – how unfathomable,
how amazing”125.
It is thus clear that the ethics of ‘great compassion’, which goes beyond
good and evil, does not mean rejection of all ethical principles recognized
by society. Only those who attain ‘enlightenment’ can break all rules in the
name of ‘great compassion’, which can be expressed in any form
depending on the situation.
The Buddhist concept of ‘great compassion’ is often interpreted as passive
identification with the downtrodden, which does nothing in a practical
sense to ‘improve the world’. This view is evident, for instance, in
commentary by Paul Tillich on the subject of Buddhist ethics126. ‘Great
compassion’ is clearly not linked to any specific commandments or
concrete program to better the world. It can be expressed in any form
depending on the situation, it does not necessitate any particular reforms of
the social system. As the ‘spirit of the law’, it transcends specific ethical
122
Dumoulin 1979: 98.
123
Ibid.
124
Haskel 1984: 154.
125
Shibayama 1980: 267.
126
Abe 1985: 183.
61
rules precisely because they are not immutable. Suzuki Daisetz Suzuki
describes the state of the enlightened as holy and distinguishes it from a
moral outlook. “A moral person will never be holy so long as he remains
within the sphere of morality, which is a relative sphere. Morality is never
innocent, spontaneous, unconscious of itself”127.
Nietzsche’s words – that what is done out of love always happens beyond
good and evil128 – acquires new meaning from the standpoint of the ‘logic
of paradox’. Nietzsche himself may well have sensed this meaning when
he wrote: “What else is love but understanding and rejoicing in the fact
that another person lives, acts, and experiences otherwise than we do? In
order to bridge these opposites with joy, love must not eliminate or deny
them”129.
In this article, Nishida’s logic of paradox (logic of absolutely contradictory
self-identity) has been traced in Zen masters’s teaching on ethics. I have
tried to prove that only by taking into consideration the paradoxological
structure of Zen discourse on ethics, can one explain the logical connection
between the epistemological aspect of Enlightenment and the ethical aspect
of Enlightenment. Such a paradoxological structure can also be seen in
Zen masters’s admonitions which can be summarized as follows: Do not
choose good or evil but at the same time do not choose evil, although the
way to such a goal is not a moral discipline.

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