Process Safety Overview

SPEAKER
Dr. Wisdom Patrick Enang (FNSE, CENG MIMechE)
MEng, MPhil, PhD Mechanical Engineering
+2348173555667, wisdom_enang@yahoo.co.uk

NIGERIAN INSTITUTION OF SAFETY ENGINEERS AKS CHAPTER’S JUNE 2021 TECHNICAL SESSION
Safety Moment (Oil Depot Explosion in Lyon)
Safety Moment (Explosion of Piper Alpha)
 Process Safety – Risk Management
Process Safety:
1. Why do we need to manage risks?
2. How do we know that something is properly designed, constructed,
operated, and maintained?
3. How do you know how much protection is enough?

• Learn from past events

• Codify the experience in Design Practices, or other sources
• Apply these standards to plant operations

Safety in Process Design 4

Design Engineering Services
 Process Safety Fundamental Assumption
The fundamental assumption
◦ Plants designed, constructed, operated, and maintained to appropriate
standards will not suffer catastrophic loss of containment if the operation stays
within design parameters of temperature, pressure and composition.

What about when the operation isn’t within design parameters?

◦ Prevent: First principle is to have systems to prevent that event from occurring
◦ Alert: The second is to have a system to alert personnel that something has
gone wrong
◦ Mitigate: The third is mitigate the loss that occurs
 Process Safety Terminology

Probability
Hazards
Consequences

Risk
Severity

Risk
Analysis
Risk
Risk Management
Assessment

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 Hazards and Risks
Hazard?
+ A physical or chemical characteristic of a
material, system, process, condition, or
activity that has the potential for causing harm
to people, property, or the environment

+ A deviation from an intended condition

Risk – The fact that something bad could happen

1 2 3

1 An event that could occur because of a hazard or condition.

2 Consequence (severity) if the event takes place.

3 Probability (likelihood) that an event will take place.

RISK = Consequence x Probability
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 Principles of Hazard Loss Prevention and Control
First Principle - Prevent the Event
Second Principle - Minimize the Loss

Industrial Hazard Control Steps

Accident Prevention Program

Prevention Control Response

- Safe Design - Engineering - Emergency Response
Restoration
- Hazard Identification - Human - Infrastructures
- Administrative

Pre Incident Incident Post Insident

Layer of Protection in Process Plant

Plant Emergency Response

Physical Protection (Dikes)

Automatic Action (ESD)

Critical Alarm,Operator Supervision
Basic Control,Process Alarm

Process Design
Risk Reduction Option
 HAZOP Review
To prevent the undesirable consequences of incidents, the hazards that can
lead to incidents must be identified. Once the hazards are identified, they are
further evaluated to ensure controls are in place to minimize the chance of
incidents.
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPs) are a form of hazard identification
used to identify potential hazards and operational problems in terms of plant
design and human error.
HAZOP normally take place after the design is complete and preliminary P&IDs
are available. The goal is to find any hazards that could lead to hazardous
situations e.g. equipment failure. The intent of HAZOP is not to re-design the
process.
Safety in process design (safety technology) need to be incorporated early in
the process development.
Layered Approach in the Hazard Management Process
 What is Safety Engineering?
The application of science and statistical analysis to the identification and
correction of problems in the design, construction, operation, and
maintenance of systems and equipment to prevent and mitigate loss from
hazards. Much of this science is experiential, based on learning from historical
incidents.
Answers these big questions
◦ What can go wrong?

◦ How can we prevent it from going wrong?

◦ How will I know something has gone wrong (what will alert me)?

◦ If it does go wrong, how can we mitigate (lessen in severity) the loss?

Primary focus is on hazards associated with process facilities and avoiding
loss of Containment

Fundamentals of Safety Engineering

13
Updated August 20, 2010
 Process Safety in Design (Concept Selection)

Planning for
Select Define Execute Operate
Development

• Early Risk Assessment

and Mgt Plan
• Initial HAZID
• SHE reviews
• Risk Assessments
• Early Loss Prevention
Concepts & Philosophy
• FEED risk mgt
coordination
procedures

The concept selection phase is fundamental to "design in safety" into a facility for
operational and process safety success.
◦ Each of the concepts under consideration will have an inherent risk profile.
◦ Options are compared economically with an understanding of the operational
risks associated.
◦ High level review of the inherent safety and possible elimination and/or
mitigations to SHE risks are also performed.
Odoptu Initial Production (Safety in Concept Selection)
Conceptual Design Risk Assessment (CDRA) GENERAL PLAN
Scope 0 5 10
• Drilling km
• Initial Production Facility Odoptu
◦ 35 kbd oil
◦ 80 Mscfd gas
▪ Compression
Oil to Onshore

Processing
▪ 80 km mixed-phase pipeline Processing Facility

Onshore
in Chayvo Bay area

Facility
▪ Hydrocarbon processing at Chayvo
Onshore Processing Facility Arkutun-Dagi

Purpose of the analysis

▪ Identify issues with the design & Oil pipeline
implementation of the base case to De-Kastri
Val
▪ Develop recommendations for improving Chayvo
Chayvo
the design
 Concept Definition and FEED

Planning for
Select Define Execute Operate
Development

• HAZID and SHE reviews

• Initial Loss prevention
studies & consequence
analysis
• HAZOPs
• Loss Prevention
Philosophies
• Risk Assessment and
Mgt Plan
• Detail Design
Coordination procedures

This phase of the project includes completing optimization studies, finalizing

process flow diagrams (PFD's), and developing project specifications and process
and instrument diagrams (P&IDs).
The Loss Prevention philosophies are finalized. These philosophies align all
interested organizations and steward the development of project specifications.
 Arkutun-Dagi – FEED (Safety in FEED)

Fire and Explosion Study

▪ Integrated topsides facility of ~36,000MT,
largely enclosed
▪ Objective: determine modules blast loads
and fire zones
▪ Method:
◦ Explosion risk (pressure-frequency
curves) calculated based on NORSOK
standards

Results:
• Addition of firewalls to obtain smaller fire /
deluge zones also resulted in smaller
overpressures in wellbay / manifold area
• Validated approach to maximize vent area
• 3 instead of 4 firewater pumps (cost savings)
 Detailed Design

Planning for
Select Define Execute Operate
Development

• Finalize LP studies
•Gas detection
•Fire & blast
•Relief systems
•EER
•Safety Inst. Systems
• Final update to Risk
Mgt Plan
• 3-D model & on-site
Loss Prevention
Reviews

Detailed design finalizes the design evolution from the concept definition phase
and includes completing the process and instrument diagrams (P&IDs) by
incorporating data from equipment vendors and layouts.
As the engineering is significantly progressed, the loss prevention studies are
finalized based on location of all equipment, piping, process pressures,
temperatures, and flow compositions. This study includes confirming fire and
blast analysis, gas dispersion studies, safety system reviews, escape, evacuation
and rescue studies, HAZOPs and safety instrumented system reviews.
 Specifying Material for Process Operating Envelop
Factors used in material selection and equipment design

• Design Pressure (DP)

• Design Temperature (DT)

It is necessary to establish the mechanical design of an equipment which is

generally, the most severe combination of coincident temperature and
pressure expected during service.

Design Pressure: is the pressure used as a basis for determining the minimum
metal thickness of a pressure containing component using the maximum
allowable stress at the coincident temperature (design temperature).

Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) is the maximum gauge

pressure permissible at the top of a vessel in its normal operating position at
the designated coincident temperature and liquid level specified for that
pressure.

MAWP must always equal or exceed design pressure.

 Pressure Below Minimum Design

Vacuum potential cannot be ignored

 Temperature Below Minimum Design

Brittle Fracture

• The consequences of brittle failure

can be very severe.

• Brittle fracture typically occurs

without warning.

o With little or no deformation

o At a stress level below the
value used for design

• And fails instantaneously

• It can occur at temperatures above

ambient.
 Spacing Design Basis
Avoid escalation of incidents by
• Separating potential flammable release sources from continuous ignition sources.
• Minimize involvement of adjacent facilities in a fire, hence preventing further
equipment failures.
• Segregating high risk facilities or equipment.

Ensure emergency actions by

• Permitting access for fire fighting.
• Permitting access for emergency shutdown actions in a fire situation.
• Ensuring that critical emergency facilities are not subject to fire damage, e.g.
firewater pumps.

Reduce the risk to personnel by

• Separating people from process equipment when locating buildings and control
rooms.
• Allow footpath escapes for operators.

Enable normal operations by

• Allowing access for normal operations and maintenance.
• Allowing for turnarounds with adjacent units operating.
Offshore Layout
Normal Minimum Spacing (FT) – Major Onshore
Production Facility